J-S29041-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

*Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Cour t. COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, Appellee

v. DENSON MATTHEW QUINN, Appellant : : : : : : : : : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

No. 1944 WDA 2014 Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered Novemb er 12, 2014,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Fayette County, Criminal Division, at No(s): CP-26-CR-0000487-2014 BEFORE: PANELLA, MUNDY, and STRASSBURGER, JJ.* MEMORANDUM BY STRASSBURGER, J.: FILED JUNE 30, 2015 Denson Matthew Quinn (Appellant) appeals from the j udgment of sentence entered following his conviction for one c ount of indecent assault. After review, we affirm. On February 17, 2014, Appellant was arrested and c harged with sexually assaulting a female friend earlier that mo nth. On August 5, 2014, following a bench trial, Appellant was found guilty of indecent assault. On November 12, 2014, Appellant was sentenced to a ter m of 30 to 60 months’ incarceration. Additionally, Appellant was classif ied as a Tier II offender pursuant to the Sex Offender Registration and Notif ication Act (SORNA). 1 As a result, Appellant was ordered to comply with the registration and reporting

1 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9799.10-9799.41.J-S29041-15

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requirements of SORNA. This timely appeal followed . Both the trial court and Appellant complied with the requirements of Pa. R.A.P. 1925. Appellant raises three issues on appeal. 1. Whether the evidence was legally and factually i nsufficient to prove that [Appellant] was guilty of indecent assau lt? 2. Is it unconstitutional to require an Appellant t o register for a lifetime when said registration requirement exceeds the statutory maximum penalty for Appellant’s offense? 3. Is [SORNA] unconstitutional in requiring [] an A ppellant to register for twenty[-]five (25) years? Appellant’s Brief at 7. Our standard of review for a challenge to the suffi ciency of the

evidence is well-settled. The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence is whether viewing all the evidence admitt ed at trial in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, the re is sufficient evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every el ement of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying the ab ove test, we may not weigh the evidence and substitute our judgm ent for the fact-finder. In addition, we note that the facts an d circumstances established by the Commonwealth need not preclude e very possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a de fendant's guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the evide nce is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no pr obability of fact may be drawn from the combined circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving ever y element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire record must be evaluated and all evidenc e actually received must be considered. Finally, the trier of fact while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and the w eight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all, part or none of the evidence.J-S29041-15

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Commonwealth v. Snyder , 870 A.2d 336, 350 (Pa. Super. 2005) (citation omitted). The statute provides, in relevant part, A person is guilty of indecent assault if the perso n has indecent contact with the complainant, causes the c omplainant to have indecent contact with the person or intenti onally causes the complainant to come into contact with seminal f luid, urine or feces for the purpose of arousing sexual desire in the person or the complainant and (1) the complainant is unconscious or the person knows that the complainant is unaware that the indecent contact is occurring[.] 18 Pa.C.S. § 3126(a)(4). Indecent contact is define d as “any touching of the sexual or other intimate parts of the person for th e purpose of arousing or gratifying sexual desire, in any person.” 18 Pa.C.S . § 3101. Appellant contends that his conviction cannot stan d because “the testimony concerning the crime[] charged was incons istent and was contradicted by the physical and testimonial eviden ce.” Appellant’s Brief at 13. Specifically, Appellant contends that the Com monwealth failed to present evidence that he touched the sexual or inti mate parts of the victim.

Id. at 16. We disagree. This Court previously rejected the notion that “the character of an indecent assault depends entirely on its degree of success achieved by the

attacker.” Commonwealth v. Capo , 727 A.2d 1126, 1128 (Pa. Super. 1999) (stating “[the appellant’s] inability to achi eve more intimate contactJ-S29041-15

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than was in fact accomplished does not make that as sault equivocal or lessen its indecency”). At trial, the victim testified that she and Appell ant - her temporary

roommate at the time of the incident - were watchin g TV in her bedroom. N.T., 8/4/2014, at 19. She was lying on her bed; h e was sitting at the foot

of the bed. Id. at 18-19. The victim was wearing a green t-shirt, sweatpants, a bra, and underwear. Id. at 20. The victim testified that she and Appellant were not in a relationship of any sor t, and at no point during the evening did she attempt to initiate a sexual en counter with Appellant.

Id. at 19-20. The victim testified that she fell aslee p and was awakened by Appellant’s tugging on her shirt. Id. at 20. She jumped up and realized that her underwear and sweatpants had been removed and t hat she was naked

from the waist down. Id. Appellant was fully clothed, lying beside her in

bed. Id. at 21. At that point, the victim demanded Appella nt leave the room and he complied. The victim reported the inci dent to police a few days

later. Id. She testified that she found her underwear “shove d between the bed and the wall” and her sweatpants on the bedroom floor. Id. at 21. The evidence presented was sufficient to sustain Ap pellant’s conviction

for indecent assault. It is well-established that “ the uncorroborated testimony of the complaining witness is sufficient to convict a defendant of

sexual offenses.” Commonwealth v. Bishop , 742 A.2d 178, 189 (Pa.J-S29041-15

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Super. 1999). Instantly, the victim’s testimony es tablishes that Appellant had indecent contact with her while she was asleep. See Commonwealth v. Vosburg , 574 A.2d 679, 684 n.2 (Pa. Super. 1990) (holding that the Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Vosburg committed indecent assault on an eight-year-old victim by pulling on her underwear while she lay in bed, a nd specifically rejecting Vosburg’s contention that pulling on the victim’s u nderwear was insufficient to establish that the act was for the purpose of ar ousing sexual desire). As such, we find that Appellant’s claim is without mer it. Appellant’s final two issues concern the constitut ionality of SORNA. Appellant’s Brief at 19-21. On multiple occasions, our Courts have considered, and rejected, the issues raised by Appe llant. These prior decisions reason that the imposition of the registr ation and notification requirements does not constitute punishment. See, e.g., Commonwealth

v. Williams , 832 A.2d 962, 986 (Pa. 2003) (upholding as non-pu nitive the registration, notification, and counseling provisio ns of Megan’s Law II);

Commonwealth v. Rhoads , 836 A.2d 159 (Pa. Super. 2003) (same). More recently, this Court upheld the constitutionality o f SORNA’s registration requirements in Commonwealth v. Perez , 97 A.3d 747 (Pa. Super. 2014). Moreover, specific to Appellant’s second argument, in Commonwealth v. McDonough , 96 A.3d 1067 (Pa. Super. 2014) this Court rejecte d theJ-S29041-15

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argument that mandating compliance with SORNA by of fenders who have served their maximum term is unconstitutional. Appe llant has failed to convince us that another constitutional analysis of SORNA would produce a different result. Accordingly, we determine that A ppellant is not entitled to

relief. Judgment of sentence affirmed. Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary Date: 6/30/2015