United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit 

Chicago, Illinois 60604 

Submitted May 28, 20200F

*

Decided June 8, 2020 

Before 

FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge 

DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge 

AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge

No. 19-2571 

ANDRE V. POWELL, 

Petitioner-Appellant, 

v. 

JOHN GALIPEAU, 

 Respondent-Appellee.

 Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Northern District of Indiana, 

South Bend Division. 

No. 3:19-CV-297-RLM-MGG 

Robert L. Miller, Jr., 

Judge. 

O R D E R 

 Andre Powell petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus challenging the revocation 

of his placement in a community re-entry program without notice or a hearing. The 

district court denied the petition and Powell appealed. Because Powell has since been 

released from prison, a live controversy no longer exists and we therefore vacate and 

remand to the district court with instructions to dismiss the case as moot. 

*

 We have agreed to decide this case without oral argument because the briefs 

and record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would 

not significantly aid the court. FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C). 

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION 

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 
No. 19-2571 Page 2 

 In 2013 Powell was convicted of Class B felony burglary and sentenced to 

18 years’ incarceration. While serving his sentence, Powell was placed in a work-release 

program at the South Bend Community Re-Entry Center and assigned to jobs with the 

Indiana Department of Natural Resources and the South Bend Cubs, a minor league 

baseball team. But after several infractions (Powell was caught stealing from both the 

Cubs and the Re-Entry Center, and he failed to show up for work at the Department of 

Natural Resources), the Indiana Department of Correction revoked his placement in the 

work-release program and transferred him to Westville Correctional Facility. Only after 

the transfer did Powell receive any kind of a hearing. 

 In his petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, Powell asserted that his transfer to 

Westville without prior notice or a hearing violated due process, and that his transfer 

violated his equal protection rights because he was sanctioned more severely than 

similarly situated offenders. The district court denied the petition, concluding that 

Powell had no constitutional liberty or property interest in a work-release program and, 

as a result, he was not entitled to due process before his transfer. And even if he had 

been entitled to due process, his claim would not be cognizable in habeas corpus 

because the revocation of his placement did not alter the fact or duration of his 

confinement. 

On appeal Powell challenges the district court’s determination that habeas 

corpus was not the correct means by which to contest his transfer. The parties, at our 

direction, filed jurisdictional statements addressing whether this appeal should be 

dismissed as moot in light of information from the warden that Powell since has been 

transferred into a community-transition program and soon would be released from 

prison. 

Our jurisdiction is limited to live “cases and controversies.” U.S. Const. Art. III, 

§ 2; see United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36 (1950); Auto Driveaway Franchise 

Systems, LLC v. Auto Driveaway Richmond, LLC, 928 F.3d 670, 674 (7th Cir. 2019). A 

petition for a writ of habeas corpus becomes moot after a petitioner is released from 

custody unless the petitioner will suffer sufficient collateral consequences from the 

feature of his custody that he is challenging. See Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7–14 

(1998); Lane v. Williams, 455 U.S. 624 (1982); Tara Gold Res. Corp. v. S.E.C., 678 F.3d 557, 

559 (7th Cir. 2012). Although we presume that a criminal conviction has collateral 

consequences, we do not extend that presumption with respect to prison disciplinary 

proceedings. Spencer, 523 U.S. at 7–16; Eichwedel v. Curry, 700 F.3d 275, 279 (7th Cir. 

2012) (collecting cases). 
No. 19-2571 Page 3 

The parties’ submissions confirm that the case is moot. Powell has been released 

from Westville. According to the Indiana Department of Correction’s website, Powell 

was released from the facility on February 21, 2020, and “[r]eturned to court authority 

on release.” Offender Data: Andre Powell, IND. DEP’T OF CORRECTION, https://www.in.gov/

apps/indcorrection/ofs/ofs?previous_page=1&detail=951140 (last visited May 20, 2020). 

On March 4 Powell filed notice of a change of address from Elkhart County Work 

Release to the Faith Mission in Elkhart. See Powell v. Galipeau, No. 19-2571 Doc. 19 

(7th Cir.). Powell’s departure from Westville1F means that he cannot “obtain ‘any 

potential benefit’ from a favorable decision.” Pope v. Perdue, 889 F.3d 410, 414 (7th Cir. 

2018) (quoting United States v. Trotter, 270 F.3d 1150, 1152 (7th Cir. 2001)). Powell 

already has received the relief he sought—his release from Westville—and there is no 

further relief that the facility can provide him. Further, Powell does not identify, let 

alone establish, any potential collateral consequences to the revocation of his workrelease. See Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7–14 (1998); Lane v. Williams, 455 U.S. 624 (1982); 

Tara Gold Res. Corp. v. S.E.C., 678 F.3d 557, 559 (7th Cir. 2012). 

To the extent he wishes to raise a constitutional challenge to his transfer to a new 

facility, he must bring an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or another statute authorizing 

damages or injunctions. Isby v. Brown, 856 F.3d 508 (7th Cir. 2017). 

We VACATE the judgment and REMAND with instructions to dismiss the 

litigation as moot.