S. HRG. 111–701, PT. 5 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR 

APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2011 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

ON 

S. 3454 

TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2011 FOR MILITARY 

ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, AND FOR DEFENSE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF 

ENERGY, TO PRESCRIBE PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR SUCH FISCAL 

YEAR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES 

PART 5 

EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES 

APRIL 21, 2010 

( 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2011—Part 5 EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES 

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62–158 PDF 2010

S. HRG. 111–701 PT. 5 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR 

APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2011 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

ON 

S. 3454 

TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2011 FOR MILITARY 

ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, AND FOR DEFENSE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF 

ENERGY, TO PRESCRIBE PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR SUCH FISCAL 

YEAR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES 

PART 5 

EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES 

APRIL 21, 2010 

( 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman 

ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia 

JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut 

JACK REED, Rhode Island 

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii 

BILL NELSON, Florida 

E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska 

EVAN BAYH, Indiana 

JIM WEBB, Virginia 

CLAIRE MCCASKILL, Missouri 

MARK UDALL, Colorado 

KAY R. HAGAN, North Carolina 

MARK BEGICH, Alaska 

ROLAND W. BURRIS, Illinois 

JEFF BINGAMAN, New Mexico 

EDWARD E. KAUFMAN, Delaware 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona 

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma 

JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama 

SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia 

LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina 

JOHN THUNE, South Dakota 

ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi 

GEORGE S. LEMIEUX, Florida 

SCOTT P. BROWN, Massachusetts 

RICHARD BURR, North Carolina 

DAVID VITTER, Louisiana 

SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine 

RICHARD D. DEBOBES, Staff Director 

JOSEPH W. BOWAB, Republican Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES

BILL NELSON, Florida, Chairman 

ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia 

JACK REED, Rhode Island 

E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska 

EVAN BAYH, Indiana 

MARK UDALL, Colorado 

JEFF BINGAMAN, New Mexico 

EDWARD E. KAUFMAN, Delaware 

GEORGE S. LEMIEUX, Florida 

LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina 

ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi 

SCOTT P. BROWN, Massachusetts 

RICHARD BURR, North Carolina 

SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine 

(II) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES 

NONPROLIFERATION PROGRAMS AT THE DEPARTMENTS OF DEFENSE AND ENERGY

APRIL 21, 2010

Page 

Nacht, Hon. Michael L., Assistant Secretary for Global Strategic Affairs, 

Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy .......................................... 4 

Baker, Kenneth E., Acting Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, National Nuclear Security Administration ................................. 14 

(III) 

(1) 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION 

FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 

2011 

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 21, 2010 

U.S. SENATE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING

THREATS AND CAPABILITIES, 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, 

Washington, DC. 

NONPROLIFERATION PROGRAMS AT THE 

DEPARTMENTS OF DEFENSE AND ENERGY 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:12 a.m. in room 

SR–222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Bill Nelson (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Committee members present: Senators Bill Nelson and LeMieux. 

Majority staff members present: Madelyn R. Creedon, counsel; 

and Roy F. Phillips, professional staff member. 

Minority staff member present: Dana W. White, professional staff 

member. 

Staff assistants present: Paul J. Hubbard and Jennifer R. 

Knowles. 

Committee members’ assistants present: Greta Lundeberg, assistant to Senator Bill Nelson; and Brian Walsh, assistant to Senator LeMieux. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR BILL NELSON, CHAIRMAN 

Senator BILL NELSON. Good morning. I want to welcome our witnesses. 

The Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities is 

meeting today to hear from the Department of Defense (DOD) and 

the Department of Energy’s (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) and their respective efforts to prevent the 

proliferation of nuclear weapons and materials. 

We have with us this morning Dr. Michael Nacht, the Assistant 

Secretary of Defense for Global Security Affairs, and Ken Baker, 

the acting Deputy Administrator for Nuclear Nonproliferation. 

Also, we have a group of Russian university students who are in 

the United States to further their nonproliferation studies. They 

were, unfortunately, able to spend some additional time in the 

United States——[Laughter.] 

2 

Therefore, they can attend our hearing this morning, thanks to 

the ash from the Icelandic volcano. I want to welcome you all, and 

I hope this experience in American democracy is valuable to you. 

The President has embarked on a three-pronged effort to reduce 

the spread of nuclear weapons, nuclear materials, and nuclear 

technology. As he has said in the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), 

‘‘The threat of global nuclear war has become remote, but the risk 

of nuclear attack has increased. The most immediate and extreme 

threat today is nuclear terrorism.’’ 

Today, we will discuss the efforts at DOD and DOE to thwart the 

goals of these particular nuclear terrorists. Obtaining a global commitment to stop these potential terrorists is critical. The United 

States needs to have the global community, all of us, working together. 

Last week’s Nuclear Security Summit, of which I had the privilege of attending part, with the participation of 47 key countries, 

was a good start. Now, that commitment needs to be sustained. 

Several countries, such as Canada, the United Kingdom, and Russia, have been in the effort from the beginning. Others have come 

on board since. But, the effort has to be global in order to be successful. We look forward to hearing more about the summit from 

our witnesses. 

To implement the renewed focus on securing materials and preventing proliferation, each of the two Departments has requested 

additional funds in fiscal year 2011. We fully support the nonproliferation efforts, and we also want to make sure that the additional funds are executable. We look forward to a good conversation 

this morning. 

Let me turn to our ranking member, Senator LeMieux. 

STATEMENT OF SENATOR GEORGE LEMIEUX 

Senator LEMIEUX. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you to the witnesses for being with us today and providing their valuable testimony. 

I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for calling this hearing. It’s 

a critical time for our country as the world grapples with how to 

manage nuclear ambitions of rogue states and state sponsors of terror, most notably, Tehran. The proliferation of nuclear, biological, 

chemical, or radioactive material to rogue nations or terrorist organizations is perhaps the greatest single threat to global security. 

So, with these challenges in mind, I look forward to hearing from 

the witnesses about how we’re going to confront these issues, these 

21st century threats, through nonproliferation. 

While the United States and Russia and its former republics retain most of the world’s nuclear technology, expertise, and material, the Cold War is over and nonproliferation regimes, practices, 

and mores of the past 50 years will not thwart the threats of the 

next 50 years. The time of mutual assured destruction is over. 

Whether we admit it or not, the world has accepted a nuclear 

North Korea, and I fear we are prepared to accept a nuclear Iran. 

We are hearing today in the news of Iranian shock troops being positioned now in Venezuela, something that we have talked about in 

this committee as an emerging threat to this country, as well. 

3 

We cannot talk about the future of nonproliferation without discussing our U.S. policy towards Iran, which is focused primarily on 

preventing Tehran from acquiring a nuclear weapon. 

Again, Mr. Chairman, I look forward to the testimony of our witnesses. I welcome our guests today and submit the rest of my statement for the record. 

[The prepared statement of Senator LeMieux follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY SENATOR GEORGE LEMIEUX

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I’d also like to thank the witnesses for joining us this 

morning and for their many years of distinguished service. 

I want to thank the chairman for calling for this hearing. This is a critical time 

for our country as the world grapples with how to discourage Tehran’s nuclear ambitions. The proliferation of nuclear, biological, chemical or radioactive material to a 

rogue nation or terrorist organization is perhaps the greatest single threat to global 

security. So, I look forward to hearing from the witnesses about how we are working 

to make our nonproliferation efforts relevant in the 21st century. 

While the United States and Russia and its former republics retain most of the 

world’s nuclear technology, expertise and material, the Cold War is over and nonproliferation regimes, practices and mores of the last 50 years will not thwart the 

threats of the next 50 years. The time of ‘‘mutual assured destruction’’ is over. 

Whether we admit it or not, the world has accepted a nuclear North Korea. I fear 

we are prepared to accept a nuclear Iran. We cannot talk about the future of nonproliferation without discussing the U.S. policy toward Iran—which has focused primarily on preventing Tehran from acquiring a nuclear weapon. 

However, the record of the past year is discouraging. It is difficult to dispute that 

Iran is closer to possessing a nuclear weapons capability today than it was a year 

ago. According to Lieutenant General Burgess, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, in his testimony before the full committee last week, he said that 

Iran could have enough weapon-grade uranium for one bomb within the next year. 

If Iran is allowed to possess a nuclear capability, it will result in a regional and 

possibly global cascade of proliferation. 

Even the idea of Iran obtaining this capability has changed the balance of power 

in the Middle East, in reports last week there is evidence that the Syrian Government has transferred long-range Scud missiles to Hezbollah. This is a significantly 

destabilizing action. 

Yet, we already hear some resigning themselves to a nuclear Iran. But are we 

prepared to manage this volatile region with deterrent concepts conceived during 

the Cold War? Would Iran’s capability embolden violent groups currently engaged 

in terrorism and subversion in the region? At a time when the United States is reducing its nuclear arsenal, can we provide a credible extended deterrence to partners and allies who do not currently possess a nuclear capability? Given the possibility that Iran could acquire this capability within the next year, I hope our witnesses can help us understand how our current nonproliferation projects and programs can meet these near-term challenges. 

Beyond Iran, it is imperative that the nuclear nonproliferation regime and the 

rules-based international order that the United States and our allies have spent 

more than 60 years building is both credible and relevant. Global security relies on 

the belief that the United States will meet its commitments and guarantee consequences. I look forward to your testimony. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Okay. We’re going to start with Secretary 

Nacht, Assistant Secretary for Global Strategic Affairs, and then 

we’ll go to you, Mr. Baker. 

What I would like you all to do—your written statements are put 

in the record—is to take 5 or 7 minutes and share with us your 

ideas, and then we’ll go to you, Mr. Baker, with the same thing, 

and then we’ll get into some detailed questions. 

Mr. Secretary? 

4 

STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL L. NACHT, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR GLOBAL STRATEGIC AFFAIRS, OFFICE OF THE 

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY 

Dr. NACHT. Thank you, Chairman Nelson, Ranking Member 

LeMieux, and members of the subcommittee. It’s my pleasure to 

appear before you today to discuss DOD’s nonproliferation and 

threat reduction efforts, including the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program. 

DOD is working hard to build upon our legacy of nonproliferation 

and threat-reduction successes, and to expand and adjust our programs to meet today’s proliferation and emerging threats. 

A word about the changing strategic environment in DOD’s strategy. Today, the threat environment posed by proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) is complex and unpredictable. 

President Obama recognizes the challenges of today’s WMD 

threats, and he’s pursuing a bold agenda to reduce proliferation 

dangers and to achieve the peace and security that comes from a 

world free of nuclear weapons. 

The recent diplomatic initiatives and policy reviews have increased broad awareness and expectations for the United States, 

DOD, and our international partners to work collaboratively to reduce and counter WMD threats. 

We have a threefold approach in DOD. First, we aim to support 

and rejuvenate multilateral nonproliferation initiatives and treaties. Second, we seek to reduce and eliminate WMD dangers at 

their source and in transit. Third, we seek to enhance our ability 

to detect and respond to emerging threats. Let me address each of 

these elements in turn. 

On strengthening the nonproliferation regime, we are accelerating efforts to work with our allies and partners to rejuvenate 

and reinforce this regime, starting with a renewed commitment to 

the international legal frameworks that serve as the foundation for 

our efforts. We’re actively working to strengthen the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), which is the cornerstone of the nuclear nonproliferation regime. At the upcoming NPT Review Conference, 

starting next month, we will seek an outcome that reaffirms parties’ commitment to the treaty and shores up its three pillars: nonproliferation, disarmament, and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. 

In addition, President Obama has committed his administration 

to pursue the ratification of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty 

(CTBT), because it restricts additional countries from developing, 

acquiring, and deploying nuclear weapons, and it hinders the ability of nuclear powers to develop new types of nuclear warheads. We 

will also seek a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) that would 

ban the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons. 

DOD fully supports these efforts; and, in particular, the fiscal 

year 2011 budget request from DOD recognizes the nonproliferation value of these international agreements. It aims to fund technological improvements in instrumentation and software used for 

detection of treaty violations, such as air sample monitoring, analysis of seismic events, and improvements in infrasound detection. 

These measures will ensure compliance with the NPT, the CTBT, 

and the FMCT. 

5 

The administration also recognizes the importance of a variety of 

multilateral activities and mechanisms that help to prevent proliferation, such as the PSI. PSI builds political support for 

counterproliferation, and it increases cooperation through multinational endorsement of the PSI Statement of Principles and participation in PSI exercises, 30 of which have been conducted since 

2003. 

The U.S. Government has taken on an important new role this 

year by serving as the PSI focal point, providing support, improving information flow, and coordinating schedules of international 

activities among partners, consistent with the President’s desire to 

turn the PSI into a durable international institution. 

The second element, on reducing and eliminating the threats, 

DOD’s approach involves engaging in active international partnerships to reduce and eliminate WMD dangers, both at their source 

and in transit. The unprecedented gathering of 47 states to address 

these issues during the Nuclear Security Summit, just last week, 

represents a critical step in the President’s commitment to secure 

vulnerable nuclear materials worldwide by the end of 2013. 

Over the years, Congress has expanded CTR’s authorities and 

created new opportunities for the program to embark on these important national and international security priorities. This legislation enables the CTR program to address emerging WMD threats 

and to achieve longstanding WMD nonproliferation goals more effectively and comprehensively. Accordingly, new funding mechanisms provide DOD with additional resources to think and act beyond traditional projects and activities. As we move forward, four 

broad principles will guide our evolution and expansion: integration, responsiveness, stewardship, and cooperation. 

This year, we are taking real steps to exercise new legislative authorities that would expand the CTR program, across the globe, to 

reduce and eliminate emerging threats while simultaneously continuing our important work in Russia and states of the former Soviet Union. 

In accordance with our authorities and with full coordination 

with our interagency partners, in consultation with Congress, we 

are seeking a determination from the Secretaries of Defense and 

State to conduct CTR projects and activities with new partner 

countries outside the former Soviet Union to meet the President’s 

broader nuclear nonproliferation agenda. 

The CTR program is DOD’s mechanism to support the President’s initiative, and the requested increase of $74.5 million will 

support expanded security cooperation with Russia and additional 

efforts with new partner countries. 

Working with partner countries, DOE and other interagency 

partners, and consistent with our Centers of Cooperation Engagement model, we plan to support a Nuclear Security Center of Excellence in China and a Nuclear Energy Center with a nuclear security component in India, as was announced at last week’s Nuclear Security Summit. By using the centers, countries and agencies involved will be able to provide lessons learned and an exchange of best practices without requiring access to actual material 

or weapon sites. 

6 

DOD is similarly expanding our Biological Threat Reduction Pro- grams (BTRPs), and we are requesting $56.9 million in budget increase to meet our new global health security requirements in support of the President’s National Strategy for Countering Biological 

Threats and the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) recommendations from DOD. 

In addition to these expansion efforts, the BTRP continues to 

partner with former Soviet Union countries to enhanced biosafety 

and biosecurity and consolidate especially dangerous pathogens 

(EDPs). 

Additionally, CTR’s chemical programs continue to assist Russia 

with safe, secure, and environmentally sound destruction of a portion of its chemical weapons nerve-agent stockpile that is most vulnerable to theft or diversion. 

The third element of DOD’s approach, detecting and responding 

to emerging threats, involves improving our ability to respond to 

these dangers. For instance, instability resulting from the collapse 

of a nuclear-armed state would risk the global proliferation of nuclear material, weapons, or technology, posing a threat to our 

Homeland and the homelands of our allies. We must be prepared 

to detect threats and defend ourselves against WMD dangers. This 

includes enhancements to interdiction and elimination capabilities, 

as well as preparations to respond quickly to an attack, should our 

preventive and deterrent efforts fail. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Dr. Nacht, I need you to wrap up. 

Dr. NACHT. I am just about done, Senator. 

Our QDR identifies preventing proliferation and countering 

WMD as one of the top priority missions of DOD, and we’ll be 

working closely with Special Operations Command (SOCOM) ability to counter WMD operations in establishing a Joint Task Force 

on Elimination (JTFE) Headquarters to plan, train, and execute 

WMD elimination operations. 

Other aspects of my testimony are included in my written statement in the record. 

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Nacht follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY DR. MICHAEL NACHT

Chairman Nelson, Ranking Member LeMieux, members of the subcommittee, it 

is my pleasure to appear before you to discuss the Department of Defense’s (DOD) 

nonproliferation and threat reduction efforts, including the Proliferation Security 

Initiative (PSI) and the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program. The Department is working hard to build upon our legacy of nonproliferation and threat reduction successes and to expand and adjust our programs to meet today’s proliferation 

and emerging threats. 

STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT AND DOD’S STRATEGY

Today, the threat environment posed by proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) is highly complex and unpredictable. As Director of National Intelligence Blair stated in his February 2010 testimony before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence: pursuit and possible acquisition of WMD will continue well into the future. He recognized that the Intelligence Community ‘‘continues to assess that many of the countries that are still pursuing WMD programs 

will continue to try to improve their capabilities and level of self-sufficiency over the 

next decade. Nuclear, chemical, and/or biological weapons—or the technologies and 

materials necessary to produce them—also may be acquired by states that do not 

now have such programs; terrorist, insurgent, or criminal organizations, acting 

alone or through middlemen.’’ Such an intent to acquire WMD, combined with powVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:05 Dec 06, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00012 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\62158.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
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erful cross-cutting global trends of the 21st century—such as technological advances, 

an increasingly interconnected global economy, the emergence of new strains of disease, the persistence of terrorism, black-market proliferation, and the frailty of strategically important states—create conditions that allow for dual-use technology, sensitive materials, and personnel with the scientific expertise to design and use those 

technologies to become increasingly accessible to potential state and non-state adversaries. 

President Obama recognizes the challenges of today’s WMD threats and he is pursuing a bold agenda to reduce proliferation dangers and to achieve the peace and 

security that comes from a world free of nuclear weapons. Recent diplomatic initiatives and policy reviews have increased broad awareness and expectations for the 

United States, DOD, and our international partners to work collaboratively to reduce and counter WMD threats. Ongoing efforts include: 

• Presidential-led diplomatic initiatives, such as the G8 Global Partnership 

Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, the 

Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, and the Global Nuclear 

Lockdown Initiative; 

• Advancement of international nonproliferation and disarmament frameworks, including last week’s Nuclear Security Summit, the recently signed 

New START Agreement between the United States and Russia, and the upcoming Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference; 

• National-level strategies and policy reviews focusing on WMD threats, including the 2009 National Strategy for Countering Biological Threats, the 

2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (2010 QDR), and the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (2010 NPR); and 

• Independent studies, such as the Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction, known as the Graham-Talent report, and the congressionally-commissioned 2009 National Academy of Sciences (NAS) study 

and report titled, Global Security Engagement: A New Model for Cooperative Threat Reduction. 

DOD is actively working to implement the President’s vision. We have undertaken 

a series of policy reviews to develop a comprehensive approach to advance these 

goals and we are aligning our strategies and approaches accordingly. The 2010 QDR 

identified preventing WMD proliferation as one of six key challenges faced by the 

United States, and it recommended that the United States increase its efforts to secure vulnerable nuclear materials and expand the biological threat reduction program. Most recently, the 2010 NPR elevated the prevention of nuclear proliferation 

and nuclear terrorism to the top of the U.S. policy agenda and aligned U.S. nuclear 

weapons policies and posture to address these most pressing security threats. 

Combined, evolving and emerging WMD threats along with unprecedented efforts 

to reduce those threats have raised the profile and priority of the Department’s nonproliferation and threat reduction programs and tools. As President Obama made 

clear in his April 2009 speech in Prague, overcoming the twin dangers of WMD proliferation and WMD terrorism requires a comprehensive approach. DOD is aligning 

our programs to become more flexible, agile, and responsive to build upon our long 

legacy of securing our Nation and the world from WMD threats. Here our approach 

is three-fold: First, we aim to support and rejuvenate multilateral nonproliferation 

initiatives and treaties. Second, we seek to reduce and eliminate WMD dangers at 

their source and in transit. Third, we seek to enhance our ability to detect and respond to emerging threats. 

STRENGTHENING THE NONPROLIFERATION REGIME

For years we have worked with our allies and partners to develop a global nonproliferation infrastructure that can reduce our collective vulnerability to these 

weapons. The current network of initiatives, regimes, and treaties offers some important tools for advancing this critical agenda—but much more remains to be done. 

Today, we are accelerating efforts to work with our allies and partners to rejuvenate 

and reinforce the nonproliferation regime, starting with a renewed commitment to 

the international legal frameworks that serve as the foundation for our efforts. 

We are actively working to strengthen the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)—the 

cornerstone of the nuclear nonproliferation regime. At the upcoming NPT Review 

Conference in May 2010, we will seek an outcome that reaffirms parties’ commitment to the treaty and shores up its three pillars: nonproliferation, disarmament, 

and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. We want to discourage the abuses of the treaty 

withdrawal provision and ensure that there are real consequences for treaty violations. At the same time, we will emphasize our support for peaceful uses of nuclear 

energy that do not increase the risk of weapons proliferation. The NPT Review ConVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:05 Dec 06, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00013 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\62158.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
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ference is not an end in itself, but a critical milestone in the effort to enhance nonproliferation efforts worldwide. Efforts this May will contribute to our ambitious 

nonproliferation agenda. 

In addition, President Obama has committed his administration to pursue the 

ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). The CTBT is important 

to the nonproliferation effort because it restricts additional countries from developing, acquiring, and deploying nuclear weapons, and it hinders the ability of nuclear powers to develop new types of nuclear warheads. In the meantime, as a sign 

of our commitment to the CTBT regime, we will continue to maintain our unilateral 

moratorium on nuclear weapons-testing. Finally, we will also seek a Fissile Material 

Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) that would ban the production of fissile material for use in 

nuclear weapons. 

DOD fully supports these efforts. In particular, the fiscal year 2011 budget request recognizes the nonproliferation value of these international agreements. It 

aims to fund technological improvements in instrumentation and software—such as 

air sample monitoring, analysis of seismic events, and improvements in infrasound 

detection—used for detection of treaty violations. These measures will ensure compliance with the NPT, CTBT, and FMCT. 

The administration also recognizes the importance of a variety of multilateral activities and mechanisms that help to prevent proliferation, such as the Proliferation 

Security Initiative (PSI). Since its establishment in 2003, PSI has grown to include 

95 endorsing countries. PSI builds political support for counterproliferation and increases cooperation through multinational endorsement of the PSI statement of 

principles and participation in PSI exercises, 30 of which have been conducted since 

2003. By endorsing the PSI, partners recognize the urgency of the WMD proliferation threat and commit themselves to taking action to stop shipments of proliferation concern on a voluntary basis, consistent with national legal authorities and relevant international law. The PSI also helps build the capacity of countries on the 

front lines of WMD transshipment to counter proliferation by hosting exercises in 

which countries share best practices, engage in scenario planning, and examine decision making processes. The U.S. Government has taken on an important new role 

this year by serving as the PSI ‘‘Focal Point,’’ providing support, improving information flow, and coordinating schedules of international activities among partners consistent with the President’s desire to turn the PSI into a durable international institution. 

In addition, this administration is seeking Export Control Reform. Under the rubric of ‘‘Higher Walls Around Fewer Items,’’ our goal is to make exporting dangerous 

or sensitive items much more difficult, while at the same time lowering unnecessary 

barriers to profitable technology exports that pose no threat to our security. This 

broad-based interagency effort to review the current system and process of administering and enforcing U.S. export controls is close to making its final recommendations, and, with the cooperation of Congress, will then start the work of implementation. 

Despite these efforts, we recognize that this nonproliferation regime is under serious strain, in large part because of countries that choose to violate both the letter 

and the spirit of their commitments and because some countries choose to live outside this regime altogether. Responding to this challenge, this administration has 

gone on the diplomatic offensive to address nuclear proliferation threats, seeking to 

reclaim lost ground with allies and partners. This outreach is paying real dividends. 

Our demonstrated commitment to engagement and our efforts to find diplomatic solutions is helping us to put more pressure on the world’s two greatest current proliferation threats, Iran and North Korea. In the case of North Korea, the successful 

implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1874 has demonstrated the international community’s resolve to stem the DPRK’s ability to pursue nuclear, ballistic missile, and other WMD-related activities, and to prevent proliferation to and from North Korea. The United States has undertaken close coordination with partners on full implementation of the resolution, which provides for, 

among other things, enhanced provisions regarding inspection of suspect cargo. 

REDUCING AND ELIMINATING THREATS

The second element of the Department’s approach involves engaging in active 

international partnerships to reduce and eliminate WMD dangers both at their 

source and in transit. Vulnerable nuclear, biological, and chemical materials that 

are secured or eliminated cannot be used for harmful purposes by terrorists or other 

hostile actors. 

As this committee is aware, the CTR Program has been working to reduce nuclear, biological, and chemical threats since its inception in 1992, and has estabVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:05 Dec 06, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00014 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\62158.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
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lished a successful track record. Building on that success, we are transforming and 

expanding the CTR Program to meet today’s threats. Over the years, Congress has 

expanded CTR’s authorities and created new opportunities for the program to embark on these important national and international security priorities. This legislation enables the CTR program to address emerging WMD threats and to achieve 

long-standing WMD nonproliferation goals more effectively and comprehensively. 

Accordingly, new funding mechanisms provide the Department with additional resources to think and act beyond traditional projects and activities. 

Four broad principles—integration, responsiveness, stewardship, and cooperation—will guide our evolution and expansion. First, we are fully integrating CTR 

within broader whole-of-government counter-WMD approaches, as well as within 

productive and established bilateral and multilateral frameworks. Second, the CTR 

program is becoming both agile enough to accept targets of opportunity and flexible 

enough to utilize CTR in new regions and for new projects. Third, we are improving 

resource management and stewardship by better aligning expenditures with priorities, improving execution and accountability of funds, and developing sustainable, 

long-term solutions and capacity-building opportunities for our partner countries. 

Fourth, the CTR Program has renewed its focus on the cooperative components of 

our program, including establishing mutually beneficial projects with our partner 

countries and ensuring that the vision for any project includes common awareness 

of threats and solutions. Local vulnerabilities will be met with local solutions. 

With these principles as our guide, we will engage with countries and regions to 

achieve common goals and provide sustainable capabilities. Depending on the 

vulnerabilities, local capacity, and status of our relationship with a given country, 

we could employ any of the following four models as a template to expand CTR engagements and related projects and activities. First, the ‘‘Traditional Model’’ has 

been employed with individual former Soviet Union (FSU) states to establish an exceptionally high level of capability and national proficiency to deal with various materials and various levels of vulnerability. Next, a ‘‘Tailored Model’’ seeks to work 

bilaterally with countries to tailor CTR projects to identify and address specific 

vulnerabilities within the context of political and capability realities. A ‘‘Regional 

Model’’ seeks to develop baseline capabilities across a region to reduce the potential 

for future threats to emerge and to provide countries with the capacity to recognize 

those threats if they do emerge. Although key international partners will be important in each of the four models, the regional model is likely to rely most heavily 

on the participation and engagement of the international community. Our final 

model, known as ‘‘Centers of Cooperation,’’ will allow the Department to partner 

with key countries to increase information sharing and to develop best practices for 

appropriate CTR objectives. Instead of focusing our efforts on securing materials or 

building capacity at the source, our efforts will focus on developing long-term relationships that will have positive second- and third-order effects throughout the region. 

Although I have discussed our broad strategy and new approaches to meet our 

requirements, we cannot do all that the President and the world demand without 

additional resources. The CTR budget has held steadily around $430 million over 

the past 3 years. This year, however, we are taking real steps to exercise new legislative authorities to expand the CTR Program across the globe to reduce and eliminate emerging threats while simultaneously continuing our important work in Russia and FSU countries. This is why the President has requested a significant increase in the DOD CTR budget through fiscal year 2015. The overall fiscal year 

2011 budget request for the DOD CTR Program is $522.5 million, a 23 percent increase over fiscal year 2010. Program enhancements in fiscal year 2011 over the fiscal year 2010 baseline include an additional $74.5 million to fund the Global Nuclear Lockdown Initiative and $56.9 million to expand the Biological Threat Reduction Program. I would now like to describe some examples of recent successes and 

plans to implement this new strategy in several areas of our nuclear, biological, and 

chemical threat reduction efforts, as well as our Proliferation Prevention Initiative 

(PPI) and Defense and Military Contacts (DMC) programs. 

As you are well aware, the CTR Program has been involved in reducing nuclear 

threats for a long time. It has been almost two decades since Congress passed the 

Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1991, the hallmark legislation that established the Nunn-Lugar Program. Within 6 months of its enactment, the United 

States and the Russian Federation signed the CTR Umbrella Agreement and began 

the arduous task of eliminating the enormous number of strategic offensive arms 

that had been built up by the Soviet Union. Although elimination work has largely 

been concluded in the other states of the former Soviet Union, it goes on to this day 

in Russia as ballistic missiles, launchers, and ballistic missile submarines continue 

to be dismantled. In addition, the Department continues to work closely with the 

10 

Department of Energy and the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense (MOD) to 

ensure the appropriate infrastructure is in place to enable Russia to sustain over 

the long term the hundreds of millions of dollars worth of modernized physical protection systems that have been installed at nuclear weapons storage sites. Finally, 

the Department continues to assist Russia in transporting nuclear warheads from 

operational locations to dismantlement facilities or more secure, consolidated storage sites. 

Although we continue to focus on the Department’s mission to reduce nuclear 

threats in Russia, we also are building upon our legacy of success to meet the President’s broader nuclear nonproliferation agenda. The unprecedented gathering of 47 

states to address these issues during the Nuclear Security Summit last week represents a critical step in the President’s commitment to secure vulnerable nuclear 

materials worldwide by the end of 2013. The CTR Program is DOD’s mechanism to 

support the President’s initiative and the requested increase of $74.5 million will 

support expanded security cooperation with Russia and additional efforts with new 

partner countries. As required by the fiscal year 2008 legislation, the CTR Program 

will seek a determination from the Secretaries of Defense and State to conduct CTR 

projects and activities with new partner countries outside the FSU. Working with 

partner countries, DOE, and other Interagency partners, and consistent with our 

Centers of Cooperation engagement model, we plan to support a nuclear security 

Center of Excellence in China and a Nuclear Energy Center with a nuclear security 

component in India, as was announced at last week’s Nuclear Security Summit. By 

using the centers, countries and agencies involved will be able to provide lessons 

learned and an exchange of best practices without requiring access to actual material or weapons sites. 

The Department is similarly expanding our biological threat reduction programs, and we are requesting a $56.9 million budget increase to meet our new global health 

security requirements in support of the President’s National Strategy for Countering 

Biological Threats and 2010 QDR recommendations. In Afghanistan, we are working 

at the request of the acting Minister of Public Health to help consolidate an independent collection of diagnostic laboratories under a new National Public Health 

Laboratory in Kabul. The Department is also considering expanding the program 

into Sub-Saharan Africa, where we believe there are opportunities to implement regional approaches for human and animal disease detection, diagnosis, surveillance, 

and reporting. 

In addition to these expansion efforts, the BTRP continues to partner with FSU 

countries to enhance biosafety and security and to consolidate especially dangerous 

pathogens. In Georgia, we completed construction of a new Central Reference Laboratory (CRL) located in Tbilisi and also renovated other human regional diagnostic 

laboratories. In Kazakhstan, the CTR program is a member of a Kazakhstan Government cross-functional working group appointed to design a new Central Reference Laboratory. A successful CRL groundbreaking ceremony took place on March 

30, 2010, and actual construction is expected to begin in a few months. Lastly, in 

Ukraine, the CTR Program is working with the Ministry of Health to consolidate 

all of Ukraine’s human especially dangerous pathogens at a DOD-renovated interim 

human central reference laboratory, and we are developing plans to renovate facilities for a permanent human central reference laboratory for reference diagnosis and 

safe secure research. We are also planning to construct a veterinary central reference lab to consolidate all of Ukraine’s animal especially dangerous pathogens and 

provide for reference diagnosis and safe and secure research. 

CTR’s chemical programs continue to assist Russia with safe, secure, and environmentally sound destruction of a portion of its chemical weapons nerve agent stockpile that is most vulnerable to theft or diversion. This year we also hope to complete 

elimination of on-site equipment at the former nerve-agent weapons production facility at Novocheboksarsk. Our efforts are intended to achieve U.S. chemical agent 

proliferation prevention goals while helping Russia comply with its Chemical Weapons Convention requirements. At Russia’s request, and in our judgment to the mutual benefit of the people of the United States, we will continue some technical support for the Shchuch’ye Chemical Weapons Destruction Facility, which began eliminating chemical weapons in March 2009. The United States contributed more than 

$1 billion to the construction of this facility, and our continued technical support 

will assist in maintaining the operational status of U.S.-furnished equipment, as 

well as equipment supplied by other donor countries, so that the elimination process 

continues expeditiously. 

In addition to CTR’s programs to secure nuclear, biological, and chemical material 

at the source, the WMD Proliferation Prevention Initiative (PPI) is CTR’s means to 

enhance our partners’ abilities to detect and interdict WMD ‘‘on the move.’’ DOD 

has just completed a multiyear effort with Azerbaijan’s State Border Guard ServiceVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:05 Dec 06, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00016 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\62158.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
11 

Coast Guard and elements of its Navy to enhance maritime detection, surveillance 

and interdiction capabilities on the Caspian Sea and we will continue to provide 

sustainment to that project for another 2 years. In Ukraine, we are working with 

the State Border Guard Service to enhance maritime detection and interdiction capabilities on the Black Sea, as well as providing extensive assistance to land borders 

between the key ports of entry along the Moldovan border and in the Chernobyl Exclusion Zone. 

Although not an element of CTR, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA)’s 

International Counterproliferation Program (ICP) complements the capital-intensive 

investments of the WMD–PPI program through its modest yet effective ‘‘train and 

equip’’ efforts. The ICP is unique in its legislative authority to partner explicitly 

with the Federal Bureau of Investigation and U.S. Customs in furtherance of deterring the proliferation of WMD across the FSU, the Baltic states, and in Eastern Europe. We are currently working with DTRA to determine how best to expand the 

program globally. 

The final element of the Department’s threat reduction efforts is the Defense and 

Military Contacts (DMC) Program, which is currently transitioning to meet changed 

legislative guidelines and expanded authorities to support specific relationship 

building opportunities for CTR engagement in new geographic areas. Under this 

new approach, the CTR Policy Office will develop policy guidance in close cooperation and coordination with OSD’s regional offices, AT&L/Treaties and Threat Reduction, and the Unified Combatant Commands. DTRA’s CTR Program Office will administer the program in accordance with that guidance. 

DETECTING AND RESPONDING TO EMERGING THREATS

The third element of the Department’s approach involves improving our ability to 

detect and respond to emerging WMD dangers. Here the Department has a particular responsibility to our Nation, as well as to our allies and partners. For instance, instability resulting from the collapse of a nuclear-armed state would risk 

the global proliferation of nuclear material, weapons, or technology, posing a threat 

to our homeland and the homelands of our allies. We must be prepared to detect 

threats and defend ourselves against WMD dangers. This includes enhancements to 

interdiction and elimination capabilities as well as preparations to respond quickly 

to an attack should our preventive and deterrence efforts fail. 

Our Quadrennial Defense Review identifies preventing proliferation and countering weapons of mass destruction as one of the top priority missions for the Defense Department, and our fiscal year 2011 budget request reflects that commitment. This request will fully fund efforts to enhance SOCOM’s ability to conduct 

counter-WMD operations by increasing funding by $60 million. It will also establish 

the standing Joint Task Force Elimination (JTF–E) Headquarters to plan, train and 

execute WMD elimination operations. The JTF–E works in conjunction with special 

operations forces to locate, characterize, secure, disable or destroy hostile WMD programs or capabilities in a non-permissive or semi-permissive environment. It will 

also provide nuclear disablement, exploitation, and intelligence capabilities with increased capacity to coordinate operations with Special Operations Forces. Currently 

the Joint Staff is developing several options for the command and control structure 

and force-sizing for the standing headquarters. 

The budget request includes $22 million to improve capabilities for national technical nuclear forensics technologies and the fielding of new capabilities, including 

funding for ground and air collection. Other key capability enhancements anticipated by this budget request include the modernization of WMD Civil Support 

Teams and CBRNE Consequence Management Response Forces to assist State and 

local governments in the event of a WMD attack, as well as enhanced technical 

reachback capabilities to ensure warfighters have real time access to information on 

WMD. We are also working to adapt our architectures, plans, and operations so that 

we can respond to WMD crises with greater speed and agility. 

Additionally, we must engage partner nations, allies, and the broader international community to improve our ability to detect and respond to such dangers 

and reduce the risk of nuclear terrorism. Here we are working to support a number 

of multilateral efforts, including the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism 

(GICNT), an international partnership of nearly 80 states and 4 observers that enhances individual, regional, and collective capabilities to combat nuclear terrorism 

through deterrence, prevention, detection, and response objectives. Through multilateral activities and exercises, partners share best practices and lessons learned. 

The United States and Russia, co-chairs to the GICNT, are currently taking tangible 

steps that will transform the GICNT into an action-oriented and institutionalized 

program. 

12 

CLOSING REMARKS

The world is changing and the Obama administration is bringing a full court 

press to assemble like-minded countries to meet our collective national and international security obligations to make the world safe from all weapons of mass destruction. These efforts continue to underscore the need and relevance of the Department’s nonproliferation, threat reduction, and WMD detection and response 

tools. The Department takes its responsibilities seriously and we are building on our 

legacy of success to evolve and expand to meet today’s challenges. 


421etc1.eps
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421etc2.eps
14 

Senator BILL NELSON. Mr. Baker? 

STATEMENT OF KENNETH E. BAKER, ACTING DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR FOR DEFENSE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION, 

NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION 

Mr. BAKER. Mr. Chairman, I want to apologize up front; I caught 

a cold vacationing in Florida, but I assure you, sir, that it did not 

come from the great State of Florida. So, I apologize for the cold. 

[Laughter.] 


421etc3.eps
15 

Senator LEMIEUX. Mr. Chairman, I already corrected the record; 

he caught it at the airport before he came to Florida. We know that 

he could not have gotten a cold in Florida. [Laughter.] 

Mr. BAKER. Yes, sir, it was in the airport or, in Virginia, but it 

was not in Florida. But, I enjoyed my vacation, even with the cold, 

in Florida. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Mr. Baker, it’s an oxymoron, ‘‘cold/Florida.’’ 

Senator LEMIEUX. Right. 

Mr. BAKER. Yes, sir. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I’m Ken Baker, Principal Assistant 

Deputy Administrator of the NNSA’s Office of Defense Nuclear 

Nonproliferation, and the Acting Deputy Administrator. 

It’s always a great pleasure to come before this committee to tell 

you about the NNSA’s nuclear nonproliferation program. I’m prepared to make a formal written statement, Mr. Chairman, and, 

with your permission, I will submit that for the record. I do have 

about 3 or 4 minutes of oral testimony. 

Senator BILL NELSON. That was already entered, 12 minutes ago. 

Mr. BAKER. Thank you, sir. 

The President is requesting $2.7 billion for fiscal year 2011 for 

the nonproliferation program, an increase of 26 percent over the 

last year’s funding levels. We are trying to prevent nuclear weapons from falling in the hands of terrorists, to stem the further proliferation of nuclear weapons, materials, and technology expertise 

to build them. 

I’m not one to hype the threat. It’s not easy to build a nuclear 

weapon. But, the consequences of any nuclear attack or nuclear incident would be so dire that it would greatly affect all of our American citizens. We must do everything we can, as quickly as possible, 

to ensure that this does not happen. 

The President has challenged the United States and international community to accelerate our materials security efforts 

over the next 4 years. The fiscal year 2011 budget request reflects 

the initial investment from this challenge. Our fundamental priority is the security of nuclear materials because if terrorists are 

unable to acquire nuclear materials, a weapon cannot be fashioned. 

In fact, the largest portion of our budget is aimed at making sure 

that vulnerable nuclear material is protected, removed, and disposed of. These first-line-of-defense programs are the heart of the 

President’s 4-year effort and drive the increases requested for the 

Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) and Material Protection, 

Control, and Accounting (MPC&A) program. 

For example, the budget increase requested to allow the GTRI to 

remove an additional 530 kilograms of excess highly-enriched uranium (HEU) from countries such as South Africa, Mexico, Serbia, 

Ukraine, and Belarus, as well as to convert seven additional reactors from HEU to low-enriched uranium (LEU). 

The Fissile Materials Disposition (FMD) program is also essential to our efforts toward nuclear disarmament and a world free of 

nuclear danger. This program works to dispose of surplus U.S. 

HEU and U.S. and Russian weapon-grade plutonium. Of the funds 

requested for the FMD program, 87 percent is for efforts to dispose 

of surplus U.S. weapon-grade plutonium. The largest part of this 

16 

involves the construction of a Mixed-oxide (MOX) Fuel Fabrication 

Facility in Aiken, SC, which has been underway for over 2 years, 

and it is on schedule and within budget. FMD has also made 

progress in the disposition of Russia surplus weapon-grade plutonium. Just last week, at the Nuclear Security Summit, Secretary 

Clinton and Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Lavrov signed a 

protocol amending the Plutonium Management Disposition Agreement. This agreement commits both countries to dispose of no less 

than 34 metric tons of surplus weapon-grade plutonium, which, 

combined, represents enough material for approximately 17,000 nuclear weapons. 

Our security work in Russia has been going on for many years, 

and the results are tangible. Thousands of nuclear warheads and 

hundreds of tons of weapon-grade plutonium are better secured 

today, due to our efforts. But, we have additional work to do. The 

job is not complete. We have identified some new areas that need 

to be addressed before we can conclude our efforts in Russia. 

We’re concerned about two things. First, the sustainability. It 

would do us little good to have spent years working to improve security in Russia if we fail to help our partners create a sustainability program in nuclear security. The second thing we must do 

is to look beyond Russia to create multiple sustainability levels of 

defense, such as providing radiation detection monitors and related 

response training over the world, and securing seaports away from 

our borders through our Second Line of Defense program. No security program is perfect, and any system can break down due to 

human error, equipment malfunction, or overwhelming attack. 

Multiple layers of defense help mitigate these issues. 

Our elimination of weapon-grade plutonium in the three reactors 

that were remaining in Russia, I can say today, sir, is complete. 

Two reactors that make weapon-grade plutonium were shut down 

1 year ago, and the last one was shut down last week. So, we have 

completed this program of shutting down all weapon-grade plutonium reactors in Russia. 

This budget request will allow us to continue to provide vital 

support to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the 

Nuclear Suppliers Group. We want to continue to revitalize the 

U.S. nuclear safeguards technology and human base, which has 

suffered attrition over the years, through our Next Generation 

Safeguards Initiative. 

Last, we want to continue using the investment in world-class 

capabilities of DOE’s nuclear weapons labs to conduct research and 

development of new technology capabilities to support the Nation’s 

arms control and nonproliferation efforts. 

In summary, Mr. Chairman, I thank this committee for your continued support and longstanding and newly ambitious efforts. We 

are equipped to play a critical role in preventing terrorists, rogue 

states, and proliferators from acquiring a nuclear component. 

Again, I appreciate this opportunity, and I’m ready to take your 

questions, sir. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Baker follows:] 

17 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY KENNETH E. BAKER

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Committee Members, for the opportunity to 

present the Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration 

(NNSA) fiscal year 2011 President’s budget request for the Office of Defense Nuclear 

Nonproliferation. 

The Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation mission is both critical and multi-faceted: 

to provide policy and technical leadership to limit or prevent the spread of Weapons 

of Mass Destruction (WMD)-related materials, technology, and expertise; to advance 

technologies to detect WMD-related proliferation worldwide; and to eliminate, reduce, or secure surplus nuclear weapons-related materials. In short, we detect, 

deter, secure, or dispose of dangerous nuclear and radiological materials worldwide. 

The President’s fiscal year 2011 budget request for the Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation portfolio is $2.69 billion, an increase of 25.8 percent from fiscal year 

2010. As NNSA Administrator D’Agostino has stated, this budget request is a ‘‘direct and tangible display of the President’s commitment to this mission, and a demonstration of the critical role NNSA plays in implementing the President’s unprecedented nuclear security agenda.’’ NNSA’s Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation program 

is a key component of the President’s nonproliferation vision, and we are working— 

together with our more than 130 international partners—to achieve these global security goals. 

This comprehensive nonproliferation, nuclear security, and arms control agenda 

was outlined in the President’s April 2009 speech in Prague, Czech Republic and 

consists of several key objectives, including: 

• Implementing a new international effort to secure all vulnerable nuclear 

materials worldwide in 4 years; 

• Taking concrete actions toward a world without nuclear weapons; 

• Breaking up nuclear black markets and halting nuclear smuggling; and 

• Strengthening the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). 

The fiscal year 2011 Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Budget Request can be 

summarized into these four major categories of effort. This fiscal year 2011 request 

funds efforts to support the President’s nuclear security vision, as an early step in 

meeting this multi-year initiative. 

Additionally, within these four categories, we are making solid contributions in 

cross-cutting administration and NNSA priorities, including strengthening the Nation’s Science and Technology (S&T) base, reinvigorating America’s scientific and 

technical human capital, and upholding our strong commitment to effective project 

management. 

Specifically, our $2.69 billion fiscal year 2011 request includes: 

• More than $1 billion for the Fissile Materials Disposition (FMD) program 

to dispose of surplus plutonium and highly enriched uranium by constructing a MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility and a Waste Solidification Building, developing a capability to disassemble excess nuclear weapon pits, and 

supporting Russian plutonium disposition activities. The fiscal year 2011 

request aligns management and funding responsibilities for the interrelated 

surplus plutonium disposition activities, in support of U.S. nonproliferation 

and arms control objectives, under a single appropriation. The fiscal year 

2011 Russian Fissile Materials Disposition Request seeks $100 million of a 

total $400 million U.S. commitment to support plutonium disposition in 

Russia. On April 13, 2010, Secretary of State Clinton and Russian Minister 

of Foreign Affairs Lavrov signed the Protocol to amend the 2000 Plutonium 

Management and Disposition Agreement (PMDA). 

• Over $590 million for the International Nuclear Materials Protection and 

Cooperation (INMP&C) program (an increase of $18 million) for additional 

Material Protection Control & Accounting (MPC&A) upgrades, expansion of 

MPC&A cooperation with countries outside of Russia and the former Soviet 

Union, and additional deployment of radiation detection systems to combat 

illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive materials under the Second Line of Defense program; 

• Nearly $560 million for the Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) (an 

increase of 68 percent) to remove and secure high-priority vulnerable nuclear material around the world in 4 years, accelerate additional conversions of highly enriched uranium (HEU) fueled research reactors to the use 

of low enriched uranium (LEU) fuel, and to provide a comprehensive approach to permanently deny terrorists access to nuclear and radiological 

material at civilian sites worldwide; 

18 

• Over $350 million for the Nonproliferation and Verification Research & 

Development (R&D) program (an 10 percent increase) to provide the key 

technical support for the President’s arms control and nonproliferation 

agenda; and 

• Nearly $156 million for the Nonproliferation and International Security 

(NIS) program (a decrease of almost 17 percent, primarily the result of a 

reduction in activities to support verification of disablement of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea nuclear program) to safeguard nuclear material; control the spread of WMD technologies, equipment, and expertise; 

and verify nuclear reductions and compliance with international regimes, 

treaties, and agreements. 

SECURING NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND MATERIALS FROM TERRORISTS

The President’s April 5, 2009 speech in Prague presented a vision to address the 

international nuclear threat. His call to secure all vulnerable nuclear materials 

around the world within 4 years is a cornerstone of this strategy. Within the U.S. 

Government, the Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation will perform a significant portion of this crucial nuclear security work. Implementing this nuclear security initiative will require expanding and accelerating our security cooperation with 

Russia and other key countries, pursuing new partnerships to secure nuclear materials, and strengthening nuclear security standards, practices, and international 

safeguards. 

Our fiscal year 2011 budget request funds early efforts to support the administration’s nuclear security vision, as a first step in meeting this multi-year initiative. 

Two Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation programs are providing sizeable contributions to this goal: the Global Threat Reduction Initiative and the International Nuclear Materials Protection and Cooperation programs. 

The Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) mission is to reduce and protect 

vulnerable nuclear and radiological materials at civilian sites worldwide. To execute 

this mission, GTRI: 1) Converts research reactors and isotope production facilities 

from the use of highly enriched uranium (HEU) to low enriched uranium (LEU); 2) 

Removes and disposes of excess nuclear and radiological materials; and 3) Protects 

high-priority nuclear and radiological materials from theft and sabotage. These 

three key subprograms of GTRI—Convert, Remove, and Protect—provide a comprehensive approach to achieving its mission and denying terrorists access to nuclear and radiological materials. 

The 68 percent GTRI increase in the President’s fiscal year 2011 budget request 

accelerates these threat reduction activities to secure all vulnerable nuclear materials in 4 years. Among other priorities, the fiscal year 2011 budget request allows 

GTRI to initiate efforts to remove over 1,650 kilograms of excess HEU and convert 

an additional 7 research reactors to the use of low enriched uranium fuel. Additionally, as part of its mission to reduce the use of HEU in civilian applications globally, 

GTRI will address the anticipated supply shortage of the medical isotope Molybdenum-99 (Mo-99) by implementing projects demonstrating the viability of non-HEU 

based technologies for large-scale Mo-99 production. 

The International Nuclear Materials Protection and Cooperation (INMP&C) program works in the former Soviet Union and other countries of concern to secure nuclear weapons and weapons-usable nuclear materials. The Material Protection Control and Accounting (MPC&A) program achieves this mission by providing security 

upgrades at nuclear sites, consolidating these materials at fewer sites that are more 

secure, and supporting the development of sustainable MPC&A systems. Beyond security upgrades, the MPC&A program also works with partner countries to develop 

regulations and procedures concerning the material control, accounting, and physical protection of nuclear materials, including in the areas of training, education, 

transportation, nuclear security culture, protective forces, material measurements, 

nuclear material accounting and inspections. In Russia, INMP&C partners include 

the Russian Ministry of Defense (MOD), the State Corporation for Atomic Energy 

(Rosatom), and Rostekhnadzor, the Russian nuclear regulatory agency. 

As agreed under the Bratislava Nuclear Security Initiative of 2005, major 

progress was made on security upgrades in Russia, including completion of all MOD 

warhead storage sites by the end of 2008. As a result of this success, some important upgrade work was added to MPC&A’s mission after February 2005, and that 

work is currently being accelerated to support the President’s 4 year nuclear security goal. Although this particular program is one of our more mature threat reduction efforts and has made considerable progress in Russia and elsewhere, work remains to be done to secure other vulnerable nuclear materials around the world 

within 4 years. 

19 

The fiscal year 2011 INMP&C budget request allows this program to continue additional nuclear security upgrades at the 19 (out of 214) remaining Russian buildings within the program’s scope where upgrades have not been completed, and to 

complete five of these 19 buildings in fiscal year 2011. It also provides for comprehensive sustainability efforts to continue transitioning maintenance of completed 

upgrades to Russia. Under the fiscal year 2011 budget request, the INMP&C program also would expand nuclear security cooperation to new partner countries outside of Russia and states of the former Soviet Union, in order to meet the administration’s global nuclear security agenda. 

TOWARD A WORLD WITHOUT NUCLEAR WEAPONS

The President has acknowledged that the goal of a world without nuclear weapons 

will not be reached quickly, but he stated that America will take concrete steps toward this goal. Our Nonproliferation and International Security (NIS) program is 

engaged actively in these efforts, including the support we provided for negotiating 

the new START treaty with the Russian Federation and supporting efforts towards 

ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). In fiscal year 

2011, NIS will build upon these current efforts by continuing to provide policy and 

technical support for nonproliferation and arms control treaties and agreements 

that strengthen the nonproliferation regime and promote transparent WMD reductions. In addition, NIS also will continue to develop and deploy transparency measures to ensure verifiable nuclear reductions and compliance with nonproliferation 

and arms control agreements. This includes work that benefits from support provided by the Nonproliferation and Verification Research and Development (R&D) 

program, to develop technologies that detect potential clandestine weapons programs or illicit diversions and provide options for the dismantlement of nuclear 

equipment, weapons, and components, and develop new monitoring tools to ensure 

that the obligations of foreign governments are being met. Particular emphasis will 

be placed on the development of scientifically sound verification approaches that 

meet the President’s goal of an effectively verifiable Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty 

(FMCT) while protecting critical national security equities. 

Investments in NNSA’s R&D program provide the core U.S. capability for advances in both U.S. and international capabilities to monitor arms control and nuclear-related treaty obligations, such as those conferred by the NPT, the FMCT, and 

the CTBT. The R&D program contribution includes research, development, production, and delivery of space- and ground-based sensors to detect nuclear detonations. 

Additionally, this program leads the nonproliferation community’s R&D effort to advance next generation detection capabilities to detect foreign nuclear materials and 

weapons production facilities and processes. In keeping with the President’s commitment for verifiable treaties, in fiscal year 2011 the R&D program will include test 

and evaluation activities to demonstrate new U.S. treaty monitoring technologies 

and capabilities. 

Our Fissile Material Disposition (FMD) program is also a crucial component of the 

Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation contribution to the administration’s nonproliferation and arms control agenda, through its mission to eliminate surplus U.S. highly 

enriched uranium and U.S. and Russian surplus weapon-grade plutonium. Of the 

funds requested for FMD, 87 percent is for efforts to irreversibly dispose of surplus 

U.S. weapon-grade plutonium. The largest part of this involves the construction of 

the Mixed-Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility (MFFF) in Aiken, SC, which has been underway for over 2 years and is on schedule and within budget. The MFFF is scheduled to start operations to produce MOX fuel in 2016. Overall, the MOX project is 

42 percent complete with two significant buildings (the 57,000 square foot administration nuilding and the 38,000 square foot secured warehouse) completed in 2009, 

for a total of 10 out of 17 auxiliary buildings completed to date. The Waste Solidification Building (WSB) is scheduled to begin operations in 2013 to support MFFF 

cold start-up testing. Overall, the WSB project is 34 percent complete. 

In addition to constructing the MOX Facility and the Waste Solidification Building, the Department of Energy is exploring combining NNSA’s Pit Disassembly and 

Conversion Project and the Office of Environmental Management’s Plutonium Preparation Project into a single project, to be managed by NNSA and located in the 

existing K–Area Facility at the Savannah River Site. As a result, the President’s 

fiscal year 2011 Budget Request supports realigning funding and management of 

interrelated surplus U.S. plutonium disposition activities under a single appropriation within the Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation appropriation. Complying with the 

Department’s project management order, DOE Order 413, FMD will develop a conceptual design report, along with the requisite project support documentation to 

move toward a Critical Decision 1 (approval of alternative selection and cost range) 

20 

determination. This preparatory work prior to alternative selection will be completed approximately 12–18 months from the start of such work. 

In addition to progress on U.S. fissile materials disposition, FMD has also made 

much progress on disposition of Russian surplus weapon-grade plutonium. In 2009, 

the United States and Russia completed negotiations on a Protocol to amend the 

2000 Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement (PMDA), and on April 13, 

2010 the Protocol was signed by Secretary of State Clinton and Russian Minister 

of Foreign Affairs Lavrov. Under the PMDA, each country commits to dispose of no 

less than 34 metric tons each of surplus weapon-grade plutonium—enough material 

for approximately 17,000 nuclear weapons. The amended PMDA reflects both Russia’s revised plan for disposing of its 34 metric tons of surplus weapon-grade plutonium using fast reactors under certain nonproliferation conditions and Russia’s commitment to implement its program independent of any assistance beyond the $400 

million U.S. financial contribution. The Protocol calls for both countries to begin disposing of their surplus plutonium in the 2018 timeframe. The fiscal year 2011 Russian Fissile Materials Disposition Request seeks $100 million of the total $400 million commitment to support plutonium disposition in Russia, with the balance of the 

more than $2 billion in estimated remaining costs to be borne by Russia. 

BREAKING UP BLACK MARKETS AND HALTING NUCLEAR SMUGGLING

As a complement to our facility-based physical security efforts that serve as a first 

line of defense, NNSA executes a number of programs that provide an additional 

layer of defense by detecting and preventing illicit transfers of nuclear-related materials, equipment, and technology. These programs help implement the President’s 

Prague speech call to build on efforts to break up nuclear black markets and detect 

and intercept dangerous materials in transit. 

Within the Office of International Nuclear Materials Protection and Cooperation, 

the Second Line of Defense (SLD) Core program cooperates with foreign partners 

to install radiation detection equipment at borders, airports, and strategic ports in 

Russia, other former Soviet Union states, Eastern Europe, and other key countries, 

and to provide related training and support. The Core program is also teaming with 

foreign law enforcement agencies to provide equipment, develop training, conduct 

exercises, and exchange best practices in mobile detection. The SLD Megaports Initiative likewise cooperates internationally to deploy radiation detection equipment 

and provide related training to key, high volume and/or strategically located ports. 

The fiscal year 2011 budget request provides for SLD installations at an additional 

55 sites in 19 foreign countries, and for the completion of Megaports installations 

and activities at 4 additional foreign seaports. 

The Office of Nonproliferation and International Security (NIS) supports efforts 

to halt illicit trafficking by strengthening global capacity to prevent the theft, diversion, and spread of nuclear materials, technologies, and expertise. Specifically, NIS 

is training international partners in export control, licensing, enforcement, interdiction, and physical protection of nuclear materials. These programs include the International Nonproliferation Export Control Program (INECP), which works with foreign country partners as well as domestic USG export enforcement agencies to 

strengthen national export control systems, practices, and awareness. Additionally, 

the Cooperative Border Security Program (CBSP), focusing on building overarching 

border security system capacity, works with foreign country partners to create training programs and shape analytical methods and tools so that states can deploy sustainable capabilities to protect their borders. NIS also provides specialized support 

to domestic licensing, enforcement, and interdiction agencies through such efforts as 

the Interdiction Technical Analysis Group (ITAG). ITAG supports Department of 

State-led interagency interdiction working groups that review potential proliferation 

activity and transactions in the nuclear, missile, and chemical and biological fields, 

by providing technical analysis of proliferation-relevant commodities and technologies through reachback to the national laboratories. The fiscal year 2011 budget 

request supports the continuation of these efforts. Finally, the fiscal year 2011 budget request increase for the Nonproliferation and Verification R&D program will advance development, testing, and evaluation of next generation capabilities to detect 

the illicit diversion of special nuclear materials, both internal and external to nuclear facilities. 

STRENGTHENING THE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY

President Obama has also called upon America and its partners to strengthen the 

NPT as a basis for cooperation. The Office of Nonproliferation and International Security (NIS) will continue efforts to strengthen nonproliferation regimes and multilateral organizations, by providing international policy expertise and technical reVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:05 Dec 06, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00026 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\62158.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
21 

sponses to address issues concerning the control of proliferation-sensitive items, in 

order to help shape 

nonproliferation policy initiatives both domestically and multilaterally. NIS will 

also help develop a new international civil nuclear framework to further the President’s energy security and environmental goals without jeopardizing national security. NIS will work within existing regimes and arrangements, including via peaceful nuclear cooperation agreements and the national NPT review process, among 

others, to help develop and advance this new framework. 

In fiscal year 2011, NIS also will work to strengthen and support the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)—and the international safeguards system it 

administers—to confront the challenges posed by nuclear proliferation and global 

nuclear energy expansion. NIS will continue to implement the Next Generation 

Safeguards Initiative (NGSI), which is working to revitalize the U.S. technical and 

human capital base supporting IAEA safeguards, and to develop the tools, approaches, and authorities needed by the IAEA to fulfill its mandate far into the future. This includes developing and implementing new safeguards concepts and approaches, and working with partners to develop nuclear infrastructure in countries 

pursuing nuclear energy programs that emphasizes safeguards, security, and nonproliferation obligations. NIS also will implement IAEA safeguards, including the 

Additional Protocol, at DOE facilities and continue to engage industry and the IAEA 

to incorporate safeguards requirements early-on in the facility design and construction phases. Additionally, NIS will continue bilateral safeguards partnerships to develop new safeguards approaches, help states implement their NPT safeguards obligations, and facilitate the nuclear safeguards and security infrastructures required 

for new countries to access the peaceful benefits of clean nuclear energy. 

CROSS-CUTTING PRIORITIES

Integrated across these four broad categories of effort, the Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation program is also implementing over-arching administration and NNSA 

priorities, including: 

• Strengthening the Nation’s Science and Technology (S&T) base; 

• Reinvigorating America’s scientific and technical human capital; and 

• Upholding our strong commitment to effective project management. 

Increases in our fiscal year 2011 budget request directly support Presidential and 

NNSA priorities to strengthen the Nation’s Science and Technology base. The increase in the Nonproliferation and Verification R&D budget by $34 million, or 10 

percent, for example, will expand the program’s basic and applied research for nonproliferation and national security applications and fund new technical capabilities 

to meet the President’s nonproliferation and arms control treaty monitoring objectives. The R&D program remains the Nation’s largest long-term basic R&D program 

in this area and supports not only NNSA customers but also the Departments of 

Defense, State, Homeland Security, and the Intelligence Community. 

As Administrator D’Agostino noted in his testimony last week, NNSA is working 

to develop and retain the next generation of scientists, engineers, and technical experts required to meet our critical mission. For example, through our Next Generation Safeguards Initiative, we will significantly develop human capital within the 

DOE National Laboratories by supporting over 100 Next Generation Safeguards Initiative summer interns at the Laboratories, funding postdoctoral fellowships in 

international safeguards, and sponsoring six safeguards courses. In fiscal year 2011 

and beyond, our R&D program will continue developing the next generation of nuclear engineers and scientific researchers through a $15 million per year, universitybased program—the 10-year Integrated University Program. This program is coordinated with component efforts by the DOE Office of Nuclear Energy and the Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission. 

To further develop scientific and technical human capital, the Office of Fissile Materials Disposition has co-sponsored (with DOE’s Office of Environmental Management) several Regional Nuclear Suppliers Outreach events for American suppliers 

interested in providing services and products in the nuclear sector. At these events, 

U.S. companies are given insight into current and future markets for products and 

services. Additionally, they learn the requirements of the Nuclear Quality Assurance program applicable not only to DOE but to the commercial nuclear industry. 

This forum helps ensure that NNSA has an adequate number of qualified commercial suppliers, and helps more American companies become qualified to supply similar products and services to the commercial nuclear power industry. Currently, more 

than 1,800 people are employed by the project at Savannah River Site with more 

than 4,000 working on MOX-related activities in the United States. 

22 

As Administrator D’Agostino also noted last week, with the increased resources 

you provide us comes our increased responsibility to be effective stewards of taxpayers’ money. The Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation program takes this responsibility seriously, and we implement the highest standards of project management 

practices to make our programs more efficient and more cost-effective. Our MOX 

Fuel Fabrication Facility effort is a good example. Despite their size and complexity, 

both the Mixed-Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility (MFFF) and Waste Solidification 

Building (WSB) projects are progressing on schedule and within budget in accordance with their approved cost and schedule baselines. Additionally, the MFFF 

project recently celebrated a milestone of 3 million workhours without a lost day of 

work due to injury. 

As another effective project management element, we are increasing our costsharing efforts, not just as a matter of fiscal responsibility to the American public 

but as a force multiplier to address high-priority international nuclear security and 

nonproliferation objectives. Our cost-sharing partnerships include both monetary 

transactions and in-kind contributions, and additional Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation programs are incorporating cost-sharing as part of their revised program model and project management practices. With respect to monetary donations, 

to date, Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation has received approximately $60 million 

from seven overseas partners to execute our internationally-recognized nonproliferation work. However, our programs also utilize in-kind cost-sharing agreements. For 

example, under the Second Line of Defense Core Program, DOE/NNSA and Russia’s 

Federal Customs Service have agreed to equip all of Russia’s approximately 350 border crossings by 2011, and the costs for this effort will be split approximately evenly 

between DOE/NNSA and the Russian Federal Customs Service. The Second Line of 

Defense/Megaports Initiative has 12 cost-sharing arrangements in place for portal 

monitoring equipment installation and training. Under our Fissile Materials Disposition program, although the United States has committed to contribute $400 million in support of plutonium disposition efforts in Russia, the Russia Federation 

bears responsibility for the approximately $2 billion remaining required to implement its plutonium disposition commitment. Additionally, over the past 10 years, 

the Russian Federation has provided over $30 million toward the cost of conducting 

research and development on the Gas Turbine-Modular Helium Reactor (GT–MHR) 

for plutonium disposition in Russia, and intends to continue to support that effort 

on a 50/50 cost sharing basis. As a final example, the Russian Government has committed to provide $3 million to help remove the HEU spent fuel from the Vinca Institute in Serbia as part GTRI’s fuel removal work 

Since 1994, DOE/NNSA has spent approximately $2 billion on Russian nuclear security work. Sustainability is the key to ensuring that these national security investments continue to be utilized to their full potential. We continue to stress to our 

Russian partners the importance of sustaining these systems, including the eventual 

need for Russia to take the full financial responsibility for sustaining completed nuclear security enhancements. To this end, the INMPC&A program recently reached 

agreement with Russia’s Rosatom on a Joint Sustainability and Transition Plan. 

This plan identifies specific timelines for each site to take over financial responsibility for sustainability related activities in Organizational Planning, Human Resource Development, Regulatory Development, Operational Cost Analysis, Maintenance, Performance Testing, and Configuration Management. We believe that such 

sustainability efforts, combined with the other project management practices referenced, will return the maximum benefit to the American public for their investment in global security and America’s national security. 

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, I am proud of NNSA’s nonproliferation accomplishments to date. 

The fiscal year 2011 budget request for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation builds 

upon a strong foundation of past achievements that will help us reap genuine security dividends from our nonproliferation efforts in the future. We have a narrow 

window of opportunity here and now, making use of fleeting global momentum on 

nonproliferation already underway, to renew our commitment to nonproliferation 

and nuclear security. Although the challenges to nuclear security are many, the potential benefit from expanded and accelerated international cooperation to address 

these challenges is enormous. Together with our interagency and international partners, through concerted action, and the continued support of Congress and the 

American people, we can reach this shared goal. I thank the chairman and the committee for your time. 

23 

Senator BILL NELSON. Thank you, gentlemen. 

We’ll turn to Senator LeMieux first. 

Senator LEMIEUX. Thank you for your testimony. I want to say, 

as a prefacatory remark, that I’m supportive of your efforts, and 

the administration’s efforts, to reduce the amount of weapon-grade 

nuclear material in the world, to lock those materials down so that 

they don’t get in the hands of rogue states. I also support the President’s efforts—I know that he has come forward on trying—to get 

rid of tactical nuclear weapons because of the dangers that they 

could get into the hands of rogue states. 

I want to focus specifically on a rogue state that we know, or at 

least we believe, is trying to arm itself with a nuclear weapon and 

that’s Iran. We’ve heard testimony, in front of the full committee, 

that Iran may be able to produce a nuclear weapon in a very short 

time period, certainly less than 5 years, maybe from 1 to 3 years. 

We heard testimony, yesterday, that Iran may be able to develop 

an intercontinental ballistic missile within 5 years. 

I want to focus if we can, to start off with on Iran, on Tehran’s 

efforts. We have, of course, the knowledge that we gained months 

ago on the new facility that they have in Qom. It seems that despite the administration’s overtures to have a diplomatic solution 

to this, that Tehran has snubbed its nose at us and is proceeding 

on the path of developing a nuclear weapon. 

How concerned are you about Iran’s acquisition of enough weapon-grade fissile material to make a nuclear weapon? 

Mr. Secretary? 

Dr. NACHT. It is a serious concern of DOD and the administration. It’s a top priority of this administration to prevent Iran from 

developing or acquiring a nuclear weapon. Very recently, Under 

Secretary Flournoy and the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, 

General Cartwright, testified just last week, in fact, in front of the 


421etc4.eps
24 

full Senate Armed Services Committee, and cited the two central 

objectives of our policy, working to prevent Iran from acquiring 

these weapons and countering Iran’s destabilizing activities and 

support for extremists in the Middle East. 

Our primary focus continues to be enhancing regional security 

cooperation with Middle Eastern partners. We’re working actively 

to counter destabilizing Iranian activities by strengthening the capacities of vulnerable states in the region. Through prudent military planning, we continue to refine options to protect U.S. and 

partner interests from Iranian aggression, to deter Iran’s destabilizing behavior, and to prepare for contingencies, all while reducing the risks of miscalculation. 

There is currently legislation in Congress that has passed the 

House and Senate overwhelmingly and which would levy new unilateral sanctions on Iran’s importation of refined petroleum and 

also take away much of the President’s flexibility to grant waivers. 

The Department of State and the White House are concerned because the extraterritoriality provision in the bill could undermine 

our attempts to levy multilateral sanctions. This is a highly sensitive issue, but we hope to move forward with it. 

It’s a combined effort at trying to limit Iranian capabilities and 

build support in the region to dissuade the Iranians from proceeding down this path. We have intensive discussions going on in 

New York now with the United Nations (U.N.) to craft language of 

a U.N. Security Council resolution which will provide meaningful 

sanctions against the Iranian Government. 

Senator LEMIEUX. I think we all would like to see meaningful 

sanctions. Up until this time, that has not been achieved. We know 

that the President, from what we read, is working on it with China 

and Russia, and we hope that that comes about. But, we also know 

that the last time that we worked to bring the world community 

together to stop a rogue country from gaining a nuclear weapon, it 

didn’t work. That was with North Korea. If we continue on this 

path, it may happen again. Hope springs eternal that sanctions 

will work and that we will change Ahmadinejad’s mind, which 

seems unlikely to me. A moment ago, you talked about military 

planning and contingencies. Can you elaborate on that? 

Dr. NACHT. I’ll just state what Secretary Gates stated on Monday 

of this week, that he had written a memo that presented a number 

of questions and proposals intended to contribute to an orderly and 

timely decisionmaking process with respect to the Iranian nuclear 

weapons program. In support of the administration’s pivot to a 

pressure track on Iran earlier this year, this memo identified next 

steps in our defense planning process, where further interagency 

discussion and policy decisions would be needed in the months and 

weeks ahead. That’s all I’m able to say at this time about planning 

for contingencies with respect to Iran. 

Senator LEMIEUX. Mr. Baker, do you have anything you’d like to 

add on this? 

Mr. BAKER. We’re just as concerned as you are, sir. What we’re 

doing is looking at all the procurements that may be going into 

Iran, and trying to stop those procurements. They may be dual-use 

equipment used for nuclear capabilities, we’re working that very 

hard with industry. We know, in an unclassified setting, that there 

25 

are many procurement lines. We’re educating industry on the export control rules, on the licensing rules, and we’re trying to cut 

off these networks going into Iran to help Iran build a nuclear 

weapon. We were and are concerned. We’re doing everything in 

DOE, from an export-control standpoint and with industry, to try 

to stop any procurement that may be dual-use-type equipment. 

Senator LEMIEUX. I can’t stress enough how much this worries 

me. I hope, and I would assume, that this is a topic of daily conversation in your lives. I can’t think of any other priority that 

would come ahead of this topic. This is a country that its leader 

is openly hostile to the United States of America, openly hostile to 

our allies in Israel, and says he wants to wipe Israel off the face 

of the map. 

Mr. Chairman, I’d like to have entered into the record this Washington Times article from today, which was a front-page story, if 

I may? 

Senator BILL NELSON. Without objection. 

Senator LEMIEUX. It is about Iran boosting its Qods shock troops 

in Venezuela. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

26 


421etc5.eps
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421etc6.eps
28 

Senator LEMIEUX. At our last subcommittee hearing of this committee, we discussed, in detail—and I would hope that it’s something that you all have focused on, and, if you haven’t focused on, 

you will—the gathering storm and alliances between Caracas and 

Tehran. We know that President Ahmadinejad has visited President Hugo Chavez several times, that there is a direct flight from 


421etc7.eps 421etc8.eps
29 

Caracas to Tehran, with some sort of extra-airport-type arrangement, where they don’t go through customs, and people can get off 

the plane and get on the plane without knowing who they are. We 

know that Hezbollah and Hamas are set up in Latin America. We 

know that our friends in Colombia are dealing with Venezuela, allowing narcotraffickers to fly over their airspace. 

Senator Nelson and I have the great pleasure to have so many 

military installations in Florida. I had the opportunity to visit one 

in Key West this weekend, which is our Joint Interagency Task 

Force that does phenomenal work interdicting these narcoterrorists. If you look at the flight paths of these trafficking planes, 

they’re all flying over Venezuela. We know that Venezuela is cooperating with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia. A 

Spanish judge has recently come out and said that, in a formal proceeding, Venezuela was working with the Basque Homeland and 

Freedom (ETA) to assassinate President Uribe and his predecessor. 

Now, we find out that Iran is going to put shock troops in Venezuela. 

I want you all to focus on this topic because I’m worried about 

an Iranian attack from the south, not just from the east. I hope 

that this is something that you’ve at least focused on or talked 

about. I’d be happy to hear any response you’d like to make to that. 

Mr. Secretary? 

Dr. NACHT. I would just say that the issues you’ve raised are 

taken most seriously at the highest levels of DOD and our Government. DOD does not comment publicly on any military planning in 

which we are engaged. Any specific questions you might have on 

Venezuela we can take for the record and we’ll get back to you with 

specific responses. 

Senator LEMIEUX. Mr. Baker? 

Mr. BAKER. Likewise, sir. Again, we’re trying to work all the 

technology, and, like I say, all the procurement networks, which we 

know pretty well in DOE, and educating industry to stop anything 

going into Iran. We’re working this hard, and in an unclassified 

setting, we know many of the networks. What we can do, from 

DOE, is use our capabilities at the laboratories, our technology capabilities, and our connections with industry, which is vast, to educate them on lines of procurement that goes into Iran, to try to stop 

any dual-use equipment that could be used to help them build the 

nuclear program. 

Senator LEMIEUX. Thank you both, gentlemen. 

Mr. Chairman, I have other questions, but I want to defer to you. 

I know that you’ll have questions for our panel here and perhaps 

I’ll have an opportunity to ask some more questions later. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Thank you, Senator LeMieux. 

Mr. Baker, in the programs that the NNSA has to prevent Iran 

from getting materials and technology, you mentioned the export 

controls. Talk to us about the support of the IAEA, and talk to us 

about preventing nuclear smuggling. 

Mr. BAKER. We’re doing very much on nuclear smuggling, sir. We 

have many programs that help this. 

Number one, we have what we call a Second Line of Defense program where radiation detection units are put on borders of countries in Russia and also the former Soviet Union. What we do is 

30 

stop things at the border that may be smuggled out of the country. 

Right now, we have identified 650 sites that we’re trying to put radiation detection in, and we have 400 of them completed. 

What we’re doing in Russia—and Russia is paying for half of 

this, and we’re paying for the other half—or every spot around 

Russia, about 200 spots, is that we have put a fence around Russia 

with radiation detection to ensure things cannot be smuggled out 

easily. 

We also are working seaports. We have 100 seaports from which 

things are coming to the United States that we are trying to put 

radiation detection in. We have finished 27 of them. We will have 

another 13 done this year. We’ll have the whole system done by 

2015, covering all the megaport issues. 

We also work in export control. We are educating people on licensing of dual-use equipment. We’re educating industry. We’re 

educating the enforcers of export control laws on the danger of this 

stuff getting out. 

We have, sir, as you probably know, some cases in the past—I 

can’t say much here—that things have been already caught by our 

systems on the borders of Russia. 

It is a system that is working pretty well. Like I say, we have 

to have triple phenomenology, if I can use that word, that we try 

to protect it at a source, but if that fails—and an insider is a big 

problem, we know, that could try to get this stuff out; they know 

the vulnerability of the system—we can stop them at the border or 

stop them at the seaports, and also educate everyone on export control rules. Hopefully—you don’t ever know what you don’t know— 

we’re getting this done as quickly as we can. It’s a very critical 

area. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Would you please characterize the cooperation by Russia, and characterize the cooperation of the host 

countries in those seaports? 

Mr. BAKER. With Russia, generally, I can’t tell you; with the customs people in Russia, there is a better relationship. I have the relationship right with the head of customs. He is really, really good 

to work with. There are parts of Russia where it’s tougher. But 

putting this border security system up around Russia, customs has 

been very cooperative. They’re just as scared as we are. It’s worked 

really well in the nuclear smuggling area. 

On seaports, it’s a little tougher but we know where they’re at. 

When we go in and explain what we’re trying to do to help to keep 

things coming from the United States, it’s a little tougher, but 

we’re succeeding. Just this last summit, we had a megaport agreement signed with Italy, and we had a megaport signed with Argentina. It is working. We have, if I can say this, sir, right now more 

agreements than we have money right now on megaports. So, it is 

working. It’s a little different, a little more difficult than it is with 

Russia right now with customs, but it is working. I want you to 

know, we’re doing everything we can to make it work even better. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Please describe the historical relationship 

with Russia, going back to Nunn-Lugar. 

Mr. BAKER. I’ve been working with Russia for a long time. In the 

Nunn-Lugar days, it was tougher. Russia didn’t trust us. They 

knew that they needed our help. I’ve gone into Russia, sir, in the 

31 

middle-1990s, and I’ve seen things that I would like to tell you in 

person, that I don’t want public. It was a scary time. When the 

Berlin Wall came down, many things became vulnerable, and Russia needed our help. They needed our help with giving clothing to 

the guards that guard the nuclear weapons. We had to build an accounting system for them. We had to build a regulation system for 

them. We worked really hard. 

But now, today, it seems like Russia has gone on personalities 

many times. I’ve seen things that I’ve never thought I would see, 

and I used to be war-planning advisor to President Reagan in the 

White House, so I was the guy that held the football for the President, and I saw things I used to target. They would show me these 

things. They know my background. But, I’ve been working with 

them; they know we’re there to help them, and they know we’re 

there not as spies, even though I’ve been called that before. The relationship has really improved over the years. It got a little tougher 

after the invasion of Georgia. But, Russians said, and we said, regardless of what happens with things, our work has to continue. 

This is the security of two great countries. It’s our national security. Many times people ask me, ‘‘Why are we doing this in Russia?’’ It’s our national security that we’re concerned about; one nuclear device getting over here. 

It has been tough at times, but we’ve succeeded. Again, you don’t 

know what you don’t know, but they have shown us things that I’d 

never thought I would see. We’ve been in warhead sites. They took 

me to a place called West 19 not very long ago where all the warheads are. When Dr. Condoleezza Rice was here, she said that was 

the worst site she ever saw. We fixed it. Now it’s just as good as 

Pantex or one of our other facilities. We’re getting ready to take the 

Office of Management and Budget to that site to show them the 

type of work that we did on West 19. So, we’ve seen things. They 

opened up to us. 

Now, when is the window going to close? I hope never. There’s 

a great relationship between President Obama and President 

Medvedev. But, we know in 21⁄2 years they’re going to have an election in Russia, and there are two guys running, and one of them 

is going to win. I know the one who’s going to win if they both run, 

but it is really a great relationship. President Medvedev and President Obama agreed in Prague, and they also agreed in this summit, that they will work closely together because nuclear terrorism 

is the biggest thing there is, and they both want to stop this. 

Right now, we have a bilateral commission headed by Secretary 

Clinton and Foreign Minister Lavrov. My boss, Dan Poneman, Deputy Secretary of Energy, and I work all the nuclear security in Russia and the nuclear energy. What we do every 6 months is we lay 

out what needs to be done in Russia, from a security standpoint, 

and then we report on what we’ve done. Every 6 months. I just met 

with him 3 weeks ago, and we have another report. We’ll do another report in June. 

This checklist goes to Secretary Clinton and then goes to the 

President to show everything we’re doing in Russia and how we’re 

accomplishing—it’s like a metric. 

32 

It’s a long answer to your question, sir, but I’m optimistic the relationship will stay good for the next 3 years, and hopefully we can 

get all the work done in Russia very soon. 

Senator BILL NELSON. How about the other parts of the old Soviet Union where nuclear weapons and materials were kept? 

Mr. BAKER. The other parts of the Soviet Union have been pretty 

good. Right now we’re blending down all the HEU in Kazakhstan. 

We’re getting ready to do that with GTRI. We have an agreement 

that came out of the summit from Ukraine, where we can have all 

their HEU and bring it back. We’re taking HEU out of Poland. 

We’re also taking HEU out of Belarus. 

They’ve been cooperating pretty well. I can’t give you an example. It’s hard sometimes. It’s really hard, and we have to work with 

them. Sometimes you have to give them a little more money than 

you wish you could to get the stuff out. But, it’s our national security. If you look at DOE’s budget on this, compared to the defense 

budget, well, you can’t even see it; it’s a little squeak. It’s very low 

for, in my opinion, the biggest threat this country faces, as Dr. 

Nacht said. 

Senator BILL NELSON. All right. Let’s address our support to the 

IAEA. 

Mr. BAKER. Yes, sir. 

We are building more and more support for the IAEA. The IAEA 

needs help. They need technical people. We’re getting people from 

our laboratories to volunteer to go and work. Another thing they 

need, badly, is new safeguards. Right now, we have a new safeguards initiative that is educating more people, expertise, better 

technology, measurements, and also better concepts on safeguards. 

For the last 30 years, we have lived with safeguards that should 

have been updated. But, now, during the nuclear renaissance, we 

have to build better safeguards for the IAEA, so we’re building 

that. That’s going very well. This committee has supported us very 

well in that. We have a 5-year window that we’re building technology. We have 200 interns right now, post-docs, learning safeguards, so we won’t have a brain drain on this for the IAEA. This 

is going very well with the IAEA. 

What we’re working with IAEA is the Convention on Physical 

Protection. They call it IAEA 225. That regulation is what the 

IAEA makes all countries that have nuclear material hold to; this 

is what they check. We’re updating that to make it tougher. After 

September 11, we had to change things. We’re almost there, in a 

new IAEA 225, Revision 5, we call it. The President said this. He 

got commitments out of all 47 members that were here at the summit that they would push Revision 5. It’s in 120-day review period 

right now. 

We’re helping the IAEA have better safeguards. We’re trying to 

give them more technology. The President said in Prague that he 

wanted to support the IAEA. I think we’re doing that, to the best 

of our ability, to give them what they need to do their job. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Thank you, Mr. Baker. 

Mr. BAKER. Yes, sir. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Senator LeMieux. 

Senator LEMIEUX. In terms of trying to secure the nuclear stockpile of the world, HEU, for example, I would assume that, when 

33 

the Soviet Union fell and the Cold War ended, when we started our 

relations with Russia, that some kind of accounting was undertaken to determine where everything was. Do we have confidence 

that we know today where all the weapon-grade material is in the 

world? 

Mr. BAKER. I think we do now. I think I can say in an open hearing that when we started this work in 1994, they didn’t even know. 

We started it, and we’ve built procedures—I’m trying to keep this 

unclassified—that we know where the material was located. Now, 

again, sir, you don’t know what you don’t know, as I say. But, we 

think we have a good handle on it. 

Russia, I think, would admit back in those days they did not 

have a handle. We saw this when we went in there. I think today 

we do in Russia. 

We also think we know where all the HEU is in the world. We 

have a document, done by our Global Threat Reduction Agency, 

that shows where we think all the HEU is in the world also. 

We feel we have a pretty good handle on that. One thing we have 

not been able to do in Russia is to get into their serial production 

plants. These serial production plants—they won’t let us in—are 

where they build weapons. We’ve secured about everything, or we 

soon will; we have 19 buildings to go and then we’re finished. Then, 

we’ll get into the sustainability area, which we’re working right 

now in Russia. We’ve completed 210 of the buildings. There’s 229. 

In this fiscal year 2011 budget, we’re asking for money to finish 

these 19 buildings in Russia. All the Ministry of Defense work is 

done. The warhead sites are done. We took half of those and secured those, and DOD took the other half and secured them. Like 

West 19 I was telling you about, it was a facility that we did. 

They’re secure. 

We think we have a fairly good handle on it. Matter of fact, I’ll 

leave it at that. It is a fairly good handle. We don’t know, maybe, 

if we got it all. But, we do have a document that shows where it’s 

at in Russia. We do have a document that shows where the HEU 

is throughout the world. In our GTRI, our goal is to protect 200 reactors. That’s our goal. Right now, we have converted 63 reactors. 

We converted or shut down 71 of them, together. Some of them just 

shut down; we didn’t have to convert them. 

Senator LEMIEUX. Can I interrupt you for a second? 

Mr. BAKER. Yes, sir. 

Senator LEMIEUX. The 200 reactors, is that focused on ones that 

can create material that can be used for weapon production, as opposed to just ones that are for domestic electric production? 

Mr. BAKER. All of this is that they can make a weapon. This is 

HEU. 

Senator LEMIEUX. Right. So, you’ve not only mapped out where 

all the material that’s already existing may be, but then, are also 

trying to reduce that material. You’re also trying to secure the 

areas where it could be created so that it doesn’t get out into the 

world. 

Mr. BAKER. Yes, sir. We are. 

Senator LEMIEUX. What efforts, if any, has the United States undertaken with China to work in a similar collaborative fashion as 

we are doing with Russia? 

34 

Mr. BAKER. I can tell you what we do in China. China is a country that many people think ought to pay their own way. We have 

worked with the civilian sector of China; we have not worked with 

the military section. What we have done with the civilian sector of 

China, one, China has converted two of their reactors from HEU 

on their own to LEU; they paid the money, $30 million. We have 

four neutron reactors in China that we want them to convert. They 

have to have a special type of fuel to convert these, so we’re helping 

them build that special type of fuel to convert these reactors. From 

these neutron reactors, there are other places, like Pakistan and 

other ones, and we’re going to try to convert them. 

We have what we call a ‘‘Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Technology,’’ 

called PUNT, in China, and that’s to work with them on safeguards, to educate them on export control, and to educate them on 

nuclear technology and on dual-use equipment. We have worked 

that with China, and, basically, at no cost to us. We ran a prototype detector on a megaport in China. One megaport. They paid for 

the equipment. We provided the expertise. We hope to do more in 

China besides one megaport, but they wanted to see us demonstrate how to use one. 

What we have right now is a goal that China will pay at least 

60 percent of this, and maybe 70 percent of the work we do, and 

we pay the 30 or whatever percent left. 

China is not going to be a Russia at all, but we are working with 

them on these things that are so important, like nuclear smuggling. It’s gone fairly well, and we hope to do more. But, on the 

military side, they don’t want any part of us. 

Senator LEMIEUX. One final topic I’d like to raise with you goes 

back a little bit to what we first started with. We know that there 

are countries who are going to want to have nuclear power. There 

are peaceful countries. I have a list here of the countries around 

the world who have nuclear reactors, some in places that I didn’t 

know had reactors, a total of 437, according to this document from 

March 31, around the world. 

Right now, Iran’s saying it wants nuclear energy for peaceful 

purposes. We doubt that very much. But what happens? What 

should we be doing going forward? I know, Mr. Secretary, you’ve 

made a career out of studying policy. This seems to be about as difficult of a policy question as one can imagine; when we have difficult states, when we have rogue countries, when we have Iran. 

But, it’s not going to just be Iran, it’s going to be Syria; it’s going 

to be Venezuela; it’s going to be other countries that are going to 

say that they’re going down this same path that North Korea went 

down and Iran is on, which is, ‘‘Well, we want it for peaceful purposes,’’ and then all of a sudden there’s a bomb. 

How do we, as part and leader of the international community, 

handle this trend, which we know will occur? Is there a way that 

we can set up some kind of international regime that will deal with 

these types of states wanting nuclear energy which we believe will 

be pretextual for them obtaining a weapon? 

Dr. NACHT. Thank you for that question, Senator. The whole 

premise of the NPT was to facilitate the growth in the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes while closing off the nuclear 

weapons option. Despite all of our difficulties with Iran and North 

35 

Korea in recent years, actually all things considered up to now 

we’ve been rather successful. There are only a handful of countries 

that are not members of the NPT or have really not behaved properly with respect to the NPT. 

We hope that in the NPT Review Conference next month in New 

York, one of the outcomes will be a strengthened treaty regime 

which will make it more difficult to withdraw from the treaty and 

which will provide more incentives by strengthening the IAEA for 

growth of peaceful programs while closing off the nuclear weapons 

option. 

Also, in the NPR that DOD just recently produced, we note that 

countries that are non-nuclear weapon states and that are in full 

compliance with their nonproliferation obligations, that those countries would not be the subject of use or threatened use of nuclear 

weapons by the United States. Whereas, countries that are not in 

compliance with their nonproliferation obligations, as Secretary 

Gates said, all options for the United States are on the table. We 

are providing both incentives and disincentives for states not to go 

down the nuclear road. 

We know that some states are concerned that, if Iran acquires 

nuclear weapons that their security is threatened; it might stimulate their own interests. We’re working very hard, diplomatically 

and with our own counterparts at the military level, to ensure that 

they are—especially our allies and partners—secure. 

Senator LEMIEUX. There is significant concern of an arms race 

in the Middle East with countries like Saudi Arabia and others 

who wanted weapons. 

Dr. NACHT. Yes. Prominent figures in the field, like former Secretary of Defense Bill Perry and others, have characterized the current situation as a tipping point, where perhaps several additional 

states could go down the nuclear road if we don’t solve this problem. We’re very aware of this, and we have a wide variety of activities underway with every one of these governments to try to provide the incentives and assure them that it’s really not the way to 

go, to go down the nuclear path. 

This is even true with our NATO allies. We have several European countries that looked at nuclear options years ago, and they 

foreswore them because they’re under the nuclear security guarantee of the United States as part of Article 5 of the NATO treaty. 

We don’t want any of those countries to rethink their idea, so we 

want to, in fact, strengthen our extended deterrence relationships 

with every one of these countries. It’s really a multifaceted strategy. 

At the same time, we realize that because of climate change concerns, because of fossil fuel supply uncertainties, for a variety of 

reasons, nuclear energy for peaceful purposes is probably going to 

grow, and perhaps grow quite considerably over the next several 

decades. The challenge will only increase for us, increase for the 

IAEA, increase for DOE and DOD, to play a meaningful role, to 

make sure countries understand that: peaceful path, no problem; 

weapons, not desirable, not permitted. The strategy keeps evolving 

because the players evolve, the technology evolves, and some of the 

policy issues evolve. 

36 

Senator LEMIEUX. I think the challenge we have is that, as we 

progress in the modern world for some of these rogue states, having the capability of nuclear power even is a marquee; it is something that brands them in the higher echelon of states around the 

world. They want that branding. It’s one thing for a country to 

agree and say, ‘‘We’re not going to seek nuclear weapons,’’ but 

when you can’t trust the country to start with, and they’re say a 

country like Syria, who we believe is further assisting in getting 

missiles to Hamas and Hezbollah; if a country like that says, 

‘‘Okay, well, we want a nuclear power plant for peaceful purposes,’’ 

just like with an Iran, you don’t believe them. How does the world 

community set up a structure—and maybe this is part of what 

you’re working on—ahead of the problem so that we’re not being 

reactive to a country that now says, ‘‘We’re building a reactor, 

we’re building a nuclear power program.’’ How do we get ahead of 

it so that there’s some kind of sanctioning that’s going to have to 

occur for, not just, ‘‘We want to have a weapon,’’ but also, ‘‘We want 

to pursue nuclear energy’’? 

Dr. NACHT. The country that you mentioned, Syria, is a member 

and a part of the NPT. If they want to move further into the ‘‘nuclear energy for peaceful purposes’’ area, they have to work with 

the IAEA, which is to not only facilitate their work, but to also ensure that there’s no weapons activity related to this peaceful purposes. 

Mr. BAKER. There are hundreds of reactors 

Dr. NACHT. We need to strengthen the IAEA, as Ken Baker has 

said, because they don’t have enough resources and enough capability at the moment to do the kind of job we all think is needed. 

At the same time, we have to demonstrate, perhaps with other 

countries, like Iran—which Syria will pay close attention to—that, 

to move down the road will incur tremendous disadvantage, tremendous pain to them, so they should have no incentive of any 

kind to think about diverting any peaceful nuclear program for 

weapons. 

Mr. BAKER. There are 189 countries that are members of the 

NPT, and Article 2 of the NPT says they can build nuclear power 

for peaceful uses. What we’re doing—DOE’s doing—is this Advanced Safeguards Program that we’re trying to give the IAEA. 

Once a country gets nuclear power, proliferation becomes a bigger 

problem, so the IAEA challenge, as Dr. Nacht said, is greater. We 

have to give them better safeguards. 

We also are helping countries have a better export control system. We’re working with many countries getting tighter control on 

nuclear weapons. But, if they’re a member of the NPT, and Article 

2 says they can do that, as Dr. Nacht said, you can’t very easily 

stop them, but you have to have controls, you have to give the tools 

and capabilities to the IAEA to make sure they’re not doing something else. 

Senator LEMIEUX. Iran’s a signatory to the NPT, right? 

Mr. BAKER. Yes, sir, they are. 

Senator LEMIEUX. North Korea was, and then they backed out? 

Mr. BAKER. They’ve withdrawn. 

Senator LEMIEUX. So, there’s no teeth on the back side of this? 

37 

Dr. NACHT. Sir, this is what we’re engaged in right now, which 

is a tough sanctions program that we’re developing toward Iran, 

and a tough sanctions program that’s been implemented and may 

further be strengthened against North Korea. 

To have targeted sanctions, to have penalties to the leadership, 

penalties to those who make the decisions, in order to, hopefully, 

change their policies. 

Senator LEMIEUX. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Dr. Nacht, the DOD CTR program is also 

going to play a role in the global lockdown effort. What is the DOD 

plan to achieve that goal? 

Dr. NACHT. We’re currently engaged in several activities, and 

we’re seeking additional funding for CTR, specifically related to the 

global lockdown. Funding for spent naval fuel and fissile material 

disposition in Russia—several of them are Russia-related; site security enhancement in Russia; and automated nuclear warhead inventory control in Russia. These are building on longstanding CTR 

programs we’ve had with the Russians. By the way, I should add 

in response to some of the previous questions, DOD’s relationships 

with the Russians at multiple levels are really quite good, from the 

very highest levels of military officials and political leaders to people in more technical capacities and people at the working level. 

In addition, as part of the global lockdown we are seeking funds 

to establish Nuclear Security Centers of Excellence outside the 

former Soviet Union, one in India and one in China; each has 

somewhat different objectives. These centers will assess equipment 

and manpower; they’ll provide material security training; they’ll 

demonstrate enhanced security procedures and processes; and 

they’ll provide lessons learned without having to be directly at the 

site of where weapons are located. 

Again, it’s an effort to work together and to enlist in these cases 

Indian and Chinese support, which is central as trying to facilitate 

the global lockdown. 

By the way, I should also add in response to a previous question 

there was a strategy. In developing the strategy for the global 

lockdown, the work for the global lockdown that just happened has 

been in place for a long time; there was an interagency assessment 

that was commissioned, and a comprehensive classified assessment 

was done, of where the material is. We can’t say for certain that 

we know where everything is in every country, but we’re quite confident that it provides the sound basis for moving ahead on the 

global lockdown process. 

A number of activities in Russia, and some new centers outside 

of Russia, are the elements of about $74 million in additional funding for how CTR will contribute to the global nuclear lockdown. 

Senator BILL NELSON. What about in those countries of the 

former Soviet Union outside of Russia? 

Dr. NACHT. We’ve had longstanding activities there, where we’ve 

been involved in Kazakhstan, for example, and in a number of 

other countries of the former Soviet Union. We’re also, as part of 

CTR that was not only nuclear, deeply involved on the biological 

and chemical weapons side as well. There’s a lot of consultation activity in trying to identify sites, build support for the Biological 

Weapons Convention, and the Chemical Weapons Convention 

38 

verification procedures. It’s a multifaceted activity in a number of 

countries for nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. 

Senator BILL NELSON. All of the areas that the Soviet Union had 

nuclear material and weapons, outside of what is today Russia, you 

feel good about a lockdown? 

Dr. NACHT. We’re very intent on achieving the President’s goal 

of locking down this material in 4 years, but it’s tough. We learned 

about uranium in Kazakhstan quite a long time ago, and it didn’t 

actually initially come through the Intelligence Community. I think 

it would be misleading to say that it’s going to be a totally comprehensive, air-tight system that we know of in advance. We’re 

going to have to roll up our sleeves, work in these countries, work 

with them, build momentum, and show that cooperation in the 

global nuclear lockdown is in everybody’s interest. I think as we do 

that we’re very hopeful that we can achieve the President’s goal. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Would you provide to the committee, in 

classified form, your analysis, or analyses done previously, in between the time that the Soviet Union was disintegrating in late 

1991 up to when the Nunn-Lugar program started, where you all, 

in Nunn-Lugar, were actually on the scene? Would you share with 

the committee in classified form the answers to the obvious questions? Was that material secured? What possibly was not secured? 

What is its viability today, if it were unsecured, and so forth? 

[The information referred to follows:] 

[Deleted.] 

Senator BILL NELSON. Thank you very much for doing that. 

Now, are the global lockdown activities of the CTR program and 

the NNSA programs coordinated? 

Mr. BAKER. I can start. I can say: absolutely. Coordination has 

been good the last few years. One example is the Ministry of Defense sites in Russia. When Russia said, ‘‘Come in and do our warhead sites,’’ we worked with DOD. Like I told you, sir, we did half 

of them, they did half. We coordinated very well together. On this 

4-year lockdown, as Dr. Nacht said, we will get the job done. We 

have decided, basically, what lanes we’re in, who’s going to do 

what, and where. We meet with DOD quite often. Matter of fact, 

we have a big meeting with DOD just tomorrow to discuss this 4- 

year plan even more. In my opinion, from a DOE perspective, it is 

working extremely well. 

Dr. NACHT. Yes, and I would say, really, the same thing. Sometimes cooperation in some areas leads to cooperation in other areas. 

For example, we’ve just gone through a very intensive experience 

producing the NPR, and there was really intimate involvement by 

NNSA, the NNSA leadership, and the DOE leadership in the production of that report. All the signals, all the incentives, from the 

top leadership of our departments is to encourage more collaboration at other levels, including in CTR, which has been going on 

very well for many years. We know we have to work together because we each bring different perspectives and different expertise 

to the table. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Mr. Secretary, does DOD know the full extent of the material involved in this effort for which you all have 

responsibility? 

39 

Dr. NACHT. For the global nuclear lockdown? Yes, as I mentioned, there was a major study—it’s a classified study—done before the rollout for the global nuclear lockdown, and that is really 

the basis for our understanding of what we have to go after to 

achieve the President’s goal in 4 years. That’s been shared with the 

interagency. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Your testimony is that you think that 

other countries are sharing our concern about these materials? 

Dr. NACHT. Absolutely. I think the President has been extraordinarily effective in communicating the seriousness of this problem. 

Even as recently as a few years ago, prominent Russian figures 

spoke openly about their skepticism about nuclear terrorism. They 

were happy to work with the United States on securing some of 

their own sites, but they didn’t really think that problem at least 

was their problem. Now, I think they’re fully aware; I know that 

they’re fully aware of the seriousness of the problem, both because 

of the nuclear proliferation issue that we’ve discussed already, and 

also because of the terrorism issue that they’ve experienced in their 

own Moscow subways. 

The President, through the combination even recently of the NPR 

and completing the New START and the Nuclear Security Summit, 

all leading up to the NPT review conference, and his statement 

earlier last year in September at the U.N. at the opening of the 

General Assembly, all are really having an effect on heightening 

awareness and support around the world for this problem. As we 

know, 47 national leaders met in the United States; it was the 

largest group of its kind since San Francisco in 1945. 

Senator BILL NELSON. I must say that I was pleasantly surprised 

that, on fairly short notice, that many leaders showed up. 

Dr. NACHT. Right. 

Senator BILL NELSON. It does, indeed, express their concern. 

Mr. BAKER. I think, sir, that this summit, at least in my experience in nonproliferation, was the biggest thing to ever happen. I do 

believe, like Dr. Nacht, that they all are committed; they all are 

just as scared as we are. If you look at the initiatives that came 

out of the summit, it was more than we expected. Some people in 

the White House said it was five times better—I won’t name 

names—than they ever thought it would be. If they’re going to do 

this again in 2 years in South Korea, it’s going to keep emphasis 

high in nuclear security. 

Senator BILL NELSON. I think you’re right. I think what they’re 

waking up to is, if a terrorist attack can occur in the Moscow subway, it can occur anyplace. 

Mr. Baker, is Russia fully committed to taking back the original 

Russian material? 

Mr. BAKER. Yes, sir. We have taken back most of it. We have 

some left. But, they have been really easy to work with. What we 

have, every 6 months we go to Russia or they come here—most of 

the time we go to Russia—we lay out the schedule for the 6 months 

on takeback of Russian fuel. This has worked very well. We had 

some complications, like we can’t pass fuel through Kazakhstan, so 

we had to take some of it by train and then by boat around to 

Mayak, Russia, where it was going to be stored. We have it there. 

Russia is on board with us, sir, 100 percent. 

40 

Senator BILL NELSON. Are other countries willing to pay part of 

the cost to secure this material? 

Mr. BAKER. On this, most of the costs have been with us. They’re 

willing to give up the HEU if we can convert the reactor to LEU, 

but most of the cost, on this Russian takeback, has been on our 

shoulders. 

Senator BILL NELSON. What about plutonium? 

Mr. BAKER. Plutonium, we have a little plutonium that we’re trying to bring back, or bring back someplace, from one of these countries of which I’d rather not say in public. But, plutonium will take 

time. We have this agreement with Russia now to get rid of 34 

tons. I know that’s not all of it, but, I think, as this goes along and 

they burn 34 tons and we burn 34 tons—like I said, that can make 

17,000 weapons—in my opinion, time will tell, they will continue 

to burn more and more plutonium in the reactors, just like we will 

continue. Hopefully, the momentum will not stop with 34 tons of 

plutonium in each country. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Mr. Baker, you had talked earlier about 

the disposition of 34 metric tons of weapon-grade plutonium by converting it to the fuel for the commercial power reactors. The facilities were originally supposed to be operational by now, but now 

they’ve been delayed until 2016. It’s a hefty cost. The Government 

Accountability Office completed a report that found that the project 

may not have enough plutonium feedstock. What is NNSA planning to do to make sure the plutonium is available? 

Mr. BAKER. Sir, we’re working that problem right now. We have, 

we know, 9.6 metric tons of plutonium right now that we can burn. 

It depends on how fast you burn it through the MOX system. The 

MOX system is able to burn 3 metric tons of plutonium a year in 

their reactor. So, we do have a problem on feedstock. We’re working that right now. We’re trying to find out where because the pit 

disassembly plant has been delayed, and we haven’t even gone to 

Critical Decision-1 with the pit disassembly plant. We’re concerned, 

but we’re working that problem hard. We have both environmental 

management people, in DOE and NNSA, working together to make 

sure we have feedstock to burn through that MOX system when it 

comes on in 2016. 

But, it is a problem, and I will keep you advised, sir, how we’re 

working this. Hopefully, we’ll find a solution for it. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Dr. Nacht, DOD is now doing a task force 

that is going to be available to destroy WMD. Tell us how it’s going 

to be organized, who’s going to participate, how are they going to 

be trained, and what is the needed funding. 

Dr. NACHT. Thank you, Senator. Yes, we’ve requested $22 million 

initially against this effort. This is the JTFE headquarters, which 

would be developed in conjunction with SOCOM, to locate, characterize, secure, disable, or destroy WMD in, potentially, a conflict or 

other semi-permissive environment, not a peaceful environment. 

Our QDR identified preventing proliferation in WMD as a top 

priority for DOD. This is the first time, really, that this has happened. That’s also having an effect on senior civilians in DOD, senior military, the combatant commanders, and others. They are elevating in their own minds, their own activities, and their own planning: stopping and dealing with WMD in their daily work. 

41 

Having called it a top priority for DOD, we’re now establishing 

this study headquarters for WMD elimination. The Joint Chiefs of 

Staff study is underway. The Secretary of Defense will make a decision down the road about the precise nature or the characteristics 

of the center. All I can say is, we’re in the early stages of studying 

how this would be set up. 

SOCOM will be a central player in these activities. 

Senator BILL NELSON. How does this fold into the lessening of 

warheads that will be required under the new treaty? 

Dr. NACHT. That’s a somewhat separate activity. We have a treaty with the Russian Federation, assuming it’s ratified by the Senate and the Russian Duma, that will enter into force sometime this 

year and will lead to the reduction of the number of deployed strategic nuclear warheads. Those reductions will take place by the respective governments and will be verified, both collaboratively and 

by national technical means, on both sides. That’s something we 

have a lot of experience on, going back to SALT I, back in 1972. 

We have almost 40 years of experience of doing this with the Russians. This treaty has its own special characteristics, but I think 

we’re very confident it’s a highly verifiable treaty. That’s separate 

from this activity, which is really to, if necessary, disable or destroy 

WMD in the hands of folks that we think are very antithetical to 

U.S. national interests. It’s much of a special ops kind of activity. 

Senator BILL NELSON. All right. I think what you ought to do is 

come also to the committee in a classified session and go through 

some of that with us. 

Dr. NACHT. On the JTFE, yes? I’m happy to do that. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Yes, and perhaps bring in Admiral Olson’s 

folks on that as well. Is the CTR program going to play a role in 

any aspect of that task force? 

Dr. NACHT. Yes, I think, absolutely. The work on CTR and related aspects of dealing with WMD proliferation is a community 

within DOD. Some of our experts are sitting right behind me, such 

as Deputy Assistant Secretary Hersman and her team in Policy; we 

have other key people on the Joint Staff that we work with in the 

Services, in Under Secretary Carter’s organization, Acquisition, 

Technology, and Logistics, including Mr. Weber, the Assistant to 

the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs. We have a whole community, and we work on all 

of these activities really very closely together. 

There’s also an international dimension. We talk to NATO about 

this. We’re involved with countries around the world through PSI. 

It’s quite comprehensive, but it’s really quite coherent. I think, unquestionably, it is a growing priority for DOD, reflecting what the 

President has said, that the likelihood of global nuclear war is low, 

but nuclear attack is not low, and we need to elevate nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism as the top security concerns in the 

nuclear area. 

DOD is responding. It is responding to this directive. 

Senator BILL NELSON. You spoke as if the treaty just announced 

by the U.S. and Russian Presidents was going to be confirmed later 

this year. Do you know something that I don’t know? 

Dr. NACHT. ‘‘Hopefully.’’ I said ‘‘hopefully’’ that you would consent to ratification in this calendar year. Whenever you consent to 

42 

ratification. We can’t move forward with the elements of a treaty 

until it’s in force. It doesn’t enter into force until the treaty has 

been consent to ratified and has been deposited in the national capitals and in Geneva. Until that is done, there won’t be any action 

taken. We’re hopeful that Senate consent to ratification will be 

done in calendar year 2010, but you would know far better than 

I. 

Senator BILL NELSON. I’m hopeful, as well. 

Are both the CTR and the NNSA nonproliferation programs executable? Both of you have requested additional funds for fiscal year 

2011. Can you use those funds in a timely fashion? 

Mr. BAKER. The short answer is, yes, sir. We had very low—last 

year, in our program that is part of the 4-year plan—uncosted balances. In GTRI last year, we had $8.6 million remaining uncommitted. The MPC&A program, which is securing things in Russia and 

other places, we had $7.6 million. We think every penny that the 

President is asking for can be spent, or most of it can be spent. We 

will have uncommitted down below double digits. We are off, as 

hard as we can, working the 4-year plan. 

Dr. NACHT. In DOD, by far the two biggest areas where we’re 

seeking additional funding are to support the global nuclear 

lockdown, which we’ve discussed now at some length, and in BTRP. 

We’ve actually cut funding in a number of other areas to reduce the 

additional amount of funds that we are requesting. I can tell you, 

as someone who’s personally involved in this, this went through an 

incredibly intensive scrubbing within DOD with folks who, in the 

comptroller’s office, look at program analysis and evaluation, with 

folks who look at technical feasibility, the policy community, the acquisition community; they all worked very intensively to come up 

with requested funds that were fully executable, and they’re fully 

consistent with the President’s top priorities. 

They also, and I would say, funding reflects importance to some 

degree; the fact that there’s increased funding for these areas is another tangible signal that DOD is really taking these areas as very 

high priorities. The Secretary of Defense is extraordinarily supportive of this effort. 

Senator BILL NELSON. In the DOE budget you have included 

funds for space-based nuclear detectors. Your budget says that 

these sensors are going to fly on Global Positioning System (GPS) 

satellites and on Space-Based Infrared System (SBIRS). There is 

legislation mandating the maintenance of the capability provided 

by these detectors. Yet, the Air Force no longer has the nuclear detection sensor manifested on a SBIRS satellite. What do you understand is the status of these nuclear detection sensors on the SBIRS 

satellite? 

Mr. BAKER. We are still building. If I can, sir, I’ll give you a more 

expanded answer for the record, if it’s okay. 

But, we have expanded, and we have continued to build, nuclear 

detection sensors. You are right; it’s been a struggle with the Air 

Force on launching these things. We’re trying to work that right 

now. We have a commitment in DOE to continue to build these 

sensors, and hopefully they will fly on SBIRS one day, or however 

they get up there. But, if I can, I’d like to provide you a more deVerDate Aug 31 2005 14:05 Dec 06, 2010 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00048 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\62158.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
43 

tailed classified answer to that question. There is a problem here, 

and I agree with you. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

[Deleted.] 

Senator BILL NELSON. Thank you. We’ve had some problems 

with the SBIRS also, so let’s get into that in an appropriate setting. 

Mr. BAKER. Yes, sir. 

Senator NELSON. Now, let me ask you, Mr. Baker, the Library 

of Congress is running a program called the Open World Program. 

It works with Russia to develop broader understandings between 

Russian folks and American folks. It’s focused on civil society with 

extensive judicial, legal young leaders, and regional and local governmental exchange programs. It’s sponsored nonproliferation programs focused on export controls and technical safeguards. 

The Russian participants in these programs have visited our national laboratories and had discussions about the nonproliferation 

programs. The Library of Congress would like to continue to partner with NNSA to expand the program to the Ukraine. 

Are you willing to discuss this initiative with the director of the 

program, to see if there are areas of mutual interest? 

Mr. BAKER. Absolutely, sir. It’s a good program the Library of 

Congress is running. The Library of Congress has been working 

with Pacific Northwest’s lab and our lab in Oak Ridge. We support 

our national labs’ involvement, and we will continue to support this 

endeavor by the Library of Congress. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Does any of the staff have any more questions? [No response.] 

Okay, gentlemen, this has been a very illuminating hearing. We 

want to thank you for the hearing. We want to thank you for your 

public service. 

The hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:46 a.m., the subcommittee adjourned.] 

Æ