Defense Science Board 

Task Force 

on 

Force Protection in Urban 

and Unconventional 

Environments 

March 2006 

Office of the Under Secretary of Defense 

For Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics 

Washington, D.C. 20301-3140 
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___________________________________________________________ TABLE OF CONTENTS

_______________________________________________________________________ i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.............................................. III

Recommendations ............................................................................. xii

INTRODUCTION ..........................................................................................................1

The Future of Force Protection ...........................................................2

THE COMPRESSION OF STRATEGIC, OPERATIONAL, AND TACTICAL LEVELS IN 

SSTR OPERATIONS.....................................................................................................9

THE TRAINING REGIME ...........................................................................................16

Professional Military Education .......................................................20

INFORMATION OPERATIONS ...................................................................................25

TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE AND RED TEAMING ......................................................33

RAPID LEARNING AND SHARING OF EXPERIENCE.................................................36

THE ROLE FOR TECHNOLOGY.................................................................................39

JOINT URBAN OPERATIONS ACTIVITY AT JOINT FORCES COMMAND ..................42

CONCLUSION............................................................................................................44

APPENDIX A. TERMS OF REFERENCE ......................................................................47

APPENDIX B. TASK FORCE MEMBERSHIP................................................................49

APPENDIX C. BRIEFINGS, DISCUSSIONS AND VISITS ..............................................51

APPENDIX D. ACRONYMS........................................................................................55
 

TABLE OF CONTENTS____________________________________________________________ 

ii ________________________________________________________________________ 

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_______________________________________ SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

_______________________________________________________________________ iii

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The Under Secretary for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics 

(USD [AT&L]), the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the 

Director, Defense Research and Engineering requested the Defense 

Science Board (DSB) to form a task force to evaluate force protection 

in the context of post- major combat operations that have been 

conducted in Iraq and Afghanistan. The task force has assumed that 

such operations include stability, security, transition, and 

reconstruction (SSTR); counterinsurgency; and related operations that 

can occur in situations other than post-major combat. Attributes that 

contribute to the challenge of these missions include: 

 Multiple objectives, some in tension with others 

 Military intermingled with civilians 

 Adaptive adversaries hidden within the populace 

 No front lines – all forces at risk 

 Protracted operations lasting for years 

As directed, the task force’s focus was not on short-term fixes, but 

rather on preparing the Department to meet future challenges. 

Discussions with active duty officers with recent operational 

experience in Iraq have had a considerable effect on its findings. Its 

members also learned from visits to U.S. Army and Marine Corps 

training sites and from a variety of other presentations, including 

those given by British and Israeli officers about their experiences with 

force protection in similar operations. 

Force protection is not an end in itself. Furthermore, protecting 

the force is not only, or even mainly, about defensive measures. To 

the extent that “force protection” connotes bunkers and barbed wire, 

it is not a helpful term. The task force did not attempt to define force 

protection, but heard and agreed that protecting the force depends on 

information, an offensive mindset, winning trust, hearts and minds, 

as well as defensive measures. 
 

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ________________________________________ 

iv ________________________________________________________________________ 

One division commander emphasized that providing services – 

sewer, water, electricity, trash (SWET) – was his most effective force 

protection measure. In such circumstances, to paraphrase a chart 

from the National Training Center, money, food, water, medicine, 

employment, recognition, and respect are all ammunition (and 

armor). Ultimately, protecting the force while accomplishing the 

mission depends on all of these elements guided by realistic 

objectives and sound strategy, as well as sufficient boots on the 

ground. 

This report offers two major themes: 

(1) Empower the “strategic corporal.” The nature of SSTR 

operations places enormous burdens on junior officers, noncommissioned officers (NCOs), and the units they command. At 

present, they must make decisions traditionally thought of as far 

above their pay grades. On a daily basis they are demonstrating how 

capable they are. The U.S. military will have to use them to the 

fullest extent of their potential if the United States is to meet the 

challenges that will confront it in the course of coming decades. 

 For these missions, small unit performance represents the key to 

success. Tactical actions will inevitably have strategic implications. If 

there is to be one message that the Department’s leadership should 

take away from this report, it is that small units and their leaders are 

strategic assets, and the Department should resource them 

accordingly. Increased investment here can have high payoff in new 

capabilities. 

(2) Accelerate the transformation of the Department of Defense 

to an adaptive learning organization. A learning organization 

continuously monitors and objectively assesses its performance as 

well as that of its adversaries and devises and rapidly implements 

new approaches when the old ones will no longer work. The goal of 

becoming a learning organization is explicit in the National Defense 

Strategy of the United States of America (March 2005), which calls for 

“continuous transformation” and states: “We will continually adapt 

how we approach and confront challenges, conduct business, and 

work with others.” The rapid adaptation of the Army’s and the 
 

_______________________________________ SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

_______________________________________________________________________ v

Marine Corps’ training capabilities suggests attributes of learning 

organizations. On the other hand, the attributes of an effective 

learning organization are less evident in the Department’s experience 

of the past four years with information operations. 

In the major combat phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), U.S. 

forces achieved the twin goals of accomplishing the mission and 

protecting the force through an interdependent joint force – enabled 

by speed, stealth, and precision – employing multiple, simultaneous 

lines of attack to outstrip their Iraqi opponents’ ability to react. 

In counterinsurgency operations, U.S. forces could achieve these 

goals by becoming a force: 

 Agile enough to present a constantly changing face to the 

enemy, 

 Adaptable enough to learn faster than the enemy, and 

 Culturally sensitive enough to provide reassurance, services, 

and protection to the civilian population, as well as training 

and mentoring to the indigenous security forces. 

Can the American military gain such attributes and still maintain 

the ability to conduct conventional military operations? Only if the 

Department is willing to make major changes in some of the basic 

enablers of mission accomplishment/force protection in SSTR 

operations. These enablers include training, leader development, 

professional military education (PME), intelligence, information 

operations (IO) and rapid learning and sharing of best practices. In 

some of these areas positive change is already underway. 

Technology and materiel can contribute to enhanced force 

protection in SSTR and counterinsurgency operations and this report 

identifies some of these opportunities. However, they will not 

provide “silver bullets”. The human dimension habitually is the 

dominant factor in war. It certainly will continue to be in future SSTR 

and counterinsurgency operations. Thus the task force has centered 

its attention on the enablers listed in the previous paragraph 

particularly how these contribute to small unit effectiveness and the 

transformation of the Department of Defense (DoD) into an adaptive 
 

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ________________________________________ 

vi ________________________________________________________________________ 

learning organization. In addition, as directed by its terms of 

reference, the task force reviewed the Joint Urban Operations Activity 

(JUOA) at Joint Forces Command (JFCOM). 

Training and Leader Development 

In these protracted operations, proper training can have a 

significant impact sooner than the other elements of doctrine, 

organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel 

and facilities (DOTMLPF). Training has been a significant 

asymmetric advantage of U.S. military forces over the course of the 

past two decades. 

A training revolution, first initiated by the Air Force and Navy for 

aerial combat, was applied to land combat by the Army beginning in 

the late 1970s. Large training facilities, explicit conditions and 

standards, world class opposition forces (OPFOR), the use of 

observers/controllers and, not least of all, after-action reviews that 

provided open and honest critiques characterized this revolution. 

Since then, and until recently, these training capabilities have 

largely focused on the upper echelons of high intensity fighting. The 

Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), with its focus on light 

infantry operations, has been an exception. Although the Army 

trains primarily for major combat operations, it has spent most of its 

operational time over the past decade in counterinsurgency and SSTR 

operations. Nevertheless, the members of the task force were 

uniformly impressed with the strides that are being made in the 

Army and Marine Corps training centers to address the new security 

environment that has characterized on-going operations in Iraq. 

Kudos are due for the progress achieved, but it is not sufficient. 

A second revolution is needed. The goal should be to preserve 

the strengths of the first training revolution, while building on the 

current training adaptations including those ongoing at the National 

Training Center (NTC), Marine Corps Twenty-nine Palms Training 

Center (29 Palms), and the JRTC. 
 

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_______________________________________________________________________ vii

This second training revolution would place special emphasis on 

junior officer/NCO training and leader development. It would 

greatly increase the scope of home station training and provide more 

realistic depiction of the civilian environment and ways to measure 

combined kinetic and non-kinetic operations. It would also enhance 

the centralized training facilities to include more extensive urban 

environs. 

Professional Military Education 

The challenges of the 21st century demand that senior officers be 

more thoroughly educated and culturally attuned in command 

positions. In some areas, the Department is making a start in the right 

direction with its requirement that graduates of the military 

academies and those on Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) 

scholarships attain higher levels of language proficiency. However, 

the Department and the services need to reform the personnel 

systems so that fast track officers have the opportunity to attend the 

most prestigious graduate schools in the world to obtain master’s 

degrees and doctorates in subjects like area studies, languages, 

cultural studies, and military history. 

Perhaps the most important step in improving the ability of future 

leaders to understand the broader issues involved in force protection 

is to afford greater exposure to other cultures and nations early in 

their careers. Additional opportunities for advisory tours, exchange 

tours, and foreign study would serve to provide future leaders with 

the skills to recognize the cultural gulfs and historical frameworks 

that they and their subordinates will confront. 

None of this will be easy, and it will most probably demand a 

rethinking of the military career with an emphasis on more officers 

serving thirty years than is currently the case. There must not only be 

an emphasis on cultural understanding and awareness, but a real 

symbiosis between training, education and experience. Only by such 

an emphasis can learning in the school house connect to experience in 

the real world. 
 

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ________________________________________ 

viii ________________________________________________________________________ 

Moreover, the ground-centric nature of SSTR operations will also 

demand changes to the training and intellectual preparation of Navy 

and Air Force officers if they are to be effective participants in joint 

task force headquarters conducting these types of operations. 

Information Operations 

Commanders at all levels in the field are inventing “information 

operations” directed at the local populace and integrating these nonkinetic methods into their operations. However, they need more help 

in both message and media. U.S. Soldiers and Marines on the ground 

daily are conducting strategic communication. They represent the 

face of America to local populace. But, they need more cultural 

awareness and language skills. 

However, current IO definitions, policy and doctrine don’t 

adequately address this kind of “influence operations.” Instead they 

focus on actions to affect adversary information and information 

systems while defending one’s own. Psychological operations 

(PSYOPS) is an exception but is limited in quantity and skill set and 

doesn’t adequately reach the lower levels of the combat force who 

need their skills. Influence operations, public diplomacy and public 

affairs demand coherent, consistent messages resting on the same 

philosophical, ideological and political principles. 

Influence operations are too pervasive a tool to be left to 

specialists and must be emphasized in leader development, training 

and education. Tactical level influence operations best practices 

should be captured and disseminated. 

Tactical Intelligence and Red Teaming 

There are important roles for surveillance assets and other 

intelligence tools, but human intelligence (HUMINT) is the most 

important contributor to tactical intelligence in SSTR and 

counterinsurgency operations. HUMINT is also fragile and 

deception-prone. Building strong relations with the local population 

is essential to gaining trusted human intelligence. Everyone in the 

unit must become a collector, not just intelligence and civil affairs 
 

_______________________________________ SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

_______________________________________________________________________ ix

personnel. Knowledge of the local culture, as well as language skills, 

are critical enablers to establishing relationships and gaining 

information. 

Pattern recognition and link analysis conducted at all levels, down 

to the individual Soldier and Marine, are already part of the current 

training regime. This is an area where technology could contribute to 

enabling more effective tools. The efforts at the U.S. Army’s 

Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) and elsewhere to 

enhance the collection and value of intelligence work needs to be 

accelerated, especially making intelligence much more readily 

available at the lower tactical levels. 

Red teaming can be a powerful tool for an adaptive learning 

organization. When done right, it will help anticipate initiatives and 

responses by adversary groups and thus complement evidentiarybased intelligence. However, for a variety of reasons, effective red 

teaming is not commonplace.1 

Finding appropriate personnel is one challenge, since the red team 

will need to emulate the cultural predilections, motivations, 

objectives, internal planning, technical and operational capabilities, 

and decision processes of potential adversary groups. The Army has 

recently initiated an effort to develop more effective red teamers. 

Another challenge is providing sufficient independence for the red 

team, while still ensuring its products have ample opportunity to 

inform operational and investment decisions. 

Rapid Learning and Sharing of Experience 

SSTR and counterinsurgency missions place great demands on 

learning lessons. Adversaries seem to change tactics, techniques and 

procedures (TTPs) almost daily. U.S. forces must operate in complex, 

cultural, political, infrastructure and physical environments. These 

environments can be equally challenging, but different, in the next 

 

1. A more complete discussion of the challenges of red teaming is provided in the report 

of the DSB Task Force on “The Role and Status of DoD Red Teaming Activities” (Sept, 

2003). 
 

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ________________________________________ 

x ________________________________________________________________________ 

village or town. Traditional lessons learned processes won’t work 

here. Needed are new ideas and new models. The pace of change in 

theater makes it impossible for study groups like this one (indeed the 

Pentagon itself) to keep up. In no area is this truer than how lessons 

are being learned during operations. 

Effective force protection depends on being able to capture and 

disseminate locale dependent TTP best practices extremely rapidly 

among the lowest tactical levels. It also requires that lessons be 

promulgated rapidly to the highest levels in order to inform decisions 

on strategy, organization, training, technology initiatives and the like. 

A new model for learning lessons is evolving in the field enabled 

by the dramatic growth of networking. This is the power of networkcentric ideas: network as a verb. Both vertical and horizontal 

networking is occurring within and outside the chain of command. 

An example of the first has been the First Cavalry Division’s creation 

of its own internet, (CAVNET) and its use of the Defense Advanced 

Research Projects Agency’s (DARPA) Command Post of the Future. 

Companycommand.com and platoonleader.org are examples of 

horizontal networking initiatives originally begun outside of formal 

channels. Also happening in the field are collaboratively derived and 

validated lessons learned and concepts. There is, as a result, 

continuous “experimentation,” rapid dissemination, and adjustment 

at the small unit leader level. 

An approach like JFCOM’s OIF Lessons Learned activity, which 

embeds analysts in headquarters engaged in ongoing operations, also 

has a role here. In addition to capturing lessons on the spot, it 

provides reach back help in resolving issues and, in some cases, turns 

lessons observed into immediate remedial action. 

The Role for Technology 

The extended nature of SSTR operations presents challenges and 

opportunities for inserting new technology-enabled capabilities 

directly into the operations. The challenge is that the introduction of 

technology must be closely integrated within rapidly evolving 
 

_______________________________________ SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

_______________________________________________________________________ xi

concepts, TTPs, and training. Current processes are not up to the task 

of providing timely insertion. 

Technology not only enhances training at the combat training 

centers (CTCs), but can be a powerful enabler of another training 

revolution. Most significantly it could help bring CTC-like standards 

to training units at their home stations. 

Joint Urban Operations Activity at Joint Forces Command 

The Joint Urban Operations (JUO) leadership is doing a good job 

in difficult circumstances. The task force was particularly impressed 

with the tools developed for the Urban Resolve experiment and 

JFCOM’s efforts to extend the utility of these experimental tools to 

mission rehearsal, training, and operational opportunities. 

However, the security situation has changed substantially since 

the JUOA was conceived and created. Then there was a lack of 

interest in urban operations within parts of the Department. (“We 

don’t do cities.”) Now it is no longer necessary to have an advocate 

for the importance of urban operations. There are many real world 

urban operations, and most of the learning is occurring in theater –

particularly by junior officers in command positions. Thus, the 

executive agent role as originally envisioned should be reassessed. 

Furthermore, a significant increase in staff and resources would be 

required in order for the JUOA serve as an effective executor of a JUO 

master plan. 

An alternative to JUOA being “in charge” of a comprehensive 

master plan is have the JUOA be an advocate and executor for a few 

important needs. One of these is sponsoring a few joint urban 

experiments and training events per year. Another is helping 

integrate air and space assets of all the services and defense agencies 

into joint urban operations and thus strengthening the vertical 

dimension of these types of operations. 
 

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ________________________________________ 

xii ________________________________________________________________________ 

RECOMMENDATIONS

The task force’s recommendations will protect the force better by 

substantially enhancing the capability of small units to conduct 

counterinsurgency and SSTR operations, and accelerating DoD’s 

transformation into an adaptive learning organization 

The task force focused on several enablers of these mutually 

supporting goals: training, leader development, professional military 

education, information/influence operations, tactical intelligence, 

red-teaming, and the rapid learning and sharing of operational 

lessons. These are not the only critical enablers but were chosen 

because they are either not getting needed resources or attention, or 

there remain obstacles (bureaucratic and other) to progress. All these 

recommendations are directed at the Secretary of Defense and the 

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. In some cases an implementation lead 

is suggested. 

Recommendation 1: 

Training, Leader Development, 

and Professional Military Education 

 Make training, leader development, and PME (with 

special attention to Junior Officers and NCOs) much 

higher priority elements of force transformation. This 

will involve substantially more resources for training 

and will demand that senior Office of the Secretary of 

Defense (OSD) and Joint Staff officials work closely with 

Service Chiefs to develop and execute plans. Training 

and PME generally have not competed well with the 

acquisition community for dollars. The addition of 

several hundreds of millions of dollars to enhance 

training is one of the highest payoff investments that 

DoD can make to protect the force in SSTR and 

counterinsurgency operations. Targets for such 

investment (some of which is already underway, 

especially in the Army and Marine Corps) include:
 

_______________________________________ SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

_______________________________________________________________________ xiii

− Recognize the strategic importance of combatexperienced junior officers and NCOs as agents of 

change, and assign them accordingly. 

− Expand and accelerate efforts to bring CTC-class 

training standards to units at their home stations. This 

would involve the creation of deployable training teams, 

mobile simulators (for unconventional warfare small 

unit training), and greater exploitation of tools for 

distance learning. As part of this effort, create a major 

initiative to develop simulation tools and synthetic 

environments to support home-station training and 

junior officer leader development. Provide continual 

enrichment to these tools and environments by 

incorporating lessons learned and experiences from 

returning junior officers and NCOs. 

− Accelerate and expand the adaptation ongoing at the 

NTC, JRTC, and 29 Palms. There is much to be done to 

provide: 

 Ways to assess combined kinetic and non-kinetic 

operations, together with metrics, 

 Enhanced instrumentation, 

 World class counterinsurgency OPFOR, 

 More extensive and realistic populace play, 

 More insertion of new technology/capabilities 

into training regimens, 

 Greater capability to support training elsewhere 

including in-theater, 

 Training rotations as an opportunity to facilitate 

unit transitions and handover, 

 Learning of basic language skills, 

 More opportunities for joint training, and 
 

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ________________________________________ 

xiv ________________________________________________________________________ 

 More involvement of other U.S. Government 

agencies, international partners, and nongovernment organizations (NGOs). 

 Greatly expand training environs for urban operations. 

− Create urban training environments (physical, 

infrastructure, cultural, adversarial) large enough to 

“swallow” a battalion. 

 Reinvigorate the role of PME in developing more 

thoroughly educated and culturally attuned officers in 

command positions. 

− Insure that officers on the fast track to command 

positions have the opportunity for exposure to other 

cultures early in their careers through advisory tours, 

exchange tours, and foreign study. 

− Provide more opportunities for advanced degrees in 

area and cultural studies, languages, and military history 

at the most prestigious universities in the world and 

ensure that such study is considered “career enhancing” 

by promotion boards. 

 Task the services and JFCOM to provide a plan in six 

months detailing the improvements and means needed 

to underwrite a second education and training 

revolution accounting for joint full spectrum 

operations (combat, counterinsurgency, SSTR, 

peacekeeping, and humanitarian presence). 

Recommendations 2 & 3: 

Information Operations 

 Charter a fast-track team to address the serious 

problems that afflict U.S. attempts to conduct 

information/ influence operations. 
 

_______________________________________ SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

_______________________________________________________________________ xv

− The team should recommend organizational, doctrinal, 

and operational changes to clarify definitions, 

responsibilities, purposes, missions, and assignments 

with particular emphasis on those information 

operations conducted by U.S. forces in theater largely 

directed at the local populace. 

− Appoint an OIF-experienced and successful land force 

commander as the team leader with a civilian deputy 

from Public Affairs. Include in the team hand-picked 

officers and NCOs with diverse influence/IO experience, 

commanders who have successfully integrated these 

operations into a larger campaign and experts from the 

private sector. Interim results should be available within 

60 days and final report in 120 days. 

 Rapidly implement section 5.5.2 of DoD Directive 

3000.05 on Military Support for Stability, Security, 

Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations 

since money is ammunition: “Institutionalize 

procedures to achieve rapid distribution of funding, 

goods, and services, with appropriate accountability 

safeguards, by U.S. commanders deployed in foreign 

countries in support of stability operations.” 

Recommendations 4 & 5: 

Tactical Intelligence and Red Teaming 

 Provide much easier access to intelligence at tactical 

levels (battalions and below). Accelerate the efforts at 

the Army’s INSCOM and elsewhere to provide this 

capability along with the collaborative environment that 

fosters sharing of information and knowledge. This 

environment must embrace the critical role of the lower 

tactical levels as collectors as well as customers of 

intelligence. These capabilities should be packaged into 

a joint tool set with the corresponding training support 

and be SIPRNET-compatible at tactical levels.
 

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ________________________________________ 

xvi ________________________________________________________________________ 

 Establish aggressive red teaming to emulate the 

cultural predilections, motivations, objectives, internal 

planning, technical and operational capabilities, and 

decision processes of potential adversary groups and 

uncommitted populace. 

− Embed the red teaming in a process wherein senior 

decision makers and commanders use its products to 

inform operations, inform investment decisions, 

operations and intelligence collection. 

− Consider extending to other DoD organizations the 

Army’s recent initiative to develop more proficient red 

teamers. 

Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (VCJCS), Under Secretary of 

Defense Policy (USD [P]) and USD (AT&L) could be designated as 

leads. 

Recommendation 6: 

Rapid Learning and Sharing of Experience 

 Evolve a new approach exploiting the networking 

innovations going on in the field, the considered 

assignments of military personnel returning from 

theater and the experience of JFCOM’s OIF Lessons 

Learned activity. This will involve, inter alia.

− Embedding more observers and analysts into ongoing 

operations at tactical levels, and 

− Creating integrated teams of warfighters, intelligence 

analysts, operational analysts, and technologists that can 

rapidly perform the operations analyses needed to help 

turn observations (data) into lessons (knowledge) into 

actions (lessons learned).2 

The verb evolve is chosen with care because the lessons learned 

process must itself be the subject of constant inquiry and adaptation. 

 

2. The DSB Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) Task Force running in parallel with this 

task force provides a similar recommendation for such integrated teams. 
 

_______________________________________ SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

_______________________________________________________________________ xvii

Making all this happen will require the Services, Regional 

Combatant Commands, JFCOM, OSD and the Joint Staff all 

working together. 

Recommendations 7 & 8: 

The Role of Technology 

 Initiate a major technology effort aimed at 

breakthrough enhancements to training and leader 

development with special attention to junior officers 

and NCOs, home-station training and non-kinetic 

operations. (Build on efforts currently underway in 

DARPA and the services). 

 Provide for more rapid insertion of new capabilities to 

include enhanced language translators into the field by 

inserting more prototypes into unit rotational training, 

and by establishing a prototyping capability – with 

operational analysis and system engineering support –

at the operational commands. 

USD (AT&L) and USD (Personnel & Readiness) should work 

closely with the Services and Combatant Commands to make these 

happen. 

Recommendation 9: 

Joint Urban Operations Activity at Joint Forces Command 

 Focus JFCOM’s Joint Urban Operations Office on just 

a few critical needs rather than attempt to create and 

oversee a comprehensive master plan. The task force 

suggests these needs are: 

− Strengthening the vertical dimension of urban 

operations (and making them more joint) by 

orchestrating substantially increased contribution from 

the Air Force and Navy, 

− Developing and promulgating lessons from junior 

officers (working closely with the service lessons learned 

activities), and 
 

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ________________________________________ 

xviii ________________________________________________________________________ 

− Sponsoring a few major JUO training/experiment events 

a year. 

OVERARCHING RECOMMENDATION

Counterinsurgency and SSTR operations put great demands on 

small units and their leaders. Every reasonable step should be taken 

to push decision-making and tactical control to the lowest level 

equipped to exercise it and, for the future, to push this decision 

making and control to even lower levels through better, more 

relevant, and more innovative training, preparation, and equipage. A 

great strength of America’s operational forces is the services’ junior 

officers and NCOs. The thrust of the task force’s recommendations is 

to make them better prepared and give them better tools to meet the 

challenges of the future security environment. 

The focus on small unit operations in this report is not meant to 

diminish the role of the operational levels of command. Indeed, the 

training, leader development and PME recommendations in this 

report will better prepare the junior officer commanders to ultimately 

take on the responsibilities of operational-level command in these 

challenging missions. 
 

_______________________________________________________________ INTRODUCTION

_______________________________________________________________________ 1

INTRODUCTION

The charge to this Defense Science Board (DSB) task force was to 

“recommend technological and operational art changes across all ... 

DOTMLPF and policy ... to improve the security and force protection 

of military and civilian personnel conducting post major combat 

operations to achieve campaign and strategic objectives.” The DSB 

2004 Summer Study, “Transition to and from Hostilities,” has 

provided comprehensive coverage of the challenges involved in SSTR 

operations. A separate DSB task force working with this task force 

has examined the IED threat. 

A recurrent theme throughout this report is the importance of 

small unit excellence and leadership for the achievement of successful 

force protection. The “strategic corporal” of the twenty-first century 

will have important implications for the priorities that the 

Department and the services establish in the day-to-day business of 

preparing military units for the missions they will confront. 

The next section of this report provides the framework for 

thinking about the strategic, operational, and tactical issues that will 

affect the problems involved in force protection. This will be 

followed by sections on training, professional military education, 

cultural understanding, IO, intelligence and red teaming, rapid 

learning and sharing of experience, technology, and the Joint Urban 

Operations Activity. 

Appendix A provides the terms of reference for this report and 

Appendix B lists the members of and government advisors to the task 

force. Appendix C provides a list of presentations, discussions, and 

visits the task force covered over the course of its meetings. To a 

considerable extent, the presentations provided by active duty 

officers with recent operational experience in Iraq have shaped the 

task force’s findings. Visits to U.S. Army and Marine Corps training 

sites, as well as, a variety of presentations to the task force that 

included commentaries on the problems confronted by British and 

Israeli officers in force protection in Northern Ireland and the 
 

INTRODUCTION _______________________________________________________________ 

2 ________________________________________________________________________ 

occupied territories, respectively, have also influenced the task force’s 

thinking on the subject. 

THE FUTURE OF FORCE PROTECTION

In the coming century, U.S. military forces will find themselves 

involved in interventions in troubled areas of the world. Those 

interventions will range from full-scale conventional war, to SSTR 

and counterinsurgency operations that involve serious fighting, to 

peace enforcement operations, to peacekeeping. In the largest sense, 

the future demands that the United States and its military will 

confront appear even more uncertain than they have in the past. 

Thus, adaptability to new and surprising challenges will be a crucial 

element to success at the tactical, operational, and even the strategic 

levels. Exacerbating these difficulties will be the fact that future 

opponents of the United States are monitoring the events in Iraq, 

with the result that future interventions are going to demand a 

sensible and realistic strategic framework. The end state of such 

interventions may well remain unpredictable, but the assessment of 

potential risks before intervention must include a realistic balance of 

ends, means, as well as, the costs and difficulties involved in longterm force protection. 

Force protection in unconventional and urban environments is 

much more dynamic with a broader range of challenges than those 

involved in conventional warfare. Inevitably, force protection will 

find itself inextricably linked to a combination of political, economic 

and strategic factors. These include the political objectives of the 

United States, the culture and religion of the area in which U.S. forces 

find themselves involved, and the stability and homogeneity of the 

society, as well as the state of the existing economy and 

infrastructure. 

Achieving the mission and protecting the force in such 

environments will require significant tailoring of the military forces 

involved. At the operational level it will require detailed planning 

and exercises for SSTR operations in advance (see 2004 DSB Summer 
 

_______________________________________________________________ INTRODUCTION

_______________________________________________________________________ 3

Study) for countries and regions that appear ripe for intervention and 

are important to American interests. Moreover, such planning efforts 

must be dynamic and explicitly address the shaping of the post-major 

conflict environment (during military operations, transition, and 

post-conflict). They need to address the potential for the growth of 

likely unconventional adversaries including the evolving effect of the 

ongoing operations on the culture and religion, the society, the 

economy and infrastructure. Major military and SSTR operations 

likely will occur simultaneously, and planning must inevitably see 

them holistically and as a coherent and connected, but ever changing, 

whole. 

Force protection is not an end in itself, and thus the members of 

the task force have examined it within the context of the range of 

missions and the problems associated with adaptation to cultural and 

political contexts. Throughout the range of military operations, U.S. 

commanders have confronted, and will continue to confront, the dual 

responsibilities of (1) accomplishing the mission and (2) ensuring the 

safety of those under their command, while continually making 

decisions about the risks to each. These two responsibilities are 

inextricably linked, because the political objectives, for which the 

United States government has and will employ its military forces, 

depends on the support of U.S. citizens for success. Consequently, the 

safety of its men and women in uniform will remain a primary 

concern of a democratic state, whatever the military or political 

circumstances. Moreover, casualties suffered in longer endeavors 

when the mission is more open-ended and the enemy more elusive 

can have a greater political impact than casualties suffered in those 

operations where the U.S. military is pursuing a defined mission and 

a clear opponent. 

As a result, there is both tension and synergy between these 

responsibilities. Force protection is crucial to the creation of the 

circumstances that facilitate military forces executing their 

operational missions. It may well be – as was the case during the 

conventional military operations in April 2003 – that exposing both 

combat and supporting forces to greater risk will result in a more 

rapid achievement of the mission and thus fewer casualties in the 

long run. However, public support has consistently proven crucial to 
 

INTRODUCTION _______________________________________________________________ 

4 ________________________________________________________________________ 

success in war; and significant casualties will inevitably affect that 

support. 

In the widest sense, force protection involves the protection to the 

extent possible of U.S. military forces in all environments from bases 

in North America to their employment in combat. It also requires the 

protection of assets in non-combat areas from attacks, such as that 

which seriously damaged the USS Cole. Nevertheless, force 

protection must not interfere with the accomplishment of the mission 

or negatively impact on the political ties that bind the American 

people to their military. Above all it must not lead to a garrison 

mentality or to a belief that hunkering down behind concertina wire 

and armor represents a serious effort to achieve mission completion. 

To do so would invariably rob U.S. forces of the ability to shape their 

battlespace and understand how the enemy is operating. It would 

rob them of the capacity to perform effective counterinsurgency 

operations, which inevitably must involve operating in close contact 

with the civilian population. 

The realities of the challenges presented by force protection that 

this task force has addressed have the following attributes: 

 Military forces, enemy forces, and civilians in close proximity. 

Indeed the mission may involve protection of the civilian 

population. 

 Uncertainty about where, or even who, the enemy is. America’s 

future opponents will inevitably hide in populations that 

include their supporters, the intimidated, and the wavering. 

 Adaptive, resourceful, and committed adversaries. Future 

opponents will prove to be effective learning organizations 

(which is what U.S. forces are already seeing in Iraq). 

 Distributed operations. Ironically, in view of much of American 

defense writings over the past decade, opponents have been 

successfully employing the concept of distributed operations. 

When there are no front lines, all forces are at risk and logistic 

convoys, like merchant ship convoys in World War II, become 

“movements to contact,” or are targets for loosely organized 

enemy actions. 
 

_______________________________________________________________ INTRODUCTION

_______________________________________________________________________ 5

 Protracted operations. Operations, such as the current SSTR 

operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, can last for decades. 

 Future operations will inevitably call on the U.S. military to execute 

multiple, simultaneous, and co-located missions. These may 

include not only security, but governance, humanitarian, 

reconstruction, and training missions. 

 The objective will be to transition governing responsibilities back to 

local control as soon as possible. Nevertheless, turnkey transitions 

are unlikely and the long-term commitment of U.S. advisors 

will be the norm. 

 Interagency considerations. The Department will be called upon 

to integrate its military forces with other instruments of 

national power and non governmental actors even more 

closely than during major combat operations, or as happened 

in Iraq, provide services that other government agencies are 

unprepared to make available. 

 Coalition considerations. The importance of allied military forces 

and their intelligence organizations may prove crucial to the 

protection of U.S. forces, particularly if they are more familiar 

with the area, culture, and politics, where military operations 

are taking place. 

Based on what the task force heard from those with whom it 

interacted – as well as its own experiences – its members believe that 

“force protection” is not a helpful term. It inevitably connotes 

bunkers and barbed wire. Instead of confining itself to such a narrow 

conception of the problem, the task force focused on ways to 

maximize mission effectiveness, while minimizing casualties. In the 

major combat phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom, U.S. military forces 

achieved their operational and tactical goals by parallel and 

simultaneous application of effects, enabled by speed, stealth, 

precision, and a willingness to take acceptable risks in regard to force 

protection. The resulting set of capabilities allowed U.S. forces to 

outstrip the ability of its Iraqi military opponent to react. In effect, the 

result was a replication of the German blitzkrieg victory over the 

French in 1940, except with far fewer casualties. 
 

INTRODUCTION _______________________________________________________________ 

6 ________________________________________________________________________ 

The visual and psychological impact of the stunning American 

victory over the Iraqi military in a matter of a few weeks makes it 

unlikely that future opponents will attempt to fight a conventional 

war against the U.S. military. A crucial enabler to the success of U.S. 

forces in March and April 2003 was the ability of support forces to 

defend themselves against the attacks launched by Saddam’s fedayeen. 

Nevertheless, the fate of the 507th Maintenance Company underlines 

the importance of force protection for all U.S. forces, non-combat and 

combat, even when a major conventional campaign is underway –

especially given the current emphasis on rapid, distributed 

operations. 

Future opponents may choose to fight insurgent wars of attrition 

aimed at exhausting U.S. political patience and willingness to 

continue the struggle. That is clearly what the insurgents in Iraq are 

waging at present, and many of America’s opponents, especially in 

the Middle East, are closely watching what is transpiring. In 

counterinsurgency operations, the U.S. military will only achieve the 

nation’s goals by becoming a force with the following attributes: 

 Agile enough to present a constantly changing face to the 

enemy, 

 Adaptable enough to learn faster than an enemy, and 

 Culturally attuned and sensitive enough to provide 

reassurance, services, and protection to the civilian population 

and training and mentoring to the indigenous security forces. 

One of the larger questions that confront U.S. military leaders at 

present is whether the buildup of skills necessary for SSTR operations 

over the long haul will result in the atrophy of those required for 

major conventional operations. U.S. experiences in both Iraq and 

Afghanistan suggest that considerable work remains to be done in 

preparing future forces for the kinds of situations they will likely 

confront. The Department and the services need to make major 

changes in how U.S. forces plan, train, educate, and approach 

intelligence and information operations – all of which represent 

essential elements in successful force protection. Greater attention 
 

_______________________________________________________________ INTRODUCTION

_______________________________________________________________________ 7

needs to be given to the non-kinetic operations which play such 

important roles in these situations. 

Such changes will have to come within the larger framework of 

how the United States military prepares its forces to handle the 

problems involved in SSTR operations. Nevertheless, ongoing 

operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have emphasized that intelligence 

and information operations represent significant weaknesses and 

require far greater attention from the Department’s leadership both in 

the long- and short-term. 

The experiences gained in both Afghanistan and Iraq have also 

demonstrated that the services need to change their traditional view 

of the role of junior officers and NCOs. The most competent junior 

officers have shown extraordinary abilities in adapting to the 

complex, ambiguous, and uncertain challenges that SSTR operations 

have presented. The Department needs to utilize their newly 

acquired skills to the fullest if it is to prepare itself for future 

challenges. 

There are many good things that are happening in the 

Department’s transformational efforts as a result of the combat 

experiences of U.S. forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, much 

more remains to be done if the U.S. military is to cope successfully 

with future contingencies. 

Current SSTR operations have indicated that enhanced small unit 

performance is critical to success in force protection. What happens 

on the tactical level often has strategic implications. It is the business 

of commanders at senior levels – not to mention the Pentagon’s 

bureaucracy – to ensure that tactical troops have the support they 

need. And, it is even more important that the services and the 

Department translate the lessons of the present into the capabilities of 

the future. 

Protecting the force is not only, or even mainly, about defensive 

measures. Instead, force protection in the kinds of missions the U.S. 

military will likely confront in the 21st century will depend on an 

offensive mindset, information, unpredictability, and winning the 
 

INTRODUCTION _______________________________________________________________ 

8 ________________________________________________________________________ 

trust, hearts and minds of the local population, as well as defensive 

measures. One division commander emphasized that providing 

services (SWET) was his most effective force protection measure. In 

such circumstances, to paraphrase a chart from the National Training 

Center, money, food, water, medicine, employment, recognition, and 

respect are all ammunition (and armor). Ultimately, effective force 

protection depends on all these types of actions guided by realistic 

objectives and sound strategy. 

Above all, the U.S. military and its components must become 

learning organizations in the truest sense of that concept. A learning 

organization continuously monitors and objectively assesses its own 

and its adversaries’ performance, and devises and rapidly 

implements new approaches when old ones will no longer work. To 

do this DoD must: 

 Become better at tactical intelligence 

 Provide more rapid sharing of knowledge and lessons 

(horizontal at least as important as vertical) 

 Enable rapid insertion of new capabilities (both TTPs and 

technologies) 

 Tie training closely to what is being learned in the field (it 

appears that this is being done) 

 Tie experiments more closely to ongoing operations 

 Put the experience and knowledge of operators to best use in 

their next assignments 

Attributes of a learning organization are reflected by the rapid 

adaptation of training capabilities by the Army and Marines to the 

new missions. On the other hand, the Department’s experience of the 

past four years with information operations is not suggestive of an 

effective learning organization. 
 

_______________________________________THE COMPRESSION OF STRATEGIC, OPERATIONAL, 

AND TACTICAL LEVELS IN SSTR OPERATIONS

_______________________________________________________________________ 9

THE COMPRESSION OF STRATEGIC, OPERATIONAL, AND 

TACTICAL LEVELS IN SSTR OPERATIONS

STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

Addressing the problems of force protection demands a realistic 

understanding of the current world environment, as well as the 

prospects for instability in the future. If the past is any indicator, 

getting the strategy right has always allowed for corrections at the 

operational and tactical levels. On the other hand, getting the strategy 

wrong has resulted in defeat, no matter how brilliant the tactical and 

operational expertise. 

In addressing the future threat environment, there are a number 

of assessments that bear on the issues involved in force protection 

that can provide a framework for thinking about the problem. The 

rise of a peer competitor is one of the possible major challenges to 

American security over the coming century. In terms of a potential 

peer competitor, one great question mark on the horizon is China. 

The China that emerges from the economic explosion occurring at 

present on the Asian mainland will depend on how effective the 

diplomatic, economic, and social policies of the United States and its 

Asian allies are in persuading China’s leaders that they have more to 

gain from cooperation than confrontation. 

While the rise of a peer competitor challenge to U.S. security is a 

possibility, a strong case can be made that the great challenge for 

both the First World and the United States in the foreseeable future 

will be that of an unstable and tumultuous Middle East, where the 

political ramifications of U.S. actions in Afghanistan and Iraq are just 

emerging. The Middle East will retain its economic and political 

significance as long as oil continues as the major engine of the First 

World. Moreover, the Islamic world, particularly its Arab lands, 

continues to deal with globalization issues driven by political and 
 

THE COMPRESSION OF STRATEGIC, OPERATIONAL, 

AND TACTICAL LEVELS IN SSTR OPERATIONS __________________________________________ 

10 ________________________________________________________________________ 

scientific developments that took the west over nine centuries to 

create – and that adaptation only began in the 1920s. 

If that were not difficult enough, the Middle East possesses deep 

tribal, religious, and political divisions. Imans; ideological 

modernizers such as the Ba’ath; tribes, with conflicts reaching back 

centuries; Sunni fanatics; Shi’a revolutionaries; and the Druze, 

among others, all contest for significant roles in the Arab world. 

Exacerbating these tensions, a population explosion throughout 

much of the Arab world has created a huge bulge of young men, a 

significant number of whom, unemployed and encouraged by 

religious fanaticism in the mosques, find religious fundamentalism 

attractive. While only a relatively small percentage of those will turn 

to active participation in violence, the patterns of history suggest that 

such population bulges of young men often translate into civil unrest 

leading to revolution or war. The likelihood is that whatever the fates 

of Bin Laden and Zarqawi, these masses will provide a flow of 

recruits from which Islamic Jihadists can draw. The implications for 

future conflict and consequently force protection are immense, 

because they suggest that U.S. forces will remain engaged at various 

levels for the foreseeable future. 

These internal conflicts and the challenges of adapting to the 

threat and promise of the global world will all help continue the 

political turmoil within the Middle East – most of which will be 

unpredictable and difficult to assess as to its possible impact on 

American interests. The First World will be able to exercise only 

partial influence over the endemic conflicts and troubles within the 

Arab and Islamic worlds. Nevertheless, there will be times when 

intervention – military or otherwise – will be required. Furthermore, 

as American experiences with the Taliban in Afghanistan underlined, 

the intervention of U.S. military power can occur in unexpected 

places. 

Thus, future American interventions in the region are likely, in 

large part because what happens in places like Somalia and 
 

_______________________________________THE COMPRESSION OF STRATEGIC, OPERATIONAL, 

AND TACTICAL LEVELS IN SSTR OPERATIONS

_______________________________________________________________________ 11

Afghanistan will impact on the world of the United States and its 

allies. These wars and operations in which the U.S. military will be 

involved will be characterized by a combination of religious and 

cultural conflict at their heart. Any United States intervention then 

could prompt deep suspicion, at times bordering on hostility, of 

America’s intentions. 

Thus, most of the wars and military interventions of the 21st

century will be cultural and religious conflicts. Knowledge of the 

enemy’s cultural and religious drives will represent an essential 

element in the success or failure of American efforts. The kinds of 

conflicts and interventions that America’s armed forces will confront 

will require even better trained and educated junior officer and NCO 

levels, who have so far demonstrated an ability to adapt to new 

circumstances in the current conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Such 

wars will also require a more coherent educational preparation for 

future military leaders.

OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

As Operation Iraqi Freedom underlined, U.S. military forces 

possess unmatched capabilities at the operational level of war. 

However, what the U.S. experience in Afghanistan and Iraq has 

reiterated is that simple military intervention – pure military 

operations – will represent only the first step. Any approach to 

operational level of war must always keep in mind that the only 

reason to wage war is to achieve political goals, and the achieving of 

those goals must include coherent and effective SSTR and 

counterinsurgency operations, as well as the direct military purpose 

of destroying the enemy’s military forces. 

During the Second World War, the Anglo-American powers 

prepared extensively for the post-conflict phases in both Europe and 

the Pacific. The long-term, post-conflict policies developed during the 

war and put in place over the period from the end of the war to the 

mid-1950s, helped seal the victory that military forces had achieved 

from 1939 to 1945. As the 2004 Defense Science Board (DSB) summer 

study highlighted, future interventions will require carefully 
 

THE COMPRESSION OF STRATEGIC, OPERATIONAL, 

AND TACTICAL LEVELS IN SSTR OPERATIONS __________________________________________ 

12 ________________________________________________________________________ 

developed and articulated plans and tools for long-term efforts, 

created well in advance of potential hostilities or state failures, to 

establish more effective governance in areas where the United States 

intervenes. 

Thus, history suggests that pre and post-conflict stability and 

counterinsurgency operations demand the same attention to detail 

and understanding of human nature and the political context as do 

major combat operations. Moreover, the post-conflict and major 

combat operations need to be fully integrated including preparation 

to stand up indigenous military and police forces that can nip 

insurgent activities at the earliest stage meanwhile aggressively 

attending to root causes that incubate insurgency. 

It is no stretch to consider major combat to be a shaping operation 

for the longer and more expensive follow-on decisive operations to 

win the peace. In the largest sense this requires a long-term focus on 

the political and strategic aims for which U.S. forces are conducting 

military operations, as well as on the more immediate military 

problem of defeating enemy military forces. Force protection must 

play a major role in all of this. 

The military leaders of U.S. forces will have to understand not 

only their own cultural, political and economic framework, but those 

of others. They will have to be familiar and at ease with people who 

have very different attitudes and come from different cultures. Above 

all, they will need to develop a sixth sense – what the Germans call 

Fingerspitzengefuhl – as to when things are right on the street or in 

the conference room and when they are wrong. They will have to 

entrust and empower their subordinates to make decisions in a world 

of uncertainty and ambiguity. Technology will be a major enabler, 

but it cannot, and will not, replace the crucial importance of the 

ability of Soldiers and Marines to make decisions based on a deep 

understanding and knowledge of local conditions. 

In many respects, the increasing level of jointness in U.S. military 

operations has resulted in a considerable improvement in capabilities 
 

_______________________________________THE COMPRESSION OF STRATEGIC, OPERATIONAL, 

AND TACTICAL LEVELS IN SSTR OPERATIONS

_______________________________________________________________________ 13

at the operational level. However, the ground-centric nature of SSTR 

operations will demand changes to the training and intellectual 

preparation of Navy and Air Force officers if they are to be effective 

participants in joint task force headquarters conducting these types of 

operations. 

THE TACTICAL ENVIRONMENT

The events over the past two years have underlined that U.S. 

forces are likely to confront opponents who will attack them with 

raids, ambushes, improvised explosive devices, car bombs, snipers, 

mortars, and other means that maximize their potential to hide 

among the people, while minimizing the technological and tactical 

advantages that Americans possess. 

Traditional defensive measures are insufficient to deal with these 

challenges. Hunkering down cedes the initiative to the enemy and 

will largely undermine the ability of U.S. forces to interface 

successfully with the population in order to understand their needs, 

gather intelligence, and, above all, shape local opinion. 

An aggressive posture in force protection will pay off in the long 

run in terms of nipping troubles in the bud and preventing the 

enemy from embedding itself within local society. Force protection 

must begin with the ability of U.S. forces to establish a relationship 

with the local community while denying the enemy such access. 

If the United States is to achieve its political objectives, force 

protection must involve taking the war to the enemy and away from 

the local populace with all the physical and psychological means 

possible. The panoply of traditional tactics, such as snipers, 

aggressive patrolling, and counter ambushes, must be employed in 

constant and unpredictable patterns. Mixed in with these small unit 

tactics to cover U.S. forces must be a cultural awareness of the nature 

and proclivities of both the enemy and the local population. Above 

all, commanders down to squad level must recognize that their 

tactical actions can have political and strategic consequences. 
 

THE COMPRESSION OF STRATEGIC, OPERATIONAL, 

AND TACTICAL LEVELS IN SSTR OPERATIONS __________________________________________ 

14 ________________________________________________________________________ 

In the end, force protection at the tactical level must recognize the 

intertwining of military means and actions with political goals and 

actions. In this regard, one of the significant weaknesses that was 

identified all too often in reviews of recent operations has been the 

difficulties in providing commanders at the local level with the 

funding authority and the decision tools to choose among competing 

demands to execute projects of direct interest to the locals. As the 

2004 DSB summer study suggested, “Money is ammunition,” and in 

the case of force protection “money is armor.” The ability to provide 

the resources to carry out projects of benefit to the locals may be one 

of the most important tools in a tactical commander’s toolbox for 

establishing the access and prestige necessary to gain links to local 

community leaders. There are training implications here. 

Yet, no matter how effective their forces may prove in the tactical 

and operational sense, political and military leaders must never 

forget that counterinsurgency forces have only won in the past by 

their ability to build up indigenous forces capable of standing on 

their own, tactically and operationally, against the insurgents. In the 

end, U.S. military forces cannot expect to “win.” Their mission must 

be to establish a framework within which the local military and 

police forces are able to swim in the sea of the populace and remove 

the medium that supports the bacilli of guerrillas and terrorists. 

Given the potential inadequacies in local forces, U.S. forces must 

display patience and forbearance based on knowledge and 

understanding of the local culture. As T.E. Lawrence observed in The 

Seven Pillars of Wisdom, in regard to training the Arabs who 

overthrew Ottoman control over much of the Middle East: “Better the 

Arabs do it tolerably, than you do it perfectly.” 

There is a larger point here. The tactical environment of force 

protection involves far more than the combat aspects of protecting 

U.S. forces. Crucial to success at the tactical level of force protection 

will be the ability of U.S. forces on the ground to influence and shape 

the local population in order to undermine the ability of the enemy to 

exist within the sea of the population. Engagement and relationship 

building, as well as the handover of relationships established to 
 

_______________________________________THE COMPRESSION OF STRATEGIC, OPERATIONAL, 

AND TACTICAL LEVELS IN SSTR OPERATIONS

_______________________________________________________________________ 15

follow on U.S. forces, will represent key components in creating a 

safe tactical environment. Without an understanding of the evolving 

needs of the local population and the creation of effective means of 

meeting those increasing expectations over time, all the while 

communicating with them, U.S. forces will remain literally in the 

dark. 

Handing over tactical relationships built up with the local 

population to follow-on tactical units must form a crucial piece in the 

puzzle of handling the insurgency at the tactical level. Those U.S. 

forces, which have occupied areas for significant periods, must have 

the time to pass the relationships they have built up to those who 

replace them in terms of normal troop rotations. 

If there is one message that the Department’s leadership should 

take away from U.S. experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq, it is that 

small units and their leaders represent strategic assets and should be 

resourced accordingly. That is the fundamental lesson of what has 

happened and continues to happen on the sharp end. The United 

States may not possess enough of the right means it will need to deal 

with future operational environments. A renewed emphasis on the 

training and preparation of such units would represent a clear 

recognition of the kinds of military challenges the United States is 

likely to confront in the 21st century. 
 

THE TRAINING REGIME __________________________________________________________ 

16 ________________________________________________________________________ 

THE TRAINING REGIME

Current U.S. experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq have underlined 

the effectiveness of small unit leaders, officers as well as NCOs. In 

this respect two factors have come into play. First has been the 

success of the current training regime in preparing junior leaders to 

address the challenges of conventional combat. A significant success 

story of U.S. operations in Iraq has been the adaptability of those 

small unit leaders to the actual political and cultural conditions they 

have confronted. In every respect they have lived up to what history 

has suggested about the competence and skill of U.S. Soldiers and 

Marines. 

Nevertheless, the task force believes the Department needs to 

improve the skills and effectiveness of those required to meet the 

challenges of the “strategic corporal” in the 21st century. Perhaps, the 

one area where the Department can have the most immediate effect 

in preparing to meet both present and future missions lies in the 

training of small units and the development of junior officers and 

NCOs. In the current protracted operations, training can have a 

significant impact sooner than any of other elements of DOTMLPF. 

Over the past several decades training has been a powerful 

asymmetric advantage possessed by U.S. forces. A training 

revolution, first initiated by the Air Force and Navy for aerial combat, 

was applied to land combat by the Army beginning in the late 1970s. 

That revolution involved the use of large training facilities, explicit 

conditions and standards, world class OPFOR, the use of 

observer/controllers, and, above all, open, honest critiques. Such 

training efforts, which soon included the Marine Corps, resulted in 

leaders and forces acquainted with the vagaries of major 

conventional operations. The results were plain to see in the 

devastating victories over Iraqi armed forces in 1991 and 2003. 

Since then, training capabilities have largely focused on the upper 

levels of command and high intensity fighting. Since the focus of the 

JRTC has been light infantry operations, it has been an exception to 
 

__________________________________________________________THE TRAINING REGIME

_______________________________________________________________________ 17

the emphasis on high intensity combat. Nevertheless, the overall 

training emphasis in the Army has been at the high end, while its 

units have primarily found themselves in counterinsurgency, 

peacekeeping, and SSTR operations over the past decade and a half. 

What is needed to meet the challenges of lower-end missions that the 

task force believes will be the primary focus of U.S. military 

operations in coming decades is a second training revolution. 

Such a training revolution would preserve the strengths of the 

first training revolution. It would also solidify and build on the 

adaptation already ongoing at the NTC, the JRTC, and 29 Palms. The 

task force was impressed by how these centers have adapted to the 

new challenges, including those of force protection. Such adaptations 

need to remain in place even after the current conflict in Iraq finally 

terminates. In addition, the Army, in particular, might well consider 

major alterations in its emphasis on Battle Command Training 

Program to include a broader range of environments that will 

confront U.S. forces in the future. Moreover, computer-based 

simulations rarely lend themselves to the kind of ambiguities and 

uncertainties that characterize wars against insurgencies. 

Thus, the Department needs to push for a number of significant 

changes in the regimen of training its ground forces. In effect, this 

would result in a second training revolution. 

An essential ingredient of a second training revolution is greatly 

enhanced home station training. The quality of home station training 

– bringing training to the unit – would be elevated to that of a 

Combat Training Center (CTC), with an emphasis on accelerating the 

maturation of junior officer/NCO training and leader development. 

Enhanced home station training would entail creative and increased 

use of deployable training teams, distance learning, and virtual 

synthetic environments. 

The centralized training capabilities also warrant attention and 

more resources to carry on the changes they are already making and 

fulfill plans for new capability. There is much to be done. Two of the 

more pressing needs are (1) finding ways to measure combined 
 

THE TRAINING REGIME __________________________________________________________ 

18 ________________________________________________________________________ 

kinetic and non-kinetic operations and (2) providing more realistic 

urban environments.

There has been a much-needed proliferation of urban-type 

environments at these training facilities. There were seven “Iraqi” 

villages at the NTC populated by role-playing Americans of Arab 

descent when the task force visited it. Just a few years before there 

were none. However, the villages at all the training sites typically are 

small, consisting of no more than several dozen structures. In the case 

of the Marines’ use of former Air Force installations (George and 

March in California) for urban training, they were not representative 

of likely real world urban environments. Urban training 

environments of sufficient size and diversity are urgently needed to 

“swallow” a battalion and more realistically challenge the unit with 

the disruptive effects of urban terrain.

There should be greater attention to and emphasis on civilian 

environments. Cultural, linguistic, religious, and tribal factors must 

be more realistically included in the training regimen wherever it 

occurs. 

The combination of superior home-station training and 

enhancements at the centralized training facilities can steepen the 

learning curve of units deploying to theater. Thus, it would provide 

some of the learning that is now done on the job in much more 

deadly environments. 

Conventional infantry forces are made more like Special 

Operations Forces by increasing their ability to operate 

independently and use language and cultural awareness as force 

multipliers. Doing this implies longer periods of initial training of 

recruits for the infantry. The British spend two and a half times 

longer in initial training of an infantryman. 
 

__________________________________________________________THE TRAINING REGIME

_______________________________________________________________________ 19

Recommendation 1: 

Training, Leader Development, 

and Professional Military Education

 Make training, leader development, and PME (with 

special attention to Junior Officers and NCOs) much 

higher priority elements of force transformation. This 

will involve substantially more resources for training 

and will demand that senior OSD and Joint Staff officials 

work closely with Service Chiefs to develop and execute 

plans. Training and PME generally have not competed 

well with the acquisition community for dollars. The 

addition of several hundreds of millions of dollars to 

enhance training is one of the highest payoff 

investments that DoD can make to protect the force in 

SSTR and counterinsurgency operations. Targets for 

such investment (some of which is already underway, 

especially in the Army and Marine Corps) include:

− Recognize the strategic importance of combatexperienced junior officers and NCOs as agents of 

change, and assign them accordingly. 

− Expand and accelerate efforts to bring CTC-class 

training standards to units at their home stations. This 

would involve the creation of deployable training teams, 

mobile simulators (for unconventional warfare small 

unit training), and greater exploitation of tools for 

distance learning. As part of this effort, create a major 

initiative to develop simulation tools and synthetic 

environments to support home-station training and 

junior officer leader development. Provide continual 

enrichment to these tools and environments by 

incorporating lessons learned and experiences from 

returning junior officers and NCOs. 

− Accelerate and expand the adaptation ongoing at the 

NTC, JRTC, and 29 Palms. There is much to be done to 

provide: 
 

THE TRAINING REGIME __________________________________________________________ 

20 ________________________________________________________________________ 

 Ways to assess combined kinetic and non-kinetic 

operations, together with metrics, 

 Enhanced instrumentation, 

 World class counterinsurgency OPFOR, 

 More extensive and realistic populace play, 

 More insertion of new technology/capabilities 

into training regimens, 

 Greater capability to support training elsewhere 

including in-theater, 

 Training rotations as an opportunity to facilitate 

unit transitions and handover, 

 Learning of basic language skills, 

 More opportunities for joint training, and 

 More involvement of other U.S. Government 

agencies, international partners, and nongovernment organizations (NGOs). 

 Greatly expand training environs for urban operations. 

− Create urban training environments (physical, 

infrastructure, cultural, adversarial) large enough to 

“swallow” a battalion. 

PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION

A weakness that appeared in the initial months of post-conflict 

operations was the lack of intellectual preparation that some senior 

and mid-level military leaders displayed in addressing the initial 

challenges that the Sunni insurgency represented. Thus, too many 

senior officers failed to recognize the evolving nature of the conflict 

in which U.S. forces were engaged. As a battalion commander noted 

at the end of his year’s tour of duty during this period: 
 

__________________________________________________________THE TRAINING REGIME

_______________________________________________________________________ 21

Too many leaders (both civilian and military) positioned at operational 

headquarters or in strategic executive branch positions were excessively 

involved in what was happening in tactical units at the expense of 

developing a long-term strategy and operational concept to implement it... 

There was little conception of the operational art at CJTF-7. Units initially 

occupied zones that transcended local government boundaries... Military 

units were more or less distributed evenly across Iraq, even though it soon 

became apparent that the heart of the insurgency lay in the Sunni Triangle... 

Shortage of forces, lack of vision, or lack of will prevented a more permanent 

presence in the area and an effective plan to deal with Fallujah until after it 

had become a symbol for the insurgency.3

PME has been the stepchild of service and joint efforts to prepare 

senior military leaders for the positions of commanders and senior 

staff positions since the Second World War. There is some irony in 

this state of affairs, because PME played a major role in the success of 

American military efforts in that conflict. Admittedly, there are some 

bright spots – such as the second year programs at the Army, Marine, 

and Air Force staff colleges, the Naval War College, and the 

advanced Strategic Arts Program at the Army War College – where 

serious intellectual preparation of officers to address the operational 

and strategic issues confronting the United States and its military is 

occurring. Nevertheless, a pervasive attitude towards professional 

military education appears to be that officers deserve a rest in their 

busy careers. 

The clearest formulation of what PME should do was enunciated 

by Admiral Stansfield Turner, who carried out an educational 

revolution at the Naval War College in the early 1970s: 

War colleges are places to educate the senior officer corps in the larger 

military and strategic issues that confront America in the late twentieth 

century. They should educate these officers by a demanding intellectual 

curriculum to think in wider terms than their busy operational careers have 

thus far demanded. Above all the war colleges should broaden the 

intellectual and military horizons of the officers who attend, so that they 

 

3. Battalion commander’s email to the authors. 
 

THE TRAINING REGIME __________________________________________________________ 

22 ________________________________________________________________________ 

have a conception of the larger strategic and operational issues that confront 

our military and our nation.

4

The problem today is even more direct and challenging, as the 

United States confronts the cultural wars of coming decades, rather 

than the monolithic and inflexible Soviet Union. The nature of that 

security challenge demands a more intellectually demanding 

education of officers – a PME system that should start at the 

beginning of an officer’s career. Moreover, it does not appear that an 

officers’ performance at staff or war college becomes a major 

determinant in consideration of his or her suitability for promotion. 

In the 1970s, the Army made a considerable effort to provide 

graduate educational opportunities to its brightest officers. Such 

opportunities have slowly but steadily decreased over the 

intervening decades (until a very recent modest increase). Perhaps 

emblematic of that decline is that China’s People’s Liberation Army 

may have more of its officers in the graduate schools of American 

universities than does the American military (an observation based 

on data that is several years old). 

The challenges of the 21st century demand more thoroughly 

educated, culturally attuned officers in command positions. The 

Department is making a start in the right direction with its demand 

that graduates of the military academies and those on ROTC 

scholarship attain higher levels of proficiency in foreign languages. 

Nevertheless, this represents only a first step. The Department and 

the services need to reform the personnel systems so that more fast 

track officers have the opportunity – as did the current combatant 

commander of Central Command – to attend the most prestigious 

graduate schools in the world to obtain master’s degrees and 

doctorates in subjects like military history, area studies, languages, 

and cultural studies. 

Perhaps the most important step in improving the ability of future 

leaders to understand the broader issues involved in force protection 

 

4. Admiral Stansfield Turner, quoted in Williamson Murray, “Grading the War Colleges,” 

The National Interest, Winter 1986/1987. 
 

__________________________________________________________THE TRAINING REGIME

_______________________________________________________________________ 23

lies in the provision of greater exposure to other cultures and other 

nations early in their careers. Additional opportunities for advisory 

tours, exchange tours, and foreign study, all would serve to provide 

future leaders with the skills to recognize the cultural gulfs and 

historical frameworks that they and their subordinates are 

confronting. None of this will be easy, and it will most probably 

demand a rethinking of the military career with an emphasis on more 

officers serving thirty years than is currently the case. 

The Department and the services are also going to have to think of 

PME and the exposures described above as an integral part of an 

officer’s career. It is an enabler that begins when future officers are 

still in college and continues through every year of their career until 

they leave the military. There must be a distinct break with the 

traditional belief that PME only occurs at the staff and war colleges. 

If the American military are to rise to the larger challenges involved 

in force protection, while operating within foreign societies and 

cultures, major changes are in order. 

Cultural Understanding 

Real cultural understanding represents a major challenge for the 

American military. But it is a challenge that must be met. The success 

in meeting it will depend to a considerable extent on the willingness 

and ability of the Department to emphasize skills and knowledge, 

which it can only obtain through a major overhaul of the system of 

professional military education and changes in the training regimes. 

In other words there must not only be an emphasis on cultural 

understanding and awareness, but a real symbiosis between 

experience, training and education. Only by such a redesign can 

learning in the school house connect to experiences in the real world. 

Junior officers and NCOs, with accumulating experience in 

theater, can have a real impact on the training that units and leaders 

receive. It appears that this is beginning to happen at the training 

centers. Nevertheless, it is worth recalling that during the Vietnam 

War, a number of divisions had to establish their own individual 

training programs because training of basic soldiers in the United 

States was so unrealistic and out of touch with what was really 
 

THE TRAINING REGIME __________________________________________________________ 

24 ________________________________________________________________________ 

happening on the battlefield. A disconnect between the training base 

and the cultural realities that Soldiers and Marines confront while 

deployed will inevitably have a disastrous impact on the ability of 

U.S. forces to deal with the larger issues of force protection. 

It is especially important that when the fighting in Afghanistan 

and in Iraq winds down the Department must maintain a major 

emphasis on cultural awareness in its training efforts as an essential 

ingredient in force protection. As the task force suggested above in 

the section on the most probable strategic environment, the United 

States will soon again find itself drawn into the maelstrom of the 

Middle East. The cultural experience gained at such cost over the past 

four years must not be allowed to atrophy for whatever reason. U.S. 

forces and leaders must have a better sense of the political, cultural 

and economic framework as an integral part of force protection than 

they did in 2001. 

Recommendation 1: 

Training, Leader Development, 

and Professional Military Education 

 Reinvigorate the role of PME in developing more 

thoroughly educated and culturally attuned officers in 

command positions. 

− Insure that officers on the fast track to command 

positions have the opportunity for exposure to other 

cultures early in their careers through advisory tours, 

exchange tours, and foreign study. 

− Provide more opportunities for advanced degrees in 

area and cultural studies, languages, and military history 

at the most prestigious universities in the world and 

ensure that such study is considered “career enhancing” 

by promotion boards. 

 Task the services and JFCOM to provide a plan in six 

months detailing the improvements and means needed 

to underwrite a second education and training 

revolution accounting for joint full spectrum 

operations (combat, counterinsurgency, SSTR, 

peacekeeping, and humanitarian presence). 
 

______________________________________________________ INFORMATION OPERATIONS

_______________________________________________________________________ 25

INFORMATION OPERATIONS

Broadly defined, information operations represent one of the most 

important attributes of force protection in both current and future 

military efforts. To turn Mao’s famous aphorism around, not only the 

guerrilla, but the Soldier and the Marine as well must swim in the sea 

of the populace if they are to achieve mission objectives. Information 

operations create the atmosphere within which successful SSTR 

operations can take place. But that will occur only if those in charge 

of IO possess an understanding of both the medium and the message. 

At present in the Department, not to mention the U.S. government, 

such an understanding falls far short of what is needed. 

“Information operations” is a term dating at least back to 1996 

whose application is still evolving to meet the changing dynamics of 

the battlespace as well as the maturing understanding of information 

tactics and techniques. 

Joint doctrine defines IO as: 

Actions taken to affect adversary information and information systems 

while defending one’s own information and information systems. This broad 

category is then further subdivided into either offensive or defensive 

information operations. 

A more recent document, approved by the Secretary of Defense, 

defines IO as: 

The integrated employment of the core capabilities of Electronic Warfare, 

Computer Network Operations, Psychological Operations, Military 

Deception, and Operations Security, in concert with specified supporting 

and related capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversarial 

human and automated decision-making while protecting our own.5

Common to both definitions is the focus on the adversary. 

However, over the last decade the U.S. military forces have been 

 

5. Department of Defense Information Operations Roadmap, 30 October 2003. 
 

INFORMATION OPERATIONS _______________________________________________________ 

26 ________________________________________________________________________ 

involved in a variety of operations on battlefields that contained 

enemy, friendlies and “others” – categories that are ill defined at best 

and changeable more like a kaleidoscope than a telescope. On such 

battlefields, the above definitions seem far too narrow. A form of 

operation so weakly defined does not invite a clear concept against 

which organizations and resources can be easily generated. 

Public affairs is directed at U.S. audiences. Public diplomacy is 

engaging, informing, and influencing key international audiences 

while IO targets the adversary. All three terms fall short of describing 

the diversity of audiences U.S. troops routinely have encountered in 

settings as varied as the Horn of Africa, the Balkans, Central Asia, 

and the Middle East. Local populations in such areas can be divided 

into at least four groups: (1) those with malevolent intent, (2) those 

who shelter and support in one way or another the insurgents, (3) 

fence-sitters, who are not overly hostile, but need to be won over, and 

(4) those who are favorably disposed to the presence of U.S. and 

coalition forces and who will, on occasion, help. 

In SSTR operations, IO is clearly needed to thwart and perhaps 

even change the behavior patterns of the first two groups. 

Nevertheless, it is obvious that the need is just as great, if not greater, 

to influence the latter two groups, because, while they are not 

adversaries or enemies of the United States, the clear aim of the 

insurgents is to convert them into enemies of the United States, or at 

the least intimidate them into not cooperating with U.S. and coalition 

forces. 

IO, public diplomacy, and public affairs demand coherent, 

consistent messages, which rest on the same philosophical, 

ideological, and political principles and track over long periods of 

time. Bumper stickers and slogans are inadequate to influence the 

minds of those struggling to meet the challenges raised by the influx 

of Western ideas into societies that are far removed from the ideals of 

Western liberal democracy. A lack of coherence in IO undermines 

U.S. efforts at force protection – thus endangering the lives of U.S. 

forces. 
 

______________________________________________________ INFORMATION OPERATIONS

_______________________________________________________________________ 27

Neither IO, nor public diplomacy, nor public affairs fully 

corresponds to the needs of the forces in the field. In October 2004, 

the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the following 

definition of strategic communications6: 

Strategic Communications: The transmission of integrated and 

coordinated USG themes and messages that advance U.S. interests and 

policies through a synchronized interagency effort supported by Public 

Diplomacy, Public Affairs, and Military Information Operations, in concert 

with other political, economic, information, and military actions. 

The U.S. Soldiers and Marines on the ground daily are conducting 

strategic communications. Soldiers and Marines represent the face of 

America on much of the “Arab street.” In a real sense they represent 

“influence” to the locals. As a young marine NCO commented in an 

after-action report: “I am tired of being told every Marine is an intel 

collector. I am also a transmitter. We need better guidance on the 

message we should be sending.” 

Regardless of which term is used, or how it is defined, there is a 

need to improve the capability of commanders at all levels to conduct 

“influence operations,” a term this task force uses where the target 

audience is the local population. A recent article by a Marine Corps 

officer and veteran of IO in several theaters puts it this way: 

To ensure that the tactical user has something to grasp, paraphrasing the 

definition as “influencing the way someone thinks” stays within the spirit of 

the definition no matter how much it changes.7

However, current definitions of IO and current policy and 

doctrine don’t adequately account for the critical effect of American 

troops, who are in continuous contact with the indigenous 

population. DoD must do a much better job of addressing the 

capabilities and needs of these most public of public “diplomats.” 

 

6. The DSB 2004 Summer Study on Transition to and From Hostilities found Strategic 

Communication to be “in crisis” and in urgent need of transformation. 

7. Lieutenant Colonel Joseph F. Paschall, USMC, “IO for Joe: Applying Strategic IO at the 

Tactical Level” in Field Artillery magazine, July-August 2005, pp. 25-29. 
 

INFORMATION OPERATIONS _______________________________________________________ 

28 ________________________________________________________________________ 

Commanders have had to invent the necessary capabilities on the 

fly. One example comes from the experience of the 1st Cavalry 

Division during its year in the greater Baghdad area. The division 

organized an IO/Non-Kinetic Operations staff of about 40 people and 

informed their work with polling feedback gathered by a 

combination of translators (organic and contractor) and people 

provided by the University of Baghdad. 

An example of the evolving notion of what is IO is the following 

division-level description of its IO objectives in Baghdad: 

IO will focus on influencing the Baghdad population to choose progress 

and prosperity over violence and hostilities as a means to achieve their best 

interests. 

This will be accomplished by leveraging the successes of each line of 

operation. Support of the government and Multi-National Force Baghdad 

will be achieved by leveraging division and line of operation-specific Iraqi 

spokesmen to publicize these improvements to the citizens of Baghdad. 

Support for [the] election[s] will be maintained by informing the populace of 

[the] purpose for [the] upcoming elections to prevent distrust related to false 

expectations of the purpose of the January elections. 

Compare the above approach to the official definitions for 

information operations, which focus on influencing the adversary. 

Instead, the division targeted the citizens of Baghdad, most of who 

were not “adversaries,” but who nevertheless were going to prove 

critical to the success of the January 2005 elections. 

The task force heard from a number of returning Marine and 

Army veterans of the counterinsurgency efforts in Iraq, the 

limitations of current definitions, doctrine, expertise, training, and 

experimentation. The concerns include the following: 

 IO in both the pre- and post-major conflict period were limited 

by outdated broadcast technology, lack of education and 

exposure of our psychological operations (PSYOP) and IO 

force to modern media techniques, a lack of imaginative 

messages that were more closely linked to the operations 

themselves, and a self-defeating bureaucratic process that 
 

______________________________________________________ INFORMATION OPERATIONS

_______________________________________________________________________ 29

resulted in messages that were “vanilla” in impact and 

overtaken-by-events by the time they were delivered. 

 The IO process was too time consuming, required “message 

approval” at too high a staff level – even for the most 

mundane local efforts, and failed to capitalize on the most 

modern advertising and media techniques (especially those 

related to political campaign advertising) that allow significant 

message turnaround in less than 12 hours. 

The skill sets needed to identify and influence friendly and 

neutral foreign audiences are largely different from those needed for 

IO directed against the adversary. The exception is PSYOPS, but 

PSYOPS is a limited commodity. The typical local commander had 

little access to influence operations experts. There are too few such 

experts on the battlefield and they tended to be located at a relatively 

high organization level not available to the lower level commander 

when and where needed. Because of the strategic consequences of 

tactical actions in these types of operations, the current structure for 

IO is daily challenged to align IO capabilities with the relatively 

lower level leaders who need them. 

It is also important that the lower level combat leaders have a 

better understanding of what capabilities to pursue and how to use 

them in a variety of situations. Training and the development and 

dissemination of best practices have major roles to play here. 

During its visits to the NTC, 29 Palms, and the JRTC, the task 

force found the lessons learned in overseas theaters being imparted to 

units being trained for overseas deployment. Training activities 

indicate new emphasis being given to “influence operations.” The 

Army and Marine Corps both use the term “non-kinetic operations,” 

and both emphasize the contributions of non-kinetic “influence 

operations” during force preparations for deployment. During the 

task force’s visits to the JRTC and NTC, members observed “Arab 
 

INFORMATION OPERATIONS _______________________________________________________ 

30 ________________________________________________________________________ 

villages” manned by role-playing Americans with Arab backgrounds 

mimicking circumstances in Iraq.8 

A major challenge in training is to combine kinetic and nonkinetic operations and establish metrics (what to measure) and ways 

to measure performance of these non-kinetic operations. This is 

attempted in Iraq with polling and at the major training sites with 

qualitative human interpretation of after-the-fact results. The training 

establishment is struggling with but has not yet found the non-kinetic 

equivalent of instrumentation and ground truth so critical to the 

After-Action Review learning process. 

Technology has begun to paint a somewhat different face on 

influence operations. While personal connection is still a strong 

means of influencing, the proliferation of television and radio in 

nearly all of the third world has driven the PSYOPS community to 

ratchet up its pace and sophistication in themes and preparation of 

materials. Again, there is a gap between the capabilities of the 

professional PYSOPS officer and the ground commander. 

Commanders with recent experience in Iraq told the task force of the 

need for rapid turnaround of materials to exploit situations that 

emerge and the need for such materials in a sophisticated, often 

digital form. 

There are some clear civil affairs lessons that have been learned 

(or relearned) in our most recent operations. The effectiveness of 

construction projects in any host nation is magnified if the 

construction team is composed of primarily host nation personnel. 

Providing SWET services are viewed by commanders as important a 

force multiplier as any form of combat organization or hardware. The 

ability to provide the resources to carry out projects of interest to the 

locals may be one of the most important tools in the local 

commander’s toolbox that can provide him or her the access and 

respect necessary to gain links to leaders in the community. The 

importance of funds available at tactical levels is emphasized in the 

 

8. The task force understands that such an environment has been also created at 29 Palms 

since the task force’s visit there. 
 

______________________________________________________ INFORMATION OPERATIONS

_______________________________________________________________________ 31

recent DoD Directive 3000.05 on Military Support for Stability, 

Security, Transition and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations. 

Additional complexity attends mission assignments. IO, as 

formally defined, is a mission assigned to U.S. Strategic Command. 

However, the task force did not find the DoD organization with the 

mandate to develop the capabilities needed by the tactical units to 

identify non-adversary audiences and develop specific themes and 

messages to inform them, motivate them, persuade them, and move 

them to action in support of U.S. strategic objectives. 

In conclusion, the goals of influence operations are to 

disadvantage the enemy, influence the undecided population, 

reassure friends, and sustain the momentum of U.S. efforts. The 

following notions are central to understanding what is needed for the 

U.S. military to become much better at influencing operations: 

 Top-down clearly articulated goals, themes and messages are 

needed. 

 The capabilities of the IO “professionals” (specialists) do not 

always reach the lower levels of the combat force that need 

their skills. 

 Technological advances have raised the levels of sophistication 

required in both the substance and means of distribution 

needed in development of influencing materials. 

 There are IO successes at the tactical level that need to be 

captured as best practices and shared with a wider audience. 

 The Soldier and Marine are powerful tools to influence others 

on the battlefield but must be better equipped with cultural 

and language skills. 

Influence operations are too pervasive a tool to be left to 

specialists – it must be taught and emphasized in leader 

development, training and education. There are officers and NCOs 

with the right kind of experience, to help address the shortfalls in 

influence capabilities. This task force believes that it would be useful 

for the Secretary of Defense to select an experienced land force 

general officer to lead a task force that would examine current 

IO/strategic communications and develop clear-cut and workable 
 

INFORMATION OPERATIONS _______________________________________________________ 

32 ________________________________________________________________________ 

definitions and concepts, which would reflect the human dimension 

(troops on the ground), and much needed interfaces and synergies 

with public diplomacy and public affairs. 

Recommendations 2 & 3: 

Information Operations 

 Charter a fast-track team to address the serious 

problems that afflict U.S. attempts to conduct 

information/ influence operations. 

− The team should recommend organizational, doctrinal, 

and operational changes to clarify definitions, 

responsibilities, purposes, missions, and assignments 

with particular emphasis on those information 

operations conducted by U.S. forces in theater largely 

directed at the local populace. 

− Appoint an OIF-experienced and successful land force 

commander as the team leader with a civilian deputy 

from Public Affairs. Include in the task force handpicked officers and NCOs with diverse influence/IO 

experience, commanders who have successfully 

integrated these operations into a larger campaign and 

experts from the private sector. Interim results should 

be available within 60 days and final report in 120 days. 

 Rapidly implement section 5.5.2 of DoD Directive 

3000.05 on Military Support for Stability, Security, 

Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations 

since money is ammunition: “Institutionalize 

procedures to achieve rapid distribution of funding, 

goods, and services, with appropriate accountability 

safeguards, by U.S. commanders deployed in foreign 

countries in support of stability operations.” 
 

___________________________________________ TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE AND RED TEAMING

_______________________________________________________________________ 33

TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE AND RED TEAMING

Tactical intelligence is a vital contributor to force protection in the 

current tactical environment and will remain so in future 

environments. There will be critical roles for sensors and other 

technical intelligence assets, particularly if they can approach the 

goals of persistent surveillance and tracking. However, the task force 

believes that HUMINT will continue to be the most important 

contributor to tactical intelligence in the cultural and religious 

conflicts of the future. Building relationships with the local populace 

is the most important contributor to gaining tactical intelligence in 

the circumstances confronting U.S. forces. Everyone is a collector, not 

just an intelligence officer and civil affairs. Thus, knowledge of the 

local culture and language skills represent crucial enablers to the 

building of relationships required to gain information. 

Once again this task force looks to training, leader development, 

and PME to provide the leverage in this area, especially in terms of 

the preparation of junior officers. Pattern recognition and link 

analysis – part of the current training regime – offer opportunities for 

technology enablers. It will be those on the scene who will connect 

the cultural dots and understand what actions need to be taken. 

Without that recognition, especially transmitted up the chain of 

command, force protection will remain a chimera, in which the 

approach of concertina wire and Fortress Apaches will remain the 

mainstay of force protection efforts – a dead end. 

The work being done by the Army’s INSCOM to enhance the 

collection and value of tactical intelligence particularly impressed the 

task force. That organization is pursuing three complementary 

thrusts to: 

1. Provide analysts with easier access to multi-INT, without 

having to know specifically what to ask for. 

2. Provide analysts with a collaborative environment in which 

they can share knowledge, not just data. 
 

TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE AND RED TEAMING ___________________________________________ 

34 ________________________________________________________________________ 

3. Push process to the lowest levels, to make intelligence more 

accessible to those working at lower levels. 

The Department should support these efforts at INSCOM 

enthusiastically with resources and accelerate the fielding of the 

capabilities it develops. 

Perhaps one of the most important steps that the Department and 

the services can take in light of the experiences that U.S. forces have 

gained in operations in both Afghanistan and Iraq is an increased 

focus on serious red teaming. By “red teaming,” the task force means 

the creation of a culturally based opponent, who thinks in a 

fundamentally different fashion from how Americans think. At 

every level such red teams must possess the background and 

understanding of the “other,” especially his culture, religion, and 

history. When done right it will help anticipate initiatives and 

responses by adversary groups and the reactions of the uncommitted 

populace and thus complement evidentiary-based intelligence. 

However, finding appropriate personnel is a major challenge. The 

U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) recently 

established the University of Foreign Military and Cultural Studies at 

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, to provide the education, training, and 

practical experience foundation to enable a force-wide red teaming 

capability. 

Another challenge is providing sufficient independence for the 

red team, while still ensuring its products have ample opportunity to 

inform operational and investment decisions.9 

The aim must not be just to provide a training opponent for U.S. 

forces, but rather to help in acculturating U.S. commanders, junior 

officers, and NCOs to the challenges they will confront in different 

cultural environments and within which they will have to operate. 

The results of the red teaming should also inform intelligence 

collection. In the age of the “strategic corporal,” such red teaming can 

 

9. A more complete discussion of the challenges of red teaming is provided in the report 

of the DSB Task Force on The Role and Status of DoD Red Teaming Activities (Sept, 

2003). 
 

___________________________________________ TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE AND RED TEAMING

_______________________________________________________________________ 35

begin the educational processes on which force protection must rely 

in the 21st century. 

Recommendations 4 & 5: 

Tactical Intelligence and Red Teaming 

 Provide much easier access to intelligence at tactical 

levels (battalions and below). Accelerate the efforts at 

the Army’s INSCOM and elsewhere to provide this 

capability along with the collaborative environment that 

fosters sharing of information and knowledge. This 

environment must embrace the critical role of the lower 

tactical levels as collectors as well as customers of 

intelligence. These capabilities should be packaged into 

a joint tool set with the corresponding training support 

and be SIPRNET-compatible at tactical levels.

 Establish aggressive red teaming to emulate the 

cultural predilections, motivations, objectives, internal 

planning, technical and operational capabilities, and 

decision processes of potential adversary groups and 

uncommitted populace. 

− Embed the red teaming in a process wherein senior 

decision makers and commanders use its products to 

inform operations, inform investment decisions, 

operations and intelligence collection. 

− Consider extending to other DoD organizations the 

Army’s recent initiative to develop more relevant and 

proficient red teamers. 

Vice Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff (VCJCS), Under Secretary of 

Defense Policy (USD [P]) and USD (AT&L) could be designated as 

leads. 
 

RAPID LEARNING AND SHARING OF EXPERIENCE _________________________________________ 

36 ________________________________________________________________________ 

RAPID LEARNING AND SHARING OF EXPERIENCE

A clear enabler of effective responses to the insurgency in Iraq 

and the adaptive approaches that the insurgents utilized was that 

Soldiers and Marines shared their experiences and thus were able to 

adapt to changes the enemy was making in his methods and tactics. 

Much of the most impressive sharing occurred in an ad hoc fashion 

within relatively small tactical units, which were able to cobble 

together procedures to pass tactical information back and forth 

among their members. Companycommand.com and 

platoonleader.org are examples of horizontal networking initiatives 

originally begun outside of formal channels. 

An impressive example of networking within the chain of 

command was CAVNET, under the command of Major General Peter 

Chiarelli, and its use of DARPA’s Command Post of the Future 

(CPOF). It appears that both of these initiatives have been picked up 

by other organizations, although the task force heard concerns about 

the future of CPOF. Such field-generated capabilities inevitably face 

legitimate concerns about future sustainability and the more 

bureaucratic “not invented here” reactions from acquisition 

communities 

Regarding lessons learned, SSTR and counterinsurgency 

operations daily present new challenges to U.S. forces. There are 

adversaries who seem to change TTPs almost daily and U.S. forces 

must operate in complex, cultural, political, infrastructure and 

physical environments that vary greatly from location to location. 

Unfortunately, bureaucratic systems of lessons learned merely 

feed combat reports and accounts of actions or encounters with 

insurgents back to staffs in the United States. All too often such 

processes appeared more attuned to collecting lessons than in 

providing the learning mechanisms that would help U.S. and 

coalition forces to deal more effectively with an adaptive enemy. 

Traditional lessons learned processes won’t work here. New models 

are needed. 
 

_________________________________________RAPID LEARNING AND SHARING OF EXPERIENCE

_______________________________________________________________________ 37

What is needed in the lessons learned arena appears to be less 

process and bureaucracy and more responsiveness to those in harm’s 

way. The crucial element in all of this is that the focus on lessons 

learned must be involved within the theater of operations, supported 

by a responsive and robust reach back capability to additional 

analysts and experts. 

Effective force protection depends on being able to capture and 

disseminate TTP best practices extremely rapidly among the lowest 

tactical levels. It also requires that lessons be promulgated rapidly to 

the highest levels in order to inform decisions on strategy, 

organization, training, technology initiatives and the like. 

A new model for learning lessons will need to exploit the 

dramatic growth of networking at tactical levels. This is the essence of 

the power of network-centric ideas: network as a verb. 

The JFCOM Lessons Learned for OIF approach used by 

embedded headquarters analysts engaged in ongoing operations also 

has applicability to the force protection challenge. In addition to 

capturing lessons on the spot, this group is able to reach back for help 

in resolving issues and, in some cases, turn lessons recorded into 

immediate remedial action. 

Recommendation 6: 

Rapid Learning and Sharing of Experience 

 Evolve a new approach exploiting the networking 

innovations going on in the field, the considered 

assignments of military personnel returning from 

theater and the experience of JFCOM’s OIF Lessons 

Learned activity. This will involve, inter alia:

− Embedding more observers and analysts into ongoing 

operations at tactical levels, and 

− Creating integrated teams of warfighters, intelligence 

analysts, operational analysts, and technologists that can 

rapidly perform the operations analyses needed to help 
 

RAPID LEARNING AND SHARING OF EXPERIENCE _________________________________________ 

38 ________________________________________________________________________ 

turn observations (data) into lessons (knowledge) into 

actions (lessons learned).10 

The verb evolve is chosen with care because the lessons learned 

process must itself be the subject of constant inquiry and adaptation. 

Making all this happen will require the Services, Regional 

Combatant Commands, JFCOM, OSD and the Joint Staff all 

working together. 

 

10. The DSB Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) Task Force running in parallel with this 

task force provides a similar recommendation for such integrated teams. 
 

______________________________________________________THE ROLE FOR TECHNOLOGY

_______________________________________________________________________ 39

THE ROLE FOR TECHNOLOGY

Over the past century technology has come to play an 

increasingly important role in conflict. Yet rarely in that period has 

technology provided the “silver bullet.” At the end of the Second 

World War, the Germans possessed the only combat jet aircraft in the 

world, the best tanks, a revolutionary submarine, and the only 

ballistic and cruise missiles in existence. Ironically, in 1940 and 1941, 

three-quarters of the Wehrmacht’s tank force was inferior to the 

armored fighting vehicles possessed by their opponents. 

Nevertheless, new technological capabilities can make a considerable 

difference particularly when complementing discipline, good 

training, a good understanding of the adversary’s intelligent tactics, 

competent doctrinal conceptions, and first-rate campaign planning. 

The extended nature of SSTR operations presents challenges and 

opportunities of inserting new technology-enabled capabilities 

directly into the operations. The challenge is that the introduction of 

technology must be closely integrated within new concepts, tactics, 

TTPs, and training. Current processes are not up to the task of 

providing timely insertion. The opportunity is that, properly used, 

technology can be a powerful enabler for new ways of conducting 

difficult operations. 

Technology can also be a powerful enabler of another training 

revolution. Besides enhancing training at the combat training center 

(CTC), more significantly, technology can help bring CTC-like 

standards to training units at their home stations. 

Examples of promising technologies include the following: 

 Technologies that can reduce clutter and noise in extremely 

high clutter/noise environments, high endurance unmanned 

platforms, and advanced radio frequency/infrared/video 

sensors can all help enable persistent surveillance. 

 Biometric technologies show promise, particularly close-up 

measures (e.g., fingerprints and retina scans) for identifying 
 

THE ROLE FOR TECHNOLOGY ______________________________________________________ 

40 ________________________________________________________________________ 

individuals. Less mature are the use of remote, non-contact 

devices and techniques for use in both surveillance and 

interrogation. There are also promising approaches for field 

supportable rational biometric databases, which may 

ultimately be more important than the sensors and algorithms 

themselves. 

 The integrated use of computers may have a high pay-off in a 

variety of applications: synthetic environments and 

simulation, distance learning and training, pattern recognition 

and link analyses to support tactical intelligence, and data 

mining to generate cultural profiles by region. Inexpensive 

and easily distributed technologies to capture and analyze the 

results of field tests and training exercises, as well as lessons 

learned from individuals at all levels returning from the field 

would also be of considerable use, as was underscored during 

the task force’s visit to the NTC. 

 Significant enhancement of the performance of language 

translators could be a great boon to the “strategic corporal.” 

The task force heard from Soldiers and Marines that the 

performance of current devices is mixed at the very best. 

Nevertheless, it is important to remember that the most effective 

force protection measure in Iraq has been constructive “engagement” 

with the local population. This view was underscored by virtually all 

of the recently returned brigade and battalion commanders who 

discussed their personal “lessons learned” with the task force. Many 

technologies, however, have tended to create barriers between U.S. 

military personnel and the local population, especially individual 

passive technologies (e.g., body and vehicle armor, protective glasses, 

etc.). In that sense, they may be counterproductive in certain settings. 

The most important technologies will be those that can bridge the gap 

between protection and defacto isolation. 
 

______________________________________________________THE ROLE FOR TECHNOLOGY

_______________________________________________________________________ 41

Recommendations 7 & 8: 

The Role of Technology 

 Initiate a major technology effort aimed at 

breakthrough enhancements to training and leader 

development with special attention to junior officers 

and NCOs, home-station training and non-kinetic 

operations. (Build on efforts currently underway in 

DARPA and the services). 

 Provide for more rapid insertion of new capabilities to 

include language translators into the field by inserting 

more prototypes into unit rotational training and by 

establishing a prototyping capability – with operational 

analysis and system engineering support – at the 

operational commands. 

USD (AT&L) and USD (Personnel & Readiness) should work 

closely with the Services and Combatant Commands to make these 

happen. 
 

JOINT URBAN OPERATIONS ACTIVITY AT JFCOM ________________________________________ 

42 ________________________________________________________________________ 

JOINT URBAN OPERATIONS ACTIVITY AT JOINT FORCES 

COMMAND

The JUOA is doing a good job within the parameters of its original 

organizational design. The members of the task force were 

particularly impressed with the tools developed for the Urban 

Resolve experiment and JFCOM’s efforts to extend the utility of these 

experimental tools to mission rehearsal, training, and operational 

opportunities. 

However, the security situation has changed substantially since 

the JUOA was conceived and created. When the Department 

assigned the joint urban operations responsibility to JFCOM, within 

the services there was still considerable opposition to the idea that 

U.S. forces would ever again have to engage an enemy in major cities. 

Events in Iraq have ended such speculation in a decisive fashion. 

Moreover, the fighting in Iraq in cities like Fallujah and Ramadi has 

provided direct experience and lessons that no exercises or training 

under peacetime conditions could possible emulate. 

The art of urban operations is evolving too fast, too far away for a 

traditional executive agent role to be effective. Furthermore, in order 

that JUOA serve as an effective steward of a JUO master plan, a 

significant increase in their staff and resources would be required. It 

is therefore an appropriate time to reassess the executive agent role as 

originally envisioned for JFCOM. It is no longer necessary to have an 

advocate for the importance of urban operations. 

An alternative to JUOA being “in charge” of a comprehensive 

master plan is have the JUOA be the advocate and executor for a few 

important needs. 
 

________________________________________JOINT URBAN OPERATIONS ACTIVITY AT JFCOM 

_______________________________________________________________________ 43

Recommendation 9: 

Joint Urban Operations Activity at Joint Forces Command 

 Focus JFCOM’s Joint Urban Operations Office on just 

a few needs rather than attempt to create and oversee a 

comprehensive master plan. The task force suggests 

that the most important of these activities should be: 

− Strengthening the vertical dimension of urban 

operations (and making them more joint) by 

orchestrating substantially increased contribution from 

the Air Force and Navy, 

− Developing and promulgating lessons from junior 

officers (working closely with the service lessons learned 

activities), and 

− Sponsoring a few major JUO training/experiment events 

a year. 
 

CONCLUSION _________________________________________________________________ 

44 ________________________________________________________________________ 

CONCLUSION

The task force believes that the extensive combat experiences in 

Iraq and Afghanistan have provided an invaluable basis for 

improving and expanding the capabilities of U.S. forces in the force 

protection arena. The first step towards improving the Department’s 

abilities in this arena must be a major effort to insure that the lessons 

learned thus far in those conflicts are not unlearned in the day-to-day 

hustle and bustle of “peacetime” soldiering. Moreover, the 

Department must insure that the young officers and NCOs, who have 

gained such extensive experiences in these two “three-block wars,” 

are not stifled. Bureaucracies at stateside installations sometimes do 

not recognize the extraordinary capacity for initiative that they have 

already displayed in combating the insurgents in Iraq and 

Afghanistan. The needs of the coming wars, their complexity, and 

their potential length all demand a far higher emphasis on rigorous 

PME to prepare officers and NCOs for the challenges they will 

confront. Significantly, General George Marshall felt that the greatest 

mistake he had made in the Second World War had been to close 

down the staff and war colleges. 

Secondly, the Department needs to focus on recognizing that force 

protection must involve issues that are far wider than concertina wire 

and bunkers. Force protection needs to become a way of thinking far 

beyond direct, passive measures. Force protection must involve the 

recognition that the achievement of political goals will inevitably 

require military forces that possess the cultural, linguistic, and 

historical understanding to work successfully with the population. It 

also demands intelligence capabilities in which technology is only an 

enabler to support those who are culturally attuned to the world in 

which the insurgent and the guerrilla live; it is only that knowledge 

that can effectively turn the information gained by technology into 

intelligence. Above all, it requires the ability to project a coherent and 

effective political message that not only reaches, but affects its target 

audience. 
 

_________________________________________________________________CONCLUSION

_______________________________________________________________________ 45

Lastly, counterinsurgency and SSTR operations put great 

demands on small units and their leaders. A great strength of 

America’s operational forces is the services’ junior officers and NCOs. 

The thrust of the task force’s recommendations is to make them better 

prepared and give them better tools to meet the challenges of the 

future security environment. 

The substantive recommendations of this task force represent 

changes in the Department’s thinking and culture, which is no easy 

task. Yet, given the very considerable differences in the challenges 

that the American military will confront in the 21st century from what 

its forces confronted in the last century, it would seem that such an 

effort is essential to the well being of this great nation. The enemy is 

already gathering in places where America’s most sophisticated 

capabilities are increasingly irrelevant. 
 

CONCLUSION _________________________________________________________________ 

46 ________________________________________________________________________ 

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_________________________________________________APPENDIX A. TERMS OF REFERENCE

_______________________________________________________________________ 47

APPENDIX A. TERMS OF REFERENCE
 

APPENDIX A. TERMS OF REFERENCE _________________________________________________ 

48 ________________________________________________________________________ 

This page intentionally left blank.
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3010 DEFENSE PENTAGON

WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3010

S~ptember 21, 2004

ACQUISITION,

TECHNOLOGY

AND LOGISTICS

MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN, DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD

SUBJECT: Terms of Reference-Defense Science Board Task Force on

Force Protection in Urban and Unconventional Environments

You are requested to initiate a Defense Science Board Task Force to review

and evaluate force protection capabilities in urban and unconventional

environments and provide recommendations to effect change to the future Joint

Force. The Task Force's foci should be to evaluate force protection in the context

of post major combat operations that have been conducted in Iraq and

Afghanistan. In these operations, loss of national treasure - military and civilian,

U.S. and other nations - has resulted from actions executed by non-state and rogue

actors. The threat and capabilities these insurgent, terrorist and criminal actions

present pose a most serious challenge to our ability to achieve unified action.

The Task Force should consider the following issues and context in its

approach to provide recommendations to effect change:

Approaches to provide force protection and security that work well

for traditional combat missions will require adaptation and may be

much less applicable when civil-military operations are required to

achieve objectives.

a.

b, Relevant experiences of other countries (e.g., UK with Northern

Ireland, Israel with the Palestinians, Russia with Chechnya, Australia

with East Timor) as well as UN operations in dealing with rogue and

non-state actors.

Relevant experiences and capabilities of civilian agencies and the

reserve components typically employed in peacekeeping, peace

enforcement and law enforcement roles.

c.

How operational art may be adapted to thwart adversary asymmetric

advantages.

d.

The Task Force is requested to accomplish the following objectives

Leverage the following reference documents as context for the study

and provide insight into the future security challenges the Joint Force

a.
and its interagency and multinational partners may face in urban and

unconventional environments:

0

0

Joint Operations Concepts (JOpsC), dated November 2003

An Evolving Joint Perspective: US Joint Warfare and Crisis

Resolution in the 21st Century, dated 28 Jan 03

Protection Joint Functional Concept, dated 31 December 2003

The Joint Operational Environment--Into the Future,

Coordinating Draft dated 5 March 2004

0

0

b.

c.

d.

e.

f.

g.

h.

Evaluate the root causes of injuries, mortality, and morbidity of

troops and personnel in post major combat operations.

Review current efforts, Improvised Explosive Device (lED) Defeat

Integrated Process Team and others, to negate the effects of IEDs,

rocket propelled grenades and other lethal means employed by

insurgent forces in standoff and close quarters tactics.

Review and evaluate on-going Joint Urban Operations (JUO)

initiatives to determine how well they are synchronized with the

projection of the future security environment. In addition, assess JUO

initiatives for specific emerging capabilities associated with force

protection.

Review and evaluate current efforts in Intelligence, Surveillance &

Reconnaissance to detennine how well they support specific force

protection needs.

Evaluate campaign objectives in post major combat operations and

consider what operational and functional capabilities are needed to

provide an asymmetrical advantage to protect the Joint Force.

i

Review the interaction between Strategic Communications in support

of campaign objectives and force protection considerations.

Recommend technological and operational art changes across all of

the critical considerations of DOTMLPF + Policy that can potentially

be implemented to improve the security and protection of military and

civilian personnel conducting post major combat operations to

achieve campaign and strategic objectives.

Requesthe Task Force provide its insights in the format of "short

shots" of problem, recommended solution(s) and rationale.

Incremental feedback as well as a final report is desired.

1.

The study will be sponsored by me as the Acting Under Secretary of Defense

(Acquisition, Technology and Logistics), the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, and the Director, Defense Research and Engineering. Dr. Ted Gold and

GEN Bill Hartzog, USA (Ret.) will serve as co-Chairmen of the Task Force.

LtCol Chris Bargery will serve as the Executive Secretary and LTC Scott Dolgoff,

USA will serve as the Defense Science Board Secretariat Representative.

The Task Force will be operated in accordance with the provisions ofPL 92-

462, the "Federal Advisory Committee Act" and DOD Directive 5104.5, "DoD

Federal Advisory Committee Management Program." It is not anticipated that this

Task Force will need to go into any "particular matters" within the meaning of

section 208 of Title 18 U.S. Code nor will it cause any member to be placed in the

position of acting as a procurement official.

£;" Folt.

,.", , C: H It ,If L \IV WYAlN£
This page intentionally left blank. 
 

______________________________________________ APPENDIX B. TASK FORCE MEMBERSHIP

_______________________________________________________________________ 49

APPENDIX B. TASK FORCE MEMBERSHIP

CO-CHAIRMEN

Dr. Theodore Gold 

GEN William Hartzog, USA (Ret) Burdeshaw Associates, Inc. 

TASK FORCE MEMBERS

Dr. Joseph Braddock 

Dr. Delores Etter* U.S. Naval Academy 

Dr. Bryan Gabbard Defense Group Inc. 

LtGen Earl Hailston, USMC (Ret.) Rolls-Royce 

Dr. William Hurley Institute for Defense Analyses 

Maj Gen Kenneth Israel, USAF (Ret.) Lockheed Martin Integrated 

Systems & Solutions 

Dr. Williamson Murray Institute for Defense Analyses 

LTG Charles Otstott, USA (Ret.) 

Mr. John Sandoz Hicks and Associates, Center for 

Adaptive Strategies and Threats 

MG Robert Scales, USA (Ret.) Colgen, Inc. 

RDML Thomas Steffens, USN (Ret.) Anteon Corp. 

Mr. Robert Stein* 

Gen Michael Williams, USMC (Ret.) LMI 

Mr. Daniel Winegrad 

*Co-Chairs of DSB IED Task Force 

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

Mr. Todd Chappell Joint Staff J-3 

 

DSB REPRESENTATIVE

LTC Scott Dolgoff, USA 

GOVERNMENT ADVISORS

Col Lyle Armel, USMC USMC Readiness Branch

COL Edward Martin, USA Joint IED Defeat Task Force

Dr. Robert Popp DARPA

Mr. Doug Richardson U.S. Special Operations 
 

APPENDIX B. TASK FORCE MEMBERSHIP ______________________________________________ 

50 ________________________________________________________________________ 

Command

Mr. Ben Riley OUSD (AT&L)

LTC Richard Scheels, USA TRADOC

Dr. Gordon Spencer National Ground Intelligence 

Center 

CDR Joseph Spivey, USN JFCOM 

Col Michael Vendzules, USAF USAF Force Protection Battlelab 

STAFF

Ms. Julie Evans Strategic Analysis, Inc. 

 
 

______________________________________ APPENDIX C. BRIEFINGS, DISCUSSIONS AND VISITS

_______________________________________________________________________ 51

APPENDIX C. BRIEFINGS, DISCUSSIONS AND VISITS

U.S. Army’s Asymmetric Warfare Group-threats, 

capability gaps, and efforts to close those gaps 

LTC Hammon, USA 

Army leader development for stabilization and 

reconstruction. Discussion on cultural awareness, IO 

integration, case study methodology, college battle 

rhythm, and The Center for Army Tactics (CTAC) 

irregular initiatives. In addition, the panel discussed 

internal challenges, including obtaining feedback from 

the field, limited time, and maintaining faculty 

currency. 

Mr. Chuck Zaruba 

Mr. Cary 

Mr. Hadfield 

Mr. Crumrine 

Mr. Thaden 

Mr. Gerling 

Lt. Col Hodges Via VTC – U.S. 

Army Command and General Staff 

College (CGSC), Fort Leavenworth 

British Perspective on Force Protection BGen Johnny Torrens-Spence 

Col James Murray-Playfair 

LTC Bob Bruce 

Cold War Historical Perspective Dr. Joe Braddock 

Combating Terrorism Technology Task Force Mr. Ben Riley 

Counterintelligence, HUMINT, and Force Protection COL Dave Summers, USA

Discussion: Counter-Ideology COL Michael Shalak 

J-5 

Discussion on his experience in the Middle East (as a 

former SEAL and liaison with Egyptians during Desert 

One) with the task force. He also discussed his civilian 

work experience with Blackwater Security and the 

Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission. 

Capt Patrick Toohey, USMC (Ret)

Experience in Iraq/public affairs/strategic 

communications strategy. 

BG Vincent Brooks, USA 

The Future of Urban Warfare Training MajGen Tom Jones, USMC 

Commanding General TECOM 
 

APPENDIX C. BRIEFINGS, DISCUSSIONS AND VISITS ______________________________________ 

52 ________________________________________________________________________ 

- Command, Control, Communications, and 

Computers/Lessons Learned/Fires/Non-Lethal 

Weapons 

- Training Strategies 

- Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance 

- Science and Technology/Models and Simulations 

- Joint Concept Development and Experimentation 

- Way Ahead 

Joint Urban Operations Center 

IED CONOPS Brief Lt Col Kenny Volmert, USAF

Israeli Perspective on Force Protection in counterinsurgency operations 

BG Yaacov Ayish, Commander 

Armour Brigade ( Reserves) 

Col. David Ovadia, 

Head of Land Systems Division 

Col. Yoav Zacks, 

R&D Attache, Embassy of Israel 

Law Enforcement Community Perspective: Panel 

Discussion. Each member spoke about his/her 

experience in law enforcement. In particular, they 

discussed community relations, non-traditional threats 

and how to cope with them at the local level, and their 

experiences with radical Islam. 

Chief Kitzerow, Portsmouth VA 

Mr. Charles Prouty, Former FBI 

SAC for the Boston area 

Major Jerry Burke, MA State Police 

Dr. Kathleen Kiernan, former 

Deputy Director of Bureau of 

Alcohol, Firearms, and Tobacco 

Mr. Martin Mahon, DC Police 

Mr. Dennis Fascian, ATF Intel 

Analyst 

Learning to Eat Soup With A Knife: Counterinsurgency 

Lessons From Vietnam And Iraq 

LTC John Nagl, USA 

Former OIF Brigade/Battalion Commanders Panel COL David Teeples, USA 

COL Kevin Stramara, USA 

LTC Hugh Van Roosen, USA 

OIF Command Perspective- discussion on his experience 

commanding a Regimental Combat Team in the al 

Anbar Region. 

Col John Toolan, USMC 

OIF Command Perspective on force protection in the 

urban environment and the threat of improvised 

explosive devices (IED) 

LtGen Jim Mattis, former 1st Mar 

Civ Cdr, currently CG of MCCDC 
 

______________________________________ APPENDIX C. BRIEFINGS, DISCUSSIONS AND VISITS

_______________________________________________________________________ 53

OIF Lessons Learned COL Mike Ryan, USA 

OIF Operational Perspective LtCol Bryan McCoy

Operation OIF II and Force Protection LTG Thomas Metz, USA 

Perspective on Force Protection in Iraq Col Mike Linnington, Joint Chiefs 

of Staff, J8 and COL (Sel) Mark 

Calvert

Psychological operations LTC Mike Layrisson, USA

Red team expertise Mr. Frank Legasse 

DTRA 

Security Issues-Special Work and Travel for contractors Mr. Fred Demech 

Northrop Grumman 

SOCOM Brief current initiatives on force protection Col Paul Burke, USMC 

Stability and Support Operations 

(2d Bde Combat Team of the 101st Airborne Division 

(Air Assault) during OIF 1 SASO in Mosul, Iraq from 

May 03 to Feb 04) 

COL Joe Anderson, USA 

Status of the Joint IED Defeat Task Force COL Lamont Woody, USA 

Task Force 1041, Operation DESERT SAFESIDE Col Brad Spacy, USAF 

 and LtCol Chris Bargery, USAF 

Discussion on Force Protection LtGen John Sattler, USMC 

Discussion on Force Protection GEN William Wallace, USA 

Thoughts on Force Protection: The Historical 

Parameters 

Dr. Wick Murray 

TRADOC: Overview of Convoy Protection Effort COL Ronald Isom, USA 

TRADOC: Overview of Capability Needs in Force 

Protection / Overview of Counter-Rocket, Artillery and 

Mortar Effort 

Mr. Steve West

Training Transformation Dr. Paul Mayberry

USMC Briefing- challenges and efforts to improve force 

protection in urban and unconventional environments 

Col Lyle Armel, USMC 
 

APPENDIX C. BRIEFINGS, DISCUSSIONS AND VISITS ______________________________________ 

54 ________________________________________________________________________ 

INSCOM Overview, Fusion/Horizontal Integration 

Tactical Overwatch/Force Protection IOC analytic & 

visualization Tools 

Project & Future Technologies 

Visit to INSCOM: 

MG John Kimmons, USA 

MAJ John Altman, Operations 

Officer, and Mr. Dan Yuill, Senior 

Analyst, IOC 

Software Integration Laboratory 

Dr. James Heath, Senior Science 

Advisor to G-2 HQDA and CG 

INSCOM and Members of Future 

Directorate 

- Command Brief 

- Scenario brief 

- Discussion with Observer Controllers 

- Observe training with 29th BCT 

- Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain 

(MOUT) Brief/Tour 

Visit to Joint Readiness Training 

Center 

- Discussion with Deputy Director 

- Signals Intelligence Directorate brief 

- Research Associate Directorate Support to IED 

- Information Assurance Directorate 

Visit to National Security Agency 

- Roundtable of Battalion Commanders and Officers 

from units recently returned from Iraq. Focus on 

Lessons Learned. Each unit presents key lessons 

learned, focused on equipment shortfalls in theater, 

or equipment that worked well 

- Current, near future and far term MOUT 

capabilities at MAGTF-TC, to include potential 

integration of stability and support operations 

training, show Onyx CD 

- Observe training unit at MOUT 

Visit to 29 Palms 

 

Observe the after action review process and discussion 

with leadership about what they are learning and how 

the lessons are being fed back into the system during 

rotation 05-11 

Visit to National Training Center, 

Ft. Irwin, CA 
 

_________________________________________________________________ APPENDIX D 

_______________________________________________________________________ 55

APPENDIX D. ACRONYMS

CAVNET 1st Cavalry Division Internet 

CPOF Command Post of the Future 

CTC Combat Training Center 

DARPA Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 

DoD Department of Defense 

DOTMLPF Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and 

Education, Personnel and Facilities 

DSB Defense Science Board 

HUMINT Human Intelligence 

IED Improvised Explosive Devices 

INSCOM U.S. Army’s Intelligence and Security Command 

IO Information Operations 

JFCOM Joint Forces Command 

JRTC Joint Readiness Training Center 

JUO Joint Urban Operations 

JUOA Joint Urban Operations Activity 

MOUT Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain 

NCO Non-Commissioned Officer 

NGO Non-government Organization 

NTC National Training Center 

OIF Operation Iraqi Freedom 

OPFOR Opposition forces 

OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense 

PME Professional Military Education 

PSYOPS Psychological Operations 

ROTC Reserve Officer Training Corps 

SSTR Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction 

SWET Sewer, Water, Electricity, Trash 

TRADOC U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command 

TTP Tactics, Techniques and Procedures 

USD (AT&L) Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and 

Logistics 

USD (P) Under Secretary of Defense for Policy 

VCJCS Vice-Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff