### In the 

# United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit

____________________ No. 17

- 1510
M AURICE L EWIS , Plaintiff

- Appellant ,

v.

C ITY OF C HICAGO , et al. , Defendant s

- Appellee s

.

____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division

. No. 1 6

- CV

- 7592

— Amy J. St. Eve , Judge

.

____________________
A RGUED F EBRUARY 6, 2018

— D ECIDED J ANUARY 23, 2019

____________________

Before R IPPLE , S YKES , and B ARRETT , Circuit Judges

. S YKES , Circuit Judge

. Maurice Lewis spent more than t wo years in pretrial detention in the Cook County Jail based on police reports falsely implicat ing him for unlawful ly possessin g a firearm

. After the charges against him were dropped, Lewis sued the City of Chicago and six police officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking damages for violation2 No. 17

- 1510

of his ri ghts under the Fourth Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment

. The district cour t dismissed the suit , ruling t hat both claims were time

- barred

. Lewis appeal ed

. Twelve days later the Supreme Court decided Manuel v. City of Joliet (“ Manuel I ”) , 137 S. Ct. 911 , 920 (2017) , clarif ying that detention without probable cause violates the Fourth Amendment “when it precedes, but also when it follows, the start of legal process in a criminal case. ” Id. at 9 18

. The Court declined to decide when such claims accrue , instead remanding the case to this court to resolve that issue. Id

. at 922. In September the Manuel panel held that a Fourth Amendment claim for wrongful pretrial detention accrues on the date the detention ends

. Manuel v. City of Joliet (“ Manuel II ”), 903 F.3d 667, 670 (7th Cir. 2018).
The combined effect of Manuel I and II save s part of Lewis’s c ase

. Consistent with Manuel I , Lewis pleaded a viable Fourth Amendment claim for unlawful pretrial detenti on . And Manuel II confirms that the claim is timely because Lewis filed it withi n two years of his release from detention.
The due

- p rocess claim is another matter. Manuel I make s clear that the Fourth Amendment, not t h e D ue P rocess Clause, governs a claim f or wrongful pretrial detention. To the extent Hurt v. Wise , 880 F.3d 831, 843

– 44 (7th Cir. 2018), holds otherwise, it is incompatible with Manuel I and II and is overruled. 1 We therefore reverse the dismissal of the

1 Because this opinion resolves a conflict in our circuit caselaw, it was circulated to all judges in acti ve service. See 7 TH C IR

. R. 40(e). NoneNo. 17

- 1510 3

Fourth Amendment claim and a ffirm the dismiss al of the due

- process claim , though on different grounds

. I. Background On September 12, 2013, Chicago police o fficers searched an apartment on West Walton Street where they encountered Lewis and two others

. During the search, t he officers discovered a handgun. Lewis alleges tha t the officers had no basis to believe the gun was his. He claims that he didn’t live at the apartment and never told the officers otherwise. He further alleges that the officers never found anything in the apart ment indicating that he lived there.

T he officers arrested Lewis for illegal ly possessi n g the firearm. Lewis clai ms that the officers prepared police reports falsely stating that he “ had admitted to residing in the Walton Street Apartment” and that the officers “had found and seized evidence establishing that [Lewis] resided i n the Walton Street Apartment.”
The day a fter Lewis’s arrest , a state

- court judge held a pr obable

- cause hearing and found cause to believe that Lewis illegally possessed the weapon , 720 I LL

. C OMP

. S TAT

. 5/24

- 1. 1 (a) , and violated Illinois’s armed habitual criminal
statute , i d. § 5/24

- 1.7(a). The judge ordered Lewis held for trial . Two weeks later a prosecutor amended the charges, and a different judge held a pr obable

- cause hearing on the new charges

. Officer Abraham Mora testified that the search of the apartment uncovered a handgun an d two documents addresse d to Lewis at the Walton Street address. T he judge

favored a hearing en banc. Circuit Judge Amy J. St. Eve di d not participate

.4 No. 17

- 1510

found probable cause to deta in Lewis for trial. He sat in the Cook County Jail for two years until the charge s were dropped on September 29, 2015. On July 26, 2016, Lewis sued the C ity and six officer s under § 1983 alleging that he was held in jai l pending trial based on fals ified evidence , violatin g hi s rights under the Fourth Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause . He also raised a claim under Illinois law for malicious prosecution.
The defendants moved to dis miss the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

. The judge granted the motion , dismiss ing the constitutional claims with prejudice after finding them time

- barred under the two

- year statute of limitations applicable to § 1983 claims in Illinois. The judge then relinquished supplemental jurisd iction over the state

- law claim , dismiss ing it without prejudice.
II. Discussion
We review a Rule 12(b)(6) dismiss al de novo

. Jakupovic v. Curran , 850 F.3d 898, 901 (7th Cir. 2017 ). To survive a motion to dismiss , a complaint must contain “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
A. Fourth Amendment Claim

Lewis maintains that he pleaded a viable Fourth Amendment claim for unlawful pretrial detention based on falsified evidence . He also argues t hat the claim is timely

. Under Manuel I and II , he is correct on b oth points.No. 17

- 1510 5

The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons ... against unreasonable ... seizures.” U.S. C ONST

. amend. IV. A person is “seized” whenever an official “restrain s his freedom of movement” such that he is “not free to leave.” Brendlin v. California , 551 U.S. 249, 254

– 55 (2007). “ [ T ] he general rule [is] that Fourth Amendment seizures are ‘reasonable’ only if basedon probable cause to believe that the individual has committed a crime.” Bailey v. United States , 568 U.S. 186, 192 (2013) ( internal quotation marks omitted)

. Lewis alleges that h e was detained

— that is to say,

“ seiz ed ”

— in the Cook County Jail for two years based on fals ified police reports and that th is injury is actionable under § 1983 as a violation of his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizure

. Our circuit caselaw

once foreclosed this theory

. See, e.g. , Newsome v. McCabe , 256 F.3d 747 , 750 (7th Cir. 2001). Prior to Manuel I , our cases held that “once detention by reason of arrest turns into detention by way of arraignment

— once police action gives way to legal process

— the Fourth Amendment falls out of the picture and the detainee’s claim that the detention is improper becomes a claim of malicious prosecution violative of due process.” Llovet v. City of Chicago , 761 F.3d 759, 763 (7th Cir. 2014)

. T he Supreme Court superseded this circuit precedent in Manuel I

. Elijah Manuel was arrested for possession of unlawful drugs. After a probable

- cause hearing based on evidence allegedly fabricated by the police , a local judge found probable cause and sent Manuel to the county jail to await trial . T here he sat for 48 days until the prosecutor dismissed the charge

. Manuel I , 137 S. Ct. at 915

– 16. He6 No. 17

- 1510

sought damages under § 1983 alleging tha t his pretrial detention violated the Fourth Amendment. T he district court dismis sed the claim based on binding circuit precedent and we affirmed

. Id

. at 916. T he Supreme Court r eversed, holding that Manuel stated a Fourth Amendment claim when he sought relief “not merely for his (pre

- legal

- process) arrest, but also for his (post

- legal process) pretrial detention.” Id

. at 919

. The Court jettisoned the malicious

- prosecution analogy and the due

- pro cess source of the right, instead ground ing the claim in long

- established Fourth Amendment doctrine: The Fourth Amendment prohibits government officials from detaining a person in the absence of probable cause. That can happen when the police hold someone without any reason before the formal onset of a criminal proceeding. But it can also occur when legal process itself goes wrong

— when, for example, a judge’s probable

- cause determination is predicated solely on a police officer’s false statements. Then, too , a person is confined without constitutionally adequate justification. Legal process has gone forward, but it has done nothing to satisfy the Fourth Amendment’s probable

cause requirement. And for that reason, it cannot extinguish the detainee’s Fourth Am endment claim

— or somehow , as the Seventh Circuit has held, convert that cla i m into one founded on the Due Process Clause.
Id

. at 918

– 19 (citation s omitted).No. 17

- 1510 7

Manuel I thus clarifie d that the constitutional injury arising from a wrongful pretrial detention rests on the fundamental Fourth Amendment principle that a pretrial detention is a “seizure”

— both before formal legal process and after

— and is justified only on probable cause. Id

. at 918. Manuel alleged that his detention was not supported by probable cau se because the judge’s order holding him fo r trial was based only on “ police fabrications

. ” Id. at 919. I f that proved to be true, his detention was unreasonable in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Id. Put another way , the initiation of formal l egal process

“ did not expunge Manuel’s Fourth Amendment claim because the process he received failed to establish what that Am endment makes essential for pre trial detention

— probable cause to believe he committed a crime.” Id. at 919

– 20. A s we explained in our decision on remand in Manu el II , a Fourth Amendment claim for wrongful pretrial detention is concerned with “the detention rather than the existence of criminal charges.” 903 F.3d at 670.

Lewis ’s allegations are materially indistinguishable from Manuel ’s

. He has therefore pleaded a plausible Fourth Amendment claim. T he officers respond with an assertion of qualified immunity . “Qualified imm unity attaches when an official’ s conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights o f which a reasonable person would have known.” Kisela v. Hughes , 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1151 (2018) (per curiam) (quoting White v. Pauly , 137 S. Ct. 548, 551 (2017) (per curiam)). Qualified immunity requires a two

part inquiry: w e must determine (1) whether facts alleged or shown by a plaintiff make out a violation of a constitutional right, and (2) if so, whether that right was clearly established8 No. 17

- 1510

at the time of the defendant ’ s alleged misconduc t. Pearson v. Callahan , 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009).
It has been clear s ince at least Franks v. Delaware , 438 U.S. 154 (1978), that falsifying the factual basis for a judicial probable

- cause determination violates the Fourth Amendment . A judicial determination of probable cause is normally entitled to a pres umption of validity, butthis presumption is premised on an “assumption ... that there will be a truthful showing ” of probable cause. [ Franks , 438 U.S.] at 164

– 65, 98 S. Ct. 2674 (emphasis in original). Accordingly,
t he presumption may give way on a showing that the officer who sought the warrant “ knowingly or intentionally or with a reckless disregard for the truth, made false statements to the judicial officer, and that the false statementswere necessary to the judicial officer’s determination that probabl e cause existed for the arrest. ” Beauchamp v. City of Noblesville, Ind. , 320 F.3d 733, 742

– 43 (7th Cir. 2003) (citing Franks , 438 U.S. at 155

– 56, 98 S. Ct. 2674).
Whitlock v. Brown , 596 F.3d 406, 410 (7th Cir. 2010) (omission in original) (alterations omit ted)

. Lewis allege s that the officers falsely asserted , both in their police reports and in testimony at the probable

- cause hearing , that he admitted residing at the apartment where the gun was found and that they found evidence showing that he lived there. Accepting these allegations as true, as we must at this stage, n o reasonable officer could have thought this conduct was constitutionally permissible. It makes noNo. 17

- 1510 9

difference t hat our circuit caselaw situated the constitutional violation in the Due P rocess Clause rather than the Fourth Amendment

. The question remains whether the claim is timely

. A § 1983 claim borrow s the statute of limitations for analogous personal

- injury claims in the forum state ; in Illinois that period is two years. 735 I LL

. C OM P

. S TAT . 5/13

- 202; Wallace v. Kato , 549 U.S. 384, 388

– 89 (2007)

. But federal law determines when the claim accrues. Wallace , 549 U.S. at 388

– 89.
Manuel II addressed the accrual question the Supreme Court remanded in Manuel I , holding that a Fourth Amendment cl aim for wrongful pretrial detention accrues when the detention ceases

. 903 F.3d at 669. Two considerations support ed this c onclusion. First, because the constitutional violation is “ongoing” rather than “dis crete , ” the claim accrues when the on going violation ends

. Id. Second, “ a claim cannot accrue until the would

- be plaintiff is entitled to sue, yet the existence of detention forbids a suit for damages contesting that detention’s validity.” Id. at 670 (citing Preiser v. Rodriguez , 411 U.S. 475 (1973), and Heck v. Humphrey , 512 U.S. 477 (1994))

. Under Manuel II , Lewis’s Fourth Amendment claim is timely

. Lewis remained in jail until the charge s against him were dropped on September 29, 2015

. He filed this § 1983 suit less than a year later on July 26, 2016 , well within the
two

- year statute of limitations. 2 He is entitled to move forward on his Fourth Amendment claim.

2 We note that the Supreme Court has granted certiorari to resolve a circuit split on the claim

- accrual question reserved in Manuel I

. See McDonough v. Smith , No. 18

- 485 , 2019 WL 166879 (Mem.) (Jan

. 1 1 , 2019)

.10 No. 17

- 1510

B. Due

- Process Claim

Lewis a rgues that this same misconduct by law enforcement

— falsi fying the police reports that led to his pretrial detention

— also violated his right to due process , giving rise to an additional constitutional claim under § 1983

. Manuel I holds otherwise , as does our decision on remand in Manuel II

. To reiterate , Manuel I explained that “ [ i ] f the complaint is that a form of legal process resulted in pretrial detention unsupported by probable cause, then the right allegedly infringed lies in the Fourth Amendment.” 137 S. Ct. at 919. A s we’ve noted above, Manuel I cl arified that the initiation of formal legal process “ cannot extinguish the detainee’s Fourth Amendment claim

— or somehow , as the Seventh Circuit has held, convert that claim into one founded on the Due Process Clause .” Id. at 918

– 19 (emphasis added). I t’s n ow clear that a § 1983 claim for unlawful pretrial detention rests exclusively

o n the Fourth Amendment.

Lewis relies on Hurt v. Wise as support for his position that pretrial detention based on fabricated evidence violates rights secured by two constitutional provisions

— the Fourth Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth

— and is actionable under § 1983 as two separate constitutional claims

. Hurt conflicts with Manuel I and II , so we take this opportunity to clear up the con f lict

. In Hurt the police arrested three siblings for their suspected role s in the death of their uncle. “Bu t one by one, each was absolved ” : o ne sibling was never criminally charged, the next saw the charges against her dropped after four months in jail , and the th ird w as acquitted at trial afterNo. 17

- 1510 11

eight months in jail

. Hurt , 880 F.3d at 835. The three siblings sued the officers accusing them of fabricating evidence

— including confessions

— and seeking relief under § 1983 and Illinois law

. Id. The officers moved for summary judgment based on qualified immunity. The district court denied the motion, id

. at 839, and we mostly affirmed. As relevant here, Hurt first rejected the officers’ qualified

immunity defense on the Fourth Amendment claim , concluding t hat i n light o f the evidence in the summary

judgment record, a reasonable trier of fact could find that the plaintiffs “wer e arrested without even arguable probable

cause [] and thus in violation of the Fourth Amendment.” Id. at 843 (citing Manuel I , 137 S. Ct. at 918

– 19).

T wo of t he Hurt plaintiffs

— the two that were held in jail pending trial

— argued that the same police misconduct supported a n additional claim for violat ion of their right to due process, relying on the malicious

- prosecution / due

process theory embedded in our circuit caselaw. See, e.g. , Julian v. Hanna , 732 F.3d 842 (7th Cir. 2013) ; Newsome , 256 F.3d 747. Hurt d etermine d that Manuel I ha d not disturbed the general rule of the Newsome line of cases : while there is “no free

- standing constitutional tort of malicious prosecution,” other constitutional rights protect people against “abusive arrests [and] fabrication of evidence.” 880 F.3d at 843. What matter ed was that the plaintiffs had

“ identified the constitutional right at issue”

— the Due Process Clause, which “forbids the [S] tate from depriving a person of liberty (including by pre

- trial detention) based on manufactured evidence.” Id

. But in Manuel II

— decided nin e months after Hurt

— we explained that a ll § 1983 claim s for wrongful pretrial deten-12 No. 17

- 1510

t ion

— whether based on fabricated evidence or some other defect

— sound in the Fourth Amendment

. Like the plaintiffs in Hurt , Manuel relied on the tort of malicious prosecution as an analogy . 903 F.3d at 669. W e explained that w hile this “might have seemed sensible before the Supreme Court spoke , ” after Manuel I it i s the “wrong characterization ” ; indeed, “the Justices deprecated the analogy to malicious prosecution.” Id. at 669

– 70 (citing Manuel I , 137 S. Ct. at 9 17

– 20 ). Instead, t he con stitutional right in question is the “right not to be held in custody without probable cause,” the violation of which gives rise to a “plain

- vanilla Fourth Amendment ” claim under § 1983 because the essential constitutional wrong is the “absence of probable cause that would justify the detention.” Id. at 670 (citing Manuel I , 137 S. Ct. at 917

– 20). In other words, the Fourth Amendment, not the Due Process Clause, is the source of the right in a § 1983 claim for unlawful pretrial detention, whether before or after the initiation of formal legal process.

W e overrule precedent only in limited circumstances ; a clear intracircuit conflict is one of th em

. Glaser v. Wound Care Consultants, Inc. , 570 F.3d 907, 915

– 16 (7th Cir. 2009). Manuel II and Hurt cannot be reco nciled. Indeed, Hurt is hard to square with Manuel I

. T he Supreme Court held that the initiation of formal legal process follow ing an arrest does not convert a Fourth Amendment unreasonable

- seizure claim “ into one founded on the Due Process Clause.” 137 S. Ct. at 919. The injury of w rongful pretrial detention may be remedied under § 1983 as a violation of the Fourth Amendment , not the Due Process Clause. To the extent Hurt holds otherwise, it is overruled.No. 17

- 1510 13

We close by noting the important point that a claim f or wrongful pretrial detention based on fabricated evidence is distinct from a claim f or wrongful conviction based on fabricated evidence : “ [ C ] onvictions premised on deliberate ly fabricated evidence will always violate the defendant’s right to due proces s.” Avery v. City of Milwaukee , 847 F.3d 433, 439 (7th Cir. 2017) (emphasis added) ; see also Mooney v. Holohan , 294 U.S. 103, 112 (1935) (explaining that the use of perjured testimony “to procure the conviction and imprisonment of a defendant is as inconsi stent with the rudimentary demands of justice as is the obtaining of a like result by intimidation”); Whitlock v. Brueggemann , 682 F.3d 567, 580 (7th Cir. 2012)

. Moreover, m isconduct of this type that results in a conviction might also violate the accused’s right to due process under the rubric of Brady v. Maryland , 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and Kyles v. Whitley , 514 U.S. 419 (1995), if government officials suppress ed evidence of the fabrication. Avery , 847 F.3d at 443

– 44. We reiterate that we deal here o nly with a claim of wrongful pretrial detention , not a claim of wrongful conviction

.

* * * Applying Manuel I and II , we hold that Lewis timely filed a viable Fourth Amendment claim for wrongful pretrial detention . We therefore reverse t he d ismiss al of tha t claim and remand for further proceedings

. Under Manuel I and II , the Due Process Clause does not apply , so the judgment is otherwise affirmed

. A FFIRMED in part and R EVERSED AND R EMANDED in part

.