S. HRG. 111–701, PT. 1 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR 

APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2011 

HEARINGS 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

ON 

S. 3454 

TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2011 FOR MILITARY 

ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, AND FOR DEFENSE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF 

ENERGY, TO PRESCRIBE PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR SUCH FISCAL 

YEAR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES 

PART 1 

MILITARY POSTURE AND TO RECEIVE TESTIMONY RELATING TO 

THE ‘‘DON’T ASK, DON’T TELL’’ POLICY 

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY 

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY 

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE 

U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND, U.S. AFRICA COMMAND, AND U.S. JOINT 

FORCES COMMAND 

U.S. NORTHERN COMMAND AND U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND 

U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND AND U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND 

U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND, U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND, AND U.S. 

FORCES KOREA 

BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE POLICIES AND PROGRAMS 

LITTORAL COMBAT SHIP ACQUISITION 

FEBRUARY 2, 23, 25; MARCH 4, 9, 11, 16, 26; APRIL 20; DECEMBER 14, 

2010 

( 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2011—Part 1 

MILITARY POSTURE AND TO RECEIVE TESTIMONY RELATING TO THE ‘‘DON’T ASK, DON’T TELL’’ POLICY

● DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

● DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

● DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

● U.S. EUROPEAN 

COMMAND, U.S. AFRICA COMMAND, AND U.S. JOINT FORCES COMMAND

● U.S. NORTHERN COMMAND AND U.S. 

SOUTHERN COMMAND

● U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND AND U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND

● U.S. PACIFIC 

COMMAND, U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND, AND U.S. FORCES KOREA

● BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE POLICIES AND 

PROGRAMS

● LITTORAL COMBAT SHIP ACQUISITION 

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

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62–155 PDF 2011

S. HRG. 111–701, PT. 1 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION FOR 

APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2011 

HEARINGS 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

ON 

S. 3454 

TO AUTHORIZE APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2011 FOR MILITARY 

ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, AND FOR DEFENSE ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF 

ENERGY, TO PRESCRIBE PERSONNEL STRENGTHS FOR SUCH FISCAL 

YEAR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES 

PART 1 

MILITARY POSTURE AND TO RECEIVE TESTIMONY RELATING TO 

THE ‘‘DON’T ASK, DON’T TELL’’ POLICY 

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY 

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY 

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE 

U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND, U.S. AFRICA COMMAND, AND U.S. JOINT 

FORCES COMMAND 

U.S. NORTHERN COMMAND AND U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND 

U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND AND U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND 

U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND, U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND, AND U.S. 

FORCES KOREA 

BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE POLICIES AND PROGRAMS 

LITTORAL COMBAT SHIP ACQUISITION 

FEBRUARY 2, 23, 25; MARCH 4, 9, 11, 16, 26; APRIL 20; DECEMBER 14, 

2010 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov/ 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

(Before July 22, 2010) 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman 

ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia 

JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut 

JACK REED, Rhode Island 

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii 

BILL NELSON, Florida 

E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska 

EVAN BAYH, Indiana 

JIM WEBB, Virginia 

CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri 

MARK UDALL, Colorado 

KAY R. HAGAN, North Carolina 

MARK BEGICH, Alaska 

ROLAND W. BURRIS, Illinois 

JEFF BINGAMAN, New Mexico 

EDWARD E. KAUFMAN, Delaware 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona 

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma 

JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama 

SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia 

LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina 

JOHN THUNE, South Dakota 

ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi 

GEORGE S. LeMIEUX, Florida 

SCOTT P. BROWN, Massachusetts 

RICHARD BURR, North Carolina 

DAVID VITTER, Louisiana 

SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

(After July 22, 2010) 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman 

JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut 

JACK REED, Rhode Island 

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii 

BILL NELSON, Florida 

E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska 

EVAN BAYH, Indiana 

JIM WEBB, Virginia 

CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri 

MARK UDALL, Colorado 

KAY R. HAGAN, North Carolina 

MARK BEGICH, Alaska 

ROLAND W. BURRIS, Illinois 

JEFF BINGAMAN, New Mexico 

EDWARD E. KAUFMAN, Delaware 

CARTE P. GOODWIN, West Virginia 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona 

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma 

JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama 

SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia 

LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina 

JOHN THUNE, South Dakota 

ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi 

GEORGE S. LeMIEUX, Florida 

SCOTT P. BROWN, Massachusetts 

RICHARD BURR, North Carolina 

DAVID VITTER, Louisiana 

SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine 

RICHARD D. DEBOBES, Staff Director 

JOSEPH W. BOWAB, Republican Staff Director 

(II) 

(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES 

MILITARY POSTURE AND TO RECEIVE TESTIMONY RELATING TO THE ‘‘DON’T ASK, 

DON’T TELL’’ POLICY

FEBRUARY 2, 2010

Page 

Gates, Hon. Robert M., Secretary of Defense ........................................................ 11 

Mullen, ADM Michael G., USN, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff ....................... 21 

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

FEBRUARY 23, 2010

McHugh, John M., Secretary of the Army ............................................................. 180 

Casey, GEN George W., Jr., USA, Chief of Staff of the Army ............................. 228 

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

FEBRUARY 25, 2010

Mabus, Hon. Raymond E., Jr., Secretary of the Navy .......................................... 316 

Roughead, ADM Gary, USN, Chief of Naval Operations ..................................... 324 

Conway, Gen. James T., USMC, Commandant of the Marine Corps .................. 342 

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

MARCH 4, 2010

Donley, Hon. Michael B., Secretary of the Air Force ............................................ 453 

Schwartz, Gen. Norton A., USAF, Chief of Staff of the Air Force ....................... 464 

U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND, U.S. AFRICA COMMAND, AND U.S. JOINT FORCES

COMMAND

MARCH 9, 2010

Stavridis, ADM James G., USN, Commander, U.S. European Command .......... 538 

Ward, GEN William E., USA, Commander, U.S. Africa Command .................... 576 

Mattis, Gen. James N., USMC, Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command ....... 595 

U.S. NORTHERN COMMAND AND U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND

MARCH 11, 2010

Renuart, Gen. Victor E., Jr., USAF, Commander, U.S. Northern Command, 

and Commander, North American Aerospace Defense Command ................... 655 

Fraser, Gen. Douglas M., USAF, Commander, U.S. Southern Command .......... 672 

U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND AND U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND

MARCH 16, 2010

Olson, ADM T., USN, Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command ............ 735 

Petraeus, GEN David H., USA, Commander, U.S. Central Command ............... 742 

Page

IV 

U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND, U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND, AND U.S. FORCES KOREA

MARCH 26, 2010

Chilton, Gen. Kevin P., USAF, Commander, U.S. Strategic Command .............. 839 

Willard, ADM Robert F., USN, Commander, U.S. Pacific Command ................. 851 

Sharp, GEN Walter L., USA, Commander, United Nations Command, Combined Forces Command, U.S. Forces-Korea ....................................................... 867 

BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE POLICIES AND PROGRAMS

APRIL 20, 2010

Miller, Hon. James N., Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for 

Policy ..................................................................................................................... 919

Gilmore, Hon. J. Michael, Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, Department of Defense .................................................................................................... 929 

O’Reilly, LTG Patrick J., USA, Director, Missile Defense Agency ...................... 933 

Macy, RADM Archer M., Jr., USN, Director, Joint Integrated Air and Missile 

Defense Organization, and Deputy Director for Force Protection, J–8, The 

Joint Staff ............................................................................................................. 942 

LITTORAL COMBAT SHIP ACQUISITION

DECEMBER 14, 2010

Mabus, Hon. Raymond E. Jr., Secretary of the Navy ........................................... 1018 

Roughead, ADM Gary, USN, Chief of Naval Operations ..................................... 1020 

Stackley, Hon. Sean J., Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition ...................................................................................... 1021 

Pandolfe, RADM Frank C., USN, Director, Surface Warfare Division OPNAV 

N86 ........................................................................................................................ 1023 

Labs, Eric J., Ph.D., Senior Analyst for Naval Forces and Weapons, Congressional Budget Office ............................................................................................. 1023 

O’Rourke, Ronald, Specialist in Naval Affairs, Congressional Research Service .......................................................................................................................... 1032 

Francis, Paul L., Managing Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management, 

Government Accountability Office ...................................................................... 1042 

(1) 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION 

FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 

2011 

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 2, 2010 

U.S. SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, 

Washington, DC. 

MILITARY POSTURE AND TO RECEIVE TESTIMONY 

RELATING TO THE ‘‘DON’T ASK, DON’T TELL’’ POLICY 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:05 a.m. in room SD– 

G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin (chairman), presiding. 

Committee members present: Senators Levin, Lieberman, Reed, 

Akaka, Bill Nelson, E. Benjamin Nelson, Bayh, Webb, McCaskill, 

Udall, Hagan, Begich, Burris, McCain, Inhofe, Sessions, Chambliss, 

Graham, Thune, Wicker, LeMieux, and Collins. 

Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk. 

Majority staff members present: Jonathan D. Clark, counsel; 

Madelyn R. Creedon, counsel; Gabriella Eisen, counsel; Richard W. 

Fieldhouse, professional staff member; Creighton Greene, professional staff member; Jessica L. Kingston, research assistant; Michael J. Kuiken, professional staff member; Gerard J. Leeling, 

counsel; Peter K. Levine, general counsel; Jason W. Maroney, counsel; William G.P. Monahan, counsel; Michael J. Noblet, professional 

staff member; Roy F. Phillips, professional staff member; John H. 

Quirk V, professional staff member; and William K. Sutey, professional staff member. 

Minority staff members present: Joseph W. Bowab, Republican 

staff director; Adam J. Barker, professional staff member; Christian D. Brose, professional staff member; Pablo E. Carrillo, minority investigative counsel; Paul C. Hutton IV, professional staff 

member; Michael V. Kostiw, professional staff member; Daniel A. 

Lerner, professional staff member; David M. Morriss, minority 

counsel; Lucian L. Niemeyer, professional staff member; Christopher J. Paul, professional staff member; Diana G. Tabler, professional staff member; Richard F. Walsh, minority counsel; and Dana 

W. White, professional staff member. 

Staff assistants present: Kevin A. Cronin, Jennifer R. Knowles, 

Christine G. Lang, and Breon N. Wells. 

Committee members’ assistants present: James Tuite, assistant 

to Senator Byrd; Christopher Griffin, assistant to Senator 

2 

Lieberman; Carolyn A. Chuhta, assistant to Senator Reed; Nick 

Ikeda, assistant to Senator Akaka; Christopher Caple, assistant to 

Senator Bill Nelson; Ann Premer, assistant to Senator Ben Nelson; 

Patrick Hayes, assistant to Senator Bayh; Gordon I. Peterson, assistant to Senator Webb; Tressa Steffen Guenov, assistant to Senator McCaskill; Jennifer Barrett, assistant to Senator Udall; Lindsay Kavanaugh, assistant to Senator Begich; Roosevelt Barfield, assistant to Senator Burris; Anthony J. Lazarski, assistant to Senator Inhofe; Lenwood Landrum and Sandra Luff, assistants to Senator Sessions; Clyde A. Taylor IV, assistant to Senator Chambliss; 

Adam G. Brake, assistant to Senator Graham; Jason Van Beek, assistant to Senator Thune; Erskine W. Wells III, assistant to Senator Wicker; Brian Walsh, assistant to Senator LeMieux; and Chip 

Kennett, assistant to Senator Collins. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN 

Chairman LEVIN. Good morning everybody. The committee this 

morning welcomes Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Admiral Michael Mullen for 

our hearing on the Department of Defense (DOD) fiscal year 2011 

budget request and the associated Future Years Defense Program 

(FYDP), the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), and the 

2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR). 

Gentlemen, as always we are thankful to you and to your families for your dedicated service to our Nation, to the soldiers, sailors, 

airmen, and marines at home, and in harm’s way around the globe, 

and to their families. Your commitment to the welfare of our troops 

and their families shines through all that you do. The American 

people are grateful for that and we are grateful and eager to help 

whenever we can. 

The fiscal year 2011 budget request includes $549 billion for the 

base budget and $159 billion for the ongoing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. On top of this $708 billion request for 2011, the administration has included a 2010 supplemental request of $33 billion 

to fund the additional 30,000 troops to support the President’s Afghanistan policy announced last December. 

The budget request continues the defense reforms begun last 

year to rebalance the force toward the military capabilities necessary to prevail in today’s conflicts, to buy weapons that are relevant and affordable, and to assure that tax dollars are used wisely. 

The long-anticipated 2009 QDR report was also submitted on 

Monday with the Department’s 2011 budget. This is, and the report 

is explicit, a wartime QDR. The Department’s analysis and decisions place the focus and priority on policies, programs, and initiatives that support the current fight in Afghanistan and Iraq and 

against al Qaeda. The QDR makes and justifies tough choices and 

indicates that more tradeoffs will be necessary in the future. 

I’ll note that along with the budget request the administration 

submitted the BMDR. This review was required by the National 

Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2009. This is the 

first comprehensive policy and strategy framework for missile defense and it is long overdue. 

3 

Secretary Gates’ cover memo to the report notes that ‘‘I have 

made defending against near-term regional threats a top priority of 

our missile defense plans, programs, and capabilities,’’ and that 

statement is consistent with what Congress has been urging for 

many years. 

The report also says that before new missile defense programs 

will be deployed, they must first be tested realistically to demonstrate that they are effective and reliable. It also states that our 

missile defense programs must be fiscally sustainable over the long 

term, and emphasizes international cooperation with our allies and 

partners, and expresses an interest in cooperation with Russia. 

Those are all important elements of a sound missile defense policy. 

Consistent with the reform goals set out by Secretary Gates and 

the results of the QDR, a top priority for DOD must be the critical 

requirements for the ongoing conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq. 

This committee has sought to ensure that our combatant commanders have what they need to succeed in those conflicts, including technologies to counter improvised explosive devices (IEDs); 

mine resistant ambush protected (MRAP) all-terrain vehicles 

(ATVs); intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets; 

and additional helicopters. This committee will continue to support 

the needs of our men and women who are in those conflicts. 

I have long argued that the principal mission in Afghanistan 

should be training the Afghan security forces so that they can take 

responsibility for the security of their country. What we heard during our recent visit to Afghanistan was that President Obama’s 

speech at West Point in December had a tangible, positive effect on 

the recruitment of Afghan security forces. Lieutenant General Bill 

Caldwell, the head of NATO training mission in Afghanistan, told 

us that President Obama’s setting of the July 2011 date for the beginning of U.S. troop reductions in Afghanistan energized Afghanistan’s leadership, made clear to them that President Obama means 

business when he says our commitment is not open-ended, and got 

them to focus on planning for the shift in responsibility for Afghan 

security that is highlighted by that 2011 July date. 

Even more than a pay raise, General Caldwell told us, the July 

2011 date increased recruiting of Afghan soldiers because Afghan 

leaders called for and reached out to local leaders to produce new 

recruits across the country. The number of Afghan recruits in 

training has jumped from 3,000 in November to over 11,000 as of 

last month. 

Key to the success of the mission of strengthening the Afghan 

Army will be the partnering of coalition and Afghan units together 

on a one-to-one unit basis and for Afghans to take the lead in operations. The budget the President sent over yesterday includes significant resources for the training and partnering mission, including increased funding for the Afghan Security Forces Fund in both 

the 2010 supplemental and the 2011 request. The fully-integrated 

partnering of coalition and Afghan units, living together and integrating their lives daily, is at the heart of our troops’ mission. 

Lieutenant General David Rodriguez, the Commander of the 

International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Joint Command in 

Afghanistan, has promised to get us data, indicated on a chart that 

I have up behind me and a handout which is circulated, on the 

4 

number of Afghan units fully-integrated with coalition forces and 

how many of those Afghan units are in the lead-in operations. This 

effort is key to the transition to an Afghan lead-in providing for the 

Nation’s security and we will track this data very closely. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

Chairman LEVIN. While I’m pleased with the increased 

partnering in the field, we were disappointed with the shortfall in 

trainers for the initial training needed for the Afghan Army and 

police. General Caldwell told us that he had only 37 percent of the 

required U.S. and NATO trainers on hand and NATO countries 

were about 90 percent short of meeting their commitment to provide about 2,000 non-U.S. trainers. That’s simply inexcusable and 

our NATO allies must do more to close the gap in trainers. 

In the area of personnel, I am pleased that this budget request 

provides increased funding for military personnel and for the defense health program. The budget request includes funding to support the care and treatment of wounded warriors, including $1.1 

billion for the treatment, care, and research of traumatic brain injuries (TBIs) and psychological health. The budget would also increase funding for family support programs by $500 million over 

last year’s levels and include the funding necessary to support the 

temporary increase to the Army’s active duty end strength to 

569,400, which will help improve dwell time and reduce stress on 

the force. 

The catastrophic January 12 earthquake that struck Haiti reminded all of us just how indiscriminate natural disasters can be 

and renewed America’s commitment to Haiti. DOD has mobilized 

resources and manpower to aid in the relief effort in support of the 

Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). 


202ful1.eps
5 

Just last week, the committee approved a $400 million reprogramming to ensure that DOD was adequately resourced for 

that important support mission. We are prepared to continue to 

work with Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen to ensure DOD is 

able to continue providing support to this critical humanitarian disaster response effort in the weeks and months ahead, and we all 

greatly appreciate the skill shown by U.S. Service personnel in response to the Haiti disaster. 

Now, following this hearing, as previously announced, at around 

noon we’re going to turn to the issue of Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell 

(DADT). I would appreciate questions on that subject being asked 

after Secretary Gates’ statement on the subject at that time. 

Secretary Gates, Admiral Mullen, we look forward to your testimony, and now I turn to Senator McCain for any opening remarks 

that he may have. 

[The prepared statement by Senator Levin follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY SENATOR CARL LEVIN

This morning, the committee welcomes Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Michael Mullen, for our hearing on 

the Department of Defense’s (DOD) fiscal year 2011 budget request and the associated Future Years Defense Program, the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), 

and the 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review. 

Gentlemen, as always we are thankful to you and your families for your dedicated 

service to the Nation and to the soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines at home and 

in harm’s way around the globe and to their families. Your personal commitment 

to the welfare of our troops and their families shines through all that you do. The 

American people are grateful for that and we are grateful and eager to help wherever we can. 

The fiscal year 2011 budget request for the Department of Defense includes $549 

billion for the base budget and $159 billion for the ongoing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. On top of the $708 billion request for 2011 the administration has included 

a 2010 supplemental request of $33 billion to fund the additional 30,000 troops to 

support the President’s Afghanistan policy announced last December. The budget request continues the defense reforms begun last year to rebalance the force toward 

the military capabilities necessary to prevail in today’s conflicts, to buy weapons 

that are relevant and affordable, and ensure that tax dollars are used wisely. 

The long anticipated 2009 QDR Report was also submitted on Monday with the 

Department’s fiscal year 2011 budget submission. This is, and the report is explicit, 

a wartime QDR. The Department’s analysis and decisions places the focus and priority on policies, programs, and initiatives that support the current fight in Afghanistan and Iraq, and against al Qaeda. The QDR makes and justifies tough choices— 

and indicates that more tradeoffs will be necessary in the future. 

It is also worth noting that this QDR’s force sizing framework is no longer based 

on a combination of simultaneous or sequential major regional conflicts, as it has 

in the past, such as the ability to fight and prevail in two major wars. Instead, the 

analysis used a series of wargames through a range of plausible strategic scenarios 

to inform decisions on force structure and capability or capacity adjustments. The 

QDR assumes that our security challenges and the operational environment will be 

as taxing into the future as it is today. Therefore, the emphasis remains on appropriately sufficient force capability and capacity to support current operations and 

ensuring the sustainability of the All-Volunteer Force through the rotational demands that appear likely over the next several years. As we all hope, over time, 

forces no longer needed to support operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, will shift 

their focus to preparing for and deterring future adversaries—in other words, rebuilding our military strategic depth, which is critically important for long-term security of our Nation. 

I would note that, along with the budget request, the administration submitted 

the Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR). This review was required by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009. This is the first comprehensive policy and strategy framework for missile defense, and it is long overdue. Secretary Gates’ cover memo to the report notes, ‘‘I have made defending against nearVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:37 May 06, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\62155.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
6 

term regional threats a top priority of our missile defense plans, programs, and capabilities.’’ This is consistent with what Congress has been urging for several years. 

In addition to outlining our national priorities for defending the homeland against 

missile threats from nations like North Korea and Iran, and for flexible and adaptable regional missile defense, the review describes several important policies. For 

example, it says that before new missile defense systems will be deployed, they 

must first be tested realistically and demonstrate that they are effective and reliable. It also states that our missile defense programs must be fiscally sustainable 

over the long term. It emphasizes international cooperation with our allies and partners, and expresses an interest in cooperation with Russia. I believe these are all 

important elements of a sound missile defense policy. 

Consistent with the reform goals set out by Secretary Gates and the results of 

the Quadrennial Defense Review, a top priority for the Department must be the critical requirements for the ongoing conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq. This committee 

has sought to ensure that our combatant commanders have what they need to succeed in those conflicts, including technologies to counter improvised explosive devices; MRAP-All Terrain Vehicles; intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assets; and additional helicopters. I am confident that this committee will continue to 

support the needs of our men and women who are in these conflicts. 

The next 12–18 months will be critical in Afghanistan. Based on what I saw and 

heard during my visit to Afghanistan in January, I am somewhat more optimistic 

than I was after my last visit in September that the fully-resourced, counterinsurgency strategy announced by President Obama is the right strategy and is 

starting to take hold. This strategy focuses on the security of the Afghan people. 

Our troops understand and embrace this people-centered approach. 

I have long argued that our principal mission in Afghanistan should be training 

the Afghan security forces so they can take responsibility for the security of their 

country. What we heard during our visit to Afghanistan was that President Obama’s 

speech at West Point in December had a tangible, positive impact on the recruitment of the Afghan security forces. Lieutenant General Bill Caldwell, the head of 

the NATO Training Mission in Afghanistan, told us that President Obama’s setting 

of the July 2011 date for the beginning of U.S. troop reductions in Afghanistan energized Afghanistan’s leadership, made clear to them that President Obama means 

business when he says our commitment is not open-ended, and got them to focus 

on planning for the shift in responsibility for Afghanistan’s security that is highlighted by that July 2011 date. Even more than the pay raise, General Caldwell told 

us the July 2011 date has increased recruiting because Afghan leaders called for 

and reached out to local leaders to produce new recruits across the country. As a 

result, the number of Afghan recruits in training jumped from 3,000 in November 

to over 11,000 as of last month. 

Key to the success of the mission of strengthening the Afghan Army will be the 

partnering of coalition and Afghan units together, on a one unit-to-one unit basis, 

and for Afghans to take the lead in operations. The budget the President sent over 

yesterday includes significant resources for the training and partnering missions, including increased funding for the Afghan Security Forces Fund in both the fiscal 

year 2010 Supplemental and the fiscal year 2011 request. 

The fully integrated partnering of coalition and Afghan units—living together and 

integrating their lives daily—is at the heart of our troop’s mission. Lieutenant General David Rodriguez, the commander of the ISAF Joint Command in Afghanistan, 

has promised to get me data, indicated on the chart behind me and the handout 

that was circulated, on the number of Afghan units fully integrated with coalition 

forces and how many of those Afghan units are in the lead in operations. This effort 

is key to the transition to an Afghan lead in providing for their nation’s security. 

Accordingly, I intend to track the data on this chart very closely. 

While I am pleased with the increased partnering in the field, I am disappointed 

with the shortfall in trainers for initial training needed for the Afghan Army and 

police. Lieutenant General Caldwell told us he had only 37 percent of the required 

U.S. and NATO trainers on hand, and NATO countries were about 90 percent short 

of meeting NATO’s commitment to provide about 2,000 non-U.S. trainers. This is 

simply inexcusable, and our NATO allies must do more to close the gap in trainers. 

Other areas where progress appears to be happening are in equipping the Afghan 

security forces, including with equipment coming out of Iraq as U.S. forces draw 

down there, and in putting in place a plan for reintegrating lower-level Taliban 

fighters willing to lay down their arms and abide by the Afghan Constitution. In 

both of these areas, U.S. efforts in Afghanistan have been aided by authorities provided by Congress in last year’s National Defense Authorization Act. 

Also challenging over the coming months will be maintaining security and stability in Iraq. Following Iraq’s national elections, the posture and mission of U.S. 

7 

forces in Iraq will change significantly, as they draw down from over 100,000 to 

under 50,000 soldiers, and the U.S. combat mission comes to an end in August of 

this year, as called for by President Obama. The U.S.-Iraq status of forces agreement sets a December 2011 deadline for the withdrawal of all U.S. forces from Iraq. 

Even as operations continue in Iraq and Afghanistan, we also must continue to 

bring the fight to al Qaeda and its affiliates as they look for new operational hubs. 

We have already seen al Qaeda’s interest in places like Yemen and Somalia, but 

we must attempt to ensure we are a step ahead of al Qaeda in places like West 

Africa and the South Pacific. Assisting our allies and partners in these regions is 

critical and DOD’s focus on building the capacity of our allies and partners is welcome. Turning to the readiness of our Armed Forces, the fiscal year 2011 budget request 

provides adequate levels of funding including support for ongoing operations in Iraq 

and Afghanistan. The war funding request includes $21.3 billion for repairing and 

replacing equipment and $2.8 billion in the base budget to reset and reconstitute 

equipment. This committee has long advocated for the Department to shift funding 

for reset and reconstitution from the war budget into the base budget and it appears 

they have finally begun to do so in this year’s budget request. We must recognize 

however that the $2.8 billion is a modest down payment against our long term reset 

and reconstitution requirements and this level of funding will need to be sustained 

several years after forces have withdrawn from Iraq and Afghanistan. 

Readiness funding in this year’s budget request increases by 8.5 percent to account for additional costs associated with depot maintenance, flying hours, steaming 

days, training, force growth, and other increases in operational tempo. It is imperative these vital readiness accounts are protected and fully funded. However, while 

our deployed forces remain ready as they go into combat, until there is a decrease 

in operational tempo, force readiness for non-deployed units will continue to suffer 

historical lows, which poses significant risk and adverse impacts to our National 

Military Strategy. 

In the area of personnel, I am pleased that this budget request provides increased 

funding for military personnel and the Defense Health Program. The budget request 

includes funding to support the care and treatment of Wounded Warriors, including 

$1.1 billion for the treatment, care, and research of traumatic brain injuries (TBI) 

and psychological health. The budget would also increase funding for family support 

programs by $500 million over last year’s levels and include the funding necessary 

to support the temporary increase of the Army’s active-duty end strength to 569,400, 

which will help improve dwell time and reduce stress on the force. 

I am disappointed, Secretary Gates, that you have announced that you will recommend a veto if the Defense bills include funding for the F136 alternate engine. 

Apart from the attributes afforded by competition in improving technology and ensuring better contractor performance, I believe that the business case today may be 

different than the one the Department faced 4 years ago when the Department 

made the original termination decision. Based on the information that I have been 

provided, it would appear to me that the additional investment that Congress has 

made in the program since that original decision would change the business case 

for going forward with this program. At the time of the original decision, the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) assessed that the F136 alternate engine would have 

to achieve savings of roughly 18 percent to make economic sense, a figure in excess 

of the historical averages achieved in previous procurement programs, which IDA 

assessed as being 14.6 percent. With the additional investment that we have made 

since that time, it would appear that the required savings threshold would now be 

closer to 13 percent, or a figure below the average that procurement competitions 

have yielded in the past. 

The catastrophic January 12 earthquake that struck Haiti reminded all of us just 

how indiscriminate natural disasters can be and renewed America’s commitment to 

Haiti. DOD has mobilized resources and manpower to aid in the relief effort in support of the Department of State and U.S. Agency for International Development. 

Just last week, the committee approved a $400 million reprogramming to ensure 

DOD was adequately resourced for this important support mission, and we are prepared to continue to work with the Secretary and Admiral Mullen to ensure DOD 

is able to continue to provide support to this critical humanitarian disaster response 

effort in the weeks and months ahead. We appreciate the skill shown by U.S. Service personnel in response to the Haiti disaster. 

Following this hearing, as previously announced, at around noon, we will turn to 

the issue of ‘‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell.’’ I would appreciate questions on that subject 

being asked after Secretary Gates’ statement on the subject. 

Secretary Gates, Admiral Mullen, we look forward to your testimony. Now I will 

turn to Senator McCain for any opening remarks he may have. 

8 

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN 

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I 

join you in welcoming the witnesses to discuss the President’s 

budget request for fiscal year 2011 and the 2010 QDR and its impact on the FYDP for DOD. 

Secretary Gates, I greatly appreciate that you continue to place 

the highest priority of the Department on supporting the men and 

women of the Armed Forces. I am consistently amazed and heartened by the courage, commitment, and dedication of the brave men 

and women who choose to answer the call to defend the Nation. We 

all know they endure long, hard work under very demanding conditions and in some cases making the ultimate sacrifice. They in turn 

ask their families to endure unwelcome separations and the burden 

of managing the homefront. Your country’s volunteer force and 

their families are a national asset and they deserve our steadfast 

and united support. 

Informed by the 2010 QDR, your 2011 base budget request of $549 billion builds upon the substantial changes you outlined in 

last year’s budget by establishing strategic priorities and identifying where DOD needs to spend scarce resources. Secretary Gates, 

last year I supported your view that winning the wars of today, 

while deterring and preparing for the conflicts of tomorrow required a balancing of risks. I look forward to your assessment of 

why this year’s budget and the QDR that it’s based on entail an 

acceptable amount of risk between our present and future priorities. 

The 2011 overseas contingency operations (OCO) request of $159 billion and 2010 supplemental request of $33 billion support our 

men and women in Iraq and Afghanistan, and I fully support your 

efforts to use OCO and supplemental funding to address many 

operational shortfalls in Afghanistan through increased funding for 

ISR assets, electronic warfare capabilities, and increasing the end 

strength of our Special Operations Forces (SOF). 

Your request includes significant funding for building the Afghan 

security forces. I remain very concerned that we’re not on pace to 

achieve the end strength of 400,000 by 2013 as recommended by 

General McChrystal. I’m eager to hear whether you think your 

funding request will enable us to achieve that goal. 

On the issue of a 2011 withdrawal, from speaking with the President of Pakistan to the tribal leader in Kandahar who fought 

against the Russians, there’s great uncertainty out there because 

of the President’s statement. There’s great uncertainty whether 

we’re going to stay, and it was raised to me by every leader that 

I met with, including the tribal chief who had fought against the 

Russians, who looked at me and said: ‘‘Are you going to stay or are 

you going to leave like you did last time?’’ 

Our allies and friends in the region need to be reassured that 

2011 is not the date for withdrawal and, although your words and 

that of the Secretary of State have been excellent, the President 

has not made that statement in a way that would be reassuring to 

our allies as well as to our enemies. 

Because we ask our men and women in uniform and their families to sacrifice so much, both Congress and the administration 

must be ready to make some tough funding decisions, something 

9 

we’ve failed miserably at in previous years. Despite numerous calls 

last year for earmark reform, the fiscal year 2010 defense appropriations bill signed into law a bill that contained over $4 billion 

in earmarks and $3 billion in unrequested and unwanted funding 

for C–17s and the alternative engine for the Joint Strike Fighter 

(JSF). That’s $7 billion that the Department had to eat in programs that it didn’t request or need. 

This business as usual spending that we’ve come to accept is unnecessary, wasteful, and it diverts precious funding from other, 

more pressing military priorities. 

Secretary Gates, I was encouraged in your rollout of the budget 

yesterday that you laid an early marker with Congress by indicating that if we added funds to continue the C–17 and alternate 

engine for the JSF in 2011 you would recommend that the President veto the bill. I strongly support such a recommendation, but 

feel it may fall on deaf ears up here unless that veto threat comes 

early, consistently, and directly from the President. 

We cannot continue to condone spending billions of dollars on 

programs that the Department doesn’t want or need. If the President is really serious, if he’s really serious about not wasting billions of dollars more of the taxpayers’ money, he should also say 

that he will veto any appropriations bill that comes across his desk 

with earmarks and pork barrel spending on it. It has to stop. 

On the F–35 JSF program, I appreciate the management decisions you announced yesterday to replace the program executive officer and withhold more than $600 million where accountability required that those changes be made. As you appropriately stated 

yesterday during your press conference: ‘‘When things go wrong, 

people will be held accountable.’’ I’d like to see that happen in some 

other areas of government. 

I am nonetheless concerned about your comment during the 

press conference that it was clear there were more problems with 

the F–35 than you were aware of when you visited the Fort Worth 

plant last August. With your recently announced management decisions, I hope the process by which you get reliable, up to date information about important aspects of the program when you need it 

has improved. 

However, I am still concerned about whether the Services will 

get sufficiently capable JSFs when they need them. Just a few 

weeks ago, the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation found 

that continued production concurrent with the slow increase in 

flight testing over the next 2 years will commit DOD and the Services to test, training, and deploy plans with substantial risk. Naval 

Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) recently determined that the 

Marine Corps and the Navy’s version of the JSF may end up being 

too expensive to operate, with each flight hour flown costing about 

$31,000 compared with around $19,000 per flight hour for the Services’ current F/A–18 Hornets and AV–8B Harriers. I’d appreciate if 

you could comment on these and potentially other issues you see 

facing this program. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Senator McCain follows:] 

10 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN

Mr. Chairman, thank you. I join you in welcoming Secretary Gates and Chairman 

Mullen today to discuss the President’s budget request for fiscal year 2011, the 2010 

Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), and its impact on Future Years Defense Programs for the Department of Defense. 

Secretary Gates, I greatly appreciate that you continue to place the highest priority of the Department on supporting the men and women of the U.S. Armed 

Forces. I am consistently amazed and heartened by the courage, commitment, and 

dedication of the brave men and women who choose to answer the call to defend 

our Nation. They endure long hard work under very demanding conditions, and in 

some cases making the ultimate sacrifice. They, in turn ask their families to endure 

unwelcome separations and the burden of managing the homefront. Our country’s 

volunteer force and their families are a national asset. They deserve our steadfast 

and united support. 

Informed by the 2010 QDR, your 2011 base budget request of $549 billion builds 

upon the substantial changes you outlined in last year’s budget by establishing strategic priorities and identifying where the Department needs to spend scarce resources. Secretary Gates, last year I supported your view that winning the wars of 

today while deterring and preparing for the conflicts of tomorrow required a balancing of risk. I look forward to your assessment of why this year’s budget, and the 

QDR that it is based on, entail an acceptable amount of risk between our present 

and future priorities. 

Your 2011 Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) request of $159 billion and 

2010 supplemental request of $33 billion supports our men and women in Iraq and 

Afghanistan. I fully support your efforts to use OCO and supplemental funding to 

address many operational shortfalls in Afghanistan through increased funding for 

intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) assets, Electronic Warfare (EW) 

capabilities and increasing the end strength of our Special Operations Forces. Your 

request includes significant funding for building the Afghan security forces. I remain concerned that we are not on pace to achieve the end strength of 400,000 by 

2013, as recommended by General McChrystal. I am eager to hear whether you 

think your funding request will enable us to achieve that goal. 

Because we ask our men and women in uniform and their families to sacrifice so 

much, both Congress and the administration must be ready to make some tough 

funding decisions—something that we have failed miserably at in previous years. 

Despite numerous calls last year for earmark reform, the fiscal year 2010 Defense 

Appropriations Bill signed into law contained over $4 billion in earmarks and $3 

billion in unrequested and unwanted funding for C–17s and the alternative engine 

for the Joint Strike Fighter. That’s $7 billion that the Department had to eat in programs that it didn’t request or need. This business-as-usual spending that we have 

come to accept is unnecessary, wasteful and it diverts precious funding from other 

more pressing military priorities. Secretary Gates, I was encouraged in your rollout 

of the budget yesterday that you laid an early marker with Congress by indicating 

that if we added funds to continue the C–17 and alternate engine for the Joint 

Strike Fighter in 2011, you would recommend that the President veto the bill. I 

strongly support such a recommendation, but feel it may fall on deaf ears up here 

unless that veto threat comes early, consistently and directly from the President. 

We cannot continue to condone spending billions of dollars on programs that the Department doesn’t want or need. If the President is serious about not wasting billions 

of dollars of the taxpayers’ money, then he should use every opportunity this year 

to vow to veto any appropriations bill that that is laden with pork barrel spending. 

Mr. Secretary, on the F–35 Joint Strike Fighter Program, I appreciate the management decisions you announced yesterday—to replace the program executive officer and withhold more than $600 million—where accountability required that those 

changes be made. As you appropriately stated yesterday during your press conference, ‘When things go wrong, people will be held accountable.’ I am, nonetheless, 

concerned about your comment during the press conference that it was clear there 

were more problems with the F–35 than you were aware of when you visited the 

Fort Worth plant last August. With your recently announced management decisions, 

I hope the process by which you get reliable, up-to-date information about important 

aspects of the Program when you need it, has improved. 

However, I am still concerned about whether the Services will get sufficiently capable Joint Strike Fighters when they need them. Just a few weeks ago, the Director, Operational Testing and Evaluation found that continued production concurrent 

with the slow increase in flight testing over the next 2 years will commit the Department and Services to test, training, and deployment plans with substantial risk. 

NAVAIR recently determined that the Marine Corps and the Navy’s version of the 

11 

Joint Strike Fighter may end up being too expensive to operate, with each flight 

hour flown costing about $31,000, compared with around $19,000 per flight hour for 

the Services’ current F/A–18 Hornets and AV–8B Harriers. I would appreciate it if 

you could comment on these and potentially other issues you see facing this program. 

Thank you Chairman Levin. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator McCain. 

I will put the balance of my statement in the record and if 

there’s part of your statement that you didn’t give, of course, that 

will be made part of the record, too, if you wish. 

Secretary Gates, we welcome you, Admiral Mullen, and Mr. Hale. 

Please proceed. 

STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT M. GATES, SECRETARY OF 

DEFENSE 

Secretary GATES. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee: 

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you to discuss the 

President’s budget request for fiscal year 2011. 

I first want to thank you for your support of the men and women 

of the United States military these many years. These troops are 

part of an extraordinary generation of young Americans who have 

answered their country’s call. They have fought our wars, protected 

our interests and allies around the globe, and, as we have seen recently in Haiti, they have also demonstrated compassion and decency in the face of incomprehensible loss. 

I have a brief opening statement to provide an overview of the 

budget request. My submitted statement includes many more details that I know are of interest to the committee. 

Chairman LEVIN. Mr. Secretary, I’m going to interrupt you at 

this time and do something which I know you would love us to do, 

which is to approve a number of nominations. We have a quorum 

present and we should take advantage of that. Forgive the interruption. I will ask the committee now to consider 5 civilian nominations and 1,802 pending military nominations. 

First, the civilian nominations of Douglas Wilson to be Assistant 

Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs; Malcolm Ross O’Neil to be 

Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and 

Technology; Mary Sally Matiella to be Assistant Secretary of the 

Army for Financial Management and Comptroller; Paul Luis 

Oostburg Sanz to be General Counsel of the Department of the 

Navy; and Jacqueline Pfannenstiel to be Assistant Secretary of the 

Navy for Installations and Environment. 

Is there a motion to report these nominations? 

Senator MCCAIN. So moved. 

Chairman LEVIN. Second? 

Senator INHOFE. Second. 

Chairman LEVIN. All in favor say aye. [Chorus of ayes.] 

That is approved. 

Finally, I’ll ask the committee to consider the 1,802 pending military nominations. They’ve been before the committee the required 

length of time. Is there a motion? 

Senator MCCAIN. So moved. 

Chairman LEVIN. Second? 

Senator INHOFE. Second. 

Chairman LEVIN. Second. All in favor say aye. [Chorus of ayes.] 

12 

Opposed, nay. [No response.] 

The motion carries. Thank you. 

Mr. Secretary. 

Secretary GATES. A most worthwhile interruption. The budget requests being presented today include $549 billion 

for a base budget, a 3.4 percent increase over last year, or 1.8 percent real increase after adjusting for inflation, reflecting the administration’s commitment to modest, steady, and sustainable real 

growth in defense spending. We’re also requesting $159 billion in 

fiscal year 2011 to support OCOs, primarily in Afghanistan and 

Iraq, plus $33 billion for the remainder of this fiscal year to support the added financial costs of the President’s new approach in 

Afghanistan. 

The base budget request reflects these major institutional priorities: first, reaffirming and strengthening the Nation’s commitment 

to care for the All-Volunteer Force, our greatest strategic asset; second, rebalancing America’s defense posture by emphasizing capabilities needed to prevail in current conflicts while enhancing capabilities that may be needed in the future; and third, continuing the 

Department’s commitment to reform how DOD does business, especially in the area of acquisitions. Finally, the commitments made 

and the programs funded in the OCO and supplemental requests 

demonstrate the administration’s determination to support our 

troops and commanders in combat so they can accomplish their 

critical missions and come home safely. 

The budget continues the Department’s policy of shifting money 

to the base budget for enduring programs that directly support 

warfighters and their families, whether on the battlefield, recovering from wounds, or on the homefront, to ensure that they have 

steady, long-term funding and institutional support. 

The base budget request was accompanied and informed by the 

2010 QDR, which establishes strategic priorities and identifies key 

areas for needed investment. The 2010 QDR and fiscal year 2011 

budget build upon the substantial changes that the President made 

in the fiscal year 2010 budget request to allocate defense dollars 

more wisely and reform the Department’s processes. 

The fiscal year 2010 budget proposals cut, curtailed, or ended a 

number of programs that were either performing poorly or in excess of real world needs. Conversely, future-oriented programs 

where the United States was relatively underinvested were accelerated or received more funding. 

The fiscal year 2011 budget submissions and QDR are suffused 

with two major themes. The first is continued reform, fundamentally changing the way this Department does business, the priorities we set, the programs we fund, the weapons we buy, and how 

we buy them. Building on the reforms of last year’s budget, the fiscal year 2011 request two additional steps aimed at programs that 

were excess or performing poorly. They include terminating the 

Navy EPX intelligence aircraft, ending the Third Generation Infrastructure Surveillance Program, cancelling the Next Generation 

CGX Cruiser, terminating the Net-Enabled Command and Control 

Program, ending the Defense Integrated Military Human Resources System (DIMHRS) due to cost overruns and performance 

concerns, completing the C–17 program and closing the production 

13 

line, as multiple studies in recent years show that the Air Force 

already has more of these aircraft than it needs, and ending the 

alternate engine for the F–35 JSF, as whatever benefits might accrue are more than offset by excess costs, complexity, and associated risks. 

I am fully aware of the political pressure to continue building the 

C–17 and proceed with an alternate engine for the F–35. So let me 

be very clear: I will strongly recommend that the President veto 

any legislation that sustains the unnecessary continuation of these 

two programs. 

The budget and reviews are also shaped by a bracing dose of realism, with regard to risk, and with regard to resources. We have 

in a sober and clear-eyed way assessed risks, set priorities, made 

tradeoffs, and identified requirements based on plausible real-world 

threats, scenarios, and potential adversaries. 

Just one example. For years, U.S. defense planning and requirements were based on preparing to fight two major conventional 

wars at the same time, a force-sizing construct that persisted long 

after it was overtaken by events. The Department’s leadership now 

recognizes that we must prepare for a much broader range of security challenges on the horizon. They range from the use of sophisticated new technologies to deny our forces access to the global commons of sea, air, space, and cyberspace to the threat posed by nonstate groups delivering more cunning and destructive means to attack and terrorize, scenarios that transcend the familiar contingencies that dominated U.S. planning after the Cold War. 

We have learned through painful experience that the wars we 

fight are seldom the wars that we planned. As a result, the United 

States needs a broad portfolio of military capabilities with maximum versatility across the widest possible spectrum of conflict. 

This strategic reality shaped the QDR’s analysis and subsequent 

conclusions, which directly informed the program decisions contained in the budget. 

Before closing, I would like to offer two thoughts to consider 

when assessing the U.S. investment in national defense. First, the 

requests submitted this week total more than $700 billion, a massive number to be sure. But at 4.7 percent of gross national product, it represents a significantly smaller portion of national wealth 

going to defense than was spent during most of America’s previous 

major wars, and the base budget represents 3.5 percent of GDP. 

Second, the President recently exempted the defense budget from 

spending freezes being applied to other parts of the government. It 

is important to remember, however, that, as I mentioned earlier, 

this Department undertook a painstaking review of our priorities 

last year and as a result cut or curtailed a number of major programs. These programs had they been pursued to completion would 

have cost the American taxpayer about $330 billion. 

In closing, Mr. Chairman, my thanks to you and members of this 

committee again for all you have done to support our troops and 

their families in light of the unprecedented demands that have 

been placed upon them. I believe the choices made and the priorities set in these budget requests reflect America’s commitment to 

see that our forces have the tools they need to prevail in the wars 

14 

we are in, while making the investments necessary to prepare for 

threats on or beyond the horizon. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Secretary Gates follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY HON. ROBERT M. GATES

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee: 

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you to discuss the President’s 

budget requests for fiscal year 2011. I first want to thank you for your support of 

the men and women of the U.S. military these many years. I know they will be uppermost in your thoughts as you deliberate on these budget requests. Our troops 

are part of an extraordinary generation of young Americans who have answered 

their country’s call. They have fought this country’s wars, protected our interests 

and allies around the globe, and, as we’ve seen recently in Haiti, they have also 

demonstrated compassion and decency in the face of incomprehensible loss. 

The budget requests being presented today include $549 billion for the base budget—a 3.4 percent increase over last year, or 1.8 percent real growth after adjusting 

for inflation, reflecting this administration’s commitment to modest, steady, and 

sustainable real growth in defense spending. We are also requesting $159 billion in 

fiscal year 2011 to support Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO), primarily in 

Afghanistan and Iraq, plus $33 billion for the remainder of this fiscal year to support the added financial costs of the President’s new approach in Afghanistan. 

The base budget request was accompanied and informed by the 2010 Quadrennial 

Defense Review (QDR), which establishes strategic priorities and identifies key 

areas for needed investment. The 2010 QDR and fiscal year 2011 budget build upon 

the substantial changes that the President made in the fiscal year 2010 budget request to allocate defense dollars more wisely and reform the department’s processes. 

The base budget request reflects these major institutional priorities: 

• First, reaffirming and strengthening the Nation’s commitment to care for 

the All-Volunteer Force, our greatest strategic asset; 

• Second, rebalancing America’s defense posture by emphasizing capabilities needed to prevail in current conflicts, while enhancing capabilities that 

may be needed in the future; and 

• Third, continuing the department’s commitment to reform how the Department of Defense (DOD) does business, especially in the area of acquisitions. 

Finally, the commitments made and programs funded in the OCO and supplemental requests demonstrate this administration’s determination to support our 

troops and commanders in Afghanistan and Iraq so they can accomplish their critical missions and return home safely. 

At this point, I would like to offer two thoughts to consider when assessing the 

U.S. investment in national defense: 

First, the requests submitted this week total more than $700 billion—a massive 

number, to be sure. But, at 4.7 percent of gross national product, it represents a 

significantly smaller portion of national wealth going to defense than was spent during America’s previous major wars. 

Second, the President recently exempted the defense budget from spending freezes 

being applied to other parts of the government. It is important to remember, however, that this department already undertook a painstaking review of our programs 

and priorities last year, and proposed to cut, curtail, or end a number of programs. 

These programs, had they been pursued to completion, would have cost the American taxpayer about $330 billion. 

CARE FOR OUR ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE

The fiscal year 2011 budget request includes $138.5 billion for military pay and 

allowances, an increase of $3.6 billion—or 2.6 percent—over last year. This includes 

an increase of 1.4 percent for military basic pay, which will keep military pay increases in line with those in the private sector. This amount funds bonuses and 

other incentives to meet recruiting and retention quality and quantity goals—especially for our most critical skills and experience levels. The military deserves generous pay because of the stress and danger these jobs entail. In recent years, Congress has added 0.5 percent to the administration’s requested military pay raise— 

an action that adds about $500 million a year to our budget now and in future 

years, and reduces the funds available for training and equipping the force. In this 

time of strong recruiting and retention, I urge Congress to approve the full reVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:37 May 06, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00020 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\62155.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
15 

quested amount for the fiscal year 2011 military pay raise but not to add to the 

request. 

Wounded, Ill, and Injured 

This budget supports the department’s intense focus on care for our wounded, ill, 

and injured military members. As I’ve said before, aside from winning the wars 

themselves, this is my highest priority. Key initiatives include: 

• Achieving a seamless transition to veteran status for members leaving 

the military and increased cooperation between the Departments of Defense 

and Veterans Affairs; 

• Ensuring a high standard at facilities caring for wounded warriors, including first-rate hospitals and the Army’s Warrior Transition Units; 

• Enhancing case management of individuals transitioning to civilian life— 

especially those needing long-term care; 

• Establishing a better Disability Evaluation System—to create a simpler, 

faster, more consistent process for determining which members may continue their military service and helping them become as independent and 

self-supporting as possible; and 

• Working with the VA to create Virtual Lifetime Electronic Records to improve veteran care and services by improving the availability of administrative and health information. 

The fiscal year 2011 budget request includes $2.2 billion for enduring programs for our wounded, ill, and injured. It also includes $300 million to complete the 

Army’s Warrior Transition complexes and new medical facilities in the Washington, 

DC, capital region. The $2.2 billion for these programs is $100 million more than 

the fiscal year 2010 enacted amount and is more than double the fiscal year 2008 

level of $1 billion. 

Military Health System 

The fiscal year 2011 budget includes $50.7 billion for the Unified Medical Budget 

to support the Military Health System that serves 9.5 million eligible beneficiaries. 

Over the past decade, U.S. health-care costs have grown substantially, and defense 

health costs have been no exception, more than doubling between fiscal year 2001 

($19 billion) and fiscal year 2010 ($49 billion). These costs are expected to grow from 

6 percent of the department’s total budget in fiscal year 2001 to more than 10 percent in fiscal year 2015. 

Military Family Support Programs 

The department remains fully committed to providing assistance to our troops and 

their families in light of the unprecedented demands that have been placed on them. 

As the President stated in the State of the Union Address last week, our men and 

women in uniform and their families have our respect, our gratitude, and our full 

support. The budget reflects the department’s policy of shifting money to the base 

budget for enduring programs so that they will not disappear as war funding declines. The fiscal year 2011 base budget includes $8.1 billion for a variety of familysupport programs vital to the morale and well-being of our military members and 

their families—an increase of $450 million over last year. The OCO request includes 

$700 million for family support—bringing the total to $8.8 billion. 

Build and Sustain Facilities 

The fiscal year 2011 budget includes $18.7 billion to fund critical military-construction and family-housing requirements, including substantial funding to recapitalize many department schools for children of servicemembers. 

The fiscal year 2011 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) investment funding 

of $2.4 billion is less than prior years because most of the funding needed to implement the 2005 round of BRAC decisions has already been appropriated for 24 major 

realignments, 24 base closures, and 765 lesser actions—all of which must be completed by September 15, 2011, in accordance with statute. 

We have requested $14.2 billion to modernize the department’s facilities; to support the recently completed growth in the Army and Marine Corps; to support the 

relocation of 8,000 marines from Okinawa to Guam; and to recapitalize medical facilities and schools for servicemembers’ children. 

REBALANCING THE FORCE—THE WARS WE ARE IN

Achieving our objectives in Afghanistan and Iraq has moved to the top of the institutional military’s budgeting, policy, and program priorities. We now recognize 

that America’s ability to deal with threats for years to come will largely depend on 

our performance in the current conflicts. The fiscal year 2011 budget request took 

16 

a number of additional steps aimed at filling persistent shortfalls that have plagued 

recent military efforts, especially in Afghanistan. 

Rotary-Wing Aircraft 

To increase these capabilities, this request includes more than $9.6 billion for the 

acquisition of a variety of modern rotary-wing aircraft, including the creation of two 

Army combat aviation brigades by fiscal year 2014. The goal is to train 1,500 new 

Army helicopter pilots per year by 2012. 

Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) 

The fiscal year 2011 budget request continues efforts to increase ISR support for 

our fighting forces. The ISR Task Force was formed in April 2008 to generate critical operational ISR capacity—primarily in Afghanistan and Iraq. Since then, the 

department has worked to secure substantial funding to field and sustain ISR capabilities. In the fiscal year 2011 budget, that includes: 

• $2.2 billion for procurement of Predator-class aircraft to increase the 

Combat Air Patrols (CAPs) available to deployed forces from 37 to 65 by 

2013; and 

• Doubling procurement of the MQ–9 Reaper over the next few years. 

Electronic Warfare (EW) 

The fiscal year 2011 budget request supports the QDR’s call for better EW capabilities for today’s warfighters. The Navy procurement budget includes $1.1 billion 

in fiscal year 2011 and $2.3 billion in fiscal year 2012 for the addition of 36 EA– 

18G aircraft, with 12 procured in fiscal year 2011 and 24 in fiscal year 2012. These 

resources and capabilities will help fill an imminent EW shortfall that has been consistently highlighted by the combatant commanders as one of their highest priorities. 

Special Operations Forces (SOF) 

The fiscal year 2011 budget requests $6.3 billion for USSOCOM—nearly 6 percent 

higher than in fiscal year 2010. The department plans to call for SOF funding to 

increase sharply over the next several years, including an increase of about 2,800 

personnel in fiscal year 2011. 

REBALANCING THE FORCE—PREPARING FOR THE FUTURE

The fiscal year 2011 budget includes $189 billion for total procurement, research, 

and development. This investment reflects the fact that the United States needs a 

broad portfolio of military capabilities with maximum versatility across the widest 

possible spectrum of conflict, including conventional conflict with the technologically 

advanced military forces of other countries. To meet the potential threats to our 

military’s ability to project power, deter aggression, and come to the aid of allies 

and partners in environments where access to our forces may be denied, this budget 

request includes substantial funds for conventional and strategic modernization. 

Tactical Aircraft 

The fiscal year 2011 budget funds programs to develop and buy superior aircraft 

to guarantee continued air dominance over current and future battlefields, most importantly the F–35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF). The fiscal year 2011 base budget includes $10.7 billion for continued development of the F–35, and for procurement of 

42 aircraft. An additional JSF is purchased in the OCO budget. This budget reflects 

a restructuring of the JSF program to stabilize its schedule and cost. The department has also adjusted F–35 procurement quantities based on new data on likely 

orders from our foreign partners and realigned development and test schedules. 

Mobility and Tanker Aircraft 

The fiscal year 2011 budget continues to support development of a new aerial refueling tanker. The KC–X, the first phase of KC–135 recapitalization, will procure 

179 commercial derivative tanker aircraft to replace roughly one-third of the current 

aerial refueling tanker fleet at an estimated cost of $35 billion. Contract award is 

expected in the summer of 2010 and procurement should begin in fiscal year 2013. 

To support this long-range effort, $864 million has been requested for research into 

the next-generation tanker. 

The fiscal year 2011 budget ends production of the C–17, supports shutdown activities for production of new aircraft, and continues the modification of existing C– 

17s. With the completion of the program, the United States will have 223 of these 

aircraft, more than enough to meet current and projected requirements. 

17 

Shipbuilding 

The fiscal year 2011 budget reflects the department’s formulation of a realistic, 

executable shipbuilding plan through the Future Years Defense Program. Overall, 

the fiscal year 2011 budget includes $25.1 billion for fiscal year 2011 procurement 

of new ships, equipment and research and development into future construction— 

including $15.7 billion for Navy shipbuilding and conversion activities. It reinforces 

the ongoing transition to a naval force that can meet the needs of today’s 

warfighters and reduce reliance on very costly and increasingly vulnerable large 

surface combatants in the future. The fiscal year 2011 request and planned out-year 

funding would allow the department to: 

• Build a new aircraft carrier every 5 years; 

• Shift large-deck amphibious ship production to a 5-year build cycle to 

maintain a long-term force structure of nine large-deck aviation ships to 

support amphibious operations; 

• Stabilize near-term production quantities for the Littoral Combat Ship 

and the Joint High Speed Vessel to support irregular warfare operations; 

• Produce two attack submarines per year beginning in fiscal year 2011 

and continue development of a new strategic deterrent submarine; and 

• Build three Mobile Landing Platform ships—one ship per year in fiscal 

year 2011, fiscal year 2013, and fiscal year 2015. 

Ground Forces Modernization 

The fiscal year 2011 budget advances restructuring of the Army’s Future Combat 

Systems, principally through Brigade Combat Team (BCT) modernization. The fiscal 

year 2011 request for BCTs is $3.2 billion, mostly for research and development. 

The fiscal year 2011 budget also supports the development of a new ground-vehicle program to replace aging systems. The new program will take into account the 

hard battlefield lessons of recent years, especially with respect to threats posed by 

improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and will include a role for the MRAP and M– 

ATV vehicles that have been so important in Afghanistan and Iraq. 

Space and Cyber Capabilities 

Just about all of our military forces—land, sea, and air—now depend on digital 

communications and the satellites and data networks that support them. The role 

of space and satellites has never been more crucial to military operations—from 

GPS-guided munitions and navigation to missile defense and communications. The 

fiscal year 2011 budget continues to strengthen U.S. capabilities in space, with $599 

million allocated to procure Advanced Extremely High Frequency satellites instead 

of the Transformational Satellite, which was cancelled in the fiscal year 2010 budget. 

With cheap technology and minimal investment, adversaries operating in cyberspace can potentially inflict serious damage on our command and control, ISR, and 

precision strike capabilities. The fiscal year 2011 budget continues to fund the recruiting and training of new experts in cyber warfare begun in fiscal year 2010, and 

supports the stand up of a new U.S. Cyber Command. 

Ballistic Missile Defense 

DOD continues to pursue missile-defense systems that can provide real capability 

as soon as possible while taking maximum advantage of new technologies. In accordance with the 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review, our goal is a missile-defense program that balances capabilities and risks in order to deter aggression; 

project power and protect U.S. and allied interests; and respond to warfighter requirements. 

This year’s base budget request includes $9.9 billion total for missile defense— 

almost $700 million more than last year, mostly for the Missile Defense Agency. 

This includes funding for: 

• Enhanced missile defenses for deployed forces, allies, and partners to defend against regional threats—including THAAD battery ground components and interceptors, as well as the conversion of additional Aegis ships. 

• The ‘‘Phased Adaptive Approach’’ for missile defense: a flexible, scalable 

system to respond to developing threats. This has particular applicability 

to Europe, where the new approach allows us to adapt our systems more 

rapidly as new threats develop and old ones recede. In the short-term, we 

will be able to provide immediate coverage and protection by deploying current and proven systems such as the Aegis and SM–3. 

• A viable homeland defense against rogue threats—including groundbased interceptors at Fort Greely, AK, and Vandenberg Air Force Base, CA. 

18 

• Expansion of the flight-test program to test capabilities against medium- 

, intermediate-, and long-range threats. 

• Investments in break-through technologies to improve our ability to 

counter threats during the boost phase while focusing on the most promising new technologies. 

Nuclear Weapons 

The Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) being released in March will outline the policy 

framework for achieving the President’s objectives to reduce nuclear weapons with 

a long-term goal of elimination; and maintain a safe, secure, and effective arsenal 

as long as these weapons exist. It will also provide steps to strengthen deterrence 

while reducing the role of nuclear weapons. While the NPR conclusions are still 

being developed, the President’s budget requests for the Defense and Energy departments reflect several priorities already established in our review: 

• Funding to sustain a nuclear triad of ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers 

under the New START Treaty; and 

• Increased National Nuclear Security Administration funding for infrastructure, warhead life extension, and science and technology. 

Details of these and other elements of our nuclear posture will be presented in 

the final NPR report in March. 

Building Partner Capacity 

In a world where arguably the most likely and lethal threats will emanate from 

failed and fractured states, building the security capacity of partners has emerged 

as a key capability—one that reduces the need for direct U.S. military intervention, 

with all of its attendant political, financial, and human costs. To provide more resources, predictability, and agility to this important mission, the department will 

seek an increase in Global Train and Equip authority in the fiscal year 2011 budget 

to $500 million—authority that includes coalition activities to support current operations. 

REFORMING HOW THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DOES BUSINESS

President Obama is committed to ending unneeded and troubled programs and 

achieving a better balance between capabilities needed to succeed in current conflicts and capabilities needed to prepare for the conflicts we are most likely to see 

in the future. 

The fiscal year 2011 budget request builds on the reforms of last year by ending 

a number of unneeded or troubled programs: 

• Next Generation Cruiser CG(X): Cancelled due to concerns about costs 

and utility in future combat scenarios. Any resulting capability gap will be 

filled by an enhanced Navy destroyer program. 

• Navy Intelligence Aircraft EP(X): This Navy-planned EP–3 replacement 

was cancelled because of cost and its redundancy with other technologies 

and systems. 

• Third Generation Infrared Surveillance: This sensor system was cancelled 

because there are better alternatives. 

• The Defense Integrated Military Human Resources System (DIMHRS): 

DIMHRS has been in development for over 10 years and cost $500 million—with little to show and limited prospects. 

• Net Enabled Command and Control: This joint program has had cost 

overruns and performance shortfalls. 

JSF Alternate Engine 

One of the tougher decisions we faced during this budget process was whether or 

not to formally add the alternate engine to the Joint Strike Fighter program. It has 

been the position of this department since 2007 that adding a second JSF engine 

was unnecessary and too costly. 

Over the past year, as part of our thorough review of the overall JSF program, 

we took a fresh look to determine whether the second engine option had reached 

a point in funding and development that supported a different conclusion. We considered all aspects of this question and, in the end, concluded that the facts and 

analysis simply do not support the case for adding an alternate engine program. 

There are several rationales for this conclusion: 

First, even after factoring in Congress’ additional funding, the engine would still 

require a further investment of $2.5 billion over the next 5 years. 

19 

Second, the additional costs are not offset by potential savings generated through 

competition. Even optimistic analytical models produce essentially a break-even scenario. 

Third, the solution to understandable concern over the performance of the Pratt 

& Whitney program is not to spend yet more money to add a second engine. The 

answer is to get the first engine on track. Further, the alternate engine program 

is 3 to 4 years behind in development compared to the current program, and there 

is no guarantee that a second program would not face the same challenges as the 

current effort. 

Fourth, split or shared buys of items, particularly from only two sources, do not 

historically produce competitive behavior since both vendors are assured some share 

of the purchase. Another reality is that the JSF is designed to support a wide diversity of military customers, including the Navy, Marine Corps, and overseas buyers, 

many of whom are unable or unwilling to purchase from two engine manufacturers. 

For all these reasons, we are firm in our view that the interests of the taxpayers, 

our military, our partner nations, and the integrity of the JSF program are best 

served by not pursuing a second engine. 

I believe most proponents of this program are motivated by the genuine belief 

that a second engine is the right thing to do. I look forward to engaging Congress 

in this discussion and sharing with them our facts and analysis. However, we have 

reached a critical point in this debate where spending more money on a second engine for the JSF is unnecessary, wasteful, and simply diverts precious modernization funds from other more pressing priorities. Accordingly, should Congress add 

more funds to continue this unneeded program, I will strongly recommend that the 

President veto such legislation. 

C–17 

The fiscal year 2011 request completes the C–17 program and begins shutting 

down the production line. At present, we have 194 C–17s (plus 111 C–5s) in our 

strategic airlift fleet. By the end of this fiscal year, the department will have procured 223. 

Three department studies completed over the past 5 years have concluded that 

the U.S. military has more than enough strategic airlift capacity, and that additional C–17s are not required. Some factors to consider: 

• In 2004, the Air Force Fleet Viability board determined that the fleet of 

C–5As—the oldest variant—will remain viable until at least 2025. The Air 

Force and the manufacturer believe that the C–5 fleet will remain viable 

until 2040. Ongoing modernization and refurbishment efforts are intended 

to increase the reliability, availability, and maintainability of the C–5 fleet; 

• Despite the demands of the current military campaigns, the existing C– 

17 fleet is not being ‘‘burned up.’’ With the exception of 2003—when there 

were only 111 aircraft in the fleet that were being surged to begin the Iraq 

war—the annual use of the C–17 inventory has been within program limits; 

and 

• While it is true that the C–17 can land places where the C–5 cannot, of 

the 200,000 landings made by C–17s since 1997, less than 4 percent were 

in places that were not accessible to the C–5. In summary, for these and 

other reasons, the department has concluded that the current C–17 is more 

than sufficient to meet the military’s airlift needs. Should Congress add 

funds to continue this program, I will strongly recommend a presidential 

veto. 

Acquisitions 

The department is implementing initiatives that will increase the numbers and 

capabilities of the acquisition workforce, improve funding stability, enhance the 

source-selection process, and improve contract execution. Our intent is to provide 

the warfighter with world-class capability while being good stewards of taxpayer 

dollars. 

To operate effectively, the acquisition system must be supported by an appropriately-sized cadre of acquisition professionals with the right skills and training to 

perform their jobs. To address these personnel deficiencies, DOD will increase the 

number of acquisition personnel by 20,000 positions—from about 127,000 in fiscal 

year 2010 to about 147,000 by fiscal year 2015. We will be making significant increases in training and retention programs in order to bolster the capability and 

size of the acquisition workforce. 

20 

Civilian Workforce 

The fiscal year 2011 budget funds a pay raise of 1.4 percent for DOD civilians— 

the same as the military pay raise. The request includes funding to transition out 

of the National Security Personnel System (NSPS)—as directed by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010. 

About 225,000 DOD employees are covered by NSPS. These employees must convert to a successor statutory personnel system. The fiscal year 2011 budget includes 

$23 million to implement NSPS transition and $239 million for estimated higher civilian pay for employees transitioning out of NSPS. 

The request supports the DOD plan, announced last year, to grow its civilian 

workforce by in-sourcing—replacing contractors with DOD civilian employees. DOD 

is on track to reduce the number of support service contractors from the current 39 

percent of our workforce to the pre-2001 level of 26 percent, and replace them with 

full-time government employees. DOD will hire as many as 13,400 new civil servants in fiscal year 2010, and another 6,000 in fiscal year 2011, to replace contractors 

and up to 33,400 new civil servants in place of contractors over the next 5 years. 

This includes 2,500 acquisition personnel in fiscal year 2010 and 10,000 through fiscal year 2014. 

FISCAL YEAR 2010 SUPPLEMENTAL REQUEST

As the President stated, the goal of the United States in Afghanistan and Pakistan is to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat Al Qaeda and to prevent its resurgence in 

both countries. The international military effort to stabilize Afghanistan is necessary to achieve this overarching goal. Rolling back the Taliban is now necessary, 

even if not sufficient, to the ultimate defeat of al Qaeda and its affiliates operating 

along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. I believe the strategy announced by the 

President represents our best opportunity to achieve our objectives in a part of the 

world so critical to America’s security. 

The fiscal year 2010 supplemental requests $33.0 billion to support the President’s buildup of U.S. troops in Afghanistan for the rest of this fiscal year and fund 

other related requirements, including $1 billion for Iraqi security forces. DOD urges 

Congress to approve this supplemental by the spring to prevent disruption of funding for our troops in the field. 

The fiscal year 2010 supplemental includes $19.0 billion to support an average 

troop level in Afghanistan of 84,000 U.S. troops—16,000 higher than the 68,000 assumed in the enacted fiscal year 2010 budget. Troop levels are expected to reach 

98,000 by September 30, 2010. The additional troops will consist of: 

• Two Army counterinsurgency BCTs; 

• An Army Training BCT; 

• A USMC Regimental Combat Team; and 

• Enablers such as Explosive Ordnance Disposal teams. 

The supplemental also includes $1.1 billion—on top of the $11.3 billion already 

enacted—to field and sustain critically important lifesaving MRAPs and M–ATVs 

for troops already there and for the additional forces being deployed this fiscal year. 

FISCAL YEAR 2011 OVERSEAS CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS

To fund military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq in fiscal year 2011, we are 

requesting $159.3 billion, comprised of these major categories: 

• Operations ($89.4 billion): Incremental pay for deployed troops, subsistence, cost of mobilizing Reserve Component personnel, and temporary wartime end-strength allowances. 

• Force Protection ($12.0 billion): Body armor, protection equipment, and 

armored vehicles to protect forces—including the rapid deployment and 

sustainment of MRAPs and M–ATVs. 

• IED Defeat ($3.3 billion): To develop, procure, and field measures to defeat improvised explosive devices threatening U.S. and coalition forces. 

• Military Intelligence ($7.0 billion): To enhance U.S. intelligence capabilities and operations including ISR. 

• Afghan Security Forces ($11.6 billion): To build and support military and 

police forces capable of conducting independent operations and providing for 

Afghanistan’s long-term security. 

• Iraqi Security Forces ($2.0 billion): To continue building and sustaining 

Iraq’s efforts to defend its people and protect its institutions as the United 

States removes troops by the end of 2011. 

21 

• Coalition Support ($2.0 billion): Reimbursements and logistical 

sustainment for key cooperating nations supporting U.S. military operations. 

• Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) ($1.3 billion): To 

provide flexible funds for commanders in the field to finance urgent humanitarian and reconstruction needs. 

• Reconstitution/Reset ($21.3 billion): To fund the replenishment, replacement, and repair of equipment and munitions that have been consumed, destroyed, or damaged due to ongoing combat operations. This request includes funding to procure one Joint Strike Fighter aircraft to replace the 

combat loss of an F–15. 

• Military Construction ($1.2 billion): To expand the logistical backbone 

and operational foundation for our fighting forces. 

• Temporary Military End Strength ($2.6 billion): To support temporary 

end-strength increases in the Army and Navy for ongoing military operations. 

• Non-DOD Classified Programs ($5.6 billion): To fund non-DOD classified 

activities that support ongoing military operations—the President’s counterterrorism strategy in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and the drawdown of U.S. 

forces in Iraq. 

Iraq Force Levels 

This request supports the President’s goal of a responsible drawdown of U.S. 

forces and transfer to full Iraqi responsibility and control. Troop levels in Iraq are 

projected to decrease to 50,000 by August 31, 2010. Further reductions will occur 

in accordance with the U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement. The projected forces levels 

would be: 

• Six Advisory and Assistance Brigades (AABs) by August 31, 2010. 

• Six AABs for the first part of fiscal year 2011, decreasing to approximately four AABs (approximately 35,000 personnel) in Iraq by the end of 

fiscal year 2011. 

CONCLUSION

Mr. Chairman, my thanks to you and members of this committee for all that you 

have done to support our troops and their families. I believe the choices made and 

priorities set in these budget requests reflect America’s commitment to see that our 

forces have the tools they need to prevail in the wars we are in while making the 

investments necessary to prepare for threats on or beyond the horizon. 

Thank you. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. 

Admiral Mullen. 

STATEMENT OF ADM MICHAEL G. MULLEN, USN, CHAIRMAN, 

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF 

Admiral MULLEN. Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain, distinguished 

members of this committee: Thank you for the chance to appear before you and discuss the state of our military as well as the President’s fiscal year 2011 defense budget submission. I also thank you 

all for the extraordinary support you provide each and every day 

to our men and women in uniform as well as their families. That 

they are well equipped, well trained, well paid, and enjoy the finest 

medical care anywhere in the world is testament in no small part 

to your dedication and stewardship. 

I’ve seen many of you in the war zone, in hospitals, and at bases 

all over this country. So have our troops. They know you care. Just 

as critically, they know their fellow citizens care. All they want 

right now is guidance on the mission before them and the tools to 

accomplish it. That’s why I’m here today to speak on their behalf 

about the guidance they are getting from this Department and to 

secure your continued support for the tools we want to give them. 

22 

Secretary Gates has already walked you through the major components of the QDR and the President’s fiscal year 2011 defense 

budget submission, both of which, when combined with the new 

BMDR and our OCOs fund request, build upon the reform effort of 

last year and represent as comprehensive a look at the state of our 

military as I have seen in my experience. 

I will not endeavor to repeat his excellent summation and I 

would ask you to accept without further comment my endorsement 

of the findings contained in each of these documents. Let me leave 

you rather with three overarching things to consider as you prepare to discuss these issues today and as you prepare to debate 

this budget request in the future. 

First, there is a real sense of urgency here. We have well over 

200,000 troops deployed in harm’s way right now and that number 

includes only those in Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring 

Freedom. Tens of thousands more are meeting our security commitments elsewhere around the globe and many of those missions are 

no less dangerous, certainly no less significant. 

I am sure you have stayed abreast of our relief efforts in Haiti, 

where more than 20,000 of your soldiers, sailors, marines, airmen, 

and coastguardsmen are pitching in feverishly to help alleviate the 

suffering of the Haitian people. It is truly an interagency and international mission and these troops are blending in beautifully, doing 

what is required, where and when it is required, to support the 

Government of Haiti, USAID, and the U.N. mission there. 

We also continue to do what is required to win the wars we fight, 

and the one that needs fighting the most right now is in Afghanistan. You’ve seen the reports and you know the situation. The 

Taliban have a growing influence in most of Afghanistan’s provinces and the border area between that country and Pakistan remains the epicenter of global terrorism. You no doubt followed with 

great interest the development of the President’s strategy to deal 

with this threat, a strategy that in my view rightly makes the Afghan people the center of gravity and the defeat of al Qaeda the 

primary goal. 

We have already moved over 4,500 troops to Afghanistan and expect that about 18,000 of the President’s December 1st commitment 

will be there by late spring. The remainder of the 30,000 will arrive 

as rapidly as possible over the summer and early fall, making a 

major contribution to reversing the Taliban momentum in 2010. Indeed, by the middle of this year Afghanistan will surpass Iraq for 

the first time since 2003 as the location with the most deployed 

American forces. 

Right now, the Taliban believe they’re willing. Eighteen months 

from now, if we’ve executed our strategy, we’ll know they aren’t, 

and they’ll know that they can’t. 

Getting there will demand discipline and hard work. It will require ever more cooperation with Pakistan, and it will most assuredly demand more sacrifice and more bloodshed. But the stakes 

are far too high for failure. That’s why we’re asking you to fully 

fund our fiscal year 2010 supplemental and the fiscal year 2011 

OCOs request. It’s why we want a 6 percent increase for Special 

Operations Command. It’s why we need your support to develop 

and field a Next Generation Ground Combat Vehicle, to allow us 

23 

to grow two more Army combat aviation brigades, and to continue 

rotary wing production, including nearly $3 billion for the V–22 Osprey program. 

In keeping with the Secretary’s strong emphasis on ISR, an emphasis more than justified by our long experience in Iraq and Afghanistan, we are asking for more capability in unmanned aircraft 

and ground-based collection systems, including nearly $3 billion to 

double the procurement rate of the MQ–9 Reaper by fiscal year 

2012. 

Our future security is greatly imperiled if we do not win the 

wars we are in. As the QDR makes clear, the outcome of today’s 

conflicts will shape the global security environment for decades to 

come. I’m very comfortable that we can and will finish well in Iraq, 

remaining on pace, despite a spate of recent violence to draw down 

American forces to roughly 50,000, ending our combat mission 

there, and transitioning to an advise and assist role. 

But without your continued support, we will not be able to show 

the meaningful progress in Afghanistan that the Commander in 

Chief has ordered, the American people expect, and the Afghan 

people so desperately need. This is no mission of mercy. This is the 

place from which we were attacked in 2001, the place from which 

all—from which al Qaeda still plots and plans. The security of a 

great nation, ours and theirs, rests not on sentiment or good intentions, but on what ought to be a cold and unfeeling appraisal of 

self-interest and an equally cold and unfeeling pursuit of the tools 

to protect that interest, ours and theirs. 

That leads me to the second thing I’d like to consider: proper balance. Winning our current wars means investment in our hard-won 

irregular warfare expertise, a core competency that should be institutionalized and supported in the coming years, and we are certainly moving in that direction. But we must also maintain conventional advantages. We still face traditional threats from regional 

powers who possess robust regular and in some cases nuclear capabilities. These cannot be ignored. The freedom to conduct operations in support of joint, allied, and coalition efforts, assuring access and projecting combat power, can only be preserved through 

enduring warfighting competencies. 

In the air, this means sufficient strike aircraft and munitions capable of assuring air superiority. At sea, it means having enough 

ships and enough sailors to stay engaged globally and keep the sea 

lanes open. On the ground, it means accelerating the modernization of our combat brigades and regiments. On the whole, it means 

never having to fight a fair fight. 

Thus, the President’s budget request will buy us another 42 F– 

35s. It will maintain a healthy bomber industrial base and it will 

fund development of a prompt global strike system, as well as efforts to upgrade our B–2s and B–52s. 

For ship construction, the spending plan totals some $18 billion, 

procuring 10 new ships in 2011, including 2 Arleigh Burke destroyers, 2 Virginia-class submarines, 2 Littoral Combat Ships (LCSs), 

and a brand-new Amphibious Assault Ship. It puts the Navy on 

track to maintain aircraft carrier production on a 5-year build 

cycle, resulting in a long-term force structure of 10 carriers by 

2040. 

24 

Our budget request also seeks $10 billion for ballistic missile defense programs, including $8.4 billion for the Missile Defense Agency, and it develops ample resources to improving our cyber defense 

capabilities. Again, it’s about balance, it’s about deterring and winning the big and the small wars, the conventional and the unconventional—two challenges, one military. 

But where balance is probably most needed is in the programs 

and policies concerning our most important resource, our people. 

That’s my final point. This QDR and this budget builds upon superb support you and DOD have provided our troops and their families for much of the last 8 years. Stretched and strained by nearly 

constant combat, many of them on their fifth, sixth, and seventh 

deployments, our men and women are without question, and almost inexplicably, the most resilient and battle-ready in our history. 

On the one hand, we keep turning away potential recruits, so 

good is our retention and so attractive our career opportunities. On 

the other hand, we keep seeing an alarming rise in suicides, mental problems, prescription drug addictions, and mental health problems. Deborah and I meet regularly with young troops and their 

spouses and, though proud of the difference they know they are 

making, they are tired. Quite frankly, many of them are worried 

about their futures, their children. 

So you will see in this budget nearly $9 billion for family support 

and advocacy programs. You will see child care and youth programs increased by $87 million over last year, and you will see a 

boost in warfighter and family services, to include counseling, to 

the tune of $37 million. Military spouse employment will get a $2 

million plus-up and we will increase the budget to $2.2 billion for 

wounded, ill, and injured members. In fact, the health care funding 

level for fiscal year 2011 is projected to provide high-quality care 

for 9.5 million eligible beneficiaries. 

Lastly, we are pushing to dramatically increase the number of 

mental health professionals on staff and advance our research in 

TBIs and post-traumatic stress. We know the strain of frequent deployments causes many problems, but we won’t yet fully understand how—we don’t yet fully understand how or to what extent. 

So even as we work hard to increase dwell time, aided in part 

by the additional temporary end strength you approved last year 

for the Army, we will work equally hard to decrease the stress of 

modern military service. Indeed, I believe over time when these 

wars are behind us we will need to look closely at the competing 

fiscal pressures that will dominate discussions of proper end 

strength and weapons systems. A force well suited for long-term 

challenges and not necessarily married to any current force planning construct will be vital to our national security. 

Mr. Chairman and members of this committee, thank you again 

for your time and for the longstanding support of this committee 

to the men and women of the U.S. Armed Forces. They and their 

families are the best I have ever seen. On their behalf, I stand 

ready to answer your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Admiral Mullen follows:] 

25 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY ADM MICHAEL G. MULLEN, USN 

Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, distinguished members of the committee; it is 

my privilege to report on the posture of the U.S. Armed Forces. 

I begin by thanking you for your support of our service men and women, their 

families, and the communities that do so much to help them. We can never repay 

them for their sacrifices, but we can support their efforts. As leaders, we necessarily 

debate the best course of action to secure our Nation in a dangerous world. But our 

service men and women do not hesitate. When the decision is made, they go where 

they are needed most, where dangers must be confronted and adversaries defeated. 

I’m humbled as I visit them around the world, defending our Nation in very trying 

conditions. They care deeply for this country, and they care most that they have the 

Nation’s clear backing. The support of Congress and the American people remain 

essential to their strength and resolve. I am grateful for your unwavering recognition of the service of our forces and their families. 

Today’s Armed Forces are battle-hardened, capable, and ready to accomplish the 

Nation’s missions. They are the most combat experienced yet most compassionate 

force we have ever fielded, and continue to learn and adapt in ways that are truly 

remarkable. They are the best I have ever seen. I thank the committee for taking 

the time to understand the stresses, strains and concerns of our servicemembers. 

Your continuing legislative support of our Armed Forces makes all the difference. 

KEY DEVELOPMENTS

Over this past year, our wartime focus has shifted to Afghanistan and Pakistan. 

As I have testified before Congress on many occasions, the threats to our national 

security from al Qaeda and affiliated movements based in the Afghanistan-Pakistan 

region remain real and persistent. We require a stable and reasonably secure Afghanistan and Pakistan—inhospitable to al Qaeda’s senior leadership, capable of 

self defense against internal extremist threats, and contributors to regional stability. 

Our increasing focus on Afghanistan and Pakistan confirmed the border region to 

be al Qaeda’s center of gravity. It also showed the situation to be more dire than 

previously understood. The Afghan-Taliban’s post-2005 resurgence produced a widespread paramilitary, shadow government and extra-judicial presence in a majority 

of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces. The Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (the Pakistan Taliban) 

showed itself to be a bold and audacious enemy of the Pakistani people, ruthlessly 

seizing control of Swat in late spring. Nine Pakistani military operations against the 

Taliban that began last March have reversed their territorial gains. Throughout this 

year, we have constantly and carefully reviewed our objectives for the region. I concur completely with the President’s strategy, and believe we have now matched the 

right strategy with the required resources. The decision to authorize an additional 

21,500 American forces into Afghanistan in early 2009, followed by the President’s 

commitment of additional forces in December set conditions to reverse AfghanTaliban gains. It will also enable the Government of Afghanistan to build the security and governance necessary to eliminate the insurgency as a threat. Setbacks 

marked much of 2009, but with a new leadership team, appropriate resources, improved organization, and a better strategy, we are confident of success against al 

Qaeda and the Taliban. Success will not come easily or swiftly, but we will succeed. 

The hardest work to achieve our regional aims remains ahead of us, especially in 

2010–2011. 

Al Qaeda’s central leadership has suffered significant losses over the past several 

years. Though its operational capacity has declined, al Qaeda’s senior leaders remain committed to catastrophic terrorist attacks against the United States and our 

allies. Actions in the Pakistan-Afghanistan border area, in Iraq, and elsewhere have 

met with marked success. That said, al Qaeda successfully sought new approaches 

to plot attacks. The disrupted terrorist plot against New York City was planned in 

al Qaeda’s Pakistani safe haven and intercepted in Denver. The failed Christmas 

Day bombing attempt over Detroit was crafted by and ordered from those in Yemen’s growing safe havens. Both incidents demonstrate the resolve of al Qaeda and 

its ever-evolving strategy. While the danger remains real, like-minded governments 

and people around the world—especially those in the Muslim community—increasingly reject al Qaeda, its affiliates and what they stand for. Most want a brighter 

future for their children and grandchildren, not al Qaeda’s endless war and intolerance. They see daily evidence that al Qaeda and its affiliates deliberately target and 

kill thousands of innocent Muslims in cold blood. They know al Qaeda continues a 

ruthless and deadly campaign against the people of Islam in Iraq, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, Kenya, Indonesia, Turkey, and elsewhere. Continued progress 

against violent extremism will require enhanced, but prudent, partnerships with 

26 

key governments and movements, including consistent efforts to counter al Qaeda’s 

bankrupt message. 

The behavior of the Iranian Government is of grave and growing concern. 

Tehran’s leadership remains on a trajectory to acquire a nuclear capability, in defiance of international demands and despite widespread condemnation. Iran’s government continues to support international terrorist organizations, and pursues a coercive and confrontational foreign policy. These efforts exist alongside some of the 

greatest internal unrest Iran has faced since the Islamic Revolution in 1979. These 

events and conditions risk further destabilizing an already unstable region. 

The unpredictable has also galvanized our military, requiring a significant force 

commitment in Haiti, making it one of our most significant humanitarian missions 

in history. As of January 31, nearly 20,000 American troops are in direct support 

of the Government of Haiti, the United Nations, USAID and supporting American 

and international aid agencies. From port openings, to security and distribution of 

supplies, U.S. Southern Command’s military Joint Task Force has delivered over 1.6 

million bottles of water, 67,000 meals and 56,000 pieces of medical supplies to Haiti’s earthquake survivors. Military medical teams also supplement the U.S. Health 

and Human Services, and have already have seen over 2,800 patients and performed nearly 100 surgeries. We are committed to this assistance until the situation 

on the ground stabilizes. 

Several policy initiatives over the past year have provided the military with new 

direction. President Obama’s June speech in Cairo set the stage for a new relationship between the United States and more than a billion people across the Muslim 

world. Throughout 2009, this Congress supported the rapid and necessary deployment of more forces to Afghanistan. We also began negotiations with Russia for a 

Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty follow-on treaty, which will reduce nuclear weapons stockpiles while maintaining U.S. deterrence. As mandated by Congress, we 

have reviewed current and future threats and developed appropriate strategies in 

the Quadrennial Defense Review. We look forward to working with Congress to 

forge a common understanding of the threats our Nation faces, and how best to 

counter them. 

Key alliances continue to matter greatly in our global security efforts. Our North 

American Treaty Organization (NATO) allies and other non-NATO partners expanded support in Afghanistan over the past year. We now work there with 43 

countries and nearly 40,000 international troops. Although the world avoided a 

widespread economic depression in 2009, many of our partners were financially 

challenged and may spend less on combined security and stabilization efforts. Other 

critical allies faced internal considerations that could adversely affect U.S. and regional security interests if not managed closely. Our close alliance with Japan, in 

particular, suffered strain around basing rights in Okinawa. I am confident we will 

work through these and other issues, but it is a reminder that even our strongest 

allies cannot be taken for granted. 

Against this backdrop, the strategic priorities for the military remain unchanged 

from my last annual testimony before Congress: defending our interests in the 

broader Middle East and South/Central Asia; ensuring the health of the Force, and 

balancing global strategic risk. With your ongoing help and support, we continue to 

address each of these priorities. 

DEFEND OUR INTERESTS IN THE BROADER MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH/CENTRAL ASIA

The Broader Middle East and South/Central Asia, remains the most dangerous 

region of the world. 

Our main effort within the region has changed. The Government of Iraq is taking 

firm control of its own security. We have shifted our priority to Afghanistan and 

Pakistan, long under-resourced in many ways. That shift in focus will take the 

movement of some quarter of a million troops and their equipment in and out of 

the Central Command theater over the next several months. This is a herculean logistics effort. By the middle of 2010, Afghanistan will surpass Iraq for the first time 

since 2003 as our location with the most deployed American forces. 

Despite this surge, the security situation in both Afghanistan and Pakistan remains serious. The Afghan-Taliban have established shadow governments—featuring parallel judicial, taxation and local security/intimidation systems—in a clear 

majority of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces. Attacks by the Taliban have become far 

more numerous and more sophisticated. We are now establishing conditions—with 

military forces and expanded civilian agency presence—to reverse the Taliban’s momentum. Yet we face both a resilient Taliban insurgency and an Afghan public 

skeptical of their government’s good will, capacity, and capability. 

27 

As of late January 2010, we have already moved nearly 4,500 troops, and expect 

that 18,000 of the President’s December 1st commitment will be in country by late 

spring. The remainder of the 30,000 will arrive as rapidly as possible over the summer and early fall, making a major contribution to reversing Taliban momentum in 

2010. 

These forces are joining some 68,000 U.S. forces and more than 30,000 coalition 

forces already in Afghanistan—all of which have undertaken a fundamental shift in 

how they are being employed across the country. Our troops are now focused on protecting key population centers—separating them from the intimidation and influence of the Taliban. Simultaneously, they are training and partnering with Afghan 

security forces to enable Afghans to assume lead security for their own country as 

soon as possible. The next 12–18 months must be the time to reverse insurgent momentum and assess partnership progress. 

The brave men and women we charge to implement this fundamental shift in Afghanistan security strategy need the strong support of this Congress. We need your 

assistance in key areas like funding for Afghan National Security Forces, who will 

ultimately bring about success and security. In the short term, the Commander’s 

Emergency Response Program is needed to adequately protect the population, and 

enhanced special construction authorities and equipment procurement accounts will 

be critical to putting enough force on the ground to make a difference. 

The border area between Pakistan and Afghanistan is the epicenter of global terrorism. This is where al Qaeda plans terrorist attacks against the United States and 

our partners—and from where the Taliban leadership targets coalition troops in Afghanistan. Pakistan’s ongoing military operations against extremists in these areas 

are critical to preventing al Qaeda and associated groups from gaining ground. 

In Pakistan, the extremist threat, a fractious political system, economic weakness 

and longstanding tensions with India continue to threaten stability. We are working 

to rebuild our relationship with Pakistan and re-establish trust lost between our two 

countries. We aim to demonstrate to Pakistan—in both our words and our actions— 

that we desire a long-term relationship. Our recent concerns with Pakistan’s approach to U.S. visa requests is further testimony to the challenges of the relationship; and, it will affect increased capacity for counterterrorism and counterinsurgency, to include support for development projects. Nevertheless, the Pakistani 

Counterinsurgency Fund and the Coalition Support Funds earmarked for Pakistan 

remain essential components of our support to this critical ally. I urge you to continue them. Enhanced contact and engagement between Pakistan and the United 

States is a critical component of a maturing, long-term partnership. Thus, we are 

focusing on expanded military education exchange programs, joint training opportunities and especially Foreign Military Sales and Financing. The budget before you 

requests additional funds for these critical partnership endeavors. 

South Asian security tensions and political dynamics significantly impact our objectives in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The longstanding animosity and mistrust between Pakistan and India complicates regional efforts. Yet India and Pakistan must 

both be our partners for the long term. Bilateral military relationships are an essential component in a wide array of cooperative activities. We must recognize this and 

address it as part of our policy. While we acknowledge the sovereign right of India 

and Pakistan to pursue their own foreign policies, we must demonstrate our desire 

for continued and long-term partnership with each, and offer our help to improve 

confidence and understanding between them in a manner that builds long-term stability across the wider region of South Asia. As part of our long-term regional approach, we should welcome all steps these important nations take to regenerate 

their ‘back channel’ process on Kashmir. 

While Afghanistan and Pakistan remain the critical terrain, we must remain vigilant in denying al Qaeda unfettered physical safe havens elsewhere across the 

Broader Middle East and South Asia, including Northern and Eastern Africa. These 

efforts will not require tens of thousands of American troops. Instead, we can work 

quietly and persistently with regional allies and Coalition partners to deny al Qaeda 

territory from which to plot, train, and project global terror operations. Similarly, 

we continue to undertake collaborative, supporting efforts with like-minded governments across the broader Middle East. We now work to help the Yemeni government build the information base and the military capacity necessary to combat the 

al Qaeda threat within its borders. We applaud Yemeni efforts to confront al Qaeda 

operatives, and continue to offer Sana’a the support necessary to achieve this aim. 

We have worked with the concerned neighbors of Somalia to contain the worst aims 

and objectives of the Islamic Courts Union and al Shabaab. This must continue. In 

these areas—as well as others including Indonesia and the Philippines—our military engages with willing partners in a manner detrimental to al Qaeda’s aspirations. We undertake these partnerships in conjunction with those from American inVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:37 May 06, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00033 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\62155.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
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telligence, diplomatic and economic organizations. I must stress that in today’s environment, training and equipping partner security forces to defend and protect their 

own territory and coastal waters is a core military mission. We appreciate Congress’ 

continuing support for these important undertakings. 

The Iranian Government continues to be a destabilizing force in the region. The 

government’s strategic intent appears unchanged—its leaders continue on a course 

to eventually develop and deploy nuclear weapons. This outcome could spark a regional arms race or worse. It will be profoundly destabilizing to the region, with farranging consequences that we cannot fully predict. Tehran also continues to provide 

a range of support to militant proxy organizations, including Hamas and Hezbollah, 

fomenting instability outside its borders. Its increasingly reckless nuclear and foreign policy agenda is now playing out against the backdrop of a shrinking economy 

and a growing rift between the Iranian Government and its people. I remain convinced that exhaustive—and if necessary coercive—diplomacy with Iran remains the 

preferred path to prevent these grave outcomes. To this extent, the Joint Chiefs, 

combatant commanders, and I support all efforts to steer the Government of Iran 

off of its hazardous course. However, as with any potential threats to our national 

security, we will have military options ready for the President, should he call for 

them. 

Iraq continues to progress, although more is needed. U.S. partnership with Iraqi 

security forces has been fundamental to this progress since 2005. Last year’s level 

of violence was the lowest since 2003, testifying to the success of our approach. Al 

Qaeda is still present and has carried out a few large-scale attacks. But, Iraqi Security Forces and government leaders responded to them in a restrained, professional, 

and relatively apolitical manner. Upcoming elections will not be free from tension. 

However, I believe Iraqis are now more concerned about economic growth than domestic security threats. Credible elections are important. Foreign direct investment 

and expanded political engagement by other regional powers are also important as 

more diplomatic and economic progress will spotlight Iraq’s return to the world 

stage as a sovereign nation. 

U.S. Forces-Iraq (USF–I) remains on track to draw down American forces to 

roughly 50,000 and end our combat mission by August 31, 2010. Our security partnership will then shift to training, advising, and supporting Iraqi security forces. 

More broadly, the U.S. military will transition from a supported to a supporting effort in Iraq as we normalize relations. The State Department will increasingly be 

the face of U.S. efforts in Iraq. The U.S. military will strongly support their leadership. We request continuing congressional support for the Iraqi Forces Fund and for 

the Equipment Transfer Provision of the National Defense Authorization Act for 

Fiscal Year 2010. These transfers are a critical component America’s transition to 

a limited, but reliable partner in Iraq’s assumption of a responsible and Baghdadled security future. 

HEALTH OF THE FORCE

Our Nation’s security is founded upon a well-trained, well-equipped All-Volunteer 

Force. We must care for our people and their families, reset and reconstitute our 

weapon systems, and take on new initiatives that increase wartime effectiveness. 

Care for our People 

Our service men and women, their families, and their communities are the bedrock of our Armed Forces. Their health, resilience, and well-being are at the heart 

of every decision I make. Frankly, investing in our people remains the single greatest guarantee of a strong military. Competitive pay, selective bonuses, expanded access to mental health care, continued health benefits for tens of thousands of our 

Wounded Warriors—those with seen and unseen wounds—and their families are 

critical to this investment. 

Our military families and communities continue to play a unique and growing role 

in our national security fabric, one not seen in more than a generation. They support us and sustain us in ways we do not yet fully understand. They deserve the 

admiration and support of a grateful nation. I applaud the efforts of this body’s Military Family Caucus, and encourage significant attention and funding for their programs of greatest concern. My conversations with spouses and children around the 

world tell me these concerns center on caring for those affected by these wars, child 

care, education, health and deployment issues. 

We remain competitive in attracting the country’s best talent. For the first time 

in the history of the All-Volunteer Force, the Active Duty, Guard, and Reserve components all exceeded annual recruiting goals for 2009. This success was reflected in 

the quality of our recruits as well as their numbers. Ninety-six percent of our accessions earned a high school diploma or better. Each Service also met or exceeded its 

29 

2009 retention goals. Our ability to recruit and retain underscores the fact that this 

is the best military I have seen in my 42-year career. While competitive pay is a 

critical factor in this success, it does not stand alone. Other critical ‘people’ programs supported by Congress—like the new GI Bill, adequate housing, access to 

quality schooling for military children, and attractive family support centers—come 

together to make the harsh burdens of military life acceptable. 

We must not forget the challenges that this excellent All-Volunteer Force faces 

every day. More than 8 years of wartime operations have come at a cost. Most Army 

brigade combat teams are preparing for their fourth major deployment since September 11, with some of them preparing for their fifth—unprecedented in our history. The Marines Corps is in the same boat—their deployments are shorter but 

more frequent, and their pace is grueling. Our people spend less time at home, and 

this shorter dwell time between deployments does not allow for respite or for training along the entire spectrum of military operations. Our irregular warfare expertise—hard won over the last 8 years—has come at a price. Conventional warfighting 

skills have atrophied and will require attention. Yet this overdue attention will have 

to wait. The gains we anticipate from the coming draw-down in Iraq will be absorbed by our necessary efforts in Afghanistan for at least 2 more years. Resetting 

the force requires significant effort and sustained commitment now and post-conflict. We will continue to rely heavily on our Navy and our Air Force. 

Dwell time—the ratio of time deployed to time home—remains a concern, and one 

we must manage closely this year and into 2011. Dwell time for the Army is at 1:1.2 

and the Marine Corps is slightly better at 1:1.5. We will not see significant dwell 

time improvements across all Services until 2012. Deployment rates for Special Operations Forces (SOF) and other low-density, high-demand specialties also remain 

very high. While our force is strong and resilient, these trends cannot continue indefinitely. 

The challenges remain significant, but are manageable thanks to the support of 

Congress for increased end-strengths in the Army and Marine Corps. We are only 

now starting to feel the positive impact from these 2007-authorized increases in the 

baseline force—stabilizing deployment rates and dwell times. Coupled with the additional temporary increase of 22,000 troops within the Army, Congressional support 

for our wartime military manning needs has been critical. 

The stresses of protracted war extend beyond the deployments themselves. Our 

number of dead and wounded continues to rise, as does the strain on their families 

and their communities. Other social costs of war—divorce, domestic violence, depression, and post-traumatic stress syndrome—are unacceptably high and continue to 

increase. We have much more to do. 

Suicide deserves special attention. Despite our best efforts, 2009 witnessed a 

record level of suicides, with increases in both the Active and Reserve components. 

We have not begun to study suicides among family members and dependents. While 

there is not one cause for increased servicemember suicides, we know enough to be 

certain that better prevention training programs for leadership, for at-risk 

servicemembers, and robust funding and attention toward sober study of the problem are absolutely necessary. 

We should provide a lifetime of support to our veterans. I urge you to continue 

funding the programs supporting those that have sacrificed so much, including those 

aimed to reduce veteran homelessness and that focus on rural health care options. 

The demands on our active and veterans care services will continue to grow, and 

require the attention found in this budget. Yet we must conceive of Wounded Warrior Support in a manner that goes beyond the traditional institutions. Public, private, and individual sources of help represent a ‘‘sea of goodwill’’ towards our veterans. Our focus must be more on commitment than compensation; and more attuned to transition and ability than upon disability. Our veterans want the opportunity to continue to serve, and we should enable that opportunity. 

Reset and Reconstitute 

My concerns about the health of our force go beyond our people. Our systems and 

capabilities are under extraordinary stress as well. The high pace of operations is 

consuming our capital equipment much faster than programmed. The Air Force and 

Navy have been essentially performing non-stop, global operations for 19 years, 

since Operation Desert Storm. The Army and Marine Corps have had the majority 

of their combat forces and equipment in the combat theater of operations for nearly 

6 years. The unforgiving terrain of Afghanistan and Iraq causes extensive wear and 

tear, especially on our ground vehicles, helicopters, and supporting gear. 

The demands of the current fight mean we must increase capacity in several 

areas, including rotary wing, ISR, electronic warfare and SOF. We sustain necessary 

rotary wing capacity through the addition of two active Army Combat Aviation BriVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:37 May 06, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00035 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\62155.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
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gades, continued production of the tilt-rotor V–22, as well as our helicopter force, 

and a seventh SOF helicopter company. I support this budget’s rebalancing in favor 

of more commercial airborne ISR capabilities for combatant commanders. This budget continues increasing the number of unmanned combat air patrols, coupled with 

the ability to fully exploit the intelligence coming from these platforms. We should 

expand current technologies to fill electronic warfare shortfalls and develop nextgeneration technologies for manned and unmanned aircraft. 

New initiatives 

Too many of our processes and programs remain geared to a peacetime clock, but 

several new initiatives focused on supporting our war efforts show promise. I strongly support the Afghanistan/Pakistan Hands program and ongoing initiatives that increase the number and skill of our civil affairs and psychological operations personnel. I also strongly back the USAF’s initiative to use light aircraft for enhanced 

capacity building of key allies and partners for light mobility and attack. 

Our current acquisition process remains too unwieldy and unresponsive. Adding 

20,000 more acquisition experts by 2015 will help, as will increasing the rigor and 

efficiency of our internal processes. Stability in our programs, comprehensive design 

reviews, better cost estimates, more mature technology and increased competition 

will make the process more responsive. Once fielded, our systems are the finest in 

the world, because of the experienced and capable program managers and engineers 

building them. We need more of managers and engineers, and they need better support and leadership. 

Finally, I am growing concerned about our defense industrial base, particularly 

in ship building and space. As fiscal pressures increase, our ability to build future 

weapon systems will be impacted by decreasing modernization budgets as well as 

mergers and acquisitions. We properly focus now on near-term reset requirements. 

However, we may face an eroding ability to produce and support advanced technology systems. Left unchecked, this trend would impact war fighting readiness. 

The Department, our industry leaders, and Congress need to begin considering how 

to equip and sustain the military we require after our contemporary wars come to 

an end. 

BALANCING GLOBAL STRATEGIC RISK

Balancing global risk requires sustained attention to resetting the force. It also 

means making prudent investments to meet the challenges of an increasingly complex and challenging worldwide security environment. As the President recently 

noted, it is the United States that has helped underwrite global security with the 

blood of our citizens and the strength of our military. America’s interests are global, 

and our military must secure these interests. Where possible, we will act first to 

prevent or deter conflict. When necessary, we will defeat our enemies. Whenever 

able, we will work in concert with our many allies and partners. 

For many decades, but especially since 1989, U.S. conventional overmatch has 

guaranteed our security and prosperity, as well as that of our many allies and partners. We have helped protect expanding global commons, including into space and 

cyberspace. We have seen the likelihood of conventional war between states drop. 

We have used the tools designed for war not against human adversaries, but instead 

to support humanitarian operations. Most recently in Haiti, but elsewhere over the 

past 60 years, the military’s unmatched capacity to transport goods and services 

have provided relief in the face of tragic natural disasters. In short, many nations 

have benefited from an extraordinarily capable and ready U.S. military, even as we 

have defended our own interests. 

That capability must continue to span the full range of military operations. But 

in this post-Cold War era—one without a military near-peer competitor—we should 

not be surprised that adversaries will choose asymmetric means to confront us. 

They will seek to use both old and new technology in innovative ways to defeat our 

advantages. Terrorism will remain the primary tactic of choice for actors to conduct 

warfare ‘‘on the cheap’’. Both state and non-state actors will seek weapons of mass 

destruction through proliferation. Increasingly, states will attempt to deny our ability to operate in key regions, through the development and proliferation of ballistic 

missile systems, or by exploiting space and cyberspace. Taken together, these are 

diverse threats that require a broad set of means. 

Winning our current wars means investment in our hard won irregular warfare 

expertise. That core competency must be institutionalized and supported in the coming years. However, we must also stay balanced and maintain our advantage in the 

conventional arena. In the air, this advantage requires sufficient strike aircraft and 

munitions capable of assuring air superiority and holding difficult targets at risk. 

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building program. On the ground, we must accelerate the modernization of our combat brigades and regiments. Without question, these are expensive undertakings. 

But our present security challenges demand them. 

Countering weapons of mass destruction means investing in new research, securing nuclear materials, and preparing a layered defense. Improving our ability to 

neutralize and render safe critical targets is vital. We maintain the ability to respond to their use against our citizens. But while improving responsiveness to the 

use of such weapons is critical, more important is to counter their proliferation and 

deter their use. I advocate diverse investments in nuclear forensics and expanding 

our biological threat program, in addition to continuing investment in the highly effective counterproliferation programs that are central to our success in this critical 

endeavor. These relatively small funds will have a disproportionately positive impact on our security. 

The ability of potential adversaries to challenge our freedom of movement and the 

peaceful use of the global commons—sea, air, space, and cyberspace—has grown in 

recent years. Anti access-technologies and capabilities are proliferating, which could 

prevent us from deterring conflict in some regions. We must preserve our ability to 

gain access even when political, geographical or operational factors try to deny us 

the same. This requires funding for improvements to our missile defense capabilities, expanded long range and prompt global strike systems, and hardened forward 

bases. Threats in cyberspace are increasing faster than our ability to adequately defend against them. Cyber attacks can cripple critical infrastructure, impose significant costs, and undermine operational capabilities. Meanwhile, space-based systems 

critical to our global awareness and connectivity are aging and have proven vulnerable. A determined enemy could degrade existing space systems, significantly impacting our strategic intelligence and warning capabilities, as well as global positioning and communication. I ask Congress to support the stand-up of U.S. CyberCommand and provide funding for cyber and space initiatives to redress these growing and worrisome vulnerabilities. 

Rising states may present a strategic challenge, but also offer opportunities. China’s economic strength, military capability, and global influence continue to grow. 

While our military relations remain generally constructive, we seek much more 

openness and transparency from China regarding the growth of its conventional and 

nuclear defense forces. We also believe that China can—and should—accept greater 

responsibility for and partner more willingly to safeguard the global trade and investment infrastructure. This requires Beijing to work more collaboratively when 

determining fair access to transportation corridors and natural resources. China 

also should demonstrate greater clarity in its military investments. Absent a more 

forthcoming China in these critical areas, we must prudently consider known Chinese capabilities, in addition to stated intentions. As we seek to establish a continuous military-to-military dialogue to reconcile uncertainties and gain trust, we will 

pursue common interests in agreed upon areas such as counter-piracy, counter-proliferation, search and rescue, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. As a Pacific Rim nation with longstanding interests throughout Asia, we will continue to 

play a vigorous regional role. 

Our present dialogue with Russia is multi-faceted. It acknowledges points of contention as well as opportunities to ‘‘reset’’ our relationship on a positive trajectory. 

We seek Moscow’s cooperation in reducing the number and role of strategic nuclear 

weapons. These discussions have been constructive, and negotiations are near fruition. I believe the resulting treaty will benefit the United States, Russia, and the 

world. Moscow has also helped us establish a supplemental logistics distribution line 

into Afghanistan. Russia also helped our diplomats pressure Iran, and we look toward Moscow to do even more in this process. On the other hand, Russia continues 

to reassert a special sphere of influence with its neighbors. The Russian military 

is simultaneously modernizing its strategic forces and many conventional forces. 

Our obligations under Article V of NATO remain clear and we remain poised to fulfill them. 

North Korea’s autocratic government makes it a persistent wild card in Asia. 

Today, Pyongyang continues to pursue intercontinental ballistic missile technologies, develop nuclear weapons, and export weapons in contravention to international law and treaties. It also maintains an unfortunate and threatening posture 

toward our ally South Korea, and an unhelpful disposition toward our ally Japan. 

Of course, we can best defend our interests and maintain global order when we 

partner with like-minded nations. By forging close military-to-military relations 

with an expanding number of nations—providing training, equipment, advice, and 

education—we increase the number of states that are interested and capable of 

partnering with us. While tending to long-term allies, we should also cultivate our 

32 

relationships with other liked-minded powers around the world. Making a small investment now will pay dividends in reducing our security burden and global risk. 

We need full funding of Defense Theater Security Cooperation programs, International Military Education and Training activities, and the many security assistance programs managed by the Department of State. Preventative strategies require 

providing foreign partners with the capacity to promote stability and counterterrorism. With your help, we have made considerable strides in adapting our tools 

for security force assistance, but more is needed. I urge your complete support of 

the Global Train and Equip initiatives (under section 1206 authorities), the future 

evolution of the Global Stability fund (under section 1207 authorities), as well as 

funding for special operations to combat terrorism (under section 1208 authorities). 

The majority of threats facing the United States require integrated interagency 

and international initiatives. Supporting interagency cooperation programs, to include expanding the number of exchanges between the Department of Defense and 

other Executive Agencies, will improve interagency capacity to meet future security 

threats as well. Please urge your colleagues who oversee the Department of State 

to fully fund Secretary Clinton’s requests. I ask Congress to promote legislation that 

increases the expeditionary capacity of non-military Executive Agencies. Our future 

security concerns require a whole-of-government effort, not just a military one. 

CONCLUSION

This past year witnessed significant achievements by America’s men and women 

in uniform. Their efforts and sacrifices—as part of a learning and adapting organization—have sustained us through more than 8 years of continuous war. Thanks to 

them we are in position to finish well in Iraq. Thanks to them, we can begin to turn 

the corner in Afghanistan and Pakistan. In conjunction with our many partner nations, they’ve provided humanitarian relief assistance to millions, helped contain a 

threatening H1N1 pandemic, expanded support to national law enforcement for enhanced border security, and disrupted terrorist sanctuaries world-wide. Thanks to 

them, we have a global presence protecting our national security and prosperity. 

The demands of the present remain high, and our military role in national security remains substantial. This will continue for the foreseeable future. Yet as I have 

testified before this body in past appearances, the military serves America best 

when we support, rather than lead U.S. foreign policy. 

On behalf of all men and women under arms, I wish to thank Congress for your 

unwavering support for our troops in the field, their families at home, and our efforts to rebalance and reform the force to assure that we win the wars we are in 

and are poised to win those we are most likely to face in the future. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you so much, Admiral. 

We’ll try a 5-minute first round here. Mr. Secretary, the change 

in our Afghanistan policy is what drove the requirement, apparently, for a supplemental funding request this year. Is it your goal 

to avoid a supplemental funding request for fiscal year 2011? 

Secretary GATES. Yes, sir, it is. Our hope would be that the 

OCO’s approach is a preferred way to do this. As we saw this time 

unforeseen circumstances brought us up here to defend another 

supplemental. I think I’m on the record last year as expressing the 

hope we wouldn’t be doing another one of those, but here I am. But 

it is our intent that for fiscal year 2011 the OCO fund would be 

sufficient. 

Chairman LEVIN. Mr. Secretary, the President, you, the Admiral, 

and others have all pointed out that a principal mission for our 

forces in Afghanistan is the training up of the Afghan security 

forces to take over responsibility for the security of their country. 

Yet our NATO allies are 90 percent short of meeting their commitment for trainers for the Afghan troops. These are the ones who 

are in that early 8-week basic training period, not out in the field, 

where I think we’re doing very well and we are meeting what the 

goals are in terms of kind of on-the-job training, partnering unit 

with unit. 

33 

But back to that basic training, the NATO non-U.S. countries 

committed 2,000 trainers. They’ve produced 200. Now, what are we 

going to do to get General Caldwell those additional trainers which 

are so essential? 

Secretary GATES. My understanding is that General Caldwell’s 

short about 1700 trainers. Our hope is that with the additional 

commitments of somewhere between 7 and 10,000 additional forces 

by our NATO and other partners, that out of that number we can 

more than fill the requirement for trainers. Certainly Admiral 

Stavridis, General Petraeus, and General McChrystal have been 

talking to them about this. But I might add, Admiral Mullen just 

met with the heads of the European militaries last week. I might 

ask him for a comment. 

Chairman LEVIN. If you could just briefly say, are you confident 

that the need is going to be filled, because it’s just totally unacceptable that the commitment is made and then not kept? 

Admiral MULLEN. We all agree it’s unacceptable. It’s the top priority there and it’s a top priority from this meeting with some 28- 

plus CHODs to go back to their capitals and meet. There’s a conference later this month to focus specifically on that. 

Chairman LEVIN. The ‘‘CHOD,’’ what does that mean? 

Admiral MULLEN. Sorry. My counterparts, the chiefs of defense 

for these countries in NATO. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you. 

Secretary Gates, the BMDR report says that, in contrast to the 

practice over the last decade of fielding missile defense capabilities 

that were still being developed, that the administration ‘‘will take 

a different approach, best described as fly before you buy, which 

will result in a posture based on proven technology in order to improve reliability, confidence, and cost control.’’ That’s a welcome 

change. 

My question: Will we be deploying ground-based interceptors 

(GBIs) that have not been tested and demonstrated? 

Secretary GATES. We have deployed GBIs at Fort Greely. We 

have a very aggressive test program that has been successful. We 

believe that those interceptors give us the capability to deal with 

launches from either Iran or North Korea, a small-scale threat. 

The fact is we are continuing—in addition to robustly funding increases in theater level missile defense, we will also continue to 

spend. We have in this budget $1.35 billion to continue the development and test program for the GBIs, both the three-stage that 

are now deployed and the two-stage that we were going to deploy 

in Poland. 

So I think we, both for homeland security and for our allies and 

our troops in the field, have very strong programs going forward. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you. 

Senator McCain. 

Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Gates, do you believe that the Christmas bomber should be tried in civilian court or by military commission? 

Secretary GATES. Senator, I would defer to the Attorney General 

and the proper jurisdiction for such people. 

Senator MCCAIN. When you fill out your form when we confirm 

you for the U.S. Senate, you sign that you would give your honest 

34 

and candid opinion in response to questions. Do you want to give 

me an opinion? 

Secretary GATES. My honest opinion is that I think that the Attorney General is in the best position to judge where these people 

get tried. After all, we have—— 

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you very much. 

It was reported in the media that ‘‘When President Obama convened his national security team on January 5 to discuss the 

Christmas incident, the decision to charge the suspect in Federal 

court was specifically discussed and again nobody present raised 

any objection to it. In fact, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates made 

the point that even if Abdulmutallab had been transferred to military custody, it is unlikely that any more information could have 

been gleaned from him since enhanced interrogation techniques 

have been banned by the administration.’’ 

Is that a true depiction of your view? 

Secretary GATES. What I actually said was that I believed that 

a team of highly experienced Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 

and other interrogators could be as effective in interrogating the 

prisoner as anyone operating under the Military Field Manual. 

Senator MCCAIN. So that’s a direct contradiction to the Michael 

Isikoff piece in Newsweek magazine. So you agree with Director of 

National Intelligence Blair when he said ‘‘We did not invoke the 

HIG’’—that’s the trained interrogators—‘‘in this case. We would 

have.’’ Do you agree with Admiral Blair? 

Secretary GATES. I think we did not have the high-level interrogators there that we now have protocols in place to ensure would 

be present in such a situation. 

Senator MCCAIN. Do you agree that they should have been there? 

Secretary GATES. Yes, sir. 

Senator MCCAIN. Do you believe it was possible in 50 minutes to 

exhaust the possibilities for getting all of the information that was 

needed from the Christmas bomber? 

Secretary GATES. I’m just not in a position to know the answer 

to that, Senator. 

Senator MCCAIN. I see. Again, media reports state that you 

thought so. 

Is it your view that, absent enhanced interrogation techniques, 

that the Intelligence Community provides no value in the interrogation of a terrorist? 

Secretary GATES. No, I don’t believe that. 

Senator MCCAIN. Well, I thank you. 

On the issue of the F–35, to what do you attribute the fact that 

you were not appraised of all the major problems associated with 

the program last summer, when it seems to me you needed to be? 

Secretary GATES. We had not yet undertaken at that time, Senator McCain, an independent cost analysis that is now one of the 

requirements under the Acquisition Reform Act that you passed 

last year. Our Under Secretary for Acquisition launched such an 

exercise. He himself spent about 2 weeks full-time looking into the 

F–35 program, and as a result of the independent cost estimate 

and his own investigation came to the conclusions that the program 

required restructuring. 

35 

Senator MCCAIN. Can you give us, either verbally or in writing, 

the delays and cost overruns that we now expect? 

Secretary GATES. Yes, sir. I would say that, in terms of delivery, 

even with the restructured program, we still expect the training 

squadron to be at Eglin in 2011. We expect initial operational capability (IOC) for the Marine Corps in 2012, for the Air Force in 

2013, and the Navy in 2014, the fourth quarter of 2014. 

There will be fewer delivered aircrafts at IOC. That’s the result 

of reducing the production ramp, as has been recommended to deal 

with some of the issues associated with that. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

At the time of this hearing, the Department knew that the Joint Strike Fighter 

Program would need additional funding of approximately $3 billion to complete the 

System Development and Demonstration (SDD) phase. Additionally, SDD would require an additional 13 months to complete. Procurement costs were also estimated 

to be higher. The Department reduced the procurement ramp to align with recommendations from an Independent Manufacturing Review Team, to pay for the increased development costs and to reduce concurrency. 

Since the hearing, the Department has benefited, and will continue to benefit, 

from insight gained during the Nunn McCurdy review, and the subsequent bottoms 

up Technical Baseline Review of the development and test program. The Department is utilizing all of the independent reviews, analysis, and actual program performance from the past year to develop the fiscal year 2012 budget, and document 

the cost and schedule for the program going forward. That work is still ongoing. 

Senator MCCAIN. Well, in conclusion, given your responsibilities 

to the men and women who are serving in the military in the defense of this Nation, I hope you will come to a conclusion as to how 

enemy combatants should be treated as far as their trials are concerned and our ability to assure the American people that they will 

not be returning to the battlefield, and whether they should be 

tried and incarcerated in the United States rather than Guantanamo. I look forward to your views on that because I view that 

clearly in your area of responsibility, not the Attorney General, 

who has obviously botched this one very, very badly. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator McCain. 

Senator Akaka. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to add my welcome to Secretary Gates and Admiral 

Mullen for being here to discuss the 2011 defense budget, and to 

thank you for your service and the service of all the men and 

women in our Armed Forces, and I also welcome Mr. Hale. 

Secretary Gates, you have mentioned that beyond winning the 

wars themselves, the treatment of our wounded and ill is your 

highest priority. As a result of today’s continuing conflicts, the psychological effects of those conflicts within the ranks of the U.S. 

military have never been more profound. Secretary Gates, what do 

we need to improve our treatment of mental illness and how does 

this budget address that? 

Secretary GATES. Well, as Admiral Mullen mentioned in his 

opening statement, there is over $1 billion in this budget for the 

treatment of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and TBI. All of 

the Services have very extensive programs for dealing with psychological problems. All of the leadership, I think, have weighed in on 

this very heavily. 

36 

I would say that there are two problems that we still are wrestling with. One is the shortage of mental health care providers. We 

are—and frankly, we’ve discovered it’s a national shortage; it’s not 

just a shortage in the military, because we’re all over the country 

trying to hire these people. We’ve hired a lot, I think something on 

the order of 1,000 or 1,400 over the last 18 months or so. But we 

still need more. 

The second is still overcoming the stigma of seeking help, of getting not only our soldiers, but also their families, to get the psychological help that is available to them. 

But let me ask Admiral Mullen if he’d like to add a word or two. 

Admiral MULLEN. I think the Secretary has captured the two big 

issues. We dramatically increased the number of mental health 

providers in recent years, but we’re still short. We’re just beginning 

to understand the real impacts of TBI. 

Then the other piece I would ask for your help on is, how do we 

work with other committees here? Secretary Gates and Secretary 

Shinseki have certainly set the standard shoulder-to-shoulder that 

both DOD and VA need to work this together, because many of 

these young people transition certainly from DOD to VA. I really 

believe it has to be a three-part team that includes communities 

throughout the country. 

So how do we ensure that those who sacrifice so much receive 

the care across this entire continuum, and we understand their 

needs, which change over time. It’s those who suffer greatly in uniform, but it’s also families who have been under great stress. So 

that would be the third piece that I would add to the Secretary’s 

answer. 

Senator AKAKA. Mr. Secretary, IEDs remain the number one 

cause of casualties in Afghanistan. The administration recently announced the deployment of 30,000 additional U.S. troops to Afghanistan. As a result, more of our men and women will be exposed and 

vulnerable to this deadly form of attack. The Joint IED Defeat Organization was created to lead and coordinate all DOD actions in 

support of combatant commanders’ efforts to defeat IEDs as weapons of strategic influence. Mr. Secretary, what is your assessment 

of DOD’s efforts in protecting our troops against IEDs, and if improvement is needed what can be done to improve those results? 

Secretary GATES. Senator, I think that we have a number of very 

forward-leaning efforts to try and deal with the challenge of IEDs. 

My concern a few months ago was that these efforts were not adequately integrated and put together in a way that we derive maximum benefit from the efforts that we had under way. 

I asked the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, as well as General Jay Paxton, to co-chair an 

effort, a short-term effort, to see what more we could do, both in 

terms of better structure for how we deal with this problem, but 

also if there were some specific areas where additional attention 

was needed. They’ve brought to me some recommendations in 

terms of significant enhancements for long-term full-motion video 

so we can watch roads, we can watch the areas around our encampments, aerostats, a variety of other technical solutions. 

The commanders have increased the requirement for the MRAP 

vehicles, particularly the ATVs, so there is an additional requireVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:37 May 06, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00042 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\62155.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
37 

ment that actually is already funded or is taken care of in this 

budget for about 10,000 more MRAPs. 6,600 of those will be the allterrain version that are designed especially for Afghanistan to protect our troops. 

So we have a number of efforts. There were identified problems, 

such as the labs we had—we had a lot of labs working the IED 

problem in Iraq. We hadn’t put as many labs into Afghanistan yet. 

So this is a dynamic process and I would say to you we have a 

number of initiatives under way to improve the strong work that 

was already being done, because this is absolutely the worst killer 

and maimer of our troops and we are, with your support, sparing 

no expense and no effort to try and reduce those casualties. 

The MRAPs have made a huge difference, but the enemy is a 

thinking enemy and they change their tactics and their structures. 

Another thing we’re doing is, a very high percentage in Afghanistan of these IEDs are made from the fertilizer component ammonium nitrate, which is illegal in Afghanistan. So now we’re establishing an effort to try and hit the smuggling networks that bring 

this ammonium nitrate in to be used for these IEDs. 

But we have a lot of different efforts going on, and if the committee is interested I’d be happy to have Secretary Carter and General Paxton come up and brief on their endeavors. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Akaka. 

Senator Inhofe. 

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Let me start off by saying I disagree with Senator McCain on his 

statements on the C–17 and I disagree with him on the statements, 

his past statements on the F–22. It concerns me that we keep hearing, well, this is something that the military doesn’t want, they 

didn’t ask for, and all that. Then I go over there and that’s not 

their attitude at all. They have needs over there. Our lift capacity 

is in dire straits. We’re still using those old, beat-up C–130E models that we keep losing engines on. We actually lost two engines 

on one not too long ago when I was over there. 

The state of the art is still there in the C–17s and I think that 

we are going to have to do some surgery on that and some of the 

other things on this budget when the Senate Armed Services Committee gets together. 

Now, on the F–22, just yesterday we read about the T–50 that 

they’re coming out with, a fifth generation that the Russians have. 

I’m not at all as confident as everyone else is that our F–35s are 

going to be on line when we say; as Senator McCain just said, that 

we have cost overruns, we have problems that just recently have 

surfaced. I’m concerned about this. 

I guess if we’re down to 187 F–22s, and I think out of that what, 

only 120 are actually combat-ready and used for combat. Yet, as I 

read this article on the T–50, they’re starting to crank these things 

out and India, is talking about buying 200 of them. Who knows 

who else is going to be buying them? 

So I am concerned about it. I guess it goes beyond just that. I 

look at the Senate Armed Services Committee. On these two vehicles I mentioned, the F–22 and the C–17—in Oklahoma I don’t 

38 

have a dog in that fight. We don’t have any parochial interest 

there. But it’s the capability that we’re going to need. 

I look and I see and remember so well testimony that our defense 

for 100 years averaged 5.7 percent of gross domestic products 

(GDP). It’s now down to 3.7 and, as you project it by the figures 

that I’m getting, it will go down to 3 percent by 2019. This is what 

really concerns me, is we’re just not doing the job that we need to 

be doing to defend America, if you consider that the number one 

function of government, which I happen to. 

I do agree with Senator McCain on his concern over pulling the 

rug out from under Eastern Europe on the third site. I read something yesterday that Russia doesn’t want us to have any groundbased capability. I don’t know. 

I guess the first thing I would ask you, Mr. Secretary—and I 

should know this, but I don’t: If we’re talking about having the capability of the SM–3 and getting that working, where would it be 

used? Is this Aegis or where would we have this capability? 

Secretary GATES. In the initial phase it would be based on ships, 

but we have money in the budget for a land-based Standard missile. So it would be deployed in Europe and perhaps elsewhere, depending on the agreements that we reached with other countries. 

Senator INHOFE. You don’t think you’ll have a little bit of a problem, in that we negotiated, and we went over there, with the Czech 

Republic for its radar and then Poland for the site of the GBI, and 

then changed our minds? Isn’t that going to create a little bit of 

a problem, or have you already initiated any kind of a discussion 

with any of the European countries to have that capability there? 

Secretary GATES. Yes, and in fact we’ve reached agreement with 

the Poles already to move advanced Patriots into Poland. So I 

think, frankly, we—— 

Senator INHOFE. That’s a different capability than getting up, 

what we were talking about before. 

Secretary GATES. As I say, I don’t think we’ll have a problem. 

Senator INHOFE. Okay. All right. 

Well, Army modernization, I’ve been concerned about that. :ook 

at our capability on the Non-Line-of-Sight (NLOS) cannon. First we 

were going to have a Crusader and then that was axed by the Republicans, by President Bush, right when we were in negotiations, 

I might add, in the Senate Armed Services Committee on putting 

together a program. So I’m concerned about that. 

Now we do have the Paladin Integrated Management program 

and that’s good on the Paladin. But I have to tell you, that’s the 

same technology they had when I was in the U.S. Army, so I am 

concerned about that. 

I’m concerned that General Casey and General Chiarelli both 

have stated many times that we’re burning up equipment as soon 

as they can be procured. Yet the Army procurement funding decreased in this budget by $31 billion from fiscal year 2008 to fiscal 

year 2010. Is that a good idea? 

Secretary GATES. I think a good part of that was for the Army’s 

Future Combat Vehicle and we’re restructuring that program, and 

I think that you’ll see a significant increase when the Army moves 

into production of that vehicle. 

39 

Senator INHOFE. Well, I hope that’s the case and I hope that 

we’re here to be able to see that as a reality. 

My time has expired, but just one last question if I could, Mr. 

Chairman. On the section 1206, 1207, 1208, and so forth, the 1206 

is fine. I appreciate the fact that we have enhanced that program 

and some of the others. The 1207, that’s the civilian-to-civilian. 

That now is going to go back to the State Department, and one of 

the original reasons we wanted to have this in the DOD was the 

timing, so that when a decision is made we’ll be able to get it done. 

Do you think that’s a good move or do you think we should try to 

reverse that in terms of the 1207 in the train and equip program 

to bring it back the way it is today? 

Secretary GATES. First of all, Senator, I want to thank you for 

your support and your help on section 1206, 1207, and 1208. But 

I think when I testified here last year the plan was to begin transferring the 1207 money to the State Department. I think the plan 

you have in front of you essentially simply accelerates that process. 

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Inhofe. 

Senator Ben Nelson. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Let me add my appreciation to you and your families for your 

distinguished service. 

I’ve long been an advocate for benchmarks or measures of 

progress and I think we need to continue to do so objectively so we 

can gauge our efforts in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. I know 

this administration, as well as our NATO allies, are committed to 

objective benchmarks for measurement and we’ve done so with past 

strategies, and we’ve all talked about this so many times, most recently in December, about both Afghanistan and Pakistan. 

During that hearing in December, it was noted that measures of 

progress were being used and evaluated. I thought at that time 

those benchmarks would be forthcoming to our committee, but at 

least I have yet to see them. It seems to me that one of the most 

important times to inform the process is at the very onset of any 

change, and as this mission changes course, the way in which we 

measure efforts will change as well. 

Have comprehensive and final benchmarks or measures of 

progress been developed to reflect this new strategy, and if so when 

will these be made to the committee? Secretary Gates? 

Secretary GATES. I think they have and I frankly thought that 

they had already been provided to the committee, and I’ll check on 

it after the hearing. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

In accordance with section 1117 of the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2009 

(Public Law 111–32), the President submitted to Congress on September 24, 2009, 

a statement of the objectives of U.S. policy with respect to Afghanistan and Pakistan, and the metrics to be utilized to assess progress toward achieving such objectives. Section 1117 also includes a reporting requirement to provide Congress an assessment of the progress of U.S. Government efforts in achieving the objectives of 

U.S. policy by March 30, 2010, and every 180 days thereafter using the metrics submitted in September 2009. The President will submit the first report in Mach 2010 

and semi-annually thereafter. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Okay, thank you. 

40 

Could you talk a little bit about some of the areas of measurement that would be in these measures of progress? 

Secretary GATES. I think a couple that are pretty obvious are are 

the Afghans meeting their recruitment goals for the Afghan national security forces, are they meeting their goals in terms of limiting attrition, how many—are they meeting the number of units 

being fielded that are in the plan, are they—there are benchmarks 

associated with their training. So I think those are the kinds of 

things, at least with respect to the security forces, that we’re talking about. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Do we have anything that we might relate 

to our measures of progress with respect to our particular efforts? 

Secretary GATES. I think in some respects the President has 

made his expectations pretty clear. He has some clear expectations 

and is benchmarking us on how fast we can get 30,000 troops into 

Afghanistan and watching that carefully. I think he has clearly set 

a marker in terms of beginning to transfer security authority to the 

Afghans beginning in July 2011, so that’s a clear benchmark that 

must be met. So I think we do have some. 

Another for us is the number of civilians we’re getting into Afghanistan from the State Department, USAID, and other agencies. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Are you working with the State Department jointly in that effort? Because I know they’ve set some measures of progress of their own. 

Secretary GATES. Absolutely. This is as integrated an effort as 

I’ve ever seen the U.S. Government undertake. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Thank you. 

I’d like to talk to you just a second about our contractor conversion efforts. You announced in the spring of 2009 that DOD would 

scale back the role of contractors in support services. Quite honestly, my sense is that for too many years we were outsourcing too 

much with perhaps too little emphasis on why and whether it was 

justified. 

But regardless of the makeup, outsourcing or insourcing has to 

make sense and be oriented towards the best utilization of resources, both money and people. Is there in place a strategic plan 

for the right mix of contractor, government, civilian, and military 

personnel, and what are we doing to execute such a plan? 

Secretary GATES. First of all, our goal is to take the number of 

contractors in DOD as a percentage of the workforce back to where 

it was prior to September 11, which would mean taking it from 39 

percent to 26 percent. The plan—first of all, I think one of the effects of what we have seen in Iraq in particular has been the revival of acquisition in a couple of the Services where that as a career field had withered. I think this is particularly true in the 

Army, where a number of measures, including the allocation of 

general officer positions and so on, to revive that career field as an 

attractive career field. Some other Services have done better. 

I think that Under Secretary Carter has a clear idea of the right 

mix between contractors and civilians. But I think that the first 

place we need to look is that we probably shouldn’t have contractors evaluating contractors. So I think that’s the first area as we 

make these conversions, which I might add are on track 1 year in. 

41 

Senator BEN NELSON. My time has expired. Thank you, Mr. 

Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Just to implement the point Senator Nelson 

made, I believe in this year’s budget proposal you are proposing 

maybe 10,000 contractor jobs be eliminated and changed over to 

employees of DOD. I don’t know the exact number, but is that not 

true? It’s in the budget? 

Secretary GATES. Our goal is 20,000, to increase the number of 

acquisition professionals from 127,000 to 147,000. 10,000 of those 

will be the conversion of contractor jobs to civil service jobs. Another 10,000 will be new hires. 

Chairman LEVIN. That’s in this year’s budget, is that correct? 

Secretary GATES. That’s correct. 

Chairman LEVIN. I just wanted to clarify that point. 

Admiral MULLEN. 20,000 total is over 2010 to 2014, Senator 

Levin. 

Chairman LEVIN. Over 4 years. 

Admiral MULLEN. Right. 

Chairman LEVIN. How many in this year’s budget? 

Admiral MULLEN. The total is about 6,000. That would include 

acquisition and everything else. I’ll have to get you the number 

specifically for acquisition. 

Chairman LEVIN. To clarify the benchmarks point made by Senator Nelson, which he’s been very persistent on, to the benefit of 

everybody in the Nation, the only thing that we’ve received from 

DOD is a draft set of benchmarks and they were classified. So he 

is right, we have not received benchmarks, although we were promised them. We need both the benchmarks, but also in an unclassified way. 

Secretary GATES. The benchmarks that I was talking about were 

interagency benchmarks that had been agreed, and those were the 

ones that I thought had been delivered and I’ll pursue after the 

hearing. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

In accordance with section 1117 of the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2009 

(Public Law 111–32), the President submitted to Congress on September 24, 2009, 

a statement of the objectives of U.S. policy with respect to Afghanistan and Pakistan, and the metrics to be utilized to assess progress toward achieving such objectives. Section 1117 also includes a reporting requirement to provide Congress an assessment of the progress of U.S. Government efforts in achieving the objectives of 

U.S. policy by March 30, 2010, and every 180 days thereafter using the metrics submitted in September 2009. The President will submit the first report in march 2010 

and semi-annually thereafter. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you. Thank you. 

Senator Sessions. 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your good leadership. You’re an excellent chairman. We do have a lot on the agenda today: talking about the defense budget, the QDR, two wars, the 

BMDR, DADT, terrorist trials. I guess I would just say, I don’t 

think we can do it all justice today. I hope we’ll have more hearings 

as we go forward. Some of them, we need the Secretary of Defense 

and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. 

Just briefly, Mr. Secretary, on the Christmas Day bomber. I saw 

your former colleague, Attorney General Mukasey, this morning on 

the television pointing out that, yes, they tried Moussaui in Federal 

42 

court, he tried the case as a Federal judge at the time, but he pled 

guilty and the sentencing phase took a year. He said it was made 

into a circus. He pointed out that Guantanamo was created for the 

purpose of these kind of trials. 

When a person like the Christmas Day bomber leaves Yemen 

armed with a bomb from al Qaeda, on directions of al Qaeda, and 

flies into the United States, I suggest he’s an unlawful enemy combatant and perfectly suited for detention and trial, if need be a 

trial, in military custody. I think DOD needs to know about those 

things because the intelligence that could be gathered from a prolonged interrogation by people knowledgeable in Yemen could have 

added greatly to this. 

Now he’s been advised he has a right to a lawyer. He’s no longer 

going to cooperate or talk. He’s going to be entitled to a speedy 

trial. There are a lot of problems with that. 

So I just hope you will be alert to that as it goes by. I think the 

military has a real responsibility. 

I just would briefly say that I’ve come to understand and feel 

more strongly about the concern Senator McCain has about setting 

an absolute date for beginning to leave in 2011. We’ll hardly have 

our troops in place by then, the surge in place by then. We see 

things like President Karzai beginning to talk to the Taliban. It 

makes you wonder if he’s looking beyond our departure date. I 

worry about that. 

Mr. Secretary, you talked about the supplemental. I’ve been baffled a bit by that. It seems to me that when you’re in a war, a supplemental is an appropriate way to handle funding for that. To try 

to force into the baseline budget funding specifically for these two 

operations, with a couple hundred thousand troops deployed, is not 

a good policy. Why do you feel like we should do this only within 

the baseline budget? 

Secretary GATES. I absolutely do not believe we should do it 

within the baseline budget. I think that the purpose of providing 

the OCOs funding budget is I think that it’s actually in response 

to considerable pressure from Congress for greater—— 

Senator SESSIONS. I know you have gotten pressure from Congress on that. 

Secretary GATES.—greater predictability—— 

Senator SESSIONS. But not out of me. 

Secretary GATES.—greater predictability about how much is 

going to be spent in these wars, and so that those budgets can be 

considered within the framework of the normal consideration of the 

budget. So I think that it’s certainly not a part of the base budget, 

but it is provided in advance in a way that gives Congress the opportunity to review it in the same way it reviews the rest of the 

budget. 

Senator SESSIONS. I’m not sure. It seems we should be able to review the supplemental as well. But I guess in a way you’re creating 

a discrete funding program that we could review, and maybe that 

would be acceptable. 

Admiral Mullen, with regard to our procurement of major weapons systems, I know that DOD has focused on life cycle costs, and 

I guess you would agree that things such as fuel and maintenance 

43 

are important factors to evaluate if you’re going to evaluate the 

cost of a weapons system over a period of years? 

Admiral MULLEN. Yes, sir. 

Senator SESSIONS. I know we did that on the tanker aircraft. In 

fact, fuel and that sort of things are counted as evaluating that aircraft. Should that be applied to a procurement program like the 

LCS; the cost of fuel over its lifetime, should that be accounted for? 

Admiral MULLEN. I’ve long been concerned about life cycle costs. 

Senator Sessions, I think you know that long before now. The Secretary pointed out, and I think very importantly, in his opening 

statement that the programs that he cut last year actually had 

some life cycle value focused on about $330 billion. As far as what’s 

in a request for proposal (RFP) and what it’s going to be focused 

on, that’s something that I really can’t comment on—— 

Senator SESSIONS. I don’t know. We have an RFP in the LCS 

that I’m told does not have any factor for fuel costs. 

Admiral MULLEN. You know more about it than I do. I haven’t 

seen it. 

Senator SESSIONS. If that’s so, would you be willing to look at it 

and ask questions if that’s a wise decision? 

Admiral MULLEN. Again, as I said, for a long time I’ve been concerned about life cycle costs. Actually, I think one of the weaknesses of the acquisition system is typically that the line is not involved in it. The uniformed side is not involved in that. So I’m not 

involved from that point of view and would under actually no circumstances see an RFP or look at its evaluation criteria in what 

I’m doing right now. 

Senator SESSIONS. I would think it would be your ultimate responsibility as part of the procurement of the Department to see 

that at least basic requirements are being met. I think I hear you 

say that life cycle costs, which certainly would include fuel, should 

be a factor in evaluation of the bids or the proposals. Wouldn’t it? 

Admiral MULLEN. I’ve said life cycle costs are an important factor 

and have been for a long time. 

Senator SESSIONS. We’ll have to follow up on that. 

Thank you very much. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you. Thank you very much. 

Senator Udall is next. 

Senator UDALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Good morning, gentlemen. Thank you for being here with us 

today. 

Secretary Gates, we have a proposal from the President which I 

fully support, to freeze nondiscretionary spending for nondefense 

programs in fiscal year 2011. I think we’re going to face tighter 

budgets in future years and we may have the potential need to trip 

Pentagon budgets as well. Could you talk about how you’re posturing DOD to be able to react to that potential? 

Secretary GATES. First of all, I think that the situation out there 

in the world doesn’t change, and the world is becoming more complex and I would say more dangerous, rather than less so. I think 

that as people think about where we are, there are many reasons 

for the deficit and DOD certainly spends a lot of money. But if you 

look at where DOD is today, it’s very much within historical norms 

44 

in terms of both GDP and a percentage of the budget in terms of 

what we’re spending. 

That said, I would tell you that if DOD received significant reductions in its budget, that we would have to sacrifice force structure. We cannot do it any other way. So the result of that would 

be a reduction in military capability and a reduction in our flexibility. 

Senator UDALL. If I might, let me thank you for your focus on 

acquisition reform. I want to associate myself with Senator 

McCain’s remarks and I hope that this committee will continue to 

support you as you make some tough decisions, so that we extract 

every penny of value from every dollar that we spend. I just want 

to acknowledge the important work you’ve done there. 

Let me turn to Afghanistan. Senator Sessions expressed some 

concern, but I would like to comment that you make peace with 

your enemies, not with your friends. I’ve been interested, Admiral 

Mullen, in the re-integration of the low-level Taliban proposals that 

have been forthcoming. There was a recent conference I believe in 

the United Kingdom some significant monies pledged. 

Could you comment on those plans to the extent that you’re comfortable? 

Admiral MULLEN. The reintegration piece is clearly an important 

piece of this, and every commander feels that way. Very specifically, the reintegration is really bringing those who are literally the 

fighters who are against us right now, bringing them into the fold. 

In fact, General McChrystal is very focused on that. We are in the 

execution of this strategy which includes that, so getting everybody 

on the same page for exactly what it means and how rapidly it 

happens or doesn’t happen is where we are very much at the beginning. But we think it is an important part. There is no view at this 

point that is a panacea, because we just don’t see that many at this 

point. 

The other term that is used that I think it’s very important to 

understand is the reconciliation piece, which is a term that is focused on I would call the senior leadership of the Taliban or the 

senior leadership of the enemy—much more complex, and President Karzai has made it clear that he wants to get on this path. 

But again, it’s at the beginning. We’re at the beginning of that 

process. 

I think we have to be clear about the terms and what they mean, 

and also look at a realistic pace in terms of both expectations and 

actually what’s happening. In that regard, we’re just at the beginning. 

Senator UDALL. Let me turn to Iraq. We have elections looming. 

There is some increased violence. Do you still believe we’re on 

schedule to redeploy, as General Odierno has put in place? 

Admiral MULLEN. Yes, sir, I do. We were very focused on the 

elections in early March. It’s the elections after which we start 

coming down fairly dramatically, 104,000 today is what we have on 

the ground. We will come down to approximately 50,000 by August. 

In that timeframe, another big issue is they will be standing up a 

government and it will take them several months to do that, sort 

of the summertime, to stand up this newly-elected government. 

45 

So it’s a great time of transition. General Odierno, and Ambassador Hill on the civilian side, are very focused on all aspects of 

that. But right now, overall the indicators are positive. 

Senator UDALL. I see that my time’s expired. I want to thank you 

again for your leadership and for this comprehensive set of statements today and for a budget, Secretary Gates, that I think clearly 

leads us in the right direction. 

Thank you. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Udall. 

Senator Thune. 

Senator THUNE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Secretary, Admiral, thank you for your outstanding service 

and for appearing today and responding to some of our questions. 

Secretary Gates, I wanted to take up with you the recommendations in the budget and the QDR. Going back to the 2006 QDR, 

there was a recommendation in there to develop a follow-on bomber. You’ve made it clear that you support the development of a new 

bomber. Last April you opted not to pursue a development program 

for a follow-on Air Force bomber until you had a better understanding of the need, the requirement, and the technology. 

As part of the effort to better understand the requirement for a 

new bomber, I also understand that you stood up a Tiger Team to 

do an in-depth study of long-range strike in the new QDR. In reading the new QDR on page 33, it looks, however, like you have still 

not made a decision to move forward with the new bomber program, but instead have commissioned yet another study. 

My question is, what conclusions were drawn by the Tiger Team 

regarding the development of a new bomber and are those conclusions available to us, at least in writing for the record? 

Secretary GATES. I will get you an answer for the record on that, Senator. But there is, I think, $1.7 billion in the budget for next 

generation bomber and long-range strike. I think one of the issues 

that we’re still wrestling with is what kind of a bomber would we 

be looking for. Do we want a stand-off bomber? Do we want an attack bomber? Do we want a manned bomber or an unmanned 

bomber? Or do we want variations, where you could have a platform that could serve both purposes? 

I think we still have a lot of life left in the B–52s, as old as they 

are, and there is modernization money for both them and the B– 

2s in the budget. We’re talking about a bomber that would probably not appear into the force until the late 1920s. So we’re just 

trying to figure out, looking ahead a generation, what the right 

configuration for that would be. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

The Tiger Team to which you refer was formed to study the need, requirement, 

and technology for a follow-on Air Force long-range strike aircraft. That team completed its work last November. The team was supportive of pursuing a new longrange strike aircraft, but recognized that additional analysis was needed to explore 

options for reducing overall program costs and determining fielding timelines. Another conclusion of the Tiger Team’s study was that the Department should sustain 

the industrial base for early-stage design work and technologies for a new longrange strike aircraft while the Department continues to study all options. Through 

the Quadrennial Defense Review, the Department provided industrial base funding 

for fiscal year 2011 and fiscal year 2012 to prepare for the potential start of a new 

long-range strike program. I decided that a more in-depth analysis was required in 

order to evaluate and compare the capabilities of new long-range strike aircraft deVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:37 May 06, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00051 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\62155.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
46 

signs in the context of the full range of supporting capabilities that would be relevant to the operation of such aircraft in future combat scenarios. 

The Department is now undertaking a follow-on effort to examine the appropriate 

mix of long-range strike capabilities; upgrades to legacy bombers; manned and unmanned options; stand-off and penetrating requirements; new and improved cruise 

missiles; electronic warfare improvements; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance demands; and conventional prompt global strike options. The goal of this ongoing assessment is to ensure that the Department fully understands how all potential long-range strike options and supporting capabilities could contribute to U.S. security goals before committing to one or more major development programs. I anticipate that our analysis will inform decisions shaping the Department’s fiscal year 

2012 budget submission. 

Senator THUNE. The 2006 QDR had suggested, I think, fielding 

a new bomber by 2018. I understand the concerns that you raised 

about what type of bomber that might be. But I guess—and by the 

way, I think the $1.7 billion is a multi-year number. Isn’t that like 

a 4-year number? 

Secretary GATES. Yes. 

Senator THUNE. But why is it necessary to have another study? 

I mean, the thing has been studied and studied and studied and 

studied, on whether or not we want to move forward on developing 

a follow-on bomber. When would you expect that study to be completed? 

Secretary GATES. I’ll have to get an answer for the record. I 

think what the studies up to now have been is whether, and now 

the study is what. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

The Tiger Team that was initially formed to study the need, requirements, and 

technology for a follow-on Air Force bomber completed its work last November. The 

team’s conclusions were supportive of pursuing a new bomber, but the team recognized that additional analysis was needed to explore options for reducing overall 

program costs and determining fielding timelines. Additionally, I decided that a 

more in-depth analysis of how a new bomber might compare with other long-range 

strike options was required. Consequently, the Department chartered another study 

to look at a broader array of long-range strike options to include upgrades to legacy 

bombers; manned and unmanned options for future bombers; stand-off and penetrating options for future bombers; new and improved cruise missiles; and conventional prompt global strike options, such as land-based and sea-based conventional 

ballistic missiles. The new study will also examine the support requirements for various long-range strike options, such as electronic warfare, intelligence, surveillance, 

and reconnaissance, and secure, high-data-rate communications. 

The rationale for this new study is to ensure the Department fully understands 

how all potential long-range strike options could contribute to U.S. goals before we 

spend billions of dollars. I anticipate that results from the new study will be available in time to support the formation of the fiscal year 2012 budget. 

Another of the initial Tiger Team’s conclusions was that the Department should 

sustain the industrial base for early-stage design work and technologies for a new 

bomber while the Department continues to study long-range strike options. Consequently, the Department provided industrial base funding for fiscal year 2011 and 

fiscal year 2012 to prepare for a potential start for a new bomber program. 

Senator THUNE. Secretary Gates, with regard to the FYDP force 

structure that’s set out in the new QDR for the Air Force, the QDR 

proposes five long-range strike wings with up to 96 primary mission aircraft. According to the latest Air Force Almanac, the Air 

Force has 153 bomber aircraft and I understand some of these aircraft are dedicated to testing, but over 50 aircraft for testing seems 

like a lot. Do you plan on retiring any bomber aircraft in the near 

future? I guess a follow-on question would be, what are the assumptions underlying what appears to be a substantial reduction 

in the number of bombers? 

47 

Admiral MULLEN. Senator, I’m not aware that we are, although 

I certainly would want to check for the record to make sure that 

I have that right. But there certainly hasn’t been any big discussion about the retirement of bombers. 

If I could speak just briefly to the other issue you raise, one of 

the things that’s happened in the last two budgets in my view is 

it’s put us on a pace and with a view that evolves. Some of the previous laydowns, the 2006 QDR, were from my perspective incredibly aggressive. So part of my answer to the question of why we’re 

still doing this is because this is a very difficult problem. We want 

to get it right, and it has a huge impact, quite frankly, on the future of the Air Force because of the capability requirement. 

I think what you’re seeing is a process that is led by Secretary 

Gates to move us through a deliberative process that really focuses 

on getting it right for the future. As he indicated, the previous 

study was as to whether or not, and now we look to the future as 

what it should be. I’m supportive of that. These are tough decisions 

we absolutely want to get right. 

Senator THUNE. Could you for the record get to that question, 

though, of the number? Of the 96 bombers that are assumed in the 

five wings, with 153 Air Force bombers, a certain number of them 

allocated to testing, but that does seem like a significant number, 

whether or not there is any plan to retire and any assumptions underlying that, what would appear to be a substantial reduction in 

the number of bombers. 

Admiral MULLEN. We’ll supply it for the record, but I think a lot 

of them may be for training. I think you’re talking about primary 

aircraft, coded aircraft. There are a number designated for training 

and testing, as you say. But we’ll supply the details for the record. 

Senator THUNE. That would be great. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

[Deleted.] 

Senator THUNE. Mr. Chairman, if I could, I’d like to get for the 

record a response to a question dealing with the START Treaty in 

sort of the same vein. Thank you. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

[Deleted.] 

Chairman LEVIN. We will expect that answer for the record relative to Senator Thune’s question on START. 

Senator Hagan. 

Senator HAGAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you both, Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, for your 

testimony today and for your dedication to our men and women in 

the military. 

Secretary Gates, I applaud you for the tremendous job DOD has 

done in carrying out and supporting the relief efforts that have 

been under way in Haiti. The ability of our maritime forces to operate from a sea base while rapidly transitioning personnel and 

equipment ashore is something that I believe is an excellent demonstration of what our military is capable of doing and especially 

useful in a situation in Haiti where there’s limited capacity for air 

transport. 

48 

I believe it’s important that we maintain our advantage in projecting sea power across the range of military operations from humanitarian relief to combat. My question, Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, is do the military departments and combatant commanders have sufficient amphibious operational capabilities to address the full spectrum of requirements, both military and humanitarian, anticipated within the QDR? 

Admiral MULLEN. Ma’am, as I go back over the last 10 to 15 

years and then look at the future, my overall answer to that would 

be yes. We certainly have this within DOD over the years, debated 

this and there’s been tension. I think it’s good tension to get this 

right, and it focuses very specifically on the amount of amphibious 

lift capability that we have. 

Actually, one of my concerns specifically—so right now, yes. One 

of my concerns about the future—and I’m certain that the Commandant of the Marine Corps shares this—how is the Marine 

Corps has become very heavy. Obviously, it’s now in the sixth or 

seventh year of fighting a land war, which is not what it wants to 

do. So there are an awful lot of adjustments that have to be made 

for the future. The Marine Corps is going to have to get lighter 

than it’s been in the past. 

So I think this discussion will continue. But as far as my view 

of the future, I think we have it about right as we sit. 

Senator HAGAN. Thank you. 

I know that we’ve already discussed some of the IEDs, but I 

know that in Afghanistan the mountainous terrain and the limited 

communication infrastructures certainly pose a distinctly different 

IED threat as opposed to what we have seen in Iraq. We need additional personnel at the battalion and company levels with the appropriate expertise and technical equipment to detect the IEDs in 

areas such as Afghanistan, where the insurgents utilize the primitive forms of IEDs with very little metallic content that is buried 

into the ground. 

What type of feedback are you receiving from CENTCOM and 

the component commanders in theater with respect to their personnel requirements encountering the IEDs, and what do you expect to do to address any shortages that exist? 

Secretary GATES. A substantial number of the 30,000 troops that 

will be going are in the category of what we call enablers. That includes engineers, route clearance specialists, counter-IED specialists, all of whom are—and people associated with ISR—all of which 

are part of the counter-IED effort. 

One of the initiatives that this temporary task force that I’ve set 

up under General Paxton and Dr. Carter is looking at is establishing, at the battalion level, what we would call a warehouse approach for counter-IEDs, which would basically, instead of giving 

every battalion the same set of equipment, rather have an array 

of equipment that is available to that battalion, so that each of the 

teams going out can select the equipment that seems most appropriate to that mission that day. 

We have a wide range of these detectors and intelligence capabilities and so on, and the idea is some of these units are better, 

frankly, with certain kinds of equipment than others. There’s more 

than a little art in this. So what we’re trying to do is figure out 

49 

how, at the battalion level, we in essence could have an array of 

equipment that a team going out could take advantage of. 

So I think that there is an understanding on the part of General 

McChrystal and General Petraeus that we are pouring every bit of 

counter-IED capability into Afghanistan that we can. 

Senator HAGAN. Thank you. My time is up. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Hagan. 

Senator Wicker. 

Senator WICKER. Thank you, gentlemen. We do have a lot to talk 

about, and I share Senator Sessions’ view that it would be nice to 

have you back. I hope the chairman will be able to arrange that. 

My first question is about the 313-ship Navy, Admiral Mullen. 

The Congressional Budget Office recently testified that the current 

shipbuilding budgets are not enough to fund the Navy’s plan to increase the fleet to 313, and I think we all know that. I assume you 

agree with that. At 283, the Service has the smallest fleet since 

1916. That’s pre-World War I. We need to build more than 12 ships 

per year for the next 18 years to arrive at 313. 

Is 313 still the requirement, Admiral Mullen? How does this 

budget, how does this QDR, support the goal of a 313-ship Navy? 

Admiral MULLEN. It is still the goal. It was when I led that analysis and generated that requirement as Chief of Naval Operations. 

It remains the floor. It was a number that was achieved with an 

understanding of what the risk would be. We, the total ‘‘we’’—that’s 

the Services, the Department, those that build ships, certainly congressional support—have been working for years to get more 

money into the shipbuilding account. I think, as we laid out, there’s 

some $15 billion this year. It’s 10 ships, 1 of which is an Army 

ship. 

One of the things that we’re not going to be able to do is build 

to that number if ships keep costing a whole lot more than we expect they will. The acquisition reform is really a critical part of 

that. I’ll use the littoral combat ships as an example. That has 

cost—while I had expectations the costs would go up, certainly not 

to the degree that it has. 

So that has to be contained. We don’t need the perfect ship or 

the perfect airplane as we look to the future. So I argued for years 

there has to be a strategic partnership across all three of those entities in order to get shipbuilding and major procurement right. I 

think this budget takes some steps in that direction. But you can 

just do the math and see that we’re not going to get to 313, and 

I would not want to be satisfied with 283, which is sort of what 

the projection is right now, given the demands that we have for our 

military and our Navy. 

Senator WICKER. So it’s going to take acquisition reform to get 

us to that floor number of 313. When do you think we might be 

able to actually make some progress in that regard? 

Admiral MULLEN. I think the Secretary and many others, myself 

included, have taken steps to really put our—get our arms around 

requirements growth, having expertise there, holding people accountable. Those are some of the things that are certainly in great 

focus right now, and there’s more to do. 

But it’s going to take a few years, I think, before that really 

takes a grip and starts to have the kind of impact to be able to genVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:37 May 06, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00055 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\62155.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
50 

erate the kind of capability you need within cost. I’m encouraged 

by this shipbuilding program. It has two submarines in it. This is 

the first year it has. I can tell you it took almost 10 years to make 

that happen. So we will continue to—I think it continues to need 

to be an area of focus. It’s a vital capability for our country and, 

as you indicated, it’s the smallest Navy we’ve had for many, many 

decades. For a country that has big bodies of water on both coasts, 

that’s a maritime country, that’s a great concern. 

Senator WICKER. Would it be fair to say we are shortchanging 

part of the mission? Could you enlighten us as to what aspects of 

our mission are we shortchanging because of the lack of these 313 

ships? 

Admiral MULLEN. The Navy is very pressed right now, operating 

at a very high tempo. I think Admiral Roughead, who will certainly 

have an opportunity to speak for himself, would say that he is sort 

of at the edge of being able to meet the commitments in terms of 

global commitments. He and our Navy is heavily focused in the 

Gulf as well. The sea base that was just created very quickly in 

Haiti is certainly well within what we expect and can do. But given 

the operational tempo (OPTEMPO) that our Navy and our Air 

Force, quite frankly, is under, which sometimes gets lost in the 

focus on our ground forces—their OPTEMPO has increased as well, 

and so Admiral Roughead’s concern is that we are wearing capability out and we’re not replacing it at a rate that gets to that kind 

of number that you’re talking about. 

Senator WICKER. I see. 

Let me move back to a point that Senator McCain was making. 

I just returned also from Afghanistan and Pakistan. I agree with 

Senator McCain that this July 2011 date is mentioned when you 

talk to leaders over there. There was a term that we came back 

with from our Congressional Delegation with Leader McConnell, 

and that was a ‘‘deficit of trust.’’ It’s not just the date for the beginning of the drawdown, but also specifically with regard to Pakistan 

it’s the decade of really very ill will between the United States and 

the Government of Pakistan. 

Do you agree, Secretary Gates, that there is a deficit of trust 

about the United States’ intention to be a long-term strategic partner with Afghanistan and Pakistan, and what are we doing to address that deficit of trust? 

Secretary GATES. I think there definitely is such a deficit of trust 

with Pakistan, and I think it’s historical. The Pakistanis will speak 

of three or four American betrayals, only the most recent of which 

are turning our backs on Afghanistan and them after the Soviets 

withdrew, and the other the implementation of the Pressler amendment and cutoff of military to military relationships. 

I think, frankly, the way that trust is rebuilt is with time, effort, 

and actions. I think Admiral Mullen at this point has in his 21⁄2

years as Chairman been to Pakistan probably 15 or 16 times. He 

has an extraordinary relationship with General Kayani. I think 

there is a good personal trust there. 

But I think for Pakistanis as a whole, it is our sticking with 

them. It is our attention to their problems, including their economic problems. So we commend the Kerry-Lugar-Berman bill, 

which is very important. But I think being steadfast is important. 

51 

I was in Pakistan just a couple of weeks ago and spoke directly 

to this, and I would say that in some areas it’s more than a deficit 

of trust. There are conspiracy theories over there about our wanting to take their nuclear weapons, about our wanting to divide 

them up, all kinds of things. I spoke to that directly. So I think 

honesty in dealing with them, but a long-term effort, is what’s 

going to be required. 

In Afghanistan, my personal sense is that we have—in the various visits that I have made and Admiral Mullen and others, they 

understand that July 2011 is the beginning of a process and that 

there is no deadline on that process. But there also is an acknowledgment by some of the Afghans that in effect they needed that 

kind of wakeup call in order to begin to realize they were going to 

have to take responsibility themselves for defeating the Taliban, 

that this wasn’t something that everybody else could do for them. 

So I think that what we need to continue to communicate to the 

Afghans is that even as our security forces draw down over the 

next several years, that our presence there, our willingness to partner with them, our willingness to be a part of their economic and 

political life going forward, is a long-term, decades-long commitment by the United States to that country, not to having huge military forces there, but helping them get control of their security situation and then them being in charge of their country. 

But I think the July 2011 timeline is controversial. My own view 

is that it provided exactly the right incentive for them to begin to 

accept responsibility, but by having no terminal date on it, it allows 

us to do a conditions-based withdrawal that I think makes sense. 

Senator WICKER. Thank you. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator Wicker. 

Senator Webb. 

Senator WEBB. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, we have the recommendations of the QDR. We have 

your budget proposal. This is not the moment to comment from our 

side of the table on the details in there. 

I would like to thank Senator Wicker for his comments about the 

size of the Navy and the challenges in the Navy. Obviously, I do 

not think it is an appropriate budget item for the Navy to think 

that they can spend a billion dollars in upgrading a nice-to-have facility in Mayport at the same time when we’re looking to try to 

build a fleet up to 313 ships. Admiral Mullen, you’ll recall when 

you and I were commissioned in 1968 we had 930 ships in the 

United States Navy. We went down to 479. When I was Secretary 

of the Navy it went up to 568. 

But I want to set that aside. I want to make sure you know we’re 

still going to continue that discussion. I want to set that aside because I only have 5 minutes and I want to talk about something 

else. That is that I don’t believe, quite frankly, that the DOD budget should be sacrosanct when it comes to looking at the constraints 

and the examinations that we ought to be putting on different programs. 

Secretary Gates, I take your point about not wanting to go into 

force structure reductions. But at the same time, I believe you can 

meet the challenges and adapt for the future and still clean up a 

lot of unnecessary programs that exist in the Pentagon by taking 

52 

a hard look at programs that don’t produce a clear bottom line and 

are not simply hardware systems or force structure issues. 

I very much appreciate the efforts that you’ve made in terms of 

program reductions, which you mentioned in your opening statements. But I think there comes a time every now and then to sort 

of shake things down. I remember when I was Secretary of the 

Navy the Gramm-Rudman Act was passed over here, 1987. We had 

to implement it in 1988. It mandated a 10 percent across-the-board 

reduction in defense programs, because it was a 5 percent government-wide mandate and half of the programs at that time were 

fenced. 

They went too far. They clearly went too far. I resigned as Secretary of the Navy because they cut into force structure too far. But 

it doesn’t hurt to really get into efficiencies in an area where we’re 

not getting an appropriate bottom line. 

Let me give you three data points and I would ask today for you 

to make a commitment to really examine these types of programs. 

You and I are familiar with the Blackwater program that I wrote 

you about in 2007, and we came to some resolution on it, where 

out in San Diego they were going to spend more than $60 million 

for a private contractor to train sailors how to do their job, basically how to defend themselves on-board a ship. 

The first question I had on that was the fact that this is something that active duty people should have been doing, not a contractor. But the major concern I had was that this program came 

from operations and maintenance block funding. It had never been 

authorized. It had never been specifically appropriated as a program. It was just approved by a lower level official in the Department of the Navy based on the needs of the fleet. As we examined 

it, we found out that the Secretary of the Navy didn’t even have 

to review that program unless it was a $78 million program. 

There’s a program existing right now, and I don’t know the extent of it, where we’re basically sending military officers over to 

staff and fund think tanks. Your own Under Secretary of Defense 

was part of creating a think tank, CNAF. My understanding of 

these programs is they get military fellows. These are active duty 

people. They go over, they get their full pay and allowances. But 

not only that, they get tuition. The numbers that I saw were 

$17,000 a ‘‘semester,’’ whatever a semester is while you’re over 

there, to pay the rent, the computers and all the rest of that. 

Essentially what that means is the American taxpayer is funding 

think tanks, basically to keep them in business. They don’t produce 

any really added value to DOD in my view in terms of a direct contribution. 

Another example that just came up over the past couple of 

months is this mentors program, where, according to news reports, 

you can have retired high-ranking general officers and admirals 

making well in excess of $100,000 a year in their retirement, 80 

percent of these people working with defense contractors, and then 

going in and making up to $2,600 a day to give their advice. In 

other words, a retired admiral or general can make more in a day 

than a corporal in Afghanistan will make in a month, basically to 

do what he’s supposed to do anyway, and that is fulfill his stewardship from having spent a career in the military. 

53 

I don’t know the full cost of that, but according to USA Today these people are being paid between $200 and $340 an hour plus 

expenses. They are hired as independent contractors, so they’re not 

subject to government ethics rules. They operate outside public 

scrutiny, and many of them work for weapons makers and in effect 

are able to either gain information for companies or exchange data. 

That’s not the military I grew up in. That’s not the military you 

and I served in, Admiral. That’s not the Pentagon that I served in 

in the 1980s. 

So these are the kinds of things, Mr. Secretary, I think we can 

do and not affect force structure. 

Secretary GATES. We certainly will continue to look at these 

things. I will tell you on the mentoring program, the Deputy Secretary has been reviewing this and I think you will see some—we 

think there is great value in the program, but you will see some 

fairly dramatic changes in the way it’s administered. 

Senator WEBB. I would certainly hope so. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Webb. 

Senator LeMieux. 

Senator LEMIEUX. Thank you, gentlemen, for your service and 

for being here today to answer our questions. 

Secretary Gates, when we capture an enemy combatant in Afghanistan or Iraq, do we read them their Miranda rights? 

Secretary GATES. No. 

Senator LEMIEUX. So why should we do so if we capture one in 

this country? 

Secretary GATES. That’s a question better addressed to the Attorney General, Senator. 

Senator LEMIEUX. You were the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency before you were the Secretary of Defense? 

Secretary GATES. Yes, sir. 

Senator LEMIEUX. So I assume you have an opinion on this. 

Secretary GATES. My view is that the issue of whether someone 

is put into the American judicial system or into the military commissions is a judgment best made by the chief law enforcement officer of the United States. 

Senator LEMIEUX. Before they get into either commission, there’s 

a question of being able to ask questions, and certainly we know 

there’s a chilling effect when we give someone their Miranda 

rights. So if we’re not doing it overseas, I’m not sure why it makes 

sense that we would be doing it in this country. 

Secretary GATES. We have in place protocols now that—and 

there is authority under the law—that if a person is deemed to be 

a threat to the national security as a self-confessed terrorist would 

be, that there can be delays in Mirandizing to allow time for questioning. So we have the authority to do that even in the Article III 

system. 

Senator LEMIEUX. My colleague from Virginia was just talking 

about Mayport and that he has a different view than you expect 

that I would. You put in the QDR that, to mitigate the risk of a 

terrorist attack, accident or natural disaster, the Navy will homeport an east coast carrier in Mayport. I know you support that and 

I appreciate that. 

54 

But there is no money in the budget, as I understand it, for the 

nuclearization projects or other projects that need to be completed. 

Admiral MULLEN. There’s $239 million in the FYDP for military 

construction for Mayport. 

Senator LEMIEUX. Okay, thank you. 

Admiral Mullen, will you officially designate a ship to Mayport 

in the coming months? 

Admiral MULLEN. Actually, it’s not mine. I think that in the end 

that would be a decision that the Navy would recommend and it 

would come up to the Secretary. 

Senator LEMIEUX. Are you planning on making a recommendation soon? 

Admiral MULLEN. As soon as the Navy brings one up, and I just 

don’t know where they are in that process. 

Senator LEMIEUX. Maybe we can follow up on that later. 

I want to speak a little bit about acquisition reform. A number 

of my colleagues have mentioned this. Specifically, Mr. Secretary, 

about the JSF, we recently were given some information about the 

fact that it’s 35 percent over budget, which I think is about $18 billion if my numbers are correct. This program started in the mid1990s. It occurs to me I think we went to the moon quicker than 

we’ve produced this plane. 

So I appreciate your efforts to try to get this under control, and 

I saw that there was a suspension in the performance bonuses. My 

question to you is, in terms of acquisition reform, it seems to me 

that there needs to be reform across DOD, probably across the government, and not just performance bonuses being withheld, but 

performance penalties under the contracts that we have with vendors. 

Is there a person that you charged as responsible solely to lead 

the effort on acquisition reform, and are you looking at these contracts to make sure that the vendor would bear the cost if programs were delayed? 

Secretary GATES. Under Secretary Carter is responsible for that 

and he is taking a very close look at a large number of contracts. 

Senator LEMIEUX. I had an opportunity to be at CENTCOM yesterday and I spoke with General Petraeus. In the follow-up to my 

trip to Afghanistan at the end of October, which I went on with 

Senator Burr and Senator Whitehouse, one thing that we noted is 

that our information work there in terms of trying to get the message out to the Afghan people may be not doing as good of a job 

as it could be. 

General Petraeus talked about the fact that we were successful 

in the surge in Iraq because of the power of ideas, not just the 

power of our forces. I’m wondering if this is on your radar screen, 

the need to commit more focused energy and potentially more 

funds to providing information to the Afghan people to counteract 

what the Taliban does. The Taliban will go in and say, oh, we just 

killed a bunch of children. It’s misinformation. 

There are some good efforts that are being done. I met with a 

Colonel Kraft who was doing some very good work with trying to 

get radios out there to folks, working with territorial governors to 

get information out quickly so that we could counteract propaganda 

from the Taliban. 

55 

Is that something that’s risen to your level and do you understand the need to maybe improve our efforts? 

Secretary GATES. Absolutely, and in fact we have spent a good 

bit of time on this in the situation room with our interagency. 

Senator LEMIEUX. I’m out of time, Mr. Chairman. I’d like to ask 

just one more question for the Admiral. 

On the 313-ship Navy, the plan I guess is currently to have 10 

carriers. Is that sufficient? We’re refitting the Enterprise. Do we 

need to keep the Enterprise in operation until the Ford comes on 

line? What’s your thoughts? 

Admiral MULLEN. I think that the current requirement is for 11 

and I support that. The 10-carrier issue is to be decided literally 

decades down the road. Obviously, how we build them generates 

how many of them there are and when we retire them. 

I don’t think we should keep the Enterprise. I think the Enterprise is unique, incredibly costly, and the decision to decommission 

it after its next deployment and take the risk in that gap I think— 

it is a decision that I support, recognizing there is some risk associated with that. 

Senator LEMIEUX. Thank you very much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator LeMieux. 

Senator Burris. 

Senator BURRIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I’d like to add my thanks, gentlemen, for the wonderful service 

that you do for our country. For those of our military personnel in 

Haiti, I just want to extend my thanks to them, and also remind 

our government that we’re there to assist and not to take over or 

occupy a country, as some people are concerned about. So make 

sure that we keep that message going forward. 

Mr. Secretary, the DIMHRS, the largest enterprise resource 

planning program ever implemented for the human resource system, would replace over some 90 legacy systems. It’s intended to 

bring all payroll and personnel functions of the military into one 

integrated, web-based system. 

In August 1996, a DOD task force concluded that the multiple 

service-unique military personnel and pay systems causes significant functional shortcomings, particularly in the joint arena, and 

excessive development and maintenance costs. Their central recommendation was that DOD should move to a single all-Service, 

all-component, fully-integrated personnel and pay system with 

common core software. 

This is a program that DOD said at one time was necessary. 

Why is it considered a poorly performing program today, Mr. Secretary, and why is it not necessary and what has changed? 

Secretary GATES. Well, this is one where I think both Admiral 

Mullen and I have something to say. First of all, after 10 years of 

effort, poor performance and difficulties with that program, I would 

say that what we’ve gotten for half a billion dollars is an 

unpronounceable acronym. Many of the programs that I have made 

decisions to cut have been controversial within DOD. I will tell you 

this one was not. 

Admiral MULLEN. Both in my prior life as head of the Navy and 

actually even before that as a budget officer and certainly through 

56 

this, this program has been a disaster. The characteristics you describe, Senator, are good characteristics to have. I talked earlier 

about making a program too perfect and you just can’t get there, 

too complex. It was proven that DIMHRS couldn’t get there time 

and time again. 

So I applaud the termination of the program. That doesn’t mean 

we shouldn’t try to create the kind of enterprise effort that you just 

described, but we have to do it in a way where we’re not spending 

the kind of money that we were spending going nowhere in 

DIMHRS. 

Senator BURRIS. Gentlemen, is that where we run into a military 

bureaucracy, that people don’t want to give up something? I think 

it’s more of that. If we can pay under the Office of Personnel Management all civilian employees under one payment system, why 

can’t the military also exercise one payment system? It would be 

my assessment that you would run into turf problems that the 

military is not willing to say that a person at a grade 6 in the Navy 

should be paid as a person who’s a grade 6 in the Army, with the 

same system. So you cut a paycheck and you don’t have all these— 

what have you got, five or six different payroll systems in the military? We can save millions and millions of taxpayers’ dollars by 

combining those systems. 

Admiral MULLEN. I don’t disagree that theoretically we could get 

there and we should have that. However, it was costing us a tremendous amount of money to go nowhere in this—— 

Senator BURRIS. Then why—— 

Admiral MULLEN. Senator, even in the private sector, when you 

talk to individuals who have tried to combine, who have combined 

various multi systems, it is always a challenge. So the challenge is 

there. I think the goal is one that’s a good goal. We just were not 

getting there with DIMHRS. We were wasting our money. 

Senator BURRIS. Are you going to take it up in the future? 

Admiral MULLEN. Yes, sir, I’m sure we will. It sounds like we 

will. 

Senator BURRIS. Let me shift gears for a minute. Why is the 

funding for Iraq security forces nearly doubling from the fiscal year 

2010 budget to the fiscal year 2011 budget? When I was in Iraq it 

was my understanding we were standing down and that we 

wouldn’t need to be spending extra money for training for the security forces. Is there an explanation why the budget is increasing? 

Secretary GATES. Sir, $300 million in the 2011 OCO is to set the 

conditions for the transfer to the State Department for responsibility for training the police. 

Chairman LEVIN. Repeat what ‘‘OCO’’ means? 

Secretary GATES. The overseas contingency operations bill. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you. 

Secretary GATES. The new supplemental. 

So there are a number of categories like that. A lot of it—there’s 

only $158 million—of the billion dollars for 2010, for example, only 

$150 million of that is for equipment. The rest of it is all connected 

with our transfer of responsibilities from—costs associated with 

transfer of responsibilities either from ourselves to the Iraqis or 

from DOD to the Department of State after our troops come out. 

So most of those costs are associated in that area, along with 

57 

sustainment of and training for the Iraqis who are going to be taking our places. 

Senator BURRIS. My time has expired. But gentlemen, I hope 

that we will revisit this personnel system. If the civilians can do 

it, you get one paycheck and one pay scale system, the civilians, 

the military can do it without five or six different systems existing. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Burris. 

A couple quick items. Feel free to submit that unpronounceable 

acronym for the record. 

Secretary GATES. DIMHRS. 

Chairman LEVIN. You made reference in an earlier answer to the 

Article III system, and you were referring to the civilian court system. 

Secretary GATES. Yes, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. Now, one housekeeping announcement before I 

call on Senator Collins. When we begin our hearing on DADT, 

which it looks like we’re on schedule to begin maybe even before 

noon, we’re going to follow the same early bird order as we have 

for this hearing, so that everybody can be put on notice. We’re 

going to recognize Senators in the same order as they appeared for 

the current hearing when we reach the DADT hearing. 

Senator Collins. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. So the last will be first for that 

next hearing? 

Chairman LEVIN. I didn’t say reverse order. I said the same 

order. [Laughter.] 

I wish I could say otherwise. We’re struggling here with what is 

the best way to do it and we decided the best way to do it is to 

put everyone on notice. 

Senator COLLINS. Just don’t tell them that we’re starting early, 

then. 

Chairman LEVIN. Okay, you have a deal. [Laughter.] 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Secretary Gates, according to the QDR, on any given day there 

are more than 7 million DOD computers that are being used to 

support our warfighters and for other DOD operations. We also 

know that every single day there are attempts to hack into those 

computers. Some of these attacks are from nation-states like 

China. 

What is your assessment of the effectiveness of DOD’s current 

cyber security efforts? 

Secretary GATES. I think that we actually are, particularly with 

our classified systems, in good shape. Most of the attacks that we 

encounter, too, are to unclassified systems. But frankly, we’re not 

happy with where we are, and particularly as we look ahead. 

That’s why we have an initiative to create Cyber Command and 

also have money in the budget and have made a priority in the 

QDR and in the budget for cyber in terms of training significant 

additional individuals who are expert in this area. We’ve made it 

a top priority for the Services to fill all the slots in the education 

programs for cyber. 

So I would say I think we’re in good shape now, but we look with 

concern to the future and we think a lot more needs to be done. 

58 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. 

Admiral Mullen, last year the President announced a major policy change on how our country would extend protection against ballistic missiles to our NATO allies. I joined Senator Levin on a trip 

to talk to the Czech Republic, Poland, and Russia about this very 

issue last March. I support the change in direction. 

Part of the change in direction is that sea-based Aegis surface 

combatants would become a primary means of accomplishing that 

important mission. Now, ships dedicated to perform this mission 

will likely be tied to specific areas of operation. That means that 

they’re not going to be fully available to perform many of the other 

more traditional missions that we’ve typically assigned our major 

surface combatants. A number of analysts have suggested that that 

means we will need a larger number of major surface combatants 

if all of these missions and roles are to be executed successfully. 

How does the decision to assign major surface combatants to this 

new dedicated missile defense mission affect your assessment of 

the size of the overall fleet? 

Admiral MULLEN. It starts with an earlier discussion we had on 

the need to get to that floor of 313 ships, which we’re below target 

right now. One of the things that I’ve worried about for years is 

that we would have enough in particular surface combatants to be 

able to meet the needs that are out there, although I do not subscribe to the theory that these ships would become ships like our 

strategic ballistic missile submarines, in other words it’s the only 

thing that they do. We’ve invested too much in the broad capability 

of our surface ships, wide-ranging capability of our surface ships, 

to dedicate them to one mission. 

I think as this program has been adjusted, it focuses on regional, 

theater, evolving threats and I think that’s the right answer. So we 

would have certainly some indications and warning. We have 

enough ships to flood, if you will, to a certain area, understanding 

what the threat is. 

So I think we need to look carefully at how many we need. I also 

think we need to upgrade the ones that we have. While we are upgrading some, I think that we need to look pretty seriously in modernization at do we have enough upgrades for the ships that we’ve 

already built to meet this threat in the longer term, as well as 

looking to see if we need more. I’m more focused on the upgrade 

right now than I am additional Aegis ships per se. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Collins. 

Senator Bill Nelson. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Gentlemen, I want to compliment you on 

the relief efforts in Haiti. 

The American military leads. You are the point of the spear. You 

make it happen. Please consider that for the future, for the long 

term, we’re going to have to do something different. I was just told 

a very troubling story of a relief effort by a group of Floridians, doctors, prominent people, that took a private planeload of medical 

supplies down to a number of our doctors who have been on the 

ground just doing heroic stuff. Just before they got there, the customs had been turned back over to the Haitian Government, and 

as they’re unloading the plane of all the medical supplies to get it 

59 

to in this case to University of Miami doctors, who were there the 

day after the earthquake, the customs officials wanted bribes to release the medical supplies. 

We just can’t allow this kind of thing. So you have done tremendous things in getting us to where we are, the humanitarian mission. But for the long term, we’re going to have to have some kind 

of international trusteeship that’s going to be led by the international community, that will take this kind of nonsense away 

from the people who have done this for 200 years in Haiti. 

I’m not expecting a response. I just want to compliment you for 

what you’ve done. 

Now, I have the privilege of chairing the Emerging Threats and 

Capabilities Subcommittee and as we withdraw our conventional 

forces in Iraq, the requirement for the SOF is projected to remain. 

But they, the SOF, rely on the conventional counterparts for many 

of the support functions. So what do we do to ensure that our SOFs 

are being adequately supported as we withdraw the conventional 

forces from Iraq? 

Secretary GATES. Senator, I think there’s a two-part answer. I’ll 

take the equipment part and ask Admiral Mullen to take the people part. 

One of the things that we are doing is moving the base—moving 

the funding of the Special Operations Command (SOCOM) from the 

supplementals into the base budget. We believe SOCOM is going 

to have the capability that this country is going to need far into 

the future, and so in terms of their equipment, we’re plussing up 

the equipment that they are supplied with, much of which is 

unique to them. We are increasing the number of slots that they 

have by this budget for fiscal year 2011, increases the SOCOM personnel by 2,800 people. 

So I think that in terms of equipment and so on, we are putting 

ourselves on a long-term footing to sustain that capability. 

Admiral MULLEN. Part of—and this is in the QDR and in the 

budget—part of moving to the future is investing in the wars that 

we’re in, and there’s no more critical capability to my view that we 

are investing in in these wars than the Special Forces capability. 

That will serve us well for the future. 

I don’t know if I’ll get these numbers exactly right, but I think 

we started these wars at about 38,000. We’re at some 56,000 Special Force operators or Special Force military members now, and 

these, as the Secretary said, are growing by 2,800. This is, at least 

from my interaction with Admiral Olson, this is about as fast as 

we can grow, as fast as we can find the people to do this. 

A document which has struck both the Secretary and myself has 

been Admiral Olson’s guidance for this year in 2010. I have said 

for years I believe our whole military has to be looking at the kinds 

of characteristics—swift, agile, lethal, engaging, all those kinds of 

things that is a part of our Special Forces, as we look to the future 

for our conventional forces. 

The tension that you describe—and I think it’s a healthy tension—between the Special Forces and the Services that provide the 

people, provide a lot of the early training, go out and recruit them, 

is a good tension and we’ll have to continue to deal with that. 

60 

Senator BILL NELSON. Just a quick comment, if you would, Admiral, about the role of Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar 

System (JSTARS) aircraft in Afghanistan? You have provided adequately in the budget for keeping JSTARS as a viable option by reengining these old platforms. What’s the role in Afghanistan? 

Admiral MULLEN. It is principally tracking targets on the ground 

more than anything else. But as you ask that question, Senator 

Nelson, I think of JSTARS being the revolutionary aircraft that it 

was for Operation Desert Storm—actually, I’m sorry, even in the 

mid-1990s, early to mid-1990s in the Balkans, where we deployed 

them prior to the time that we actually finished successfully testing them, and they have provided an extraordinary capability. Yet, 

the adaptation in these wars to the persistence requirement which 

we’ve achieved much more readily with our unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) than we’ve been able to do with any manned aircraft 

per se. 

But they’re incredibly valuable, particularly in tracking targets 

on the ground, which is one of the reasons this investment is so 

important. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Thank you, sir. 

Thanks, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Nelson. 

Senator McCaskill. 

Senator MCCASKILL. First I want to thank you, Secretary Gates, 

and I hope that your office will continue to cooperate with information we’ve requested on a number of different topics for the subcommittee that I chair in Homeland Security on contracting. 

One of the things we’re trying to get to the bottom of is whether 

or not some of the contracts on the earmarks have been competitive. There is—it is said that—I think the chairman accidentally 

called on me before Senator Bayh and I want to make sure—I’m 

happy to—— 

Chairman LEVIN. Just let me thank Senator Bayh. There’s a mistake I made here and I appreciate your courtesy in dealing with 

it. Thank you. 

Senator MCCASKILL. I want to thank you for the cooperation in 

trying to get to the bottom, because I think that there is in some 

instances a fiction that some of these earmarks are being competitively given out, when in reality the Senators’ requests are being 

honored, maybe informally. But we’re trying to get to the bottom 

of it and make sure we have as much transparency as possible. 

I’ve read everything I can get my hands on on the JSF, and when 

we’re going to actually use these fighters. I’m confused about the 

date. Depending on whether you’re talking about the analysis team 

that went out from DOD or whether—I see quotes from General 

Schwartz or whoever—let’s get that on the record, Secretary Gates. 

When do you think the JSF is going to be operational for our military? 

Secretary GATES. Even with the restructuring of the program, 

the training squadron is still scheduled to deploy to Eglin Air Force 

Base in 2011. The Marine Corps will have their IOC in 2012; the 

Air Force in the second quarter of 2013; and the Navy the fourth 

quarter of 2014. Those are the latest estimates that I’ve been 

given. 

61 

Senator MCCASKILL. Okay. I heard you say those earlier. I just 

wanted to make sure that it was clarified. 

I want to tell you how much I respect the fact that you fired 

somebody. You’ve done this several times. I’ve watched you do this, 

and it is unusual. I don’t think anybody around here realizes how 

unusual it is for a Secretary of Defense to fire people when these 

things happen. Traditionally, there have not been people that have 

been fired. I just want you to know I noticed and I think it’s hard 

to do, but I think it’s very important that you send that signal of 

accountability. 

Let me ask you about the modernization of the C–5s. I’m going 

to try to go at the C–17 a little bit differently. I would like to ask 

this question: If your hands were not tied by Congress in terms of 

the modernization of the C–5s, would you continue to modernize or 

would you retire? 

Secretary GATES. We would continue to modernize a good portion 

of the C–5s. But there would be some of the older C–5As that we 

would retire. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Are you advocating that we repeal the statutory tying of your hands while you’re advocating for the closing 

of the line on the C–17s? Are you also advocating that Congress 

quit tying your hands as it relates to retiring the C–5s? 

Secretary GATES. Any greater flexibility I can have to manage 

the program, I would welcome. 

Senator MCCASKILL. I want to make sure that I get your endorsement for us retiring our hand-tying of you, obviously, the 

modernization of the C–5s has had huge problems. It turned out 

to be much more expensive than it was ever intended to be. I know 

that it’s my understanding we’re not using C–5s in Haiti, correct? 

Secretary GATES. I don’t think so. 

Senator MCCASKILL. In fact, we’re using, as we always do, the 

reliable, easy to land on short runways, load them up, get them 

out, cheaper to fly, C–17 in Haiti; isn’t that correct, Admiral 

Mullen? 

Admiral MULLEN. Yes, ma’am. 

Senator MCCASKILL. I just wanted to make sure. 

Secretary GATES. Although I would just say for the record, 200 

and some, 204,000 landings for strategic lift since 1997, 4 percent 

have been at airfields that a C–5 could not access, and half of those 

were in Iraq. 

Senator MCCASKILL. I understand that and I know that. But it’s 

important to remember that the Iraq capability was pretty darn 

important over the past 6 to 8 years in terms of military operations. I think we’re going to have the same situation in Afghanistan. Aren’t there air strips in Afghanistan that are certainly more 

friendly to a C–17 than a C–5? 

Secretary GATES. Sure. 

Senator MCCASKILL. I would like to briefly get into prescription 

drugs and our military. I think we are all painfully aware of the 

suicide problem that we have. I think we are also aware that there 

has been a ‘‘modernization,’’ of prescription drug availability in the 

military as it relates to PTSD and other mental health issues. I 

know that we have a task force looking at prescription drug use. 

62 

I wanted to also bring to the attention of the committee, and to 

you, I think as this task force is looking at prescription drug use, 

not only should we be looking at the anti-depressants that I think 

have become ubiquitous in some instances as it relates to treating 

our deployed forces when they’re having stress issues, but also the 

prescription drug for pain. I particularly have mentioned to General Casey Oxycontin, and the highly addictive nature of Oxycontin 

and the widespread availability of Oxycontin within the military, 

and the fact that we now know that in some parts of our country 

Oxycontin has a higher street value than heroin because of the 

highly addictive nature of the drug. 

I wanted to ask your cooperation, Secretary Gates—and I will be 

sending you a letter—that the prescription drug task force also 

take a look at how widely available Oxycontin is in the military 

and whether or not its overall effect has been harmful or positive. 

I wanted to ditto Senator Webb on the mentoring program. Pretty ugly. We have to get that under control and make sure it’s 

transparent. The revolving door at the Pentagon deserves as much 

attention as the revolving door in Congress. 

Thank you, Secretary Gates. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator McCaskill. 

Senator Bayh, again with our thanks. 

Senator BAYH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

First let me compliment Senator McCaskill for her line of questioning. Claire, Harry Truman would be proud. You’re focused on 

saving the taxpayers’ money. It reminds me in a previous incarnation when I was our State’s governor during difficult financial 

times. I used to scrub the budget so carefully I had a nickname in 

some quarters as ‘‘Evaneezer.’’ So I really do appreciate your efforts. 

Mr. Secretary, I’d like to begin by complimenting you and associating myself with what Senator McCaskill was saying. It was a 

breath of fresh air that you’re bringing increased accountability to 

some of these programs. Some of the practices that have been allowed to exist for too long in DOD contracting of weapons systems 

would never survive in the private sector. So the fact that people 

are being held accountable and the contractors themselves are 

being asked to share some of the burden for the delays and the cost 

overruns I think is absolutely the right thing to do. I want to commend you for that and I hope we’ll see more of the same. 

We are gathered here at a time of great financial and economic 

distress for the American people and for our government. People 

are being asked to make sacrifices. The President has called for a 

freeze and nonsecurity discretionary spending, and yet we are 

being asked to appropriate, I think you indicated, a 3.4 percent increase in Defense spending. Is that correct? 

Secretary GATES. 1 percent, 1.8 percent in real growth. 

Senator BAYH. In real growth. My point is I support that because 

of the challenges that we face. I just wanted to put it in the context 

of people are being asked to make real sacrifices. It makes even 

more important your efforts to try and save tax dollars wherever 

possible. 

63 

It seems to me that, looking at the big items, the prospect for 

any real meaningful savings in the future have to do with our commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan and perhaps the prospect that 

they will head in a better direction, allowing us to perhaps save 

some money there. So I’d like to ask you about both of those conflicts. 

I know you’ve given us your best—or your most likely case estimate about what it will take in both of those conflicts. If you had 

to say that it was going to be something other than the most likely 

case—let’s start with Iraq. The way things are trending there, 

would it be more or less likely that we would be able to withdraw 

more aggressively there than you’re currently planning on, and in 

so doing save some of the money that we’re being asked to commit 

to to Iraq? 

Secretary GATES. I think that General Odierno’s view would be 

that it would be very risky to try and accelerate the withdrawals 

beyond the timetable that he already has. 

Senator BAYH. So no real prospect for savings beyond what has 

been estimated there? 

Secretary GATES. I think not. 

Senator BAYH. In Afghanistan, my own view is that skeptics who 

look at that conflict and say, we’re going to do our part, we’re making a major commitment to stabilizing that country, to keeping the 

Taliban and the al Qaeda from having a platform to attack us— 

there’s no doubt in my mind we’ll do what is necessary. The question is whether the Afghans are capable and willing to do their 

part. You look at the history of that country, the complexity of that 

country, I think skeptics kind of wonder whether even with our 

best efforts we’ll be able to get the job done. 

Would it be your assessment that there probably is not much 

prospect for—well, if events are going to deviate from the most 

likely scenario, it’s more likely to be on the down side than the up 

side in Afghanistan, no real prospect for additional savings there? 

Secretary GATES. I suspect not. But I would tell you, Senator, 

that, as the President announced, there will be a review of our 

strategy in Afghanistan at the end of this year, and I think both 

Admiral Mullen and I are committed that if we determine that our 

strategy is not working that we will not recommend just plunging 

ahead blindly without a change of course. 

Admiral MULLEN. If I could just quickly, I think a healthy skepticism is good. I think a terminal skepticism at this point is—it’s 

far too soon. In fact, we see signs in many places now of uplifted 

spirits on the part of the Afghan people where security has turned 

around. I’m not underestimating the significance of the challenge, 

but from a strategy standpoint, a resourcing standpoint, a leadership standpoint, and a commitment on the part of the Afghans that 

we can see as a result of what the President announced, it’s better 

than it’s ever been and we’re just a few months into it. 

Senator BAYH. We’re all hopeful, but I think we all realize we 

have to be realistic as well. Mr. Secretary, I think that’s what 

you’ve outlined here: a review in progress, assessing our partners 

both in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and then making the hard decisions at the appropriate time. 

64 

Let me ask a couple of other questions. Have you requested all 

the Predators and Reapers you can use and you need? 

Secretary GATES. Yes, sir. We have pretty much maxed out the 

lines. I would just say that those capabilities in some instances, in 

more than a few instances, the challenge is not just the airframe 

or the platform; it’s the ground station, it’s the crews, it’s the linguists that enable us to use the information. So it’s the whole package that we have to put together. 

Senator BAYH. For a long time there was a shortage of pilots as 

I recall. But we’ve—— 

Secretary GATES. It was both airframes and platforms. But I 

would say over the last year to 15 months the Air Force has really 

leaned into this problem, and General Schwartz has told me that 

they are now training more UAV pilots than they are fighter-bomber pilots. 

Senator BAYH. That’s quite a change. But it’s one of those systems that’s really been delivering for us here. So I’m delighted at 

your request. 

Finally—and my time has expired—along with five of my colleagues, I was in Kabul and at the Bagram Air Base earlier this 

month, or last month now that it’s February, and I just want to— 

please convey, we have met with many of the members of the 

Armed Forces, and particularly the Special Operations folks down 

there at Bagram, they’re doing an outstanding job and I want you 

to, if you can, please relay our appreciation for the service they’re 

rendering our country. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Bayh. 

Senator Reed. 

Senator REED. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, gentlemen, for your testimony. Some points have 

been raised with respect to the trial of Abdulmutallab and I think, 

Mr. Secretary, you sort of indicated that that decision was the 

province of the Attorney General. But just as a matter of fact, had 

he been turned over to military custody he would have been provided a lawyer, I presume; isn’t that correct? 

Secretary GATES. Yes, sir. 

Senator REED. Given the fact that we’ve harmonized the rules of 

interrogation between the FBI and other agencies of the government, including the military, that the tools available for an interrogation would have been very much the same? 

Secretary GATES. Yes, sir. 

Senator REED. I think something else, too. Again, this is not a 

question of venue; this is a question more of how we combat these 

terrorists. A lot of them describe themselves as holy warriors, and 

if we reinforce their self-described holy warrior description, trying 

them essentially in a military trial and not a civilian trial, doesn’t 

that reinforce what they think they are, which is basically that 

they’re not terrorist criminals, they are some type of holy warrior? 

Secretary GATES. Well, I suppose that that’s the case. I just think 

that we’re in a good place when you have the ability to use both 

the civilian court system and the military commissions and to be 

able to make decisions on how to prosecute an individual based on 

a case by case basis depending on those specific circumstances. The 

Attorney General consulted with me in terms of the decision on the 

65 

Christmas Day bomber and I told him that I would defer to him 

on that. I think we need to use both of those venues, but I think 

it will depend on the circumstances in each case. 

Senator REED. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. 

Admiral Mullen, in Afghanistan there has been I believe an increase in recruits to the Afghani forces, which are absolutely essential to our long-term strategy. I know there’s been a pay increase 

that has helped. But what other factors have helped? 

Admiral MULLEN. I think an intangible that I would put out 

there is the fact that the commitment on the part of the United 

States and NATO nations specifically to this fight and to the totality of it, not just the military side. I think the leadership in Afghanistan visibly more committed, General McChrystal out in battlefield circulation with the President, who has connected with his 

people in ways that have been very important as well, along with— 

and I think it’s a combination of standing up for their country, 

which I am told routinely and which their leaders feel strongly 

about, in addition to the incentivized pay increases specifically. 

What we’re struggling with is, while the recruiting was at 116 

percent over the last couple of months, having the institutional capacity both from a training infrastructure standpoint as well as 

trainers to absorb that many. That’s just, quite frankly, an area 

that we haven’t focused on enough in the past and we’re trying to 

get right right now. 

Secretary GATES. I should correct the record. The Attorney General consulted with me on the five September 11 terrorists, not the 

Christmas Day bomber. 

Senator REED. Thank you, because it’s important to have the 

record accurate. 

Mr. Secretary, you have I think once again proposed robust funding for basic science in DOD in this budget. I think that’s critical. 

Could you give an idea of where you’re proposing to spend this 

money? 

Secretary GATES. Let me do that for the record if I might. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

The $200 million increase relative to the Fiscal Year 2010 Department of Defense 

request will be directed to basic research in high-priority areas that are promising 

for transformational defense capabilities. These include nano-manufacturing science, 

synthetic biology, advanced energy science, materials modeling for force protection, 

computational neuroscience and quantum information science, among other highly 

promising areas. We have increased the investment in the Army by $29 million, 

Navy by $25 million, Air Force by $34 million, the Defense Advanced Research 

Projects Agency by $102 million and with smaller changes in other Defense Agencies. The research will be conducted at universities and other nonprofit institutions, 

industries, and Government laboratories, in distribution similar to the base budget 

for basic research. The increased funds will support individual investigators and research teams, including students. 

Senator REED. You’re quite welcome to do that for the record. 

Admiral Mullen, in the QDR there is a discussion of dealing with 

anti-access environments and utilizing the advantages of sub-surface operations, which I presume is not just submarines, but also 

unmanned undersea vehicles. Can you amplify what your plans 

are? 

Admiral MULLEN. Broadly, I think the presumption is exactly 

right. We’ve focused on investments there for some years. I’d have 

to get back to you with what the specifics of that would be. I would 

66 

only say, from actually every capability area that we have, that the 

ability to create and sustain access globally, oftentimes is very important. Oftentimes this is very focused on the Western Pacific, 

but, quite frankly, it’s much broader than that and those capabilities are vital for our future. 

Senator REED. Thank you very much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Reed. 

Senator Begich. 

Senator BEGICH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you all for being here, and I am the last one standing I 

think on this round of activity. So let me try to be very quick. I 

have some very Alaskan issues, but first a little more global. 

Again, thank you for all the work you’re doing in Haiti and the 

impact that we have down there. Can you tell me, just so I have 

the number correct, what’s our total capacity down there right now 

in regards to troops that we have there? 

Admiral MULLEN. We actually had over 20,000. With the release 

of the aircraft carrier Vinson, who actually left her helicopter capability ashore in Haiti, but with the release of her we’re down to just 

under 17,000 today. 

Senator BEGICH. Do we have an idea of what the resource cost 

has been so far to DOD? 

Secretary GATES. It’s about $150 million so far. 

Senator BEGICH. Do you have an estimation of what you think 

in this budget process that you’re planning to expend for the next 

year? 

Mr. HALE. Well, I am not sure of the duration and length of this. We estimated $300 to $400 million during the first 30 days, and 

I think we’ll have to revise that depending on how long we’re there 

and the degree of our commitment. 

Senator BEGICH. Do you have within the budget that the President has presented the resources to meet that goal? 

Secretary GATES. No. 

Senator BEGICH. Okay, that’s good. That’s what we need to know. 

Secretary GATES. We can cash flow it, but we need to be repaid. 

Senator BEGICH. Understood. 

Mr. HALE. We do have the money right now, thanks to the committee and Congress, to cash flow it. 

Senator BEGICH. Okay. Do you think and believe you have a 

clear mission of what you should be doing Secretary Gates? 

Secretary GATES. Yes, I think we do. 

Admiral MULLEN. Yes, sir. It’s very clear and it’s in support of, 

obviously, first of all the Haitian people, the Haitian government, 

the UN mission. We’re in support of USAID, who has also been 

magnificent in this effort. So it is a supporting effort specifically. 

Senator BEGICH. Very good. If I can go very quickly on another 

subject that Senator McCaskill brought up, on Oxycontin. The 

other piece I would like, maybe at another time for the record, not 

only what the drug activity in the sense of distribution, but the efforts for individuals who are trying to get off of it. I have talked 

to several soldiers who have had Oxycontin as their pain management and other things, but now they’re trying to get off it and we 

have limited resources. So if you could, maybe for the record, just 

67 

give me kind of how that works and what you do for those soldiers 

that are trying to now get themselves out of that situation, if you 

could do that for the record, Admiral. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

We have come a long way in identifying and treating substance abuse in recent 

years, but our work is not done. The Department continues to work diligently to assure the appropriate use of pain medications and prevent their misuse. 

Foremost, alternative non-opioid pain treatments are being developed and used 

when possible. Physical modalities, non-opioid adjuvant medications, integrative modalities, and injection and interventional modalities all provide treatment for pain 

in some cases and thus militate against some opioid use. 

An excellent example is the Defense and Veterans Pain Management Initiative 

(DVPMI). The DVPMI seeks to improve the management of pain in military and civilian medicine. Through clinical research efforts, it has become a model for effective 

integration of acute and chronic pain medicine. Through the efforts of the DVPMI, 

peripheral nerve infusion pumps and patient-controlled analgesia pumps have been 

approved for battlefield use and for flights on military aircraft. 

The 2010 National Defense Authorization Act directed the Secretary of Defense 

to develop and implement a comprehensive policy concerning pain management. The 

Task Force Report contained numerous recommendations, and is currently being 

operationalized into a six phase Comprehensive Pain Management Campaign Plan 

that will standardize and optimize pain management. 

Additionally, alternative pain management methods are being considered which 

will allow a portion of servicemembers to avoid the possibility of addiction in many 

cases where opioid pain medications would otherwise have been used. 

When opioids are the proper choice for patient care, programs and standards of 

care are being improved to more effectively manage those patients. Closely managing patients reduces the likelihood that the use of opioids will lead to addiction. 

Efforts to improve the patient management process include embedding pain physicians in the wounded warrior clinics. We anticipate that improvements in Health 

Information Technology will also reduce duplicative prescribing and dispensing of 

medication. This includes tracking beneficiary data for prescription information and 

working with civilian organizations on the Prescription Drug Monitoring Program. 

In some cases, a servicemember requires opioids and their use can lead to addiction. In these cases, there are a variety of treatment options available. A primary 

care provider is the first step in a whole continuum of treatment levels. Patients 

move through the continuum of care as more resource intensive treatments may become necessary. 

In addition, Military OneSource allows soldiers to receive mental health counseling. The program leverages civilian resources to prevent those with addiction 

issues from failing to seek help. 

Senator BEGICH. Then give me the Iraq status again. We had 

how many troops there about a year ago? 

[The information referred to follows:] 

In February 2009, we had roughly 146,400 military in Iraq: 108,100 Army; 11,100 

Air Force; 6,200 Navy; and 21,000 Marines. 

Admiral MULLEN. Sorry? 

Senator BEGICH. How many troops did we have in Iraq about a 

year ago? What was our peak level, do you think? 140? 

Admiral MULLEN. Yes, I would say 140, 150. We’re at 104,000 

today. 

Senator BEGICH. 104,000 today? 

Admiral MULLEN. Right, and the marines are out. 

Senator BEGICH. Then by the end of August, you think we’ll be 

down to? 

Admiral MULLEN. About 50. 

Senator BEGICH. 50,000 remaining? 

Admiral MULLEN. Right. 

Senator BEGICH. Then the other date of next August, where will 

we be? 

68 

Admiral MULLEN. The following year, actually end of 2011, we’ll 

be out. 

Senator BEGICH. Again to echo what I think you said to Senator 

Udall, we’re on track? 

Admiral MULLEN. We are. 

Senator BEGICH. Very good. I’m trying to rapid-fire these, knowing my time is limited. 

In your DOD presentation of the budget, do you still have a very 

robust—another issue, separate—alternative, renewable energy 

program? I know that’s been a big plus, to be very frank with you, 

with the military. You have been leaders in this area. Are you still 

fairly, in your mind, aggressive in this arena? 

Secretary GATES. Yes. 

Senator BEGICH. Let me now be parochial, as you probably had 

anticipated. But first with regards to the GMD, I appreciate the 

missile ground defense system and the work you’ve been doing in 

Alaska and the efforts you’ve done over the years in kind of transition of what’s been going on with overall missile defense. 

The way I understand this is you’ll finish off field 2. Do you have 

the resources in this budget or do you allocate utilizing other resources to get to that final completion of the 12 and then the decommissioning of the 6? 

Secretary GATES. That’s budgeted for. 

Senator BEGICH. In this cycle? 

Secretary GATES. Yes. 

Senator BEGICH. Is there anything beyond even the six decommissioned? Do you have to budget for that or do you think you 

have that also in this cycle? 

Secretary GATES. I think it’s all in the budget. 

Senator BEGICH. If there is a difference, you’ll let us know? 

Climate change, Arctic policy. I know you mentioned it and you 

started talking about it within this process, and I think it’s important. There is an issue, and maybe again at a later time—we have 

three, the European Command, the Northern Command, and the 

Pacific Command that kind of manages it all together. Is there a 

process you’re going through now to try to bring some unified command, be it a joint command. How do we deal with that, because 

I know that’s an issue that keeps popping up. Are you going 

through the process now, Admiral? 

Admiral MULLEN. I think, Senator, we would use the normal 

process, which would bring all of that back here certainly from the 

combatant commander’s standpoint. We do that routinely across a 

host of issues. There’s no view that I’ve heard of or certainly I don’t 

see it from an intention standpoint to create another command to 

handle this. But we are looking at the policy. We actually want to 

give Thad Allen and the Coast Guard a lot of credit here because 

they’ve actually done great work and brought it to our attention in 

the last couple years. We’ve moved ahead. We still have a long way 

to go there. 

Senator BEGICH. My time is up, but that is exactly—you stated 

that the Coast Guard’s really been hollering out there at all of us. 

As you move forward on that, I would love to be engaged in that. 

As you’re well aware, a huge opportunity, also potential huge conflicts. So your work there would be greatly appreciated. 

69 

My time is up. I tried to give you a variety pack and you did a 

great job. 

Thank you very much. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Begich. 

Senator Chambliss is on his way. He has not had a first round 

yet. I think maybe we’ll just see if anyone has one question for a 

second round. I have one, and then I’ll see if others do. Okay, I’ll 

call on you too, Senator Burris. 

My question is the following. There was a study that the Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA) did on that alternate engine for the 

F–136. My question is: It’s now about 3 years old. They looked at 

how much was invested, how much would need to be invested to 

develop it, what would be the possible benefits, what would be the 

costs for that alternate engine. My question is, will you ask the 

IDA to update that study, since we’ve had a couple of years now 

of additional investment? Can you do that, Secretary Gates? 

Secretary GATES. Let me take a look at it, Senator, Mr. Chairman. I don’t know why not, but let me get back to you. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

The Department does not intend to contract with the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) to update their 2007 study. The Fiscal Year 2007 National Defense Authorization Act directed the Department to sponsor a Federally Funded Research 

Center (FFRDC) to conduct one of the three independent studies on the Joint Strike 

Fighter propulsion system. The Department selected IDA. The Department’s Cost 

Analysis Improvement Group (CAIG) was also directed to complete one of the studies. The Department’s Cost Analysis and Program Evaluation (CAPE) office, formerly the CAIG, recently updated their 2007 study to account for investment in the 

alternate engine since that time, as well JSF programmatic changes. The Department is satisfied with the CAPE’s analysis and believes that contracting with an 

FFRDC to do the same analysis would not be a prudent use of Department resources. 

The Deputy Secretary provided the CAPE’s updated analysis to Senator Levin via 

separate correspondence. 

Chairman LEVIN. All right. Is there anyone—let’s just try one 

question for everybody. Senator Burris—well, wait a minute. Let 

me see. Senator Collins would be next if you had a question. 

Senator COLLINS. No. 

Chairman LEVIN. Okay, Senator Burris. 

Senator BURRIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

My question, gentlemen, goes to the ability of small contractors 

to have the opportunity to do business with DOD, where they may 

need some type of assistance with their development project, which 

I understand that there are millions of dollars sometimes spent to 

get a piece of equipment that the military may need. I have a specific company in mind where it’s been cleared through generals and 

been authorized, but you can’t get the decision to be made, because 

we’re talking about saving—this is technical equipment for our 

space stations and our drones and other military aircraft. It seems 

like the bureaucracy with the bigger companies just seem to charge 

much more money and they sometimes try to subcontract or either 

sub-contract with these contracts, but this could be sold directly to 

the military, but there just seems to be a bureaucracy that these 

small companies run into. 

Gentlemen, is there some system or device that a small business 

can really get an opportunity to sell their product to DOD, which 

70 

is a better product and a cheaper product, which will save taxpayers’ dollars? 

Secretary GATES. Let me give you an answer for the record on 

how we deal with small business, Senator. If you will provide us 

with the specifics of the case you have in mind, we’ll look into it. 

Senator BURRIS. Mr. Secretary, I certainly will do that. 

Admiral? 

Admiral MULLEN. If I just could respond briefly, my experience 

in this is exactly what you’ve said, Senator. I think it’s very difficult to get small, innovative, creative companies into the business. 

My experience is too often competing against the bureaucracy, they 

just can’t afford it. They can’t afford the overhead. They don’t have 

the people. It puts them out of business. So they go too often in 

the private sector. There are some great ideas out there. I’ve seen 

small companies go other places, put out of business, or be consumed by the larger defense contractors. 

My engagement with larger defense contractors over the years 

has been to try to get them to support these smaller companies. 

Some of them have. But it’s a real challenge, and I think it’s a 

shortfall in what we do overall, in our overall contracting business, 

if you will, as we try to look to the future. 

Senator BURRIS. Mr. Secretary, we will get this information on 

this small company, because we’re talking about saving, if the 

numbers are correct, hundreds of millions of dollars. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you. 

If you can just have one question, because we need to take a 5- 

minute break here for everybody’s sake. 

Senator BEGICH. Mine’s very quick. Secretary and Admiral 

Mullen, I just want to follow from the comment you made earlier 

in regards to I think it was the life cycle of equipment and so forth 

and how the procurement process works and how sometimes the 

line folks are not engaged in that. I guess the question is, are you 

making efforts to change that, because I agree with you 100 percent, if the line people are not involved you end up with a product—and a good example might have been the payroll issue, but I 

won’t go into that. As a former mayor, I dealt with payroll transformation. It’s a nightmare. Is there something you’re working on 

to make that transition? 

Admiral MULLEN. I think in the area of acquisition reform, this 

is an area of focus. But we have a system right now that would 

only allow me to pull something in. It does not come to me naturally or, quite frankly and more importantly, to the Service Chiefs 

naturally, particularly on the acquisition side. 

Senator BEGICH. Are you working to change that? 

Admiral MULLEN. Yes, I am. But I don’t see—I don’t see healthy 

change coming in that regard in the near future, because that fundamental principle that was laid out in 1986 in Goldwater-Nichols 

that separates us is still there. 

Senator BEGICH. Let us know how we can help. I agree with you 

on what you’re trying to do. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you. 

71 

We’re going to call just now on Senator Chambliss, Senator 

Lieberman. We’re going to really break no later than noon here. We 

all need a 5-minute break. Senator Chambliss. 

Senator CHAMBLISS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Secretary, I was not going to get into a discussion on F–22 

particularly. We’ve been down that road. But when you responded 

to Senator McCain’s question about why you didn’t discuss the 

problems with the F–35 when we were having the debate last summer, your response was that you didn’t have the independent cost 

analysis that you have now. I thought it was pretty ironic that the 

report from the independent commission came out about 2 days 

after the vote in the Senate, where the F–22 in effect was killed. 

I couldn’t understand why you didn’t know about that, didn’t know 

that report was coming. 

But really, the 2009 report was simply a validation of exactly 

what that same commission reported in 2008. Now, I assume you 

knew about the 2008 report and for whatever reason you didn’t 

give much credence to it. Am I incorrect in that assumption? Did 

you not know about the 2008 report from that independent commission, or did you just seek to ignore it? 

Secretary GATES. I honestly don’t remember, Senator. The restructuring of this program has been due not just to the report of 

the JET from last fall, but to the time that the Under Secretary 

for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics spent on this issue just 

in the last few weeks, and that’s the reason that the restructuring 

has only been announced in the last few days. It’s because he completed his investigation, of which the JET was one part, just within 

the last couple weeks or so. 

Senator CHAMBLISS. Well, I heard your comment yesterday about 

your not intending to in any ways revisit the F–22 issue. Is that 

a correct statement? 

Secretary GATES. Correct. 

Senator CHAMBLISS. That’s even in spite of the fact that we now 

know that the assumptions that you based your decision on last 

year were wrong, that the F–35 is going to slip, and that your department has no idea of what the cost of an F–35 is going to be, 

as we’ve been told in a hearing by Dr. Carter. Now it’s gotten to 

the point where I understand you’ve even relieved your program 

manager of his duties as of yesterday on the F–35. 

So you’re not going to in any ways revisit that, even though we’re 

struggling with the issues that we talked about might come about 

with regard to the F–35? 

Secretary GATES. No, sir, because the IOCs, based on information 

that I was given in preparation for this hearing, the IOCs for the 

Services, for the arrival of the training squadron at Eglin, all remain pretty much on track. The difference will be somewhat fewer 

aircraft delivered. 

Senator CHAMBLISS. Do you intend to allow the expiration of foreign military sales (FMS) of the F–22? 

Secretary GATES. My impression is that that’s prohibited by law. 

Senator CHAMBLISS. Well, you’ve been instructed in the authorization bill last year that you will do a review of FMS and the prospect of those sales. There’s another independent commission outVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:37 May 06, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00077 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\62155.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
72 

side DOD that’s also tasked with that. So is that review not under 

consideration at this point? 

Secretary GATES. I’ll have to check, Senator. 

Senator CHAMBLISS. Could you get me an answer on that, please, 

sir. 

Secretary GATES. Sure, sir. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

The report required by section 1250(a)(b) of the National Defense Authorization 

Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2010 directed the Secretary of Defense, in coordination 

with the Secretary of State, and in consultation with the Secretary of the Air Force, 

to submit a report on potential Foreign Military Sales (FMS) of the F–22A fighter 

aircraft. The report was completed and transmitted to the Defense Committees, the 

Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, and the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on August 26, 2010. Section 1250(c) of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2010 directed 

the Secretary to contract with a Federally Funded Research and Development Center to submit an additional report on the impact of F–22A FMS on the U.S. aerospace and aviation industry. The Department contracted RAND to complete the report. RAND expects to complete the report in early 2011. 

Senator CHAMBLISS. Let me just ask you a quick question on the 

budget. I want to go back to the MRAP that’s specifically designed 

for Afghanistan. Tell me again about that vehicle? What’s the difference in that and what we’re using in Iraq, and what’s the budget 

difference there? 

Secretary GATES. The cost per vehicle is roughly the same for the 

ATV and the R–31 MRAP. The MRAP being designed for Afghanistan is designed to operate off-road, where the MRAPs in Iraq, designed for Iraq, were designed to operate on the road. So there’s 

quite a difference in the engineering as well as in the power train 

and so on. 

Senator CHAMBLISS. Any of those vehicles in Afghanistan today? 

Secretary GATES. Yes, sir. We probably have somewhere between 

500 and 700 of them now. We’re ramping up the production right 

now and our expectation is that we’ll be sending in between 500 

and 1,000 a month pretty quickly here. 

Senator CHAMBLISS. Do you have any idea when that will begin? 

Will it begin before the weather warms up? 

Secretary GATES. Yes, sir. Again, we’re probably either this 

month or next going to be at 500 a month going into the country. 

Senator CHAMBLISS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Chambliss. 

Senator Lieberman. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. 

Thanks to the witnesses for your service. It strikes me after 3 

hours that we’re coming close here to violating your rights under 

the Geneva Convention. But I thank you for your strength as 

shown here today. 

Frankly, seriously, I don’t think we’ve had a better team than 

you at DOD in a long time, and I thank you for your service in 

every way. I think this is a very good budget. Obviously, we’ll go 

over it in a series of subject matter hearings, but I think it meets 

the needs of our military within the resources that we have. 

I want to ask a question I think hasn’t been addressed. Both of 

you talked about, Secretary Gates, Admiral Mullen, about the proper balance between allocating funds to meet the unconventional 

threats we’re facing in the war against Islamist extremism, terVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:37 May 06, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00078 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\62155.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
73 

rorism, and then being set to meet threats later on from large potentially peer competitors. Somewhere in the mix with both of 

those is Iran, now still the major state sponsor of terrorism in the 

world, according to the State Department. 

It seems to me that it is also the most significant threat multiplier out there if it goes nuclear. We all want to find a diplomatic 

way to get the Iranians not to go nuclear. The Senate passed a very 

strong sanctions bill last Thursday unanimously, which goes to conference now and hopefully it will come back soon. 

But I wanted to ask you the extent to which the budget that you 

present to us will enable us to deal with this threat. If Iran goes 

nuclear, it greatly strengthens their terrorist proxies, including 

some that have killed a lot of Americans in Iraq and are causing 

some trouble in Afghanistan. It probably ends the nonproliferation, 

nuclear nonproliferation regime. 

Admiral Mullen, at one point I saw you quoted somewhere a 

while ago that said just in the normal dispatch of your responsibility it’s your responsibility to prepare plans for potential use of 

military force against Iran regarding nuclear weapons. Then General Petraeus said something similar recently. I wanted to ask you 

if that’s the case and how you would describe that, in what context 

you would put that preparation? 

Admiral MULLEN. I put it in the context I think, Senator, that 

you laid it out. I think the potential for instability is still there, 

that I’m, as many are, hopeful that the engagement dialogue has 

legs and actually can produce something. I would agree with your 

assessment that them achieving that capability, it becomes a whole 

new ballgame in terms of what the down side potential is. I don’t 

see much upside potential. We certainly over a long period of time 

have recognized that and focused on that. We work contingencies 

all the time, and it was really in that context that I was speaking 

of that. 

The President has said, Secretary Gates has said, I’ve said, all 

options remain on the table and certainly the military is one of 

them. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Secretary Gates, let me ask you a different 

side to this. In recent trips over the last year or so that I’ve taken 

to the Middle East, both to the Arab countries and to Israel, it 

seems to me that there is a kind of increasing military connection 

in a very positive sense between ourselves and our allies there. I 

wonder if you’d comment on that, and to what extent you see it in 

relationship to the current or future Iranian threat? 

Secretary GATES. We have made considerable progress over the 

past 2 years or so in developing a regional maritime surveillance, 

air and missile defense cooperation in the Gulf region. It is a step 

at a time. It is in my view clearly motivated—they are motivated— 

because of their concerns with Iran’s armaments programs and, 

leave aside nuclear weapons, the number of missiles they’re building and so on. So we have made considerable progress in those relationships. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. I thank you. My time’s up. I know we want 

to give you a minute or 2 off. Thank you again. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator Lieberman. 

74 

That concludes this hearing. The chart I referred to, which I prepared relative to the Afghan Army, will be made part of the record. 

Secretary Gates, we would ask you and Chairman Mullen to 

present this chart to your folks, make sure that it’s accurate. If 

there’s any errors in it, please let us know immediately, and ask 

General Rodriguez please to provide us the information that he has 

committed to provide. 

Admiral Mullen, you have your hand up. 

Admiral MULLEN. Just one for the record, and it’s brief. On Senator Thune’s question, he was asking about decommissioning bombers and in fact what I didn’t say was there is consideration for a 

reduction in the number of bombers in the overall START negotiations, which are ongoing and which have not come to conclusion 

yet. 

Chairman LEVIN. We will ask his staff to give him that information. 

We’re going to recess now for 5 minutes. When we come back, 

after opening statements we are going to call on Senators in the 

same order that we called on them for the first hearing. We’ll stand 

adjourned for 5 minutes. 

[Recess from 12:03 p.m. to 12:08 p.m.] 

Chairman LEVIN. The committee is now going to receive testimony from our senior leadership of DOD as we begin the task of 

addressing the DADT policy on gays in the military. I believe that 

ending the policy would improve our military’s capability and reflect our commitment to equal opportunity. I do not find the arguments used to justify DADT convincing when it took effect in 1993 

and they are less so now. 

I agree with what President Obama said in his State of the 

Union address, that we should repeal this discriminatory policy. In 

the latest Gallup poll, the American public overwhelmingly supports allowing gays and lesbians to serve openly in the military. 

Sixty nine percent of Americans are recorded as supporting their 

right to serve and many in fact are serving. 

As former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs General John 

Shalikashvili said—and he supports ending the policy—‘‘A majority 

of troops already believe that they serve alongside gay or lesbian 

colleagues.’’ One recent study estimated that 66,000 gays and lesbians are serving today, at constant risk of losing their chance to 

serve. 

Other nations have allowed gay and lesbian servicemembers to 

serve in their militaries without discrimination and without impact 

on unit cohesion or morale. A comprehensive study on this was conducted by Rand in 1993. Rand researchers reported on the positive 

experiences of Canada, France, Germany, Israel, and The Netherlands and Norway, all of which allowed known homosexuals to 

serve in their Armed Forces. Senator McCain and I have asked 

DOD to update the 1993 report. 

Ending this discriminatory policy will contribute to our military’s 

effectiveness. To take just one example, dozens of Arabic and Farsi 

linguists have been forced out of the military under DADT at a 

time when our need to understand those languages has never been 

greater. Thousands of troops, 13,000 by one estimate, have been 

forced to leave the military under the current policy. That number 

75 

includes many who could help the military complete some particularly difficult and dangerous missions. 

I have long admired the merit-based system of advancement employed by the U.S. military that allows service men and women of 

varied backgrounds to advance to positions of high leadership. An 

Army is not a democracy. It is a meritocracy, where success depends not on who you are, but on how well you do your job. Despite 

its necessarily undemocratic nature, our military has helped lead 

the way in areas of fairness and anti-discrimination. It has served 

as a flagship for American values and aspirations, both inside the 

United States and around the world. 

We will hold additional hearings to hear from various points of 

view and approaches on this matter. This committee will hold a 

hearing on February 11, when we will hear from an independent 

panel. The Service Secretaries and Service Chiefs will all be testifying before this committee during the month of February on their 

various budgets, and they, of course, will be open to questions on 

this subject as well during their testimony. 

My goal will be to move quickly, but deliberatively, to maximize 

the opportunity for all Americans to serve their country, while addressing any concerns that may be raised. We should end DADT 

and we can and should do it in a way that honors our Nation’s values while making us more secure. 

My entire statement will be made part of the record. A statement 

of Senator Gillibrand will also be inserted in the record following 

the statement of Senator McCain. 

Senator MCCAIN. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Levin follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY SENATOR CARL LEVIN

The committee continues our hearing this afternoon to receive testimony from the 

senior leadership of the Department of Defense as we begin the task of addressing 

the ‘‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell’’ policy on gays in the military. I believe ending the policy 

would improve our military’s capability and reflect our commitment to equal opportunity. 

I did not find the arguments used to justify ‘‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell’’ convincing 

when it took effect in 1993, and they are less so now. I agree with what President 

Obama said in his State of the Union address, that we should repeal this discriminatory policy. 

In the latest Gallup poll, the American public overwhelmingly supports allowing 

gays and lesbians to serve openly in the military. Sixty-nine percent of Americans 

are recorded as supporting their right to serve—and many are in fact serving. As 

former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs General John Shalikashvili, who supports ending the policy has pointed out, a majority of troops already believe they serve alongside gay or lesbian colleagues. It’s hard to know for sure, but one recent study estimated that 66,000 gays and lesbians are serving today, forced to hide their orientation and at constant risk of losing the chance to serve. 

Supporters of this policy argue that allowing gays and lesbians to serve openly 

would damage unit cohesion and morale, crucial factors in building combat effectiveness. But there is no evidence that the presence of gay and lesbian colleagues would 

damage our military’s ability to fight. Other nations have allowed gay and lesbian 

servicemembers to serve in their militaries without discrimination and without impact on unit cohesion or morale. The most comprehensive study on this was conducted by Rand in 1993. Rand researchers reported on the positive experiences of 

Canada, France, Germany, Israel, the Netherlands and Norway, all of which allowed known homosexuals to serve in their Armed Forces. Senator McCain and I 

have asked the Department to update this 1993 report. 

We should end this discriminatory policy because ending it will contribute to our 

military’s effectiveness. To take just one example: dozens of Arabic and Farsi linguists have been forced out of the military under ‘‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell’’ at a time 

76 

when our need to understand those languages has never been greater. Thousands 

of troops—13,500 by one estimate—have been forced to leave the military under the 

current policy. Certainly that number includes many who could help the military 

complete its difficult and dangerous missions. 

Supporters of ‘‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell’’ accuse those who would change it of trying 

to impose a social agenda on the military. But at this point in our history, when 

gays and lesbians openly work and succeed in every aspect of our national life, it 

is the ‘‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell’’ policy that reflects a social agenda out of step with 

the everyday experience of most Americans. 

I have long admired the merit-based system of advancement employed by the U.S. 

military that allows service men and women of varied backgrounds to advance to 

positions of high leadership. An Army is not a democracy. It is a meritocracy where 

success depends not on who you are, but on how well you do your job. Despite its 

necessarily undemocratic nature, our military has helped lead the way in areas of 

fairness and anti-discrimination, as it did in ending racial segregation in America. 

It has served as a flagship for American values and aspirations both inside the 

United States and around the world. 

We will hold additional hearings to hear from various points of view and approaches on this matter. This committee will hold a hearing on February 11 when 

we will hear from an independent panel. The Service Secretaries and Service Chiefs 

will all be testifying before this committee during the month of February and they 

will be open to questions on this subject during their testimony. 

Change is always hard, especially when it involves social issues or personal beliefs. We will proceed fairly, trying to hear varying opinions. I hope those who favor 

change will not mistake open and fair process for undue delay. 

My goal will be to move quickly but deliberately to maximize the opportunity for 

all Americans to serve their country while addressing any concerns that may be 

raised. We should end ‘‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,’’ and we can and should do it in a 

way that honors our Nation’s values while making it more secure. 

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want 

to thank you Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen for what’s turning into a very long morning for them. We appreciate your patience 

and your input on this very, very important issue. 

We meet to consider the DADT policy, a policy that the President 

has made clear, most recently last week in his State of the Union 

Address, that he wants Congress to repeal. This would be a substantial and controversial change to a policy that has been successful for 2 decades. It would also present yet another challenge to our 

military at a time of already tremendous stress and strain. 

Our men and women in uniform are fighting two wars, guarding 

the front lines against a global terrorist enemy, serving and sacrificing on battlefields far from home, and working to rebuild and reform the force after more than 8 years of conflict. At this moment 

of immense hardship for our armed services, we should not be 

seeking to overturn the DADT policy. 

I want to make one thing perfectly clear upfront. I’m enormously 

proud of and thankful for every American who chooses to put on 

the uniform of our Nation and serve at this time of war. I want 

to encourage more of our fellow citizens to serve and to open up 

opportunities to do so. Many gay and lesbian Americans are serving admirably in our Armed Forces, even giving their lives so that 

we and others can know the blessings of peace. I honor their sacrifice and I honor them. 

Our challenge is how to continue welcoming this service amid the 

vast complexities of the largest, most expensive, most well-regarded, and most critical institution in our Nation, our Armed 

Forces. This is an extremely difficult issue and the Senate vigorously debated it in 1993. We heard from the senior uniformed and 

civilian leaders of our military on eight occasions before this comVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:37 May 06, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00082 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\62155.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
77 

mittee alone. When Congress ultimately wrote the law, we included 

important findings that did justice to the seriousness of the subject. 

I would ask, without objection, Mr. Chairman, that a copy of the 

statute, including those findings, be included in the record. 

Chairman LEVIN. It will be. 

[The information referred to follows:] 


202ful2.eps
78 


202ful3.eps
79 

Senator MCCAIN. I won’t quote all those findings, but three 

points must be made. First, Congress found in the law that the 

military’s mission to prepare for and conduct combat operations requires service men and women to accept living and working conditions that are often spartan and characterized by forced intimacy 

with little or no privacy. 

Second, the law finds that civilian life is fundamentally different 

from military life, which is characterized by its own laws, rules, 

customs, and traditions, including many restrictions on personal 

conduct that would not be tolerated in civil society. 

Finally, the law finds that the essence of military capability is 

good order and unit cohesion and that any practice which puts 

those goals at unacceptable risk can be restricted. 

These findings were the foundation of DADT, and I’m eager to 

hear from our distinguished witnesses what has changed since 

these findings were written such that the law they supported can 

now be repealed. 

Has this policy been ideal? No, it has not, but it has been effective. It has helped to balance the potentially disruptive tension between the desires of a minority and the broader interests of our 

All-Volunteer Force. It is well understood and predominantly supported by our fighting men and women. It reflects, as I understand 

them, the preferences of our uniformed services. It has sustained 

unit cohesion and unit morale while still allowing gay and lesbian 

Americans to serve their country in uniform. It has done all of this 

for nearly 2 decades. 

Mr. Chairman, this is a letter signed by over 1,000 former general and flag officers who have weighed in on this issue. I think 

that we all in Congress should pay attention and benefit from the 

experience and knowledge of over a thousand former general officers and flag officers, where they say: ‘‘We firmly believe that this 

law which Congress passed to protect good order, discipline and 

morale in the unique environment of the Armed Forces deserves 

continued support.’’ So I think we should also pay attention to 

those who have served, who can speak more frankly on many occasions than those who are presently serving. 


202ful4.eps
80 

I know that any decision Congress makes about the future of this 

law will inevitably leave a lot of people angry and unfulfilled. 

There are patriotic and well-meaning Americans on each side of 

this debate, and I have heard their many passionate concerns. Ultimately, though, numerous military leaders tell me that DADT is 

working and that we should not change it now. I agree. 

I would welcome a report done by the JCS based solely on military readiness, effectiveness, and needs, and not on politics, that 

would study the DADT, that would consider the impact of its repeal on our armed services, and that would offer their best military 

advice on the right course of action. 

We have an All-Volunteer Force. It is better trained, more effective, and more professional than any military in our history, and 

today that force is shouldering a greater global burden than at any 

time in decades. We owe our lives to our fighting men and women 

and we should be exceedingly cautious, humble, and sympathetic 

when attempting to regulate their affairs. 

DADT has been an imperfect but effective policy, and at this moment, when we’re asking more of our military than at any time in 

recent memory, we should not repeal this law. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Gillibrand follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY SENATOR KIRSTEN GILLIBRAND

Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, distinguished members of the committee, I appreciate your leadership in hosting this important hearing today. 

James Madison once said, ‘‘Equal laws protecting equal rights . . . the best guarantee of loyalty and love of country.’’ 

Lesbian and gay service men and women have been serving in our Armed Forces 

bravely while being denied the full equality they deserve. Since 1993, more than 

13,500 American troops have been discharged from the military under ‘‘Don’t Ask, 

Don’t Tell’’ (DADT), at an estimated cost of over $400 million. Those discharges include more than 800 specialists with skills deemed mission critical by the U.S. military, including at least 323 linguists, approximately 10 percent of foreign language 

speakers, 59 of which specialized in Arabic, and at least 9 of which specialized in 

Farsi, the official language of Iran. Among these specialists were pilots, engineers, 

doctors, nurses, and combat medics, all of which the military has faced shortfalls 

of in recent years. 

These brave Americans were not discharged because of poor performance, but 

rather because of their sexual orientation. 

According to a recent study by the Williams Institute, an estimated 66,000 lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals are serving in the U.S. military. According to data 

provided by the Department of Defense, discharges under DADT in the Army, Air 

Force, Navy and Marine Corps declined to 428 in 2009 from 619 the previous year. 

This represents a 65 percent drop since 2001, the highest number on record. 

In a time of war, discharges have decreased, even as anecdotal evidence strongly 

suggests larger numbers of lesbian and gay servicemembers are serving openly. Despite the current law, individual commanders are deciding to retain otherwise qualified personnel. 

Why is this the case? Because the Armed Forces is experiencing shortfalls in several types of mission-critical personnel, especially in the midst of fighting ongoing 

wars, and is losing additional trained and highly qualified personnel under DADT. 

It has been estimated that the U.S. military loses more than 4,000 gay and lesbian 

military personnel each year, which it would have otherwise retained, had the 

servicemembers been able to be open about their sexual orientation, and that more 

than 40,000 recruits might join if the ban is lifted. Commanders on the ground believe what many of us strongly believe—it’s time to repeal DADT. 

In a January 2007 op-ed article published in The New York Times, General John 

M. Shalikashvili, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff when the policy was enacted, 

stated that his opinion was that DADT should be repealed. He argued that due to 

the U.S. military being stretched thin by its current deployments in the Middle 

East, the Armed Forces need to accept every American who is willing and able to 

81 

serve. Last week I was proud to share another statement from General 

Shalikashvili, 1 of only 17 people in the country’s history to serve as chairman of 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff, calling for an end to this failed policy. In his statement 

he said: 

‘‘When I was Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, my support of the 

current policy was based on my belief that implementing a change in the 

rules would have been too burdensome for our troops and commanders at 

the time. 

‘‘The concern among many at that time, was that letting people who were 

openly gay serve would lower morale, harm recruitment and undermine 

unit cohesion. ‘‘DADT’’ was seen as a useful measure that allowed time to 

pass while our culture continued to evolve. The question before us now is 

whether enough time has gone by to give this policy serious reconsideration. I believe that it has.’’ 

Twenty-five foreign militaries now let gays serve openly, including our closest 

ally, Britain. I sit on the Foreign Relations Committee and I am acutely aware that 

most of our allies—Israel, Britain, France, 22 of 26 NATO nations in all—allow gay 

and lesbian soldiers to serve openly and I believe the American military should follow suit. At a time when our Nation is fighting two wars, and with increased national security threats, we can ill afford this loss of personnel and talent in our national defense. Our military is the best in the world. Once gay and lesbian 

servicemembers are allowed to serve openly, our military will still be the best in 

the world. 

As we look at the path that has brought us to this hearing today, regarding how 

best to repeal the DADT policy, I am reminded of several leaders in the fight to 

allow openly gay servicemembers into the Armed Forces. 

One is then West Point Cadet, Lt. Alexander Raggio. In his 2006 award winning 

thesis he stated: 

‘‘The military should abandon the false acceptance of DADT and allow 

the open service of homosexuals immediately.’’ He added, ‘‘Current policy 

cannot be rationally explained except as a reflection of the personal prejudices of those who create and enforce it and, rationalized by faulty logic and 

double standards.’’ 

These steps towards equality are our duty. I strongly believe that equality is an 

inalienable American right—and should not be ascribed based on gender or race, religion or sexual orientation or gender identity. America must lead by example when 

it comes to equality and justice. Freedom from discrimination is a basic right that 

all Americans should enjoy. Lifting the ban on DADT is not only necessary for realizing equality, but it’s necessary for ensuring that our Armed Forces remain the 

best in the world. 

Pepe Johnson, a former Sergeant, U.S. Army sums up the moral imperative on 

why we have to change this policy. Every day this policy remains we ask these soldiers to lie about who they are, Pepe said ‘‘Honesty and integrity are everything in 

the army. I felt if I was lying, I didn’t have it. I wasn’t serving with integrity. I 

felt trapped. Lying is not the way of the Army—I felt I was violating regulation. 

‘‘During the 3 years I served I only wanted to be all I could be—to borrow the 

old recruiting slogan—but DADT forced me to be something other than what I was. 

That’s not consistent with the Army’s Values: ’Leaders are honest to others by not 

presenting themselves or their actions as anything other than what they are, remaining committed to the truth.’ (FM 6–22, Army Leadership) As long as DADT exists, there is a hole in the integrity of the entire military.’’ 

We must recognize that human dignity and respect are part and parcel of who 

we were as Americans—male or female, African American or Caucasian, gay or 

straight, bisexual or transgender. 

We must ensure that our Armed Forces are fully prepared with the best resources 

we can muster. DADT is a threat to our men and women in uniform and our national security. We cannot afford to handicap our efforts because of ignorance or hatred. 

This policy is wrong for our national security and inconsistent with the moral 

foundation upon which our country was founded. It is critically important for this 

Congress to take up President Obama’s call to permanently end the ban on LGBT 

Americans serving in our armed services. We will strengthen America—both militarily and morally—by repealing this discriminatory policy. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator McCain. 

Secretary Gates. 

82 

Secretary GATES. Mr. Chairman, last week during the State of 

the Union Address the President announced he will work with Congress this year to repeal the DADT law. He subsequently directed 

DOD to begin the preparations necessary for a repeal of the current law and policy. 

I fully support the President’s decision. The question before us is 

not whether the military prepares to make this change, but how we 

best prepare for it. We received our orders from the Commander 

in Chief and we are moving out accordingly. However, we can also 

take this process only so far, as the ultimate decision rests with 

you, Congress. 

I am mindful of the fact, as are you, that unlike the last time 

this issue was considered by Congress more than 15 years ago, our 

military is engaged in two wars that have put troops and their 

families under considerable stress and strain. I am mindful as well 

that attitudes towards homosexuality may have changed considerably, both in society generally and in the military, over the intervening years. 

To ensure that DOD is prepared should the law be changed, and 

working in close consultation with Admiral Mullen, I have appointed a high-level working group within DOD that will immediately begin a review of the issues associated with properly implementing a repeal of the DADT. The mandate of this working group 

is to thoroughly, objectively, and methodically examine all aspects 

of this question and produce its finding and recommendations in 

the form of an implementation plan by the end of this calendar 

year. 

A guiding principle of our efforts will be to minimize disruption 

and polarization within the ranks, with special attention paid to 

those serving on the front lines. I am confident this can be 

achieved. 

The working group will examine a change of lines of study, all 

of which will proceed simultaneously. First, the working group will 

reach out to the force, to authoritatively understand their views 

and attitudes about the impact of repeal. I expect that the same 

sharp divisions that characterize the debate over these issues outside of the military will quickly seek to find their way into this 

process, particularly as it pertains to what are the true views and 

attitudes of our troops and their families. 

I am determined to carry out this process in a way that establishes objective and reliable information on this question, with 

minimal influence by the policy or political debate. It is essential 

that we accomplish this in order to have the best possible analysis 

and information to guide the policy choices before the Department 

and Congress. 

Second, the working group will undertake a thorough examination of all the changes to the Department’s regulations and policies 

that may have to be made. These include potential revisions to 

policies on benefits, base housing, fraternization and misconduct, 

separations and discharges, and many others. We will enter this 

examination with no preconceived views, but a recognition that this 

will represent a fundamental change in personnel policy, one that 

will require that we provide our commanders with the guidance 

83 

and tools necessary to accomplish this transition successfully and 

with minimum disruption to the Department’s critical missions. 

Third, the working group will examine the potential impacts of 

a change in the law on military effectiveness, including how a 

change might affect unit cohesion, recruiting and retention, and 

other issues crucial to the performance of the force. The working 

group will develop ways to mitigate and manage any negative impacts. 

These are, generally speaking, the broad areas we have identified 

for study under this review. We will of course continue to refine 

and expand these as we get into this process or engage in discussion with Congress and other sources. In this regard, we expect 

that the working group will reach out to outside experts with a 

wide variety of perspectives and experience. To that end, the Department will, as requested by this committee, ask the Rand Corporation to update their study from 1993 on the impact of allowing 

homosexuals to serve openly in the military. 

We also have received some helpful suggestions on how this outside review might be expanded to cover a wide swath of issues. 

This will be a process that will be open to views and recommendations from a wide variety of sources, including of course members 

of Congress. 

Mr. Chairman, I expect that our approach may cause some to 

wonder why it will take the better part of a year to accomplish the 

task. We have looked at a variety of options, but when you take 

into account the overriding imperative to get this right and minimize disruption to a force that is actively fighting two wars and 

working through the stress of almost a decade of combat, then it 

is clear to us we must proceed in a manner that allows for the thorough examination of all issues. 

An important part of this process is to engage our men and 

women in uniform and their families over this period, since, after 

all, they will ultimately determine whether or not we make this 

transition successfully. 

To ensure that this process is able to accomplish its important 

mission, Chairman Mullen and I have determined that we need to 

appoint the highest level officials to carry it out. Accordingly, I am 

naming DOD General Counsel, Jeh Johnson, and General Carter 

Ham, Commander of U.S. Army-Europe, to serve as the co-chairs 

for this effort. 

Simultaneous with launching this process, I have also directed 

DOD to quickly review the regulations used to implement the current DADT law and within 45 days present to me recommended 

changes to those regulations that within existing law will enforce 

this policy in a fairer manner. You may recall that I asked DOD’s 

General Counsel to conduct a preliminary review of this matter 

last year. Based on that preliminary review, we believe that we 

have a degree of latitude within the existing law to change our internal procedures in a manner that is more appropriate and fair to 

our men and women in uniform. We will now conduct a final detailed assessment of this proposal before proceeding. 

Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain, members of the committee: DOD 

understands that this is a very difficult and in the minds of some 

controversial policy question. I am determined that we in DOD 

84 

carry out this process professionally, thoroughly, dispassionately, 

and in a manner that is responsive to the direction of the President 

and to the needs of Congress as you debate and consider this matter. 

However, on behalf of the men and women in uniform and their 

families, I also ask you to work with us to insofar as possible keep 

them out of the political dimension of this issue. I am not asking 

for you not to do your jobs fully and with vigor, but rather that as 

this debate unfolds you keep the impact it will have on our forces 

firmly in mind. 

Thank you for this opportunity to lay out our thinking on this 

important policy question. We look forward to working with Congress and hearing your ideas on the best way ahead. 

[The prepared statement of Secretary Gates follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY HON. ROBERT M. GATES

Last week, during the State of the Union address, the President announced that 

he will work with Congress this year to repeal the law known as ‘‘Don’t Ask, Don’t 

Tell.’’ He subsequently directed the Department of Defense to begin the preparations necessary for a repeal of the current law and policy. 

I fully support the President’s decision. The question before us is not whether the 

military prepares to make this change, but how we best prepare for it. We have received our orders from the Commander in Chief and we are moving out accordingly. 

However, we also can only take this process so far as the ultimate decision rests 

with you, Congress. 

I am mindful of the fact, as are you, that unlike the last time this issue was considered by Congress more than 15 years ago, our military is engaged in two wars 

that have put troops and their families under considerable stress and strain. I am 

mindful, as well, that attitudes towards homosexuality may have changed considerably—both in society generally and in the military—over the intervening years. 

To ensure that the department is prepared should the law be changed, and working in close consultation with Admiral Mullen, I have appointed a high-level working group within the department that will immediately begin a review of the issues 

associated with properly implementing a repeal of the ‘‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell’’ policy. 

The mandate of this working group is to thoroughly, objectively and methodically 

examine all aspects of this question and produce its finding and recommendations 

in the form of an implementation plan by the end of this calendar year. A guiding 

principle of our efforts will be to minimize disruption and polarization within the 

ranks, with special attention paid to those serving on the front lines. I am confident 

that this can be achieved. 

The working group will examine a number of lines of study, all of which will proceed simultaneously. 

First, the working group will reach out to the force to authoritatively understand 

their views and attitudes about the impacts of repeal. I expect that the same sharp 

divisions that characterize the debate over these issues outside of the military will 

quickly seek to find their way into this process, particularly as it pertains to what 

are the true views and attitudes of our troops and their families. I am determined 

to carry out this process in a way that establishes objective and reliable information 

on this question with minimal influence by the policy or political debate. It is essential that we accomplish this in order to have the best possible analysis and information to guide the policy choices before the Department and Congress. 

Second, the working group will undertake a thorough examination of all the 

changes to the department’s regulations and policies that may have to be made. 

These include potential revisions to policies on benefits, base housing, fraternization 

and misconduct, separations and discharges, and many others. We will enter this 

examination with no preconceived views, but a recognition that this will represent 

a fundamental change in personnel policy—one that will require we provide our 

commanders with the guidance and tools necessary to accomplish this transition 

successfully and with minimal disruption to the Department’s critical missions. 

Third, the working group will examine the potential impacts of a change in the 

law on military effectiveness, including how a change might affect unit cohesion, recruiting and retention, and other issues crucial to the performance of the force. The 

working group will develop ways to mitigate and manage any negative impacts. 

85 

These are, generally speaking, the broad areas we have identified for study under 

this review. We will, of course, continue to refine and expand these as we get into 

this process or engage in discussion with Congress or other sources. 

In this regard, we expect that the working group will reach out to outside experts 

with a wide variety of perspectives and experience. To that end, the Department 

will, as requested by this committee, ask the RAND Corporation to update their 

study from 1993 on the impacts of allowing homosexuals to serve openly in the military. We have also received some helpful suggestions on how this outside review 

might be expanded to cover a wide swath of issues. This will be a process that will 

be open to views and recommendations from a wide variety of sources, including, 

of course, Members of Congress. 

Mr. Chairman, I expect that our approach may cause some to wonder why it will 

take the better part of the year to accomplish this task. We looked at a variety of 

options, but when you take into account the overriding imperative—to get this right 

and minimize disruption to a force that is actively fighting two wars and working 

through the stress of almost a decade of combat—then it is clear to us that we must 

proceed in manner that allows for the thorough examination of all issues. An important part of this process is to engage our men and women in uniform and their families over this period since, after all, they will ultimately determine whether we 

make this transition successfully or not. 

To ensure this process is able to accomplish its important mission, Chairman 

Mullen and I have determined that we need to appoint the highest level officials 

to carry it out. Accordingly, I am naming the Department of Defense General Counsel, Jeh Johnson, and General Carter Ham, Commander of U.S. Army Europe, to 

serve as the co-chairs to for this effort. 

Simultaneous with launching this process, I have also directed the Department 

to quickly review the regulations used to implement the current Don’t Ask, Don’t 

Tell law and, within 45 days, present to me recommended changes to those regulations that, within existing law, will enforce this policy in a more humane and fair 

manner. You may recall that I asked the Department’s General Counsel to conduct 

a preliminary review of this matter last year. Based on that preliminary review, we 

believe that we have a degree of latitude within the existing law to change our internal procedures in a manner that is more appropriate and fair to our men and 

women in uniform. We will now conduct a final detailed assessment of this proposal 

before proceeding. 

Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain, and members of this committee, the Department 

of Defense understands that this is a very difficult and, in the minds of some, controversial policy question. I am determined that we in the Department carry out 

this process professionally, thoroughly, dispassionately, and in a manner that is responsive to the direction of the President and to the needs of Congress as you debate and consider this matter. However, on behalf of the men and women in uniform and their families, I also ask that you work with us to, insofar as possible, 

to keep them out of the political dimension of this issue. I am not asking for you 

not to do your jobs fully and with vigor, but rather that as this debate unfolds, you 

keep the impact it will have on our forces firmly in mind. 

Thank you for this opportunity to lay out our thinking on this important policy 

question. We look forward to working with Congress and hearing your ideas on the 

best way ahead. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you. 

Admiral Mullen. 

Admiral MULLEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain, 

and thank you for giving me the opportunity to discuss with you 

this very important matter. 

The Chiefs and I are in complete support of the approach that 

Secretary Gates has outlined. We believe that any implementation 

plan for a policy permitting gays and lesbians to serve openly in 

the Armed Forces must be carefully derived, sufficiently thorough, 

and thoughtfully executed. Over these last 2 months, we have reviewed the fundamental premises behind DADT as well as its application in practice over the last 16 years. We understand perfectly the President’s desire to see the law repealed and we owe 

him our best military advice about the impact of such a repeal and 

the manner in which we would implement a change in policy. 

86 

The Chiefs and I have not yet developed that advice and would 

like to have the time to do so in the same thoughtful, deliberate 

fashion with which the President has made it clear he wants to 

proceed. The review group Secretary Gates has ordered will no 

doubt give us that time and an even deeper level of understanding. 

We look forward to cooperating with and participating in this review to the maximum extent possible, and we applaud the selection 

of Mr. Johnson and General Ham to lead it. Both are men of great 

integrity, great experience, and have our complete trust and confidence. 

Mr. Chairman, speaking for myself and myself only, it is my personal belief that allowing gays and lesbians to serve openly would 

be the right thing to do. No matter how I look at this issue, I cannot escape being troubled by the fact that we have in place a policy 

which forces young men and women to lie about who they are in 

order to defend their fellow citizens. For me personally, it comes 

down to integrity, theirs as individuals and ours as an institution. 

I also believe that the great young men and women of our military can and would accommodate such a change. I never underestimate their ability to adapt. 

But I do not know this for a fact. Nor do I know for a fact how 

we would best make such a major policy change in a time of two 

wars. That there will be some disruption in the force I cannot deny. 

That there will be legal, social, and perhaps even infrastructure 

changes to be made certainly seem plausible. We would all like to 

have a better handle on these types of concerns and this is what 

our review will offer. 

We would also do well to remember that this is not an issue for 

the military leadership to decide. The American people have spoken on this subject through you, their elected officials, and the result is the law and the policy that we currently have. We will continue to obey that law and we will obey whatever legislative and 

executive decisions come out of this debate. 

The American people may yet have a different view. You may 

have a different view. I think that’s important and it’s important 

to have that discussion. Frankly, there are those on both sides of 

this debate who speak as if there is no debate, as if there is nothing to be learned or reflected upon. I hope we can be more thoughtful than that. I expect that we will be more thoughtful than that. 

The Chiefs and I also recognize the stress our troops and families 

are under, and I have said many times before, should the law 

change we need to move forward in a manner that does not add 

to that stress. We have two wars going on, a new strategy in Afghanistan, and remaining security challenges in Iraq. We’re about 

to move forward under a new QDR. We still have budget concerns 

and a struggling economy, and we have a host of other significant 

security commitments around the globe. Our plate is very full, and 

while I believe this is an important issue, I also believe we need 

to be mindful as we move forward of other pressing needs in our 

military. 

What our young men and women and their families want, what 

they deserve, is that we listen to them and act in their best interests. What the citizens we defend want to know, what they deserve 

to know, is that their uniformed leadership will act in a way that 

87 

absolutely does not place in peril the readiness and effectiveness of 

their military. I can tell you that I am 100 percent committed to 

that. 

Balance, Mr. Chairman, balance and thoughtfulness, is what we 

need most right now. It’s what the President has promised us and 

it’s what we ask of you and this body. 

Thank you. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Admiral. 

So that everyone has a chance within a reasonable period of 

time, we’re just going to have a 3-minute first round. 

Senator MCCAIN. Mr. Chairman, we need more than 3 minutes. 

We need more than 3 minutes. 

Chairman LEVIN. We can have a second round then. We have to 

also have a schedule here. So we’ll go to a second round if we can 

fit that into Secretary Gates’ schedule. If not, we’ll pick this up at 

a later time. 

Well now, this schedule was shared with everybody here, I know. 

Senator MCCAIN. Not with me. 

Chairman LEVIN. It was indeed shared. 

Senator MCCAIN. You’re the chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Mr. Secretary, the Washington Post I think 

this morning reported that the Military Services will not pursue 

any longer disciplinary action against gays and lesbian 

servicemembers whose orientation is revealed by third parties. Is 

that one of the degrees of latitude within existing law that you’re 

looking at? 

Secretary GATES. Mr. Chairman, a preliminary assessment, 

which fits within the 45-day review that I mentioned in my prepared statement, is that we can do the following within the confines of the existing law. We can raise the level of the officer who 

is authorized to initiate an inquiry. We can raise the level of the 

officer who conducts the inquiry. We can raise the bar on what constitutes credible information to initiate an inquiry. We can raise 

the bar on what constitutes a reliable person on whose word an inquiry can be initiated. Overall, we can reduce the instances in 

which a servicemember who is trying to serve the country honorably is outed by a third person with a motive to harm the 

servicemember. We also have to devise new rules and procedures 

in light of the appeals court decision in Witt versus the Department of the Air Force for the areas of the country covered by the 

appellate court. 

So I would say all of these matters are those that will be reviewed within this 45-day period. So it’s a little more complicated 

than the Washington Post conveyed. 

Chairman LEVIN. But all of those are possibilities? 

Secretary GATES. Yes, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. Now, would you—assuming that even if it requires legislation, would you support a moratorium on discharges 

under DADT during the course of this up to year-long assessment 

that DOD is going to be making? 

Secretary GATES. I would have to look into that, because the 

problem that we have is that all of the issues that both Admiral 

Mullen and I described in terms of what we have to look into in 

88 

terms of the effect on the force, in terms of everything else, is what 

we need to examine before I could answer that question. 

Chairman LEVIN. While you’re going to be examining the other 

points that you’re looking at, the other flexibilities, would you add 

this to the questions you’re going to look at and let us know 

promptly—— 

Secretary GATES. Sure. 

Chairman LEVIN.—as to whether you would support a moratorium pending this period on discharges? That doesn’t mean you 

couldn’t discharge at the end of the period, but there’d be a moratorium. 

Secretary GATES. We will look at it, Mr. Chairman. I would tell 

you that the advice that I have been given is that the current law 

would not permit that, but— 

Chairman LEVIN. I’m saying would you support a change in the 

current law if necessary in order to permit that. That’s what we 

need to hear from you on. 

Senator McCain. 

Senator MCCAIN. I’m deeply disappointed in your statement, Secretary Gates. I was around here in 1993 and was engaged in the 

debates, and what we did in 1993 is we looked at the issue and we 

looked at the effect on the military and then we reached a conclusion and then we enacted it into law. Your statement is the question before us is not whether the military prepares to make this 

change, but how we best prepare for it. 

It would be far more appropriate, I say with great respect, to determine whether repeal of this law is appropriate and what effects 

it would have on the readiness and effectiveness of the military, before deciding on whether we should repeal the law or not. Fortunately, it is an act of Congress and it requires the agreement of 

Congress in order to repeal it. So your statement obviously is one 

which is clearly biased, without the view of Congress being taken 

into consideration. 

Admiral Mullen, you’re the principal military adviser to the 

President and you have to consult with and seek the advice of the 

other members of the JCS and the combatant commanders. What 

in your view are the opinions of the other members of the Joint 

Chiefs and combatant commanders about changing this policy? 

Admiral MULLEN. Senator McCain, as the chairman indicated 

earlier, they’ll obviously be out in their posture hearings in the 

near future, and I would certainly defer to them in terms of exactly—— 

Senator MCCAIN. Well, in the near future I’d like you to ask 

them and we could have it on the record what their position is, in 

the near future. 

Admiral MULLEN. Yes, sir. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

Each of the Service Chiefs and combatant commanders has appeared before the 

committee, where they had the opportunity to express their views. I can tell you 

that all the Chiefs are concerned with current combat operations and the associated 

stress on the force. Given what is currently being asked of our force and their families, the Chiefs would all like to better understand the exact nature of the impact 

of any repeal of the law. This is why all of us support a comprehensive review of 

the issue in order to better advise the Secretary of Defense and the President. 

Senator MCCAIN. I would like it as soon as possible. 

89 

Admiral MULLEN. Actually, I’ve worked very closely with them 

over the last months in terms of understanding what their concerns and what our overall concerns are, and I would summarize 

them by saying it’s really important for us to understand that if 

this policy changes, if the law changes, what’s the impact and how 

we would implement it. Secretary Gates’ point about the study is 

to really understand objectively the impact on our troops and on 

our forces, and that is their biggest concern. 

Secretary GATES. I would say, Senator McCain, I absolutely 

agree that how Congress acts on this is dispositive. 

Senator MCCAIN. Well, I hope you will pay attention to the views 

of over a thousand retired flag and general officers. 

Mr. Secretary, what kinds of partnerships or unions would the 

military be prepared to recognize by law in the event that this 

DADT is repealed? 

Secretary GATES. That’s one of the many issues that I think we 

have to look at, Senator. 

Senator MCCAIN. So again, you are embarking on saying it’s not 

whether the military prepares to make the change, but how we 

best prepare for it, without ever hearing from members of Congress, without hearing from the members of the Joint Chiefs, and 

of course without taking into consideration all the ramifications of 

this law. Well, I’m happy to say that we still have a Congress of 

the United States that would have to pass the law to repeal DADT 

despite your efforts to repeal it in many respects by fiat. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator McCain. 

Senator Udall. 

Senator UDALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for holding this very important hearing. 

I want to acknowledge, Secretary Gates, the work you’ve done to 

put a plan in place. Admiral Mullen, I think the centerpiece of your 

statement will be long remembered for the courage and integrity 

with which you outlined your own personal beliefs and how we can 

proceed. 

I’m proud to hail from a region of the country, the Rocky Mountain West, where we have a live and let live attitude. Some people 

would call it small ‘‘l’’ libertarianism. People’s personal lives, the 

choices that people make, are not the government’s business. I 

can’t help but think about a great Arizonan—I grew up in Arizona. 

My father was an Arizonan, my mother was a Coloradan, and I 

have the great honor to represent Colorado now. Barry Goldwater 

once said: ‘‘You don’t have to be straight to shoot straight.’’ That’s 

the opportunity that we have here today as Congress and the Pentagon moves forward. 

I have a few concerns I’d like to share in the couple of minutes 

that I have, and I’ll pepper my comments with questions and hopefully there’ll be time for you to respond. There have been a lot of 

studies done, Mr. Secretary, Rand, and there’s a recent study in 

the Joint Force Quarterly. It’s not clear to me that the study group 

needs a full year to study the implementation and transition. I 

want to just put that out there. 

I want to ensure that the focus of the group is on how to implement repeal of the policy, not whether, and I want to ask you to 

90 

assure me that the end point of the study would be a road map to 

implementing repeal, and that Congress would then be in a position to take legislative action that the Pentagon as a whole could 

support. 

Before you answer, I’d like your reaction to a legislative proposal 

that you may have seen. It would be to write into repeal legislation 

the period of time you suggest you need, say 1 year, while legislating that at the end of that time we would have finality, in other 

words a complete end to DADT. During that year-long transition, 

the DOD would have full authority and discretion with respect to 

DADT investigations and discharges. 

Language like this would certainly make me much more comfortable since I want, and so many others, a clear path to full repeal, and I’m not sure I see finality in the study. 

Again, thank you, gentlemen, and hopefully there’s a little bit of 

time left for you to answer. 

Secretary GATES. I think the purpose of the examination that 

we’re undertaking frankly is to inform the decisionmaking of Congress and the nature of whatever legislation takes place. It’s also, 

frankly, to be prepared to begin to implement any change in the 

law. We obviously recognize that this is up to Congress and my 

view is, frankly, that it’s critical that this matter be settled by a 

vote of Congress. 

The study is intended to prepare us along those lines so that we 

understand all of the implications involved. Frankly, there have 

been a lot of studies done, but there has not been a study done by 

the military of this, and this is the kind of thing that Admiral 

Mullen was talking about. 

I would just say with respect to your second point that I think 

we would regard—if legislation is passed repealing DADT, we 

would feel it very important that we be given some period of time 

for that implementation, at least a year. 

Admiral MULLEN. Senator, if I may, the only thing I would comment about all the studies and all the polls, I would just urge everybody that’s going to be involved in this, look at those studies 

and polls deliberately and what they actually looked at specifically, 

and to just reemphasize what the Secretary said: There really 

hasn’t been any significant statistically significant and objective 

survey of our people and their families. That gets to the Chiefs’ 

concern and mine as well, which really is engaging them in a way 

that we really understand their views on this. That just hasn’t 

been done and, as urgently as some would like this to happen, it’s 

just going to take some time to do that. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Udall. 

Senator Sessions. 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I know this is an 

important issue. We need to think it through, and every American 

is entitled to fairness and justice as we deliberate these issues. I 

do think we should do it at a high level. 

I would note, however, a bit of a concern that arises from something Senator McCain suggested. That is that the President as the 

Commander in Chief has announced a decision, and the Secretary 

of Defense apparently supports that decision. Admiral Mullen now 

has declared that he personally believes in this decision. So then 

91 

presumably someone below you will do some work on the policy, 

whether this is a good policy or not. So I guess if it was a trial we 

would perhaps raise the undue command influence defense. 

I think we need an open and objective and fair evaluation of this. 

A lot of things that have been said I would note that are not accurate, at least in my view, at least misrepresent certain things. One 

of them is 10,000 people have been dismissed from the military or 

voluntarily left the military under this provision. But that’s over 10 

years. It would be 1 percent maybe, if it was 1 year less than that, 

maybe if it was 1 year less than that, maybe .75 of 1 percent. But 

over a decade, it would be one-tenth of 1 percent or less. 

Also, there will be costs. I noticed—and I give the military credit. 

A lot of people don’t know this, Admiral Mullen, how open the debate and discussion you are. There’s an article in the Joint Forces 

Quarterly that basically supports this change. It was an awardwinning article, and they raised a lot of different issues both for 

and against, and the military welcomed that. I salute that. I think 

that’s healthy. 

But one of the points it made is that Charles Moskos, one of the 

original authors of the DADT points out that the number of discharges for voluntary statements by servicemembers—presumably, 

they come forward and say that they are homosexual—accounts for 

80 percent of the total, and the number of discharges for homosexual acts have declined over the years. Do you think that’s approximately correct? 

Admiral MULLEN. Senator Sessions, I think it is approximately 

correct. But it does go to again sort of a fundamental principle with 

me, which is everybody counts. Part of the struggle, back to the institutional integrity aspect of this—— 

Senator SESSIONS. Well, I know. I appreciate your view. 

Admiral MULLEN.—and putting individuals in a position that 

every single day they wonder whether today’s going to be the day 

and devaluing them in that regard just is inconsistent with us as 

an institution. I have served with homosexuals since 1968. Senator 

McCain spoke to that in his statement. Everybody in the military 

has, and we understand that. So it is a number of things which cumulatively for me personally get me to this position. 

But I also want to reemphasize what I said, is I am not all-knowing in terms of the impact of what the change would have, and 

that’s what I want to understand, and any impact and understanding readiness and effectiveness is absolutely critical. 

Senator SESSIONS. Well, it’s pretty clear what your view is and 

it would be clear on all your subordinates, every single 

servicemember in uniform. I don’t think that they are required to 

lie about who they are. I think that’s an overstatement, although 

I think the rule of DADT has seemed to work pretty well. 

I would note from the Christian Science Monitor here that the 

Chiefs of the Services met with the Chairman, Mike Mullen—I’m 

quoting from the article—‘‘and the consensus seemed to be that, 

the military fighting two wars and now responding to a new mission in Haiti, now is not the time to make such a big change to 

military policy.’’ That’s my understanding of the status of things. 

I just hope that as we discuss it you’ll recognize first that Congress has made the decision, it’s not yours to make, and we’ll have 

92 

to change it if we do change it; and second, you shouldn’t use your 

power to in any way influence the discussion or evaluation of the 

issue. 

Secretary GATES. Senator, I would just say that we can’t possibly 

evaluate the impact on unit cohesion, on morale, on retention, on 

recruitment and so on, unless we encourage people to tell us exactly what they think and exactly what their views are honestly 

and as forthrightly as possible. Otherwise there’s no use in doing 

this at all. 

Again, I just can’t emphasize enough, we understand from the 

beginning of this that this must be an act of Congress. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you. 

Admiral MULLEN. Senator Sessions, for me this is about—this is 

not about command influence. This is about leadership, and I take 

that very seriously. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you. 

Senator Hagan. 

Senator HAGAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Secretary Gates, I want to say that I applaud your efforts in 

commissioning a thorough evaluation of DADT and how to implement a repeal of the policy in order to minimize disruption in military readiness. I was just wondering, within this study how will 

you study—how will the study take into account the views of the 

combatant commanders in theater in order to minimize any disruption in the military readiness? 

Secretary GATES. The combatant commanders and the Service 

Chiefs will all have a part in this. The one thing that I have asked 

is that as we go through this process we try to—try not to disrupt 

or impact the deployed forces, and particularly those in Afghanistan and Iraq. They have enough on their minds and it seems to 

me we can get the answers that we need to the questions that need 

to be asked by not adding to their burden. So the one limitation 

I’ve put on this, which obviously does not apply to the combatant 

commanders, is that we try and have as little impact on the deployed force as possible. 

Senator HAGAN. Mr. Secretary and Admiral Mullen, as we move 

to end discriminatory practices within our Armed Forces, is there 

any reason to believe that the dedication and professionalism of our 

leaders in uniform is based in any way upon your sexual orientation, and that the moral fitness of our men and women should be 

based upon their sexual orientation? If not, then on what grounds 

do you believe that there remains a need to discriminate based on 

a servicemember’s sexual orientation? 

Admiral MULLEN. Senator Hagan, I personally don’t think sexual 

orientation, again, has a place for these kinds of decisions. I actually, I think there’s a gap between that which we value as a military, specifically the value of integrity, and what our policy is. But 

again, that’s personally where I am. I think it’s really in the review 

that would take place over the course of the next—by the end of 

this year, that I would look to certainly understand it much more 

fully, understand the impact if and when the policy changes, the 

impact on our people. 

That’s really—rather than at the end of this, we’re to some degree at the beginning of really trying to understand that. That’s in 

93 

light of many other opinions on this, including the opinions of those 

who’ve retired, all those things. But it really is—what I need to understand is to get it from our people and their families, and incorporating that in addition to all the other requirements that are 

here will be the goal of the review over the next better part of this 

year. 

Senator HAGAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Hagan. 

Senator Wicker. 

Senator WICKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I, too, am disappointed with this decision by the administration. 

But I’ll say this for our two witnesses. They understand the chain 

of command. I think we understand that elections have consequences, and these two gentlemen see their charge as moving forward with the directives of their commander. I think Secretary 

Gates said it explicitly in his statement: ‘‘We have received our orders from the Commander in Chief and we are moving out accordingly.’’ 

So we’ll have a debate about this and we will appreciate the information that the Department gathers for us. 

Senator McCain referenced in his statement more than 1,000 retired flag and general officers. Actually, I think it’s upwards of 

1,160 retired flag and general officers from all the armed services 

who have come out against a change in this policy. For my colleagues, their statement urging continued support for the 1993 law 

is contained at www.flagandgeneralofficersforthemilitary.com. 

I would commend to the members of this committee an op-ed 

written by Carl E. Mundy, Jr., a retired four-star general and 

former Commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps, who points out— 

who mentions the strong support for the current policy by this 

overwhelming number of retired flag and general officers, and 

points out that certain findings were made by Congress in support 

of the 1993 law to ensure clarity concerning the rationale behind 

the current statute. Key findings included that the primary purpose of the Armed Forces is to prepare and to prevail in combat, 

not to promote civil rights or social justice or compassion or individual fairness, but to prepare for and prevail in combat. 

Further findings include that success in combat requires military 

units that are characterized by high morale, good order and discipline, and unit cohesion; and further, that one of the most critical 

elements in combat capability is unit cohesion, that is the bonds of 

trust among individuals servicemembers. 

I would ask, Mr. Chairman, that this op-ed dated January 12, 

2010, by General Mundy be included in the record at this point. 

Chairman LEVIN. It will be made part of the record. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

94 


202ful5.eps
95 

Senator WICKER. So I appreciate the situation that our two witnesses find themselves in and I look forward to the debate and 

hope that the policy remains. 

Thank you. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Wicker. 

Senator Webb. 

Senator WEBB. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, let me see if we can review the facts here. This is 

obviously quite an emotional issue, but it’s also a legislative issue. 

My understanding from hearing both of your statements is this 

year period that you’re going to take in order to examine the issues 

will be followed then by clearer observations about the implications 

of changing the law. Would that be a correct way to state it? So 

you’re not coming in here saying, we’re going to change the law and 

this is the year that we’re going to put into figuring out how to implement the change? 

Secretary GATES. Our hope would be that the information we 

would develop during the course of this review would help inform 

the legislative process. 

Senator WEBB. Right. I salute both of you for very careful statements. Admiral Mullen, I salute you for the courage, for what you 

said, but I want to also emphasize that you balanced that in your 

statement saying you don’t know what’s going to come out of this. 

We don’t know. 


202ful6.eps
96 

What we’re looking for here is an examination of the present law, 

what is the most damaging aspect of the present policy? I think, 

Admiral Mullen, you made a very powerful statement in terms of 

the integrity of the individual as your deciding factor on your personal view. 

What is, on the other hand, what’s the great value of this law 

if we were to do away with it and move into something else? Again, 

what are the perils of undoing the law? Where are we going? 

Would we know we are going in the proper direction? We don’t. We 

can’t really say that today. 

I think that when you say that this is something that will ultimately be decided by Congress, I’d also like to emphasize my own 

agreement with what you have been saying about how important 

it is to hear from people who are serving, because whether the ultimate decision might be here with Congress, that decision can’t be 

made in a proper way without a full and open input from all of 

those who are serving, not just combatant commanders—family 

members, people who are in the operating units. 

The way that I am hearing this, which I would agree with, is 

that we have a duty here in a very proper way to understand the 

impact of this on operating units, to raise the level of understanding of the complexity of this issue among the American people 

and up here, as well as attempting to deal fairly with this issue. 

So again, I salute you both for a very responsible and careful approach to how we examine this. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator Webb. 

Senator Chambliss. 

Senator CHAMBLISS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Just as was stated by my friend Senator Udall, I think that a 

live and let live policy is not a bad policy to adhere to, and that’s 

what we have in place in the military with DADT right now. 

To you, Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, you’re in a tough 

spot and we understand that. This is an extremely sensitive issue. 

Everybody on this committee, I’m satisfied, is very sensitive to the 

issue, both inside and outside the military. In the military, it presents entirely different problems than it does in civilian life, because there is no constitutional right to serve in our Armed Forces. 

Today we know we have gay and lesbians soldiers serving. They’ve 

served in the past. They’re going to serve in the future and they’re 

going to serve in a very valiant way. 

But the primary purpose of the Armed Forces is to prepare for 

and to prevail in combat should the need arise. Military life is fundamentally different from civilian life in that military society is 

characterized by its own laws, rules, customs, and traditions, including restrictions on personal behavior that would not be acceptable in civilian society. Examples include alcohol use, adultery, 

fraternization, and body art. If we change this rule of DADT what 

are we going to do with these other issues? 

The Armed Forces must maintain personnel policies that exclude 

persons whose presence in the Armed Forces would create an unacceptable risk to the Armed Forces’ high standards of morale, good 

order, and discipline, and unit cohesion. In my opinion, the presence in the Armed Forces of persons who demonstrate a propensity 

97 

or intent to engage in homosexual acts would very likely create an 

unacceptable risk to those high standards of morale, good order 

and discipline, and effective unit cohesion and effectiveness. 

I’m opposed to this change and I look forward to a very spirited 

debate on this issue, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Chambliss. 

I believe Senator Burris is next. Senator Burris. 

Senator BURRIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I’d like to extend my deep admiration for our two distinguished 

leaders and their position. Not only are you following the direction 

of the Commander in Chief, but, Admiral Mullen, you expressed 

your personal view, which is to be commended. 

What we need is a policy that allows any individual who has the 

integrity and the commitment to serve this country, to serve this 

country. We can go back to President Truman, who took the audacity to integrate the Services. At one time my uncles and members 

of my race couldn’t even serve in the military. We moved to this 

point where they’re some of the best and brightest that we’ve had, 

generals and even now the Commander in Chief is of African 

American heritage. 

So what we are doing here now is not looking at the integrity 

and the commitment that individuals can make, not based on their 

sexual orientation, but in defense of this country. I say the policy 

needs to be changed, the policy must be changed, and we must 

have everyone who is capable, willing, and able to volunteer to defend this country, defend this great American tradition of ours, to 

have the opportunity to serve regardless of their sexual orientation. 

So based on that, we must continue to have the American spirit 

and have individuals who are willing to serve. 

I don’t have a question, Mr. Chairman. I just have this statement. I hope that we will look at legislation. By the way, the House 

has drawn up a bill. There are 185 members on this House bill. It’s 

House Bill 1283 and I’m hoping and praying that we will get it and 

move on this issue and not be wasting the taxpayers’ time and all 

of the energy on something that is so basic in human rights and 

opportunities for individuals in this country. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator Burris. 

Senator Collins. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, unlike my colleagues, I do have some questions rather than just a 

statement to ask. 

Admiral Mullen, we know that many of our NATO allies allow 

gays and lesbians to serve openly and many of these countries have 

deployed troops who are serving with us in Afghanistan. Are you 

aware of any impact on combat effectiveness by the decision of our 

NATO allies to allow gays and lesbians to serve openly? 

Admiral MULLEN. Senator Collins, I’ve talked to several of my 

counterparts in countries whose militaries allow gays and lesbians 

to serve openly and there has been, as they have told me, no impact on military effectiveness. 

Senator COLLINS. We’ve heard today the concern that if DADT 

is repealed that it would affect unit cohesiveness or morale. Are 

98 

you aware of any studies, any evidence, that suggests that repealing DADT would undermine unit cohesion? 

Admiral MULLEN. I’m not. In fact, the 1993 RAND study focused 

heavily on unit cohesion and that became the principal point put 

forward by the military leadership at the time, and I understand 

that. I understand what it is, I understand what goes into it, and 

that there are—there’s been no thorough or comprehensive work 

done with respect to that aspect since 1993. That’s part of what 

needs to be addressed as we move forward over this year. 

Secretary GATES. I would just underscore that. Part of what we 

need to do is address a number of assertions that have been made 

for which we have no basis in fact. 

Senator COLLINS. Exactly. 

Secretary GATES. We need—the purpose of the review that we 

are undertaking is to find out what the force, what the men and 

women in our Armed Forces, and, as Senator Webb said, and their 

families really think about this. The fact is at this point we don’t 

really know. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator Collins. 

Senator Lieberman is next and then, assuming nobody else 

comes in, then Senator McCaskill would be next, and then Senator 

Reed. Senator Lieberman. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. 

I opposed the DADT policy when it was created by this committee in 1993 and I remain opposed to it today. Therefore I support repealing it as soon as possible. My feeling, stated simply, 

then was that what mattered most was not how a member of the 

military lived his or her private sexual life, but that they were prepared to risk their lives in defense of our country; and that my 

judgment was that in a combat situation a member of the military 

in a tank or an MRAP today is going to care a lot more about the 

capability and courage of the soldier next to them than they are 

about the sexual orientation of that soldier, just as over the years, 

as Senator Burris referred to, they came to care a lot less about 

the race of the soldier next to them than about his or her courage 

or capability. 

Therefore, I’m grateful that the President has said he supports 

the repeal of DADT. I thank you, Secretary and Chairman, for saying that the question now is not whether, but how, and I think for 

us really when, we will repeal DADT. Am I right that what you’re 

telling us today is that what you’re going to do as soon as possible, 

at least after 45 days, is to determine how you can reduce the impact of the DADT within the current state of the law? Is that correct? 

Secretary GATES. Yes, sir. The numbers actually have gone down 

fairly substantially. They were about 600 and some in 2008, 428 in 

2009. We don’t know—I mean, we can’t quantify what the possible 

changes that I have talked about here, what impact they would 

have on that. But at least it would—if we are able to do something 

like that, would make these folks less vulnerable to somebody seeking revenge or whatever their motives in terms of trying to wreck 

somebody’s career. 

99 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Am I correct, just to ask the question and 

get it on the record, that your judgment as advised by counsel is 

that it requires an act of Congress repealing DADT for the actual 

policy itself to be ended in the military? You can’t do it by executive action. 

Secretary GATES. Yes, sir, that is correct. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. I wanted to ask you if—I’m sure one of the 

reactions to what you announced today will be that this is a delay. 

I want to ask you to consider not only the 45-day limit, but whether you would think about providing regular reports to Congress, 

and therefore the public, on the progress of the study that you’re 

doing during this next year? 

Secretary GATES. I don’t see any reason why we can’t do that. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. I appreciate that. 

Then the final obviously is that it’s up to us in Congress and in 

the Senate. We have to get 60 votes to repeal DADT or else it will 

remain in effect. 

Thank you. 

Chairman LEVIN. Unless there’s a provision inside the defense 

authorization bill that goes to the floor, which would then require 

an amendment to strike it from the bill, in which case the 60-vote 

rule would be turning the other way. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. It’s good. It is with great appreciation that 

I accept the higher wisdom of the chairman of the committee. I 

think that’s a great way to go. 

Chairman LEVIN. That’s on the record, everybody. [Laughter.] 

Thank you, Joe. 

Senator McCaskill is next. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I just want to make sure that we’re crystal clear about a couple 

of things here. First, are gay and lesbian Americans currently serving in our military? 

Admiral MULLEN. Yes. 

Senator MCCASKILL. In fact isn’t the foundation of the current 

policy that we welcome their service? 

Admiral MULLEN. Yes. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Are you aware of any morale issues or disciplinary problems surrounding the current service of gay and lesbian Americans as members of our military? 

Admiral MULLEN. Certainly not broadly. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Now, I think what you’re embarking upon 

is important. I think it is welcome. But here’s my problem. We now 

have established that we have gay and lesbian Americans serving 

in the military, that they are not broadly causing any kind of disciplinary or morale problems, that we welcome their service. 

So the issue isn’t whether or not gay and lesbian Americans are 

serving in the military. It’s whether or not we talk about it. So how 

are you going to get their input in this survey? 

Admiral MULLEN. Actually, my take on that is—well, hang on a 

second. [Pause.] 

I think that we would have to look very carefully at how we 

would do that. 

Senator MCCASKILL. That’s the point I would like to leave you 

with today, is that unfortunately because of this policy we welVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:37 May 06, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00105 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\62155.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
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comed their service. They’re serving bravely and well. We don’t 

have any kind of issues with morale and cohesiveness surrounding 

their service. But yet when it comes time to evaluate their service, 

they’re not allowed to talk about it. So you have a real challenge 

in getting perhaps maybe some of the most important input you 

may need as you consider this policy. I’ll be anxiously awaiting how 

you figure that one out. 

Admiral MULLEN. Yes, ma’am. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator. 

Secretary GATES. One approach, Senator, is to talk to those who 

have been separated. 

Senator MCCASKILL. I think that’s terrific. I think the ones who 

have been separated would be a great place that you can get good 

information. But I don’t know that you’re going to be able to get 

at those that are currently serving, because obviously they’re not 

going to e able to step forward and talk bout it. But I agree, Secretary Gates, that’s a great place because so many of them voluntarily separated because of issues of integrity. 

Thank you 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator McCaskill. 

Senator Reed. 

Senator REED. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Secretary, I want to follow up the point that Senator Collins 

made. It was my understanding that both Canada and the United 

Kingdom have allowed gays and lesbians to serve openly, in the 

case of Canada since the early 90s and Great Britain since at least 

early 2000. They are fighting side by side with us today in Afghanistan, and in fact I would think that we would like to see more of 

their regiments and brigades there. 

Does that I think suggest, as Admiral mentioned to me before, 

that their combat effectiveness has not been impaired and we’ve 

had the opportunity to work with them in joint operations. Does 

that add credibility, evidence, or weight to the discussions that 

you’re undertaking? 

Secretary GATES. I think that it is clearly something we need to 

address. We need to talk to those countries’ militaries in a more 

informal and in-depth way about their experience. I think that 

their experience is a factor, but I also would say that each country 

has its own culture and its own society and it has to be evaluated 

in those terms as well. 

Senator REED. I think one of the aspects you referred to in your 

prepared remarks is the at least presumptive difference in terms 

of the attitudes at different ranks within the military. Is that 

something you can comment upon now? Have you done any research or, Admiral Mullen, can comment about the attitudes based 

on age or based on other factors? 

Secretary GATES. I think that really goes to the point of what we 

need to do in the months ahead. I think Admiral Mullen would 

agree that we don’t know. We don’t have information based on 

rank or anything like that. 

Admiral MULLEN. Anecdotally, it would be my only comment: 

There really hasn’t been any objective review of this. So I think it 

would be too soon to comment, because actually anecdotally, there 

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are young poeople, noncommissioned officers, senior officers, on 

both sides this issue. It gets to this strongly held views driving 

this, as opposed to really understanding objectively what this policy 

change would mean. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Let me ask a final question, which I think 

is implicit in your overall testimony. That is—and this is rather 

simplistic, but there will be a decision and then there will be the 

implementation of that decision. I would assume that, at least in 

part, those have to be coordinated or referenced, so that part of this 

discussion and analysis going forward is not only a decision, but it’s 

also about how this policy would be implemented in a very detailed 

fashion. That would be something that would be available to Congress before they made the decision, or can you comment at all 

about that aspect? 

Secretary GATES. Let me just start by saying, sure, because one 

of the things that we will look at is, if there is a problem with unit 

cohesion, how would you mitigate it? How through training or regulations or other measures do you—if Congress were to repeal the 

law, then how would we implement it, just as you say. Part of our 

review process is, as we look at the different aspects of it, what are 

the problem areas that we’re going to see and how do we address 

those? 

As I said in my statement, it’s everything from base housing to 

various policies and regulations and so on. All of those have to be 

addressed. 

Admiral MULLEN. For me, Senator, it’s understanding the impact. It is then in that understanding that speaks in great part to 

potential implementation, and that then really goes to the core of 

where I am on this, which is leadership. So I mean, understanding 

that and they are integral to each other, impact and implementation, then says to me, Mullen, here’s how you lead this, this is what 

you need to do to move through it if the law changes. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you. 

Just briefly following up Senator Reed and Senator Collins’ point 

about other militaries, and Senator Reed’s point that our military 

is fighting side-by-side and with militaries who do not have a discriminatory policy against open service by guys, have you noticed 

any impact on our troops who serve with Canadians or with Brits 

because of a British or Canadian policy that allows gays to openly 

serve? Admiral? 

Admiral MULLEN. Since these wars started in 2003, it has not 

been brought to my attention that there’s been any significant impact of the policies in those countries on either their military effectiveness or our ability to work with them. 

Chairman LEVIN. I have to make one comment on a suggestion 

that somehow or other, Admiral, you were simply following orders 

here of your Commander in Chief, who’s made a decision, in your 

testimony this morning. I think your testimony was not only eloquent, but it was personal. You made it very clear that you were 

reflecting your personal view, which you are obligated under the 

oath you take to give to us. We thank you for that, and I thank 

you not just because it happens that I agree with what you said, 

but more importantly because you are required to give us a perVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:37 May 06, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00107 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\62155.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
102 

sonal view, and it was clear to me and I think clear to most of us 

that this was a view that you hold in your conscience and not giving to us because you were directed to by anybody, including the 

Commander in Chief. 

This statement of yours in my judgment was a profile in leadership this morning. It’s going to take a great deal of leadership to 

have this change made. I hope it is—the sooner the better, as far 

as I’m concerned. But with the kind of leadership you’ve shown this 

morning, I think it’s very doable, hopefully in a short period of 

time. 

One other comment and that has to do with what can be done 

in the interim—you’re going to be looking at that—without legislative change. Secretary, it’s my understanding that when servicemembers are discharged under DADT with an honorable discharge, 

that DOD policy now is that they only receive half of their separation pay which is authorized by statute. You’re authorized to either 

get half or full pay. Would you take a look at that as something 

we can do in the interim here to indicate a greater sense of fairness 

about this issue. 

You’re sitting there quietly, Senator Udall. I should have asked, 

do you have a final question? 

Senator UDALL. No, thank you. 

Chairman LEVIN. I thank you both. It’s been a long hearing this 

morning and we very much appreciate you, the men and women 

that serve with you and your families. We will stand adjourned. 

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR ROBERT C. BYRD

TACTICAL SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE/ELECTRONIC WARFARE

1. Senator BYRD. Secretary Gates, it has been brought to my attention that during 

operations in Afghanistan, U.S. forces enter areas believed to be infiltrated by the 

Taliban and, because of the widespread availability of cell phone and satellite phone 

technology, their efforts to capture the enemy are thwarted when lookouts provide 

early warning of their approach. What efforts can be undertaken to provide readily 

available, comprehensive, and continuous support to defeat this enemy capability? 

Please provide a detailed response (in classified form, if necessary). 

Secretary GATES. [Deleted.] 

2. Senator BYRD. Secretary Gates, it has also been brought to my attention that 

during operations in Afghanistan, U.S. forces have had to rely on physical searches 

of caves and other dangerous areas to locate Taliban propaganda radio stations. 

What capabilities exist to locate and defeat these facilities, and are they sufficiently 

deployed to prevent these facilities from operating? Please provide a detailed response (in classified form, if necessary). 

Secretary GATES. [Deleted.] 

INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE PROGRAMS

3. Senator BYRD. Secretary Gates, the current ability of the Air National Guard 

(ANG) to perform its Incident Awareness and Assessment (IAA)/Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) mission to support law enforcement, counternarcotics, weapons of mass destruction response, search and rescue, border and 

maritime security, and National Security Special Events requirements within the 

United States has been degraded due to the transfer of 6 of the 11 ANG RC–26 aircraft to support Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) as an enduring U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) requirement. These transfers, combined with maintenance and upgrade requirements, have reduced the number of available aircraft in 

the Continental United States to as few as one operational aircraft at times. What 

efforts are underway to reconstitute this domestic capability? 

103 

Secretary GATES. No timeline has been established for the return of the six RC– 

26 aircraft supporting OCO in the CENTCOM area of responsibility. Although I do 

not expect the RC–26 to be permanently deployed, I anticipate the aircraft will 

maintain a prolonged presence in theater to help offset the current airborne full motion video shortfall. 

The ANG is nearing completion of a capabilities based analysis that will identify 

domestic requirements for a fixed-wing aircraft with capabilities similar to those on 

the RC–26 (results expected in May 2010). This analysis will provide a basis for 

which the U.S. Air Force and ANG can better identify and fill domestic incident 

awareness and assessment requirements. 

4. Senator BYRD. Secretary Gates, are sufficient ISR assets currently dedicated to 

U.S. Africa Command? Please explain (in classified form, if necessary). 

Secretary GATES. [Deleted.] 

MEDICAL EVACUATION

5. Senator BYRD. Secretary Gates, the progress being made in Afghanistan by the 

United States in connection with minimizing the time between battlefield injury and 

arrival at a facility with surgical capabilities is admirable, and the performance of 

our medical evacuation and combat search and rescue crews can only be described 

as heroic. Are you committed to maintaining the current standard in Afghanistan 

as additional forces are deployed and operations spread over a larger geographic 

area? 

Secretary GATES. [Deleted.] 

6. Senator BYRD. Secretary Gates, several of our North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies also provide medivac support in areas occupied by U.S. forces. 

What efforts are underway to shorten the NATO 90-minute standard for medical 

evacuation from the battlefield? 

Secretary GATES. Less than a year ago (June 18, 2009), International Security Assistance Force Command (COMISAF) issued Fragmentary Order 318–2009 (Reassessment of Medical Evacuation (MEDEVAC) timelines) reducing the NATO standard for MEDEVAC timelines from 120 minutes to 90 minutes. COMISAF also directed that the regional commands conduct assessments to determine whether service personnel are receiving appropriate and expedient medical care. General 

McChrystal’s goal is for medical treatment to be made available to all assigned 

forces of International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)/U.S. Forces-Afghanistan 

(USFOR–A) within 60 minutes of receipt of the medical request. The current 

COMISAF MEDEVAC plan is based on the 60-minute standard, and includes aircraft necessary to meet this timeline. 

Additionally, the Departments of Defense and State continue to encourage our Allies and partners to invest in additional helicopters and the associated technology 

required for MEDEVAC in adverse conditions, as well as to drop those caveats that 

preclude currently deployed airframes and aircrew from responding in a timely 

manner. 

7. Senator BYRD. Secretary Gates, I have been informed that certain NATO allies 

have caveats on their medical evacuation aircraft that limit their support during 

certain times of the day and under certain battlefield conditions. When U.S. combat 

forces operate in these areas, they are often required to provide their own medical 

evacuation capabilities because of the NATO 90-minute standard and the caveats 

on their operations. What is being done to remedy this issue? 

Secretary GATES. Seven nations currently have caveats on MEDEVAC missions 

that include minimum night vision goggle illumination requirements, dust limitations, constraints on flying in mountainous terrain, requirements for landing zones 

to be secured, or have higher headquarters approval processes. Although the Departments of Defense and State consistently appeal to ISAF nations to remove operationally restrictive caveats, we are realistic that limitations in training, budgets, 

and political desire will preclude all caveats being dropped. Therefore, as part of the 

President’s increase in forces to Afghanistan, a Combat Aviation Brigade (CAB) is 

being deployed in RC-North to provide, among other missions, timely MEDEVAC 

coverage. Additionally, General McChrystal has directed regional commanders to ensure that all Allied service personnel receive appropriate and expedient medical 

care, ideally within 60 minutes of receipt of a MEDEVAC request. 

To support achievement of the goal of 60 minutes for our service men and women, 

in June 2009 I issued a memorandum to Commander, U.S. CENTCOM directing 

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him to achieve medical evacuation parity between Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom, with the standard for both theaters at 60-minute mission completion time. I further instructed General Petraeus to improve MEDEVAC 

response times in Afghanistan by: 

(1) establishing procedures to expedite MEDEVAC mission launches without having to wait for approval; 

(2) creating a process to identify, analyze, and report all MEDEVAC missions 

that take longer than 60 minutes; 

(3) reviewing existing MEDEVAC approval and launch procedures across Afghanistan; 

(4) directing USFOR–A to review ISAF/NATO procedures and Standard Operating Procedures, and making recommendations to ISAF for streamlining current requirements; and 

(5) requiring all U.S. forces in the USCENTCOM to review and understand existing MEDEVAC procedures. 

8. Senator BYRD. Secretary Gates, the fiscal year 2011 budget request supports 

creation of two CABs. What is the timetable for standing up these units? 

Secretary GATES. The 12th Active Component CAB, currently designated the 16th 

CAB, is planned to be fully operational by 2012. The majority of the personnel requirement for this CAB already exists, as this formation was consolidated utilizing 

existing aviation force structure. Some personnel growth is required to grow the 

headquarters for an assault battalion, an aviation support battalion, and the brigade headquarters; the spaces required for these formations were resourced in Total 

Army Analysis 12–17 (TAA 12–17). 

The Army Staff will present a recommendation for stationing location and 

timelines for the 13th Active component CAB to the Secretary of the Army 

(SecArmy) and Chief of Staff, Army (CSA) in late May 2010. There are multiple 

courses of action affecting the recommendation for the final stationing timeline 

which are dependent on available military construction, equipping and production 

line capabilities. Once the SecArmy and CSA have made their final stationing 

timeline decision we will be able to provide Congress with an expected timeline and 

final stationing locations for these units. 

9. Senator BYRD. Secretary Gates, will priority be given to the standup of the associated medivac companies to support combat medical evacuation in Afghanistan? 

Secretary GATES. [Deleted.] 

10. Senator BYRD. Secretary Gates, what procurement is planned for fiscal year 

2011 to ensure that these units are able to be fielded as rapidly as possible? 

Secretary GATES. One of the two CABs is being reorganized from existing aviation 

force structure and will not require additional procurements. The second CAB is 

being built incrementally as manning and equipment become available. Fiscal year 

2011 procurement includes 4 CH–47F helicopters, 16 UH–60M, and 2 HH–60M 

MEDEVAC helicopters. 

11. Senator BYRD. Secretary Gates, of the UH–60M aircraft proposed for procurement in fiscal year 2010 and fiscal year 2011, how many will be allocated to replace 

the aging fleet of UH–60A aircraft currently being used for medical evacuation? 

Secretary GATES. Due to a growth in medical evacuation requirements across the 

Army, the Army projects that it will not start replacing UH–60A aircraft with HH– 

60M aircraft until fiscal year 2015. Prior to fiscal year 2015, the HH–60Ms that the 

Army procures will fill the new requirement for additional MEDEVAC aircraft. 

12. Senator BYRD. Secretary Gates, the Afghanistan mission of the aging fleet of 

combat search and rescue aircraft has been expanded to include medical evacuation. 

This means that the direct combat support role of these HH–60 aircraft and the associated wear and tear on these aircraft has been dramatically increased. How many 

additional HH–60 aircraft will be procured in fiscal year 2010 and fiscal year 2011 

to replace existing combat search and rescue aircraft? 

Secretary GATES. The Air Force is purchasing four HH–60 aircraft in fiscal year 

2010 and the fiscal year 2011 budget requests the purchase of three additional HH– 

60 aircraft during fiscal year 2011. There are an additional three aircraft identified 

in the fiscal year 2011 OCO request. 

13. Senator BYRD. Secretary Gates, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have placed 

a dramatic strain on the UH–60 aircraft. What is the principal factor limiting the 

105 

acquisition of new aircraft to support the UH–60 mission: production capacity, cost, 

lack of available or appropriate alternative aircraft, or some other reason? 

Secretary GATES. The Army is committed to procure UH–60M aircraft as part of 

the Army’s overall plan to modernize the UH–60 Blackhawk Fleet. The UH–60 fleet 

is the largest helicopter fleet in the U.S. Army. The Army manages its UH–60 fleet 

modernization using Army force generation requirements to meet operational demands. There are no constraints to acquire the full number of aircraft required 

within budgeted resources. The maximum UH–60 production capacity has not been 

exceeded and the Army is procuring over 70 UH–60M aircraft each year through 

fiscal year 2015 for a total of 451 aircraft. 

IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE DEFEAT

14. Senator BYRD. Secretary Gates, in Afghanistan, the largest percentage of U.S 

casualties is being suffered directly from the employment of improvised explosive 

devices (IEDs) by enemy forces. What is the status of your review regarding IED 

defeat in Afghanistan and when can forces on the ground expect to see additional 

support? 

Secretary GATES. We have a number of very forward-leaning efforts underway to 

try and deal with the challenge of IEDs. Last November, I asked the Undersecretary 

of Defense for Acquisition Technology and Logistics (AT&L) and the Joint Staff, Director of Operations (J–3), to co-chair an effort focused on integrating Counter-IED 

programs across the Department of Defense (DOD). They made a number of recommendations, most recently to significantly enhance long-term full motion video 

platforms like aerostat blimps. In addition to this larger integration effort the theater commanders increased their requirement for Mine-Resistant Ambush-Protected 

(MRAP) vehicles, particularly the MRAP all-terrain vehicles. There is an additional 

requirement that is funded, or reflected in the OCO request, for approximately 

10,000 more MRAPs—6,600 of those will be the all-terrain version that is designed 

specifically for Afghanistan. Another important step has been to work collaboratively with the Government of Afghanistan to ban ammonium nitrate, the ingredient in the most prevalent IEDs in Afghanistan. Afghan National Security Forces 

and the coalition are aggressively pursuing smuggling networks that bring ammonium nitrate into the country to be used for making IEDs. 

RAPID PROTOTYPING AND ACQUISITION CAPABILITY

15. Senator BYRD. Secretary Gates, as you know, when a requirement is received 

from the battlefield, it is almost always a current requirement. However, the defense acquisition process is not set up in such a way to facilitate immediate or nearterm fulfillment of these requirements. In many cases, these requirements can be 

met immediately. In other cases, minor modifications to existing technologies can 

be made. In past wars, when the United States was less dependent on contractor 

support, these modifications could be made on the fly, often in the theater of operations. Similar requirements are being developed today. However, because of the 

current force structure and requirements process, these modifications or off-the-shelf 

requirements languish while our forces remain at risk. What efforts are currently 

underway to develop rapid prototyping and rapid acquisition capabilities and centers to address these requirements as quickly as possible? 

Secretary GATES. Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom clearly demonstrated the importance of developing a Departmental structure capable of rapidly 

responding to urgent warfighting needs. To respond to these urgent requirements, 

the Department has created several organizations that work with the Services to 

provide rapid prototyping and rapid acquisition. The Joint IED Defeat Organization 

(JIEDDO) and the Rapid Fielding Directorate (RFD) within the Director of Defense 

Research and Engineering (DDR&E) are indicative of flexible organizations focused 

on expeditiously addressing the Joint urgent operational needs of our warfighters. 

When necessary, I have also formed task forces to quickly respond to emerging 

threats, such as the MRAP and the ISR Task Forces. Additionally, each of the Services and the U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) have developed rapid acquisition processes to respond to Service-specific urgent needs. 

Rapid prototyping and rapid acquisition have enabled the Department to develop 

and field the all-terrain version of the highly successful, MRAP vehicle. The MRAP 

program made excellent use of rapid prototyping and rapid acquisition to accelerate 

schedules and deliveries of this lifesaving, highly effective vehicle. Additionally, 

within the last 6 months, the Department has used the Joint Capability Technology 

Demonstration (JCTD) Program to rapidly develop and demonstrate persistent 

106 

ground surveillance technologies that will directly benefit U.S. Forces in Afghanistan. The success of this recently accelerated JCTD (Persistent Ground Surveillance 

System (PGSS)) will deliver increased force protection and persistent surveillance 

sensors and command and control. The rapidly developed and procured Distributed 

Tactical Communication System now permits remote forces to stay in contact with 

friendly forces. The Transnational Information Sharing Cooperation (TISC) JCTD’s 

‘‘All Partners Access Network’’ is enabling U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) 

to coordinate with non-governmental organizations, coalition and interagency partners in support of Haitian disaster relief. Each of these systems was rapidly developed to respond to Warfighter and humanitarian assistance needs in less time than 

conventional defense systems. 

As I have previously stated, stability and counter-insurgency missions require 75 

percent solutions over a period of months. The Department is infusing innovative 

thinking and flexibility into its sometimes rigid procurement processes and adapting 

our policies and organizations to rapidly meet today’s threats to servicemembers and 

missions. 

SPECIAL OPERATIONS

16. Senator BYRD. Secretary Gates, it has come to my attention from a variety 

of sources that U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) in Afghanistan do not have 

sufficient medivac, manned ISR platforms, and dedicated air assets. As a result, 

forces are at increased risk. What is being done to remedy this situation? 

Secretary GATES. Deployed SOF in Afghanistan currently have sufficient medevac 

resources to support current operational requirements. 

Personnel training is the biggest factor limiting how fast DOD can deliver more 

manned ISR platforms to Afghanistan. Training pipelines for ISR operators and intelligence analysts are operating at maximum throughput to operate and employ 

newly acquired hardware, and DOD continues to ensure proper numbers and placement of analysts to effectively collect, analyze, and exploit intelligence data. 

To address the current need for battlefield mobility, one additional MH–47 will 

be delivered to Afghanistan in May, and two additional Chinooks will arrive in December 10 and June 11, respectively. Additionally, five CV–22s deployed in April to 

support SOF mobility requirements in Afghanistan, to include vertical lift. DOD is 

also accelerating delivery of CV–22s to better support the forces requiring them, and 

the Department anticipates adding five more CV–22s to the fleet in the coming year. 

Additionally, Program Objectives Memorandum (POM) initiatives will grow 

SOCOM’s helicopter fleet by eight MH–47 Chinooks by fiscal year 2015, and 

SOCOM’s CV–22 Osprey fleet will grow from the current 12, to 50 by 2016. 

17. Senator BYRD. Secretary Gates, when can these units expect to receive additional support? Please provide a detailed response (in classified form, if necessary). 

Secretary GATES. Deployed SOF in Afghanistan currently have sufficient medevac 

resources to support current operational requirements. 

Personnel training is the biggest factor limiting how fast DOD can deliver more 

manned ISR platforms to Afghanistan. Training pipelines for ISR operators and intelligence analysts are operating at maximum throughput to operate and employ 

newly acquired hardware, and DOD continues to ensure proper numbers and placement of analysts to effectively collect, analyze, and exploit intelligence data. 

To address the current need for battlefield mobility, one additional MH–47 will 

be delivered to Afghanistan in May, and two additional Chinooks will arrive in December 10 and June 11, respectively. Additionally, five CV–22s deployed in April to 

support SOF mobility requirements in Afghanistan, to include vertical lift. DOD is 

also accelerating delivery of CV–22s to better support the forces requiring them, and 

the Department anticipates adding five more CV–22s to the fleet in the coming year. 

Additionally, POM initiatives will grow SOCOM’s helicopter fleet by 8 MH–47 Chinooks by fiscal year 2015, and SOCOM’s CV–22 Osprey fleet will grow from the current 12, to 50 by 2016. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR DANIEL K. AKAKA

FOREIGN LANGUAGE DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIC PLAN

18. Senator AKAKA. Secretary Gates, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) 

recently reported that while DOD is developing a foreign language development 

strategic plan, DOD doesn’t know when it will be finished. In the absence of an approved plan, it will be difficult for DOD to guide the Services as it develops its apVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:37 May 06, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00112 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\62155.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
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proach to foreign language and regional proficiency transformation. Furthermore, it 

will be difficult for DOD and Congress to assess progress toward a successful transformation. Do you have an estimate as to when DOD will issue a strategic plan? 

Secretary GATES. The Department is nearing completion of its strategic plan for 

language skills, regional expertise, and cultural capabilities. We anticipate its release by late summer of 2010. 

19. Senator AKAKA. Secretary Gates, how will this plan address the development 

of foreign language skills for all servicemembers to better perform warfighting and 

non-warfighting activities? 

Secretary GATES. The strategic plan, built on the foundation laid in numerous 

strategic documents, will address the development of foreign language skills by focusing on identifying needed capabilities and requirements of the combatant commands and Defense Agencies. The plan will also outline specific steps how to build 

these capabilities into the Department. 

The strategic plan is designed to provide a comprehensive, systematic, and actionable way ahead. The plan’s vision statement, goals, objectives, and tasks will focus 

on building and enhancing language skills, regional expertise, and cultural capabilities as vital enablers for the Department to shape and respond to national security 

issues. The desired result will be the institutionalization of language skills, regional 

expertise, and cultural capabilities across the Department and the generation of a 

globalized force, with the right combination of skills and in the right numbers, 

equipped with the capabilities needed to meet the diverse operational needs of the 

21st century. 

ASIA-PACIFIC REGION READINESS

20. Senator AKAKA. Secretary Gates, it is impossible to overstate the importance 

of our military engagement in the Asia-Pacific region. It’s obvious that there are 

many challenges in this area, given the administration’s emphasis on this vital region. If one looks at continuing developments in the Pacific, our conventional adversaries are getting better and it is critical we maintain our superiority in the region. 

Given the many demands on the defense budget and the unique mission and environment we have in the region, how does DOD’s fiscal year 2011 budget impact our 

military readiness in the Pacific region? 

Secretary GATES. The fiscal year 2011 budget request supports the Quadrennial 

Defense Review (QDR) which identifies the unique mission and environment of the 

Pacific Region. The United States has been a Pacific power for more than a century. 

The vast distances of the Pacific and the low density of U.S. basing and infrastructure there place a premium on forward stationed and forward-deployed U.S. forces. 

We seek to sustain and strengthen our Asia-Pacific alliances and partnerships to advance mutual security interests and ensure sustainable peace and security in the 

region, while also promoting contributions by our allies and partners to global security. Toward this end, the fiscal year 2011 budget request supports augmenting and 

adapting our forward presence, which reassures allies of the U.S. commitment to 

their security. At the same time, we will encourage our allies and partners to enhance their roles in security and in regular multilateral security cooperation within 

the region to build trust, increase transparency, and reduce the risks of crisis or 

conflict. 

U.S.-PAKISTAN MILITARY ENGAGEMENT

21. Senator AKAKA. Secretary Gates, you were recently quoted in a speech at the 

Pakistan National Defense University that rebuilding relationships with this generation of Pakistani officers—who have had little or no interactions with the American military—cannot be done in just a few months. Rather, it will take years—requiring openness, transparency, and, above all, continuous engagement on both 

sides. What is U.S. and Pakistan progress in this area and how we can improve? 

Secretary GATES. Critical relationships are built through many aspects of DOD’s 

engagement program. For example, under the International Military Education and 

Training (IMET) program and the Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program 

(CTFP), DOD brings Pakistani officers into U.S. Professional Military Education 

(PME) programs, where they and their families can gain an appreciation for the 

United States and its citizens that pays dividends long after the officers return to 

Pakistan. Within Pakistan, the best examples are the training and equipping activities that U.S. forces carry out every day in various locations throughout the countryVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:37 May 06, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00113 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\62155.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
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coaching, teaching, mentoring, and enabling soldiers, noncommissioned officers 

(NCOs), and officers. 

These opportunities, and the progress achieved through them, are difficult to 

quantify because they are based on the complexity of personal contacts and commitment; nonetheless, the progress is quite real. As an example, from fiscal year 2009 

to fiscal year 2010, Pakistan IMET funding rose from $2.3 to $5.0 million, which 

supported 132 Pakistani students in fiscal year 2009 and is forecasted to support 

197 students in fiscal year 2010. We continue to seek to expand opportunities for 

such interchanges through IMET and other avenues. Where DOD has built such relationships, the PAKMIL leaders with whom DOD interacts have allowed us to expand our training and assistance, teach PAKMIL forces far more sophisticated tactics, and the fundamentals of Military Intelligence. Conversely, in those places and 

with those PAKMIL units where we are still struggling to build such relationships, 

there has been far less progress. 

The primary organization that engages the Pakistani Military (PAKMIL) on a 

continuous basis is the Office of Defense Representative Pakistan (ODRP) in 

Islamabad, Pakistan. This joint military organization, led by the three-star flag officer who also commanded our Humanitarian Relief efforts after the 2005 earthquake 

in Pakistan, provides the direct, military-to-military engagement for U.S. 

CENTCOM and DOD. 

ODRP’s ongoing efforts to strengthen and enable the PAKMIL’s ongoing combat 

operations against violent extremist organizations are fundamentally based on the 

establishment and nurturing of personal relationships with a broad range of 

PAKMIL officers and servicemembers. The ‘‘trust gap’’ that divides our countries 

and our militaries is quite real, and will take years to overcome. By focusing on personal relationships, DOD has learned that it can still create opportunities for real 

progress in achieving DOD’s goals to improve the PAKMIL’s skills in conducting 

counterinsurgency operations and strengthening its defense capabilities. 

We also utilize the DOD’s Near East South Asia (NESA) Center’s initiatives, 

which host Pakistani military officers and familiarize them with U.S. political values, governmental structures, policymaking processes, and policies related to South 

Asia and other regions of special interest to Pakistan. These initiatives are another 

essential piece in building the U.S.-Pakistan military relationship. 

ELECTRONIC HEALTH RECORD SYSTEMS

22. Senator AKAKA. Secretary Gates, the National Defense Authorization Act 

(NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2008 required DOD and the Department of Veterans Affairs 

(VA) to accelerate their exchange of health information and to develop capabilities 

that allow for interoperability (generally, the ability of systems to exchange data) 

by September 30, 2009. It also required compliance with Federal standards and the 

establishment of a joint interagency program office to function as a single point of 

accountability for the effort. In a January 2010 report, the GAO noted that the 

DOD–VA interagency program office is not yet positioned to function as a single 

point of accountability for the implementation of interoperable electronic health 

record systems or capabilities. In addition, GAO also stated that if the program office does not fulfill key management responsibilities as GAO previously recommended, it may not be positioned to function as a single point of accountability 

for the delivery of future interoperable capabilities, including the development of the 

virtual lifetime electronic record. What is the status of the virtual lifetime electronic 

record? 

Secretary GATES. Following the President’s announcement of April 9, 2009, DOD 

and VA accelerated efforts already underway to develop an approach to achieve the 

Virtual Lifetime Electronic Record (VLER). On August 21, 2009, the Deputy Secretaries of Defense and Veterans Affairs endorsed a development approach for VLER’s 

health component, leveraging the Federal Health Architecture’s Nationwide Health 

Information Network (NHIN) concept and standards. The VLER approach is multiphased. The initial two phases will aid in defining additional pilots and the VLER 

implementation timeline, which is anticipated to occur in six month increments. 

A VLER Pilot in San Diego was implemented on January 30, 2010. The San Diego 

Pilot participants were DOD’s Naval Medical Center San Diego, VA’s San Diego 

Medical Center, and Kaiser-Permanente. They demonstrated the use of the NHIN 

to exchange a selected set of data elements of a ‘‘Continuity of Care’’ document. Kaiser Permanente is a contract provider for VA, but not for DOD in the San Diego 

area, so DOD had no shared patients with Kaiser Permanente. Lessons learned 

from the San Diego Pilot are being incorporated into the next Pilot in Tidewater, 

Virginia. 

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Subsequent phases of VLER will include additional VA and DOD sites, live patient information, expanded data domains, different document types, and the ability 

for additional civilian sector partners to participate. VLER will build on the San 

Diego Pilot data set and expand it initially to Naval Medical Center Portsmouth, 

the VA Medical Center Hampton, and private sector partners in the Tidewater/ 

Hampton Roads area in Virginia. The target date for activation of Phase 1b is July 

31, 2010. The hospitals at Fort Eustis and Langley Air Force Base will be incorporated into the pilot after the initial activation. The Departments anticipate selecting additional sites for implementation by January 31, 2011. 

23. Senator AKAKA. Secretary Gates, what is your assessment of the progress 

being made and what are your thoughts on how the DOD and VA should proceed? 

Secretary GATES. The Departments of Defense (DOD) and Veterans Affairs (VA) 

are making substantial progress with electronic health record (EHR) systems. Historically, their respective systems existed in mutually exclusive lifecycles, with DOD 

serving beneficiaries from accession until retirement or separation and VA providing 

services from that point forward. Each Department’s EHR capability evolved to 

meet functional requirements, mission-specific and shared. Each Department also 

developed a system to obtain clinical information from private providers of purchased care. 

The historical EHR model is evolving as the Departments collaborate on and deliver health information technology solutions that improve the secure sharing of 

electronic benefits, personnel, and health information. Today, DOD and VA share 

more health information for clinical use than any other two health organizations in 

the Nation. Each Department has real-time access to the other’s health data on 

more than 3.5 million shared patients, including over 173,300 patients who are in 

theater. Further, since 2001, DOD has securely shared 1.6 terabytes of data on over 

5.0 million patients using the Federal Health Information Exchange initiative. 

Shared data includes patient demographic data, medication and allergy data, laboratory results, radiology reports, discharge summaries, consult reports, and health 

assessments. 

Today, each Department is modernizing its EHR capability and migrating from 

outdated legacy technologies to enable more rapid, flexible, and scalable responses 

to evolving national health care and computer industry standards. Common requirements will be treated as opportunities to consider common capabilities. A disciplined 

process for reviewing and identifying potential opportunities for shared acquisition 

or development is in place to ensure that shared efforts support the effective execution of each Department’s medical mission. The end-to-end lifecycle of health care 

will become a seamless process. 

The Departments’ efforts coincide with the movement to national standards led 

by the Department of Health and Human Services. As the Nation develops an increased capability for health information exchange using the Nationwide Health Information Network (NHIN) portfolio of services, DOD and VA are developing a Virtual Lifetime Electronic Record (VLER) that will employ NHIN services. Over time, 

VLER will become the primary method for DOD and VA to exchange clinical information with each other and with purchased care providers in the private sector. 

Until then, legacy system interoperability will be maintained. 

FUTENMA AIRBASE

24. Senator AKAKA. Secretary Gates, there has been growing concern over a possible delay of the implementation of the move of the Futenma Airbase on Okinawa’s 

remote east coast. Japan has said that it needs more time to consider the base’s 

future following recent elections. What is your assessment of the situation and how 

does DOD plan to proceed? 

Secretary GATES. I recognize that implementing the Futenma realignment agreement has been a challenge. The process has spanned three U.S. administrations and 

multiple Japanese cabinets. 

Prime Minister Hatoyama has stated that he intends to resolve the issue by May. 

I look forward to resuming work with the Government of Japan to fulfill our longstanding mutual objective of realigning our force posture in Japan to ensure that 

the Alliance’s operational capabilities remain sustainable politically and operationally. 

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DON’T ASK, DON’T TELL

25. Senator AKAKA. Secretary Gates, in the President’s State of the Union speech, 

he said he will work with Congress and the military to repeal Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell 

(DADT). DOD has a lot on its plate, from fighting two wars, supporting contingency 

operations in Haiti, to trying to build and maintain the best military force in the 

world in a fiscally constrained environment. What are the men and women in uniform telling you regarding this issue? 

Secretary GATES. As I announced in my statement previously before this committee, I have appointed a high-level Working Group within the Department to review the issues associated with properly implementing a repeal of the Don’t Ask, 

Don’t Tell policy. Over the course of the next 8 months members of the Working 

Group will meet with a wide array of individuals of all Services, ranks, ages and 

assignments, officers and enlisted, to seek their advice, opinions, and concerns regarding a repeal and how it should be implemented. 

26. Senator AKAKA. Admiral Mullen, a repeal of DADT will have an effect on 

many levels of the military. As a former commander, you have had to deal with how 

changes in policy have affected those under your command. It has been argued that 

a repeal could present some very complicated issues in the daily lives of our military. It has also been said that these resulting changes could affect morale and discipline in the ranks. Have you had the opportunity to talk to military leaders of our 

allies who allow individuals to serve in their militaries regardless of sexual orientation? Please provide comments on anything that you have learned from them. 

Admiral MULLEN. I am familiar with the militaries of a number of countries, typically western-style democracies, that have lifted the ban on homosexual conduct. I 

have spoken with the chiefs of many of these militaries. Their experiences are informative, but as the Congressional Research Service notes, we must be careful in 

making comparisons to other militaries. Our military is uniquely American, shaped 

by our unique national experience. I want to understand the range of issues repeal 

presents within our forces, and how those issues might be managed. 

That is why we are undertaking a comprehensive review of the issue to better understand the dynamics of any repeal. 

SUICIDE PREVENTION CONFERENCE REPORT

27. Senator AKAKA. Admiral Mullen, suicide prevention is difficult and challenging. There have been a lot of people in the Services and the VA who have 

worked diligently on this issue. The Services have experienced a rise in the number 

of suicides since the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq started. There is a need to understand suicide, look at the causes, and get to a point where we can prevent it. I 

would like to request a report on the results of the recent DOD/VA 2010 Suicide 

Prevention Conference. In particular, what follow-up actions are to be required from 

the two departments, as well as what is the timeframe which specifies the goals and 

actions that are to be achieved? 

Admiral MULLEN. The 2010 DOD/VA Suicide Prevention Conference, Building 

Strong and Resilient Communities, was attended by approximately 980 people from 

DOD, VA, the Services, and other Federal and civilian agencies. The conference was 

hosted by the Suicide Prevention and Risk Reduction Committee (SPARRC), which 

is chaired by the Defense Centers of Excellence for Psychological Health and Traumatic Brain Injury and VA and also includes representatives from DOD, the Services, and other Federal agencies. The conference demonstrated the progress DOD 

and VA have made in suicide prevention efforts, but also identified six key areas 

that need additional attention, including families; dissemination of resources; 

postvention activities; reducing stigma; building resilience; and additional research. 

Postvention refers to all activities after a suicide event. The SPARRC members and 

its partners will continue to collaborate this year to address some of the most pressing suicide prevention issues as highlighted during the conference. 

The conference identified the need for additional outreach, training, and education 

for families. Families should be viewed as the first line of defense in recognizing 

the signs and symptoms associated with suicide risk. SPARRC has formed a family 

subcommittee, which includes representatives from the Services, National Guard, 

and Reserves to focus on the needs of families, such as outreach, education, and 

training. During the course of calendar year 2010, the subcommittee will identify 

the most pressing needs of family members and provide recommendations on how 

SPARRC can best address those gaps. The subcommittee held its first meeting in 

March 2010 and will provide recommendations to the SPARRC in December 2010. 

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The dissemination of resources and tools to servicemembers, veterans, and families is another area that requires additional focus. Many innovative resources and 

tools currently exist, but servicemembers, veterans, families, and clinicians need to 

be aware of and have access to them. Populations in rural areas, particularly as it 

pertains to the National Guard, Reserves, and veterans are especially difficult to 

reach. One of the top priorities this year is to launch the SPARRC website. This 

website will serve as a ‘‘clearinghouse’’ for suicide prevention resources and practical 

tools for servicemembers, veterans, families, and clinicians. It will also create a collaborative space and allow for further improvement of dissemination and sharing of 

resources. An easily accessible web-based location for resources will ensure 

servicemembers, veterans, families, and clinicians know where to go for help and 

have access to critical resources no matter where they are located. 

The conference emphasized the need for consistent postvention activities within 

DOD. To address this issue, SPARRC has formed a working group to draft a DOD 

policy memo on postvention activities. Members of the working group will include 

representatives from the Services, National Guard, Reserves, VA, other Federal 

partners, as well as civilian organizations. The group will leverage existing 

postvention initiatives and best practices to develop a policy applicable to DOD. The 

working group expects to have a draft completed by September 2010. 

First hand testimonies from the conference emphasized the importance of seeking 

help, support and treatment. Stigma remains a toxic threat to access to care and 

needs to be eliminated. SPARRC and its partners will continue working to 

proactively transform culture through public education campaigns such as Real 

Warriors (www.realwarriors.net), the Marine Corps ‘‘Cover Me’’ video, and numerous other efforts to reduce stigma and encourage help-seeking behaviors to prevent 

suicide. Reducing stigma is an ongoing effort that DOD and VA will engage in 

throughout year. 

The conference also demonstrated the importance of engaging leaders at all levels 

to proactively mitigate risk through building resilience. The second highest priority 

highlighted by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s strategic guidance for 

2009–2010 states, ‘‘we will focus on Health-of-the-Force by considering holistically 

how to better prepare our force and care for our people.’’ Development of a Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) is currently underway to address 

Total Force Fitness based on the CJCS’s guidance. The estimated completion date 

for the CJCSI is fiscal year 2011. 

Finally, the conference highlighted the need for additional research and evidencebased models. The RAND Corporation conducted a study to identify state of the art 

suicide prevention practices. This effort was discussed at the conference and the results will be disseminated by May 2010. The Department will continue to engage 

in other research efforts to inform suicide prevention efforts throughout the DOD. 

SPARRC and its partners will work aggressively this year to accomplish these initiatives, but also recognize that suicide prevention is an ongoing effort. Continued 

collaboration between SPARRC members will ensure completion in a timely manner. Further, the SPARRC will facilitate communication and dissemination of 

emerging knowledge and tools through sustained outreach to military line leaders, 

health care professionals, family members, and communities. 

28. Senator AKAKA. Admiral Mullen, DOD has made significant progress caring 

for our military heroes with mental health issues. But, before we can care for them, 

we must first identify them. One of the biggest issues we must address is reducing 

the stigma related to seeking counseling. You recently stated at the DOD/VA Suicide Prevention Conference last month that the stigma still exists among 

servicemembers. It is imperative to get the message to our warriors that it would 

be courageous to reach out for help. How would you assess DOD’s continuing efforts 

to tear down the stigma that still deters many from seeking treatment for problems 

such as Traumatic Brain Injury and Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder and what do 

we need to do as we move forward? 

Admiral MULLEN. Current DOD-wide resilience and anti-stigma initiatives are focused on research and evaluation of the range and effectiveness of military resilience programs, to include, the Real Warriors Campaign to combat stigma, to increase servicemembers awareness of and encourage use of resources, utilization of 

the Warrior Resilience Conference to enhance and integrate core principles, DOD/ 

Federal programs development and utilization, promoting leadership in health and 

well-being, and providing practical tools for units and colleagues. 

Information on DOD Wide Real Warriors Campaign program is provided in attachment one. Although the Services do not have individual anti-stigma campaigns, 

anti-stigma efforts are reflected at all levels of their programs (see attachment two) 

including imbedded psychological health providers in personnel communities and 

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primary care clinics (to avoid concern about seeking behavioral health services from 

the medical community), removal of personal information in psychological heath utilization reports to leadership, confidential counseling services, lower stigma options 

for seeking care for issues such as sleep difficulties rather than mental health, and 

many other new initiatives delivered within the units, aleviating stigma concerns. 

Finally, and most importantly, a robust series of evaluation initiatives are underway to provide objective measurement of the range and effectiveness of resilience 

programs in the military. These evaluation efforts are outlined in detail in the third 

attachment. 


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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR EVAN BAYH

READINESS FUNDING CONCERNS

29. Senator BAYH. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, the fiscal year 2011 

budget materials request an 8.5 percent increase in Operation and Maintenance 

(O&M) funding from last fiscal year’s budget. The budget materials claim to rebalance the force. Yet without a decrease in operational tempo, force readiness continues to be consumed as quickly as it is created. How does this request rebalance 

the force if the lack of readiness in our nondeployed forces continue to cause significant risk to our National Military Strategy? 

Secretary GATES and Admiral MULLEN. In the absence of force cuts, DOD needs 

real growth to sustain its operations because some major programs grow faster than 

inflation—for example military health and readiness requirements. 

• Sustains air, ship, and land forces operations 

• Increased fuel costs 

• Interoperable communications 

• Intelligence and security activities 

• Information, surveillance, and reconnaissance activities 

The DOD also made significant progress to shift the financing of enduring programs from the OCO budget to the base budget. Adds were made to the base program for flying hours, servicemember and family support, intelligence, and special 

operations previously funded through OCO. 


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Also DOD faces higher operating costs for more sophisticated weapons—e.g., 

stealth materials and technologies require more expensive maintenance. 

• Depot maintenance for land forces equipment, ships, and aircraft • Related contract logistics support 

Training costs associated with more sophisticated weapons are higher. 

• Advanced skills training such as flight training 

30. Senator BAYH. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, is the reset funding request for fiscal year 2011 sufficient and when will we begin to see a return on its 

investment in reset in terms of improved readiness? 

Secretary GATES and Admiral MULLEN. The Department’s reset funding request of $21.3 billion is sufficient, based on an examination of individual military Service 

requests, reconciled with the administration’s ground rules for items acceptable for 

inclusion in reset funding. This amount will cover requirements for replenishing ammunition and missile stocks expended in operations and training, replacement of 

equipment lost in battle or worn beyond economic repair, and maintenance activities 

based on scheduled need. If funding is provided as requested, the Department will 

maintain the highest level of readiness that is achievable, but readiness levels are 

dependent on other Overseas Contingencies Operations funding as well, such as 

Military Personnel, O&M to maintain operating tempo levels, and Force Protection 

funding, to mention a few. 

31. Senator BAYH. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, would additional reset 

funding restore readiness levels sooner and what are the anticipated reset costs for 

the out-years? 

Secretary GATES and Admiral MULLEN. The Department’s reset funding request 

of $21.3 billion is sufficient for fiscal year 2011, based on an examination of individual military Service requests, reconciled with the administration’s ground rules 

for items acceptable for inclusion in reset funding. It is anticipated that reset funding will be needed for at least 2 years after the contingencies end. The Department 

will assess the need for future reset funding based on force levels in the theater of 

operations, as well as specific equipment battle losses and damage as those are incurred. Outyear funding requirements are not precisely known at this time, as they 

are dependent on those circumstances, as well as the timing of eventual force drawdown. 

32. Senator BAYH. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, to what extent has DOD 

evaluated the impact of sending additional forces to Afghanistan on overall force 

readiness? 

Secretary GATES and Admiral MULLEN. Through our quarterly Global Force Management Board (GFMB) process, the Department routinely evaluates the impact and 

risk associated with force sourcing before the decision to allocate additional forces 

is approved. Furthermore, as a major component of the Chairman’s Readiness System (CRS), the Joint Combat Capabilities Assessment (JCCA) process evaluates our 

ability to execute plans based on our current force posture and readiness. In turn, 

the Joint Staff examines and evaluates the results of the JCCA process and reviews 

force readiness on a quarterly basis through the Joint Force Readiness Review 

(JFRR). 

33. Senator BAYH. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, how confident are you 

that the supplemental request will or will not be sufficient to cover all costs, considering the disaster assistance currently being provided to Haiti by our military 

forces? 

Secretary GATES and Admiral MULLEN. Based on the current force assumption, 

the fiscal year 2010 OCO supplemental request will be sufficient assuming congressional support for a Haiti supplemental. The Department is requesting a supplemental of $655 million to support operations in Haiti. The Haiti supplemental includes $400 million to reimburse the Component’s for Haiti operations and $255 

million for the Overseas Humanitarian Disaster Assistance and Civilian Assistance 

(OHDACA). 

34. Senator BAYH. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, what is the plan to recoup those costs which are currently being taken out of O&M? 

Secretary GATES and Admiral MULLEN. The Department is requesting a supplemental of $655 million to support operations in Haiti. The Haiti supplemental includes $400 million to reimburse the Services for funds that were transferred from 

the O&M appropriation to the OHDACA appropriation for the Haiti operations. It 

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also includes $255 million for the OHDACA to cover the costs for DOD’s humanitarian support to Haiti and other contingencies that are affected by natural disasters. 

RESET/RECONSTITUTION AND READINESS IN AFGHANISTAN

35. Senator BAYH. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, as DOD begins to increase troop levels in Afghanistan, the Army and Marine Corps have been adjusting 

their plans to redeploy equipment from Iraq. Some of this redeploying equipment, 

which was scheduled to return to the United States, is now being redirected to units 

headed to Afghanistan. In addition, we understand that some forces will move directly from Iraq to Afghanistan. How is DOD handling the reset of this equipment 

to original capability before it goes into Afghanistan? 

Secretary GATES and Admiral MULLEN. The equipment directly transferred from 

Iraq to Afghanistan is combat-ready and is being transferred without going through 

a reset event. The transferred equipment is primarily Theater Provided Equipment 

(TPE) that units deploying to Afghanistan will fall in on. Use of TPE reduces transportation requirements, a particularly important consideration for supporting Operation Enduring Freedom. In rare cases based on operational need, some units were 

transferred from Iraq to Afghanistan with serviceable, combat-ready organizational 

equipment and TPE. Some equipment items, such as MRAPs, are being reconfigured 

to meet operational requirements and repaired as required en route to Afghanistan 

at an in-theater facility; however, this is not a reset event. As most TPE has been 

in theater for more than 6 years, the Services anticipate higher than normal washout rates as well as increased repair costs in future years. The organizational equipment assigned to units redeploying from Iraq to home station will be reset as appropriate after return. 

36. Senator BAYH. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, what are the cost implications for reset/reconstitution given increases in troop levels and new platforms 

such as MRAP vehicles and Multipurpose All-Terrain Vehicles (M–ATVs)? 

Secretary GATES and Admiral MULLEN. The Department will assess the need for 

future reset funding based on force levels in the theater of operations each year, as 

well as specific equipment battle losses and damage as those are incurred. Equipment Reset costs will be more dependent on equipment already in theater that will 

be scheduled for maintenance cycles and possible replacement, than the presence of 

new platforms such as MRAPs and M–ATVs. Outyear funding requirements are not 

precisely known at this time, as they are dependent on those circumstances, as well 

as the timing of eventual force drawdown and equipment return to the continental 

United States (CONUS). 

37. Senator BAYH. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, what additional training 

is being provided to those forces that will move directly into Afghanistan from Iraq? 

Secretary GATES and Admiral MULLEN. The combatant commander and joint service provider of forces transitioning from Iraq to Afghanistan is responsible for ensuring those forces receive any required Afghanistan specific training prior to assignment to that area. Core competency training associated with the CENTCOM Area 

of Responsibility (AOR) and the Request For Forces (RFF) requested capability(ies) 

has previously been completed by those forces already deployed to Iraq. Afghanistan 

specific training will be provided based on RFF requirements and can include but 

not be limited to Rules of Engagement (ROE), cultural training, enemy threat briefs, 

detention procedures, medical and casualty evacuation (MEDEVAC/CASEVAC) procedures, and other force protection measures. Additional training and briefings on 

various Afghanistan command directives such as the July 2009 ISAF headquarters 

(HQ ISAF) tactical directive will also be incorporated into individual and unit training requirements as required. 

38. Senator BAYH. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, is there sufficient basing 

in Afghanistan to handle the additional troops, and given the logistical challenges 

in Afghanistan, has DOD synchronized the arrival of troops with their equipment, 

and if not, what is the operational impact? 

Secretary GATES and Admiral MULLEN. A. The basing in Afghanistan will have 

to expand in order to handle the additional troops the President ordered, but U.S. 

CENTCOM and U.S. Forces Afghanistan (USFOR–A) have structured a plan to send 

Engineers in early to build additional Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) and expand 

existing FOBs to accommodate the additional forces prior to their arrival. As for 

synchronization, CENTCOM and U.S. Transportation Command conducted planning 

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conferences in December and again in late January. These planning conferences refined requirements for personnel and associated equipment and developed a phased 

transportation plan to ensure synchronized force build up. The Global Force Management process is now closely managing the deployment of those forces to arrive 

in country at virtually the same time as their equipment, so the troops are not waiting without their equipment. 

B. I agree with what Secretary Gates said. I think it is important to realize, the 

basing standard we are building to is the Initial Standard, which is expeditionary, 

with our troops living in austere conditions utilizing unit organic tentage, with force 

protection and basic life support services provided but not much more. Our intent 

is to improve the facility infrastructure over time to a Temporary Standard. In order 

to improve the sustainable living environment of our forces, we have asked for some 

Military Construction (MILCON) funds to facilitate these improvements and appreciate your continued support in these efforts. To the question of phasing, the forces 

are arriving in three phases and the engineers are timed to arrive in time to prepare FOBs for the troops arriving for the next phase. The FOB construction and expansion plans are on track and the additional 30,000 troops the President ordered 

will be closed by the end of August this year as planned. Finally, I would just note 

that the Department continues to improve synchronized force flow through prudent 

planning and expanded air, road and rail routes across Europe and Central Asia, 

routes also known as the Northern Distribution Network (NDN). The NDN augments other well-established routes running through Pakistan and is an important 

part of our capacity and synchronization solutions. 

EARMARKS

39. Senator BAYH. Secretary Gates, every year our committee receives letters from 

Senators requesting earmarks. While we have taken significant steps to increase 

earmark transparency to the general public, the process for evaluating and which 

to support has essentially remained the same over the years. As a result, in order 

to support a few earmarks we must make funding cuts in other areas to meet budget resolution top line requirements and the President’s budget request. Unfortunately, cuts sometimes take additional risk in DOD’s O&M accounts. How can you 

help us better determine what earmark requests are in line with real military value 

or requirements and what are simply wasteful spending? 

Secretary GATES. What you are asking essentially is for assistance in cutting the 

President’s defense budget request in order to fund earmarks that we did not request. Your question acknowledges that earmarks cause additional risk in DOD’s 

O&M accounts, and that is what I would underscore. If certain earmarks have some 

military value, that does not alter the fact that those earmarks would displace genuine, higher priority requirements in our request. When our DOD leaders formulate 

each year’s budget request, we always have to omit certain requirements because 

they cannot be accommodated in a constrained topline. Each year’s budget request 

includes our most pressing military needs, and cuts to the request increase the risks 

for our current and future warfighters. 

40. Senator BAYH. Secretary Gates, in your opinion, what would constitute a valid 

member request? 

Secretary GATES. In my opinion, the program needs to have military value to the 

Department and be a priority of the administration. The budget request that the 

President submitted for fiscal year 2011 reflects the most pressing needs of our military warfighters that could be accommodated within the constrained Defense 

topline. Any action by Congress to reduce the budget request for Defense to fund 

programs not requested by the adminsitration increases the risk for current and future warfighters. 

41. Senator BAYH. Secretary Gates, from your experience, how would you characterize the additional risks are we accepting to military readiness by making cuts 

in O&M accounts? 

Secretary GATES. The President’s fiscal year 2011 budget request balances our 

needs, including O&M accounts, to secure and advance U.S. security interests 

around the world. Reduction to any appropriation account increases the risks of not 

being able to meet our mission requirements. The fiscal year 2011 budget supports 

our force structure requirements and will sustain our readiness levels. Should significant cuts be made to operating budgets, readiness goals will be put at risk. 

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FULL DISCLOSURE BUDGET

42. Senator BAYH. Secretary Gates, in last week’s issue of Defense Daily, retired 

Pentagon senior budget analyst, John King, proposed a ‘‘full-disclosure budget, 

where all parties can see the real military requirement backed by quantifiable rationale, the budget plan, and any gap created by affordability or other development 

or acquisition delays . . . To re-channel all the misspent pork war energy, DOD can 

set up a show-and-tell office, where companies, research institutes, and universities 

can bring their ideas and proposals. DOD conducts a hard-nosed evaluation of how 

the proposal adds military value and fits into the budget plan.’’ This process would 

be open to the public as well. What is your take on this idea and how feasible is 

it? 

Secretary GATES. A full disclosure budget is feasible, and that is exactly what 

DOD uses. So this proposed process is essentially already used and is not a new 

idea. Every DOD budget request is backed by quantifiable rationale to justify the 

military requirements being funded. Our budget plans or presentations discuss development or acquisition delays, or affordability issues. And companies, research institutes, and universities have full access to bring their ideas and proposals in response to DOD requests for proposals (RFPs). 

QUESTIONS SUBMTITED BY SENATOR MARK BEGICH

ENERGY SECURITY

43. Senator BEGICH. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, over the course of the 

past several years, DOD has engaged in a number of initiatives to increase its energy security. Energy security is critical to national security. How important do you 

believe it is for DOD to achieve energy security and what specific steps is DOD taking to get there? 

Secretary GATES and Admiral MULLEN. It is critical that the Department achieve 

energy security. The U.S. military’s reliance on oil and other fossil fuels poses four 

broad security challenges. The first is the growing risk to operating forces. Attacks 

on our supply lines in Afghanistan and Iraq are increasingly sophisticated and effective, resulting in a growing number of casualties. The ability of potential adversaries to attack our fixed energy supplies and delivery forces will continue to improve. In short, our fuel inefficiency endangers our troops and threatens our missions. 

A second challenge is the insecurity of the global commons. Most petroleum products are transported by sea, and much of this trade passes through vulnerable 

chokepoints such as the Straits of Hormuz and the Straits of Malacca. The free flow 

of energy through these vital channels may be threatened by piracy, political instability, or military action. Thus, fuel inefficiency is a strategic as well as a tactical 

threat. 

A third challenge has to do with oil supply, demand, and price volatility. Tightening global oil supplies and political instability within some oil-producing nations 

created significant price volatility in recent years, raising our costs and making 

budget and acquisition decisions more difficult. The challenge will increase as the 

growing demand for energy—particularly in Asia—outstrips projected oil production 

and refining capacity. 

A final challenge is grid vulnerability. The Department’s reliance on a fragile commercial grid to deliver electricity to its 500-plus installations places the continuity 

of critical missions at risk. Most installations lack the ability to manage their demand for and supply of electrical power and are thus vulnerable to intermittent 

and/or prolonged power disruption due to natural disasters, cyber attacks, and sheer 

overload of the grid. Because of U.S. combat forces’ increasing reliance on 

‘‘reachback’’ support from installations in the United States, power failures at those 

installations could adversely affect our power projection and homeland defense mission capability. For example, the Department operates Predator drones in Afghanistan from a facility in Nevada and analyzes battlefield intelligence at data centers 

here at home. This means that an energy threat to bases at home can be a threat 

to operations abroad. 

The Department has made meaningful progress in addressing energy security, 

though we have much more to do. In keeping with the requirements of the 2009 

NDAA, I have created the Office of Director for Operational Energy Plans and Programs. The President has nominated Sharon Burke to head this new Directorate, 

and I hope the Senate will confirm her very soon. The Military Departments are 

standing up their energy offices as well and they are developing detailed strategic 

plans. The Service Secretaries have also made energy a high priority. For example, 

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in October, Navy Secretary Ray Mabus announced a set of ambitious new goals to 

boost the energy efficiency of the Navy and the Marine Corps. His plans include 

fielding a completely sustainable carrier strike group (nuclear vessels and ships 

powered by biofuel), dubbed ‘‘the Great Green Fleet,’’ by 2016, and producing half 

of the Navy’s installation energy requirements from renewable sources by 2020. Secretary Mabus also stated recently that energy-related costs will become a greater 

consideration in Navy acquisition decisions. We have seen how the vulnerability of 

logistics forces, coupled with a huge demand for fuel, creates an operational risk 

that must be reduced. As Congress has directed, I will develop and implement the 

Energy Key Performance Parameter in the requirement development process and 

the Fully Burdened Cost of Fuel in the acquisition process to help drive down this 

risk to forces and the cost of assuring operational energy security. 

With respect to fixed installations, under my direction the Department has pursued a two-part investment strategy that is designed to: (1) reduce the demand for 

traditional energy while (2) increasing the supply of renewable energy sources. In 

addition to the Department’s military construction budget, financing for these investments has come from our Energy Conservation Investment Program, Energy 

Savings Performance Contracts and mechanisms such as Enhanced Use Leases, and 

Power Purchase Agreements. 

Efforts to curb demand—through conservation measures and improved energy efficiency—are by far the most cost-effective way to improve an installation’s energy 

profile. A large fraction of energy efficiency investments go to retrofit existing buildings; typical retrofit projects install high-efficiency heating, ventilation, and cooling 

(HVAC) systems, energy management control systems, new roofs, and improved 

lighting. The Department is also taking advantage of new construction to incorporate more energy efficient designs, material and equipment, using LEED Silver 

standards as a guide. From 2005 to 2008, DOD reduced the energy intensity of facilities by 11 percent through conservation and investment in energy efficiency. 

On the supply side, military installations—which are large and disproportionately 

located in the southwest and on our coasts—are well-situated to support solar, wind, 

geothermal and other forms of renewable energy. For example, Nellis Air Force 

Base in southern Nevada built a 14-megawatt (MW) photovoltaic solar array using 

a public-private partnership. The military’s interest in renewable energy is nothing 

new. Naval Air Weapons Center China Lake in California has been operating a 

270–MW geothermal plant since 1987. The Department renewable energy goal is to 

produce or procure 25 percent of energy from renewable sources by fiscal year 2025. 

The assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas’ Security 

Affairs, the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Installations and Environment, 

and the Office of the Director for Operational Energy Plans and Programs are also 

leading an effort on grid-related energy security relative to DOD operations. The 

purpose is to ensure DOD’s critical missions continue unimpeded during interruptions in grid power and to inform the interagency and industry on DOD’s needs related to grid-supplied power. 

44. Senator BEGICH. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, how does the budget 

and the QDR budget reflect a move towards energy security? Please describe in detail. 

Secretary GATES and Admiral MULLEN. The recently released QDR makes clear 

that crafting a strategic approach to energy and climate change is a high priority 

for DOD. 

To achieve operational energy reductions, the Department tripled investment in 

energy security technology over the last 4 years, from $400 million to $1.2 billion. 

DOD is investing to improve the efficiency of aircraft engines, which account for a 

large fraction of all operational energy consumption. One promising project is the 

Highly Efficient Embedded Turbine Engine, based on a high-pressure ratio, hightemperature core turbine technology that should reduce fuel consumption by 25 percent and also be applicable to commercial aircraft. The Army is developing technology to reduce the fuel consumption of tactical ground vehicles such as the High 

Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) by 30 to 40 percent in the future. 

The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) is spending $100 million on an 18-month project to develop affordable algae-based synthetic fuels. DOD 

is testing a more advanced approach within the Net-Zero Joint Concept Technology 

Demonstration program that would allow a FOB to create all the power it needs 

within its own perimeter fence—largely through renewable energy. The demonstration is hosted at the National Training Center at Fort Irwin, CA. Generators used 

to provide HVAC at FOBs are another major consumer of operational energy. In 

2008, DOD began spraying insulating foam on tents, trailers and other temporary 

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structures in Iraq, and later Afghanistan, with significant results. Estimates of the 

fuel saved for heating and cooling in these structures are approximately 50 percent. 

In one demonstration, DOD insulated 9 million square feet of temporary structures 

and reduced daily fuel demand by an estimated 77,000 gallons, which can translate 

to 13 fewer trucks convoying fuel each day. Once confirmed, the Director for Operational Energy Plans and Programs will lead the creation of a DOD-wide Operational Energy Strategy setting priorities and informing how the Department addresses energy in its core planning, requirements, acquisition, and budgeting processes. With respect to fixed installations, the Department is pursuing a two-part investment strategy that is designed to: (1) reduce the demand for traditional energy; and 

(2) increase the supply of renewable energy sources. In addition to the Department’s 

military construction budget, financing for these investments has come from its Energy Conservation Investment Program, Energy Savings Performance Contracts, 

and mechanisms such as Enhanced Use Leases and Power Purchase Agreements. 

BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE

45. Senator BEGICH. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, last year, the administration made significant changes to the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) 

element of Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD). The decision was made to decrease deployment of interceptors in the United States from 44 to 30. Additionally, deployment of a European GMD capability was cancelled in favor of a phased-adaptive approach to address a range of threats in the area. The new approach is intended to 

augment the existing GMD long-range capabilities in the United States. As a result 

of the decision to cancel deployment of GMD Europe, Alaska and California are the 

Nation’s only line of defense against a long-range intercontinental ballistic missile 

(ICBM). How does the fiscal year 2011 budget and the BMD review reflect a robust 

strategy and investment in the GMD program to provide defense of the Nation with 

30 operational interceptors? 

Secretary GATES and Admiral MULLEN. The fiscal year 2011 President’s budget 

request lays out a funded plan to expand the integration of the GMD capabilities 

into the larger Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS). This will include deploying 

30 operational ground-based interceptors (GBIs), as well as delivery of 4 additional 

interceptors as operational spares (based on reliability estimations) and 18 additional interceptors to support the flight test program. The GMD element will maintain operational effectiveness and reliability through a number of initiatives designed to: thoroughly test the performance of the system; achieve a high state of 

readiness; monitor the health of the deployed interceptors; and modernize the system with technology improvements to the interceptor and supporting ground systems. 

The Department plans to complete the construction of Missile Field 2 in Fort 

Greely, AK, by emplacing the full 14 GBI silos and making those silos operationally 

ready. This will both replace older, inadequate silos from Missile Field 1 and provide a reserve capability to deploy up to 8 additional GBIs rapidly from the pool 

of interceptors currently designated for testing. Although the Department does not 

currently foresee a need for more than 30 deployed GBIs, these extra operational 

silos will provide an additional hedge against future threat uncertainty. The Department does not require the procurement of additional GBIs for this purpose. The Department will also complete a second GMD Fire Control node at Fort Greely, AK, 

by the end of calendar year 2011. 

INTERCEPTOR INFRASTRUCTURE

46. Senator BEGICH. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, what decisions have 

been made with respect to infrastructure required to deploy interceptors, specifically 

at Fort Greely, Alaska? 

Secretary GATES and Admiral MULLEN. There are currently two completed missile 

fields at Fort Greely, AK—Missile Field 1 and Missile Field 3 with 6 and 20 silos, 

respectively. The fiscal year 2011 President’s budget request reflected the funding 

needed to continue the operations, sustainment, and maintenance of Missile Field 

1 and to complete Missile Field 2 in a 14-silo configuration. 

This effort also requires continued use of fiscal year 2009 funds previously appropriated for work on Missile Field 2 and fiscal year 2010 funds previously appropriated to suspend work on Missile Field 2. MDA submitted a reprogramming request to the Department’s Comptroller for the realignment of $72.8 million of fiscal 

year 2009 RDT&E funds and $16 million of fiscal year 2010 RDT&E funds within 

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the BMDS Midcourse Defense program element for the continuation of Missile Field 

2. This configuration’s additional silos will enable future flexibility to increase GBI 

inventory in response to emerging threats. 

Upon completion of Missile Field 2, Missile Field 1 will be decommissioned. Missile Field 1 was originally designed as a test bed, so it lacks required hardening and 

redundant power, and has significant infrastructure reliability issues. The Missile 

Field 2 design includes shielding and addresses the reliability concerns of Missile 

Field 1. Missile Field 1 will not be decommissioned until Missile Field 2 is fully 

available for emplacing GBIs. In the meantime, Missile Field 1 will be closely monitored and maintained in a high state of readiness through intensive maintenance 

procedures. 

47. Senator BEGICH. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, has DOD taken any 

measures to preserve deployment capacity as a hedge against the increasing threat 

in the event more than 30 operational interceptors are required? 

Secretary GATES and Admiral MULLEN. Yes, The Department plans to buy 52 

GBIs, 30 of which will be operationally deployed, 4 of which will be held as operational spares, and the rest of which will be test articles. DOD expects this level 

to provide sufficient protection of the homeland, while allowing the Missile Defense 

Agency (MDA) to pursue a robust test program and enabling operational flexibility 

should a new threat emerge. DOD will maintain readiness and continue to develop 

existing operational capabilities at Fort Greely, AK, and Vandenberg Air Force 

Base, CA. 

DOD will hedge against an increased threat in numerous ways, including: 

• Complete the second field of 14 silos at Fort Greely to hedge against the 

possibility that additional deployments become necessary. 

• Continue development and assessment of a two-stage GBI. 

• Deploy new sensors in Europe to improve cueing for missiles launched at 

the United States by Iran or other potential adversaries in the Middle East. 

• Invest in further development of the Standard Missile-3 (SM–3) for future 

land-based deployment as the ICBM threat matures. 

• Pursue a number of new GMD system enhancements, and develop next 

generation missile defense capabilities. 

48. Senator BEGICH. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, how is the deployment 

capacity in Missile Field 2 at Fort Greely funded, and is this all in fiscal year 2011 

or a reprogramming? 

Secretary GATES and Admiral MULLEN. The fiscal year 2011 President’s budget 

request contains funding needed to complete Missile Field 2 in a 14-silo configuration. The request reflects funds required in addition to fiscal year 2009 funds previously appropriated for work on Missile Field 2 and fiscal year 2010 funds previously appropriated to suspend work on Missile Field 2. 

The MDA submitted a reprogramming request to the Department’s Comptroller 

for the realignment of $72.8 million of fiscal year 2009 RDT&E funds and $16 million of fiscal year 2010 RDT&E funds within the BMDS Midcourse Defense program 

element for the continuation of Missile Field 2. 

49. Senator BEGICH. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, what deficiencies and 

readiness are achieved by continuing completion of Missile Field 2 in a 14-silo starting capacity? 

Secretary GATES and Admiral MULLEN. Completing Missile Field 2 in a 14-silo 

configuration allows for the decommissioning of Missile Field 1 and provides future 

flexibility to increase the number of interceptors, if the threat evolves. When Missile 

Field 2 is completed and fully available for emplacing GBIs, the MDA plans to 

transfer six GBIs currently deployed in Missile Field 1 to Missile Field 2. 

Once Missile Field 2 is fully operational, Missile Field 1 will be decommissioned 

since it was designed as a test bed only and is not hardened or sufficiently reliable 

for a long-term operational deployment. Specifically, Missile Field 1 lacks backup 

power and has significant infrastructure reliability issues. These reliability issues 

include extensive mold contamination in the Missile Field 1 utilidor, requiring personnel to suit up for a hazardous environment; inadequate valve connections in the 

chilled water system, resulting in leaks of glycol; and dust intrusion at Mechanical 

Electrical Building-1. The Missile Field 2 design includes shielding and addresses 

the reliability concerns of Missile Field 1. 

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR ROLAND W. BURRIS

MODERNIZATION AND RECAPITALIZATION

50. Senator BURRIS. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, what particular programs address the Services’ modernization and recapitalization? 

Secretary GATES and Admiral MULLEN. 

Guardian Armored Security Vehicle (ASV): 

• Modernization: 

• Product Director (PD), ASV, is addressing limited modernization (Engineering Change Proposals (ECPs)) through existing modification and services line or by modernization through spares. 

• Reset (Operations and Maintenance, Army-funded): 

• Planning is underway to reset approximately 1,500 ASVs during fiscal 

year 2011–2017. 

• While the average age of ASVs is 3 years, some ASVs in theater accumulated 20,000-plus miles per year (peacetime OPTEMPO is estimated at 

2,729 miles per year for a useful life of 20 years). 

• Reset will bring ASVs to fully mission capable condition, to include replacing basic issue items such as shovels and tire jacks. 

• Recapitalization (RECAP—Other Procurement, Army (OPA), funding is required): 

• The Army has not programmed RECAP funding in POM fiscal year 2012– 

2017. 

• OPA funding currently ends in fiscal year 2011, with production ending in fiscal year 2012. 

• However, in accordance with a recent Acquisition Decision Memorandum, 

the ASV Product Office will continue to collaborate with the Combat Developer on desired upgrades. Potential outcome of this collaboration could result in an ASV RECAP requirement. 

Stryker: 

• Modernization: 

• Evolutionary acquisition approach to achieve the full Stryker Capability 

Development Document 

• Planned as separate and distinct program from base Stryker 

• Provides suspension, structure and power growth capability to support 

planned upgrades 

• Includes modified lower hull for under belly IED protection as well as upgraded suspension to support up to a 60,000-pound GVW 

• Key Upgrades include Lethality, Survivability, 360 degrees Situational 

Awareness, Sniper Detection 

• Assumes JTRS & Battle Command Upgrades 

• 30-ton Capacity Configuration 

• Reset: 

• Army selected Anniston Army Depot, Alabama, as centralized Reset facility for the Stryker Family of Vehicles. 

• Stryker vehicle resets for OCONUS based Stryker Brigade Combat 

Teams (2nd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division—Schofield Barracks, HI, and 

2nd Cavalry Regiment—Vilseck, Germany), as well as the 1st Brigade, 25th 

Infantry Division SBCT (Fort Wainright, AK) may still be conducted at 

home station. 

• Stryker Reset provides annual scheduled service level plus maintenance 

action, does not return vehicles to zero hours/zero miles standard. 

• Recapitalization: 

• Stryker does not perform RECAP efforts. 

DEFENSE SUPPORT TO CIVILIAN AUTHORITIES

51. Senator BURRIS. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, please explain how the 

mission to provide defense support to civil authorities is addressed. 

Secretary GATES and Admiral MULLEN. During the 2010 QDR, I directed a significant emphasis to domestic military operations, including Defense Support of Civil 

Authorities. After considerable analysis in the QDR, the Department will make a 

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number of changes in its approach to support civil authorities responding to Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosives (CBRNE) incidents 

in the United States. 

First, the Department will re-structure CBRNE Consequence Management Response Force 1 (CCMRF–1) to be larger and faster than it is today, with more life 

saving capabilities. CCMRFs 2 and 3 will be significantly downsized to become command and control (C2) elements, each able to handle up to 45,000 Title 10 general 

purpose and specialized forces in the event of multiple, simultaneous incidents. 

Most significantly, rather than building three large Federal-level response forces 

to be employed by U.S. Northern Command, the Department will start placing a National Guard-based Homeland Response Force (HRF) in each of the ten Federal 

Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) regions beginning at the end of fiscal year 

2011. Each HRF, routinely operating in State status (State Active Duty or in duty 

under Title 32, U.S. Code) at the direction of a governor, will consist of approximately 560 personnel. The HRFs will include CBRNE capabilities similar to the existing National Guard CBRNE Enhanced Response Force Packages (CERFPs), as 

well as additional robust C2 and security capabilities. I anticipate that the HRFs 

will serve as a catalyst for promoting greater regional integration within the FEMA 

regions and promoting closer working relationships with the FEMA Regional Administrator offices, Defense Coordination Officers, and individual States. 

OVERSEAS CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS

52. Senator BURRIS. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, what role will the ongoing contingency operations play in future force-sizing? 

Secretary GATES and Admiral MULLEN. All of our servicemembers (Active and Reserve) continue to perform extraordinarily in light of the demands we have placed 

upon them. We cannot fail to have the right numbers and kinds of uniformed personnel to win our wars and deter potential adversaries. Additionally, our force, Active and Reserve, must be large enough to not only satisfy deployed demands, but 

also have a base that recognizes the personal needs of our volunteers and their families. We believe we are currently at an appropriate force level. As our future challenges evolve and requirements change, we will work closely with Congress to determine if adjustments are necessary. 

GUANTANAMO DETAINEE OPERATIONS

53. Senator BURRIS. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, how does the budget 

support the President’s decision on Guantanamo (GTMO) detainee operations? 

Secretary GATES and Admiral MULLEN. The President’s fiscal year 2011 OCO 

budget request includes $350 million to finance all detainee operations at the Guantanamo Bay detention facility or another site. 

DON’T ASK, DON’T TELL

54. Senator BURRIS. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, taking a look at discharge statistics provided by DOD, it appears that the number of individuals discharged during years of conflict drop off drastically. Can you explain these numbers—noting that reports of homosexual conduct are not covered under the military’s stop-loss policies? 

Secretary GATES and Admiral MULLEN. I cannot speculate as to why separations 

under the homosexual conduct policy have declined in recent years. However, the 

Department has not changed how it applies 10 U.S.C. § 654 in ‘‘years of conflict.’’ 

55. Senator BURRIS. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, once this change is enacted, how will you address the cases involving pending and previously discharged 

servicemembers? 

Secretary GATES and Admiral MULLEN. If the law is repealed, any pending homosexual conduct discharge cases would be ceased. Those servicemembers previously 

separated would remain separated. As part of their assessment, the working group 

will examine re-accession policies for such servicemembers if the law is repealed. 

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN

PROGRAM MANAGEMENT OF THE F–35 LIGHTNING ACQUISITION

56. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Gates, I am gratified by the management decisions you announced yesterday to instill accountability in the Joint Strike Fighter 

(JSF) program by replacing the program executive officer and withholding more 

than $600 million. Does the withhold reflect the outcome of pending discussions between your office and the prime contractor, following the instructions you issued in 

December 2009 to restructure the program, to have the contractor fund part of the 

proposed extension in development? 

Secretary GATES. A more accurate way to portray the handling of the $614 million 

withhold is that the Department is changing the paradigm under which the contractor can earn that fee. I decided that the current award fee structure would not 

properly incentivize the contractor. Therefore, the Department took the future fee 

that the contractor could have earned and redistributed it in a fashion that better 

reflects the behavior I expect. The criteria are objective, date certain, and designed 

to accomplish major events in the program with the appropriate level of detail to 

ensure the event is successful instead of just complete. In addition, the fee is backloaded, with a major portion applied to the ability of the contractor to meet the estimate at completion. Failure to do so results in the complete loss of that fee. 

57. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Gates, under what circumstances, if any, could the 

prime contractor recoup that withholding? 

Secretary GATES. The remaining fee for the contractor’s development effort is 

$614 million. We are restructuring that $614 million and revising the SDD contract 

structure to reward measurable progress against significant schedule events and ensure event-based fees, to include completion at or under the estimate at completion. 

The contractor can recoup the withheld fees only if these events are successfully 

completed according to the schedule and the estimate at completion is achieved. 

F–35 TESTING AND ENGINEERING ISSUES

58. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Gates, as you of course know, I am concerned 

about the F–35 Lightning acquisition program, even with the restructuring you announced in December 2009. A few weeks ago, the Director of Operational Testing 

and Evaluation (DOT&E) found that ‘‘[c]ontinued production concurrent with the 

slow increase in flight testing over the next 2 years will commit the Department 

and Services to test, training, and deployment plans with substantial risk.’’ Will extending development of the JSF, as is being proposed under the budget request, be 

supported with additional flight test aircraft, the delivery of software, and an adequate pace of testing, so that operational testing of fully integrated and capable aircraft will occur on time in 2016? 

Secretary GATES. The program office is currently working with all the test stakeholders, including the Operational Test (OT) community, to finalize the test schedule outlining both the timing and the appropriate allocation of resources for a successful completion of System Development and Demonstration as well as successful 

transition to OT. The restructured program will mitigate cost and schedule challenges. The restructured program funds the F–35 program to an Independent Cost 

Estimate, adds additional schedule to development test, moves the full rate production decision to April 2016, adds additional test assets to flight test to build on the 

successful ongoing ground test, and expands the software integration capacity. 

These actions are in-line with multiple independent assessments performed in 2009 

covering cost, schedule and capacity. 

59. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Gates, please explain how your budget request 

will ensure that program management emphasizes maintaining robust engineering 

and test forces; early completion of detailed test plans; fully resourcing those plans; 

and rigorous accreditation of models and labs. 

Secretary GATES. The fiscal year 2011 budget request for the JSF program is the 

result of rigorous analysis by a Joint Estimating Team (JET), led by the Office of 

the Director, Cost Analysis and Program Evaluation. The JET’s analysis informed 

a senior leadership JSF Task Force that led to a restructure of the JSF development 

and test program. The program office is currently working with all the test stakeholders, including the OT community, to finalize the test schedule outlining both the 

timing and the appropriate allocation of resources for a successful completion of System Development and Demonstration and transition to OT. The Department will 

conduct an even more in-depth review of the JSF program as part of the NunnVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:37 May 06, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00137 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\62155.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
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McCurdy certification process. All aspects of the program, to include engineering 

manning, test plan scheduling, resourcing, and lab and modeling accreditation will 

be reviewed. 

60. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Gates, to what extent will your budget proposal 

ensure that the delivery of assets for OT&E and initial training will be managed 

consistent with plans approved for OT&E? 

Secretary GATES. The Department has fully funded F–35 System Development 

and Demonstration (SDD) to the Joint Estimating Team (JET) II estimate, which 

includes adequate funds for both developmental and operational testing. The funds 

are adequate to purchase and deliver aircraft and all the necessary support equipment to the OT community. In addition, the Department has fully resourced, across 

the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP), for adequate organic and contractor 

support of developmental and operational testing. The program office is currently 

working with all the test stakeholders, including the OT community, to finalize the 

test schedule outlining both the timing and the appropriate allocation of resources 

for a successful completion of SDD. 

61. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Gates, do you expect that the delivery of those test 

and training assets will deviate from those plans? If so, please explain. 

Secretary GATES. I expect delivery of test and training assets to happen on a 

timeline commensurate with the restructured program. The program office is currently working with all the test stakeholders, including the OT community, to finalize the test schedule outlining both the timing and the appropriate allocation of resources (including training) for a successful completion of System Development and 

Demonstration as well as successful transition to OT. 

62. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Gates, during the hearing, you explained that, at 

this moment, the program is holding schedule in terms of the expected initial operating capability (IOC) dates for all the variant aircraft except that fewer quantities 

may be delivered. Please explain. 

Secretary GATES. At the date of the hearing, the Services were still evaluating 

how the restructured program would impact IOC dates. The Services have completed their review, and the Marine Corps IOC is still projected for December 2012 

with Block 2 capability, while the Air Force and Navy IOCs are now projected for 

2016 with Block 3 capability. 

63. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Gates, the concurrency structured into the JSF 

program’s test, production, and training plans has obscured the mission capability 

of low-rate initial production (LRIP) aircraft and support systems. How will DOD, 

under its proposed budget, improve the process by which the mission capability of 

LRIP systems will be accurately and credibly predicted well before delivery? 

Secretary GATES. Concurrency was a choice made at the outset of the program, 

which was a sound strategy for the Department. It is designed to replace legacy aircraft and provide the Warfighter a 5th generation strike fighter as quickly as possible, allowing the Department to reach a more economic order quantity while still 

thoroughly testing the aircraft. To that end, DOD intends to produce aircraft at a 

rate consistent with the Independent Manufacturing Review Team recommendations to the maximum extent possible. To mitigate concurrency risks, a great deal 

of upfront investment was made in design tools giving us a greater level of confidence in the design of the aircraft than we would have for legacy systems such 

as the F–16 or F–15. Early ground and flight test data closely match model predictions for flying qualities, performance, and structures, justifying our upfront investment. The maturity of the physical aircraft and the restructured program give 

us confidence that our predictions will remain sound concerning the capabilities of 

the F–35. 

64. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Gates, I understand that the JSF program office 

is executing a comprehensive, robust, and fully funded live fire test plan. However, 

the program recently removed shutoff fuses for engine fuel hydraulics lines. Coupled 

with the prior removal of dry bay fire extinguishers, this may increase the likelihood 

of aircraft combat losses from ballistic threat induced fires. At present, only the Integrated Power Plant (IPP) bay has a fire suppression system. Though the JSF Executive Steering Board (JESB) has approved the Joint Program Office’s (JPO) request to remove these safety systems as an acceptable system trade to balance 

weight, cost, and risk, DOT&E remains concerned regarding the aircraft’s vulnerability to threat-induced fires. Why is DOT&E’s concern here not valid? 

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Secretary GATES. The Department is committed to delivering the most affordable, 

supportable, lethal and survivable F–35 aircraft that meets the needs of the 

warfighter. The overall survivability posture of the F–35 is without equal due to advanced avionics and sensor suite, 5th generation stealth performance, advanced 

countermeasures and robust, balanced vulnerability reduction design. The 

warfighting effectiveness of each design feature is carefully balanced against the 

overall system impact to cost, weight and supportability. According to the JPO, the 

removal of PAO (polyalphaolefin) coolant shut-off valves and fuses for engine fueldraulic lines resulted in a minimal (.05 Pk) impact on the vulnerability assessment, 

no impact on the safety assessment, avoids ∼11 lbs. per aircraft in weight, avoids 

∼$40,000 (CTOL and CV)—$50,000 (STOVL) per aircraft in procurement cost, and 

avoids ∼$1.4 million in development cost. The JESB decision included a requirement 

to update the vulnerability assessment after conclusion of the live-fire testing in calendar year 2011. All F–35 aircraft vulnerability data will then be re-assessed. 

65. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Gates, looking ahead to 2010, exactly what milestones does the Director, Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (DCAPE) believe the JPO and prime contractor must complete on time and on budget to achieve 

stated IOC dates? 

Secretary GATES. DCAPE has identified five performance metric areas for tracking in fiscal year 2010 that CAPE will monitor closely to assess whether the JPO 

and prime contractor are making reasonable progress against what the Joint Estimating Team (JET) schedule forecast and cost estimate prepared in fall 2009 (also 

known as the ‘‘JET II estimate’’). These areas are: 1) Progress in software for Block 

0.5 and 1.0 releases; 2) the status of Mission System Hardware qualification activities; 3) the level of engineering change traffic resulting from ongoing flight test and 

early production activities; 4) the availability of flight test aircraft at test sites; and 

5) the status of sortie generation rates, flight test hours completion, and test point 

verification completion. 

66. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Gates, to what extent will the verification, validation, and accreditation (VV&A) of labs and models as test venues be event-driven, 

subject to disciplined oversight by the government and independent review? 

Secretary GATES. The JSF Program Office employs a specific process for 

verification, validation and accreditation of each model, lab, and simulation intended as a test venue. A joint government/contractor team reviews the validation 

evidence and accreditation support packages. The team makes a recommendation to 

accredit the venue to the government accreditation authority in the program office, 

which is either the chief engineer or the program executive officer. Independent review of the validation and accreditation process or content is not currently included 

in the process but would be useful in helping to ensure adequate F–35 test data 

are used in the validation phase and that models are not used before accreditation 

is complete. 

67. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Gates, to what extent will these labs and models 

not be used to close verification success criteria unless formally approved for that 

use? 

Secretary GATES. I expect the JSF program office leadership to follow the process 

and assure any verification success criteria dependent on model accreditation are 

not considered closed unless the model successfully completed an adequate validation and accreditation process. 

IMPACT OF IRAQI ELECTIONS ON DRAWDOWN PLANS

68. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Gates, the budget request is based on assumptions 

that include the ability to withdraw all combat forces from Iraq by the end of fiscal 

year 2011, leaving a non-combat U.S. military training and assistance force of about 

50,000. The ability to make substantial reductions in combat forces hinges on the 

timing of the next round of Iraqi parliamentary elections that were first scheduled 

for January and which have now slipped to March. Domestic political and security 

considerations in Iraq may lead to further delays. The bombing in Baghdad on February 1, 2010, was the fifth suicide attack in Baghdad in a week. While it’s not totally unexpected given the national elections in March, a sudden deterioration in security could have considerable implications for the withdrawal of most U.S. troops 

later this year. Do you anticipate General Odierno will recommend that the estimated 65,000 U.S. combat troops return this August? 

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Secretary GATES. DOD is on schedule to draw down to 50,000 U.S. forces in Iraq 

and to end the combat mission by August 31, 2010. The remaining U.S. forces will 

be engaged in training, equipping, and advising the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF); targeted counterterrorism operations; and protection of U.S. military and civilian efforts. U.S. forces will continue to draw down responsibly in compliance with the Security Agreement. 

DOD’s ability to continue the drawdown of U.S. forces is a testament to the increasing capability of the ISF, as evidenced by their performance during the elections. Since U.S. forces repositioned from the cities in June 2009, the ISF have had 

the lead for operations in Iraq, with U.S. forces playing a supporting role through 

partnering with and enabling the ISF. 

69. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Gates, what will be the budget impact if forces in 

Iraq cannot be withdrawn according to the current plan? 

Secretary GATES. The budget impact would be proportional to the size of the force 

that is not withdrawn. The budget impact could be substantial because it is very 

expensive to sustain deploy forces, even if the operating tempo is moderate compared to active combat. Still, I remain confident that U.S. forces can be withdrawn 

according to our current plan. 

70. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Gates, how will that impact the ability to source 

the increase of troops in Afghanistan? 

Secretary GATES. The responsible drawdown of U.S. forces in Iraq continues forward as planned and will be executed concurrently with the increase of forces in 

Afghanistan. The Iraqi national elections and the plan to drawdown U.S. military 

forces in Iraq do not adversely affect the ability to source the force increase in Afghanistan. The Iraqi national elections were successfully conducted on March 2010. 

The security environment established by the ISF prevented any large scale effective 

attacks by insurgents or extremist elements seeking to derail the conduct or outcome of the elections and demonstrated the increasing capability of the Iraqis to 

provide security for themselves. As our requirements in Iraq continue to decrease, 

units that redeploy from or are no longer required to deploy to Iraq will return to 

the pool of forces available to deploy in support of the mission in Afghanistan or 

other global requirements. 

71. Senator MCCAIN. Admiral Mullen, I remain concerned that Iraq will not have 

the training and equipment that it will need to maintain a credible defense after 

most of our forces leave later this year. What are we doing to ensure that Iraq receives the equipment and training necessary to ensure we can responsibly withdrawal as scheduled? 

Admiral MULLEN. In spite of Iraq’s recent budgetary challenges that impact both 

manning and equipping the ISF, we remain confident that with continued and focused U.S. support, specifically the $3 billion in requested Iraqi Security Forces 

Funds, the ISF will be capable of providing internal security and foundational external defense by the time U.S. forces withdraw at the end of December 2011. 

As of February 2010, the Iraqi Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program had executed 144 cases valued at $5 billion. Between now and the end of 2011, USF–I will 

continue to support the training and equipping of the ISF. We are currently working 

with Iraq on 96 additional FMS cases valued at over $4 billion. In addition, thanks 

to critical authorities provided by Congress in the 2010 NDAA, the United States 

will transfer equipment to the ISF to further assist Iraq in meeting critical equipping requirements. 

MILITARY PAY RAISE

72. Senator MCCAIN. Admiral Mullen, for the last 3 years, Congress has increased 

the administration’s proposed increase in pay by half a percentage point. What is 

the impact on the DOD budget by such a directed increase in fiscal year 2011 and 

beyond? 

Admiral MULLEN. The cost of an additional half percent pay raise increase to the 

fiscal year 2011 budget is $339 million in fiscal year 2011 and $2.2 billion across 

the FYDP. Increases in pay beyond DOD requests contribute to a reduction of funding for our readiness accounts which will jeopardize our ability to meet defense objectives to prevail in today’s wars, prevent and deter conflict, prepare to defeat adversaries and succeed in a wide range of contingencies, and preserve and enhance 

the All-Volunteer Force. 

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U.S. FORCES IN KOREA

73. Senator MCCAIN. Admiral Mullen, what will be the total costs in terms of infrastructure, family support programs, and other operating costs to achieve DOD’s 

long-term goal to phase out all unaccompanied tours in Korea? 

Admiral MULLEN. The fiscal year 2011 FYDP includes $536 million to increase 

the total number of families in Korea to 4,900. Additional increases in the number 

of families in Korea, as part of the Department’s long-term goal to phase out unaccompanied tours, will be addressed in future budget requests. 

74. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Gates, are these costs reflected in the budget request for fiscal year 2011 and the FYDP? 

Secretary GATES. The fiscal year 2011 FYDP includes $536 million to increase the 

total number of families in Korea to 4,900. Any further increases in the number of 

families in Korea, as part of the Department’s long-term goal to phase out all unaccompanied tours, would be addressed in future budget requests. 

FORCE STRUCTURE IN AFGHANISTAN

75. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Gates, GAO recently reviewed military readiness 

issues and raised concerns that the flow of forces into Afghanistan, including critical 

enabling forces, is being impeded by a force cap placed on the total number of troops 

equal to 68,000 plus the President’s announced increase of 30,000, with a 10 percent 

buffer of 3,000 additional troops. This 10 percent buffer, which could temporarily 

raise troop levels above the maximum of 98,000, can only be authorized on a caseby-case basis by you. Is there a hard cap on the number of troops in Afghanistan? 

Secretary GATES. In December 2009, President Obama committed an additional 

30,000 forces to Afghanistan for an extended surge of 18 months. Since taking office, 

the President has committed 52,000 additional troops to Afghanistan for a total U.S. 

force of 92,000. 

The deployment of an additional 30,000 forces for the extended surge will be 

largely completed by the end of August. There is no hard cap on the number of 

forces in Afghanistan. DOD’s commitment of significant military resources to support this effort is consistent with the President’s strategy set forth in March 2009, 

and is directly linked to the progress of General McChrystal’s civil-military plan to 

reverse the Taliban’s momentum and create time and space to develop Afghan security and governance. DOD will maintain this increased force level through July 

2011. During this time, we will regularly measure our progress and, beginning in 

July 2011, transfer lead security responsibility to the Afghans and start to transition our combat forces for redeployment. 

76. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Gates, is this cap driven by operational factors, 

budget concerns, or other policy considerations? 

Secretary GATES. In December 2009, President Obama committed an additional 

30,000 forces to Afghanistan for an extended surge of 18 months. Since taking office, 

the President has committed 52,000 additional troops to Afghanistan for a total U.S. 

force of 92,000. 

The deployment of an additional 30,000 forces for the extended surge will be 

largely completed by the end of August. There is no hard cap on the number of 

forces in Afghanistan. DOD’s commitment of significant military resources to support this effort is consistent with the President’s strategy set forth in March 2009, 

and is directly linked to the progress of General McChrystal’s civil-military plan to 

reverse the Taliban’s momentum and create time and space to develop Afghan security and governance. DOD will maintain this increased force level through July 

2011. During this time, we will regularly measure our progress and, beginning in 

July 2011, transfer lead security responsibility to the Afghans and start to transition our combat forces for redeployment. 

77. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Gates, should there be any arbitrary cap on the 

total number of forces that may be temporarily in Afghanistan if such forces are 

necessary to establish the capability to succeed in the mission? 

Secretary GATES. In December 2009, President Obama committed an additional 

30,000 forces to Afghanistan for an extended surge of 18 months. Since taking office, 

the President has committed 52,000 additional troops to Afghanistan for a total U.S. 

force of 92,000. 

The deployment of an additional 30,000 forces for the extended surge will be 

largely completed by the end of August. There is no hard cap on the number of 

forces in Afghanistan. DOD commitment of significant military resources to support 

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this effort is consistent with the President’s strategy set forth in March 2009, and 

is directly linked to the progress of General McChrystal’s civil-military plan to reverse the Taliban’s momentum and create time and space to develop Afghan security and governance. DOD will maintain this increased force level through July 

2011. During this time, we will regularly measure our progress and, beginning in 

July 2011, transfer lead security responsibility to the Afghans and start to transition our combat forces for redeployment. 

78. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Gates, are there indications from CENTCOM that 

the build-up of forces in Afghanistan is being impeded by the cap on forces? 

Secretary GATES. No, the U.S. CENTCOM has indicated the build-up/increase of 

U.S. forces approved by POTUS in December 2009 is not being impacted by the total 

authorized force. U.S. CENTCOM has worked a very detailed transportation plan 

to ensure a majority of these forces arrive in-country by late summer and this plan 

still remains feasible. 

79. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Gates, if the President’s priority is to rapidly increase U.S. force levels in Afghanistan to turn the tide in the fight against the 

Taliban and al Qaeda so the U.S. can begin to withdraw forces by July 2011, is 

managing the flow of forces to stay below an arbitrary cap consistent with that priority? 

Secretary GATES. In December 2009, President Obama committed an additional 

30,000 forces to Afghanistan for an extended surge of 18 months. Since taking office, 

the President has committed 52,000 additional troops to Afghanistan for a total U.S. 

force of 92,000. 

The deployment of an additional 30,000 forces for the extended surge will be 

largely completed by the end of August. There is no hard cap on the number of 

forces in Afghanistan. DOD’s commitment of significant military resources to support this effort is consistent with the President’s strategy set forth in March 2009, 

and is directly linked to the progress of General McChrystal’s civil-military plan to 

reverse the Taliban’s momentum and create time and space to develop Afghan security and governance. DOD will maintain this increased force level through July 

2011. During this time, we will regularly measure our progress and, beginning in 

July 2011, transfer lead security responsibility to the Afghans and start to transition our combat forces for redeployment. 

80. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Gates, will a delay in the supply of trainers for 

Afghan security forces, or a decision by NATO allies not to provide trainers, affect 

the need for U.S. forces above the 30,000 approved by the President? 

Secretary GATES. Ensuring that the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM– 

A) has sufficient institutional and operational trainers remains a top priority. DOD 

is currently working with NATO to resource NTM–A. A series of SHAPE-led force 

generation efforts have resulted in a significant number of international commitments to help meet the institutional and operational trainer shortfall. The U.S. Government continues to be engaged in very active diplomatic efforts to urge our coalition partners to provide additional trainers and mentoring teams for the Afghan National Security Force (ANSF). We are also examining DOD’s own contributions to 

ensure we are doing everything we can to fill the requirement. 

OVERSEAS CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS BUDGET REQUEST

81. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Gates, among the items in the fiscal year 2011 

OCO supplemental budget request is a request for one F–35 JSF aircraft. I understand that this aircraft is intended to replace an F–15E fighter plane from the 336th 

Fighter Squadron, Seymour Johnson Air Force Base, North Carolina that crashed 

while conducting combat operations in eastern Afghanistan, near the Ghazni province on July 18, 2009. I also understand that the existing ground rules for determining what projects can be funded with the supplemental budget allow for the replacement of combat equipment as a result of loss during combat operations. 

I have been told that because the Air Force can no longer procure F–15E aircraft 

from the prime contractor, you elected to procure a fighter aircraft currently in production. I am troubled by this request. The JSF aircraft you are proposing to buy 

here will cost $205 million, as opposed to the F–15E unit cost of around $65 million. 

More importantly, the very earliest that the Air Force can accept delivery of its first 

operationally capable aircraft will be 2013, and development of the JSF will not be 

completed until a few years later. Would you please provide a major cost breakout 

and explain why you are asking $205 million for this one JSF aircraft? 

137 

Secretary GATES. In early summer 2009 the Air Force provided an estimate for a fiscal year 2011 OCO F–35 aircraft. At that time, the estimate was $204.9 million. 

This cost control was subsequently used to develop the detailed cost breakout that 

appeared in DOD’s fiscal year 2011 President’s budget (PB) Justification. If Congress approves the additional OCO aircraft, the unit cost for 23 aircraft (fiscal year 

2011 22 aircraft plus 1 OCO aircraft) would be approximately $182.5 million. OCO 

funds appropriated above this amount will be used for initial spares associated with 

the OCO F–35. The table below reflects the numbers which were submitted in the 

fiscal year 2011 PB documentation for the base and OCO request, and what the 

OCO numbers should have been in the documentation for the same weapon system 

unit cost ($182.5 million). 

82. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Gates, as a cost effective alternative to buying a 

JSF aircraft here and to ensure timely fielding of needed strike fighter capability 

in theater, to what extent have you explored the possibility of refixing a legacy F– 

15E intended for retirement, or one that has actually been retired, pursuant to the 

Air Force’s Combat Air Forces (CAF) Restructure Plan? 

Secretary GATES. The F–15E Strike Eagle is a two-seat all-weather ground attack 

aircraft designed for high-speed interdiction and is a derivative of the F–15C Eagle 

that is used for air superiority. The F–15Es are some of the newest fighters in the 

Air Force (AF) active inventory, and as of today, none of them have been retired 

or are planned to be retired. 

BMD–CAPABLE SHIPS AND SM–3

83. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Gates, with the growing threat from China, North 

Korea, and the Middle East, does DOD have enough BMD/SM–3 resources/assets to 

defend the United States, its allies, and forward deployed forces in the region? In 

answering this question, please break out your responses by BMD-capable ships and 

SM–3 missiles. 

Secretary GATES. The Department will have 20 Aegis BMD ships and 81 SM–3 

interceptors available for worldwide deployment by the end of fiscal year 2010. The 

Aegis BMD ships and SM–3 interceptors deployed to the East Asia, Middle East, 

and Europe are sufficient to carry out assigned missions in those regions. 

The Department also plans to have 23 Aegis BMD ships operationally available 

in fiscal year 2011, along with a total of 110 SM–3 interceptors. By Phase 2 of the 

EPAA in the 2015 timeframe, the Department plans to have 37 Aegis BMD-capable 

ships along with 112 SM–3 Block IA and 180 Block IB interceptors available. 

The Department understands that demand for regional BMD capabilities will outstrip supply for quite some time. Given this reality, DOD is pursuing a collaborative 

approach with Allies and partners to strengthen regional deterrence architectures. 

It is important to note that as we manage U.S. resources, our objective is to provide 

a steady-state capability that can be augmented for added defensive capability for 

a limited duration in times of increased threat. This is the essence of the phased 

adaptive approach to regional architectures. 

84. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Gates, does the Navy have enough Aegis Class Destroyers to support both MDA and Navy requirements? 

Secretary GATES. The Navy currently has sufficient large surface combatants to 

meet the demand for Aegis destroyers. The Navy does not have the capacity to meet 

the entire BMD requirement. In the near term, DOD will employ a comprehensive 

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face combatants with Aegis BMD capability. A modernization program is in place 

to increase BMD capacity to meet the additional Combatant Commander’s forward 

presence requirements for BMD capable ships. The restart of the Aegis shipbuilding 

program is aligned with providing the required Aegis BMD capacity. 

By spring 2010, Navy will have 21 BMD capable ships, and by 2015, new construction and modernization will bring the total of BMD capable ships to 27. The 

Navy will continue to work with the MDA to support global BMD demands. It is 

important to recognize that Navy force structure is not sized to utilize multi-mission 

Aegis ships for an exclusive use mission on an enduring basis. Such single mission 

use invariably results in shortages in other mission areas and a loss of operational 

flexibility for the Joint Force Commander. Navy’s long-term plan is to make all 

Aegis destroyers and up to 15 Aegis cruisers BMD capable to provide BMD forward 

presence ‘‘in stride’’ while also performing its other missions. 

CONTRACT OVERSIGHT PERSONNEL

85. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Gates, last May, the Special Inspector General for 

Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) found that Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC–A), the lead element for training Afghan security forces, 

did not have ‘‘the mechanisms necessary to ensure that U.S. funds are managed effectively and spent wisely.’’ In particular, the SIGAR noted a lack of qualified contracting personnel in the command. Have you increased the number of personnel 

overseeing these training contracts, and if so, by how much? 

Secretary GATES. NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan and Combined Security 

Transition Command-Afghanistan (NTM–A/CSTC–A) takes contracting oversight seriously. Every resource that is misallocated due to inefficiency, miscommunications, 

and undue delay cannot contribute to improving the operational capabilities of the 

Afghan National Security Forces. Concerning contracting oversight, we have taken 

the following specific actions in the areas of oversight, quality assurance, contract 

management, and senior leadership review: 

• Oversight: For our large Continental United States (CONUS) based contracts that require a substantial degree of effort to implement adequate 

contract oversight, we have coordinated to have the contracting command 

provide a full-time ’in-country’ Contract Officer Representative (COR) located with CSTC–A. 

For contracts that are awarded in Afghanistan and for small CONUS based 

contracts CORs have been appointed from either CSTC–A or other USFOR– 

A personnel. Additionally, for certain contracts that require technical competence (such as vehicle and weapons maintenance) we are arranging for 

U.S. Government civilians from Army Depots (e.g. Red River Army Depot) 

to deploy and provide us with oversight assistance. 

• Quality Assurance: We are enforcing the requirement for Quality Assurance Surveillance Plans (QASP) for CSTC–A contracts and have in place a 

tracking system to ensure designated CORs are verifying compliance with 

the QASP. During the contract planning phase, requirement generators develop a detailed written QASP and the associated COR coverage requirements identifying the quantity, locations, and required qualifications & 

skills for required CORs to provide adequate oversight coverage to reasonably ensure compliance with the QASP. 

• Contract Management: We established a six-person CSTC–A Contract 

Management team that has developed improved processes and they also 

monitor CSTC–A contracts to validate contract oversight and share best 

practices across the command. We are in the process of implementing a systemic approach to review the contract oversight and standards for every 

contract. Additionally, each month we identify COR requirements for every 

location where contracted services are provided and update the description 

of the oversight responsibilities that need to performed. 

86. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Gates, in this audit, the SIGAR described a particular $404 million training contract where the government contracting personnel 

were located in Maryland and Pennsylvania—nine time zones away from where the 

work was actually being performed. Is DOD planning to deploy more DOD contract 

oversight personnel out to the field in Afghanistan? 

Secretary GATES. Yes. Overall the DOD has increased the numbers of Contracting 

Officer Representative (CORs) and Contracting Officer Technical Representatives 

(COTRs), and placed military commanders at each training site associated with this 

contract. In addition, DOD has taken the following steps to increase oversight: 

139 

• Established a contract management cell within Combined Security Transition 

Command-Afghanistan. 

• Added greater flexibility in assignment of contract advisors with the ability 

to more geographically and among the levels of Advisor/Trainer (Ministerial 

Systems, Institutional Training, Field level). 

• Issued orders in theater on how to select, train and place CORs for the upcoming Research and Development and Engineering Command Contract. 

• Developed a contract statement of work to reduce the number of contract advisors and identify other efficiencies and increased contractor oversight in so 

doing. 

The Department takes its contingency contracting oversight functions extremely 

seriously and will continue to keep Congress informed of how the Department performs this important function. 

NAVAL READINESS

87. Senator MCCAIN. Admiral Mullen, as you recall, the only priority that the 

Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) identified as unfunded in your last budget submission was ship depot maintenance. Over the last few months, a number of press accounts have come out describing problems directly related to how ineffectively the 

shipyards are maintaining the readiness of the Navy’s oldest surface combatants. 

I understand that this year’s proposed budget increases total funding for ship depot 

maintenance by almost $800 million over last year. To what extent does that proposed amount fully fund the Navy’s current requirement for ship depot maintenance 

and capture depot maintenance volume that has accumulated from chronic underfunding over time? 

Admiral MULLEN. The fiscal year 2011 budget request in the O&M baseline and Other Contingency Operations accounts is $6.1 billion and funds 99 percent of the 

total projected ship maintenance requirement. This request, and the percent of requirement funded, clearly reflects the Navy’s commitment to ensure that ships are 

properly maintained to support current operations, and reach their expected service 

lives. 

The request also funds the Surface Ship Life Cycle Management (SSLCM) activity. Established in May 2009, SSLCM mission is to provide centralized SSLCM. In 

conjunction with Naval Sea Systems Command and Commander, Naval Surface 

Forces (CNSF), the SSLCM activity conducted a detailed review of fiscal year 2011 

surface ship maintenance requirements. The fiscal year 2011 budget request incorporates the results of this review. The SSLCM activity is assessing maintenance requirements for each ship class based on engineered technical requirements necessary to reach expected service life, and any additional requirements that are identified will be included in future budget requests. 

C–17 ACQUISITION PROGRAMS

88. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Gates, over the last 4 years, the Senate Appropriations Committee added 44 C–17s that we neither needed nor could afford, at a total 

cost of over $14 billion above DOD’s requests—in the form of earmarks. As DOD 

had done in the preceding few years, you proposed last year to cancel the C–17 

Globemaster program and argued against a congressional earmark that intended to 

buy 10 more of those aircraft for $2.5 billion. You stated that the cost of buying and 

operating those additional aircraft would ‘‘invariably result in a reduction in critical 

warfighting capability somewhere else in the defense program.’’ Is this view shared 

by the Service Chiefs and unified and combatant commanders? 

Secretary GATES. The current C–17 fleet is in excess of our strategic airlift needs, 

resulting in increased operating costs at the expense of other priorities. This position, supported by the Services and Combatant Commanders, is based on the findings of several recent mobility studies to include the Mobility Capabilities Requirements Study 2016 (MCRS–16). The objectives of MCRS–16 were to determine the 

mobility capabilities and requirements needed in support of the National Military 

Strategy in the 2016 timeframe, to determine capability gaps/overlaps associated 

with the programmed mobility force structure, and to support the QDR and decisions regarding mobility programs. The study found that the planned capacity of the 

programmed strategic airlift fleet, consisting of 223 C–17s and 111 C–5s, exceeds 

the most demanding projected requirements. In addition, the report noted that C– 

17s could be used to support intra-theater missions without adding to the peak demand for C–17s. Both of these insights are consistent with findings from previous 

mobility studies. 

140 

Based upon this information no additional C–17s should be procured, and I request your support in granting me the authority to allow for the proper management of the strategic fleet by providing the Department greater flexibility in retiring 

C–5 aircraft and eliminating the current statutory requirement to maintain a minimum fleet of 316 strategic airlift aircraft. 

89. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Gates, what affect would the purchase of yet more 

C–17s, as some Members might insist on again this year, have on our ability to field 

critical warfighting capabilities? 

Secretary GATES. Unnecessary acquisition programs deplete funding for our readiness accounts which jeopardize our ability to meet defense objectives to prevail in 

today’s wars, prevent and deter conflict, prepare to defeat adversaries and succeed 

in a wide range of contingencies, and preserve and enhance the All-Volunteer Force. 

I am fully aware of the political pressure to continue building the C–17, but I will 

strongly recommend that the President veto any legislation that sustains the unnecessary continuation of this program. 

90. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Gates, while I appreciate your commitment in 

your opening statement to recommend a veto for further C–17 funding in the current budget request, will you request that that the President directly signal his intent to veto this bill if it authorizes any expenditure for more C–17s, as was done 

with F–22 funding last year? 

Secretary GATES. I will continue to strongly recommend to the President that he 

veto any legislation that sustains the unnecessary continuation of the C–17 program 

for the reasons stated in my testimony. 

MISSILE DEFENSE

91. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Gates, the supply of missile defense assets, whether it be Aegis cruisers, SM–3 missiles, THAAD units, etc., pales in comparison to 

the worldwide demand of our combatant commanders. How does DOD and this 

budget seek to satisfy the stressing needs of the new European phased adaptive approach while also continuing to meet those needs of our ongoing efforts in the Pacific, the Middle East, and the Homeland? 

Secretary GATES. The fiscal year 2011 President’s budget request affirms and continues the decisions made in the fiscal year 2010 PBR to realign BMD programs 

and plans to focus on regional missile defenses. Toward this end, investments in regional missile defenses amount to about $3.8 billion in the fiscal year 2011 President’s budget request, or almost half of the MDA budget request. Significant investments will continue over the FYDP, enabling the Department to make progress in 

closing the gap between demand and supply. By 2015 DOD plans to have 6 THAAD 

batteries with 281 interceptors, along with 292 SM–3 interceptors and 37 Aegis 

BMD-capable ships. 

As the Department makes progress on fielding additional regional missile defenses, I will also work to build on a strong foundation of cooperative relationships 

and utilize appropriate contributions from Allies. It is important to note that as we 

manage U.S. resources, my objective is to provide a steady-state capability that can 

be augmented for added defensive capability for a limited duration in times of increased threat. This is the essence of the phased adaptive approach to regional architectures. 

92. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Gates, does modernization and sustainment of our 

GBIs and the development and testing of a two-stage GBI remain a priority for 

DOD? 

Secretary GATES. Yes. I believe that defending the homeland against the threat 

of limited missile attack is a high priority for the Department. Therefore, the DOD 

is committed to continue modernizing and sustaining the GMD system. 

The fiscal year 2011 President’s budget request lays out a funded plan that includes fielding 30 operational GBIs, as well as delivery of 4 additional interceptors 

as operational spares (based on reliability estimations), and 18 additional interceptors to support the flight test program. The GMD sustainment program will maintain and support an effective defensive system, meeting Warfighter requirements 

over the expected 20-year life cycle. 

As part of a hedging strategy for homeland defense against long-range ballistic 

missile attacks, the Department is continuing the development and assessment of 

the two-stage GBI. The planned two-stage flight testing also supports three-stage 

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data collection requirements and adds to our confidence in and sustainment of the 

GBIs. 

93. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Gates, are you committed to the modernization 

and sustainment of our GBIs and the procurement of additional GBIs if it were determined that technological advancements with the SM–3 do not come to fruition 

in the planned timeframe? 

Secretary GATES. I am committed to modernizing and sustaining the GMD system 

as the Department defends the United States against ballistic missiles. 

The fiscal year 2011 President’s budget request lays out a funded plan that includes completing the fielding of 30 operational GBIs; delivering 22 additional GBIs 

for testing, stockpile reliability, and operational spare requirements; and refurbishing 16 of the original 52 GBIs for both operational and flight test rotation during the FYDP. The budget request also provides for continued Exoatmospheric Kill 

Vehicle (EKV) software upgrades for the GBIs with focus on improved probability 

of kill while leveraging improved sensor data. Additionally, we will be completing 

the establishment of a second command and control node at Fort Greely, AK. 

The GMD sustainment program maintains and supports an effective defensive 

system, meeting Warfighter requirements over the expected 20-year life cycle. This 

program is planned within established Army and Navy standards for missile field 

and depot-level support, including the surveillance and testing of GBIs over their 

lifetime. A service-life extension decision is anticipated in the 2027 timeframe. 

Development and testing of the two-stage GBI will continue as a hedge alternative should the SM–3 Block II A/B not emerge as anticipated. The first two-stage 

GBI test will occur this summer. 

NUCLEAR WEAPONS COMPLEX

94. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Gates, in the past you have been quite vocal on 

the need for modernization of the nuclear weapons complex. The fiscal year 2010 

budget lacked adequate funding to address the dire infrastructure needs. More than 

a year has passed since you stated that ‘‘there is absolutely no way we can maintain 

a credible deterrent and reduce the number of weapons in our stockpile without either resorting to testing our stockpile or pursuing a modernization program.’’ Do you 

believe the President’s fiscal year 2011 budget addresses the critical needs for modernizing our nuclear weapons complex? 

Secretary GATES. Yes, I believe that the fiscal year 2011 budget provides a credible modernization program to meet the national security needs of the United 

States. The fiscal year 2011 budget for the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) reverses a decade’s long decline in the U.S. nuclear weapons enterprise 

in terms of both stockpile management and the recapitalization of aging and 

unsustainable nuclear facilities that do not meet modern safety standards. 

Specifically, the fiscal year 2011 NNSA budget requests funds to: 

• Revitalize warhead surveillance efforts, and the science and technology 

that supports stockpile assessment and certification in the absence of nuclear testing. 

• Protect human capital—including the expertise to design, develop, and 

field warheads-through a stockpile management program that fully exercises these capabilities. 

• Design and build a modern facility at Los Alamos—the Chemistry and 

Metallurgy Research Replacement Nuclear Facility—for plutonium R&D 

and pit production support. 

• Design and build a modern facility at Y–12—the Uranium Processing Facility—to support Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) and related operations. 

FUNDS FOR THE CLOSURE OF GTMO

95. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Gates, the OCO portion of the President’s budget 

request for fiscal year 2011 includes $350 million in a transfer fund for the detention facilities at GTMO, provides funding to make improvements at the Illinois 

State Prison at Thomson, IL, in the amount of $150 million, and includes another 

$158 million for information technology improvements at the Rock Island Arsenal, 

IL, to support DOD detainee operations at Thomson. These funds are in addition 

to another $150 million in the Department of Justice (DOJ) budget request to purchase the Thomson facility from the State of Illinois. Current law prohibits bringing 

detainees from GTMO for any reason except for detention during trial or for other 

legal proceedings. 

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Why are the amounts requested for purchase and improvement of Thomson and information technology support, a total of nearly $458 million, so high considering 

that the existing prison and courtroom facilities at GTMO were built for about $240 

million? 

Secretary GATES. The $350 million request is for detainee operations in general and not just for Thomson. Of the $350 million, approximately $100 million is for 

improvements at Thomson Correctional Center, approximately $50 million is for improvements at Rock Island Arsenal, approximately $35 million is for procuring capital equipment for the facility, and approximately $60 million is for capital equipment and supplies for detention operations. The remaining $105 million is for operations at GTMO and Thomson. 

The $458 million request includes DOJ purchase, DOJ operations, DOD renovations, and DOD operations. When operations costs are excluded, the relevant comparison for ‘‘GTMO’’ facility investment at Thomson is approximately $200 million 

(DOJ’s purchase price of DOD’s portion of the prison plus DOD’s renovation costs). 

96. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Gates, are these amounts in addition to the more than $200 million per year that it is estimated to cost to try Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and his four September 11 cohorts in New York? 

Secretary GATES. The $200 million per year was estimated by New York City officials as their cost to conduct the trials. The amounts requested in the President’s 

budget are separate from this estimate. 

97. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Gates, what is the estimated amount of funding 

necessary to carry out all September 11 terrorist trials in GTMO? 

Secretary GATES. I cannot estimate a number at this time. The cost per trial varies depending on the number of pre-trial motions, witnesses, and other variables 

which are difficult to predict. 

98. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Gates, what is the estimated amount to try all the 

detainee cases the DOJ believes can be tried, which I understand is about 35 total 

cases, in GTMO? 

Secretary GATES. I cannot estimate a number at this time. The cost per trial varies depending on the number of pre-trial motions, witnesses, and other variables 

which are difficult to predict. 

99. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Gates, why is $158 million needed for information 

technology improvements at Rock Island to support detention facilities at Thomson? 

Secretary GATES. Of the $350 million request, only approximately $35 million is 

for procuring capital equipment, which includes information technology hardware at 

both Thomson and Rock Island. 

100. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Gates, does this request include funding for military housing and other base support facilities at Thomson and Rock Island for the 

military personnel that will be stationed to support the new facility? 

Secretary GATES. No, it does not. There are no plans to build military housing because the Department’s initial preliminary environmental assessment shows that 

the local economy can support the estimated number of personnel that will work at 

Thomson and Rock Island. 

101. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Gates, how many military personnel will be assigned to Thomson and where will they be housed? 

Secretary GATES. I estimate that approximately 800 military personnel will be assigned to Thomson in a temporary duty status at initial operational capability. The 

exact number of military personnel assigned to Thomson will be determined by the 

Commander, U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM). These personnel will leverage 

the local economy for housing, and initial environmental planning documents affirm 

that the local economy can support them. 

102. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Gates, how many additional military personnel 

will be assigned to Rock Island to support detention operations at Thomson and 

where will they be housed? 

Secretary GATES. Pending completion of NORTHCOM’s planning efforts, I estimate that up to 500 personnel supporting the detainee operations will be assigned 

to Rock Island at initial operational capability. The exact number of personnel assigned to Rock Island will be determined by the Commander, NORTHCOM. These 

personnel will leverage the local economy for housing, and initial environmental 

planning documents affirm that the local economy can support them. 

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103. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Gates, if Congress approves a change in the law 

to allow long-term detention without trial in the United States, and also approves 

the funding requested to purchase and improve detention facilities at Thomson, 

what is the timeline to begin detention operations at Thomson? 

Secretary GATES. From the date the restriction on long-term detention without 

trial in the United States ceases to have effect, and the funding requested to purchase and improve detention facilities at Thomson becomes available. I would not 

give any estimate because there are too many variables to work through. 

104. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Gates, when do you estimate the Bureau of Prisons would purchase the Thomson facility from the State of Illinois? 

Secretary GATES. The Bureau of Prisons cannot begin negotiating a purchase 

price until enactment of the portion of the President’s fiscal year 2011 budget that 

contains the DOJ appropriations and provides funding for planning and assessment 

to continue at Thomson. 

105. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Gates, when would the extensive improvements 

at Thomson and Rock Island begin? 

Secretary GATES. Improvements could not begin until the environmental assessment is completed, the Bureau of Prisons purchases the facility, and DOD receives 

authorization and funding from Congress. 

106. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Gates, when would the IOC for detention operations at Thomson be achieved? 

Secretary GATES. I estimate that initial operational capability would be achieved 

10–13 months after DOD receives authorization and funding from Congress. 

107. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Gates, when is the earliest date that military 

commission trials be held at Thomson under this plan? 

Secretary GATES. Military commission trials could be held when initial operating 

capability is achieved. 

108. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Gates, when would the Final Operational Capability (FOC) for detention operations at Thomson be achieved? 

Secretary GATES. Full operational capability would be achieved in 13–18 months 

after DOD receives authorization and funding from Congress. 

109. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Gates, what is the difference in terms of the 

number of detainees that could be held or the nature of detention operations between IOC and FOC? 

Secretary GATES. There is no difference in either the number of detainees that 

could be held at IOC and FOC or the nature of detention operations at IOC and 

FOC. 

110. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Gates, on what date would detention operations 

at GTMO actually end? 

Secretary GATES. Detention operations at GTMO could end shortly after Thomson 

is operational. 

DISPOSITION OF GTMO DETAINEES

111. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Gates, the President established a Joint Task 

Force (JTF) shortly after taking office last January to review all the available information on the detainees at GTMO and to make recommendations on whether they 

should be tried, released, or held long-term without trial. These recommendations 

were to extend to whether trials should be by military commission or by Federal 

courts, and the location of such trials. After extending the deadline for their work 

by 6 months, the media now reports that the report has been completed and recommendations on all the detainees have been made. When will the JTF report be 

made available to Congress, since the details it contains will influence our consideration of funding for alternatives to GTMO? 

Secretary GATES. The report was completed on January 22, 2010, and subsequently sent to the White House. It is not my decision to release the report. 

112. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Gates, will the administration come forward with 

a legislative proposal to repeal the current restrictions on bringing detainees from 

GTMO to the United States in time for comprehensive review before Congress reVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:37 May 06, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00149 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\62155.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
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ceives the JTF report or takes action on the funding request for the closure of 

GTMO? 

Secretary GATES. The administration is reviewing a number of possibilities relating to this issue, and it will not move any detainees to the United States unless 

it is in full compliance with U.S. law. 

113. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Gates, if an administration’s legislative proposal 

is forthcoming, will it address other aspects of detention policy such as: 

• a prohibition on release of detainees into the United States; 

• denial of any immigration status to detainees, including refugee and asylum status, if detainees are ordered released by a Federal court as a result 

of habeas corpus challenges to their detention; 

• authorization for long-term detention without trial within the United 

States; and 

• uniform rules for Federal courts to apply in conducting habeas corpus 

proceedings reviewing the detention of terrorists captured during our ongoing armed conflict with al Qaeda and the Taliban, and associated forces, 

which are responsible for the attacks of September 11? 

Secretary GATES. The President said that we will not release any detainee into 

the United States who will endanger American lives, and that we will use all lawful 

and appropriate means to protect the American people. The authority to detain individuals under the immigration laws pending their removal from the United States, 

particularly where they pose a threat to national security, is but one mechanism 

that may be relied upon, if necessary, to ensure that detainees will not endanger 

our citizens. 

Furthermore, denial of any immigration status to detainees has already been constituted. Section 552(f) of the fiscal year 2010 Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, which was signed into law by the President on October 28, 2009, 

specifically bars immigration benefits for detainees including ‘‘classification as a refugee or applicant for asylum.’’ 

LAW OF THE SEA TREATY

114. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Gates, the U.S. has not ratified the Law of the 

Sea Treaty while China has continued efforts to assert sovereignty over contested 

areas in the South China Sea and in other areas where such claims support China’s 

national security interests. Beijing has now suspended military-to-military exchanges as a result of the recent U.S. announcement to continue defensive arms 

sales to Taiwan. How are we managing our relationship with China in disputed 

areas such as its maritime claims? 

Secretary GATES. Despite China’s recently announced suspension of military-tomilitary relations, I remain highly committed to strengthening the mechanisms that 

the Department has in place to engage China on this and other security issues, including the U.S.-China Defense Consultative Talks, the U.S.-China Defense Policy 

Coordination Talks, and the U.S.-China Military Maritime Consultative Agreement 

process. These mechanisms provide for open and sustained channels of communication to build greater confidence and mutual understanding, discuss candidly our differences, and improve understanding and application of safety standards and rules 

of the road for operations that improve the safety of sailors and airmen of all countries in the region. 

I regard any suspension of discussions on operational safety as potentially dangerous, and I regard the suspension of these discussions on political grounds as particularly unfortunate. PLA General Xu Caihou and I both reaffirmed our commitment to maintaining open dialogue on security and safety issues during his visit in 

October. The United States remains committed to all of our dialogue mechanisms 

with the PLA. 

Regarding China’s maritime claims and the competing claims by other states 

around the South China Sea, U.S. policy continues to be that we do not take sides 

on the competing legal claims over territorial sovereignty, including those in the 

South China Sea and East China Sea. Furthermore, the United States does not propose to arbitrate or mediate the underlying conflicts between the competing claims. 

However, it is my view that our strong and continued presence in the region does 

provide a sense of stability and a modicum of breathing room for the claimants to 

pursue political means to resolve these issues. In short, the U.S. presence is a stabilizing influence for all claimants in the region. 

145 

115. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Gates, how do you think the relationship with 

China will develop as we continue to share the global commons—sea, air, space and 

cyberspace—as our interests clash or diverge? 

Secretary GATES. As U.S.-PRC interactions at sea, in the air, in space, and in 

cyberspace become more frequent, it will become increasingly important that the 

United States and China have effective mechanisms for communication to avoid 

miscalculation or misunderstanding. I believe that the United States and China 

should seek to recognize and expand shared interests in upholding the stability of, 

and access to, the global commons, and work together cooperatively in support of 

those interests. Where our interests diverge, we must ensure that each has a clear 

understanding of the other’s intentions, and that open channels of communication 

exist to avoid escalatory reactions or perceptions that could breed mistrust or inadvertently destabilize the overall bilateral relationship. Whether addressing shared 

or divergent interests with China, I have been diligent to ensure DOD’s positions 

are advanced in accordance with customary international law. 

DOD has several existing mechanisms to facilitate discussion with China on the 

topics you mentioned, and the Department is examining ways to expand their scope 

and effectiveness. In 1998, then-Secretary Cohen signed the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement (MMCA) with China’s Minister of Defense, and under its auspices the U.S. and China have held discussions on maritime operational safety, at 

sea and in the air. In 2005, DOD established what became the Defense Policy Coordination Talks as a forum for discussing, among other things, issues of maritime 

security. In 2008, DOD also began a Dialogue on Nuclear Policy and Strategy, and, 

in October 2009, General Xu Caihou, Vice Chairman of China’s Central Military 

Commission, visited U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) and engaged in discussions with General Chilton and his staff on the issues under STRATCOM’s purview. 

The American and Chinese Governments have not yet reached the point where 

these interactions are sufficiently consistent or substantive to constitute the solid 

foundation needed for a stable and productive relationship—one that can withstand 

the stresses that inevitably emerge between two countries with interests as diverse 

as those of the United States and China. Going forward, I believe that a whole-ofgovernment approach on both sides of the table provides the best formula for building the necessary foundation. 

OKINAWA TO GUAM REALIGNMENT

116. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Gates, on February 17, 2009, the U.S. Government reaffirmed its support of an agreement with the Government of Japan (GOJ) 

concerning the implementation of the relocation of 8,000 marines and their families 

from Okinawa to Guam by 2014 in a manner that maintains unit integrity. Since 

then, Japan elected a new Prime Minister, Yukio Hatoyama, who has asked the 

U.S. Government to consider new options for the Futenma Replacement Facility 

(FRF), which is part of the larger agreement for Guam. I note that the agreement 

stipulates that the Japanese Government must demonstrate tangible progress regarding the FRF, which has been defined to include a signature by the Governor 

of Okinawa on a landfill permit required to commence construction. This action was 

currently planned to take place in mid to late 2010. In a press conference yesterday, 

you suggested that we should demonstrate patience in the negotiations with the 

Japanese Government on the future of the agreement. With that said, the fiscal 

year 2011 budget request contains $387 million in military construction funds for 

infrastructure on Guam to support the relocation of marines from Okinawa. This 

is in addition to $160 million authorized for construction in the 2010 defense bill. 

If the Japanese position does not change regarding Futenma, will DOD still proceed 

with the award of construction contracts on Guam to support the relocation of the 

marines? 

Secretary GATES. The fiscal year 2011 budget request is $452 million in military 

construction funds for infrastructure on Guam to support the relocation of marines 

from Okinawa. The NDAA for Fiscal Year 2010 approved $514 million to support 

the relocation effort. 

The framework for U.S.-Japan force posture realignment is the U.S.-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation, issued following the May 1, 2006, meeting of 

the cabinet-level U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee. This framework confirms that the Okinawa-related realignment initiatives are interconnected and, specifically, that the III Marine Expeditionary Force (III MEF) relocation from Okinawa to Guam is dependent on, among other things, tangible progress toward completion of the FRF. 

146 

The relocation to Guam is a capabilities issue, not a basing issue. I have a responsibility to provide operationally ready forces in support of the combatant commander 

and to meet our commitments to Allies and partners in the region, including under 

the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security. 

The Department is currently waiting for the GOJ to complete its review of the 

FRF. Prime Minister Hatoyama stated that he intends to resolve the issue by May, 

and I look forward to resuming work with the GOJ to fulfill our longstanding mutual objective of realigning our force posture in Japan to ensure that the Alliance’s 

operational capabilities remain politically and operationally sustainable. 

117. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Gates, what other options are acceptable to DOD 

for the relocation of Marine Corps aviation units from Marine Corps Air Station 

Futenma? 

Secretary GATES. The FRF, included in the May 2006 U.S.-Japan Realignment 

Roadmap, resulted from several years of bilateral coordination that took into account the political, operational, safety, noise, environmental, and infrastructure requirements associated with the Marine Corps forces in Okinawa. These forces, 

which consist of air, ground, logistics, and command elements, remain dependent 

upon the interaction of those elements in regular training, exercises, and operations. 

I am not aware of any other options that meet these criteria. DOD is prepared 

to review what the GOJ comes up with to determine its feasibility, including operational, safety, noise, environmental, and infrastructure aspects, as well as to discuss its political sustainability given local conditions. DOD remains committed to 

the FRF—as reflected in the May 2006 Realignment Roadmap—as the best way to 

move forward with the strategic transformation of U.S. presence in Okinawa. 

118. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Gates, when do you expect to see a resolution on 

the status the FRF? 

Secretary GATES. Prime Minister Hatoyama stated that he intends to resolve the 

issue by May. The GOJ is conducting a review of options and has asked the U.S. 

Government to be patient as they prepare to present an official alternative. I look 

forward to resuming work with the GOJ to fulfill our longstanding mutual objective 

of realigning our force posture in Okinawa to be more politically and operationally 

sustainable. 

119. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Gates, would you recommend to the President 

the continuation of the movement of marines to Guam absent an acceptable solution 

for the FRF? 

Secretary GATES. The current framework for U.S.-Japan force posture realignment 

is the U.S.-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation, issued following the 

May 1, 2006, meeting of the cabinet-level U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee. This framework confirms that the Okinawa-related realignment initiatives 

are interconnected and, specifically, that the III Marine Expeditionary Force (III 

MEF) relocation from Okinawa to Guam is dependent on, among other things, tangible progress toward completion of the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF). 

A suitable FRF is considered the ‘‘lynchpin’’ for III MEF relocation to Guam. The 

relocation to Guam is a capabilities issue, not a basing issue. I have a responsibility 

to provide operationally ready forces in support of the combatant commander and 

to meet our commitments to allies and partners in the region, including under the 

U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security. 

The Department is currently waiting for the GOJ to complete its review of the 

FRF. Prime Minister Hatoyama stated that he intends to resolve the issue by May, 

and I look forward to resuming work with the GOJ to fulfill our longstanding mutual objective of realigning our force posture in Japan to ensure that the Alliance’s 

operational capabilities remain politically and operationally sustainable. 

120. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Gates, if the GOJ fails to approve the current 

roadmap regarding Futenma, is the United States prepared to nullify the current 

framework and remain in Futenma? 

Secretary GATES. The current framework for U.S.-Japan force posture realignment 

is the U.S.-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation, issued following the 

May 1, 2006, meeting of the cabinet-level U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee. While a suitable FRF is considered essential for an enduring presence on 

Okinawa, the Department is prepared to stay at Futenma if no replacement facility 

is approved by the GOJ. 

The GOJ is reviewing the FRF; Prime Minister Hatoyama has stated that he intends to resolve the issue by May. We look forward to resuming work with the GOJ 

to fulfill our longstanding mutual objective of realigning our force posture in Japan 

147 

to ensure that the Alliance’s operational capabilities remain sustainable, politically 

and operationally. We have a responsibility to provide operationally ready forces in 

support of the combatant commander and to meet our commitments to allies and 

partners in the region, including under the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security. 

INTERNATIONAL PILOT TRAINING

121. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Gates, many of our allies choose to conduct fighter pilot training here in the United States for various reasons ranging from the 

availability of adequate ranges to cost and the quality of training. This obviously 

affords the U.S. Air Force an outstanding opportunity to partner and train with 

NATO and other allied pilots. From what I have been told, the Secretary of the Air 

Force’s International Affairs office manages the program. Does DOD normally guide 

or influence a partner nation’s selection of the best location among candidate bases 

already conducting similar missions in the United States to conduct training to 

maximize efficiency for cost, quality of training, and access to ranges? 

Secretary GATES. There is no initiative in the U.S. Air Force concerning a decision 

to influence or guide international partner pilot training to a particular location. 

The Air Force provides tuition-based pilot training at 14 locations. Each location, 

with the exception of undergraduate pilot training, is the sole provider of tuitionbased training for a particular model of aircraft. For example, all F–16 tuition-based 

training is done at Tucson Air National Guard Base (ANGB), AZ, through the 162d 

Fighter Wing and their assigned F–16 aircraft and instructor pilots. 

When a partner nation desires to bed down its own aircraft at a continental 

United States (CONUS) air force base, the Secretary of the Air Force for International Affairs (SAF/IA) provides options based on the country’s requested training 

needs and budgetary requirements. When presented with available locations, training capabilities, and pricing information, the partner nation selects the training 

venue that best meets their needs. The U.S. Air Force is committed to providing the 

most effective training venue available for our international partners consistent 

with their training needs and budget by dispassionately providing the facts and 

costs for the available training. 

122. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Gates, would the office of the Secretary of Defense have any reason to provide guidance to Secretary of the Air Force’s International Affairs office to encourage an allied nation to remain at a certain location, 

regardless of the cost or quality of training? If so, what would be those reasons and 

why? 

Secretary GATES. There are occasions when discussions take place between the 

appropriate DOD offices and a partner nation concerning their choice of a bed down 

training location, usually when information is requested by the partner nation. Cost 

and quality of training are always considered in these discussions and are provided 

on all available training locations. Once the data are provided, we expect the partner nation to make the decision that best meets their training needs and budgetary 

requirements. 

When a partner nation requests tuition-based training for a specific aircraft, there 

are no alternatives and the requesting nation is limited to the stated location and 

standard student cost. 

CONTRACTOR PERFORMANCE FOR THE MISSILE DEFENSE AGENCY

123. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Gates, in the fiscal year 2011 budget press conference for the MDA, David Altwegg, Executive Director, was asked about the quality of work being conducted by contractors on MDA acquisition programs. Altwegg 

responded stating: 

‘‘I’m not going to name names today, but I’m going to tell you we continue 

to be disappointed in the quality that we are receiving from our prime contractors and their subs—very, very disappointed; quality-design issues, but 

more in quality of products delivered, which then results in rework and 

which reserved—because most of these contracts are cost contracts, it costs 

the taxpayer more.’’ 

Given the cost-plus nature of many of these contracts and the allegation that 

reckless failures by contractors are resulting in unnecessary cost increases, how do 

you intend to address these concerns, both within MDA and across DOD? 

148 

Secretary GATES. MDA has consistently expressed concern over the magnitude 

and frequency of quality problems encountered in the development and manufacture 

of the various elements that make up the Missile Defense System. 

MDA made significant changes in its acquisition processes over the past several 

years that both Lieutenant General O’Reilly, the MDA Director, and I believe will 

improve the quality in the manufacture of our weapons systems. Specifically: 

• MDA established a robust quality organization within the Agency, which 

focuses on tackling problems identified during development and testing. 

One of the first steps of this organization was the development of a MDA 

Assurance Plan, and a MDA Parts, Materials and Process Plan. These 

plans require major contractors to adopt disciplined processes and procedures that lead to enhanced quality, a reduction in rework, lower costs, and 

preventing ‘‘parts’’ quality issues from progressing to the finished components. Second, MDA Quality Safety and Mission Assurance now conducts 

periodic mission assurance audits at contractors’ facilities to monitor compliance and ensure the contractors are following their approved policies and 

procedures for the manufacture of systems. Following the audit, any deficiencies identified are tracked and reported to the MDA Director until they 

are successfully closed out. 

• MDA made significant changes to the award fee process and quality control has received increased emphasis over the past year. Prior to the beginning of each award fee period, the contractor is provided with an expectations letter clearly articulating the areas that the fee determining official 

considers to require emphasis during the period. The award fee expectations letters outline to contractors that poor quality will not be tolerated 

and will reduce award fee earned when appropriate. 

• MDA also moved away from cost plus award fee contracts to cost plus incentive fee contracts, an approach that measures contractor performance 

more precisely. Cost overruns result in lower fees, while the contractor has 

also the opportunity to earn more based on demonstrated positive performance against objective criteria. 

• MDA performs an annual assessment of its contractor’s performance that 

is recorded in a database called Past Performance Information Retrieval 

System (PPIRS) where these assessments are retrieved and used as part of 

past performance evaluations supporting future source selections throughout DOD. Negative reports, such as poor quality control, can lead to a contractor not being selected for a competitive contract award. 

• MDA embarked on efforts to re-compete many of its major contracts. The 

Agency’s expectation is that the competitive process will result in lower 

cost, better performance, and higher quality. 

• MDA clearly articulated to companies that it will not authorize future 

contract scope when a clear trend of poor quality assurance is not addressed 

by senior personnel and they do not initiate changes to cause enduring improvement in the quality and reliability of products. 

124. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Gates, what steps can be taken to ensure that 

contractors are held responsible to provide quality products without unnecessary increases in cost? 

Secretary GATES. I believe that the greater use of incentive-type contracts with 

cost incentives and objective criteria, rather than award fee contracts with more 

subjective criteria, should improve contractor performance. In addition, greater emphasis on past performance as a discriminator during contract competitions will 

incentivize sources to achieve quality performance. 

125. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Gates, please explain to what extent the fee 

structure of those contracts covered by Executive Director Altwegg’s comment can 

be better designed to incentivize optimal performance. What specific remedial efforts 

do you intend to employ to achieve that result? 

Secretary GATES. The contract fee structure is just one element in how we motivate or incentivize better contract performance. We will monitor contractor performance under the revised incentive structure over time and propose new steps when 

appropriate. The steps taken by MDA will accomplish our mutual goal of achieving 

optimal contract performance. Specifically: 

• MDA established a robust quality organization within the Agency, which 

focuses on tackling problems identified during development and testing. 

One of the first steps of this organization was the development of a MDA 

Assurance Plan, and a MDA Parts, Materials and Process Plan. These 

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plans require major contractors to adopt disciplined processes and procedures that lead to enhanced quality, a reduction in rework, lower costs, and 

preventing ‘‘parts’’ quality issues from progressing to the finished components. Second, MDA Quality Safety and Mission Assurance now conducts 

periodic mission assurance audits at contractors’ facilities to monitor compliance and ensure the contractors are following their approved policies and 

procedures for the manufacture of systems. Following the audit, any deficiencies identified are tracked and reported to the MDA Director until they 

are successfully closed out. 

• MDA made significant changes to the award fee process and quality control has received increased emphasis over the past year. Prior to the beginning of each award fee period, the contractor is provided with an expectations letter clearly articulating the areas that the fee determining official 

considers to require emphasis during the period. The award fee expectations letters outline to contractors that poor quality will not be tolerated 

and will reduce award fee earned when appropriate. 

• MDA also moved away from cost plus award fee contracts to cost plus incentive fee contracts, an approach that measures contractor performance 

more precisely. Cost overruns result in lower fees, while the contractor has 

also the opportunity to earn more based on demonstrated positive performance against objective criteria. 

• MDA performs an annual assessment of its contractor’s performance that 

is recorded in a database called PPIRS where these assessments are retrieved and used as part of past performance evaluations supporting future 

source selections throughout DOD. Negative reports, such as poor quality 

control, can lead to a contractor not being selected for a competitive contract award. 

• MDA embarked on efforts to recompete many of its major contracts. The 

Agency’s expectation is that the competitive process will result in lower 

cost, better performance, and higher quality. 

• MDA clearly articulated to companies that it will not authorize future 

contract scope when a clear trend of poor quality assurance is not addressed 

by senior personnel and they do not initiate changes to cause enduring improvement in the quality and reliability of products. 

TRICARE FEES

126. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Gates, in your recent press comments on the fiscal year 2011 budget request, you stated that reasonable tradeoffs had to be made 

to control cost growth in the TRICARE program. What is the administration’s rationale for charging military families or retirees higher out of pocket fees for health 

care they earned in return for their military service? 

Secretary GATES. There are no proposals in the fiscal year 2011 budget request 

that will raise discretionary fees for military families or retirees. However, fees for 

the TRICARE program have remained static since its inception in 1995, while 

health care costs have soared. For example, the Prime enrollment fee has remained 

$460 a year for a retiree family since 1995. As a result, many beneficiaries are returning to the Military Health System (MHS), opting to use their more generous 

TRICARE benefits versus other health plans. 

MHS costs have more than doubled between fiscal year 2001 ($19 billion) and fiscal year 2010 ($49 billion). At this growth rate, MHS costs are projected to approach 

$64 billion by fiscal year 2015, more than 10 percent of the Department’s top line 

budget. While the Department continually looks for opportunities for savings and 

efficiencies within the MHS, these efforts are unlikely to solve the long-term sustainability issues of the TRICARE benefit without changes to the beneficiary costsharing structure 

EXTENDING BENEFITS TO NEW CATEGORIES

127. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Gates, the Senate Committee on Veterans Affairs 

has recently adopted legislation that would extend TRICARE benefits to certain current and former members of the Armed Forces and their family members for health 

problems occurring as a result of exposure to environmental hazards at Camp 

LeJeune and the Atsugi Naval Air Facility if so determined by an advisory board 

on military exposures. What is your position on expansion of eligibility for TRICARE 

to cover such individuals, including those who may be otherwise ineligible for DOD 

health care benefits? 

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Secretary GATES. Before we would extend health benefits, we would need evidence 

of causality between consumption of contaminated water and any adverse health 

conditions. The Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry of the Centers for 

Disease Control and Prevention has not yet established linkage between the consumption of contaminated water at Camp Lejeune and health conditions in the population who consumed the contaminated water. 

Health benefits coverage should be limited only to those conditions where there 

is sound scientific evidence of a causal relationship between exposure, including the 

amount of exposure dose, and specific disease outcomes. Absent information on exposure dose and in accordance with proposed Senate legislation, this determination 

would be made by an Advisory Committee and a Scientific Review Committee. In 

addition to consideration of causally-related associations with the particular contaminants identified, consideration must be given to the severity of exposures (dosages) that individuals may have encountered while residing at Camp Lejeune or the 

Naval Air Facility Atsugi, Japan. The doses of contaminates are critical in determining risk, as many low dose exposures do not create significant health risks. The 

Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry is embarking on a series of studies to better identify the exposed personnel and then to study disease outcome in 

those individuals in order to identify any positive associations. 

It should also be noted, in accordance with the National Defense Authorization 

Act for Fiscal Year 2007, the Marine Corps contracted with the National Academy 

of Sciences (National Research Council (NRC)) to review the evidence regarding potential associations between exposure to contaminated drinking water at Camp 

Lejeune and adverse health effects in prenatal children, children, and adults. The 

NRC review report concluded that while former Camp Lejeune residents and workers were exposed to unregulated solvents, there are no conclusive associations between adverse health effects and exposure to the contaminated water at the base. 

The report noted that for the chemicals of greatest concern, tetrachloroethene and 

trichloroethene, the highest levels measured in the mixed-water samples at Camp 

Lejeune were much lower than the lowest dose that caused adverse effects in the 

most sensitive strains of species of laboratory animals. The review concluded, however, that even though adverse effects were unlikely, they could not be ruled out 

completely and that the Department of the Navy (and other policy makers) should 

move forward with responses they deem appropriate based on available information. 

In regard to the personnel who were assigned at Naval Air Facility Atsugi, Japan 

while the Japanese Shinkampo incinerator was operational, a number of comprehensive health studies were accomplished by the U.S. Navy Environmental 

Health Center. As a result of these assessments, it would be difficult to attribute 

any particular cancer occurring in this population that is related to the incinerator 

emissions. 

128. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Gates, if enacted, how would the TRICARE program implement health benefits coverage limited to conditions related to exposure 

to environmental hazards? 

Secretary GATES. The Department provides or arranges for medically necessary 

health care for those entitled to the MHS benefit. In the broad sense, we do not 

deny care to those entitled to care based on the cause of their medical condition. 

If the statute is changed and the Department is directed to provide care for a new 

category of beneficiary, we would use existing regulatory procedures to define eligibility and health care coverage. 

PAYMENTS TO CIVILIAN HOSPITALS

129. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Gates, what amount of savings is assumed in 

this request as a result of payment reform for civilian hospitals, such as application 

of Medicare outpatient prospective payments, and payments to sole community providers? 

Secretary GATES. TRICARE implemented its Outpatient Prospective Payment 

System (OPPS) on May 1, 2009 to bring its reimbursement rates for hospital outpatient services into alignment with Medicare rates. All public comments were 

taken into account before the final rule was published on December 10, 2008. The 

rule provided a phase in period of four years for network hospitals and three years 

for non-network hospitals to buffer the effect of the decline in payments. Prior to 

this rule, TRICARE paid billed charges for emergency room visits and a CHAMPUS 

Maximum Allowable Charge for outpatient radiology, pathology, and ambulatory 

surgery. In total, the payments reflected approximately 45 percent of overall billed 

charges. 

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The fiscal year 2011 President’s budget for the Defense Health Program assumes $366 million in savings associated with this change. The calculation included the 

phase in schedule as well as the assumption that some hospitals would qualify for 

Military Contingency Payment Adjustments which offset the effect on facilities serving a significant number of active duty servicemembers and their families. These 

adjustments may be applied if certain volume or TRICARE revenue thresholds are 

met by the hospital. This provision was designed to ensure continued access to care 

in military communities. Sole community hospitals are among those affected by the 

OPPS regulation. 

Based on the first 3 months of fiscal year 2010, we are on track to realize these 

projected savings. TRICARE Regional Offices are assisting hospitals with documentation of their claims history to qualify for the Military Contingency Payment 

Adjustment. 

130. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Gates, do civilian hospitals lose money every 

time they care for a TRICARE patient? If so, why? If not, please explain, based on 

data available to DOD. 

Secretary GATES. We have no evidence that civilian hospitals lose money. Statute 

(10 U.S.C. 1079(j)(2)) requires TRICARE to pay institutional providers according to 

the rules which apply to Medicare reimbursement to the extent practicable. In comparing OPPS reimbursement to the prior formula, our analysis of a nationwide sample of 73 hospitals indicated reimbursement would drop from approximately 45 percent of overall billed charges to 30–40 percent. This amount exceeds publicly available cost to charge ratios in all but four States (Wyoming, Utah, Nebraska, and 

Alaska), thus covering hospitals’ costs for the care. 

While TRICARE’s OPPS represents a significant change for hospitals, it aligns 

our program with Medicare, covers hospital costs, and includes considerations for 

hospitals seeing a large volume of TRICARE patients. 

MEDICAL FACILITIES IN THE NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION

131. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Gates, nearly all of our Nation’s seriously wounded and ill warriors return to medical facilities in the National Capital Region (NCR) 

even if they do not become inpatients here. It is imperative that the quality of care 

at Walter Reed and Fort Belvoir retain the high degree of excellence provided today 

as well as achieve additional attributes of world-class care in the new joint facility. 

In its independent review of DOD’s plans for the new Walter Reed National Military Medical Center (WRNMMC), an advisory committee of the Defense Health 

Board (DHB) found that there is an ‘‘urgent need to clarify the vision, goals, and 

expectations’’ for the new facility and to ‘‘consolidate organizational and budgetary 

authority in a single entity.’’ The NDAA for Fiscal Year 2010 requires DOD to delineate budget and operational authority to provide and operate world class military 

medical facilities in the NCR as part of a plan that must be submitted to Congress 

by March 31, 2010. Are funds included in DOD’s FYDP to invest in the existing facilities at Bethesda to raise them to world-class standards? 

Secretary GATES. The Department has developed a Comprehensive Master Plan 

for the NCR, which provides a roadmap to continue improving the finest healthcare 

facilities possible for our military families. Military medicine in the NCR incorporates many of the world-class attributes and capabilities as defined in the DHB 

panel’s recently established standard. Since our 2009 review of the DHB report, the 

Department has institutionalized even greater requirements than the report outlined and has undertaken a Master Facilities Planning process to define and execute 

the requirements as part of our Comprehensive Master Plan. This plan will inform 

the DOD’s FYDP starting fiscal year 2012. 

132. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Gates, what are the plans for DOD and the JTF, 

NCR Medical, to address the issues of command and control, resources and staffing, 

both military and civilian, of the integrated care system for the NCR? 

Secretary GATES. 

Command, Control, and Resources: 

The 2005 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) recommendation that realigned 

operations from Walter Reed Army Medical Center (WRAMC) to a new WRNMMC, 

Bethesda and Fort Belvoir Community Hospital (FBCH), was the Department’s first 

step in a larger effort to transform, realign, and significantly enhance the way it 

delivers healthcare in the NCR. Taking into account the recommendations of the 

DOD’s 2007 Independent Review Group and the President’s Commission on Care for 

America’s Returning Wounded Warriors (Dole-Shalala), the DOD Senior Oversight 

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Council recommended, and the Department established, the Joint Task Force National Capital Region Medical (JTF CAPMED) as a standing JTF to oversee these 

efforts. 

The NCR BRAC Health Systems Advisory Subcommittee of the DHB’s independent review of DOD’s plans for the new WRNMMC, Bethesda, and FBCH identified authority issues in the NCR as ‘‘foundational’’ and recommended empowering 

a single official with complete organizational and budgetary authority in the NCR. 

The Department is developing and implementing a comprehensive master plan for 

the NCR Medical as required under section 2714 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2010 

that will address this. 

Manpower Document: 

The Department has determined an Active-Duty Force mix distribution for the 

new WRNMMC, Bethesda and FBCH and the Services have identified the resources 

to meet the defined manning requirements. At WRNMMC, Bethesda the ActiveDuty Force mix will be approximately 41 percent Army, 54 percent Navy, and 5 percent Air Force. At FBCH, it will be approximately 62 percent Army, 36 percent 

Navy, and 2 percent Air Force. The distribution of forces is necessary to understand 

where the future requirements for the civilian workforce will be located. 

An Intermediate Manpower Document (IMD) is being developed and will be used 

to facilitate the development of the ultimate Joint Table of Distribution (JTD). The 

IMD is an authoritative database that supports the underlying manning documents 

for each Service. It will allow the compilation of all personnel requirements for the 

eventual JTD while maintaining more flexibility for changes during the transition 

and as experience is gained operating the new hospitals. The IMD will look exactly 

like a JTD in all aspects, which will facilitate its eventual migration to the JTD. 

The final iteration of the Department’s draft JTD version 3.0 was renamed the IMD. 

Following the completion of the IMD, JTF CAPMED and the Services will develop 

a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) to commit resources in support of the IMD. 

Until the Department makes its final determination on the ultimate governance 

alignment of JTF CAPMED, the IMD can remain a local database, with necessary 

MOAs, allowing flexibility for position changes and realignments. 

Civilian Personnel: 

Retaining the skilled workforce in the NCR is imperative to operating the new 

WRNMMC, Bethesda and FBCH. A Joint manning solution coupled with a comprehensive human capital strategy will allow the Department to incorporate the rich 

legacies of both WRAMC and NNMC as national icons in establishing the new 

WRNMMC, Bethesda and FBCH. While attrition levels of government civilians at 

WRAMC remain normal, individuals at WRAMC and NNMC remain concerned 

about their jobs and location in the end state. The Department is engaged in comprehensive communication efforts with the current workforce to ensure transparency and maintain trust. 

The Department has established a Civilian Human Resources (CHR) Council to 

oversee the transition of civilian employees in the NCR. In February 2010, the CHR 

began matching current permanent WRAMC civilians to work locations at either 

WRNMMC, Bethesda or FBCH. Utilizing a workforce mapping model to execute a 

Guaranteed Placement Program (GPP), the Department will be able to identify 

placement options for the vast majority of WRAMC government civilians at their desired work location performing their preferred work assignment. Placement options 

will also include reassignment opportunities and career progression opportunities 

that do not exist today. By July 1, 2010 notifications will be made to civilian employees of their future work assignments and locations at WRNMMC, Bethesda, 

FBCH or other opportunities within the GPP. Government civilians will not incur 

any loss in pay as a result of the transition. 

The Department is taking significant actions to accommodate work location preferences for as many civilians as possible. Approximately 1,500 of the WRAMC civilian personnel will be placed at WRNMMC, Bethesda. Surveys indicate that approximately 405 current civilian employees prefer to work at FBCH, which includes 355 

civilian employees assigned to WRAMC and 50 civilian personnel assigned to 

NNMC. DOD may be able to expand WRAMC placement opportunities for civilian 

personnel at WRNMMC Bethesda through workforce mix analysis, insourcing and/ 

or other initiatives. All new permanent civilian hires at WRAMC and NNMC are 

being advised that their work and position may move to FBCH in 2011. This change 

was effective as of February 2010. In addition, DOD will leverage attrition over the 

next year and a half to create additional positions at WRNMMC, Bethesda in order 

to place current permanent WRAMC civilians. DOD is committed to maintaining a 

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highly-skilled workforce in the NCR able to meet the unique healthcare needs of the 

Nation’s servicemembers, retirees, and their families. 

133. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Gates, what steps has DOD taken and what additional steps are necessary to apprise civilian health care employees at Walter 

Reed and Bethesda of their future status within the new facility in order to retain 

the highest quality staff now serving? 

Secretary GATES. Retaining the skilled workforce in the NCR is imperative to operating the new WRNMMC, Bethesda and FBCH. A Joint manning solution coupled 

with a comprehensive human capital strategy will allow the Department to incorporate the rich legacies of both WRAMC and NNMC as national icons in establishing the new WRNMMC, Bethesda and FBCH. While attrition levels of government civilians at WRAMC remain normal, individuals at WRAMC and NNMC remain concerned about their jobs and location in the end state. The Department is 

engaged in comprehensive communication efforts with the current workforce to ensure transparency and maintain trust. 

The Department has established a CHR Council to oversee the transition of civilians in the NCR. In February 2010 it began matching current permanent WRAMC 

civilians to their work locations at either WRNMMC, Bethesda or FBCH in the end 

state. Utilizing a workforce mapping model to execute the Guaranteed Placement 

Program (GPP), the Department will be able to place the vast majority of WRAMC 

government civilians at their desired work locations doing the work they want to 

do and will provide reassignment opportunities and career progression opportunities 

that do not exist today. Notifications will be made to Federal Government civilians, 

who will be transitioned to a single DOD civilian manning model, of their future 

work locations at WRNMMC, Bethesda, FBCH, or other opportunities within the 

GPP by July 1, 2010. Government civilians will not incur any loss in pay as a result 

of the transition. 

The Department has taken significant actions to meet work location preferences 

for as many civilians as possible. The Active-Duty Force mix across these hospitals 

will facilitate the placement of approximately 1,500 of the WRAMC civilian personnel to be placed at the WRNMMC, Bethesda. Surveys indicate that more than 

355 Federal Government civilians at WRAMC and 50 at NNMC desire to go to 

FBCH. There are approximately 230 contract billets planned for FBCH and 475 for 

WRNMMC, Bethesda and depending on the skills needed, DOD may be able to use 

some of those contractor billets to expand WRAMC personnel placements at Bethesda. In addition, effective February 2010, all new permanent hires at WRAMC 

and NNMC are being advised that their work may move to FBCH in 2011. DOD 

will also be leveraging attrition over the next year and a half to create additional 

‘‘spaces’’ at Bethesda to place current permanent WRAMC civilians. DOD is committed to maintaining a highly-skilled workforce in the NCR able to meet the 

unique healthcare needs of the Nation’s servicemembers, retirees, and their families. 

SUPPORT FOR MILITARY FAMILIES WITH SPECIAL NEEDS

134. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Gates, the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2010 required 

DOD to establish an Office of Community Support for Families with Special Needs, 

and to significantly improve programs both in the Office of the Secretary of Defense 

and throughout the military departments to assist military families with special 

educational and medical needs. What are DOD’s plans to implement this program 

in fiscal year 2010? 

Secretary GATES. We have established the Office of Community Support for Military Families with Special Needs within the office of the Deputy Under Secretary 

of Defense for Military Community and Family Policy. The NDAA for Fiscal Year 

2010 requires the office to develop and implement a comprehensive policy on support for military families with special needs. 

An Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)/Services working group has been 

meeting since April 2009, on how to better support military families with special 

needs, for both Active Duty and the Reserve component. The working group has 

begun developing the policy and will develop standards and metrics by which to 

measure the effectiveness of the support provided. 

We met with military families with special needs to better understand their needs 

and will continue to involve them. We will also consult with military and civilian 

specialists supporting families with special needs to help us develop the family support program. 

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In November 2009, the Department sponsored joint service training for over 300 

military personnel who serve military families with special needs. 

The Department has established a repository of information for military families 

with special needs at Military OneSource (www.militaryonesource.com/ 

specialneeds). The launch page provides a central location for families to learn about 

services and support available from the military as well as from the communities 

outside the gate. 

135. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Gates, why does the request for fiscal year 2011 

omit any request for funding this mandate? 

Secretary GATES. Although the Department did not request funds in the fiscal 

year 2011 budget, we understand the importance of this program. We are reviewing 

our funding options for fiscal year 2011 and will work with Congress to resolve any 

concerns. 

136. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Gates, what is DOD’s estimate of the funds required to meet this mandate in fiscal year 2011 and how will it be achieved? 

Secretary GATES. The Military Community and Family Programs office under the 

Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness) continues to refine the implementation plan, including the requirements of the program management office. 

Once the implementation plan is complete, funds will be realigned within available 

resources, or reprogrammed during the Omnibus reprogramming action to meet the 

initial fiscal year 2010 funding requirements of the Office of Community Support 

for Military Families with Special Needs. The implementation plan will also lay out 

the fiscal year 2011 funding requirements and strategies. As necessary, the Department will submit a reprogramming action to meet fiscal year 2011 requirements. 

ROTARY WING SUPPORT IN AFGHANISTAN

137. Senator MCCAIN. Admiral Mullen, on September 28, 2009, Newsweek released an article titled ‘‘Not So Special Forces’’ describing a shortage of aviation assets, particularly rotary lift, to support SOF in Afghanistan, including a claim that 

nearly 80 percent of aviation requests made by SOF in Afghanistan were rejected. 

Aware of the vital role SOF play in our efforts against terrorism, the 2010 QDR 

calls for a substantial increase in SOF personnel and a correlating increase in key 

enabling assets for SOF, including rotary lift. While this increase is necessary to 

support the growing end strength of SOF, it will not provide near-term relief to already strained resources in-country. What is your current assessment of the availability of enabling forces, including rotary lift, for SOF in Afghanistan? 

Admiral MULLEN. We continue to have shortfalls in ISR and rotary wing support 

to SOF in Afghanistan. Personnel training is the biggest factor limiting how fast we 

can deliver more ISR to Afghanistan. Training pipelines for ISR operators and intelligence analysts are operating at maximum throughput to operate and employ newly 

acquired hardware, and we continue to ensure proper numbers and placement of analysts to effectively collect, analyze, and exploit intelligence data. 

To address the current need for battlefield mobility, one additional MH–47 will 

be delivered to Afghanistan in May, and two additional Chinooks will arrive in December 2010 and June 2011, respectively. Additionally, five CV–22s deployed in 

April to support SOF mobility requirements in Afghanistan, to include vertical lift. 

We are also accelerating delivery of CV–22s to better support the forces requiring 

them, and we anticipate adding five more CV–22s to the fleet in the coming year. 

Currently at initial operational capability, CV–22 units cannot currently sustain a 

permanent presence in Afghanistan and they are limited to 4–6 month deployments 

to accommodate training new crews. However, their presence will become more enduring as the fleet grows and the CV–22 reaches full operational capability in fiscal 

year 2011. 

138. Senator MCCAIN. Admiral Mullen, what steps, if any, have been taken to alleviate the shortage of key enabling forces, including rotary lift, in Afghanistan for 

SOF? 

Admiral MULLEN. We continue to have shortfalls in ISR and rotary wing support 

to SOF in Afghanistan. Personnel training is the biggest factor limiting how fast we 

can deliver more ISR to Afghanistan. Training pipelines for ISR operators and intelligence analysts are operating at maximum throughput to operate and employ newly 

acquired hardware, and we continue to ensure proper numbers and placement of analysts to effectively collect, analyze, and exploit intelligence data. 

155 

To address the current need for battlefield mobility, one additional MH–47 will 

be delivered to Afghanistan in May, and two additional Chinooks will arrive in December 2010 and June 2011, respectively. Additionally, five CV–22s deployed in 

April to support SOF mobility requirements in Afghanistan, to include vertical lift. 

We are also accelerating delivery of CV–22s to better support the forces requiring 

them, and we anticipate adding five more CV–22s to the fleet in the coming year. 

Currently at initial operational capability, CV–22 units cannot currently sustain a 

permanent presence in Afghanistan and they are limited to 4–6 month deployments 

to accommodate training new crews. However, their presence will become more enduring as the fleet grows and the CV–22 reaches full operational capability in fiscal 

year 2011. 

139. Senator MCCAIN. Admiral Mullen, do you believe that U.S. forces will have 

adequate rotary medical evacuation lift in Afghanistan once the surge of 30,000 

forces is in place? 

Admiral MULLEN. The Joint Staff stood-up an operational planning team to examine the current and future requirements for rotary medical evacuation, or 

MEDIVAC, platforms in Afghanistan given the increase in number of deployed 

forces. I expect to be briefed on the team’s assessment by 10 May and I will subsequently provide the results to the committee. That said, we will do all we need to 

do to ensure there is adequate rotary medical evacuation lift in Afghanistan once 

the surge of 30,000 forces are in place. 

The Joint Staff is working closely with U.S. CENTCOM and U.S. Joint Forces 

Command (JFCOM) to accurately define the CENTCOM Commander’s requirements 

and sourcing solutions. Additionally, in order to be adequately prepared to source 

solutions once the Commander’s requirements are finalized, U.S. Joint Forces Command is working closely with the Services, Reserves, and National Guard Bureau 

to determine readiness and availability of forces. 

IMPACT TO READINESS FROM OFF-SHORE DRILLING

140. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Gates, the President stated his support for new 

off-shore drilling initiatives during his State of the Union Address. As you may 

know, the issue of drilling in the Eastern Gulf of Mexico has raised concerned within DOD over potential impacts to the test and training air ranges in that area. 

Some of this concern has been addressed with recent negotiations with the Department of the Interior about acceptable methods of drilling. What is the current position of DOD concerning the issuance of additional leases in the Eastern Gulf of Mexico to support off-shore drilling operations and the current concerns about the impact to military readiness? 

Secretary GATES. On April 2, 2010, the DOD transmitted a report to the Department of Interior (DOI) on the compatibility of DOD activities with oil and gas resource development on the outer continental shelf. Transmittal of the report occurred after months of discussions with the DOI and was in response to the Mineral 

Management Service’s ‘‘Draft 2010–2015 Outer Continental Shelf Oil and Gas Lease 

Sale Plan.’’ 

The report applied greater analytic rigor than past reports, going beyond the 

former binary analysis where areas were either compatible or incompatible with development, to include areas of conditional compatibility (drilling with stipulations 

such as periodic evacuation or no permanent surface structures). While only a small 

portion of the Eastern Gulf was found to be compatible without restrictions, larger 

areas were found to be conditionally compatible. The report only examined military 

mission and did not address environmental issues. 

DON’T ASK, DON’T TELL POLICY

141. Senator MCCAIN. Admiral Mullen, in your testimony on February 2, you were 

clear that the Joint Chiefs have not yet developed their best military advice about 

the impact of a repeal of the DADT policy and the manner in which you would implement a change in policy. You stated that you would like to have the time to do 

so. However, many in Congress intend to move quickly through legislation to repeal 

10 U.S.C. § 654 as quickly as possible. 

In view of the time needed to perform the high level review, do you support legislative change to the current homosexual conduct policy before the Chiefs have formulated their advice? 

Admiral MULLEN. I agree with the approach that the Secretary of Defense has 

proposed, which calls for a careful review of this policy. Given all we are currently 

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asking of our force and their families, I think we owe it to them to understand the 

exact nature of the impact of any repeal of the law. I also believe this review will 

be useful to Congress in your deliberations. This is why we are undertaking a comprehensive review of the issue, and I support taking the time to do so. I do not support legislative change to current homosexual conduct policy before the Chiefs have 

formulated their advice, tied to the results of the ongoing comprehensive review. 

142. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Gates, you testified that a high-level working 

group within DOD will review the issues associated with properly implementing a 

repeal of the DADT policy. Part of this review, you testified, will be to reach out 

to authoritatively understand the views and attitudes of the force. Please explain 

in detail what steps DOD will take to implement the President’s direction to begin 

the preparations necessary for repeal of the current law and policy. 

Secretary GATES. As I have directed, the Working Group will solicit the views of 

a wide array of individuals including military families. Over the course of the next 

8 months members of the Working Group will meet with a wide array of individuals 

of all Services, ranks, ages and assignments, officers and enlisted, to seek their advice, opinions, and concerns regarding a repeal and how it should be implemented. 

The Working Group will thoroughly, objectively, and methodically examine all aspects of this question, and produce its finding and recommendations in the form of 

an implementation plan by the end of this calendar year. 

143. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Gates, are the actions you are directing intended 

to strengthen the argument for repeal of existing law? 

Secretary GATES. The Comprehensive Review Working Group is conducting a comprehensive review of the issues associated with a repeal of the law. I have directed 

this effort be carried out professionally, thoroughly, dispassionately, and in a manner responsive to the direction of the President and to the needs of Congress this 

matter is debated and considered. 

144. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Gates, what difference will it make, if any, in 

DOD planning if a significant proportion—say 50 percent—of servicemembers and 

their families register objection to a change in the policy? 

Secretary GATES. I am not in a position to speculate as to what the Working 

Group may find and conclude in the course of its review. I do know that the Working Group will undertake its review in an objective and thorough manner, and I expect that the Working Group co-chairs will provide me with their best assessment 

of the impact of repeal, regardless of what that may be, to permit me to determine, 

as I said in my testimony, how best to prepare for implementation of a congressional 

repeal. 

145. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Gates, please explain in detail how you intend 

to authoritatively understand the views and attitudes of Active and Reserve 

servicemembers. 

Secretary GATES. Over the course of the next 8 months members of the Working 

Group will meet with a wide array of individuals of all Services, ranks, ages, and 

assignments, officers and enlisted, to seek their advice, opinions, and concerns regarding a repeal and how it should be implemented. The Working Group is in the 

process of developing appropriate means by which to accomplish this. 

146. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Gates, as part of your review, do you intend to 

seek the views of veterans or retired members of the Armed Forces? If no, why not? 

Secretary GATES. The Working Group will seek to hear from the many responsible 

voices of those individuals and groups with diverse views on this important matter, 

including veterans and retired members of the Armed Forces. 

147. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Gates, please explain in detail how the working 

group will attempt to gauge the impacts of a change in the law on military effectiveness, including how a change might affect unit cohesion, recruiting, and retention. 

Secretary GATES. As stated in my testimony, the Working Group will examine the 

potential impacts of a change in the law on military effectiveness, including how a 

change might affect unit cohesion, recruiting and retention, and other issues crucial 

to the performance of the force. To accomplish this task, I have directed the Working Group to systematically engage the force and in an appropriately balanced manner engage Members of Congress, key influences of potential servicemembers, and 

other stakeholder groups who have expressed a view on the current and prospective 

policy. 

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148. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Gates, you have outlined plans for a study about 

changing, or more likely, repealing the current law regarding military service by homosexuals. Please describe the regulatory or legislative changes you will seek or direct this year with respect to DOD’s DADT policy and title 10, U.S.C., § 654. 

Secretary GATES. The Working Group will produce its findings and recommendations in the form of an implementation plan by the end of this calendar year. I anticipate recommended regulatory and legislative changes will be included in this report. Additionally, as announced in my testimony, I have directed the Department 

to quickly review the regulations used to implement the current Don’t Ask, Don’t 

Tell law, and within 45 days present recommended changes to regulations that will 

enforce this policy in a fairer manner within existing law. 

149. Senator MCCAIN. Admiral Mullen, you are the principal military adviser to 

the President and the Secretary of Defense, but under law, you must consult with 

and seek the advice of the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the combatant commanders. What are the views of the other Joint Chiefs of Staff and the 

combatant commanders about changing the existing homosexual conduct policy? 

Admiral MULLEN. Each of the Service Chiefs and combatant commanders has appeared before the committee, where they had the opportunity to express their views. 

I can tell you that all the Chiefs are concerned with current combat operations and 

the associated stress on the force. Given what is currently being asked of our force 

and their families, the Chiefs would all like to better understand the exact nature 

of the impact of any repeal of the law. This is why all of us support a comprehensive 

review of the issue in order to better advise the Secretary of Defense and the President. 

150. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, subparagraph (a) of 

section 654 of title 10, U.S.C., sets forth 15 findings of fact concerning homosexuality in the Armed Forces. Do you disagree with any of the findings? If so, how? 

Secretary GATES and Admiral MULLEN. I fully support the President’s decision. 

The President announced a plan to work with Congress this year to repeal 10 U.S.C. 

§ 654. He subsequently directed DOD to begin the preparations necessary for repeal 

of the current law and policy. I have directed this effort be carried out professionally, thoroughly, dispassionately, and in a manner responsive to the direction 

of the President and to the needs of Congress this matter is debated and considered. 

The Comprehensive Review Working Group will solicit the views of a wide array 

of individuals from the different Services on this subject. This working group is conducting a comprehensive review of the issues associated with a repeal of the law. 

With the preparation and conclusions of the working group completed, the next 

stage will be Congressional deliberation and decision, as only Congress can repeal 

10 U.S.C. § 654. 

151. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, would you please explain your views about what conditions are now present in the Armed Forces that 

justify repealing the current homosexual conduct policy now. 

Secretary GATES I support the President’s decision to work with Congress this 

year to repeal 10 U.S.C. § 654 and to direct DOD to begin the preparations necessary for a repeal of the current law and policy. The Comprehensive Review Working Group I have established will, among other things, solicit the views of a wide 

array of individuals from the different Services on this subject, and I look forward 

to the continued progress of the working group as they undertake their important 

task in the months ahead. 

Admiral MULLEN. Given all we are currently asking of our force and their families, I think we owe it to them to understand the exact nature of the impact of any 

repeal of the law. I support the approach that the Secretary of Defense has proposed, which calls for a careful review of issues and impact related to this policy 

and its potential repeal. This review will help us better understand the conditions 

in today’s Armed Forces related to this law and policy. 

My personal view, as I have expressed, is that current law and policy conflict with 

our core value of integrity—as individuals and as an institution. But I need to understand the full impacts of any change to the law, and how to best ensure the 

wellbeing of the force should the law change. 

It is premature for me to speculate now regarding what the review will find. I 

look forward to working with leaders within DOD to conduct this review in a manner that preserves the high state of readiness of the U.S. military. 

152. Senator MCCAIN. Admiral Mullen, you have extensive operational and command experience, including command of three ships. Even on today’s most modern 

158 

ships and submarines, living conditions are spartan. The same is certainly true for 

deployed ground forces in Iraq, Afghanistan, and around the globe. What is your 

message to military personnel of any rank who object to being required to live and 

work under such conditions with an openly gay individual? 

Admiral MULLEN. We ask much of our servicemembers, and we put them into situations where they are living and working, day in and day out, under tough conditions. At all times, we must be attentive to good order and discipline and morale, 

and maintaining military effectiveness. We will always take the steps necessary to 

preserve effectiveness and readiness, consistent with our core values and military 

ethos, and our mission. 

153. Senator MCCAIN. Admiral Mullen, we should anticipate that many military 

leaders, officer and enlisted, will object to changes in the current DOD homosexual 

conduct policy. Yet you have testified about your personal view that good leadership 

requires military leaders to support changes to the policy. Please expand on your 

views about military leadership and the burden of implementing the homosexual 

conduct policy. 

Admiral MULLEN. For the record, I testified that understanding the impact of any 

change to the law gets to the core of where I am at on this issue, which is leadership. We must be prepared to lead if the law changes. 

I do not expect to try to change someone’s views about homosexuality. I do believe 

that we can have clear standards of conduct and behavior, and hold people accountable to those standards. To ensure we can lead effectively, we are undertaking a 

comprehensive review of the issue to better understand the dynamics of any repeal. 

Leadership requires preparation, and it is my responsibility to ensure our leaders 

are ready for any decision Congress should make. 

154. Senator MCCAIN. Admiral Mullen, what is your message to officer and enlisted leaders who oppose change but whom you consider key to making changes to 

the policy work successfully. 

Admiral MULLEN. I do not expect to try to change someone’s views about homosexuality. I do believe that we can have clear standards of conduct and behavior, 

and hold people accountable to those standards. To ensure we do this effectively, 

we are undertaking a comprehensive review of the issue to better understand the 

dynamics of any repeal. 

I have great confidence in the quality of our officer and enlisted leadership and 

know that with sound preparation they can lead the force successfully, should the 

law and policy change. 

155. Senator MCCAIN. Admiral Mullen, in your view, to what degree and how 

would repeal of the current law and DOD homosexual conduct policy improve military readiness? 

Admiral MULLEN. I cannot say what all the impacts of repeal of the law would 

be. That is why we are undertaking a comprehensive review of the issue to better 

understand the impacts of any potential change. A balanced, reasoned assessment 

will best serve us as we consider this matter. 

156. Senator MCCAIN. Admiral Mullen, what effect would repeal of the current 

law and policy have on recruiting and retention? 

Admiral MULLEN. I cannot say for certain how repeal might affect these areas. 

That is why we are undertaking a comprehensive review of the issue to better understand the impacts of any potential change. It is important for us to understand 

these dymanics in order to lead the force, should the law change 

157. Senator MCCAIN. Admiral Mullen, to what extent, if any, has the current law 

and DOD DADT policy hindered the military’s ability in a measurable way to recruit and retain qualified personnel to meet service manpower requirements? 

Admiral MULLEN. I know that some schools have expressed concern over the presence of recruiters due to the existence of this law. Our recruiters currently are able 

to accomplish their mission, and we will continue to work through issues directly 

with those schools that express concerns. 

However, I cannot say for certain how the current law affects recruiting and retention overall, or its how its potential repeal might affect recruiting and retention. 

That is why we are undertaking a comprehensive review of the issue to better understand the impacts of any potential change of current law and policy. 

158. Senator MCCAIN. Admiral Mullen, to what extent, if any, has the current law 

hindered the ability of the Army and Marine Corps to expand in recent years? 

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Admiral MULLEN. The Marine Corps has already completed its growth to new active duty end strength levels of 202,100. The Army is on track to grow to 547,400, 

and I am confident that the Army will be successful in getting to that level. I cannot 

say how current law has helped or hindered this process. Recruiting and retention 

are impacted by many factors, and it is important that we understand these as best 

we can. 

159. Senator MCCAIN. Admiral Mullen, to what extent, if any, has the requirement to separate homosexual personnel under section 654 created a measurable impact on readiness of the force? 

Admiral MULLEN. The number of annual separations is small (less than fourtenths of 1 percent of all separations). No one likes to see talent leave the Service, 

but it is our job to follow the law. I support Congress’ examination of Don’t Ask, 

Don’t Tell, and should the law change we will work within any new guidance. Related to your deliberation, I support the approach the Secretary of Defense has proposed, which calls for a careful review of this policy. 

160. Senator MCCAIN. Admiral Mullen, to what extent, if any, do you think the 

repeal of the current law and DOD homosexual conduct policy would affect military 

readiness, cohesion, morale, good order, and discipline? 

Admiral MULLEN. We have fair and responsive disciplinary and administrative 

processes by which we promptly investigate and adjudicate instances of inappropriate conduct. Our standards and processes apply to conduct, regardless of orientation, rank, or gender. However, I cannot say exactly what all the impacts of repeal 

of the law would be. That is why we are undertaking a comprehensive review to 

better understand the issues associated with any potential change. A balanced and 

thorough review will support effective leadership within the force, should the law 

change. 

161. Senator MCCAIN. Admiral Mullen, what effect would a repeal of current law 

have on the propensity of prospective recruits to enlist and on the propensity of 

influencers (parents, coaches, teachers, and religious leaders, for example) to recommend military service? 

Admiral MULLEN. I cannot say for certain how repeal might affect recruiting and 

retention. I would expect a range of views among influencers, who guide our young 

Americans towards public service as policemen, firemen and first responders, as 

well as towards the armed forces. Through our comprehensive review of the issue 

we aim to better understand the impacts of any potential change from current law 

and policy. 

162. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Gates, according to data provided by the Services 

and DOD, the number of discharges for homosexual conduct consistently has been 

significantly less than 1 percent, compared to discharges for other reasons. The Congressional Research Service concluded that most discharges occur among younger, 

less experienced personnel. Do you consider the numbers of discharges under the 

existing DOD policy to adversely affect the readiness of the Armed Forces? 

Secretary GATES. The Comprehensive Review Working Group will examine impacts—both positive and negative—of repeal of the law. This will include the impact 

of no longer discharging servicemembers for homosexual conduct, as is currently required by law. 

163. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Gates, what percentage of separations on the 

basis of the policy can be attributed to statements only, i.e., individuals who identify 

themselves as homosexual or bisexual? 

Secretary GATES. In fiscal year 2009, there were 428 homosexual conduct separations. Of these, 341, or approximately 80 percent, were based on the member making a statement that he or she was homosexual, bisexual, or words to that effect. 

164. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Gates, what percentage of total discharges has 

been based on extrinsic evidence, i.e., third-party reports? 

Secretary GATES. The Department does not currently track homosexual conduct 

discharges this way. All discharges are due to a military member engaging in one 

of the forms of conduct set forth 10 U.S.C. § 654: (a) engaging in, attempting to engage in, or soliciting another to engage in a homosexual act, (b) stating that he or 

she is a homosexual or bisexual, or words to that effect, or (c) marrying or attempting to marry a person known to be of the same biological sex. Of the 428 separations 

in fiscal year 2009, 341 were statements cases, 80 were acts cases, and 7 were marriage cases. 

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165. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Gates, the 2008 Military Times poll of active 

duty subscriber/respondents found that 10 percent said they would decline reenlistment if the law is repealed, and another 14 percent would consider ending their careers. Even a smaller proportion of losses among mid-career people would cause 

many difficulties in short-handed units. What weight do you give to this 2008 Military Times poll regarding the views of currently serving individuals? 

Secretary GATES. These sentiments, as well as many others held by servicemembers, will be one of many data points the Working Group will consider in its 

review. 

166. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Gates, do you think that servicemembers with 

more than 10 years of military service should be given a temporary retirement option or some other separation payment if they express objection to serving on Active 

Duty with openly gay servicemembers? 

Secretary GATES. No, I do not believe a temporary retirement option nor other 

separation pay should be given in these circumstances. 

167. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Gates, if the effective date of the law were postponed, how could current law be enforced pending that date? 

Secretary GATES. I do not have a position on the implications of such an arrangement. However, I do not support a moratorium on homosexual conduct discharges 

while the Working Group is undertaking its review. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JEFF SESSIONS

AIR FORCE TANKER COMPETITION

168. Senator SESSIONS. Secretary Gates, I understand that many factors in the 

previous RFP that favored a larger, more capable aircraft have been removed from 

the RFP and many factors that favor a smaller, less capable aircraft are now mandatory. If the pending tanker RFP fails to result in a real competition, meaning at 

least two teams decide to bid, then we really do not have a competition. What steps 

are you taking to ensure that both sides stay at the table and bid on the pending 

draft RFP? 

Secretary GATES. I pledged to Members of Congress a fair, open, and transparent 

process. DOD and the Air Force favor a competition but will let the RFP process 

run its course. The RFP is structured to be fair to all sides and, above all, to the 

taxpayer and warfighter. The process of procuring a new Air Force tanker needs to 

recommence without delay. Numerous meetings with potential offerors were held as 

part of the draft RFP process. Careful consideration is being given to all requests 

and comments, and all questions are being answered to ensure that the Department 

is crystal clear on how the winning offeror will be selected. The approach will be 

crafted to favor no one except the Warfighter and taxpayer. The Department has 

steered straight down the middle. 

169. Senator SESSIONS. Secretary Gates, what steps do you plan to take if one of 

the sides does not bid and we do not have a real competition? 

Secretary GATES. As I stated at the House Armed Services Committee hearing on 

February 3, 2010, ‘‘We would like to have a competition . . . and we hope that both 

companies will agree to participate. But we will move forward. We have to have new 

tankers. We hope very much that there will be a real competition. We hope very 

much that both competitors stay in the competition. But should that not prove to 

be the case, we will—we have to move forward. It’s been delayed too long. We need 

to get this thing started.’’ 

NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE

170. Senator SESSIONS. Secretary Gates, last year the President’s budget request, 

as it pertained to NMD, called for cutting back the deployment of GBIs from 44 to 

30 while curtailing further modernization. Thanks to your efforts, this year’s budget 

request seems to indicate a commitment to continue to improve the GMD system, 

while also purchasing additional missiles for testing and stockpile reliability. Can 

we continue to count on your support for a robust GMD modernization program that 

will ensure the system keeps pace with the threat? 

Secretary GATES. Given the uncertainties of future ICBM threats, I will preserve 

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tial investment in the GMD element to ensure it remains effective and viable over 

the long-term. This is accomplished by funding element and system improvements, 

including: 

• Refurbishment or delivery of 22 GBIs for testing and operational spare 

requirements; 

• New software upgrades to expand GMD integration with the BMDS and 

improve interceptor discrimination capability; 

• Interceptor obsolescence mitigation and avionics upgrades; 

• The completion of Missile Field 2 with 14 silos at Fort Greely, AK, by 

fiscal year 2012, increasing the number of silos available for operational use 

if needed to address the threat; 

• The completion of the Future Power Plant at Fort Greely, Alaska to address survivability and reliability concerns; and 

• Implementation of a GMD reliability, availability, and maintainability 

program; 

Fiscal year 2011 funding will complete the establishment of a second GMD Command and Control node at Fort Greely, AK. The fiscal year 2011 budget also requests funds to continue executing operationally realistic ground and flight testing 

of the GMD element of the BMDS, and to validate BMDS system performance 

through robust models and simulation anchored by flight test data. 

171. Senator SESSIONS. Secretary Gates, can you assure us there will not be a 

break in production for the GBI until DOD determines how many GBIs are needed 

for testing and stockpile reliability over the life of the system, as per section 233 

of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2002? 

Secretary GATES. The MDA’s most recent purchase of GBIs occurred in December 

2006. As a result, lower-tier GBI suppliers began completing delivery, i.e., began a 

‘‘production break,’’ in 2007 for sub-assemblies to support the manufacture and delivery of the remaining GBIs on contract. All remaining third- and fourth-tier GBI 

suppliers are expected to complete their deliveries in fiscal year 2010 with the exception of Aerojet and Rockwell Collins. 

The fiscal year 2011 President’s budget request (fiscal year 2011 PBR) lays out 

a funded plan that includes completing the fielding of 30 operational GBIs; delivering 22 additional GBIs for testing, stockpile reliability and operational spare requirements; and refurbishing 16 of the original 52 GBIs for both operational and 

flight test rotation during the FYDP. 

The three requirements set forth in section 233 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2010 

have either been met or will be met shortly. First, I delivered the BMDR to Congress on February 1, 2010. Second, in the fiscal year 2011 PBR, MDA states plans 

to acquire five additional GBIs, beginning in fiscal year 2011, to satisfy Integrated 

Master Test Plan (IMTP) and stockpile reliability testing requirements to support 

the service life of the GMD element of the BMDS. 

With respect to the third requirement, within the next several weeks, a report on 

the GBI production line will be submitted to the congressional defense committees. 

The report will detail the Department’s plans to utilize the additional $50 million 

fiscal year 2010 appropriation to keep the manufacturing lines for critical suppliers 

warm through fiscal year 2010, with most of the component suppliers completing 

deliveries in fiscal year 2011. This investment along with the planned five additional GBIs, plus additional hardware components to support GBI scheduled maintenance and refurbishment activities, will sustain third and fourth tier GBI suppliers until fiscal year 2013. 

GBI purchases after fiscal year 2013 will likely include manufacturing line restart 

costs for third- and fourth-tier GBI suppliers. Also, any additional GBI purchases 

beyond the planned 2011 purchases will likely include redesign/development costs 

due to parts obsolescence. With ongoing refurbishments for operational and flight 

test GBIs, the first- and second-tier GBI manufacturing lines will remain warm beyond 2016. 

EUROPEAN MISSILE DEFENSE

172. Senator SESSIONS. Secretary Gates, the Phased Adaptive Approach to missile 

defense in Europe calls for fielding land-based SM–3 Block IB missiles in Europe 

starting in 2015. Is the IB missile on schedule, and have you identified the two 

countries that will host its deployment in 2015? 

Secretary GATES. Yes. The SM–3 Block IB missile is on schedule for flight testing 

in fiscal year 2011, deployment on Aegis ships in 2013 and fielding on land in 2015. 

162 

In February 2010, Romania agreed to host the land-based SM–3 Southern Europe 

site planned for deployment in Phase 2 (2015 timeframe). In the coming months, 

the U.S. and Romanian Governments will work together and begin discussions on 

the system, including the steps necessary to establish a missile defense facility in 

Romania. 

In October 2009, Poland agreed to host a similar Northern Europe site in Phase 

3 (2018 timeframe). I expect that by the planned time of this deployment, the more 

advanced SM–3 Block IIA will be available. The Department has concluded a supplemental Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) with Poland and the Polish Government recently agreed to an updated BMD basing agreement that will enable us to 

move forward with the land-based SM–3 site in Poland. The supplemental SOFA 

has been ratified by the Polish Parliament and entered into force. The BMD Agreement was signed but has not yet been ratified by the Polish Parliament. 

173. Senator SESSIONS. Secretary Gates, last year you testified that the two-stage 

GBI will continue development as a hedge against technical difficulties with the 

SM–3 Block IIA and IIB missiles. Is this still the plan? 

Secretary GATES. Yes. As part of a hedging strategy for defense of the homeland 

against long-range ballistic missile attacks, the Department is continuing the development and assessment of the two-stage GBI. My overall testing strategy for the 

two-stage GBI, which includes flight testing, supports three-stage data collection requirements as well. 

174. Senator SESSIONS. Secretary Gates, how and when would we know that it 

is necessary to substitute the two-stage GBI for the SM–3 Block II missile? 

Secretary GATES. There are two planned versions of the SM–3 Block II, the SM– 

3 Block IIA and the SM–3 Block IIB. The SM–3 Block IIA is planned for use aboard 

ships first, and then for use ashore until the Block IIB is developed and available. 

The Aegis BMD ship-based SM–3 Block IIA will remain an operational need independent of decisions related to developing and producing two-stage GBIs or Block 

IIBs. 

MDA will know if it is necessary to substitute the two-stage GBI for the Block 

IIB after the Block IIB flight testing, which is currently planned for fiscal year 

2016. The MDA is engineering the systems and maturing the technologies for the 

SM–3 Block IIB. The technical maturity will be determined through a series of 

knowledge points that tie achievement of critical information to reducing developmental risk and increasing confidence in capabilities. These knowledge points will 

measure confidence in the SM–3 Block IIB through the end of fiscal year 2016, providing data that will be used to determine whether development should continue or 

whether alternative designs should be considered. 

175. Senator SESSIONS. Secretary Gates, what has been Russia’s reaction to the 

new missile defense plans for Europe? 

Secretary GATES. Russia’s initial reaction to the new system was positive. Although the Department is transparent with Russia about the Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA), Russia recently expressed concern that the adaptive nature of the 

system makes is appear to be open-ended, and in later phases could undermine Russia’s strategic deterrent. The new system poses no threat to Russia, and I believe 

Russia has an interest in working with the United States and Europe to defend 

against the growing missile and nuclear threat from Iran and other states. I will 

continue to be transparent with Russia about our plans for the PAA to try to allay 

its concerns, and I will seek avenues for cooperation in this area. 

176. Senator SESSIONS. Secretary Gates, I’ve seen press reports that Russia may 

now be concerned that the SM–3 Block II missile may be a threat to their strategic 

forces and that Russia will seek to limit its deployment in the ongoing Strategice 

Arms Reduction Treaty (START) follow-on negotiations. What can you tell me about 

this? 

Secretary GATES. Russia expressed concerns that the SM–3 Block IIB interceptors 

that we would deploy in Phase 4 of the Phased, Adaptive Approach (PAA), in the 

event that the threat environment evolves to require the deployment, could be capable of engaging their ICBMs. The Department is in discussions with Russia on the 

nature of the threat presented by various ballistic missile programs and the potential for missile defense cooperation. During our consultations with Russia, DOD 

stressed that the PAA is not directed at Russia. I believe that Russia may be unnecessarily concerned simply because the SM–3 Block IIB is still in development and 

thus Russia could be suspicious about the final capabilities of the interceptor. I will 

continue to be transparent with Russia on DOD’s BMD capabilities, including the 

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SM–3 Block IIB interceptor, to allay their concerns and build trust. Regarding New 

START Treaty, I have been clear with Russia that U.S. missile defense systems are 

not directed against Russia and that the new treaty is about strategic offensive 

arms. 

177. Senator SESSIONS. Secretary Gates, the administration’s new approach to 

missile defense in Europe hopes to solicit allied participation. We are hearing, however, that NATO is facing a funding crisis due to the operational demands related 

to Afghanistan. How likely is it that we can expect European contributions to the 

defense of their territory against medium- and long-range ballistic missiles? 

Secretary GATES. I believe that, as an alliance, NATO can best contribute to European territorial missile defense in two areas—political commitment and command 

and control (C2) infrastructure. 

In terms of political commitment, I am seeking a decision by NATO to take on 

territorial missile defense as a mission for the alliance. If NATO adopts such a mission, there will be a NATO-wide BMD effort to which the United States can contribute through the European Phased, Adaptive Approach (PAA). Furthermore, Allies will be able to contribute their current and future missile defense capabilities 

to this effort, augmenting the overall defense and the PAA. 

Regarding C2 infrastructure, NATO is developing a C2 network that will allow 

Allies to link their missile defense assets together, called the Active Layered Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (ALTBMD) program. By linking Allied assets, including those of the U.S. PAA, NATO and the United States can create a more efficient 

and cost-effective architecture. 

Currently, NATO is funding the component of ALTBMD that will provide C2 for 

defense of deployed forces only, rather than territorial missile defense. I strongly 

support continued funding for ALTBMD, as well as the ongoing study to determine 

the implications of expanding ALTBMD to include C2 for territorial missile defense. 

To date, NATO spent ÷159 million of the total ÷451 million cost for the current 

ALTBMD program. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR LINDSEY GRAHAM

FUNDING FOR CONTSRTUCTION/RESTORATION

178. Senator GRAHAM. Secretary Gates, some military agencies do not appear to 

be spending funds appropriated by Congress for construction, cleanup and restoration activities. The Air Force Center for Engineering and the Environment and 

Naval Facilities Engineering Command has yet to obligate hundreds of millions of 

dollars appropriated. The United States Army Corps of Engineers continues to fall 

further behind in awards for the New Orleans Hurricane Risk Reduction Program 

and for the Everglades restoration. The funds for these projects represent a large 

number of jobs which could be filled by capable DOD contractors. What is the root 

cause of the delay and what is being done to remedy this situation? 

Secretary GATES. I fully support the President’s budget and will continue to fully 

execute the construction, cleanup and restoration projects for which funds are authorized and appropriated. The root of the ‘‘problem’’ is the global economic downturn. As a result of that downturn, during fiscal year 2009, the Department was 

able to award many projects below initial government estimates, producing bid savings. DOD is making every effort to quickly apply those bid savings to offset a variety of requirements such as increases in costs on other projects and reductions to 

programs levied by Congress in fiscal year 2010. In those rare circumstances when 

the Department cancels a project, we notify Congress as required by statute. 

Regarding the New Orleans Hurricane Risk Reduction Program, the Army Corps 

of Engineers is awarding construction contracts at a rapid pace, and construction 

work is progressing throughout the New Orleans area. As of mid-April 2010, the 

Army Corps awarded 251 of 361 planned construction contracts and obligated $8 billion of the $14.5 billion appropriated for the program. 

The Everglades restoration projects experienced contract award delays stemming 

from complications in establishing required cost share agreements with non-Federal 

sponsors. The Corps has made significant progress in completing agreement negotiations with the South Florida Water Management District (SFWMD), the primary 

non-Federal sponsor for Everglades restoration projects, by executing a Comprehensive Everglades Restoration Plan (CERP) Master Agreement in August 2009. This 

agreement provides the foundation for all future Project Partnership Agreements by 

establishing basic terms of cooperation for CERP projects including cost sharing, 

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sight by agency technical staff. The Corps is awarding contracts more rapidly since 

putting this agreement into effect. Additionally, to accelerate contract awards, the 

Corps is improving coordination with SFWMD during respective agency review and 

approval of draft agreements and allowing construction contract advertisements to 

be made prior to execution of partnership agreements, thus permitting earlier contract award following execution of those agreements. 

AIR FORCE TANKER COMPETITION

179. Senator GRAHAM. Secretary Gates, regarding the competition for the new Air 

Force tanker competition, some have advocated a dual buy of tankers, wherein DOD 

would buy aircraft from the two major competitors who have previously proposed 

aircraft as the new aerial tanker. What is your position on this proposal? 

Secretary GATES. I am not planning for a dual award at this time. The Air Force 

considered all options per congressional direction, but ruled out split buy and dual 

award approaches based on budget affordability and fleet concerns including increased training, operations, maintenance, and support costs. I am committed to a 

single-award, competitive strategy for a commercial derivative tanker as it provides 

the best value for the Warfighter and taxpayer. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOHN THUNE

START TREATY

180. Senator THUNE. Secretary Gates, a January 25, 2010, article in RIA–Novosti, 

a Russian press outlet, stated that the United States and Russia have coordinated 

a number of disputed issues in relation to the START follow-on treaty. Specifically, 

the article said an agreement has been reached to reduce the number of nuclear delivery vehicles, meaning bombers, submarines, and land-based missiles, of 700 to 

750 systems. Today, the United States deploys about 883 delivery vehicles, when 

ghost or phantom systems are taken off the books. Testimony before the House in 

July indicated that the Russians at best can deploy 500 delivery vehicles through 

the course of the START follow-on treaty. At the delivery vehicle levels of 700 to 

750 reported in the Russian press, where will these significant cuts come out of our 

triad? 

Secretary GATES. I believe that the New START Treaty allows the United States 

to maintain an effective nuclear deterrent. Under the draft New START Treaty, 

both the United States and Russia have seven years after entry into force of the 

treaty to meet the treaty limits. The Department will have sufficient time to align 

our forces and to effect the necessary eliminations to fulfill our obligations under 

the New START Treaty with regard to our strategic delivery vehicles and their associated warheads. The specific mix of systems to be maintained was closely examined 

during the Nuclear Posture Review, with a final decision deferred pending signing 

of the Treaty. 

181. Senator THUNE. Secretary Gates, at the delivery vehicle levels of 700 to 750 

reported in the Russian press, is Russia actually giving up any delivery vehicles? 

Secretary GATES. As of October 1, 2009, Russia declared 809 deployed Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) and their associated launchers, deployed Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs) and their associated launchers, and deployed heavy bombers under START counting rules. Some of these systems may not 

be accountable under the New START Treaty, but others may still represent delivery vehicles that will be eliminated during the treaty’s seven-year elimination period 

following entry into force. 

NEXT GENERATION BOMBER

182. Senator THUNE. Secretary Gates, the 2006 QDR made the decision to develop 

a follow-on bomber, and you have made clear that you support the development of 

a new bomber. However, last April you opted not to pursue a development program 

for a follow-on Air Force bomber until you had a better understanding of the need, 

the requirement, and the technology. As part of this effort to better understand the 

requirements for a new bomber, I understand that you stood up a Tiger Team to 

do an in-depth study of long-range strike in the new QDR. However, on reading the 

new QDR, on page 33, it looks like you have still not made a decision to move forward with a new bomber program, but instead have commissioned yet another 

165 

study. What conclusions were drawn by the Tiger Team regarding the development 

of a new bomber? 

Secretary GATES. The Tiger Team to which you refer was formed to study the 

need, value, and technology for a follow-on Air Force long-range strike aircraft; that 

team completed its work last November. The team was supportive of pursuing a 

new long-range strike aircraft, but recognized that additional analysis was needed 

to explore options for reducing overall program costs and determining fielding 

timelines. The Department decided that a more in-depth analysis was required in 

order to determine how a new long-range strike aircraft might compare with other 

options. An assessment of the various support functions for long-range strike assets 

was also needed. Consequently, the Department chartered another study to look at 

a broader array of options to include the appropriate mix of long-range strike capabilities; upgrades to legacy bombers; manned and unmanned options; stand-off and 

penetrating requirements; new and improved cruise missiles; electronic warfare improvements; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance demands; and conventional prompt global strike options. 

The goal of this new study is to ensure that we fully understand how all potential 

long-range strike options could contribute to U.S. security goals before spending billions of dollars. We anticipate that the new study will be completed in time to inform decisions shaping the Department’s fiscal year 2012 budget. 

The final conclusion of the Tiger Team’s study was that the Department should 

sustain the industrial base for early-stage design work and technologies for a new 

long-range strike aircraft while the Department continues to study all options. The 

Department provided industrial base funding for fiscal year 2011 and fiscal year 

2012 to prepare for the potential start of a new long-range strike program. 

BOMBER FORCE STRUCTURE

183. Senator THUNE. Secretary Gates, with regard to the FYDP force structure 

set out in the new QDR for the Air Force, the QDR proposes five long-range strike 

wings with up to 96 primary mission aircraft. According to the latest Air Force Almanac, the Air Force has 153 bomber aircraft. I understand some of these aircraft 

are dedicated to testing, but over 50 aircraft for testing seems like a lot. Do you 

plan on retiring any bomber aircraft in the near future? 

Secretary GATES. The total number of bombers in the Air Force inventory is 162 

(66 B–1, 20 B–2, and 76 B–52 aircraft). 96 represents the total number of combat 

coded aircraft with the difference being made up from training, backup, attrition Reserve, and test airframes. The table below shows the breakdown by aircraft type and 

coding. The attached slides show the geographic location, coding, and correct number for each bomber in the Air Force inventory. At this time, the Air Force has no 

plans to retire any of the 162 bombers currently in the inventory. I believe that the 

2011 President’s budget provides for aggressive modernization for all three types of 

bombers, to keep them relevant far into the future. 

Airframe Total Combat Coded (CC) Training (TF) Backup (BAI) Attrition 

Reserve (AR) Test (CB) 

B–1 ............................................. 66 36 16 9 1 4 

B–2 ............................................. 20 16 0 4 0 0 

B–52 ........................................... 76 44 16 11 2 3 

Atch: Bomber inventory slides 

184. Senator THUNE. Secretary Gates, what are the assumptions underlying what 

appears to be a substantial reduction in the number of bombers? 

Secretary GATES. At this time, there are no plans to retire any of the bombers 

currently in the inventory. The fiscal year 2011 budget provides for aggressive modernization for all three types of bombers, to keep them relevant far into the future. 

QDR RED TEAM

185. Senator THUNE. Secretary Gates, I understand you appointed a so-called 

‘‘Red Team’’ of retired senior officers and outside defense experts to give you an outside assessment of the QDR. I understand that the Red Team reviewed the QDR’s 

assessments and conclusions through the summer of 2009, and submitted a memo 

to you in the fall of 2009. As you know, you are required by the QDR statute in 

Title 10 to appoint an independent panel to assess the QDR. However, that panel 

will not be able to provide a report to us until July of this year, meaning that we 

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may very well have completed work on the National Defense Authorization Bill for 

Fiscal Year 2011 before we see an independent assessment of the QDR. Since we 

won’t be able to read an independent assessment of the QDR in a timely way, please 

provide us with a copy of the Red Team’s memo to you, with the names of the Red 

Team members redacted to protect any confidentiality agreements. 

Secretary GATES. When I appointed the QDR Red Team, I assured the members 

that their insights would help inform my decisionmaking and would not be subject 

to outside review. I did this to foster frank and forthright advice for use by the Department in its internal deliberations. However, the Commander, U.S. Joint Forces 

Command, General James Mattis, and Director of Net Assessment, Mr. Andrew 

Marshall, served as co-chairs of the QDR Red Team. They would be happy to provide Members their perspectives on the QDR. 

The QDR Independent Panel has begun its work and has indicated it will publicly 

deliver interim findings before the release of its final report in July 2010. 

186. Senator THUNE. Secretary Gates, are any members of the Red Team that assessed the QDR also now members of the independent panel assessing the QDR? 

Secretary GATES. Mr. Andrew Marshall, Director of the Office of Net Assessment, 

and General James Mattis, Commander U.S. Joint Forces Command, served as the 

co-chairs of the 2010 Red Team. The identities of other members of the QDR Red 

Team remain confidential. I believe that it is critical that I maintain the ability to 

have candid discussions with senior defense thinkers outside of government on a 

non-attribution basis. 

I selected members for the QDR Independent Panel based on their ability to offer 

an objective, independent, and non-partisan perspective. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR ROGER F. WICKER

ARMY AIRCRAFT MODERNIZATION

187. Senator WICKER. Secretary Gates, I am glad to know that the QDR places 

success in today’s wars as its first priority. It is our foremost responsibility to provide for our national defense. Just as the tactics and strategies have adjusted to 

that of our enemy, so must our approach to investing the necessary resources to rapidly equip the warfighter for success. 

I also appreciate your stating that this budget is shaped by embracing a dose of 

realism. One dose of realism that we can’t avoid is the long-term impacts that the 

current deficit forecast is going to have on all sectors of the government, to include 

DOD. Given that realism, it is increasingly important that we do our best to get 

the best long-term benefit out of the investments we make to fulfill our immediate 

needs. 

One major focus area of this budget is to increase the availability of helicopters 

by procuring more aircraft and improving aircraft capabilities. Due to the 

cancelation of the armed Scout helicopter program, DOD is planning to invest well 

over a billion dollars in the aging Kiowa Warrior. That investment has transformed 

from performing safety enhancements to a long-term modernization program. I now 

hear discussions ranging from engine upgrades to reconstituting a production line. 

While many of these improvements are necessary to maintain operational capability, none will result in the performance capabilities that are desired. Yet, I don’t 

know of any investments being planned on other fleet assets that would reduce your 

risk of providing more capable Scout capabilities and could realistically achieve the 

80 percent of optimal solution that you have mentioned in the past. 

Are there any newer aircraft in the Army’s fleet that could be enhanced, which 

would significantly exceed the capability of the legacy Scout helicopter, and could 

also provide returns on that investment much further into the future? 

Secretary GATES. The Army is exploring all options to leverage existing and potential developmental solutions to replace the legacy scout helicopter. Investment in the 

OH–58D Kiowa Warrior (KW) as a bridging strategy is critical in fulfilling the 

Army’s immediate reconnaissance needs in support of Army Force Generation 

(ARFORGEN) requirements. This investment will address immediate obsolescence, 

safety, and weight reduction issues and will enable the aircraft to perform better 

in the current combat environment until a viable replacement is procured. The 

Army is conducting an Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) to address Armed Aerial Scout 

(AAS) capabilities and determine a replacement for the KW. The study will be completed in April 2011 at which time the existing KW path ahead will be re-evaluated 

along with the future AAS recommendations for a leadership decision. 

167 

188. Senator WICKER. Secretary Gates, would you be supportive of the Army exploring all options to leverage existing assets to provide the highest level of Scout 

capability until the Army acquires and fields its future Armed Aerial Scout aircraft? 

Secretary GATES. The Army is exploring all options to leverage existing and potential developmental solutions. In July 2009, the Defense Acquisition Executive (DAE) 

directed the Army to conduct an AoA to meet Armed Aerial Scout capabilities and 

determine a replacement for the OH–58D Kiowa Warrior. This AoA will determine 

the appropriate materiel solution(s) to address any capability gaps and meet Army 

requirements. The AoA will be conducted in two non-sequential phases with the preliminary results completed in December 2010 and final results published in April 

2011. 

On April 14, 2009, the Secretary of the Army approved a strategy to reinvests in 

the Kiowa Warrior helicopter to address obsolescence and sustainment until a viable 

replacement is procured. The strategy includes a funded ACAT II program called 

the Cockpit and Sensor Upgrade Program (CASUP). The CASUP addresses obsolescence, safety, and weight reduction to perform better in the current combat environment. The Army expects to sustain the Kiowa Warrior until 2025. 

MINE RESISTANT AMBUSH PROTECTED VEHICLES

189. Senator WICKER. Secretary Gates, you mentioned the funding requested in 

the budget for an additional 10,000 MRAPs, of which 6,600 are the new M–ATV. 

What type of MRAP vehicle makes up the remaining 3,400? 

Secretary GATES. The most recent purchase of MRAP family of vehicles includes 

1,460 more Oshkosh M–ATVs, 1,050 Navistar MaxxPro Dashs, 250 GDLS RG–31s 

and 58 BAE RG–33s. The remaining 582 vehicles to fulfill the estimated requirement for Afghanistan have not yet been defined. 

190. Senator WICKER. Secretary Gates, will these platforms be sent to Afghanistan? 

Secretary GATES. All of the vehicles most recently purchased are being sent to Afghanistan. 

191. Senator WICKER. Secretary Gates, how will they compliment the M–ATVs? 

Secretary GATES. MRAP vehicles are designed to meet mission requirements. The 

M–ATV was uniquely designed for missions requiring off-road mobility. The earlier 

variants in the MRAP family of vehicles were designed for other missions ranging 

from urban area patrolling, route clearance and Special Forces missions. The Department continues to make available all vehicles under the MRAP family of vehicles to Warfighters upon Combatant Command requirements. Our most recent purchase of MaxxPro Dashs, RG–31s and RG–33s will include improved suspension systems that are more suitable to the rough terrain in Afghanistan. I believe that these 

vehicles will complement the M–ATVs by supporting other, but closely related missions. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR GEORGE S. LEMIEUX

INFORMATION OPERATIONS

192. Senator LEMIEUX. Secretary Gates, in October, I traveled to Afghanistan 

with Senators Burr and Whitehouse. While there we learned of the good work being 

done by our SOFs in the area of strategic communications—particularly in countering the enemy’s false messages. However, I am concerned that too often we are 

not getting our message out to counter the enemy’s. Some of the soldiers in Afghanistan are using what is called radio-in-a-box technologies to try and counter enemy 

propaganda. I think this approach should be more prevalent in the military. What 

is in this budget to help our soldiers get the best message out to local Afghans? 

Secretary GATES. During fiscal year 2011, I will ensure that DOD will allocate 

funds specifically for the dissemination of messages to the Afghan people down to 

the local level. DOD collaborates with the ISAF and the Department of State (DOS) 

to commit significant resources to ensuring the U.S. Government is getting our message out, and when necessary countering the enemy’s propaganda. DOD and ISAF 

fund programs in Afghanistan that capitalize on radio and television programming, 

as well as a variety of printed products to disseminate messages that support U.S. 

and coalition objectives. The messages are directed at key audiences at multiple levels from national to local and are focused on objectives such as increasing support 

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ing reporting of illicit activities. The majority of DOD and ISAF efforts are concentrated on content development and dissemination, and DOS has made a significant commitment to building the communications infrastructure in Afghanistan. 

The radio-in-a-box provides tactical military commanders a very capable temporary 

solution to short-range radio broadcasts in areas not covered by permanent stations. 

The funds provided to U.S. and coalition forces in Afghanistan allow commanders 

the flexibility to purchase more of these systems should they determine it is necessary to bridge the gap until DOS or another organization’s efforts provide a permanent solution. 

193. Senator LEMIEUX. Secretary Gates, do you believe our forces are well-trained 

and doing enough to project good news in the warzone? 

Secretary GATES. I believe that U.S. forces are the best trained military in the 

world to fight and win America’s wars. DOD committed significant resources to increase cultural awareness among U.S. forces and improve the understanding of the 

environment in which U.S. forces operate. DOD made significant progress in information operations, working closely with the ISAF, DOS, other U.S. Government 

agencies, and nongovernmental organizations to ensure the Afghanistan people and 

the international community understand the coalition’s commitment to the future 

of Afghanistan. U.S. and ISAF forces conduct face-to-face engagement with leaders 

at all levels, develop and disseminate messages through radio, television, and printed products, and participate with our Afghan partners in civil-military activities. As 

technology advances, and the infrastructure develops in Afghanistan, DOD will continue to develop new methods of getting the message to the audience. 

194. Senator LEMIEUX. Secretary Gates, what is the training pipeline for soldiers 

who conduct information operations? 

Secretary GATES. Both the service components and the Joint community have specific training requirements for personnel who conduct Information Operations (IO). 

Specific service requirements are varied and driven by their unique operational and 

doctrinal requirements. I expect all servicemembers assigned to a combatant command to have had appropriate exposure to joint operational concepts and procedures; particularly within the area of IO and so will focus my comments on the 

Joint IO community. 

Within the Joint IO community, training requirements and the training pipeline 

are clearly described in Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 

1630.01, Joint Information Operations Force. Based on the policy established in 

CJCSM 1630.01, members of the Joint IO Force are drawn from commissioned officers in grades O–4 through O–9 and non-commissioned officers in grades E–6 

through E–9. The manual further stipulates that these individuals must have completed either a U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) certified Joint IO Planning 

Course or a JFCOM-certified Joint IO Core Capabilities Specialist Course and occupy a billet requiring Joint IO education and/or training. At present there are 159 

joint billets requiring JFCOM-certified IO planners and 153 Joint billets requiring 

JFCOM-certified IO Core Capability Specialists. 

Commissioned and non-commissioned officers, in the grades I previously mentioned, enter the Joint IO training pipeline upon assignment to a JFCOM-certified 

IO Planning or IO Core Capability Specialist Course. The Joint Forces Staff College’s Joint IO Planners Course constitutes the only JFCOM-certified Joint IO Planning Course at present. JFCOM-certified Joint IO Core Capability Specialist 

Courses include the Joint Military Deception Training Course, the Joint Theater 

Electronic Warfare Operations Course and the Joint Network Attack Course. Besides these courses, Joint Operations Security and Psychological Operations courses 

are currently under development. 

Upon designation by the appropriate service component, an officer or noncommissioned officer, who has already completed service component IO training, will attend 

one of the JFCOM-certified IO training courses. After graduation, these personnel 

should be assigned to an OSD-level, Joint Staff, combatant command staff or JTF. 

In the case of an OSD-level, Joint Staff or combatant command assignment, this 

tour of duty will normally be 36 months. For a JTF, the tour duration could range 

from 60 days to more than a year. 

195. Senator LEMIEUX. Secretary Gates, how is the private sector being utilized 

to help the military adopt best practices for information operations? 

Secretary GATES. DOD seeks partnership with the private sector to understand 

the information environment and improve DOD information-related capabilities. 

DOD has developed and continues to identify relationships with communication 

companies, media companies, software developers and producers, academia, and deVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:37 May 06, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00174 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\62155.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
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fense contractors to remain abreast of technological advances, media resources, and 

access to information not readily available to the military. These relationships are 

very important to DOD capability providers and help DOD adopt best practices. For 

example, one of the five core capabilities of information operations, psychological operations (PSYOP), utilizes the private sector to produce high-quality products targeted at specific foreign population segments. Public Affairs use the private sector 

to assist in monitoring the enormous number of global media sources and outlets, 

to gain cultural understanding, and for translation support. Information operations 

planners integrate applicable information capabilities consistent with U.S. Government guidance and policies to support the Commander’s information goals and objectives. The Department recently forwarded an extensive report to Congress outlining our efforts to align information operations with other U.S. Government activities via the strategic communication process. 

196. Senator LEMIEUX. Admiral Mullen, do you believe we need to put more resources toward information operations? 

Admiral MULLEN. The information environment plays an increasing role in all the 

Department’s activities and we’re looking at Information Operations (IO) across the 

board to determine future requirements. Although IO is a relatively small part of 

the defense budget, several combatant commands have highlighted its importance 

in their Integrated Priority Listings; specifically in support of the VOICE programs 

and for cyber activities. 

Currently, there are numerous IO-related studies in various stages of completion 

looking specifically at what we will need in the future. The Joint Force Information 

Operations Study is evaluating joint IO organizations, roles and missions, training 

and education, and measures of effectiveness. The Electronic Warfare Initial Capabilities Document and the PSYOP Capabilities Based Assessment are reviewing 

those capabilities at the Service level. The PSYOP Capabilities Based Assessment 

will validate whether or not there is a need for growth in the active and Reserve 

components to support both special and conventional forces. These are detailed studies and their recommendations are expected later this year. The results of these 

studies will influence SOCOM’s and JFCOM’s requests for additional future resources. It is my opinion that we wait to allow those studies to inform future IO 

funding recommendations. 

197. Senator LEMIEUX. Admiral Mullen, how are we empowering the Afghans to 

spread news more rapidly to local populations? 

Admiral MULLEN. HQ ISAF, alongside the U.S. Embassy and the U.K. Embassy, 

are working with the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) 

to bolster their Government Media Information Center (GMIC). The central GMIC 

in Kabul provides GIRoA the ability to rapidly disseminate news to all critical outlets. Additionally, the Kandahar GMIC, located on the Governor’s Compound, is expected to be operational in April and will provide similar capacity and capability for 

the southern region. ISAF has embedded planners and liaison personnel in both of 

these facilties. To assist the security ministries, ISAF has partnered with the MoD 

and MoI to establish the Security News Coordination Center (SNCC). The SNCC is 

already operational and ensures shared situation awareness among MoI, MoD, and 

ISAF strategic communication teams. MoI, MoD, and ISAF personnel man the 

SNCC together, and will ultimately provide 24/7 media response capability. Regular 

meetings between President Karzai’s spokesman, Mr. Wahid Omar, and the ISAF’s 

Communications Directorate Staff ensure key issues are clarified and resolved, delivering one common voice to the Afghan people. 

Most of the direct production and distribution of information is supported by U.S. 

Agency for International Development (USAID) initiatives in Afghanistan; programs 

like journalist training and media programming/content management training are 

successful examples. That said, the IJC-in heavy consultation with Afghans-produces a wide array of media for public consumption. Radio programming provides 

the greatest outreach across Afghanistan. Recently, the IJC produced a ‘‘radio 

drama’’ portraying key security issues (reintegration, for example) in a culturally 

appropriate way. Television, newspapers and pamphlets also cover areas where literacy and access to electricity are greatest. 

170 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR DAVID VITTER

OPTEMPO AND DWELL TIMES

198. Senator VITTER. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, a previously identified 

and ongoing problem our military faces is an incredible operational tempo with inadequate dwell times between deployments. Today you stated that ‘‘we will not see 

significant dwell time improvements across all Services until 2012.’’ Unforeseen 

events such as the Haiti relief effort will only serve to further exacerbate this problem. Have you accounted for contingency troop deployments, such as Haiti, in your 

calculations? 

Secretary GATES and Admiral MULLEN. Barring a major contingency operation 

that requires a substantial ground campaign, Army and Marine Corps forces will 

begin to approach a 1:2 BOG to Dwell ratio in fiscal year 2012. U.S. forces can absorb some small scale operations such as Haiti relief, but multiple occurrences may 

impact forces in Dwell. Overall, we anticipate 24–36 months following redeployment 

from Iraq and Afghanistan to reset and train the force for full spectrum readiness. 

199. Senator VITTER. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, when do you expect 

to achieve the goal of 2 years at home for every 1 year deployed? 

Secretary GATES and Admiral MULLEN. The pace of operations in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom has not yet allowed our 

ground forces to achieve the dwell goal of 2 years at home for every 1 year deployed. 

Although we have seen some small dwell improvements over the past year, the Department does not anticipate achieving this goal until late in calendar year 2011. 

200. Senator VITTER. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, should more be done 

now to increase dwell times for an already stressed military? If so, what are your 

recommendations? 

Secretary GATES and Admiral MULLEN. The temporary increase in Army end 

strength has been helpful, particularly in regard to ensuring that units have sufficient personnel to address those individuals who cannot deploy. This increase does 

not affect the unit’s dwell time, but does provided for needed personnel replacements and ensures a more ready and deployable unit. Although we have seen some 

small dwell improvements over the past year, with the surge in Afghanistan, we do 

not anticipate achieving the goal of a 1:2 dwell ratio until late in calendar year 2011 

for ground forces. We do not anticipate any unit will spend less than a year at home 

before being deployed again. We, as a Department, are managing dwell times closely, and based on projected demand for ground forces, we anticipate some very real 

and significant improvements in dwell in the next 2 years. 

CIVIL EXECUTIVE AGENCIES

201. Senator VITTER. Admiral Mullen, you have asked Congress to ‘‘promote legislation that increases the expeditionary capacity of non-military executive agencies’’ 

stating that ‘‘our future security concerns require a whole-of-government effort.’’ According to National Security Presidential Directive 44, DOS is now the lead for stability operations. Should your request be interpreted to mean that DOS and other 

non-military executive agencies are currently failing in the execution of their overseas roles in parallel to DOD efforts? 

Admiral MULLEN. State continues to develop and strengthen its capacity to execute its overseas roles. National Security Presidential Directive 44, has been further 

enhanced by the Reconstruction and Stabilization Civilian Management Act of 2008 

(Title XVI, P.L. 110–417), which codifies State’s role as the lead for reconstruction 

and stabilization by establishing the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction 

and Stabilization (S/CRS) under the Office of the Secretary of State. S/CRS is leading the establishment of a whole-of-government civilian response capability, the Civilian Response Corps, which responds to failed and failing states either in conjunction with the military or in the absence of military forces. The Civilian Response 

Corps is comprised of active and standby members from eight participating civilian 

agencies and, when fully implemented, will serve as the main non-military expeditionary force of the U.S. Government. 

The President’s fiscal year 2011 budget request includes $184 million for the Civilian Stabilization Initiative, which funds the stand-up of the Civilian Response 

Corps, and supports S/CRS’s efforts to manage and deploy this civilian force. I urge 

Congress to fully fund and support this request. 

171 

202. Senator VITTER. Admiral Mullen, in your opinion, is DOS adequately prepared to assume agency primacy in Iraq, Afghanistan, and future conflict areas as 

hostilities transition to stabilization and reconstruction activities? 

Admiral MULLEN. I simply don’t have the visibility inside State to tell you whether they are prepared for that role today. I do know that the State Department is 

working hard to build that capacity. The Secretary of State, through the Office of 

the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), has been developing 

a whole-of-government civilian response capability that can deploy to both conflict 

and post-conflict situations. The Civilian Response Corp, or CRC, is gaining 

strength to meet this mission. Furthermore, the President’s fiscal year 2011 budget 

request includes $184 million for the Civilian Stabilization Initiative, which funds 

the stand-up of the CRC, and supports S/CRS’s efforts to manage and deploy this 

civilian force. 

As is now happening in Haiti, I envision a gradual transfer of responsibility based 

on the situation on the ground. In that sense, DOD and DoS, through the leadership 

of General Odierno and Ambassador Hill, will gradually shift ‘‘primacy’’ from a military to a civilian led force. I expect this same gradual transition in Afghanistan 

when appropriate. 

On a parallel note, Defense has supported S/CRS by transferring over $350 million under the Section 1207 authority to State for conflict prevention, stabilization 

and security projects and by urging congressional support for S/CRS’s budget request and for soft power overall. 

203. Senator VITTER. Admiral Mullen, what specific legislated increases in expeditionary capacity of non-military executive agencies do you recommend? 

Admiral MULLEN. I recommend that Congress fully fund the Civilian Stabilization 

Initiative, which will allow the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization to continue to build and deploy a whole-of-government civilian expeditionary response capability to failed and failing states. 

I also recommend that Congress fully fund the Complex Crisis Fund in State, 

which is intended to replace the Section 1207 transfer authority. 

Finally, I recommend that Congress authorize flexible hiring authorities, already 

granted by Congress to State for hiring civilian to deploy to Iraq and Afghanistan, 

to S/CRS to more rapidly stand-up the Civilian Response Corps, as well as any other 

personnel authorities necessary for the CRC to reach its full potential as quickly as 

possible. 

I would also recommend a pooled fund, as proposed by Secretary Gates, continue 

to be considered for security capacity building, stabilization, and conflict prevention. 

State, USAID, and Defense would contribute to these funds and no project could 

move forward without the approval of all agencies. Although there are obstacles to 

this concept, it is worth continued consideration as it could further support the activities of the Civilian Response Corps under future reconstruction and stabilization 

crises. We need agility, flexibility, effective oversight mechanisms, and tools that 

foster cooperation across the executive branch which could also enhance cooperation 

across jurisdictional boundaries among congressional committees—thereby actually 

strengthening congressional oversight in the national security arena. We believe 

this pooled fund is the first step. 

F136 ENGINE

204. Senator VITTER. Secretary Gates, Congress has been very clear in its support 

of the F136 competitive engine for the JSF for about 15 years. Why does it not make 

sense to make the investment needed to complete program and capitalize on the 

benefits of competition in production just like the Air Force did on the F–16 in the 

mid-1980s, particularly since we’re talking about a production of over 4,000 engines 

during the procurement of the JSF? 

Secretary GATES. Maintaining two engine suppliers would result in increased development, production, and support costs. Recent experience with engine development for the F–22 and F/A–18E/F indicates that sole source risks are modest and 

acceptable, and the Pratt & Whitney F135 engine continues to meet or exceed our 

stringent performance requirements. The risks involved with a single engine supplier are acceptable, and savings associated with competition, which may be realized 

in the future, will not sufficiently offset the upfront development costs when competing against existing Department priorities. 

205. Senator VITTER. Secretary Gates, history has shown that it’s very difficult 

to control costs on a sole source program. If you terminate the F136 engine, you will 

172 

have a $100 billion sole source program on the engines for the JSF. What would 

be the incentive for the sole source supplier to control costs when they would know 

that DOD would have no alternative to their engine? 

Secretary GATES. In my view, maintaining two engine suppliers would result in 

increased development, production, and support costs. Recent experience with engine development for the F–22 and F/A–18E/F indicates that sole source risks are 

modest and acceptable, and the Pratt & Whitney F135 engine continues to meet or 

exceed the Department’s stringent performance requirements. The risks involved 

with a single engine supplier are acceptable, and savings associated with competition, which may be realized in the future, will not sufficiently offset the upfront development costs when competing against existing Department priorities. 

206. Senator VITTER. Secretary Gates, how does DOD intend to ensure cost control under a sole source circumstance? 

Secretary GATES. Pratt & Whitney leadership committed to assist the Department 

in correcting the cost growth concerns on the F135 engine. In addition, company 

leaders agreed, from corporate funds, to fund a number of affordability initiatives 

that require investment in order to further reduce the cost of the F135 engine. The 

Joint Assessment Team proposed that, with commitment and funding, the cost 

growth trends can be reversed and I have every expectation that the Department 

will accomplish that. DOD will continue to work with Pratt & Whitney, with affordability as a major concern, to take actions that will continue to lower the price of 

the F135 for the future. The company’s incentive is to please one of its primary customers, as there will likely be an opportunity for Pratt & Whitney to pursue future 

DOD and partner-nation work, and a failure on its part to achieve affordability 

could likely be a deciding factor in the future. 

C–17 ACQUISITION PROGRAMS

207. Senator VITTER. Secretary Gates, over the last 4 years, the Senate Appropriations Committee added 44 C–17s that we neither needed nor could afford, at a total 

cost of over $14 billion above DOD’s requests—in the form of earmarks. As DOD 

had done in the preceding few years, you proposed last year to cancel the C–17 

Globemaster program and argued against a congressional earmark that intended to 

buy 10 more of those aircraft for $2.5 billion. You stated that the cost of buying and 

operating those additional aircraft would ‘‘invariably result in a reduction in critical 

warfighting capability somewhere else in the defense program.’’ Is this view shared 

by the service chiefs and unified and combatant commanders? 

Secretary GATES. I believe that the current C–17 fleet is in excess of our strategic 

airlift needs, resulting in increased operating costs at the expense of other priorities. 

This position, supported by the Services and combatant commanders, is based on 

the findings of several recent mobility studies to include the MCRS–16. The objectives of MCRS–16 were to determine the mobility capabilities and requirements 

needed in support of the National Military Strategy in the 2016 timeframe, to determine capability gaps/overlaps associated with the programmed mobility force structure, and to support the QDR and decisions regarding mobility programs. The study 

found that the planned capacity of the programmed strategic airlift fleet, consisting 

of 223 C–17s and 89 C–5s, exceeds the most demanding projected requirements. In 

addition, the report noted that C–17s could be used to support intra-theater missions without adding to the peak demand for C–17s. Both of these insights are consistent with findings from previous mobility studies. 

Based upon this information, it is my position that no additional C–17s should 

be procured, and I request your support in granting me the authority to allow for 

the proper management of the strategic fleet by providing the Department greater 

flexibility in retiring C–5 aircraft and eliminating the current statutory requirement 

to maintain a minimum fleet of 316 strategic airlift aircraft. 

[Whereupon, at 1:23 p.m., the committee adjourned.] 

(173) 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION 

FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 

2011 

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 23, 2010 

U.S. SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, 

Washington, DC. 

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:35 a.m. in room SD– 

G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin (chairman) presiding. 

Committee members present: Senators Levin, Lieberman, Reed, 

Akaka, E. Benjamin Nelson, Udall, Hagan, Begich, Burris, McCain, 

Sessions, Chambliss, Graham, Thune, Wicker, Burr, Vitter, and 

Collins. 

Committee staff member present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff director. 

Majority staff members present: Jonathan D. Clark, counsel; 

Gabriella Eisen, counsel; Michael J. Kuiken, professional staff 

member; Peter K. Levine, general counsel; Jason W. Maroney, 

counsel; William G.P. Monahan, counsel; Michael J. Noblet, professional staff member; Roy F. Phillips, professional staff member; 

John H. Quirk V, professional staff member; and William K. Sutey, 

professional staff member. 

Minority staff members present: Joseph W. Bowab, Republican 

staff director; Adam J. Barker, professional staff member; Paul C. 

Hutton IV, professional staff member; Michael V. Kostiw, professional staff member; Daniel A. Lerner, professional staff member; 

Lucian L. Niemeyer, professional staff member; Diana G. Tabler, 

professional staff member; and Richard F. Walsh, minority counsel. 

Staff assistants present: Paul J. Hubbard, Jennifer R. Knowles, 

and Brian F. Sebold. 

Committee members’ assistants present: James Tuite, assistant 

to Senator Byrd; Christopher Griffin, assistant to Senator 

Lieberman; Carolyn A. Chuhta, assistant to Senator Reed; Nick 

Ikeda, assistant to Senator Akaka; Caroline Tess, assistant to Senator Bill Nelson; Ann Premer, assistant to Senator Ben Nelson; 

Patrick Hayes, assistant to Senator Bayh; Gordon I. Peterson, assistant to Senator Webb; Roger Pena, assistant to Senator Hagan; 

Roosevelt Barfield, assistant to Senator Burris; Anthony J. 

Lazarski, assistant to Senator Inhofe; Lenwood Landrum, assistant 

to Senator Sessions; Clyde A. Taylor IV, assistant to Senator 

174 

Chambliss; Jason Van Beek, assistant to Senator Thune; Brian 

Walsh, assistant to Senator LeMieux; Kyle Ruckert, assistant to 

Senator Vitter; and Chip Kennett, assistant to Senator Collins. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN 

Chairman LEVIN. Good morning, everybody. 

Today, Secretary McHugh and General Casey will testify before 

our committee on the plans and programs of the U.S. Army as part 

of our review of the fiscal year 2011 Annual Budget and Overseas 

Contingency Operations (OCO) Request. 

Gentlemen, we are thankful to you for your dedicated service to 

our country, and to your families for their support of your service. 

As the committee meets again this year to review the Army’s 

posture, we find ourselves, as always, inspired by, and proud of, 

what our soldiers have accomplished and what they continue to do. 

General Casey, I understand that you will be introducing some 

special guests later on this morning. We look forward to meeting 

them, to hearing their stories from you, and thanking them in person for their service and their sacrifice. 

America’s Army today is as great as any other in the Army’s 

nearly 235 years of service to the Nation. Great service, however, 

always comes with great sacrifice. Our Army remains globally committed and overstretched by nearly 8 years of continuous combat. 

Thankfully, the drawdown of U.S. forces in Iraq has begun, but 

over 96,000 American soldiers remain engaged in operations there, 

contributing to the continued strain on our forces. I’m hoping that, 

at a minimum, we will achieve the planned withdrawal of additional units from Iraq, set to reach 50,000 by the end of this August. 

Much depends on the ability and willingness of the Iraqis themselves to preserve hard-fought gains; and, in turn, that will depend 

in large measure on whether the political steps Iraqi leaders have 

consistently promised to take will be completed. 

At the same time we see the drawdown of forces in Iraq, the administration has shifted its strategic emphasis and resources to the 

counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan and support to help 

Pakistan confront the al Qaeda and Taliban threats. 

An additional 30,000 troops—many Army—will be committed to 

support operations in Afghanistan to implement a people-centered 

counterinsurgency strategy to help defeat al Qaeda and the Taliban 

and more quickly build up the capabilities of Afghanistan security 

forces. 

Last week, coalition forces, including large numbers of Afghan 

Army units, started a major offensive operation in Helmand Province to take control of key populations away from the Taliban and 

build support for the Afghan Government by leaving security and 

services in the wake of removal of the Taliban to them. Hard fighting continues, and some of our best and bravest have been lost and 

wounded. 

I’ve long argued that the principal mission in Afghanistan should 

be training the Afghan military and police so that they can take 

responsibility for the security of their country. It is essential to the 

success of our objectives in Afghanistan that we strengthen the Afghan army, deepen the partnership of coalition and Afghan units, 

175 

operating together on a one-unit to one-unit basis, and for Afghans 

to take the lead in achieving security. In this respect, operations 

in Helmand could be a turning point for the Afghan people and 

their government, their security forces, and the people of this critically important region. But, we are still short thousands of trainers 

in Afghanistan for the initial 8 weeks of training. That is totally 

unacceptable. Our North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies have provided only 10 percent of the trainers that they committed. 

Although the Army continues to meet the demands of counterinsurgency and support operations in Afghanistan and Iraq and 

around the world, the Army—soldiers and their families—are 

stressed in many ways. In order to gain and sustain necessary 

higher readiness levels in our deployed forces, the readiness of our 

nondeployed forces has been at historic lows. Most of our nondeployed Army units are not ready to quickly respond to an unforeseen contingency. Consequently, getting those units reconstituted 

and ready for their next rotation to Iraq or Afghanistan is that 

much more difficult and risky. This Nation faces substantially increased risk, should we need the Army to respond to another contingency, despite the amazing resilience of our troops and their 

families. 

In light of this challenge, the Department of the Army, over the 

last 3 years, has set a goal to reestablish a balance within the force 

by 2011. By balance, we understand that soldiers and units would 

have twice as much time at home as they would deployed. Nondeployed units would achieve required levels of personnel, equipment, and training readiness necessary to meet other strategic contingencies; budget pressures to support current operations would 

ease, allowing greater investment in modernization; and Army families would enjoy greater stability and less stress. The committee 

is interested to learn more about how the Army’s fiscal year 2011 

budget request will achieve balance in 2011, even assuming that 

declining operational demands on the force keep pace with current 

strategic plans. 

An issue of concern to the committee, and related to the strain 

on the force, is the size of the Army. In order to deal with getting 

units ready for the rotational requirements of Afghanistan and 

Iraq, the Secretary of Defense has permitted the Army to retain 

22,000 soldiers, temporarily, above its authorized end strength of 

547,000. Additional troops, plus limiting the growth of Active component Army combat brigades to 45, are intended to address the 

Army’s soldier shortages in units getting ready to deploy. However, 

questions of additional permanent Army end strength, as well as 

unit structure, need to be carefully considered, in light of the inevitable and heavy near- and long-term budgetary pressures that such 

increases will put on the Army’s investment and modernization accounts. 

We’d like the witnesses to address the Army’s analysis of its current and future end strength and unit structure requirements, and 

their ideas on how to manage the growth of personnel costs. 

Nothing in our defense establishment is as important or as expensive as our people. In fact, the 2009 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) makes preservation of the All-Volunteer Force an overVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:37 May 06, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00181 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6601 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\62155.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
176 

arching national defense strategy objective. The Army’s 2011 budget request supports this objective and makes a strong commitment 

to ensure that we are taking care of our servicemembers and their 

family. 

Much of the defense budget’s growth can be attributed to significant and necessary increases in pay and benefit accounts. For example, the fiscal year 2011 budget request continues the Army’s 

major commitment to expand and improve programs for wounded 

soldiers and their families, as well as for the prevention, identification, and care of soldiers and their families suffering from the 

stress of ongoing operations. 

I commend the Army for your commitment. I look forward to the 

witnesses’ discussion of these programs today. 

The long anticipated 2009 QDR, submitted with the fiscal year 

2011 budget, places the Department of Defense’s (DOD) focus and 

priorities squarely on policies, programs, and initiatives that support the current fight in Afghanistan and Iraq and against al 

Qaeda around the world. 

The QDR recognizes the tremendous contributions that the Army 

has been providing in this fight over the last several years, and 

emphasizes that these types of contingencies are more likely the 

wave of the future. Accordingly, the 2009 QDR’s recommendations 

support much of what the Army has already been doing, but it includes new direction for building or realigning capabilities and 

force structure that will make it more structurally relevant to the 

requirements of irregular or unconventional warfare. 

We look forward to the witnesses’ assessments on the 2009 QDR, 

what it means for the Army today and into the future, and how 

their 2011 budget request supports the changes that are directed. 

As challenging as meeting the demands of current operations is 

today, the Army must also ensure that it remains technologically 

dominant across the range of potential contingencies and assure 

our future security. Army modernization, however, has proven difficult to manage and achieve. Army technical modernization, as 

part of a broad transformational effort, appears to have been consistently falling short of plans and promises. Secretary Gates’ decision last year to restructure the Future Combat Systems (FCS) 

program, including cancellation of the previously planned manned 

combat vehicle systems, require the Army to fundamentally change 

its approach to modernization. 

The 2011 budget request carries the Army deeper into yet another modernization strategy that attempts to rationalize the demands for new, immediately ready technologies needed to quickly 

support the current fight with the opportunities that other less mature technologies may offer for the force in the next 5, 10, or 15 

years, such as the Army’s commitment to a new ground combat vehicle. 

The Army must also manage its modernization investment risks 

carefully and consistently with our recently enacted Weapons System Acquisition Reform Act. It also needs to guard against allowing 

its enthusiasm for modernization and the near-term availability of 

resources to lead to a high-risk schedule-driven program, where the 

necessary technologies are not mature and the operational requirements are not urgent. 

177 

We look forward to the witnesses’ report on their efforts to establish an Army modernization program that meets the many challenging goals of simultaneously being comprehensive, relevant, 

technologically achievable, manageable, affordable, and enduring. 

So, Secretary McHugh and General Casey, the Nation could not 

be more proud of the Army, its soldiers, and their families, and we 

are grateful for your leadership of our Army and our Army family. 

Senator McCain. 

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN 

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I join you in welcoming Secretary McHugh and General Casey 

here today. 

Gentlemen, I thank you for your leadership in these challenging 

times. 

I’ve also had the opportunity of saying hello to our wounded warriors and spouses and brave Americans, and I look forward to your 

introduction of them to the committee. I thank them for their service and sacrifice. 

We all know the Army has been operating at a high operational 

tempo for the past 8 years, while meeting wartime requirements a 

half a world away, so we should consider the implications of the 

President’s 2011 budget request in the context of our most pressing 

challenges, which are, of course, success in Afghanistan and Iraq. 

I applaud Secretary Gates’ recent statement that, ‘‘Achieving our 

objective in Afghanistan and Iraq has moved to the top of our institutional military’s budgeting policy and program priorities.’’ I look 

forward to your explanation of how the budget priorities of the institutional Army directly support ongoing operations in Afghanistan and continuing efforts to succeed in Iraq. 

General Casey, you have expressed concern, and very legitimate 

concern, about the effect of continued deployments on our All-Volunteer Army. While stretching our forces does create risk, we have 

demonstrated that the best way to reduce that risk is by succeeding in theater. The Iraq troop surge offers an important lesson 

in that regard. 

Now we have the right mission and the right leadership in place 

in Afghanistan. The additional 30,000 troops ordered by the President are beginning to arrive, and the burden on the institutional 

Army is high. It’s incumbent on you to field the best-trained and 

-equipped force in the world, and it is incumbent on us, in Congress, to approve resources sufficient to do so. We are committed 

to the long-term success of Afghanistan and Iraq as stable states 

that can govern and secure themselves and will not become bases 

of attacks on the United States, on our allies. 

I would also point out, incredibly, that retention and recruitment 

is at an all-time high in the history of the All-Volunteer Force. 

Many are surprised by that; in fact, I am pleasantly surprised. But, 

the fact is, it’s a testimony to the patriotism and willingness to 

serve of young Americans all over this country. 

The competition for resources frequently pits development of future capabilities against the cost of sustaining current operations, 

and this gets to the heart of the Army’s modernization efforts. Last 

year, we supported Secretary Gates’ decision to restructure the 

178 

Army’s FCS program with spinouts of mature technologies to the 

current force. 

The Army has done much over the past year to develop a new 

acquisition strategy based on an incremental Brigade Combat 

Team (BCT) modernization plan. This new acquisition plan, like 

the previous FCS program, will be a multiyear, multibillion-dollar 

program that is the centerpiece of the Army’s transformation efforts. I’m interested in hearing from our witnesses how the Army 

plans to transition from the FCS program to the BCT modernization program. Specifically, what is the Army’s BCT modernization 

strategy and spinout plan, and what is the impact of an incremental modernization strategy on the Army’s budget for 2011 and 

beyond? 

Since taking office, Secretary Gates has taken decisive action to 

increase capabilities available to our deployed forces, especially 

those forces in combat in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

As we all know, improvised explosive devices (IEDs) continue to 

be the greatest killer of American troops in Iraq and Afghanistan, 

and I applaud the Army and DOD for fielding technologies to protect our men and women on the battlefield. Congress authorized 

and appropriated billions for mine-resistant ambush-protected 

(MRAP) vehicles, and their increased use has reduced the Army’s 

reliance on other lightly-armored vehicles. 

Enhancing capabilities of our fighting forces is critical to our efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. I support the Army’s budget request 

to field more helicopters and aircrews, create two combat aviation 

brigades, and fund new unmanned aircraft. 

Recently, Mr. Secretary, I was down at the Yuma Proving 

Ground. I was very impressed by the coordination and communication between field commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan and the 

Yuma Proving Ground, as we face these ever-evolving new technologies that the enemy is using in developing new and more lethal 

IEDs. From the battlefield to testing and response, I was extremely 

impressed. 

Finally, I’m interested, of course, in the views of General Casey 

and Secretary McHugh on the Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell (DADT) policy. 

We will continue to listen to our military leaders. As I pointed out 

before, recruitment and retention is at an all-time high in the history of the All-Volunteer Force, and obviously changes in a policy 

that, I think, is working would have to be carefully considered. 

I want to make perfectly clear that I am enormously proud of 

every American who puts on an Army uniform to serve in a time 

of war, and we want to encourage more of our fellow American citizens to serve and to open up opportunities to do so. 

So, with that, I would like to thank you, Mr. Secretary. I think 

this is your first inquisition here, and we certainly welcome you on 

the other side. We want to thank you, again, for your outstanding 

service for many years as a member of the House Armed Services 

Committee, and the work we did together. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Senator McCain follows:] 

179 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I join you in welcoming Secretary McHugh and General Casey here today. Gentlemen, thank you for your leadership in these challenging times. I would also like to welcome the soldiers and spouses who are seated 

behind you and take this opportunity to thank them for their service and sacrifice. 

The Army has been operating at a high operational tempo for the past 8 years while 

meeting wartime requirements half a world away. So we should consider the implications of the President’s fiscal year 2011 budget request in the context of our most 

pressing challenges, success in Afghanistan and Iraq. 

I applaud Secretary Gates’ recent statement that ‘‘achieving our objectives in Afghanistan and Iraq has moved to the top of the institutional military’s budgeting, 

policy, and program priorities.’’ I look forward to your explanation of how the budget 

priorities of the institutional Army directly support ongoing operations in Afghanistan and continued efforts to succeed in Iraq. 

General Casey, you have expressed very legitimate concern about the effect of continued deployments on our all-volunteer Army. While stretching our forces does create risk, we have demonstrated that the best way to reduce that risk is by succeeding in theater. The Iraq troop surge offers an important lesson in that regard. 

Now we have the right mission and the right leadership in place in Afghanistan. 

The additional 30,000 troops ordered by the President are beginning to arrive and 

the burden on the institutional Army is high. It is incumbent on you to field the 

best-trained and -equipped force in the world and it is incumbent on Congress to 

approve resources sufficient to do so. We are committed to the long-term success of 

Afghanistan and Iraq as stable states that can govern and secure themselves and 

that will not become bases for attacks on the United States or our allies. 

I would also point out that retention and recruitment is at an all time high in 

the history of the All-Volunteer Force. Many are surprised by that, but I believe it 

is testimony to the patriotism and willingness to serve of young Americans. 

The competition for resources frequently pits development of future capabilities 

against the cost of sustaining current operations. This gets to the heart of the 

Army’s modernization efforts. Last year we supported Secretary Gates’ decision to 

restructure the Army’s Future Combat Systems (FCS) program with spin-outs of 

mature technologies to the current force. The Army has done much over the past 

year to develop a new acquisition strategy based on an incremental Brigade Combat 

Team (BCT) Modernization plan. This new acquisition plan, like the previous FCS 

program, will be a multiyear, multibillion-dollar program that is the center piece of 

the Army’s transformation efforts. I am interested in hearing from our witnesses 

how the Army plans to transition from the FCS program to the BCT Modernization 

Program. Specifically, what is the Army’s BCT modernization strategy and spin-out 

plan and what is the impact of an incremental modernization strategy on the 

Army’s budgets for fiscal year 2011 and beyond? 

Since taking office, Secretary Gates has taken decisive action to increase capabilities available to our deployed forces—especially those forces in combat in Iraq and 

Afghanistan. Improvised explosive devices (IEDs) continue to be the greatest killer 

of American troops in Iraq and Afghanistan and I applaud the Army and the Department of Defense for fielding technologies to protect our men and women on the 

battlefield. Congress authorized and appropriated billions for mine-resistant vehicles 

and their increased use has reduced the Army’s reliance on other lightly armored 

vehicles. Enhancing capabilities for our fighting forces is critical to our efforts in 

Iraq and Afghanistan and I support the Army’s budget request to field more helicopters and air crews, create two Combat Aviation Brigades, and fund new unmanned aircraft. 

I would note here that I was at Yuma Proving Ground last week and was very 

impressed by the coordination and communication taking place between field commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan and the Proving Ground as we face ever evolving 

IED technologies used by the enemy. The short response time between testing of 

new technologies and their application on the battlefield was extremely impressive. 

Finally, I’m interested in the views of General Casey and Secretary McHugh on 

the ‘‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell’’ policy. We will continue to listen to our military leaders, 

and as I have pointed out, recruitment and retention is at an all-time high in the 

history of the All-Volunteer Force. I think that the current policy is working and 

changes to it would have to be carefully considered. 

I want to make perfectly clear that I’m enormously proud of every American who 

puts on an Army uniform to serve at a time of war. I want to encourage more of 

our fellow citizens to serve and to open up opportunities to do so. 

I look forward to our witnesses’ testimony. Thank you Chairman Levin. 

180 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator McCain. 

A special welcome to you, Secretary McHugh. You’re battle-tested 

over in the House, so you come with a great background. 

Mr. Secretary. 

Secretary MCHUGH. It does look a little different from down here 

than it does from up there, I’ll just say. [Laughter.] 

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN M. MCHUGH, SECRETARY OF THE 

ARMY 

Secretary MCHUGH. I should say, I’ve never missed being in Congress so much as I do right now. [Laughter.] 

But, with your permission, Mr. Chairman, I certainly want to 

thank you, sir, and you as well, Ranking Member McCain, for your 

very kind and very gracious comments, not just in support of me, 

but in support of this absolutely incredible Army. 

It is a privilege, although somewhat intimidating, to be before 

you here today, but I do it with great pride, because we are here, 

along with the Chief of Staff, in support of America’s Army. 

As was noted, it was just a few short months ago that I sat before you as President Obama’s nominee for our Nation’s 21st Secretary of the Army, and at that time, I recall very clearly, I promised you, and assured you, of my dedication and commitment to 

support our men and women in uniform, Army civilians, and the 

great families, who, I know all you understand so very well, stand 

with them. I pledged to work with you, as well, in support of that 

great institution. 

It’s some 5 months later, and I want to tell you, I come before 

you again reaffirming that commitment; but, doing so having been 

in the Pentagon, having worked with these great men and women 

for that time, it brings an even greater appreciation of those wonderful Americans who serve within the Army ranks, and the vital 

role they play in defense of our great Nation. 

One-point-1 million soldiers, some 279,000 civilians, and, as I 

noted, their families, proudly serving in some 80 countries around 

the world, and they continue to be at the forefront in ongoing 

counterinsurgency operations against our enemies, assisting other 

nations to build their own security capacity, supporting homeland 

defense, deterring and defeating hybrid threats and hostile state 

actors, and, as we’ve witnessed, I think, so proudly, in recent days 

in Haiti, providing life-saving humanitarian assistance in response 

to natural disasters. 

At the risk of stating the obvious, every member of this committee, and every member of the House and the Senate at large, 

are critical to the success of these vital missions, in your capacity 

as our congressional overseers. As was mentioned, I know full well, 

from my nearly 17 years of service on the House Armed Services 

Committee, that a strategic partnership between Congress and the 

Army is critical to the Army’s success. I think I can speak from experience, as well; without exception each and every one of you has 

partnered with us to ensure that our soldiers, civilians, and family 

members receive the very best in training, equipment, healthcare, 

and vital family programs. I want to say, on behalf of a grateful 

Army, thank you for your leadership and for your unwavering support. 

181 

This morning, if I may, Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain, and 

other distinguished members, I’d like to share, just briefly, a few 

of my priorities and some of the perspectives I’ve gained over the 

past several months on where the Army is now, and where it’s 

heading in fiscal year 2011. 

Admittedly, over the last several months, I’ve been on kind of a 

crash course. I learned I was not quite as smart as I routinely said 

every 2 years in my campaign for reelection. But, through the process of studying our programs, visiting installations in the United 

States and overseas, examining units in all stages of what we call 

R4 Gen, and most importantly, talking with our soldiers, civilians, 

and their family members throughout the force, how well and yet 

the challenges that lie before us. 

I have been, in this time, both impressed and challenged personally by what I’ve observed and what I’ve discovered. Frankly, I’ve 

found an Army that is clearly fatigued by nearly 9 years of combat, 

but through it all is today a resilient, determined, and extraordinarily effective. Our soldiers today, through nearly 9 years of 

war, have more expertise, more education, more training, and more 

lethal capabilities than ever before, and due to the advancement, 

equipment, training and doctrine, are more likely than ever before 

to return safely to their loved ones and to a grateful Nation. 

But, in spite of those significant gains, the stress on our personnel and their families remains all too real. For all our efforts, 

as has been referenced, and as the Chief of Staff has said repeatedly, we remain out of balance. As I know all of you clearly understand, the All-Volunteer Force is a national treasure, as Senator 

McCain mentioned. If we wish to sustain it, supporting our critical 

family and quality-of-life programs for our soldiers and their families must be a top priority. If I say nothing else here today, I want 

to assure you, for those of us in the Army family, it is the top priority. The 2011 proposed budget rightly focuses on those initiatives 

that support our soldiers, families, and civilians. The submission 

requests $1.7 billion in 2011 to standardize and fund those vital 

family programs and all those that they serve. 

We’re attempting to aggressively address the cause of stress on 

individuals resulting from the effects of multiple deployments, including the essential effort to increase dwell time. As all of you 

know, and has been referenced here already this morning, with 

continuing deployments in multiple theaters, this has been no easy 

task. But, I want to assure you in the strongest terms, the Army 

is committed to our wounded warriors and those critical programs 

that support them, and to building dwell ratios, bringing back a 

sense of stability in terms of their redeployments. 

We fully believe it is our solemn obligation to provide world-class 

care and transition services to our wounded, ill, and injured 

through properly led and properly resourced Warrior Transition 

Units. Your Army is committed to ensuring that the quality of life 

for those who serve, or who have served, is commensurate with the 

quality of their service. 

On the subject of family programs, I’ve heard from many of the 

good Senators on this panel about reductions in base operation support (BOS) budgets in installations across the country. Earlier this 

182 

month, General Casey and I announced the Army’s plan to increase 

BOS funding by $500 million in fiscal year 2010. 

The Army Installation Management Command continues to work 

with each installation to guarantee that essential BOS needs are 

met. 

We also will conduct a comprehensive mid-year review of all BOS 

accounts to ensure that adequate funding is maintained to meet 

Army priorities through the remainder of the fiscal year. 

I want to make it clear that as our installations look for ways 

to operate more efficiently, as they should, family programs will be 

sacrosanct; they will not be touched. That isn’t to say we won’t ask, 

‘‘Is this program working? Is the money well spent? Are there better ways to provide necessary care?’’ Where change is required, 

we’ll change things, but where money is best directed, we’ll so direct it. But, through all of that, Army families will not be left behind. 

Second, I found an Army with equipment systems and networks 

in need of reset while simultaneously requiring significant modernization to ensure our soldiers maintain a decisive edge on the 

battlefield of today, as well as superiority over threats of tomorrow. 

Nowhere is this challenge more evident than in the need to repair, 

replace, and recapitalize equipment affected by the harsh realities 

and environment of war. As the responsible drawdown in Iraq continues and the flow of forces and equipment to Afghanistan grows, 

we’ll confront this reality anew. 

Additionally, we have to strive to modernize efficiently in an era 

of growing fiscal challenges. As such, with this year’s budget, the 

Army is embracing what I believe is an affordable yet effective 

modernization strategy designed to revamp our vehicle, network, 

aviation, and logistical systems. We’ve requested $31.7 billion for 

research, development, and acquisition which includes $3.2 billion 

for the BCT modernization, $1.29 billion to fund tactical vehicle 

modernization, $2.74 billion to fund Army network systems, and 

$6.41 billion to fund aviation modernization. Fully funding these 

programs is vital to our soldiers’ welfare this year and beyond. 

Third, I found an Army acquisitions system that, while improving, still lacks the workforce and flexibility needed to efficiently 

and affordably purchase the right weapons, services, and equipment to our soldiers. Here, too, the proposed budget will help us 

better meet our continued commitment to growing the Army’s acquisition workforce by thousands of positions over the next few 

years, thereby ensuring that we have the best available equipment 

for our soldiers, while being responsible stewards of the taxpayers’ 

dollars. 

But, I would tell you, workforce improvements are not enough to 

fix the procurement system, and I know you on this committee, 

particularly the chairman and the ranking member, who worked so 

hard on the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act (WSARA) of 

last year, know that full well. The entire process must be retooled, 

and in that way, more fully adopt an agile system that rapidly develops, purchases, and fields innovative solutions. This approach 

will require more streamlined procedures and flexible rules, and for 

that, we need your help. 

183 

As I mentioned, in 2009 Congress significantly reformed how 

DOD purchases major weapons systems. Thank you to this committee and its leadership in that regard. But, as the chairman and 

the ranking member so correctly noted, both at that time and since, 

it’s only a start. Now it’s time to address how we purchase services, 

and on that front, we look forward to partnering with you to develop better ways and better systems that achieve that critical objective. 

In the end, I would tell you we have an Army that is strong in 

spirit, strong in ability, and strong in results. We need to recognize, 

too, this is an Army that, after 8 years of uninterrupted war, is 

tired, stressed and too often burdened by the inefficiencies of bureaucracy. This must change, and with your help, we’ll make those 

changes. 

Let me close by highlighting, again, my deep appreciation for the 

men and women in uniform, the civilians and the families who support them, and by so doing, support this Nation. Every day, I’m 

humbled by their dedication. I’m so blessed to have the chance to 

walk into a building every morning to go to work where the word 

hero really means something. All of you on this great committee 

are part of that magnificent formula for freedom. Thank you, again, 

for all you do in support of our men and women in uniform, our 

Army civilians, and their families. 

I deeply appreciate the opportunity to appear here before you, 

and I look forward to your questions. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The joint prepared statement of Secretary McHugh and General 

Casey follows:] 

JOINT PREPARED STATEMENT BY HON. JOHN M. MCHUGH AND GEN GEORGE W. 

CASEY, JR., USA 

INTRODUCTION

America’s Army continues to answer the Nation’s call, as it has since it was established nearly 235 years ago. Today our Army is fighting two wars, assisting other 

nations as they build their own security capacity, supporting civil authorities at 

home, helping the people of Haiti rebuild after a devastating earthquake, and preparing to deter and defeat new threats. The Army’s soldiers, civilians, and families 

faithfully shoulder the load that our Nation asks of them. With the support of Congress, we are on track with our 4-year plan to put the Army back in balance. 

Though their sacrifices can never be fully repaid, the Nation continues to recognize and honor our soldiers and their families by supporting them before, during, 

and following deployments. Our soldiers rely upon the best training and equipment 

that our Nation can provide to accomplish their mission. Yet even with this continued support, the demands of 8 years of war weigh heavily on our Army. The strain 

of multiple deployments is evident on soldiers and their families. Equipment is used 

at a pace that seriously challenges our maintenance and replacement capabilities 

and resources. The stress is present in our institutions as we change 20th-century 

systems and processes to meet the demands of the 21st century. 

Our Nation faces the difficult challenge of balancing when, where, and how to engage in a dynamic and uncertain world while meeting important priorities at home. 

However, when the security of our citizens or allies is threatened, the Nation can 

depend on America’s Army—the Strength of the Nation. 

STRATEGIC CONTEXT

The United States faces a complex strategic landscape with an array of diverse 

security challenges. We are fighting wars in Iraq and Afghanistan while preparing 

for future challenges to our national security. For the foreseeable future, violent extremist movements such as al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations comprise the 

most immediate threats. Current global economic conditions, changes in demoVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:37 May 06, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00189 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\62155.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
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graphics, cultural pressures associated with globalization, and competition for scarce 

resources exacerbate the uncertainty and volatility of the strategic environment. 

Within this setting, the American soldier stands as our Nation’s most visible and 

enduring symbol of commitment in an era of persistent conflict. 

PERSISTENT CONFLICT

For the near future, persistent conflict—protracted confrontation among state, 

non-state, and individual actors that are increasingly willing to use violence to 

achieve their political and ideological ends—will characterize the global security environment. Security crises will arise unpredictably, vary in intensity and scope, and 

last for uncertain durations. These challenges will take place in all domains: land, 

sea, air, space, and cyberspace. Natural disasters and humanitarian emergencies 

will continue to be frequent and unpredictable missions, requiring the commitment 

of soldiers and resources. In this dynamic environment, the Army will conduct operations that span the spectrum of conflict from humanitarian and civil support to 

counterinsurgency to general war, often simultaneously. 

GLOBAL TRENDS

Several global trends will continue to shape the international security environment and the conflicts confronting our Nation. Globalization may increase prosperity, but it can also spread destabilizing influences. The unequal distribution of 

benefits creates societies with divisions between ‘‘haves’’ and ‘‘have nots’’—divisions 

that can be exploited by extremist ideologies and lead to conflict. Fault lines reflecting protracted competition and friction can erupt unpredictably as societies struggle 

to adjust to the move toward modernity and greater interdependence. Meanwhile, 

increasingly available and affordable technology provides our adversaries sophisticated tools to enable a networked approach to recruiting the disenfranchised and exporting terror. 

Shifting demographics and rapid population growth that is increasingly urbanized 

can continue to break down traditional, localized norms of governance, behavior, and 

identity, and further strain already stressed governments. This is especially true 

where a lack of economic opportunity increases the potential for instability and extremism. Those who are disaffected may rebel against perceived western interference, challenges to traditional values, and ineffective governments. Increased resource demand, in particular energy, water, and food, is a consequence of growing 

prosperity and populations. The growing global competition for resources will continue to produce friction and increase opportunities for conflict. In this environment, 

climate change and natural disasters will compound already difficult conditions in 

developing countries by igniting humanitarian crises, causing destabilizing population migrations, and raising the potential for epidemic diseases. 

The two trends of greatest concern are the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and failed or failing states. A catastrophic attack utilizing WMD 

has the potential to be globally destabilizing. Failed or failing states, lacking the 

will or capacity to maintain effective territorial control, contribute to regional instability and provide ideal environments for terrorist groups to plan and export operations. The merging of these two trends constitutes a significant and compelling 

threat. Together, these trends make conflict in the decades ahead more likely. 

CHARACTER OF CONFLICT IN THE 21ST CENTURY

Global trends and recent conflicts—such as those in Lebanon and Georgia—and 

our own recent combat experience indicate the evolving character of conflict in the 

21st century. 

Conflicts will be waged among diverse actors—state and non-state—with the latter employing capabilities that, during the last century, remained largely the purview of nation-states. Motives, objectives, and often the identities of these actors will 

be difficult to discern, and are likely to shift as some act covertly and others use 

proxies. The battle to gain influence over, and support from, populations will be central to our success. Therefore, conflict will be unavoidably waged among the people. 

The initiation, location, duration, and intensity of conflicts are increasingly unpredictable. In an interdependent world, conflicts are more susceptible to the potential 

for spillover, creating regionally, and potentially globally, destabilizing effects. All 

of this will occur under the unblinking scrutiny of the 24-hour global media cycle 

and the internet. Details of conflict as well as misinformation will flow equally 

across social, communications, and cyber networks. Our adversaries will exploit 

these media and communication sources locally and globally. 

We are more likely to face hybrid threats-diverse and dynamic combinations of 

conventional, irregular, terrorist, and criminal capabilities employed asymmetrically 

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to counter our advantages. Hybrid threats require hybrid solutions-adaptive military 

forces that can function in a variety of situations with a diverse set of national, allied, and indigenous partners. Given the strategic environment, enduring global 

trends, and the character of 21st-century conflict, the Army will operate as part of 

a Joint, interagency, inter-governmental, and multi-national team to fulfill its global 

commitments. 

ROLES OF LAND FORCES

More than 1 million of our men and women have served in the ongoing campaigns 

in Iraq and Afghanistan. Over 3,900 American soldiers have given their lives, and 

more than 25,000 others have been wounded during this longest period of sustained 

conflict ever fought by an All-Volunteer Force. Today, America’s Army has over 

255,000 soldiers and more than 18,500 Army civilians serving in nearly 80 countries 

around the world—with the remainder stationed within the United States supporting domestic missions, resetting from recent deployments, or preparing for an 

upcoming deployment. 

Our soldiers are performing magnificently around the world every day, and the 

roles for land forces in this environment are becoming increasingly clear. 

First, the Army must prevail in protracted counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. 

Not only must we prevail in our current missions in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Philippines, we must be prepared to prevail in any future COIN operation. 

Second, the Army must engage to help other nations build capacity and to assure 

our friends and allies. Through security force assistance, we can increase the capacity of other nations’ military and police to uphold the rule of law, ensure domestic 

order, and deny sanctuary to terrorists—thereby helping avoid future conflicts that 

might otherwise develop. American soldiers are currently deployed to Central America and the Balkans, building the capacity of indigenous security forces. Additionally, the Army has established an Army Service Component Command for U.S. Africa Command to assist partner nations and humanitarian organizations in Africa. 

A third role that the Army fulfills is to provide support to civil authorities at 

home and abroad. In the past year alone, American soldiers have fought fires in the 

west, conducted search and rescue operations in the Rockies and Alaska, and assisted with tsunami relief in American Samoa, in support of civil authorities. The 

Army has also provided a sizeable force to support the relief efforts in Haiti following the catastrophic earthquake that destroyed its capital. Army units from both 

the active and Reserve components remain prepared to react to a variety of crises 

as consequence management and response forces. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers is a lead organization in providing DOD support to civil authorities for disaster relief at home and engineering support to the U.S. Agency for International 

Development overseas. Abroad, the Army has also supported civil authorities in 

many ways, such as sending Agribusiness Development Teams from the Army National Guard to Afghanistan. 

Finally, the Army must deter and defeat hybrid threats and hostile state actors. 

As an Army, we recognize that we must remain prepared to meet and defeat hostile 

state actors that threaten our national security. But we recognize that the probability of facing a nation that will challenge America’s military head-on is lower 

than it was during the Cold War and other periods in our history. Our readiness 

and capability to confront near-peer competitors also deters war by raising the 

stakes for nation-state and hybrid actors who would threaten our security interests. 

To meet these threats, Army units continue to participate in joint and international training exercises around the world, ensuring that military skills and cooperative partnerships remain strong. The Army continues to position forces in Korea 

and at various missile defense sites in order to discourage actors who seek to disrupt regional stability and security. 

TWO CRITICAL CHALLENGES

The Army has operated at a demanding pace for the last 8 years, and while it 

has met each challenge, the strain has placed the Army out of balance. Demand for 

Army forces continues to exceed the sustainable supply. Against that backdrop, the 

Army continues to meet the wartime requirements of our Nation while it addresses 

the two major challenges facing our force—restoring balance and setting conditions 

for the future. In 2007, we established a 4-year plan to restore balance to an Army 

that had experienced the cumulative effects of years of conflict. The fiscal year 2011 

budget supports the final year in that plan. As we continue to restore balance to 

the force, we are also setting the conditions for the Army of the 21st century—an 

Army that fulfills our strategic role as an integral part of our Joint Force. 

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RESTORING BALANCE: THE ARMY’S FOUR IMPERATIVES

With the help of Congress, we have made significant progress over the past 3 

years in our plan to restore balance—a plan founded on four imperatives. Yet today 

the Army remains out of balance. We’ve improved our ability to sustain the Army’s 

soldiers, families, and civilians; prepare forces for success in the current conflict; 

reset returning units to rebuild the readiness consumed in operations and to prepare for future deployments and contingencies; and transform to meet the demands 

of the 21st century. As a result of this progress we now are in a better position to 

achieve balance than we were 2 years ago. Critical to this was the growth in the 

size of the Army. 

The security agreement with Iraq that transferred security in urban areas to 

Iraqis was a momentous and welcomed accomplishment. The hard work and sacrifice of our soldiers with the support of Congress helped make this achievement 

possible and set the conditions for our responsible drawdown of combat forces in 

Iraq this year. Coupled with our growth, the drawdown in Iraq allowed for our increased commitment of forces to Afghanistan to stem the rising violence, and disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda while reversing the momentum of the Taliban 

insurgency. However, the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan continue to create demands that have our Army operating beyond sustainable capacity. In fact, in 2009 

more soldiers were deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan combined than during the 

height of the Iraq surge. 

Presently, and for the short term, we lack sufficient strategic flexibility, and we 

continue to accumulate risk. We continue to stress our soldiers, families, civilians, 

equipment, and institutional systems, so our efforts to restore balance must not 

waiver. 

Sustain 

Sustaining our All-Volunteer Force is our first imperative. Nowhere is the stress 

on our force more profound than in the toll it takes on our people, as is tragically 

evident in the rising number of suicides and increasing need for counseling among 

our soldiers and families. We are aggressively addressing the causes of stress on individuals resulting from the cumulative effects of multiple deployments, and seeking 

to build resilience in soldiers, families, and civilians. The Army is committed to ensuring that the quality of life of those who serve the Nation is commensurate with 

the quality of their service. 

Goals 

To sustain the force, the Army continues to pursue four major goals. Our first goal 

is to recruit and retain quality soldiers and civilians dedicated to service to the Nation. Next, we are committed to furnishing the best care, support, and services for 

soldiers, families, and civilians by improving quality of life through meaningful initiatives such as the Army Family Action Plan, the Army Family Covenant, Army 

Community Covenants, and the Comprehensive Soldier Fitness Program. It is our 

solemn obligation to provide world-class warrior care and transition to our wounded, 

ill, and injured warriors through properly led and resourced Warrior Transition 

Units. Finally, by supporting the families of our fallen comrades we honor their 

service and sacrifice. 

Progress and Accomplishments 

• The Army met 104 percent of its recruiting goals for 2009, and achieved 

both numeric goals and quality benchmarks for new recruits. 

• All components exceeded 105 percent of their reenlistment goals. 

• We reduced off-duty fatalities by 20 percent, to include a 15 percent reduction in overall privately-owned-vehicle fatalities and 37 percent reduction in motorcycle fatalities. 

• In collaboration with the National Institute of Mental Health, the Army 

began a seminal study into suicide prevention that will inform the Army 

Suicide Prevention Program and society’s approach to suicide. 

• We began instituting Comprehensive Soldier Fitness—an all-inclusive approach to emotional, social, spiritual, family, and physical fitness—as the 

foundation to building resiliency within the Army. 

• We initiated an unprecedented series of construction projects at five 

major hospitals as part of our commitment to modernize our healthcare system. 

• The Army established the Warrior Transition Command and reorganized 

Warrior Transition Brigades to provide centralized support, rehabilitation, 

and individualized transition planning to our recovering warriors. 

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• We expanded Survivor Outreach Services to over 26,000 family members, 

providing unified support and advocacy, and enhancing survivor benefits for 

the families of our soldiers who have made the ultimate sacrifice. 

• We implemented the post-September 11 GI Bill, significantly increasing 

educational benefits for Active Duty soldiers, veterans, and family members. 

• The Army Reserve established Army Strong Community Centers to support geographically-dispersed soldiers and families. Together with Army 

National Guard Family Assistance Centers and Soldier and Family Assistance Centers on active duty installations, these centers provide help to soldiers’ families near their hometowns. 

Fiscal Year 2011 Budget Highlights 

• Provides $1.7 billion to standardize and fund vital family programs and 

services to include welfare and recreation; youth services and child care; 

Survivor Outreach Services; and expanded education and employment opportunities for family members. 

• Provides a 1.4 percent military basic pay raise and civilian pay raise, a 

3.9 percent basic allowance for housing increase, and a 3.4 percent basic allowance for subsistence increase. 

• Warrior Transition Units for our wounded soldiers will continue to receive strong support in fiscal year 2011 with $18 million in military construction funds allocated to resource construction of barracks spaces. 

• Supports Residential Communities Initiatives program, which provides 

quality, sustainable residential communities for soldiers and their families 

living on-post, and continues to offset out-of-pocket housing expenses for 

those residing off-post. 

Prepare 

Our soldiers face determined enemies—so preparing the force for our current conflict is complex and time-consuming, but essential for success. Our units must have 

the people, training, and equipment they need to prevail. Meanwhile, our institutions and systems must adapt to provide those critical capabilities in a timely manner and in sufficient quantities. 

Goals 

To prepare the force, we have four key goals. First, we accelerated the pace at 

which we needed to Grow the Army to our end strength and to grow our modular 

brigades to 73 Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) and nearly 230 Support Brigades. 

Second, the Army is committed to improving individual and collective Training to 

better prepare soldiers and leaders for a complex and challenging operational environment. Next, we continuously work to provide our formations with effective equipment in a timely manner that maintains our technological edge and protects our 

most critical resource—the soldier. Finally, we must transform the Army to a rotational model—Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN)—the core process for generating trained, ready, and cohesive units on a sustained and rotational basis—to 

meet current and future strategic demands. 

Progress and Accomplishments 

• We began the phase-out of stop-loss, starting with the Reserve Component in August 2009 and the Army National Guard in September 2009, and 

followed by the Active Army in January 2010. Today, no mobilizing or deploying units have stop-loss soldiers in their ranks. 

• The force achieved its ‘‘Grow the Army’’ end strength goal of 1.1 million 

in 2009. The Active component continues to grow toward its additional authorized temporary end strength in order to improve unit manning within 

the already existing Army structure as we eliminate stop-loss. 

• Fifteen-month tours effectively ended in November 2009, when the last 

soldiers on those extended deployments returned. 

• We completed fielding nearly 12,000 Mine Resistant Ambush Protected 

(MRAP) vehicles in Iraq and Afghanistan and delivered the first MRAP AllTerrain Vehicles (M–ATVs) to Afghanistan—just 15 months after identifying the need for that capability. As of the beginning of February, we have 

provided nearly 800 M–ATVs to Afghanistan. 

• This year, we successfully manned, trained, equipped, and deployed 67 

brigade equivalents. 

• The Army exceeded fleet readiness of 90 percent for ground equipment, 

to include MRAPs, and 75 percent for aviation. 

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• We established Army Training Network (ATN)—a 21st Century Approach 

to Army Training. This revolution in training knowledge access is now providing a one-stop portal to share training best practices, solutions, and 

products across the Army. 

• The Army increased its employment of biometric technologies enabling 

the Army to better identify the enemy among the populace. 

Fiscal Year 2011 Budget Highlights 

• Funds permanent, Active component end strength at 547,400; Army Reserve at 205,000; and National Guard at 358,200 in the base budget and 

supports a 22,000 temporary increase in the Active component through the 

Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) request. 

• Procures and upgrades the Army’s UH–60 Black Hawk, CH–47 Chinook, 

and AH–64 Apache helicopters, which are vital to operations in Afghanistan 

and Iraq. 

• Provides over $1 billion for flight crew training in all components to fund 

flying hours, maintenance, fuel, airfield operations, and specialized skill 

training. 

Reset 

With the pace of continuous combat operations in two wars for the past 8 years, 

we are consuming our readiness as fast as we can build it. Reset restores returning 

units—their soldiers, families, and equipment—to a level of readiness necessary for 

future missions. 

Goals 

Our Reset plans include four goals. Our efforts to revitalize soldiers and families 

seek to reestablish and strengthen relationships following deployments. The Army’s 

comprehensive efforts to repair, replace, and recapitalize equipment affected by the 

harsh environments of the war are essential to resetting units. In particular, achieving responsible drawdown in Iraq while increasing our commitment of forces and 

equipment to Afghanistan will require an unprecedented reset effort. The Army 

must retrain soldiers, leaders, and units to build critical skills necessary to operate 

across the spectrum of conflict in the current security environment. Lastly, we are 

identifying and applying the lessons learned from the Reset Pilot Program that was 

designed to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the Reset process. Army 

Reset is a necessary process that must continue not only as long as we have forces 

deployed, but an additional 2 to 3 years after major deployments end. 

Progress and Accomplishments 

• The Army completed the reset of 29 brigades’ worth of equipment in fiscal year 2009 and continued the reset of 13 more. In total, we have reset 

more than 98,000 pieces of equipment as depot production has doubled 

since September 11, 2001. 

• We began executing a responsible drawdown in Iraq which will redistribute, transfer, or dispose of 3.4 million pieces of equipment; redeploy 

143,000 military and civilian personnel, and 147,000 contractors; close 22 

supply support activities; and consume or dispose of over 21,000 short tons 

of supplies. 

• In 2009, more than 160,000 soldiers and family members participated in 

over 2,600 strong bonds events designed to strengthen Army families. 

• The Army continues to revise its approach to training by emphasizing 

doing fewer tasks better, making judicious use of field time, and maximizing the use of mobile training teams and distributed learning. 

• We completed our Reset Pilot Program and will begin instituting the full 

Reset model across the Army in 2010. 

• The Army fostered partnerships by executing more than $24 billion in 

new foreign military sales. 

Fiscal Year 2011 Budget Highlights 

• Provides $10.8 billion to reset Army equipment through the Overseas 

Contingency Operations (OCO) request. 

• Supports training and sustainment of Army forces to include individual 

skills and leader training; combined arms training toward full spectrum operations; and adaptable, phased training based on the ARFORGEN process. 

Transform 

Since 2004, the Army has been transforming our force to provide the combatant 

commanders tailored, strategically responsive forces that can dominate across the 

189 

spectrum of conflict. Transformation is a continuous process that sets the conditions 

for success against both near-term and future enemies. 

Goals 

Our goals for transformation include continued modular reorganization to standardize our formations to create a more deployable, adaptable, and versatile force. 

We will accelerate fielding of advanced technologies to ensure our soldiers retain 

their technological edge. The Army will operationalize the Reserve components by 

systematically building and sustaining readiness while increasing predictability for 

these soldiers, families, employers, and communities. 

Completing the requirements of the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) statutes is central to restationing forces. soldier and leader development will ensure 

that we produce the next generation of agile and adaptive military and civilian leaders who are supremely competent in their core proficiencies and sufficiently broad 

enough to operate effectively in the joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and 

multi-national environments. 

Progress and Accomplishments 

• The Army is 88 percent complete on the modular conversion of its brigades. The fiscal year 2011 budget will support the near completion of this 

process. 

• The Army consolidated existing aviation force structure to create a 12th 

Active component combat aviation brigade (CAB) forming an additional 

deployable CAB without adding force structure. 

• The Army activated the 162nd Infantry Brigade at Fort Polk, LA, providing a dedicated and enduring capability to prepare combat advisors to 

train and build capacity in foreign security forces. Trainers from the brigade are now deployed to Afghanistan to assist with the training and development of the Afghan security forces. 

• The Army developed a new incremental capability package approach to 

modernization which will allow technologically mature, soldier-tested, proven technologies to be prioritized, bundled in time, and fielded to the force 

more quickly than ever before. 

• We provided combatant commanders with dedicated, regionally based 

network operations support, and integrated cyber security capability in the 

form of Theater Network Operations and Security Centers, unique within 

the Department of Defense. 

• This past year, the Army closed three active installations and five U.S. 

Army Reserve Centers and is on course to complete BRAC in fiscal year 

2011. To date, we have awarded 265 major military construction projects, 

of which 59 are complete. 

• The Army built a Leader Development Strategy that balances experience, 

greater opportunities for professional education, and training in full spectrum operations. 

Fiscal Year 2011 Budget Highlights 

• Invests nearly $3.2 billion in BCT modernization programs that include 

procurement of the first incremental changes packages for Infantry BCTs 

and additional research, development, testing, and evaluation funding for 

subsequent change packages as well as initial development of the Ground 

Combat Vehicle (GCV). 

• Provides funds to begin equipping a 13th CAB. 

• Supports the increase in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaisance 

(ISR) platforms to include the Extended Range/Multi-Purpose, Raven, Shadow unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and the Extended Medium Altitude 

Reconnaissance and Surveillance System. 

SETTING CONDITIONS FOR THE FUTURE

21st Century Army 

The second critical challenge facing the Army is setting the conditions for the future through a continuous process of transformation. We must ensure that our Nation has the capability and range of military options to meet the evolving challenges 

we face in the 21st century. We need an Army that is a versatile mix of tailorable 

and networked organizations, operating on a rotational cycle, to provide a sustained 

flow of trained and ready forces for full spectrum operations and to hedge against 

unexpected contingencies—at a tempo that is predictable and sustainable for our 

All-Volunteer Force. 

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Versatility is the central organizing principle of a balanced Army. It enables our 

forces and institutions to effectively execute operations across the spectrum of conflict. Our modular heavy, Stryker, and light brigades provide a versatile mix of 

forces that can be combined to provide multi-purpose capabilities, and sufficient capacity to accomplish a broad range of tasks from peacetime engagement to major 

combat operations. 

Our modular units are designed to be tailorable. Brigades now have capabilities 

previously found at division level and higher. These brigades can be tailored for specific missions and combined with support units and key enablers such as ISR, communications, civil affairs, psychological operations, public affairs capabilities, and 

expanded logistics support, to accomplish a wide variety of missions and increase 

the land options available to combatant commanders. 

The network is essential to a 21st-century Army. Networked organizations improve the situational awareness and understanding leaders need to act decisively at 

all points along the spectrum of conflict, while providing connectivity down to the 

individual soldier. The network allows dispersed Army organizations to plan and operate together, and provides connectivity to joint, combined, and interagency assets. 

To support this objective, the Army will use the Global Network Enterprise Construct (GNEC) as our strategy to transform LandWarNet to a centralized, more secure, operationalized, and sustainable network capable of supporting an expeditionary Army. 

To provide a sustained flow of trained and ready forces at a tempo sustainable 

for our All-Volunteer Force, we will put the whole Army under a rotational modelARFORGEN. 

The ARFORGEN process includes three force pools—Reset, Train-Ready, and 

Available. Each of the three force pools contains a versatile force package, available 

at varying time intervals based on its readiness level. Each force pool consists of 

an operational headquarters (a corps), 5 division headquarters (of which 1 or 2 are 

National Guard), 20 BCTs (3 or 4 are National Guard), and 90,000 enablers (about 

half of those are Guard and Reserve). Each will be capable of full spectrum operations once we reach a steady-state, ratio of time deployed (known as ‘‘boots on the 

ground’’ or BOG) to time at home (dwell) of 1:2 (BOG:dwell) for Active component 

forces and 1:4 for Reserve component forces. This versatile mix of land forces could 

sustain operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. At lower demand levels, a sustainable 

BOG:dwell ratio of 1:3 for Active component forces and 1:5 for Reserve component 

forces provides ready, global reaction forces and regionally-oriented forces for engagement in support of Theater Security Cooperation Programs. This process also 

allows strategic flexibility to surge in response to unexpected contingencies across 

the spectrum of conflict, and provides operational depth with more forces available 

for longer commitment times. 

The increased demands of our combatant commanders, coupled with the size of 

our Active component (AC) force, require that we continue to integrate Reserve component (RC) forces as part of our operational force. Continued and routine access 

to our RC forces is essential to sustaining current operations, and is improving the 

overall operational experience and quality of our RC forces. Additionally, sufficient 

Army National Guard (ARNG) forces must be ready and immediately available to 

their state and territorial authorities to respond to domestic crises. We are building 

an integrated Army in which our RC forces are included in the rotational cycle, but 

at a deployment rate of about half that of their AC counterparts. 

The ARFORGEN process increases predictability for soldiers, Families, employers, 

and communities, and enables our RC to remain an integral element of the operational force while providing the Nation with the strategic depth (i.e. those nondeployed units which are 2 to 3 years from commitment) and operational flexibility 

to meet unexpected contingencies. 

The Army has undergone significant changes in recent years, and we must continue to change in order to keep pace with an environment of uncertainty and complexity in this era of persistent conflict. The same requirements that drive the imperative to change also drive our modernization efforts and need for institutional 

adaptation. 

Realizing Change 

To become the Army the Nation needs in the second decade of the 21st century, 

we are transforming the Army and prioritizing programs and efforts that show the 

most promise for today and tomorrow. Similarly, we are transforming business processes across the Army, including how we identify requirements, acquire, and provide 

materiel capabilities to our soldiers, and how we adapt our institutions to align with 

the ARFORGEN process. 

191 

On April 6, 2009, Secretary Gates announced his adjustments to the defense program as part of the President’s budget proposal for fiscal year 2010. The Secretary’s 

decisions had an immediate and major impact on our FCS-centric Army modernization effort. He terminated the MGV portion of FCS, directing that we ‘‘reevaluate 

the requirements, technology, and approach—and then re-launch the Army’s vehicle 

modernization program . . . .’’ He further directed the Army to ‘‘accelerate the initial 

increment of the program to spin out technology enhancements to all combat brigades,’’ and retain and deliver software and network development program in increments, and incorporate MRAP into our force structure. Secretary Gates’ intent for 

these bold adjustments was clear—to better reflect the lessons that we were learning from ongoing operations and better posture Army forces for a broader range of 

future challenges. 

To fully implement the Secretary of Defense’s direction, the Army has developed 

a comprehensive plan. We refer to this new program as the Army’s ‘‘BCT Modernization Plan,’’ which is a subset of our overall Army Modernization Strategy. 

BCT Modernization Plan 

We will leverage the lessons learned from the last 8 years to provide effective and 

affordable equipment now, while reducing the time it takes to develop and field new 

and updated materiel solutions. BCT Modernization includes four elements: modernizing the network over time to take advantage of technology upgrades, while simultaneously expanding it to cover ever increasing portions of the force; incorporating 

MRAPs into our force; rapidly developing and fielding a new GCV that meets the 

requirements of the 21st-century Army; and incrementally fielding capability packages that best meet the needs of soldiers and units as they train and then deploy. 

ARMY NETWORK

Central to the Army’s modernization efforts is an enhanced and interoperable 

communication network that gives the Army a decisive advantage across the spectrum of conflict. The network supports leaders in making timely, informed decisions, 

and supports organizational agility, lethality, and sustainability. It allows our soldiers to know where the enemy is, where other friendly forces and civilian populations are, and what weapon systems are available for them at any given time. The 

network links soldiers on the battlefield with space-based and aerial sensors, robots, 

and command posts—providing unprecedented situational awareness and control 

and enabling the application of precise lethal fires on the modern battlefield. 

Maintaining our technological advantage is a constant challenge. The Army’s battle command network must be continuously upgraded to ensure security and provide 

improved capability, capacity, connectivity and operational effectiveness. The 

Warfighter Information Network (Tactical) (WIN–T) is designed to extend the network ultimately to the company level for BCTs and provide real-time information, 

such as high definition imagery, from surveillance sources. The Joint Tactical Radio 

System (JTRS) was born joint with the specific requirement to resolve radio interoperability among the services. It will provide soldiers at the tactical level with 

connectivity at extended ranges, including voice, data, and video, enabling them to 

move information from platoon to higher-level command posts in complex terrain 

(including urban and mountainous areas). 

MRAP STRATEGY

In response to deadly IEDs in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Nation made a tremendous investment in fielding MRAPs that have saved lives by providing significantly 

improved protection for our soldiers. The Army is incorporating these vehicles 

throughout its unit formations. Additionally, we used the basic design of the MRAP 

as the foundation for the M–ATV, modifying it for the mountainous terrain in Afghanistan and in other regions around the world. The MRAP family of vehicles provides the versatility our forces need to rapidly move around the battlefield, particularly in an IED environment, with the best protection we can provide. 

GROUND COMBAT VEHICLE

Combining the lessons learned from the survivability of the MRAP, the tactical 

mobility of the Bradley Fighting Vehicle, and the operational mobility of the 

Stryker, the Army is developing a GCV that possesses all of these qualities. Providing soldiers protected mobility is our top design criteria. The first combat vehicle 

designed from the ground up to operate in an IED environment, the GCV will have 

enhanced mobility that will allow it to operate effectively in both urban and off-road 

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tantly, it will have the capacity available to accept future upgrades incrementally 

as technologies mature and threats change. 

The GCV will be versatile enough to support our expeditionary requirements and 

be capable of carrying an infantry squad. It will combine sustainability features that 

match the availability rates of the Stryker while consuming less fuel than current 

vehicles of similar weight and power. The pace of change and the operational environment demand an expedited acquisition timeline, so the Army is pursuing a GCV 

program timeline that provides the first production vehicles in 7 years. 

CAPABILITY PACKAGES

Capability packages provide the Army a regular, timely process to enable our 

deployable units with the latest materiel and non-materiel solutions based on the 

evolving challenges of the operating environment. The best available capabilities 

will go to the soldiers who need them most, based on the threats they are likely 

to face. These bundles of capabilities will include materiel, doctrine, organization, 

and training to fill the highest priority requirements and mitigate risk for soldiers. 

This incremental packaging approach will enable leaders to make timely, resourceinformed decisions, and will help ensure that we provide the best available technologies to fulfill urgent needs to soldiers in the fight—all driven by the cyclic readiness produced by ARFORGEN. These capability packages will upgrade our units as 

they prepare to deploy by providing them improved capabilities such as precision 

fires and advanced Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR). 

The Army Modernization Strategy 

The Army’s BCT Modernization Plan is a key element of our overall Army Modernization Strategy. The Army Modernization Strategy reflects our overarching vision of how we will achieve our ends, which is to: 

Develop and field an affordable and interoperable mix of the best equipment available to allow soldiers and units to succeed in both today’s and tomorrow’s full spectrum military operations. 

The Army Modernization Strategy relies on three interrelated lines of effort: 

(1) Develop and field new capabilities to meet identified capability ‘‘gaps’’ through 

traditional or rapid acquisition processes. In support of this Line of Effort in 

fiscal year 2011 we have requested $934 million to develop the Army’s new 

GCV, which will overcome critical capability gaps in both current and future 

operations. It is envisioned to have the tactical mobility of a Bradley, the operational mobility of a Stryker, and the protection of an MRAP. We are also requesting $459 million to procure the Extended Range Multi-Purpose Unmanned Aerial Vehicle. This extraordinarily capable platform, which is already making a difference in Operation Enduring Freedom, gives commanders 

longer dwell ISR capabilities across a joint area of operations. 

(2) Continuously modernize equipment to meet current and future capability 

needs through upgrade, replacement, recapitalization, refurbishment, and 

technology insertions. Army efforts in this line of effort include our request 

for $887 million for the procurement of 16 Block III AH–64 Apache Helicopters, as well as the upgrade of 13 AH–64 Helicopters to Block II. Block III 

Apache is part of a long-term effort to improve situational awareness, performance, reliability, and sustainment of the Apache. Block II upgrades continue our commitment to modernize the Army National Guard Aviation Fleet. 

Additionally, in this line of effort, we have requested $505 million to upgrade 

Shadow RQ–7 UAVs. This key upgrade will increase the payload capacity and 

enhance the performance of this key ISR asset for our BCT Commanders. 

(3) Meet continuously evolving force requirements in the current operational environment by fielding and distributing capabilities in accordance with the Army 

Resource Priorities List and ARFORGEN Model. Meeting the constantly evolving needs of theater commanders and the demands of persistent conflict will 

require unprecedented agility in our equipping and modernization programs. 

One example of this agility can be found in our Kiowa Warrior fleet. We are 

currently maneuvering our fleet of OH–58D Kiowa Warrior Light Helicopters 

to meet Army and combatant command requirements based on the 

ARFORGEN model. As Air Cavalry Squadrons return from conflict, their OH– 

58D helicopters are placed into Reset. Units in Reset have very few aircraft, 

if any. Because the Kiowa Warrior fleet is short 35 aircraft overall, when the 

squadrons transition into the Train/Ready Phase of ARFORGEN, they are provided a number of helicopters sufficient to conduct training (25), but less than 

what they are fully authorized (30). When the units move into the available 

phase, they are provided their full complement of aircraft. It is this agility 

193 

that has allowed Army forces to meet the needs of theater commanders for 

over 8 years of sustained combat. 

What do we need? Congress has been very supportive of Army Modernization 

needs in the past. Their tremendous support has ensured that the Army soldier is 

the best equipped and most respected combatant in the world. In order to execute 

Army Modernization and ensure the continued success of soldiers and units, we depend on a variety of resources, not the least of which is predictable funding. For 

fiscal year 2011, we have requested $31.7 billion for procurement and Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E) efforts. 

Adapting the Institution and Transforming Business Practices 

In addition to modernizing our operating force, we are transforming our institutional Army. As required by section 904 of the 2008 National Defense Authorization 

Act (NDAA), the appointment of the Under Secretary of the Army as the Army’s 

Chief Management Officer (CMO) has allowed the Army to develop a series of initiatives to adapt the institutional Army and transform our business practices. In accordance with section 908 of the 2009 NDAA, these efforts will result in the development and implementation of a comprehensive program that establishes a series of 

measurable performance goals and objectives. Specifically, the comprehensive program will address the following: 

• Developing and implementing a business transformation plan focused on 

running the Army as effectively and efficiently as possible. 

• Continuing the Army’s business process reengineering activities, led by 

OSD’s Business Transformation Agency. 

• Developing an integrated business systems architecture that emphasizes 

transparency and seamless access to data, and provides timely and accurate 

information to decisionmakers. 

• Preparing Army leaders to take a greater role in inculcating the Army 

with a cost-conscious culture. 

While the Army transformed its operating force—building versatile, agile units capable of adapting to changing environments—the institutional Army continued to 

use processes and procedures that were designed to support a pre-September 11 

Army based on tiered levels of readiness. To support this new operating force, the 

Army must have an updated institutional Army—our generating force. 

Once the mission is defined, our institutions must seamlessly and continuously 

adapt—tailoring force packages and quickly adjusting training, manning, and equipping—to ensure units have all of the physical and mental tools necessary to succeed. 

Institutional agility allows us to adapt to the realities that present themselves. 

To that end, the CMO and Office of Business Transformation will build upon 

progress that has already been made toward the Army’s institutional adaptation, 

specifically: 

• Improvement of the ARFORGEN process-aligning the generating force 

and its processes to better support soldiers, families, and units within the 

operating force. 

• Adoption of an Enterprise Approach-developing civilian and military leaders who take a collaborative, holistic view of Army objectives and resources 

to make better decisions for the Army. 

• Reformation of the requirements and resource processes—delivering timely and necessary capabilities at best value. 

This transformational approach will overlay everything that the institutional 

Army does, with the unwavering goal of effectively and efficiently providing trained 

and ready forces to meet combatant commander requirements. 

STEWARDSHIP AND INNOVATION

The Army remains devoted to the best possible stewardship of the resources it is 

provided by the American people through Congress. The establishment of the CMO 

and initiatives related to the transformation of Army business practices represent 

the Army’s effort to act as a responsible steward. Several other initiatives serve to 

conserve resources and to reduce waste and inefficiencies wherever possible. 

The Army achieved full operating capability of the new Army Contracting Command, Expeditionary Contracting Command, and Mission and Installation Contracting Command in 2009. These organizations are dedicated to ensuring professional, ethical, efficient, and responsive contracting. 

Civilians are assuming increased responsibilities within the Army. The Army is 

recouping intellectual capital by in-sourcing former contracted positions that were 

associated with inherently governmental functions. In fiscal year 2009, the Army 

194 

saved significant resources by in-sourcing more than 900 core governmental functions to Army civilians. We plan to in-source 7,162 positions in fiscal year 2010, and 

are programmed to in-source 11,084 positions during fiscal year 2011–2015, of which 

3,988 are acquisition positions. These positions were identified in the Army’s ongoing contractor inventory review process. 

In the Employer Partnership program, the Army Reserve works with public agencies and private employers to leverage their shared interests in recruiting, training, 

and credentialing highly skilled citizen-soldiers. The Army Reserve has signed more 

than 800 partnership agreements with corporations, state agencies, and local police 

departments. 

Energy security is a key component of Army installations, weapons systems, and 

operations. The Army has developed a comprehensive energy security strategy, and 

is acting now to implement initiatives to make us less dependent on foreign sources 

of fuel and better stewards of our Nation’s energy resources. In support of these 

goals, we fielded the largest hybrid vehicle fleet within the Department of Defense. 

Energy will continue to be a key consideration in all Army activities in order to reduce demand, increase efficiency, seek alternative sources, and create a culture of 

energy accountability, while sustaining or enhancing operational capabilities. 

The Army is committed to environmental stewardship. Through cooperative partner agreements and the Army Compatible Use Buffer Program, the Army protected 

more than 28,000 acres of land at 14 locations in fiscal year 2009. Through creative 

solutions, the Army continues to conduct realistic training on its installations while 

protecting threatened and endangered species on Army lands. 

AMERICA’S ARMY—THE STRENGTH OF THE NATION

The professionalism, dedicated service, and sacrifice of our All-Volunteer Force 

are hallmarks of the Army—the Strength of our Nation. 

Our soldiers and their families quietly bear the burdens of a Nation at war. Our 

civilians stand with them, dedicated to the Nation and the Army that serves it. Despite the toll that 8 years of combat has taken, these great Americans continue to 

step forward to answer our Nation’s call. In an environment in which we must make 

hard choices, they deserve the very best we can offer, commensurate with their dedication and sacrifice. 

To continue to fulfill our vital role for the Nation, the Army must sustain its efforts to restore balance and set conditions for the future. We have made significant 

progress this year, but challenges remain. The continued support of Congress will 

ensure that the Army remains manned, trained, and equipped to protect our national security interests at home and abroad, now and in the future. America’s 

Army—the Strength of the Nation. 

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Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. 

General Casey. 

STATEMENT OF GEN GEORGE W. CASEY, JR., USA, CHIEF OF 

STAFF OF THE ARMY 

General CASEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain, 

members of the committee. 

As the chairman said, I would like just to begin by introducing 

four representative members of this great Army that we have. 

First, I’d introduce Mrs. Donna Engeman. Donna’s husband, 

John, was killed in Iraq 4 years ago, and she currently runs our 

Survivor Outreach Services Programs. It’s a program we put in 

place, about 2 years ago, to increase what we were doing for surviving family members. Her son, Patrick, is on his second tour in 

Iraq. 

Next to her is Staff Sergeant Christian Hughes. He was wounded 

in Afghanistan in October. He’s recovering from his wounds in Walter Reed, and he looks forward to rejoining his unit as soon as he 

can. 

Next is Sergeant First Class Shana Tinsley. Her husband, Arthur, is a Master Sergeant. He leaves for Afghanistan Thursday, I 

think, and she will be here with her children, working here with 

us in the Pentagon. 

Lastly, Sergeant First Class Jeff Lawson. He has recently completed a program at the University of Pennsylvania that qualifies 

him to be a master resilience trainer, and this is an important part 

of our Comprehensive Soldier Fitness Program that I will talk 

about a bit later. He has three tours in Iraq, himself. 

So, thank you all, very much, for coming out. [Applause.] 

Chairman LEVIN. General, thank you so much for bringing these 

special guests to us. I just want to give them a special thanks for 

their service, their families’ service, their dedication and commitment to this country. We stand in awe of you. Thank you. 

General CASEY. Thank you. 

Now, if I could, Mr. Chairman. As you noted, I’ve been saying for 

the past 3 years that the Army is out of balance, that we’re so 

weighed down by our current commitments that we can’t do the 

things we know we need to do to sustain this All-Volunteer Force 

and to prepare to do other things. I can tell you that, with the help 

of the committee, we’ve made progress over the last year to get 

back in balance, but we’re not quite out of the woods yet. 

That said, fiscal year 2011 budget completes the procurement 

funding to finish our conversion to modular organizations that we 

began in 2004 and the growth that we began in 2007. It also contains the military construction funding to complete the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) moves of 2005. So, your continued 

support will allow us to meet the goals we set 6 years ago to build 

an Army that was both relevant to 21st century challenges and 

back in balance. 

Now, this plan that we put in place to get ourselves back in balance was centered on four imperatives. We had to sustain our soldiers and families; they’re the heart and soul of the force. We had 

to continue to prepare our soldiers for success in the current conVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:37 May 06, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00234 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\62155.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
229 

flict. We had to reset them effectively when they return. Then we 

had to continue to transform for an uncertain future. 

Let me just give you a short progress report on where we are. 

Our first objective was to finish our growth. You’ll recall, the administration, in January 2007, directed that we increase the size 

of the Army by 74,000. Originally, we were going to do that by 

2012. With Secretary Gates’ and your support, we completed it last 

spring. When that did not prove to be sufficient, we were granted 

a temporary increase of 22,000 soldiers, and we will evaluate, later 

this year, that entire amount. This growth, coupled with the drawdown in Iraq, has allowed us to meet the need for additional forces 

in Afghanistan without returning to 15-month deployments and 

without going back on stop-loss. 

Our second key objective was to increase the time our soldiers 

spend at home. I will tell you, after almost 3 years in the job, I’m 

more convinced than ever that this is the most important element 

of putting ourselves back in balance, and for several reasons. One, 

our soldiers need time to recover from repeated combat deployments. What we continue to see across the force are the cumulative 

effects of these deployments. We recently completed a study that 

demonstrates what we intuitively knew, that it takes 2 to 3 years 

to recover from a 1-year combat deployment. That’s why it’s so important for us to meet our near-term objective of 2 years at home 

between deployments for our Active Force and 4 years at home between deployments for our Reserve components. As demand decreases, we plan to move to more sustainable goals of 3 and 5 

years, respectively, between deployments. 

More time at home also gives us more stable preparation time for 

the next mission and more time to prepare to do other things. 

When you’re only home for a year, you barely have time to finish 

your leave before you have to begin preparing to go back. I’ve recently visited units that had 18 months home. The difference between 18 months at home and 12 months at home, and the pace 

of the tempo that they’re home, is significant. 

Additionally, as time at home increases, we’ll be able to see more 

units training for the full spectrum of operations, and we will 

gradually rekindle some of the skills that have atrophied over the 

past several years. 

Our third objective was to move away from our Cold War formations to organizations that are more relevant for the challenges 

we’ll face in the 21st century. In 2004, we set out to convert all 

300-plus brigades in our Army to modular organizations. Today, 

we’re almost 90-percent complete, and these formations are demonstrating their versatility and their value in Iraq and Afghanistan 

every day. 

We also set out to rebalance the skills resident in these formations. This involved converting, retraining, and equipping around 

150,000 soldiers from all components to new jobs. By way of example, in the last 6 years we have stood down around 200 tank companies, artillery batteries, and air-defense batteries, and we’ve 

stood up a corresponding number of military police, engineers, civil 

affairs, and Special Forces companies. This has paid tremendous 

benefits in the current operations. 

230 

So, together, the rebalancing and the modular conversions represent the largest organizational transformation of the Army since 

World War II, and we will have done this while fighting two wars. 

Fourth, we are moving to put the whole Army on a rotational 

readiness model, much like the Navy and Marine Corps have been 

on for many years. This model will allow us to more efficiently and 

effectively provide a sustained flow of land forces that are trained 

for the full spectrum of operations to our combatant commanders. 

It will also allow us to have forces available to hedge against the 

unexpected contingencies that you spoke of. It will also allow us to 

do this in a way that’s predictable and sustainable for this All-Volunteer Force. 

Our fifth objective was to complete our restationing, and we’re 

just over half way through these efforts. We’re on track to complete 

the 2005 BRAC by the end of 2011. This will affect over 380,000 

soldiers, family members, and civilians. While it’s a lot of turbulence, the construction on these new installations will significantly 

improve the quality of life for our soldiers and families. 

So, the bottom line, Mr. Chairman, is we’ve made progress, but 

we still face challenges as we work to restore balance and set the 

conditions for the future. 

I’d like to conclude my remarks with comments on three areas 

that are very important to us and, I would hope, also important for 

this committee. 

First of all, sustaining our people. This budget contains money 

for housing, barracks, childcare, youth centers, Warrior Transition 

Units, and surviving spouse programs—all critically important to 

sustaining our soldiers, civilians, and families through a period in 

which our country is asking so much of them. In general, we’re 

strengthening our programs to build resiliency into the force, to 

help them deal, not only with the challenges of the past, but with 

the challenges of the future. 

We’ve all seen the manifestations of the stresses of 81⁄2 years at 

war—elevated suicide rates, increased demand for behavioral 

health counseling and drug and alcohol counseling, increased divorce rates, increased numbers of soldiers temporarily 

nondeployable from nagging injuries from previous deployments— 

and we’ve been moving aggressively to give our soldiers and families the skills they need to deal with these challenges. 

In October, we began a program that we had been working on 

for more than 18 months with some of the best experts in the country. The program is called Comprehensive Soldier Fitness. I’ve spoken about it here before. It’s designed to give mental fitness the 

same level of effort that we give to physical fitness. We intended 

to provide our force the resiliency skills that they need to succeed 

in an era of persistent conflict. This program consists of four components: an online self-assessment to identify resiliency strengths, 

this assessment has already been taken by over 250,000 soldiers; 

next, online self-help modules; third, master resilience trainers, 

like Sergeant Lawson. These are designed to conduct resiliency 

training down to the unit level. We’ve trained over 600 Sergeant 

Lawsons at the University of Pennsylvania already. Finally, there 

will be resiliency training at every Army Leader Development 

231 

School. This program shows great promise, and I’d be happy to discuss it further in the questions and answers. 

Second, the reset of our equipment will be increasingly important 

as we complete the drawdown in Iraq over the next 2 years, and 

for 2 to 3 years after the conclusion of combat operations. It’s important to note that our reset efforts have been a key factor in 

maintaining the high operational readiness rates for ground and 

air systems in Iraq and Afghanistan. This budget provides almost 

$11 billion to reset our equipment, and sustained funding for reset 

will be essential to the long-term health of the force. 

Finally, this budget, as you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, contains 

a significant adjustment to our modernization strategy. I believe 

that we are in a period of continuous and fundamental change, and 

that we must continually adapt to deal with evolving threats. So, 

in conjunction with the Secretary of Defense, we’ve transitioned 

away from the FCS program to what we believe is an achievable, 

affordable modernization program for our BCTs. This program 

leverages the lessons that we’ve learned at war and the lessons 

that we learned from the FCS program itself. It contains four elements. First of all, incrementally modernizing our networks over 

time to take advantage of rapid advances in technology. Second, incrementally fielding capability packages to put the best equipment 

into the hands of our soldiers as rapidly as it is available. Third, 

incorporating MRAP vehicles into our force. Lastly, rapidly developing and fielding a new ground combat vehicle that meets the requirements of a 21st century Army. 

We intend to make this program a model for the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act (WSARA), and we look forward to 

working with the committee on it. 

In closing, I’d like to reiterate how proud I am of what the men 

and women of this great Army continue to accomplish at home and 

around the world. We’ve made progress in restoring balance, but 

we still face a tough road ahead, and we could not have done it 

without the committee’s support. 

Thank you very much. The Secretary and I look forward to your 

questions. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you so much, General. We appreciate 

that testimony. 

Let’s try a 7-minute first round. 

This goes, first, to you Mr. Secretary; the fiscal year 2011 budget request for DOD includes $549 billion for the base budget and $159 

billion for the ongoing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Now, on top 

of the $708 billion request for 2011, the administration has included a 2010 supplemental request of $33 billion to fund the additional 30,000 troops to support the President’s policy announced 

last December, and much of that additional funding is required to 

support the Army’s operating costs. What is your estimate, Mr. 

Secretary, of how far into the current fiscal year the Army can 

cover its war costs before you’re going to need that appropriation 

of additional funds? 

Secretary MCHUGH. I appreciate you asking this, Senator, because obviously it is something we spend a lot of time talking about 

on the Army side. I recognize full well that the process of introducing, and ultimately passing and having signed, a supplemental, 

232 

under any conditions, is not always subject to a calendar, but there 

are realities, as you just mentioned. 

Our budget people tell us, including DOD Comptroller Hale, that 

the last possible moment in which we can comfortably fund this 

would be at the end of June, beginning of July. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you. 

The WSARA was designed to address the problems that we’ve 

had with weapons systems that take too long and cost too much, 

by getting the programs off on a sounder footing, with better systems engineering, better cost estimates, more mature technologies, 

and better developmental testing. Is the Army on track to rebuild 

its systems engineering, cost estimating, and developmental testing 

capabilities, as required by that Act? 

Secretary MCHUGH. We believe we are. I’ve jokingly said, over 

the last several months, as a prime cosponsor of that bill in the 

House, that had I known I was going to be Secretary of the Army, 

I probably would have read it more carefully. But, having the 

chance now to work with it, we’re working very hard, particularly 

in programs like the ground combat vehicle, to meet the kinds of 

standards and the kinds of milestone judgments and prototype 

competitions that is envisioned in this act. 

I would tell you, we have a challenge on insourcing and growing 

that workforce. If you look at the statistics over the last 10 years, 

there’s been a 15 percent cut in the acquisition workforce in the 

Army. At the same time, we’ve been called upon to execute approximately a 500 percent increase in contracted dollars. I think the 

workforce, as strained as they have been, have done a good job in 

that regard. Over 2008 and 2009, we had about 1,000 protests to 

the contract lettings through our systems, and yet, of those 1,000, 

approximately only 8 were sustained. 

Nevertheless, the long pole in the tent, it seems to me, is bringing in more contract expertise. We had a good start. We’ve 

insourced about 900 core functions. We’ve saved about $41 million. 

We have, though 2015, a plan to insource nearly 4,000 new positions. Targets sometimes are hard to achieve. But, I think we’ve 

done, thus far, a pretty good job in respecting both the intent and 

the letter of that law. 

Chairman LEVIN. In general, you feel you’re on track. 

Secretary MCHUGH. I do, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you. 

Now, on the Wounded Warrior Transition Command, you’ve both 

made references to our responsibility to our wounded warriors. The 

Army has set up a Warrior Transition Command to oversee the 

care and support of wounded or ill or injured soldiers. In your 

judgement, is that new command now in operation, and is it effective? 

General CASEY. It has been fully operational, Mr. Chairman, and 

it has been increasingly effective. We’ve continued to improve our 

facilities, the staffing, and actually how we process soldiers through 

the Warrior Transition Unit system. We are trying to shift our 

focus away from just disability, over to rehabilitation. We focus 

them on goal-settings, to move them more rapidly through the 

process. 

233 

The other bit is, we’ve added an automation component to this, 

and we’re automating the evaluation board process, and I think 

that’s going to help us streamline this, as well. Short answer, it 

has improved the way we handle our warriors. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you. 

Relative to the DADT law and policy, Secretary Gates testified 

that he’s appointed a high-level working group to review the issues 

that are associated with implementing a repeal of the DADT law 

and policy. Admiral Mullen has testified that he and the Service 

Chiefs are in support of that approach. 

Let me ask both of you; would you object to a moratorium on discharges for homosexuality until completion of that review? 

Mr. Secretary? 

Secretary MCHUGH. Mr. Chairman, I hate to parse words, but it 

depends what you mean by support. 

Chairman LEVIN. Well, I said, would you object to a moratorium? 

Secretary MCHUGH. We don’t feel we have the legal authority to 

impose that, from the Department side. But, quite honestly, if it 

were the will of Congress and the President to institute that moratorium, I can’t see that we would object to that, per se. 

Chairman LEVIN. Okay. 

General, if Congress adopted a moratorium, would you object to 

that? Would you recommend against it? What would be your position? 

General CASEY. Senator, I would recommend against it. Aside 

from the legal issues that the Secretary mentioned, it would complicate the whole process that Secretary Gates had laid out. We 

would be put in a position of actually implementing it while we 

were studying implementation, and I don’t think that would be 

prudent. 

Chairman LEVIN. If the moratorium were simply a moratorium? 

In other words, you’re not implementing anything, you’re just withholding discharges until that study is completed. 

General CASEY. Mr. Chairman, this process is going to be difficult and complicated enough. Anything that complicates it more, 

I think I would be opposed to. 

Chairman LEVIN. Well, if we do that, we’ll try and make it simple and straightforward. 

Senator McCain. 

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I thank the witnesses. 

General Casey, you’ve put forward the goal of increasing dwell 

time for soldiers, so they can spend 2 years at home for every year 

deployed. I think it’s a laudable goal. Obviously, there’s two ways 

of reaching it: reduce our commitment overseas or increase end 

strength. What would be the effect of making the temporary endstrength increase of 22,000 soldiers permanent? Would that be 

helpful? 

General CASEY. Senator, it would have a slight impact on dwell 

across the Army. I can tell you that, with the drawdown in Iraq 

and the plus-up in Afghanistan, we actually get 70 percent of the 

Active Force to our goal of 1 year out, 2 years back, in 2011, and 

80 percent of the Guard and Reserve meet their goal. So, we are 

234 

well on the way to getting that, because of our growth and because 

of the drawdown in Iraq. 

Senator MCCAIN. Do you still think we can get close to your objectives by 2011? 

General CASEY. I do, Senator. 

Senator MCCAIN. Secretary McHugh, how much of the Army’s 

OCO request could be placed in the base budget? 

Secretary MCHUGH. About $8 billion, sir. 

Senator MCCAIN. Out of $100 billion. 

Secretary MCHUGH. A hundred-plus, yes. 

Senator MCCAIN. So, we will probably see supplemental requests 

for a long period of time. 

Secretary MCHUGH. Well, I can’t speak to that. There is certainly 

an expectation—a hope, if you will—amongst the Army leadership 

and, I expect, most of the Services, as we are engaged in named 

overseas operations, that we would have supplemental support. 

Senator MCCAIN. In other words, you think we need 

supplementals? 

Secretary MCHUGH. If we’re going to operate in these types of 

theaters, yes, we absolutely do. 

Senator MCCAIN. Mr. Secretary and General Casey, as we know, 

they are going to stop making the Humvee. The 2011 request ends 

production in the Humvee line of vehicles. Maybe you could provide, for the record, the long-term plan for a wheeled-vehicle fleet. 

I understand the President’s budget request. I hope that we have 

some plans on a replacement for that. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

The long-term plan for the Light Tactical Vehicle (LTV) fleet is to support the development and procurement of the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) and to modernize the existing High Mobility Multi-purpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) fleet 

through recapitalization. 

The Army is currently reviewing the LTV requirement, which currently stands at 

approximately 150,000 vehicles. As JLTV is projected to start procurement in fiscal 

year 2013, the HMMWV requirement will decrease proportionately. The Army will 

divest based on criteria in favor of the most modern, capable versions of armored 

and unarmored HMMWVs. 

The Army recognizes there will continue to be a requirement for both armored 

and unarmored HMMWVs in the fleet. As JLTV is fielded and its capabilities evaluated, the role of both armored and unarmored HMMWVs will be reassessed, and 

the fleet will be adjusted accordingly. 

Senator MCCAIN. General Casey, do you feel that the operational commanders also ought to have input into this issue of how 

to address the DADT issue? 

General CASEY. Their input is certainly welcome, but we’re the 

ones responsible for organizing and preparing the forces that they 

employ. So, I believe that we, the Service Chiefs, have a greater 

stake in it. But, their reasoned opinions are always welcomed. 

Senator MCCAIN. Of course, since they have to implement your 

personnel policies, and are given that responsibility, it seems to me 

they should be consulted, as well. 

I think it’s pretty obvious what the next step is in this effort to 

repeal DADT. Senator Levin just said, now instead of going 

through the study that the Secretary of Defense has called for, the 

forces now will want a moratorium before any decision is made. 

Not unexpected, but certainly it flies in the face of what the Secretary of Defense committed to, and that is, before a decision is 

235 

made to change a policy that, in my view at least, is working, we 

would then impose a moratorium. 

What are the plans for this long-range study that the Secretary 

of Defense is going to implement? Do you know, Secretary 

McHugh? 

Secretary MCHUGH. In general terms, Senator, it’s still being set 

up; and, in fact, some of the basic construct of the seniors group 

was worked out this weekend. 

If I may, before I go to that, just to return to the chairman’s 

question. My answer about a moratorium was predicated upon the 

assumption that if Congress were to pass it, we would respect and 

obey that. 

Senator MCCAIN. But, that was not the chairman’s question. 

Secretary MCHUGH. Well, that’s how I took it. I want to be clear. 

If you’re asking for my personal opinion as to the effects of a moratorium, we have any number of cases underway, pursuant to the 

current law, that would be greatly complicated were there a moratorium; but if it were passed, obviously, and the intent of my answer was to say, we would follow through with that. 

Chairman LEVIN. What are those cases, if I could just interrupt? 

Secretary MCHUGH. Well, we have Lieutenant Choi, a member of 

the New York Reserve, for example, who’s in a process now, whose 

Federal recognition has been withdrawn, who’s not had final action. 

Chairman LEVIN. Who is being discharged? 

Secretary MCHUGH. We’ve not yet seen the recommendations 

and paperwork out of the State, but certainly with the process of 

withdrawing his Federal recognition, that would certainly lend to 

that decision and others. I’m not trying to prejudge the appropriateness of that discharge or any other discharge, I’m just saying 

it would bring a legal complication to the circumstances. 

But, if Congress were to pass it, and the President were to sign 

that, we would step forward and respect it and implement it. 

Senator MCCAIN. Mr. Secretary, but that’s not the question. The 

question is, would you support a moratorium before the review, as 

conducted by the Secretary of Defense, is completed? 

Secretary MCHUGH. If the question is my personal opinion, if 

asked, the preference would be, we would not enact a moratorium. 

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you very much. 

Unfortunately, last year we put hate crimes on the defense authorization. For the first time in history, we put a legislation that 

didn’t have anything to do with defense authorization on the authorization bill, and I’m greatly concerned about what would be put 

on this authorization bill since the precedent was shattered last 

year by the majority by putting on legislation that had nothing to 

do with the Nation’s defense. 

I thank you for your candid answers, and I thank all of you for 

your service to the country. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator McCain. 

Senator Lieberman. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. 

Just while we’re on DADT, am I correct in concluding, based on 

your testimony, two things; one, if Congress adopted a moratorium 

on enforcement of DADT or adopted repeal and the President 

236 

signed it, that you would carry out those those laws? Is that correct? 

Secretary MCHUGH. Absolutely. 

General CASEY. Absolutely. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. The second question is, on the question of 

repeal of DADT, what I’m hearing both of you say—maybe you 

want to fill it in—is that, this morning, you are neither supporting 

nor opposing repeal. Is that correct? 

Secretary MCHUGH. I have a somewhat different position on this 

matter, under the constructs of my responsibilities as Secretary. I 

work for the President of the United States and the Secretary of 

Defense. I entered this job with a full understanding, and the 

President has been consistently clear, that he supports repeal of 

this policy. Recent developments, of course, are the first steps by 

the administration to take steps to work in a way in which he believes can bring about an end to that. My job is to try to provide, 

as the Secretary of Defense is doing at this moment, the best possible information and views, from the Army’s side, so that they can 

formulate whatever decision forward and way forward they may 

choose, and thereafter, to best explain and represent the policies 

that the Commander in Chief has put forward. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Mr. Secretary. 

I know, when we talked about this a while back, General Casey, 

I thought I understood you to say that you had some questions 

about a repeal, but that you were not taking a hard position either 

for or against, at this point. 

General CASEY. Senator, I think that’s fair. As I mentioned to 

you, I do have serious concerns about the impact of the repeal of 

the law on a force that’s fully engaged in two wars and has been 

at war for 81⁄2 years. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right. 

General CASEY. We just don’t know the impacts on readiness and 

military effectiveness. 

Secretary MCHUGH. Exactly. 

General CASEY. That’s why I fully support what Secretary Gates 

has laid out. I’ll fully participate in that. I feel I can provide my 

informed military judgments to the Secretary of Defense, the President, and Congress. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Good enough. 

Let me go on to the end strength question that Senator McCain 

took up for a moment in his questioning. We worked very hard to 

give you the increase in temporary end strength of 22,000 soldiers. 

Based on the dwell time, the time back at base, that our troops 

have and the stress that they’re under, and also, of course, based 

on the unpredictability of the two hot wars we’re involved in, in 

Iraq and Afghanistan, which is to say, what demands there’d be on 

manpower we never can foresee—I notice there’s a story in the 

paper this morning suggesting that, because of uncertainties surrounding the election in Iraq and the post-election negotiating to 

form a new government, that it may be necessary to keep more of 

our soldiers in Iraq longer than we had originally hoped. It’s not 

clear yet, but while we’re surging in Afghanistan. So, I want to get 

clear, just for the record, General Casey. Have you filled that 

22,000 increase in end strength now? 

237 

General CASEY. We have not. We will fill up to 15,000 this year. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right. 

General CASEY. Then we’ll make a decision, later this year, 

whether of not we want to complete the last 7,000. It’s tied, as you 

would suggest, to the demand on our forces—and the drawdown in 

Iraq. I will tell you, because of what was already spoken of here— 

the military personnel costs—we will work to find the right balance 

between an Army that we can afford and an Army that is able to 

meet the Nation’s demands at sustainable deployment rates for its 

soldiers. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. I appreciate it. We had a hearing yesterday 

with Secretary Flournoy and General Paxton about a status report 

on where we are in the operations in Afghanistan and Marja, and 

based on statements that General McChrystal and General 

Petraeus have made, this is the beginning of a turn-the-momentum-against-the-Taliban operation that will presumably go from 

Marja in Helmand Province into Kandahar. These are all very 

troop intensive operations, and we know that, in this kind of conflict, numbers matter. So, I just want to express my hope—first a 

concern, if I can—that in the budget that you’re receiving, this end 

strength increase temporarily goes to 2012. My concern is that 

you’re going to get squeezed budgetarily to make a decision against 

the troop increase that we may need in Afghanistan and Iraq, because the truth is that personnel really do cost a lot of money. The 

net effect of that, I fear, will be that we will increase the stress on 

our forces and not do so well in combat. In a sense, the Secretary 

of Defense’s decision—which I support with the fiscal year 2011 

budget—to add two additional combat aviation brigades—which I 

supported, because it provides much needed aviation assets for the 

Army—also creates additional manpower and budgetary demands 

on our overtaxed force. 

So, you get my point. I’m concerned that the Army’s going to be 

pressured, for reasons of money, not effectiveness in the field or 

your goal, which I totally support, of increasing dwell time, to not 

have the personnel we need to achieve those ends. How would you 

respond? 

General CASEY. Senator, I share your concerns, and I assure you 

that we won’t get pressed by that to do something that will impact 

a force that’s already stretched by 81⁄2 years of war. As I talked to 

you in your office, the Secretary and I will let you know, here, as 

we get closer to this, about how we’re thinking on it and where 

we’re going. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. I appreciate that. I’ll keep asking the question. 

Mr. Secretary, do you want to add anything? 

Secretary MCHUGH. Well, I would simply say, Senator, as both 

the Chief and I have discussed, we deeply appreciate that plus-up; 

and it was through yours and other great members of this committee that that came about. We feel that if our plans for 

drawdowns in Iraq and the continued plus-up goes according to the 

outlines, that we can meet our dwell objectives without that end 

strength. But, obviously, as General Odierno’s comments in the 

media this morning suggest, this is a situation that could change, 

and we need to make that judgment at the appropriate time. 

238 

Senator LIEBERMAN. I appreciate that. Thank you. 

You have a lot of allies here in that cause, so thank you very 

much. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Lieberman. 

Senator Chambliss. 

Senator CHAMBLISS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, again, thanks for your service. 

Mr. Secretary, you and I have been good friends for a long time, 

and I’m very proud of your service and your continuing commitment to our military Services, particularly the U.S. Army. 

My State continues to be at the forefront of both the war in Afghanistan and the conflict in Iraq. The 48th Brigade of the Georgia 

National Guard is in the process of returning home right now, after 

another very successful engagement, this time in Afghanistan. Of 

course, the 3rd Infantry Division is on their fourth tour in Iraq now 

and, again, just doing a terrific job. We’re very proud of those folks. 

General Casey, you referenced in your statement that this budget includes all the remaining funding to complete the round of 

BRAC. While the Taliban can’t stop the U.S. Army in Afghanistan, 

it appears that the red cockaded woodpecker in Georgia has at 

least slowed down the transfer of the Armor School. Can you give 

us an update on that, and does your budget reflect the fact that 

we’re going to complete that in the short term? 

General CASEY. The budget reflects the fact that we’re going to 

complete the construction. Frankly, I am not up to speed on where 

we are with the red cockaded woodpecker. 

Mr. Secretary, I don’t know if you have the data either. 

I’ll find out, and let you know. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

The move of the Armor School and stand up of the Maneuver Center of Excellence 

(MCOE) at Fort Benning is on track to meet the September 15, 2011, BRAC 2005 

deadline. The Sierra Club and the Southern Environmental Law Center have expressed concerns and discussed possible litigation regarding the adverse impact the 

military construction and subsequent training at the MCOE will have on the red 

cockaded-woodpecker (RCW), a federally listed endangered species. Thus far, several 

of the concerns expressed by the Sierra Club and the Southern Environmental Law 

Center have been satisfactorily addressed. Remaining issues of concern are expected 

to be resolved in late March 2010 when the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service issues 

a supplement to the existing Biological Opinion that will provide greater clarity and 

specificity on the requisite procedures to ensure proper management of the RCW. 

General CASEY. I was down at Benning probably 2 months ago, 

and they told me that they were on track. They mentioned some 

problems, but they didn’t think those were going to keep us from 

meeting that September 2011 date to have Armor Center down 

there. 

Senator CHAMBLISS. Okay. Well, if you could just give us a followup on that in writing, or have your staff give me a call, that 

would be fine. 

Mr. Secretary, we previously discussed the issue of Fort Stewart 

and the Army’s decision not to grow the additional three BCTs, as 

previously stated. With that in mind, the QDR mentions two pending reviews of our four European-based BCTs. As you well know, 

we eagerly await the outcome of those reviews and hope that the 

Army will give a hard look at where those BCTs should be based, 

239 

and keep in mind both your commitments to NATO allies, as well 

as the need to have troops based in the continental United States. 

Now, in that regard, the fiscal year 2010 defense appropriation 

bill called for a review to be completed within 60 days of enactment 

of the Department’s efforts to mitigate the impact of the brigade 

basing decisions that I mentioned above on local communities. Can 

you give us the status of that, since we are at the 60-day mark? 

Secretary MCHUGH. The one thing I’ve learned, Senator, since 

my 5 months in the Pentagon, is that 60 days usually means 75. 

I’ve not yet seen that report. I promise you we will attempt to find 

out where it is for you and provide that information for you. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

Per the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Legislative Affairs congressional 

report tracking system, OSD (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics) is writing this 

report and is expected to have it completed in the near future. 

Secretary MCHUGH. As to the rebasing, we expect the NATO review and the attendant U.S. posture reviews, as to the four brigade 

teams’ end in the European theater, to be concluded, and, hopefully, a decision can be made whether they’ll be retained in Europe 

or, perhaps, one or both be brought back home by the fall of this 

year. 

Senator CHAMBLISS. Okay. 

With respect to the reset and replacement of the equipment that 

we are using, or have used, in Iraq over the last several years, it’s 

pretty obvious, when you’re on the ground over there, that a lot of 

this equipment is just simply worn out. If we’re truly going to leave 

the Iraqis in a position to be able to maintain security, both internally and also threats from external sources, we’re probably going 

to have to leave some equipment with them. What’s the plan of the 

Army now with respect to how much of this equipment is truly 

going to be brought back to the United States to be reset, how 

much is going to be left there for the Iraqis, and how much is simply too worn out to do either of the above? 

General CASEY. Senator, that is a great question. In fact, we 

have been working on the drawdown in Iraq for over 18 months, 

and putting in place the stewardship boards to ensure that we 

have a good handle on this. As you suggest, just to give you an idea 

of the scope of this, this is about 3 million pieces of equipment in 

Iraq, and as you say, in various states of repair. About 70 percent 

of that equipment belongs to Army units. That will come back to 

the United States, get reset, and get put back into units. The remaining 30 percent is nonstandard equipment. About 95 percent of 

that will be retained for our future use. It’s things like X-ray machines that we use at entry sites. About 5 percent will be made 

available to State agencies for emergency use. 

Right now, it looks like we will leave about half a billion dollars 

worth of excess equipment to the Iraqis, and that includes trucks, 

Humvees, rifles, generators, and those kinds of things. Part of that 

has been provided by the authorities that came from this committee. But, of all the billions of dollars, only about half a billion 

dollars will be left there for the Iraqis. 

Senator CHAMBLISS. Okay. I think Senator McCain touched on 

the issue of the 22,000 personnel that we’ve plussed-up and whether or not we ought to make those permanent. But, without repeatVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:37 May 06, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00245 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\62155.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
240 

ing the specific question that he asked—I hope I’m not—General 

Casey, what are your thoughts on making the current temporary 

increase of end strength at 22,000? 

General CASEY. Senator, because of the costs of personnel and 

the impact of that on the rest of the programs within the budget, 

I want to look at it very closely. As I mentioned to Senator 

Lieberman, if we meet the drawdown in Iraq targets about as 

they’ve been laid out, we may not need the entire 22,000, and we 

may not need to keep it. But, it’s something we’ll look very, very 

closely at here, probably over the next 6 months. 

Senator CHAMBLISS. I would fully expect this committee is going 

to support your decision, whatever it may be, but the one issue that 

I keep hearing, back home as I visit the Army posts, is the operational tempo issue, and it primarily comes from spouses, the same 

as what you already know, I’m sure. Trying to deal with that issue 

is not easy, but one way to do it is to make these 22,000 troops 

permanent. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Chambliss. 

Senator Reed. 

Senator REED. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, gentlemen, for your service. 

General Casey, the Marines deployed, initially, MRAP vehicles 

that had specialized suspension for Afghanistan. Where is the 

Army in that process? Is that something you intend to do? 

General CASEY. I was up at Aberdeen, and I looked at one of 

those systems up there, and we have a plant in Kuwait that is actively transitioning some of the MRAP vehicles that we have in 

theater to the new suspension system. So, we’re actively working 

on that. 

Senator REED. Is it your goal to fully equip all our Army forces 

in Afghanistan with those vehicles, or what is the plan? 

General CASEY. My recollection, Senator, is that we’re converting 

a certain type of MRAP vehicle. All MRAP vehicles don’t necessarily need that kit, and so we’ll continue to outfit those. 

Senator REED. Thank you. 

Both for the Secretary and for the Chief of Staff; as we go forward, both in Iraq and Afghanistan, hopefully the need for combat 

brigades will decrease, and the need for trainers will increase. How 

are you trying to accommodate that shift in the future? 

General CASEY. We have been creating, probably for the last 6 

months or so, Senator, advise-and-assist brigades for Iraq and modular brigades that are augmented with additional trainers for Afghanistan. There’s a two-phase training process: one, that when 

they go to their mission rehearsal exercise at one of our training 

centers, they get some training there; and then, last year, we stood 

up a new brigade whose sole mission is to conduct security force 

assistance trainings for general-purpose units. So, the leadership of 

those units also receives additional training in the skills required 

to work with indigenous forces, much like our Special Forces do. 

We’re having great success with the combination of those. 

The other thing, Senator, I was down visiting a brigade from the 

82nd at one of their exercises, and I said, ‘‘What’s the story, guys, 

can we really do this? Can conventional units do this training?’’ 

241 

There was silence, and then one of the battalion commanders said, 

‘‘Sir, it’s what we’ve been doing for the last 4 years.’’ Since 2005, 

our conventional forces have been actively working with the indigenous forces in Iraq and also in Afghanistan. So, we’re getting much 

better at it. 

Senator REED. This proposal you’re talking about is the embedded trainers or units working with American brigades? 

General CASEY. We put additional field-grade officers into existing brigades so that they can partner with divisions and border brigades, things like that. 

Senator REED. But, at some point, the presence of brigades—in 

Iraq first, and then Afghanistan—will be minimal, and what about 

individual trainers or training structures that don’t depend upon 

the brigades? 

General CASEY. Both Iraq and Afghanistan have structures to 

stand up the institutional side of their armies. It’s called MNSTC– 

I, in Iraq, and it’s called CSTC–A, in Afghanistan. Lieutenant General Bill Caldwell, USA, has been working in Afghanistan to stand 

it up. Frankly, it was under-resourced. In fact, we’ve just sent 

about 50 senior leaders from that training brigade to Bill Caldwell 

to augment his staff and continue to get things going there. That 

is where, currently in Afghanistan, he is having problems with the 

trainers, the institutional trainers that I think the Chairman mentioned in his opening statement. 

Senator REED. Going forward, General and Mr. Secretary, are 

you consciously planning to resource this effort with qualified noncommissioned officers on an extended basis? Is that built into your 

plan? 

General CASEY. Absolutely. In fact, we have begun selecting lieutenant colonel and colonel commanders, off of a command select list 

to command in those organizations. 

Senator REED. Another aspect to this training issue is interagency training, prior to deployment. Is that going on, and how effective is that? 

General CASEY. It is, but it’s tough, Senator. What we wind up 

doing is contracting retired interagency folks to come out and give 

us that expertise as we’re going through the training. The other 

agencies just aren’t big enough to provide the folks that are actually going to be out there in time. So, that continues to be difficult. 

Senator REED. So, there’s no sort of training as you do before deploying military units to bring all of the relevant parts together, 

train for a period of time, and then deploy. You have surrogates, 

and then when they get in the field, they get together with the actual agency partners. 

General CASEY. Right. If we’re getting the actual partners there, 

it’s by exception and not the rule. 

Senator REED. There’s been a lot of discussion about the DADT 

policy. Have you heard anything from commanders in the field in 

Afghanistan or Iraq about the readiness of British forces or Canadian forces, which do allow gay servicemembers to serve openly? Is 

there any reluctance, by American units, to cooperate? Any feedback from individual soldiers about their policies? 

242 

General CASEY. I have heard nothing from anyone about any conflicts with British or Canadian soldiers, or any other country’s soldiers, that have already implemented that policy. 

Senator REED. Have you had anybody suggest that their battle 

readiness was impaired by that policy? 

General CASEY. I have not, Senator. 

Senator REED. As you go forward, you’re reorganizing the military—as you point out, the most significant reorganization in decades—is there any thought about changing the construct of the Reserve Forces, of putting more or less combat service support elements there? If there is, can you comment? 

General CASEY. We’re always trying the get the mix of Active 

component and Reserve component forces right. We made a conscious decision in 2004 to get through this, to complete this reorganization that we’ve done. Now we’re reassessing and we’re taking 

a hard look at ourselves to see if we have the mix right. That will 

take place over the next 6 months, and I’d be happy to keep you 

abreast of it as we go forward. 

Senator REED. Thank you, General. 

I just want to recognize and commend you Mr. Secretary for your 

leadership. We were all very gratified when the President nominated you, and your performance since then, Mr. Secretary, has 

been very exceptional, and I thank you for that service. 

Thank you. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Reed. 

Senator Wicker. 

Senator WICKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Let me echo my appreciation to both witnesses for their service. 

To reiterate what I said when Congressman McHugh was nominated by the President, I think the President chose well, and we’re 

proud of the Secretary. 

Just to follow up on Senator Reed’s question, General. Have you 

had conversations with British or Canadian generals of like rank 

about the transition and their observation with regard to DADT? 

General CASEY. I have not, Senator. 

Senator WICKER. Okay. But, don’t you think that might be a good 

idea, something you might pursue? 

General CASEY. We will do that as part of this process. 

Senator WICKER. Okay. Thank you. 

There’s been a lot of discussion about MRAP vehicles today. In 

your prepared testimony, gentlemen, you say the Army is incorporating these vehicles throughout its unit formations. I understand that Secretary Gates mentioned sharing MRAP vehicles with 

our allies. To either one of you, are we going to do that, or is that 

just a notional concept? Would we be giving them to other countries? Would we be selling them under a foreign military sales-type 

program? Specifically, how many MRAP vehicles do we have in 

Iraq today? I have information that it’s about 23,000. Would that 

be a fair number? 

General CASEY. No, Senator. We have probably about 9,300 

MRAP vehicles or so in Iraq. 

Senator WICKER. Ninety-three hundred? 

General CASEY. That’s the total for the Army now. 

Senator WICKER. The Army. 

243 

General CASEY. We have almost 12,000 total deployed and about 

600 of these MRAP all-terrain vehicles (MATVs) out there. 

Senator WICKER. Okay. 

General CASEY. That number of 23,000 sounds high, but it may 

be all of the other Services thrown in there. 

Senator WICKER. Okay. Is this part of the equipment that Senator Chambliss was talking about? Will some of these be left in 

control of the Iraqis? Are we going to bring them all back? 

Secretary MCHUGH. We’re not through that process, as yet, Senator. I will tell you that, with respect to discussions to provide 

MRAP vehicles or any other piece of hardware to our allies, obviously we want them to be equipped as they help us on this or any 

other battlefield, they have adequate protection. But, the last I 

knew, the Secretary of Defense’s position was that we must meet 

U.S. solders’ requirements first and foremost. 

As to the means of disposal of those, either through some sort of 

in-kind donation or should they pay up front, it will be on a caseby-case basis, should we get to that point. 

Senator WICKER. Okay, now this refurbishing that Senator Reed 

asked about is taking place in Kuwait. Is that to make them ready 

for the different terrain in Afghanistan? 

General CASEY. It’s to put a more agile suspension system on 

them, yes. 

Senator WICKER. Will all of them have to go through this refurbishing before they’re sent to Afghanistan? 

General CASEY. Senator, I don’t believe so, but I don’t know exactly. So, I will provide that to you for the record. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

Yes. All mine-resistant ambush-protected (MRAP) vehicles that are being redistributed from Iraq to Afghanistan are routed thru the Army’s MRAP Sustainment 

Facility in Kuwait. This ensures all required maintenance actions are performed before these vehicles are shipped to our forces in Afghanistan. 

Senator WICKER. Okay. 

General CASEY. It will apply to some models for sure. I don’t 

know that it applies to all the models, but I’ll get you that for the 

record. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

Based on past experience, virtually all vehicles require some level of maintenance 

work after being redeployed to Kuwait. Current priorities at the mine-resistant ambush-protected Sustainment Facility are the Maxx Pro (manufactured by International Military Group of NAVISTAR), CAIMAN (manufactured by BAE, Inc.) and 

Force Protection variants. 

In the case of the Cougar, the Joint Program Office (JPO) is planning to install 

an independent suspension system on 515 Cougar vehicles on loan to the U.S. Army 

from the U.S. Marine Corps and U.S. Navy. This system will better enable the Cougar to operate within the challenging terrain of Afghanistan. The JPO has modified 

approximately 600 U.S. Marine Corp and U.S. Navy Cougars. These vehicles were 

modified in Kuwait and are now operating in Afghanistan. 

Senator WICKER. I understand we’re transitioning from the 

MRAP vehicle to the MATV. Are we going to be building any more 

MRAP vehicles or are we going to start making MATVs exclusively, 

at this point? 

Secretary MCHUGH. My understanding is that the various platforms of MRAP vehicles will continue. The theater demand is for 

the MATV, but that doesn’t suggest that some of the other variants 

244 

don’t have suitability and applicability in other uses, and that will 

be examined on a case-by-case basis. But, clearly, from the battlefield, the MATV, particularly in Afghanistan, is the high-demand 

platform. 

We’re getting the impression you’re interested in MRAP vehicles. 

Senator WICKER. Indeed, and other members of the panel have 

been interested in MRAP vehicles. 

One other line of questioning, and that’s with regard to the Fire 

Scout vehicles. They’ve been made by Northrop Grumman, in my 

State of Mississippi. I was disappointed when Secretary Gates canceled the program. 

We have eight Fire Scout vehicles manufactured, sitting in storage in the manufacturing plant in Mississippi. The President’s 

budget indicates that the Army is working to transfer existing assets to the Navy or Special Forces. But, my question is, it would 

seem to me that the Army would need a vertical takeoff-and-landing capability in Afghanistan, much as the Fire Scout can provide. 

So, can either one of you tell me why the Army decided to cancel 

the Fire Scout program? When will the Army present Congress 

with its plan on moving forward with existing assets that have 

been manufactured and are sitting unused? Is the Army currently 

conducting any studies to determine the need for a vertical takeoffand-landing unmanned air system capability in its future force? 

General CASEY. Senator, if I could, I’d answer those in reverse. 

Right now, we don’t have any studies ongoing for a vertical takeoff 

and landing system. We will get you the plan for how we intend 

to deal with the existing systems here within the next 60 days. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

With the termination of the Class IV Unmanned Aerial System, the U.S. Army 

considered several options for disposition of the eight U.S. Army Fire Scouts that 

are currently at Moss Point, MS. While a final decision has not yet been made, the 

Army anticipates transferring the Fire Scouts to the U.S. Navy as soon as possible 

to facilitate their continued development of the Fire Scout Unmanned Aerial System. 

General CASEY. Now to the question of why did we go down this 

road to begin with? The bottom line is, Senator, that we developed 

an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) strategy that gave us more capability at less cost. We studied this over the last year, and we 

looked at the payload, the cost, and the force structure that was 

attendant to operating the different systems. When we compared it 

to an improved Shadow, which is a system that’s already in the 

force, the Shadow gave us more value for the money, and more capability for the money, as well. While a vertical takeoff-and-landing 

capability is convenient, it just didn’t put it over the top, in terms 

of the capabilities that the improved Shadow gave us for the cost. 

Senator WICKER. The Shadow doesn’t have that vertical capability. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator Wicker. 

Senator Akaka. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to add my welcome to Secretary McHugh and General 

Casey, and I want to thank you for your distinguished service to 

our country. 

245 

I also want to thank the men and women of our Army, both uniformed and civilian, who serve our country proudly. Also, I want 

to thank Army families, who make many sacrifices while their 

loved ones serve our country. 

Mr. Secretary, the number of servicemembers returning from deployment who have mental health issues is a great concern. Many 

servicemembers are reluctant to volunteer information that could 

reflect negatively on the state of their mental health. Secretary 

McHugh, considering servicemembers’ reservations to volunteer 

such information, can you update us on the Army’s efforts to 

proactively identify and assist soldiers in dealing with mental 

health issues? Also, for those transitioning from the Active component, how is the Army helping them to find mental healthcare, either from the VA or from the civilian sector? 

Secretary MCHUGH. You raise a very important point, Senator. 

There has long been the attitude, amongst men and women in uniform across the Services, that somehow mental health is a shortcoming, a handicap, a weakness. From the Army side—and, I think 

it’s fair to say, from all of the Services—we’re working very hard 

to try do change the opinions of those who we hope will find themselves in a position to reach out for help. Earlier, the Chief mentioned Comprehensive Soldier Fitness, and this change of attitude 

has to begin at the very basic level, and that is to have Army doctrine treat physical fitness and mental fitness along the same par. 

That is the attempt of this initiative. I think it’s fair to say that, 

combined with the online mental health assessments that are 

available through that program, and coupled with the resilience 

trainers that are increasingly going out into the units and helping 

soldiers become more resilient, that they’re beginning to understand it’s okay to seek out help. 

We have the same challenge, quite frankly, that we see in the 

civilian community, and that is a difficulty in bringing on necessary behavioral health specialists. In fact, we’re at about 86 percent of our stated requirements for those behavioral health providers, and we’re working, each and every day, to try build on that. 

But, we’ve had success, I would argue, particularly in moving our 

concern about behavioral health, and our focus on it, away from 

just the predeployment. We’re reaching out into the battlefields. 

We have the mental health advisory teams that come back and provide advice to us as to what we can do to extend that service. Now 

in the battlefields, both Iraq and Afghanistan, we have mental 

health specialists dealing with the troops, dealing with them on patient-to-provider ratios that, frankly, are better than our stated requirement. We have a requirement in theater of about 1 of these 

behavioral health providers for every 700 soldiers, in both Iraq and 

Afghanistan. We’re just about or just above the 1-to-600. 

So, the way you get people to understand it’s okay is to act as 

if it’s okay and by providing that kind of care and destigmatizing 

it. That’s key to our success in the future, and it’s certainly key to 

our activity, thus far. 

Senator AKAKA. The other part of that question was on whether 

there are any efforts being made to help them plan for their 

healthcare from either the VA or the private sector. 

246 

Secretary MCHUGH. We don’t just turn people loose, Senator. 

When soldiers redeploy, thanks to the work of both Houses of Congress, and certainly this and the House Armed Services Committee, 

we’re now providing not one but two post-deployment reassessments. We’re trying to create a continuum where we can, more 

early on, identify folks who are either likely or who are encountering problems; and when those people are identified, we try to 

provide for them in house. 

Where distance becomes a challenge, as it often does with respect 

to the Reserve component, we’re working through the Reserves, 

through the Yellow Ribbon Reintegration Program, and others to 

make sure that we can do everything we can to connect people who 

are in need, based on their service challenges, to those who can 

provide them help. 

I don’t want to suggest that we have this perfect. We don’t. But, 

it is, nevertheless, something we focus on every day, and we’re improving every day. But, we still have a ways to go. 

Senator AKAKA. I’m very interested, Secretary McHugh, in collaboration between the Services and the VA. Of note, the Army has 

worked with the VA on a Physical Disability Evaluation System 

pilot program, and a Virtual Lifetime Electronic Record systems. 

Mr. Secretary, can you give me an update on the pilot program and 

how you are addressing the challenges of creating a Virtual Lifetime Electronic Record system? 

Secretary MCHUGH. I can provide you an overview, and I think 

the Chief could give you more detail, because he’s been focused on 

this. I spent a lot of time in Congress, on the House Armed Services Committee, frankly, frustrated at the disconnect between the 

various evaluation systems maintained in the military versus those 

in the VA, and we’re working very hard, particularly post what we 

found out at the Walter Reed Army Medical Center. One of the 

great frustrators of soldiers, in our Warrior Transition Units who 

were doing the transitioning from the military to the VA disability 

system, was that disconnect and the frustration of repetitive dealings. 

The last report I got is that the model study is going fairly well 

and they hope to have it completed and results in the relatively 

near future. But, I’d defer to the Chief for any fill-in-the-blanks he 

might have. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you. 

Chief? 

General CASEY. The pilot is currently working at 10 places, and 

we’re going to increase it by another 5 in March. That, frankly, is 

not as fast as I’d like to see it go, because intuitively, we all believe 

it’s the way that we should go. 

The general feedback we get from the soldiers is, they see the 

one physical given in the pilot is more fair, because it allows them 

to start getting their benefits sooner. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Akaka. 

Senator Sessions. 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, both of you, for your service, and I look forward to 

continuing to work with you to support the finest Army this NaVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:37 May 06, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00252 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\62155.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
247 

tion, I think, has ever fielded. They’ve been under great stress, and 

have exceeded all our expectations. I’m so proud of the men and 

women that serve. 

Just a few issues that I’d like to raise. General Casey, we have 

a continual discussion about unmanned aerial systems, and there 

was some confusion, for a period of time, about who was going to 

be responsible for that. I think that matter has been settled with 

clarity. 

First, is that so? Second, we’ve seen how effective they can be, 

is there any need to expand the number of military units and reduce the size of the units that have access to this kind of capability? 

General CASEY. To answer your first question, we have worked 

very closely with the Air Force over the last 18 months to resolve 

who’s in charge, and at what level. I feel very comfortable that we 

have resolved those differences. 

Senator SESSIONS. Was that different from Secretary England’s 

decision? Have you made any changes from what I understood his 

decision was? 

General CASEY. What I was speaking of, Senator, was the employment aspect of it, not the procurement side of it. 

The other thing I would say is I think you know that, in this 

budget, we have been given some additional assets to procure some 

additional UAVs. In fact, several companies of our top-line UAV. I 

think we all feel that these systems give our soldiers, not only a 

great capability to operate in irregular warfare operations, but they 

are relevant across the spectrum of conflict. 

Senator SESSIONS. Well, like I said, we have MRAP vehicles and 

we spend a lot of money on those protective vehicles. But, there 

was an article in the paper, in the last few days, about a young 

officer using an unmanned aerial system to identify a group of people planting an IED in the road. So, it could save lives in a lot of 

different ways. I just hope that you will not hesitate to ask for 

what you need. 

Second, with regard to the Commanders’ Emergency Response 

Program (CERP) funds and the funds, General Casey, that soldiers 

have to deal with local civilians. Let’s say, in the Afghan theater, 

there’s a village, remote from the central government, that has always sort of taken care of its own matters. What I think we 

learned in Iraq—and you were there when it really happened—was 

that if you work with some of the local leaders, and can help them 

have the resources to hire and train local people who are going to 

defend the local community, sometimes you get a lot better result 

than if you take those young people and send them off to some distant part of the country, where they have no family and not the 

same loyalty. 

As I understand it, the commanders have certain abilities to utilize funds through CERP to work with local leaders, but the substantial majority of the money may be going through the State Department, and often they’re not in these more remote villages. My 

question is: are you satisfied that you have enough funds, based on 

the amount that’s out there, to actually work with local leaders, 

shake hands with them, make some commitments, and be able to 

248 

deliver on those commitments in a way that can transform a whole 

village, region, or valley in a more positive way? 

General CASEY. Senator, there’s $1.3 billion in the fiscal year 2011 budget for CERP funds. The bulk of that, $1.1 billion, is going 

to Afghanistan. That seems to me to be an appropriate amount for 

what their needs are there, at the low level. 

Senator SESSIONS. Can that be used at the local level, let’s say, 

to help a local leader hire a police force, and pay those people? 

General CASEY. Yes. I’m a little rusty on the exact restrictions 

they have. Hiring people sometimes is outside of the realm of 

CERP. 

Senator SESSIONS. Well, there we go. 

General CASEY. But, certainly it can be used—— 

Senator SESSIONS. See that’s the problem. It was in the Washington Post; they had an interesting article about it. Ambassador 

Eikenberry and Ambassador Holbrooke were quoted about it, and 

they have concerns. Kabul has concerns. They like everybody to answer only to them, of course. But, didn’t we have success in Iraq, 

when you were there, in creating loyalty with the local leaders by 

the military people being able to deliver, and help them provide 

jobs and security forces for their people? 

General CASEY. Yes, Senator. I was just there before Christmas 

and I’m not getting any feedback that that’s not happening in Afghanistan. 

Senator SESSIONS. There’s still some uncertainty about it. I just 

hope, Mr. Secretary, sometimes DOD has to defend its legitimate 

interest in the internal bureaucracies that are out there. I don’t 

know precisely where the line ought to be drawn, but I know, in 

certain areas of Afghanistan, there really is no State Department 

presence. The only presence there is a trained, skilled military officer, who meets with a tribal leader, and he needs to be able to offer 

that leader something, and make decisions that could neutralize 

hostilities and save lives. Is that something you’ve thought about? 

Secretary MCHUGH. I have, and it’s something that I agree with 

you about. The workings between State and DOD on this program 

took some time. My understanding is that now it’s working relatively well, that commanders on the ground do have access to 

those funds that provide, as you correctly noted, Senator, a great 

opportunity and a great option to create local jobs through various 

construction projects, be it a repair of a road, or be it construction—— 

Senator SESSIONS. What about security forces? 

Secretary MCHUGH. I have to demur, as I think I heard the Chief 

do. 

Senator SESSIONS. Well, it’s a pretty big issue, would you agree 

that that’s a big issue? Will you look at it? That’s all I’m asking. 

Secretary MCHUGH. I’m not disagreeing. What I’m saying is, I’m 

not certain, under the current construct, if direct hiring is allowable under CERP. I just don’t know of it is or it isn’t. Generally, 

a CERP is a construction program that provides jobs and, obviously, economic security in that way. If there’s an opportunity for 

hiring of direct forces, we’re generally inclined to do that through 

other means. But we can certainly check and get back to you. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

249 

Direct hiring of local security personnel is not allowed under the Commanders’ 

Emergency Response Program (CERP). CERP may be used for short-term security 

contracts that hire security personnel on a temporary basis to guard critical infrastructure. 

Senator SESSIONS. General Casey, just briefly, you did that in 

Iraq. The forces were able to partner with local people, put their 

local young men on the payroll as security forces, and they ran al 

Qaeda out of their villages, time and time again, didn’t they? 

General CASEY. I think that happened afterwards. I don’t recall 

hiring security forces with CERP. 

Senator SESSIONS. I don’t know where they got their money but 

I’m just telling you, that’s a big deal. They don’t have time to send 

them off a year to Kabul to be trained and get sent some other 

place in Afghanistan. I mean, the reality is now; you’ve cleared a 

village or whatever, and you have some support and I just think 

we need to cut through this and be able to recognize, in some areas 

of the country, that the military are the only real people there that 

make a good decision, and they should have access to some of those 

funds, if need be, to do that. 

General CASEY. I’ll check on that and get back with you. 

Secretary MCHUGH. I’ll double check on that. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

Military commanders in Afghanistan do have access to the Commanders’ Emergency Response Program funds and may use those funds to contract for temporary 

security guards to protect critical infrastructure, including neighborhoods and other 

public areas in a village. The contracts must be short-term, usually for the life of 

the project involved, but not to exceed 365 days. 

Senator SESSIONS. I have some other questions I’ll submit to you 

in writing. 

I, again, thank you for your service. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Sessions. 

I do believe that Senator Sessions is correct. I think the CERP 

funding has been authorized at least for the reintegration piece; it’s 

not just for construction. I think it’s been specifically authorized for 

reintegration, which would include payroll. 

Secretary MCHUGH. We will certainly check and see how that’s 

being applied. 

Chairman LEVIN. I think it is not only authorized, I think it’s 

been used for that purpose, at least to reintegrate some of the 

lower-level Taliban with some pay for them. 

Senator Ben Nelson. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, 

gentlemen, for your service. 

I thank the members of the Army for your service, as well as the 

families who support our men and women in uniform. 

I’d like to turn to military construction (MILCON), just for a moment, Secretary McHugh and General Casey. General Casey, you 

and I have talked about reset and recapitalization, so what I’m 

really addressing is, the budget request includes significant funding increases to replace aging facilities for the National Guard and 

the Reserves. Obviously, the investment is critical, considering the 

Guard and Reserve personnel comprise some 51 percent of your 

end strength. But, your request for Guard and Reserve MILCON, 

while $1.2 billion, is less than 1 percent of your total base budget, 

250 

and only a fifth of your total MILCON request. Some of Nebraska’s 

Guard units, for example, are lacking, currently, adequate space to 

store and reset new equipment. For example, Nebraska units lack 

33 acres for improved and unimproved parking to store new trucks, 

tractors, and trailers, as well as 8,000 square feet of heated storage 

and 3,500 square feet of security vault storage. 

We’ll take this for the record, but what is the current state of our 

Guard and Reserve infrastructure at the present time? Perhaps 

you could make some general comments. We’d like to have something more for the record. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

The current state of Army Reserve infrastructure is adequate to support its current missions but inadequate to support all its missions. Competing requirements 

from mission areas such as Grow the Army, Army Modular Force, Army Force Generation, provide facility lease options to address Army requirements to support unit 

stationing plans and others will always be a constraint to a modernized infrastructure. The average age of Army Reserve facilities is over 42 years old, the majority 

of facilities are under-sized for today’s mission requirements, encroached upon by 

local community activities and are Anti-Terrorism/Force Protection non compliant. 

Base Realignment and Closure Act of 2005 (BRAC 2005) funding helped tremendously in providing over 120 new Air Force Reserve Commands that meet today’s 

operational and training needs; however, BRAC 2005 funding modernized only 11 

percent of the Army Reserve Center facility inventory. The Army National Guard 

has stated that they could use $1.5 billion per year for 20 years to address revitalizing their facilities. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Secretary McHugh? 

Secretary MCHUGH. Senator, as we have begun to operationalize 

the Guard and Reserve, there have been significant challenges. The 

first wave of those challenges were based largely on the equipment 

side. If you look at the state of both the personnel, as well as the 

equipment readiness for Guard and Reserve, although still a work 

in progress, we’ve made some successful steps. The personnel readiness ratings have improved about 4 percent this year over last. 

The equipment, right now, is at about 79 percent readiness. If you 

count substitute equipment, that raises to about 89 percent. But 

what that tells us is, we have a long way to go. 

As to the distribution of MILCON, certainly, if I were in a Guard 

or Reserve unit, I’d feel as though I wasn’t getting what I needed, 

and we have to admit that. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Well, that’s why, in taking them to an 

operational Reserve, it has to be thorough with respect to not only 

equipment, but to their facilities, so that the facilities management 

is capable of taking care of the equipment and keeping them an 

Operational Ready Reserve. So, that’s my concern, and obviously 

it’s your concern, as well. But, I hope that you can address that in 

more detail for us and for the record. 

Secretary MCHUGH. We will do that, Senator. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

The Army fully supports the fiscal year 2011 President’s budget request. The fiscal year 2011 request completes the U.S. Army Reserve’s Grow the Army effort to 

provide new facilities for those additional soldiers. However, funding is currently not 

sufficient to address all of the Army Reserve’s requirements to include modernizing 

our legacy facilities, provide new/upgraded maintenance facilities, provide leasing 

funded options to address Army requirements to field units faster and upgrade our 

facilities to meet current mission standards and anti-terrorism/force protection set 

back requirements. Long-term solutions for all of the remaining requirements (such 

as recapitalizing existing facilities for existing missions) necessitates a long-term 

funding strategy beyond the Future Years Defense Program. Obsolete legacy faciliVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:37 May 06, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00256 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\62155.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
251 

ties adversely affect readiness, organizations, missions and installations across the 

Army. This issue affects all Army commands and components and adversely impacts 

the mission and organizations. 

Secretary MCHUGH. As I said, we’re making progress, but it’s incremental, at best, I would agree with you. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Well, if we don’t continue to make 

progress, what we’ll see happen is what would be fairly obvious, 

that would be a sliding back of the capabilities of the Guard and 

Reserve to be that Operational Reserve, and readiness will suffer, 

I think, as we all understand. 

On human capital, one of the biggest challenges will be managing and expanding the new missions while maintaining the fixed 

end strength. A significant number of questions have been asked 

about that. What I’d like to do is focus on the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance mission seeing a great deal of growth all 

across the services, due in part because of this expansion of the 

UAVs. How will the Army be able to staff the growing needs of 

these missions, both as to the increased number of units and increased number of these UAVs? What are we doing to be able to 

keep pace with the growing nature of the use of such? 

General? 

General CASEY. That’s a great question, Senator, we have 

learned a lot over the course of the last 81⁄2 years about intelligence, particularly in how to apply intelligence in this environment. We are in the process of going through another significant 

reevaluation of our whole intelligence structure. As we look at this, 

we do very good analysis of where our gaps and shortfalls are. But, 

what we don’t do well, and what we are working on, is 

redundancies, and how to get at redundancies. To get at high-payoff forces, like the intelligence forces, we have to continue to be 

able to free up redundant forces from other areas, to put them in 

these high-payoff areas. That process is hard, but it’s ongoing right 

now. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Do you think that we’re maintaining an 

adequate pace? Is it something we need to step up in order to have 

our readiness there be as sufficient as we would like it? 

General CASEY. I think you always like to go faster. We are keenly aware of the fact that we’re at war and we have soldiers deployed, and I think we’re moving on this about as fast as is reasonably possible, Senator. 

Senator BEN NELSON. I’ve also noticed that the fiscal year 2011 request includes $507 million to buy 29 MQ–1 drones, and a plan 

to spend $2.9 billion on 158 of these aircraft by 2015. The Air 

Force’s request, $1.1 billion in fiscal year 2011, to purchase 48 

MQ–9 drones, and they’ll spend $7.3 billion on 341 MQ–9s over the 

same period. 

Is there intercooperation between the Air Force and the Army 

sufficiently on this so that there’s no overlap or underlap, in that 

we don’t have a stovepipe situation developing where we have ours, 

they have theirs? Obviously, coordination of these efforts would 

strengthen our overall military. 

General CASEY. You’re exactly right. I’ve been working directly 

with the Air Force Chief for almost 2 years on UAV issues. I can’t 

look you in the eye and tell you we’ve eliminated all the redunVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:37 May 06, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00257 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\62155.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
252 

dancies, Senator, but we will continue to work closely with the Air 

Force to avoid that. 

Senator BEN NELSON. These are not only essential military requirements we need to meet to have the sufficient number of UAVs 

for certain, but we don’t want to underlap the situation in any significant way, because, obviously, the information can be exchanged 

readily if there’s a willingness to do it. I appreciate the fact that 

you’re suggesting to us that you’re working with your counterpart 

in the Air Force. I hope that will continue. Obviously, I’m going to 

ask the Air Force the same question. So, if I can smooth the process for you, I’ll be happy to. 

General CASEY. Use my name, yes. 

Senator BEN NELSON. I’ll use your name. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Nelson. 

Senator Collins. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General Casey, 6 years ago this week, at a hearing before the 

Personnel Subcommittee, you and I had a discussion about the 

problem of sexual assaults in the military. At that time, you stated 

that the Army had a zero-tolerance policy, and you pledged your 

commitment to trying to deal with this growing problem. 

Last fiscal year, however, there were 2900 reports of sexual assaults among servicemembers; and obviously, since the Army’s the 

biggest, on a percentage basis, the majority of those assaults occurred among our soldiers. This reflected an increase of 8 percent 

over the previous fiscal year. 

Now, I understand that the Army is contending that this is a result of better reporting and that our female soldiers, in particular, 

feel more comfortable now coming forward to report assaults, but 

it is still extremely troubling that we’re seeing those kinds of numbers. Why haven’t we made more progress in the past 6 years in 

this troubling area? 

General CASEY. Senator, that’s a fair question, and I can tell you, 

I still remember that hearing. As the Vice Chief, I went back and 

we worked very hard to put together a prevention and response 

program because we, frankly, didn’t have one that was effective. 

We worked very hard on it. 

When I came back to this job—it was probably about 18 months 

ago, now—I was sitting down and getting a report on where we’d 

come, and I was shown the data for the last year, I think it was 

the year before, and we were clearly the highest of the Services. I 

was told the same thing that you were, ‘‘Well, we just report better.’’ I said, ‘‘Baloney.’’ As I bored into it, it was clear to me that 

we had a program that was almost entirely focused on response, on 

helping the victim after it happened, and not on the prevention. 

Secretary Geren and I sat down and used Secretary Geren’s experience when he was working with the Air Force on this, to put together a program to change our culture so that we could prevent 

the assaults before they happened. We kicked that off in the end 

of 2008, and we put $28 million in his budget to bring that program to fruition. We recognized—and we started it in 2008—that 

it was a culture change and that it was going to take some time. 

253 

But, we’re absolutely committed to staying on this until we fix it. 

I still feel that we’re zero-tolerance, and we have to be. 

Senator COLLINS. Secretary McHugh, would you like to add anything? 

Secretary MCHUGH. I would, Senator. As you and I have talked 

before, there’s very few, if any, other single issues that are more 

contrary to the Army values than sexually assaulting or harassing 

another member in uniform, or anyone, for that matter. I made the 

pledge to you and to others in the House—Congresswoman Harman, for example—and any number of others who have, thankfully, 

focused on this issue so carefully. 

The Chief, I think, has highlighted what the Army needs to do, 

and that is to change the culture. I can’t tell you how it came to 

the level it did. I don’t want to say it was ever acceptable, because 

it wasn’t, but clearly, there was some kind of disconnect amongst 

our young soldiers that didn’t help them understand more clearly, 

this is not just wrong, it’s unacceptable. The I. A.M. Strong program, under the SHARP program, as you’re aware, is the major 

means by which we convey that new attitude of values. It’s something we’re working very hard. The Chief correctly mentioned the 

$28-million appropriation in the President’s proposed budget for 

this. 

But I think we need to, as well, while changing the culture, help 

those victims understand that, if they do come forward, they’re 

going to be helped. That critically means that we’re going to pursue, legally, those that have committed these acts. I think there 

was an attitude amongst many, largely female, victims that if they 

reported, they’d become a victim again by a system that just didn’t 

follow through and somehow didn’t care. 

We have worked hard to start, in our Judge Advocate General 

schools, to put courses in for prosecutors to pursue these. We’ve 

hired highly qualified experts and forensic scientists who are 

skilled in pursuing crime scenes, and brought in new prosecutors, 

as well, so that those soldiers who are the victim of this horrendous, unacceptable crime, when they are brave enough to come forward, see that it means something and we follow through. 

So, the Chief correctly said, it’s frustrating, in that it doesn’t 

happen overnight, but we are fully committed to that. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. 

I know, from our discussions, that you also share my concern 

about the enormous increase in suicides in the Army. You’ve had 

a previous discussion with members of this panel about the need 

for more mental health services. Secretary McHugh, I just want to 

commend you for your emphasis in talking about not just physical 

fitness, but mental and emotional fitness. I think that’s absolutely 

critical. 

It’s troubling that the Army had its worst year on record last 

year, as far as the number of suicides. But, it’s even more troubling 

that we don’t know why, that there doesn’t seem to be a correlation—at least that’s what I’m told—between the number of deployments or whether the person is in the Reserve or on Active Duty. 

Are we any closer to understanding why there is this troubling 

spike in suicides? 

254 

Secretary MCHUGH. Sadly, the answer is not much closer. We 

have instituted—and I appreciate your kind comments—the Comprehensive Social Fitness program, that I think is so critical, and 

we’re transitioning that now to families, as well, to help people become more mentally resilient. That was a lot of great work by the 

Chief and by my predecessor. Those kinds of things need to continue to help people better cope. 

But, as to why people take this step, particularly as to why men 

and women in uniform do, we’re still, in many ways, befuddled. 

The best hope I see, in terms of understanding it truly, is the 5- 

year longitudinal study that the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army has 

headed up for us, with the Institute of Mental Health, that will 

take a cold, hard look, over a necessary period of time, to try to 

better understand that. Frankly, we don’t have much better answers in the civilian community either. 

But, as you noted, 160 suicides last year in the Army, the highest number ever, tells us that we have to focus in on this even 

more strongly, and we’re doing that. 

The one thing I would say about this 5-year study—it seems like 

a long time, and it is—is that there is a process for quarterly reports, so that, as things hopefully come to light as we begin to understand things we might do in the interim, the data will be provided, and the guidance provided, for us to step forward and to try 

to put into place some measures that will hopefully provide some 

solutions. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Collins. 

Senator Hagan. 

Senator HAGAN. Thank you. 

Secretary McHugh and General Casey, thank you very much for 

being here today, for your service and your testimony. 

General Casey, thank you for bringing the individuals you introduced. 

I want to thank each and every one of you for your service to our 

military. 

I do want to say that we all know that we have the best army 

in the world and that Fort Bragg’s 82nd Airborne Division is leading the effort in the Regional Command East in Afghanistan, and 

there are also elements of the 82nd throughout Afghanistan and 

Iraq, advising, assisting, and partnering with the Afghan National 

Security Forces, as well as the Iraqi Security Forces. 

I also want to point out the exceptional contributions to the 

Army Special Forces in theater, as well as the 30th BCT from the 

North Carolina National Guard. I can’t tell you how proud we are 

of the incredibly important job that they are doing. 

Secretary McHugh and General Casey, in your opening statements, both of you talked about the commitment that you have for 

the families. Secretary McHugh, you said that the number one concern to you is the care for families and the programs for them. 

General Casey, when you were talking about getting the Army 

back in balance, you stated that dwell time was the most important 

issue in order to get back in balance. Then you gave details about 

that. 

255 

Obviously, ensuring family readiness plays a big role in Army retention. Improving the quality of life of our Army families allows 

our soldiers to operate in theater more effectively. I’d like to have 

you comment on some of the enhanced family programs that you 

have mentioned and which are included in this budget. 

Secretary MCHUGH. I appreciate, first of all, the great service of 

all those great North Carolinians you mentioned, not just in Fort 

Bragg, but your Reserve component soldiers. I was over there; I 

had a chance to visit with some of them, and they should make you 

proud. They make all of us proud. 

If you can’t tell, I will state it for the record, I’m a big admirer 

of Secretary Pete Geren, my predecessor, and one of many great 

things he did is work with the Chief of Staff and really make a 

commitment to our Army families that we’re going to do everything 

we can to return the sacrifice that, as you so correctly noted, Senator, they make, each and every day on our behalf. The main conveyance of that was the Army Family Covenant. It was one of the 

first acts I did when I came to the Pentagon was to resign that in 

a ceremony that reaffirmed our commitment to those families and 

the various programs that we’ve instituted to try to attend to their 

needs. 

We have done a good job on funding. In fact, over the last several 

years, the appropriations for Army family programs has doubled. 

It was about $750,000 when we started, now just 2 short years 

later, it’s up to $1.5 billion. The President’s budget would increase 

it to $1.7 billion, and by the end of 2015 it would be up to $1.9 billion according to the planned way forward. 

It does a whole host of things. It provides respite care for the 

caregivers and families whose soldier is deployed; it provides respite care to those soldiers and their families who have children 

with special needs; there’s the Spousal Employment that works 

with Fortune 100 and 500 companies to provide employment opportunities for spouses. In fact, we’ve had the great success through 

those terrific companies of filling jobs for more than 35,000 Army 

spouses, and just on and on and on. 

It’s just something we have to do. You noted, we sign up the soldier, we re-sign the family. It’s something that we believe in very, 

very devoutly. We have a plan for creation of 50-some new child development centers, 7 new youth centers, just trying to take the 

whole range of family needs and show them that the family cares. 

General CASEY. The only thing I really can add is, as you point 

out, keeping the families understanding that we really are committed to them over the long haul is an essential part of holding 

this force together over the next couple of years. 

Senator HAGAN. Well, I appreciate your signing of the Army 

Family Covenant. I do think that’s extremely important. I think 

these programs, and the enhancement of the programs, are certainly playing a big role in the families and the retention. So, I 

thank you for that. 

I know we’ve had a lot of discussion today about the MRAP vehicles. I wanted to say that I’m supportive of the Joint Light Tactical 

Vehicle (JLTV) program; however, I want to learn more about how 

that program fits within the Army’s long-term ground vehicle strategy. When the JLTV program first began in 2006, the MRAP vehiVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:37 May 06, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00261 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\62155.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
256 

cle requirement did not exist, and the unforecasted procurement of 

significant numbers of the MRAP vehicles has impacted the overall 

JLTV program. The Army has stated that the MRAP vehicles fill 

a short-term urgent joint service requirement in order, obviously, 

to protect our soldiers, while the JLTVs are the long-term solution. 

Can you describe how it is in the best interests of the Army to 

maintain the JLTV and the MRAP vehicle, given their overlapping 

missions and requirements, and how does the JLTV service the 

long-term solution in order to better protect our soldiers? 

Secretary MCHUGH. Let me take the first swat at that, Senator. 

It really all starts with Humvees. The Army did an assessment this 

year as to the requirements for the current light tactical vehicle in 

the Army fleet, the Humvee. What we discovered is, we had totally 

met our stated requirements for that platform. As such, there are 

no funds included in this budget for any more procurement, beyond 

the stated contract, for Humvees. 

The question we have to ask ourselves is: how do we provide for 

a light tactical vehicle until the JLTV, the joint program with the 

Marine Corps, is up and running? The answer to that is really twofold. One, we’ve experienced far fewer battle losses, and far fewer 

breakdowns on the Humvee platforms than originally expected. So 

we feel that we can meet a large part of that through recapitalization and reset of the platforms we have available. As you said, 

about 3,000 or so of the Humvee requirements can be met by our 

MRAP vehicle stocks. So until the JLTV comes onto line, we feel 

very comfortable that we have a light tactical vehicle that will 

serve and keep safe our men and women in uniform. 

One of the concerns of the Humvee, of course, is that commanders are telling us that it does not provide, in its manufactured 

state, the level of protection that is necessary. We hope the JLTV 

will meet that need. 

General CASEY. The other thing I’d add to that is in response to 

another question over here about; what’s our wheeled vehicle strategy? 

Senator HAGAN. Right. 

General CASEY. We are in the throes of completing that. But, 

DOD has had a significant investment in the MRAP vehicle, and 

we have to figure out how to incorporate that into our force, and 

into our overall wheeled vehicle strategy. 

Senator HAGAN. I have another host of questions concerning this, 

but I believe my time has run out, so I’d put those on the record. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator Hagan. 

Senator Graham. 

Senator GRAHAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you both for your service. 

When it comes to mental health professionals, I know they’re in 

short supply nationwide, but approximately many more mental 

health professionals do we need to address some of the problems 

related to suicide and just general mental health problems? What’s 

the strategy to find these people? 

Secretary MCHUGH. The requirement of behavioral health providers in the Army is 4,304 as I mentioned earlier, we are at 86 

percent of that, which, if my math is correct, is 3,714. 

257 

So, we are roughly about 600 short. The strategy is to try to use 

the flexibilities that this Congress has provided us in creating incentive programs and outreach programs to try to convince those 

folks, who obviously are in great demand in the private sector, to 

come and to serve their Nation in the Army. 

Senator GRAHAM. Do you have the tools you need to be competitive with the private sector? 

Secretary MCHUGH. We’re making progress. I guess that would 

suggest that we have sufficient tools. Certainly, as we go forward, 

if more flexibility and more initiatives are needed, we won’t hesitate to ask. 

Senator GRAHAM. That’s my invitation. Let us know. Is it harder 

to recruit a mental health professional than it is just a traditional 

doctor? 

Secretary MCHUGH. Generally, recruiting of specialties and subspecialties is more challenging, simply because you don’t have the 

density of personnel available. 

Senator GRAHAM. Is there a cross-training effort within the military to get people who enjoy the military and are willing to go into 

a new career? 

Secretary MCHUGH. Well, we do have education opportunities, 

through the university hospital system and scholarships and such, 

that can be provided to candidates who meet the qualifications. 

Senator GRAHAM. Okay, great. 

When it comes to the Guard and Reserve, I think TRICARE has 

been very helpful, making that available to Guard and Reserve 

families, because a lot of them didn’t have healthcare, it just gave 

them an opportunity to purchase TRICARE for their Guard and 

Reserve time, which I think is a pretty good deal for the force. 

The other issue I hear from the Guard and Reserve everywhere 

I go is about lowering the retirement age. I know there’s several 

ideas floating around about how you can earn an early retirement 

by doing more Active Duty tours and getting credit for that. I do 

understand the need for the military to sort of self-select, but I’m 

looking from the 20- to the 30-year point. It used to be that most 

Guard and Reserve members stayed in 30 years. A lot of them are 

getting out, now, at 20, for a variety of reasons; multiple deployments being one reason. Is there a strategy to deal with allowing 

people to retire early, but incentivizing them to stay from 20 to 30, 

based on the needs of the military? 

Secretary MCHUGH. That’s part of the process that we have to 

do in deciding what kind of structure has to be put into place to 

operationalize the Guard and Reserve. 

Senator GRAHAM. Right. 

Secretary MCHUGH. The challenge I think we ultimately have to 

face is: how do we sufficiently incentivize those good folks to come 

from our communities, to periodically leave their jobs and their 

families, to act as an operationalized Guard and Reserve, but, at 

the same time, recognizing we have to keep certain distance, in 

benefits and such, with the Active. 

Senator GRAHAM. You don’t want to cross-purpose here. 

Secretary MCHUGH. True. 

Senator GRAHAM. You don’t want to get people out of the Active 

Duty. 

258 

Secretary MCHUGH. Exactly. 

Senator GRAHAM. But, I don’t really think it’s that much of a 

problem right now, with the benefit packages, from the 20- to 30- 

year period, a lot of people are leaving earlier, some of our best and 

brightest, if they could earn their way to early retirement, they 

might stay past 20. 

Secretary MCHUGH. I think it’s correct to say we’re willing to 

consider any kind of initiative. 

Senator GRAHAM. Yes. 

Secretary MCHUGH. I know that there are many champions in 

Congress of a variety of approaches. 

Senator GRAHAM. Yes. 

Secretary MCHUGH. My good friend, who is now retired, Jim 

Saxton on the House side, was very active in this regard. 

Any ideas would be happily accepted. 

Senator GRAHAM. I’ll give you some input, and I appreciate your 

willingness to receive it. 

General, moving on to Guantanamo Bay. General Petraeus said 

Sunday that he believed it was in our national security interest to 

try to close Guantanamo Bay. Do you share that view? 

General CASEY. Senator, that’s a policy issue that is outside the 

purview of my job here, as the Chief of Staff of the Army. 

Senator GRAHAM. Fair enough. Just from your travels, do you 

think Guantanamo Bay is used by our enemies, still, against us, 

the images of the past? 

General CASEY. I have read intelligence where I have seen how 

the enemy has used that against us. 

Senator GRAHAM. That’s fair enough. 

We’re looking at the DADT policy. I think you all have given 

good answers about how we’ll study it. Any movement to change 

the role of women in combat? Has that time come? 

Secretary MCHUGH. From the Army perspective, Senator, we 

conduct, periodically, an assessment of all the MOSs and who is eligible to serve in them. That’s ongoing right now. It is not directed 

specifically at women in combat, but, obviously, the billets that are 

either open or closed to women would be part of that review. 

Senator GRAHAM. So, General, what’s your view about expanding 

the ability of women to serve in combat roles? 

General CASEY. Senator, I believe that it’s time that we take a 

look at what women are actually doing in Iraq and Afghanistan, 

and look at our policy. We’ve discussed this, between ourselves 

here. We don’t have an active effort going on, but I think it’s time. 

Senator GRAHAM. I agree with you, because, as I understand it, 

women, on the aviation side, fly combat missions. Probably the 

time has come to look at that, and if you could give us some input, 

we’d appreciate it. 

Thank you both for your service. I know these have been stressful times for our men and women in uniform, and they’ve delivered. 

I just want to make sure that we’re here to deliver for them, and 

that’s why your testimony is so helpful. 

Thank you. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Graham. 

Senator Udall. 

Senator UDALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

259 

Good morning, Secretary McHugh, great to see you here. Thank 

you for taking the time to come out to Colorado and visit Fort Carson. I know you could spend every day of the rest of your tenure 

visiting the facilities around the country, but when you come back 

out, maybe we can join together and be inspired by the men and 

women there at Fort Carson. 

General Casey, thank you for your service. You and I have had 

some conversations about the transition opportunity for soldiers 

with Outward Bound. It’s an organization I worked with for 20 

years, and it’s a wonderful way to provide those soldiers with the 

opportunity to get in touch with that excitement, the adrenaline, 

the meaning that comes when you serve in combat, but also how 

you make that transition with those needs back to civilian life. 

A couple of shout-outs. I wanted to acknowledge Master Sergeant 

Rubio, who’s here. She served as a fellow in my office for a year. 

It’s a wonderful program. General, you need to know that, whether 

she’s in uniform or in civvies, she brings a complete game. I miss 

her. I know she’s back with her first love, but I wanted to acknowledge the great work she did for me. 

Then, Sergeant First Class Larson, thank you for what you’re 

doing as a master resilience trainer. I liked what General Casey 

said about mental fitness. This thing up here is the biggest, 

baddest piece of equipment we have but it needs to be maintained 

and upgraded, it needs a little tender love and care, sometimes the 

sights have to be recalibrated. But, thank you for what you’re doing 

in that regard. You’re a brain mechanic, it sounds like, and we 

have a lot more to learn. So, thank you for pushing the envelope 

there. 

I’d like to turn to two areas. One, I want to talk about Combat 

Aviation Brigades, and then conclude with a couple of comments on 

DADT. 

We’ve seen, in these last few decades, just how important aviation is. It’s a combat multiplier. Everything from airborne attacks 

to aeromedical evacuations. It appears in the fiscal year 2011 budget that we’re going to increase aviation assets, it supports the development of a twelfth combat aviation brigade, and then begins to 

acquire, it looks like, equipment for a planned thirteenth aviation 

brigade. 

When will you make stationing decisions for those brigades, General and Mr. Secretary? Can you share some criteria that the Army 

would use to make those decisions? 

Secretary MCHUGH. Those are ongoing right now. Obviously, 

there have been no final determinations made. As I think both you 

and your colleague on your right from Alaska are aware, the Army 

is looking very carefully at all the permutations of that stationing, 

from environmental to training capacity, et cetera, et cetera. So, I 

would expect, in the very reasonably near future, those decisions 

will be finalized. 

Senator UDALL. I look forward to working with you in that way. 

We have, certainly, mountainous terrain that rivals and matches 

that in some of the theaters in which we’re undertaking operations 

today. We have, in Colorado, of course, a history of training combat 

aviators up in the Eagle County region, at the High-Altitude Army 

260 

Aviation Training facility that the National Guard runs so effectively. So, thank you for that outline. 

Let me turn to DADT. What I heard both of you say is, when 

the repeal occurs, you’ll follow the leadership and the dictates of 

the Commander in Chief and the Joint Chiefs themselves. I appreciate that clarity. 

If I might, I’d like to make a couple of comments on how I see 

this. We did talk about the moratorium and how that might work 

or be implemented. It was mentioned that a moratorium would introduce legal complications; for example, in the case of Lieutenant 

Dan Choi. It seems to me that that complication would simply be 

that the Army would not, for the duration of the moratorium, discharge an Arabic-speaking combat veteran who’s now participating 

in drills with his Guard unit, at the request of his superior officers. 

My belief is, the moratorium could be put in place as we put this 

implementation plan together. I say that because the testimony of 

Admiral Mullen and Secretary Gates was that the review is not 

about whether, but it’s about how we’ll implement the repeal. So, 

it seems that the eventuality of the repeal isn’t in question. 

In that spirit, this Senator thinks that we ought to put a moratorium in place during this implementation period. In other words, 

the moratorium would be in effect until we begin to implement this 

plan to repeal the DADT measure. 

The Army and the military does human resources as well as any 

corporation, as well as any organization I’ve ever seen. I know that 

this is one of the challenges, and one of the reasons we, maybe, 

need some time to study how you implement. How do you deal with 

those servicemembers who are in the pipeline right now, if you 

will, because of DADT, because they’ve been identified as being gay 

servicemembers? I just think that we should do everything possible, given that we’re going to, based on what the President, Secretary Gates, and Admiral Mullen have said, implement a repeal, 

that we should do everything possible to ensure that as few 

servicemembers are discharged between now and then. 

Who’s going to be the last gay servicemember to be discharged 

under DADT? That would be a tragedy, in my mind, because 

they’re clearly patriots, they clearly want to serve their country. 

Admiral Mullen made it very clear that they shouldn’t have to lead 

a lie to serve their country and defend their country. 

I’ll end on this note, I mentioned Senator Goldwater in the previous hearing. He was an Arizonan. I had the great privilege to 

know him as a boy. He and my father, who served in Congress— 

one a Democrat, one a Republican—loved Arizona, they loved the 

libertarian spirit of the west, where it’s live and let live. Senator 

Goldwater famously said, ‘‘You don’t have to be straight to shoot 

straight.’’ I think that’s what we’ve come to be aware of, and that’s 

why I so strongly support repealing this policy, so that every single 

American can serve who would like to. 

You don’t need to respond. I just wanted to, for my own heartfelt 

reasons, make that statement to the committee. 

Thank you again for your leadership. I’m just so proud to know 

both of you and to be able to serve with you in my capacity as you 

defend our Nation. 

Thank you. 

261 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Udall. 

I’m going to have a question on that issue, the DADT answer of 

yours, on a second round, which will be brief, I think. But, I will 

have another question or two on that same subject. 

Senator Begich. 

Senator BEGICH. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. 

Thank you both for being here. I know you’ve been here for several hours, so I’ll try to give you a random selection, because you’ve 

come through the snowstorm to my office, and I appreciate that. 

We had a good time there, having a good discussion about many 

issues. I have a couple of broad questions, then I’m going to kind 

of bring it down a little parochial. 

First, if I can follow up on the dwell-time issue. Based on the rebalancing that’s occurring, for soldiers that are listening, and for 

families that are listening, give me a sense of the difference that 

it will be for a family, today or next year versus 2, 3 years ago, 

in the amount of dwell time or time home they might have. Can 

you put that in kind of a term that people can see it and hear it? 

General CASEY. I can try, Senator, but for the last 5 years, a 

good portion of the force was deploying on 1 year out, 1 year back. 

We were, frankly, meeting ourselves coming and going. 

Senator BEGICH. Right. 

General CASEY. They’d come home, take their leave, come back, 

and immediately start training to go back. So, the time they were 

home, they weren’t home. 

Senator BEGICH. Right. 

General CASEY. I went down and visited a unit that was home 

for 18 months. The difference in pace between 18 months at home 

and 12 months at home was striking. The difference in pace between 24 months at home and 12 months at home is going to be 

even more striking. As I mentioned earlier, we expect to get 70 percent of the Active Force to 2 years at home by 2011, and 80 percent 

of the Guard and Reserve at 4 years at home by 2011. 

Senator BEGICH. When you say 2011, do you mean calendar year 

or fiscal year? 

General CASEY. By the end of the calendar year. 

Senator BEGICH. End of calendar year 2011. 

Very good. Thank you. I know you had mentioned it earlier, and 

I just wanted to kind of reemphasize, because I agree with you, and 

we’ve talked a little bit about this, in regards to the amount of 

dwell time is critical for the long-term health of the military. It 

doesn’t matter if it’s the Army or the Air Force, but Army, specifically, because the amount of time that you’re out is going to be critical for the long-term health. So, I want to say thank you for moving down that path. 

Mr. Secretary, did you have something that you wanted to add 

to that? 

Secretary MCHUGH. I was just going to say there’s another component to it, as well, that, if families are listening, the Chief and 

I certainly fully endorse the commitment that we’re not going to revert to 15-month deployments, and we’ll be sending folks out without the threat of stop loss. 

Senator BEGICH. Excellent. 

262 

Secretary MCHUGH. That doesn’t directly play into the dwell 

time, although, in a very real way, it does, because it requires more 

troops. But, families care very much about that, and I think they 

would want to be assured of that, as well. 

Senator BEGICH. That’s great. That’s a good point. It’s a combo 

package. 

Let me ask a couple more general questions and then I’m going 

to be on a couple of quick Alaska issues. 

I want to follow up with Senator Graham on mental health services and making sure you hire the right professionals. I heard the 

pay differential between the private-sector mental health providers 

and what we’re able to pay, there’s a gap there. Is that one of the 

challenges you have? Because if that’s the case, I think this committee, or members, would be very interested in trying to help 

solve that to make sure we’re competitive in the marketplace, especially as this economy is now turning around. Healthcare providers 

in the private sector will be one of the biggest fast-growth areas in 

the new economy, and we’re going to be competing with that. When 

I say we, the military. I want to make sure we are not at an economic disadvantage. 

Is that something you could get to me and indicate, at some 

point, if there is a gap? If so, what strategies do you have? Because 

as this economy picks up, the fastest-growing industry will be 

healthcare, and we will have a problem competing against that. Is 

that a fair request? 

General CASEY. Yes, sir. 

Senator BEGICH. Excellent. 

When people do retire, do you do exit interviews with those folks 

that are retiring, to determine why they’re leaving early? Is there 

an actual datapoint study that you guys utilize? 

General CASEY. I don’t know that we do retirees so much as we 

do soldiers or officers who leave before retirement. 

Senator BEGICH. Before retirement. 

General CASEY. I know we do very good sitdowns just to find out 

what’s on their mind and what’s motivating them to leave. I don’t 

know that we do that with retirees. 

Senator BEGICH. Actually, I misstated. The way you stated it was 

correct. 

General CASEY. Yes. 

Senator BEGICH. The early retirees, basically, people getting out 

before their 20 or 30 years. Do you put that in any kind of analysis 

that can be shared with this committee or with members? I’d be 

curious, what are those two or three top things that people say, 

‘‘This is why I’m leaving,’’ based on data? 

General CASEY. Right. We do have that data available. In fact, 

we recently completed a survey—it was finished up in the end of 

the summer last year—and it’s a general survey of the force. As 

part of that survey, it was repeated deployments that still remains 

the number one reason for soldiers leaving the Army. 

We also utilize our various intellectual centers, such as we maintain at West Point. I’m thinking specifically of our midgrade officers who were leaving the force in greater numbers than we’d like, 

and in greater numbers, I think, than we would expect. They’ve 

done some analysis to see what it was that they felt they weren’t 

263 

getting as part of their Army service. In large measure, it was educational and the rotations and to go to the various schools and such 

that we’re trying to respond to. So, it’s not something we look at 

holistically, but through bits and pieces, particularly where we’re 

finding challenges. We try to get whatever answers we can. 

Senator BEGICH. Very good. That helps. 

Let me get to, very quickly, a couple of quick Alaskan ones. This 

is one that you could respond to later, because it’s very, very specific. In Fairbanks, in the basic allowance for housing, there was 

a study done. When they did the study, it reduced the rates of 

what the soldiers would get for their housing in Fairbanks. I can 

tell you, from my experience of almost 25 years in the landlord 

business, that they did it at a time when the utility rates were 

lower and vacancy rates were higher, which is summer. It creates 

a problem, because then the analysis sets the rate, which then they 

will have to pay for or deal with as they go into the winter months, 

which was lower vacancy rates and the higher utility costs. The 

end result is, the soldiers—we’ve gotten calls on this—end up paying out of their pocket to make sure they can compensate for the 

housing allowance. 

Would you take a look at that? We will send you something a little more detailed. But, just in my 25-plus-years experience in the 

real estate business, the timing of the survey was probably not the 

most appropriate time, or they could have extended it over the winter-fall to get a better picture. Because you can go $2 or $3 a gallon 

heating-fuel differential between those months, as an example, and 

the rates can dramatically be different, based on winter and accessibility of the fuel and other things, especially in Fairbanks, which 

is a significant problem with heating issues. If you wouldn’t mind, 

just note that. 

The last thing I’ll say—only because Senator Udall isn’t here 

now, I can say it—that, of course, we have the best training 

grounds. We don’t have hills, we have mountains, and all three of 

us have talked about that in the past. But, as you progress on utilization of training facilities, the one, as I mentioned to you, is the 

unmanned aircraft. I think we have some superb locations that, as 

you consider all the deployments and reassignments of equipment, 

obviously we want to be engaged in that discussion. You know it 

better than I do by your ground troops up there, but what we have 

up there is exceptional. I’ll tell Senator Udall later that I credited 

his and I didn’t say anything about mine. 

Thank you very much for your testimony. 

Chairman LEVIN. You create a real problem for me, Senator 

Begich, because I’m tempted to talk about our training areas in 

Michigan, and I’m going to resist that temptation, only because of 

time limitations. 

I have a couple of questions. One has to do with equipment that 

we have authorized to go from Iraq—or, more technically, perhaps, 

Kuwait—to the Afghan Army. We are short on training that army, 

not just in the shortage of trainers I pointed out, but we also have 

not done what we need to do in terms of equipment. So, we authorized, in the last authorization bill, not just equipment that could 

go to the Iraqi army, even though it was not excess equipment. The 

same thing is true with the Afghan army. 

264 

We talked to one of our trainers over there, when we were there 

a few months ago, and he indicated, as a matter of fact, some of 

that equipment was beginning to arrive from Iraq-Kuwait into Afghanistan for the Afghan army, not just for our guys. 

In going through the numbers there, General, you indicated that 

half a billion dollars of excess equipment, I believe, was left for the 

Iraqis. Perhaps it was non-excess. I’m not sure. But, in any event, 

we have authorized, not just excess equipment, but non-excess 

equipment, understanding we’re going to have to replace that, but 

also understanding that it’s essential that we get equipment to the 

Afghan army if we’re serious about turning over responsibility for 

the security of Afghanistan to that army. 

Do you have any numbers at all on how much either excess or 

non-excess equipment has gone from the Iraq theater to the Afghan 

army or police? 

General CASEY. I know we’ve processed the Afghans’ uparmored 

Humvees, machine guns, and some ammunition and repair parts, 

but I don’t have any specific numbers. 

Chairman LEVIN. If you could get us that for the record, I’d appreciate it. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

The Department of the Army is using multiple means and authorities to transfer 

or sell equipment located in the Iraq Theater and other locations to the Afghanistan 

National Security Forces (ANSF). Current efforts to facilitate equipping the ANSF 

include: Foreign Military Sales of 1,626 Non-Excess Up Armored HMMWVs (1,317 

are for the Afghan National Police and 309 for the Afghan National Army); excess 

defense articles transfer of over 211,000 pieces of organizational clothing and individual equipment; 1,260 machine guns; approximately 6.5 million rounds of ammunition; and 2,500 life support items such as tents, light sets and folding cots. Additionally, the Department is processing a request for transferring over 5,000 pieces 

of excess, nonstandard equipment located in Iraq (commercial nontactical vehicles, 

communications, and maintenance-related equipment). 

Chairman LEVIN. Now, on this question of DADT, what you’ve 

indicated, appropriately, is that a moratorium could create complications for pending legal cases. But, the decision of the Commander in Chief to end the policy—the only issue being, in his 

mind, how and when, and not whether—has also got to create some 

complications for existing cases. If you were representing somebody, in an existing case, who was being discharged or threatened 

with discharge, I assume you’d ask for a stay until there’s a resolution of the matter. 

So, what I will need from you is your lawyers’ assessment as to 

whether or not there are complications, currently, with the decision 

of the Commander in Chief to end the policy, and just to have a 

study as to how it’s done, and to compare that to any complications 

which might occur from having a suspension of the discharges, 

pending a decision on whether to repeal. 

Remember, a moratorium or a suspension is not a repeal. That 

would mean that, if for some reason it were not repealed down the 

road, then the current discharge policy would stay in place. 

So, my request of you is that you get an assessment from your 

lawyers to this committee as to whether there are complications 

from the decision that’s been given by the Commander in Chief, 

relative to repeal down the road, and whether there are complications from a moratorium, which obviously there could be, as well 

265 

as from a down-the-road repeal announcement, and to compare for 

us whether or not, one way or the other, there are more or less 

complications. 

That’s not a question, other than to ask you whether or not you 

will ask your lawyers if they could prepare that assessment for us. 

Secretary MCHUGH. Absolutely. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

The analysis you requested is currently under review and consideration as part 

of the Secretary of Defense’s study of the potential repeal of the Don’t Ask, Don’t 

Tell (DADT) law. The Army is working closely with Department of Defense officials 

to assess the personnel, readiness, legal, and operational issues and impacts associated with action to suspend, modify or repeal DADT. Upon completion, it is expected 

the analysis will include the information outlined in the chairman’s request, which 

will be shared with the committee when available. While the Secretary’s comprehensive study is ongoing, the Army is committed to providing the committee with information on the Army’s implementation of current DADT law. 

Chairman LEVIN. We thank you both. We thank the men and 

women you lead. We particularly, again, want to acknowledge the 

presence of your special guests here today. We thank them for their 

service, for your son’s service, Mrs. Engeman. We are grateful for 

it. It’s a grateful Nation that is united behind our troops and our 

veterans, no longer facing the kind of divisions we had in previous 

engagements, such as Vietnam, but, regardless of policy differences, totally behind our forces, our men and women who put on 

the uniform of this country. 

Thank you all. 

We will stand adjourned. 

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR CARL LEVIN

ADAPTABILITY OF HIGHER-END COMBAT UNITS TO LOWER-END MISSIONS

1. Senator LEVIN. General Casey, the notion of a full spectrum force has been a 

central and enduring organizing, equipping, and training concept for the Army. Today’s range of potential security threats, and the likelihood that the Army will be 

called upon to meet simultaneous conventional and irregular challenges, calls for a 

much more adaptable, if still full-spectrum force. 

Over the years, the Army has argued that, as a rule, most capabilities required 

for higher-end combat operations can be adapted for application to lower-end missions. The Army’s modular brigade combat teams (BCTs)—whether infantry, heavy, 

or Stryker—can be task organized, or if necessary augmented, for lower-end missions such as stability operations and security force assistance missions, while remaining capable of full-spectrum operations. 

On the other hand, since the start of counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan 

and Iraq several senior Army leaders have acknowledged that the notion of lesser 

and included tasks at the lower end of the spectrum were not in fact easily adapted 

in units trained and ready for high-end conflict. 

The 2009 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) recognizes this challenge and directs specific structural changes in the Army including the conversion of at one 

heavy brigade to a medium Stryker brigade, the potential conversion of heavy to 

lighter brigades in the future, and increasing the number of combat aviation brigades to 13. 

What are the Army’s assumptions and observations today about the adaptability 

of higher-end combat units, equipment, and training for application in lower-end 

stability or counterinsurgency missions? 

General CASEY. We continue to rebalance the force to achieve the right mix of capabilities to meet current demands while preparing for future challenges. Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have shown that the right mix of BCT-types, properly tailored for the mission, possess full spectrum utility to protect our own forces 

as well as the local population and successfully train and partner with indigenous 

security forces. During the QDR we examined how to further institutionalize lessons 

learned in current operations as well as next steps to posture the Army to execute 

266 

Full Spectrum Operations as part of the Joint Force in the mid- to far-term. Full 

Spectrum Operations recognizes the unpredictability of the environment and hybrid 

nature of kinetic and non-kinetic threats. The key to meeting this guidance and 

maintaining the balance outlined by the Secretary of Defense is the modularization 

and rapid mission tailoring of the BCT through the Army Force General 

(ARFORGEN) Cycle. This is the base general purpose force organizational construct 

designed to balance the offense, defense, stability, and civil support operations as 

part of the Joint Force. 

The QDR outlines the importance of providing a highly adaptable, versatile Security Force Assistance (SFA) capability for all combatant commanders in the future. 

The BCT contains a range of experience in combat arms, combat support and combat service support. This composition serves as a firm base of trainers and advisors, 

together with the integral supporting staff. It has the ability to task-organize constituent elements to provide teams of the required size and skill set for each mission, providing simultaneous sustained SFA across multiple locations using organic 

command and staff capabilities. 

The Army has developed numerous initiatives to improve and complement the 

adaptability of BCTs for stability and counter-insurgency missions. The Army’s Institutional or Generating Force can augment the operating force to conduct SFA. 

Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) is one example of this capability with 

32 schools and centers at 16 Army installations—all of which can provide ‘‘Train the 

trainer’’ experts. The Army has developed a new SFA doctrine, established a permanent SFA training formation and associated planning teams in Geographic Combatant Commands. It has enhanced SFA-related education, training and gaming; increased foreign language and cultural training; and increased study and publication 

of SFA lessons learned. 

2. Senator LEVIN. General Casey, what risks might additional emphasis on nonconventional missions, in doctrine and training, pose for the Army’s ability to conduct traditional high-end combat missions? 

General CASEY. The nature of conflict today requires a flexible approach for anticipating force requirements. Accordingly, the Army’s greatest emphasis must be on 

creating a versatile force. We must prepare soldiers, units and their equipment for 

future missions, both conventional and non-conventional, by providing adequate 

time to train for full-spectrum operations and to reduce uncertainty and stress for 

soldiers and their families. We continue to assess and transform the force to meet 

combatant commanders’ requirements by revising our modernization strategy, completing transformation from Cold War legacy formations to modular formations and 

improving business processes in order to apply resources efficiently. 

Although we are focused on prevailing in current counterinsurgency operations, 

improving the Army’s deployment to dwell time ratios will increase training opportunities across the full-spectrum of operations necessary to meet future requirements. Rebalancing the force remains an essential part of mitigating risk from unforeseen contingencies for our Army. Restoring readiness will enable the Army to 

prepare for and accomplish all assigned missions as a member of the Joint Force. 

Mitigating these risks will sustain our Army, which is the most experienced combat 

force in the world. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN

M4 CARBINE

3. Senator LIEBERMAN. General Casey, I understand that although the M4 Carbine performed to Army specifications during the battle of Wanat, you are now reviewing options to improve that weapon’s performance during sustained firefights, 

namely by requiring a thicker barrel. I am glad that the Army is making these improvements, and the only concern that I have is that the process for approving them 

may take too long. What steps are you taking to expedite the speed with which 

these improvements for the M4 reach our troops in the field? 

General CASEY. The Army had previously approved the heavier barrel, as well as 

a full auto trigger mechanism. These improvements are already in use by our Special Operations units, who use the M4A1. We are also incorporating an ambidextrous fire control selector into the M4 series. The heavy barrel and ambidextrous 

selector will begin to reach our conventional forces in the fourth quarter of fiscal 

year 2010. The full auto trigger will be available in the second quarter of fiscal year 

2011. The next series of improvements include an improved rail system and weapon 

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bolt and carrier. These will be available in the second and fourth quarter fiscal year 

2012, respectively. 

The Army is continually testing and upgrading the carbine. For example, since 

1991 more than 8 million rounds have been fired in product improvement testing. 

As a result of this testing, over 62 performance enhancing improvements have been 

incorporated into the carbine design to include the trigger assembly, extractor 

spring, recoil buffer, barrel, chamber and bolt. These improvements have made a 

significant difference to the mean time between stoppages (MRBF) for the weapon. 

The requirement for the M4 is 600 MRBF, but with these improvements applied 

testing has demonstrated the reliability is over 3,600 MRBF. 

ARMY FORCE STRUCTURE

4. Senator LIEBERMAN. Secretary McHugh, the report accompanying the Senate 

Armed Services Committee’s mark of the National Defense Authorization Act for 

Fiscal Year 2010 included a special interest item requiring a report providing an 

analysis comparison, and projected impacts of limiting the Army’s Active component 

to 45 rather than 48 BCTs through 2012. I note that the deadline for that report 

is March 1, 2010—can you reconfirm that you will submit this report by that deadline? 

Secretary MCHUGH. The Army anticipates providing the committee with an interim report no later than 4 March and a final response by 30 April 2010. We are 

reviewing the recent troop increase in Afghanistan and the Iraq drawdown plan to 

better assess the effects of maintaining the Army at 45 versus 48 Active BCTs. 

LAND WARRIOR PROGRAM

5. Senator LIEBERMAN. Secretary McHugh, the Land Warrior system has received 

positive reviews from the soldiers who have used it in Iraq and Afghanistan, and 

it is my understanding that there are currently units with operational needs statements that have not received Land Warrior equipment due to funding constraints 

and production lead times. In light of these recent requests for Land Warrior systems, is it fair to conclude that the Army prematurely terminated this program? 

Secretary MCHUGH. No. The Army learned valuable lessons from the Land Warrior system but it did not represent the complete capability we desired. The Ground 

Soldier System is expected to cost less, weigh less, and provide greater operational 

mission duration using more advanced technologies than were resident in the original Land Warrior system. Fielding of the Ground Soldier System is expected to 

begin in fiscal year 2012. 

6. Senator LIEBERMAN. Secretary McHugh, now that Ground Soldier System is 

going into production, what lessons have been learned by the Army from the Land 

Warrior fielding that would assist them in providing this capability to dismounted 

troops in a timely manner? 

Secretary MCHUGH. The Army learned a great deal from the Land Warrior program, and we are applying these lessons to our Ground Soldier System in order to 

get the best capability to our dismounted soldiers in the most efficient manner possible. For example, the Army learned that soldier acceptance of the system and its 

capabilities is critical to achieving operational success; and effective training at the 

individual and collective unit levels plays a vital role in that acceptance. Soldier and 

unit leader input has resulted in recommendations to improve form, fit, and function. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR BILL NELSON

ARMY TEST RANGE UNFUNDED REQUIREMENTS

7. Senator BILL NELSON. General Casey, on February 22, the Senate Armed Services Committee received a copy of a letter you wrote on February 19 to Representative Buck McKeon, the ranking member of the House Armed Services Committee, 

in which you provided a list of what are called unfunded requirements. On that list 

were two items that relate to the Army’s test infrastructure: $18 million for Test 

and Evaluation Instrumentation, and $23 million for Army Test Range Infrastructure. 

As the chairman of the Emerging Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee, I am 

glad to see the Army indicating that additional funding for these items would, as 

you say in your letter, ‘‘provide added value to commanders in the field.’’ This comVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:37 May 06, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00273 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\62155.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
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mittee has been concerned for many years about the need to improve our military 

test and evaluation infrastructure. 

Can you tell me how these additional funds would improve the Army’s ability to 

conduct test and evaluation of our ever more complex weapon systems? 

General CASEY. The additional funds would be used for the replacement and restoration of critical infrastructure and instrumentation, such as radars, optics, telemetry and digital systems. This new equipment/infrastructure will better align our 

testing with changing requirements and will allow us to monitor/analyze more complex technologies during evaluations and experiments. The funds would also provide 

for modeling and simulation to address survivability, reliability, maintainability and 

the increased complexity of ballistics, which affects every major Army acquisition 

program. 

NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVE COMPONENT OPERATIONAL TEMPOS

8. Senator BILL NELSON. Secretary McHugh and General Casey, the wars in Iraq 

and Afghanistan have transformed our Guard and Reserve Forces from Strategic 

Reserves to an operational force. The increased demand placed on these 

servicemembers has naturally led to increased requirements for more training, 

equipment, and facilities. What are the biggest challenges you face with the high 

operational tempo for the Guard and Reserve Forces? 

Secretary MCHUGH and General CASEY. Even as the men and women of the Army 

National Guard (ARNG) continue to demonstrate their dedication to the Nation, the 

reality is that there are significant challenges for Guard and Reserve Forces. While 

we continue with the transformation of the ARNG into an Operational Force, the 

Army is using the ARFORGEN model to try to make deployments predictable and 

to provide stability for soldiers, families, and their employers. The ARNG also has 

Homeland Defense and Civil Support missions, which place additional demands and 

requirements on the soldiers and their equipment. 

The men and women of the ARNG can meet the demands of the operational 

tempo, provided that they are properly prepared physically and have the resources 

available to complete their Federal and State missions. The citizen-soldier must 

have access to proper medical and dental care, before, during, and after mobilization 

because when soldiers are not available for medical reasons, it has a ripple effect 

as soldiers are pulled from other units to plug holes. Providing care also promotes 

stability for families by reducing the financial and personal impacts of serving as 

a member of the ARNG. 

Equipment has also been strained by the operational tempo over the past 8 years. 

The dual-use equipment within the ARNG is vital to both the Federal and State 

missions. As conditions have changed outside the borders of the United States, so 

too have conditions within the borders. These changing requirements must be constantly evaluated to ensure that the ARNG is equipped to meet the challenges of 

today and tomorrow with equipment that is available, well-maintained, and relevant. 

The ARNG also faces a difficult challenge with regard to individual soldier training. Soldiers awaiting training occupy a position within a unit in the ARNG, even 

though they are nondeployable. This impacts overall readiness and forces the ARNG 

to cross-level soldiers from other units. As with the medically nondeployable, this 

has a ripple effect over time that creates stress on soldiers, families, and employers. 

9. Senator BILL NELSON. Secretary McHugh and General Casey, what risk does 

your budget take with equipping and training the Guard and Reserves? 

Secretary MCHUGH and General CASEY. The ARNG and Army Reserve are being 

equipped based on a deliberate investment plan which is commensurate with their 

mission and commitments. Over the last 4 years, the ARNG and Army Reserve have 

been equipped and modernized at a pace exceeding that of the Active component. 

Shortages do remain, but working with the Reserve components we are ensuring 

they have the necessary equipment to execute their State and Federal commitments. 

From the Individual Training perspective, the ARNG accepts risk in certain functional training courses in order to maintain the necessary Duty Military Occupational Skills Qualification rate for deploying units. This ensures that soldiers are 

qualified to perform their primary duties when deployed. Functional courses teach 

soldiers secondary skills such as advanced gunnery and maintenance courses, and 

airborne or air assault training. The Army Reserve has adapted a similar program. 

Soldiers from the ARNG and the Army Reserve also go through Mobilization Training prior to deploying. 

269 

10. Senator BILL NELSON. Secretary McHugh and General Casey, please describe 

the Grow the Force initiatives that will increase the Army Reserve Forces in Florida 

and other States. 

Secretary MCHUGH and General CASEY. Pursuant to the Grow the Army Initiative, the Army Reserve was granted an increase in Force Structure Allowance from 

205,000 to 206,000. Additionally, the Army Reserve restructured 16,000 

unstructured Trainees, Transients, Holdees and Students spaces into structured 

forces to help meet the Army’s increased operational requirements. Due to 

resourcing constraints, the Army Reserve has programmed the activation of these 

new units over a 5 year period (fiscal year 2009–fiscal year 2014) with the majority 

of actions occurring in fiscal year 2010–2011. In some cases, previously scheduled 

inactivating units are retained in the force, resulting in no local community disruption. Given that programming the force is a continuous process, the original Grow 

the Army list has changed. Today, there are 144 Army Reserve units programmed 

in 32 States and Puerto Rico. Florida has 11 units in 6 communities in the Grow 

the Army program. The ARNG has no ‘‘Grow-the-Force Initiatives’’ that will increase forces. 

11. Senator BILL NELSON. Secretary McHugh and General Casey, what additional 

military construction (MILCON) funding is needed to rehabilitate and construct Reserve centers and National Guard facilities for training and duty? 

Secretary MCHUGH and General CASEY. The funds requested in President’s fiscal 

year 2011 budget will be used complete the USAR’s Grow the Army efforts in order 

to provide new facilities for additional soldiers. ‘‘Military Construction Army Reserve’’ funding, however, is not sufficient to address all of the USAR’s requirements, 

which include modernizing our legacy facilities and upgrading our facilities to meet 

current mission standards and Anti-Terrorism/Force Protection (AT/FP) set back requirements. The Army Reserve would need $180 million in additional MILCON 

funding to rehabilitate and construct these Reserve centers for training and duty. 

These specific construction projects are as follows: 

Installation Location Project Title Cost 

Fort Collins ........................................................ CO Army Reserve Center ......................................... $11,200 

Homewood .......................................................... IL Army Reserve Center ......................................... 12,800 

Rockford ............................................................. IL Army Reserve Center/Land ................................ 10,800 

Fort Benjamin Harrison ..................................... IN Army Reserve Center ......................................... 50,000 

Kansas City ........................................................ KS Army Reserve Center/Land ................................ 16,000 

St. Joseph .......................................................... MN Army Reserve Center ......................................... 9,000 

St. Charles ......................................................... MO Army Reserve Center ......................................... 26,000 

Greensboro ......................................................... NC Army Reserve Center/Land ................................ 16,500 

Schenectady ....................................................... NY Army Reserve Center ......................................... 16,000 

Orangeburg ........................................................ SC Army Reserve Center/Land ................................ 11,400 

Total $179,700 

The ARNG requires $1.5 billion a year for 20 years to revitalize its facilities. 

MOBILIZATION FOR TRAINING FOR RESERVE COMPONENT SOLDIERS

12. Senator BILL NELSON. Secretary McHugh and General Casey, the Army recently withdrew the mobilization for training option for Reserve component soldiers. 

This concept relieved pressure on the State National Guard training budgets, and 

it lengthened the dwell time for soldiers in some cases. What prompted this change 

in policy, your assessment of the change, and whether or not it is something that 

should be revisited? 

Secretary MCHUGH and General CASEY. Mobilization for Training is a cumbersome system that was not being effectively used by the state Adjutants General. 

In most cases, the Mobilization for Training program was used to ensure that soldiers received their requisite military education. With the current ARFORGEN 

cycle, however, soldiers are being afforded time to get needed training. Funding the 

Army School Systems budget will help to ensure that the Mobilization for Training 

program is no longer necessary. 

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7TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP

13. Senator BILL NELSON. Secretary McHugh and General Casey, the Army’s 7th 

Special Forces Group is in the process of moving from Fort Bragg, NC, to Eglin Air 

Force Base, FL, to increase joint training opportunities between the Army and Air 

Force Special Forces. What is the status of the move? 

Secretary MCHUGH and General CASEY. The move of the 7th Special Forces Group 

(SFG) to Eglin Air Force Base (AFB) in accordance with Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) is proceeding as planned. Construction is on or ahead of schedule and 

is to be completed no later than 1 August 2011. The unit move is slated for August 

and September 2011. The 7th SFG has advanced party elements in place at Eglin 

AFB to coordinate and facilitate the logistics, and the operations associated with the 

arrival of the 7th SFG. 

14. Senator BILL NELSON. Secretary McHugh and General Casey, is the move on 

time? 

Secretary MCHUGH and General CASEY. The BRAC move of the 7th SFG is currently on schedule, and is to be completed by 15 September 2011. 

15. Senator BILL NELSON. Secretary McHugh and General Casey, what issues remain? 

Secretary MCHUGH and General CASEY. There are no BRAC related issues at this 

time. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED B. SENATOR E. BENJAMIN NELSON

GUARD AND RESERVE MILITARY CONSTRUCTION

16. Senator BEN NELSON. Secretary McHugh and General Casey, your budget requests include significant funding increases to replace aging facilities for the National Guard and the Reserves. This investment is critical considering the Guard 

and Reserve personnel comprise some 51 percent of your end-strength. However, 

your request for Guard and Reserve MILCON is $1.2 billion, which is less than 1 

percent of your total base budget and only a fifth of your total MILCON request. 

Some of Nebraska’s Guard units are lacking adequate space to store reset and new 

equipment. For example, Nebraska units lack 33 acres for improved and unimproved parking to store new trucks, tractors, and trailers, as well as 8,000 square 

feet of heated storage and 3,500 square feet of security vault storage. What is the 

current state of our Guard and Reserve infrastructure, both nationally and within 

Nebraska? 

Secretary MCHUGH and General CASEY. Army Reserve Nationally: The average 

age of Army Reserve facilities is over 42 years old. The majority of facilities are 

under-sized for today’s mission requirements, encroached upon by local community 

activities and not compliant with Anti-Terrorism/Force Protection (AT/FP) standards. BRAC Act funding helped to provide over 120 new AFRCs that meet today’s 

operational and training needs, as well as to modernize 11 percent of the Army Reserve Center facility inventory. 

Army Reserve Nebraska: The Army Reserve will construct and modernize 7 of 13 

facilities within the next 7 years. The remaining 6 facilities are inadequate and are 

not AT/FP compliant. The facility in Fremont will be rehabilitated in fiscal year 

2015 and the remaining five facilities are not currently programmed. 

ARNG Nationally: The Army is proposing in the fiscal year 2011 budget submission Army National Guard MILCON funding of $874 million, more than in any previous budget submission. In the fiscal year 2011 budget, the ARNG has 20 projects 

where it is proposing to either build new or revitalize existing Readiness Centers 

to address space or condition shortfalls or to support new missions. 

The ARNG infrastructure has about 80 percent of the required square footage, 

and the average facility requires about 20 percent of its original value in repairs. 

Critical shortfalls include Readiness Centers, Training Facilities, and Maintenance 

Facilities. Replacing aging and inadequate facilities with modern facilities that 

allow efficient training to support the ARFORGEN cycle is a high priority for the 

Army and the National Guard. 

ARNG Nebraska: Nebraska’s ARNG infrastructure also has about 80 percent of 

required building square footage, and the average facility requires about 20 percent 

of its original value in repairs. There are two MILCON Projects proposed for Nebraska in the fiscal year 2011 budget: a Readiness Center in Mead and a Readiness 

Center addition or alteration in Lincoln. 

271 

17. Senator BEN NELSON. Secretary McHugh and General Casey, you noted that 

there is a concern that the investment in infrastructure isn’t enough and that equipment may not be properly stored and maintained. I am concerned that this will undermine the readiness. What is being done to address what are known facility gaps? 

Secretary MCHUGH and General CASEY. The ARNG is pursuing a number of options to address well-known facility gaps related to equipment storage and maintenance. Storage issues alone total about $2.2 billion. This number reflects the upfront 

costs related to the requirements of an Operational Force. Projects include constructing secured parking areas and storage buildings, acquiring land and modifying 

facilities (especially arms vaults to meet code requirements and increase capacity). 

Most states have taken a hard look at this shortfall and have plans to execute the 

funds quickly to resolve increasing storage requirements. Short-term solutions include installing portable vaults and erecting unheated storage buildings, which will 

allow rapid installation and construction. Many states have looked at longer-term 

solutions, such as acquiring additional land. Nearly all states have itemized their 

shortfalls and stand ready to remedy these and other well-known facility gaps. 

18. Senator BEN NELSON. General Casey, barring constraints from other mission 

areas, what level of funding do you need to address all your MILCON requirements? 

General CASEY. Competing requirements from other mission areas will always be 

a constraint. MILCON funding is currently not sufficient to address all of the 

Army’s MILCON requirements. The Army has prioritized its existing resources to 

support the Army Modular Force, Grow the Army, completing BRAC, completing 

Global Defense Posture Realignment, and completing the barracks modernization. 

Long term solutions for all of the remaining requirements (such as recapitalizing 

existing facilities for existing missions) necessitates a long-term funding strategy beyond the fiscal year 2012–2017 POM. Obsolete legacy facilities adversely affect readiness, organizations, missions and installations across the Army. The level of funding that the ARNG requires for the facility revitalization is $1.5 billion a year for 

20 years. At this level of funding the ARNG will meet its readiness requirements. 

BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE

19. Senator BEN NELSON. General Casey, in your letter of February 19 to the 

House Armed Services Committee, you indicated that one of the so-called unfunded 

requirements of the Army is the Patriot missile defense system. Your letter indicated that an additional $134 million of funding for Patriot would be valuable to 

our combatant commanders. The Patriot system is our only combat-proven missile 

defense system, and is a critical element of our ability to defend our forward deployed forces and allies against existing short- and medium-range ballistic missiles. 

Can you tell me how these additional funds would be used to improve the Army’s 

Patriot capability? 

General CASEY. The Patriot Advanced Capability-Phase 3 (PAC–3) missile is a hit 

to kill surface-to-air interceptor. It provides the most robust protection for troops 

and critical infrastructure against Tactical Ballistic Missiles and Air Breathing 

threats. Funds are necessary to repair and recertify PAC–3 missiles and return 

them to the operational force. The Enhanced Launcher Electronic System (ELES) 

is the upgrade kit applied to aging PAC–2 launching stations, to upgrade them to 

fire the PAC–3 missile. The proposed funding would procure 24 additional ELES upgrade kits in fiscal year 2011, upgrading 24 additional PAC–2 launchers to the 

PAC–3 capability. 

20. Senator BEN NELSON. General Casey, do you believe additional Patriot capabilities would help meet the requirements of our combatant commanders to defend 

against short- and medium-range ballistic missiles from countries like North Korea 

and Iran? 

General CASEY. Given the rapid proliferation of short- and medium-range ballistic 

missiles, it is critical that we continue to modernize and grow our regional ballistic 

missile defense capabilities. We are already increasing our Patriot capacity by growing our PAC–3 battalions from 13 to 15 over the next 2 years. Within the broader 

ballistic missile defense strategy, as articulated in the January 2010 Ballistic Missile Review Report, 15 Patriot battalions is sufficient capacity to address those 

threats that the Patriot can defend against. Our modernization strategy will also 

focus on complementary ballistic missile defense capabilities, including the Terminal 

High-Altitude Area Defense system currently being fielded, the AN/TYP–2 radar, 

and overarching command and control battle management architecture. AdditionVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:37 May 06, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00277 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\62155.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
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ally, it is important that we continue to procure PAC–3 missiles and Patriot launcher upgrades to enhance the capability of our Patriot Battalions. 

HUMAN CAPITAL

21. Senator BEN NELSON. General Casey, from a human capital perspective, one 

of the biggest challenges facing the Services will be managing expanding and new 

missions while maintaining a fixed end-strength. The intelligence, surveillance, and 

reconnaissance (ISR) mission is an area that is seeing a great deal of growth across 

all of the Services due in large part to the significant expansion of unmanned aerial 

vehicles (UAVs) or remotely piloted aircraft. What is the current state of your training pipeline for operators and analysts, and how are you expanding it to meet demand? 

General CASEY. The Army approach to Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) training is a systematic, module-based training program, which produces highly trained, 

professional and Federal Aviation Administration tested Enlisted UAS operators. 

We have Common Soldier UAS Operator training for Shadow, Hunter, WarriorAlpha, and the Extended Range/Multi-purpose (ERMP) UAS. 

Through 2004, we trained less than 1,000 operators and maintainers per year on 

a single shift, Monday through Friday. In 2005, we expanded to two shifts to meet 

the increasing demand. In 2008 and 2009, we hired and trained 253 additional instructors and support personnel, and currently train in three shifts at multiple locations to accommodate the 2,000+ operators and maintainers programmed for 2010. 

Current training throughput requires Libby Army Airfield (LAAF) operations 6 days 

per week, 16 hours per day. The Army is in the process of validating the requirement to increase airfield operations at LAAF to 6 days per week, 24 hours per day 

in order to meet the future UAS training requirements. 

To meet growing requirements for analysts, the Army’s Intelligence Center of Excellence has doubled the annual number of Imagery Analysts graduates over the 

past 5 years. Since 2005, over 1,500 Imagery Analysts have been trained at Fort 

Huachuca. This has resulted in a current on hand strength of 110 percent for Active 

Army Imagery Analysts (MOS 35G) throughout the force. 

Full Motion Video (FMV) training is an integral part of the 105-day Imagery Analyst course where students are exposed to current tactics, techniques and procedures 

(TTPs) used in overseas contingency operations (OCOs). Students utilize the Distributed Common Ground System—Army approved software for exploitation of all Full 

Motion Video (FMV). Soldiers in training also receive further scenario-based FMV 

training as they conduct convoy live-fire exercises with a UAS flying in support of 

the mission. Additional exposure to FMV exploitation in support of intelligence, surveillance and exploitation comes during a 10-day capstone exercise during which 

students plan, execute and exploit simulated UAS missions in support of BCT requirements/operations. 

22. Senator BEN NELSON. General Casey, what kind of retention rates are you 

seeing in UAV pilot and sensor operators and intelligence analyst specialties? 

General CASEY. The Army is retaining nearly 100 percent of its warrant officer 

Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) 150U, (Tactical Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 

(TUAV) Operations Technicians), who have trained and deployed in this specialty 

over the past 5 years. 

Although the Army transferred this specialty from Military Intelligence to the 

Aviation in September 2008, it was originally established under MOS 350U, Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Operations Technician. Since its transfer, the MOS has been 

restructured to be managed with the Army’s other Aviation skills. It is currently 

in the fourth year of a 5-year growth and integration plan within the Aviation 

Branch and is at 89 percent of assigned strength. 

This specialty’s unusually high retention rate is to be expected during its initial 

development. Personnel are selected for their longevity and interest, and, therefore, 

are very likely to continue service. As the specialty matures beyond the initial 

growth phase, however, the Army expects to see an increase in losses that more 

closely resemble other Aviation Warrant Officer specialties. Regarding enlisted personnel, the 15W Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Operators specialty is retaining just 

under 95 percent of first-term inventory (approximately 500 soldiers), as compared 

to the average first-term retention across all enlisted specialties of just over 87 percent. 

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UNMANNED AIRCRAFT

23. Senator BEN NELSON. General Casey, with regard to mission effectiveness, 

how are you coordinating efforts with the Air Force to integrate your growing fleet 

of drones with their unmanned and manned aircraft into concept of operations that 

will ensure safe and effective mission execution? 

General CASEY. Each of the Services have missions that require specific capabilities, which are often unique to that Service. For example, the Navy has a requirement to support maritime operations using shipborne systems. The need to share 

information across all Services, however, is not unique. To that end, the Department 

of Defense (DOD) has stressed interoperability between the Services as the cornerstone of all manned and unmanned Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance 

system acquisitions and employments. 

Today, for example, a ground maneuver commander can expect full motion video 

transmitted from any manned or unmanned aircraft overhead will be received and 

displayed by another Service’s remote video receiver. This has been made possible 

through the Services working closely together to develop interoperable data link protocols for control, video and encryption. To ensure safe and effective mission execution, we use joint processes, which apply to both manned and unmanned systems, 

to ‘‘de-conflict’’ airspace and layer assets to provide the best mission profiles. 

24. Senator BEN NELSON. Secretary McHugh, what process does DOD have to 

produce a comprehensive plan to integrate policy and requirements across the Services for unmanned aircraft programs? 

Secretary MCHUGH. In 2007, due to the diversity of the Services’ unmanned aircraft programs, DOD created the UASs Task Force to coordinate policies and acquisitions across DOD. Although the Services retain their individual Title 10 authorities and responsibilities, this organization, led by the Under Secretary of Defense 

for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, is the central clearinghouse for interoperability protocols, national airspace access initiatives and the development of common procurements where applicable. An example of this close cooperation between 

the Services can be seen in real time transmission of Full Motion Video (FMV). 

By adhering to a set of uniform standards for interoperability, the Army One System Remote Video Terminal, and similar systems in other Services, receive real 

time FMV from all transmitting manned and unmanned aircraft overhead. This 

interoperability enables joint support of combat operations regardless of the Services 

involved. Additionally, policy is being developed and published by the Joint Staff, 

which will guide standards of training for UAS operators across the Services. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JIM WEBB

TRANSFER OF OWNERSHIP OF FORT MONROE, VA

25. Senator WEBB. Secretary McHugh, it has come to my attention that three critical health and safety projects at Fort Monroe, VA, remain unfunded, in spite of the 

Army’s plan to transfer ownership of that installation’s property to the Commonwealth of Virginia in 2011. I realize BRAC law does not provide for new MILCON, 

however, infrastructure remediation, modernization, and maintenance that will affect the health and safety of the installation’s current staff and personnel or its future owner should be completed prior to the transfer of this property. These critical 

projects are: 

1. $10.1 million to upgrade the water supply system to provide adequate supply 

for the fire-suppression system; 

2. $15.0 million to bring sanitary sewer infrastructure up to Virginia Department 

of Environmental Quality standards; and 

3. $20 million to complete flood-protection projects. 

What are the Army’s plans to address these health and safety requirements before 

Fort Monroe is transferred to Virginia at the end of fiscal year 2011? 

Secretary MCHUGH. The current conditions of these systems meets current Federal health and safety standards and are operating properly to ensure the safety of 

our soldiers, our civilians and their families. We have invested funds to ensure that 

the fire suppression system meets all operational requirements with no shortfalls 

in safety standards. The sanitary sewer infrastructure meets Federal safety standards, and in 2003 the Army initiated and completed a $26 million flood control construction project. 

274 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR KAY R. HAGAN

RECAPITALIZATION OF HIGH MOBILITY MULTI-PURPOSE WHEELED VEHICLES

26. Senator HAGAN. General Casey, I understand the Army is in the process of 

recapitalizing its Humvees to increase survivability and mobility. What is the status 

of the Army’s Humvee recapitalization program? 

General CASEY. The Army is developing a program to continue the recapitalization of High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMWWVs) currently underway at Red River and Letterkenny Army Depots. We have requested $983 million 

in fiscal year 2011 for this effort, and may request permission to reprogram some 

amount of fiscal year 2010 funding to support this program. 

27. Senator HAGAN. General Casey, what are the requirements? 

General CASEY. The Army will recapitalize approximately 8,390 legacy High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs) to reduce the fleet age as 

HMMWVs will remain in the Army’s fleet through at least 2025. We will also have 

the requirement to recapitalize over 7,000 Up Armored HMMWVs returning from 

theater as we responsibility draw down from Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom. 

JOINT LIGHT TACTICAL VEHICLE COST

28. Senator HAGAN. General Casey, I understand it is difficult to generate an accurate cost estimate of the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) program because it 

is still in development. However, defense analysts suggest the JLTV program may 

cost as much as $30 to $70 billion, depending upon the final unit cost of the vehicle 

and the number procured. What is the Army’s JLTV procurement requirement, and 

what is the current estimated per vehicle cost? 

General CASEY. The current Army JLTV procurement requirement is 54,883 vehicles. However, the Army is in the process of developing and refining our tactical 

wheeled vehicle strategy; therefore, a final planned JLTV quantity has not been determined. The Army is creating a flexible vehicle strategy emphasizing a mixed fleet 

approach that spans performance, protection and payload. Planning figures are subject to change as the Army’s tactical wheeled vehicles strategy evolves, the availability of base funding changes, and service requirements develop. The average base 

vehicle cost is between $370,000–$400,000, including general and administrative 

fees and profit. This base vehicle cost includes hull/structure, suspension, power 

pack/drive train, auxiliary automotive, ring mount, Gunners Protection Kit and Government Furnished Equipment A–Kit (all in-dash wiring and items integral to the 

vehicle). 

29. Senator HAGAN. General Casey, will the Army have to reduce total JLTV acquisition quantities or scale back JLTV capabilities in order to deal with rising 

costs? 

General CASEY. The Army is actively pursuing this vehicle. Although the final 

planned quantity has not been determined, the current procurement requirement 

remains 54,883 vehicles. The program is in the Technology Development (TD) 

Phase. The requirements and cost data developed during the TD phase are being 

evaluated to provide an affordable system that is balanced between payload, performance and protection. Based on current estimates of quantity, schedule, and 

technical capability, there has been no cost growth and no reduction in acquisition 

quantities. 

NEXT GENERATION GROUND VEHICLE

30. Senator HAGAN. Secretary McHugh and General Casey, Secretary Gates emphasized the importance of having the Army adequately develop a next generation 

ground vehicle capability that takes into account and adapts to the lessons learned 

in theater. Can you discuss the status of the Army’s assessment with the Marine 

Corps on joint capability gaps for ground vehicles? 

Secretary MCHUGH and General CASEY. Future Combat Systems Acquisition Decision Memorandum, dated 23 June 2009, directed the Army, in conjunction with the 

Marine Corps, to ‘‘initiate actions to assess joint capability gaps for manned ground 

vehicles.’’ The Army Capabilities Integration Center and the Marine Corps Combat 

Development Command implemented a consolidated assessment process from June 

to August 2009. Much like the Army’s and Marine Corps’ earlier assessments for 

the JLTV, this review included comprehensive lessons learned, current operational 

275 

data for specific types of platforms and seminar wargames with both Generating 

Force and Operating Force members. 

In August 2009, the Army-Marine Corps Board approved the joint capability gap 

assessment for manned ground vehicles, which addresses protection, network, mobility and lethality shortfalls. This was included in the Army’s submission to the 

Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) as part of the approval process for 

the Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV) Initial Capabilities Document in November 2009. 

The next formal step in the requirements process is submission of a Capabilities Development Document to the JROC. 

31. Senator HAGAN. Secretary McHugh and General Casey, can you also discuss 

how the assessment is providing new requirements for Army GCV modernization? 

Secretary MCHUGH and General CASEY. The joint capability gaps assessment for 

manned ground vehicles provided key insights into prioritizing modernization efforts 

for all combat vehicles. We apply these lessons learned in our analysis of vehicle 

upgrades, divestments and new procurements. For example, the capability gaps in 

protection underpin our efforts to improve Stryker protection. 

The assessment also weighed heavily in drafting the operational requirements for 

the GCV (e.g., new kinds of weapon systems and/or equipment needed by the 

warfighter in current operations). For example, the capability gaps identified regarding protected mobility and non-lethal assets for manned ground vehicles led to 

specific operational requirements in the draft GCV Capabilities Development Document. 

32. Senator HAGAN. Secretary McHugh and General Casey, what effect will the 

vehicle modernization program have on the Army’s force structure, operational capabilities, procurement, and budget requirements? 

Secretary MCHUGH and General CASEY. The Army’s combat vehicle modernization 

is a combination of the new GCV program with divestiture and recapitalization 

(RECAP) of other existing combat vehicles, to include rebuilds and upgrades. 

RECAP will continue for the Abrams, Paladin, and Stryker and RESET will continue for Bradley as interim solutions until GCV is available. Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicle variants will also provide protected mobility. 

The GCV effort is part of a holistic Army plan to modernize its combat vehicle 

fleet within the existing force structure. The GCV platform will be highly survivable, mobile and versatile. The GCV is the first vehicle that will be designed from 

the ground up to operate in an improvised explosive device (IED) environment. It 

is envisioned to have greater lethality and ballistic protection than a Bradley, greater IED and mine protection than an MRAP, and the cross country mobility of an 

Abrams tank. 

Our intent for the first installment of GCV procurement is conduct a one for one 

replacement of Bradley Infantry Fighting vehicles in Heavy BCTs with the first brigade being equipped in fiscal year 2019. In conjunction with developing our program 

for fiscal year 2012–2017, we will develop a balanced modernization effort across our 

platforms based on capability needs and the resources available. 

ALTERNATIVE FUEL AND POWER

33. Senator HAGAN. Secretary McHugh and General Casey, Afghanistan’s mountainous terrain poses significant logistical challenges, which drives up the cost of 

our operations in theater. I believe we need to engage in significant research and 

development initiatives involving alternative fuel and power sources, as well as fuel 

efficient engines for the Army’s tactical wheeled vehicles. What are the Army Research Office and Program Executive Office doing to increase the fuel efficiency of 

tactical wheeled vehicles? 

Secretary MCHUGH and General CASEY. Fuel efficiency is a Key System Attribute 

(KSA) in the JLTV Capability Development Document. The JLTV effort is the future of the light tactical vehicle fleet. The fuel efficiency KSA states that the JLTV 

shall achieve 60 (Threshold) 65 (Objective) ton-miles per gallon as measured at 

gross vehicle weight (including armor) using Test Operating Procedure 2.2.603 over 

the Munson Standard Fuel Course. The Tank and Automotive Research, Development and Engineering Center’s analysis of the three technology development contractor vehicles states that the JLTV is currently at 76 ton-miles per gallon. Clearly, 

this highlights the Army’s commitment to incorporating more fuel efficient vehicles 

into our Tactical Wheeled Vehicle fleet. 

The Army is also pursuing research and development initiatives in a number of 

technological areas, which enable increased fuel efficiency in the ground tactical 

276 

wheeled vehicle fleet. Ongoing efforts include development of the following: lightweight structural materials (armors and composites, which can reduce the overall 

vehicle weight resulting in more fuel efficient vehicles) and technologies to enable 

high efficiency energy storage, efficient motors, exportable power and thermal/power 

management for application on a hybrid electric vehicle. In addition, the Army is 

evaluating a number of currently fielded engines for their ability to perform in an 

operational environment using alternative fuels. Although these fuels alone are not 

expected to increase the vehicles’ fuel efficiency, their widespread use could reduce 

the Army’s overall dependence on petroleum. 

Finally, the Army Research Office is investing in promising research in a number 

of fundamental technological areas, such as the conversion of cellulosic materials 

into hydrocarbons, understanding the chemical kinetics of hydrocarbon combustion, 

spray and combustion diagnostics and new hydrocarbon spray methodologies. These 

basic research investments have the potential to further enable the use of alternative fuels and ultimately improve gas mileage. 

ARMY IRREGULAR WARFARE CENTER

34. Senator HAGAN. General Casey, I am pleased the Army is looking into establishing an Irregular Warfare Center in order to streamline irregular warfare doctrinal development. Has the Army made a decision on the location of the Irregular 

Warfare Center? 

General CASEY. I have tasked TRADOC to assess and then recommend to me 

whether we should establish an Irregular Warfare Center. Our Combined Arms 

Center at Fort Leavenworth currently has proponency for all warfighting doctrine 

across the full spectrum of conflict including operations against traditional threats, 

counterinsurgency, and stability operations. In the execution of this responsibility, 

they will closely coordinate with the JFK Special Warfare Center at Fort Bragg, NC. 

I expect TRADOC’s recommendation within the next 90 days. 

35. Senator HAGAN. General Casey, what is the TRADOC’s position? 

General CASEY. The U.S. Army TRADOC and the Headquarters, Department of 

the Army are examining the benefits of creating a center for Irregular Warfare (IW). 

If created, the IW center would leverage expertise, experience and core capabilities, 

from sources both internal and external to the Army, as well as harness the intellectual capital of the growing IW community. The center would focus on collecting lessons learned, identifying best practices and informing concept development. This 

would more effectively enable the integration of doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel and facilities across TRADOC and the 

Army. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR ROLAND W. BURRIS

SUPPLEMENTAL REQUEST

36. Senator BURRIS. Secretary McHugh and General Casey, there is a $20 billion supplemental request for fiscal year 2010 in addition to a $102.2 billion OCOs request for 2011. If the supplemental is being replaced by the OCO request, then why 

is there such a big disparity? 

Secretary MCHUGH and General CASEY. The $20 billion supplemental is a re- quested increase to the $78 billion provided by the fiscal year 2010 OCO, which was 

enacted in December 2009. This is additional funding required this fiscal year to 

support the increasing force levels in Afghanistan. The fiscal year 2011 OCO request of $102 billion is to provide fiscal year 2011 funding for all operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. 

BALANCING THE FORCE

37. Senator BURRIS. Secretary McHugh and General Casey, it is my understanding that in a speech to the Association of the U.S. Army and other forums last 

fiscal year, that you expected the Army will achieve operational balance in the force 

by 2011. Do you still believe that the Army will reach that goal, specifically, with 

achieving the dwell time ratios? 

Secretary MCHUGH and General CASEY. Although the recent troop increase in Afghanistan delays the Army’s long-term goal of a 1:3/1:5 ratio of time deployed versus 

time spent at home station (i.e., ‘‘BOG:Dwell’’), the Army’s current growth continues 

to mitigate this new Operation Enduring Freedom force demand. 

277 

Because of the growth of the Army over the past 5 years (more than 70,000 troops 

since 2004; 40,000 of them in the last 2 years) and the drawdown in Iraq, the Army 

can execute this increase without going to 15-month deployments, without going to 

less than 12 months at home between deployments and without continued implementation of stop loss. Assuming the drawdown in Iraq continues on schedule, the 

Army will achieve our BOG:Dwell goals. The Army estimates that approximately 70 

percent of the Active component and 80 percent of the Reserve component will 

achieve BOG:Dwell goals of 1:2 Active component and 1:4 Reserve component by 

2011. The remainder of the force will continue to see an increase in its dwell rate 

and will meet these goals by 2012. 

38. Senator BURRIS. Secretary McHugh and General Casey, will you meet the 

Grow the Army objectives that are part of achieving operational balance? 

Secretary MCHUGH and General CASEY. The Army will meet the Grow the Army 

objectives of building or converting 301 brigades across all components by the end 

of fiscal year 2014. The support from your committee continues to ensure the Army 

will be capable of achieving operational balance and conducting full spectrum operations. 

FORCE PROTECTION

39. Senator BURRIS. Secretary McHugh and General Casey, you testified in the 

past that force protection is a major imperative with current and future OCO. Why 

did you not request mine-resistant ambush protected (MRAP) vehicles and other 

force protection vehicles as part of your 2011 budget, OCO, or fiscal year 2010 supplemental requests? 

Secretary MCHUGH and General CASEY. To date, the MRAP initiative remains a 

joint program and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) submits requests for 

programmatic funding. All funding received is managed and controlled by OSD and 

the Joint Program Office—MRAP. 

In fiscal year 2010, OCO funds were requested to procure MRAP–All Terrain Vehicles (M–ATVs) for the Army and other Services. There is no MRAP procurement 

anticipated in fiscal year 2011, because the Army’s known needs will have been met. 

The M–ATVs were requested for the Army as part of overall OSD fiscal year 2010 

OCO budget submission. Additionally, OSD recently directed the procurement of an 

additional 1,300 MRAPs and 1,460 M–ATVs for the Army in fiscal year 2010. 

OSD anticipates that the MRAP initiative/program will transition to individual 

Service management in fiscal year 2012. At that time, the Army will assume budgetary control for our fleet of MRAP vehicles. The Army is committed to incorporating the MRAP Family of Vehicles into the future force structure. 

40. Senator BURRIS. Secretary McHugh and General Casey, how does your UAV 

budget request compare with the other Services’ requests? 

Secretary MCHUGH and General CASEY. The Army’s UAV budget request is comparable to that of the other services. The total DOD budget request for procurement 

and development of UAVs was approximately $5.1 billion. Of that amount, the Army 

requested $1.45 billion to procure, retrofit and develop the Extended Range/MultiPurpose UAS, to retrofit the RQ–7B Shadow with Tactical Common Data Link, 

longer wings and laser designators and to procure new the RQ–11B Raven Small 

UAS and retrofit it with digital data link kits. For their UAV programs, the Air 

Force requested $1.1 billion; the Navy and Marine Corps requested $.7 billion; and 

the Special Operations Command requested $1.8 billion. 

41. Senator BURRIS. Secretary McHugh and General Casey, is separate research, 

development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) and procurement necessary? 

Secretary MCHUGH and General CASEY. Separate RDT&E and procurement budget lines are necessary, because each Service has different requirements for its Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS). The Army UASs are tactical platforms under the direct control of the Combatant Commander used to provide immediate, responsive, 

real-time Reconnaissance, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and, if deemed appropriate, attack support to influence the current fight. The Air Force uses its UASs 

to provide Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance information for analysis at 

a strategic level in order to influence future battles. Finally, the Navy has its own 

unique requirements, such as overwater operations, and therefore, designs its UASs 

to operate in a salt water environment. Although each Service may manage and develop UASs to meet its individual requirements, where appropriate, the Army 

leverages the technologies being developed by the other Services. 

278 

ARMY NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES

42. Senator BURRIS. Secretary McHugh and General Casey, I applaud the level 

of integration of the ARNG and the Army Reserves into the total Army. The Army 

has carried the lion’s share of the OCO missions and should be commended. How 

would you characterize the success of their integration and support to the worldwide missions of the Army? 

Secretary MCHUGH and General CASEY. During the last 8 years of war, our Reserve component (RC), the Army National Guard (ARNG) and U.S. Army Reserve 

(USAR), has consistently demonstrated its readiness and ability to make sustained 

contributions to ongoing operations. The challenges facing the United States today 

and in the future require the employment of the RC as part of a global operational 

force. To that end, we have institutionalized the transformation of the RC from a 

Cold War Era strategic Reserve to an operational Reserve. 

The Army’s procurement strategy for the ARNG/USAR is focused on modernization on par with the Active component (AC) and in accordance with the ARFORGEN 

model. Over the last 5 years (fiscal years 2006–2010) the Army has invested a total 

of $28.4 billion in ARNG equipping. Additionally, over the same 5 years, Congress 

appropriated an additional $4.4 billion for the ARNG in the National Guard and Reserve Equipment Appropriation. Much of the equipment from the fiscal year 2008 

and fiscal year 2009 procurements are now emerging from production and are being 

fielded. This filled shortages and modernized equipment on hand (EOH)—giving 

units increased capability, (although readiness calculations may not appear to show 

significant improvement due to a concurrent growth in requirements). 

The overall EOH summary by Components at the end of March 2009 was: AC 80 

percent; ARNG 77 percent; USAR 80 percent. The Army has programmed approximately $102.4 billion over the next 5 years to address shortfalls and modernize 

equipment. Based on current operational requirements, the Army anticipates bringing the AC to 86 percent, the ARNG to 83 percent, and the USAR to 81 percent 

EOH by 2017. Transforming RC to an Operational Reserve will require the Army 

to develop new policies and make targeted investments in support of desired outcomes: efficient delivery of medically ready and trained soldiers to RC units; incentives programs to sustain family and employer support for the Guard and Reserve; 

policies for utilization and integration of the total force; and investments in RC unit 

management programs and collective training. 

43. Senator BURRIS. Secretary McHugh and General Casey, do you see a need to 

ask for more funding to cover the costs of full-time manning for the National Guard 

and the Army Reserves? 

Secretary MCHUGH and General CASEY. No. Our Reserve components are able to 

leverage OCOs funding to mitigate war-related demands for additional manning. 

44. Senator BURRIS. Secretary McHugh and General Casey, it appears that the 

majority of the ARNG’s portion of the budget request is in the OCO and supplemental. Will the baseline request adjust when these two budgets are no longer needed? 

Secretary MCHUGH and General CASEY. Yes. The baseline will be adjusted when 

the OCOs and supplemental budgets are not longer needed. 

RECRUITING

45. Senator BURRIS. Secretary McHugh and General Casey, the fiscal year 2011 

baseline $43.9 billion Operation and Maintenance request funds the recruiting and 

training the All-Volunteer Force program. Is there a study examining the possibility 

of having one recruiting command that serves the needs of the total force vice having three separate agencies? 

Secretary MCHUGH and General CASEY. The Army combined the Army Reserve 

and Regular Army recruiting programs in the 1990s, but has not taken action to 

add ARNG recruiting. This is primarily due to the authority that the 54 States and 

territories exercise in determining whether an individual will be enlisted in the 

Guard. There are no formal studies examining the possibility of having one recruiting command that serves the needs of the total force—Regular Army, Army Reserve, 

and ARNG. 

279 

POST-DEPLOYMENT AND MOBILIZATION RESPITE ALLOWANCE

46. Senator BURRIS. Secretary McHugh and General Casey, the Army issued an 

information paper on February 17, 2010 titled, ‘‘Post Deployment & Mobilization 

Respite Allowance.’’ It is my understanding that there are over an estimated 20,000 

National Guard and Reserve soldiers who exceeded their original deployment schedule that are eligible to receive post deployment and mobilization respite allowance. 

It is my understanding this process has taken over 3 years, and to date, many have 

not been paid. Can you explain to me how this situation occurred and what is the 

timeline to expeditiously resolve this very unfortunate issue? 

Secretary MCHUGH and General CASEY. The National Defense Authorization Act 

for Fiscal Year 2010, Section 604 (Public Law 111–84), authorized the Service Secretaries to retroactively compensate former servicemembers for Post-Deployment Mobilization Respite Absence (PDMRA) days earned from January 19, 2007, through 

the date the Military Department implemented the PDMRA program. Under the 

statutory authority, however, the Service Secretaries may provide such benefits only 

in accordance with regulations prescribed by the Secretary of Defense. The DOD implementation policy was approved on February 1, 2010, and the Army began payments on March 1, 2010. We will continue to process and pay these claims until 

all eligible individuals are appropriately compensated. 

DIVERSITY

47. Senator BURRIS. Secretary McHugh and General Casey, the Army has worked 

hard to advocate a robust diversity program that provides opportunities for minorities and women to reach the highest ranks. After reviewing your equal opportunity 

Army strength data, I see that the overall number of minorities and women in the 

ARNG are very scarce given that the Army National Guard makes up approximately 35 percent of the total force. Is there not enough qualified minorities and 

females officers available in the Army National Guard? 

Secretary MCHUGH and General CASEY. At the national level, four of the nine 

senior positions in the Army National Guard are occupied or filled by a female or 

a minority officer. The percentage of female officers in the Army National Guard 

has continued to increase over time. In 1992, 7.8 percent of the Army National 

Guard officer corps was made up of females compared to 12.2 percent at the end 

of fiscal year 2009. 

Regarding African Americans, as of fiscal year 2009, 10.2 percent of officers in the 

Active Army were African American, while in the ARNG it was 7.9 percent. Although the disparity between the two is not that great, there is obvious room for 

improvement. The ARNG has programs to encourage African Americans, as well as 

other minorities to join the Army. These programs apply to officer and enlisted personnel and are integral to supporting the overall recruiting mission of the U.S. 

Army Accessions Command. 

48. Senator BURRIS. Secretary McHugh and General Casey, is there a plan to address this disparity? 

Secretary MCHUGH and General CASEY. Although the overall disparity is not that 

great, whatever differences there are may stem from the fact that each state looks 

at its program individually, as does the ARNG. Diversity programs vary from State 

to State based on their individual requirements and demographics. The ARNG is 

considering one standardized framework for continuity and measurement purposes. 

Although one blanket set of standards may not work for all states, recruiting goals 

and objectives could be tailored to address these areas. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN

ARMY TO REVISE REQUIREMENTS GENERATION PROCESS

49. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary McHugh and General Casey, Lieutenant General 

Reno (retired) recently completed an internal study of the Army’s requirement’s generation process, which has not been shared with Congress. We understand General 

Reno’s report emphasizes the need to make Army requirements realistically reflect 

resource constraints. This would prevent the creation of future requirements which 

are neither technologically nor financially obtainable. Do you agree with General 

Reno’s recommendation? Please explain how you plan to make the Army requirements process better informed by resource constraints. 

280 

Secretary MCHUGH and General CASEY. In June 2009, Lieutenant General (R) 

William Reno completed the Reforming the Requirements and Resourcing Processes 

in Support of Army Institutional Adaptation study known as The Reno Study. The 

purpose was to recommend methods by which the requirements system could be reformed and better aligned with the resourcing systems of the Army. The Army intends to deliver The Reno Study to the committee in early March. 

I wholeheartedly support LTG Reno’s recommendations to improve our requirements determination processes. We must continuously improve our acquisition 

model to ensure the Army identifies capabilities that provide the best operational 

capability at the best cost. The Reno Study provides several recommendations to incorporate cost-based analysis earlier in the Army requirements generation process, 

which will improve decisions on required capabilities informed by life-cycle costs and 

operational risk. The earlier use of analytics to determine best value (best capability 

for best cost) will identify feasible alternatives with associated costs across the doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel and facilities (DOTMLPF) domains. 

To implement these recommendations, we are updating our requirements determination and programming policies, training analysts to conduct cost-benefit analyses and placing them in our Capabilities Development and Integration Directorates 

within the TRADOC, and requiring cost-based analysis across the DOTMLPF domains for all new requirements submitted to the Department. The culmination of 

these efforts will enable our senior leaders across governance forums to weigh 

choices based on best value and make better-informed decisions. 

50. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary McHugh and General Casey, when will this report 

be provided to the committee? 

Secretary MCHUGH and General CASEY. In June 2009, Lieutenant General (R) 

William Reno completed the Reforming the Requirements and Resourcing Processes 

in Support of Army Institutional Adaption study, also known as ‘‘The Reno Study.’’ 

The Army intends to deliver the study to the committee in early March. The Army 

has conducted a detailed analysis of the study, and has developed implementation 

proposals for each of its 98 recommendations. The Under Secretary of the Army and 

the Vice Chief of Staff Army are conducting final reviews of these proposals. 

END STRENGTH AND DEPLOYMENT CYCLE TIME

51. Senator MCCAIN. General Casey, you have put forward the goal of increasing 

dwell time for soldiers so that they spend 2 years at home for every 1 year deployed. 

There are two ways to achieve that goal: to reduce our commitments overseas or 

to increase end-strength. What are the budgetary and dwell-time implications of 

making the temporary end-strength increase of 22,000 soldiers permanent? 

General CASEY. Budget: A sustained 22,000 increase would cost $11.15 billion 

across the Future Years Defense Program (fiscal year 2012–fiscal year 2017) above 

the Program Objective Memorandum (POM). This cost estimate includes $4.71 billion Operations and Maintenance (O&M), $5.67 billion Military Personnel Appropriation Army (MPA) and $0.77 billion Medicare Eligible Retiree Health Care Fund, 

assuming such an increase would remain predominantly in grades E1 through E4. 

Dwell: A sustained 22,000 increase above documented authorizations would not 

add any rotational units to the force pool and therefore would not have any impact 

on unit BOG: Dwell ratios. A sustained 22,000 increase would certainly relieve 

stress and strain on the force by filling our deploying units appropriately, compensate for nondeployable soldiers in deploying units, and improve readiness of 

units throughout the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) process. 

52. Senator MCCAIN. General Casey, in review of the 2009 QDR, I noted that one 

of the objectives was ‘‘to further rebalance the capabilities of the U.S. Armed Forces 

and institutionalize successful wartime innovations to better enable success in today’s wars while ensuring that our forces are prepared for a complex future.’’ The 

QDR went on to assert priorities for the sizing and shaping of the force which assumed a range of conflicts and contingencies similar to what our Armed Forces are 

presently facing. Yet the QDR proposed a force structure for the Army that is essentially what you currently have, without the 22,000 soldiers. In your testimony today, 

you state that ‘‘the Army has operated at a demanding pace for the last 8 years 

and . . . the strain has placed the Army out of balance.’’ You go on to say that ‘‘the 

campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan continue to create demands that have our Army 

operating beyond sustainable capacity.’’ I see a disconnect between your testimony 

and the results of the QDR. Does the QDR’s recommendation regarding Army force 

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structure allow the Army to meet its goals regarding dwell time given the QDR’s 

defense objectives regarding prevailing in today’s wars, preparing to defeat adversaries, and preserving the force? 

General CASEY. The temporary manpower increase of up to 22,000 was authorized 

by the Secretary of Defense to assist with near term manning challenges and ensure 

units are appropriately manned prior to deployment. The temporary manpower increase does not include force structure and is intended to mitigate the increase in 

the soldier nondeployable rate associated with the current high demand for forces. 

With the upcoming responsible OIF drawdown and the subsequent projected demand reduction on the force, the Army views the manning challenge as temporary. 

Therefore, the projected decrease in demand on the programmed Army force structure will allow the Army to achieve balance by the end of 2011 and meet the rotation dwell time goals given the QDR’s defense objectives. 

53. Senator MCCAIN. General Casey, have you determined how many deployed 

forces your current force structure levels can sustain to meet your goals for dwell 

time? If so, what is that number? 

General CASEY. Our interim goal, only sustainable in the near-term, is 2 years 

at home for every 1-year deployed for the Active Force and 4 years at home for 

every 1-year mobilization for the Reserve component. At these dwell ratios, the 

Army can produce a continuous supply of 1 corps headquarters, 5 division headquarters, 20 BCTs, and about 90,000 troops worth of enablers. 

Our long-term dwell goal, which we believe is necessary to maintain the All-Volunteer Force, is a ratio of three periods at home for each period deployed for the 

Active component, and 5 years for every 1 year mobilized for the Reserve component. Our target for achieving this long-term goal is 2015. At this dwell ratio, the 

Army can produce a continuous supply of 1 corps, 4 divisions, 16 BCTs, and about 

72,000 troops worth of enablers. 

READINESS OF NONDEPLOYED READINESS

54. Senator MCCAIN. General Casey, in review of your February 23 testimony, I 

note your continued concern that ‘‘presently, and for the short term, we lack sufficient strategic flexibility, and we continue to accumulate risk.’’ This risk is reflected 

in the quarterly readiness reports received by this committee that continue to show 

severely degraded readiness for nondeployed units. I also note that the QDR does 

not propose any initiatives or plans to specifically address the issues of the reset 

or readiness of nondeployed forces in the Army and the Marine Corps. In your opinion, why did the QDR not address the issue of the readiness status of nondeployed 

units in the Army? 

General CASEY. We will continue to accumulate risk in the near-term as we meet 

requirements for the current campaigns, and we anticipate a tough few years ahead 

in providing sufficient strategic flexibility to meet future contingencies. Eight and 

a half years at war builds latent risks; risks that inherently impact soldiers and 

their families, and their equipment. 

The QDR addresses the primary readiness concerns to the Joint Force. First, and 

most importantly, the QDR recognizes the need to preserve the All-Volunteer Force 

and to sustain the health of our soldiers, civilians, and their families. Next, the findings clearly articulate the importance of managing deployment tempos and associated challenges with resetting and reconstituting equipment. These two issues directly impact readiness for the Joint Force, and particularly, the Army. 

Under the ARFORGEN’s cycle, we do not apply a single, standardized test of 

readiness to all units. Instead, different units in different phases of ARFORGEN are 

expected to be at different levels of readiness. As an example, ARFORGEN Reset 

phase is specifically designed without any readiness expectations for unit personnel 

and equipment. Typically, it is a 6-month process that systematically restores 

units—whether re-deployed or nondeployed—to a level of personnel and equipment 

readiness that permits resumption of training for future missions. 

Reset encompasses those tasks necessary to reintegrate soldiers and families, and 

tasks required to organize, man, equip, and train a unit. As units progress from 

Reset to Train/Ready status, they possess the soldiers and equipment required to 

train to a level of readiness that will enable the Army to provide a surge capacity 

for contingencies. We are not able to provide this now, but in the near- to mid-term 

we expect to achieve this capacity and restore our strategic flexibility. In the available cycle of ARFORGEN, soldiers and units are at a level of readiness to execute 

assigned full spectrum operations. 

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Meeting the requirements of the last 8 years at war, the Army has not achieved 

targeted deployment to dwell ratios creating heightened stress to soldiers and their 

Families. By managing deployment tempos, specifically deployment to dwell at 

home station time ratios, we build readiness with predictability and sufficient physical and mental recovery time for soldiers and their families. As dwell times at home 

station stabilize and increase in time, individual soldier and unit readiness will increase as they train and prepare for the full spectrum of military operations. 

As cited in the QDR, DOD is developing policies and initiatives to assess the effects of stress to the force, the impact of low dwell rates and measures to mitigate 

the same. Similarly, the Army has implemented numerous initiatives to mitigate 

stressors to soldiers, their families, and units. These initiatives, among many others, 

include: the Comprehensive Soldier Fitness Program, the Army Suicide Prevention 

Program, Army Family Action Plan and Warrior Care and Transition. 

Reset is essential in maintaining our equipment and Army Pre-positioned Stocks 

(APS) readiness. During Reset, we repair or replace destroyed, degraded and lost 

equipment. Although current support provides for the full restoration and replacement of all equipment in support of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, success in 

restoring readiness following responsible draw downs in both campaigns will depend 

on reliable, timely and consistent funding to reset the force. Of particular importance will be support to our soldier, families, and veterans, and restoring the readiness of our equipment and pre-positioned stocks. The combination of these actions 

will improve readiness in the near- to mid-term. 

55. Senator MCCAIN. General Casey, what do you consider to be an acceptable degree of risk for the readiness of nondeployed forces? 

General CASEY. The Army mitigates risk to the readiness of nondeployed forces 

by progressively increasing unit readiness as they cycle through the ARFORGEN 

force pools from RESET through Train/Ready to the Available force pool. 

The RESET force pool provides a unit time to reintegrate soldiers with their Families, receive new personnel, field new equipment, conduct individual training, attend institutional training and initiate collective training. The Train/Ready force 

pool progressively increases a unit’s readiness by completing the fill of personnel 

shortages, fielding equipment, conducting collective training and conducting mission 

readiness exercises to validate unit readiness in meeting Combatant Commanders’ 

and Service requirements. Risk decreases as a unit progresses from the RESET 

force pool, without any readiness expectations, to the Available force pool. 

Additionally, the Army is establishing ARFORGEN Aim Points to track a unit’s 

progression and focus resources to ensure its readiness increase. The first Aim Point 

is when a unit emerges from the RESET force pool. The second Aim Point is approximately 45 days before a unit’s mission readiness exercise. ARFORGEN will 

generate enough forces to meet Combatant Commander and Global Force Management sustained demands and to have depth to respond to contingencies. 

56. Senator MCCAIN. General Casey, what are your plans over the next 2 years 

to mitigate this risk? 

General CASEY. The Army’s plan to reduce risk to the force in the near-term is 

contingent upon achieving sustainable deploy-to-dwell ratios, adequately providing 

for soldiers, civilians, and families, resetting our Soldiers and their equipment, and 

securing reliable, timely and consistent funding. 

With your support and no change to known troop requirements the Army will 

reach a deploy-to-dwell ratio of 1 year deployed to 2 years at home station for the 

Active component and one year deployed to 4 years at home station for the Reserve 

component in fiscal year 2012, as well as begin to move towards our long-term deploy-to-dwell ratios. Improving dwell times is critical to preserving the All-Volunteer 

Force as we implement Army initiatives to improve and sustain the health of our 

soldiers and their families, and provide them with a quality of life that is commensurate with their service to the Nation. 

We are developing a revised Modernization Strategy to build the necessary capabilities required to meet future contingencies while balancing capabilities between 

the Active and Reserve components. Continued additional funding above the base 

budget is critical to mitigating risk in the near to mid-term to allow us to reset 

equipment and Army Prepositioned Stocks. This additional funding will be needed 

for several years after completion of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

57. Senator MCCAIN. General Casey, based on your plan, when is this committee 

going to see an overall improvement in the readiness of nondeployed units as reflected in quarterly reports? 

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General CASEY. The Army plans to improve readiness by increasing dwell times 

for Army units, reconstituting its Army Prepositioned Stocks, and operationalizing 

the Reserve Component. 

The recent approval of the Army’s accelerated Grow the Army plan was intended 

to rapidly improve the unit’’ time deployed to time at home’’ ratio. As dwell time 

increases, we expect to see sustained improvement in the readiness of nondeployed 

units. The Army is continuing to transition the Reserve component to an accessible 

partner of the total operational force and is integrating the ARNG and the U.S. 

Army Reserve (USAR) into the Sustained Sourcing Approach. The Army has programmed approximately $102.4 billion over the next 5 years to procure shortfalls 

and modernize equipment, which is anticipated to bring the ARNG and USAR to 

83 percent and 81 percent Equipment On Hand respectively by 2017 based on current operational requirements. 

The current Army procurement strategy for ARNG/USAR is focused on modernization and is on par with the active Component in accordance with the 

ARFORGEN model. Integration of the Reserve Component into the ARFORGEN 

cycle better enables Reserve Component employment as part of the Joint Force 

while preserving some ability to expand the scope by accelerating availability. With 

timely and predictable funding, we will be able to provide units more of their required equipment earlier in the process, not just-in-time for their deployment. This 

will also help us restore the Army’s strategic depth and increase our flexibility to 

defend the Nation. 

58. Senator MCCAIN. General Casey, do you believe the funding proposed for 

reset, manning, and training in the fiscal year 2011 budget and the Future Years 

Defense Plan will allow you to restore readiness of nondeployed units to an acceptable level? 

General CASEY. The readiness of nondeployed formations continues to be the biggest concern for the Army—it is the foremost concern driving the Army’s risk assessment for the Chairman. The Army has been at war since September 11, and 

seen sustained growth annually in overseas contingencies operations since the end 

of the Cold War. The fiscal year 2011 budget will help arrest the continued decline 

in the readiness of nondeployed forces—but will not in and of itself reverse the decline in nondeployed readiness. ARFORGEN accepts the proposition that some 

forces are less ready due to their proximity in the deployment cycle. Right now, too 

many nondeployed forces are at degraded readiness levels. The readiness of nondeployed forces will not improve to an acceptable level (based on ARFORGEN goals) 

until demand is reduced. 

ESTABLISHMENT OF AN ARMY UNIT AT THOMSON CORRECTIONAL FACILITY

59. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary McHugh and General Casey, the OCO portion of 

the President’s budget request for fiscal year 2011 includes $350 million in a transfer fund for the detention facilities at Guantanamo Bay, provides funding to make 

improvements at the Illinois State Prison at Thomson, Illinois, in the amount of 

$150 million, and includes another $158 million for information technology improvements at the Rock Island Arsenal, Illinois, to support DOD detainee operations at 

Thomson. The current plan calls for approximately 600–1,000 permanently-stationed Army personnel to perform duties at Thomson with base support provided 

by Rock Island Arsenal, which is about 60 miles from the Thomson facility. Do you 

support the use of Army personnel and facilities for this initiative? 

Secretary MCHUGH and General CASEY. The Army is the Executive Agent for detainee operations policy, and we are coordinating closely with DOD regarding the 

potential use of the Thomson facility. If DOD assigns this task to the Army, we will 

develop the appropriate personnel structure to accomplish this mission to the best 

of our ability. 

60. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary McHugh and General Casey, does the Army have 

the available manpower authorizations to support this new mission? 

Secretary MCHUGH and General CASEY. If OSD assigns the Army this task, we 

will thoroughly review the manpower requirements needed to accomplish the mission. 

61. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary McHugh and General Casey, do you support the 

proposal to require Army personnel to commute 60 miles each way to work at the 

Thomson facility? 

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Secretary MCHUGH and General CASEY. If the Army was directed to perform this 

mission, the senior commander within the local area has the flexibility to establish 

and define the local commuting area. A distance of 50 miles, one way, is normally 

considered to be within reasonable commuting distance of a station, but the 50-mile 

rule is not inflexible. 

62. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary McHugh and General Casey, do you have any proposals or plans to mitigate the effects of this dislocation for soldiers and their families? 

Secretary MCHUGH and General CASEY. In addition to the senior commander’s authority to establish and define the local commuting area, the Army could accommodate short distance moves within proximity of the facility if the Army is directed 

to perform this mission. 

MILITARY CONSTRUCTION REQUIREMENTS FOR AFGHANISTAN

63. Senator MCCAIN. General Casey, the budget request for fiscal year 2011 OCO 

contains $761 million for facilities and infrastructure to be constructed in Afghanistan, plus an additional $90 million for future planning and design of facilities in 

Afghanistan. In the justification documents provided with the budget request, most 

of these projects are not proposed to be completed until mid-2012, almost a full year 

after the President’s announced goal for start of the withdrawal of forces. In other 

words, we may be faced with a scenario where we are still constructing facilities 

at the same time we are withdrawing forces. I ask you only because the amounts 

are requested by the Army. Does this make sense to you? 

General CASEY. Yes, the Army continues to plan for all scenarios and will adjust 

plans and operations as the situation develops. The Afghanistan projects requested 

in the fiscal year 2011 MILCON base program were identified to support 

CENTCOM’s Global Defense Posture plan. These projects serve a dual purpose by 

supporting CENTCOM’s enduring mission post conflict and contingency operations 

prior to unit drawdown and mission accomplishment. fiscal year 2011 OCO projects 

support current contingency operations. All projects were coordinated with 

CENTCOM and ARCENT with the current timeline taken into consideration. 

Projects will be cancelled or scaled down as needed. 

64. Senator MCCAIN. General Casey, are the proposed dates for completion of construction consistent with the President’s policies and goals? 

General CASEY. Yes, we are planning for operational requirements, consistent 

with the administration’s policies and goals, beyond 2012. 

In addition, based on the Global Defense Posture Plan, the Army will have an enduring presence in Afghanistan and other countries in Southwest Asia. Projects in 

the base budget are required to support the enduring force. 

65. Senator MCCAIN. General Casey, should I read in these documents the military’s plan to maintain forces in Afghanistan long after June 2011? 

General CASEY. Based on the Global Defense Posture Plan, the Army will have 

an enduring presence in Afghanistan and other countries in Southwest Asia. Our 

plans support operational requirements, consistent with the administration’s policies and goals, beyond 2012. 

IMPLICATIONS OF IRAQI ELECTIONS

66. Senator MCCAIN. General Casey, the U.S. presence in Iraq is currently about 

96,000 uniformed personnel. General Odierno said yesterday that the planned withdrawal of all U.S. combat forces by the end of August 2010 could be delayed if conditions worsen in the coming months as Iraqis choose a new government. Should the 

Iraqi elections scheduled for March 7 be postponed, will the Army be capable of sustaining the necessary forces in Iraq while fulfilling the requirements of the troop 

increase in Afghanistan? 

General CASEY. All indications are the elections are going to take place as 

planned. 

EQUIPMENT AND READINESS

67. Senator MCCAIN. General Casey, with regard to excess military equipment, 

specifically Class II, VII, and IX, currently located in the Southwest Asia theater, 

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what specific steps is the Army taking to return excess equipment to nondeployed 

Army units? 

General CASEY. This question requires a two part answer: 

First, with regard to excess Class II (general supplies) and IX (repair parts), we 

will retrograde our serviceable stocks, and redistribute them throughout the Total 

Army (to include Army Prepositioned Stocks (APS)). The items may be redistributed 

to Afghanistan, APS and other War Reserve requirements, as well as used to offset 

the routine resupply of Army units worldwide. 

Second, regarding excess Class VII (end items), our first priority for materiel, 

which is not needed, is redistribution to satisfy requirements in Afghanistan. If not 

needed there, it will redeploy to the Continental United States, be Reset, and redistributed to nondeployed units. The Army will use its Army’s Resourcing Priorities 

List to determine the distribution of this equipment. If not needed within the Army 

anywhere, these items will be offered to Foreign Military Sales customers as Excess 

Defense Articles, or will be disposed of by the Defense Reutilization and Marketing 

Service. Excess non-standard gear no longer needed by the Army will be offered to 

U.S. State and local governments, subject to their willingness to pay transportation 

costs to return the items to the United States. 

68. Senator MCCAIN. General Casey, how is equipment that was rushed to Iraq, 

like MRAP vehicles, being incorporated into the Army’s vehicle fleet? 

General CASEY. The Army has developed a predecisional allocation plan for 

MRAPs as they return from theater. This plan was briefed to Army senior leaders 

and is undergoing revision based on guidance to conduct a detailed cost benefit analysis. The results will be presented to Army senior leaders the end of March 2010. 

Other pieces of non-standard equipment that have been acquired to meet operational requirements are being reviewed through the Non-Standard Equipment 

(NSE) disposition process. As a part of the NSE disposition process, selected NSE 

items that have potential to become enduring capabilities will be sent through the 

Capabilities Development for Rapid Transition (CDRT) process for additional detailed analysis. These processes use wartime lessons learned and other inputs to determine if equipment procured through non-traditional means should be incorporated into the Army’s long term force structure. If it is determined a piece of 

equipment should be retained, a capabilities document is developed to assist in the 

documentation of the structure, manning, training and sustainment (including base 

budget) as the first step in the formal process of becoming an acquisition program 

or being incorporated into an existing acquisition program. 

69. Senator MCCAIN. General Casey, have these vehicles been placed on units’ 

property books? 

General CASEY. Yes, as the Joint Program Office issued MRAP vehicles to units 

in theater, they were placed on unit property books. Moreover, last year U.S. Army 

Central directed units in theater to conduct 100 percent inventories to ensure all 

equipment (including MRAP vehicles) appeared in our automated property book system, which provides both accountability and visibility. We will continue to focus on 

property accountability at every level during the drawdown in Iraq. 

70. Senator MCCAIN. General Casey, the President’s 2011 budget request ends 

production of the Humvee line of vehicles. In many instances Humvees are no 

longer the preferred transport in theater, having been supplanted by more heavily 

protected vehicles, like MRAPs. When does the Army intend to finalize a tactical 

wheeled vehicle strategy? 

General CASEY. The Army originally developed an overarching tactical wheeled 

vehicle (TWV) strategy in 2009. This strategy takes maximum advantage of existing 

platforms; plans for the integration of MRAP into the fleet; emphasizes a mixed 

fleet approach that spans the ‘‘Iron Triangle’’ of protection, payload and performance; and moves the Army to a fleet of scalable protection. Additionally, we published a TWV investment strategy on 30 October 2009. 

We are currently working the latest updates to the strategy as part of our POM 

12–17 submission. This work includes the ongoing TRADOC MRAP and TWV studies to determine the feasibility of adjusting the fleet mix. This will inform long-term 

life cycle management decisions and future investment strategies. 

DON’T ASK, DON’T TELL HOMOSEXUAL CONDUCT POLICY

71. Senator MCCAIN. General Casey, in recent testimony before this committee 

the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mullen, stated his personal view 

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that the current Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell (DADT) policy on homosexual conduct should 

be repealed. You testified on February 23, 2010, to the effect that you are not ready 

to endorse elimination of the DADT policy and that you want to first see the results 

of the high level review that Secretary Gates has ordered before you provide advice 

on this. Do you agree with the proposition that some have advanced that the decision to repeal the DADT policy has already been made by the President as Commander in Chief and that the only reason for the review and delay is to formulate 

a plan for implementation? 

General CASEY. In his State of The Union Address on 27 January 2010, President 

Obama indicated an intention to ‘‘work with Congress and our military to finally 

repeal [10 U.S.C. § 654]. . . . ‘‘ Secretary Gates stated, ‘‘[t]o ensure that the department is prepared should the law be changed, and working in close consultation with 

Admiral Mullen, I have appointed a high-level working group within the department 

that will immediately begin a review of the issues associated with properly implementing a repeal of the ‘‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell’ policy.’’ Therefore the reason for the 

review is to identify issues associated with the proper implementation of a repeal 

of DADT, should Congress act to change the law. 

72. Senator MCCAIN. General Casey, what do you view as the purpose and utility 

of the high level review? 

General CASEY. At the direction of the Secretary of Defense, the Army is participating in an OSD Task force to determine the potential impact of a repeal of 10 

U.S.C. § 654 to military readiness, military effectiveness and unit cohesion and how 

to best manage any noted impact during implementation if the law is ultimately 

changed. The review will assess servicemember views and attitudes concerning 

Don’t Ask Don’t Tell and will determine what changes to Service regulations and 

policies may be necessary in the event that the current law is repealed. 

73. Senator MCCAIN. General Casey, do you personally hold open the possibility 

that you will review the outcome of the high level review and determine that the 

DADT policy should remain in effect and not be changed? 

General CASEY. The finding of the high-level review will certainly inform my opinion as to whether and how the DADT policy should be changed. However, the ultimate decision remains with Congress. 

74. Senator MCCAIN. General Casey, is it your understanding that the DADT policy lawfully cannot be repealed or ignored, despite the President’s preferences, and 

that openly gay soldiers must continue to be processed for separation until Congress 

repeals or modifies section 654 of title 10, U.S.C.? 

General CASEY. The Army’s policy on homosexual conduct implements DOD policy 

and Federal Law. DOD policy implements 10 U.S.C. § 654 and applies to all 

branches of the Armed Forces. Due to current law and governing policy, when a soldier has violated the homosexual conduct policy, the commander must initiate separation procedures. 

75. Senator MCCAIN. General Casey, in your view, has the DADT policy since 

1993 affected the Army’s military readiness negatively or positively? 

General CASEY. Under the current homosexual conduct policy, the Army continues 

to accomplish the mission of providing trained and ready forces in support of the 

combatant commanders. 

76. Senator MCCAIN. General Casey, how would repeal of the current law, in your 

judgment, affect recruiting and retention in the Army? 

General CASEY. The OSD Task Force study will help determine the impact of repealing the current law on recruiting and retention. If any impacts are identified 

and Congress changes the law, the Army will take appropriate actions to address 

any effects on our recruiting and retention programs. 

77. Senator MCCAIN. General Casey, has the current law and DADT policy hindered the ability of the Army to increase its end strength in recent years? 

General CASEY. The current law and ‘‘Don’t Ask Don’t Tell’’ policy has not negatively impacted the Army’s ability to increase end strength. The Army has enjoyed 

tremendous success in meeting the end strength goals and is ahead of schedule (resulting in end strength of 543,645 for fiscal year 2008). The Army met the fiscal 

year 2010 end strength goal of 547,400 in January 2009. As a result of meeting the 

end strength growth early, the Army currently has enough enlisted soldiers to fill 

all the current authorizations, which helps to mitigate the stress of the high operational pace. The current fiscal year 2010 end strength projection is 563,543 comVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:37 May 06, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00292 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\62155.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
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pared to our targeted end strength of 562,400, which includes a 15,000 temporary 

end strength increase. This success is based on both our recruiting and retention 

programs. 

78. Senator MCCAIN. General Casey, in his testimony on February 2, Admiral 

Mullen was clear that the Joint Chiefs have not yet developed their best military 

advice about the impact of a repeal of the DADT policy or the manner in which a 

change would be implemented. However, many in Congress intend to move quickly 

through legislation to repeal the law as quickly as possible, including imposition of 

a moratorium on administrative separations while the high level review proceeds. 

Do you support legislative change to the current policy before the Chiefs have formulated their advice? 

General CASEY. The military must look hard at how a new policy would be implemented and address any issues in the Armed Services that may result from a repeal 

of the current law. It is important to have accurate data on how soldiers and their 

families feel about implementing a new policy. Because a moratorium would complicate the process laid out by Secretary Gates, I would object to a moratorium until 

the Services have a clearer picture. 

79. Senator MCCAIN. General Casey, what is the basis for your objection to a congressionally-mandated moratorium on separations of openly gay servicemembers 

under the DADT policy? 

General CASEY. It would complicate, and in some respects, undermine the whole 

process that Secretary Gates had laid out. The practical impact of a moratorium 

would be the same as the repeal of the current law. We would be put in a position 

of actually implementing a ‘‘repeal’’ while we were studying the potential impacts 

of implementing a repeal. 

ROLE OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

80. Senator MCCAIN. General Casey, Admiral Mullen is the principal military adviser to the President and the Secretary of Defense, but under law, he must consult 

and seek advice from the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the combatant commanders. Have you been given adequate opportunity to state your views to 

date? 

General CASEY. Yes. The Chairman, Vice Chairman and Service Chiefs meet regularly to discuss issues and collectively make decisions. 

HIGH LEVEL REVIEW OF DON’T ASK, DON’T TELL

81. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary McHugh and General Casey, on February 2, Secretary Gates testified that a high-level working group within DOD will review the 

issues associated with properly implementing a repeal of the DADT policy. Part of 

this review, he testified, will be to reach out to authoritatively understand the views 

and attitudes of the force. Please explain what steps the Army has been asked to 

take in order to implement the President’s direction to ‘‘begin the preparations necessary for repeal of the current law and policy.’’ 

Secretary MCHUGH and General CASEY. The Army fully supports the working 

group established by Secretary Gates. General Carter Ham, Commander, U.S. Army 

Europe, was selected as the co-chair of the working group. It is my understanding 

that the group will seek input from across the Army regarding the views and attitudes of the force concerning changing the law and the current DADT policy. The 

group is also expected to review the regulations used to implement the current policy to determine if there are different ways to enforce existing polices. Finally, the 

Army has ensured full participation in the working group by assigning officers and 

enlisted personnel in the specialties requested. 

82. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary McHugh and General Casey, is it correct that the 

actions the Secretary of Defense has directed are intended to strengthen the argument for repeal of existing law? 

Secretary MCHUGH and General CASEY. The actions directed by the Secretary of 

Defense are intended to ‘‘objectively and methodically examine all aspects of this 

question, and produce its findings and recommendations’’ by the end of this calendar 

year. 

83. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary McHugh and General Casey, what difference will 

it make, if any, in DOD planning if a significant proportion—say 50 percent—of 

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servicemembers and their family members register objection to a change in the policy? 

Secretary MCHUGH and General CASEY. The views of soldiers and Army families 

will be relevant to our assessment of the potential impact that a repeal of the current law may have on military readiness, military effectiveness and unit cohesion. 

DOD policy implements 10 U.S.C. § 654, which applies to all branches of the Armed 

Forces. If the existing law is changed, the Army will comply with the new law and 

resulting DOD policy. We will deal with this issue with the same professionalism 

that has marked our conduct during this war and that has been a hallmark of this 

institution for 234 years. 

84. Senator MCCAIN. General Casey, according to data provided by the Services 

and DOD, the number of discharges for homosexual conduct has consistently been 

far less than 1 percent, compared to discharges for other reasons. The Congressional 

Research Service concluded that most discharges occur among younger, less experienced personnel. How many soldiers have been discharged since September 11, 

2001, for violating DADT? 

General CASEY. The total number of Army Homosexual Conduct discharges from 

fiscal year 2001 through fiscal year 2009 (9 years) is 3,211. 

Fiscal Year 

2001 ..................................................................................................................................................... 627 

2002 ..................................................................................................................................................... 433 

2003 ..................................................................................................................................................... 378 

2004 ..................................................................................................................................................... 325 

2005 ..................................................................................................................................................... 386 

2006 ..................................................................................................................................................... 280 

2007 ..................................................................................................................................................... 303 

2008 ..................................................................................................................................................... 284 

2009 ..................................................................................................................................................... 195 

85. Senator MCCAIN. General Casey, does that number adversely affect the readiness of the Army? 

General CASEY. As Chief of Staff of the Army, I am focused on my Title 10 responsibilities of preparing and sustaining an Army at war. That number of soldiers separated for violating the homosexual conduct policy since September 11, 2001, has not 

affected the readiness of the Army as we have accomplished the mission of fighting 

and winning this nation’s wars. 

MEDIUM EXTENDED AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM

86. Senator MCCAIN. General Casey, the Medium Extended Air Defense System 

(MEADS) is the Army’s follow-on program to the Patriot missile system. It is being 

co-developed by the United States (funding 58 percent), Germany (25 percent), and 

Italy (17 percent). MEADS is designed to provide 360-degree coverage and protect 

against short-range ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, UAVs, and aircraft. In their 

most recent assessment of MEADS, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) determined that many critical technologies have not matured since development started in 2004 and will not be fully mature until the production decision in 2012. During the program’s preliminary design review (PDR) in 2008, it was determined that 

this program carried excessive risk and that at least an additional $1 billion and 

more time would be needed prior to Critical Design Review, which is now scheduled 

for August this year. What steps are being taken to ensure that the program stays 

within budget and schedule? 

General CASEY. As an international cooperative program, the overarching decision 

body for MEADS is the National Armaments Directorate. The representatives or 

National Armaments Directors are senior defense officials of partner nations. The 

U.S. National Armaments Director is the Defense Acquisition Executive (DAE). Program direction and oversight is being migrated from a Joint Steering Committee to 

a more senior tri-national Board of Directors (BOD). The senior U.S. member of the 

BOD is OSD for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (OSD–AT&L), The Office of 

Portfolio Systems Acquisition (PSA) and is supported by the Army Acquisition Executive. 

In an effort to contain costs and reduce program risks, the National Armaments 

Directors agreed to pursue a rebaseline of the original 110 month program. This 

would extend the Design and Development program by up to 24 months. The naVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:37 May 06, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00294 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\62155.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
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tions are awaiting the response to the proposal for the rebaselined program. Based 

on the direction of the BOD, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization MEADS Management Agency General Manager is conducting cost reviews and the OSD–Cost Assessments and Program Evaluation is conducting an independent cost estimate of 

the rebaselined program. Preliminary projections indicate the extended program will 

add at least $700 million in cost to the U.S. over the remainder of the Design and 

Development (D&D) program. Several changes are being sought to adjust the program. We acknowledge the schedule and cost growth and are discussing additional 

steps with the international partners to address the cost and schedule changes in 

the upcoming years. The OSD–AT&L is the lead for these international negotiations 

for the Department, so I will defer to OSD–AT&L for a current status of those negotiations. 

87. Senator MCCAIN. General Casey, given the international collaboration associated with MEADS, is it true that this program is exempt from traditional DOD acquisition regulations? If so, was or is MEADS in risk of breaching Nunn-McCurdy? 

General CASEY. The International (North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)) 

MEADS Program is exempt from DOD 5000 Regulations. It is governed by the negotiated tri-national Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). The International 

MEADS program is executed by a NATO agent, NATO MEADS Management Agency, which complies with the MOU and NATO rules and regulations. 

As part of the normal stewardship of our funds, we assess the program against 

typical program metrics, such as procurement and total program unit costs as used 

in Nunn-McCurdy evaluations, as well as requiring program documentation similar 

to those required by DOD 5000 (e.g. test plans, cost documents, etc.). Based on 

available estimates, the U.S. MEADS current program assessments are within 

Nunn-McCurdy thresholds. The department will have a more precise assessment at 

the conclusion of the OSD Cost Assessments and Program Evaluation’s Cost Assessment. 

88. Senator MCCAIN. General Casey, is the Army looking at any alternatives to 

a follow-on system for Patriot? 

General CASEY. The Army is continuing to program and plan for the MEADS as 

a replacement for Patriot. 

HUMANITARIAN MISSIONS

89. Senator MCCAIN. General Casey, what effect will continuing humanitarian operations in Haiti have on the Army’s continuing missions in Afghanistan and Iraq, 

or the ability to respond to contingencies around the world? 

General CASEY. Assuming force requirements do not increase, continuing humanitarian operations in Haiti should have little or no effect on the Army’s continuing 

missions in Afghanistan and Iraq, or the ability to respond to contingencies around 

the world. It is anticipated units supporting Haiti operations will be redeployed with 

sufficient time for reset and train-up for scheduled future deployments. 

90. Senator MCCAIN. General Casey, what is the Army’s understanding of the duration, personnel, and equipping requirements in response to the continued humanitarian mission to Haiti? 

General CASEY. Duration - Our understanding of the duration of the humanitarian mission is that units will remain in place until relieved. The mission will not 

impact operations in Afghanistan or Iraq. 

Personnel - Units are currently transitioning based on U.S. Southern Command 

(SOUTHCOM) timeline. 

• U.S. Army South (USARSO) is assuming command and control of Joint 

Task Force (JTF) Haiti, from 18 Airborne Command Post (ACP), not later 

than 15 Mar 2010. 18 ABC ACP is redeploying and will return to home station. 

• 2/82 Airborne (ABN) is redeploying and will return to home station by 

end of Mar 2010. There is no requested backfill for 2/82 ABN. FORSCOM 

projects 2/82 ABN will assume GRF mission on or around 01 Apr 2010. 

• 377 Theater Support Command (TSC) replaced the 3rd Expeditionary 

Support Command (ESC) Headquarters on 06 Mar 2010. 

Equipping - Units deployed to Haiti with organic equipment. Equipment will not 

be left behind unless directed by Command Authority. 

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91. Senator MCCAIN. General Casey, how is the Army preparing to deal with future disaster relief missions, to include assisting partners to better prepare for these 

regional and global responses? 

General CASEY. The Civil-Military Emergency Preparedness program, which was 

created at the inception of the Partnership for Peace program in 1994, is the Army’s 

primary means to assist partner nations in enhancing their disaster preparedness 

and response capacities. Annually, this program conducts bilateral and regional 

events that support DOD and Army security cooperation objectives by enhancing 

civil-military cooperation and building our partners’ capacity to respond to both natural and manmade disasters. 

In fiscal year 2009, the program, which is funded by DOD and managed by Headquarters, Department of the Army, conducted 23 events with 14 countries using a 

budget of $1.4 million. In fiscal year 2010, the Army plans to conduct 32 events in 

16 countries including support to U.S. Africa Command’s emergency response events 

using a $1.8 million budget. Recently, the program developed a new global assessment tool called Providing International Disaster Emergency Support, or ProvIDES, 

which quantitatively assesses a nation’s capabilities and capacity to establish requirements for enhancing effectiveness across all phases of preparedness and response. 

Additionally, the Army assists partners with disaster preparedness through security cooperation activities executed by the Army Service Component Commands as 

well as through programs at the Army Medical Command and the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation (WHINSEC). Of note, since 2007 a total 

of 13 students from Chile have participated in disaster preparedness training at 

WHINSEC. 

MID-LEVEL OFFICER SHORTFALLS

92. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary McHugh and General Casey, the committee heard 

outside testimony last year that the Army is projected to experience a shortfall of 

approximately 3,000 captains and majors until at least 2013. Please describe the 

current status of this shortfall, its impact, and the Army’s mitigation efforts. 

Secretary MCHUGH and General CASEY. The Army’s current officer shortages stem 

from force structure growth designed to support the development of additional capabilities needed to meet emerging threats in our OCOs. Based on this growth, we 

project the Army will be short over 4300 captains and majors (across all officer competitive categories) through fiscal year 2010, with the shortage dropping to about 

2900 in fiscal year 2011. We project the Army will be specifically short approximately 3800 Army Competitive Category (ACC) captains and majors through fiscal 

year 2010, with the shortage dropping to about 2700 in fiscal year 2011. The Army 

expects to be above full strength for captains in aggregate for fiscal year 2013 and 

beyond. 

A shortage of 1,000–1,300 (10 percent–12 percent) ACC majors will continue from 

fiscal year 2011 through fiscal year 2013, and we will remain short 1,900–2,200 (10 

percent–12 percent) majors across all competitive categories during the same time 

period. The Army will not be able to eliminate the major shortage in the foreseeable 

future, but can ease its effects by using captains to fill certain major vacancies after 

fiscal year 2012. 

Examples of measures taken to mitigate captain and major shortages include the 

following: increasing Regular Army accessions to 5500 by the end of fiscal year 

2010; Reserve Component calls to active duty (over 1500 to date); and the use of 

‘‘Blue-to-Green’’ inter-Service transfers (over 500 to date). The Army is also implementing high promotion rates to both captain and major (including 2 years belowthe-zone eligibility for selection to major). We will work to lower these rates gradually to allow additional opportunities to differentiate exceptional performers. We are 

also slowly increasing promotion ‘‘pin-on’’ points for lieutenants and captains as our 

personnel inventories become more healthy. 

The Army is also using incentives to help mitigate our shortages of captains and 

majors. We offered the Captains’ Retention Menu of Incentives in September 2007 

through March 2009 with a goal of retaining and managing critical skills in officers 

to complete the Army’s modularity conversion. As a result of this program, the 

Army increased captain retention through fiscal year 2011 for over 16,000 of the 

23,000 captains, who were eligible to participate. We have also continued to use the 

pre-commissioning Officer Career Incentive Program, first implemented in fiscal 

year 2006. By adding 3 guaranteed years of active service to the initial obligations 

of officers commissioned through USMA and ROTC programs, this program has inVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:37 May 06, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00296 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\62155.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
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creased retention at the 8th year of service from a historical 47 percent to between 

62 percent and 69 percent. 

BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM MODERNIZATION PROGRAM

93. Senator MCCAIN. General Casey, this year’s budget request continues work 

begun under Future Combat Systems (FCS) with a multi-billion dollar request for 

the Army’s BCT Modernization program, which includes the Early Infantry BCT (E– 

IBCT) component. The Director of Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) reported in February 2010 that ‘‘all E–IBCT systems require further development before fielding,’’ that E–IBCT systems ‘‘demonstrated reliability well below user requirements,’’ and that the ‘‘systems [tested] were not in the same configuration as 

the systems intended for purchase.’’ Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 

Technology, and Logistics [USD (AT&L)] Carter recently approved the Army’s request to move E–IBCT into Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP), but said that ‘‘testing has identified large reliability shortfalls’’ and that the Army lacks ‘‘a clear operational perspective of the value’’ of these systems in their current form. Why is the 

Army moving ahead with LRIP of the E–IBCT set of systems, when they have not 

met important reliability goals? 

General CASEY. The Army has just entered year 3 of a 4-year test cycle for Increment 1 capabilities. The Army will not field any new equipment until system performance is sufficient to satisfy the capability requirements of the warfighter. Given 

our desire to get E–IBCT capabilities into the hands of soldiers as soon as possible, 

Increment 1 employs an extensive developmental and operational test program. This 

will culminate with one brigade set of low rate initial production equipment being 

tested as part of initial operational test and evaluation in 2011. The ‘‘test-fix-test’’ 

strategy we are utilizing has allowed the program to continuously mature hardware 

models and software as it progresses through the development process. One key element of this strategy has been the use of the Army Evaluation Task Force. Comprised of combat veterans, these soldiers evaluate all of the E–IBCT equipment and 

provide invaluable feedback to the program which permits continual improvement 

to these systems. 

In 2009, the second year of warfighter tests, results indicated that Reliability, 

Availability and Maintainability scores fell short of their requirements. The Army 

has implemented an aggressive reliability growth plan that has identified 100 percent of the root causes. To date, 98 percent of the known failures have been corrected and are implemented for Limited User Test 10. 

As directed in the December 2010 Acquisition Decision Memorandum, the Program Office will report to the OSD the results of these tests, which will factor into 

approval to proceed with production and fielding plans. 

94. Senator MCCAIN. General Casey, how does the Army intend to mitigate E– 

IBCT developmental delays? 

General CASEY. Increment 1 equipment and software has undergone robust testing and evaluation. All programmatic milestones including Preliminary Design Review (PDR) and Critical Design Review (CDR) have been met and approved through 

a series of Defense Acquisition Board reviews and decisions ultimately leading to 

a Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP) decision in December 2009. 

Soldiers are part of a 4-year test and evaluation process. Early in development 

the Army made the decision to deliver pre-production equipment and network components to the Army Evaluation Task Force to allow soldiers to test and evaluate 

the systems. Resultant soldier feedback has played a key role in optimizing design 

throughout the development phase leading to better product design. Increment 1 capabilities are only now in their third year of the pre-planned 4-year test cycle. 

OSD has asked the Army to report on the progress at the end of the second year 

as these capabilities move through the 2010 test cycle. The Army is required to report test and evaluation plans, risk mitigation strategies and test and evaluation 

results at two Defense Acquisition Board meetings in April 2010 and December 

2010. These reviews will shape the path ahead for the LRIP of the Early Infantry 

BCT (E–IBCT) equipment sets 2 and 3. 

The Increment 1 LRIP decision was based on sound acquisition processes and 

multiple reviews/tests/evaluations of hardware and software. Production will be intensely managed and will allow for adjustments to be made in the LRIP stage as 

additional test results are finalized. Such an incremental process will allow for technological upgrades and refinements even during the fielding process. 

The Government’s interests are protected through a series of established decision 

points. 

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1. Milestone C for Increment 1 in December 2009 authorized acquisition of the 

first E–IBCT set of equipment. This decision was supported by results from 

2009 test cycle (year 2 of 4) and DODI 5000.2 Statutory and Regulatory requirements. 

2. Limited User Test 2010 (year 3 of 4) assessment and breakout decision review 

is scheduled for December 2010. This review evaluates year 3 of 4 test and 

evaluation results plus risk mitigation plans prior to authorization for the final 

two LRIP E–IBCT sets of equipment. Finalization of the Full Rate Production 

(FRP) plan will also occur. 

3. A FRP decision for the additional six E–IBCT sets of equipment will occur in 

December 2011using all 4 years of test results. This decision will be supported 

by the fiscal year 2011 (year 4 of 4) testing including the Initial Operational 

Test and Evaluation demonstrating that Increment 1 production units are 

operationally safe, effective, suitable, and survivable. 

95. Senator MCCAIN. General Casey, what are the advantages of developing and 

procuring E–IBCT spin-out increments together under one contract? 

General CASEY. The development effort and the procurement effort are being acquired as two separate contracts. For clarification purposes, there is only one 

planned spin out of the Early-Infantry Brigade Combat Team (E–IBCT) capability. 

The Army, as directed by the Milestone Decision Authority, is planning on two spin 

out programs called increments. The Increment 1 E–IBCT program will field capability to nine E–IBCTs and the Increment 2 program will field additional capability 

to thirty-one IBCTs. The Increment 1 capability is completing development under 

a cost-reimbursable development contract (restructured from the former Future 

Combat Team Program). The Increment 1 capability (systems) is being procured as 

an integrated set for fielding to the E–IBCT under a separate fixed-price low-rate 

initial production contract. 

96. Senator MCCAIN. General Casey, what would be the advantages or disadvantages of incrementally upgrading E–IBCTs using multiple, smaller contracts? 

General CASEY. For clarification purposes, there is only one planned spin out of 

the Early Infantry Brigade Combat Team (E–IBCT) capability. A follow-on incremental capability is under development for the Infantry Brigade Combat Team 

(IBCT). 

For purposes of responding to this question it is assumed that ‘‘multiple, smaller 

contracts’’ as used in this question refers to platform level versus integrated system 

of systems performance contracts. 

Upgrading E–IBCTs using multiple, smaller contracts shifts overall IBCT performance and schedule risk to the Government, which may or may not be acceptable 

depending on the lifecycle phase. Breaking out performance accountability across 

multiple contracts makes the Government responsible for integrated performance 

versus the contractor. Prior to completion of integrated operational test and evaluation, this risk was determined unacceptable for E–IBCT given the magnitude of cost 

and schedule impacts associated with managing and fixing component (platform) deficiencies to meet the integrated specification. Under a single contractor, that contractor is responsible for meeting the integrated performance and, therefore, responsible for any deficiency. Furthermore, if each platform is being developed or enhanced under separate contracts, the Government becomes responsible for coordinating the timely delivery of each platform. Should effort under one platform fall 

behind schedule then it could become grounds for Government caused delay and equitable adjustment entitlement claims by contractors performing on the other contracts. 

Post fielding, the advantage to using multiple contracts for upgrade efforts is 

greater flexibility and insight in making platform specific changes. The disadvantages of using multiple contracts are contracting and administrative staffing needs 

substantially increase to accommodate the award and monitoring of multiple contracts. Additionally, contracts for associated E–IBCT systems may be impacted by 

each platform change which would have to be contractually addressed. 

INTERNAL THREATS TO ARMY PERSONNEL AND THEIR FAMILIES

97. Senator MCCAIN. General Casey, in January 2010, an independent panel appointed by Secretary Gates to identify gaps or deficiencies in DOD force protection 

policies following the horrific killing of 12 servicemembers, 1 Army civilian, and the 

wounding of 43 others at Fort Hood, TX, on November 5, 2009, concluded that DOD 

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was inadequately prepared to address internal threats. Do you agree with that finding? 

General CASEY. The independent review chaired by Former Army Secretary Togo 

West and retired Navy Adm. Vernon Clark identified shortfalls in DOD’s procedures 

for identifying and responding to potentially dangerous internal threats. 

I agree with their assessment and concur with Secretary Gates’ view that, as a 

result of the shortcomings revealed by the Fort Hood tragedy, DOD must do more 

to adapt to the evolving domestic internal security threat to American troops and 

military facilities that has emerged over the past decade. 

98. Senator MCCAIN. General Casey, what actions have you taken since the 

killings at Fort Hood to assess the specific threats posed by violent extremism to 

U.S. Army personnel and their families? 

General CASEY. On 23 November 2009, the Army issued an All Army Action message on Force Protection (DTG 231751ZNov 09). The message directed the immediate review of force protection measures to identify potential insider threats and 

to prevent or mitigate acts of violence directed against the Army. 

The message tasked Army leaders to become familiar with the ten key indicators 

of terrorist activities and to use them in conjunction with Subversion and Espionage 

Directed Against the Army (SAEDA) training. It also directed leaders to engage 

their soldiers and know their behavior on and off duty, to train leaders in identifying indicators of potential violence and terrorist behavior and to identify and report soldiers exhibiting indicators of potential violence. The message tasked senior 

leaders to ensure compliance with existing privately owned weapons registration 

policies, ensure leaders emphasize SAEDA training and ensure soldiers know how 

to report those suspected of subversion and espionage. Leaders are to take appropriate actions wherever soldiers exhibit behaviors that adversely affect good order 

and discipline in the Army. 

In addition, the message tasked mission commanders and installation commanders to perform risk assessments of their installations and to consider detailing, 

on a routine but random basis, law enforcement officials to observe behavior at primary gathering places like commissaries, schools and hospitals. It directed them to 

increase community oriented policing programs, review and adjust Random 

Antiterrorism Programs, and revitalize Neighborhood Watch Programs. The message also tasked installation commanders to coordinate information sharing between 

local civilian and installation law enforcement officials so commanders receive feedback on off base activities. 

My office is reviewing the findings and recommendations of the DOD Independent 

Review of the Fort Hood Shootings, and, where appropriate, is in the process of implementing many of the recommendations, in accordance with Army policies and 

processes. 

99. Senator MCCAIN. General Casey, what actions have you taken to reduce the 

risk that internal threats driven by violent extremism will result in harm to U.S. 

Army personnel and their families, such as improved awareness and reporting programs? 

General CASEY. On 23 November 2009, the Army issued an All Army Action message on Force Protection (DTG 231751ZNov 09). The message directed the immediate review of force protection measures to identify potential insider threats and 

to prevent or mitigate acts of violence directed against the Army. 

The message tasked Army leaders to become familiar with the ten key indicators 

of terrorist activities and to use them in conjunction with Subversion and Espionage 

Directed Against the Army (SAEDA) training. It also directed leaders to engage 

their soldiers and know their behavior on and off duty, to train leaders in identifying indicators of potential violence and terrorist behavior and to identify and report soldiers exhibiting indicators of potential violence. The message tasked senior 

leaders to ensure compliance with existing privately-owned weapons registration 

policies, ensure leaders emphasize SAEDA training and ensure soldiers know how 

to report those suspected of subversion and espionage. Leaders are to take appropriate actions wherever soldiers exhibit behaviors that adversely affect good order 

and discipline in the Army. 

In addition, the message tasked mission commanders and installation commanders to perform risk assessments of their installations and to consider detailing, 

on a routine but random basis, law enforcement officials to observe behavior at primary gathering places like commissaries, schools and hospitals. It directed them to 

increase community oriented policing programs, review and adjust Random 

Antiterrorism Programs, and revitalize Neighborhood Watch Programs. The message also tasked installation commanders to coordinate information sharing between 

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local civilian and installation law enforcement officials so commanders receive feedback on off base activities. 

My office is reviewing the findings and recommendations of the DOD Independent 

Review of the Fort Hood Shootings, and, where appropriate, is in the process of implementing many of the recommendations, in accordance with Army policies and 

processes. 

100. Senator MCCAIN. General Casey, what actions have been taken to improve 

the application of military personnel evaluation policies with respect to medical personnel, and to hold accountable supervisors who fail to report substandard performance? 

General CASEY. We are currently in the process of reviewing our evaluation reporting systems including leader counseling and development, roles and responsibilities of rating officials, and the synchronization of evaluation report assessments 

with the identification and selection of qualified leaders. Insights from investigations into the Fort Hood tragedy are being carefully considered in our review. 

ARMY SUICIDE STUDY

101. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary McHugh, in July 2009, the Department of the 

Army launched a $50 million study by the National Institute of Mental Health on 

Army suicides. The study is reportedly designed to be able to identify quickly potential risk factors that can inform existing prevention strategies. What is the status 

of the research project and how much DOD money has been expended to date? 

Secretary MCHUGH. The Army Study to Assess Risk and Resilience in 

Servicemembers (Army STARRS) is a 5-year study being conducted through a cooperative agreement grant award from the National Institute of Mental Health 

(NIMH). In July 2009, NIMH awarded the grant to a consortium consisting of the 

Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences, Columbia University, the 

University of Michigan, and Harvard University. The research is being conducted 

by the grantees, as well as NIMH scientists. Army scientists are also participating 

in scientific coordination and review. 

Army STARRS began receiving historical data from internal Army sources in January 2010. This followed a detailed review to identify relevant data sources, the establishment of a Data Use Agreement, and demonstrating compliance with the 

Army’s Information Assurance protocol. Parallel Data Use Agreements with applicable DOD data sources are being processed. The Study is scheduled to begin new 

data collection from current soldiers and new recruits over the next 6 months. 

The Army transferred $10 million to NIMH in June 2009 to cover the fiscal year 

2009 expenditures. An additional $10 million is programmed for fiscal year 2010. 

102. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary McHugh, what specific findings, if any, have been 

helpful in improving prevention strategies? 

Secretary MCHUGH. From a scientific perspective, it is too early in the study to 

have substantive findings. In the interim and at our request, National Institute of 

Mental Health (NIMH) has provided a report on civilian ‘‘best practices’’ regarding 

suicide prevention and behavioral health care. NIMH and the Army are working together to identify where relevant interventions could be implemented. 

103. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary McHugh, what are future deliverables and when 

are they expected? 

Secretary MCHUGH. The STARRS will report its progress and findings on a quarterly basis, as well as on an ad hoc basis as it makes new findings. 

In the coming year, Army STARRS is scheduled to deliver initial findings on risks 

and protective factors for suicide and related outcomes. This will be based on analyses of historical data, as well as detailed new information on the characteristics, 

exposures and experiences of current soldiers and new recruits, with a particular 

focus on known risk factors for suicide, such as mental health problems. 

In subsequent years, the study will follow soldiers over time, identify those who 

have particular negative (or positive) outcomes and deliver practical, actionable information on specific risks and protective factors for suicide. This is designed to assist the Army preventing suicide and improving soldiers’ overall psychological 

health. 

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TRAUMATIC BRAIN INJURY AND POST TRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER

104. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary McHugh and General Casey, please provide a 

comprehensive list and description of policy and program actions which are underway in the Army to identify and treat traumatic brain injury (TBI), including mild 

TBI, and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). 

Secretary MCHUGH and General CASEY. The Army TBI program is a standardized, comprehensive program that provides a continuum of integrated care and services for soldiers and patients from point-of-injury to return to duty, or transition 

from active duty and/or return to highest functional level. 

The policy documents supporting the program include the following: the TBI Task 

Force report, the TBI Action Plan, four All Army Activity messages, and the TBI 

Operations Order. The Army is also initiating an ‘‘Educate, Train, Treat & Track’’ 

campaign plan to facilitate leader and medical collaboration to improve acute concussion identification and management. The plan’s goal is a cultural change in 

warfighter management after concussive events to include identification and treatment close to point of injury, documentation of the incident and expectation of recovery with early treatment. 

Key actions that facilitate identification and treatment of TBI include: educating 

the Force on TBI; funding over 350 staff to provide TBI care; implementing TBI 

screening for all medically evacuated patients and all soldiers during post-deployment; implementing the Military Acute Concussion Evaluation for initial concussion 

assessment; and developing and implementing Clinical Practice Guidelines for the 

management of soldiers with concussion in both the deployed and nondeployed settings. 

To help those dealing with PTSD and other psychological effects of war, Army 

leadership is taking aggressive, far-reaching steps to ensure the availability of an 

array of behavioral health services for soldiers and their families. Key actions that 

have facilitate identification and treatment of PTSD include: improving the distribution of behavioral health providers in theater and increasing access to care; implementing the Respect-Mil program to integrate behavioral healthcare into the primary care setting; incorporating Battlemind training in the Deployment Cycle Support program; producing two DVD/CDs that deal with family deployment issues; 

screening soldiers using the Post-Deployment Health Assessment and Reassessment; revising the questionnaire for national security positions regarding mental 

and emotional health; instituting post traumatic stress training for our health care 

providers; and hiring approximately 350 additional behavioral healthcare providers 

and 44 marriage and family therapists across the Army Medical Command. 

Additionally, on 1 Oct 2008 the Army established the Comprehensive Soldier Fitness Program. The mission of this program is to develop and institute a holistic, resilience building fitness program for soldiers, families, and Army civilians. The program focuses on optimizing five dimensions of strength: Physical, Emotional, Social, 

Spiritual, and Family. Comprehensive Soldier Fitness expects this to enhance the 

performance (capability) and build the resilience (capacity) of the Force in this era 

of persistent conflict and high operational tempo. 

Finally, the Army supports and conducts innovative TBI and PTSD research. The 

Army Medical Research and Materiel Command manages the Congressional Special 

Interest medical research program and serves as the Executive Agent of the DOD 

Blast Injury research program. In partnership with the Department of Veterans Affairs, the Defense Center of Excellence, civilian hospitals and research institutes, as 

well as other organizations such as the National Football League, the Army is working aggressively to improve our understanding of TBI and psychological health conditions. 

105. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary McHugh and General Casey, how much is provided for these programs in the fiscal year 2011 request? 

Secretary MCHUGH and General CASEY. The President’s proposed budget for the 

fiscal year 2011 Defense Health Program (DHP) provides the Army $285 million for 

TBI and psychological health, focused on initiatives related to access, surveillance, 

quality, resilience and transition. The DHP also enhanced funding for medical research, which will include funds directed toward research on TBI and psychological 

health. 

106. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary McHugh and General Casey, are there any unfunded requirements for personnel, programs, treatment or research with respect to 

TBI and PTSD? If so, please identify each such requirement. 

Secretary MCHUGH and General CASEY. The President’s proposed budget for the 

fiscal year 2011 DHP fully funds the Army’s identified requirements for personnel, 

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programs and treatment with respect to TBI and PTSD. Similarly, the combined Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation investment of Army and the DHP adequately addresses the key gaps in our knowledge of TBI and PTSD, as well as the 

technological development required to field improvements in medical treatment and 

prevention. 

NURSING SHORTAGE

107. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary McHugh, what is the current state of the nursing 

shortage within the U.S. Army and what actions are underway to increase the supply of nurses available to the Army, both in uniform and civilian nurses? 

Secretary MCHUGH. The Army Nurse Corps has been successful in meeting its recruiting goals for Active Duty nurses. In the aggregate, the Army Nurse Corps is 

over 100 percent of required end strength. As such, the recruiting focus has shifted 

from building capacity to building capability. 

The Army Nurse Corps will continue its current accession strategies, but enhance 

them through precision recruiting initiatives. We have realigned recruiting incentives to make Army Nursing competitive with incentives offered nationally. Our 

focus is recruiting experienced nurses in specialties such as trauma/critical care, 

emergency nursing and all behavioral health disciplines to ensure position fill in low 

density, high complexity areas of concentration. Incentive Specialty Pay for nurses, 

who achieve and maintain certification in these areas of concentration, has been an 

effective retention incentive that assists the Army Nurse Corps to maintain capability in critical fill areas to support operations at home and abroad. 

Through effective recruitment, we have successfully increased the number of civilian registered nurses (RNs) throughout the Army Medical Command, even as the 

mission requirements of a protracted conflict have generated an increased demand 

for healthcare providers. The staffing strength has steadily increased to over 5,300 

civilian RNs in 2009, representing a 45 percent increase over the 2007 end strength. 

The Civilian Nurse Loan Repayment Program (CNLRP) and the Recruitment, Relocation and Retention Initiatives Program (3Rs) are two successful civilian nurse 

incentive programs. The 3Rs support our newly appointed and current employees 

by offering incentives commensurate with service agreements. Since its inception, 

the CNLRP has supported tuition loan repayment for over 283 RNs and 32 licensed 

practical nurses. Central funding of the CNLRP at $1.5 million annually began in 

2006. The use of 3Rs for Army Medical Command civilian nurses increased from 

$4.8 million in 2007 to $8.2 million in 2009. Although the recruitment and retention 

incentives for RNs have been successful, Army Medical Command still had over 650 

open hiring actions for RNs at the end of 2009. These open actions represent about 

12 percent of our civilian RN workforce and are typical of the number of vacancies 

we manage as part of routine turnover. 

The Army Medical Command’s success in attracting experienced nurses into the 

military healthcare system may be partially due to the downturn in the economy 

and private sector salaries. We must maintain aggressive recruitment efforts and 

incentives for nurses, regardless of the Economic environment, to ensure future success. 

MENTAL HEALTH RESOURCES IN AFGHANISTAN

108. Senator MCCAIN. General Casey, the Army’s most recent Mental Health Advisory Team study identified a shortage of mental health providers for Army personnel serving in Afghanistan. What actions have you taken to address that gap in 

staffing? 

General CASEY. There is currently no staffing gap in Afghanistan. Based on the 

Mental Health Advisory Team’s (MHAT) findings and recommendations, the Army 

pushed additional behavioral health providers into Afghanistan to close the staffing 

gap. There are approximately 104 behavioral health providers serving in Afghanistan providing clinical services to the supported force. The ratio in Afghanistan of 

1 behavioral health provider for every 663 servicemembers improves upon the 

MHAT’s recommended ratio of 1:700. 

MEDICAL EVACUATION IN AFGHANISTAN

109. Senator MCCAIN. General Casey, in March 2009 Secretary Gates directed 

that medical care and evacuation capabilities in Afghanistan achieve parity with the 

Iraq theater. Have we achieved that goal? 

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General CASEY. Critically wounded personnel in both theaters are being delivered 

to surgical facilities consistently in less than 1 hour. The Army recognizes the strategic value of this mission, and have reprioritized our resources, changed our structure and invested in improvements to take care of the wounded in Afghanistan. The 

Army implemented several initiatives to achieve this standard. The greatest being 

the increase in assets deployed to the Theater. 

In March 2009, there were 15 HH–60 medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) helicopters 

and 3 Forward Surgical Teams (FST) deployed. Today, the Army has deployed 39 

HH–60 MEDEVAC helicopters and an additional 6 FSTs. Additionally, the Army’s 

increased assets include Level III surgical augmentation and a medical brigade command and control headquarters. Other initiatives include changing doctrine for 

aeromedical evacuation to 1 hour for urgent and urgent surgical missions, increasing force structure, increasing additional assets, fielding improved aircraft capabilities, streamlining procedures, establishing new data collection/reporting requirements and releasing a VCSA SENDS Aeromedical Evacuation Message. The Army’s 

force structure changes include aggressively growing 9 additional MEDEVAC companies in the Reserve component (two of which will be deployed this year) and a 

force design structure change in each of the 37 MEDEVAC companies increasing 

from 12 aircraft/12 crews to 15 aircraft and 20 crews. The first of these newly designed companies will be deployed this year. 

The Army also continues to modernize MEDEVAC aircraft with improved engines, 

satellite communication capability and forward looking infrared technology. We are 

committed to aggressively pursuing initiatives that further improve medical care 

and evacuation capabilities for our fighting forces. 

110. Senator MCCAIN. General Casey, are sufficient MEDEVAC helicopters, 

crews, and forward surgical teams available in Afghanistan to ensure rapid evacuation and care for the wounded? 

General CASEY. Currently we have sufficient evacuation capability to ensure rapid 

evacuation of the wounded. The challenge is the surge. Although we all know that 

requirements will go down in Iraq, the reality is that future demand will have a 

short term net increase that may exceed our available supply. In order to mitigate 

this challenge, the Army has changed its sourcing strategy. The Army is beginning 

to source the requirement with the new 15 aircraft/20 crew MEDEVAC companies 

instead of replacing units in the fight with the older construct of 12 aircraft/12 crew 

MEDEVAC companies. This strategy will increase capacity and capability and mitigate surge requirements. These efforts are part of a larger joint effort to ensure sufficient MEDEVAC capability is sustained in Afghanistan. 

111. Senator MCCAIN. General Casey, what is the ratio of U.S. personnel who are 

injured to those who die, and how does that compare with experience in the Iraq 

theater? 

General CASEY. The ratio of U.S. personnel injured in Operation Enduring Freedom to those who die is 1 Soldier Killed in Action for every 7 Soldiers Wounded 

in Action (based on reports from theater since October 7, 2001). For Operation Iraqi 

Freedom, the ratio of U.S. personnel injured to those who die is one soldier killed 

in action for every nine soldiers wounded in action (based on reports from theater 

since March 19, 2003). This information, from the Defense Manpower Data Center 

Contingency Tracking System, is current as of February 6, 2010. 

SUPPORT FOR SURVIVORS

112. Senator MCCAIN. General Casey, please provide information describing the 

Army’s Survivor Outreach Services (SOS) program. 

General CASEY. In fiscal year 2008, the Army began a holistic review of programs, 

services, and policies for survivors of the fallen to ensure we serve them in a manner commensurate with their level of service and sacrifice to the Nation. The Army 

created the SOS program to standardize services and ensure we meet our commitment to these family members. 

The SOS program has been operational for 1 year and provides a holistic and 

multi-agency service delivery model to our survivors. The SOS program supports all 

survivors—including Reserve component survivors—who have lost loved ones while 

on active duty, regardless of whether the loss was a result of combat, accident, illness or suicide. The SOS Program services remain available until the survivors no 

longer desire them; however, some services, such as medical care requires the recipient be a DOD ID card holder. The SOS helps Survivors understand their benefits 

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and make timely and more accurate decisions that impact positively on them and 

their families. 

The range of services covers the entire spectrum of care, from life skill education 

to treatment. Services are tailored to the needs of the survivors and may include 

support groups, educational seminars, financial counseling, advocacy, information, 

referral, and behavioral health treatment. 

The Army increased SOS Program staffing levels by adding support coordinators 

and financial counselors at garrisons and communities closest to where the families 

live. Support coordinators serve as the long-term support agent and links survivors 

to programs and services. Additional staff was placed at the Casualty Assistance 

Centers to include benefit coordinators and trainers who are subject matter experts 

on benefits and entitlements, and provide standardized training for Casualty Assistance and Notification Officers. 

113. Senator MCCAIN. General Casey, what are the goals of the program? 

General CASEY. Our Fallen Warriors have paid the ultimate sacrifice, and the 

Army is committed to serving their families—both Active and Reserve component 

survivors—for as long as they desire. The goal of the SOS program is to deliver on 

this promise by expanding and standardizing services, as well as building a comprehensive program that embraces and reassures survivors that they are continually linked to the Army for as long as they desire. 

114. Senator MCCAIN. General Casey, are sufficient resources available to achieve 

those goals? 

General CASEY. The current fiscal year funding of $53.8 million has been adequate to establish the program. To ensure we reach out and fully support every survivor, as well as improve our case management systems, the Army plans to increase 

our garrison and headquarters capabilities by adding a full-time SOS Support Coordinator at every garrison and increasing staffing at the Department of the Army 

level. 

115. Senator MCCAIN. General Casey, what additional resources or legislative authority, if any, are needed? 

General CASEY. At this time, no changes to legislation are required to support the 

SOS program. As we refine and develop the program, we will request additional 

funding in future budget requests as necessary. 

SUPPORT FOR MILITARY SPOUSES

116. Senator MCCAIN. General Casey, please provide a comprehensive description 

of training and support programs provided to military spouses at all points in the 

career of Army personnel. 

General CASEY. Families are important to the Army, a priority to soldiers, and 

a vital factor in the Army’s overall readiness. A prepared Family is better able to 

manage deployment, long-term separations, and Army life in general. The Army has 

a myriad of training and support programs that are geared towards our spouses, 

both Active and Reserve Component. 

To help new spouses adapt to the Army, we have developed the New Spouse Orientation Seminar, which this available online. 

The Building Strong and Ready Families is a commander-directed program that 

is primarily for first-time soldiers and spouses as they adapt to Army life. 

Army Family Team Building classes provide junior spouses and those new to the 

military with the skills and tools to successfully maneuver through the Army system. 

Senior Spouse Leadership Seminars are offered annually to spouses whose soldiers are attending training at the Army War College and the Sergeants Major 

Academy. These courses are designed to assist senior spouses in enhancing their 

roles as mentors and advisors. 

The Enlisted Spouse Outreach and Training Plan prepares enlisted spouses for requirements of key assignments through drill sergeant, recruiter, and first sergeant 

spouse seminars. 

The Joint Senior Spouse Course is the only senior spouse course regarding leadership. It is jointly conducted and is the 5-day course for spouses of newly promoted 

general officers. This course complements the CAPSTONE course for general officers 

conducted by the National Defense University. 

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In addition to these training programs, there is a multitude of programs and services, which offer support to spouses. Let me take a few moments to highlight some 

of these programs. 

Services for Multi-Cultural Families target support for Families with foreign-born 

spouses. 

Liaison for Citizen Immigration Services is available to Families seeking guidance 

for the citizenship and residency application process. 

Hearts Apart offers support to all waiting Family members—Active Army, Army 

Reserve, and National Guard spouses and children. 

The Operation Resources for Educating About Deployment and You (Operation 

READY) training program assists commanders in meeting family readiness objectives. Operation READY includes training modules and resources designed to help 

soldiers and their families cope with personal, Family, and financial demands of deployment. 

Military Family Life Consultants (MFLCs) provide non-medical, short-term, problem-solving counseling services which help soldiers and families cope with the reactions to stressful or adverse situations created by deployments and reintegration. 

The MFLC works directly with Army Community Service, ARNG Headquarters and 

Army Reserve Regional Commands to provide deployment and reintegration support 

to soldiers and their families. Consultants with specialized skills (e.g., financial, 

child, and youth needs) may be requested to respond to installation and Reserve 

Component needs. The goal is to prevent Family distress by providing education and 

information on Family dynamics, parent education, support services, and the effects 

of stress and positive coping mechanisms. In April 2009, MFLCs increased the number of nonmedical Behavioral Health counseling sessions offered for servicemembers 

and their Families from 6 to 12 sessions per person/per issue. 

Family Readiness Group (FRG)/Rear Detachment Training is available to FRG 

leaders and rear detachment commanders. Virtual FRGs (vFRG) provide all the 

functionality of an FRG via a secure, online setting to meet the needs of geographically dispersed units and families. 

The Employment Readiness Program provides assistance to family members in acquiring skills, networks, and resources that will allow them to participate in the 

work force and to develop a career plan. Employment services are available to all 

Army components regardless of location. Services include: career counseling and 

coaching; employment training classes; job fairs; Army Spouse Career Assessment 

Tool; job listings; and information and assistance on the Military Spouse Career Advancement Account. 

The Army Spouse Employment Partnership (ASEP) is an expanding partnership 

that is mutually beneficial to the Army and corporate America. ASEP consists of 

a small group of committed partners from the private sector, military, and Federal 

Government who have pledged their best efforts to increase employment and career 

opportunities for military spouses. The partnership provides Army spouses the opportunity to attain financial security and achieve employment goals through career 

mobility and enhanced employment options. Additional training and support opportunities includes Battlemind Training for spouses, which assists in understanding 

PTSD and TBI. 

The Dependents’ Educational Assistance (DEA) Program provides education and 

training opportunities to eligible dependents of certain veterans. DEA reduces tuition by offering up to 45 months of education benefits. 

The Stateside Spouse Education Assistance Program (SSEAP) is a need-based 

education assistance program designed to provide spouses of active duty and retired 

Army soldiers, and widows(ers) of Army soldiers who died either on active duty or 

in a retired status, and residing in the United States, with financial assistance in 

pursuing educational goals. The program assists spouses/widows(ers) in gaining the 

education required to allow them to qualify for increased occupational opportunities. 

SEAP provides for up to $2,500 maximum per academic year for fees, supplies, or 

books. 

The Army has a website (Army OneSource) which provides detailed information 

for all of these programs. 

117. Senator MCCAIN. General Casey, what resources are available to support 

these programs in the fiscal year 2011 request? 

General CASEY. The resources requested for training and support programs for 

military spouses has more than doubled from the fiscal year 2008 budget of $116.9 

million to the fiscal year 2011 budget request of $321.1 million. 

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118. Senator MCCAIN. General Casey, are there any unfunded requirements with 

respect to programs to support military spouses? If so, please identify each such requirement. 

General CASEY. All programs provided by Army Community Services that support 

military spouses are fully funded. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE

ARMY STRUCTURE

119. Senator INHOFE. Secretary McHugh and General Casey, the 2010 QDR 

states, ‘‘In the mid- to long-term, U.S. military forces must plan and prepare to prevail in a broad range of operations that may occur in multiple theaters in overlapping time frames. This includes maintaining the ability to prevail against two capable nation-state aggressors.’’ I am concerned that DOD is being short sighted in our 

QDR and budgeting process; that the cost of Iraq and Afghanistan is coming at the 

expense to maintaining our long-term military capability. The Army’s fiscal year 

2011 budget request appears focused more on maintaining the force in the current 

fight and less on developing a force capable of winning across the spectrum of future 

threats. Is the Army postured and structured properly to counter the full spectrum 

of threats, low and high end, in the near- and far-term? 

Secretary MCHUGH and General CASEY. The Army has outlined two major priorities: Restoring Balance and Setting Conditions for the Future. To restore balance, 

we are targeting the four imperatives of Sustain, Prepare, Reset and Transform. 

First, we must sustain the All-Volunteer Force by ensuring a quality of life for our 

soldiers, families, and Army civilians that is commensurate with their quality of 

service. Second, we must prepare soldiers, units, and their equipment for future deployments by providing adequate time to train for full-spectrum operations and to 

reduce uncertainty and stress for soldiers and their families. Third, we must reset 

the force as it returns from extended deployments, to a level of personnel and equipment readiness that permits the resumption of training for future missions across 

the full range of potential military operations. Finally, we must continuously assess 

and transform the force to meet combatant commander requirements by revising 

our modernization strategy, completing transformation from Cold War legacy formations to modular formations, and improving business processes. 

Our fiscal year 2011 budget reflects how we have transformed the Army and 

prioritized programs and efforts that show promise for today and tomorrow. The 

Army incorporated a BCT modernization plan that continuously modernizes equipment to meet current and future capability needs through upgrade, replacement, recapitalization, refurbishment, and technology insertions. Army efforts in this line of 

effort include our request for $887 million for the procurement of 16 Block III AH– 

64 Apache Helicopters, as well as the upgrade of 13 AH–64 Helicopters to Block II. 

Block III Apache is part of a long-term effort to improve situational awareness, performance, reliability, and sustainment of the Apache. Block II upgrades continue our 

commitment to modernize the ARNG Aviation Fleet. Additionally, in this line of effort, we have requested $505 million dollars to upgrade Shadow RQ–7 UAVs. This 

key upgrade will increase the payload capacity and enhance the performance of this 

key Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) asset for our BCT commanders. 

We are confident the current program provides the resources and structure to 

meet the imperatives defined above while also setting conditions for the future. The 

Army continues to serve the needs of the Nation in an increasingly unpredictable 

global security environment. While me must maintain access to consistent, timely 

and reliable funding, we believe the fiscal year 2011 base budget and OCOs requests 

provide the resources necessary to sustain the force, ensure deployment readiness, 

reset the force, and to transform the Army to ensure an adaptive, capable and dominant force in support of combatant commanders and the Nation. The Army takes 

seriously its obligation to maintain responsible stewardship of the resources appropriated to it by the American public. Current enterprise initiatives are studying how 

to continually improve Army business practices and policies to better enable this 

stewardship. 

As we responsibly draw down our forces in both Iraq and Afghanistan and train 

for Full Spectrum Operations, we must sustain reliable, timely, and consistent funding. A force capable of deterring or defeating emerging adversaries is supported by 

funding that restores balance and readiness for our soldiers, families, and veterans, 

and allows us to reset our equipment and Army Prepositioned Stocks. 

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120. Senator INHOFE. Secretary McHugh and General Casey, does the Army have 

the right equipment currently in inventory or being developed to address these contingency requirements? 

Secretary MCHUGH and General CASEY. Yes. The current and future strategic environments of persistent conflict require the Army to modernize our capabilities continuously and aggressively to stay ahead of our adversaries. The objective of the 

Army’s modernization effort is to develop and field a versatile and affordable mix 

of the best equipment available to allow soldiers and units to succeed in full spectrum operations both today and tomorrow. 

The Army will accomplish our modernization goals by focusing our efforts on three 

major lines of effort: develop and field new capabilities to meet identified gaps 

through traditional and rapid acquisition processes; continuously modernize equipment to meet current and future needs through the procurement of upgrades, recapitalization and divestment; and meet continuously evolving force requirements in 

the current operational environment by fielding and distributing capabilities in accordance with Army priorities. Examples include the ongoing Apache Block III and 

Paladin Improvement Programs, new GCV and Joint Light Tactical Truck Programs. 

COMBAT VEHICLES AND HELICOPTERS

121. Senator INHOFE. Secretary McHugh and General Casey, the Army’s current 

fleets of combat vehicles and helicopters were developed and procured over 30 to 60 

years ago and are aging at an increasingly rapid rate. The M1 Abrams tank was 

developed in the 1970s and fielded in the 1980s, the M2 Bradley Fighting Vehicle 

was developed over 25 years ago, and the M109A6 Paladin howitzer is on its sixth 

version. The Army’s helicopter fleet continues to get older and suffer the effects of 

continuous combat operations, with ages ranging from 15 to 40-plus years, with the 

CH–47 dating back to 1962 and on its seventh version (CH–47F). How does the 

Army achieve a balanced and full spectrum strategy when its fleet of combat vehicles and helicopters range from 30 to 50 years old? 

Secretary MCHUGH and General CASEY. The Army reduced the Fleet Age of M1 

Abrams tanks and M2 Bradley Fighting Vehicles by conducting a national level 

reset of its vehicles returning from deployments. This combat vehicle reset restored 

capability or ‘‘life’’ lost during combat operations. Additionally, the Army recapitalized these vehicles by installing equipment upgrades to incrementally modernize the 

vehicle fleet resetting a vehicles’ age to zero hours/miles. These actions reduced the 

fleet age in aggregate, while allowing the Army to integrate lessons learned from 

OEF/OIF to enhance survivability and battle command. 

We are making a similar investment in the M109A6 Paladin 155mm, Self-propelled howitzers and Field Artillery Ammunition Vehicles (FAASV) with the Paladin 

Integrated Management (PIM) program. The PIM program will produce a new chassis with Bradley common engine, transmission and suspension systems. The new 

PIM chassis combined with the current cannon turret will provide the needed power 

to maneuver the howitzer and FAASV with the Abrams and Bradley fleets. In addition, with Bradley common components, the PIM program will reduce the logistic 

footprint of the Heavy BCT, while restoring the fleet age and minimizing the overall 

maintenance costs. 

The Army will also continue to modernize its aviation fleet through procurement, 

recapitalization and reset. A total of 464 CH–47F model aircraft are planned for delivery to the Army over the next 12 years. Of these, 220 will be new builds and the 

remaining 244 ‘‘remanufactured’’ aircraft utilize dynamic components from the divested CH–47D. Unlike the CH–47D which was created on the same aging frame 

of the CH–47A fleet, the CH–47F will include a new airframe, wiring harness and 

hydraulic system. The current average age of the CH–47D fleet is 20 years and the 

current age of the CH–47F fleet is 2 years. Other Army airframes are receiving 

similar attention like the UH–60A to A to L RECAP Program, which recapitalizes 

228 UH–60A ARNG and USAR legacy fleet Black Hawk helicopters in fiscal year 

2010 thru fiscal year 2015. 

122. Senator INHOFE. Secretary McHugh and General Casey, what is the plan for 

Army helicopter modernization for fiscal year 2011 and beyond? 

Secretary MCHUGH and General CASEY. Army Aviation continues to transform 

and modernize to meet current and future full-spectrum aviation requirements. The 

Aviation Transformation Plan, which guides fleet modernization strategy and aviation formation transformation, is based on a full, in-depth analysis that integrates 

lessons learned from recent operations in Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation 

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Enduring Freedom. The Plan restructures Army Aviation warfighting units into 21 

Combat Aviation Brigades (13 Active, 8 Reserve components). 

Additionally, we have significant MEDEVAC and cargo/utility modular capabilities above division level to support the combatant commander requirements ensuring the aviation units are modular, capable, lethal, tailorable and sustainable. To 

maintain our current capability, and meet future requirements, we are executing a 

combination of aircraft recapitalizations and remanufactures, in addition to replacing wartime losses with brand new aircraft. 

The future vision for Army Aviation is being assessed and developed throughout 

the aviation community of operators and materiel development. The challenge is to 

chart a future for Army Aviation while maintaining and fighting the world’s best 

rotary wing and unmanned system fleets. To do this, we must continue the cooperation with industry and academia to ensure we provide the incentive to make the 

next leap in technology that will bring us the development of future propulsion systems and revolutionary aircraft designs that will meet our future requirements for 

faster, more capable, more efficient and more easily sustained aircraft systems. 

As part of the process, the Army is participating in several studies looking at future Rotorcraft capabilities. These include the DOD’s Future Vertical Lift Study, the 

Joint Future Theater Lift effort, and our own Joint Multi-Role Helicopter Study. 

These capabilities-based assessments will lay out a strategic plan for the Department’s vertical lift that will take us to the next fleet of rotorcraft and vertical lift 

aircraft in the 2025 timeframe. 

The Army will also continue to modernize its aviation fleet through procurement, 

recapitalization and reset. A total of 464 CH–47F model aircraft are planned for delivery to the Army over the next 12 years. Of these, 220 will be new builds and the 

remaining 244 ‘‘remanufactured’’ aircraft utilize dynamic components from the divested CH–47D. Unlike the CH–47D which was created on the same aging frame 

of the CH–47A fleet, the CH–47F will include a new airframe, wiring harness and 

hydraulic system. The current average age of the CH–47D fleet is 20 years and the 

current age of the CH–47F fleet is 2 years. Other Army airframes are receiving 

similar attention like the UH–60A to A to L RECAP Program, which recapitalizes 

228 UH–60A ARNG and USAR legacy fleet Black Hawk helicopters in fiscal year 

2010 thru fiscal year 2015. 

GROUND COMBAT VEHICLE PROGRAM

123. Senator INHOFE. Secretary McHugh and General Casey, the cancellation of 

the Armored Gun System, Comanche, Crusader, and the FCS Manned Ground Vehicle program, along with recent reports on the uncertainty of the GCV as part of the 

BCT Modernization program, gives me cause for concern over the Army’s capabilities in the coming years. Since the Manned Ground Vehicle portion of FCS was terminated last year, you have made it a priority to field the new GCV within the next 

7 years. The press has been reporting that there is disagreement between DOD and 

the Army about the Army’s GCV program—‘‘U.S. Army, Pentagon at odds over new 

vehicle’’—Reuters, February 17, 2010. Is there disagreement and if so, what is it 

based on? 

Secretary MCHUGH and General CASEY. The Army and OSD agree on the need 

to develop the new GCV in response to current and emerging threats and the limitations of the existing combat vehicle fleet. In response to the Secretary of Defense’s 

direction, the Army has reviewed requirements and developed an acquisition plan 

for GCV that is consistent with DOD policy and law. As part of the Materiel Development Decision approval process, the Army provided OSD with several briefings 

to ensure that all questions and concerns were addressed. The shared goal is to see 

the GCV program proceed in a way that will ensure its success. As a result of 

Army’s last meeting with OSD, the GCV Request for Proposal was released. In accordance with DOD policy and law, OSD will continue to be involved in the planning 

for the GCV program as it moves toward a Milestone A decision. 

124. Senator INHOFE. Secretary McHugh and General Casey, what are you doing 

differently to ensure that the GCV doesn’t suffer the same fate as other failed programs? 

Secretary MCHUGH and General CASEY. The GCV program plan has incorporated 

several mitigation strategies into the program plan. First of all, we will have contractors deliver subsystem level competitive prototypes early in the development. 

This will give the program manager an undeniable indication of the contractor’s 

progress. Second, we will retain competition throughout the Technology Development (TD) and Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) phases. This 

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will keep the competing contractors responsive and innovative; they will not have 

any assurance that they are the sole source for GCV production. This strategy required the contractors to maintain schedule and reduce costs as they progress 

through the TD and EMD phases. Third, we will stay focused on maintaining the 

program schedule during execution, even if that results in slightly less capability. 

A 7-year schedule is the constant even if that schedule results in an 80–85 percent 

solution. Finally, the modular design approach with growth margin to support system updates will support performance improvements over time and will provide 

flexibility for emerging/changing requirements. 

125. Senator INHOFE. Secretary McHugh and General Casey, if the GCV is fielded 

in accordance with your schedule, how long will the current fleet of vehicles such 

as the Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicles remain in the force? 

Secretary MCHUGH and General CASEY. The current fleet of combat vehicles including the Bradley will remain in use through 2030. The GCV will replace the 

Bradley in its Infantry Fighting Mission Role starting in 2017 with replacement of 

the Bradley’s other mission roles to follow. 

126. Senator INHOFE. Secretary McHugh and General Casey, what are your plans 

to upgrade the other vehicles such as the engineer, field artillery, ambulance, and 

command vehicles? 

Secretary MCHUGH and General CASEY. The Army continues to explore an incremental approach to conduct modernization for its combat vehicle fleet. This effort 

is tied to how the Army conducts its current fight and adjusts its force structure 

and mix analyses. The Army has a significant number of M113 variants which are 

serving in command and control, engineer, field artillery and ambulance roles. 

There are about 5,200 of these variants required. As the Army builds its Program 

Objective Memorandum (POM) 12–17 investment program, we will be exploring options for the replacement of these vehicles. Those options include using Strykers, 

Bradley Fighting Vehicles and MRAP vehicles to fill some or all of these roles. 

HEALTH AND QUALITY OF THE ARMY

127. Senator INHOFE. Secretary McHugh and General Casey, the Army’s strength 

is in its soldiers, their families, and the Army civilians who support them. Even 

after 8-plus years of combat operations, the Army remains resilient and capable, a 

fact that never ceases to leave me in awe. I applaud you, General Casey, for the 

emphasis you have placed on the Comprehensive Soldier Fitness Program, the Army 

Risk Reduction Program, and the Health Promotion Program as part of your stated 

objective to ‘‘sustain soldiers, civilians, and families.’’ I also applaud the Army in 

taking an aggressive approach last year to address the soldier suicide issue and continue to pursue the right solutions for the growing trend of suicides among family 

members. What is your assessment of the health and quality of the Army? 

Secretary MCHUGH and General CASEY. Our soldiers, families, and civilians are 

clearly stressed and fatigued by nearly 9 years of combat. The Army is out of balance, and that balance needs to be restored to sustain this All-Volunteer Force for 

the long haul. Yet through it all, our Army remains amazingly resilient, determined, 

and extraordinarily effective. Today, our soldiers have more expertise, education, 

training and capabilities than ever before, and in fiscal year 2009 our incoming Active component soldiers had the highest high school diploma rates since fiscal year 

2003. 

128. Senator INHOFE. Secretary McHugh and General Casey, where is the Army 

in terms of the Comprehensive Soldier Fitness Program, the Army Risk Reduction 

Program, and the Health Promotion Program? 

Secretary MCHUGH and General CASEY. Comprehensive Soldier Fitness (CSF) is 

a rapidly maturing program designed to develop psychological and physiological resilience across the entire Army community, including soldiers, family members, and 

Department of the Army civilians. To date, over 395,000 soldiers have taken the 

Global Assessment Tool, which is a web-based strengths assessment. Eight webbased training modules that target resilience skills are currently available to soldiers once they complete the Global Assessment Tool, and 20 modules will be available by the end of fiscal year 2010. Additionally, CSF has trained 829 Master Resilience Trainers at the University of Pennsylvania and satellite locations, with a goal 

of training at least 1,800 trainers by the end of fiscal year 2010. These Master Resilience Trainers lead resilience development training in their units and local communities. CSF is currently budgeted for $42 million annually over the next 5 years. 

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The Army considers reduction of soldier high-risk behaviors as an ultimate goal. 

These behaviors, whether they be substance abuse, domestic violence, financial 

problems, self-medication or others are viewed by the Army as possible precursors 

to suicide, as well as serious issues that must be dealt with individually. In essence, 

many of our human services fall under the general rubric of risk reduction. The 

Army also has a specific Risk Reduction Program that aids commanders and human 

service providers in tracking 15 high-risk soldier behaviors in units and addressing 

areas of high risk. This program is now being expanded to deployed units and to 

the Reserve and National Guard as a result of initiatives from the Army Suicide 

Prevention Task Force. 

The goal of the Army Health Promotion Program is to maximize readiness, 

warfighting ability and work performance. Objectives include enhancing the wellbeing of all soldiers, Army civilians, family members, and retirees; and encouraging 

lifestyles that improve and protect physical, behavioral and spiritual health. The 

Army Health Promotion Program encompasses a variety of activities designed to facilitate behavioral and environmental alterations to improve or protect health and 

well-being. This includes a combination of health education and related policies, organizational, social, behavioral, spiritual and health care activities and initiatives. 

These are integrated to produce a single comprehensive program evaluating population needs, assessing existing programs and coordinating targeted interventions. 

129. Senator INHOFE. Secretary McHugh and General Casey, how have the measures taken in 2009 helped to reduce the suicide rates in the Army? 

Secretary MCHUGH and General CASEY. The Army had a record number of suicide 

deaths in January and February 2009. If the trend had continued, the Army was 

on track to exceed 200 Active Component suicide deaths for 2009. The Army’s senior 

leadership engaged this problem head-on. 

The Army conducted a ‘‘suicide stand-down’’ in March 2009, released an interactive suicide training video and implemented several initiatives to reduce the ‘‘stigma’’ associated with seeking behavioral health services. The Confidential Alcohol 

Treatment and Education Pilot program in Schofield Barracks, HI; Fort Richardson, 

AK; and Fort Lewis, WA allows self-referral into treatment programs without command notification. Several ‘‘tele-behavioral’’ health pilot programs are underway, 

which require all redeploying soldiers, from the senior commander to the most junior soldier, to receive behavioral health screening. 

In 2010, we have continued this effort by expanding the training for ‘‘peer support’’ using the Ask - Care - Escort model, developing new interactive training videos, and increasing access to behavioral health care thru telemedicine initiatives. Finally, the Army fully supports the requirement set forth in the National Defense 

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 for ‘‘person to person’’ behavioral health assessments for every servicemember upon their redeployment from an overseas operation. 

130. Senator INHOFE. Secretary McHugh and General Casey, what is the Army 

doing to address suicides among family members? 

Secretary MCHUGH and General CASEY. : The Army Suicide Prevention Task 

Force and the Army Campaign Plan for Health Promotion, Risk Reduction and Suicide Prevention have addressed family member and Army civilian suicide prevention 

efforts. 

Many of our outreach efforts have a specific family member focus. For example, 

this year’s interactive training video ‘‘Home Front’’ will have specific scenarios for 

family member’s—both spouses and children. The Walter Reed Army Institute of 

Research developed Family Battlemind training for use in both pre- and post-deployment settings. Key components include teaching families the following: 

• Independence: the capability of having a fulfilling and meaningful life as 

part of an Army-centric Family 

• Resiliency: The ability to overcome setbacks and obstacles and to maintain positive thoughts during times of adversity 

The Army Medical Department has expanded access to behavioral health within 

Military Treatment Facilities and through TRICARE. The Army helped initiate the 

TRICARE Assistance Program and Tele-Behavioral Health program for geographically dispersed Family Members. This demonstration project will expand access to 

existing behavioral health services by using audiovisual telecommunication systems, 

such as video chat and instant messaging to access existing behavioral health centers. It also expands access to the behavioral health call centers and counseling 

services for eligible beneficiaries, which assists Reserve component and Active component families, who do not live near an Army post. 

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EQUIPMENT RESET

131. Senator INHOFE. Secretary McHugh and General Casey, since 2003, Army 

units have left behind a significant amount of their organizational equipment in 

Iraq and Afghanistan as with some given to Iraqi or Afghan forces, some abandoned 

and some left in place to provide future capability in theatre. In some instances, 

leaving this equipment has created home-station training challenges for units going 

through reset in preparation for another deployment. In the fiscal year 2011 OCO 

request, $10.8 billion is highlighted for reset of Army equipment. As well, it was 

noted that ‘‘the Army has reset 29 brigades worth of equipment in fiscal year 2009 

and continued the reset of 13 more, with a grand total of some 98,000 pieces since 

September 11, 2001.’’ As I understand reset, it is a continuous requirement, occurring as brigades return from combat operations and prepare for the next, and will 

have to continue well after operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have ceased. Is the 

Army experiencing any equipment shortages due to reset or recap funding? 

Secretary MCHUGH and General CASEY. No. The Army does have some equipment 

shortages, but they are not due to inadequate reset or recapitalization funding. The 

Army greatly appreciates all of the support Congress has provided for Army equipment reset, which has enabled the Army to meet all such requirements for redeployed units. 

You are correct regarding continuous reset. As our Army organizations return 

from operational missions, they immediately move to reset to prepare for the next 

mission. When equipment shortfalls are identified, the Army uses our ARFORGEN 

model as a mitigation strategy to support training and homeland defense missions 

for nondeployed forces. Many of our current equipment shortages can be traced to 

the extraordinary demands imposed by fighting two wars simultaneously. 

WATER PURIFICATION

132. Senator INHOFE. Secretary McHugh and General Casey, the task of supplying 

U.S. and coalition forces in Afghanistan is a daunting task, a task that was challenging even without the deployment of additional U.S. and coalition forces and the 

increase in ground operations. Supply lines to Afghanistan are long and difficult, 

with many of our operating bases in austere locations. One piece in a February 14 

New York Times article about the movements of a Marine company in Helmand 

Province caught my eye—some of the Marines were carrying 5-gallon jugs of water 

which increased the weight they were carrying to 100 pounds or more. I have received reports from Army, Marine, and Special Operations units regarding the need 

for man-portable water filtration units. What is the current state of supply operations to your soldiers in Afghanistan? 

Secretary MCHUGH and General CASEY. U.S. Forces Afghanistan has the capacity 

to produce and distribute both bulk and bottled water for current forces, as well as 

for the future force structure. 

Current bulk water requirements are 1.5M gallons per day and 147,000 cases of 

bottled water per day. With the surge, projected bulk requirements will rise to 2.5 

million gallons per day and projected bottled water requirements to 220,000 cases 

per day. Today, the current maximum bulk capacity for water production supporting 

Afghanistan is 3.4 million gallons per day and a bottled water capacity of 544,000 

cases per day. This capacity is based on the forward positioning of five commercial 

water bottling plants: two in Kabul, and one each in Pakistan, Uzbekistan, and 

United Arab Emirates. 

We fully recognize that the major challenge in tactical water operations in Afghanistan, as with any supply commodity in that theater, is distribution, not necessarily capacity or wholesale production. To address this distribution challenge, the 

Army has deployed its full array of tactical water purification systems, as well as 

water storage and distribution assets as far forward as possible. These tactical systems range from larger capacity production units, such as the 3,000 gal per hour 

Reverse Osmosis Water Purification Unit, to lighter weight purification systems 

that are designed to support smaller unit configurations, such as Teams, Platoons, 

and Company-sized elements. These lighter systems are capable of being delivered 

by air along with a robust storage capability to support them. 

Moreover, there are currently seven Expeditionary Water Packaging Systems 

(EWPS) being deployed to various operating bases in Afghanistan, placing water 

production and distribution closer to the forces. The EWPS are government owned, 

contractor operated water bottling systems using tactical production equipment. 

Each is capable of producing a minimum of 5,000 one-liter bottles per day. 

Finally, we recently deployed six well drilling rigs, currently in Afghanistan, to 

drill new wells closer to the point of consumption. This will shorten the distribution 

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leg. The CENTCOM water strategy continues to be the development of water resources and the production of water at the forward operating bases (FOBs); thus reducing transportation requirements. 

Currently, there are no Operational Needs Statement or Joint Unit Operational 

Needs Statement or Rapid Equipping Force 10 Liner requirements for a manportable water filtration unit. 

133. Senator INHOFE. Secretary McHugh and General Casey, can you check on our 

ability to purify water in austere locations, ensuring a safe supply of drinking water 

for our soldiers in theater? 

Secretary MCHUGH and General CASEY. The Army has sufficient water purification, storage and distribution systems available for employment in a tactical environment. Each of these systems is approved for use by the U.S. Army Health Command; thereby ensuring that the water is safe for soldier consumption. These systems have been successfully supporting Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring 

Freedom. Our forces continue to receive potable and palatable water on-time and 

in sufficient quantities to meet all water requirements for consumption and personal 

hygiene. 

To ensure that water production capability is closer to the point of consumption 

in austere areas, we have deployed six well drilling rigs in Afghanistan, to expand 

water resources and production of water at our FOBs. 

Currently, we also have the following tactical systems, designed for austere deployment, in support of Operation Enduring Freedom: 

Water Purification Units: 

• The 600 Gallon per hour (GPH), trailer mounted, Reverse Osmosis Water 

Purification Unit (ROWPU) is capable of purifying 600 gallons of seawater 

and 900 gallons fresh water per hour. Eighteen (18) of these systems are 

in deployed status providing a total capability of 10,800 GPH. 

• The 3000 GPH, trailer mounted, ROWPU is capable of purifying 2,000 

gallons of seawater and 3,000 gallon of fresh water. Twenty-four of these 

systems are in a deployed status providing a total capability production of 

72,000 GPH. 

• The 1500 GPH, Tactical Water Purification System is capable of purifying 

1,200 GPH seawater and 3000 GPH fresh water. Nine systems are in a deployed status providing at total production capability of 13,500 GPH. 

• The Light Weight Purifier (LWP), which is the Army’s most expeditious 

reverse osmosis purification unit, is capable of producing 125 GPH from a 

fresh water source and 75 GPH from a salt water source. Both air transportable and air droppable, 26 systems are in a deployed status providing 

a total capability production of 3,250 GPH. 

Storage and Distribution: 

• Water Tank Rack (HIPPO) consists of a 2,000 gallon potable hard wall 

water tank in an ISO frame with an integrated pump, hose and fill stand. 

• Water Storage and Distribution Systems, which consists of 800,000 and 

40,000 gallon system, are collapsible tanks and support equipment and that 

provide large volumes of bulk potable water storage and distribution (two 

800,000 and three 40,000 systems are in a deployed status providing a storage and distribution of 1.7 million gallons of water). 

• The Expeditionary Water Packaging System, which is a newly developed 

tactical water purification system capable of bottling water, is being deployed to Afghanistan (7 systems total). These systems are designed to operate at austere FOBs, placing water packaging and distribution closer to 

U.S. forces. Each system is capable of bottling 5,000 one liter bottles per 

day. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JEFF SESSIONS

ARMY AVIATION

134. Senator SESSIONS. General Casey, I am very happy about the QDR plus-up 

of two Combat Aviation Brigades for the Army. With this plus-up of aviation assets 

must come a plus-up in resources. Do you believe adequate resources are available 

to support the growth in Army aviation? 

General CASEY. Yes, I think we have what we need. The first of these combat 

aviation brigades (CAB) was organized by consolidating existing aviation force structure within the Army. With the exception of adding some required headquarters 

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personnel and common equipment such as trucks and generators, the resources required were minimal. All aircraft and crews required were already in the existing 

force structure. As for the second CAB, the majority of the funding required ($5.5 

billion) was provided. While we have determined that it is feasible to activate this 

CAB, there is an unfunded requirement remaining (∼$1.2 billion) to cover operations, training and some personnel costs, which we will have to make adjustments 

for in our budget process. 

135. Senator SESSIONS. General Casey, are you planning to increase resources for 

the Aviation Training Center at Fort Rucker? 

General CASEY. Yes. We have already begun increasing resources for training at 

Fort Rucker. Funding there increased from $775 million (fiscal year 2009) to $995 

million (fiscal year 2010) to $1.067 billion (fiscal year 2011) annually to cover increases in undergraduate and graduate flight training. Fort Rucker has already 

hired 40 new contract instructor pilots to train AH–64, CH–47, and UH–60 flight 

training with plans to increase the total to 52 new instructors. The Aviation Center 

has received an additional 21 AH–64Ds and 20 UH–60s to meet the increased training requirements. New hangar ($36 million) and maintenance facilities ($29 million) 

are being constructed in fiscal year 2011 to support training increases. Additionally, 

$34 million in improvements will be made this year to existing structures and 

ranges to support increased training. 

136. Senator SESSIONS. General Casey, will this plus-up of Army aviation include 

manned and unmanned teaming increases? 

General CASEY. The Army has achieved great success by combining the capabilities of manned and unmanned systems in combat operations, and will maximize this 

new aviation organizational force design construct. Additional Combat Aviation Brigades (CABs) and their manned helicopter assets will be paired with existing unmanned systems, to provide greater manned-unmanned operations capability. In addition to teaming with UAS resident within BCTs, the Extended Range Multi-Purpose UAS will be assigned to CABs. We are also developing concepts combining 

Shadow UAS with manned scout helicopters in an Armed Reconnaissance Squadron. 

These efforts will greatly expand the Army’s manned-unmanned capabilities. 

137. Senator SESSIONS. General Casey, will the Center of Excellence for unmanned aerial systems at Fort Rucker receive additional resources to continue doctrine development, integration, and execution planning for the manned and unmanned team initiative? 

General CASEY. The Army Unmanned Aircraft System Center of Excellence (UAS 

CoE) is a critical organization that provides a professional and focused team to ensure the Army maintains our leadership role in the UAS community across all Army 

warfighting functions. This includes our groundbreaking efforts to develop and improve manned-unmanned operations. 

The UAS CoE is currently a provisional organization and is resourced through 

May 2010. Fort Rucker has forwarded a Concept Plan to Headquarters, TRADOC 

to ensure that the UAS CoE remains as an enduring organization with 6 military 

and 11 civilian personnel authorized on an approved Table of Distribution and Allowances. As the Army reviews our Generating Force personnel numbers (including 

TRADOC), our unmanned systems mission growth is a key area upon which we will 

focus. 

ANNISTON ARMY DEPOT

138. Senator SESSIONS. Secretary McHugh, I just visited Anniston Army Depot 

last week while working in Alabama. I understand that the Army is considering 

placing the installation under the command of the Army’s Installation Management 

Command. The community is up in arms over this decision. Do you believe Anniston 

Army Depot will increase its productivity and lower its Army Capital Working Fund 

rates because of this realignment of command? 

Secretary MCHUGH. The Army Materiel Command (AMC) and Installation Management Command (IMCOM) are in the process of conducting a transfer of responsibility for base operation functions in a pilot at ANAD. IMCOM will assume responsibilities for non-Army Working Capital Fund (AWCF) base operation support functions. 

Under the pilot concept, ANAD with the support of AMC and IMCOM regional 

office, will create a virtual structure to determine if the proposed transfer of nonAWCF base operating functions and costs to IMCOM can be done with no impacts 

308 

to the ANAD production mission and no additional cost to Army as a whole. If the 

pilot is successful and implementation is approved there will be a reduction in base 

operating costs (overhead costs) that have to be allocated to stabilized workload; 

however, due to the complex nature of rates this would only be a good measure if 

all extraneous variables were held constant (i.e. direct labor hours available to allocate overhead costs, direct labor and material costs, Accumulative Operating Results 

adjustments, etc). 

139. Senator SESSIONS. Secretary McHugh, if productivity does not increase and 

Army Capital Working Funds rates are not reduced, will you carry on with the reassignment? 

Secretary MCHUGH. The Army will consider all factors prior to moving forward 

with the reassignment. We have established three guiding principles for assessing 

the results of the pilot: (1) maintaining or reducing costs; (2) maintaining or improving mission effectiveness; and (3) preserving the mission commander’s flexibility to 

direct resources. As we conduct the pilot program, we will adjust the parameters 

as required to address any issues encountered. 

AFGHANISTAN

140. Senator SESSIONS. General Casey, I think we would all agree that the Anbar 

Awakening during the Iraq war was a great success and signaled the beginning of 

stabilization in that troubled theater. A recent Washington Post article that appeared on January 22 highlights U.S. Central Command’s use of local defense initiatives to similarly train local militias as security forces to bridge the gap until more 

Afghan army and police forces can be trained. Recent estimates imply that 32,000 

soldiers need to be added over the next 10 months in order to meet the stated goal 

of 134,000 troops by the end of the year. While not all lessons from the Iraq war 

can be applied to Afghanistan, former Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf recently wrote, ‘‘Afghanistan for centuries has been governed loosely through a social 

covenant between all the ethnic groups, under a sovereign king. This structure is 

needed again to bring peace and harmony.’’ Would you agree that this program will 

spread coalition influence into remote regions and bridge the gap until we can recruit and train adequate Afghan army and police forces? 

General CASEY. Central Command (CENTCOM) is working on several initiatives 

to achieve local security by incorporating more community involvement. It’s my understanding that these initiatives are Afghan led and supported by the CENTCOM. 

141. Senator SESSIONS. General Casey, do you think the Afghani government can 

be persuaded to support this program or is this something that will have to be implemented independently? 

General CASEY. I believe the Afghan government will proceed with caution as the 

initiatives are more fully developed and implemented, but I defer to CENTCOM for 

their assessment. 

142. Senator SESSIONS. General Casey, what is your opinion on our ability to adequately screen militia candidates for this program to ensure that we are not training the wrong folks? 

General CASEY. I defer to CENTCOM to respond since they are on the ground and 

better able to assess the situation. 

143. Senator SESSIONS. General Casey, the Post article addressed differences between DOD and the Department of State (DOS) concerning implementation of a 

timeline. General McChrystal has already implemented this program on a small 

scale using existing funding. In order to fully implement, though, Ambassador 

Eikenberry must release additional funds. How are existing Commander’s Emergency Response Program funds being used to support this program and are these 

funds adequate to fully implement local defense initiatives? 

General CASEY. Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) funding is 

used for short-term, private sector contracts for temporary guards of critical infrastructure, not to train local militias as security forces. The CERP program supports 

local defense initiatives by funding development projects in targeted areas. As noted 

in the same Washington Post article, ‘‘In Afghanistan, compensation will be in the 

form of money for development projects in areas where the groups operate.’’ Current 

CERP funding is adequate to accomplish these development efforts. 

309 

144. Senator SESSIONS. General Casey, what support is needed from DOS and 

what is DOD doing to resolve these differences in a timely manner? 

General CASEY. I believe there is a lot of cooperative activity taking place between 

DOD and Department of State. We have ongoing partnerships with the Iraqi Security Forces and the Afghan National Security Forces with a number of counter-terrorism initiatives ongoing. As for the specific details regarding support that DOD 

needs from the Department of State, I have to defer to DOD to respond. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR DAVID VITTER

MEDIUM EXTENDED AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM

145. Senator VITTER. Secretary McHugh, GAO and OSD have confirmed that 

MEADS will cost billions more than expected. What amount of additional funding 

will be necessary that exceeds the existing budget baseline? 

Secretary MCHUGH. The cost growth for the International Program is estimated 

to be over $1.2 billion to be shared by the three Nations. The U.S. share of this is 

estimated to be in the range of $700 million (preliminary estimates). The OSD for 

Cost Assessments and Program Evaluation assessment is ongoing and will be used 

to refine these estimates further. 

146. Senator VITTER. Secretary McHugh, why has the MEADS program not been 

scrutinized under Nunn-McCurdy? 

Secretary MCHUGH. We evaluate and assess the program against the NunnMcCurdy criteria as part of our normal program management. The program has 

been reporting program unit costs against Nunn-McCurdy criteria since September 

2004, and current estimates are within the thresholds. We continue to monitor the 

matter closely, and OSD directed the Cost Assessments and Program Evaluation office to develop an independent estimate. 

147. Senator VITTER. Secretary McHugh, MEADS was designed to upgrade the capabilities of the U.S., German, and Italian Air and Missile Defense (AMD) systems. 

However, the MEADS program is 9 years behind to deliver the capability to our 

troops and our allies. What is the reason and justification for this delay and how 

will we defend ourselves from current threats while we continue to wait for 

MEADS? 

Secretary MCHUGH. The MEADS Design and Development program of record 

began in July 2004. Issues emerged during the program’s Preliminary Design Review, necessitating an Army and OSD independent review. The independent review 

assessed the program to be approximately 18 months behind schedule, with a high 

degree of concurrency and risk leading into Critical Design Review and testing. The 

independent review team recommended a rebaseline of the program, adding approximately 18–24 months (at additional cost), to reduce engineering and test concurrency and reduce overall risks. The MEADS initiative has experienced a series 

of starts and stops since the concept inception in the early 1990s. Since the Milestone B Defense Acquisition Board in 2004, the program has been fully funded but 

will require approximately $700 million between fiscal year 2012–17 to support the 

rebaselined schedule and effort. 

The United States utilizes a combination of Air and Missile Defense systems to 

provide required capability to the force today. Most notably, the Patriot Missile System is forward deployed in multiple Areas of Responsibility. These systems undergo 

periodic upgrades to increase capability against an evolving threat, mitigate obsolescence, and minimize sustainment costs. Patriot is the only combat-proven Tactical 

Ballistic Missile Defense in the force. Patriot continues to match the threat and provide our troops with excellent Air Defense coverage. 

148. Senator VITTER. Secretary McHugh, in addition to years of program delays, 

cost overruns, and technological challenges for the MEADS program, I understand 

there may be changes to the key performance parameters (KPPs) for MEADS. What 

changes have been made to the KPPs? 

Secretary MCHUGH. Currently, no changes to the KPPs are being made; however 

the U.S. Army TRADOC has been tasked to review MEADS requirements 

149. Senator VITTER. Secretary McHugh, is it possible that an AMD system could 

be centered around the upgraded Patriot AMD system, which I understand would 

be a more cost-effective alternative to MEADS? 

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Secretary MCHUGH. While it is possible, even an upgraded Patriot Air and Missile 

Defense system would not meet the MEADS requirements for a 360-degree surveillance and fire control capability. 

[Whereupon, at 12:18 p.m., the committee adjourned.] 

(311) 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION 

FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 

2011 

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 25, 2010 

U.S. SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, 

Washington, DC. 

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:37 a.m. in room 

SDG–50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin 

(chairman) presiding. 

Committee members present: Senators Levin, Lieberman, Reed, 

Akaka, Bill Nelson, Webb, Hagan, Begich, Burris, Inhofe, Sessions, 

Thune, Wicker, LeMieux, and Collins. 

Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk. 

Majority staff members present: Creighton Greene, professional 

staff member; Jessica L. Kingston, research assistant; Peter K. Levine, general counsel; Jason W. Maroney, counsel; William G.P. 

Monahan, counsel; John H. Quirk V, professional staff member; 

and Russell L. Shaffer, counsel. 

Minority staff members present: Joseph W. Bowab, Republican 

staff director; Michael V. Kostiw, professional staff member; Lucian 

L. Niemeyer, professional staff member; Christopher J. Paul, professional staff member; and Diana G. Tabler, professional staff 

member. 

Staff assistants present: Paul J. Hubbard, Christine G. Lang, 

and Brian F. Sebold. 

Committee members’ assistants present: Christopher Griffin, assistant to Senator Lieberman; Carolyn Chuhta, assistant to Senator Reed; Nick Ikeda, assistant to Senator Akaka; Christopher 

Caple, assistant to Senator Bill Nelson; Juliet Beyler and Gordon 

Peterson, assistants to Senator Webb; Julie Holzhueter, assistant 

to Senator Hagan; David Ramseur, assistant to Senator Begich; 

Brady King, assistant to Senator Burris; Anthony J. Lazarski, assistant to Senator Inhofe; Sandra Luff, assistant to Senator Sessions; Clyde A. Taylor IV, assistant to Senator Chambliss; Jason 

Van Beek, assistant to Senator Thune; Erskine Wells III, assistant 

to Senator Wicker; Brian Walsh, assistant to Senator LeMieux; and 

Chip Kennett, assistant to Senator Collins. 

312 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN 

Chairman LEVIN. Good morning, everybody. We welcome Secretary Mabus, Admiral Roughead, and General Conway to our committee this morning to testify on the plans and programs of the Department of the Navy in our review of the fiscal year 2011 annual 

budget and overseas contingency operations (OCO) request. This 

committee is grateful to each one of you for your service to our Nation and for the valorous and truly professional service of the men 

and women under your command, and we are also grateful to their 

families. 

Since our last meeting, the Department of Defense (DOD) has 

completed the 2009 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). We look 

forward to the witnesses’ assessments of the 2009 QDR, what it 

means for the Department of the Navy today and into the future, 

and how their fiscal year 2011 budget request supports the changes 

which were directed. 

Our witnesses this morning are faced with a number of critical 

issues that confront the Department of the Navy in the budget, 

such as balancing modernization needs against the costs of supporting ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The President’s strategic review, concluded in December, called for a surge 

in additional U.S. Marine Corps forces to Afghanistan, including an 

increase to 18,500 marines in Afghanistan by March 2010, with 

that number rising to 19,400 by mid-April. 

The recent launch of major operations in southern Afghanistan 

represents a critical test of the President’s counterinsurgency strategy and the campaign plan developed by the International Security 

Assistance Force (ISAF) commander, General McChrystal, to implement that strategy. U.S. and ISAF personnel, with the U.S. Marines playing a central role, are partnering side by side with Afghan forces in support of extending the authority of the Government of Afghanistan to the Central Helmand River Valley, including the former Taliban stronghold of Marjah. 

The ratio of Afghan to U.S. troops in Marjah is almost one to 

two, one Afghan soldier to two coalition troops, a considerable improvement, as I’ve mentioned before, over the one to five ratio 

which was the case when a number of us visited the marines in 

Helmand Province last September. General Petraeus, commander 

of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), has called this operation 

the initial salvo of a 12- to 18-month military campaign. The extraordinary bravery of our soldiers and marines, as well as our allies, reminds us once again how truly heroic our men and women 

in uniform are. 

I’ve argued for a long time that our principal focus in Afghanistan should be the building of the capacity of the Afghan army and 

police so they can take the lead in providing for their country’s security. In this respect, it is difficult to understand why there has 

been a persistent shortfall in the number of trainers available to 

provide the 8-week basic training to Afghan security forces. That 

is a totally unacceptable situation. 

As we discussed in my office, General Conway, you and the Marines are looking for ways to help out General Bill Caldwell, the 

head of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Training 

Command in Afghanistan, to help him to fill the gap by deploying 

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Marines on shorter rotation to Afghanistan to serve as trainers for 

the Afghan army, and we’re going to be interested in getting your 

update on the progress in supplying those marines as trainers. 

We have proceeded with the drawdown of Marine Corps forces in 

Iraq. Where these forces once averaged roughly 25,000 marines, as 

of last Friday there were only about 150 marines in Iraq. By 

spring, the marines will have completed their redeployment. 

The Navy has also been contributing directly to the war effort in 

CENTCOM as well. In addition to normal deployments of ships and 

aircraft in support of these operations, the Navy currently has deployed almost 12,000 individual augmentees (IAs) to support these 

missions on the ground in Afghanistan and Iraq. In total, the Navy 

provides approximately 15,600 sailors in the form of IAs, including 

3,800 personnel in the training pipeline to fulfill mission requirements of the combatant commanders. 

So we express the thanks of this committee for how well and ably 

the men and women of the Department of the Navy and their families are responding to these challenges. 

Many of the challenges facing the Department of the Navy center 

on acquisition programs. We have great concerns about cost problems in the shipbuilding arena, the most notable example being the 

Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program. Since last year the Navy has 

decided on a winner-take-all acquisition strategy for the contract 

for the two LCS vessels approved in the fiscal year 2010 budget. 

We also look forward to receiving all of the analytical efforts that 

were required by our National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 

Year 2010 regarding future surface combatant production and the 

truncation of the DDG–1000 production line. We understand that 

the Navy decided to make this change for a number of reasons, including mission requirements and affordability. However, we want 

to ensure that whatever program we pursue has a sound basis in 

reasoning behind it before we launch on another vector. 

If the Department of the Navy is unable to get control of its acquisition programs and cost growth, there is no way that the Navy 

is going to be able to afford the fleet of 313 ships that Admiral 

Roughead says that he needs, and it is obvious that other capabilities would suffer as well. I cannot overstress the importance that 

the whole Navy Department shoulders its responsibility to correct 

mistakes in acquisition programs because the future strength of 

our Navy depends on it. 

General Conway, lest you feel left out of the acquisition discussion, you’re pursuing the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV) 

program. In your prepared statement you emphasize the importance of the EFV to the Marine Corps’ amphibious assault mission 

and of the continuing relevance of that mission and capability to 

our Nation’s defense. The Marine Corps’ amphibious assault concept rests on launching an assault from a safe distance from shore, 

beyond where our ships can be easily observed and attacked. This 

concept depends on an ability to swim ashore from 20 to 30 miles 

out to sea with armored vehicles, which is the purpose of the EFV. 

The QDR heavily emphasized the need to overcome the so-called 

anti-access capabilities and strategies that might be employed by 

potential adversaries and approved continuing the EFV program 

despite previous cost, schedule, and performance issues with the 

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program. So we need to understand how the Marine Corps’ amphibious assault mission relates to the anti-access concerns and initiatives discussed in the QDR and what are you doing in the EFV 

program to correct the previous problems with the program. 

The President last year signed the Weapons Systems Acquisition 

Reform Act (WSARA). While I’m certain that this legislation is 

going to help correct past problems, we also know that we will succeed only through concerted efforts within the executive branch to 

implement the spirit of that legislation and improve past behavior 

within the Department. We in Congress cannot legislate a culture 

change. So we look forward to hearing how the Department of the 

Navy is proceeding to implement the provisions of this act. 

Another concern surrounds future ship and aircraft force levels. 

We are facing the prospect that the current Navy program will lead 

to potentially large gaps between the forces that the Chief of Naval 

Operations (CNO) has said that he needs and the forces that will 

be available to his successors. For instance, the Navy is facing a 

shortfall of as many as 250 tactical fighters needed to outfit our 10 

aircraft carrier air wings and 3 Marine Corps air wings in the middle of this decade. With shortfalls that large, we could be faced 

with drastically reducing the number of aircraft available on short 

notice to the combatant commanders, either because we have deployed under strength air wings or because we did not deploy the 

carrier at all because of these aircraft shortages. 

Since the last time we saw a Future Years Defense Program 

(FYDP), we’ve actually had a slight net loss of production of new 

strike fighter aircraft over comparable years in the FYDP, a result 

that cannot help this situation. 

Turning to naval readiness, currently the Navy is operating with 

a 1-year backlog in aircraft and ship depot maintenance. When 

asked for your unfunded priorities in the fiscal 2010 budget request, Admiral Roughead, you only had two unfunded items on 

your list, aircraft and ship depot maintenance in the amount of 

$395 million. Both sides of the aisle on this committee, as well as 

our House counterparts, authorized that critical funding, but, unfortunately, that addition was not supported by the appropriators. 

As a result, over $188 million in deferred maintenance was not executed last year. 

In the fiscal year 2011 presidential budget request, again we 

have a very short list from the Navy of unfunded requirements, including aircraft and ship depot maintenance and aircraft spares to 

meet the Navy’s maintenance requirements. While we encourage 

the Navy’s commitment to these vital readiness accounts, we’re 

very interested in hearing from the witnesses today specifically 

why this funding is critical to the Navy’s mission, what were the 

effects of not receiving last year’s maintenance funding, and what 

are the potential ramifications of not receiving additional fiscal 

year 2011 funds to support these needs. 

Readiness rates need to be restored rather than delayed. Additionally, I believe it is essential that the Navy not rely on OCO 

funding to make up for maintenance shortfalls. Such an approach 

does not contribute to long-term sustainment and risks degrading 

the expected service life of the fleet. 

315 

We look forward to hearing your testimony. Again, we are grateful to you and your families for supporting your service and, of 

course, the men and women that you command. 

Senator McCain is not here. Senator Inhofe is the acting ranking 

member this morning. 

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE 

Senator INHOFE. Mr. Chairman, I’m going to go ahead and submit Senator McCain’s statement for an opening statement. But I’d 

like to make an observation. When we have these Navy posture 

hearings, I look around and I see a very heavy representation from 

coastal States, and I’m not sure why. I’d like to remind my colleagues up here of something that may surprise them a little bit: 

We in my State of Oklahoma are in fact navigable. We have a navigation way that we put in many years ago. 

In fact, when I was in the State senate many years ago, the head 

of the World War II submarine veterans came to me and he told 

me the story of the submarine veterans, about how half of them 

died in World War II and the other half took care of the families 

of those others. He said, ‘‘I’d like to do a memorial; I’d like to bring 

a World War II submarine all the way up to Oklahoma.’’ 

We studied it and it could be done. So we went down to Orange, 

TX, and got the USS Batfish and we took all 300 feet of this thing 

all the way up the channel. It had to go down under some of the 

bridges and have flotation and all that. All my adversaries were 

saying, ‘‘We’re going to sink Inhofe with his submarine.’’ But we 

made it, so we have a submarine in my State of Oklahoma. 

We also have quite a presence, which surprises people, of Navy 

and Marines, with TACAMO Operations for E–6s at Tinker Air 

Force Base. There is a very large presence of Navy there. At Vance 

Air Force Base we’re doing primary training of not just Air Force, 

but also Navy and the Marines. Then down at Fort Sill we do most 

of the artillery training, General Conway, for marines there at Fort 

Sill in my State of Oklahoma. So we have a great personal interest 

in this hearing today. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Senator McCain follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN

Mr. Chairman, I join you in welcoming our witnesses here today to discuss the 

President’s budget request for fiscal year 2011 for the Department of the Navy. I’m 

sure I speak for all members of our committee when I say that our thoughts and 

prayers are with all the deployed sailors and marines, with their families, and with 

particular concern for those marines who are currently engaged in the combat operations. I also want to commend the thousands of men and women of the Navy and 

Marine Corps who deployed to Haiti within just a few hours of the earthquake to 

support humanitarian efforts there. Their hard work and dedication reflects the 

very finest traditions of the Department of the Navy. 

While supportive of your fiscal year 2011 budget submission, I do have concerns 

about the Navy’s future force that I would like to have you specifically address. 

For example, last year, the Navy estimated that its shortfall of carrier-based 

strike-fighter aircraft was growing larger than previous estimates—243 aircraft 

short by 2018. That number is now 100. I’d like to know what the Navy’s current 

appraisal of that ‘‘strike-fighter gap’’ is and what steps it is taking under its budget 

proposal to manage that issue. While this is undoubtedly an important issue, protecting taxpayers’ interests requires that any proposal to buy more F/A–18s under 

a multi-year contract fully complies with applicable law. 

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On the F–35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program, with a newly announced slip 

in development of 13 months, that program appears to be headed into another 

breach of Nunn-McCurdy’s cost growth limits. Among my concerns here is whether 

the Navy and Marine Corps will be equipped with the F–35 in time to have the capability they need, when they need it. With the Marine Corps expected to take delivery of a squadron of these fighters first among all the Services in 2012 and its 

acute reliance on this Program to provide much-needed capability, my concerns 

about this Program apply with the most force to them. 

On ship depot maintenance, I am encouraged that this year the Navy has added 

about $1.2 billion over last year’s request to overhaul ships and, in particular, restore those systems that affect safety and current combat capability to established 

performance levels. But, that amount does not cover the ship maintenance periods 

that were not funded in last year’s budget—because the appropriators saw it fit to 

strip that money away to fund earmarks. Still, that leaves nine additional ships 

that will not undergo repair work next year. From the witnesses, I would like to 

hear their concerns about underfunding ship overhauls and whether our surface 

fleet may be returning to the days of a hollow force. 

On the Littoral Combat Ships Program, the Navy will down-select to a single sea 

frame and split its production between two competing shipyards—reflecting a new 

acquisition strategy designed to reduce the ship’s overall cost. I would like to know 

whether the costs of that troubled program will be below the congressional cost cap 

and whether the Program will finally deliver the capability that it was designed to 

provide at its inception. 

Next, the LPD–17 amphibious ship program has too seen more challenges than 

we had hoped. From the witnesses, I would like to know if we are seeing a systemic 

problem with the readiness of the Navy’s amphibious ships and how the budget request addresses that issue. 

Finally, the Navy’s 30-year Shipbuilding Plan calls for the replacement of 14 

Ohio-class submarines and the multi-year procurement of 2 Virginia-class attack 

submarines per year to replace Los Angeles-class submarines. But, those ballistic 

missile submarines run about $6.5 billion each and the Virginia-class submarines 

cost about $2 billion each. That alone consumes over 75 percent of the current shipbuilding budget. Particularly in the context of our current economic challenges, we 

have to be careful that our commitment to recapitalizing the submarine fleet does 

not impinge on our commitment to the surface fleet. I hope the witnesses can give 

us their views on the impact of the Plan on our force projection capability in the 

future and the shipbuilding industrial base. 

I would like to take a moment to convey my support the Department’s decisions 

to terminate or cut back on those Navy and Marine Corps programs that have benefited from a reassessment of our requirements or suffered from a chronic inability 

to manage development and production risk. Those programs include canceling 

plans to build two new joint command ships; delaying the Expeditionary Fighting 

Vehicle Program; and terminating the EP–X manned intelligence, surveillance, and 

reconnaissance aircraft program, as well as the JSF Alternate Engine program and 

the Next Generation Cruiser (CG(X)). According to the Office of Management and 

Budget, those program cuts will save taxpayers as much as $573 million over last 

year’s budget, freeing up resources much needed by our combatant commanders to 

fight the fights we are in and defense against threats likely to arise in the future. 

I look forward to hearing from these witnesses on these, and other, tough but important issues, which go squarely to how we arm and equip those men and women 

who serve their Nation so selflessly at home and abroad. 

Thank you, Chairman Levin. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator Inhofe. 

Secretary Mabus. 

STATEMENT OF HON. RAYMOND E. MABUS, JR., SECRETARY 

OF THE NAVY 

Mr. MABUS. Mr. Chairman, Senator Inhofe, and distinguished 

members of this committee, it’s a real pleasure to be here today 

with you. The CNO, the Commandant, and I are grateful for the 

commitment that the members of this committee have shown to the 

men and women in uniform in the Navy and Marine Corps. We are 

exceptionally proud to be here today representing our sailors, marines, civilians, and their families. 

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The Navy and Marine Corps remain the most formidable expeditionary fighting force in the world, capable of operations across the 

entire spectrum of warfare. Today 40 percent of our forces are deployed and over half our fleet is at sea. In Helmand Province, Afghanistan, more than 15,000 marines are engaged in major combat, 

counterinsurgency, and engagement operations, including, as the 

chairman pointed out, the effort to clear the Taliban from their 

stronghold in Marjah. They’re supported by naval aircraft flying 

close air support from the Eisenhower and our forward-deployed expeditionary aviation assets. 

A total of 12,000 sailors are on the ground in Iraq, Afghanistan, 

and across the broader Middle East and another 9,000 sailors and 

marines are embarked on our ships at sea. Off the coast of Africa, 

ships are protecting international commerce off Somalia, and ships 

are operating as partnership stations with our regional allies. Off 

the coast of South America, more ships are stemming the flow of 

illegal drugs into the United States. 

Our ballistic missile defense forces are ready to defend against 

any threat to international peace in Europe, the Middle East, and 

the Pacific Rim, where our forward-deployed forces continue their 

role as a strategic buffer and deterrent against rogue states and potential competitors alike. Today in Haiti, 9 ships and 1,900 marines 

from the 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) continue to provide humanitarian aid, medical assistance, and disaster relief. 

The Navy and Marine Corps are flexible, responsive, and everywhere our Nation’s interests are at stake. Our global presence reduces instability, deters aggression, and allows us to respond rapidly to any crisis. 

I believe that the President’s fiscal year 2011 budget for the Department of the Navy is a very carefully considered request that 

gives us the resources we need to conduct effective operations and 

meet all the missions we have been assigned. Our shipbuilding and 

aviation requests concur with the findings of the QDR and its objectives of prevailing in today’s wars, preventing conflict, preparing 

for future wars, and preserving the force. 

With this budget, the Navy and Marine Corps will continue to 

maintain the maritime superiority of our forces, sustain a strong 

American shipbuilding base, and ensure our capacity for rapid 

global response. 

Across the FYDP, we have requested the funds to build an average of 10 ships a year, including 1 carrier, 1 big-deck amphibious 

ship, 10 Virginia-class submarines, and 17 LCSs. We’ll leverage the 

technologies captured from the canceled Future Cruiser Program 

and truncated DDG–1000 program into what will become our 

Flight 3 Burke-class guided missile destroyers. These technologies 

include the SPY–3 and air and missile defense radar. 

Through the submitted shipbuilding plan, we will increase the 

size of our fleet to approximately 320 ships by 2024. In our shipbuilding program, I believe we have made the most cost effective 

decisions to achieve the most capable force, one that achieves equal 

flexibility to confront missions across the spectrum of conflict from 

the technically complex, like ballistic missile defense and integrated air defense, to low intensity, humanitarian response, and regional engagement. 

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In aircraft procurement, we have requested just over 1,000 aircraft across the FYDP, including both fixed and rotary wing. Over 

the next year, the Navy and the Marine Corps will continue to 

move ahead with changes to our acquisitions process. In compliance with the WSARA, we are aggressively developing our acquisition strategies to ensure that on-time and on-budget becomes the 

standard for the Navy and Marine Corps. 

I’m grateful for the support of this committee for the decision to 

recompete the LCS program when it failed to meet program standards, and I can assure you that we will not hesitate to recompete 

or cancel other programs whenever substandard performance demands such a change. 

Change is also required to address the way in which the Navy 

and Marine Corps use and produce energy. Energy reform is an 

issue of national security and it’s essential to maintaining our strategic advantage, warfighting readiness, and tactical edge. By 2020, 

I’ve committed the Navy to generate half of all the energy we use 

from alternative sources. 

Forty years ago, I stood watch on the deck of the USS Little Rock 

as a young junior officer. Today I have the great and solemn privilege of standing watch on behalf of our Navy and Marine Corps in 

a time of war and national challenge. I’m honored by the trust that 

the President and Congress have placed in me and fully recognize 

the solemn obligation I have to those who defend us. 

I, along with the CNO and the Commandant, look forward to 

hearing your thoughts, answering your questions about our budget 

request, our specific programs, and our policies. I also look forward 

to working closely with you as we move forward to sustain the 

Navy and Marine Corps as the most formidable expeditionary 

fighting force in the world. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Mabus follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY HON. RAYMOND E. MABUS, JR. 

Chairman Levin and Senator McCain, it is a pleasure to be here today with the 

Senate Armed Services Committee as the representative of the nearly 900,000 sailors, marines, and civilians that make up the Department of the Navy. The Chief 

of Naval Operations, the Commandant of the Marine Corps and I are privileged to 

lead some of the best men and women in the country, who are selflessly serving the 

United States all around the world in support of our safety, our security, and our 

national interests. 

The Navy and Marine Corps remain the most formidable expeditionary fighting 

force in the world. We are America’s Away Team. The mission and experience of 

our team is well matched to the multiple and varied challenges that threaten our 

Nation’s security and global stability. 

Today the Navy and Marine Corps are conducting operations across the spectrum 

of military operations, from major combat and ballistic missile defense to humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. 

Fifteen thousand marines are at the forefront of our Nation’s defense, serving in 

and around Helmand Province, Afghanistan. By spring this number will grow to almost 20,000. It is a testament to the responsiveness and combat capability of the 

Marine Corps that the first troops to depart for Afghanistan in the wake of the 

President’s December 1 announcement were 1500 marines from Camp Lejuene, NC. 

The new arrivals, who deployed before the end of last year, joined the Second Marine Expeditionary Brigade already in place. Together they are taking the fight to 

the Taliban and al Qaeda in their sector and assisting the Afghan Provincial Government in reestablishing control. General Conway describes their capability as a 

two-fisted fighter, capable of simultaneously combating an adaptive and insidious 

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insurgency among the Afghan civilians while maintaining the skill set to conduct 

major combat operations. 

The Navy in Afghanistan is contributing Special Operations Forces, Explosive 

Ordnance Disposal Teams, Seabee civil engineering assets, all of the airborne expeditionary tactical Electronic Warfare capability, medical and intelligence professionals, and logistical support. From our carriers operating in the Indian Ocean, we 

are launching a significant percentage of the close air support that watches over our 

marines and soldiers on the ground. The Navy has over 12,000 sailors on the ground 

in Central Command supporting joint and coalition efforts in both Iraq and Afghanistan and another 9,000 sailors at sea supporting combat operations. 

The Navy and Marine Corps today are globally engaged in a host of other security 

and stability operations. In our cruisers and destroyers, the Navy has built a strong 

ballistic missile defense force. These multi-mission ships routinely deploy to the 

Mediterranean, the Arabian Gulf, and the Western Pacific and extend an umbrella 

of deterrence. Across the Future Years’ Defense Program we will expand this mission and operationally implement the President’s decision in September 2009 to 

focus on sea-based ballistic missile defense. 

That capability is complemented by the continued preeminence of the ballistic 

missile submarines in our strategic deterrent force, who operate quietly and stealthily on station every day of the year. 

In the Gulf of Aden and Western Indian Ocean, Combined Task Force 151 is leading the international effort to combat piracy in the Gulf of Aden. They are coordinating their operations with forces from the European Union, North Atlantic Treaty 

Organization, and a total of 24 Nations contributing ships, aircraft, and staff personnel as well as operational and intelligence support. 

Our ships and maritime patrol aircraft in the Caribbean and off South America 

are working with the Coast Guard-led Joint Interagency Task Force-South, which 

ties together information and forces from 13 nations to stem the flow of illegal narcotics into the United States. In 2009 alone they contributed to the seizure or disruption of almost 220,000 kilograms of cocaine with a street value of over $4 billion. 

Both the Navy and Marine Corps routinely conduct training exercises and multilateral operations with nations all around the world to solidify our relationships 

with traditional allies and forge partnerships with new friends. Global Partnership 

Stations in Africa, South America, and the Pacific are training hundreds of sailors, 

marines, and coastguardsmen from dozens of nations and are supporting regional 

diplomatic and humanitarian engagement efforts, like those of the hospital ship 

USNS Comfort and the Fleet Auxiliary USNS Richard E. Byrd in the summer of 

2009. The two ships together treated over 110,000 patients in the Caribbean, South 

America, and Oceania, and the USNS Comfort furthered an existing partnership 

with numerous civilian aid organizations. 

The Navy-Marine Corps team remains on the frontline of response to natural disasters. In 2009 we provided humanitarian assistance to Indonesia, the Philippines, 

and American Samoa, and delivered thousands of tons of food, water, and medical 

supplies to those affected by devastation. After the January 12 earthquake in Haiti, 

the Navy and Marine Corps responded immediately. Within a week of the earthquake, 11 Navy ships, including the carrier USS Carl Vinson, the big-deck amphibious ship USS Bataan, and the hospital ship USNS Comfort were on station off the 

coast of Haiti. These ships embarked 41 Navy and Marine Corps helicopters and approximately 2,000 marines of the 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit. On station, our 

units treated patients, provided helicopter lift capability, and delivered hundreds of 

tons of relief aid. Additional personnel and capabilities continued to flow in over the 

next weeks. Our mission there will continue as long as required. 

The Navy and Marine Corps are flexible, responsive, and everywhere that our Nation’s interests are at stake. The Navy and Marine Corps’ global presence reduces 

instability, deters aggression, and allows for rapid response to a wide range of contingencies. 

In order to ensure our continued global mobility, the Department of the Navy 

strongly supports accession to the Law of the Sea Convention. The United States 

must continue to take maximum advantage of the navigational rights contained in 

the Convention. Ratification would enhance stability for international maritime 

rules and ensure our access to critical air and sea lines of communication. 

I have now been the Secretary of the Navy for 9 months, and in that short period 

of time I have met thousands of our sailors and marines serving on the frontlines 

at sea and ashore. I have been constantly inspired by the high morale, courage, and 

commitment to serving our country displayed by every one of them as they conduct 

our missions. In return, I have continually expressed to them the appreciation of 

the American people for the sacrifices they and their families are making every day. 

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I have met our operational commanders and seen first-hand the warfighting readiness of our Fleet and our Marine Forces. I have inspected the facilities of our industry partners who are building the Navy and Marine Corps of tomorrow. With the 

advice and support of my leadership team, I have made some initial decisions to better prepare the Navy and Marine Corps for the challenges of the future. These observations and our initial actions have given me a good picture of the Navy and Marine Corps, and from this vantage I can report to Congress and the President the 

current state of the Services, the budgetary requirements we need to successfully 

perform our mission, and the future direction I believe we must take. 

The Department of the Navy’s fiscal year 2011 budget request reflects the President’s priorities, Secretary Gates’ strategic and fiscal guidance, and fundamentally 

aligns with the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) priorities: 

(1) Prevailing in today’s wars 

(2) Preventing and deterring conflict 

(3) Preparing for a wide range of future contingencies 

(4) Preserving and enhancing the All-Volunteer Force 

This budget request of $160.7 billion will maintain across the Future Years’ Defense Program our commitment to a strong industrial base. The fiscal year 2011 request of $18.5 billion for contingency operations includes incremental costs to sustain operations, manpower, equipment and infrastructure repair as well as equipment replacement to support our focus on increasing threats in Afghanistan and 

elsewhere. 

In the fiscal year 2011 budget request, we have included funds for nine ships, including two additional Virginia-class submarines, two destroyers in the restarted 

Arleigh Burke line, a lower-cost commercial variant of the Mobile Landing Platform, 

the multi-role Landing Helicopter Assault Replacement, a Joint High Speed Vessel, 

and two Littoral Combat Ships, which will be constructed under the terms of the 

down-select we will conduct this fiscal year. In aviation, we have requested 206 aircraft in fiscal year 2011, including 20 F–35 Joint Strike Fighters for both the Navy 

and Marine Corps, 24 MH–60R and 7 P–8As to begin replacing our aging anit-submarine warfare (ASW) and maritime patrol squadrons, 18 MH–60S for logistics support, 28 H–1 variant helicopters, and 30 MV–22 for the Marine Corps, 22 F/A–18E/ 

F and 12 EA–18G to continue replacing the EA–6B. For Marine Corps ground operations, we have requested funding for an additional 564 Logistics Vehicle System 

Replacement (LVSR) and High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) 

tactical vehicles. The fiscal year 2011 budget request also contains development 

funding for the Navy Unmanned Combat Aerial System and continues development 

of the Broad Area Maritime Surveillance Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV). We have 

continued our support of the Naval Expeditionary Combat Command, including 

funding for a fourth Riverine Squadron. 

The Department’s long-range shipbuilding and aviation intentions are designed to 

sustain our naval superiority and they achieve a balance of capability and affordability that both wins today’s wars even while preparing for the challenges of the 

future. 

There are four strategic, tactical, and personnel management imperatives I believe the Department of the Navy must also address to maintain preeminence as 

a fighting force and successfully address whatever comes in the future. These four 

areas reinforce the strategic framework of the QDR and address the areas of risk 

it identifies. They are: 

(1) Taking care of our sailors, marines, civilians, and their families 

(2) Treating energy in the Department of the Navy as an issue of national 

security 

(3) Creating acquisitions excellence 

(4) Optimizing unmanned systems 

They underpin the development of our fiscal year 2011 budget request, execute 

Presidential policy, and comply with and respond to congressional direction. 

TAKING CARE OF SAILORS, MARINES, CIVILIANS, AND THEIR FAMILIES

Sailors and marines are the fundamental source of our success. They are our most 

important asset, and they must always come first in our minds and in our actions. 

One of my most important responsibilities as Secretary is to ensure adequate compensation, medical care, and family support services are provided to our sailors, marines, civilians, and their families. 

The Navy and Marine Corps will continue to recruit and retain the same high 

quality individuals we brought into and kept in the service in 2009. We remain committed to providing a competitive pay and benefits package to aid recruiting. The 

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package includes not only basic pay and housing allowances, but also provides incentives for critical specialties in health care, explosive ordnance disposal, and nuclear propulsion. 

Beyond compensation, we recognize that quality of life programs are crucial to retention and the military mission. We are providing expanded career opportunities, 

opportunities for life-long learning, and a continuum of care and family support. The 

Department continues to support a wide array of readiness programs, including deployment support services, morale and welfare services, and child and teen programs. Our innovative personnel management and human resource programs were 

in fact recognized by civilian experts as among the best in the country when, in October 2009, the Navy was named by Workforce Management Magazine as the winner of the Optimas Award for General Excellence. 

Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, over 10,000 marines and sailors have 

been wounded in action. Their service has been exemplary and unselfish, and in 

their sacrifice they have given so much of themselves for our country. The Department of the Navy, through the Wounded Warrior Regiment and the Navy Safe Harbor Program, provides support and assistance to our wounded, ill, and injured 

servicemembers and their families throughout recovery, rehabilitation, and reintegration. We continue to provide encouragement and support for wounded sailors 

and marines, in partnership with the Department of Veterans Affairs, long after 

they have left the Service. 

Our medical community has continued to strive for excellence in the care of our 

sailors and marines. Navy Medicine has reached out to its civilian colleagues, and 

we have established partnerships with civilian hospitals to improve our understanding and care for those affected by traumatic brain injuries, mental health 

issues, amputation, and disfiguring injuries. I had the opportunity last fall to see 

this first-hand, when I witnessed groundbreaking pro-bono work in reconstructive 

surgery on behalf of Wounded Warriors at the UCLA Medical Center. 

We will continue to aggressively address the issues of sexual assault prevention 

and response. Sexual assault is a criminal act that is corrosive to the readiness and 

morale of a professional military organization. In the fiscal year 2011 budget request, we have requested funds to support a reinvigorated program under the supervision of a new Office of Sexual Assault Prevention and Response, which I created 

within the Secretariat to focus attention on the issue, develop effective training, and 

coordinate prevention and response programs across the Navy and Marine Corps. 

In 2010, the Department will move forward on expanding the opportunities for 

women in the Navy. We will establish a process to integrate women into the submarine force, beginning with nuclear-trained and Supply Corps officers on our ballistic and guided missile submarines. 

After 8 years of continuous combat operations, the Navy and Marine Corps’ people 

remain strong, and the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC), and I are very focused on maintaining the overall health of the 

force. The fiscal year 2011 budget request reinforces these goals and is designed to 

provide the fiscal support necessary to sustain the force. The visible support of Congress to our personnel programs is deeply appreciated and has been vital in maintaining overall readiness. 

ENERGY REFORM

The way in which we use and produce energy is an issue of national security and 

is essential to maintaining our warfighting capabilities. At present, we simply rely 

too much on fossil fuels, which are susceptible to both price and supply shocks 

caused by events in volatile areas of the world largely outside the scope of our control. Those potential shocks have, in turn, strategic, operational, and tactical effects 

upon our forces. In addition, fossil fuel emissions are the root cause of many of the 

impending security challenges of tomorrow, and the QDR has correctly identified 

that climate change and its effects: rising sea levels, pressure on natural resources, 

and changes to the polar regions, will increasingly affect our force structure and the 

global security environment as the 21st century progresses. In order to improve our 

long-term strategic and fiscal position, I have set the Navy and Marine Corps on 

a path to change the way in which we use and produce energy. 

In October 2009, I issued five energy targets. They are ambitious in their scope, 

but I firmly believe that little will be accomplished without bold, innovative, and 

timely action. The most important of the targets commits the Navy and Marine 

Corps to generating half of all the energy we use, including that used by the operational fleet, from alternative sources by 2020. I have also committed the Navy and 

Marine Corps to consider energy as a mandatory evaluation factor in contracting, 

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and to consider as an additional factor in our business dealings, the energy footprint 

of the companies that sell to the Navy and Marine Corps. 

America is a world leader precisely because of our willingness to not just embrace 

change, but to create it. The U.S. Navy has always been a technological leader. We 

moved from wind to coal in the 19th century, coal to oil early in the 20th century, 

and to nuclear power in mid-century. In every transition there were opponents to 

change, but in every case the strategic and tactical position of naval forces improved. In this century, I have asked the Navy to lead again by pioneering technological change through use of alternative energy. But I want to reiterate that every 

action and program we undertake must and will have as an effect improved 

warfighting capability. We will strive in every case to improve energy efficiency and 

reach cost-neutrality over the life of the program. 

Many of our initiatives are already doing this. We conducted a ground test of an 

F/A–18 Hornet jet engine this fall running on a biofuel blend and we intend to conduct an airborne test of the ‘‘Green Hornet’’ later this year. In late 2010, the Navy 

will also conduct tests of a more efficient F/A–18 engine, which will increase the aircraft’s range. Afloat, the USS Makin Island, the first ship constructed with a hybrid-electric drive that dramatically lowers fuel consumption at lower speeds, saved 

approximately $2 million in a single transit to her new homeport in San Diego. Over 

the life of the ship, we estimate the savings will be up to $250 million using today’s 

fuel prices. Writ large across the Navy, as we begin to retrofit our DDG fleet with 

similar propulsion systems, the potential fuel savings will only grow. 

In addition to these tactical applications, we have implemented a number of energy projects at our facilities ashore, and numerous other efficiency initiatives 

throughout the Fleet. As the President clearly stated in Copenhagen, changing the 

way we use and produce energy is a national security imperative. 

ACQUISITION EXCELLENCE

The ships and aircraft of the Navy and Marine Corps are unmatched at sea and 

over land. Our precision munitions, networked targeting systems, armored vehicles, 

stealth technology, and unmanned vehicles are advanced systems that define the 

leading edge of warfare in all domains. 

These truths have been brought home to me during my visits with the defense 

industry. I have had the opportunity to visit shipyards, aircraft manufacturers, factories, and depots; and I applaud the hard work and dedication of this country’s 

skilled workforce—Americans who take as much pride in their patriotism as they 

do in their craftsmanship. 

The issue before us all, however, is affordability. Acquisition costs are rising faster 

than our budget’s top-line, and without deliberate, sustained action to reverse this 

trend, we put the size and capability of the future force at risk. In accordance with 

the Weapons System Acquisition Reform Act passed by Congress in 2009, the Navy 

and Marine Corps will aggressively pursue additional ways to make the acquisitions 

process more rigorous; we will prudently safeguard the resources entrusted to us by 

the American taxpayer, and we will fully meet the obligation we hold to our Sailors 

and Marines. 

This requires close examination of the way we do business in our policies, practices, priorities, and organization, with a clear focus on controlling cost. The Navy 

and Marine Corps will continue initiatives to raise standards, to improve processes, 

to instill discipline in procurement, and to strengthen the professional corps that 

manages our major defense acquisition programs. 

We are pressing forward with key initiatives that promise to improve our ability 

to affordably deliver combat capability to the fleet. 

We are improving the quality of our cost estimates, which underpin our investment decisions. We are strengthening our cost estimating group, requiring independent cost estimates, and incorporating Departmental best practices in the formulation of our Service Cost Position for all major programs. We are using these realistic cost and schedule estimates to drive difficult decisions at the front end of the 

requirements process. 

We are developing our acquisition strategies with the intent of expanding the use 

of fixed price contracts, leveraging competition, and tightening up on the use of incentive and award fees to ensure quality systems are delivered consistently on budget and on time to our sailors and marines. When we could not achieve these objectives this past year on the Littoral Combat Ship program, we rewrote the program’s 

acquisition strategy to improve performance through competition. I thank the committee for its strong support of this revised strategy, and I assure you that I will 

not hesitate to recompete or cancel programs when substandard performance demands change. 

323 

We are demanding strict discipline in the execution of our contracts. Before commencing production on new start ship programs, I have reported to you the results 

of reviews conducted to ensure that designs are mature. We are specifically clamping down on contract changes, the most-often cited reason for cost growth, through 

improved policies and increased oversight. 

Our goals for modernizing today’s force and recapitalizing the fleet affordably cannot be accomplished without a healthy industrial base and strong performance by 

our industry partners. We have worked hard to procure our ships, aircraft, and 

weapon systems at a rate intended to bring stability to the industrial base and enable efficient production. The Navy’s long-range shipbuilding plan was developed 

with particular regard for maintaining the unique characteristics and strength of 

the base and our efforts support the QDR’s emphasis on maintaining the defense 

industrial base with appropriate levels of competition, innovation, and capacity. The 

Future Years’ Defense Program outlines construction of a balanced force of 50 ships, 

an average of 10 ships per year, which requires the full breadth of capabilities and 

services provided by our major shipbuilders and vendors. 

In the end, industry must perform. We will work with our shipyards, aircraft 

manufacturers, and weapon systems providers to benchmark performance, to identify where improvements are necessary, to provide the proper incentives for capital 

investments where warranted, and to reward strong performance with terms and 

conditions that reflect our desire for a strong government-industry partnership. 

To meet our objectives, we must be smart buyers. The acquisition workforce has 

been downsized over the past 15 years and in truth our professional acquisition 

corps has been stretched too thin. Accordingly, and with your strong support, we 

are rebuilding the acquisition workforce through a number of parallel efforts. We 

must both increase the number of acquisition workers and restore to the government the core competencies inherent to their profession. The Department has added 

800 acquisition professionals in the last year towards the goal of increasing the community by 5,000 over the Future Years’ Defense Program. This represents a 12 percent growth in our workforce. 

UNMANNED SYSTEMS

The complex nature of today’s security environment, as well as current and future 

anti-access threats faced by the United States require that the Navy and Marine 

Corps investigate the contributions unmanned systems can make to warfighting capability. Unmanned systems are unobtrusive, versatile, persistent, and they reduce 

the exposure of our sailors and marines to unnecessary threats. They perform a vast 

array of tasks such as intelligence collection, precision target designation, oceanographic reconnaissance, and mine detection, and that array will grow exponentially 

year to year. 

Navy and Marine Corps unmanned systems have already made key contributions 

to operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and in the counter-piracy effort off the coast of 

Africa. Unmanned aircraft systems have flown thousands of flight hours in support 

of Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom. Unmanned ground 

vehicles employed by the Marine Corps have conducted thousands of missions detecting and/or neutralizing improvised explosive devices. Unmanned maritime systems have provided improved port security. 

We continue to support research and development activities to improve these capabilities and increase the level of autonomy in unmanned systems. Over the Future Years’ Defense Program we will continue to focus on transitioning from research and development and limited deployments, through test and evaluation, to 

full fleet integration and operations. In order to best direct our research and harness the capabilities of unmanned systems, I am tasking the Department to develop 

a comprehensive roadmap for unmanned system development, to include a coordinated strategy for air, ground, surface, and subsurface systems focused on integration and interoperability with our existing platforms and capabilities. 

The initiatives and investments contained in the fiscal year 2011 budget request 

will move us onto this path. I look forward to reporting continued progress throughout the year. 

CLOSING

In this statement, I have discussed the strategic and tactical imperatives that 

guide the Department and influence the future decisions we will make. Specific programmatic requests are reflected in the fiscal year 2011 budget request, which I believe incorporates the difficult trade-offs and disciplined decision making that you 

and the American taxpayer expect of us. We have carefully weighed risks and made 

proposals to you that will ensure we retain a ready and agile force capable of conVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:37 May 06, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00329 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\62155.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
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ducting the full range of military operations. We will continue to work hard to be 

effective stewards of the resources you allocate to us. 

Forty years ago I stood watch on the deck of the USS Little Rock as a young junior officer. Today I have the solemn privilege of standing watch on behalf of our 

Navy and Marine Corps in a time of war and national challenge. I am honored by 

the trust the President and Congress have placed in me and I fully recognize the 

solemn obligation I have to those who defend us. 

That obligation fueled my desire to observe our people up close in their varied and 

often dangerous jobs. I’ve seen first hand the courage of our young marines in 

Helmand, the determination of a wounded SEAL to walk despite losing two legs, 

the pride of a young sailor in a hot engine room, the selfless dedication of corpsmen, 

nurses, and doctors caring for the fallen. 

Sacrifice and service created and preserve the freedom and opportunity that we 

enjoy as Americans. Although we aspire to create a world in which violence and aggression have been eliminated, we understand that peace and stability are often secured only when strong nations and good people are willing and prepared to use decisive force against those who threaten it. The Navy and Marine Corps stand ready 

to do so. 

Your commitment to the service of our country and your recognition of the sacrifice of our sailors, marines, civilians, and their families has been steadfast and is 

fully reflected in the support of this committee for our key programs and our people. 

I, along with my partners, the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Roughead, and 

the Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Conway, look forward to hearing 

your thoughts and answering any questions you may have about our budget request 

or specific programs of interest. I also look forward to working closely with Congress 

as we move forward to sustain the Navy and Marine Corps as the most formidable 

expeditionary fighting force in the world. 

Thank you and Godspeed. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. 

Admiral Roughead. 

STATEMENT OF ADM GARY ROUGHEAD, USN, CHIEF OF NAVAL 

OPERATIONS 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Thank you, sir. Chairman Levin, Senator 

Inhofe, members of the committee, it is my honor to appear before 

you again representing more than 600,000 sailors and Navy civilians. Sixty-five thousand of them are deployed, 12,000 on land in 

the CENTCOM area of operations, and 56 percent of our fleet is 

underway carrying out our maritime strategy, a prescient precursor 

to the 2010 QDR. 

They are projecting power into Afghanistan, building partnerships in Africa, delivering relief in Haiti, silently patrolling under 

the sea in every ocean, and providing ballistic missile defense in 

the Arabian Gulf, the Western Pacific, and the Eastern Mediterranean with pride and determination. 

They are even deployed on the first LCS, 2 years ahead of schedule, and I think it’s noteworthy that in the first week of that ship’s 

deployment it seized over a quarter of a ton of cocaine. 

It is our sailors and Navy civilians who make all things possible, 

and thanks to your support we made important progress in building tomorrow’s Navy, remaining ready to fight today, and supporting our sailors, Navy civilians, and families last year. This 

year’s budget submission will take us even further. 

As the high demand for our Navy continues apace, we have stabilized end strength and the tone of the force remains positive. We 

will continue to aggressively improve wellness programs and medical and social services for our wounded warriors, indeed for all 

who serve. For our fleet as a continuously deployed force, we must 

continue to reset in stride. Conducting regular maintenance and 

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training so that our ships and aircraft reach their expected service 

lives is extremely important. 

This year’s budget aligns our baseline budget for operation and 

maintenance (O&M) accordingly and reflects a significant shift 

away from supplemental funding. I strongly request your support 

for this important change. 

While we reset, we must also procure ships and aircraft to reach 

our requirement of more than 313 ships. Last year we commissioned 9 ships and over the next decade our plan procures an average of 10 ships per year, significant growth for the near term. 

For aviation, we remain committed to bringing new capabilities 

on line, the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) and unmanned aircraft, and 

to maintaining the readiness of our current naval air force, all of 

which give our Nation flexibility in response unencumbered by 

overseas basing. 

Affordability for all our plans will remain fundamental to our decisions. The effectiveness of our unmanned systems, ships, and aircraft is a feature of the systems which connect them. Last year, I 

brought information capabilities and resources under a single Information Dominance Directorate within the Navy staff and commissioned Fleet Cyber Command 10th Fleet. I see benefits of that 

already. 

I am proud of our Navy’s accomplishments last year and I am 

confident we can achieve more with this year’s budget submission. 

Our risk continues to trend towards significant and achieving the 

right balance within and across my priorities remains critical to 

mitigating it. But I remain optimistic because of our outstanding 

sailors and Navy civilians and the spirit of our Nation. We have 

seen more challenging times and emerged prosperous, secure, and 

free. 

I ask you to support our 2011 budget request and thank you for 

all you do to make the U.S. Navy a global force for good today and 

into the future. I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Admiral Roughead follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY ADM GARY ROUGHEAD, USN 

NAVY FISCAL YEAR 2011 POSTURE STATEMENT

Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, and members of the committee, it is my honor 

and pleasure to appear before you, once again, representing the more than 600,000 

sailors and civilians of the U.S. Navy. Every day, our dedicated Navy men and 

women are forward deployed protecting the global commons in every domain: sea, 

land, air, space, and cyberspace. I appreciate your continued support for them as 

our Navy protects our Nation and our national interests. 

When I signed our Maritime Strategy with General Conway and Admiral Allen 

more than 2 years ago, I was confident that the strategy would prepare us well for 

the current and future security environments. Since then, it has guided our operations and investments, and I am further convinced of its relevance to our operations today and of its enduring attributes. The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review 

(QDR) validated the underlying principle articulated in the Maritime Strategy that 

preventing wars is as important as winning wars. The QDR also declared that U.S. 

security and prosperity are connected to that of the international system, that deterrence is a fundamental military function, and that partnerships are key to U.S. 

strategy and essential to the stability of global systems. These themes reinforce the 

tenets of our Maritime Strategy and the six core capabilities it identified for our 

maritime Services: forward presence, deterrence, sea control, power projection, maritime security, and humanitarian assistance and disaster response (HA/DR). 

My priorities for the Navy remain unchanged: to build tomorrow’s Navy, to remain ready to fight today, and to develop and support our sailors, Navy civilians, 

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and their families. We are making progress in these areas thanks to your continued 

support. Some highlights follow. 

We added nine new ships to our fleet in 2009, including USS Freedom (LCS–1), 

currently on its first deployment, and USS Independence (LCS–2), our second Littoral Combat Ship. We delivered three DDG–51 destroyers and restarted the DDG– 

51 line to increase surface combatant capacity for maritime security, deterrence, and 

anti-submarine warfare. We are adapting our force to meet the President’s demand 

for sea-based ballistic missile defense (BMD) of Europe while sustaining our current 

BMD missions in the Arabian Gulf and Western Pacific. Our Virginia-class submarine program continues to excel with the delivery of USS New Mexico (SSN–779) 

4 months ahead of schedule. We rolled out our first carrier variant of Joint Strike 

Fighter (JSF) (F–35C) aircraft, the timely delivery of which remains essential to fulfilling our strike fighter requirements. We are conducting the first deployment of 

our Vertical Take-Off and Landing Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (VTUAV) and we expect the first test flight of our Navy Unmanned Combat Aerial System demonstrator 

this year. 

In the information and cyberspace domain, I established Fleet Cyber Command/ 

U.S. Tenth Fleet as the global operator of Navy’s cyber, networks, cryptology/signals 

intelligence, information, electronic warfare, and space operations. I restructured 

the Navy staff to bring all Navy information capabilities and resources under our 

new Information Dominance Deputy Chief of Naval Operations and created the 

Navy Information Dominance Corps, integrating more than 45,000 sailors and civilians from our existing intelligence, information professional, information warfare, 

meteorology/oceanography, and space communities. About 1,400 of these sailors are 

deployed globally as individual augmentees (IAs) today, most supporting operations 

in the Central Command (CENTCOM) area of responsibility. 

More than 40 percent of our fleet is underway daily, globally present and persistently engaged. Our forward presence enabled the rapid response of our aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson and numerous other surface and USNS ships, helicopters, and 

personnel to Haiti to provide humanitarian aid after the devastating earthquake in 

January. We remain engaged in operations in Afghanistan and in the drawdown of 

U.S. forces in Iraq. Navy has more than 21,000 Active and Reserve sailors on the 

ground and at sea in CENTCOM. This includes a doubling of our construction battalion (SEABEE) presence in Afghanistan and ongoing IA support to both operations. I recently issued our Navy Vision for Confronting Irregular Challenges to 

shape how our Navy will plan for, resource, and deliver a wide range of capabilities 

to confront irregular challenges associated with regional instability, insurgency, 

crime, and violent extremism at sea, in the littorals, and on shore. 

Our Navy continues to support our people and their families. We are in the process of expanding opportunities for service at sea to women in the Navy by opening 

to them assignments on submarines for the first time in history. Our Navy has received 19 national awards in the past 18 months for its workforce planning, lifework integration, diversity, and training initiatives. Most notably, Workforce Management magazine awarded Navy the 2009 Optimas Award for General Excellence, 

which recognized the U.S. Navy as an employer of choice among the ranks of previous distinguished recipients such as Google, Intel, and Hewlett-Packard. We have 

met or exceeded overall officer and enlisted (Active and Reserve) recruiting goals for 

2009 and we are on track to achieve similar success in 2010. I appreciate the support of Congress for our fleet and its dedicated sailors, Navy civilians, and their 

families that serve our Nation every day. 

I continue to focus on ensuring our Navy is properly balanced to answer the call 

now and in the decades to come. Last year, I stated our risk was moderate trending 

toward significant because of the challenges associated with Fleet capacity, increasing operational requirements, and growing manpower, maintenance, and infrastructure costs. This risk has increased over the last year as trends in each of these areas 

have continued. We are able to meet the most critical combatant commander demands today, but I am increasingly concerned about our ability to meet any additional demands while sustaining the health of the force, conducting essential maintenance and modernization to ensure units reach full service life, and procuring our 

future Navy so we are prepared to meet the challenges of tomorrow. 

The costs to own and operate our fleet continue to rise due to increasing operational demands, higher maintenance requirements, and growing manpower costs. 

Over the last decade, the overall size of our active fleet decreased by more than 30 

ships, about 10 percent, and our active duty end strength decreased by about 13 

percent, while operational demands globally have grown. Our Navy’s high tempo of 

operations has placed additional stress on our smaller fleet of sailors, ships, and aircraft and we are consuming the service life of our fleet at a higher than expected 

rate. We are implementing force management measures in the near term to stretch 

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the capacity of our 285-ship force to meet increasing global requirements. Through 

our Fleet Response Plan, we are tailoring our training and maintenance cycles to 

generate ready forces, allowing us to meet the most critical combatant commander 

requirements today. The impact of these measures on our fleet has been felt in 

longer deployments and shorter dwell times, which increase stress on our sailors 

and drive up maintenance requirements and costs for our ships and aircraft. Regular maintenance of our ships and aircraft, and training and certification of our 

crews between deployments, is essential to our ability to sustain our force. It is how 

we reset. This ‘‘reset in stride’’ is different from other Services. It ensures our ships 

and aircraft maintain the required continuous forward presence whether supporting 

coalition troops in Afghanistan, deterring North Korea and Iran, or providing humanitarian aid in Haiti. For our Navy, continuous reset translates into decades of 

service for each ship and aircraft, a significant return on investment. 

Our reset and readiness are tied directly to our operation and maintenance 

(O&M) funding. Over the last decade, we have relied upon a combination of base 

budget and overseas contingency operations (OCO) funding to operate and maintain 

our Navy. Our fiscal year 2011 OCO request for O&M is tightly focused on supporting our ongoing and increased operations in CENTCOM. Our fiscal year 2011 

base budget request for O&M is focused on properly sustaining our ships and aircraft so they reach their expected service life; funding enduring readiness requirements, particularly in aviation; and funding price increases, most notably in fuel, 

to support our enduring operations. Together, our OCO and base budget O&M requests reflect our commitment to resource current operations while preserving our 

fleet for future operations. I ask for your full support of this year’s O&M request. 

Our fiscal year 2011 budget request achieves the optimal balance among my priorities to build tomorrow’s Navy, to remain ready to fight today, and to develop and 

support our sailors, Navy civilians, and their families. It supports our Maritime 

Strategy and the 2010 QDR and continues us on the path we started in fiscal year 

2010 to support our forces forward, take care of our people, continue rebalancing 

our force to meet current and future challenges, and reform how and what we buy. 

Highlights follow. 

BUILD TOMORROW’S NAVY

Since the release of our Maritime Strategy, I have stated that our Navy requires 

a minimum of 313 ships to meet operational requirements globally. This minimum, 

a product of our 2005 force structure analysis, remains valid. We are adjusting our 

requirement to address increased operational demands and expanding requirements, 

as outlined in the QDR, for BMD, intra-theater lift, and forces capable of confronting irregular challenges. Our shipbuilding plan addresses these operational 

needs by growing our fleet to 315 ships in 2020 and peaking at 320 ships in 2024. 

Per the President’s direction, we will improve our capacity to conduct sea-based 

BMD of Europe by increasing our inventory of Aegis-capable ships through our restarted DDG–51 production line and modernization of our existing cruisers and destroyers. The funding for these upgrades will deliver the capability and capacity of 

ships required to perform this mission while maintaining sustainable deployment 

ratios for our sailors. To fulfill combatant commander requirements for intra-theater 

lift, we will increase the number of Joint High Speed Vessels (JHSV) in our Fleet; 

the large payload bays, speed, and shallow draft of these versatile ships make them 

capable of supporting a wide range of naval missions, including security cooperation, 

security force assistance, and logistics support. To provide forces capable of confronting irregular challenges, we will continue to pursue the planned number of Littoral Combat Ships, providing a flexible and modular ship optimized for operations 

close to shore. We are moving from developing a Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future) squadron optimized for high-end, forcible entry operations to augmenting our 

three existing Maritime Prepositioning Squadrons (MPS) with enhanced sea basing 

capabilities that are useful across a wide range of military operations. The augmented MPS will support our amphibious warfare force, which we will build to a 

minimum of 33 ships to increase our capacity to conduct theater security cooperation, sustain combat and assistance operations from the sea, and hedge against future conflict. 

We have improved the balance among capability, capacity, affordability, and 

executabilty in our procurement plans by developing a shipbuilding plan that procures our most needed capabilities, increases Fleet capacity in the near-to-mid-term, 

and is fiscally executable within the FYDP. It carefully manages increasing levels 

of operational and institutional risk, recognizing that, for as much as our Navy does 

to protect our national security and prosperity, the overall economy of our Nation 

undoubtedly does more. I am confident our near-term plan provides the capability 

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and capacity we need to conduct contingency operations and build partner capacity 

while retaining our ability to deter aggressors, assure allies, and defeat adversaries. 

Beyond 2024, I am concerned about the decrease in Fleet capacity that will occur 

as our legacy cruisers, destroyers, submarines, and amphibious ships reach the end 

of their service lives. Many of these ships were brought into service during the 

1980s, when we procured some ship classes at a rate of four to five ships per year. 

While economic and security conditions are sure to change between now and then, 

it takes 10 to 15 years to design and build our ships, which then remain in service 

for 20 to 50 years. A long view is necessary to ensure our Navy has sufficient capacity to protect America’s global national interests in the future. 

As directed by the QDR, we are working with the Air Force and Marine Corps 

on an Air Sea Battle concept that will identify the doctrine, procedures, training, 

organization, and equipment needed for our Navy to counter growing military 

threats to our freedom of action. This joint effort will help us inform investments 

and identify future opportunities to better integrate naval and air forces across the 

entire range of operations. We are already moving forward with the Air Force to 

streamline capabilities, manpower, and resources related to our unmanned aviation 

systems. We continue to pursue our unique maritime aviation capabilities in carrierbased strike, anti-submarine warfare, and naval special warfare missions. 

Underpinning the capacity and capability of our fleet is a highly technical and 

specialized industrial base. A strategic national asset, our shipbuilding and aviation 

industrial base is essential to sustaining our global fleet and remains a significant 

contributor to our Nation’s economic prosperity. Our shipbuilding industrial base directly supports more than 97,000 uniquely-skilled American jobs and indirectly supports thousands more through second and third tier suppliers. The highly specialized skills in our shipbuilding base take years to develop and, if lost, cannot be easily or quickly replaced. Level loading and predictable ship procurement allow industry to stabilize its workforce and retain the critical skills essential to our national 

security. 

I am committed to reducing the total ownership cost of our fleet so that what we 

buy today does not pressurize our ability to operate tomorrow. Significant cost drivers for our Fleet include increasing technical and design complexity, changes in requirements, reductions in the number of ships procured, and higher labor costs. To 

reduce these costs, we are pursuing common hull forms and components, open architecture for hardware and software, and increased modularity. Moreover, we are considering total ownership costs in procurement decisions. We are exploring new ways 

to design our ships with greater affordability throughout their lives, including reducing costs of fuel consumption, maintenance, and manpower and by increasing the 

efficiency of our maintenance and support processes and organizations. We are 

leveraging open production lines to deliver proven and required capabilities, such 

as in our DDG–51 and EA–18G programs. We are promoting longer production runs 

with our Virginia class SSNs, EA–18G and F/A–18E/F, P–8A, BAMS, and DDG–51 

programs. We are capitalizing on repeat builds to control requirements creep and 

increase predictability with our aircraft carrier, destroyer, and submarine programs. 

Finally, we are pursuing evolutionary instead of revolutionary designs to deliver required future capabilities. Our future missile defense capable ship, for example, will 

be developed by spiraling capability into our DDG–51-class ships, instead of designing and building a new cruiser from the keel up. 

I remain committed to delivering a balanced and capable fleet that will meet our 

national security requirements. I seek your support for the following initiatives and 

programs: 

AVIATION PROGRAMS

Aircraft Carrier Force Structure 

The Navy remains firmly committed to maintaining a force of 11 carriers for the 

next 3 decades. With the commissioning of USS George H.W. Bush (CVN–77) and 

inactivation of the 48-year-old USS Kitty Hawk (CV–63), our last conventionally 

powered aircraft carrier, we now have an all nuclear-powered carrier force. Our carriers enable our Nation to respond rapidly, decisively, and globally to project power, 

as we have done in Iraq and Afghanistan, or to deliver humanitarian assistance, as 

we have done in Haiti, while operating from a small, yet persistent, footprint that 

does not impose unnecessary political or logistic burdens on other nations. Our carriers remain a great investment for our Nation. 

Our 11-carrier force structure is based on worldwide presence and surge requirements, while also taking into account training and maintenance needs. I thank Congress for granting us a waiver to temporarily reduce our force to 10 carriers for the 

period between the inactivation of USS Enterprise (CVN–65) and the delivery of 

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Gerald R. Ford (CVN–78). We will continue to meet operational commitments during this 33-month period by managing carefully carrier deployment and maintenance cycles. After the delivery of CVN–78, we will maintain an 11-carrier force 

through the continued refueling program for Nimitz-class ships and the delivery of 

our Ford-class carriers at 5-year intervals starting in 2020. 

CVN–78 is the lead ship of our first new class of aircraft carriers in nearly 40 

years. Ford-class carriers will be our Nation’s premier forward-deployed asset capable of responding to crises or delivering early decisive striking power in a major 

combat operation. These new carriers incorporate an innovative new flight deck design that provides greater operational flexibility, reduced manning requirements, 

and the ability to operate current and future naval aircraft from its deck. Among 

the new technologies being integrated in these ships is the Electromagnetic Aircraft 

Launch System (EMALS), which will enable the carrier’s increased sortie generation 

rate and lower total ownership costs. EMALS is on track for an aircraft demonstration later this year and is on schedule to support delivery of CVN–78 in September 

2015. 

Strike Fighter Capacity: Joint Strike Fighter and F/A–18 E/F 

Our Navy remains committed to the JSF program. The timely delivery of the F– 

35C carrier variant remains critical to our future carrier airwing strike fighter capacity. Our Navy has the necessary tactical aircraft capacity in the near term to 

support our Nation’s strategic demands; however, a January 2010 assessment forecasts a decrease in our carrier-based strike fighter capacity that peaks in 2014 and 

remains through 2019. We have a plan to address this capacity decrease that involves several management and investment measures. 

Our force management measures are targeted at preserving the service life of our 

existing legacy strike fighter aircraft (F/A–18 A–D). We will reduce the number of 

aircraft available in our squadrons during non-deployed phases to the minimum required. We will reduce our Unit Deployed squadrons (UDP) from 12 aircraft to 10 

aircraft per squadron to match the corresponding decrease in Marine Corps expeditionary squadrons. We are accelerating the transition of five legacy F/A–18C squadrons to F/A–18E/F Super Hornets using available F/A–18E/F aircraft and will transition two additional legacy squadrons using Super Hornet attrition reserve aircraft. 

These measures make our legacy strike fighter aircraft available for High Flight 

Hour (HFH) inspections and our Service Life Extension Program, which together 

will extend their service life and manage to some extent the decrease in our carrierbased strike fighter capacity through 2018. These measures expend the service life 

of our Super Hornets earlier than programmed, so we are refining our depot level 

production processes to maximize throughput and return legacy strike fighter aircraft to the fleet expeditiously. Our fiscal year 2011 budget procures 22 additional 

F/A–18E/F aircraft. 

Our investment measures are targeted at extending the service life of our F/A– 

18 A–D aircraft and procuring JSF. HFH inspections, which have been in place for 

2 years, provide the ability to extend the service life of our legacy F/A–18 A–D aircraft to 8,600 flight hours, while engineering analysis is underway to determine the 

SLEP requirements necessary to reach the service life extension goal of 10,000 flight 

hours. The HFH and SLEP programs increase our institutional risk by diverting investment and maintenance funds from other accounts, but they are necessary measures to address our strike fighter decrease while preserving our investment in JSF. 

I remain committed to the JSF program because of the advanced sensor, precision 

strike, firepower, and stealth capabilities JSF will bring to our Fleet. While the 

overall schedule for JSF has slipped, causing us to reduce the overall rate of procurement, initial operating capability is still planned for 2014 and we have not reduced the total number of airframes we plan to buy. We are monitoring the JSF 

program closely and managing our existing strike fighter capacity to meet power 

projection demands until JSF is delivered. Procurement of an alternate engine for 

JSF increases our risk in this program. The Navy does not have a requirement for 

an alternate engine, and its additional costs threaten our ability to fund currently 

planned aircraft procurement quantities, which would exacerbate our anticipated 

decrease in strike fighter capacity. Our fiscal year 2011 budget request procures 

seven F–35C aircraft. 

EA–18G Growler 

The proliferation of technology has allowed state and non-state actors to use the 

electromagnetic spectrum with increasing sophistication. Airborne Electronic Attack 

(AEA) provides one of the most flexible offensive capabilities available to the joint 

warfighter and it remains in high demand in traditional, irregular, and hybrid conflicts. The Navy continues to provide extensive AEA support from our carriers afloat 

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and from our expeditionary EA–6B Prowler squadrons deployed currently to Iraq 

and Afghanistan. 

We are leveraging the mature and proven F/A–18E/F airframe production line to 

recapitalize our aging EA–6B aircraft with the EA–18G Growler. As directed in the 

QDR, we are planning to procure an additional 26 EA–18G Growler aircraft across 

the FYDP to increase joint force capacity to conduct expeditionary electronic attack. 

Our program of record will buy 114 total EA–18G aircraft, recapitalizing 10 Fleet 

EA–6B squadrons and four expeditionary squadrons. The program continues to deliver as scheduled. In September, our first EA–18G transition squadron, based at 

NAS Whidbey Island, reached Initial Operational Capability and it will deploy as 

an expeditionary squadron later this year. Our fiscal year 2011 budget requests 

funding for 12 EA–18Gs. 

P–3 Orion and P–8A Poseidon Multi-Mission Maritime Aircraft 

Your continued support of the P–3 and P–8A force remains essential and is appreciated greatly. Our P–3 Orion roadmap focuses on sustainment and selected modernization until it is replaced by the P–8A Poseidon. These aircraft provide capabilities ideally suited for regional and littoral crises and conflict, and are our pre-eminent airborne capability against submarine threats. Our P–3s are in high demand 

today for the time-critical intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance they provide 

to the joint force on the ground in CENTCOM and for their direct contributions to 

our maritime domain awareness in key regions across the globe. 

P–3 Zone 5 wing fatigue has resulted in the unplanned grounding of 49 aircraft 

between 2007 and 2009, with more expected. Mitigation measures include a combination of targeted Zone 5 modifications and outer wing replacements. As of December, we have returned 12 aircraft to service after completing Zone 5 modification 

and 32 aircraft are currently being repaired. As part of our sustainment program, 

we have included $39.6 million in our fiscal year 2011 budget request to conduct 

outer wing installations on nine of our P–3 aircraft. P–3 sustainment and modernization programs are critical to ensuring successful transition to the P–8A, while 

preserving essential maritime and overland battle space awareness. 

The P–8A completed it’s first Navy test flight this past October and will resume 

integrated flight testing in March of this year. The P–8A will achieve initial operating capability and begin replacing our aging P–3 aircraft in 2013. Our fiscal year 

2011 budget request procures seven P–8A aircraft. 

MH–60R/S Multi-Mission Helicopter 

The MH–60R and MH–60S successfully completed their first deployment together 

this past summer with the USS John C. Stennis carrier strike group. The MH–60R 

multi-mission helicopter replaces the surface combatant-based SH–60B and carrierbased SH–60F with a newly manufactured airframe and enhanced mission systems. 

With these systems, the MH–60R provides focused surface warfare and anti-submarine warfare capabilities for our strike groups and individual ships. Our fiscal 

year 2011 budget request procures 24 MH–60R helicopters. The MH–60S supports 

surface warfare, combat logistics, vertical replenishment, search and rescue, air ambulance, airborne mine counter-measures, and naval special warfare mission areas. 

Our fiscal year 2011 budget request procures 18 MH–60S helicopters. 

SURFACE SHIP PROGRAMS

Littoral Combat Ship 

Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) is a fast, agile, networked surface combatant that is 

optimized to support naval and joint force operations in the littorals and capable 

of supporting open-ocean operations. It will operate with tailored-mission packages 

to counter quiet diesel submarines, mines, and fast surface craft. The modular and 

open architecture design of the seaframe and mission modules provides the inherent 

flexibility to adapt or add capabilities beyond the current Anti-Submarine, Mine 

Countermeasures, and Surface Warfare missions. These ships will employ a combination of manned helicopters and unmanned aerial, surface, and undersea vehicles. 

USS Freedom (LCS–1) has completed her post-delivery testing, trial, and shakedown periods and commenced her maiden deployment in February to Southern 

Command and Pacific Command. Her deployment 2 years ahead of schedule will 

allow us to incorporate operational lessons more quickly and effectively as we integrate these ships into our Fleet. USS Independence (LCS–2) completed builder’s 

trials in October 2009 and acceptance trials in November 2009. We accepted delivery of Independence on 18 December 2009, and commissioned her 16 January 2010. 

In March 2009, fixed price contracts were awarded for USS Fort Worth (LCS–3) and 

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USS Coronado (LCS–4) which are now under construction by Lockheed Martin and 

General Dynamics respectively. 

I am impressed and satisfied with the capabilities of both LCS designs and am 

committed to procuring 55 of these ships. Affordability remains the key factor in acquiring LCS in the quantities we require. After careful review of the fiscal year 

2010 industry proposals, consideration of total program costs, and ongoing discussions with Congress, we made the decision to cancel for affordability reasons the 

Phase II requests for proposals for three fiscal year 2010 LCS ships and adjust our 

acquisition strategy. In fiscal year 2010, we will conduct a competition among the 

existing LCS industry participants to down-select to a single LCS design. The winner of the down-select will be awarded a block buy contract for up to 10 ships, to 

be procured from fiscal year 2010 through fiscal year 2014 at a rate of two ships 

per year, built in one shipyard. To sustain competition and increase capacity, the 

winner of the down-select will be required to deliver a Technical Data Package to 

the Navy to support competition for a second contract source. We plan to award up 

to five ships to a second source beginning in fiscal year 2012 with one ship and continuing with an additional two ships per year through fiscal year 2014. The winner 

of the down-select will provide combat systems equipment, up to 15 ship sets, for 

the ships built by the two contract sources: 10 sets for the 10 ships under contract 

with the winner of the down-select and up to 5 additional sets for the 5 ships being 

procured by the second contract source. The five additional sets will later be provided as government-furnished equipment to support the second source LCS contract. We intend to procure all future LCS ships within the national Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2010 revised cost cap. Our down-select strategy leverages competition to the maximum extent practical, provides for economic 

procurement quantities, improves learning curve and commonality opportunities, 

and ultimately provides for program stability. We recently issued the requests for 

proposals for this contract and expect industry bids in March of this year. 

Consistent with our new strategy, our fiscal year 2011 budget requests two LCS 

seaframes and an additional $278 million to secure an LCS block buy, which is essential to lowering unit costs. I request your support as we acquire LCS in the most 

cost-effective manner and deliver its innovative capability in sufficient capacity to 

our Fleet. 

Integrated Air and Missile Defense 

Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) incorporates all aspects of air defense 

against ballistic, anti-ship, and overland cruise missiles. IAMD is vital to the protection of our force, and it is an integral part of our core capability to deter aggression 

through conventional means. The demand for sea-based BMD is increasing significantly. The Navy’s mature and successfully demonstrated maritime BMD capability 

will play a primary role in the first phase of our Nation’s plan to provide for the 

missile defense of Europe. Aegis BMD counters short, medium, and some intermediate-range ballistic missiles through active defense and is able to pass target information to other BMD systems, thereby expanding the BMD battlespace and support of homeland defense. Currently, 20 ships (4 cruisers and 16 destroyers) have 

this capability and are being used to perform maritime BMD. All of the Arleigh 

Burke-class destroyers and nine of the Ticonderoga-class cruisers are planned to receive BMD capability through our modernization program. 

DDG–51 Restart and Future Surface Combatant 

To address the rapid proliferation of ballistic and anti-ship missiles and deepwater submarine threats, as well as increase the capacity of our multipurpose surface ships, we restarted production of our DDG–51 Arleigh Burke-class destroyers 

(Flight IIA series). These ships will be the first constructed with IAMD, providing 

much-needed BMD capacity to the Fleet, and they will incorporate the hull, mechanical, and electrical alterations associated with our mature DDG modernization program. We will spiral DDG–51 production to incorporate future integrated air and 

missile defense capabilities. 

We are well underway with restarting DDG–51 production. We awarded advance 

procurement (AP) contracts for DDG–113 and –114, and expect to award an AP contract for DDG–115 in the coming months, to support the long lead items necessary 

for production of these ships. I thank Congress for supporting our fiscal year 2010 

budget, which funded construction of DDG–113. We anticipate a contract award for 

DDG–113 production this spring. Our fiscal year 2011 budget requests funding for 

the construction of DDG–114 and DDG–115 as part of our plan to build a total of 

eight DDG–51 ships through the FYDP. 

The Navy, in consultation with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, conducted 

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tem solution necessary to meet our IAMD requirements while balancing affordability and capacity in our surface Fleet. The study concluded that Navy should integrate the Air and Missile Defense Radar program S Band radar (AMDR–S), SPY– 

3 (X Band radar), and Aegis Advanced Capability Build (ACB) combat system into 

a DDG–51 hull. While our Radar/Hull Study indicated that both DDG–51 and 

DDG–1000 were able to support our preferred radar systems, leveraging the DDG– 

51 hull was the most affordable option. Accordingly, our fiscal year 2011 budget cancels the next generation cruiser program due to projected high cost and risk in technology and design of this ship. I request your support as we invest in spiraling the 

capabilities of our DDG–51 class from our Flight IIA Arleigh Burke ships to Flight 

III ships, which will be our future IAMD-capable surface combatant. We will procure the first Flight III ship in fiscal year 2016. 

Modernization 

As threats evolve, we must modernize our existing ships with updated capabilities 

that sustain our combat effectiveness and enable our ships to reach their expected 

service life, which in the case of our destroyers and cruisers, is more than three decades. Our destroyer and cruiser modernization program includes advances in standard missiles, integrated air and missile defense, open architecture, and essential 

hull, mechanical and electrical (HM&E) upgrades. Maintaining the stability of the 

cruiser and destroyer modernization program is critical to achieving relevant future 

Navy capability and capacity. 

Our Navy plans to conduct DDG modernization in two 6-month availabilities. The 

first availability is focused on HM&E modifications, while the second availability, 

conducted 2 years later, is focused on combat systems modernization. The program 

will commence in fiscal year 2010 and focuses on the Flight I and II DDG–51 ships 

(hulls 51–78). All ships of the class will be modernized at midlife. Key tenets of the 

DDG modernization program include: an upgrade of the Aegis Weapons System to 

include an Open Architecture (OA) computing environment, an upgrade of the SPY 

radar signal processor, the addition of BMD capability, installation of the Evolved 

Sea Sparrow Missile (ESSM), an upgraded SQQ–89A(V)15 anti-submarine warfare 

system, integration with the SM–6 Missile, and improved air dominance with processing upgrades and Naval Integrated Fire Control-Counter Air capability. 

The Cruiser Modernization Program will modernize all remaining cruisers (Baseline 2, 3, and 4). The first fully modernized cruiser, USS Bunker Hill (CG–52), was 

completed in June 2009. The key aspects of the CG modernization program include: 

an upgrade to the Aegis weapons system to include an OA computing environment, 

installation of an SPQ–9B radar, addition of the Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile 

(ESSM), an upgrade to Close-In Weapon System (CIWS) Block 1B, an upgraded 

SQQ–89A(V)15 anti-submarine warfare system, and improved air dominance with 

processing upgrades and Naval Integrated Fire Control-Counter Air capability. Six 

Baseline 4 cruisers will receive the BMD upgrade. 

Our fiscal year 2011 budget requests funding for the modernization of three cruisers and three destroyers. 

DDG–1000 

The DDG–1000 Zumwalt guided missile destroyer will be an optimally crewed, 

multi-mission surface combatant designed to fulfill long-range precision land attack 

requirements. In addition to providing offensive, distributed and precision fires in 

support of forces ashore, these ships will serve as test-beds for advanced technology, 

such as integrated power systems, dual band radars, and advanced survivability features, which can be incorporated into our other ship classes. The first DDG–1000 

is under construction and approximately 20 percent complete. We recently notified 

Congress of a Nunn-McCurdy breach in this program as a result of our decision to 

reduce the number of DDG–1000s in the original program. DDG–1000 will be a 

three-ship class. It is scheduled to deliver in fiscal year 2013 with an initial operating capability in fiscal year 2015. 

Joint High Speed Vessel 

Intra-theater lift is key to enabling the United States to rapidly project, maneuver, and sustain military forces in distant, overseas operations. The Joint High 

Speed Vessel (JHSV) program is an Army and Navy joint program that will deliver 

a high-speed, shallow draft surface ship capable of rapid transport of medium payloads of cargo and personnel within a theater to austere ports without reliance on 

port infrastructure for load/offload. In addition, the Navy JHSV will be capable of 

supporting extensive Security Force Assistance and Theater Security Cooperation 

operations, including the hosting of small craft for training. A JHSV Production 

Readiness Review was completed in October 2009 and the first vessel construction 

began this past December with an anticipated delivery to the Army in fiscal year 

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2012. The second ship, a Navy vessel, is scheduled to be delivered in 2013. Our fiscal year 2011 budget includes funds for the construction of Navy’s third JHSV. Navy 

continues oversight of JHSV procurement for the five Army-funded vessels in this 

program. The Army assumes full responsibility for these five vessels following acquisition. 

SUBMARINE PROGRAMS

Virginia-Class SSN 

The Virginia-class submarine is a multi-mission submarine that dominates in the 

littorals and open oceans. Now in its 13th year of construction, the Virginia program 

is demonstrating that this critical undersea capability can be delivered affordably 

and on time. Thanks to Congress, these ships will begin construction at a rate of 

two a year in 2011, with two ship deliveries per year beginning in 2017. The Navy 

continues to realize a return from investments in the Virginia cost reduction program and construction process improvements through enhanced shipbuilder performance on each successive ship. These submarines are under budget and ahead 

of schedule, and their performance continues to exceed expectations with every ship 

delivered. Three of the five commissioned ships completed initial deployments prior 

to their Post Shakedown Availabilities, a first for the Navy. I am pleased with the 

accomplishments of the combined Navy-Industry team and look forward to even 

greater success as we ramp up production to two submarines next year. 

SSGN 

Our Navy has four guided missile submarines that provide high-volume strike 

and irregular warfare capabilities in support of operations and missions across the 

broad spectrum of conflict. SSGNs are performing well on deployment, and we are 

learning valuable lessons from each mission. Combatant commanders value the 

long-range strike capability they provide and we are investigating options to sustain 

this capability in the most operationally and cost effective manner, to include options for expanding the long-range strike capacity of the submarine fleet. 

SSBN and Ohio Replacement 

Our Navy supports the Nation’s nuclear deterrence capability with a credible and 

survivable fleet of 14 Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines (SSBN). Originally designed for a 30-year service life, this class will start retiring in 2027 after more than 

42 years of service. 

The United States needs a reliable and survivable sea-based strategic deterrent 

for the foreseeable future. To ensure there is no gap in this critical capability, our 

fiscal year 2011 budget requests research and development funds for the Ohio replacement to support the start of construction of the first ship in fiscal year 2019. 

The Ohio replacement will be a strategic, national asset with the endurance and 

stealth to enable our Navy to provide continuous, survivable strategic deterrence 

into the 2080s. Appropriate R&D investment is essential to design a reliable, survivable, and adaptable submarine capable of deterring all potential adversaries. We 

completed our Analysis of Alternatives study in 2009, and Milestone A is planned 

for April 2010. The Ohio Replacement program will leverage the many successes of 

the Virginia SSN program to achieve acquisition and total ownership cost goals. The 

United States will realize significant program benefits as a result of our close partnership with the United Kingdom’s Vanguard SSBN replacement program, particularly in the design and construction of a common missile compartment. Our cooperation with the UK mitigates technical risk and shares design costs. 

AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE SHIPS

Our amphibious warfare ships provide essential capabilities for the full range of 

military operations, including theater security cooperation, humanitarian assistance, 

conventional deterrence, and forcible entry as part of major combat operations. With 

the unique capability to move hundreds of personnel and substantial material 

through complementary surface and air capabilities, these ships are key to our ability to overcome geographic, political, and infrastructure impediments to access. The 

Commandant of the Marine Corps and I have determined that a minimum of 33 amphibious assault ships represents the limit of acceptable risk in meeting the 38-ship 

requirement for supporting a forcible entry operation conducted by an assault echelon of two Marine Expeditionary Brigades (MEB). Our 33-ship force would be comprised of 11 LHA/D amphibious assault ships and a mix of 11 LPD–17 amphibious 

transport dock ships and 11 LSD dock landing ships. At this capacity, we are accepting risk in the speed of arrival of the combat support elements of the MEB. The 

QDR and our 30-Year Shipbuilding Plan account for 29–31 amphibious warfare 

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ships within the FYDP. We plan to procure the 11th LPD–17 in 2012, which will 

allow us to realize a 33-ship minimum amphibious force in about fiscal year 2016. 

We continue to review options to achieve and sustain the minimum 33 amphibious 

ship assault echelon force. 

LPD–17 Class Amphibious Warfare Ship 

The LPD–17 class amphibious warfare ships represent the Navy and Marine 

Corps commitment to an expeditionary fleet capable of power projection, security 

force assistance, and theater security cooperation in diverse operating environments. 

These ships have a 40-year expected service life and will replace four classes of 

older ships: the LKA, LST, LSD–36, and the LPD–4. Two LPD–17 class ships have 

completed their initial deployments, and USS New York (LPD–21), forged with steel 

from the World Trade Center, delivered in November 2009. We continue to apply 

the lessons learned during construction and initial operation of the early ships to 

those under construction. Quality is improving with each ship delivered as we continue to work closely with the shipbuilder to address cost, schedule, and performance concerns. 

LHA Replacement (LHA(R)) 

LHA(R) is the replacement for our aging Tarawa class ships, which will reach the 

end of their already extended service life between 2011–2015. LHA(R) will provide 

us flexible, multi-mission amphibious capabilities by leveraging the LHD–8 design 

and increasing aviation capacity to better accommodate the JSF, MV–22, and other 

aircraft that comprise the future Marine Corps Air Combat Element. We laid the 

keel of the lead ship, USS America (LHA–6), in April 2009 and our fiscal year 2011 

budget includes one LHA(R) which is split-funded in fiscal year 2011 and fiscal year 

2012. 

Mobile Landing Platform and Future Maritime Preposition Force 

The Future Maritime Preposition Force (MPF(F)) program was envisioned as a 

forward-deployed squadron of ships capable of at-sea assembly and rapid employment of forces in an area of interest during a crisis. Our requirement for amphibious 

and joint forcible entry operations was reevaluated during the QDR and, as a result, 

we have adjusted our approach to augment our three existing Maritime 

Prepositioning Squadrons (MPS) instead of developing an MPF(F) squadron. MPF(F) 

was optimized for high-end, forcible entry operations, while the augmented MPS 

will provide enhanced sea basing capabilities across a wide range of contingency operations. Each existing MPS will be augmented by one Large Medium-Speed Rollon/Roll-off (LMSR) cargo ship (transferred from the Army), a T–AKE combat logistics ship, and a new Mobile Landing Platform (MLP). The MLP will be based on 

existing designs for commercial ocean-going tankers and will meet most of the mission requirements envisioned for the original MLP design. The three augmented 

MPS reflect the QDR’s emphasis on day-to-day deterrence and partner capacity 

building, while continuing to meet forcible entry needs. Our fiscal year 2011 budget 

request procures one MLP. 

INFORMATION DOMINANCE PROGRAMS

Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) 

We are investing in unmanned aircraft to meet an increasing warfighter demand 

for Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR), and we are making technology investments to expand UAS operations to other mission areas. The Broad 

Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS) UAS will enhance our situational awareness 

and shorten the sensor-to-shooter kill chain by providing persistent, multiple-sensor 

capabilities to Fleet and Joint Commanders. The VTUAV Fire Scout is on its first 

deployment aboard the USS McInerney (FFG–8). We are developing a medium endurance maritime-based UAS and a Small Tactical Unmanned Aerial System 

(STUAS) that will support a variety of ships, Naval Special Warfare and Navy Expeditionary Combat Command units, and Marine Corps elements. 

The Navy Unmanned Combat Aircraft System demonstration (UCAS–D) is designed to prove carrier suitability of an autonomous, unmanned, low observable, carrier-based aircraft. This effort includes maturing technologies for aircraft carrier 

catapult launches and arrested landings, as well integration into carrier-controlled 

airspace. Initial flight tests to demonstrate carrier suitability are scheduled to start 

later this year and autonomous aerial refueling demonstrations are planned for 

2013. We will leverage the lessons learned from operating the demonstrator in developing a low-observable unmanned carrier-launched airborne strike and surveillance system. 

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Mobile User Objective System 

Our Maritime Strategy demands a flexible, interoperable, and secure global communications capability that can support the command and control requirements of 

highly mobile and distributed U.S. and coalition forces. Satellite communications 

give deployed forces a decisive military advantage and often offer the only communication means to support on-going operations. Rapidly expanding joint demand for 

more access at ever-higher data rates requires moving beyond our current legacy 

Ultra High Frequency (UHF) satellite capabilities. The Mobile User Objective System (MUOS) will satisfy those demands when initial operational capability is 

reached in fiscal year 2012. I request your continued support of MUOS and the critical UHF satellite communication capability it will provide to the joint warfighter 

as the aging UHF Follow-On constellation degrades. 

Next Generation Enterprise Network 

The Navy is continuing its transition from disparate independent computer networks to a single secure network environment. We are currently evolving our ashore 

network from the Navy Marine Corps Intranet (NMCI), the largest intranet in the 

world, to the Next Generation Enterprise Network (NGEN). NGEN Increment 1 is 

the follow-on to the existing NMCI contract, which expires at the end of fiscal year 

2010. NGEN will sustain the services currently provided by NMCI, while increasing 

government command and control of our network and enabling secure, reliable, and 

adaptable global information exchange. Future NGEN increments will expand on 

services currently provided by NMCI and support seamless transition between 

afloat and ashore environments. A continuity of services contract is expected to be 

awarded this spring and NGEN Initial Operating Capability is scheduled for the 

summer of 2012. 

E–2D Advanced Hawkeye 

The E–2D Advanced Hawkeye aircraft, which replaces the E–2C, will improve 

nearly every facet of tactical air operations and add overland and littoral surveillance to support theater Integrated Air and Missile Defense against air threats in 

high clutter, complex electro-magnetic and jamming environments. The airborne 

radar on the E–2D, with its improved surveillance capability, is a key pillar of the 

Navy Integrated Fire Control concept. The E–2D is scheduled to begin operational 

test and evaluation in 2012. The first Fleet squadron transition is planned for 2013, 

with deployment planned for October 2014. Our fiscal year 2011 budget requests 

four E–2D Hawkeye aircraft. 

REMAIN READY TO FIGHT TODAY

Our Navy continues to operate at a high tempo. We are filling new combatant 

commander requirements for BMD, electronic attack, intelligence, surveillance, and 

reconnaissance (ISR), combat support, combat service support, and maritime security force assistance, in addition to conducting ongoing deployments in support of 

our maritime and national strategies. 

In CENTCOM alone, we have more than 9,000 sailors at sea, including a U.S. 

Navy aircraft carrier and air wing dedicated to providing 24/7 air support to U.S. 

and coalition forces on the ground. Navy Riverine forces are on their sixth deployment to Iraq, conducting interdiction patrols and training their Iraqi counterparts. 

Our surface ships in the region are providing BMD and conducting counterterrorism, counterpiracy, maritime security, theater security cooperation, and security force assistance operations. On the ground in CENTCOM, we have more than 

12,000 Active and Reserve sailors supporting Navy, joint force, and coalition operations. Navy Commanders lead 6 of the 12 U.S.-led Provincial Reconstruction Teams 

in Afghanistan. We have doubled our construction battalions (SEABEEs) in Afghanistan, increasing our capacity to build forward bases for U.S. forces and improve 

critical infrastructure in that country. Our Naval Special Warfare Teams continue 

to be engaged heavily in direct combat operations and our Explosive Ordnance Disposal teams continue to conduct lifesaving counter-Improvised Explosive Device operations on a daily basis. As we shift our effort from Iraq to Afghanistan, demand 

for Navy individual augmentees (IAs) has grown. We are providing IAs to support 

the increase of U.S. forces in Afghanistan while our IAs in Iraq remain at current 

levels to support the withdrawal of U.S. combat troops, maintain detention facilities 

and critical infrastructure, and assist coalition efforts until they can be turned over 

to Iraqi forces. During my recent trip to CENTCOM, I met with many of our dedicated Navy men and women supporting these efforts and I could not be more proud 

of their contributions. Their expert skill, ingenuity, competence, and drive are impressive and unmatched. 

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Our high tempo will likely continue as combat forces draw down in Iraq and Afghanistan. Navy enabling forces will remain in CENTCOM to provide protection, 

ISR, and logistics support to our troops and partner forces in the region, while we 

will continue to maintain a forward-deployed presence of about 100 ships around the 

world to prevent conflict, increase interoperability with our allies, enhance the maritime security and capacity of our traditional and emerging partners, and respond 

to crises. Global demand for Navy forces remains high and continues to rise because 

of the unequalled and unique ability of our naval forces to overcome diplomatic, geographic, and military impediments to access while bringing the persistence, flexibility, and agility to conduct operations from the sea. 

Reset in stride is how our Navy prepares our Fleet to deploy again. Lifecycle 

maintenance and training between deployments is essential to our reset and to the 

ability of our ships and aircraft to reach their expected service lives. Although we 

are on pace to grow our fleet for the next 10 years, our fleet reduced in size over 

the past decade. As a result, while we continue to maintain the same number of 

ships at sea assigned to combatant commanders, we have a historically low number 

of ships available for at-sea training, exercises, and surge operations. Our fiscal year 

2011 budget request balances the need to meet increasing operational requirements, 

sustain our sailors’ proficiency, and conduct the maintenance required to ensure our 

ships and aircraft reach their full service lives. Highlights follow of initiatives that 

ensure our Navy remains ready to fight today. 

Depot Level Maintenance 

Our ships and aircraft are capital assets that operate in challenging physical and 

security environments. Keeping these assets in acceptable operating condition is 

vital to their ability to accomplish assigned missions and to reach their expected 

service lives. Timely depot level maintenance, performed in a cycle determined by 

an engineered assessment of expected material durability and scoped by actual 

physical condition, will preserve our existing force structure and ensure it can meet 

assigned tasking. Continued investment in depot level maintenance is essential to 

our efforts to achieve and sustain the force structure required to implement the 

Maritime Strategy. 

Last year, I established the Surface Ship Life Cycle Management (SSLCM) Activity to address deficiencies in our ship class maintenance plans that could prevent 

our ships from reaching their full service life. SSLCM has established an engineered 

approach to surface ship maintenance that optimizes existing maintenance availability work packages and better tracks ship material condition through robust inspections and corrosion control tasks. We accelerated our review of the requirements 

for certain ship classes, significantly improving the accuracy of our surface ship 

maintenance requirements in fiscal year 2011 over prior years. We are committed 

to a full review of all surface ship class maintenance plans, which will take several 

years. The value of investing in an engineered approach to maintenance is evident 

in our submarine force, where we have successfully extended the time between 

scheduled availabilities based on demonstrated material conditions and verification 

of engineering analysis. Because we have invested in this engineering and planning 

effort, we have been able to safely recover additional operational availability and reduce the overall depot level maintenance requirement for our submarines. This significant step has provided some of the resources needed to make additional investments in surface ship maintenance. 

Our combined fiscal year 2011 budget funds 99 percent of the projected depot ship 

maintenance requirements necessary to sustain our Navy’s global presence. Our 

budget funds aviation depot maintenance to provide 100 percent of the airframes 

for deployed squadrons and 96 percent of the nondeployed airframes. I request that 

you fully support our baseline and contingency funding requests for O&M to ensure 

the effectiveness of our force, safety of our sailors, and longevity of our ships and 

aircraft. 

Shore Readiness 

Our shore infrastructure is a fundamental enabler of our operational and combat 

readiness and is essential to the quality of life and quality of work for our sailors, 

Navy civilians, and their families. As I described last year, rising manpower costs 

and growing operational demands on our aging fleet have led our Navy to take risk 

in shore readiness. This risk increases our maintenance, sustainment, restoration, 

and modernization requirements and continues our reliance on old and less efficient 

energy systems. These factors increase the cost of ownership of our shore infrastructure and outpace our efforts to reduce costs through facilities improvements and energy upgrades. At our current investment levels, our future shore readiness, particularly the recapitalization of our facilities infrastructure, is at risk. 

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To manage our risk in shore infrastructure, our fiscal year 2011 budget request 

prioritizes funding for our most critical needs, including Navy and Joint mission 

readiness, nuclear weapons security and safety, and improving our bachelor quarters through sustained funding for our Homeport Ashore initiative. To guide investment in other areas ashore, we continue to pursue our capabilities-based Shore Investment Strategy, which targets our investment in shore infrastructure to where 

it will produce the highest return on investment and have the greatest impact on 

achieving our strategic and operational objectives, such as in areas that enable critical warfighting capabilities, improve quality of life, and fulfill Joint requirements. 

We have made essential progress and improvements in nuclear weapons security, 

child care facilities, and bachelor’s quarters. Thank you for funding all our requested military construction projects in 2010, as well as 19 additional projects and 

our Reserve program. Your support allowed us to address ship, aircraft, systems, infrastructure, and training requirements, while enhancing the quality of life and 

quality of service for our sailors and their families. Your similar support and assistance through the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 was also very 

helpful. As you requested, we identified Military Construction projects for Child Development Centers and barracks and prioritized them according to operational need 

and the ability to obligate funds quickly. We selected infrastructure and energy 

projects based on mission requirements, quality of life impact, environmental planning status, and our ability to execute quickly. Our aggressive execution schedule 

is on track; we have awarded all but 1 of our 85 initial projects and construction 

outlays are ramping up swiftly. 

Training Readiness 

Our Fleet Synthetic Training (FST) program provides realistic operational training with seamless integration of geographically dispersed Navy, Joint, Interagency 

and Coalition forces. Using virtual and constructive training environments has allowed us to reduce our energy consumption and greenhouse gas emissions while providing the level of sophistication necessary to prepare our sailors for operational and 

tactical mission proficiency. We continue to evolve FST to provide our sailors with 

exposure to a multitude of warfare areas. Last year, we conducted our first BMD 

Fleet Synthetic Training event, proving the viability and effectiveness of integrated 

Navy, Joint, and partner-nation BMD training. 

The proliferation of advanced, stealthy, nuclear, and non-nuclear submarines continues to challenge our Navy’s ability to guarantee the access and safety of joint 

forces. Effective Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) training with active sonar systems 

is vital to meeting potential threats. The Navy remains a world leader in marine 

mammal research and we will continue our robust investment in this research in 

fiscal year 2011 and beyond. Through such efforts, and in full consultation and cooperation with other Federal agencies, Navy has developed effective measures that 

protect marine mammals and the ocean environment from adverse impacts of midfrequency active sonar while not impeding vital Navy training. We continue to work 

closely with our interagency partners to further refine our protective measures as 

scientific knowledge evolves. It is vitally important that any such measures ensure 

the continued flexibility necessary to respond to future, potentially unforeseen national security requirements. 

Over the last year, we completed environmental planning for seven existing and 

proposed at-sea training and combat certification areas. We expect to complete planning for another six areas by the end of 2010 as we continue to balance our responsibility to prepare naval forces for deployment and combat operations with our responsibility to be good stewards of the marine environment. 

Conducting night and day field carrier landing practice (FCLP) prior to at-sea carrier qualifications is a critical training requirement for our fixed-wing carrier-based 

pilots, who must develop and maintain proficiency in the fundamentals necessary 

to conduct safe carrier-based flight operations. We continue to seek additional airfield capacity in the form of an outlying landing field (OLF) that will enhance our 

ability to support FCLP training for fixed-wing, carrier pilots operating from Naval 

Air Station Oceana and Naval Station Norfolk. The additional OLF will allow Navy 

to meet training requirements and overcome challenges related to capacity limits, 

urban encroachment, and impacts from adverse weather conditions at existing East 

Coast facilities. In August 2009, the Navy announced that the release of the draft 

environmental impact statement (EIS) for construction and operation of an OLF 

would be delayed. This delay was necessary to ensure JSF noise analysis is included 

in the OLF draft EIS. The Navy is committed to developing, with local, State, and 

Federal leaders, a plan to ensure the OLF provides positive benefits to local communities while addressing Navy training shortfalls. 

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Energy and Climate 

Energy reform is a strategic imperative. The Secretary of the Navy and I are committed to changing the way we do business to realize an energy-secure future. In 

alignment with the Secretary of the Navy’s five goals, our priorities are to advance 

energy security by improving combat capability, assuring mobility, ‘‘lightening the 

load’’, and greening our footprint. We will achieve these goals through energy efficiency improvements, consumption reduction initiatives, and adoption of alternative 

energy and fuels. Reducing our reliance on fossil fuels will improve our combat capability by increasing time on station, reducing time spent alongside replenishment 

ships, and producing more effective and powerful future weapons. Most of our 

projects remain in the demonstration phase; however, we are making good progress 

in the form of hybrid-electric drive, delivered last year on the USS Makin Island 

(LHD–8), bio-fuel engines, advanced hull and propeller coatings, solid state lighting, 

and policies that encourage sailors to reduce their consumption through simple 

changes in behavior. 

Thanks to your support, the American Reinvestment and Recovery Act funded 

Navy energy conservation and renewable energy investment in 11 tactical and 42 

shore-based projects totaling $455 million. Tactical projects included alternative 

fuel, drive, and power systems, while ashore projects included alternative energy 

(wind, solar and geothermal) investments in 10 States and the installation of advance metering infrastructure in three regions. Our fiscal year 2011 budget continues to invest in tactical and ashore energy initiatives, requesting $128 million for 

these efforts. 

In our Maritime Strategy we addressed maritime operations in an era of climate 

change, especially in the ice diminished Arctic. In May 2009, I established the 

Navy’s Task Force on Climate Change to develop policy, investment, and force-structure recommendations regarding climate change in the Arctic and globally over the 

long-term. Our focus will be to ensure Navy readiness and capability in a changing 

global environment. 

Second East Coast Carrier-Capable Port 

Hampton Roads is the only nuclear carrier capable port on the East Coast. A catastrophic event in the Hampton Roads area affecting port facilities, shipping channels, supporting maintenance or training infrastructure, or the surrounding community has the potential to severely limit East Coast Carrier operations, even if the 

ships themselves are not affected. Consistent with today’s dispersal of West Coast 

aircraft carriers between California and Washington State, the QDR direction to 

make Naval Station Mayport a nuclear carrier-capable homeport addresses the 

Navy’s requirement for a capable facility to maintain aircraft carriers in the event 

that a natural or manmade disaster makes the Hampton Roads area inaccessible. 

While there is an upfront cost to upgrade Naval Station Mayport to support our nuclear aircraft carriers, Mayport has been a carrier homeport since 1952 and is the 

most cost-effective means to achieve strategic dispersal on the east coast. The national security benefits of this additional homeport far outweigh those costs. 

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 

The Law of the Sea Convention codifies navigation and overflight rights and high 

seas freedoms that are essential for the global mobility of our Armed Forces. It directly supports our national security interests. Not being a party to this Convention 

constrains efforts to develop enduring maritime partnerships, inhibits efforts to expand the Proliferation Security Initiative, and elevates the level of risk for our sailors as they undertake operations to preserve navigation rights and freedoms, particularly in areas such as the Strait of Hormuz and Arabian Gulf, and the East and 

South China Seas. By becoming a party to the Convention, the United States will 

be able to expand its sovereign rights to the increasingly accessible outer continental shelf areas of the resource rich environment of the Arctic, as well as in other 

locations where technological advances are opening up previously unobtainable resources. Accession to the Law of the Sea Convention remains a priority for our 

Navy. 

DEVELOP AND SUPPORT OUR SAILORS, NAVY CIVILIANS AND THEIR FAMILIES

Our sailors, Navy civilians, and their families underpin our Maritime Strategy 

and are the foundation of our Nation’s global force for good. We have great ships, 

aircraft, weapons, and systems, but it is our skilled and innovative sailors who turn 

these ships, aircraft, and technologies into capabilities that can prevent conflict and 

win wars. In January 2010, we released the Navy Total Force Vision for the 21st 

century to guide our efforts to attract, recruit, develop, assign, and retain a highlyVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:37 May 06, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00344 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\62155.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
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skilled workforce and reaffirm our commitment to supporting our uniformed and civilian people wherever they serve and live. 

We have transitioned from reducing end strength to stabilizing our force through 

a series of performance-based measures. Our stabilization efforts remain focused on 

maintaining a balanced force in terms of seniority, experience, and skills while supporting growth in high-demand areas such as cyber and special operations. We recognize the importance of retaining the talent and experience of our sailors after they 

complete their active duty obligation so we are actively removing barriers associated 

with the transition between Active and Reserve careers to allow for a continuum 

of service over a lifetime. Our fiscal year 2011 budget requests authorization and 

funding for 328,700 Active end strength and 65,500 Reserve end strength. We continue to request OCO funding for our individual augmentees that are performing 

non-core Navy missions in support of contingency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. OCO funding remains critical to our ability to meet these missions without 

adversely impacting fleet readiness or sailor dwell time. 

We continue to provide support to our sailors and their families, including those 

who are wounded, ill, and injured, through expanded Fleet and Family Support 

services, Navy Safe Harbor, and our Operational Stress Control (OSC) program. We 

are addressing aggressively the recent rise in suicide rates by implementing new 

training and outreach programs for fleet commanders, sailors, and Navy families to 

increase suicide awareness and prevention. We are focused on reducing sexual assaults in our Navy through our new Sexual Assault Prevention and Response 

(SAPR) Office and initiatives that emphasize our intolerance for sexual assault and 

related behavior in our Navy. We remain committed to helping our sailors balance 

work and family commitments through initiatives such as 12-month operational 

deferments for new mothers (the most comprehensive policy of all military services), 

21 days of administrative leave for adoptive parents, 10 days of paternity leave, a 

Career Intermission pilot program, and flexible work options. I continue to emphasize diversity outreach and mentorship to ensure we attract, leverage, and retain 

the diverse talent of our Nation. Diversity among U.S. Naval Academy and Navy 

Reserve Officer Training Corps (NROTC) applicants and graduates continues to 

grow each year. Through our Naval War College and Naval Postgraduate School, 

we are providing Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) and world-class 

higher education and training to our sailors. We continue to build our Foreign Area 

Officer program to strengthen existing and emerging international partnerships. 

Our fiscal year 2011 budget request represents a balanced approach to supporting 

our sailors and their families, sustaining the high tempo of current operations, and 

preserving fleet and family readiness. I request the continued support of Congress 

for our fiscal year 2011 manpower and personnel initiatives. 

Recruiting and Retention 

Our Navy has attracted, recruited and retained a highly-skilled workforce over 

the past several years, and we expect this success to continue into fiscal year 2011. 

Fiscal year 2009 marked the second consecutive year Navy achieved its aggregate 

officer and enlisted recruiting goals in both the Active and Reserve components. At 

the forefront of this effort is our highly trained and professional recruiting force, 

which has postured us to respond to changing trends. We continue to attract the 

highest quality enlisted recruits in our history. We are exceeding DOD and Navy 

standards for the percentage of non-prior service enlisted recruits who have earned 

a high school diploma and whose test scores are in the upper mental group category. 

We met the Navy standard of 95 percent of recruits with a high school diploma in 

fiscal year 2009 and are currently at 96 percent this fiscal year. We exceeded the 

Navy standard of 70 percent of recruits in the upper mental group category in fiscal 

year 2009 (77 percent tested into this group) and we are currently at 78 percent 

this fiscal year. 

Navy will remain competitive in the employment market through the disciplined 

use of monetary and non-monetary incentives. Using a targeted approach, we will 

continue our recruiting and retention initiatives to attract and retain our best sailors, especially those within high-demand, critical skill areas that remain insulated 

from economic conditions. Judicious use of special and incentive pays remains essential to recruiting and retaining these professionals in the current economic environment, and will increase in importance as the economic recovery continues. Our goal 

remains to maintain a balanced force, in which seniority, experience, and skills are 

matched to requirements. 

Diversity 

Our Navy draws its strength and innovation from the diversity of our Nation. We 

continue to aggressively expand our diversity. We are committed to implementing 

340 

policies and programs that foster a Navy Total Force composition that reflects 

America’s diversity. We have increased diverse accessions through targeted recruiting in diverse markets, developed relationships with key influencers in the top diverse metropolitan markets, and are aligning all Navy assets and related organizations to maximize our connection with educators, business leaders and government 

officials to increase our influencer base. Recruiting and retaining a diverse workforce, reflective of the Nation’s demographics at all levels of the chain of command, 

is a strategic imperative, critical to mission accomplishment, and remains focus area 

for leaders throughout our Navy. 

We continue to expand our relationships with key influencers and science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM)-based affinity groups to inform our 

Nation’s youth about the unique opportunities available in our Navy. To increase 

our accessibility to diverse markets, we established NROTC units at Arizona State 

University and Tuskegee University. Tuskegee University accepted students in the 

fall of 2009, and ASU will accept students in the fall of 2010. Our diversity outreach 

efforts have contributed to our 2013 U.S. Naval Academy and NROTC classes being 

the most diverse student bodies in our history. In the years ahead, we will continue 

to focus our efforts on retaining this talent by building and sustaining a continuum 

of mentorship approach that reaches out and engages sailors throughout their career. This approaches includes social networking, strong relationships with affinity 

groups, and various programs offered by our sailors’ immediate commands and associated leadership in addition to their respective enterprises and communities. 

Women on Submarines 

The Secretary of the Navy and I are in the process of changing the Navy policy 

that restricts women from serving aboard our submarines. This move will enable 

our Navy and, specifically, our submarine force to leverage the tremendous talent 

and potential of our female officers and enlisted personnel. Initial integration will 

include female officers assigned to ballistic missile (SSBN) and guided missile 

(SSGN) submarines, since officer accommodations on these submarines have more 

available space and appear to require less modification. The plan also integrates female supply corps officers onto SSBNs and SSGNs at the department head level. 

We are planning the first female submarine officer candidate accessions into the 

standard nuclear training and submarine training pipelines this year, making it 

possible to assign the first women to submarines as early as fiscal year 2012. Integration of enlisted females on SSBNs and SSGNs and integration of officer and enlisted female personnel on attack submarines (SSNs) will occur later, once the extent of necessary modifications is determined. This initiative has my personal attention and I will continue to keep you informed as we integrate these highly motivated 

and capable officers into our submarine force. 

Sailor and Family Continuum of Care 

We remain committed to providing our sailors and their families a comprehensive 

continuum of care that addresses all aspects of medical, physical, psychological, and 

family readiness. Our fiscal year 2011 budget request expands this network of services and caregivers to ensure that all sailors and their families receive the highest 

quality healthcare available. Navy Safe Harbor, Navy’s OSC Program, Reserve Psychological Health Outreach Program, Warrior Transition Program (WTP), and Returning Warrior Workshop (RWW) are critical elements of this continuum. 

Navy Safe Harbor continues to provide non-medical support for all seriously 

wounded, ill, and injured sailors, coastguardsmen, and their families through a network of Recovery Care Coordinators and nonmedical Care Managers at 16 locations 

across the country. Over the past year, Safe Harbor’s enrollment has grown from 

387 to 542. Over 84,000 sailors have participated in OSC training, which is providing a comprehensive approach designed to actively promote the psychological 

health of sailors and their families throughout their careers while reducing the traditional stigma associated with seeking help. The WTP and RWWs are essential to 

post-deployment reintegration efforts. WTP, established in Kuwait and expanded via 

Mobile Care Teams to Iraq and Afghanistan, provides a place and time for individual augmentees to decompress and transition from life in a war zone to resumption of life at home. The RWW identifies problems, encourages sailors to share their 

experiences, refers family members to essential resources, and facilitates the demobilization process. 

Stress on the Force 

As we continue to operate at a high operational tempo to meet our Nation’s demands in the Middle East and around the world, the tone of the force remains positive. We continue to monitor the health of the force by tracking statistics on personal and family-related indicators such as stress, financial well-being, and comVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:37 May 06, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00346 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\62155.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
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mand climate, as well as sailor and family satisfaction with the Navy. Recent results indicate that sailors and their families remain satisfied with command morale, 

the quality of leadership, education benefits, health care, and compensation. 

Suicide affects individuals, commands and families. We continue efforts at suicide 

prevention through a multi-faceted approach of communication, training, and command support designed to foster resilience and promote psychological health among 

sailors. Navy’s calendar year 2009 suicide rate of 13.8 per 100,000 sailors represents 

an increase from the previous year rate of 11.6 per 100,000 sailors. Although this 

is below the national rate of 19.0 per 100,000 individuals for the same age and gender demographic, any loss of life as a result of suicide is unacceptable. We remain 

committed to creating an environment in which stress and other suicide-related factors are more openly recognized, discussed, and addressed. We continue to develop 

and enhance programs designed to mitigate suicide risk factors and improve the resilience of the force. These programs focus on substance abuse prevention, financial 

management, positive family relationships, physical readiness, and family support, 

with the goal of reducing individual stress. We continue to work towards a greater 

understanding of the issues surrounding suicide to ensure that our policies, training, interventions, and communication efforts are meeting their intended objectives. 

Sexual assault is incompatible with our Navy core values, high standards of professionalism, and personal discipline. We have reorganized our efforts in this critical 

area under the Navy SAPR program, which takes a multi-faceted approach to raise 

awareness of effective prevention methods, victim response and offender accountability. Recent program reviews undertaken by the Government Accountability Office, the Defense Task Force on Sexual Assault in the Military Services, and the 

Navy Inspector General will help us to identify program gaps and refine our program so we can continue to promote a culture that is intolerant of sexual assault. 

Learning and Development 

Education and training are strategic investments that give us an asymmetric advantage over our adversaries. To develop the highly-skilled, combat-ready force necessary to meet the demands of the Maritime Strategy and the Joint Force, we have 

15 learning centers around the country providing top-notch training to our sailors 

and Navy civilians. We continue to leverage civilian credentialing programs to bolster the professional qualifications of sailors in all ratings and increase sailor equity 

in their own professional advancement. We are balancing existing education and 

training requirements with growth in important mission areas such as cyber warfare, missile defense, and anti-submarine warfare. Cultural, historical, and linguistic expertise remain essential to the Navy’s global mission, and our budget request supports expansion of the Language, Regional Expertise, and Culture program 

for NROTC midshipmen, as well as implementation of the AF–PAK Hands Program. 

We recognize the importance of providing our people meaningful and relevant education, particularly JPME, which develops leaders who are strategically-minded, capable of critical thinking, and adept in naval and joint warfare. Our resident courses 

at Naval War College, nonresident courses at Naval Postgraduate School and Fleet 

Seminar program, and distance offerings provide ample opportunity for achievement 

of this vital education. I appreciate the support of Congress in the recent post-September 11 GI Bill. We have led DOD in implementing this vital education benefit 

and continue to carefully balance our voluntary education investments to further develop our force. 

CONCLUSION

Our sailors are performing brilliantly, providing incredible service in the maritime, land, air, space, and cyberspace domains around the world today. I am optimistic about our future and the global leadership opportunities that our Navy provides for our Nation. Our fiscal year 2011 budget request continues the progress we 

started in fiscal year 2010 to increase fleet capacity, maintain our warfighting readiness, and develop and enhance the Navy Total Force. I ask for your strong support 

of our fiscal year 2011 budget request and my identified priorities. Thank you for 

your unwavering commitment to our sailors, Navy civilians, and their families, and 

for all you do to make our U.S. Navy an effective and enduring global force for good. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you so much, Admiral Roughead. 

General Conway. 

342 

STATEMENT OF GEN. JAMES T. CONWAY, USMC, COMMANDANT 

OF THE MARINE CORPS 

General CONWAY. Mr. Chairman, Senator Inhofe, and distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity 

to report to you on the posture of your Marine Corps. My pledge, 

as it has been over the years, is to provide you with a candid and 

honest assessment. 

Having recently returned from a trip to theater, I’m pleased to 

report to you on the magnificent performance of your marines and 

sailors in combat. If you count a 4-year enlistment as a generation 

of marines, we are now experiencing our third generation of great 

young patriots since our Nation was provoked on September 11. 

The first generation broke trail, leading strikes into Afghanistan 

and Iraq. The second generation quelled a once-violent province of 

Anbar. Today there are less than 150 marines in Iraq. But our 

third generation has more than 15,000 serving in Afghanistan. 

Your marines are fighting a skilled and determined enemy, but, 

with the Afghan Security Forces, they are once again proving they 

are the strongest tribe in the Taliban stronghold of Helmand. Let 

me assure you from what the Sergeant Major and I witnessed firsthand, the highest morale in the Corps resides in those units that 

are posted to Afghanistan. 

My written statement to the committee provides a snapshot of 

the Corps and describes our near-term focus, long-term priorities, 

and our vision of the future. That vision matches closely the results 

of the QDR. The Secretary of Defense seeks to create a U.S. military more closely focused on hybrid threats, yet capable of responding to a major-level contingency. That combination essentially describes the Marine Corps that we have built today, a Corps that 

we call a two-fisted fighter, able to perform equally well in a 

counterinsurgency or in a high-intensity combined arms fight. 

Our resource expenditures, moreover, reflect our dual, or swing, 

capacity. That is to say that 100 percent of Marine Corps equipment can be used in a hybrid conflict or in a major fight. Equipment procurement is indeed our primary concern as we look at the 

fiscal year 2011 budget and beyond. Our requirements for equipment density in Afghanistan and our resolve to reestablish our 

maritime prepositioned squadrons have driven equipment stocks to 

an all-time low in our operating forces at home station. The ability 

to perform and train for deployment and certainly the ability to respond to an unexpected contingency is at significant risk based on 

this increasing shortfall. 

Congress has promised us resources for reset and reconstitution, 

but increasingly we cannot wait for the guns to fall silent in Afghanistan for such an effort to begin. We ask for your help in this 

critical area. 

Our military construction (MILCON) accounts in the fiscal year 

2011 budget and the FYDP are sufficient to help maintain the 

promise we made to our marines that they’ll have quality living 

spaces while they’re home between deployments. One need only 

visit some of our major bases and stations to realize that we waited 

too long to begin the effort. 

Similarly, we believe that even in wartime we must continue a 

heavy emphasis on education of our officers and senior staff NCOs. 

343 

A strong reservoir of strategic and operational thinkers is a must 

on a sophisticated joint and combined battlefield. Therefore, a quality Marine Corps University with facilities to match our already 

world class student body, faculty, and curriculum is a major priority. We trust we will receive your fully support on our MILCON 

investments that will pay huge investments in the years to come. 

Ladies and gentlemen of the committee, I must admit my own 

surprise that our Marine Corps and their families have remained 

so resilient over these 9 years of conflict. They have been incredibly 

determined, loyal, and courageous in an effort to see these two 

wars to a successful close. Much of the credit goes to you in Congress for providing them with the finest in terms of equipment, 

warrior care, quality of life for families, and compensation. 

The number one question in the minds of our troops is always: 

Is the country behind us? The Members of Congress have answered 

that question in spades, both by your apportionment of the Nation’s 

precious resources and also through personal efforts to visit both 

the troops in theater and our wounded at Bethesda and Walter 

Reed. 

As a result of the above and the natural tendency of marines to 

stick around for a fight, our recruitment and retention are at alltime highs. I predict that for the second year in a row we will close 

out reenlistment opportunities for first-term and career force halfway through the fiscal year. Clearly, such a phenomenon would not 

be possible if marines and their families were not happy in the 

service of their country. 

One day this long war with terrorists and Islamic extremists will 

be over. Your Marine Corps will cease being a second land army 

and will gladly rejoin our Navy brothers aboard amphibious ships 

in order to project American global presence, demonstrate American good will, and if need be protect America’s vital interests. 

Until that day comes, however, your Corps will continue, as we 

say, to do windows. That is, we’ll continue to take aboard the indomitable youth of America and make them marines, with the absolute conviction that as a result they will one day be better citizens. We will be trained and as equally prepared to route Taliban 

fighters in Marjah as we are to feed beleaguered Haitians outside 

Port au Prince. 

With your continued support and that of our loyal countrymen, 

we will do whatever the Nation asks us to do and do it exceedingly 

well. 

Thank you, and I look forward to your questions, sir. 

[The prepared statement of General Conway follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY GEN. JAMES T. CONWAY, USMC 

Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, members of the committee, thank you for the 

opportunity to provide a written report for the record on the current posture of the 

Marine Corps. My pledge, as always, is to provide you with a candid and honest 

assessment. On behalf of all marines, their families, and our civilian employees, I 

want to thank you for your concern and continued support. 

This brief statement contains a summary of our near-term focus and enduring priorities, an update on your Marine Corps today, a discussion of the challenges we 

see ahead, and our vision of the future. In addition to any testimony you wish to 

receive from me, I have directed the Deputy Commandants of the Marine Corps to 

meet with you as individuals and members of your respective subcommittees, and 

to provide you any other information you require. Our liaison officers will also deVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:37 May 06, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00349 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\62155.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
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1 As of 23 December 2009. 

2 As of 1 December 2009, the percentage of marines on their first enlistment was 68.6 percent, 

and the number of marines with less than 1 year on active duty is 29,032. 3 Authorized end strength of 202,000 = 21,000 officers + 181,000 enlisted marines = 1:9. 

4 6.5 percent of DOD budget represents fiscal year 2010 USMC Green dollars and Direct Blue 

(Navy) dollars. 5This is consistent with the official Defense Department definition of an expeditionary force: 

‘‘An armed force organized to accomplish a specific objective in a foreign country.’’ Joint Pub 

1–02 Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Washington, DC: 

2001, as amended through 31 August 2005), p. 193. 

liver copies of 2010 U.S. Marine Corps Concepts and Programs to the offices of each 

member of the committee. This almanac and reference book contains detailed descriptions of all our major programs and initiatives. We hope you will find it useful. 

I. YOUR MARINE CORPS

We believe that Americans expect their marines to be ready to respond when our 

country is threatened; to arrive on the scene on short notice anywhere in the world 

via the amphibious ships of the U.S. Navy, as was necessary when a disastrous 

earthquake recently struck Haiti; and to fight and win our Nation’s battles. The 

public invests greatly in the Marine Corps. In turn, our commitment is to uphold 

their special trust and confidence and provide them the best return on their investment. 

Characteristics 

Your Marine Corps is a young force that provides great value to the Nation. 

• The average age of a marine is 25 years old. 

• Almost half of the enlisted force—84,830 marines—is between the ranks of 

private and lance corporal (pay grades E1–E3).1

• Almost 70 percent of your marines are on their first enlistment, and some 

30,000 have been in uniform for less than a year.2

• The ratio of officers to enlisted marines is 1:9—the lowest of all the Services.3

• More than 136,000 marines (67 percent) are in deploying units—what we call 

the Operating Forces. Nearly 30,000 marines are forward deployed, forward 

based, or on training exercises around the world. 

• For 6.5 percent 4 of the baseline 2010 Defense budget, the Marine Corps provides: 

• 17 percent of the Nation’s active ground combat maneuver units 

• 12 percent of the Nation’s fixed wing tactical aircraft 

• 19 percent of the Nation’s attack helicopters 

Expeditionary 

The Marine Corps is the Nation’s naval expeditionary, combined-arms force-inreadiness. To marines, expeditionary connotes fast, austere, and lethal. 

• Expeditionary means rapid deployment by air or sea to respond to crises of 

temporary duration. For example, within 24 hours of the speech by the President of the United States in December announcing the current strategy in Afghanistan, the lead elements of 1st Battalion, 6th Marines from Camp Lejeune, 

NC, were en route to Afghanistan. 

• Expeditionary means being efficient and effective while operating in an austere environment—a task-organized force that is manned and equipped no larger or heavier than necessary to accomplish the mission. 

• Expeditionary means being prepared for decisive action—to be lethal, if necessary—but also possessing the lesser-included capabilities for security cooperation, humanitarian assistance, or disaster relief. 

• In summary, the term expeditionary to marines goes to the very heart of our 

service culture, core values, and warrior ethos. Service as part of an expeditionary force means embracing a Spartan way of life and regular deployments 

on foreign soil in furtherance of our Nation’s interests.5

Organization 

The Marine Corps is the only general-purpose force in the Department of Defense 

(DOD) that is trained and equipped as the Nation’s first responders. 

• We organize in Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (MAGTFs). Under a single 

command element, the MAGTF integrates three major subordinate elements: (1) 

Ground Combat Element, (2) Aviation Combat Element, (3) Logistics Combat 

Element. Each element of the MAGTF is complementary, and Marine Corps 

345 

forces are most effective and best employed as MAGTFs within the joint or multinational command structure. 

• MAGTFs are adaptive, general-purpose rapid response forces. They are multicapable, transitioning seamlessly from fighting conventional and hybrid threats 

to promoting stability and mitigating conditions that lead to conflict. For example, in 2003, after completing a conventional, 350-mile attack over land from 

Kuwait to Baghdad, I Marine Expeditionary Force—a 60,000-marine-plus 

MAGTF—was able to transition quickly to security and stability operations. 

Near-Term Focus 

We understand the economic challenges facing our country and the hard decisions 

Congress must make. We thank you for your unwavering support. This report discusses the near-term focus of the Marine Corps: 

• The current fight in Afghanistan and the responsible drawdown in Iraq 

• Readiness and reset of equipment 

• Modernization of the MAGTF 

• Preparing for the next contingency and the uncertainties of the future 

Enduring Priorities 

Through the Future Years Defense Program and beyond, we are focused on: 

• Providing the Nation a naval expeditionary force fully prepared for employment as a MAGTF across the spectrum of operations 

• Remaining the most ready when our Nation is least ready 

• Providing for our marines and their families 

II. IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN

Operation Iraqi Freedom 

Since testimony before your committee last year, the Marine Corps has transferred authority for Anbar Province to the U.S. Army and is near completion of a 

responsible drawdown from Iraq. 

• From 2003–2009, our force levels in Iraq averaged 25,000 marines. 

• As of February 19, 2010, there were 159 marines in Iraq. By spring of this 

year, our mission in Iraq will be complete and your marines will redeploy. 

Operation Enduring Freedom 

In Afghanistan, the mission has expanded. 

• As of September 23, 2009, there were more marines in Afghanistan than in 

Iraq. 

• By March 2010, there will be more than 18,500 marines in Afghanistan, and 

by mid-April, that number will grow to a robust MAGTF of 19,400 personnel 

with equipment, and will be commanded by a Marine two-star general. 

• Your marines have already had success and have made a difference in some 

of the toughest regions of Afghanistan, primarily Helmand Province in the 

south—formerly a Taliban stronghold, and the source of the highest volume of 

opium production in the world. However, more work remains to be done. 

Summary 

• Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have required the Marine Corps to fight 

as a second land army. Although we have been successful in our assigned missions in Iraq and Afghanistan, that success has come at the price of degraded 

readiness for our designed missions. The Marine Corps will always do whatever 

the Nation requires. But, as Congress has authorized and resourced, the Marine 

Corps is trained, organized, and equipped for our primary mission as a force 

in readiness. 

• The harsh environments and tempo of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan 

through 8 years of combat have accelerated wear and tear on our equipment. 

The enemy’s weapon of choice—the improvised explosive device (IED)—has 

forced us to increase the weight of our personal protective equipment and the 

armor on our vehicles. 

• The distributed nature of operations has shown us that our legacy tables of 

equipment were inadequate. The required type and number of ground vehicles, 

radios, and other major end items of equipment have significantly increased. In 

our infantry battalions, for example, the number of tactical vehicles has almost 

doubled while the number of radio sets has grown sevenfold. Our preliminary 

estimates indicate that the cost of restructuring the Marine Corps’ tables of 

equipment would be $5 billion over fiscal year 2012 through fiscal year 2015. 

346 

• The amount of equipment that has been damaged, destroyed, or has reached 

the end of service life from accelerated use has increased, and the cost associated with fixing or replacing this equipment has increased significantly. 

• Based upon the Marine Corps current analysis, our estimated reset cost is $8 

billion. The $8 billion consists of $3 billion requested in the fiscal year 2011 

OCO and an additional long-term reset liability of $5 billion upon termination 

of the conflict. 

• Equipment on hand at home station to support training has been serious degraded. Particularly worrisome is our capacity to respond to other contingencies. 

• We are institutionalizing the lessons learned in Iraq and Afghanistan in 

training, education, organization, doctrine, and capability development. One of 

the ways we are doing this is through the Marine Corps Center for Lessons 

Learned. 

• The current operating environment in Iraq and Afghanistan has led to an exponentially increased need for intelligence collection assets down to lower levels 

of command. The Marine Corps Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance 

Enterprise provides support to the MAGTF in this operating environment by organizing all of the intelligence disciplines, sensors, and equipment and communication architecture into a single capability that is integrated and networked 

across all echelons. 

III. READINESS

1. Personnel Readiness 

Our people—the brave men and women who wear our uniform and the spouses, 

children, and the parents who support them—are our most valuable resource. In 

2009, your Corps lost 65 marines to enemy action in combat. We also lost 52 marines who died by suicide—this serious issue, which will be discussed later in this 

report, has my personal attention. 

End Strength 

Current authorized end strength is 202,100 marines in the Active component and 

39,600 marines in the Selected Reserve. 

• During fiscal year 2007, the Marine Corps requested and received authorization to grow 27,000 additional personnel by the end of fiscal year 2011. 

• We completed our growth during fiscal year 2009—2 years ahead of schedule. 

We attribute this to four factors: quality recruiting, exceptional retention, reduced personnel attrition, and a great young generation of Americans who want 

to serve their country during wartime. 

• With this personnel increase, we will improve training, upgrade readiness, 

and enhance the quality of life for all personnel and their families. The goal is 

to build the equivalent capacity of three Marine Expeditionary Forces—the largest MAGTF and principal Marine Corps warfighting organization. 

• We are continuing to shape the Marine Corps with the right mix of units, 

grades, and occupational specialties. 

Quality 

• Recruiting. In fiscal year 2009, we exceeded goals in numbers and standards 

for the Active component and the Selected Reserve. The Active component 

accessed 31,413 personnel, and the Selected Reserve accessed 9,627 personnel. 

In fiscal year 2010, our goal is to access 27,500 enlisted personnel in the Active 

component and commission 1,800 new officers. 

• Enlistment Standards. One of the DOD standards for new recruits is that at 

least 90 percent will possess a high school diploma. The Marine Corps has chosen to maintain a higher standard; our goal is a high school graduation rate 

of 95 percent. In fiscal year 2009, for our combined active and Reserve components, the high school graduation rate of our recruits exceeded 98 percent. 

• First-Term Reenlistments. In fiscal year 2009, 8,011 first-term marines reenlisted, meeting 109.2 percent of our goal. This represented a retention rate of 

33.7 percent, exceeding our traditional retention rate of 24 percent. In the first 

quarter of fiscal year 2010, 5,194 first-term marines have already reenlisted— 

77 percent of the goal for the entire year. 

• Subsequent Term Reenlistments. In fiscal year 2009, 7,985 marines who had 

completed at least two enlistment contracts chose to reenlist again. This number represented 107 percent of our goal and a 78.6 retention rate—the highest 

in history. In the first quarter of fiscal year 2010, 5,685 marines who had completed at least two enlistment contracts chose to reenlist again—82 percent of 

the goal for the entire year. 

347 

6 As of 3 January 2010. 

• Officers. The quality of officers accessed and retained remains high. In one 

example, the share of Marine-option U.S. Naval Academy candidates in the top 

third of their graduating class greatly exceeded representative levels in 2008. 

The number of Naval Academy graduates who chose to become Marine Corps 

officers last year was 270—the highest number in history for the second year 

in a row. 

• In fiscal year 2009, our officer retention rate was 93 percent and during fiscal 

year 2010, we expect officer retention to remain stable. 

Reservists 

The Marine Corps Reserve is a full partner in the total force. As of January 2010, 

there were 39,164 marines in the Selected Reserve and another 55,233 in the Inactive Ready Reserve. Marine Forces Reserve includes 183 training centers in 48 

States, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico. 

• The extensive contributions of the Reserve have reduced deployment requirements for the Active component, thereby improving the health of the total force. 

More than 54,000 marines from the Selected Reserve and the Inactive Ready 

Reserve have mobilized and deployed in support of Operations Iraqi Freedom, 

Enduring Freedom, or other operational commitments around the globe.6

‘‘Every Marine into the Fight’’ 

The majority of your marines joined the Corps after our Nation was already at 

war. They expect to train, deploy, and fight because that is what they believe marines are supposed to do. As such, the 2007 ‘‘Every Marine into the Fight’’ initiative 

adjusted personnel assignment policies so marines serving in nondeploying units or 

the supporting establishment would have the opportunity to deploy. At the same 

time, we monitor carefully the frequency and duration that units and individual personnel spend deployed. 

• To date, 73 percent of the available marines have deployed in support of Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom, or other operational commitments around the globe. 

• Individual Deployment Tempo. We measure individual deployment tempo on 

a 2-year sliding scale—the number of days deployed out of the previous 730 

days. In the last 7 years, we have seen a 20-fold increase in the individual deployment tempo of marines in the Active component. In October 2002, the number of marines who deployed for at least 120 consecutive days in a 2-year period 

was 4,845. As of January 2010, 100,760 marines had deployed for at least 120 

consecutive days. 

• Unit Operational Tempo. The metric we use to measure unit operational 

tempo is the ratio of ‘‘deployment to dwell’’—months deployed to months at 

home station. We limit the duration of deployments for units and individual marines to no more than 7 months for battalions and squadrons. Higher headquarters units deploy for 1 year. 

• Our goal is to achieve a 1:2 deployment to dwell ratio in the Active component and a 1:5 ratio in the Reserve component. Our Reserve units are currently 

operating at a ratio that more closely approximates a ratio of 1:4, while many 

of our Active component units, on average, are nearing the goal of 1:2 (see Table 

1). 

Table 1. MAGTF Unit Deployment to Dwell Ratios 7

MAGTF Element Average Ratio (Months Deployed : Months Home Station) 

Command Element ............................................................................... 1:1.43 

Ground Combat Element ...................................................................... 1:2.08 

Aviation Combat Element .................................................................... 1:2.11 

Logistics Combat Element ................................................................... 1:1.79 

7 As of 18 November 2009. 

• The subordinate units most frequently deployed are Intelligence Battalions, 

1:1.01 (Command Element); Infantry Battalions, 1:1.78 (Ground Combat Element); VMU Squadrons, 1:1.10, and Attack Helicopter Squadrons, 1:1.28 (Aviation Combat Element); and Explosive Ordnance Disposal Companies 1:1.30 (Logistics Combat Element). 

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Suicide Prevention 

The number of marines who have died by suicide in recent years is shocking and 

unacceptable. This issue has my personal attention, and we have multiple programs 

at work to reverse this trend. 

• Causes. Our studies have shown that regardless of duty station, deployment, 

or duty status, the primary stressors associated with marine suicides are problems in romantic relationships, physical health, work-related issues, such as 

poor performance and job dissatisfaction, and pending legal or administrative 

action. Multiple stressors are typically present in a suicide. This is consistent 

with the findings of the other services and civilian agencies. 

• Deployments. We analyze suicides monthly and annually for combat-related 

trends such as the number of deployments and dwell time. Although it is reasonable to assume that one or more deployments may cause an increase in suicides, to date, we have been unable to establish a direct correlation between deployments and suicides. 

Civilian Employees 

Civilian employees are a vital part of the Marine Corps. In fiscal year 2010, civilian Federal employees will number more than 25,000. Through initiatives in management and career development, the Marine Corps is dedicated to maintaining a 

civilian workforce with the leadership skills and technical competencies necessary 

to meet the challenges of today as well as those of the future. 

• Traditionally, civilian employees have served primarily in the supporting establishment. Now, more than ever before, they are deploying with the operating 

forces and serving in positions traditionally occupied by Active Duty marines. 

For example, we are in the process of hiring more than 260 tactical safety specialists, who will each rotate on deployments with the operating forces. We are 

also participating in DOD’s program to build a deployable Civilian Expeditionary Workforce. 

Families 

While we recruit marines, we retain families. More than 45 percent of your marines are married, and we believe that investing in military families is critical to 

the long-term health of the institution. When marines know that their loved ones 

at home station have access to quality housing, healthcare, child development services, and education, they are better prepared to face the rigors of deployment and 

more inclined to stay in uniform when they return home. 

• Family Readiness Programs. Our baseline budget in fiscal years 2010 and 

2011 for family programs is $399 million per year. We have reformed our family 

readiness programs at every level of command at all of our installations. As an 

example, we have created more than 400 full-time positions for family readiness 

officers down to the battalion and squadron level. 

• Child Care. Today, we are currently meeting 64 percent of potential need for 

child care spaces. To meet the DOD standard of 80 percent of potential need 

based on the current population, we would require approximately 3,000 additional spaces. With your support, we have programmed an additional 2,615 

spaces that will open over the next 18–24 months. 

• Families with Special Needs. With an increase of $11 million for the Exceptional Family Member Program in this year’s baseline budget, we have made 

great strides improving the programs that support special needs family members. Enrollment is now mandatory and more than 8,900 exceptional family 

members are in the program. The Marine Corps assigns a caseworker to each 

family, who assists during relocation, deployment, and life events. In addition, 

the Marine Corps now underwrites the cost of up to 40 hours of respite care 

per month for families in the program. To date, the Marine Corps has provided 

more than 250,000 hours of respite care. 

Wounded Warriors 

About 9,000 marines have been injured or fallen seriously ill while serving in support of Operations Iraqi Freedom or Enduring Freedom. We are deeply committed 

to their care as well as the welfare of their families. Since activation in April 2007, 

the Wounded Warrior Regiment has provided a wide range of nonmedical care for 

the injured and ill. The Marine Corps now also has wounded warrior battalions at 

Camp Pendleton and Camp Lejeune. 

• Infrastructure. The Marine Corps is investing $50 million from the 2009 

Overseas Contingency Operations supplemental for the construction of resource 

and recovery centers at Camp Pendleton and Camp Lejeune. These recovery 

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centers will provide spaces for counseling, physical therapy, employment support, financial management, and other training and outreach programs in support of our wounded. 

• Outreach. With a 24-hour call center for wounded marines and their families, 

the Wounded Warrior Regiment has contacted 99.4 percent of all marines (7,654 

out of 7,703) who were wounded since the beginning of Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom, in order to determine their health status. We also 

maintain a toll-free number to the medical center in Landstuhl, Germany, for 

families to contact their loved ones who have been wounded. 

• Recovery Care. The Marine Corps has 42 recovery care coordinators, who coordinate non-medical services for marines and their families during recovery, 

rehabilitation, and transition. 

• Mental Health 

• Traumatic Brain Injury. Naval medicine remains at the forefront of researching and implementing pioneering techniques to treat traumatic 

brain injury. One technique, Hyperbaric Oxygen Treatment, is showing 

great promise. We anticipate a study to begin this spring that tests the 

efficacy of this revolutionary treatment. The Marine Corps has a formal 

screening protocol for marines who suffer concussions or who are exposed 

to blast events in theater. 

• Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder. We are attentive to the mental health of 

our warriors and we are dedicated to ensuring that all marines and family members who bear the invisible wounds caused by stress receive the 

best help possible. We developed the Combat Operational Stress Control 

program to prevent, identify, and holistically treat mental injuries caused 

by combat or other operations. 

• With the increased workload, we do have concerns about the capacity of mental health care in military medicine. Operational support and current treatment 

facility demands continue to stretch our mental health professional communities, even though DOD has taken many steps to increase mental health services. Our shortages of mental health professionals are a reflection of Nationwide shortages of this specialty. We are actively engaged in discussions about 

possible solutions. 

2. Equipment Readiness 

We have sourced equipment globally, taking from non-deployed units and strategic programs to support our forces in theater. As a result, the amount of equipment remaining for non-deployed units to use for training and other potential contingencies is seriously deficient. 

• For example, while the overall supply rating of Marine Corps units in Afghanistan is near 100 percent, the supply rating of units at home station is less 

than 60 percent. 

• Additional equipment is being procured with supplemental funds, but the production rates are too slow to meet our requirements for new equipment orders. 

Equipment Reset 

As mentioned previously, the distributed and decentralized nature of operations 

in Iraq and Afghanistan has shown us that our legacy, 20th century tables of equipment are significantly inadequate. Moreover, the tempo of operations has accelerated the wear and tear on equipment. Also, the diversion of equipment in theater 

from Iraq to Afghanistan has delayed reset actions at our logistics depots in the 

United States. 

• Our preliminary estimates indicate that the cost of restructuring the Marine 

Corps’ tables of equipment would be $5 billion over fiscal year 2012 through fiscal year 2015. 

• In light of the continued high tempo of operations in Afghanistan, and the 

delay in reset actions due to the diversion of equipment in theater, we estimate 

the cost of reset for the Marine Corps to be $8 billion ($3 billion requested in 

the fiscal year 2011 OCO and an additional $5 billion reset liability upon termination of the conflict). 

Aviation Readiness 

All Marine Corps aircraft in support of overseas contingency operations are exceeding programmed rates, and are thus consuming service life at a rate sometimes 

three times higher than that scheduled for the lifetime of the aircraft. (See Table 

2.) This will eventually result in compressed timelines between rework and, ultimately, earlier retirement of the aircraft than originally programmed. 

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8Data as of 18 February 2010. To clarify any misperceptions, these are not the formal readiness percentages the Marine Corps uses in separate reports to Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Office 

of the Secretary of Defense, and Congress. The readiness percentages in those reports are a 

measurement against MARES reportable items, a more select range of equipment. 9Data as of 18 February 2010. 

• It is critical that our aviation modernization programs, discussed in the next 

section of this report, continue to receive the support of Congress. 

• The majority of our legacy platforms are at the end of their service life and 

most of the production lines are closed. 

Table 2. Fiscal Year 2009 USMC Aircraft Utilization Rates 

Overseas Contingency Operations 

Aircraft Average Age 

(Years) 

Programmed Rates (Hours/Month) 

OCO Rates 

(Hours/Month) OCO Life Usage 

AH–1W ........................................................................... 19 19.5 32.7 1.7x 

UH–1N ........................................................................... 35 21.7 30.0 1.4x 

CH–46E ......................................................................... 41 13.6 31.1 2.3x 

CH–53D ......................................................................... 40 23.8 50.3 2.1x 

CH–53E ......................................................................... 21 19.2 33.6 1.8x 

MV–22B ........................................................................ 3 20.9 29.4 1.4x 

AV–8B ........................................................................... 13 20.9 24.1 1.2x 

F/A–18A ........................................................................ 23 25.5 72.5 2.9x 

F/A–18C ........................................................................ 16 23.9 65.5 2.7x 

EA–6B ........................................................................... 27 26.4 66.0 2.5x 

Note: Programmed rates are defined in the Weapon System Planning Document and are based on the projected dates an aircraft will be replaced by a new platform or reworked to extend its service life. Programmed rates include monthly flight hours and the associated logistical 

support required for each aircraft. 

Strategic Prepositioning Programs 

• Marine Corps prepositioning programs trace their origins back 30 years, when 

the Iranian revolution, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Iraqi attack on 

Iran, and the deepening civil war in Lebanon collectively brought to the forefront the limitations of strategic airlift to respond to no-notice contingencies. 

The solution—the Secretary of Defense testified in 1980, and Congress agreed— 

was prepositioned combat equipment, ammunition, and supplies afloat on commercial vessels underway or docked in strategic locations. The Marine Corps developed three squadrons of maritime prepositioned ships and, in 1982, began 

prepositioning equipment and ammunition underground in Norway. 

• The first real test for these programs was in 1991, during Operation Desert 

Shield. In 2003, in Kuwait, the Marine Corps downloaded 11 vessels from all 

3 prepositioned squadrons and moved 648 principal end items from Norway in 

preparation for Operation Iraqi Freedom. Without this capacity, the Marine 

Corps would not have been able to move half of the entire operating forces— 

more than 60,000 fully equipped marines—halfway around the world for a 350- 

mile attack on Baghdad. 

• When completely loaded, Marine Corps prepositioning vessels today carry 

more than 26,000 pieces of major equipment including tanks, wheeled tactical 

vehicles, and howitzers, as well as the necessary supplies to support the force. 

• When measured against authorized allowances, the percentage of major item 

equipment (Class VII) currently present in the prepositioned fleet is 94 percent; 

the percentage of supplies currently present is in excess of 99 percent.8

• In Norway, the current percentage of on-hand major end item equipment 

(Class VII) measured against authorized allowances is 47 percent; the percentage of on-hand supplies is 78 percent.9

• It is important to note that these programs are not just a strategic war Reserve. Marine Corps prepositioning programs support forward-deployed training 

exercises and, along with the amphibious ships of the U.S. Navy, the steady 

state requirements of the combatant commanders. For example, using the 

equipment positioned in Norway, the Marine Corps provides security force assistance to partner nations in U.S. European Command and U.S. Africa Command. 

• In summary, Marine Corps prepositioning programs are vital to the Nation 

and they require the continued funding and support of Congress. 

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3. Infrastructure 

Bachelor Housing 

Our number one priority in military construction is barracks. In years past, due 

to fiscal constraints, we had focused on operational concerns. We now have a program under way that will provide adequate bachelor housing for our entire force by 

2014. Table 3 depicts Marine Corps fiscal year 2011 investment in new barracks. 

Table 3. USMC Fiscal Year 2011 Barracks Construction 

[In millions of dollars] 

Location Fiscal Year 2011 

Investment 

New Barracks 

Spaces 

Twentynine Palms, CA ............................................................................................................. $53.2 384 

Camp Lejeune, NC .................................................................................................................. 326.6 2,794 

Cherry Point, NC ...................................................................................................................... 42.5 464 

Camp Pendleton, CA ............................................................................................................... 79.9 860 

MCB Hawaii, HI ....................................................................................................................... 90.5 214 

MCB Quantico, VA ................................................................................................................... 37.8 300 

Total ............................................................................................................................... $630.5 5,016 

• The Marine Corps is committed to funding the replacement of barracks furnishings on a 7-year cycle and to funding the repair and maintenance of existing barracks to improve the quality of life of marines. 

Summary 

• Our equipment shortfalls are serious and the impacts on readiness have been 

significant. Our nondeployed units do not have the required amount of equipment they need to train or support other contingencies. Moreover, the harsh environments of Iraq and Afghanistan, the tempo of operations, and our employment as a second land army since 2004 has accelerated wear and tear on our 

equipment and delayed the reset activities necessary to prepare for the next 

contingency. 

• We estimate that the cost of restructuring the Marine Corps’ tables of equipment from fiscal year 2012 through fiscal year 2015 would be $5 billion and the 

cost to reset for the Marine Corps will be $8 billion ($3 billion requested in fiscal year 2011 OCO and an additional $5 billion reset liability upon termination 

of the conflict). 

• Iraq and Afghanistan have not adversely affected personnel readiness or the 

resiliency of the force. The Marine Corps continues to recruit and retain the 

highest quality people. Your marines want to make a difference; they understand being a marine means deploying and fighting our Nation’s battles. Indeed, the marines with the highest morale are those currently in Afghanistan. 

• The Marine Corps has achieved its goal of 202,000 active duty personnel and 

has done so with no compromise in quality. However, the Marine Corps has not 

achieved the correct mix of skills and paygrades. Continued funding will be 

needed to balance the force correctly. 

• Our personnel growth has outpaced our growth in infrastructure, and your 

continued support is needed to provide the additional barracks, messing, and 

office spaces required. 

IV. MODERNIZATION OF THE MAGTF

Our modernization effort is not merely a collection of programs but a means of 

aligning the core capabilities of the MAGTF across the spectrum of present and future security challenges. All of our procurement programs are designed to support 

the full range of military operations. 

The Individual Marine 

Marines are the heart and soul of your Corps. The trained, educated, and physically fit marine enables the Corps to operate in urban areas, mountains, deserts, 

or jungles. However, we are concerned about weight. Depending on the enemy situation, and including helmet, body armor, individual weapon, water, ammunition, and 

batteries, the weight of gear for a marine on foot-patrol in Afghanistan can average 

90 pounds. There is a delicate balance between weight and protection, and we continue to pursue the latest in technology to provide marines with scalable protection 

based on the mission and threat. 

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Tactical Vehicles 

The Marine Corps currently has a total ground tactical vehicle quantity of nearly 

47,500. Over the next 10 years, we plan to replace about 50 percent of that total. 

• We are planning, programming, and budgeting toward a balanced fleet of vehicles. Our chief considerations are mobility, survivability, payload, transportability, and sustainability. Our goal is a portfolio of vehicles that is able to support amphibious operations, irregular warfare, and operations ashore across the 

range of military operations. We envision a blend of Expeditionary Fighting Vehicles, Marine Personnel Carriers, Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles, 

and replacements for our High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles. 

• The Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV) is the number one modernization 

program in the ground combat element of the MAGTF. The requirements of the 

current and future security environment have driven the research and development of the critical capabilities associated with the EFV. The Marine Corps has 

not taken a myopic view of the EFV; we are well aware of the fiscal realities 

and developmental challenges associated with such a revolutionary vehicle. We 

are, however, convinced that national security demands the capabilities of the 

EFV and justifies the costs. This vehicle will save lives and enable mission success across an extremely wide, and highly probable, range of operational scenarios. 

Fire Support 

We are modernizing Marine Corps land-based fire support through a triad of 

weapons systems—a new and more capable 155mm howitzer, a system of land-based 

rockets, and a helicopter-transportable 120mm mortar. Each of these is extremely 

accurate. This accuracy is critical in counterinsurgency operations and irregular 

warfare because accuracy reduces the instances of civilian casualties and collateral 

damage to local infrastructure. 

• The Lightweight 155mm Towed Howitzer (M777) weighs about half of the 

cannon it is replacing and fires projectiles to a range of 15–19 miles. Our Marine Expeditionary Brigade in Afghanistan has 15 of these howitzers at 3 different locations, which have collectively fired more than 600 rounds since April 

2009. 

• The High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (M142 HIMARS) provides highvalue rocket and missile fire in support of ground forces. Each system carries 

six rockets or one missile. Like our new lightweight howitzer, HIMARS has 

proven itself over the past year in Afghanistan, delivering long-range precision 

fires. 

• The Expeditionary Fire Support System is a rifled 120mm mortar, internally 

transportable 110 nautical miles by both the MV–22 Osprey and the CH–53E 

helicopter. This will be the primary indirect fire-support system for helicoptertransported elements of the ground combat element. A platoon equipped with 

these new mortars recently deployed with the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit. 

Marine Aviation 

Marine pilots are naval aviators; they are trained to fly from the ships of the U.S. 

Navy or from expeditionary airfields ashore in support of marines on the ground. 

We are in the midst of an unprecedented modernization effort. By 2020, we will 

have: 

• Transitioned more than 50 percent of our aviation squadrons to new aircraft 

• Added 5 more operational squadrons and almost 100 more aircraft to our inventory 

• Completed fielding of the tilt-rotor MV–22 Osprey and the upgraded Huey 

(UH–1Y) utility helicopter 

• Updated our entire fleet of aerial refuelers to the KC–130J model 

• Fielded the upgraded Cobra (AH–1Z) attack helicopter and the Joint 

Strike Fighter (F–35B) 

• Fielded an entirely new family of Unmanned Aircraft Systems 

• Introduced a new model of the heavy-lift CH–53 cargo helicopter 

The Joint Strike Fighter 

The Marine Corps is on track to activate DOD’s first operational Joint Strike 

Fighter squadron in 2012. Although our investment in this program may seem high, 

it is important to note that the Marine Corps has not bought a fixed-wing tactical 

aircraft in 11 years, and that the Joint Strike Fighter will ultimately replace three 

different types of aircraft currently in our inventory. 

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• The short-takeoff and vertical landing variant (F–35B) of the Joint Strike 

Fighter will be transportable aboard the amphibious ships of the U.S. Navy; it 

will be able to operate under the same austere conditions as does the AV–8 

Harrier; it will be able to carry more bombs and loiter overhead longer than 

does the F/A–18 Hornet; and it will be a better electronic warfare platform than 

our legacy EA–6 Prowler. 

The Osprey 

We are very pleased with the performance of the tilt-rotor MV–22 Osprey. The 

Osprey provides greater speed, more range, and enhanced survivability compared to 

other rotary wing platforms. It flies more than twice as fast and carries three times 

the payload at more than six times the range of the medium-lift helicopter it is replacing. 

• Osprey squadrons have completed three successful deployments to Iraq and 

one aboard ship. One squadron is currently in Afghanistan. We are nearing delivery of our 100th operational aircraft, and at a current build of 30 Ospreys 

per year, we are replacing our CH–46E medium-lift helicopter squadrons at a 

rate of two squadrons per year. 

Logistics Command and Control 

Global Combat Service Support System—Marine Corps is the cornerstone of our 

logistics modernization strategy. 

• The program is a portfolio of information technology systems that will support 

logistics command and control, joint logistics interoperability, secure access to 

information, and overall visibility of logistics data. It will align Marine Corps 

logistics with real-world challenges, where speed and information have replaced 

mass and footprint as the foremost attributes of combat operations; it will replace 30-year old legacy supply and maintenance information technology systems; and it will provide the backbone for all logistics information for the 

MAGTF. 

V. VISION

The current transnational struggle against violent extremism will not end anytime soon. Other threats—conventional and irregular—will continue to emerge and 

the complexity of the future operating environment will only increase. As we look 

to the future, we believe we must refocus on our core competencies, especially combined-arms training and operations at sea with the U.S. Navy. 

2010 Quadrennial Defense Review 

We believe the report from the Quadrennial Defense Review offers an accurate 

and informed analysis of the challenges in the future security environment, particularly with respect to growing complexity of hybrid threats and the spread of advanced anti-access capabilities. 

• We concur with the overarching need for a comprehensive and balanced approach to national security—a whole of government approach. 

• We agree with the need for a U.S. military that is balanced in capabilities 

for irregular warfare and conventional conflict. For the Marine Corps, we have 

always believed in such a balance. Our equipment and major programs, and our 

means of employment as an integrated MAGTF, reflect our commitment to be 

flexible in the face of uncertainty. One hundred percent of our procurement can 

be employed either in a hybrid conflict or in conventional combat. 

• Finally, while our current focus is rightly on today’s fights, we believe it 

is critical that we do not underestimate the need to maintain the ability 

to gain access in any contested region of the world. 

Seabasing and the Navy-Marine Corps Team 

With oceans comprising about 70 percent of the Earth’s surface and the world’s 

populations located primarily on the coasts, seabasing allows our Nation to conduct 

crucial joint operations from the sea. 

• Seabasing is a capability and a concept. It is the establishment of a mobile 

port, airfield, and replenishment capability at sea that supports operations 

ashore. In effect, seabasing moves traditional land-based logistics functions offshore. 

• From the sea, U.S. forces will be able to conduct the full range of military 

operations, from disaster relief and humanitarian assistance to irregular warfare and major combat operations. Sea-based logistics, sea-based fire support, 

354 

and the use of the ocean as a medium for tactical and operational maneuver 

permit U.S. forces to move directly from sea to objectives ashore. 

• There are misperceptions that the United States has not conducted an amphibious operation since Inchon during the Korean War in 1950. Since 1982, our 

Nation has conducted more than 100 amphibious operations. For example, the 

Navy-Marine Corps Team has been on the scene in Bangladesh (1991), the Philippines (1991), Liberia (1996), and East Timor (1999). 

• After September 11, U.S. amphibious forces, from a seabase, led the first 

conventional strikes against the Taliban in Afghanistan. 

• In 2004, the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit was on station in Southeast 

Asia to support the relief efforts after the Tsunami. 

• In 2005, from a seabase in the Gulf of Mexico, the Navy and Marine 

Corps supported recovery efforts after Hurricane Katrina. 

• In 2009, off the coast of Somalia, when pirates boarded the Maersk Alabama, the 13th Marine Expeditionary Unit and the USS Boxer were on station to support the counterpiracy operations. 

• Last month, with Haiti’s airfield overwhelmed and their seaport disabled by 

wreckage following the earthquake, the USS Bataan Amphibious Ready Group 

and the 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit provided a significant and sustainable 

delivery of food, water, and other supplies without the logistical burden ashore. 

• Seabasing—Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF) Enhancements 

• Critical to seabasing are the logistics vessels of the Maritime 

Prepositioning Force. As discussed in the Long-Range Plan for Naval Vessels, we have restructured our Maritime Prepositioned Force (Future) program and will enhance the current capabilities of each of our three existing 

Maritime Preposition Force Squadrons. 

• One mobile landing platform (MLP), one Large Medium-Speed Roll-on/ 

Roll-off (LMSR) ship, and one Lewis and Clark-class (T–AKE) cargo ship 

will be added to each squadron of the MPF. 

• The MLP will interface with the LMSRs, which are being added to each 

MPF squadron from fiscal year 2009–2011, thus providing the capability to 

transfer cargo while at sea and making each MPF squadron highly responsive to demands across the full-spectrum of operations. 

• In summary, as the security environment grows more complex, so does 

the value of amphibious forces. 

Expeditionary Operations in the Littoral Domain 

The littoral domain is where the land and sea meet. This is where seaborne commerce originates and where most of the world lives. Littorals include straits—strategic chokepoints that offer potential control of the world’s sea lanes of communication. The Navy-Marine Corps team and the vitality of the amphibious fleet is critical 

to overcoming anti-access challenges in locations along the coastlines of the world 

where there are no American military forces or basing agreements. 

• The QDR emphasized the need for U.S. naval forces to be capable of robust 

forward presence and power projection operations, while adding capability and 

capacity for working with a wide range of partner navies. Amphibious forces are 

perfectly suited for engagement and security force assistance missions, as well 

as humanitarian missions such as are ongoing in Haiti. In short, the strategic 

rebalancing directed in the QDR places high demands on our amphibious forces. 

• Given the fiscal constraints facing the Department of the Navy, the Secretary 

of the Navy, Chief of Naval Operations, and I agreed that 33 amphibious ships 

represents the limit of acceptable risk in meeting the 38-ship requirement we 

established in a letter to the committee on 7 January 2009. 

• We currently have a 31-ship force in the U.S. amphibious fleet. The LongRange Plan for Naval Vessels projects a 33 ship amphibious inventory in the 

near-term. 

• With a robust inventory of amphibious ships the Navy-Marine Corps team 

will be able to: 

• Better address the growing steady state combatant commander requirement for theater security cooperation, forward presence, and crisis response. 

• Strengthen our Nation’s relations with allied and partner countries 

through peacetime engagement and training exercises. 

• Better ensure our Nation is ready to respond with humanitarian assistance when disaster strikes anywhere around the globe. 

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10Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR Report) (Washington, DC: Feb 

2010), p. xvi, 46. 11Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR Report) (Washington, DC: Feb 

2010), pp. 20–26. 12 Each year, the Marine Corps selects officers for the International Affairs Officer Program, 

which consists of two professional tracks: Foreign Area Officer (FAO), and Regional Area Officer 

(RAO). The International Affairs Officer Program provides graduate-level study and language 

training for nine geographic areas. There are 329 international affairs officers on active duty 

(262 FAOs, 67 RAOs). The officers in this program possess advanced knowledge and expertise 

in the language, culture, and political-military affairs of a given region. Since 2008, the Marine 

Corps has doubled the number of accessions in the FAO program, and accessions will continue 

to increase through 2015. Moreover, the Marine Corps provides mid-grade officers (major-lieutenant colonel) for the Afghanistan-Pakistan (AFPAK) Hands Program. Our current requirement 

is to provide 63 officers—3 cohorts of 21 officers each. 13The Marine Corps also has a separate, voluntary graduate education program, through 

which officers attend Naval Postgraduate School and other secondary institutions to obtain advanced degrees. There are 300 officer billets in the Marine Corps that require master’s degrees. 

The Marine Corps also maintains an active fellowship program. 14DOD, QDR, p. 76. 

• In the event of major conflict, improve our response time to gain theater 

access with combat forces without having to rely on basing agreements with 

foreign governments. 

• Finally, to clarify any misperceptions about the numbers of amphibious ships 

cited in the 2010 QDR Report, those numbers of ships are neither shipbuilding 

requirements nor targets; they are simply statements of the amphibious ship 

numbers across the fiscal year 2011–2015 Future Years Defense Program.10

Training, Education, and Professional Development 

• ‘‘Two-Fisted Fighters.’’ The QDR Report calls for increased counterinsurgency 

capacity in the general purpose forces of the United States.11 The Marine Corps 

has long recognized the special skills required to operate with host nation forces 

and among local populations. Evidence of this dates back to the Marine Corps 

publications of Small Wars Operations (1935) and the Small Wars Manual 

(1940), both comprehensive texts on counterinsurgency operations and irregular 

warfare. Today, through standing Marine Corps organizations such as the Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning and the Center for Irregular 

Warfare, and programs such as the International Affairs Officers Program, we 

continue to build capacity in foreign language, and regional and cultural 

skills.12

• Leadership Development. We recognize the need for a diversity of skills and 

specialties, and our standing guidance to promotion, command, and special selection boards is to give due consideration to personnel with special skills and 

nontraditional career patterns. 

• Marine Corps University. Annually, a percentage of Marine Corps officers 

from the rank of captain through colonel attend year-long resident courses in 

professional military education at Marine Corps University in Quantico. The 

Marine Corps University is regionally accredited to award postgraduate degrees 

and, in 2009 alone, University schools awarded 200 master’s degrees.13

• Facilities are an integral part of supporting professional military education. 

To that end, the Marine Corps fiscal year 2011 military construction budget request includes funding for additions in Quantico to the General Alfred M. Gray 

Research Center and the Staff NCO Academy. These projects will support our 

plan to upgrade the infrastructure of the Marine Corps University. 

• Acquisition Professionals. The Marine Corps has an active acquisition professional program in place to meet the need identified in the QDR ‘‘for technically 

trained personnel—cost estimators, systems engineers, and acquisition managers—to conduct effective oversight.’’ 14 There are about 520 acquisition billets 

in the Marine Corps—400 are entry and mid-level positions filled by enlisted 

marines and officers, and 120 are senior-level acquisition professional positions 

filled by field grade officers who oversee our major ground and aviation programs. Our acquisition professional officers are members of the Defense Acquisition Community; they possess Level II certification, 4 years of acquisition experience, at least 24 undergraduate credit hours in business. 

Future Realignment of Marine Forces in the Pacific 

The Governments of the United States and Japan have agreed to invest in a realignment of forces that will result in Marine Corps forces postured in the Pacific 

for a long-term presence on Japan, Guam, and Hawaii. Critical requisites to the implementation of this realignment are: 

356 

• Japanese construction of a replacement for Marine Corps Air Station 

Futenma that meets both operational and safety requirements. 

• An appropriate force laydown that supports the operational requirements of 

the Commander, U.S. Pacific Command. 

• Adequate available airlift and sealift within theater to transport marines to 

training areas and partner countries. 

• Adequate training areas and ranges in Guam and the Northern Mariana Islands that can maintain readiness as well as support security cooperation with 

our regional partners. 

• An enduring, sustainable ‘‘live where you work,’’ base on Guam that maximizes operational effectiveness, minimizes encroachment, accommodates future 

development, and provides a quality of life on Guam commensurate with any 

other U.S. base. 

• Continued political and financial support by the Governments of the United 

States and Japan. 

Refined planning and staff interaction processes within DOD have made significant contributions to our efforts to align these requirements. Planned and executed 

properly, this realignment effort will result in an enduring solution that provides 

forward deployed combat ready Marine forces to uphold our Nation’s commitment 

to the security and stability of the Pacific region. 

Energy and Water Initiatives 

We believe energy and water are two of our Nation’s most valuable resources. We 

are focused on improving our stewardship at our installations and on the battlefield. 

• Our Installations. We have already gained efficiencies and achieved savings 

at all our major installations. We have three major goals: 

1. From 2003–2015, reduce energy consumption by 30 percent 

2. Through 2020, reduce water consumption by 2 percent per year 

3. By 2020, increase the use of alternative energy at our installations to 

50 percent of the total energy consumed 

• On the Battlefield. Operations in Afghanistan have forced us to reevaluate 

energy and water distribution and usage in expeditionary environments. We believe the future security environment will again require the Marine Corps to operate over long distances in austere environments, and we are actively pursuing 

a wide range of solutions to: 

• Lighten the combat load of our marines and sailors 

• Reduce our overall footprint in current and future expeditionary operations 

• Lessen energy consumption and dependence on fossil fuels 

• Achieve resource self-sufficiency in expeditionary environments 

CONCLUSION

As a naval expeditionary force in the form of an elite air-ground team, the Marine 

Corps is ready and willing to go into harm’s way on short notice and do what is 

necessary to make our country safe. America expects this of her marines. In the 

complex and dangerous security environment of the future, the Marine Corps stands 

ready for the challenges ahead. We appreciate the continued support of Congress. 

Thank you again for this opportunity to report on the posture of your Marine Corps. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you so much, General. We can’t thank 

you and your marines enough for what they are doing in Afghanistan and other places around the world. It was an eloquent statement. We’re appreciative. 

I want to talk to you, not just about our marines, but also about 

the Afghan forces that they’re fighting with and how well that’s 

working out. We heard from ISAF the other day that there are five 

brigades of Afghan Security Forces that are part of Operation 

Moshtarak, and we want to know from you if you can tell us, based 

on what you understand, just what your assessment is as to whether or not the Afghan army particularly is in the fight. 

We heard from Marine General Nicholson that the Afghan forces 

are not cosmetic, but what is your assessment? 

357 

General CONWAY. Sir, first of all, it’s in their blood to fight. They 

have a warrior culture and so that gives you good raw material to 

draw from. There are issues with regard to educated young men in 

Afghanistan to lead. But our experience is, at least at this point, 

at the lower levels when you join an Afghan infantry unit you have 

fighters at your flank. 

That has been our experience now in the early days of the assault onto Marjah. Not as many as we would like, but more than 

perhaps we saw when Marine forces were first introduced, before 

the President’s decision on the 30,000. 

I am concerned, as you noted in your opening statement, sir, 

about the number of trainers and the ability to raise the Afghan 

forces that will be needed to one day turn the country over to them 

and walk away. But I’m also optimistic that as we help to bridge 

that effort and as the Army trainers and perhaps NATO trainers 

become more available to us that that will be something that we 

will be able to accomplish. 

Chairman LEVIN. I forgot to announce that we’ll have an 8- 

minute first round. 

Are the Afghan forces and the Marine Corps jointly coordinating 

planning and conducting the operations? 

General CONWAY. We are, sir. There’s an Afghan brigadier general who’s quite a charismatic character, who has brought his officers into the planning sessions, and we’ve been very satisfied with 

their tactical acumen and their ability to lead their forces. 

Actually, we have taken partnering to a new level, to the degree 

that we have actually integrated Afghan units into our company 

and platoon formations. As the Sergeant Major and I arrived at 

Dwyer, we witnessed some of the rehearsal activity that was taking 

place with both Afghan and U.S. units for the helicopter-borne assaults that kicked off the first day of Marjah, and they were knitted closely together. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you. 

Mr. Secretary and Admiral, I want to hear a little bit more detail 

about the readiness and maintenance concerns. We added some 

funding last year. It was not appropriated, and so I want to ask 

you about the impact of not receiving last year’s unfunded maintenance requirements. What would be the effects on naval readiness 

if you do not receive support for the unfunded aircraft and ship 

depot maintenance requirements that you’ve identified in the fiscal 

year 2011 budget? 

Mr. MABUS. As the CNO pointed out in his opening statement, 

the Navy resets in stride. Our O&M budget is essentially our reset 

budget and it allows the Navy to make sure that our ships reach 

the end of their operational life, that they are ready for any eventuality that comes along. 

We have requested a fairly substantial increase in operational 

maintenance funds for this year and we think that they are crucial 

to keeping Navy readiness at the place it should be. If we receive 

the funds that we have requested, we will have 99 percent of our 

depot maintenance for ships, 100 percent for deployed aircraft, and 

96 percent for nondeployed aircraft. 

The unfunded requirements that you talk about, we would be un- able to do nine ship depot availabilities totaling about $35 million. 

358 

For the aircraft, we’d be unable to do about 21 aircraft and 240 engines, the overhaul and upgrade. So that would be the result of not 

receiving that 

Chairman LEVIN. Admiral? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Yes, sir. To follow on with the Secretary, it 

is ensuring the current readiness of today, that the systems are up, 

that the necessary repairs have been done, so that we can stay in 

the deployment cycles that are part of what we do as a Navy. It’s 

also about getting those ships to the end of their service lives so 

that we can realize the force structure that we need. If we’re not 

doing the maintenance on them today, they’re not going to live as 

long as they normally would. 

It also gets to the ability to train in the way that we’ve planned 

to train. If the ships aren’t ready to go, we can’t get out and do 

the training. Similarly with the aircraft. So that it begins to have 

an effect on the competencies of our people. So it all adds together, 

and that’s why we made the move to increase the percentage as we 

did this year. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you. 

We’re going to be facing the issue of the Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell 

(DADT) law and what actions, if any, should be taken in this year’s 

authorization bill or otherwise. Secretary Gates testified earlier 

this month along with Admiral Mullen. Secretary Gates said that 

he’d appointed a high-level working group to review the issues associated with properly implementing a repeal of DADT law and policy, and Admiral Mullen testified that he’s in complete support of 

Secretary Gates’s position, both professionally as our top military 

officer, but also personally. 

Secretary Mabus, let me first ask you and then I’ll ask your colleagues, what are your views on DADT? Should we repeal it and, 

if so, what process should we follow in any event? 

Mr. MABUS. Since DADT is the law, whatever happens resides in 

Congress. I support the repeal of DADT. I do think the President 

has come up with a very practical and workable way to do that, 

to work through the working group that the Secretary of Defense 

has set up to make sure that we implement any change in the law 

that Congress makes in a very professional and very smooth manner and without any negative impacts on the force. 

Chairman LEVIN. Has that working group been appointed? 

Mr. MABUS. Yes, sir. It’s headed by Jeh Johnson, the General 

Counsel for DOD, and General Ham, the head of U.S. Army Europe. 

Chairman LEVIN. Admiral Roughead? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Yes, sir. The DADT is the law and that will 

be a matter for Congress to change or not change, and clearly we 

will abide by that law. 

I think the path that has been laid out is extremely important 

to be able to perform the assessment that the Secretary has called 

for, because there are comparisons made to other navies, there are 

comparisons made to other forces, there is a lot of anecdotal information, none of which really addresses the current force that we 

serve in today. I believe it is important to assess that force, the 

opinions of that force, and also the families, because we as a Navy, 

as a military, have made our families part of who we are in ways 

359 

that other services have not, other countries have not. The assessment is extremely important and we are fully supportive of that, 

and we have our very best people assigned to that group that is 

being led by General Ham and Jeh Johnson. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you. 

General Conway? 

General CONWAY. Sir, my professional perspective, first of all, is 

that our Commander in Chief has spoken and the Secretary of Defense has a way to examine, based on data and gathering of perspectives from the force, just how we should proceed. My personal 

opinion is that, unless we can strip away the emotion, the agendas, 

and the politics and ask, at least in my case, do we somehow enhance the war-fighting capabilities of the United States Marine 

Corps by allowing homosexuals to openly serve, then we haven’t 

addressed it from the correct perspective. At this point, I think that 

the current policy works. At this point, notwithstanding the results 

that the study will bring forward, my best military advice to this 

committee, to the Secretary, to the President, would be to keep the 

law such as it is. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much. 

Senator Inhofe. 

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I appreciate that answer very much. 

In your opening statement—and this goes both for the Navy and 

the Marine Corps—right now you have some 30,000 marines deployed, less than 20,000 in the theater of Iraq and Afghanistan. At 

a time when the Navy and the Marine Corps are being called on 

to project presence in more parts of the world than ever before, I 

see an unacceptable growth in the risk of the force. 

When you take into consideration what’s happening right now— 

and I could read the whole list of the strike fighter shortfall that’s 

going to reach a peak of 263 aircraft by 2017. We’re looking at a 

lot of the resources dropping down. Would you want to talk about 

a risk assessment? I would say both to Admiral Roughead and 

General Conway, what would the risk assessment be right now in 

light of the operational tempo and the lack of resources that are 

out there? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. With regard to our risk, as I said in our 

opening statement, Senator, we are trending towards significant. 

It’s not that the total force is at risk, but that we have some pockets where it would be a challenge for us to swing those capabilities. 

For example, our SEABEES are heavily engaged, our explosive ordinance disposal is heavily engaged, our SEALs are heavily engaged. 

We have taken our maritime patrol aircraft that normally are optimized for anti-submarine warfare, but because of the systems 

that we have on them they are extremely effective in the over-land 

fight and the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance mission, and so we essentially have that fleet committed to the fight, 

appropriately so. 

So there is risk should there become a maritime campaign of 

being able to swing those types of assets. But, the fleet response 

plan that we have in place makes us more flexible than we ever 

360 

have been. Still there are some pockets where we do have some 

risk. 

Senator INHOFE. The reason I bring this up, General Conway— 

I’ve talked to you about this before. One of the problems I have in 

these posture hearings when they come to Washington, you hear a 

lot rosier of a scenario than you do when you go out in the field 

and you talk to people in the field. I guess a lot of that’s because— 

and I’m talking about everyone up here—when we go out to Iraq, 

Afghanistan, or Djibouti or any of the other areas, you hear more 

about the problems than how good things are. 

So I always appreciate it if you can be as open as possible. That’s 

why I think using the term, what would the risk assessment be, 

high, low, and so forth, that’s a good way to approach it during 

these hearings. Any thoughts on that, General Conway, as far as 

your feelings? 

General CONWAY. Sir, as I tried to provide in my opening statement, we do have serious concerns actually. Our priority, the Secretary of the Navy’s priority, is that marines at the front of the 

spear increasingly in Afghanistan will have everything they need 

in order to be able to win that fight. But in the process, we’re taking away from our capabilities elsewhere. 

At this point, we’re at about a 60 percent readiness factor with 

regard to equipment in our home station forces. Should there be a 

requirement for marines to flow elsewhere, we could be in some serious straits. We would hold what we have in Afghanistan, perhaps 

call on our Reserves, use our Maritime Prepositioning Squadrons 

(MPS) equipment, and all those things. So we could get the job 

done, but it would not be nearly as elegant. 

Senator INHOFE. Yes. Aren’t you using a lot of your resources, 

though, over there that otherwise you’d use in training? 

General CONWAY. Absolutely, 100 percent of what is required in 

theater, 60 percent of what’s available in home station. That’s an 

imbalance I’m uncomfortable with. 

Senator INHOFE. I think that’s significant. The Marine Corps are 

famous for not complaining about anything. They’re the only Service that has retreads. Is that still true now? 

General CONWAY. Yes, sir. 

Senator INHOFE. You’re not complaining, right? 

Let me just ask on another line. I’ve been active in Africa for 

many years in things not even related to defense. But, when we 

made a decision to go and become active in Africa right after September 11, I think that was the right thing to do. We’re working 

on brigades there to help train or have the Africans train the Africans and we’re assisting, so that as the squeeze takes place in terrorism and some of this terrorist activity goes down through the 

Horn of Africa and Djibouti that they’ll be ready to do a lot of 

things. 

I was also one that was very active in pursuing the idea of taking the continent of Africa, that was in three commands, and putting it in one command, U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM). I think 

that was good. I only wish that we were actually down in Ethiopia 

or someplace instead of up in Germany for the headquarters, but 

that’s a political problem in Africa and I understand that. 

361 

Admiral, because of the piracy and all these problems that are 

going on, not just in the area in East Africa, but what’s happening 

in the Gulf of Guinea and around there, what is your activity and 

what contribution are you making to some of those coastal African 

nations? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Yes, sir. Thank you, and Africa has been an 

area of focus for us. We are the only Service that has a four-star 

component commander that addresses Africa. 

Senator INHOFE. Yes. I was over there and I visited with them 

just recently. 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Yes, sir, and I think that has paid great 

dividends. 

Clearly, we’re working with several other navies on the counterpiracy operations in the Gulf of Aden and off the coast of Somalia, 

and that has had some additional benefits of bringing many people 

together that otherwise normally wouldn’t be—Russia, China, us, 

the European Union, and NATO. But we’ve also very aggressively 

taken on this idea of Africa partnership stations. Initially we began 

in the Gulf of Guinea and on the west coast of Africa, but we now 

are operating an Africa partnership station on the east coast of Africa. 

Most recently, the Gunston Hall, the ship that was on its way 

over to be the West Africa partnership station, we sent to Haiti. 

The staff was already embarked, African officers who participated 

directly, actively, and effectively in that Haiti relief operation. So 

that actually enhances how they’re able to come along. 

We’ve also reached out to South Africa. I’m the first CNO to have 

visited there. We have had an aircraft carrier visit there for the 

first time and also one of our nuclear submarines was welcomed 

there. 

So we’re looking at the west coast. We’re working with the navies 

there, maritime strategic, humanitarian assistance, but also just 

bringing the navies of Africa together in a constructive and a very 

focused way so that we can get to some of the issues that are going 

to be important for their development. 

Senator INHOFE. Yes, because I know that on the west side 

around the Sea of Guinea some of the finds and the oil activity and 

all of that, that’s increased your activity and I know it’s draining 

a lot of resources. 

General Conway, I visited your marines in Djibouti and other 

areas down there. What’s your activity down there? 

General CONWAY. Sir, we think that Africa is going to be tremendously important to our country in the long term, and so at this 

point I think it’s fair to say we’re doing what we can. My agreement with General Ward, the Commander of AFRICOM, is that we 

substantially are going to take a rain check at this point. We will 

work with our brothers in the Navy and we’ll go inside the continent where we need to to try to accomplish some of his smallerscaled engagement opportunities. 

I would, at this point, like to tout our Reserves because they are 

carrying the preponderance of that load. They are stepping up and 

volunteering, coming on duty to do some of these things at a time 

when our Active Forces are simply engaged in the transition to go 

back now to Afghanistan. 

362 

So I would say at this point, sir, we appreciate the importance. 

We want to be players in the long term and we’re doing what we 

can. 

Senator INHOFE. I appreciate that. It’s kind of the forgotten continent. People talk about other areas and they don’t talk about Africa as much. But you guys are doing a great job there. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Inhofe. 

Senator Lieberman. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Secretary, Admiral, General, thank you very much for your 

extraordinary service to our country. 

I don’t have any questions about DADT, but I do really want to 

respond to the answers that you gave Senator Levin, which I appreciate, I think were thoughtful and honest. I want to make two 

comments about them. General Conway, I agree with you that ultimately the question of what we do about DADT has to be held to 

the standard of military readiness. I’m supportive of repealing 

DADT. I believe it’s the fair and right thing to do. But in the end, 

because we are fulfilling our constitutional responsibility to provide 

for the common defense, as you are and those who serve with you 

are, this has to pass the test of military readiness. 

I believe it will, based on my knowledge of what’s happened in 

other militaries, including those like the Brits and the Canadians 

that we serve alongside today in Afghanistan and Iraq. I visited Afghanistan in January. There is a British general, General Carter, 

who our forces serve under the direction of, and it seems to work 

very well. 

But I want to say that I agree with that and I think it’s important that all of us go forward in that way. This has to pass the test 

of military readiness. In fact, I hope that repealing DADT will enhance military readiness, but that’s yet to be determined as the 

study goes on. 

The second thing that gives me confidence about this, and it’s a 

factor that’s hard to weigh prospectively, but we can acknowledge 

it retrospectively, which is exactly the sense of duty and honor that 

characterized your answers. This is the law. If the law changes, the 

military will follow it. If the Commander in Chief takes a position, 

the military will make it work. 

That’s been the history of the military, taking us through some 

transitions within the military that seemed very hard when they 

were first mentioned. That too, which I wanted to express my appreciation for, is what gives me confidence that on the day this 

happens and the repeal occurs that there’s an intangible factor 

here that will make it work, which is that the leadership will say 

that, these are our orders now from Congress, from the Commander in Chief, and now we have to make it work and make it 

work for the benefit of our military, our country, and every individual who serves in our military. 

So I thank you for what you said. I look forward to working with 

you on that. 

I want to go back now to the Navy, Mr. Secretary and Admiral, 

and to say that I’m glad to see that this year’s budget and the 30- 

year shipbuilding plan includes an SSBN–X, the new generation of 

363 

strategic deterrence submarine. This is the program that will provide a replacement for the Ohio-class submarines that have so ably 

defended our Nation since 1981. 

Admiral, I note that the 30-year shipbuilding plan states that the 

requirement for SSBNs will be reassessed in the Nuclear Posture 

Review (NPR). I understand that the requirements-building process 

for our strategic deterrence submarines is classified, but I think it 

is also important, to the extent that we can in an open setting, that 

we explain to the public that they’re not made of whole cloth. In 

that sense, I want to ask you the specific question: Could you describe, to the degree you can in public session, the significance of 

having a fully operational SSBN force and what risks could result 

from a reduction in that force? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Thank you very much, Senator. For fear of 

being a little parochial on that line, there’s no question that as we 

look at our strategic triad, all important to be sure, but that the 

true stealth of our SSBN force in my opinion makes it the most 

survivable leg of the triad. It is also a leg that we can move, that 

we can protect through its stealth and through its movement in 

ways that the other legs don’t enjoy. 

The SSBN–X that we are in the process of designing, its last patrol will be in 2080. 

So the importance of getting the design done properly and thoroughly and thoughtfully is absolutely key to ensuring that that 

very survivable leg of the triad remains almost to the end of the 

century. If that capability were not to exist, it would not be in the 

best security interest of the Nation. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Is it fair to say, Admiral, that assuming we 

make progress in some of the nuclear reduction negotiations we’re 

in with the Russians and perhaps more broadly and the number of 

our nuclear warheads goes down, that the importance of the strategic nuclear fleet goes up because of its survivability? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. I do believe that the importance does increase. I also think it is important to understand that the number 

of submarines that we need are not strictly based on the number 

of warheads, but rather where you want the submarines to be to 

provide that continuous coverage, and that also is a driver of the 

number. It’s where you put them and the rotation that they’re on. 

So those two things come into play and it’s not simply about the 

number of weapons. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Well said. 

Secretary, do you want to add anything to that? 

Mr. MABUS. Just that in order for us to field the SSBN–X on 

schedule to replace the Ohio-class that now is when we have to do 

the design work, the engineering work, and we have to begin building the first of those boats in 2019. We tried this year in the 30- 

year shipbuilding plan to be very realistic in terms of costs of each 

ship and in terms of historically what Congress has appropriated 

for our total shipbuilding budget and putting the SSBN–X in our 

core budget was part of that realism. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thank you for that answer. 

Admiral Roughead, we have a perennial favorite here that seems 

to blossom for our committee every year and that’s the question 

about the alternate engine for the JSF. When you were asked 

364 

about an earmark to develop an alternate engine for the JSF last 

July, you said that space on an aircraft carrier is at a premium. 

I note that in your prepared statement which you gave to the 

committee for this hearing you say that continued development of 

an alternate engine would ‘‘increase our risk in the underlying JSF 

program.’’ 

Could you draw out those two statements and tell us what your 

feeling is today as we go forward with this battle again? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Yes, sir. My position on the alternate engine 

is based on the operational needs that we have in the Navy and 

the constraints that we face, not just on our aircraft carriers, but 

JSF will also be in our large-deck amphibious ships and they are 

even more challenged space-wise than our carriers are. 

One can look at a carrier and see a very large ship, but when 

that ship is deployed we have things packed in almost every nook 

and cranny in order to provide that reliability and responsiveness. 

So having to stock two different types of engines is just not practical for us. 

The costs associated with the alternate engine in my opinion 

would simply continue to pressurize a program that is already 

being pressurized for a variety of reasons. So from the perspective 

of the Navy and the support that I render to the Marine Corps and 

their JSF, the best course of action for us and my recommendation 

has been and will continue to be one engine, because that’s what 

serves us the best. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. I appreciate it. Thank you. 

My time is up. I just want to say finally, General, that when I 

went to Afghanistan in January and was able to spend some time 

with General Larry Nicholson and the marines—and I just want to 

validate what you said. The morale is very high. The interactions 

with the Afghan forces are exemplary. It’s really inspiring to see, 

and I thank them and thank you. 

General CONWAY. Thank you, sir. I’ll pass your comments along. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Lieberman. 

Senator Sessions. 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I thank each of you for your service. 

I’m disappointed to have to raise the subject I’m going to raise 

with you, Mr. Secretary, but I just feel no alternative to it. Some 

might say you’re worrying about a parochial interest, but the LCS 

is a part of our Navy’s future, as Admiral Roughead and his predecessors have all committed to. Fifty-five of those ships are expected 

to be built and we’re getting close to having a bid on it. 

You would agree, I assume, that when you draft a request for 

proposal (RFP) it should be fair, give each party a fair opportunity 

to succeed, and properly set standards that serve the interest of the 

Navy and the warfighter. I guess you do. So I would take that as 

a yes. 

I’m concerned about it. In October 2009, you made a speech at 

a Naval Energy Forum in which you said, ‘‘We have to change the 

way we award contracts. The lifetime energy costs of a building or 

a system and the fully-burdened costs of fuel in powering those will 

be a mandatory evaluation factor when awarding contracts.’’ That 

makes sense to me. 

365 

Then later, at the Press Club in September 2009, you say, ‘‘We 

no longer have the luxury to say this is a good deal today, let’s buy 

it. We have to get our arms around the life cycle.’’ 

In your testimony today you talk about having half the Navy’s 

fuel from alternative sources by 2020. I will just say, that’s a costly 

decision. I don’t know that that’s necessary as a policy decision for 

the Navy. It’s just going to deny other money for other areas. But 

I would note that you’re correct to focus on energy costs, and one 

way to save energy is not use so much, to use less. 

So you said in your remarks today, ‘‘I have also committed the 

Navy and Marine Corps to consider energy as a mandatory evaluation factor in contracting and to consider as an additional factor in 

our business dealings the energy footprint of the companies that 

sells to the Navy and Marine Corps.’’ 

As you and I have discussed, I have to ask you publicly: How is 

it that in this combat ship, this new transformational littoral ship, 

that we have a factor capping the life cycle costs, apparently all life 

cycle costs, not just fuel use, at 3 percent? Isn’t that too small? 

Could it be a mistake and will you reevaluate it? 

Mr. MABUS. Thank you, Senator. As we discussed, the whole idea 

behind the LCS was a total ownership cost for the lifetime of the 

ship—the crew size, the type of weapons, and the maintenance 

costs that would be involved. All these things for both variants are 

an important determinant for deciding to build the LCS in the first 

place. 

We believe that the way the RFP is written is an absolutely level 

playing field, and is an absolutely fair way to pick the down-select. 

Senator SESSIONS. Does it meet your standard that you announced last October that the lifetime energy cost will be a mandatory factor? You have to fully and fairly evaluate the lifetime energy costs, do you not? 

Mr. MABUS. Sir, we believe that the way the RFP is written, the 

lifetime energy cost will be fully and fairly—— 

Senator SESSIONS. All right. What if it becomes clear that the 3 

percent factor for total lifetime cost that you’ve apparently capped 

in this RFP is not a fair evaluation of the lifetime energy cost? 

Would you be willing to reevaluate it? 

Mr. MABUS. I believe, based on everything we know today, that 

the way the RFP is written and the only reason we down-selected 

or made the decision to down-select the one variant was because 

the bids came in at an unsustainable level for each variant prior, 

that we are considering everything that involves total ownership 

costs for each of those variants. 

Senator SESSIONS. I know the cost was high, and I think you’ve 

gotten all the bidders’ attention. If they can’t submit a competitive 

bid, then they don’t need to be selected. But when you set up the 

criteria for the bid, don’t you think it should adequately reflect the 

lifetime fuel consumption costs of the vessels involved? 

Mr. MABUS. I believe that the RFP that we did does do that, yes. 

Senator SESSIONS. So the answer is yes. Would you not agree 

that cost should not be the only factor, that value for the 

warfighter, capability, should be also adequately considered in the 

bid process? 

366 

Mr. MABUS. Our major concern is for capability and value to the 

warfighter. However, we have determined through the first two 

ships of each of these variants that either will give us the capability that we need and will give us high value for the warfighter. 

Senator SESSIONS. That worries me, because you say these are 

the only things we care about. For example, the ship that would 

be built in Alabama can accommodate two helicopters, they can 

land without a tether. The other ship can only account for one and 

that has to be tethered to bring the helicopter down. It has substantially more cargo space. It uses less fuel. It cruises, I think 

we’ll establish, with greater stability. 

So if the prices came in exactly the same and one ship had greater potential or even if one was slightly more expensive than the 

other one, should you not be sure to give some credit for that, rather than just say both meet minimum requirements? 

Mr. MABUS. I think both meet far more than minimum requirements. They meet all our requirements, each one of the variants 

do. 

Senator SESSIONS. Are you saying that you should or should not 

give credit for what might be a substantial additional capability? 

Mr. MABUS. I think that both variants have shown that they 

meet not only minimum requirements, but all the requirements 

that the Navy has established for these ships. Both are excellent 

competitors. As you pointed out, we have not received any bids yet. 

Senator SESSIONS. You can have two good automobiles, but if you 

want to carry some cargo and one has a larger luggage compartment and it costs $50 more and it has other capabilities that you 

need like cruise control or some things, I think you should give 

credit for that. 

But regardless of that, I want to ask you again: Are you saying 

that even if there is shown to be a RFP that fails to meet your stated goal and the logical goal—this is a good goal; you’re correct to 

say this—that the lifetime energy cost must be a mandatory evaluation factor, and if this RFP fails to adequately do that would you 

consider changing it? 

Mr. MABUS. Well, I do believe that the RFP does do it. 

Senator SESSIONS. I know you said that, but if there’s some rare 

possibility that there was an incorrect accounting and maybe a slip 

of the typewriter and it wasn’t written quite right, would you be 

willing to change that? 

Mr. MABUS. At this point in the RFP process, Senator, we’re expecting bids in. Based on our view or the analysis that we have 

done previously on the two ships that we have, and on the projected use of those ships, frankly, it’s unclear if either has an advantage on energy consumption over the lifetime. 

Senator SESSIONS. I think you should fairly evaluate it. I certainly agree with that, and you should rigorously analyze and compare the fuel savings that each claim to have. 

I would just note that the Air Force tanker aircraft in their second RFP changed the lifetime fuel costs, which they calculated rigorously, from 25 years to 40 years, raising it even to a greater 

level. You count the entire lifetime cost of this ship at 3 percent 

and I think that’s so far beyond the actual relevant factors that it 

really needs to be evaluated. I’m disappointed to have to spend this 

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time raising that, but you want the best ship for the Navy and we 

don’t want to have an RFP that does not get you that, along with 

a competitive price. 

Thank all of you. General Conway, we appreciate your marines. 

They’re doing such a fabulous job. Admiral Roughead, I appreciate 

your service. You know this Navy so well and I appreciate that. I 

thank you, Secretary Mabus. 

Mr. MABUS. Thank you, Senator. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Sessions. 

Senator Reed. 

Senator REED. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, gentlemen, for your testimony. 

Mr. Secretary and Admiral Roughead, the Secretary of Defense 

announced that women will be allowed to serve on submarines. 

Can you give us an idea of when that will happen? How long will 

it take to do the preparation, and what significant steps do you feel 

we have to make to accommodate that decision, Mr. Secretary? 

Mr. MABUS. The preliminary timeline that we have set forth 

shows that if we get women into the pipeline to serve on two of our 

classes of submarines, SSBNs and SSGNs, coming out of this year’s 

class, and we take them through the normal nuclear power training and normal submarine training, the first women will be on submarines late in fiscal year 2011. 

We think that we’ve learned a lot from integrating women into 

our surface ships almost 20 years ago and that those lessons are 

very applicable today. Some of those lessons are that you need a 

critical mass of women on a crew, and for that reason we want to 

put enough women on each submarine. It also is important to have 

more senior women or a more senior woman officer on each submarine to act as mentors for the new people coming in, and so 

we’re looking at bringing supply corps officers as department heads 

on these first tours. Once these first tours are completed, the 

women that came into the submarine force as ensigns will have the 

experience to be those department heads. 

Finally, the reason for choosing the SSGNs and SSBNs to be the 

lead ships that we integrate women into is that neither would require any structural modification to allow those women officers to 

be integrated into the force. 

Finally, one of the lessons that we learned and one of the things 

that we are going to do in this integration is to make sure that any 

questions are answered by the force, any questions are answered 

by the families, and that we are very open and transparent about 

exactly how we’re doing this. 

But we think this is a great idea and that it will be done very 

smoothly and very professionally and that it will enhance our 

warfighting capabilities. 

Senator REED. Admiral Roughead, any comments? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. We have a very good plan. We have great 

interest. We’re ready to go. The first young women will come 

aboard at the end of 2011. 

Senator REED. Thank you. 

General Conway, let me also join my colleagues in commending 

your marines who are fighting so aggressively and effectively today 

and doing a remarkable job, as they always do. Let me look at anVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:37 May 06, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00373 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\62155.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
368 

other issue, though. In the fiscal year budget you’re restructuring 

the Maritime Prepositioned Force for the future. In that restructuring, will that still allow you to move to an offshore location and 

conduct operations without any intermediate land base or adjacent 

land base? 

General CONWAY. Yes, sir, it will. We still have as the core element of the Maritime Prepositioned Force three brigades of equipment that are embarked aboard the collective of ships. The Maritime Prepositioned Force Future, which will allow us to do sea basing in the aggregate, is still under development and that will take 

some years to bring to pass. 

But in the meantime, we have a steady and resilient capability 

at about 44 percent these days of supply availability, and we consider that in some ways very much a national Reserve. 

Senator REED. Going forward, are your plans taking into consideration what has become typically the more heavy and larger vehicles that the Marine Corps is using, because of the limitations on 

some of the ships? 

General CONWAY. Yes, sir, we are. Frankly, some of those vehicles won’t fit aboard our ships, and so it is a cause for concern. We 

don’t want the Marine Corps of the future to be the Marine Corps 

that we have today, for instance in Afghanistan or that we saw in 

Iraq. We need to cut it back. We need to shed weight. We need 

modular kinds of concepts so that if we do go static we can add 

armor protection for our troops or those types of things that a requirement might cite. 

But in the meantime, our definition of expeditionary is fast and 

austere, and those things call for us to be much lighter than we 

are today. 

Senator REED. Is there a parallel discussion of different types of 

equipment in the future that would make you lighter? 

General CONWAY. Yes, sir. The Joint Light Tactical Vehicle is a 

classic example of that. We emphasize the light. Our partner in it 

is the Army. They’re not quite as concerned about it as we are. We 

are concerned about the additional weight of the helicopters that 

we’re going to see and what it does to center of gravity on our Lclass ships, those manner of things. 

So it’s something that we keep a constant eye on, sir, and try to 

keep curtailed to the degree that industry can support us. 

Senator REED. Thank you. 

Admiral Roughead, I want to associate myself with the comments 

of Senator Lieberman about the wisdom of including the SSBN development. But also in that area of undersea warfare, there is a renewed emphasis on unmanned sub-surface vehicles and sub-surface 

operations. Can you give us an idea of the development of some of 

those systems, where you stand and where you’re going? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Yes, sir. I mentioned in my opening remarks 

that we’ve done a reorganization within my headquarters that has 

given us a much better focus and effort into unmanneds. Unlike 

the other Services, we in the Navy are the only ones that will be 

exploring the underwater effort. We have some very interesting 

concepts. We’ve made a prototype deployment of some of those systems. It’s clear to me that the area that we have to spend most of 

our effort in is in power. A lot of folks will want to hang a new 

369 

sensor of some kind on these vehicles, but we have to get to the 

power issue. That’s where we are focusing ourselves. That’s where 

we are encouraging our labs to look, to get into that. We have run 

some experiments out in the Pacific with some unmanned concepts 

that I find not only very exciting, but I’m very optimistic as to 

where we can take those. It has my full attention. 

Senator REED. Thank you. 

The QDR called for a new air-sea operational concept for the Pacific theater of operations, beginning with the review obviously. 

Can you give us some indication of how you propose to conduct that 

review and who will the participants be, and in general terms how 

do you go forward? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Yes, sir. That review is already under way. 

We began bringing the group together from the Air Force and the 

Navy, and the Marine Corps is also included because of the air 

power that they also generate. The groups have been formed and 

we are working our way through the various scenarios. 

I’ll be getting an update here from them very shortly. I think it’s 

a great opportunity for us to look, not only at the airborne systems, 

but the networks that are involved, and we are well underway. We 

started before the QDR was published. 

Senator REED. So we can assume there’s a cyber dimension in 

this review of significance? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. My direction to my team was if you’re not 

talking about networks it’s not going to pass the test. 

Senator REED. Thank you very much, gentlemen. 

Thank you. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Reed. 

Senator Wicker. 

Senator WICKER. Thank you very much. 

I appreciate the testimony of all three witnesses. Secretary 

Mabus, I think you will agree with the members of this committee 

that you are well served by the two gentlemen on your right and 

left. 

Mr. MABUS. It gives me an incredible feeling of comfort and security to be surrounded by the CNO and the Commandant. 

Senator WICKER. Right, and the committee and country are well 

served by them also. 

Let me just follow up on the DADT questions. Secretary Mabus, 

I understand your position. It’s very straightforward. Yesterday 

with Secretary McHugh, Senator McCain asked a question about 

whether there was any discussion pending the survey of attitudes 

that’s being done of a moratorium on the current DADT enforcement. Have you been a part of any discussion that enforcement actions might be suspended pending a final decision? 

Mr. MABUS. No. 

Senator WICKER. Secretary Mabus, in the Navy are there some 

discharges and actions pending at this time? 

Mr. MABUS. Senator, I don’t know how many are pending. 

There’s usually a small number each year. I don’t know what’s 

pending today. 

Senator WICKER. But from the information that you have, the 

law, as it currently is, is going to be enforced until such time as 

370 

the survey is completed and the law is changed; is that your understanding? 

Mr. MABUS. Until such time that the law is changed, we will follow the law. 

Senator WICKER. All right. Then let me ask you, Admiral 

Roughead. You said something about comparisons to other navies 

and anecdotal information. I wonder if you could just briefly explain what you were getting to there? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Yes, sir. The surveying and the attitudes of 

the U.S. Navy have never been formally sensed or assessed. There 

is often discussion about how other services and other countries 

have implemented homosexual service into their navy, army, air 

force, or whatever it may be. But while I have high regard for those 

other Services, they are not us. They do not come from our culture. 

They do not come from the beliefs that the young men and women 

bring into the service. We have to be able to assess our force and 

judge what our force believes and what the attitudes within our 

force are. That’s why this assessment is so important, and not use 

surveys from other militaries and other countries. 

Senator WICKER. I thank you for clarifying that statement. 

I want to ask about the cost as it relates to changing requirements. I’ll ask that question with regard to our amphibious ships. 

I think I’ve had the conversation with both the General and the 

Admiral about the well deck aspect. For those within the sound of 

my voice who don’t know, a well deck is a hangar-like deck located 

on the waterline on the back of some amphibious assault ships, and 

by taking on water the ship can lower its stern, flooding the well 

deck and allowing boats and amphibious landing craft to dock with 

ships. 

We just completed at Northrop Grumman the LHD–8. That ship 

has a well deck. Now, the next two ships will not have a well deck, 

the LHA–6 and, as I learned at last year’s hearing, most emphatically the LHA–7 will not have a well deck. I think it’s fair to say 

that General Conway wishes that those did have a well deck. Then 

the follow-on ship, the LHA, will indeed have a well deck again. 

Now, we’re told that on the two ships where it was eliminated, 

that the decision was made to enlarge the hangar space to accommodate the F–35 and the V–22 Osprey, so the well deck was eliminated. 

If the design continues to change, gentlemen, isn’t it fair to say 

that this is a significant cost driver? We’re interested in commonality and the use of common hulls, and I would simply submit 

that this is going to be a cost driver and it’s regrettable. Would either one of you like to comment on this? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Yes, sir. In fact, the Marine Corps and the 

Navy have periodic warfighter talks. This was one of the topics 

that we discussed just last week. There were decisions made in 

years past about the configuration of the big-deck amphibs and, as 

was pointed out, the weight, the volume of the equipment has 

changed, and the interest in going back to the well deck design is 

something that was a topic. 

In order to get into looking in that redesign, there is a cost associated with it, and then the cost of redesign. Depending on when 

we do it, that cost can change, and I have committed to the ComVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:37 May 06, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00376 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\62155.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
371 

mandant that we’re going to take a very hard look at this as we 

go into our 2012 budget to see how that can best be done to support 

the needs of the Marine Corps. 

General CONWAY. I would only complement the CNO’s answer, 

sir, to say that we’re operating at risk with the numbers of 

amphibs that we have. It’s our view that those that are at sea 

ought to have the maximum flexibility possible for whatever the 

mission might require. Ergo, our desire to have well decks on ships 

after the two that you referenced. 

We also would like to have that ship in the 2016 budget because 

we will need it for purposes of putting MEUs to sea and that type 

of thing. So as the CNO said, we’re going to look at it from a business case perspective, analyze the costs against the timeline, and 

hopefully make a very good decision. 

Senator WICKER. Let me ask you about the requirement for 38 

amphibious ships, as opposed to the QDR recommendation for an 

amphibious fleet of 29 to 33. It is the testimony of both the CNO 

and the Commandant that a 33-ship amphibious fleet represents 

the limit of acceptable risk. So let me ask you this: What is the risk 

of going below 33 and are you willing to take issue publicly with 

the possibility in the QDR of 29, 30, 31, or 32? What are your 

major concerns about going below 33 amphibious ships? 

General CONWAY. Sir, I think what the QDR reflects is the 5- 

year program on out, and the numbers are below 33 at that point. 

There is then obviously additional risk. I think, to give it perspective, though, you did acknowledge the agreement that we have 

with the CNO on what we actually see as the requirement, what 

that risk number is in and around 33. 

If you look at the 30-year shipbuilding plan, it sort of runs a sine 

wave. At one point we build to as many as 36. So I think you have 

to look at it perhaps from a larger perspective, realize that we also 

want a strong and balanced fleet out there supporting our amphibs 

and that there are cost drivers. 

So would we like more? Of course. Are we fiscally realistic at this 

point? I’d like to think we’re also that. 

Senator WICKER. Admiral, is the 31 an acceptable risk? What is 

the risk? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. I think the Commandant and I are in agreement—that 33 is a risk that we believe is acceptable now, because 

if you don’t have that number then the speed and the amount 

which you can flow becomes questionable. So, as the Commandant 

mentioned, it is a question of balancing the many shipbuilding demands that we have and building the fleet that is balanced and 

gives us the broadest capability, and 33 is acceptable. 

Senator WICKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Wicker. 

Senator Akaka. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to say aloha to our esteemed panel of leaders here today. 

First, I would like to thank each of you for your dedicated service 

to our country. I also want to commend the military and civilian 

men and women of the Navy and Marine Corps for their outstanding service and thank their families for the support of their 

loved ones. 

372 

The proposed fiscal year 2011 budget highlights the Department’s priorities of prevailing in today’s war, preparing for a wide 

range of contingencies, and managing its most precious resource, 

its people. 

I was pleased to hear the Department of the Navy has agreed to 

fund a study that will address the health concerns from drinking 

water contamination at Camp Lejeune. I look forward to the results. I see this as a positive step to help determine the true scope 

of the problem and the number of people affected. I will include 

questions for the record on this matter. 

Secretary Mabus, I’m very interested in collaboration between 

the Services and the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). Of note, 

the Department has worked with the VA on the physical disability 

evaluation system pilot program and the virtual lifetime electronic 

records system. Mr. Secretary, how are you addressing the challenges of creating a virtual lifetime electronic record system? 

Mr. MABUS. Thank you, Senator. I think it goes without saying, 

but I want to repeat, that our care for our veterans, and particularly our wounded warriors, is the most important thing that we 

do. We have an obligation to those who have borne the battle and 

who have come back to us wounded, to do everything that we can 

to make whatever transition they have to make whatever transition they have to make as smooth as possible. 

The things that we are doing on the subject that you talked 

about, in Chicago, for example, we’re putting together VA and 

Navy medicine in one place, so that there’s one stop for everyone 

to go to, Navy, Marine Corps, and veterans. 

You talked about the single physical and mental evaluation. That 

pilot program is ongoing at our six largest personnel installations. 

We are ready to extend that and make it permanent, and we’re 

working very closely with the VA to do that. 

Similarly, on the lifetime electronic records we’re moving forward 

to make sure that every servicemember and everyone who has 

served will have that, so that there will be a seamless transition 

between service and back to the community or service and back to 

the unit. 

I’ve been with the Commandant to Bethesda, and the Commandant makes one statement and that is, to every marine: If you 

want to stay a marine, regardless of your wounds, we’ll find a place 

for you in the Marine Corps. While there are a lot of different decisions made by our wounded warriors as they progress through rehabilitation as to whether to continue in the Marines or the Navy 

or to go back to their community, the idea that they are welcome 

as a marine has a very powerful impact, I think, on those young 

men and women who have been wounded. 

Finally, in terms of employment, one of the things that we are 

working very hard on and that we’re proud of is we just had an 

employer conference for our wounded warriors to allow those who 

have decided to rejoin their communities, go back to the civilian 

world, that they’ll have a job when they get there. We should be 

able to help them make sure that they have a good job waiting for 

them when they finish their rehabilitation process. 

373 

I will end as I began, which is there is no more important thing 

that we do than to care for our veterans, and particularly our 

wounded warriors. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you for your response. 

Admiral Roughead, to ensure mission success the Navy must 

have shipyards that are modern, flexible, and safe. The Navy’s public shipyards play a vital role in keeping the fleet operating to meet 

the significant challenges posed all over the world. In June 2009, 

the Navy reported a shortfall of $1.3 billion in sustainment, restoration, and modernization projects at its four public shipyards. 

Admiral, how is this shortfall affecting current and future Navy 

readiness and how is the Navy addressing this situation? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Sir, when we look at our accounts for our 

public shipyards, which are extraordinarily important to us as a 

Navy, but also for all of our shore infrastructure, and we set what 

the shortfalls are, that is a figure that we use to take us to the 

very highest level of everything that is there. Obviously, as we 

work our way through the budgets and deal with the many issues 

that we have there will be a difference between absolute perfection 

and that which we bring our facilities to. But I can assure you that 

the mission capability and the safety, especially the safety aspects 

of our shipyards and our facilities, are provided for, and we value 

that capability and we ensure that we have funded to deliver on 

that safety and mission capability. 

Senator AKAKA. Admiral, I’m glad to hear that the Naval Academy’s current freshman class is the most diverse in the history of 

the great institution. I believe that diversity is a real strength. Organizations that are diverse are able to use to their advantage 

many different views and perspectives. I understand that diversity 

is a very important issue for you. 

Can you share with us your views in this area and how you’re 

approaching diversity in the senior levels of the officer, enlisted, 

and civilian ranks? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Thank you, Senator. I would also add that 

not only did we achieve the most diverse class at the Naval Academy, but our Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) class was also 

the most diverse, simply because we have had a much more aggressive outreach program and have really attracted many, many 

bright young men and women to the Navy, and I’m very proud of 

what we’ve done. 

But it’s more than just those who are coming in, it’s looking at 

the leadership that we have currently. What I do periodically with 

the leaders of the various specialty areas within the Navy is to sit 

down with them individually leader to leader, not a staff function, 

and go through where their underrepresented minorities are serving, the types of jobs that they have, the types of educational and 

experiential opportunities that we’re providing them, because we 

know that in order to be selected for promotion there are certain 

experiences that are valued. 

This is not a quota system. This is not a goal, but rather we ask 

if we are bringing the bright young leaders of the future along and 

putting them in positions and giving them the experiences that 

they need. We do that routinely. As I mentioned, we’ve just recently created an Information Dominance Corps. Last week I did 

374 

my first review of that group, and it allows us to look at how we’re 

developing that leadership. You’re right, sir; it’s a very high priority for me. 

Senator AKAKA. Let me ask General Conway for any further comments on this. 

General CONWAY. Sir, my answers again are significantly the 

same. It starts with a strong young cadre of diverse officers that 

can go through the traditional assignments that will allow them to 

prosper and grow, and we’re seeing that. We have two battalions 

attacking in Marjah. One of them is commanded, for instance, by 

a very capable young black officer who just is representative of 

what we’re seeing increasingly in our Corps all the way through 

the general officer ranks. So the process works. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Akaka. 

Senator Collins. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thanks to each of you for your service. I was pleased that my 

friend and colleague Jack Reed raised the issue of women serving 

on submarines. Actually, I wasn’t pleased, because I wanted to be 

the first to raise that issue. But it was good to hear your testimony 

that you do not see significant costs in reconfiguring submarines to 

allow women to serve. I view this as creating more opportunity for 

women in the Navy to go through the ranks. I just want to start 

by commending you for that decision. 

Admiral Roughead, in your testimony you indicated that the 

DDG–1000 program has recently triggered a Nunn-McCurdy 

breach. For the record, I just want to clarify my understanding 

that this breach is solely due to the decrease in quantity from 10 

to 3 DDG–1000s, as opposed to any dissatisfaction with the performance of Bath Iron Works, which is slated to build all 3 of the 

DDG–1000s. Is that correct? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. That’s correct, Senator. It’s pure mathematics. Fewer ships and the math triggers the breach. We’re in the 

process of complying with the requirement to make the certifications that are necessary. But it’s a mathematical issue and, as 

I’ve been able to say on many occasions over the last couple of 

years, the program is extremely well run by very, very fine people. 

Of course, we know the great work that comes out of Bath and look 

forward to that. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. 

Secretary Mabus, that’s your assessment as well? 

Mr. MABUS. Yes, it is. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. 

Secretary Mabus, Congress has previously strongly supported the 

Navy’s two previous uses of multi-year procurements for the DDG– 

51 shipbuilding program. What we found is that multi-year procurements have tended to reduce acquisition costs, they have led 

to more stability in the workforce among our dual-source shipbuilding industrial base, and that too has contributed to reduced 

acquisition costs. 

The Navy is proposing in its FYDP to procure a total of six 

DDG–51 destroyers over 4 years between fiscal year 2012 and fisVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:37 May 06, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00380 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\62155.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
375 

cal year 2015 at alternating procurement rates of one or two ships 

per year. Now, prior to the restart last year of the DDG–51 program the Navy had procured the most recent DDG–51s in two successive 4-year multi-year procurements, and I would note that previous studies have found that the most efficient procurement level 

necessary to meet force structure requirements and maintain production efficiency is to do three DDG–51s a year. 

Has the Navy decided on an acquisition plan for procuring these 

ships? Are you looking at doing multi-year procurements, which 

could help you reduce the costs? 

Mr. MABUS. In any procurement program that we do, we look at 

all the alternatives, including multi-years. There are, as you are 

well aware, certain thresholds that a multi-year has to reach and, 

because the DDG–51 line, as you pointed out, was restarted last 

year, we have not had sufficient ship numbers to make a decision 

and to do the certifications necessary of whether a multi-year will 

save us the requisite amount of money or not. 

Senator COLLINS. I would encourage you to take a close look at 

that approach, which has been used successfully in the past. 

Mr. MABUS. Thank you. 

Senator COLLINS. Admiral Roughead, you have said strongly and 

repeatedly that you view 313 ships as the minimum for our fleet, 

and indeed there was a draft version of the QDR which suggested 

that the Navy might request a minimum level of 324 ships. In any 

event, 313 is the number that you’ve consistently testified is necessary. 

Recently the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) gave testimony 

before the House subcommittee in which it cast doubt on whether 

the funding in the FYDP is adequate to meet that minimum level. 

Indeed, the CBO has warned that its estimate shows that the 

battleforce fleet could fall to only 270 ships by 2025 with a $15 billion annual budget and estimated that if there were a bit higher 

budget it might be 240 ships. But still, in both cases the projections 

by CBO do not show us meeting that 313-ship level. 

Could you comment on the CBO analysis, please? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Yes, ma’am. The budget that we have proposed and that is before you puts us on a trajectory and we believe 

that we have adequately priced the ships that will take us beyond 

the 313 minimum. As we get out into what I would call the midyears and the requirements that we have for building the fleet, recapitalization of ships that we’re building in large numbers every 

year, as they fall off the scope as we recapitalize the strategic deterrent, the funding does become quite challenging in that mid-year 

period. 

But the budget that we have before you and the plan that we 

have laid out puts us on that trajectory to take us over 313 ships. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. 

Finally, Mr. Secretary, I know you’ve been to my State and I 

very much enjoyed your visits, both to Bath Iron Works and the 

Portsmouth Naval Shipyard in Kittery, ME. I want to associate 

myself with the comments made by the Senator from Hawaii about 

the importance of our public shipyards, which are making such a 

contribution, particularly in the area of submarine overhaul and 

maintenance. I believe that Senator Akaka has made very good 

376 

points about the backlog in maintenance projects. The chairman 

also has referred to that. I just want to pledge to work with you 

to make sure that you have the funding needed. 

Mr. MABUS. Thank you, Senator. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Collins. 

Senator Hagan arrived in the nick of time to be recognized. Your 

timing is exquisite. I hope it was intentional so I don’t catch you 

by surprise. 

Senator HAGAN. Oh, no, that’s fine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Senator Hagan. 

Senator HAGAN. I just wanted to once again thank you for being 

here and your testimony and especially your service, each and 

every one of you. You’re doing a great job. 

I wanted to say that my office has received a signed agreement 

in principle concerning the Camp Lejeune water contamination 

study, and the signed agreement between the Assistant Secretary 

of the Navy for Environment and the acting Director for the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR), and I certainly appreciate the Department’s deciding to fully fund this 

Camp Lejeune water mortality study in the ATSDR and Annual 

Plan of Work. 

But I wanted to know when we can expect for this agreement in 

principle to be solidified and when will the money be transferred 

to ATSDR for the actual study? 

Mr. MABUS. The money will be transferred as soon as we get the 

voucher and it will take 3 or 4 days. But we are ready to fund this. 

The agreement in principle is pretty much the agreement. We’re 

ready to move forward on this with all six studies, four of which 

previously have been agreed to, with the mortality study and with 

the health survey. We have committed to fully fund whatever 

science comes out of the health survey in terms of doing a fuller 

health study. 

Senator HAGAN. Great. I think the fact that we have so many 

families that have had questions for so many years, that it is time 

to begin this study so that we can get answers to the family members who have served at Camp Lejeune over so many years. So 

thank you on that one. 

I also wanted to talk about that in Afghanistan, with the challenging terrain and extremely limited infrastructure, it serves as a 

formidable logistical challenge for our military. Recent reports have 

indicated that DOD pays an average cost of $400 per gallon for fuel 

that’s delivered to and consumed in Afghanistan’s remote locations, 

where the Marines often operate. 

The extent of our current dependence on fossil fuels is a strategic 

vulnerability that has the potential to influence foreign policy and 

national security objectives. What does the Marine Corps intend to 

do in order to lighten our energy footprint, reduce energy inefficiencies in expeditionary environments, and reduce energy dependencies? Are our Marine Corps bases and stations vulnerable to the 

energy grid? 

General CONWAY. Ma’am, let me correct something first of all 

that was cited. A Defense Science Board study did determine as 

much as $400 is sometimes spent on fuel, but for the most part 

377 

that’s fuel that’s flown up to Army forces in RC-East in some very 

rigorous terrain. Our costs on average are more than what you pay 

at the service station here, but not nearly approximating those 

costs. 

That said, frankly, I was stunned when I looked at what I consider to be waste in terms of how we are going about the fight. 

There’s a lot of what I would call low-hanging fruit in terms of how 

we can become more efficient in terms of our fuel, in terms of the 

structures that we build and their ability to retain cold or heat, in 

terms of water, and any number of things that we consume on a 

daily basis that simply can be made better. 

So we have put in place an Expeditionary Energy Office, a colonel with about 10 people both military and civilian that will work 

for him. We’re not going to burden the field commander with this 

responsibility. That would be unfair. I’ve been in his shoes and he 

simply needs to know what he needs and how soon it’s going to get 

there. But we think that we owe it to the Nation to be better stewards of the resources available, to cut back on our needs where we 

can, to keep young marines and sailors off those convoys to the extent that we have reduced demand, and we’re very serious about 

going about that. 

In terms of bases and stations, we think we’re doing pretty well. 

We have the mandate that’s been placed on us. It is one of the Secretary’s four priorities, to cut back our energy consumption about 

30 percent by 2015, petroleum consumption by 20 percent at the 

same time, and we’re working hard to be able to do that. 

We’ve had more success I would say at this point in our western 

bases and stations because of solar energy and wind. But across 

the Corps we’re working hard to try to be more efficient and again 

better stewards of our resources. 

Senator HAGAN. Do you have plans and procedures in place to 

monitor how you’re achieving these goals? 

General CONWAY. Yes, ma’am, absolutely, only through metrics 

and determining just what we can do. There have been some things 

done already. For whatever combination of reasons, the Army did 

not have need for eight solar water generation kinds of capabilities. 

We took those happily and they’re already in Afghanistan. 

But we have a series of metrics that the office of this colonel is 

maintaining to give us a grade and see where we need to go. 

Senator HAGAN. Great. 

I have a question concerning the mental health care for our returning servicemembers. As our service men and women continue 

to rotate home from Iraq and Afghanistan, there are those among 

them that are obviously returning with significant mental health 

issues. Early intervention services for these men and women may 

reduce the demands placed upon the VA once these servicemembers are discharged. 

What programs or initiatives are being put into place to address 

the mental health concerns of our returning servicemembers? 

Mr. MABUS. Senator, as I said in answer to a previous question, 

there’s nothing more important that we do than to care for the people who have borne the battle. That is equally true of mental 

health as it is in physical health. The Navy and Marine Corps are 

both doing a lot of work in both post-traumatic stress disorder 

378 

(PTSD) and traumatic brain injuries (TBIs). For TBIs, one key is 

very early diagnosis and care near the battlefield. The Marine 

Corps in particular, supported by Navy medicine, has been working 

to make sure that the symptoms are recognized by both medical 

and non-medical personnel in the field. 

We do a mental evaluation before people go on deployment in the 

Navy or in the theater as marines. We do a second one when they 

come out to see if there has been any impact, and then another 

evaluation some time after they return home. 

For Navy IAs, as we bring them out of theater we have a stopover in Kuwait to allow them to decompress from what they have 

been doing before they return home and be evaluated in terms of 

physical and mental health. I know that the Commandant and the 

CNO can give you other details, because we are working very hard 

on these things. 

One of our primary focuses is to make sure that there is no stigma attached to asking for help for mental health issues. One of the 

things we look at is to make sure that as people ask for help that 

those people who ask are promoted at exactly the same rate as the 

ones who do not need that assistance. So I think that in our senior 

enlisted ranks and our officer ranks that the understanding that 

we need to make sure that there is no stigma attached to asking 

for mental health services, and in fact that there’s an imperative 

that if you need any help or if people around you recognize the 

symptoms that they encourage you to get help. 

We’re working as hard as we are on anything to make sure that 

our returning warriors’ mental health needs are absolutely met. 

Senator HAGAN. Thank you. I do want to thank you again for 

having the agreement in principle completed on the Camp Lejeune 

water mortality study, and that obviously begins as soon as possible. So thank you for that. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Hagan. 

Senator Thune. 

Senator THUNE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to thank you all, Admiral, General, Secretary, very much 

for your service to our country, and I appreciate your responses to 

the committee and the questions that you’re being posed today. 

I would echo what the Senator from North Carolina has said on 

the issue of energy. That’s something I have a great interest in. 

The Air Force has taken quite a fairly aggressive goal out there in 

terms of trying to acquire 50 percent of their domestic aviation fuel 

via alternative fuel blends in which the alternative component is 

derived from domestic sources. I think this issue of dependence, 

this dangerous dependence that we have on foreign sources of energy, is a very real issue, and of course the military is the biggest 

user. 

I hope that the Navy and the Marine Corps can move in that direction as well, because I do think it’s not only a national security 

issue, but it’s also something that I think in terms of the economic 

security of the country is really critical. I’m hoping that you can 

pursue that path as well. 

Admiral Roughead, I wanted to raise a question with you. I’m 

very concerned about the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty 

379 

(START) follow-on treaty negotiations that we’re currently having 

with the Russians, and particularly worried about the steep cuts 

that are being made to the number of delivery vehicles and that 

it might necessitate making our nuclear triad a diad. President 

Obama agreed in a joint understanding with President Medvedev 

last July to reduce the nuclear delivery vehicles somewhere in the 

range of 500 to 1,100 systems. Then a few days later General Cartwright, who is the current Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and 

former head of Strategic Command, testified before this committee 

that he would be very concerned about the ability to maintain the 

nuclear triad if the number of delivery vehicles would go below 

about midpoint between 1,100 and 500 or, in other words, if the 

number went to somewhere in the 800 delivery vehicle range. 

So the question I have, Admiral, is do you share General Cartwright’s concern about the ability to maintain the nuclear triad if 

the final START number agreed on for delivery vehicles is below 

that 800 delivery vehicle number? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Yes, sir. The negotiations are still ongoing. 

But I think as you get into the lower numbers that General Cartwright cited, it does become problematic. We have been working 

with the Joint Staff and all the Services, and clearly the value of 

the triad is well acknowledged. 

Senator THUNE. Do you see a scenario in which the triad might 

be in jeopardy if they agreed to a number, though, that’s below 800, 

if you get down to 700, 750? There has been some reporting in the 

Russian press that that’s the range that they’re looking at. 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. In the discussions that I’ve had, Senator, 

I’m not concerned about that—nor have we had discussions about 

any elimination of a leg of the triad. 

Senator THUNE. Good. 

Admiral, the new QDR rightly dedicates a lot of ink to deterring 

and defeating aggression in anti-access environments, and it directs the Navy and the Air Force to develop a new joint air-sea battle concept for defeating adversaries with sophisticated anti-access 

and area denial capabilities, which in turn will help guide the development of future capabilities needed for effective power projection operations. 

I strongly support expanding and improving our Nation’s longrange strike and power projection capabilities and I was pleased to 

see you mention in your prepared testimony that the Navy, as directed by the QDR, is working with the Air Force to develop this 

new joint air-sea battle concept, and I understand that was discussed a little bit earlier this morning. 

I understand that you and the Air Force Chief of Staff signed a 

memorandum to begin developing this new operational concept last 

September. In your view, how will long-range strike capabilities fit 

into this new air-sea battle concept? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. I think that they will fit into the air-sea battle concept, as will many other facets of that type of operation. 

We’ve also included the Marine Corps in air-sea battle. But I believe there’s long-range strike that needs to be considered. Even 

the ability for us to be able to engage in an air-sea battle from 

under the sea becomes extremely important, and also the importance of networks in how we knit all this together is a key element, 

380 

and I’ve made that point to my people, that in addition to all of 

the kinetic considerations that we also have to be thinking in terms 

of networks, because any adversary is going to be looking at that 

same thing as well. 

Senator THUNE. Last September the Manchester Guardian reported that the President has rejected the Pentagon’s first draft of 

the NPR as being too timid and has called for a range of more farreaching options consistent with his goal of eventually abolishing 

nuclear weapons altogether, according to European officials, and 

that’s a quote from that newspaper. Is that an accurate report? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. I haven’t read the Manchester Guardian, 

Senator. But I’ve been involved in the NPR and I believe that the 

process we’ve had, the considerations we’ve had, has placed great 

value on our nuclear deterrent force, all legs of that triad, and the 

considerations of being able to field the strategic needs of the Nation. I haven’t read the article, but I’m very comfortable with the 

discussions we’ve had, the involvement that we’ve had, and how 

we’re looking at things. 

Senator THUNE. With respect to the delay on that, why is it continually getting pushed back? We’re now looking at April as the latest date that we’ve heard in terms of that being completed. 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Yes, sir. We continue to work with the Office of the Secretary of Defense on this, and I’ll get back to you on 

the particulars of the delay. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

The delay reflects the fact that the current Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) is fundamentally different from the prior NPRs conducted in 1994 and 2001. The differences are of scope, process, and context. 

On scope: The 1994 NPR was focused almost exclusively on force structure and 

numbers. The 2001 review also addressed forces, but had more to say about strategy 

than in 1994. In contrast, the 2010 NPR is broadly reviewing capability, strategy, 

and policy. This comprehensive approach reflects requirements applicable to the 

2010 NPR that are in section 1070 of the National Defense Authorization Act 

(NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2008, Public Law 110–181. 

On process: The two prior NPRs were both conducted by the Department of Defense with some coordination with the White House. As stated in section 1070 of 

the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2008, the Secretary of Defense shall conduct this NPR 

in consultation with the Secretary of Energy and the Secretary of State, so this review is interagency in character. From the review’s start last April, the Departments of State and Energy have been key partners in the process and have added 

significant value to the comprehensive approach. Moreover, the review undertook to 

provide results in the form of options, across all areas of review, for discussion by 

senior leaders. This has facilitated a broad, high-level discussion of nuclear posture 

and policy of a kind not conducted in decades. 

On context: The rising risks of nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism since 

the 2001 NPR have underscored the need for a fresh approach to strategy and policy. In Prague in April 2009, the President articulated a vision for reducing 21st 

century nuclear dangers that highlighted the commitment to the ultimate elimination of such weapons globally. He then asked for a work plan of concrete steps 

that would move demonstrably toward that goal, while also meeting continuing requirements of deterrence, assurance, and strategic stability. Determining how best 

to accomplish these objectives has required broad and deep analysis. 

Senator THUNE. That comes from a European newspaper. But 

we’ve been led to believe that the analysis guiding the START negotiations in the QDR was completed at the front end of that NPR 

process, and that the first draft was reportedly scrapped on a concern that it was too timid in terms of reducing the number of nuclear weapons. 

Maybe you don’t want to comment. 

381 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. The too timid phrase is one that I had not 

heard before. I think as we have worked our way through what’s 

a very complex process, I’ve been very comfortable with the discussions that we’ve been having, sir. 

Senator THUNE. All right, good. 

Thank you, gentlemen. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Thune. 

Senator Burris is next. 

Senator BURRIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I’d like to add my thanks to these three excellent Americans for 

their dedication and commitment to the service of our country. I 

would just like to let them know where I spent last week—at the 

Marine Corps recruiting depot in San Diego and the Marine Air 

Station in Miramar, where I experienced and flew the Osprey simulator and crashed it about 20 times. Also, Mr. Secretary, I visited 

the naval medical center in San Diego. I must say, Commandant, 

I thought I was a pretty rough kid coming up until I saw the basic 

training that those marines were going through in preparing them 

to be warriors and to defend this country. The leadership that I 

met was terrific, from the officers on down to the enlisted personnel. I want to compliment you for what you’re doing in preparing those young men. 

General CONWAY. Thank you, sir. I’ll pass that to the troops. 

Senator BURRIS. Also, on the question of DADT, gentlemen, I 

hear the various positions and I know that you may have some 

input into that major question that we will be confronting. Keep in 

mind that at one time blacks could not serve with any dignity in 

our military. We just heard the comment on where we are now 

with this diversity issue and the top ranks. Not only that, but 

we’ve had an African American who served as the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff, and of course we have currently an African American who’s 

the Commander in Chief. Also, at one time we didn’t allow women 

in our services, and now we’re talking about even having women 

on submarines. 

So please keep that in mind in terms of what it is and how we 

judge individuals by their orientation or by their sex or by their 

race, so just by way of comment. 

Mr. Secretary and General Conway, the JSF program has been 

plagued with numerous delays and setbacks. If the program continues to be beset with difficulties, at what point will your readiness posture be significantly affected in terms of that aircraft? 

General CONWAY. Sir, we have seen setbacks in the program. We, 

as a product of this 5-year defense plan, have seen a reduction of 

28 Marine Corps JSFs and that’s a serious impact on our readiness, because for about 11 or 12 years now we have not bought an 

attack aircraft. We did not buy the E&F when the Navy did and 

so we’ve been relying upon our F–18s A through D types and on 

our venerable Harriers. 

So we’re really anxious to have the JSF come on line when it’s 

supposed to, with the capacities that we believe it has. We’re nevertheless encouraged that the supplier is going to make his 

timeline that he’s promised us, which is initial operating capacity 

in 2012. 

382 

Senator BURRIS. Commandant, pardon me. That’s not what my 

information is. My information is that they’re behind schedule, that 

they’re trying to test various components of it because of the complications of it replacing three or four of those other planes. If we 

have any information to the contrary, please—— 

General CONWAY. We’ll have to compare notes, sir. December 

2012 is what we have been tracking now for quite some time. We 

have three aircraft at Pax River at our test facilities. We will see 

vertical flight we think this quarter and delivery of other airplanes 

before the end of the year. 

It is the answer to your question, though, because 2012 is really 

important to us in that we have gone for so long without this capacity. 

Senator BURRIS. Absolutely. 

General CONWAY. If we don’t make those kinds of timelines it 

will almost immediately have an impact on our ability to provide 

the strike fighter capacity that both the Navy and the Air Force depend on. 

Senator BURRIS. General, I applaud the level of integration of the 

Navy and the Marine Corps Reserves into the total force structure 

by the Navy and the Marine Corps. How would you characterize 

the success of their integration into the overall mission of the Department of the Navy? 

Mr. MABUS. I think the integration of the Reserves of the Marine 

Corps and the Navy has been an absolute success. We simply 

wouldn’t be able to do some of the missions that we do without the 

Reserves. They perform an incredibly wide variety of missions. 

Their training and readiness is exemplary, and when they are 

called to active duty they are integrated seamlessly and well. As 

I said, we owe our Reserves not only the training and readiness, 

but also the things that I answered previously about health care, 

mental health care, and when they return from active duty. 

Senator BURRIS. Mr. Secretary, do you see the need for more 

funding to cover the costs of fulfilling the manning of the reservists? 

Mr. MABUS. Senator, I think that the budget that we submitted 

will allow us to meet every mission, both Active Duty and Reserve. 

Senator BURRIS. Admiral, did you want to comment on that, sir? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. I was just going to say that integration is 

absolutely extraordinary. But even with that, we’re not satisfied. In 

the Navy we’re continuing to look at ways with which our Active 

and Reserve components can flow between the two more 

seamlessly. A few months ago, by the time you got all of the paperwork and admin done, it was about a 4-month process. We now 

have that down to 8 days and my personnel chief and my Chief of 

Naval Reserve know they have to get it to 72 hours. 

We can do that because of the terrific professionalism and the 

fact that we truly are one Navy. It doesn’t make any difference if 

we’re Active or Reserve. We are one Navy. 

General CONWAY. Senator, I would only comment on the mentality of the Reserves. It’s absolutely incredible to me, but our Secretary of Defense has set aside guidelines and terms of their usage 

and how frequently we can make use of our Reserve formations. 

These people want to come on board active duty and they want to 

383 

come on board in most instances even more frequently than what 

the policies will now allow for. 

There are just tremendous people out there who really do want 

to be a part of what’s taking place in the world today. 

Senator BURRIS. Commandant, you’re making that comment and 

I see this myself. Even those wounded warriors, the ones that come 

back from combat injuries, or amputees—I saw some of them out 

in San Diego Hospital or saw them over at Walter Reed. I’m 

amazed at the commitment that they have. 

I asked this young infantryman from the Army at Walter Reed 

when I was out there a question. He was an amputee just below 

the knee and he was being discharged that day. I asked him: Okay, 

young man, what do you want to do? He said, ‘‘Sir, what I really 

want to do is to go back and join my unit.’’ 

General, I couldn’t hold it. I just cried right before him. I mean, 

it’s amazing to me. We have to give thanks to those type of individuals, committed to give us protection and that cause and help us 

to be the America that we are. We couldn’t do it without them. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. My time is up. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Burris. Senator Burris 

speaks for this entire committee with those eloquent comments. 

Senator LeMieux. 

Senator LEMIEUX. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Secretary, General Conway, Admiral Roughead, thank you 

for your service to the country. Thank you for the men and women 

who serve in the Navy and the Marines. 

As we had a chance to talk about last night, Florida loves having 

the Navy and the Marines, not as many marines as we would like, 

General, but we’ll work on that. But from Naval Air Station (NAS) 

Jacksonville and NAS Pensacola down to Key West to Blount Island to Mayport, we’re just very privileged and proud to have you 

in Florida in the numbers that you’re in. 

I want to first commend you for the work that you have done and 

are doing in Haiti. I had a chance to go on a Congressional delegation trip 2 weeks ago and to visit the young men and women who 

are down there who are helping in that rescue and the humanitarian effort. It is as difficult a situation as one could find in the 

world. They’re doing great work, and I appreciate the work that 

they continue to do. 

The next thing I’d like to talk to you about is a topic that we’ve 

discussed before. It will not come as a surprise to you, and that is 

Mayport and the decision that the Secretary of the Navy signed, 

the record decision to make Mayport a nuclear-ready facility in 

order to have a nuclear-powered submarine. 

Now, it’s my understanding that we have enjoyed having an aircraft carrier in Mayport since 1952 and it’s been maybe not continuously that way, but it was that way up and through 2006, 

when the USS Kennedy was decommissioned. 

Admiral Roughead, I know that there has been some discussion 

about homeporting a carrier at Mayport. But it’s my understanding 

that the Navy has had a long policy of strategic dispersal, that is 

dispersing your assets in numerous places in order to best protect 

them, and that you do this, for example, on the west coast of the 

United States. So is it true that the Navy has historically had airVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:37 May 06, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00389 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\62155.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
384 

craft carriers homeported in multiple ports on each coast, and that 

Mayport has been home to several aircraft carriers in the past? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. That’s correct, sir. 

Senator LEMIEUX. Also, is it true that the Navy maintains more 

than one nuclear-capable port on the west coast and that making 

Mayport nuclear-capable only makes a sensible strategy just like 

the Navy employs on the west coast of the United States? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Yes, sir, that’s correct. 

Senator LEMIEUX. I’ve heard discussion that this is going to be an extremely expensive proposition, talks about $1 billion to $2 billion, and that it’s not going to be an effective or efficient decision 

for the Navy. Can you comment on that for me, Admiral? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Yes, sir. We estimate the cost to be just past $500 million. Some of those costs have already been incurred because we are involved with dredging the basin there. But the costs 

are also spread out over a period of years. It’s not one lump sum 

in any given year, it’s spread out, and will give us the opportunity 

to have an alternate carrier port on the east coast, which would 

then make it possible for every ship class that we have to have alternatives as far as where they could go to be maintained or where 

they could go to put in if they had emergency work to be done. 

Senator LEMIEUX. I guess, Admiral, that part of the concern is 

that if there is only one East Coast port for a nuclear carrier and 

there were some kind of natural disaster or other manmade disaster, that that would significantly limit our strategic abilities. 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Particularly as it would apply to our carrier 

fleet, yes it would, sir. 

Senator LEMIEUX. In terms of the future of the Navy and the 

ships that the Navy will have, it’s my understanding that more and 

more ships may be nuclear-powered, not just subs, not just aircraft 

carriers, and that that’s going to require proper shore facilities to 

maintain those nuclear propulsion plants. 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Senator, as we look to the future, nuclear 

power clearly is something that we will be looking at as a propulsion source. There are many factors that come into play—construction, maintenance, the manning, and the training. But as we look 

to the future, fuel considerations, energy considerations, and then 

the power that some of the newer weapons systems are going to require, you’re automatically drawn to nuclear power as a source, 

and we’re going to be looking at that. 

Senator LEMIEUX. So having those capabilities in multiple locations to be able to service those ships is important? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Yes, sir, it is. 

Senator LEMIEUX. Last on the Mayport issue: I’ve heard some 

talk about concerns about hurricanes and weather. In Florida we’ve 

unfortunately, like other States, had hurricanes hit us in the past. 

Has there been an evaluation as to whether or not Jacksonville is 

as susceptible as the rest of Florida is to hurricanes? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Yes, sir. That was one of the factors that we 

looked at, because I think that one can easily conjure up an image 

that anything in Florida is susceptible to multiple hurricanes. But 

when you look at the historic nature of the storm tracks, that area 

in the Jacksonville area is not prone to what many perceive to be 

a high incidence of hurricanes. 

385 

The patterns either take them south or the patterns take them 

up toward the Carolinas, and the area in Jacksonville seems to be 

in a very fortunate pocket. 

Senator LEMIEUX. It does. I’m not aware of a hurricane ever hitting Jacksonville. Perhaps it has. It hasn’t in the last 4 years that 

I’m aware of, and I don’t think we’ve had one prior to that. Maybe 

a long time ago, but it has been a long time. That area does seem 

to be a pocket. 

I want to next talk a little, if I may, Mr. Secretary and Admiral, 

about the good work that the Navy is doing in relation to Colombia. 

I had an opportunity to visit Colombia last week on a delegation 

trip and meet with President Uribe as well as Minister of Defense 

Silva and talk about the good work that we’ve been doing for the 

past 8 years—longer than that, but specifically in the past 8 

years—to help the Colombian military with fighting narcotrafficking and all of the challenges that Colombia has had with 

the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia. 

It recently was mentioned to me by the Admiral that the Fourth 

Fleet was able to achieve a major success with a drug seizure on 

February 22 and disrupting a go-fast vessel and recovering more 

than a quarter ton of cocaine. 

I want to emphasize to you how important I think this work is. 

The drug terrorists, these folks what are working from Colombia 

all the way up through Central America into Mexico, are very dangerous people. They are not just drug gangs. They are terrorists. 

We recently saw this incident in Mexico where a young soldier who 

had been killed in a firefight with one of the drug cartels and then 

given a State funeral, that his entire family was killed afterwards 

by the drug cartel in order to make a point. 

That is extremely worrisome to me. It’s also extremely worrisome 

to me, not to get into information that we can’t speak about openly, 

but we know that Iran is projecting its image into Latin America. 

We know that Ahmadinejad has visited Venezuela on several occasions. We know that there are concerns about Hamas and 

Hezbollah in Latin and South America. 

So I want to commend you on the work that you’re doing with 

the Colombians and with our other partners in Central and South 

America. I had an opportunity to visit our friends in Honduras as 

well and our good work that we’re doing there in partnership with 

them under the new government. 

I want to make the point of how important I think it is that you 

continue to do the work that you’re doing with Joint Interagency 

Task Force-South and with the Coast Guard and the combined efforts with the Colombian military, because I find that to be an 

emerging threat to our country and to our national security. While 

we are focused, properly, on Afghanistan and Iraq and other places 

in the world, we cannot fail to look south. We cannot fail to make 

sure that we do not have terrorist threats within this hemisphere. 

So thank you for that good work and thank you for your service. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator LeMieux. 

Senator Webb. 

Senator WEBB. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

386 

Just to follow on a bit, as you might expect, from the comments 

of my good friend from Florida and my other good friend from Florida arriving to make comments after I speak, I’d like to emphasize 

that I do have a good deal of empathy for that area of Florida for 

the fact that they have lost ships due to retirement, and that there 

are ways to address that situation. 

But I would also like to emphasize that this discussion is clearly 

not over, and that there are strong statements that could be made 

contrary to what was just said. This isn’t the place. I have a very 

limited amount of time here and I want to get into some detail 

with the situation in Okinawa and Guam, General Conway. 

But we are in a situation where we are going to have to find 

ways to make better use of limited funds and we are going to be 

wanting to put them in places that enhance our overall ability to 

perform our national objectives, and that very strongly includes 

making sure that we hit the mark on our shipbuilding goals, Admiral, as you and I discussed when you visited. There’s a great deal 

of concern about this. 

I just listened to Senator Collins mention a CBO study that indicated that if certain trends were followed the size of the Navy could 

be at 270 ships by 2025. I know that the bow wave always looks 

good in the Pentagon. I spent 5 years over there. Your testimony 

is that you can hit your 313 minimum in a certain period of time. 

But these are just as compelling strategic concerns as dispersal. 

I’ve been through three different renditions of strategic dispersal 

debates in my adult lifetime, one of them, as you’ll remember, during the Reagan administration, when we were going to put a strategic homeport in Corpus Christi. I went down there and made the 

speech when I was Secretary of the Navy to open that one. They 

were talking about a strategic homeport in Alaska. 

You’re familiar with the service of Admiral Joe Prueher, I assume, former Vice CNO, commander of Sixth Fleet, former Commander in Chief, Pacific, and former Ambassador to China, who is 

not being paid by anyone as a lobbyist to express a point of view, 

who stated his strong agreement that this amount of money would 

be much better spent in shipbuilding than in creating a redundant 

facility. 

So I want to make that point, just because I’m sandwiched here 

between two opposing points of view, but this discussion is not 

over. 

I just returned from a visit to Tokyo, Okinawa, Guam, Tinian, 

and Saipan. The purpose of this trip was to first meet with the new 

leadership of the Japanese Government, but then also to listen to 

the viewpoints on Okinawa and in these other areas in terms of 

this military base realignment. General, as you recall, I spent a 

good bit of time out there in 1973 and 1974, walked and drove 

every square inch of the military lands on Guam, Tinian, Saipan, 

went up to Okinawa, and looked at our training areas. 

Without going through the whole drill, there are two questions 

that I am very concerned about right now. One is for you, General, 

and the other is for you, Mr. Secretary. We have gotten ourself into 

a box with respect to a 2014 timeline, not only in the situation at 

Okinawa, which has been delayed because of the Futenma relocation controversy, and we’re waiting for the Japanese Government 

387 

to come forward with a decision, but also in terms of the way we 

are dealing with the situation on Guam. 

This realignment of marines and these new bases were arguably 

supposed to be completed by 2014. I think what is happening out 

there is that the civilian populace in both places are getting very 

nervous about the prospect of these timelines, in Okinawa, one, because people see that it’s not really doable practically; and on 

Guam, because of the civilian infrastructure itself that would be 

needed, you can’t hit that mark. 

I would like to get your thoughts on that timeline, General, and 

what our position might be on it. 

General CONWAY. Sir, I share your concern. Of course, we will 

await the Japanese decision, hopefully by May. But any delay at 

this point I think is going to be reflected downrange attempting to 

meet our timelines. Going all the way back to the 1970s probably, 

but certainly today, there’s only a certain workforce capacity on 

Guam to get things done. There is a lot that needs to be done. 

So our concern is that for every month we delay a decision and 

action really on the part of both governments in cohort with each 

other, it’s going to have impact on our ability to make the 

timelines. 

Senator WEBB. I think we’re going to have to start talking more 

realistically about what those timelines are and calm people down. 

I would also strongly encourage looking at more training areas and 

firing ranges on Tinian rather than Guam. Guam is 208 square 

miles. They now say 210; somewhere they’ve gotten 2 more square 

miles since I was working out there. But one-third of that island 

is already military retention areas. It’s very difficult to put firing 

ranges and that sort of thing on there. 

Tinian is wide open. I went up and looked at it again. The difficulty is it’s not part of the specific plan that’s being discussed. 

But the utility long-term is very strong. 

Mr. Secretary, I hope you will be able to raise the importance of 

getting funding for the civilian side on this Guam project if we’re 

serious about doing this. We cannot remain as a viable balancing 

force in the Pacific without these bases. At the same time, the 

numbers I got from last year, just to give you an idea of the disconnect here, were that, in terms of MILCON projects for this 

buildup, there was $700 million in the DOD budget inside the wire 

and only $51 million outside the wire, and $50 million of that was 

DOD money for roads in Guam. 

As the General mentioned, they’re going to have to increase 

workforce out there. They have school difficulties, hospital difficulties. When I was there, there was a $50 million grant that was 

supposed to come their way through the stimulus package for the 

port authority that somehow did not happen. This is American soil. 

This isn’t like being off in Kuwait somewhere. These are American 

citizens and the people who have supported this have now started 

to wonder whether we are really serious about doing it in a responsible way. That can only happen, I think, through interagency coordination and strong discussions with the White House. 

Mr. MABUS. Yes, sir, I agree. On the grant for the Apra Harbor, 

I was a very strong advocate for that grant and met with the SecVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:37 May 06, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00393 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\62155.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
388 

retary of Transportation on two different occasions to urge him to 

do that grant, for the exact reasons that you just stated. 

Senator WEBB. I contacted the White House when I was on 

Guam, trying to make the point that this isn’t simply a transportation issue; it’s a national security issue. I think that $50 million 

when they have $150 billion in unexpended money from the stimulus package would go a long way towards calming people down 

out there, but also getting this done. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Webb. 

Senator Bill Nelson. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Mr. Chairman, before my dear friend Senator Webb departs, we have certainly had a different position with 

regard to our parochial interests on the homeporting of a carrier. 

Florida has always been a second port and the Atlantic fleet of carriers has always been dispersed. It was up until 1987 that there 

was—— 

Senator WEBB. Excuse me. We’ve had this discussion before. I 

have a meeting I have to go to. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Okay. Well, as you are departing, I just 

wanted to point out that you are a distinguished former Secretary 

of the Navy, and in your confirmation hearing in 1987—well, the 

former Secretary and now Senator from Virginia has just departed; 

I’ll just finish the sentence. I went back and checked the record, 

and indeed he supported strategic dispersal of carriers in his confirmation hearing for Secretary of the Navy. 

Of course, it’s the logical position, and that was 1987 and the Atlantic fleet, just like the Pacific fleet, had always been dispersed so 

that you don’t put all your eggs in one basket. There are three 

homeports for the Pacific fleet. There have always been two 

homeports for the Atlantic fleet, and that was the case up until 21⁄2

years ago when the conventional carrier John F. Kennedy was 

mothballed, and that left no carriers in Mayport. 

Since then a new carrier has come on line, a nuclear carrier since 

we now have all nuclear carriers, but the Navy has made its decision. This goes back. The record is replete. In February 2005 the 

CNO, Admiral Clark, stated that the Navy should have two Atlantic carrier ports. 

In March 2006, the Deputy Secretary of Defense and former Secretary of the Navy Gordon England stated: A nuclear carrier 

should be in Florida to achieve dispersion. 

In March 2006, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Admiral 

Giambastiani, shared his judgment before this committee that we 

should disperse our carriers. 

These are all parts of the record of this committee, Mr. Chairman. 

In July 2007, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Admiral Mullen, 

stated, ‘‘I am on the record more than once for this, very supportive 

of strategic dispersal of our carriers.’’ 

In December 2008, the Secretary of Defense wrote, ‘‘Having a 

single CVN homeport has not been considered acceptable on the 

West Coast and should not be considered acceptable on the East 

Coast.’’ 

389 

In January 2009, the Navy issued a record of decision to establish Naval Station Mayport as a CVN homeport. Then we went 

through all last year, the QDR, at the insistence of the Senator 

from Virginia. When the QDR was complete, DOD validated the 

Navy’s position, stating in the QDR, ‘‘To mitigate the risk of terrorist attack, accident, or natural disaster, the U.S. Navy will 

homeport an east coast carrier in Mayport, FL.’’ 

I didn’t intend to come here and speak on this. If I’d have known 

that my colleague from Florida was going to speak on it, I would 

have encouraged him not to. But it seems like that we have to continue, and therefore I will continue. Just so the record is understood, Admiral, you earlier testified that the total cost of making 

Mayport nuclear-capable for a homeport of a nuclear carrier would 

be somewhere around $500 million. 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. That’s correct, sir. 

Senator BILL NELSON. You also stated, if I recall, because I heard 

you on the television, that that included the amount that was being 

spent now for the dredging as well as the repairs to the wharf. Is 

that correct? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. That’s correct, sir. It’s to make that port nuclear carrier-capable, which I include to be a maintenance capability. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Therefore, I would like the record to reflect that that was a matter that we took care of in the defense appropriations bill for this current fiscal year. That is law, and that 

money is appropriated and it’s being spent, and it is a total amount 

of some $70 million for the dredging out to a mile and a half, and 

that’s dredging down to 55 feet to accommodate a nuclear carrier, 

as well as to the repairs to the wharf, which are the two long-lead 

items that need to be done. 

So if my math is correct, $70 million already appropriated from 

what the Admiral said, approximately $500 million. We’re talking 

about somewhere in the range of about $430 million left over a several-year period to be appropriated to have a second homeport for 

a nuclear carrier; is that right? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. That’s correct, sir, give or take some adjustments in there. But we’ve begun the process. The money is spread 

over the FYDP, and this year what we need is to be able to continue this plan. It’s the money that allows us to do the appropriate 

planning that allows us to most efficiently lay in that improvement. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Mr. Chairman, I certainly don’t want to 

continue to take the committee’s time on this. The decision has 

been made. A good slug of the appropriations are already underway. The military has made its decision all the way up to the Secretary of Defense with the QDR, and I’d like to move on. 

But as long as this keeps being raised as an issue, I’m going to 

have to have a fight in the Budget Committee over this very same 

issue. 

If that is the case, so be it. It seems to me that at some point 

we ought to understand that the decision has been made and it’s 

been made for the purposes of securing the national defense. If we 

disperse carriers in three homeports with another two ports available in the Pacific, for a total of five, we sure better not put all five 

390 

Atlantic fleet carriers in one port up river, which the commercial 

channel runs right by the docks. 

So I will stop right there. I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, 

for your patience. 

I want to thank the CNO, the Secretary of the Navy, and the indulgence of the General. I want to thank you all for your public 

service. Thank you. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator Nelson. 

I have just a few additional questions. I don’t know if any other 

colleagues do, but if they do I’m sure they’ll come back. 

First, Secretary, on the WSARA of 2009, it was designed to address some of the problems that we’ve had with weapons systems 

that take too long and cost too much. An effort is there in law, but 

it’s going to require in the culture to insist on early tradeoffs between cost, schedule, and performance, better systems engineering, 

better cost estimates, more mature technologies at the beginning, 

and better developmental testing. 

Is the Navy on track to rebuild its systems engineering, cost estimating, and developmental testing capabilities as required by our 

law? 

Mr. MABUS. Yes, sir, we are. We are aggressively moving to hire 

the acquisition professionals back into the Navy to get those requirements on line. 

Chairman LEVIN. The committee added nine F/A–18 E and Fs to 

the budget request last year, in part to help with a real shortfall 

in strike fighters. We understand the Department was glad to get 

those additional aircraft. We’ve seen a restructuring this year of 

the JSF program, with a resultant slowdown, we believe, in the 

production of F–35s, with a slight increase in the number of F–18s, 

but that increase does not match the slowdown in the F–35 aircraft 

production. 

What is the current assessment of the Navy of the maximum size 

of the fighter shortfall, Admiral? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Yes, sir. We have worked this management 

of our tactical aviation very hard for the last couple of years, and 

I believe we have done some very good work in using attrition aircraft and transitioning squadrons a little ahead of schedule. So 

right now as we sit and we look at what we’re going to have in the 

future, it’s about 100 aircraft. In POM 2012 we’re going to have to 

look at the life extension on some of our earlier 18 A through Ds, 

and that’s where our focus will be. 

Chairman LEVIN. Why not request the increase in the F/A–18 E 

and Fs procurement to compensate for that reduction in JSF? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. What we are looking at, Senator, is the cost 

of the life extension on the A and Ds is not unattractive. We have 

to look at that and that’s where our focus is right now. Getting the 

JSF on track and delivered is of paramount importance, but we’re 

going to look at the life extension program on the earlier Hornets. 

Chairman LEVIN. Admiral, your prepared statement says that, 

‘‘Accession to the Law of the Sea Convention remains a priority for 

the Navy.’’ Is that your personal and professional view regarding 

accession to that convention? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Absolutely, and it’s even more important 

than just the Navy, Senator. I believe that as we deal with reVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:37 May 06, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00396 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\62155.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
391 

source issues in the coming years and decades being party to that 

treaty will be in the best interests of the Nation. 

Chairman LEVIN. Secretary, your prepared statement said that 

you support ratification of that convention, saying that, ‘‘Ratification would enhance stability for international maritime rules and 

ensure our access to critical air and sea lines of communication.’’ 

Secretary, what effects would you foresee if we do not ratify that 

convention? 

Mr. MABUS. Senator, I think that ratifying the convention will 

give us much more ability to make those things happen in terms 

of free access to sea lanes, and in terms of our ability to use the 

sea as a maritime commons. I think that if we do not ratify that 

convention we take some risk in being able to do some of the things 

that we need to do. 

Chairman LEVIN. Secretary and Admiral, let me join in my commendation for the Navy for reassessing a prohibition which it had 

on the assignment of women for service on our submarines. I think 

you’re doing the right thing and I commend you for that leadership. 

On the question of DADT, Mr. Secretary, you indicated that you 

favor repeal of that program. I guess my question is would you 

favor repeal the way you do, if you felt that it would lead to a negative impact on readiness? 

Mr. MABUS. No, sir, I do not. 

Chairman LEVIN. So in favoring the repeal, then, is it fair to assume or to believe that you believe it will not have a negative effect 

on readiness? 

Mr. MABUS. That’s my personal belief, Senator. But I do believe 

that the President has set forth a good plan in terms of how to implement and I think that we should follow that implementation 

plan. 

Chairman LEVIN. The President has also indicated, or I guess 

Secretary Gates has indicated, that there is going to be an effort 

to see if there can be some modifications in the way in which the 

rules are applied without a change in the law. Are you familiar 

with that directive? 

Mr. MABUS. I’m familiar that Secretary Gates has said that, yes, 

sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. Do you know what he is referring to? 

Mr. MABUS. No, sir, I do not. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you. 

Senator Bill Nelson. 

Senator BILL NELSON. I just wanted to mention a couple things. 

It’s pretty exciting, Admiral, as we’re now looking down the road, 

what does the new nuclear submarine look like. Part of that is 

going to be designing the launch system of the future. Would you 

share with the committee what we had talked about before, the 

role that the Naval Ordnance Test Unit at Cape Canaveral that 

has been so integral to the design of the existing SSBNs, what that 

role might be in the future? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Yes, sir. As we begin to design the new submarine that will serve our country for decades to come, one of the 

components of it will be missile compartment and launch systems. 

Clearly, the relationship that we’ve had with the center down in 

Cape Canaveral is one that will continue. As we look to the future, 

392 

there will be opportunities for not just that site, but also for employment as we begin to spin up and get into various stages of development and test. 

Senator BILL NELSON. I’d just like the record to reflect, Mr. 

Chairman, that unfortunately, due to some misplaced priorities in 

the development of the new rocket to follow on the Space Shuttle, 

that rocket is not developed and as a result there are going to be 

layoffs of some exceptionally talented and trained and educated 

people at the Kennedy Space Center, which will be a talent pool 

that is needed as the Navy gets into this design work with regard 

to the future launcher of a nuclear submarine. So I want the record 

to reflect that. 

Finally, Mr. Chairman, if I might ask General Conway. We have 

the Lightweight Mine Roller System. It’s listed as one of your unfunded programs. It’s my understanding—and I’d love to hear your 

ideas—that it has been very effective in countering the improvised 

explosive devices (IEDs) in Afghanistan. Can you describe that system and the Marines’ attitude about funding for that system? 

General CONWAY. Yes, sir, I can. It has been effective, sir. It’s 

valuable to us because it’s a steerable system that fits on the front 

of virtually all of our mine-resistant ambush-protected vehicles. 

There’s no doubt that it has saved lives. 

They for the most part are blown away when the larger IEDs go 

off. But in instances where they’re not, it’s easily repairable and 

put back into operation, and that’s what makes it different from 

some of the others. 

Sir, it’s on the unfunded priority list because actually we’ve done 

some discovery learning on the value of the system since we 

worked our budget. Normally, unfunded priority list types of things 

would not take precedence over our budget items. That’s by conscious choice. But in this case there are probably two or three instances out of that $231 million that we have found very valuable 

just in recent weeks or months in Afghanistan that we wanted to 

put on that list. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Well, we want to keep talking to you 

about that. Since this seems to be such an effective device, if it’s 

ready to be funded we want to try to provide that for you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Nelson. Thank you for 

pointing out that priority. It’s a major priority. It has been for this 

committee for as long as I can remember that these IEDs be addressed in any way we possibly can, and we have never that I can 

remember, ever not come forth with whatever funding could be usefully spent to address that threat. 

Gentlemen, we thank you and we will stand adjourned. 

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR DANIEL K. AKAKA

SUICIDE PREVENTION

1. Senator AKAKA. Secretary Mabus, the Navy and Marine Corps still face the 

tough challenge of preventing suicides. The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have 

placed additional mental burdens on our men and women in uniform. I applaud the 

Navy and Marine Corps for their campaign to increase the involvement of their 

leaders at all ranks in suicide prevention efforts. Can you please update me on the 

393 

Navy and Marine Corps’ efforts to prevent suicides, including adding more mental 

health providers and substance abuse counselors? 

Secretary MABUS. Sailors and marines are the Department of the Navy’s (DON) 

most important asset. The DON continues to develop and deploy training that 

builds resiliency for the individual servicemember while educating the force on the 

warning signs of a troubled sailor and marine. No longer is training focused solely 

on the active duty member. Training now includes DON civilian employees and is 

available to family members. Service-specific efforts include: 

• Navy has developed the Operational Stress Control (OSC) program to address the psychological health needs of sailors and their families. To date 

more than 99,000 sailors have received the initial OSC familiarization brief. 

Formal training curriculum for key points throughout a sailor’s career is 

now in various stages of development and fleet introduction. 

• Navy recently updated its suicide prevention policy guidance requiring 

commands to maintain written crisis response plans and updating reporting 

requirements. Additionally, Navy has initiated an overarching policy review 

to identify potential barriers to seeking appropriate care or to the successful 

reintegration of a sailor to a viable career path following treatment. 

• Marine Corps (USMC) is implementing its Operational Stress Control 

and Readiness (OSCAR) program. This program assists leaders in prevention, early identification, and treatment of combat and operational stress 

problems, using medical, religious and peer support assets. OSCAR reduces 

stigma associated with mental health issues and enhances other behavioral 

health programs like suicide prevention, family advocacy, and substance 

abuse by addressing all sources of operational stress. All Marine Divisions 

will receive OSCAR training by May 2010, with implementation to other 

commands soon thereafter. 

• Marine Corps has updated its suicide prevention training at Recruit 

Training, Drill Instructor School and the Basic School. Furthermore, Marine Corps is now providing new evocative suicide prevention training to 

junior enlisted, staff noncommissioned officers (NCO) and spouses. The 

training is peer taught, interactive, and personal. Nearly 100 percent of all 

NCOs and Hospital Corpsmen have received the training. A longitudinal 

study will be used to assess the training’s effectiveness. 

• Marine Corps will be participating in a National Institute of Mental 

Health study to better understand unique Marine Corps risk and protective 

factors, and to better inform prevention programs. 

• The number of mental health provider authorizations adjusts to meet the 

demand for medical services. The combination of military, Federal civilian 

service and contractor professionals provides flexibility and timeliness to 

meet the operational and beneficiary care and missions. To that end, between fiscal year 2009 and fiscal year 2012 DON will increase the number 

of military mental health authorizations by 137. 

CULTURAL AWARENESS

2. Senator AKAKA. Secretary Mabus, there has been a continuing emphasis within 

the Department of Defense (DOD) to increase cultural awareness of our personnel 

so that they may better perform counter-insurgency and stability operations. What 

is your opinion regarding the Navy and Marine Corps’ efforts at developing foreign 

language skills to better perform warfighting and non-warfighting activities? 

Secretary MABUS. Over the past years, Navy and Marine Corps have made significant progress in language familiarization and cross cultural competency training for 

in support the full spectrum of its core capabilities missions. 

Specifically, Navy has: 

• Established its Center for Language, Regional Expertise, and Culture 

(CLREC), which leverages existing foreign language, culture and area studies instruction, as well as training tools, technologies and methodologies, to 

facilitate professional development of Foreign Area Officers, Intelligence, 

Information Warfare, and Cryptologic personnel. Additionally, CLREC has 

developed practical, Navy-wide, cross-cultural skills training needed to enhance relationships with emerging partners. 

• Navy directs CLREC coordinated training and education to operational 

forces through classroom instruction provided during pre-deployment workups, or as mission-tailored Mobile Training Teams (MTT) to units already 

deployed. In 2002, in response to the attack on USS Cole, Navy established 

its Regional Security Education Program, coordinated by the Naval PostVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:37 May 06, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00399 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\62155.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
394 

graduate School (NPS) in Monterey, CA. NPS faculty and regional experts 

embark with Navy Strike and Amphibious Groups to deliver underway instruction in regional history, current affairs, threats and general cultural/ 

religious awareness. 

• Navy is increasing regional and cultural content through Navy Professional Military Education (NPME) developed by the Naval War College 

(NWC), providing non-resident language instruction to sailors and delivering in-residence training to more officers. NWC offers a set of five Regional Concentration Areas in its Elective Program within its resident intermediate and senior PME programs. 

• For officer accessions, Naval Reserve Officers Training Corps (NROTC) 

midshipmen now take a semester course in regional studies, world culture 

and/or world religions, with emphasis on Third World, Far East, and SW 

Asia. This requirement uses existing university-taught courses. The U.S. 

Naval Academy has established an International Programs Office and a 

Center for Middle East and Islamic Studies. Starting with the 2009–2010 

academic year, Navy implemented an LREC Majors program for NROTC. 

This program provides NROTC scholarships to 20–30 midshipmen per year 

who will major in select critical languages, with a minor in associated regional studies, or major in regional studies, with a minor in an associated 

language. The goal, when fully implemented across 4 years, is to have up 

to 120 total NROTC Midshipmen enrolled in the program. 

• In July 2007, U.S. Fleet Forces Command and Commander, U.S. Pacific 

Fleet developed Navy Tactical Task 4.8.5 ‘‘Maintain Cultural Awareness,’’ 

committing the fleet to a gradual, but important enhancement of the Navy’s 

awareness of overseas cultures. CLREC is tasked to define the cultural 

awareness training needed to meet the Mission Essential Task (MET) and 

to prioritize and tailor development of country and regional studies. 

• Navy’s interest in, and support for, cultural issues led it to volunteer to 

conduct a DOD-sponsored, Joint Staff-led, Regional Expertise and Cultural 

Awareness Capabilities Based Assessment (REC–CBA) to develop a validated methodology to identify combatant commander REC requirements. 

Army led an associated Language CBA. The assessments have been completed, and the resultant methodology has been submitted for implementation pending review by the Joint Staff, combatant commands, and Services. 

The Marine Corps separates the needs of its Marines into three broad categories, 

each with distinct cultural and language training requirements. These three categories are: 

(1) Professional Linguists (Intelligence Crypto-linguists and Signals Intelligence, 

and Foreign Area Officers (FAO)) 

(2) Special Forces (those marines assigned to Marine Special Operations Command) 

(3) General Purpose Forces (GPF) 

There are numerous organizations involved in the Marine Corps efforts to improve 

the culture and language skills of our entire uniformed force. In May 2005 the Marine Corps opened its Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning (CAOCL) 

under Training & Education Command as the central Marine Corps agency for operational culture training and education. CAOCL’s mission is to provide regional, 

operational culture and operational language knowledge through training, education, research and mentorship so that Marines and Marine units can plan and operate effectively in the joint expeditionary environment, anywhere in the world. 

While CAOCL is primarily focused on the GPF, there are other Marine Corps organizations and institutions that provide culture and language training and education for Marines. Intelligence Department manages the professional linguist community within the intelligence MOSs and those Marines selected for attache ́ duty. 

The Deputy Commandant for Plans, Policies and Operations (PP&O) manages the 

International Affairs Officer Program, which includes our FAOs and Regional Affairs Officers (RAO). The Marine Special Operations Command manages the training of its Marines with specific language and culture requirements and receives support from CAOCL and the Defense Language Institute (DLI). 

The goal of Marine Corps culture and language training and education programs 

is to develop a force of marines that have the operational culture and language 

skills needed to quickly and accurately comprehend, then appropriately and effectively operate, in any complex environment to achieve the desired outcomes. 

CAOCL, through its direct programs and in concert with other Marine Corps and 

joint institutions, ensures that our marines have the right culture and language 

395 

skills to perform both warfighting and non-warfighting functions anywhere in the 

world. 

The Marine Corps is: 

• Enhancing USMC capacity to meet the culture, regional studies, and language needs of the GPF across the career continuum, from accession until 

retirement, and in all operating environments across the range of military 

operations by working across the Marine Corps training and education establishment. Our enduring effort to train and educate our marines is encapsulated in the Marine Corps Regional, Culture, and Language Familiarization (RCLF) Program. Throughout the program all career marines will 

study a specific strategic region and corresponding language, while deepening their ability to operate across all cultures. Providing operational culture and language familiarization training to units throughout the 

predeployment training program (PTP). 

Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)/Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) 

• Over the last 3 years, over 68,000 deploying marines received training in 

the country-specific operational culture of Iraq or Afghanistan. 

• Over the same 3 year period, over 16,000 deploying marines were trained 

in the tactical use of either Iraqi, Pashto or Dari languages. 

• Building Partner Capacity & Security Force Assistance—Providing country-specific cultural training and robust, mission focused language training 

to support the deployment of Marines to carry out Security Force Assistance, Security Cooperation, Security Assistance, Civil Affairs, Civil Military 

Operations, Transition and Advisor team missions. 

• Coordinating and synchronizing efforts within DOD and the Interagency 

to leverage culture and language resources and minimize duplication of effort. 

• Expanding USMC research capacity and outreach to the broader U.S. 

Government, academic, nongovernmental, and international communities to 

increase our training and education capabilities. 

• Formalizing and institutionalizing culture and language training standards in a Training & Readiness Manual, eventually being a readiness reportable item for commanders. 

• Creating a cultural mentorship program to provide high quality heritage 

subject matter experts (SMEs) as operational support to senior level 

MAGTF Commanders, both at home station prior to deployment, and then 

while forward deployed. This capability embeds cultural SMEs within the 

headquarters elements to assist commanders and senior staff with mature 

counsel when facing operational decisions that are effected by culture considerations. 

• Fielding Language Learning Resource Centers at major Marine Corps 

bases and stations that facilitate focused language instruction in support of 

PTP and the RCLF Program. 

• Providing a number of computer-based language training programs such 

as Defense Language Institute’s (DLI) Head Start, Rosetta Stone and 

Transparent Languages’ CL–150. These and other government procured 

software available to Marines for self-paced study. Over 31 languages are 

currently offered. 

• Responsive to General McChrystal’s desire to improve the language skills 

of senior commanders to enhance Key Leader Engagements (KLEs), the 

Marine Corps created an Incidental Language Training Program for commanders. This program better prepares commanders to conduct key leader 

engagements while deployed in support of OEF. 

• In close coordination and partnership with the Navy Staff, the Marine 

Corps actively participated in the DOD-sponsored, Joint Staff-led, REC– 

CBA to develop a validated methodology to identify combatant commander 

REC requirements. 

• The Marine Corps is creating an interdisciplinary research capacity for 

USMC to enhance it’s understanding of culture and strategic regions and 

augment existing USMC culture and regional studies training and education efforts in order to ensure operational effectiveness. This capacity is 

blended with seasoned operational experience to create academically sound 

and operationally relevant publications and curricula. 

396 

EDUCATING SAILORS AND MARINES IN FINANCIAL LITERACY

3. Senator AKAKA. Secretary Mabus, it is vitally important that our citizens, both 

in and out of uniform, understand the importance of saving, debt reduction, planning for retirement, and understanding investments. It is also important that our 

troops be protected from predatory practices of some companies that specifically target them. Can you tell me what the Navy and Marine Corps are doing to educate 

their members on the importance of financial literacy? 

Secretary MABUS. The Navy and Marine Corps offer personal financial management services to sailors and marines and their families to ensure they have the 

knowledge, skills, and tools necessary to successfully manage their personal finances. These services are provided by certified financial counselors at Navy and 

Marine Corps installations worldwide and include the following: 

• Individual assistance to help foster financial responsibility and accountability with primary emphasis on financial independence, sound money 

management, debt avoidance, and long-term financial stability to increase 

personal, family and operational readiness. 

• Education forums specifically designed to stimulate changes in personal 

financial behavior at key career intervals, including recruit training, initial 

skills training, Petty Officer indoctrination, first-term and mid-career career exploration workshops, Transition Assistance Program, and pre-retirement seminars, with appropriate financial topics at each lifestyle milestone. 

• The Navy launched ‘‘Million Dollar Sailor,’’ a standardized wealth-building program, in February 2009 as a means of teaching sailors how to develop positive financial habits, how to be savvy consumers, and how to save 

and invest to become future million dollar sailors. Navy Fleet and Family 

Support Centers offer the program fleetwide. 

• Navy and Marine Corps Personal Financial Management Program specialists work collaboratively with installation Command Financial Specialists, on-installation banks and credit unions, and DOD financial readiness 

partners to provide information on financial planning and budgeting, credit 

and debt management, military retirement plans, Thrift Savings Plans, 

home and car purchases, insurance, investment strategies, deployment 

cycle financial impacts, predatory lending, and personal banking. 

• Both the Navy and Marine Corps participate in the ‘‘Military Saves’’ campaign, a DOD programs designed to encourage military families to improve 

personal financial savings. 

JINKANPO ATSUGI INCINERATOR

4. Senator AKAKA. Secretary Mabus, the Jinkanpo Atsugi Incinerator was a waste 

incinerator located near Naval Air Facility (NAF) Atsugi, a base manned partly by 

several thousand U.S. Navy members and their families. The incinerator, which 

closed in 2001, emitted harmful toxins into the air that spread to surrounding areas. 

NAF Atsugi’s proximity to the incinerator potentially exposed its residents to these 

harmful toxins. Can you please explain what the Department of the Navy has done 

to identify and notify persons who have potentially been exposed? 

Secretary MABUS. In April 1998, at the direction of Assistant Secretary of the 

Navy for Manpower and Reserve Affairs (ASN(M&RA)), Navy Environmental 

Health Center developed a comprehensive risk communication and health consultation program. This was coordinated with the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, NAF 

Atsugi, Branch Medical Clinic Atsugi, Commander Naval Forces Japan, Bureau of 

Naval Personnel and Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet. The plan established 

procedures for providing formal risk communication to personnel aboard NAF 

Atsugi or who subsequently received orders to Atsugi. 

One-on-one health consultations were conducted for all adults who remained on 

station for more than 6 years, all adults who had children under the age of six, 

those with chronic respiratory conditions and pregnant or nursing women. Six years 

was chosen because the cancer risk for adults residing at NAF Atsugi for 6 years 

was at a level of 1 in 10,000 above the current rate of cancer in the U.S. population. 

This risk level falls at the upper end of the Environmental Protection Agencies’ acceptable cancer risk range. A standard entry was made in medical records that described potential exposure conditions at NAF Atsugi. 

The program required that orders assigning personnel to Atsugi include a statement regarding the air quality issue and referring members to medical and base 

points of contact for further information. Overseas medical screeners were required 

to discuss the health risks and provide a focused health consultation for individuals 

with orders to NAF Atsugi, and to provide a fact sheet addressing potential risks 

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of living and working at NAF Atsugi. A phased approach was established to inform 

individuals of potential risks to adults and children living or working at NAF 

Atsugi. 

A Health and Environmental Risk Communication Plan addressed the means for 

providing information to the community (e.g., base newspaper articles, public availability sessions, fact sheets, web sites, library repositories). 

Several different medical record forms were used at NAF Atsugi to respond to 

concerns from NAF Atsugi military personnel and their families about medical documentation and full disclosure of their potential exposure and possible health effects. 

All forms were placed in personnel and family permanent health records. Branch 

Medical Clinic Atsugi, with Bureau of Medicine and Surgery’s approval, developed 

a medical record form that listed the maximum sampling concentrations measured 

in 1994 for 12 chemicals exceeding U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) or 

New York State ambient air quality standards during the air quality study. These 

chemicals included: sulfur dioxide, nitrogen dioxide, hydrochloric acid, carbon tetrachloride, benzene, dioxins, cadmium, mercury, nickel, chromium, arsenic and respirable particulates. (http://www-nmcphc.med.navy.mil/downloads/ep/Atsugi/Appendix—A—appendices.pdf). Cancer risks were also provided on this form. Beginning 

March 1, 1996, this form was inserted into the medical records of all individuals 

who requested the documentation. 

During health risk communication and consultation at NAF Atsugi, which began 

in June 1998, a revised form was completed for every individual at NAF Atsugi and 

those with orders to NAF Atsugi. This new form documented full disclosure of potential exposures and possible health effects, related to environmental conditions, 

for each military member and family member based upon their medical history. The 

new form was signed by each adult family member (18 years and older) to acknowledge receipt of risk communication. The sponsor or spouse signed the new form for 

children under the age of 18. Additionally, all servicemembers and family members 

over the age of 17 indicated that they received a risk communication briefing by 

signing an ‘‘Administrative Remarks NAVPERS 1070/613 (Rev. 10–81),’’ commonly 

referred to as a ‘‘Page 13’’ entry, to be retained in the member’s military record. 

Prior to detachment from NAF Atsugi, another medical form was completed to document arrival and departure dates, locations of residence, schools attended and employment, while assigned to NAF Atsugi. 

5. Senator AKAKA. Secretary Mabus, is there a current registry of those exposed 

to environmental toxins at NAF Atsugi? If not, why? 

Secretary MABUS. The Navy has assembled a comprehensive database of personnel and their families stationed at NAF Atsugi during the timeframe the 

Shinkampo Incinerator Complex was in operation. The Navy Marine Corps Public 

Health Center in Norfolk, VA, maintains the database. 

NUMBER OF NAVY PERSONNEL ON SHIPS OFF THE COAST OF VIETNAM

6. Senator AKAKA. Secretary Mabus, a frequently cited estimate is that around 

800,000 personnel served on ships located off the coast of Vietnam during the Vietnam war. Is this an accurate number? If not, what is the Navy’s accurate estimate 

of the number of Navy personnel who served on ships located off the coast of Vietnam during the Vietnam war? 

Secretary MABUS. The Navy does not hold records that would readily allow for an 

assessment of the accuracy of the estimate that 800,000 sailors served in ships located off the waters adjacent to Vietnam or provide the basis for an official Navy 

estimate. A rough estimate could be based upon the standard complement of crew 

for those ships that sailed within a particular proximity to the Vietnamese coast. 

The creation of such a list of Navy ships would require a compilation of those ships 

that earned the Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal for Vietnam or the Vietnam 

Service Medal followed by research into their deck logs to determine whether those 

vessels sailed within a defined area off the coast of Vietnam. A more precise figure 

would entail extremely detailed and extensive research into Navy personnel records. 

SHIPS’ PAST LOCATIONS

7. Senator AKAKA. Secretary Mabus, keeping track of a ship’s locations during its 

lifetime is an important operational and historic function. Does the Navy keep track 

of where its current and past ships have sailed? 

Secretary MABUS. The deck logs submitted by Navy ships allow for a detailed accounting of an individual vessel’s movements. However, no comprehensive resource 

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or record exists that provides a list of all Navy ships that sailed within a defined 

area during a particular time period. 

8. Senator AKAKA. Secretary Mabus, is such information readily available? If not, 

how long would it take to compile such information? 

Secretary MABUS. A single listing of all Navy ship locations is not readily available. A list of ships that sailed within a particular proximity to the Vietnamese 

coast could be compiled by creating a list of Navy ships that earned the Armed 

Forces Expeditionary Medal for Vietnam or the Vietnam Service Medal followed by 

researching those ship’s deck logs to determine whether they sailed within a defined 

area off the coast of Vietnam. It is difficult to accurately estimate the time necessary to complete such a list; however, it would require an exceptional level of detailed and extensive research. 

9. Senator AKAKA. Secretary Mabus, can you provide the names of ships that were 

located off the coast of Vietnam during the Vietnam war? 

Secretary MABUS. The Navy does not hold readily available records that would 

provide that information. A list of ships that sailed within a particular proximity 

to the Vietnamese coast could be compiled by creating a list of Navy ships that 

earned the Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal for Vietnam or the Vietnam Service 

Medal followed by researching those ship’s deck logs to determine whether they 

sailed within a defined area off the coast of Vietnam. It is difficult to accurately estimate the time necessary to complete such a list; however, it would require an exceptional level of detailed and extensive research. 

CONTAMINATED DRINKING WATER AT CAMP LEJEUNE

10. Senator AKAKA. Secretary Mabus, many military personnel and their family 

members who were stationed at Camp Lejeune from the late 1950s through the late 

1980s may have been exposed to contaminated drinking water. The chemicals contained in the contaminated drinking water are known toxins that have adverse 

health effects on humans. Military personnel and their family members who may 

have been exposed to the contaminated drinking water may have lost confidence in 

DOD’s and the Department of the Navy’s ability to provide adequate, appropriate, 

and needed health care that will result from exposure to contaminated water at 

Camp Lejeune. What are DOD and the Department of the Navy doing to identify 

personnel and family members who may have been exposed to contaminated drinking water? 

Secretary MABUS. The Department of Navy continues to reach out to our marines, 

sailors, and civilians who worked or lived aboard Camp Lejeune regarding potential 

exposure to drinking water contamination prior to 1987. In September 2007, we 

launched a Notification Registry which can be accessed via the internet or a tollfree phone line. The registry was created so that former Camp Lejeune residents, 

workers, as well as other interested parties can input their contact information so 

that we may notify them and send them up-to-date information regarding this important issue. We have used information from our personnel records as well as print 

and radio advertising to solicit individuals to register. To date, we have sent out 

over 200,000 direct notifications and registered more than 155,000 individuals. The 

registry can be accessed on the Camp Lejeune Water Study Website at http:// 

www.marines.mil/clwater or via the toll-free hotline at (877) 261–9782. 

In addition to individual notifications, the Marine Corps continues to use general 

notification tools (print and other media as well as targeted outreach to VA centers 

and retirees) to reach former base residents and workers to encourage them to register. General notification will also be used to announce the completion of the ongoing health study initiatives. The Marine Corps will keep Congressional Members updated on our notification progress. 

The Department of the Navy relies on science organizations like the Agency for 

Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR) and the National Academy of 

Sciences to inform us on scientific matters through their research initiatives. Currently, no association between adverse health outcomes and exposure to impacted 

water at Camp Lejeune has been demonstrated. 

11. Senator AKAKA. Secretary Mabus, what is the estimated number of personnel 

and family members who may have been exposed to contaminated drinking water? 

Secretary MABUS. Detailed data for servicemembers and family members who 

lived or worked on Camp Lejeune between 1957 and 1987 do not exist. The Marine 

Corps can only make estimations using assumptions that will likely produce conVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:37 May 06, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00404 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\62155.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
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servatively high estimations. We estimate that stationed at Camp Lejeune between 

1957 and 1987 there were: 

• As many as 630,000 servicemembers. 

• As many as 60,000 spouses. 

• As many as 60,000 dependent children. 

• As many as 30,000 births. 

• Total population estimate = 500,000–800,000 

Note: Data from the Defense Manpower Data Center, Camp Lejeune housing, 

Camp Lejeune schools, and ATSDR studies were used to produce these estimates. 

These estimates do not include Marine Corps Air Station New River. 

Patient care and Federal benefits for veterans and their dependents are primarily 

a function of the Department of Veterans Affairs and not a function of DOD or the 

Department of the Navy. Questions about provision of patient care or Federal benefits as a result of or related to exposure to impacted water should be directed to 

the Department of Veterans Affairs. 

12. Senator AKAKA. Secretary Mabus, what are DOD and the Department of the 

Navy doing to address the valid and pointed concerns of veterans, military personnel, and their family members? 

Secretary MABUS. The Department of the Navy cares deeply about current and 

former marines, sailors, civilian workers, and their families. We believe the best 

way to assist them is to continue our support of the research initiatives underway. 

This includes studies and surveys being undertaken by the ATSDR. Additionally, a 

scientific/medical literature review was conducted by the National Academies’ National Research Council and was released on 13 June 2009. Our hope is that these 

efforts will help answer the many questions we all have regarding exposure to the 

impacted water at Camp Lejeune, NC. 

Furthermore, the Department of Navy and the Marine Corp is proactively engaged in outreach to marines, sailors, and civilians who worked or lived aboard 

Camp Lejeune prior to 1987. In September 2007, we launched a Notification Registry that can be accessed via the internet or a toll-free phone line to collect contact 

information of former Camp Lejeune residents, workers, and other interested parties who wish to receive information updates on this important issue. To date, we 

have sent out over 200,000 direct notifications and registered more than 155,000 individuals. The registry can be accessed on the Camp Lejeune Water Study Website 

at http://www.marines.mil/clwater or via the toll-free hotline at (877) 261–9782. 

The Marine Corps also continues to use general notification tools such as print 

and other media as well as targeted outreach to VA centers and retirees to reach 

former base residents and workers to encourage them to register. General notification will also be used to announce the completion of the ongoing health study initiatives. 

CHINESE NAVAL ACTIVITIES

13. Senator AKAKA. Admiral Roughead, China’s economic growth has led it to import large amounts of raw materials, much of which comes by sea. There is speculation that China is considering establishing overseas naval bases to protect these 

supply lines. The idea of Chinese bases abroad, particularly in the Indian Ocean, 

immediately raises concerns that China is growing more active and assertive in its 

naval activities. What are your thoughts on whether or not the Navy has the capacity and capabilities to address this developing scenario? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Our Navy today has the capacity and capabilities to protect 

U.S. national interests in the Western Pacific and Indian Ocean. I am committed 

to maintaining the necessary forward presence of ships and aircraft in the Western 

Pacific and Indian Ocean, with credible combat power, to assure our allies and 

friends, deter aggression, and build partnerships with nations that share our common interests. 

As I have stated before, we require a minimum of 313 ships to meet and sustain 

combatant commanders’ warfighting and forward presence demands globally, while 

providing reasonable operational tempo for our sailors and their families and conducting the maintenance necessary to reach the expected service life of our fleet. 

Our 30-Year Shipbuilding Plan grows our fleet capacity in the near term, which will 

enable our continued, relevant presence in the Western Pacific and Indian Ocean 

region to support our national interests and counter both current and future naval 

threats. 

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CARE FOR WOUNDED SERVICEMEMBERS

14. Senator AKAKA. Admiral Roughead and General Conway, I’m encouraged with 

the additional funding in the defense budget for wounded warrior care. The Navy 

Safe Harbor Program and the Marine Corps Wounded Warrior Regiment show the 

continued commitment to our servicemembers that we will take care of them and 

their families. How would you each assess the approach within your respective Services to care for our wounded, ill, and injured servicemembers and their families? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. I am confident that we are extending the highest quality care 

to our wounded, ill and injured sailors, coast guardsmen, and their families. Our 

Navy provides a continuum of care to sailors and their families that addresses all 

aspects of medical, physical, and psychological care. Through our Navy Safe Harbor 

program, recovery care coordinators provide oversight of, and assistance with, delivery of care to recovering servicemembers and families who move between DOD, Veterans Affairs, and civilian facilities. Direct family member feedback and survey results indicate high enrollee satisfaction with the program. 

General CONWAY. The Marine Corps’ approach to caring for its wounded, ill, and 

injured Marines and their families is solid and robust. The foundation of its approach is compassionate and concerned leadership that focuses its marines on their 

abilities and stresses that they are still in the fight as they continue to contribute 

to the mission of defending our Nation. With this foundation and encouragement, 

the Marine Corps’ Wounded Warrior Regiment provides a wide range of nonmedical 

care ranging from family support and mental health treatment coordination to financial security counseling and employment transition assistance. The intent of our 

efforts is to support a Marine’s return to a full duty status or provide them with 

the support resources they need to successfully reintegrate to their communities. 

The Wounded Warrior Regiment continually assesses its approach through personal 

feedback from Marines and their families during command visits (including General 

Officer visits with our wounded, ill, and injured marines and families), town hall 

meetings and surveys. The Regiment reaches out to active duty, Reserve and veteran marines and their families through the Sergeant Merlin German Call Center, 

a recognized DOD ‘‘Best Practice’’ model. The call center, named for a Marine who 

died from injuries suffered in Iraq, receives requests for assistance and places outgoing calls to wounded, ill and injured Marines to touch base with them and offer 

help. The call center adds depth to our approach and reminds our Marines and their 

families that they will always have a place to go for help. 

CYBER THREATS

15. Senator AKAKA. Admiral Roughead and General Conway, our National security is tightly linked to cyberspace, where conflict is not limited by geography or 

time. The expanding use of cyberspace places our Nation’s interests at greater risk 

from cyber threats and vulnerabilities. How are the Navy and Marine Corps responding to cyber threats so that it can carry out its mission? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. I have elevated the role of information, cyber, and networks 

in our Navy. I established Fleet Cyber Command/U.S. Tenth Fleet as the global operator of Navy’s cyber, networks, cryptology/signals intelligence, information, electronic warfare, and space operations. I restructured the Navy staff to bring all Navy 

information capabilities and resources under our new Information Dominance Deputy Chief of Naval Operations and I created the Navy Information Dominance 

Corps, integrating more than 45,000 sailors and civilians from our existing intelligence, information professional, information warfare, meteorology/oceanography, 

and space communities. These actions have improved Navy’s ability to ensure the 

availability, integrity, confidentiality, and security of our information and 

warfighting systems. 

Additionally, the Navy has developed the Prometheus system, a unique network 

defense capability that receives, processes, aggregates, correlates, and fuses realtime and near real-time information from multiple network sources to provide Network Domain Awareness (NDA). This capability, supported by SIGINT and a Dynamic Network Defense operational construct, provides the Navy with an exceptional ability to develop a deep understanding of the network environment, to rapidly characterize network activity and enable a preemptive response to global 

threats in support of our warfighting missions. 

General CONWAY. [Deleted.] 

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SHIPYARD BUDGET SHORTFALL

16. Senator AKAKA. Admiral Roughead, to ensure mission success, the Navy must 

have shipyards that are modern, flexible, and safe. The Navy’s public shipyards play 

a vital role in keeping the fleet operating to meet the significant challenges posed 

all around the world. In June 2009, the Navy reported a shortfall of $1.3 billion in 

sustainment, restoration, and modernization (SRM) projects at its four public shipyards. How is this shortfall affecting current and future Navy readiness, and how 

is the Navy addressing this situation?? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Our public shipyards are fully functional and safely meeting 

their Fleet mission requirements. Our $3 billion naval shipyard restoration and 

modernization (RM) backlog represents the investment required to meet the very 

highest level of shipyard RM needs. Our Navy has steadily increased its investment 

in naval shipyard recapitalization over the past several years through Operation 

and Maintenance, Navy and Military Construction (MILCON) projects, and we are 

developing future investment plans to reduce the RM backlog and ensure that our 

public shipyards continue to meet their mission requirements. 

MENTAL HEALTH CARE

17. Senator AKAKA. General Conway, the Marine Corps has made significant 

progress in caring for our military heroes with mental health issues. But, before we 

can care for them, we must first identify them. One of the biggest issues we must 

address is reducing the stigma related to seeking counseling. Last summer, DOD 

launched the Real Warriors campaign, a public education effort designed to reduce 

stigma. It is imperative to get the message to our warriors that it would be courageous to reach out for help. How would you assess the Marine Corps’ continuing efforts to tear down the stigma that still deters many from seeking treatment for 

problems such as traumatic brain injury (TBI) and post-traumatic stress disorder 

(PTSD), and what more do we need to do as we move forward? 

General CONWAY. First of all I would like to state that the U.S. culture in general 

faces issues of stigma surrounding mental health problems and care. The Marine 

Corps is no different in this regard, but as an institution we understand that we 

have responsibilities and options in tackling stigma reduction that are not present 

in the civilian world. 

The Marine Corps’ approach to ensuring that all marines who need help with 

Traumatic Brain Injury and Operational Stress issues is focused in three major 

areas: strategic communications, engaged leadership and ‘‘meeting the Marine 

where he/she is.’’ 

I expect all of my leaders, officer and enlisted, to treat a marine with a TBI or 

TSI (Traumatic Stress Injury) in the same way they approach other injuries with 

the provision of command support during the treatment process with an expectation 

of improvement/resolution and a return to full duty. I broadcast this message whenever I meet with groups of Marines, which I do quite frequently. In addition, I have 

filmed a specific message on this subject in which I directly address the need for 

Marines to stay mentally as well as physically fit and that getting the help they 

need is part of being a marine. This video has been distributed throughout the Marine Corps and the informal feedback I have received has been very positive. 

The key weapon in the Marine Corps in addressing a wide range of issues related 

to earlier detection of Marines having difficulties is Engaged Leadership. No one is 

better positioned to notice a Marine ‘‘not being quite right’’ for any reason than the 

Marines that he or she serves with everyday. I rely on my leaders at all levels to 

know their Marines and intervene early when things seem to be veering off course. 

Our Combat Operational Stress Control (COSC) model as well as our ethos as warriors makes leadership the front line in noticing marines having a problem. That 

having been said, we also have a variety of formal tools and processes that aid us 

in detecting TBI and TSI problems. The Post-Deployment Health Assessment and 

Post-Deployment Health Reassessment are requirements for all marines to complete 

and represent real opportunities for these conditions to be detected. Similarly, the 

Pre-Deployment process that involves a structured review of a Marine’s health status prior to deployment provides another opportunity to discover a previously unknown medical issue. Additionally, we are working with the other Services and the 

Office of the Secretary on the implementation of the ‘‘person to person’’ post deployment mental health evaluations that are now required as a result of the NDAA 

2010. We expect that there will be some questions related to TBI as well as Traumatic Stress incorporated into these evaluations. All of these efforts serve to ‘‘normalize’’ having a discussion about psychological health and TBI and this normalizaVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:37 May 06, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00407 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\62155.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
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tion is a key element in our drive to reduce the stigma sometimes associated with 

these issues. 

Finally, while I would like all Marines to feel comfortable coming forward to discuss their concerns about a TBI or TSI, for some this is still difficult to do. As such, 

the Marine Corps has developed ways that make it easier for marines to at least 

start these conversations. Working with Navy Medicine we have assigned additional 

psychological health professionals to operational units via the OSCAR initiative. 

With OSCAR these professionals are part of a Marine unit. They train with them 

before a deployment, return home with them and importantly remain with the unit 

after returning. While I wish there were enough psychological health personnel to 

put one of these teams with every battalion that is just not the reality of the situation. To meet the psychological health needs of all marines we have also instituted 

the OSCAR extender training program that provides a comprehensive curriculum to 

organic battalion level providers, typically general medical officers and general duty 

corpsmen, as well as leaders throughout the unit. With these initiatives, Marines 

have a very high likelihood of having a known and trusted agent with additional 

psychological health training working close by and thus reducing a potential barrier 

to that critical first discussion. 

The Marine Corps is not in this alone of course. We publicize and support DOD 

efforts to provide other avenues for warriors, and their families, to access assistance 

without necessarily involving the chain of command. One prime example of this 

would be the ‘‘Military OneSource’’ hotline. While I know that my leaders, officer 

and enlisted, would prefer to be viewed by their Marines as accessible and the ‘‘go 

to person’’ for a Marine having any difficulty, having some of these other tools available that are outside the traditional chain of command will continue to be valuable 

for the foreseeable future. 

In summary, the Marine Corps recognizes that stigma is one of several potential 

barriers to marines seeking the care they need and deserve. We are addressing 

these barriers in a proactive way and the message I am receiving is that these efforts are making a difference. I sense this difference whenever I gather with a group 

of marines. We still have more to do in this area, but I am optimistic that we are 

on the right path on these issues and I will continue to pursue them with vigor for 

the remainder of my time as Commandant. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR KAY HAGAN

JOINT LIGHTWEIGHT TACTICAL VEHICLE

18. Senator HAGAN. General Conway, reportedly, the Marine Corps is considering 

removing itself from the Joint Lightweight Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) program because 

the vehicle’s weight does not lend itself to Marine Corps expeditionary operations. 

JLTV prototypes do not seem to meet the Marine Corps’ requirements in terms of 

improvised explosive device resistance, weight, survivability, and mobility. The Marine Corps is also concerned that the JLTV prototypes are too heavy to be transported by helicopter and ships. Please describe additional concerns the Marine 

Corps has with the JLTV program. 

General CONWAY. Our team updating the ground vehicle strategy has taken a 

hard look at capabilities and capacities needed by the MAGTF. That work has underlined the critical need for about 5,000 light combat support vehicles that provide 

the payload and mobility of the original HMMWV, with all the protection we can 

get in an expeditionary (aka fully transportable and maneuverable) vehicle. We are 

working hard to ensure that those 5,000 vehicles that replace the current ECV and 

M–ATV are substantially lighter than the M–ATV, and substantially more protected 

than the ECV, but at a reasonable cost. 

We are finding it challenging to develop a vehicle with expeditionary qualities in 

an ACAT I program with all services. Over the past 15 years we’ve worked successfully with the Army in building smaller quantities of vehicles that are fully suitable 

to our expeditionary needs. The Medium Tactical Truck Replacement is an excellent 

example—probably the best medium tactical truck in the world, built in relatively 

small quantities for the Marine Corps, supported by TARDEC as appropriate. 

19. Senator HAGAN. General Conway, can you also describe some of the interim 

solutions the Marine Corps has looked at? 

General CONWAY. The Small Combat Tactical Vehicle Capsule (SCTVC) is a lightweight highly protected system currently under development as a part of experimentation activities at the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory (MCWL). This vehicle 

would replace existing 2- and 4-door vehicle cabins of the HMMWV Expanded CaVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:37 May 06, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00408 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\62155.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
403 

pacity Vehicle (ECV) fleet with a protected capsule, incorporating best practices survivability design concepts such as v-shaped blast-deflecting hull forms. If SCTVC experimentation activities continue to produce positive results, an SCTVC-like capsule 

recapitalization, along with other needed upgrades, could be used by the Marine 

Corps as a low-cost recapitalization ‘‘bridge’’ to JLTV-level capabilities. 

RECAPITALIZATION OF HIGH MOBILITY MULTI-PURPOSE WHEELED VEHICLES

20. Senator HAGAN. General Conway, reportedly, the Marine Corps is in the process of determining whether to recapitalize and reset its existing Humvees, or design 

an interim vehicle with a v-shaped hull outside the auspices of the JLTV program. 

I understand the Marine Corps is testing a blast capsule that goes over a Humvee 

chassis as a probable solution to meet the Marine Corps’ requirements to recapitalize Humvees. Please provide an update on this initiative. 

General CONWAY. The SCTVC is a lightweight highly protected system currently 

under development as a part of experimentation activities at the MCWL. It is built 

by Granite Tactical Vehicles Inc. SCTVC replaces the existing 2- and 4-door vehicle 

cabins of the existing HMMWV ECV fleet with a protected capsule, incorporating 

MRAP/JLTV survivability design concepts such as v-shaped blast-deflecting hull 

forms and a lift to increase standoff. 

Key Points 

• HMMWVs will be in the Marine Corps’ inventory through 2020. The existing HMMWV ECV is constructed from aluminum and then outfitted with 

a series of often heavy fragmentation kits. These kits add significant 

weight, stressing the payload and mobility capabilities of the vehicle. 

• The SCTVC capsule increases protection levels while not increasing the 

overall weight of the vehicle. Outside of the capsule, SCTVC retains the 

characteristics and components of the existing HMMWV. Other recapitalization improvements, such as engine, suspension, and chassis upgrades, 

could also be implemented if SCTVC experimentation continues to demonstrate an effective capability. 

• MCCDC and MCWL are closely monitoring SCTVC performance. SCTVC 

is being considered in the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) Analysis of 

Alternatives as a ‘‘product improvement’’ option for cost benefit comparisons. 

• If SCTVC experimentation activities continue to produce positive results, 

an SCTVC-like capsule recapitalization, along with other needed upgrades, 

could be used by the Marine Corps as a low-cost recapitalization ‘‘bridge’’ 

to JLTV-level capabilities. SCTVC is not a replacement to MRAP or MATV. 

• We have conducted blast and ballistic testing at Aberdeen Proving 

Grounds with successful results. We are currently building three more test 

articles to evaluate basic safety and drivability, to include driveline overheating from the enclosed drivetrain. 

Plan Of Action and Milestones 

• Oct-Nov 2009: Blast and Ballistic testing conducted at Aberdeen Proving 

Grounds 

• Jan-Mar 2010: Building of three additional test articles for safety and 

drivability assessment. 

• April 2010: Safety and drivability assessment at Aberdeen Proving 

Grounds 

• May 2010: Report submitted to MCCDC and MCSC on the overall effectiveness of the SCTVC concept demonstrator 

ACQUISITION OF COMBAT VEHICLES AND RECAPITALIZATION NEEDS

21. Senator HAGAN. General Conway, within your prepared testimony you commented on the fact that the distributed nature of today’s conflicts have revealed that 

the Marine Corps’ legacy table of equipment was significantly inadequate. You have 

also addressed the requirement to replace aging equipment due to the fact that the 

wear and tear generated by the extreme conditions in Iraq and Afghanistan has reduced the service life of major end items. Understanding that the Marine Corps’ 

ground vehicle equipment set has grown heavier based upon the demands of the 

current conflicts, does the Marine Corps believe that the mix of combat vehicle programs that are currently in the acquisition pipeline will sufficiently address its recapitalization needs, and if not, what specific requirements does the Marine Corps 

still need to address in order to meet its operational requirements? 

404 

General CONWAY. As we update our vehicle strategy to meet current and future 

operating environments, we’re finding the needed vehicle capabilities are already 

documented in the three major programs being pursued by the Marine Corps, EFV, 

MPC and JLTV. While the requirements are sound, we’re finding it takes longer 

than we’d like to get those capabilities, with expeditionary qualities, built and fielded. Two of our newer legacy systems, the LVSR, MTVR are superb vehicles, but 

they are in fact being aged at an accelerated rate, along with the venerable LAVs, 

and a host of legacy support vehicles. Our vehicle assessment included a look at 

readiness risk in the next 5–10 years, cuing us of the need to focus additional R&D 

on maintenance, reliability and fuel efficiency to arrest some of the O&M cost 

growth we are seeing as the average weight of our vehicle fleet grows. We are seeing 

a direct relationship between vehicle weight and vehicle procurement cost, and a 

comparable direct relationship between vehicle procurement cost and annual O&M 

cost. So, for the Marine Corps, efforts to reduce vehicle weight have a double return 

in that they ensure our vehicles have expeditionary qualities, and contribute to 

O&M cost containment. So in summary, the Marine Corps will continue our efforts 

to replace aged equipment with new in the near term, and invest in weight and cost 

reduction technologies for the vehicle fleet in the long term 

REALIGNMENT OF FORCES IN THE PACIFIC

22. Senator HAGAN. General Conway, although the United States and Japan have 

agreed to invest in the future realignment of forces in the Pacific, there are a number of very real quality of life, capacity, encroachment, training access, and operational effectiveness concerns that still seem to be unresolved. What impact on 

training and readiness are anticipated based upon your assessment of where we are 

right now in planning for the future realignment of Marine Forces in the Pacific? 

General CONWAY. If done correctly, the realignment of forces in the Pacific could 

result in improved training and readiness for Marine forces at the individual, unit, 

joint, and coalition level. 

Key to this will be a robust training capability to support marines distributed on 

Okinawa, Guam, and Hawaii. While the ongoing Guam relocation Environmental 

Impact Statement does not address all Marine Corps training requirements, those 

requirements will be addressed by a separate Environmental Impact Statement to 

be initiated by U.S. Pacific Command. This second Environmental Impact Statement will address longstanding shortfalls in the Pacific to conduct combined-arms, 

live-fire, and maneuver training. 

One of the biggest training and readiness advantages that this future realignment 

offers is the basing of Marines on Guam where we can conduct training with our 

allies and partners in the region. This allows us to host training without the restrictions often associated with deploying to foreign countries, reciprocate training that 

have been hosted by our allies and partners, and build strong and meaningful partnerships that improve our ability to respond to contingencies in the region. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR ROLAND W. BURRIS

JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER PROGRAM

23. Senator BURRIS. Secretary Mabus and General Conway, the Joint Strike 

Fighter (JSF) program has been plagued with numerous delays and setbacks. If the 

program continues to be beset with difficulties, at what point will your readiness 

posture be significantly affected? 

Secretary MABUS. As we develop POM–12, any additional delays in the JSF program will impact future readiness. While it is difficult to define a tipping point per 

se, we will actively manage our transition plan based on the JSF production challenges, growth in capabilities, and remaining life on our legacy platforms. The PB11 

tactical aviation resource submission includes the management initiatives necessary 

to retain our readiness posture while we conduct the transition to the JSF. We will 

consider initiating an F/A–18 SLEP program, and further optimize our tactical aircraft depot efficiencies in POM12. 

General CONWAY. Readiness posture is a factor of many complex variables and is 

monitored closely for the Department. Among those variables are aircraft operational use; accidents; resources for depot repair; the type of repair required (that 

cannot always be determined until airframes are inspected); the outcome of service 

life extension programs (SLEP); the availability of spare/repair parts; resources provided to the Services; etc. As such, a precise date is difficult to state or predict at 

this time. The PB11 tactical aviation resource requirements include the manageVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:37 May 06, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00410 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\62155.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
405 

ment initiatives necessary to retain our readiness posture while transitioning to the 

JSF by increasing the F/A–18 SLEP program and further optimizing our tactical 

aircraft depot efficiencies. In fiscal year 2010 we will continue to explore other mitigation alternatives and refine our management actions to ensure readiness as the 

transition matures. 

INTEGRATION OF RESERVES INTO THE TOTAL FORCE

24. Senator BURRIS. Secretary Mabus, Admiral Roughead, and General Conway, 

I applaud the level of integration of the Navy and Marine Corps Reserves into the 

total force structure of the Navy and Marine Corps. How would you characterize the 

success of their integration into the overall missions of the Department of the Navy? 

Secretary MABUS. The integration of the Navy and Marine Corps Reserve Components (RC) into the Total Force is an absolute success. The RC performs missions 

throughout the full spectrum of operations. Their contributions are vital in achieving overall mission success. Their training and readiness are exemplary, and when 

they are called to active duty, they are integrated seamlessly and well. They stand 

shoulder to shoulder with our Active component men and women overseas at this 

very moment, and no distinction is made between Active or Reserve. They truly are 

part of one Navy and Marine Corps team. 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. We have had extraordinary success integrating our Navy reservists into our Total Force. Navy reservists provide half of the Navy’s shore-based 

support to Overseas Contingency Operations in Central Command and African Command, they participated in recent Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief operations in Haiti, and they are called upon regularly to support short-term, emergent 

needs via voluntary Active Duty for Special Work and Definite Recall assignments. 

Navy Reserve personnel continually demonstrate their readiness to respond to emergent missions across a broad spectrum of military operations as an integral part of 

the Navy Total Force. 

We have improved our processes to better facilitate movement between our Active 

and Reserve Forces. Over the last year, we reduced the average time it takes to 

transition from the Active to Reserve component from 30 days to approximately 8 

days and we are aggressively working to reduce that further, to less than 72 hours. 

Additionally, the efforts of our new Career Transition Office (CTO) have increased 

the number of Active component officers who choose to affiliate with the Reserves 

after they separate from 28 percent to 54 percent. The Naval Personnel Command 

is in the process of expanding CTO operations to also encompass transitions for enlisted sailors. We continuously review and adjust our policies and practices to allow 

our Active and Reserve sailors seamless transitions between the two components. 

General CONWAY. The Marine Corps Reserve is a full partner in the total force 

and provides operational capabilities to meet requirements across the range of military operations. The extensive contributions of the Marine Corps Reserve have reduced deployment requirements for the active component, thereby improving the 

health of the total force. More than 54,000 marines from the Selected Reserve and 

the Inactive Ready Reserve have mobilized and deployed in support of Operations 

Enduring Freedom, Iraqi Freedom, or other operational commitments around the 

globe. 

25. Senator BURRIS. Secretary Mabus, Admiral Roughead, and General Conway, 

do you see a need to ask for more funding to cover the costs of full-time manning 

for the reservists? 

Secretary MABUS. The budget that the Department of the Navy submitted will 

allow us to meet every mission. 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. No, the budget as submitted meets our mission requirements. 

General CONWAY. No, we do not see a need to request additional funding. 

WEAR AND TEAR ON THE FORCE

26. Senator BURRIS. General Conway, for the better part of a decade, the Marine 

Corps has been engaged in sustained ground combat. I am concerned about the 

wear and tear on the equipment your marines need to be successful. What potential 

problems do you see with regard to equipment shortfalls and equipment replacement due to sustained operations? 

General CONWAY. To support the requirements in OIF and OEF, the Marine 

Corps has been forced to deplete strategic in-stores equipment and redirect equipment, originally slated to return to CONUS as part of our reset, from Iraq and send 

406 

it to Afghanistan. The result is that 65 percent of our non-deployed units are now 

in a degraded state of readiness, with equipment being the largest contributing factor. Equipment shortages negatively impact training and perhaps more importantly, 

the Marine Corps’ ability respond to another major global contingency. Congress’ 

continued support and investment is needed to reset our ground and aviation assets 

to not only prevail in the current fight, but also to ensure we are prepared to overcome future challenges to U.S. interests and security. 

27. Senator BURRIS. General Conway, how has equipment modernization been affected due to the sustained operations? 

General CONWAY. Our modernization effort is not merely a collection of programs 

but a means of aligning the core capabilities of the MAGTF across the spectrum of 

present and future security challenges. All of our procurement programs are designed to support the full range of military operations. Due to the sustained effort 

of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and our focus on the forward deployed 

warfighter, some of our equipment modernization efforts have been delayed, but we 

continuously reevaluate every program to ensure we remain on track to meet the 

future security challenges. 

28. Senator BURRIS. General Conway, has the Force reached its breaking point 

in terms of stress on your personnel? 

General CONWAY. Despite the increase in unit deployments and the corresponding 

increase in the deployment tempo of our individual marines, the Marine Corps has 

not observed any indicators of adverse impacts, i.e., too much stress, to date. While 

continued high deployment tempo could result in increased attrition, decreased retention rates and decreased accessions, the Marine Corps has not observed any indicators of these adverse impact to date. 

Although not considered a ‘‘breaking point’’, we are also monitoring indicators on 

suicides, sexual assaults, divorce rates, et cetera, for signs of increased stress on the 

force and families. We are taking deliberate action in prevention programming, 

training, and leadership engagement. Examples include: 

• Expanding our program of embedding mental health professionals in 

operational units—the OSCAR program. 

• Enhancing suicide prevention capabilities by reducing stigma through 

senior/peer leadership and effective evocative peer-led training for NCOs. 

• Redesigning family readiness training with LifeSkills courses that specifically address the challenges of military life in order to increase the resiliency of our marines and their families. 

29. Senator BURRIS. General Conway, what programs do you have in place to address immediate and latent combat stress and mental health issues? 

General CONWAY. Addressing immediate and latent combat stress and mental 

health issues in our marines is a paramount priority and a leadership responsibility. 

The Marine Corps Combat and OSC program has two goals: 1. Force preservation 

and readiness and 2. Long-term health and well-being. Currently, Headquarters 

Marine Corps is implementing the OSCAR program. OSCAR extends leadership capabilities and helps build strength, resilience, and readiness in Marines. To further 

assist leaders with prevention, rapid identification, and early treatment of combat 

operational stress, we are expanding our program of embedding mental health professionals in operational units—the OSCAR program—to directly support all Active 

and Reserve ground combat elements. This will be achieved over the next 3 years 

through realignment of existing Navy structure supporting the operating forces, and 

increases in the Navy mental health provider inventory. Currently there are six authorized permanent billets, two at each active division. In fiscal year 2011, 23 additional permanent billets will be authorized in the Active and Reserve divisions. Ultimately, each Active division will have three mental health providers, and each regiment will have two. In the Reserves, the division will have four providers. OSCAR 

capability is also being extended to all deploying units, but is specifically focused 

and prioritized to support infantry battalions by providing additional training to 

OSCAR Extenders (existing medical providers, corpsmen, chaplains, and religious 

program specialists) to make OSCAR expertise immediately available to more marines. 

MINE-RESISTANT AMBUSH-PROTECTED VEHICLES

30. Senator BURRIS. General Conway, I know that force protection is a high priority for our troops deployed in support of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Have 

407 

you and General Casey conferred on the number of mine-resistant ambush-protected 

(MRAP) vehicles that are required for our overseas operations? 

General CONWAY. Along with the Joint Staff, the Army and Marine Corps have 

been working very closely together to ensure both Services have the right mix of 

vehicles for overseas operations. The Marine Corps has loaned the Army 399 Category I Cougars and reallocated 400 MaxxPro Dashes for their use in Afghanistan. 

The Army has reallocated 25 MaxxPro ambulances and 34 M–ATVs to meet Marine 

requirements. Currently we are completing the coordination to reallocate additional 

vehicles to meet service-specific needs. 

31. Senator BURRIS. General Conway, which Department has budgeted for the 

MRAP vehicles? 

General CONWAY. All MRAP funding to date has been received via the MRAP 

Joint Program Office OCO funding requests. It is anticipated that OCO funding will 

decrease with the completion of combat operations, thus transitioning sustainment 

funding responsibilities to the individual Services. Although, the Marine Corps has 

yet to be given an official date when the MRAP sustainment costs would transfer 

we anticipate that the Services will be directed to budget for the sustainment of 

MRAPs as Programs of Record in the near future, potentially as soon as POM–12. 

32. Senator BURRIS. General Conway, will MRAP vehicles play a role in the modernization of the Marine Corps? 

General CONWAY. Our plans for use of MRAP vehicles place them in our engineer 

and EOD units, supporting the Route Reconnaissance and Clearance, EOD and 

other engineer support missions. We have added these vehicles to our unit equipment lists to ensure adequate planning for sustainment of MRAPs, and are currently integrating MRAPs into our MPF planning cycles. 

MRAP vehicles and the new MRAP All Terrain Vehicle (M–ATV) will be included 

in the Marine Corps Ground Combat Tactical Vehicle (GCTV) Strategy. M–ATVs 

have the potential to fill the armament carrier mission role for the light vehicle 

fleet. 

The approved course of action proposed that all MRAPs presently allocated to the 

Marine Corps and determined to be in an appropriate operational condition will be 

retained and designated for one of three locations. (It is assumed for planning purposes that all 2502 MRAPs will remain in serviceable condition upon the completion 

of hostilities. 1218 MRAP/1284 M–ATVs) 

Because none of the MRAP vehicles have the expeditionary qualities, mobility or 

modularity needed by the MAGTF, we continue to be aggressive in developing our 

Program Objective Memorandum to support our long-term commitment to balancing 

our ground vehicles in both traditional and irregular warfare, while accepting the 

MRAP investment as a near-term bridge for protected mobility. 

AMPHIBIOUS FLEET

33. Senator BURRIS. Secretary Mabus and General Conway, the Navy’s budget 

overview states that the 2011 budget provides for a deployable force of 284 ships, 

including 11 aircraft carriers and 29 amphibious ships. The Navy has stated that 

while 38 ships are needed in the amphibious fleet to fully meet amphibious lift requirements, 33 ships will meet minimal requirements at an acceptable level of risk. 

If a 33-ship fleet already presents additional risk, how much extra risk is present 

with the 29-ship fleet supported by the budget? 

Secretary MABUS. The Navy has looked more closely at where it would be willing 

to assume risk for the future and procure only those ships which are absolutely necessary in executing the missions for which the Navy is solely responsible. In completing this review, the Navy has balanced the anticipated risk in the period with 

the uncertainties of the future to achieve the best balance of missions, resources and 

requirements possible. The shipbuilding plan provides a projected battle force that 

balances the level of risk across the fleet; while the long-term risk has increased 

above past assessments, it is acceptable for the force. 

The 2.0 Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) lift, which drives the 33 ship assault echelon requirement, is an amphibious ship combatant inventory demand necessary to support forcible entry operations in Major Combat Operations (MCO). In 

any area of operations below that of major warfare, augmented Maritime 

Prepositioning Ships (MPS) Squadrons will enhance the afloat prepositioning capacity and will continue to support the USMC 2.0 MEB lift requirement by enabling 

a reinforcing MEB to ‘‘marry up’’ ashore with its equipment from one of the three 

MPS squadrons. 

408 

The augmented MPS will enable limited seabasing operations by introducing 

three core capabilities: transfer of vehicles and equipment between ships at sea, delivery of equipment from over the horizon, and sea based sustainment of forces 

ashore. This will facilitate the routine employment of prepositioned equipment in a 

variety of activities across the range of military operations (ROMO) and mitigate 

the impact of lower than desired amphibious ship inventory levels. 

General CONWAY. The Navy has looked more closely at where it would be willing 

to assume risk for the future and not procure those ships which are not absolutely 

necessary in executing the missions for which the Navy is solely responsible. In 

completing this review, the Navy has balanced the anticipated risk in the period 

with the uncertainties of the future to achieve the best balance of missions, resources and requirements possible. The shipbuilding plan provides a projected battle 

force that balances the level of risk across the fleet; while the long-term risk has 

increased above past assessments, it is acceptable for the force. 

Any additional risk in the amphibious force may be mitigated by the Amphibious 

Lift Enhancement Program (ALEP). The ALEP is a program of record developed to 

mitigate the operational risk of the amphibious lift requirement, specifically, the vehicle square footage shortfall. ALEP is designed to provide augmentation to forcible 

entry lift capability in response to national emergency. 

The 2.0 Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) lift is an amphibious combatant inventory requirement in support of Major Combat Operations (MCO). The augmented 

Maritime Prepositioning Ships (MPS) Squadrons will enhance the operational capabilities of afloat prepositioning and will continue to support the USMC 2.0 MEB lift 

requirement by enabling a reinforcing MEB to ‘‘marry up’’ ashore with its equipment from one of the three MPS squadrons. 

The augmented MPS will enable limited seabasing operations by introducing 

three core capabilities: transfer of vehicles and equipment between ships at sea, delivery of equipment from over the horizon, and sea based sustainment of forces 

ashore. The augmented MPS will facilitate the routine employment of prepositioned 

equipment in a variety of activities across the range of military operations (ROMO). 

Given fiscal constraints, DoN will sustain a minimum of 33 total amphibious 

ships in the Assault Echelon, accepting risk in the arrival of combat support and 

sustainment elements of the MEB. The plan maintains an adaptable amphibious 

landing force of approximately 33 ships. 

34. Senator BURRIS. Secretary Mabus and General Conway, what is the long-term 

plan to get to a 33-ship force? 

Secretary MABUS and General CONWAY. It is anticipated that the total number 

of amphibious ships will be at 33 in fiscal year 2016 (LHA–7 and LPD–27 are expected to deliver in fiscal year 2016, resulting in a force of 8 LHDs and 2 LHAs, 

11 LPDs and 12 LSDs). 

Within fiscal constraints, the Department is committed to meeting the Marine 

Corps lift requirements throughout the period of the 30-Year Shipbuilding Plan. In 

fact, the Navy begins procurement of the LSD–41 class replacement, LSD(X), in fiscal year 2017—roughly 3 years earlier than necessary to ameliorate the drop-off in 

amphibious ship inventory that results from the block retirement of the LSD–41 

class. By building the LSD(X) at a 2-year interval, the Navy will have a total of 

11 LSD(X) in the inventory by about 2043. The objective force will be comprised of 

11 LPD–17 class ships, 11 LSD(X), and 11 large-deck amphibious ships. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN

DOD HOMOSEXUAL CONDUCT POLICY

35. Senator MCCAIN. Admiral Roughead and General Conway, what are your 

views about the current Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell (DADT) policy? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. My views are shaped by what is in the best interest of the 

U.S. Navy. At present, we have no empirical data upon which to base an assessment 

of the impact that DADT has had or will likely have on military readiness, recruiting, retention, end strength or attrition. The comprehensive review directed by Secretary Gates will allow us to assess the dynamics and impacts of the current law, 

as well as identify issues and potential impacts of repeal of that law. 

General CONWAY. I believe that the current policy has worked well to carry out 

the requirements directed upon us by Congress via 10 U.S.C. § 654. 

36. Senator MCCAIN. Admiral Roughead and General Conway, do you support retaining the current policy, or do you believe that the law requiring this policy be 

409 

repealed and a new policy permitting openly gay servicemembers to serve in the 

military be put into effect? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. I believe it is essential to first complete the comprehensive 

review directed by Secretary Gates to fully understand all the potential issues and 

impacts associated with changing this law. Since enactment of the law that governs 

the ‘‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell’’ policy, we have been able to field ready forces, meet recruiting and retention goals, dramatically reduce attrition, and meet our end 

strength objectives. The thorough and objective review ordered by the Secretary of 

Defense will allow us to assess the dynamics and impacts of the current law as well 

as the possible impacts that may be associated with repeal or amendment. 

General CONWAY. The President and Secretary of Defense have given us a way 

forward. We will participate in the year-long assessment that the Secretary has directed. Once this study has been completed, we will examine the issue based on the 

information gathered from all sources, including marines and their families. 

My primary interest will be on the effect of any change to readiness and military 

combat effectiveness. 

When I am asked for my advice on this matter, I will support the way forward 

that, at a minimum, maintains the current exceptional warfighting capabilities of 

the Marine Corps. 

37. Senator MCCAIN. Admiral Roughead and General Conway, in his testimony 

before this committee a week ago, Admiral Mullen, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff, indicated that he had worked closely with you and the other Chiefs in understanding what your concerns are about changing the policy. Do you think that 

your concerns have been heard and listened to? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Yes. The Chairman has always been receptive to hearing my 

views on this and other matters affecting the U.S. Navy. 

General CONWAY. The Chairman has always been open and receptive to my input 

on this and other matters impacting the Marine Corps. 

I expect that we will continue to discuss and consult on the study and development on the Department’s position on any future change to the law. 

38. Senator MCCAIN. Admiral Roughead and General Conway, what do you view 

as the purpose of the year-long review that Secretary Gates testified about? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. DOD and the Joint Chiefs owe the President and Congress 

an informed assessment of the implications of a repeal of the ‘‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell’’ 

law. As Secretary Gates has stated, we must understand all issues and potential 

impacts associated with repeal of the law and how we would manage implementation of any repeal in such a way that minimizes disruption to a force engaged in 

combat operations and other demanding military activities around the globe. The 

comprehensive review will objectively and methodically examine all aspects of this 

issue; specific lines of study will address personnel policies, including benefits, base 

housing, and discipline, as well as separation and discharge issues. This study will 

inform us all on this important issue. 

General CONWAY. As stated in the Terms of Reference, the Secretary’s review will 

examine the issues associated with the repeal of the law, should it occur, and will 

include an implementation plan that addresses the impact, if any, on the Department. 

39. Senator MCCAIN. Admiral Roughead and General Conway, is the year-long review to determine whether the current policy should change, or has the decision already been made to repeal the policy in your understanding? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. The memorandum from Secretary Gates, accompanying the 

Terms of Reference for the comprehensive review, provides that ‘‘The Chairman and 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff and I owe the President an assessment of the implications 

of such a repeal, should it occur.’’ 

General CONWAY. As stated in the Terms of Reference, the Secretary’s review will 

examine the issues associated with the repeal of the law, should it occur, and will 

include an implementation plan that addresses the impact, if any, on the Department. 

HIGH LEVEL REVIEW OF DON’T ASK, DON’T TELL

40. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Mabus, Admiral Roughead, and General Conway, 

on February 2, Secretary Gates testified that a high-level working group within 

DOD will review the issues associated with properly implementing a repeal of the 

DADT policy. Part of this review, he testified, will be to reach out to authoritatively 

410 

understand the views and attitudes of the force. Please explain what steps the Navy 

and Marine Corps have been asked to take in order to implement the President’s 

direction to ‘‘begin the preparations necessary for repeal of the current law and policy.’’ 

Secretary MABUS. The Department of the Navy is participating in the comprehensive review ordered by Secretary Gates. The review is designed to assess the implications of a repeal and determine how to implement any potential change Congress 

might make to the law. The Department is providing participants to the Comprehensive Review Working Group and the Executive Committee, comprised of senior service reps—civilian and military, as well as administrative staff in support of 

this review. We will continue to support the review which is due to report its findings to Secretary Gates by December 1, 2010. 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Navy is fully participating in the comprehensive review, and 

is providing working group participants and administrative staff in support of the 

effort. We will continue to support the review which is due to report its findings 

by December 1, 2010. 

General CONWAY. The Marine Corps is participating in the DOD Working Group 

to assess the implications of a repeal of 10 U.S.C. § 654, should that occur, and develop an implementation plan for any new statutory mandate. 

The Marine Corps is providing representation to the Comprehensive Review 

Working Group that will identify the impacts to the force of a repeal of 10 U.S.C. 

§ 654 in areas that include military readiness, military effectiveness, unit cohesion, 

recruiting/retention, and family readiness, and recommend actions that should be 

taken in light of such impacts. 

41. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Mabus, Admiral Roughead, and General Conway, 

what difference will it make, if any, in DOD planning if a significant proportion— 

say 50 percent—of servicemembers and their family members register objection to 

a change in the policy? 

Secretary MABUS. Our servicemembers are professional and dedicated, and they 

will execute the direction provided by the chain of command. I am confident we will 

continue to meet mission requirements. We owe our servic members informed and 

thoughtful decisionmaking. That is why Secretary Gates has asked all of the Services to participate in a comprehensive review, not of whether the ‘‘Don’t Ask, Don’t 

Tell’’ law should change, but what the impact would be should Congress change the 

law and develop an implementation plan for any statutory change. Our department 

is providing participants to the Comprehensive Review Working Group and the Executive Committee, comprised of senior service reps—civilian and military, as well 

as administrative staff in support of this review. We will continue to support the 

review which is due to report its findings to Secretary Gates by December 1, 2010. 

Our servicemembers have every right to expect us to proceed with careful deliberation and to reach decisions that will enhance readiness and advance mission accomplishment. But no matter what decision Congress makes, I am confident our sailors 

and marines will execute their mission fully and successful, just as they have always done. 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. I cannot speculate on what impact opposition to a change 

would have on DOD planning, but we owe our servicemembers informed and 

thoughtful decisionmaking. The comprehensive review will allow us to assess and 

better understand the impacts of the Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell law. Our servicemembers 

and their families have every right to expect us to proceed with careful deliberation 

and to reach decisions that will enhance readiness and advance mission accomplishment. 

General CONWAY. It is not clear to me that this decision will be made using strictly democratic principles. For me, given my title 10 responsibilities, the issue is the 

impact of any change to the current law and policy on readiness and combat effectiveness, not on how many people support that change. 

As instructed, the Department is conducting a review and study of the force to 

gauge the impact of a change to the current law and policy. Our understanding is 

that this study will include input from servicemembers and their families on the potential impact of a repeal of the current law on readiness, military effectiveness and 

unit cohesion, recruiting and retention, and family readiness. 

Once the Department concludes this effort, the Service Chiefs will provide review 

and comment. The Department and Chiefs will then have the opportunity to deliver 

their best advice to the President, and then to Congress. Armed with these recommendations, Congress will be able determine the way forward and we will follow 

this direction. 

411 

COST GROWTH IN JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER AIRCRAFT

42. Senator MCCAIN. Admiral Roughead and General Conway, do you expect that 

additional cost growth in the JSF program arising from Secretary Gates’ decision 

to restructure the program in December 2009 will trigger a Nunn-McCurdy breach? 

Please explain your answer. 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. DOD reported a Nunn-McCurdy breach in the JSF program 

in its December 2009 F–35 Selected Acquisition Report, which was delivered to Congress on 2 April. The report was based on the independent Joint Estimating Team 

(JET II) assessment, led by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation. The JET II determined that F–35 program cost 

increases were a result of: higher than planned development costs due to weightdriven performance issues identified in 2003, and the related schedule extension to 

address them; an increase in labor and overhead rates; degradation of airframe commonality; reduction in Department of Navy planned procurement quantities, from 

1,089 to 680 aircraft; increases in commodity prices (particularly titanium); and 

major subcontractor cost growth. 

General CONWAY. Defer to OSD. 

43. Senator MCCAIN. Admiral Roughead and General Conway, in the context of 

a projected shortfall in the Navy’s tactical strike-fighter capability over the 

intermediate- to long-term, what would that mean for the Navy? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. The Department of the Navy (DoN) has the necessary tactical aircraft capacity in the near term to support our Nation’s strategic demands; 

however, ongoing assessments forecast a potential decrease in our strike fighter inventory that will peak at the end of this decade. We plan on addressing this inventory decrease through aggressive and precise management strategies that include 

service-life extension programs to prolong the use of existing F/A–18 A–D aircraft, 

reducing the number of aircraft available in our non-deployed squadrons to the minimum required, accelerating the transition of seven legacy squadrons to F/A–18 E/ 

F Super Hornets (using F/A–18E/F attrition aircraft in two cases), and maximizing 

depot level throughput to return legacy strike fighter aircraft to the Fleet more 

quickly. Collectively, these measures will extend the service life of our legacy aircraft and make the projected inventory decrease manageable. 

While the F/A–18 fleet continues to meet operational needs in the current conflicts, the timely delivery of the JSF remains critical to our future strike fighter capacity. I remain committed to the JSF program and am watching it closely as the 

program restructures and a new program manager takes office. 

General CONWAY. The USMC will preserve our legacy fleets of Harriers and Hornets with sufficient funding while awaiting the fifth generation STOVL JSF. This 

is the best option to balance the requirement to fulfill operational commitments 

with legacy aircraft, while funding the development and procurement of the JSF. 

We are taking proactive steps today to preserve the legacy fleets, maintain their 

operational relevance, and continuing these efforts until the production of STOVL 

is sufficient to fully transition our Harriers, Hornets, and Prowlers to the STOVL 

variant. 

44. Senator MCCAIN. Admiral Roughead and General Conway, the F–35 JSF program, already facing a 1-year delay, could be heading toward a breach of NunnMcCurdy cost growth limits. Will the Navy and Marine Corps be equipped with the 

F–35 in time to have the required capabilities they need, when they need it? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. The Navy remains on schedule to deploy its F–35C carrier 

variant strike fighter with the required Block III capability as planned in 2016. 

While the JSF program restructuring directed by the Secretary of Defense pushed 

back F–35C Initial Operating Capability (IOC) to 2016, this IOC reflects our requirement for a squadron of 10 Block III aircraft that have completed Initial Operating Test & Evaluation and are ready to deploy. We will begin to receive JSF aircraft into our squadrons in 2014 and anticipate their deployment in 2016. 

General CONWAY. We are confident the action taken by the Secretary of Defense 

to address the testing and production problems in PB–11 establish a viable program 

that continues to support a Marine Corps December 2012 IOC. 

45. Senator MCCAIN. Admiral Roughead and General Conway, I’m concerned 

about the Naval Air Systems Command’s (NAVAIR) recent finding that the Navy’s 

version of the F–35 JSF may be considerably more expensive to operate than the 

legacy aircraft that it was intended to replace. Is NAVAIR’s analysis reflected in the 

Navy’s budget proposal this year? 

412 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. I have directed my leaders to study and understand the total 

ownership costs (TOCs) of new and existing systems. The NAVAIR estimate of JSF 

cost per flight hour is consistent with that direction. It is not prudent to conclude 

the TOCs of JSF based on the NAVAIR study alone. Navy has not yet completed 

operational testing of the carrier variant and flight hour costs are only one aspect 

of JSF TOCs. Understanding and controlling TOCs is a priority for the U.S. Navy, 

and we will continue to pursue ways to reduce our long-term operations and support 

costs for all our ships and aircraft. 

General CONWAY. No, the assessment you are referring to is not an official estimate, or considered a finished product, nor has it been refined or corrected to accurately compare operation and support (O&S) costs between a legacy supportability 

construct and the JSF evolutionary international collaborative approach to 

sustainment. 

We are realizing today the Congressional Budget Office analysis from 2001, age 

does cause higher O&S cost increases ranging from 1 percent to 3 percent for every 

additional year of age. The average age today of our F/A–18s is 19 years and will 

reach 32 years by retirement in 2023, increasing O&S costs by over 50 percent. The 

cost of recapitalization and modernization of our legacy aircraft will soon exceed the 

cost of procuring and sustaining an aircraft with more relevant capabilities and 

technology that will substantially increase survivability, reliability and maintainability. 

Managing the future O&S costs of the JSF is a joint DOD and international endeavor that requires deliberate action and finite analysis now in the early acquisition phase of the program to ensure affordability as the JSF ages through the next 

30 plus years of service life. The JSF program is just now maturing to the point 

where we can move from modeling cost to assessing the actual cost of operating the 

aircraft with our first deliveries in 2010. 

F–35 JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER LIGHTNING TESTING AND ENGINEERING ISSUES

46. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Mabus, Admiral Roughead, and General Conway, 

I continue to be concerned about the F–35 Lightning II acquisition program, even 

with Secretary Gates’ decision to restructure the program in December 2009. Basically, at this point, I am concerned about whether the program will make the deadlines by which it is supposed to deliver aircraft with initial operating capability 

(IOC) to each of the Services, the program’s ability to manage software risk, the 

testing program’s ability to detect and anticipate problems, and the capability of 

those aircraft that will be delivered under low-rate initial production (LRIP). A few 

weeks ago, the Director, Operational Testing and Evaluation (DOT&E) found that 

‘‘[c]ontinued production concurrent with the slow increase in flight testing over the 

next 2 years will commit DOD and the Services to test, training, and deployment 

plans with substantial risk.’’ Do you share that concern, particularly as it relates 

to the Navy’s version of the fighter? 

Secretary MABUS. The F–35 program was structured with known concurrency that 

will remain, though reduced, with the SECDEF directed F–35 program restructure. 

The DOD decision to restructure the F–35 Program was in response to multiple Department studies and reports including DOT&E’s most recent Operational Test report. The F–35 program restructure mitigates many of the risks highlighted by 

DOT&E and the GAO, though the Department acknowledges that F–35 program 

risks will continue, as would any major defense acquisition program. Software risk 

will be mitigated by the addition of another software integration line to preclude 

mission systems software from becoming a limiting factor during SDD. The F–35 

test program risks will be mitigated by the continuation of a test program assessment in conjunction with the support and advice of DOT&E. An Integrated Test Review Team composed of experts in developmental test and operational test continues 

to mature test program plans to ensure program technical maturity is aligned with 

Initial Operating Capability (IOC) dates; operational assessments are optimized; 

new opportunities for integrated test are matured; test schedule margins are realistic; and the proposed flow of technical data enables the planned operational test 

periods. To help mitigate aircraft assets required during testing, the program is adding one carrier variant (CV) aircraft to the SDD program in order to expand developmental testing capacity and will utilize three low-rate initial production (LRIP) 

aircraft in support of development testing. USMC IOC requirements encompass capabilities, equipment, training, and support metrics that will measure the progress 

of the program office to meet our goals and enable the Marine Corps to ensure all 

the tenets for operational use of the F–35B are ready. The Navy IOC date is based 

on sufficient aircraft quantities; desired capability to conduct all ORD missions, to 

413 

include, but not limited to, AI, OCA, DCA, CAS, SEAD/DEAD and CSAR in a denied, near-peer environment better than legacy aircraft; and completion of operational test of that capability. Based upon the SECDEF directed F–35 program restructure and Navy/Marine Corps IOC requirements, the Marine Corps F–35B IOC 

in 2012 and the Navy F–35C IOC in 2016. 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. I continue to watch the JSF program carefully. The F–35 

program restructure directed by the Secretary of Defense mitigates many of the 

risks highlighted by the most recent DOT&E Operational Test report; however, the 

Department acknowledges that risk in the F–35 program will continue. To mitigate 

this risk, we will add one F–35C carrier variant aircraft to the System Development 

and Demonstration (SDD) program in order to expand developmental testing capacity; we will utilize three LRIP aircraft in support of development testing; and we 

will add another software integration line to preclude mission systems software 

from becoming a limiting factor during SDD. These three steps, taken together, establish a viable program and continue to support the Navy’s 2016 IOC and the Marine Corps’ 2012 IOC. 

General CONWAY. With the recent program restructuring approved by 

USD(AT&L), the F–35B IOC is projected to be 2012 and the F–35C IOC is projected 

to be 2016. The action taken by the SECDEF to address the testing and production 

problems in PB–11 establish a viable program that continues to support a Marine 

Corps December 2012 IOC. USMC IOC requirements encompass capabilities, equipment, training, and support metrics that will measure the progress of the program 

office to meet our goals and enable the Marine Corps to ensure all the tenets for 

operational use of the F–35B are ready. 

Navy IOC is contingent on the requirement to deploy an ORD compliant, Block 

3 aircraft with IOT&E complete. 

47. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Mabus, Admiral Roughead, and General Conway, 

with the Navy to accept delivery of its first squadrons with IOC in 2012 (for the 

Marine Corps) and 2014 (for the Navy), where do you see the most significant risk 

with respect to the Navy’s versions of the fighter? 

Secretary MABUS. Based upon the SECDEF F–35 Program Restructure, the Marine Corps F–35B IOC will remain in 2012 and the Navy F–35C IOC will be in 

2016. 

The earlier Navy IOC of 2014 was based on three items: sufficient aircraft quantities; capability; and completion test. Based on the program and test schedule restructure and delivery of fiscal year 2011 procured aircraft, the Navy IOC has been 

revised to be in 2016. The most stressing Navy IOC capability requirement is Destruction of Enemy Air Defenses which requires a highly integrated mission systems 

suite and stand-off weapons. Further delays in delivery of capabilities are the most 

significant risk to the Navy IOC—with any further delays exacerbating the overall 

strike fighter shortfall. Moreover, the Navy requires a sufficient ramp to stand-up 

a training squadron and a fleet squadron prior to declaring IOC. The Navy’s intent 

is to stand up squadrons as aircraft become available and declare IOC when sufficient capability is tested and delivered. And as with any complex weapon system 

development program, unforeseen discovery during F–35B/F–35C test will remain a 

risk until completion of IOT&E. 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. The most significant risk to Navy’s version of the F–35 JSF 

is further delay in the delivery of capabilities required to achieve carrier variant 

IOC, which is currently scheduled for 2016. IOC will occur once the capabilities 

identified in our Operational Requirements Document for JSF are attained. Navy 

F–35C IOC is defined as outfitting a squadron with 10 Operational Requirement 

Document (ORD) compliant, Block III aircraft ready to deploy with Initial Operational Test and Evaluation (IOT&E) complete. 

General CONWAY. The most significant risk to IOC is the late delivery of aircraft 

to flight test and delays in mission system and ALIS software build/test. Both have 

been addressed by the Secretary of Defense in his restructure of the program in PB– 

11. 

48. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Mabus, Admiral Roughead, and General Conway, 

as you know, NAVAIR effectively determined a few weeks ago that the Marine 

Corps and the Navy’s version of the JSF may end up being too expensive to operate, 

with each flight hour ultimately costing about $31,000 compared with about $19,000 

per flight hour for current F/A–18 Hornets and AV–8B Harriers—considerably higher than the costs to operate than the legacy aircraft they were intended to replace. 

Have you reviewed NAVAIR’s analysis and, if so, do you agree with its finding on 

expected operating costs of JSF? 

414 

Secretary MABUS. I have directed my leaders to study and understand the TOCs 

of new and existing systems. The NAVAIR estimate of JSF cost per flight hour is 

consistent with that direction. However, it is not prudent to conclude the TOCs of 

JSF based on the NAVAIR study alone. The Department of the Navy has not yet 

completed operational testing of its two JSF variants and flight hour costs are only 

one aspect of JSF TOCs. Understanding and controlling TOCs is a priority for the 

Department, and we will continue to pursue ways to reduce our long-term operations and support costs for all our ships and aircraft. 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. I have directed my leaders to study and understand the 

TOCs of new and existing systems. The NAVAIR estimate of JSF cost per flight 

hour is consistent with that direction. It is not prudent to conclude the TOCs of JSF 

based on the NAVAIR study alone. Navy has not yet completed operational testing 

of the carrier variant and flight hour costs are only one aspect of JSF TOCs. Understanding and controlling TOCs is a priority for the U.S. Navy, and we will continue 

to pursue ways to reduce our long-term operations and support costs for all our 

ships and aircraft. 

General CONWAY. The department is on the front end of reviewing JSF TOCs and 

assumptions. The brief is a working document and has yet to be coordinated across 

the program office, the services and senior leadership. 

The NAVAIR cost team brief on TOCs is a pre-decisional brief. These types of 

briefs are developed to inform leadership of ongoing technical analyses and provide 

options and consequences as we work to deliver affordable programs. In a program 

such as the JSF, these analyses are constantly evolving. The brief is an internal 

working document and provides points for discussion in support of achieving successful and affordable fielding of all variants of the JSF. 

The operating and support (O&S) costs in the working document are not definitive 

and are subject to variance based on potential courses of action. The Navy Department is fully coordinated with OSD, the Air Force and the Joint Program Office in 

executing this critical program. 

49. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Mabus, Admiral Roughead, and General Conway, 

if you do, what does that mean for the Navy’s JSF program and what kind of mix 

should we achieve in terms of the Navy’s future strike-fighter force? 

Secretary MABUS. The Department’s commitment to tactical aviation integration 

is enduring. We view the integration of our forces as the best means for the Department to balance operational and programmatic risk. We are committed to making 

a mix decision at the earliest opportunity based upon F–35 program maturity as defined by discreet and successful program events and accomplishments. Among those 

key events is F–35B test burn down; F–35B/L-class Sea Trials; F–35C test burn 

down; F–35C/CVN sea-trials; and assessment of F–35B/CVN interoperability. Upon 

completion of these, and other key program milestones, the Department will make 

a determination on the proper mix between F–35B and F–35C variants. We anticipate this decision could be made after the completion of the JSF program SDD in 

accordance with the F–35 program restructure. 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. The Navy is committed to the JSF program and has not 

changed the total number of JSF aircraft it intends to buy. Our carrier air wings 

will continue to have a mix of Super Hornet and JSF into the 2030s that will bring 

great capability across a wide range of operations. Those capabilities include 

stealthy, deep penetrating strike, netted far-reaching sensors, and lethal close air 

support to troops in contact with enemy forces. 

General CONWAY. The Department’s commitment to tactical aviation integration 

is enduring. We view the integration of our forces as the best means for the Department to balance operational and programmatic risk. We are committed to making 

a mix decision at the earliest opportunity based upon F–35 program maturity as defined by discreet and successful program events and accomplishments. Among those 

key events is F–35B test burn down; F–35B/L-class Sea Trials; F–35C test burn 

down; F–35C/CVN sea-trials; and assessment of F–35B/CVN interoperability. Upon 

completion of these, and other key program milestones, the Department will make 

a determination on the proper mix between F–35B and F–35C variants. We anticipate this decision could be made after the completion of the JSF program SDD in 

accordance with the F–35 program restructure. 

50. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Mabus, Admiral Roughead, and General Conway, 

how is NAVAIR’s assessment reflected in your current budget proposal? 

Secretary MABUS. I have directed my leaders to study and understand the TOCs 

of new and existing systems. The NAVAIR estimate of JSF cost per flight hour is 

consistent with that direction. However, it is not prudent to conclude the TOCs of 

JSF based on the NAVAIR study alone. The Department of the Navy has not yet 

415 

completed operational testing of its two JSF variants and flight hour costs are only 

one aspect of JSF TOCs. Understanding and controlling TOCs is a priority for the 

Department, and we will continue to pursue ways to reduce our long-term operations and support costs for all our ships and aircraft. 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. I have directed my leaders to study and understand the 

TOCs of new and existing systems. The NAVAIR estimate of JSF cost per flight 

hour is consistent with that direction. It is not prudent to conclude the TOCs of JSF 

based on the NAVAIR study alone. Navy has not yet completed operational testing 

of the carrier variant and flight hour costs are only one aspect of JSF TOCs. Understanding and controlling TOCs is a priority for the U.S. Navy, and we will continue 

to pursue ways to reduce our long-term operations and support costs for all our 

ships and aircraft. 

General CONWAY. The assessment you are referring to is not an official estimate, 

or considered a finished product, nor has it been refined or corrected to accurately 

compare O&S costs between a legacy supportability construct and the JSF evolutionary international collaborative approach to sustainment. 

F–35 JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER AND INITIAL OPERATING CAPABILITY

51. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Mabus, Admiral Roughead, and General Conway, 

when Secretary Gates testified here on DOD’s budget request a few weeks ago, he 

explained that, while the JSF program is holding schedule in terms of when the 

Services can expect to take delivery of fighters with IOC, he expects that fewer 

quantities may be delivered. I understand that the JSF program’s IOC date for the 

Marine Corps is 2012 and for the Navy is 2014. What is your understanding of how 

many fighters with IOC will be delivered to the Navy and Marine Corps by that 

time? Please explain. 

Secretary MABUS. The current program plan stands up the first two training 

squadrons (USAF and USMC) at Eglin in 2010 and delivers production aircraft to 

the Marine Corps in 2012, Air Force in 2013, and Navy in 2014. Each service has 

differing requirements for Initial Operational Capability (IOC) depending upon what 

capabilities each Service requires at IOC encompassing aircraft performance, equipment, training, testing, and support. Based upon the F–35 program restructure 

schedule, the Marine Corps will have an IOC in 2012 and the Navy will IOC in 

2016. The Marine Corps plans to IOC with 10 BLK 2 F–35Bs and the Navy plans 

to IOC with 10 ORD compliant BLK 3 F–35Cs. 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. The current JSF program plan begins to deliver production 

aircraft to the Marine Corps in 2012 and the Navy in 2014. Navy will begin to accept JSF aircraft into its squadrons in 2014, and we expect Initial Operational Capability (IOC) of the F–35C to occur in 2016 with 10, Operational Requirements 

Document (ORD)-compliant, Block III aircraft that are ready to deploy. The Marine 

Corps expects to achieve IOC of the F–35B in 2012 with 10, Operational Requirements Document (ORD)-compliant, Block IIB aircraft. 

General CONWAY. The current program plan stands up the first two training 

squadrons (USAF and USMC) at Eglin in 2010 and delivers production aircraft to 

the Marine Corps in 2012, Air Force in 2013, and Navy in 2014. Each service has 

differing requirements for Initial Operational Capability (IOC) depending upon what 

‘capabilities’ each Service requires at IOC encompassing aircraft performance, equipment, training, testing, and support. Based upon the revised JET II schedule, the 

Marine Corps will have an IOC in 2012 and the Navy intends to IOC in 2016. The 

Marine Corps plan to IOC with 10 BLK 2 F–35Bs and the Navy plans to IOC with 

10 BLK 3 F–35Cs. 

52. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Mabus, Admiral Roughead, and General Conway, 

looking ahead to 2010, in your view what milestones do you believe the Joint Program Office (JPO) and prime contractor must complete on time and on budget to 

achieve the Navy’s IOC dates? 

Secretary MABUS. Key 2010 planned events include the following: complete the 

first F–35B Vertical Landing [accomplished March 19, 2010]; complete the first F– 

35C flight; deliver Block 1.0 software to flight test; deliver at least three aircraft 

to Eglin AFB; commence flight training operations at Eglin AFB; deliver 11 test aircraft to Naval Air Station Patuxent River and Edwards AFB; and complete 400 

flight tests. 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. The Joint Program Office (JPO) and prime contractor should 

accomplish the following milestones planned for 2010: completing the first F–35B 

Vertical Landing (accomplished on 19 March 2010); completing the first F–35C 

flight; delivering Block 1.0 software to flight test; delivering at least three aircraft 

416 

and commencing flight training operations at Eglin AFB; delivering the required 

test aircraft to Naval Air Station Patuxent River and Edwards AFB to complete test 

programs supporting IOT&E completion in 2016. 

General CONWAY. In 2010 we concur with the Joint Program Office’s objectives 

are the requisite milestones needed to keep on track to IOC. These include; ALIS 

operational at the Eglin Integrated Training Center, award of the LRIP 4 contract, 

delivery of Block 1.0 Software to Flight Test, commence flight training at Eglin, 

complete training for 125 maintenance personnel, deliver at least 3 aircraft to Eglin, 

deliver 11 test aircraft to Pax and Edwards, demonstrate flight test rate of 12 Fts/ 

Acft/Mo, and complete 400 test flights. For the Marine Corps key milestones are the 

standup of the first training squadron at Eglin, the completion of the West and East 

Coast Environmental Studies, and starting flight training of the first STOVL pilots. 

53. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Mabus, Admiral Roughead, and General Conway, 

I know that the dates by which all the Services intend to take delivery of JSFs with 

IOC are being maintained. While, for the Navy, IOC means ‘‘full warfighting capability and mission functionality’’, for the Marine Corps it means ‘‘interim 

warfighting capabilities, basic weapons and moderate mission system capabilities’’. 

However, development on the JSF is not expected to be completed (per Deputy Secretary’s statement a few days ago) before November 2015 or, more likely (per the 

Joint Estimating Teams’ original assessment), by April 2017. That is well after the 

IOC squadrons are supposed to be delivered to the Navy in 2012 and 2015. 

Therefore, it seems to me that the only way the Navy will be able to take delivery 

of its IOC squadrons on time is by accepting less initial capability and defer some 

requirements to a future upgrade program. Given the likelihood that, in others 

words, the definition of IOC for your JSF squadrons will have to change, what is 

that new definition? 

Secretary MABUS. With the recent program restructuring approved by the Secretary of Defense, the IOC for the F–35B is 2012 and 2016 for the F–35C. The actions taken by the Secretary of Defense include procuring an additional F–35C aircraft to be used for flight testing, loaning three early production aircraft to developmental test and directing the addition of another software integration line to the 

program. These three steps, taken together, establish a viable program and continue 

to support the DoN IOC dates. 

Each service has a somewhat different definition of IOC depending on what capabilities they intend to have at IOC, their operational and testing requirements, and 

the number of aircraft they require for IOC. For the Marine Corps, IOC is defined 

as a squadron of 10 F–35B Block 2 aircraft able to execute the full range of TACAIR 

directed mission sets and deploy on F–35B compatible ships and austere expeditionary sites. For the Navy F–35C, IOC date is based on three items: sufficient aircraft quantities, desired capability to conduct all ORD missions, to include, but not 

limited to, AI, OCA, DCA, CAS, SEAD/DEAD and CSAR in a denied, near-peer environment better than legacy aircraft; and completion of operational test of that capability test. 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. The Navy is retaining its definition of IOC as Operational 

Requirements Document (ORD)-compliant, Block III aircraft that have completed 

Initial Operational Test & Evaluation (IOT&E). As a result of the recent program 

restructuring approved by the Secretary of Defense, the IOC for Navy’s F–35C is 

currently in 2016. 

General CONWAY. The F–35B Block 2B is a far superior aircraft than any aircraft 

in the DoN inventory. With VLO survivability, a powerful integrated sensor suite, 

fused information displays, interoperable joint connectivity, a precision weapon capability, and self protect anti-air weapons it is a total package of capabilities that 

will revolutionize our expeditionary Marine Air-Ground combat power in all threat 

environments while reducing the reliance on supporting aircraft, tankers and 

jammers, and enabling joint interoperability with newer systems. 

The aircraft and equipment required to meet IOC were procured in fiscal years 

2008, 2009, and 2010. The training facilities for our aircrew and maintenance personnel are on track at the Joint Integrated Training Center at Eglin AFB. 

The remaining infrastructure that enables IOC to include environmental studies, 

and facilities ashore and afloat is on schedule. 

Our IOC requirements and associated metrics that encompass capabilities, equipment, training, and support will measure the progress of the program office to meet 

our goals between now and December 2012 and enable the Marine Corps to ensure 

all the elements required for operational use of the F–35B are ready. 

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JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER—MARINE CORPS VARIANT

54. Senator MCCAIN. General Conway, the draft Government Accountability Office 

(GAO) report released for DOD comment on February 12, 2010, lists a large number 

of critical issues facing JSF. In particular, the Marine Corps IOC date of 2012 does 

not appear to be achievable unless the Marine Corps accepts aircraft that are far 

below full combat capability which will have to be upgraded later at significant expense for retrofitting. The system development and demonstration (SDD) phase for 

the F–35 extends until April 2017 under the most recent December 2009 estimate 

cited by GAO based on multiple sources including NAVAIR and DOT&E, and GAO 

predicts that technical, manufacturing, and testing delays will further delay completion of the SDD wring out of potential problems. Why would the Marine Corps accept an IOC date that is 5 years or more before SDD shake out of the program is 

complete? 

General CONWAY. For the Marine Corps F–35B, IOC is defined as a squadron of 

10 aircraft able to execute the full range of TACAIR directed mission sets and to 

deploy on F–35B-compatible ships and to austere expeditionary sites. The Marine 

Corps plans to IOC with a multi-mission support capable Block 2B aircraft, primarily close air support and enhanced air interdiction. 

With the recent program restructuring, IOC is projected to be 2012 for the F–35B 

which is based on operational requirements and the associated metrics that encompass capabilities, equipment, training, and support that will measure the progress 

of the program to meet the USMC requirements between now and December 2012 

and enable the Marine Corps to ensure all the elements required for operational use 

of the F–35B are ready. An IOC declaration will be dependent upon meeting these 

requirements. 

55. Senator MCCAIN. General Conway, key milestones for the program have shifted 2 to 3 years to the right since the Program of Record was established in December 2008, yet the Marine Corps IOC has remained unchanged as 2012. Does this 

indicate that an IOC of 2012 cannot be met with an acceptable level or risk given 

the current delays in development, production, and testing? 

General CONWAY. We are confident the action taken by the Secretary of Defense 

to address the testing and production problems in PB–11 establish a viable program 

that continues to support a Marine Corps December 2012 IOC. 

CONCERNS ABOUT JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER

56. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Mabus, the concurrency structured into the JSF 

program’s test, production and training plans has obscured the mission capability 

of LRIP aircraft and support systems. How will DOD, under its proposed budget, 

improve the process by which the mission capability of LRIP systems will be accurately and credibly predicted well before delivery? 

Secretary MABUS. The F–35 program was structured with known concurrency that 

will remain, though reduced, with the SECDEF directed F–35 program restructure. 

The DOD decision to restructure the F–35 Program was in response to multiple Department studies and assessments. The Independent Manufacturing Review Team 

(IMRT) examined the transition from development to production. The IMRT recommended the program adopt a somewhat flatter and smoother ramp. The Joint Estimating Team (JET II) accepted this revised ramp and moved it later in time with 

the delayed progress of the development program. By doing so, the risk of concurrency is lowered. 

As part of the program restructure, several steps have been taken to partially restore SDD schedule. To help mitigate aircraft assets required during testing, Secretary Gates directed the procurement of one carrier variant (CV) aircraft to the 

SDD program in order to expand developmental testing capacity, and will utilize 

some LRIP aircraft in support of development testing. Secretary Gates also directed 

the addition of another software integration line to the program, to prevent the 

building of mission systems software from becoming a limiting factor on the development schedule. Finally, contract negotiations are currently underway to ensure the 

contractor is held accountable in meeting or exceeding a defined set of milestones 

connected to fee on the development contract. 

The scrutiny of the review teams has informed the actions taken by the Department to ensure the program is executable. It’s also important to note that during 

the extensive reviews that led to the program restructure, no fundamental technology or manufacturing problems were discovered, nor were there any changes to 

F–35 performance requirements. All F–35 variants are projected to meet their respective Key Performance Parameters. 

418 

57. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Mabus, I understand that the JPO is executing 

a comprehensive, robust, and fully funded live fire test plan. However, the program 

recently removed shutoff fuses for engine fueldraulics lines. Coupled with the prior 

removal of dry bay fire extinguishers, this may increase the likelihood of aircraft 

combat losses from ballistic threat-induced fires. At present, only the Integrated 

Power Plant (IPP) bay has a fire suppression system. Though the JSF Executive 

Steering Board (JESB) has approved the JPO’s request to remove these safety systems as an acceptable system trade to balance weight, cost, and risk, DOT&E remains concerned regarding the aircraft’s vulnerability to threat-induced fires. What 

is your appraisal of DOT&E’s concern here? 

Secretary MABUS. The Department is committed to delivering the most affordable, 

supportable, lethal and survivable F–35 aircraft that meets the needs of the 

warfighter. The overall survivability posture of the F–35 is without equal due to advanced avionics and sensor suite, fifth generation stealth performance, advanced 

countermeasures and robust, balanced vulnerability reduction design. The 

warfighting effectiveness of each design feature is carefully balanced against the 

overall system impact to cost, weight, and supportability. The removal of PAO shutoff valves and fuses for engine fueldraulic lines resulted in a minimal (.05 PK) impact on the vulnerability assessment, no impact on the safety assessment, avoids 

∼11 lbs. per aircraft in weight, avoids ∼$40,000 (CTOL and CV)—$50,000 (STOVL) 

per aircraft in procurement costs, and avoids ∼$1.4 million in development costs. 

The JESB decision included a requirement to update the vulnerability assessment 

after conclusion of the Live Fire Testing in calendar year 2011. All F–35 aircraft 

vulnerability data will then be re-assessed. 

EXPEDITIONARY FIGHTING VEHICLE

58. Senator MCCAIN. General Conway, the fiscal year 2011 budget calls for $243 

million in research and development (R&D) for production, testing, and evaluation 

of seven SDD2 vehicles. That is $34.7 million per vehicle in fiscal year 2011 alone. 

At what point and based on what criteria will the Marine Corps determine whether 

it is cost effective to continue the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle program? 

General CONWAY. The success criteria for the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle were 

stated in previous testimony, the Program must pass five key decision points that 

will evaluate the planned operational assessments, ability to meet KPPs, as well as 

the program cost and schedule metrics. 

MV–22 OSPREY TILT-ROTOR AIRCRAFT

59. Senator MCCAIN. General Conway, readiness rates of the MV–22 in Afghanistan have been reported as in the mid-60s, trending towards the 70s. On the other 

hand, the Army’s new CH–47F is experiencing readiness rates in Afghanistan in the 

80s and 90s, consistent with refinement of a platform that has been in use for decades. The CH–47F can reach speeds greater than 175 mph and transport more than 

21,000 pounds, and with Aviation Extended Range Fuel System, has a mission radius of more than 400 nautical miles. The CH–47F can carry 66 combat-loaded soldiers or marines. Should the Marine Corps consider the CH–47F as an alternative 

to the MV–22? 

General CONWAY. No. The MV–22B is the premier medium lift assault support 

platform in the inventory, and has performed all combat tasking in Iraq and Afghanistan without any combat losses. The MV–22B has several characteristics that 

make it superior to the CH–47D and F for Marine Aviation purposes. 

• The MV–22B’s ability to leverage its speed to rapidly build combat power 

in an objective through shorter sortie cycle times surpasses that of the CH– 

47. This was most recently demonstrated in the assault on Now Zad in Afghanistan, when the MV–22Bs were inbound with their second wave of 

troops as the helicopters were landing with their first. 

• By virtue of its design, the MV–22B transits the battlespace at 270kts 

ground speed in altitude sanctuary compared to 160kts in the heart of the 

threat as is typical for high-end traditional rotorcraft. 

• The MV–22B is built for survivability, including excellent ballistic tolerance, low IR signature, low aural signature, and widely dispersed and redundant systems. 

• The MV–22B combat radius with 24 combat troops is 325nm or better 

with internal fuel. No extended range fuel tanks are required. 

• Much like the CH–53E that can carry 55 combat troops with center-line 

seating installed yet carries 24 troops by operational procedure, the CH– 

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47 does not routinely leverage its maximum seating capacity by convention 

in combat. 

• MV–22B fulfills the medium lift requirement for the Marine Corps. The 

CH–47 would be a redundant heavy lift platform. 

• BDM Federal noted in the 1994 Medium Lift Replacement COEA Phase 

II: 

‘‘These studies generally showed that the productivity benefits resulting from carrying larger loads are negated when aircraft survivability is taken into account. 

That is, loading more troops onto each aircraft meant that more assets would be 

lost when an aircraft was downed as large capacity aircraft were also the least survivable. Studies have verified a medium lift requirement when force effectiveness 

is balanced against attrition.’’ 

• The MV–22B has specific design features to make it suitable for shipboard operations, including folding blades and wing, electromagnetic hardening, and powered steering for self-taxi on the flight deck. To operate 

aboard ship, the CH–47 would have to add blade fold capacity and make 

landing gear modifications. 

• The CH–47F operating cost of $6,899 per hour does not include Depot Level Repair charges. The current Fleet MV–22B operating cost of $11,488 

includes Depot charges, which account for roughly 50 percent of its parts 

costs. 

• At the completion of the current multi-year procurement agreement, we 

will have procured 243 of our 360 program of record. Adding a second Type/ 

Model/Series to conduct the medium-lift mission would significantly increase the program, training, and support costs. 

PROCUREMENT OF H–1 HELICOPTER

60. Senator MCCAIN. General Conway, last year, the House of Representatives cut H–1 funding by over $300 million as a funding source for the F–35 alternate engine 

based on concern about Bell’s ability to meet the production ramp. Can Bell meet 

the ramp for 31 H–1s requested in fiscal year 2011? 

General CONWAY. Yes. Manufacturing planning, processes and tooling are in place 

to support 31 aircraft production a year. Bell has consistently delivered both the 

UH–1Y and AH–1Z production aircraft 30 days or more ahead of contract requirements. This performance has been demonstrated and maintained even after a 6 

week labor strike experienced in July/August 2009. 

61. Senator MCCAIN. General Conway, how important are these H–1 assets for 

the fight in Afghanistan, given their increased capability? 

General CONWAY. These aircraft are vital to fight supporting our marines on the 

ground. Last November, Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron (HMLA)-367 deployed to Afghanistan with a full complement of nine UH–1Y aircraft. In their first 

three months HMLA–367 posted mission capable rates in excess of 77 percent while 

flying an average of 40 flight hours per aircraft per month—over two times the 

planned utilization rate of 18.9—while also playing a critical role in successes 

achieved in the Now Zad Valley of Helmand Province. The UH–1Y has not missed 

an assigned launch to date and has flown a multitude of missions in theater including troop and cargo transport, command and control, aerial and armed reconnaissance, armed escort, and close air support. The UH–1Y’s increased payload, range 

and endurance has resulted in the ability to carry more marines, more payload and 

more ordnance while increasing time on station throughout the entire spectrum of 

utility missions. The legacy UH–1N Huey forced aircrews to sacrifice either payload, 

time on station, or both, whereas UH–1Y aircrews no longer have to make those 

sacrifices. Additionally, the UH–1Y’s increased engine power and performance have 

been particularly important during missions flown at higher altitudes and in hotter 

temperatures. 

ENERGY ALTERNATIVES

62. Senator MCCAIN. General Conway, please describe the alternative you are 

pursuing to reduce our reliance on fuel on the battlefield. 

General CONWAY. Recently, our Marine Corps Warfighting Lab establish an Experimental Forward Operating Base (ExFOB) in Quantico, VA. The ExFOB was 

supported by many organization inside and outside the Marine Corps to include all 

of our fellow services energy experts and OSD’s Power Surety Task Force. Prior to 

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shelve (COTS) technologies, in the end, we invited 29 vendors to ExFOB, 27 arrived 

at Quantico for evaluation by our experts. For this phase of ExFOB we focused on 

Energy, Water, and Shelter technologies that were COTS ready and could be deployed to Afghanistan right away to reduce our reliance on fuel. Of the 27 systems 

evaluated, 2xwater purification systems, 3xphotovotaie (PV) solar-based energy systems, 1x PV solar lighting system, and 1xLED lighting system were selected for further evaluation and deployment to Afghanistan. 

63. Senator MCCAIN. General Conway, which of those initiatives do you think 

holds the most promise? 

General CONWAY. The water purification systems that can be powered by solar 

systems show the most promise at the tactical edge. As we have discovered at the 

tactical edge, for every fuel truck on the roads of Afghanistan, we have 6–7 water 

trucks. Getting small, lightweight, alternative powered water purification systems 

to the battlefield is a high priority. In addition, we are encouraged by replacing our 

incandescent lights with LED lighting and PV solar-powered area lights too. 

IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN

64. Senator MCCAIN. General Conway, I know you are proud of the performance 

of our marines in both Iraq and Afghanistan, and I share that pride. I also noticed 

that this year’s budget request includes $4.1 billion in the Overseas Contingency 

Operations (OCO) for fiscal year 2011 for Marine Corps operation and maintenance 

(O&M). The fiscal year 2010 OCO amount was $3.4 billion, although the supplemental for fiscal year 2010 raised that amount by about $1.1 billion to a total of 

$4.5 billion for all of fiscal year 2010. What are driving your O&M costs for fiscal 

year 2011? 

General CONWAY. The primary driver of our fiscal year 2011 O&M costs is related 

to Optempo (∼$850 million). Other significant drivers include depot maintenance 

(∼$525 million), transportation associated with the OIF draw down (∼$420 million), 

body armor and personal protective equipment (∼$365), and deployment specific 

training (∼$350 million). 

65. Senator MCCAIN. General Conway, does the fiscal year 2011 request include 

everything you need to support the surge in Afghanistan? 

General CONWAY. Yes, the current fiscal year 2011 request will support Marine 

Corps forces and operational requirements to support the surge in Afghanistan. 

66. Senator MCCAIN. General Conway, do you have a good feel for what the cost 

of resetting the force will be? 

General CONWAY. In light of the continued high tempo of operations in Afghanistan, and the delay in reset actions due to the diversion of equipment in theater, 

we estimate the cost of reset for the Marine Corps to be $8 billion ($3 billion requested in the fiscal year 2011 OCO and an additional $5 billion reset liability upon 

termination of the conflict). However, this estimate will change the longer we continue to remain in theater. 

67. Senator MCCAIN. General Conway, how many years after the final draw 

downs from Iraq and Afghanistan will it take to reset the force and what will it 

cost? 

General CONWAY. We believe that after the final draw downs from Iraq and Afghanistan, with appropriate funding, we will be able to reset the force in 2 to 3 

years. 

LASER-GUIDED ZUNI

68. Senator MCCAIN. General Conway, I am aware that the Marine Corps has 

placed the Laser-Guided Zuni rocket on its most current Marine Aviation Plan and 

on its Air-to-Ground Weapons roadmap. The Marine Corps has also validated the 

Urgent Universal Need Statement that requests 5-inch Laser-Guided Zuni rockets 

for use in combat operations and is pursuing the smaller 2.75-inch Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System (APKWS) rockets for helicopters. I have been briefed that 

there is no money in the budget for the 5-inch Laser-Guided Zunis for jet aircraft; 

however Marine Corps requirements documents call for its development. In fact, the 

Navy’s China Lake Weapons division has partnered with industry to build and successfully test fire Laser-Guided Zunis against fixed and moving targets. Can you tell 

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me why the Marine Corps has decided not to fund in the fiscal year 2011 proposed 

budget the development of these precision rockets for its combat forces? 

General CONWAY. Senator, several years ago the Marine Corps recognized the 

need for low collateral damage during combat operations and set out to reduce collateral damage by developing an all-precision-guided weapon inventory. In the fiscal 

year 2007 Air-to-Ground Weapons Roadmap and Marine Aviation Plan we established a goal to create a precision-guided capability for all air-to-ground weapons by 

2015. These documents included a precision-guided 5-inch Zuni rocket (I do not use 

the term Laser-Guided Zuni (LGZ) as those terms have been trade marked for a 

weapon that is not in the Marine Corps inventory). The Naval Air Warfare Center 

China Lake has been operating with industry since 2005 within a Cooperative Research and Development Activity (CRADA) to fire a guided 5-inch Zuni rocket and 

prove the concept for a precision-guided 5-inch Zuni rocket. This program, with 

MBDA Missile Systems, is designed to upgrade our extensive existing 5-inch Zuni 

rocket motors and warhead inventories by adding a Semi-Active Laser (SAL) capability. Two successful ground-launched guided shots against stationary and moving 

targets were completed in May and August 2009. A precision-guided 5-inch Zuni will 

provide a high probability kill, low cost weapon against tactical vehicles and other 

soft targets and the Marine Corps needs it to fill the ‘‘clear air’’ forward firing missile niche for legacy Marine Corps aircraft as they will not carry the Joint-Air-toGround-Missile (JAGM). In fiscal year 2007 the Marine Corps attempted a Joint Capability Technology Demonstration (JCTD), but failed to gain the required joint support. The Air Force does not use a 5-inch rocket and the Navy is focusing resources 

on JAGM for F/A–18E/F. A sole source Rapid Deployment Capability is now our preferred route to funding and fielding a guided 5-inch Zuni rocket, but is unlikely due 

to industry competition. The interest shown by many industry representatives in the 

2.75-inch fixed wing APKWS JCTD, a spinoff of the successful rotary wing APKWS 

program, indicates that pursuing a sole source acquisition strategy for the MDBA 

LGZ may be challenged by formal industry protest. Several vendors have offered solutions that provide a precision-guidance capability for the Zuni and a full and open 

competition seems likely to be required. NAVAIR’s Legal and Contracts personnel 

are assessing the options. The precision-guided 5-inch Zuni rocket will follow the 

APKWS II JCTD and will provide a low collateral damage precision munition for 

Marine legacy fixed wing aircraft. Adding precision guidance to the Zuni presents 

challenging technical issues because of its mach speed release from the aircraft and 

higher operation altitudes than the APKWS. Although APKWS and JAGM are our 

precision-guided munition solutions for the near term and require the scarce resources we have available for funding weapons, a precision-guided 5-inch Zuni rocket remains a valid weapon requirement for Marine Corps aviation. It is a capability 

being aggressively pursued by us as we support the precision-guided Zuni CRADA 

effort at China Lake. 

69. Senator MCCAIN. General Conway, are Laser-Guided Zunis included in your 

Unfunded Priority List? 

General CONWAY. Senator, developing a precision 5-inch rocket with laser guidance remains a Marine Corps goal. Currently the JAGM and the APKWS are the 

major Navy and Marine Corps weapons programs and have high priorities for rotary 

wing aircraft. The Small Diameter Bomb is a high priority program for our fixed 

wing F–35B aircraft. The precision-guided 5-inch Zuni will fill gaps between the 

JAGM and APKWS and SDB II, but it competes for scarce funds and is not yet on 

our Unfunded Priority List 

REQUIREMENT FOR A 313-SHIP NAVY

70. Senator MCCAIN. Admiral Roughead, for the past few years the Navy has justified to Congress a need for 313 ships. Does this budget support that requirement? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Yes. Our fiscal year 2011 budget request grows the capacity 

of our Fleet to 313 ships by 2020 and 320 ships by 2024. 

71. Senator MCCAIN. Admiral Roughead, I’m concerned that cost overruns in shipbuilding programs will undermine future plans. What specific actions is the Navy 

taking to mitigate cost overruns in shipbuilding programs? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. To better control shipbuilding costs, the Navy is reducing the 

types of our ships, maximizing the reuse of ship designs and components, and pursuing open architecture and mission systems modularity. These efforts permit 

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suring designs are mature and requirements are well understood prior to the start 

of construction, and by emphasizing design and affordability concepts in initial design and follow-on procurements. We have also improved acquisition governance and 

cost control mechanisms through the following initiatives: 

• Executing an acquisition governance process where leadership assesses 

technical maturity and programmatic changes that typically drive cost 

growth 

• Using cost risk analysis in budget development, which enables understanding of cost risk and uncertainty inherent in the budget 

• Improving our ability to provide comprehensive cost and earned value 

management analysis support 

• Rebuilding our core knowledge, skills and processes to improve cost estimating 

• Implementing the requirement to submit a certified cost position and ensure the program is fully funded at each milestone 

30-YEAR SHIPBUILDING PLAN

72. Senator MCCAIN. Admiral Roughead, the Navy’s 30-Year Shipbuilding Plan 

calls for the replacement of 14 Ohio-class submarines and the multi-year procurement of 2 Virginia-class attack submarines per year to replace Los Angeles-class 

submarines. Because the ballistic missile submarines run about $6.5 million each 

and the Virginia-class submarines cost about $2 billion each, those expenditures 

alone consume over 75 percent of the current shipbuilding budget. Will the Navy 

be successful in increasing its shipbuilding budget during that period of robust submarine procurement so that overall surface ship production will not decrease to just 

two surface ships per year? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Building the required force structure will largely depend on 

controlling shipbuilding costs (including combat systems) within an affordable 

range. We are committed to maintaining stability in requirements, funding, and profiles to control costs. This requires the combined efforts of the Navy, the shipbuilding industry, and the combat systems industry. Working in conjunction with 

Congress, the Navy will procure and sustain the force structure necessary to deliver 

the naval capabilities needed to support our National interests. 

73. Senator MCCAIN. Admiral Roughead, what will be the impact on most importantly our force projection capability and second the shipbuilding industrial base? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. The battle force inventory presented in our 30-year shipbuilding plan provides the global reach, persistent presence, and strategic, operational, and tactical effects required of our naval forces within reasonable levels of 

funding. On balance, the force structure represented by our 30-year shipbuilding 

plan maintains our ability to project power across the spectrum of challenges we are 

likely to face throughout the time period of the report, albeit with prudent risk 

where appropriate. One of the plan’s three basic precepts is the importance of maintaining an adequate national shipbuilding design and industrial base necessary to 

build and sustain tomorrow’s Navy. The shipbuilding plan aims to maintain that 

base. 

The SSBN(X) procurement will begin to constrain our shipbuilding plan in the latter part of this decade because recapitalization of our SSBNs will occur at the same 

time our SSN–688 submarines, CG–47 class guided missile cruisers, DDG–51 class 

guided missile destroyers, and LSD–41/49 class dock landing ships reach end-ofservice-life. During the years in which the new submarine is being procured, the 

procurement of other ship types will be reduced, resulting in force level and industrial base impacts. Even under these constraints, our shipbuilding plan still 

achieves a peak battle force inventory of 320 ships in fiscal year 2024 and averages 

about 303 ships between fiscal year 2020 and fiscal year 2040. 

74. Senator MCCAIN. Admiral Roughead, the recently released 30-year shipbuilding plan uses the 313-ship battle force inventory as its baseline. However, 

building the required force structure will largely depend on controlling shipbuilding 

costs (including combat systems) within an affordable range. Will the Navy be able 

to maintain stability in requirements, funding, and profiles in an effort to control 

costs? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Yes. New construction will be funded consistent with balanced investment profiles and expected future budgets. The Navy will continue to 

focus on program affordability by ensuring designs are mature, that affordability is 

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a factor in design and procurement concepts, and that requirements are well specified prior to the start of construction. 

The Navy is taking positive action to control costs and prevent requirement creep, 

and to have a long view regarding reduced types and models of ships, maximizing 

reuse of ship designs and components, and using open architecture and mission systems modularity. Navy leadership is engaged in managing cost and controlling requirements growth in our shipbuilding programs. We have instituted an acquisition 

governance process that causes leadership to assess technical maturity and programmatic changes. NAVSEA is improving its ability to provide comprehensive cost 

and earned value management analysis support and is rebuilding core knowledge, 

skills and processes to improve cost estimating. 

Navy is committed to developing a stable long-term shipbuilding plan to reduce 

industrial base volatility, which is a primary reason for cost growth. Great care has 

been taken to describe a plan that is fiscally sustainable over the 30-year planning 

horizon. The plan also takes into account the importance of maintaining an adequate national shipbuilding design and industrial base. 

75. Senator MCCAIN. Admiral Roughead, controlling shipbuilding costs will require the combined efforts of the Navy, the shipbuilding industry, and the combat 

systems industry. What is the Navy doing to encourage fixed-price contracts and ensuring that requirements are approved by the leadership and will not change? 

Please give some discrete examples by program type. 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. To encourage the use of fixed-price contracts, the Navy has 

developed an acquisition policy defining certain limitations and controls for use of 

cost-reimbursement type contracts and emphasizing use of fixed-priced contracts, as 

appropriate, to support the Department’s mission. 

For shipbuilding programs, the Navy has successfully used fixed-price contracts 

where the design is very mature at the start and is derived from existing ship designs and technical risk is low. In cases where the initial ships of a class include 

complex technologies, the Navy contracts for these initial ships under cost-type contracts; however, as the respective class matures and we move into serial production, 

the contracts typically used are fixed-priced. A specific example is DDG–1000, which 

is a cost contract due to the innovative design and high degree of technology insertion. Follow-on ships (DDG–1001 and –1002) will be fixed-price contracts. An example of where fixed-price contracts were used initially is JHSV. That design was mature and derived from a well understood parent design. The lead JHSV and all follow ships are contracted under a fixed-price contract. 

Additionally, these recent solicitations for shipbuilding new construction contracts 

have been fixed-price: The LCS (fiscal year 2009 and fiscal year 2010–2014 competitive solicitation); LPD–26/27; DDG–113/114, DDG–115, and DDG–1001/1002. The 

fiscal year 2009–2013 Virginia-class multi-year contract was awarded on a fixedprice basis. The upcoming solicitation for LHA–7 construction will be issued as 

fixed-price. 

To ensure that requirements are approved by leadership and changes are closely 

controlled, the Navy has several acquisition oversight processes that provide leadership visibility and vigorous control of acquisition requirements. The Navy implemented a Peer Review Program in fiscal year 2009 which applies to contracts for 

supplies, systems and services and includes tiered review and approval levels. The 

CNO’s Resources and Requirements Review Board and Naval Capabilities Board 

(NCB) are the Navy’s 3- and 2-star forums for reviewing and making decisions on 

requirements and resourcing issues. SECNAV’s requirements-acquisition governance (Gate Review) and Configuration Steering Board (CSB) processes provide Service-level approval of capabilities requirements. The annual Gate Six sufficiency reviews serve as the forum for the CSB as part of the oversight process to stabilize 

requirements and review any descoping-cost saving strategies. CVN–78, LCS, DDG– 

51 and Virginia-class have planned Gate Six reviews this year. The Navy is introducing rigor into the contract change management process by limiting the amount 

of funding program managers may spend without a Gate Six sufficiency review to 

not more than 40 percent of the program funds budgeted for engineering changes. 

Release of remaining funds to program managers will be based on the outcome of 

CSBs that are held in conjunction with Gate Six reviews. 

DDG–1000 DESTROYER PROGRAM-CRITICAL NUNN-MCCURDY BREACH

76. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Mabus, on February 4, 2010, Secretary Gates said 

the DDG–1000 destroyer program will breach Nunn-McCurdy’s cost thresholds. By 

operation of the Weapons Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009, it should be canVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:37 May 06, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00429 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\62155.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
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celed or restructured and recertified. Based on a critical Nunn-McCurdy cost threshold breach, should the Navy go forward with buying the third DDG–1000 in light 

of the Nunn-McCurdy cost breach and the growing requirement for more ballistic 

missile defense (BMD) ships in the Pacific, Mediterranean, and Persian Gulf? 

Secretary MABUS. Pursuant to the Weapons System Acquisition Reform Act of 

2009 and Section 2433 of Title 10, U.S.C. (‘‘Nunn-McCurdy’’ statute), the Secretary 

of Defense will terminate, or provide certification of the program to Congress. Navy 

is supporting the ongoing OSD-led certification process. A termination or certification decision is due to Congress by late spring 2010. 

AMPHIBIOUS FLEET AFFORDABILITY AND READINESS

77. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Mabus and General Conway, the Navy’s plan for 

a 33-ship amphibious fleet, according to the Navy’s budget proposal, represents the 

limit of acceptable risk in meeting the requirement to deliver two Marine expeditionary brigades in a forcible-entry operation. Is the Marine Corps’ desire for 38 

ships affordable and are there ways to mitigate that risk when considering the entire shipbuilding plan? 

Secretary MABUS. The 38 ship force identified by the Marine Corps represents the 

lift capacity necessary to support 2.0 MEB operations including all of their combat 

support and combat service support needs across their full range of expected missions. This risk/force level is inconsistent with the risk levels accepted by the remaining Naval Forces. Therefore, the Commandant and CNO reached an agreement 

to benchmark the Amphibious Force at 33 ships and accept a modicum of risk in 

the extent of combat support equipment available within the Assault Echelon (AE) 

forces and to move that equipment in conjunction with follow-on force equipment. 

Specific decisions made in support of this agreement are: 

• The Navy plans to procure an LHA–6 class ship in fiscal year 2011 and its 

11th LPD–17 class amphibious transport dock in fiscal year 2012. LSD(X), replacement for the existing LSD–41 class, will begin in fiscal year 2017. 

• The Navy determined the LHA–6 class amphibious assault ships previously designated for the Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future) (MPF(F)) 

would serve more effectively in the AE force where they could be employed 

in Marine forcible-entry operations. Within the context of the 30-year Shipbuilding Plan, these AE amphibious ships will be procured in fiscal year 

2011, fiscal year 2016, and fiscal year 2021. 

• The Navy begins procurement of LSD–41 class replacement, LSD(X), in 

fiscal year 2017, on a 2-year build cycle. 

• The Amphibious Lift Enhancement Program (ALEP) provides additional lift 

capacity, but does not factor in meeting the Marine Corps’ 2.0 MEB AE requirement. 

• ALEP is designed to fill the gap in vehicle square feet stowage. 

• The Navy plans to procure three Mobile Landing Platforms (MLP) as well as 

the three previously appropriated T–AKEs. These augmented Maritime 

Prepositioning Ships (MPS) squadrons enhance the afloat prepositioning capacity and will support the USMC 2.0 MEB lift requirement by enabling a reinforcing MEB to ‘‘marry up’’ ashore with its equipment from one of the three 

MPS squadrons. The augmented MPS facilitate the routine employment of 

prepositioned equipment in a variety of activities across the range of military 

operations (ROMO) and mitigate the risk of lower than desired amphibious ship 

inventory levels. 

General CONWAY. Without a top line increase and/or a reprioritization of missions 

and capabilities that form the basis of the Navy’s shipbuilding plan, the requirement for 38 amphibious assault ships outlined in our 7 January 2009 report to Congress is unaffordable. We have examined ways to mitigate risk within the context 

of the entire shipbuilding plan and determined that sustaining a minimum of 33 

amphibious ships is adequate within today’s fiscal limitations. 

78. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Mabus and General Conway, are the requirements 

for more amphibious ships greater because at least 15 to 20 percent of the amphibious fleet is not deployable because they are in shipyards undergoing maintenance 

and repair? 

Secretary MABUS. No. Under normal circumstances, no more than about 10 percent of the amphibious fleet is undergoing significant maintenance and repair that 

would preclude operational availability in the event of a national crisis. While there 

may be instances when greater than 10 percent of the force is undergoing mainteVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:37 May 06, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00430 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\62155.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
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nance, we are confident this assumption is consistent with the long term availability 

of amphibious ships for contingency operations. 

The requirement for amphibious ships outlined in the January 7, 2009, Report to 

Congress on Naval Amphibious Force Structure and the Annual Report to Congress 

on the Long Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for fiscal year 2011, calls 

for a force of 33 total ships (11 LHA/LHD, 11 LPD, and 11 LSD). Under normal 

circumstances, 29–30 are available for tasking, enough to support MEBs while accepting risk in the arrival of combat support and combat service support elements 

of the MEB. 

Without accepting this risk, the full requirement would be 38 ships. However 

SECNAV, CNO, and CMC agree that the 33-ship force equates to an acceptable 

level of risk, as stated in the January 7, 2009, Report to Congress on Naval Amphibious Force Structure. 

General CONWAY. The 38- and 33-ship numbers were based on the mutually 

agreed-to assumption that amphibious ships were operationally available 90 percent 

of the time based on OPNAVNOTE 4700 scheduled maintenance availabilities. 

The requirement for amphibious ships outlined in our 7 January 2009 report to 

Congress assumes that amphibious ships are not operationally available-class due 

to maintenance approximately 10 percent of the time. Due to the current maintenance challenges faced by the San Antonio-class, amphibious shipping is trending 

near 75 percent availability vice the 90 percent planned. We would work to improve 

operational availability to close to the 90 percent level instead of increasing our 

force structure requirement to offset a significantly lower operational availability. 

This will require increased resources, specifically maintenance funding for the upkeep of amphibious ships. 

79. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Mabus and General Conway, the serious engineering problems on LPD–17 class ships gives rise for a concern about a broader readiness problem. The recent commissioning of the USS New York in New York City 

harbor was a marvelous site, but now the ship cannot get underway because of mechanical failures in the main propulsion engines, generators, and failing piping 

welds that make the ship unsafe to operate. The LPD–17 amphibious ship program 

has more challenges than we had hoped. Are we seeing a systemic problem with 

the readiness of the Navy’s amphibious ships? 

Secretary MABUS. No. While we have seen some recurring material issues in 

LPD–17 class ships, the problems associated with a new construction ship are not 

indicative of a systemic problem with the amphibious ship readiness of the existing 

Fleet. 

General CONWAY. The Navy and Marine Corps are committed to ensuring we are 

ready to meet our amphibious mission requirements. While we have seen some recurring material issues in LPD–17 class ships, we are working with the shipbuilder 

to address these issues head on. An LPD–17 Class Strike Team was established in 

December 2008 to methodically resolve recurring/systemic class issues. Top three 

issues in progress are main propulsion diesel engine (MPDE) bearing damage, 

Geislinger coupling (connects MPDE to main reduction gear (MRG)) leaks, and 

faulty piping welds. In each case the Navy is working with the shipbuilder or vendor to identify the root cause and resolve associated material, workmanship, or inspection issues. 

LITTORAL COMBAT SHIP

80. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Mabus, later this year the Navy will down-select 

to a single sea frame for the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program and split its production between two competing shipyards—this new acquisition strategy is designed 

to reduce the ship’s overall cost. Will the costs of this troubled program be below 

the congressional cost cap? 

Secretary MABUS. Although achieving the cost cap will be challenging, the Navy 

is working to ensure the program costs are within the parameters of the cost cap 

established in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010. The 

Navy will continue to apply lessons learned to the LCS program and across the ship 

acquisition enterprise. The Navy’s acquisition strategy to competitively downselect 

to a single LCS seaframe will further contribute to cost control on this program. 

Navy remains committed to effective cost control, and believes that the acquisition 

strategy for the fiscal year 2010 and later ships and management practices provide 

the strongest possible foundation for program stability and delivery of this urgentlyneeded capability at the best value. 

426 

81. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Mabus, will the winning vessel be the least expensive to operate as is required under the acquisition reform law we enacted last year, 

which highlighted the total operating costs of weapons programs? 

Secretary MABUS. The acquisition strategy for the LCS program for fiscal year 

2010 and later vessels includes key tenets for competition identified by the Weapons 

System Acquisition Reform Act of 2009, such as competitive prototyping, dual 

sourcing, unbundling of contracts, use of modular, open architectures to enable competition for upgrades, and use of build-to-print technical data packages to enable 

production by a second source. The goal of the Government is to arrive at a bestvalue determination. The Government will however, consider life cycle cost reduction initiatives as part of its evaluation under the technical/management category. 

Offeror-proposed initiatives to reduce life cycle costs will be evaluated, assigned an 

adjective rating, and factored into the overall best value determination. 

Throughout the LCS program, the Navy has focused on reducing both acquisition 

cost and life cycle cost in LCS class ships. In this regard, life cycle cost considerations are emphasized in both designs through the Navy’s requirements for reduced 

manning, open architecture and mission package modularity that have been key design parameters since the inception of the program. 

ELECTRONIC AIRCRAFT LAUNCH SYSTEM

82. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Mabus, I am concerned that problems with developing the electromagnetic aircraft launch system (EMALS) could delay the USS Gerald Ford’s (CVN–78) entry into service. That could increase the period of time during which the Navy has 11 operational carriers from 33 months to some longer period. What is the status of that troubled program? 

Secretary MABUS. EMALS is currently undergoing System Design and Development (SDD) testing at Lakehurst, NJ, and is on track to conduct manned aircraft 

launch later this year. Manufacturing of EMALS production components is ongoing 

and is on schedule to support CVN–78 delivery dates. Motor generator components 

have the least schedule float and are being closely monitored by the Navy. 

83. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Mabus, do we expect that problems associated 

with the EMALS will cause any delays to the delivery of the CVN–78 it was designed to support? 

Secretary MABUS. Current EMALS production schedules support on-time delivery 

of CVN–78 in September 2015. Motor generators have the least schedule float and 

are being carefully managed by the Navy to ensure that required in yard dates are 

met. 

84. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Mabus, should we be looking at a conventional 

steam catapult solution if the contractor cannot resolve its engineering issues? 

Secretary MABUS. In 2009, Senior Navy leadership decided EMALS would remain 

the CVN–78 class aircraft launching system following a detailed assessment of the 

viability of both EMALS and steam catapults on the CVN–78 class. While steam 

catapults were deemed at the conclusion of the assessment to be a technically viable 

alternative to EMALS, reverting to steam would have incurred a 12–18 month delay 

in CVN–78 ship delivery, along with associated costs for redesign and delay. The 

current EMALS System Development and Demonstration (SDD) phase and production schedules continue to support the CVN–78 construction schedule. While the 

overlap of system-level testing and shipset production hardware procurement decision induces some cost and schedule risk, the management focus, review processes, 

and oversight the Navy has employed continue to mitigate these risks. The Navy 

is committed to EMALS as the launching system for CVN–78 class aircraft carriers. 

85. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Mabus, how confident are you that the EMALS 

will come on line on time so as not to delay the delivery of the CVN–78? 

Secretary MABUS. The Navy is committed to EMALS as the launching system for 

CVN–78 class aircraft carriers. EMALS technology was fundamentally proven by 

the Navy during the Program Definition and Risk Reduction phase using a fullscale, half-length prototype. Component-level testing of production representative 

hardware is currently verifying design predictions and system performance. A fullscale EMALS catapult test site is operational at Lakehurst, with launching of 

manned aircraft projected to begin later this year. 

Implementation of the EMALS system for the Gerald R. Ford-class is required to 

meet the fixed wing launch goals of the Navy, as well as provide flexibility for future operations. All manufacturing components are on schedule to support required 

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in-yard dates for delivery of CVN–78 in September 2015. The Navy is closely monitoring the production of motor generators, the component with the least schedule 

float, to ensure delivery remains on schedule. 

SHIP DEPOT MAINTENANCE

86. Senator MCCAIN. Admiral Roughead, as you recall, the only priority that you 

identified as unfunded in your last budget submission was ship depot maintenance. 

Over the last few months, a number of press accounts have come out describing 

problems directly related to how ineffectively the shipyards are maintaining the 

readiness of the Navy’s oldest surface combatants. I understand that this year’s proposed budget increases total funding for ship depot maintenance by almost $1.2 billion over last year. To what extent does that proposed amount fully fund the Navy’s 

current requirement for ship depot maintenance and capture depot maintenance volume that has accumulated from chronic underfunding over time? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Our fiscal year 2011 baseline and Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) budget requests $6.1 billion for ship maintenance. This funds 99 percent of our total projected ship maintenance requirement, including depot maintenance. 

NAVY STRIKE FIGHTER GAP

87. Senator MCCAIN. Admiral Roughead, the Navy testified last year that the socalled fighter gap or shortfall of strike-fighter aircraft on aircraft carriers was growing larger than previous estimates—243 aircraft short by 2018. Is the Navy taking 

appropriate action to mitigate the gap and the operational implications of that gap? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. The Department of the Navy (DoN) anticipates a decrease in 

our strike fighter inventory of about 100 aircraft that will peak at the end of this 

decade. We are addressing this inventory decrease through aggressive and precise 

management strategies that include service-life extension programs to prolong the 

use of existing F/A–18 A–D aircraft, reducing the number of aircraft available in our 

non-deployed squadrons to the minimum required, accelerating the transition of 

seven legacy squadrons to F/A–18 E/F Super Hornets (using F/A–18E/F attrition aircraft in two cases), and maximizing depot level throughput to return legacy strike 

fighter aircraft to the Fleet more quickly. Collectively, these measures will extend 

the service life of our legacy aircraft and make the projected inventory decrease 

manageable. 

88. Senator MCCAIN. Admiral Roughead, does the Navy have the adequate carrier 

air wings to satisfy the needs of 11 aircraft carriers? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Yes. 

Our carrier air wing (CVW) Fleet Readiness and Training Plan (FRTP) is tailored 

to compliment the training and maintenance requirements for our 11 CVNs. We will 

manage our tactical aviation inventory to ensure we have the number of aircraft required to support our deployable CVWs. 

89. Senator MCCAIN. Admiral Roughead, how does this committee reconcile different estimates of what this gap is likely to be in 2018 which Secretary Gates has 

offered is 100 aircraft? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. The Navy continues to evaluate and manage its strike fighter 

inventory. We have updated our inventory estimates as we have adjusted the assumptions in our models to reflect what we are learning about the ability to extend 

the service life of our legacy aircraft, and to adjust to procurement rates for JSF 

and the addition by Congress of nine Super Hornets into our budget last year. 

Based on current data and the application of specific management measures, the 

Navy anticipates a shortfall in our strike fighter inventory of about 100 aircraft that 

will peak in 2018. 

MISSILE DEFENSE, BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE-CAPABLE SHIPS, AND STANDARD

MISSILE–3

90. Senator MCCAIN. Admiral Roughead, as you are well aware, the supply of missile defense assets, whether it be Aegis cruisers, Standard Missile–3 (SM–3) missiles, Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) units, etc., pales in comparison to the worldwide demand of our combatant commanders. How does the Navy’s 

budget request seek to satisfy the stressing needs of the new European-phased 

428 

adaptive approach while also continuing to meet those needs of ongoing efforts in 

the Pacific, the Middle East, and the Homeland? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. To meet increasing global demands for BMD, our fiscal year 

2011 budget requests funding to increase and accelerate BMD capability and capacity in our Fleet. 

Specifically, the DOD budget request funds six BMD installations and one upgrade, in addition to Aegis modernization installs/upgrades that were included in 

PB 10 for our existing surface combatants. Additionally the budget request funds 

the construction of DDG–114 and DDG–115, the second and third ship in our DDG– 

51 restart program. Across the FYDP, our budget request increases our total number of Aegis BMD-capable ships from 21 to 38, of which 27 will be deployable in 

fiscal year 2015 to meet global requirements for BMD. 

The Aegis BMD budget contains funding to increase the number of SM–3 missiles 

in our inventory. Currently, we have 59 SM–3 missiles. The projected inventory will 

be 61 by the end of fiscal year 2010 and 262 by end of fiscal year 2015. 

91. Senator MCCAIN. Admiral Roughead, with the growing threat from China, 

North Korea, and the Middle East, do your forces have enough BMD/SM–3 resources/assets to defend the United States, its allies, and forward-deployed forces in 

the region? In answering this question, please break out your responses by BMD 

capable ships and SM–3 missiles. 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. We are meeting existing requirements for BMD forces today. 

The implementation of the phased adaptive approach to missile defense of Europe 

requires an increase in our capacity of BMD-capable ships and missiles to continue 

to meet global requirements. 

We are increasing the number of our BMD ships by accelerating the installation 

of Aegis BMD on our existing cruisers and destroyers and by restarting the DDG– 

51 shipbuilding program. By 2015, new construction and modernization will bring 

the total number of BMD capable ships in our Fleet to 27, up from 21 today. Our 

long-term plan is to modernize all 62 Aegis destroyers and up to 15 Aegis cruisers 

with BMD capability while building new, BMD-capable DDG–51 ships. 

We are also increasing the number of SM–3 missiles in our inventory. Currently, 

we have 59 SM–3 missiles. The projected inventory will be 61 by the end of fiscal 

year 2010 and 262 by end of fiscal year 2015. 

92. Senator MCCAIN. Admiral Roughead, is BMD training for the crews of these 

Aegis-BMD ships sufficient to ameliorate stresses on the force that are being called 

on to satisfy other non-BMD mission requirements? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. In February, we completed a thorough analysis of the Aegis 

modernization training program, including BMD and non-BMD mission training requirements. The analysis informed curricula improvements now underway in the 

technical training associated with new BMD baselines and open architecture systems, enlisted specialized skills training, advanced warfare team training, and command, control, communications, and intelligence interoperability training. Implementation of these curricula improvements will complete in fiscal year 2013 and will 

enhance BMD and non-BMD mission proficiency among our crews. As we increase 

the number of BMD-capable ships in the Fleet to support the President’s phased 

adaptive approach for missile defense of Europe, we will further enhance our training programs to accommodate increased student throughput at Aegis training commands. 

93. Senator MCCAIN. Admiral Roughead, to what extent does your budget request 

address that issue? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Our fiscal year 2011 budget requests funding to expand our 

training throughput from 20 to 23 BMD-capable ships by the end of fiscal year 2011. 

The expanded training will provide specialized skills for additional individual operator training, instructor capacity, team training, and technical training aids that 

will be necessary as we grow our BMD capability. 

LAW OF THE SEA TREATY

94. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Mabus and Admiral Roughead, the United States 

has not ratified the Law of the Sea Treaty while China has continued efforts to assert sovereignty over contested areas in the South China Sea and in other areas 

where such claims support China’s national security interests. Beijing has now suspended military-to-military exchanges as a result of the recent U.S. announcement 

429 

to continue defensive arms sales to Taiwan. How are we managing our relationship 

with China in disputed areas such as its maritime claims? 

Secretary MABUS. The U.S. Navy (USN) manages its relationship with China in 

disputed areas such as its maritime claims as part of the Joint Force, in coordination with the interagency, and in accordance with the appropriate DOD policies. In 

support of the larger U.S. Government effort, the USN uses consistency in both policy statements and operations. Examples include: 

• Navy leadership regularly reiterates the U.S. position with senior leaders 

from other maritime powers, such as on 08 February with the Chief of Defense Forces, Singapore Armed Forces. 

• USN representatives engaging with Chinese officials promote U.S. Government interpretations of UNCLOS and international maritime law at the 

appropriate policy venues (ex: Defense Policy Consultative Talks). 

• Naval forces in the PACOM AOR conduct missions such as hydrographic 

and military surveys in accordance with customary international law as 

codified in UNCLOS. 

• USN educational institutions engage in academic discussions with Chinese counterparts. 

• Naval forces leverage cooperative opportunities such as the HOA counterpiracy operation to develop military-to-military understanding that can 

mitigate future tensions. 

Additionally, the Navy maintains that U.S. ratification of UNCLOS directly supports our National security interests. 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. We are managing our relationship with China, and all other 

nations, in the maritime domain in accordance with customary international law. 

We continue to conduct missions that are consistent with customary international 

law, including our hydrographic and military surveys in the Pacific Command area 

of responsibility. We are also leveraging cooperative opportunities, such as in 

counter-piracy operations, to develop military-to-military understanding that can 

mitigate future tensions. Navy is committed to maintaining our forward deployed 

naval forces and rotational forward presence in the Asia-Pacific region. 

With regard to the Law of the Sea Treaty, customary international law is not universally accepted and may be changed by States over time. Customary law does not 

offer the future stability that comes with being a party to the Law of the Sea Treaty. Ratification of the Law of the Sea Treaty would codify our essential navigational 

rights and freedoms in disputed areas, and grant the United States a seat at the 

table when critical navigational, economic, and other rights are being applied, interpreted, and developed by other nations. I continue to support ratification of the Law 

of the Sea Treaty as vital to our National security interests and helpful in managing 

our relations with foreign nations, including China. 

95. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Mabus and Admiral Roughead, how do you think 

the relationship with China will develop as we continue to share the global commons—sea, air, space, and cyberspace—as our interests clash or diverge? 

Secretary MABUS. The U.S. Navy is working to support the U.S. policy of building 

a positive, cooperative and comprehensive relationship with the People’s Republic of 

China. China’s re-emergence as an actor of consequence on the international stage 

is increasing the quantity of interactions between our two militaries in the global 

commons. As a consequence, and in support of U.S. policy, the U.S. Navy is working 

hard to ensure the quality of these interactions both supports the growth of a positive military relationship and encourages China to channel their growing naval capabilities towards providing for the security of the maritime commons. 

Maritime security is a key element of our Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century 

Seapower. It is also an area of mutual interest we share with the PLA(N) as China 

has become more dependent on the stability and security of the maritime domain. 

Both the U.S. Navy and the PLA(N) are showing an increasing willingness to maintain a positive momentum in the development of our relationship, and Navy is optimistic that both sides will continue to seek to cooperate where our interests converge and to work out differences in a constructive and effective manner through 

open and frank discussions. 

The U.S. Navy seek to ensure interactions at sea between naval vessels of the two 

countries are conducted in a safe and professional manner through venues such as 

the Military Maritime Cooperative Agreement. 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. The U.S. Navy is working to support the U.S. policy of building a positive, cooperative and comprehensive relationship with the People’s Republic of China. China’s re-emergence as an actor of consequence on the international 

stage is increasing the quantity of interactions between our two militaries in the 

430 

global commons. As a consequence, and in support of U.S. policy, the U.S. Navy is 

working hard to ensure the quality of these interactions both supports the growth 

of a positive military relationship and encourages China to channel their growing 

naval capabilities towards providing for the security of the maritime commons. 

Maritime security is a key element of our Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century 

Seapower. It is also an area of mutual interest we share with the PLA(N) as China 

has become more dependent on the stability and security of the maritime domain. 

Both the U.S. Navy and the PLA(N) are showing an increasing willingness to maintain a positive momentum in the development of our relationship, and Navy is optimistic that both sides will continue to seek to cooperate where our interests converge and to work out differences in a constructive and effective manner through 

open and frank discussions. 

The U.S. Navy seek to ensure interactions at sea between naval vessels of the two 

countries are conducted in a safe and professional manner through venues such as 

the Military Maritime Cooperative Agreement. 

U.S. MARINES-OKINAWA TO GUAM REALIGNMENT

96. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Mabus and General Conway, on February 17, 

2009, the U.S. Government reaffirmed its support of an agreement with the Government of Japan concerning the implementation of the relocation of 8,000 marines and 

their families from Okinawa to Guam by 2014 in a manner that maintains unit integrity. Since then, the Japanese elected a new Prime Minister, Yukio Hatoyama, 

who has asked the U.S. Government to consider new options for the Futenma Replacement Facility, which is part of the larger agreement for Guam. I note that the 

agreement stipulates that the Japanese Government must demonstrate tangible 

progress regarding the Futenma Replacement Facility, which has been defined to 

include a signature by the Governor of Okinawa on a landfill permit required to 

commence construction. This action was currently planned to take place in mid- to 

late-2010. 

Recently, the Secretary of Defense suggested that we should demonstrate patience 

in the negotiations with the Japanese Government on the future of the agreement. 

With that said, the fiscal year 2011 budget request contains $452 million in 

MILCON funds for infrastructure on Guam to support the relocation of marines 

from Okinawa. This is in addition to $160 million authorized for construction in the 

fiscal year 2010 defense bill. Also, the Japanese Government transferred $336 million to DOD in July 2009 for projects on Guam. Does DOD plan to award construction projects on Guam with U.S. funds or funds provided by the Government of 

Japan prior to resolution of the future of Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) 

Futenma? 

Secretary MABUS. The fiscal year 2011 budget request is $452 million in MILCON 

funds for infrastructure on Guam to support the relocation of marines from Okinawa. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 provided $514 

million in authorization for construction to support the Marine relocation. 

The framework for U.S.-Japan force posture realignment is the United StatesJapan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation, issued following the May 1, 2006, 

meeting of the cabinet-level U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee. This 

framework confirms that the Okinawa-related realignment initiatives are interconnected and, specifically, that the III Marine Expeditionary Force (III MEF) relocation from Okinawa to Guam is dependent on, among other things, tangible 

progress toward completion of the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF). 

Our relocation to Guam is a capabilities issue, not a basing issue. We have a responsibility to provide operationally ready forces in support of the combatant commander and to meet our commitments to Allies and partners in the region, including under the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security. 

We are currently waiting for the Government of Japan to complete its review of 

the FRF. Prime Minister Hatoyama has stated that he intends to resolve the issue 

by May, and we look forward to resuming work with the Government of Japan to 

fulfill our longstanding mutual objective of realigning our force posture in Japan to 

ensure that the Alliance’s operational capabilities remain sustainable politically and 

operationally. 

General CONWAY. No DPRI projects have been awarded. They will be awarded 

after the Record of Decision (ROD) is signed. The ROD is anticipated in August 

2010. GoJ has stated they will provide resolution on the future of the FRF in May 

2010. 

Fiscal year 2010 MILCON projects were designed to have broad impact and enduring value to DOD stationed on Guam. For example Apra Harbor Warf improveVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:37 May 06, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00436 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\62155.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
431 

ments and defense access roads will benefit DOD independent of any Marine relocation. We have time with MILCON planning to receive and analyze GoJ FRF proposals. 

The construction plan is designed purposely to phase in capabilities and design 

requirements. This allows flexibility during the initial construction phase and ultimately allows the force laydown to drive final facility requirements. 

Initially, infrastructure and enabling facilities, such as at Apra Harbor to improve 

throughput, will be constructed. These initial construction projects have an enduring 

value no matter what the final laydown may be. This will be followed by construction of support facilities, such as the fire station and medical clinic, and housing. 

General purpose operational facilities, such as warehouses and headquarters buildings, will then be constructed. The final construction projects will be unit specific 

buildings that would be particular to the force laydown on Guam. 

97. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Mabus and General Conway, what other options 

are acceptable to the Marine Corps for the relocation of Marine aviation units from 

MCAS Futenma? 

Secretary MABUS. The current Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) plan is a result of several years of bilateral planning culminating in what was agreed to be the 

best answer for both parties. The Government of Japan (GoJ) has not made any formal proposals for alternate options, nor have they formally identified what is wrong 

with the current agreed to plan. We continue to honor the Agreed Implementation 

Plans (AIPs) and will respect the GoJ’s processes of policy review. However, it is 

the USMC position that any FRF option the GoJ may present must provide the 

same or better capability of the current FRF plan. 

General CONWAY. The current FRF plan is a result of several years of bilateral 

planning culminating in what was agreed to be the best answer for both parties. 

The GoJ has not made any formal proposals for alternate options, nor have they 

formally identified what is wrong with the current agreed to plan. We continue to 

honor the AIPs and will respect the GoJ’s processes of policy review. However, it 

is the USMC position that any FRF option the GoJ may present must provide the 

same or better capability of the current FRF plan. 

98. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Mabus and General Conway, would it be in the 

best interests of the Marine Corps to move marines to Guam absent an acceptable 

solution for the Futenma Replacement Facility? 

Secretary MABUS. The U.S.-Japan negotiated agreements were a comprehensive 

set of realignment initiatives to meet the strategic needs for both allies. Although 

the Government of Japan is taking a hard look at Futenma Replacement Facility 

options, we remain confident they realize the strategic value of having marines on 

Okinawa for their own defense and for security in the Asia-Pacific region. 

The Marine Corps requires that an aviation capability must remain on Okinawa 

to support the rest of the Marine Air Ground Task Force stationed there. We currently have that capability with Marine Aircraft Group 36 at Marine Corps Air Station Futenma. 

Our relocation to Guam is a capabilities issue, not a basing issue, and we have 

a responsibility to provide operationally ready forces in support of the combatant 

commander. We need to look at force laydown in the Pacific in total, which includes 

aviation capabilities on Okinawa. A suitable Futenma Replacement Facility is considered the ‘‘lynchpin’’ for USMC force relocation to Guam. Therefore, it is not the 

USMC desire or intent to alter the force laydown, to include moving any forces to 

Guam, until the Futenma issue is adequately resolved. 

General CONWAY. The U.S.-Japan negotiated agreements were a comprehensive 

set of realignment initiatives to meet the strategic needs for both allies. Although 

the Government of Japan is taking a hard look at Futenma Replacement Facility 

options, we remain confident they realize the strategic value of having marines on 

Okinawa for their own defense and for security in the Asia-Pacific region. 

The Marine Corps requires that an aviation capability must remain on Okinawa 

to support the rest of the Marine Air Ground Task Force stationed there. We currently have that capability with Marine Aircraft Group 36 at Marine Corps Air Station Futenma. If a suitable replacement facility proves to be untenable, for whatever 

reason, we plan to continue operating out of Marine Corps Air Station Futenma indefinitely. 

Our relocation to Guam is a capabilities issue, not a basing issue, and we have 

a responsibility to provide operationally ready forces in support of the combatant 

commander. We need to look at force laydown in the Pacific in total, which includes 

aviation capabilities on Okinawa. A suitable Futenma Replacement Facility is considered the ‘‘lynchpin’’ for USMC force relocation to Guam. Therefore, it is not the 

432 

USMC desire or intent to alter the force laydown, to include moving any forces to 

Guam, until the Futenma issue is adequately resolved. 

99. Senator MCCAIN. General Conway, on a related issue, the plan for the stationing of marines on Guam calls for the acquisition of land not currently under the 

control of DOD in order to provide adequate live fire training ranges for the marines 

stationed on Guam. Initial assessments during the environmental review of the plan 

suggest that these land acquisitions may be problematic and marines may need to 

use ranges on other islands such as Tinian and Saipan to conduct training. In your 

view, how will the potential lack of adequate ranges on Guam affect Marine Corps 

training and readiness? 

General CONWAY. A lack of adequate ranges and training capability that would 

adversely affect readiness is a show stopper. Before moving marines to Guam, we 

must ensure that adequate training capability is available. 

The Marine Corps has always maintained that adequate training capability must 

be available in the area commensurate with relocation of our marines. Marine forces 

on Guam must have the ability to sustain core competencies in order to meet the 

operational requirements of the combatant commander. 

100. Senator MCCAIN. General Conway, is this development significant, or are 

there acceptable alternatives for the training of marines stationed on Guam? 

General CONWAY. While training ranges currently planned for Guam and Tinian 

provide limited individual-skills training capabilities, these ranges do not provide 

for all requisite collective, combined arms, live and maneuver training the Marine 

Corps forces must meet to sustain core competencies. Those Marine Corps forces relocating from Okinawa to Guam will have to travel off-island to maintain requisite 

core competency. 

As part of continuing efforts by DOD to address these existing and ongoing training issues, as well as the training needs of other services in the Western Pacific, 

the OSD has directed U.S. Pacific Command to conduct an Environmental Impact 

Statement (EIS) for joint training requirements in the Western Pacific. This EIS 

will include an evaluation for additional training facilities in the Commonwealth of 

the Northern Mariana Islands and other locations in the Western Pacific to address 

collective, combined arms, live fire and maneuver training requirements for Marine 

Corps and joint forces in the area. 

101. Senator MCCAIN. General Conway, is the development of a training range 

on Tinian Island feasible? 

General CONWAY. Currently, the plan to develop four expeditionary training 

ranges to augment individual skills training on Guam is feasible. Development of 

ranges that could potentially support ranges to meet individual, unit level, and integrated combined arms training requirements for training of Marine, joint, and multilateral forces on Tinian are unknown and will be addressed in a separate Environmental Impact Statement to be conducted by U.S. Pacific Command. 

102. Senator MCCAIN. General Conway, does a potential exist that the Marine 

Corps will be forced to accept and adapt to a plan that does not provide for adequate 

live fire training ranges on Guam as originally envisioned? 

General CONWAY. The Marine Corps has always maintained that adequate training capability must be available in the area commensurate with relocation of our 

marines. A lack of adequate ranges and training capability that would adversely affect readiness is a show stopper. Before moving marines to Guam, we must ensure 

that adequate training capability is available and we are moving in the right direction towards that capability. 

103. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Mabus, on February 17, 2010, the U.S. EPA 

rated the Navy’s Draft EIS as Environmentally Unsatisfactory: Inadequate Information. This rating was based on two aspects: first, by not providing a specific plan 

to address wastewater treatment and water supply needs of the increase in Guam’s 

population due to the influx of construction workers related to facilities improvements on Guam which may result in significant adverse public health impacts; and 

second, because aspects of the project will result in what EPA views as unacceptable 

impacts to the coral reef ecosystem in Apra Harbor. EPA states that the impacts 

are of sufficient magnitude that EPA believes that the proposed improvements to 

facilities in Guam should not proceed as proposed and that improved analyses are 

required to ensure the final EIS is adequate. Given this very negative position by 

EPA on the current environmental analysis supporting the improvements of facilities on Guam, and the aggressive 2014 deadline for facilities to be ready to support 

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the relocation of 8,000 marines and 9,000 family members from Okinawa to Guam, 

what is the Navy going to do to correct these apparent deficiencies? 

Secretary MABUS. The Guam military build-up EIS is one of the most complex 

EISs ever undertaken by DOD. We have worked closely with EPA and other Federal 

and local agencies during the development of the Draft EIS, and expected that formal agency comments would point out deficiencies and areas requiring revision. We 

are currently analyzing all comments received on the Draft EIS and are determining 

how best to address these issues in the Final EIS. The White House Council on Environmental Quality is also involved and is leading interagency efforts to help determine how best to assess and address the indirect impacts of the military buildup. 

DOD is committed to executing the program on Guam in such a way that will not 

pose significant public health impacts, so we are currently evaluating the major potential causes of those impacts and developing mitigation solutions. We also continue to work with other Federal agencies to find ‘‘whole-of-government funding’’ solutions to address Guam’s existing conditions and potential impacts associated with 

the general population growth of Guam. 

104. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Mabus, can the Navy proceed with any of the 

MILCON projects requested in the fiscal year 2011 budget request, or projects to 

be funded by the Government of Japan, given the need to carry out further environmental analyses to support the build up on Guam? 

Secretary MABUS. We are currently reviewing public comments received on the 

DEIS, developing strategies for how best to address them in the Final EIS, and determining whether any of the issues raised by public comments received require further environmental analysis. As of this time we have not identified any specific 

issues or items that require additional environmental analysis such that we would 

not be able to carry out projects funded by the Government of Japan in Japanese 

fiscal year 2009 and 2010, and U.S. MILCON in fiscal year 2010 and 2011. 

We must complete the Final EIS and sign the ROD before starting any of the construction projects, regardless of funding source. Our acquisition strategy allows for 

award of contracts for all projects for which we have received GOJ or US funding 

immediately following the signing of the ROD. 

105. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Mabus, what projects are likely to be delayed due 

to the need to address the issues raised by EPA? 

Secretary MABUS. The Navy is currently reviewing the comments submitted by 

EPA on the Draft EIS. While EPA has raised many serious concerns, we are optimistic that we can respond to the issues raised and make necessary changes to the 

Final EIS to address EPA’s concerns and thus avoid any delay in the program. 

The following Government of Japan funded Japanese fiscal year 2009 and 2010 

projects, as well as the U.S. MILCON fiscal year 2010 and 2011 projects, are scheduled to be awarded shortly after a ROD is issued later this fiscal year. 

JFY 2009 ACE Gate, U&SI Ph I, AAFB 

JFY 2009 Apra Harbor, U&SI Ph 1 

JFY 2009 Finegayan, U&SI Ph I 

FY 2010 P–1003 Military Working Dogs 

FY 2010 P–204 Apra Wharf Ph I (U/T) Increment I 

FY 2010 P–100 North Ramp Utilities Ph I, AAFB 

FY 2010 P–101 North Ramp Parking Ph I, AAFB 

JFY 2010 J007 Waterfront Ops 

JFY 2010 J008 Fire Station, Finegayan 

JFY 2010 J006 Apra Harbor Clinic 

JFY 2010 J017 U&SI Ph II, Finegayan 

JFY 2010 J–010 BEQ, Finegayan 

FY 2011 P–110 U&SI, Finegayan Ph I 

FY 2011 P–202 North Ramp Utilities Ph II, AAFB 

FY 2011 P–203 North Ramp Parking Ph II, AAFB 

FY 2011 P–204 Apra Wharf Ph I (U/T) Increment II 

JFY 2011 J–011 Base Admin Bldg 

JFY 2011 J–012 MLG Admin Bldg 

JFY 2011 J–015 Enlisted Dining Facility 

JFY 2011 J–016 BEQ Site Adapt, 2 BEQs, Finegayan 

106. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Mabus, how will this delay impact the deadline 

to be ready for the marines to move to Guam by 2014? 

Secretary MABUS. We are committed to the 2014 date agreed to in the Realignment Roadmap between the United States and Japan. We are currently reviewing 

public comments received on the DEIS and developing strategies for how best to adVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:37 May 06, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00439 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\62155.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
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dress them in the Final EIS and sign a ROD in time to begin construction in fiscal 

year 2010. 

CHINA

107. Senator MCCAIN. Admiral Roughead, are you comfortable with the current 

number of U.S. submarines, especially at the rate that China is building and deploying its submarine fleet? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Our existing submarine fleet of 53 attack submarines (SSNs) 

is meeting all critical combatant commander SSN requirements, including any potential threat posed by the existing Chinese submarine fleet. 

Beyond the FYDP, our SSN force structure will dip below combatant commanders’ 

minimum force level requirement of 48 SSNs in 2024, as we decommission Los Angeles-class SSNs at a rate of 3 to 4 per year. Our ability to effectively counter submarine threats posed in this timeframe hinges on our reaching and maintaining an 

increased construction rate of two Virginia-class SSNs per year starting in 2011. 

Our fiscal year 2011 budget requests funding for this construction. 

108. Senator MCCAIN. Admiral Roughead, how is the Navy planning long-term to 

maintain its strategic and tactical dominance in Asia-Pacific? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. The Navy will continue to maintain its strategic and tactical 

dominance in the Asia-Pacific region through sustained engagement with allies and 

partners and the persistent forward presence of our combat-capable ships and aircraft in the region. Specifically, we will continue to forward deploy naval forces and 

exercise the freedom of maneuver necessary to deter aggression, assure our allies, 

and enable our quick response to regional contingencies. We will employ superior 

and resilient warfare systems, including sea-based BMD and conduct exercises to 

improve interoperability with our joint service and international partners. We will 

conduct regional maritime security operations and partnership building activities to 

protect maritime resources, support free and open seaborne commerce, and counter 

conventional and irregular challenges, including maritime-related terrorism, weapons proliferation, transnational crime, piracy, environmental destruction, and illegal 

seaborne immigration. Navy remains committed to sustained and active engagement 

in the Asia-Pacific region over the long-term to protect our vital national interests. 

PROPOSAL FOR MORATORIUM ON DISCHARGES

109. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Mabus, Admiral Roughead, and General Conway, 

in his testimony on February 2, Admiral Mullen was clear that the Joint Chiefs 

have not yet developed their best military advice about the impact of a repeal of 

the DADT policy or the manner in which a change would be implemented. However, 

many in Congress intend to move quickly through legislation to repeal the law as 

quickly as possible, including imposition of a moratorium on administrative separations while the high level review proceeds. Do you support a moratorium on discharges of openly gay servicemembers while the high level review is conducted? 

Secretary MABUS. I do not recommend enactment of a moratorium because I believe that it would complicate the ongoing review directed by Secretary Gates to assess the potential impact of a repeal of 10 U.S.C. § 654. The Department of the Navy 

is participating in the DOD Comprehensive Review Working Group to assess the implications of a repeal of 10 U.S.C. § 654 and, should that occur, to develop an implementation plan for any statutory change. That review is due to report its findings 

to Secretary Gates by December 1, 2010. I strongly believe we owe our 

servicemembers informed and thoughtful decisionmaking. 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. I do not recommend enactment of a moratorium because I 

believe that it would be extremely confusing to the force at a time when they are 

engaged in two combat operations and other demanding military activities around 

the globe. Moreover, a moratorium could complicate the ongoing review directed by 

Secretary Gates. 

General CONWAY. No. 

110. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Mabus, Admiral Roughead, and General Conway, 

what is the basis for your objection to a congressionally-mandated moratorium on 

separations of openly gay servicemembers under the DADT policy? 

Secretary MABUS. I do not recommend enactment of a moratorium because I believe that it would complicate the ongoing review directed by Secretary Gates to assess the potential impacts of a repeal of 10 U.S.C. § 654. The Department of the 

Navy is participating in the DOD Comprehensive Review Working Group to assess 

435 

the implications of a repeal of 10 U.S.C. § 654, should that occur, and develop an 

implementation plan for any new statutory mandate. That review is due to report 

its findings to Secretary Gates by December 1, 2010. I strongly believe we owe our 

servicemembers informed and thoughtful decisionmaking. 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. I believe a moratorium would be extremely confusing to the 

force at a time when they are engaged in two combat operations and other demanding military activities around the globe, and that a moratorium could complicate the 

ongoing comprehensive review directed by Secretary Gates. 

General CONWAY. Until such time as the law is changed, the Marine Corps will 

follow the law. 

Commanders in the field are executing the current law and policy to the absolute 

best of their abilities. 

During this time of war, Congress should either change the law or not. Half measures, while the public debate and in-depth study are ongoing, will only create confusion for commanders and marines and add an additional level of friction to an already complex battlefield. 

ROLE OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

111. Senator MCCAIN. Admiral Roughead and General Conway, Admiral Mullen 

is the principal military adviser to the President and the Secretary of Defense, but 

under law, he must consult and seek advice from the other members of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff and the combatant commanders. Have you been given adequate opportunity to state your views to date? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Yes. The Chairman has always been receptive to hearing my 

views on matters affecting the U.S. Navy. 

General CONWAY. Senator McCain, I believe that Admiral Mullen has sought out, 

and provided me adequate opportunity to state my views. If disagreement exists, the 

Chairman routinely shares the Service Chiefs’ views with the President and the Secretary of Defense. If the Service Chiefs think we need a stronger reply, we are not 

hesitant to write and sign a 16-star letter and send it forward. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JEFF SESSIONS

LIFE CYCLE FUEL CONSUMPTION AND COSTS

112. Senator SESSIONS. Secretary Mabus, on December 3, 2009, I sent you a letter 

and expressed concern that ‘‘TOC, including fuel efficiency, should be a critical factor of competitive cost evaluation’’ in the LCS request for proposal (RFP). On January 14, 2010, you responded in a letter and stated, ‘‘reduced TOC has been central 

to the LCS concept and requirements.’’ Additionally, you stated at the Naval Energy 

Forum in October 2009 that, ‘‘the lifetime energy cost of a building or a system, and 

the fully burdened cost of fuel in powering those, will be a mandatory evaluation 

factor used when awarding contracts.’’ Where, specifically, in the final RFP do you 

evaluate the lifecycle fuel costs in dollars for the LCS? 

Secretary MABUS. The LCS fiscal years 2010–2014 block buy solicitation does not 

specifically address life cycle fuel costs in dollars. Life cycle cost reduction is one 

of six technical/management evaluation criteria. The offerors are required to propose 

specific life cycle cost reduction initiatives for all areas of life cycle costs—training, 

maintenance, energy usage, supply support, configuration management, operations 

(including fuel usage), environmental impact and disposal. These are common TOC 

categories in the Operating and Support Cost Estimating Guide from OSD Cost 

Analysis Improvement Group (October 2007). 

The Government will not consider life cycle cost as part of its evaluation under 

the price/cost category. Since the inception of the LCS program, the Navy has focused on reducing both acquisition cost and life cycle cost in LCS class ships. In this 

regard, life cycle cost considerations are emphasized in both designs through the 

Navy’s requirements for reduced manning, open architecture and mission package 

modularity that have been key design parameters since the inception of the program. 

The Navy has performed extensive O&S cost sensitivity analysis of each ship design. Total ownership considers research and development costs, investment costs, 

disposal costs, and O&S costs including maintenance, manning, training, fuel, and 

infrastructure support. The Navy’s analysis shows both designs meet the O&S requirements. 

In this regard, fuel costs are an important contributor to the estimated life cycle 

cost for each ship design, but are also highly dependent on the speed-time profile 

436 

assumed for the LCS mission. Specifically, fuel costs for both designs would vary 

significantly based on the speed-time profile assumed. Moreover, the speed-time profile provided to both design teams in the LCS Build Specifications was based upon 

an assumption that the ship would perform a single wartime mission: mine countermeasures. It did not reflect other significant LCS wartime missions, such as antisubmarine warfare or anti-surface warfare, and did not reflect any lessons learned 

from actual operation of either of the first two ships, and did not include a peacetime operating scenario for LCS. What can be shown is that for a variety of operational profiles, both LCS designs meet the threshold value for O&S costs defined 

in the LCS Capabilities Development Document as ‘‘Ownership Cost’’ and approved 

by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council. 

With one ship of each LCS design already delivered and another ship of each design under construction, the competing designs are where they are today because 

of the inherent design features that have been required from the beginning of the 

program and the continued focus on reducing acquisition cost. If the Navy were to 

include O&S costs in the price/cost evaluation of competing proposals, then the 

Offerors would have to be provided an opportunity to re-optimize their respective 

designs to minimize O&S costs, which may result in significant proposed changes 

to each existing ship design, adding time to the acquisition process, introducing design instability, potentially increasing acquisition cost, and adding overall risk to 

the program. 

The solicitation includes an evaluation factor under the technical/management 

category for Life Cycle Cost Reduction Initiatives. Offeror-proposed initiatives to reduce life cycle costs will be evaluated, assigned an adjectival rating, and factored 

into the overall best value determination. Proposed life cycle cost reduction initiatives will therefore be a consideration in the Navy’s best value determination for 

this acquisition. Post award, the Navy may implement any or all of the proposed 

life cycle cost reduction initiatives over the lifetime of the contract, if deemed appropriate, in order to provide a more favorable long-term O&S cost profile for the selected design. 

113. Senator SESSIONS. Secretary Mabus, how did you determine the factors to address those lifecycle fuel costs in dollars and where was the data generated to determine the lifecycle fuel consumption? 

Secretary MABUS. The LCS fiscal years 2010–2014 block buy solicitation does not 

specifically address life cycle fuel costs in dollars. Life cycle cost reduction is one 

of six technical/management evaluation criteria. The offerors are required to propose 

specific life cycle cost reduction initiatives for all areas of life cycle costs—training, 

maintenance, energy usage, supply support, configuration management, operations 

(including fuel usage), environmental impact and disposal. These are common TOC 

categories in the Operating and Support Cost Estimating Guide from OSD Cost 

Analysis Improvement Group (October 2007). 

The Government will not consider life cycle cost as part of its evaluation under 

the price/cost category. Since the inception of the LCS program, the Navy has focused on reducing both acquisition cost and life cycle cost in LCS class ships. In this 

regard, life cycle cost considerations are emphasized in both designs through the 

Navy’s requirements for reduced manning, open architecture and mission package 

modularity that have been key design parameters since the inception of the program. 

The Navy has performed extensive O&S cost sensitivity analysis of each ship design. Total Ownership considers research and development costs, investment costs, 

disposal costs, and O&S costs including maintenance, manning, training, fuel, and 

infrastructure support. The Navy’s analysis shows both designs meet the O&S requirements. 

In this regard, fuel costs are an important contributor to the estimated life cycle 

cost for each ship design, but are also highly dependent on the speed-time profile 

assumed for the LCS mission. Specifically, fuel costs for both designs would vary 

significantly based on the speed-time profile assumed. Moreover, the speed-time profile provided to both design teams in the LCS Build Specifications was based upon 

an assumption that the ship would perform a single wartime mission: mine countermeasures. It did not reflect other significant LCS wartime missions, such as antisubmarine warfare or anti-surface warfare, and did not reflect any lessons learned 

from actual operation of either of the first two ships, and did not include a peacetime operating scenario for LCS. What can be shown is that for a variety of operational profiles, both LCS designs meet the threshold value for O&S costs defined 

in the LCS Capabilities Development Document as ‘‘Ownership Cost’’ and approved 

by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council. 

437 

With one ship of each LCS design already delivered and another ship of each design under construction, the competing designs are where they are today because 

of the inherent design features that have been required from the beginning of the 

program and the continued focus on reducing acquisition cost. If the Navy were to 

include O&S costs in the price/cost evaluation of competing proposals, then the 

Offerors would have to be provided an opportunity to re-optimize their respective 

designs to minimize O&S costs, which may result in significant proposed changes 

to each existing ship design, adding time to the acquisition process, introducing design instability, potentially increasing acquisition cost, and adding overall risk to 

the program. 

The solicitation includes an evaluation factor under the technical/management 

category for Life Cycle Cost Reduction Initiatives. Offeror-proposed initiatives to reduce life cycle costs will be evaluated, assigned an adjectival rating, and factored 

into the overall best value determination. Proposed life cycle cost reduction initiatives will therefore be a consideration in the Navy’s best value determination for 

this acquisition. Post award, the Navy may implement any or all of the proposed 

life cycle cost reduction initiatives over the lifetime of the contract, if deemed appropriate, in order to provide a more favorable long-term O&S cost profile for the selected design. 

114. Senator SESSIONS. Secretary Mabus, why was the determination of fuel consumption and lifecycle costs done in terms of percentages vice real dollars? 

Secretary MABUS. The LCS fiscal years 2010–2014 block buy solicitation does not 

specifically address life cycle fuel costs in dollars. Life cycle cost reduction is one 

of six technical/management evaluation criteria. The offerors are required to propose 

specific life cycle cost reduction initiatives for all areas of life cycle costs—training, 

maintenance, energy usage, supply support, configuration management, operations 

(including fuel usage), environmental impact and disposal. These are common TOC 

categories in the Operating and Support Cost Estimating Guide from OSD Cost 

Analysis Improvement Group (October 2007). 

The Government will not consider life cycle cost as part of its evaluation under 

the price/cost category. Since the inception of the LCS program, the Navy has focused on reducing both acquisition cost and life cycle cost in LCS class ships. In this 

regard, life cycle cost considerations are emphasized in both designs through the 

Navy’s requirements for reduced manning, open architecture and mission package 

modularity that have been key design parameters since the inception of the program. 

The Navy has performed extensive O&S cost sensitivity analysis of each ship design. Total ownership considers research and development costs, investment costs, 

disposal costs, and O&S costs including maintenance, manning, training, fuel, and 

infrastructure support. The Navy’s analysis shows both designs meet the O&S requirements. 

In this regard, fuel costs are an important contributor to the estimated life cycle 

cost for each ship design, but are also highly dependent on the speed-time profile 

assumed for the LCS mission. Specifically, fuel costs for both designs would vary 

significantly based on the speed-time profile assumed. Moreover, the speed-time profile provided to both design teams in the LCS Build Specifications was based upon 

an assumption that the ship would perform a single wartime mission: mine countermeasures. It did not reflect other significant LCS wartime missions, such as antisubmarine warfare or anti-surface warfare, and did not reflect any lessons learned 

from actual operation of either of the first two ships, and did not include a peacetime operating scenario for LCS. What can be shown is that for a variety of operational profiles, both LCS designs meet the threshold value for O&S costs defined 

in the LCS Capabilities Development Document as ‘‘Ownership Cost’’ and approved 

by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council. 

With one ship of each LCS design already delivered and another ship of each design under construction, the competing designs are where they are today because 

of the inherent design features that have been required from the beginning of the 

program and the continued focus on reducing acquisition cost. If the Navy were to 

include O&S costs in the price/cost evaluation of competing proposals, then the 

Offerors would have to be provided an opportunity to re-optimize their respective 

designs to minimize O&S costs, which may result in significant proposed changes 

to each existing ship design, adding time to the acquisition process, introducing design instability, potentially increasing acquisition cost, and adding overall risk to 

the program. 

The solicitation includes an evaluation factor under the technical/management 

category for Life Cycle Cost Reduction Initiatives. Offeror-proposed initiatives to reduce life cycle costs will be evaluated, assigned an adjectival rating, and factored 

438 

into the overall best value determination. Proposed life cycle cost reduction initiatives will therefore be a consideration in the Navy’s best value determination for 

this acquisition. Post award, the Navy may implement any or all of the proposed 

life cycle cost reduction initiatives over the lifetime of the contract, if deemed appropriate, in order to provide a more favorable long-term O&S cost profile for the selected design. 

115. Senator SESSIONS. Secretary Mabus, is the use of percentages a common 

practice for evaluating these important criteria? If you think it does or does not, 

please explain your rationale. 

Secretary MABUS. The LCS fiscal years 2010–2014 block buy solicitation does not 

specifically address life cycle fuel costs in dollars. Life cycle cost reduction is one 

of six technical/management evaluation criteria. The offerors are required to propose 

specific life cycle cost reduction initiatives for all areas of life cycle costs—training, 

maintenance, energy usage, supply support, configuration management, operations 

(including fuel usage), environmental impact and disposal. These are common TOC 

categories in the Operating and Support Cost Estimating Guide from OSD Cost 

Analysis Improvement Group (October 2007). 

The Government will not consider life cycle cost as part of its evaluation under 

the price/cost category. Since the inception of the LCS program, the Navy has focused on reducing both acquisition cost and life cycle cost in LCS class ships. In this 

regard, life cycle cost considerations are emphasized in both designs through the 

Navy’s requirements for reduced manning, open architecture and mission package 

modularity that have been key design parameters since the inception of the program. 

The Navy has performed extensive O&S cost sensitivity analysis of each ship design. Total ownership considers research and development costs, investment costs, 

disposal costs, and O&S costs including maintenance, manning, training, fuel, and 

infrastructure support. The Navy’s analysis shows both designs meet the O&S requirements. 

In this regard, fuel costs are an important contributor to the estimated life cycle 

cost for each ship design, but are also highly dependent on the speed-time profile 

assumed for the LCS mission. Specifically, fuel costs for both designs would vary 

significantly based on the speed-time profile assumed. Moreover, the speed-time profile provided to both design teams in the LCS Build Specifications was based upon 

an assumption that the ship would perform a single wartime mission: mine countermeasures. It did not reflect other significant LCS wartime missions, such as antisubmarine warfare or anti-surface warfare, and did not reflect any lessons learned 

from actual operation of either of the first two ships, and did not include a peacetime operating scenario for LCS. What can be shown is that for a variety of operational profiles, both LCS designs meet the threshold value for O&S costs defined 

in the LCS Capabilities Development Document as ‘‘Ownership Cost’’ and approved 

by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council. 

With one ship of each LCS design already delivered and another ship of each design under construction, the competing designs are where they are today because 

of the inherent design features that have been required from the beginning of the 

program and the continued focus on reducing acquisition cost. If the Navy were to 

include O&S costs in the price/cost evaluation of competing proposals, then the 

Offerors would have to be provided an opportunity to re-optimize their respective 

designs to minimize O&S costs, which may result in significant proposed changes 

to each existing ship design, adding time to the acquisition process, introducing design instability, potentially increasing acquisition cost, and adding overall risk to 

the program. 

The solicitation includes an evaluation factor under the technical/management 

category for Life Cycle Cost Reduction Initiatives. Offeror-proposed initiatives to reduce life cycle costs will be evaluated, assigned an adjectival rating, and factored 

into the overall best value determination. Proposed life cycle cost reduction initiatives will therefore be a consideration in the Navy’s best value determination for 

this acquisition. Post award, the Navy may implement any or all of the proposed 

life cycle cost reduction initiatives over the lifetime of the contract, if deemed appropriate, in order to provide a more favorable long-term O&S cost profile for the selected design. 

116. Senator SESSIONS. Secretary Mabus, in your letter to me dated January 14, 

2010, you stated, ‘‘prior to the fiscal year 2010 contract award, the LCS program 

will be presented to the Under Secretary of Defense of Acquisition, Technology, and 

Logistics as the Milestone Decision Authority for a Milestone B decision. Here, the 

Navy’s Life Cycle Cost Estimate will be scrutinized against an independently deVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:37 May 06, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00444 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\62155.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
439 

rived estimate for the Office of the Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE).’’ It is my understanding that the milestone decision will occur after 

the source selection. Why would you wait until after a source selection is made to 

evaluate the second most important program cost criteria for the life cycle cost of 

the LCS? 

Secretary MABUS. The contract award of the LCS fiscal year 2010–2014 block buy 

solicitation will not occur until after the Milestone B has been conducted. Rather, 

the Navy will prepare for and participate in the Milestone B decision process concurrently with its evaluation of competing proposals under this solicitation. 

This approach has been used on other shipbuilding programs and was most recently used on the competitive contract award of the Joint High Speed Vessel 

(JHSV) in November 2008. 

This approach is consistent with both the January 14, 2010 letter and in my public statements before the Naval Energy Forum in October 2009. 

117. Senator SESSIONS. Secretary Mabus, has this approach ever been used before, 

or is it common practice to consider life cycle fuel consumption after the source selection is made? If so, please provide the program name and dates where this approach was executed. 

Secretary MABUS. The contract award of the LCS fiscal year 2010–2014 block buy 

solicitation will not occur until after the Milestone B has been conducted. Rather, 

the Navy will prepare for and participate in the Milestone B decision process concurrently with its evaluation of competing proposals under this solicitation. 

This approach has been used on other shipbuilding programs and was most recently used on the competitive contract award of the JHSV in November 2008. 

This approach is consistent with both the January 14, 2010 letter and in my public statements before the Naval Energy Forum in October 2009. 

118. Senator SESSIONS. Secretary Mabus, do you feel that this approach is consistent with your statements of January 14, 2010, in the letter to me and your public statement before the Naval Energy Forum in October 2009? 

Secretary MABUS. Yes. From the inception of the LCS Program, TOC has been addressed through the utilization of open architecture, reduced manning, and reduced 

maintenance. Although fuel (energy) costs are not a specific evaluation factor in the 

cost section of the LCS Request For Proposal (RFP), the RFP strikes an appropriate 

balance between the acquisition costs and O&S costs that make up the overall 

TOCs. 

The technical/management section of the RFP specifically focuses on the drivers 

of TOC in an effort to further reduce O&S costs, particularly in the area of energy 

usage or fuel costs. From the beginning of the LCS program, the Navy has focused 

on reducing both acquisition cost and life cycle cost in LCS class ships. In this regard, life cycle cost considerations are emphasized in both LCS designs, through the 

Navy’s requirements for reduced manning, mission package modularity and open architecture that have been key design parameters since the inception of the program. 

The fiscal year 2010 LCS RFP addresses TOC as one of six technical factors. This 

factor specifically focuses on future efforts to reduce ownership cost in the areas of 

training, maintenance, supply support, configuration management, operations costs 

(which include fuel), environmental impact and disposal, all of which affect TOC. 

The RFP includes an evaluation factor under the technical/management category for 

life cycle cost reduction initiatives. Offeror-proposed initiatives to reduce life cycle 

costs will be evaluated, assigned an adjective rating, and factored into the overall 

best value determination. 

Fuel costs are highly dependent on the speed-time profile assumed for the LCS 

mission. Specifically, fuel costs for both designs would vary significantly based on 

the speed-time profile assumed. Moreover, the speed-time profile provided to both 

design teams in the LCS Build Specifications was based upon an assumption that 

the ship would perform a single wartime mission: mine countermeasures. It did not 

reflect other significant LCS wartime missions, such as anti-submarine warfare or 

anti-surface warfare, did not reflect any lessons learned from actual operation of either of the first two ships, and did not include a peacetime operating scenario for 

LCS. What can be shown is that for representative operational profiles, both LCS 

designs meet the threshold value for O&S costs defined in the LCS Capabilities Development Document as ‘‘Ownership Cost’’ and approved by the Joint Requirements 

Oversight Council. 

440 

DRAFT REQUEST FOR PROPOSAL SECTIONS L AND M

119. Senator SESSIONS. Secretary Mabus and Admiral Roughead, why was the decision made to not provide Sections L and M to the bidders during the draft RFP 

comment period? 

Secretary MABUS. The decision not to release a draft of Sections L and M until 

after the OSD Peer Review was completed was not a mishandling of the draft RFP, 

nor does it constitute a basis for protest. The sections of the RFP that were complete 

(sections A–J) were provided as a draft to the offerors to afford them an understanding of the scope, structure and requirements of the RFP and to allow them to 

provide questions or concerns related to the requirements and structure of the statement of work. Draft RFP Sections A–J were released to industry prior to the OSD 

Peer Review. 

DOD policy requires peer reviews of solicitations for major systems acquisitions 

to ensure consistent and appropriate regulation and policy implementation for negotiated source selections, improve the quality of contracting processes, and facilitate 

sharing of best practices and lessons learned across DOD. Sections L and M were 

not released to industry until after the completion of the OSD Peer Review based 

on a joint decision by Naval Sea Systems Command Contracts Directorate (NAVSEA 

02) and Program Executive Office for Ships (PEO SHIPS). 

The decision on whether to release a draft RFP and the content of the draft RFP 

varies by program. However, it is not uncommon for Sections L and M to be released 

only after they have been finalized. A draft RFP without Sections L and M was 

issued for the competitive procurement for Integrated Submarine Imaging Systems 

(ISIS) in support of the Submarine Sensor Systems Program Office (PMS 435). Contract award was made and this procurement was not protested. For the DDG–51 

program MRG and JHSV competitions, only the draft specifications were issued 

prior to the final RFP. JHSV was successfully awarded without protest; the MRG 

competition is ongoing. 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. The decision to not release a draft of Sections L and M until 

after the OSD Peer Review was completed was not a mishandling of the draft RFP, 

nor does it constitute a basis for protest. The sections of the RFP that were complete 

(sections A–J) were provided as a draft to the offerors to afford them an understanding of the scope, structure and requirements of the RFP, and to allow them 

to provide questions or concerns related to the requirements and structure of the 

statement of work. 

DOD policy requires peer reviews of solicitations for major systems acquisitions 

to ensure consistent and appropriate regulation and policy implementation for negotiated source selections, improve the quality of contracting processes, and facilitate 

sharing of best practices and lessons learned across DOD. Sections L and M were 

not released to industry until after the completion of the OSD Peer Review based 

on a joint decision by NAVSEA 02 and PEO SHIPS. 

The decision on whether to release a draft RFP and the content of the draft RFP 

varies by program. However, it is not uncommon for sections L and M to be released 

only after they have been finalized. A draft RFP without sections L and M was 

issued for the competitive procurement for ISIS. Contract award was made and this 

procurement was not protested. For the DDG–51 program MRG and JHSV competitions, only the draft specifications were issued prior to the final RFP. JHSV was 

successfully awarded without protest; the MRG competition is ongoing. 

120. Senator SESSIONS. Secretary Mabus and Admiral Roughead, do you feel this 

is a mishandling of the draft RFP and could serve as a potential area of protest? 

Secretary MABUS. The decision not to release a draft of Sections L and M until 

after the OSD Peer Review was completed was not a mishandling of the draft RFP, 

nor does it constitute a basis for protest. The sections of the RFP that were complete 

(Sections A–J) were provided as a draft to the offerors to afford them an understanding of the scope, structure and requirements of the RFP and to allow them to 

provide questions or concerns related to the requirements and structure of the statement of work. Draft RFP Sections A–J were released to industry prior to the OSD 

Peer Review. 

DOD policy requires peer reviews of solicitations for major systems acquisitions 

to ensure consistent and appropriate regulation and policy implementation for negotiated source selections, improve the quality of contracting processes, and facilitate 

sharing of best practices and lessons learned across DOD. Sections L and M were 

not released to industry until after the completion of the OSD Peer Review based 

on a joint decision by NAVSEA 02 and PEO SHIPS. 

The decision on whether to release a draft RFP and the content of the draft RFP 

varies by program. However, it is not uncommon for sections L and M to be released 

441 

only after they have been finalized. A draft RFP without sections L and M was 

issued for the competitive procurement for ISIS in support of the Submarine Sensor 

Systems Program Office (PMS 435). Contract award was made and this procurement was not protested. For the DDG–51 program MRG and JHSV competitions, 

only the draft specifications were issued prior to the final RFP. JHSV was successfully awarded without protest; the MRG competition is ongoing. 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. The decision to not release a draft of sections L and M until 

after the OSD Peer Review was completed was not a mishandling of the draft RFP, 

nor does it constitute a basis for protest. The sections of the RFP that were complete 

(sections A–J) were provided as a draft to the offerors to afford them an understanding of the scope, structure and requirements of the RFP, and to allow them 

to provide questions or concerns related to the requirements and structure of the 

statement of work. 

DOD policy requires peer reviews of solicitations for major systems acquisitions 

to ensure consistent and appropriate regulation and policy implementation for negotiated source selections, improve the quality of contracting processes, and facilitate 

sharing of best practices and lessons learned across DOD. Sections L and M were 

not released to industry until after the completion of the OSD Peer Review based 

on a joint decision by NAVSEA 02 and PEO SHIPS. 

The decision on whether to release a draft RFP and the content of the draft RFP 

varies by program. However, it is not uncommon for sections L and M to be released 

only after they have been finalized. A draft RFP without sections L and M was 

issued for the competitive procurement for ISIS. Contract award was made and this 

procurement was not protested. For the DDG–51 program MRG and JHSV competitions, only the draft specifications were issued prior to the final RFP. JHSV was 

successfully awarded without protest; the MRG competition is ongoing. 

121. Senator SESSIONS. Secretary Mabus and Admiral Roughead, who made this 

decision? 

Secretary MABUS. The decision not to release a draft of Sections L and M until 

after the OSD Peer Review was completed was not a mishandling of the draft RFP, 

nor does it constitute a basis for protest. The sections of the RFP that were complete 

(sections A–J) were provided as a draft to the offerors to afford them an understanding of the scope, structure and requirements of the RFP and to allow them to 

provide questions or concerns related to the requirements and structure of the statement of work. Draft RFP sections A–J were released to industry prior to the OSD 

Peer Review. 

DOD policy requires peer reviews of solicitations for major systems acquisitions 

to ensure consistent and appropriate regulation and policy implementation for negotiated source selections, improve the quality of contracting processes, and facilitate 

sharing of best practices and lessons learned across DOD. Sections L and M were 

not released to industry until after the completion of the OSD Peer Review based 

on a joint decision by NAVSEA 02 and PEO SHIPS. 

The decision on whether to release a draft RFP and the content of the draft RFP 

varies by program. However, it is not uncommon for Sections L and M to be released 

only after they have been finalized. A draft RFP without sections L and M was 

issued for the competitive procurement for ISIS in support of the Submarine Sensor 

Systems Program Office (PMS 435). Contract award was made and this procurement was not protested. For the DDG–51 program MRG and JHSV competitions, 

only the draft specifications were issued prior to the final RFP. JHSV was successfully awarded without protest; the MRG competition is ongoing. 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. The decision to not release a draft of Sections L and M until 

after the OSD Peer Review was completed was not a mishandling of the draft RFP, 

nor does it constitute a basis for protest. The sections of the RFP that were complete 

(sections A–J) were provided as a draft to the offerors to afford them an understanding of the scope, structure, and requirements of the RFP, and to allow them 

to provide questions or concerns related to the requirements and structure of the 

statement of work. 

DOD policy requires peer reviews of solicitations for major systems acquisitions 

to ensure consistent and appropriate regulation and policy implementation for negotiated source selections, improve the quality of contracting processes, and facilitate 

sharing of best practices and lessons learned across DOD. Sections L and M were 

not released to industry until after the completion of the OSD Peer Review based 

on a joint decision by NAVSEA 02 and PEO SHIPS. 

The decision on whether to release a draft RFP and the content of the draft RFP 

varies by program. However, it is not uncommon for sections L and M to be released 

only after they have been finalized. A draft RFP without sections L and M was 

issued for the competitive procurement for ISIS. Contract award was made and this 

442 

procurement was not protested. For the DDG–51 program MRG and JHSV competitions, only the draft specifications were issued prior to the final RFP. JHSV was 

successfully awarded without protest; the MRG competition is ongoing. 

122. Senator SESSIONS. Secretary Mabus and Admiral Roughead, on what other 

occasions has the Navy not provided these sections during the draft RFP comment 

period? 

Secretary MABUS. The decision not to release a draft of sections L and M until 

after the OSD Peer Review was completed was not a mishandling of the draft RFP, 

nor does it constitute a basis for protest. The sections of the RFP that were complete 

(sections A–J) were provided as a draft to the offerors to afford them an understanding of the scope, structure and requirements of the RFP and to allow them to 

provide questions or concerns related to the requirements and structure of the statement of work. Draft RFP Sections A–J were released to industry prior to the OSD 

Peer Review. 

DOD policy requires peer reviews of solicitations for major systems acquisitions 

to ensure consistent and appropriate regulation and policy implementation for negotiated source selections, improve the quality of contracting processes, and facilitate 

sharing of best practices and lessons learned across DOD. Sections L and M were 

not released to industry until after the completion of the OSD Peer Review based 

on a joint decision by NAVSEA 02 and PEO SHIPS. 

The decision on whether to release a draft RFP and the content of the draft RFP 

varies by program. However, it is not uncommon for sections L and M to be released 

only after they have been finalized. A draft RFP without sections L and M was 

issued for the competitive procurement for ISIS in support of the Submarine Sensor 

Systems Program Office (PMS 435). Contract award was made and this procurement was not protested. For the DDG–51 program MRG and JHSV competitions, 

only the draft specifications were issued prior to the final RFP. JHSV was successfully awarded without protest; the MRG competition is ongoing. 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. The decision to not release a draft of sections L and M until 

after the OSD Peer Review was completed was not a mishandling of the draft RFP, 

nor does it constitute a basis for protest. The sections of the RFP that were complete 

(sections A–J) were provided as a draft to the offerors to afford them an understanding of the scope, structure and requirements of the RFP, and to allow them 

to provide questions or concerns related to the requirements and structure of the 

statement of work. 

DOD policy requires peer reviews of solicitations for major systems acquisitions 

to ensure consistent and appropriate regulation and policy implementation for negotiated source selections, improve the quality of contracting processes, and facilitate 

sharing of best practices and lessons learned across DOD. Sections L and M were 

not released to industry until after the completion of the OSD Peer Review based 

on a joint decision by NAVSEA 02 and PEO SHIPS. 

The decision on whether to release a draft RFP and the content of the draft RFP 

varies by program. However, it is not uncommon for sections L and M to be released 

only after they have been finalized. A draft RFP without sections L and M was 

issued for the competitive procurement for ISIS. Contract award was made and this 

procurement was not protested. For the DDG–51 program MRG and JHSV competitions, only the draft specifications were issued prior to the final RFP. JHSV was 

successfully awarded without protest; the MRG competition is ongoing. 

123. Senator SESSIONS. Secretary Mabus and Admiral Roughead, what was the 

outcome of those acquisition programs? 

Secretary MABUS. The decision not to release a draft of sections L and M until 

after the OSD Peer Review was completed was not a mishandling of the draft RFP, 

nor does it constitute a basis for protest. The sections of the RFP that were complete 

(sections A–J) were provided as a draft to the offerors to afford them an understanding of the scope, structure and requirements of the RFP and to allow them to 

provide questions or concerns related to the requirements and structure of the statement of work. Draft RFP sections A–J were released to industry prior to the OSD 

Peer Review. 

DOD policy requires peer reviews of solicitations for major systems acquisitions 

to ensure consistent and appropriate regulation and policy implementation for negotiated source selections, improve the quality of contracting processes, and facilitate 

sharing of best practices and lessons learned across DOD. Sections L and M were 

not released to industry until after the completion of the OSD Peer Review based 

on a joint decision by NAVSEA 02 and PEO SHIPS. 

The decision on whether to release a draft RFP and the content of the draft RFP 

varies by program. However, it is not uncommon for sections L and M to be released 

443 

only after they have been finalized. A draft RFP without sections L and M was 

issued for the competitive procurement for ISIS in support of the Submarine Sensor 

Systems Program Office (PMS 435). Contract award was made and this procurement was not protested. For the DDG–51 program MRG and JHSV competitions, 

only the draft specifications were issued prior to the final RFP. JHSV was successfully awarded without protest; the MRG competition is ongoing. 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. The decision to not release a draft of sections L and M until 

after the OSD Peer Review was completed was not a mishandling of the draft RFP, 

nor does it constitute a basis for protest. The sections of the RFP that were complete 

(sections A–J) were provided as a draft to the offerors to afford them an understanding of the scope, structure and requirements of the RFP, and to allow them 

to provide questions or concerns related to the requirements and structure of the 

statement of work. 

DOD policy requires peer reviews of solicitations for major systems acquisitions 

to ensure consistent and appropriate regulation and policy implementation for negotiated source selections, improve the quality of contracting processes, and facilitate 

sharing of best practices and lessons learned across DOD. Sections L and M were 

not released to industry until after the completion of the OSD Peer Review based 

on a joint decision by NAVSEA 02 and PEO SHIPS. 

The decision on whether to release a draft RFP and the content of the draft RFP 

varies by program. However, it is not uncommon for sections L and M to be released 

only after they have been finalized. A draft RFP without sections L and M was 

issued for the competitive procurement for ISIS. Contract award was made and this 

procurement was not protested. For the DDG–51 program MRG and JHSV competitions, only the draft specifications were issued prior to the final RFP. JHSV was 

successfully awarded without protest; the MRG competition is ongoing. 

BEST VALUE APPROACH

124. Senator SESSIONS. Secretary Mabus, you stated before this committee on 

February 25, 2010, that, ‘‘both ships meet the requirements for the Navy.’’ I understand that LCS–1 has made engineering modifications after delivery to place stern 

extensions to the hull to address performance issues. If that information is accurate, 

how can you state that both ships met the requirements on delivery? 

Secretary MABUS. Surface ships, including the LCS designs, are required to meet 

stability standards, even if over 15 percent of the ship’s length is flooded. The Build 

Specification for LCS invokes this requirement. LCS–1 meets these requirements 

with the addition of the external tanks. The LCS–3 had already incorporated this 

change into the fiscal year 2009 contract baseline, which is the performance baseline 

for the fiscal year 2010–2014 block buy solicitation. Similarly, the LCS–4 incorporated larger gas turbine waterjets, which included tunnel and transom redesign, 

which is the performance baseline for the fiscal years 2010–2014 block buy solicitation. Both LCS designs in the fiscal years 2010–2014 block buy solicitation meet the 

Navy’s standards. 

125. Senator SESSIONS. Secretary Mabus, additionally, the final RFP allows for 

changes and modifications to the hull to address weight, trim, and stability. Are 

these changes to LCS–1 being allowed to compensate for a design shortfall in the 

hull’s performance even after she was delivered to the Navy? 

Secretary MABUS. Surface ships, including the LCS designs, are required to meet 

stability standards, even if over 15 percent of the ship’s length is flooded. The Build 

Specification for LCS invokes this requirement. LCS–1 meets these requirements 

with the addition of the external tanks. The LCS–3 had already incorporated this 

change into the fiscal year 2009 contract baseline, which is the performance baseline 

for the fiscal year 2010–2014 block buy solicitation. Similarly, the LCS–4 incorporated larger gas turbine waterjets, which included tunnel and transom redesign, 

which is the performance baseline for the fiscal years 2010–2014 block buy solicitation. Both LCS designs in the fiscal years 2010–2014 block buy solicitation meet the 

Navy’s standards. 

126. Senator SESSIONS. Secretary Mabus, does this then mean that LCS–1 meets 

the performance requirements as outlined by the Navy? 

Secretary MABUS. Surface ships, including the LCS designs, are required to meet 

stability standards, even if over 15 percent of the ship’s length is flooded. The Build 

Specification for LCS invokes this requirement. LCS–1 meets these requirements 

with the addition of the external tanks. The LCS–3 had already incorporated this 

change into the fiscal year 2009 contract baseline, which is the performance baseline 

444 

for the fiscal year 2010–2014 block buy solicitation. Similarly, the LCS–4 incorporated larger gas turbine waterjets, which included tunnel and transom redesign, 

which is the performance baseline for the fiscal year 2010–2014 block buy solicitation. Both LCS designs in the fiscal year 2010–2014 block buy solicitation meet the 

Navy’s standards. 

127. Senator SESSIONS. Secretary Mabus, if a provision can be made to enhance 

the performance of one ship in these areas, why did you determine that changes 

could not be made to descope the ships where they over perform to allow for cost 

competitiveness? 

Secretary MABUS. Surface ships, including the LCS designs, are required to meet 

stability standards, even if over 15 percent of the ship’s length is flooded. The Build 

Specification for LCS invokes this requirement. LCS–1 meets these requirements 

with the addition of the external tanks. The LCS–3 had already incorporated this 

change into the fiscal year 2009 contract baseline, which is the performance baseline 

for the fiscal year 2010–2014 block buy solicitation. Similarly, the LCS–4 incorporated larger gas turbine waterjets, which included tunnel and transom redesign, 

which is the performance baseline for the fiscal year 2010–2014 block buy solicitation. Both LCS designs in the fiscal year 2010–2014 block buy solicitation meet the 

Navy’s standards. 

U.S. MARINE CORPS REQUIREMENTS

128. Senator SESSIONS. General Conway, it is my understanding that you toured 

the USS Independence (LCS–2) last year. Is a larger mission bay more advantageous to Marine Corps operations when comparing LCS–2 to LCS–1? 

General CONWAY. A larger mission bay would be advantageous, however, the LCS 

has a limited interface capability and does not have the capability for at-sea offload. 

The Marine Corps continues to explore LCS options with the Navy. 

129. Senator SESSIONS. General Conway, is a larger flight deck more advantageous to Marine Corps operations when comparing LCS–2 to LCS–1? 

General CONWAY. A comparison of LCS–1 versus LCS–2 shows that LCS–2’s larger flight deck would be preferable. It is large enough to support landing up to a single CH–53E or a single MV–22 at a time and possibly supporting dual operations 

of H–1 aircraft whereas the smaller LCS–1 flight deck would only support landing 

a single H–1 at a time. However, the LCS class of ships was not structurally designed to support landing aircraft heavier than Navy MH–60 variants. This results 

in neither ship being capable of supporting landing operations of the USMC’s primary assault support helicopters (MV–22/CH–53E). The Marine Corps is currently 

working with the Navy in exploring current LCS capabilities, determining the costs 

associated with possible flight deck modifications, and how future LCS operations 

could incorporate Marine Forces. Actions such as increasing the deck and point loading strength of the LCS–2 or modifying the design of the LCS–1 flight deck to support larger helicopters would enable safe and sustained landing operations of all 

Marine Corps rotary-wing platforms. This ability would enhance and provide flexibility to stated LCS mission sets such as SOF support, NEO, HA/DR, and theater 

security cooperation/maritime influence. This would in turn provide maritime component planners greater flexibility in course of action development. We understand 

that ultimately the Navy must find solutions that best support the LCS mission. 

130. Senator SESSIONS. General Conway, were Marine Corps operational requirements taken into consideration during the development of the draft RFP or final 

RFP for the LCS program? If so, what were those requirements and if not, why not? 

General CONWAY. Marine Corps operational requirements were not taken into 

consideration. LCS was primarily designed to support three Navy missions in the 

littorals: mine warfare, anti-submarine warfare, and surface warfare. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR DAVID VITTER

CONTRACT FOR LPD–26

131. Senator VITTER. Secretary Mabus, I understand that a RFP has been released for the LPD–26 and a proposal has been submitted. Congress has appropriated significant funding for the LPD–26, and the longer there is no contract, the 

more jobs that are at risk. Please provide me with a status update on the contract. 

445 

Secretary MABUS. The Navy is committed to a stable shipbuilding plan and is actively engaged with industry to expedite shipbuilding contract awards. A Request 

for Proposal for LPD–26 with an option for LPD–27 was sent to Northrop Grumman 

Shipbuilding (NGSB) on May 4, 2009. The shipbuilder provided their LPD–26 proposal to the Navy on January 26, 2010. The Navy immediately began fact finding 

on the proposal. The review and audit of this proposal is ongoing, with negotiations 

expected to start shortly. However, the speed of the resolution and the final award 

will depend on the ability of both NGSB and the Navy to reach an agreement that 

is fair and reasonable. 

In June 2009, Navy awarded $213 million of LPD–26 long lead time material 

(LLTM). An additional $200 million is in process in order to maintain the contractor 

proposed production schedule. 

132. Senator VITTER. Secretary Mabus, how quickly will the Navy take to approve 

a bid to move forward on the LPD–26? 

Secretary MABUS. The Navy is committed to a stable shipbuilding plan and is actively engaged with industry to expedite shipbuilding contract awards. A Request 

for Proposal for LPD–26 with an option for LPD–27 was sent to NGSB on May 4, 

2009. The shipbuilder provided their LPD–26 proposal to the Navy on January 26, 

2010. The Navy immediately began fact finding on the proposal. As a result of discussions between the Navy and NGSB, the proposal is ongoing, with negotiations 

expected to start shortly. However, the speed of the resolution and the final award 

will depend on the ability of both NGSB and the Navy to reach an agreement that 

is fair and reasonable. 

In June 2009, Navy awarded $213 million of LPD–26 LLTM. An additional $200 

million is in process in order to maintain the contractor’s proposed production schedule. 

133. Senator VITTER. Secretary Mabus, can you give a definitive deadline on when 

this will be approved? 

Secretary MABUS. The Navy is committed to a stable shipbuilding plan and is actively engaged with industry to expedite shipbuilding contract awards. For the 

LPD–17 program, the Navy awarded $213 million of LLTM to NGSB for LPD–26 

on June 23, 2009. The Navy’s Request for Proposal (RFP), issued on May 4, 2009 

for construction of LPD–26, included options for LPD–27 LLTM and for LPD–27 

construction. The Navy received a proposal from NGSB for construction of LPD–26 

and some LLTM for LPD–27 on January 26, 2010, and is actively in discussions 

with NGSB to reach an agreement. 

INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY CONTRACTS

134. Senator VITTER. Secretary Mabus, the Department of the Navy was visionary 

in their pursuit and implementation of the Navy Marine Corps Intranet (NMCI), the 

single largest information technology (IT) network in the world short of the Internet 

itself. NMCI has been in place since 2000 and has proven to be invaluable to the 

Department of the Navy as the world’s preeminent command and control network 

and placing the Department of the Navy ahead of both the Army and the Air Force 

in IT capability. 

We are now coming to the conclusion of this contract which will expire in October 

of this year. It is my understanding the Department of the Navy has decided to continue operations using a Continuations of Services Contract (COSC) until the Department finalizes the RFP necessary to procure for the Next Generation Enterprise 

Contract which will be the program of record building on NMCI. 

My question for you is in these challenging economic times wouldn’t it be best for 

the taxpayers and the Department of the Navy to contract those services via a 

multi-year contract for the required duration of the COSC, instead of a series of single-year contracts? We know these multi-year contracts reduce program costs because they enable the ability to plan and make the necessary arrangements well 

into the future rather than negotiating program specifics on an annual basis regarding workforce retention, supplier pricing, and asset cost recovery. 

Secretary MABUS. As a multi-year contract the Department of the Navy would be 

locked into an extended non-competitive relationship with predetermined minimums 

that would compromise the competitive environment we seek to create for NGEN. 

The DoN goal is to transition as quickly as possible from COSC to competitive contracts. 

446 

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY SENATOR SUSAN COLLINS

PUBLIC SHIPYARDS

135. Senator COLLINS. Secretary Mabus, last year I raised the issue of maintaining the infrastructure in our four public shipyards. You indicated that the Navy is 

trying to incorporate more mission critical infrastructure improvement projects into 

the base budget rather than relying on congressional earmarks for funding. Although the President’s fiscal year 2011 budget includes slight increases in MILCON 

and SRM funding, I remain concerned about the material condition of Navy shipyards. According to the Navy the current SRM backlog, as of last December, was 

$3 billion. Can you please detail how the Navy plans on addressing this backlog and 

upgrading our public shipyards? 

Secretary MABUS. Shipyards are fully functional and safely meeting their fleet 

mission requirements. The Navy has steadily increased its investment in Naval 

shipyard recapitalization over the past several years through Operation and Maintenance, Navy and MILCON projects. 

In 2009, Navy completed a comprehensive condition assessment of the Naval shipyards to assess restoration requirements. A configuration analysis was also recently 

completed for modernization requirements. 

We are developing future investment plans to properly address the backlog to ensure that the public shipyards continue to meet future mission requirements. 

[Whereupon, at 12:28 p.m., the committee adjourned.] 

(447) 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION 

FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 

2011 

THURSDAY, MARCH 4, 2010 

U.S. SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, 

Washington, DC. 

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:35 a.m. in room SH– 

216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin (chairman) 

presiding. 

Committee members present: Senators Levin, Lieberman, Akaka, 

Bill Nelson, E. Benjamin Nelson, Udall, Hagan, Begich, Burris, 

McCain, Sessions, Chambliss, and Thune. 

Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk. 

Majority staff members present: Jonathan D. Clark, counsel; 

Madelyn R. Creedon, counsel; Creighton Greene, professional staff 

member; Jessica L. Kingston, research assistant; Gerald J. Leeling, 

counsel; Peter K. Levine, general counsel; Jason W. Maroney, counsel; Roy F. Phillips, professional staff member; and John H. Quirk 

V, professional staff member. 

Minority staff members present: Joseph W. Bowab, Republican 

staff director; Pablo E. Carrillo, minority investigative counsel; 

Daniel A. Lerner, professional staff member; Lucian L. Niemeyer, 

professional staff member; Christopher J. Paul, professional staff 

member; Diana G. Tabler, professional staff member; and Richard 

F. Walsh, minority counsel. 

Staff assistants present: Kevin A. Cronin, Paul J. Hubbard, and 

Jennifer R. Knowles. 

Committee members’ assistants present: Christopher Griffin, assistant to Senator Lieberman; Patrick Hayes, assistant to Senator 

Bayh; Gordon I. Peterson, assistant to Senator Webb; Jennifer Barrett, assistant to Senator Udall; Roger Pena, assistant to Senator 

Hagan; Lindsay Kavanaugh, assistant to Senator Begich; Roosevelt 

Barfield, assistant to Senator Burris; Sandra Luff, assistant to Senator Sessions; Clyde A. Taylor IV, assistant to Senator Chambliss; 

Jason Van Beek, assistant to Senator Thune; and Erskine W. Wells 

III, assistant to Senator Wicker. 

448 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN 

Chairman LEVIN. Good morning, everybody. We will start with a 

warm welcome to our witnesses. Secretary Donley, General 

Schwartz, we welcome you back to the committee to testify on the 

plans and the programs of the U.S. Air Force as we review the fiscal year 2011 annual budget and overseas contingency operations 

(OCO) request of the administration. 

Gentlemen, please extend on behalf of our committee our gratitude to the men and women of the Air Force and to their families, 

for the many sacrifices that they have made on behalf of our Nation; thanks to both of you for your long careers of leadership and 

service. 

The budget request continues the defense reforms begun last 

year to rebalance the force towards the military capabilities necessary to prevail in today’s wars, to buy weapons that are relevant 

and affordable, and to ensure that tax dollars are used wisely. Consistent with those reform goals set out by Secretary Gates and the 

results of the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), a top priority for 

the Department of Defense (DOD) must be the critical requirements for the ongoing conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq. Our committee has sought to ensure that our combatant commanders have 

what they need to succeed in those conflicts, including technologies 

to counter improvised explosive devices (IED) and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets. 

We’re confident that this committee will continue to support the 

needs of our warfighters in those conflicts. I would note in particular that the new budget is going to support expanding the number of Predator Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) in theater from 

approximately 150 to 200. This committee has been pressing for 

more UAVs I think every single year for at least the last 15 years. 

A number of critical issues confront the Air Force. We know that 

the Air Force is providing forces to the U.S. Central Command 

(CENTCOM) war efforts in a number of traditional roles, but is 

also providing airmen in support of land component tasks. We look 

forward to hearing this morning about how the Air Force is responding to the shift of emphasis from Iraq to Afghanistan and 

how the Air Force is supporting these current operations while preparing its forces to deal with future demands. 

The catastrophic January 12, 2010, earthquake that struck the 

nation of Haiti reminded all of us just how indiscriminate national 

disasters can be and renewed America’s commitments to the Nation of Haiti. DOD has mobilized resources and manpower to aid 

in the relief effort in support of the Department of State and the 

U.S. Agency for International Development. 

We know that the Air Force has played a critical role in supporting those relief efforts in Haiti, and we applaud those efforts 

and stand ready to continue to work with the Air Force to ensure 

that DOD is able to continue to provide support to this critical humanitarian disaster response effort in the weeks and months 

ahead. 

We await receipt of the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). We also 

expect that the Senate will be presented with a new treaty to succeed the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START). Significant reductions in the nuclear weapons stockpile, both deployed warheads 

449 

and those in reserve, while maintaining the remaining stockpile in 

a safe, secure, and reliable configuration, should strengthen our security. We will be having much more discussion on these topics in 

the coming weeks. 

The NPR, as well as the START follow-on treaty, could have a 

significant impact on the Air Force. The budget request for fiscal 

year 2011 includes funds to begin the next phase of the life extension study for the B–61 nuclear bomb. This nuclear gravity bomb 

is the only nuclear weapon carried by fighter aircraft and is the 

only nuclear weapon carried by North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

(NATO) aircraft. 

The Air Force is looking at bomber force reductions, a new bomber aircraft, and the possibility of some changes in the Minuteman 

Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) force, either in the number of deployed systems or the number of nuclear warheads loaded 

on missiles. After the significant failures in the management of the 

nuclear force structure, the Air Force has taken significant steps 

to refocus on the nuclear enterprise, including the recent standup 

of the Global Strike Command. But there is much more that needs 

to be done. More rigorous nuclear inspections have uncovered deep 

systemic problems. There’s been progress and a lot of hard work on 

the part of many dedicated professionals, but the recovery is by no 

means complete. 

The most pressing space issue for the Air Force, together with 

the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), is to address the management of space programs. Currently management of space programs is very fragmented. One of the reasons for this predicament 

is that the Air Force has been without an Under Secretary since 

well before the end of the Bush administration. 

That extended vacancy in the Under Secretary’s position raises 

a more fundamental problem that the Air Force is facing now. The 

President has nominated and the committee has considered, and 

indeed unanimously endorsed, a number of well-qualified people to 

fill vacancies in DOD. I intend to seek again unanimous consent to 

move those nominations through the Senate. They’ve been stalled 

far too long. It is unconscionable what these holds are doing to 

nominees that are nominated to fill essential positions. 

I would hope that all of my colleagues, all of us on this committee, will join in this effort to get these nominees confirmed. 

They were unanimously approved by this committee, and these vacancies matter and it makes it much more difficult for the agencies, 

in this case the Air Force, to carry out essential functions. 

Another acquisition challenge facing the Air Force is the closure 

of several production lines and the stretching out of others. Once 

again, the Air Force has chosen not to request funds for the C–17 

aircraft program and the overall F–35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) 

program has been stretched out. I know that the JSF program is 

being managed by a joint program office with representatives from 

the Air Force and the Department of the Navy. Also, at the current 

time, an Air Force official serves as the senior acquisition executive 

overseeing the JSF joint program office. 

Given the recent revelations of troubles with the system design 

and demonstration phase of the JSF program and the relief of the 

program manager, as well as Secretary Donley’s indications this 

450 

week that the initial operating capability (IOC) date for the Air 

Force has slipped and the restructured program may incur a NunnMcCurdy breach, the committee will be holding a hearing next 

week on the JSF program. I specifically want to thank again Senator McCain for his bird-dogging of this and so many programs. I 

just want to again let all the members of the committee know that 

the hearing, which Senator McCain has requested very appropriately, should be scheduled by the end of next week, and we 

thank him for his focus on this matter on behalf of all of us. 

One program that appears to be moving forward as planned at 

this time last year is the Strategic Tanker Modernization program. 

The Department of the Air Force issued a new request for proposals (RFP) late last month. We look forward to the Air Force’s 

proceeding on that program. 

Underlying all these major acquisition concerns is an acquisition 

management issue. Secretary Donley, both you and your predecessor have made it a major goal to improve the Air Force acquisition corps. I believe that we all realize that the Air Force needed 

to take significant steps to build up the acquisition workforce and 

restore confidence in the Air Force acquisition program after the 

abuses and poor decisions that were previously documented on the 

tanker lease program. 

In addition, the President last year signed the Weapons Systems 

Acquisition Reform Act (WSARA) of 2009, which this committee led 

in getting passed. While this legislation will help correct past problems, I also know that we will succeed only through concerted efforts within the executive branch to implement the spirit of that 

legislation and to improve past behavior within DOD. We cannot 

legislate a culture change. We can do everything we can legislatively, and we have. We can perform oversight, which we have a 

responsibility to do. But the culture change, which is essential, can 

only come internally. 

We look forward to hearing from you this morning about what 

progress you’re making on this issue, expanding the acquisition 

workforce, and dealing with the other issues that face the Air 

Force. 

Senator McCain. 

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN 

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I join 

you in welcoming Secretary Donley and General Schwartz here 

today to discuss the President’s budget request for fiscal year 2011 

for the Department of the Air Force. Informed by the 2010 QDR 

and the aircraft investment plan for fiscal years 2011 through 

2040, the Air Force’s fiscal year 2011 base budget request of $150 

billion builds on the substantial changes that both of you outlined 

in last year’s budget. I want to emphasize, I understand the Air 

Force is going through a period of significant transition where winning the wars of today while preparing for the conflicts of tomorrow 

requires balancing of risks. 

I look forward to your assessment as to how this budget proposal 

achieves a desirable balance between our present and future priorities. I want to again state, I greatly appreciate your continuing to 

place the highest priority on supporting our men and women who 

451 

wear the blue uniform and their families. There can be no doubt 

that, like our soldiers, sailors, and marines, they deserve the most 

steadfast and united support we can offer. 

As the chairman mentioned, JSF is one of the Air Force’s top acquisition priorities, and I’m very concerned about the stability of 

that program. Despite Secretary Gates’ decision to restructure the 

program, I remain concerned about the ability of the test program 

to detect and anticipate problems, how effectively software risk will 

be managed going forward, whether deficiencies in the program’s 

manufacturing processes will be resolved so that flight testing and 

production hold schedule, and the capability of those aircraft that 

will be delivered under low-rate initial production. 

As to the Air Force decision this week to extend the deadline by 

which it is supposed to accept delivery of JSF aircraft with IOC, 

I ask that the witnesses explain why the Air Force decided to extend the IOC date, exactly what kind of capability will those aircraft have, what effect that decision will have on the cost of buying 

that aircraft, the Air Force’s anticipated fighter shortfall, and the 

basing plans for the aircraft. 

I want to thank the chairman for scheduling a hearing on this 

very important issue. There are a lot of questions that need to be 

answered. Given Secretary Gates’ testimony before the committee 

just early last month that the Services’ IOC dates would not 

change, it appears that just over the last few weeks the Secretary 

and the Services have increased their appreciation of the development and production risks associated with the program. 

In my view, that piecemeal process by which DOD has been assessing risk and only in some cases notifying the committee in a 

timely and appropriate manner of required changes to the program 

frustrates the ability of this committee to subject this program to 

proper congressional oversight. 

Against that backdrop, I want to again thank Chairman Levin 

for agreeing to hold hearings, and probably more than one, on this 

very important weapons system. 

I have serious concerns about the Air Force’s commitment to 

managing military space programs, for which $10.9 billion is requested in the 2011 budget. I applaud the decision to move away 

from some of the high-risk programs of the past, but I’m concerned 

that the Air Force continues to make significant investments without a designated executive agent for space or a space posture review and strategy, which I now hear could be delayed by as much 

as a year. 

I look forward to hearing how committed the Air Force remains 

to its space acquisition mission and, if so, exactly how it intends 

to reverse the troubling trend of chronic schedule delays, NunnMcCurdy breaches, and the widening gaps in capability. 

Because we ask our men and women in uniform and their families to sacrifice so much, both Congress and the administration 

must be ready to make some tough funding decisions, something 

we have failed miserably at in previous years. Despite numerous 

calls last year for earmark reform, the Fiscal Year 2010 Defense 

Appropriations Bill signed into law contained over $4 billion in earmarks and $3 billion in unrequested and unwanted funding for C– 

17s and the alternative engine for the Air Force’s version of the 

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JSF. That’s $7 billion that DOD had to eat in programs that it 

didn’t request or need, at the expense of more pressing military priorities. 

I was encouraged by Secretary Gates laying an early marker last 

month by indicating that if we added funds to continue the C–17 

and the alternate engine for the JSF in 2011, he would strongly 

recommend that the President veto the bill. I look forward to seeing the President himself issue that veto threat. Now, I’d like to 

know whether our witnesses support Secretary Gates’ positions on 

both programs. 

Finally, I’m interested in the views of General Schwartz and Secretary Donley on the ‘‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell’’ policy. We will continue to listen to our military leaders. As I know, recruitment and 

retention is at an all-time high in the history of the All-Volunteer 

Force. I think that the current policy is working and changes to it 

would have to be carefully considered. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I thank the witnesses. 

[The prepared statement of Senator McCain follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN

Mr. Chairman, thank you. 

I join you in welcoming Secretary Donley and General Schwartz here today to discuss the President’s budget request for fiscal year 2011 for the Department of the 

Air Force. 

Informed by the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review and the Aircraft Investment 

Plan for fiscal years 2011 through 2040, the Air Force’s fiscal year 2011 base budget 

request of $150 billion builds on the substantial changes that the both of you outlined in last year’s budget. Where winning the wars of today while preparing for 

the conflicts of tomorrow require a balancing of risk, I look forward to your assessment as to how this budget proposal achieves a desirable balance between our 

present and future priorities. 

I greatly appreciate your continuing to place the highest priority on supporting 

our men and women who wear the blue uniform and their families. There can be 

no doubt that like our soldiers, sailors and marines, they deserve the most steadfast 

and united support we can offer. 

The F–35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) is one of the Air Force’s top acquisition priorities and I am very concerned about the stability of that program. Despite Secretary 

Gates’ decision to restructure the program, I remain concerned about the ability of 

the test program to detect and anticipate problems; how effectively software risk 

will be managed going forward; whether deficiencies in the program’s manufacturing processes will be resolved so that flight testing and production hold schedule; 

and the capability of those aircraft that will be delivered under ‘‘low-rate initial production’’. As to the Air Force’s decision this week to extend the deadline by which 

it is supposed to accept delivery of JSF aircraft with ‘‘initial operating capability’’ 

(IOC), I ask that the witnesses explain why the Air Force decided to extend that 

IOC date; exactly what kind of capability will those aircraft have; what effect that 

decision will have on the cost of buying that plane, the Air Force’s anticipated fighter shortfall, and the basing plans for the aircraft. 

Given Secretary Gates’ testimony before the committee early last month that the 

Services’ IOC dates would not change, it appears that just over the last few weeks 

the Secretary and the Services have increased their appreciation of the development 

and production risks associated with the program. In my view, that piecemeal process (by which the Department has been assessing risk and, only in some cases, notifying the committee timely and appropriately of required changes to the program) 

frustrates the ability of this committee to subject this program to proper congressional oversight. Against that backdrop, Chairman Levin has agreed to hold hearings as early as next week on the status of the F–35 program, which I wholeheartedly support. 

I also have serious concerns about the Department’s commitment to managing 

military space programs, for which $10.9 billion is requested in the 2011 budget. 

While I applaud the decision to move away from some of the high-risk programs 

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of the past, I am concerned that the Air Force continues to make significant investments without a designated executive agent for space or a space posture review and 

strategy, which I now hear could be delayed by as much as a year. I look forward 

to hearing how committed the Air Force remains to its space acquisition mission 

and, if so, exactly how it intends to reverse the troubling trend of chronic schedule 

delays, Nunn-McCurdy breaches, and widening gaps in capability. 

Because we ask our men and women in uniform and their families to sacrifice so 

much, both Congress and the administration must be ready to make some tough 

funding decisions—something that we have failed miserably at in previous years. 

Despite numerous calls last year for earmark reform, the fiscal year 2010 Defense 

Appropriations Bill signed into law contained over $4 billion in earmarks and $3 

billion in unrequested and unwanted funding for C–17s and the alternative engine 

for the Air Force’s version of the JSF. That’s $7 billion that the Department had 

to eat in programs that it didn’t request or need—at the expense of more pressing 

military priorities. 

I was encouraged by Secretary Gates’ laying an early marker last month with the 

Congress by indicating that if we added funds to continue the C–17 and alternate 

engine for the JSF in 2011, he would strongly recommend that the President veto 

the bill. I look forward to seeing the President himself issue that veto threat. For 

now, I would like to know whether our witnesses support Secretary Gates’ positions 

on both programs. 

Finally, I’m interested in the views of General Schwartz and Secretary Donley on 

the ‘‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell’’ policy. We will continue to listen to our military leaders, 

and as I note, recruitment and retention is at an all-time high in the history of the 

All-Volunteer Force. I think that the current policy is working and changes to it 

would have to be carefully considered. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator McCain. 

Secretary Donley. 

STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL B. DONLEY, SECRETARY OF 

THE AIR FORCE 

Mr. DONLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the committee. It is a pleasure to be here today representing almost 

680,000 Active Duty, Guard, and Reserve airmen and Air Force civilians. I’m also honored to be here with my partner in this work, 

General Schwartz, with whom I came into this position. He’s been 

a phenomenal partner, and he is a tireless public servant. 

Today, I’m pleased to report that America’s Air Force continues 

to make progress in strengthening both our contributions as part 

of the joint team and the excellence that is the hallmark of our 

service. We’re requesting $150 billion in our baseline budget and 

almost $21 billion in the OCO appropriation to support this work. 

In the past year and in planning for the future, we’ve focused on 

balancing our resources and risks among the four priority objectives outlined by Secretary Gates in the recently-released QDR. 

First, we must prevail in today’s wars. Your Air Force understands 

the gravity of the situation in Afghanistan, and as we continue to 

responsibly draw down forces in Iraq, we are committed to rapidly 

fielding needed capabilities for the joint team, such as surging ISR 

assets into theater and maximizing air mobility, to accelerate the 

flow of forces into Afghanistan. 

Second, we must prevent and deter conflict across the spectrum 

of warfare. As we await the results of the NPR and the New 

START, we continue concentrating on the safety, security, and 

sustainment of two legs of the Nation’s nuclear arsenal. Last year, 

we stood up Air Force Global Strike Command and we have now 

realigned our ICBM and bomber wings under the control of a single 

commander. We also stood up the Air Force Nuclear Weapons CenVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:37 May 06, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00459 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\62155.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
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ter to consolidate the management of all our nuclear weapons 

sustainment activities. To increase our engagement across the 

world, we’re building partner capacity in Afghanistan and Iraq and 

developing a training framework emphasizing light attack and mobility that can benefit other nations. 

Third, we must be prepared to defeat adversaries and to succeed 

in a wide range of conflicts. We need to ensure that we’re providing 

the right capabilities with our strategic airlift and ISR platforms 

and ensure our space-based assets continue to deliver needed capabilities for the future. 

In addition, the last two decades of sustained operations have 

strained our weapons systems. We continue to determine which 

aircraft we will modernize and sustain and which we should retire 

and recapitalize. One of our primary efforts includes retiring and 

recapitalizing many of our legacy fighters and tankers and replacing them with JSFs and KC–X aerial refueling tanker aircraft. 

These decisions require tough choices as well as the ability to 

quickly field systems that meet warfighter needs at an affordable 

price. 

Because acquisition underpins this effort, we’re continuing our 

work to recapture excellence in this area. In the past year, we’ve 

made great strides in reforming our internal processes; we’ve added 

more program executive officers, and we are growing our acquisition workforce by several thousand professionals over the next 5 

years. 

Finally, we must preserve and enhance the All-Volunteer Force. 

Airmen are our most valuable resource, and they have performed 

superbly in every mission and deployment they’ve undertaken. 

With the understanding that their families serve alongside them, 

in July of last year, the Chief and I began a year-long focus on our 

men and women and their families. This Year of the Air Force 

Family recognizes their sacrifices and looks to determine how we 

can better support, develop, house, and educate them. We’re determining which programs are performing well and where we can do 

better. 

Your Air Force is performing exceptionally well in supporting the 

current fights, responding to growing demands and shifting personnel priorities. But we’re increasingly stressed in the continental 

United States (CONUS). Rebuilding the nuclear expertise that we 

need for the future will require continued determination and patience. We’re taking more risk in non-deployed force readiness and 

facing significant challenges in modernization and infrastructure. 

At the same time, however, we are developing and fielding new 

technologies and capabilities that bode well for our future. I can 

tell you after a recent trip to the CENTCOM area of responsibility 

(AOR), Mr. Chairman, that we are recruiting and training some incredible airmen. 

We’re very grateful for your continued support, and we look forward to discussing our proposed budget. One more point, Mr. 

Chairman. Thank you for your opening comments concerning the 

two Air Force nominations still pending confirmation, Erin 

Conaton, the nominee for Under Secretary of the Air Force, and 

Terry Yonkers, the nominee for Assistant Secretary for Installations and Environment. Both of these individuals are highly qualiVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:37 May 06, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00460 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\62155.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
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fied, and we’re aware of no issues concerning their background, 

their capabilities, or their credentials. 

More to the point of some concern to others, neither have been 

involved in the Air Force KC–X tanker acquisition and, looking 

ahead, should they be confirmed, neither would have responsibility 

for source selection. 

Both nominations were cleared by this committee on December 

2, 2009. The Under Secretary position has been vacant for over 21⁄2

years; the Assistant Secretary position has been vacant for over a 

year and a half. 

Similarly, the nominee for Dr. Carter’s Principal Deputy in the 

Under Secretary’s Office for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, 

Frank Kendall, falls into the same general category. That position 

has been vacant for over a year, and his nomination has been pending action by the full Senate since October 29. 

I thank the committee, Mr. Chairman and Mr. McCain, other 

members, for your favorable reporting of these nominees, and I ask 

that each member now support their speedy confirmation by the 

full Senate. Their confirmation is important. The individuals whose 

livelihoods and careers are being held in an uncertain limbo deserve a vote, and we need to proceed with the important work of 

the Air Force and DOD. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The joint prepared statement of Mr. Donley and General 

Schwartz follows:] 

JOINT PREPARED STATEMENT BY HON. MICHAEL B. DONLEY AND GEN. NORTON A. 

SCHWARTZ, USAF 

The 2010 Air Force Posture Statement presents our vision of Global Vigilance, 

Reach and Power as a vital component of the joint team, defending our national interests, and guided by our core values of Integrity First, Service Before Self, and 

Excellence in All We Do. 

INTRODUCTION

Today, the United States confronts a dynamic international environment marked 

by security challenges of unprecedented diversity. Along with our joint partners, the 

Air Force will defend and advance the interests of the United States by providing 

unique capabilities to succeed in current conflicts while preparing to counter future 

threats to our national security. Over the last year, the Air Force made great strides 

in strengthening the precision and reliability that is our hallmark. 

STRATEGIC FOCUS

This year offers an opportunity to fully integrate our Service posture with a new 

National Security Strategy, the Department of Defense Quadrennial Defense Review 

(QDR), and strategic reviews of the Nation’s space, nuclear, and ballistic missile defense postures. Balance is the defining principle linking this budget request to our 

strategic guidance. 

In the 2010 QDR, the Secretary of Defense established four U.S. defense objectives to guide our current actions as well as to plan for the future: prevail in today’s 

wars, prevent and deter conflict, prepare to defeat adversaries and succeed in a wide 

range of contingencies, and preserve and enhance the All-Volunteer Force. In accordance with this guidance, the Air Force developed the 2011 budget request to enhance our capabilities to meet these objectives, while balancing risk appropriately. 

As the future security environment will require a range of agile and flexible capabilities, investments for today’s conflict will also support our efforts to prepare, prevent, and prevail, and preserve well into the future. 

Prevail in Today’s Wars 

Our investments in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, as well as airlift, command and control, and building partner capacity (BPC) reinforce the promiVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:37 May 06, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00461 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\62155.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
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nence of this priority in our budget request. In addition, nearly 30,000 deployed airmen daily provide key capabilities in direct support of combat operations. 

Prevent and Deter Conflict 

The Air Force made significant resource and cultural investments in reinvigorating our portion of the Nation’s nuclear deterrence over the past 18 months. We 

are now institutionalizing these successes to ensure the highest standards across 

the nuclear enterprise. Our initial investments in a family of long-range strike capabilities mark our commitment to sustaining power projection capabilities for the 

next several decades. 

Prepare to Defeat Adversaries and Succeed in a Wide Range of Contingencies 

This priority directly reflects the Air Force emphasis on balancing our commitments to today’s conflicts against preparing for mid- and long-term risks. Awarding 

a contract this year to recapitalize our aging tanker force is our top acquisition priority. Similarly, tile F–35 will be the workhorse of the fighter force for decades to 

come. Our investment in this program is timed with other modernization initiatives 

and divestment plans to ensure sufficient capabilities are available to deter and defeat potential enemies. 

Preserve and Enhance the All-Volunteer Force 

Preserving and enhancing our All-Volunteer Force provides the foundation required for our flexible and agile posture. This budget reflects a commitment to enhancing our force through education and training, while also bolstering the overall 

quality of life of airmen and their families. 

STRATEGY TO RESOURCES

As we prepared the budget request described by this Posture Statement, we structured our resource choices by balancing the twelve Air Force Core Functions across 

the near- and long-term. When considered together, the Core Functions encompass 

the full range of Air Force capabilities, and serve as the framework for this Posture 

Statement. While this document describes the core functions individually, we recognize their inherent interdependence within not just the Air Force, but also within 

the joint force and the whole of government. 

AIR FORCE CORE FUNCTIONS 

Nuclear Deterrence Operations Special Operations 

Air Superiority Global Integrated ISR 

Space Superiority Command and Control 

Cyberspace Superiority Personnel Recovery 

Global Precision Attack Building Partnerships 

Rapid Global Mobility Agile Combat Support 

Nuclear Deterrence Operations 

Since its inception, the Air Force has sewed as a proud and disciplined steward 

of a large portion of the Nation’s nuclear arsenal. We steadfastly maintain and secure nuclear weapons to deter potential adversaries, and to assure our partners that 

we are a reliable force providing global stability. 

The first Air Force priority during the last 2 years has been to reinvigorate the 

stewardship, accountability, compliance, and precision within the nuclear enterprise. 

This mission demands perfection. Last year we reorganized our nuclear forces, consolidating responsibility into a clear chain of command. All nuclear operations are 

under the command of the Air Force Global Strike Command and all sustainment 

activities are controlled by the Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center. We also added 

a fourth B–52 squadron to enhance nuclear surety through greater mission focus. 

We continued these advancements in fiscal year 2010 by reassigning Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) and nuclear bomber forces to Air Force Global Strike 

Command as it proceeds toward full operational capability. 

The fiscal year 2011 budget request continues to invest in sustaining the Air 

Force’s ICBM and bomber fleets. We will invest $295 million across the Future 

Years Defense Program (FYDP) to replace fuzing mechanisms, and to sustain test 

equipment and environmental control systems for the aging, but capable, Minuteman III ICBM weapon system. 

As we begin work to develop a future Long Range Strike capability, we recognize 

the need to continue investing in our legacy bomber fleels, including nearly $800 

million for modernization. This budget request provides the B–52, initially designed 

in the early 1950s, with an internal precision-guided weapons capability, a new 

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radar, and a modern and effective anti-skid system. This request funds modernization of B–2 analog defensive systems to ensure continued survivability against increasingly capable air defense systems. Additionally, the UH–IN replacement program supporting missile launch complexes is on track and we anticipate IOC by fiscal year 2015. 

Air superiority 

Air superiority is a necessary precondition for most U.S. military operations. 

American ground forces have operated without fear of enemy aircraft since 1953. Although we operate in uncontested airspace in current conflicts, we cannot assume 

this will be the case in the future. The emergence of modern air defenses challenges 

the ability of the Air Force to achieve air superiority. Potential adversaries are 

leveraging readily accessible technologies by modifying existing airframes with improved radars, sensors, jammers, and weapons. In addition, several nations are pursuing fifth-generation aircraft capable of all-aspect, low-observable signatures, and 

fully integrated avionics and sensors. Adversary nations are also turning to advanced surface-to-air missiles to augment or even substitute for aircraft modernization efforts. The proliferation of these sophisticated and increasingly affordable 

weapons presents an area denial capability that challenges our legacy fleet. As the 

range of potential threats evolves, the Air Force will rely on the F–22 Raptor as the 

workhorse of the air superiority fighter force for the foreseeable future. Complementing our 187 modernized F–22s, we will continue to rely on F–15C/D aircraft 

to provide an important component of our air superiority capability. 

Our fiscal year 2010 budget included plans to accelerate the retirement of some 

legacy fighter aircraft to pave the way for a smaller but more capable fighter force. 

As we work with Congress to execute this important plan, we continue to aggressively modernize our air superiority fleet, including upgrading fielded F–22s to ensure fleet commonality with current deliveries. Additionally, we began modernizing 

176 F–15Cs with the new APG–63(v)3 Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) 

radar. Along with these modifications, we are continuing the development and procurement of the AIM–9X and AIM–120D air-to-air missiles. 

The fiscal year 2011 budget requests $12.5 billion in the FYDP to sustain America’s air superiority advantage. To continue F–22 modifications, this request includes $1.34 billion to continue fleet commonality upgrades, improving reliability 

and maintainability, and adding training enhancements for the fleet. Building on 

the multi-role nature of our most advanced aircraft, this request also includes $1.19 

billion to add precision attack capabilities such as the Small Diameter Bomb. The 

Air Force will also continue the development and procurement of air-to-air munitions and defenses for the F–22 such as the AIM–9X, AIM–120D, and electronic 

warfare capabilities. To sustain our legacy aircraft viability, we included $92 million 

to continue the upgrades and modifications to the new F–15 AESA radar. Recognizing that Electronic Warfare remains an integral part of air superiority, we request $251 million in fiscal year 2011 for upgrades to the EC–130H Compass Call 

fleet. This request includes the conversion of an additional EC–130H, as well as a 

combined flight deck and mission crew simulator to increase training capacity. 

Space superiority 

America’s ability to operate across the spectrum of conflict relies heavily on space 

capabilities developed and operated by the Air Force. We support the Joint force by 

developing, integrating, and operating in six key mission areas: missile warning; 

space situational awareness (SSA); military satellite communications; positioning, 

navigation and timing; space access; and weather. 

To enhance space support to the joint force, we are increasing communications capability in fiscal year 2010 through two satellite communications programs, the 

Wideband Global Satellite (WGS) program to replace the Defense Satellite Communications System (DSCS), and Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) system 

for protected communications. We launched the second and third WGS satellites in 

fiscal year 2010; each WGS satellite provides the equivalent capacity of the entire 

legacy DSCS constellation. Additionally, the second on-orbit Space-Based Infrared 

System (SBIRS) Highly Elliptical Orbit payload was fully certified by U.S. Strategic 

Command to perform strategic missile warning. Finally, spacelift remains the backbone for national security space with a record 64 consecutive successful missions. 

The fiscal year 2011 budget request for $10.9 billion will improve our stewardship 

of space with investment in space and space-related support systems. With these resources, we will field several first-of-their-kind systems—Global Positioning System 

(GPS) Block IIF, SBIRS, and AEHF satellite communications system. This request 

proposes $1.2 billion for the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle program, $1.8 billion for the Space Based Infrared System, and $1.3 billion for GPS. We also included 

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$135 million for Joint Space Operation Center Mission System to improve SSA capabilities, and $94 million for the Operationally Responsive Space program to pursue 

innovative capabilities that can be rapidly developed and fielded in months rather 

than years. We request $577 million to fully fund WGS to meet combatant commander bandwidth requirements. Moreover, we will continue to maintain SSA 

ground-based systems and explore space-based capabilities to ensure our continued 

freedom to operate in this domain. 

Cyberspace Superiority 

Cyber threats ranging from individual hackers to criminal organizations to statesponsored cyber intrusions can challenge access to, and use of, this domain. Although the freedom to operate in the cyber domain is a precondition for our increasingly networked force, many of our potential adversaries are similarly adopting information-enabled technology, rendering them vulnerable to cyber attack as well. 

Threats to freedom of access to the cyber domain present both challenges and opportunities. 

In fiscal year 2010, we continued the development and institutionalization of 

cyberspace capabilities and integration into the joint cyberspace structure. The 

newly activated 24th Air Force, the first Numbered Air Force dedicated to cyberspace operations, recently achieved initial operational capability and has been designated the Air Force component for the sub-unified U.S. Cyber Command. We are 

also focusing on cyber personnel by normalizing the cyber career path and adding 

technical education courses. 

The fiscal year 2011 budget request reflects a continued commitment to cyber superiority. We request $31 million for expanded rapid cyber acquisition capabilities 

to keep pace with dynamic adversaries and fast-paced advances in technology. In 

support of the national cyber effort, this budget request dedicates $104 million to 

support operations and leased space for headquarters staff at the sub-unified U.S. 

Cyber Command. Additionally, we propose adding $15 million and additional manpower over the next 5 years to increase the investigative and law enforcement aspects of cyberspace defense. 

Global Precision Attack 

Global Precision Attack is the ability to hold any target at risk, across the air, 

land, and sea domains. Many of our global precision attack forces are meeting the 

current requirements of ongoing contingency operations by performing precision 

strike and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) support roles. In the 

longer term, however, the proliferation of area denial and anti-access capabilities 

will challenge the ability of current fourth-generation fighters and legacy bombers 

to penetrate contested airspace. 

The Air Force budget request in fiscal year 2010 recognized these developments 

and continued improvements to aircraft and weapons capabilities. This year, we will 

take delivery of 10 F–35s for developmental testing and to train test pilots. We are 

also modernizing legacy fighter aircraft to maintain sufficient capability and capacity until the F–35 fleet is fully operational, and are continuing to develop programs 

for preferred air-to-ground weapons. Upon completion of the required reports to 

Congress later this year, we will implement the planned reduction of 257 legacy 

fighters. We have had mixed results in test drops of the Massive Ordnance Penetrator; however, we are closely monitoring the progress of this important capability, 

and future successes likely will result in a reprogramming request to accelerate its 

development in fiscal year 2010. Finally, continued development of the second increment of the Small Diameter Bomb will give the Air Force even greater capability 

and flexibility. 

Our $14.4 billion Global Precision Attack request for fiscal year 2011 reflects a 

balanced approach across the portfolio, prioritizing investment in fifth-generation 

aircraft while sustaining legacy platforms as a bridge to the F–35. 

F–35 Joint Strike Fighter 

The multi-role F–35 is a critical element of the Air Force’s future precision attack 

capability. In addition to complementing the F–22’s world class air superiority capabilities, the F–35 is designed to penetrate air defenses and deliver a wide range of 

precision munitions. This modern, fifth-generation aircraft brings the added benefit 

of increased allied interoperability and cost-sharing across services and partner nations. 

Working in close collaboration with DOD, the F–35 program team realized a number of accomplishments over the last year, to include the first flight of the first optimized conventional take-off and landing (CTOL) Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) variantaircraft AF–I. 

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Despite these important accomplishments, the program is experiencing program 

challenges as it transitions from development to production. Last year, DOD conducted multiple, independent reviews to assess the impact of these challenges on the 

program’s cost, schedule, and technical performance. The results were consistent 

with a previous fiscal year 2008 DOD independent assessment that projected a cost 

increase and schedule slip. 

The challenges being experienced are not unusual for this phase of a major program. However, we are disappointed by the contractor’s failure to deliver flight test 

aircraft as scheduled during the past year. The result of the late deliveries will be 

a delay in the flight test program. 

Although there appear to be recent improvements, the contractor also has been 

experiencing assembly inefficiencies that must be corrected to support higher production rates. 

In response to the challenges still facing the program and the findings of the independent reviews, we have taken numerous management actions to reduce risk. Most 

significantly we have determined that it is prudent to adjust the schedule and funding to levels consistent with the most recent independent estimates. These cost and 

schedule adjustments require that we initiate the process to confirm the program 

is in breach of the Nunn-McCurdy Act criteria, and details will be reported later 

this spring. 

The F–35 is our largest and most important program and we are dedicated to successfully delivering these aircraft to both the United States and to our international 

partners in this effort. The Air Force fiscal year 2011 budget includes $5.6 billion 

for continued development and procurement of 22 CTOL production aircraft. 

Long-range Strike 

Investments in our B–52 and B–2 fleets sustain nuclear deterrence operations as 

well as conventional global precision attack capabilities in the near-term, but we are 

adding R&D funds to accelerate development of enhanced long-range strike capabilities. Building upon insights developed during the QDR, the Secretary of Defense has 

ordered a follow-on study to determine what combination of Joint persistent surveillance, electronic warfare, and precision-attack capabilities will be best suited to support U.S. power projection operations over the next two to three decades. The study 

will examine both penetrating platforms and stand-off weapon options. As part of 

this assessment, the Air Force is reviewing options for fielding survivable, longrange surveillance and strike aircraft as part of a comprehensive, phased plan to 

modernize the bomber force. Additionally, the Navy and the Air Force are cooperatively assessing alternatives for a new joint cruise missile. Finally, the Department 

of Defense also plans to analyze conventional prompt global strike prototypes and 

will assess the effects that these systems, if deployed, might have on strategic stability. 

Rapid Global Mobility 

The Air Force is committed to providing unmatched airlift and air refueling capability to the nation. Air Force mobility forces provide an essential deployment and 

sustainment capability for the Joint force, delivering personnel, equipment, and supplies necessary for missions ranging from conflict to humanitarian relief. 

We are releasing the Request for Proposal for a KC–X replacement tanker in early 

2010, and will aggressively work toward awarding a contract later this year. Additionally, we completed the successful operational testing of the C–5 Reliability Enhancement and Re-engine Program (RERP) and will induct two more C–5Bs into 

low-rate initial production. For tactical airlift, we recently concluded a test of our 

Direct Support airlift concept and continue to work with the Army to rapidly and 

smartly transfer the C–27J program to the Air Force. 

The fiscal year 2011 budget reflects a balanced approach across the tanker and 

airlift portfolios, which prioritizes recapitalization of the oldest aircraft while ensuring the continued viability of the legacy fleet. Investments in tanker capability are 

heavily weighted towards the KC–X program—our top acquisition priority—and represent $11.7 billion in the FYDP. However, while moving aggressively to recapitalize 

the tanker fleet, we must also ensure the continued health of legacy aircraft. This 

budget request includes $680 million in the FYDP for airspace access modifications 

and sustainment of the KC–10 and KC–1 35 fleets. 

The Air Force Airlift budget request is focused on meeting mobility requirements 

in the most cost efficient way possible, recapitalizing only the oldest airlift aircraft. 

To ensure continued access to all airspace, this budget continues to modernize and 

modify C–5s and C–130Hs through Avionics Modernization Programs, and upgrades 

C–5B/Cs with RERP. To complete the recapitalization of C–130Es, we request $1.8 

billion over the next 5 years to procure 24 C–130Js. Additionally, in accordance with 

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the preliminary results of the Mobility Capabilities and Requirements Study 2016, 

and subject to authorization by Congress, we intend to retire some of the oldest, 

least capable C–5As and C–130H1s. We have also requested $38.9 million in fiscal 

year 2011 to transition from C–17 procurement to sustainment. 

Special Operations 

Air Force special operations capabilities play a vital role in supporting U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) and geographic combatant commanders. As 

the Department of Defense increasingly develops irregular warfare capabilities, the 

Air Force is investing in special operations airlift, close air support, foreign internal 

defense, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities. 

In fiscal year 2010 we focused on growing and recapitalizing the special operations aircraft inventory. By the end of the fiscal year, three MC–130W Combat 

Spear aircraft will be modified with the Precision Strike Package to provide additional armed overwatch capability for SOF forces. Additionally, we will deliver the 

16th of 50 CV–22s. 

This fiscal year 2011 budget proposal includes $6.7 billion through the FYDP to 

continue growing and recapitalizing the Air Force Special Operations Command 

(AFSOC). In fiscal year 2011 we will procure five additional CV–22s and five MC– 

130Js for $1.1 billion. This request also includes $1.6 billion in the FYDP to start 

recapitalizing our AC–130H aircraft. We will rapidly recapitalize these aging aircraft through the procurement of 16 additional MC–130Js, modified with the proven 

Precision Strike Package. In fiscal year 2011 we will also increase AFSOC’s manpower by 258 personnel by fiscal year 2015 to support the addition of 16 fixed-wing 

mobility and 2 rotary-wing aircraft. 

Global Integrated Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance 

The Air Force continues to rapidly increase its ISR capability and capacity to support combat operations. Air Force ISR provides timely, fused, and actionable intelligence to the Joint Force, from forward deployed locations and globally distributed 

centers around the globe. The exceptional operational value of Air Force ISR assets 

has led Joint Force Commanders in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Horn of Africa to 

continually increase their requests for these forces. To help meet this demand, the 

Air Force currently has more than 90 percent of all available ISR assets deployed. 

In fiscal year 2010, we are quantitatively and qualitatively increasing aircraft, 

sensors, data links, ground stations, and personnel to address emergent requirements. Over the last 2 years, the Air Force increased the number of remotely piloted 

aircraft (RPA) fielded by 330 percent. We invested in a Wide Area Airborne Surveillance (WAAS) system for new and existing MQ–9s to provide up to 50 video streams 

per sensor within a few years. By the summer of fiscal year 2010, a quick reaction 

capability version of WAAS known as Gorgon Stare will provide 10 video streams 

per MQ–9. Any ROVER-equipped ground force will be able to receive any of these 

feeds. We also added four RQ–4s, and graduated our first class of RPA-only pilots. 

Early in fiscal year 2010, we proposed a shift in the nomenclature from ‘‘unmanned 

aircraft systems’’ (or UAS) to ‘‘remotely piloted aircraft’’ as part of normalizing this 

capability within the Air Force manpower structure and culture. We will also maintain our current Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS)- 

based Ground Moving Target Indicator (GMTI) capability as we begin an Analysis 

of Alternatives to determine the future of GMTI. 

To complement remotely piloted capabilities, we are deploying MC–12W Project 

Liberty aircraft to the theater as fast as they can be delivered from the factory. This 

program progressed from ‘‘concept to combat’’ in a record 9 months, and has a deployed maintenance availability rate well above 90 percent. 

Because analysis transforms data into actionable intelligence, we are shifting approximately 3,600 of the 4,100 manpower billets recaptured from the early retirement of legacy fighters to support RPA operations, and the processing, exploitation, 

and dissemination of intelligence collected by manned and remotely piloted aircraft. 

We also doubled the number of ISR liaison officers assigned to deployed ground 

forces to ensure the seamless integration of ISR collection and exploitation assets. 

Our fiscal year 2011 budget proposal reflects the Joint Force emphasis on ISR capacity, and builds on progress made in fiscal year 2010. The Air Force will reach 

50 RPA continuous, combat air patrols (CAPs) in theater by the end of fiscal year 

2011. The budget request increases MC–12W funding to normalize training and basing posture, adds Wide Area Airborne Surveillance capability, and increases the 

total number of our RPA platforms to enable fielding up to 65 CAPs by the end of 

fiscal year 2013. As we request additional RQ–4 Global Hawks for high altitude 

ISR, we also intend to continue operating the U–2 at least throughout fiscal year 

2013 as a risk mitigation effort. We will sustain our ISR processing, exploitation, 

461 

and dissemination in the Distributed Common Ground System, providing critical 

distributed analysis without having to forward deploy more forces. 

Command and Control 

Theater-wide command and control (C2) enables efficient and effective exploitation of the air, space, and cyber domain. The Air Force maintains significant C2 

capabilities at the theater level. However, the highly decentralized nature of irregular warfare also places increased demands on lower echelons of command. Matching the range and flexibility of air, space, and cyberspace power to effectively meet 

tactical requirements requires a linked C2 structure at all echelons. 

This year, we are expanding our efforts to provide C2 at the tactical, operational, 

and strategic levels. In fiscal year 2011, the Air Force is requesting $30 million 

across the FYDP to fund equipment and assured communications for U.S. Strategic 

Command’s Distributed Command and Control Node (DC2N), U.S. Northern Command’s National Capital Region-Integrated Air Defense (NCR–IADS), and U.S. Africa Command’s expanding air operations center. Tactically, we are increasing training pipelines for Joint Terminal Attack Controllers (JTACs), establishing an Air Liaison Officer career field, fielding advanced video downlink capabilities, and adding 

airborne radio and datalink gateways to improve the connectivity of air support operations centers and JTACS. 

In fiscal year 2011, the Air Force request also includes modernization and 

sustainment of both airborne and ground-based C2 systems. For Air Force airborne 

C2, we request $275 million for the E–3 Block 40/45 upgrade program. This upgrade 

modernizes a 1970s-era computer network, eliminates many components that are no 

longer manufactured, and adds avionics to comply with Global Air Traffic Management standards. To improve ground-based tactical air control operations, we are increasing manpower in the control and reporting centers and investing $51.5 million 

with the U.S. Marine Corps for a follow-on ground-based radar capability supporting 

air and missile defense. This Three-Dimensional Expeditionary Long-Range Radar 

will be the future long-range, ground-based sensor for detecting, identifying, tracking, and reporting aircraft and missiles. 

Personnel Recovery 

Personnel recovery (PR) remains an important commitment the Air Force makes 

to the Joint Force. The increased utilization of military and civilian personnel in 

support of Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) has dramatically increased the 

number of individuals who may find themselves isolated. This has in-turn created 

an increasing demand for Air Force rescue forces beyond the combat search and rescue mission. Air Force PR forces are fully engaged in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the 

Horn of Africa, accomplishing crucial medical and casualty evacuation missions for 

U.S. and coalition military and civilian personnel. 

This year, we will continue to surge critical personnel recovery capability to the 

field, and will start replacing the aging fleet. To bring the fleet back to its original 

size of 112 HH–60Gs, we will put the first 4 operational loss replacement aircraft 

on contract. Additionally, we will deliver the first two HC–1305 tanker aircraft, 

starting the replacement of the 1960s-era HC–130P fleet. 

The fiscal year 2011 budget request continues the replacement of operational 

losses and modernization of aging equipment. This request funds the last eight HH– 

60G operational loss replacement aircraft by the end of fiscal year 2012. Additionally, we begin the process of recapitalizing the remaining fleet with the inclusion 

of $1.5 billion to procure 36 HH–60G replacement aircraft in the FYDP. We also 

continue our recapitalization of the HC–130P/N fleet with HC–130J aircraft. Finally, we request $553 million in funding throughout the FYDP for the Guardian 

Angel program, which will standardize and modernize mission essential equipment 

for our pararescuemen. 

Building Parnterships 

The Air Force continues to seek opportunities to develop partnerships around the 

world, and to enhance long-term capabilities through security cooperation. In the 

U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) area of responsibility (AOR), deployed airmen 

are working with our Afghan and Iraqi partners to build a new Afghan National 

Army Air Corps and Iraqi Air Force to strengthen the ability of these nations to 

uphold the rule of law and defend their territories against violent, non-state actors. 

We are also working to further partnerships with more established allies with programs like the Joint Strike Fighter. Similarly, the third and final C–17 procured 

under the 12-nation Strategic Airlift Capability program was delivered in October 

2009, helping to address a chronic shortage of strategic airlift among our European 

allies. 

462 

In fiscal year 2011, we will expand our capabilities to conduct building partnership capacity (BPC) operations with partner air forces. Past experience has shown 

us that we are more effective trainers when we operate the same platforms as our 

partners. To increase our interoperability, the Air Force requests resources to prepare to field the Light Mobility Aircraft in fiscal year 2012 and the Light Attack/ 

Armed Reconnaissance aircraft in fiscal year 2013. These aircraft will provide effective and affordable capabilities in the two most critical mission areas for partner 

air forces: lower-cost airlift and light strike/reconnaissance training. Additionally, 

we will continue to foster BPC capability in our Contingency Response Groups. This 

request also includes $51 million to continue investing in the Strategic Airlift Capability program. Finally, we programmed $6.4 million annually across the FYDP for 

Pacific Angel humanitarian assistance missions in support of U.S Pacific Command 

theater objectives. 

Agile Combat Support 

Agile combat support underpins the entire Air Force, from the development and 

training of airmen to revitalizing processes in the acquisition enterprise. In terms 

of core functions, agile combat support reflects the largest portion of the Air Force 

budget proposal, totaling approximately $42 billion for personnel and training, installation support, logistics, and acquisition. 

Airmen and Families 

Over the last year, we stabilized end strength. Retention rates have exceeded expectations, but we continue to progress toward our end strength goal of 332,200 active duty airmen. In addition to stabilizing our end strength, we are also modernizing our training programs and aircraft. To better partner with the joint and coalition team, we will provide our airmen with cultural and regional expertise and appropriate levels of foreign language training. We are also expanding foreign language instruction for officer commissioning programs at the Air Force Academy and 

in ROTC, encouraging cadets to take foreign language coursework and participate 

in language immersion and study programs abroad. This expanded training includes 

enhanced expeditionary skills training to prepare airmen for deployment. Finally, 

as part of our effort to modernize training systems, we have established a program 

office to start the process of replacing the T–38 trainer with an advanced trainer 

capable of teaching pilots to fly the world’s most advanced fighter aircraft. 

Recognizing that family support programs must keep pace with the needs of airmen and their families, we initiated the Year of the Air Force Family in July 2009. 

We plan to add enough capacity to our child development centers to eliminate the 

child care space deficit by the end of fiscal year 2012, provide better support to exceptional family member programs, and add 54 school liaison officers to Airmen and 

Family Readiness Centers to highlight and secure Air Force family needs with local 

school administrators. 

The Air Force continues to expand its efforts to improve the resiliency of airmen 

and their families before and after deployments. This year we expanded deploymentrelated family education, coupling it with psychological screening and post-deployment health assessments. Additionally, we offer access to chaplains who provide 

pastoral care, and counselors and mental health providers trained in post-traumatic 

stress treatment at every base. We plan to further enhance support in 2010 by promoting and encouraging mental health assistance, and by providing at-risk 

deployers with tailored and targeted resiliency programs. To support this increased 

effort, we will enhance mental health career field recruiting and retention through 

special pays and targeted selection bonuses. 

Acquisition Excellence 

The Air Force continues to make progress within the Acquisition Improvement 

Plan. In 2009, we hired over 2,000 personnel into the acquisition workforce and continued contractor-to-civilian conversions. The Air Force institutionalized early collaboration with acquisition system stakeholders, senior acquisition leadership certification of requirements, cost estimation improvements, and an improved budgeting process to enhance the probability of program successes. The multi-functional 

independent review teams conducted over 113 reviews, ensuring acquisition selections are correct and defendable. As part of our recent acquisition reorganization, 

we created 11 new program executive officer positions to reduce the span of control 

and increase their focus on program execution. These enhancements demonstrate 

our commitment to restoring the public’s trust in the Air Force’s ability to acquire 

the most technologically advanced weapon systems at a competitive cost. In the 

near-term, this more rigorous approach to acquisition is likely to identify problems 

and programmatic disconnects. In the medium- and long-term, it should yield significant improvements in Air Force stewardship of taxpayer resources. 

463 

Energy 

As part of our institutional effort to consider energy management in all that we do, the Air Force requests $250 million for energy and water conservation projects 

in fiscal year 2011. This investment will ensure we meet the President’s efficiency 

goals by 2015. In fiscal year 2010, the Air Force finalized an energy plan that directs the development and use of reliable alternative energy resources, and reduces 

the life-cycle costs of acquisition programs. Additionally, the plan recognizes that 

aviation operations account for over 80 percent of the energy used by the Air Force 

each year, and directs airmen and mission planners to continue managing aviation 

fuel as an increasingly scarce resource. 

Military Construction 

The Air Force $1.3 billion MILCON request is austere, but provides funding for 

new construction aligned with weapon system deliveries. Additionally, the budget 

request sustains our effort to provide quality housing for airmen and their families. 

Finally, the Air Force remains focused on completing its Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) 2005 program and continuing the legacy BRAC programs as well as 

the environmental clean-up at legacy BRAC locations. 

Strategic Basing 

In 2009, the Air Force implemented a Strategic Basing Process to ensure basing 

decisions are made in a manner that supports new weapon system acquisition and 

delivery schedules as well as organization activation milestones. The newly established Strategic Basing Executive Steering Group directs these actions to ensure a 

standard, repeatable, and transparent process in the evaluation of Air Force basing 

opportunities. We are currently using this process to conduct an enterprise-wide 

look at F–35 basing options. 

Logistics 

Air Force requirements for weapon system sustainment funding continue to grow 

as aircraft age. In the long term, the increasing requirements for sustaining an 

aging aircraft fleet pose budget challenges and force trade-offs. We protected direct 

warfighter support, irregular warfare capabilities, and the nuclear enterprise. Since 

this year’s budget includes a simultaneous OCO submission along with a base budget, the Air Force optimized its flying hour program funding to support only the 

peacetime flying hours we can fly, given the number of deployed airmen and aircraft 

supporting these operations. Due to the volatile nature of fuel prices, reprogramming may be necessary to cover increased fuel costs. Over the longer term, enactment of the Department of Defense’s legislative proposal for the Refined Petroleum 

Products Marginal Expense Transfer Account would reduce disruptions to operations and investment programs by providing the Department of Defense flexibility 

to deal with fuel price fluctuations in the changing economy. The Air Force maintained its commitment to transforming logistics business practices, including total 

asset visibility and associated information technology, by protecting funds associated 

with fielding the first increment of the Expeditionary Combat Support System. 

READINESS AND RESOURCING

Our efforts over the last year continued to stress both people and platforms. Nearly 40,000 of America’s airmen are deployed to 263 locations across the globe, including 63 locations in the Middle East. In addition to deployed airmen, nearly 130,000 

airmen support combatant commander requirements from their home station daily. 

These airmen operate the Nation’s space and missile forces, process and exploit remotely collected ISR, provide national intelligence support, execute air sovereignty 

alert missions, and contribute in many other ways. To date, the Air Force has flown 

over 50,000 sorties supporting Operation Iraqi Freedom and almost 66,000 sorties 

supporting Operation Enduring Freedom. During this time the Air Force delivered 

over 1.73 million passengers and 606,000 tons of cargo, employed almost 1,980 tons 

of munitions, and transported nearly 70,000 total patients and 13,000 casualties 

from the CENTCOM AOR. In doing so, airmen averaged nearly 330 sorties per day. 

To support the efforts of airmen and to recruit and retain the highest quality Air 

Force members, this fiscal year 2011 budget request includes $29.3 billion in military personnel funding, to include a 1.4 percent pay increase. Our Active component 

end strength will grow to 332,200 Airmen as the Reserve component end strength 

increases to 71,200, and the Air National Guard end strength remains 106,700 in 

fiscal year 2011. Our recruiting and retention is strong, but we request $645 million 

for recruiting and retention bonuses targeted at critical wartime skills, including 

command and control, public affairs, contracting, pararescue, security forces, civil 

engineering, explosive ordnance disposal, medical, and special investigations. 

464 

SUMMARY

The Air Force’s proposed fiscal year 2011 budget of $119.6 billion achieves the 

right balance between providing capabilities for today’s commitments and posturing 

for future challenges. The Air Force built this budget to best achieve the four strategic priorities outlined in the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review: (1) prevail in today’s wars; (2) prevent and deter conflict; (3) prepare to defeat adversaries and succeed in a wide range of contingencies; and (4) preserve and enhance the All-Volunteer Force. 

Balancing requirements for today and tomorrow determined our recapitalization 

strategy. We chose to improve our existing capabilities whenever possible, and to 

pursue new systems when required. This recapitalization approach attempts to keep 

pace with threat developments and required capabilities, while ensuring stewardship of national resources. In developing this budget request, we also carefully preserved and enhanced our comprehensive approach to taking care of airmen and Air 

Force families. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. 

General Schwartz. 

STATEMENT OF GEN. NORTON A. SCHWARTZ, USAF, CHIEF OF 

STAFF OF THE AIR FORCE 

General SCHWARTZ. Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain, and members of the committee: I’m proud to be here representing your Air 

Force with Secretary Donley. 

Let me begin by reaffirming that the Air Force is fully committed 

to effective stewardship of the resources that you and the Nation 

have placed in our trust. Guided by integrity, service, and excellence, our core values, American airmen are serving courageously 

every day, with precision and reliability, on behalf of the American 

people. 

The budget request supports these airmen and our continuing efforts to rebalance the force, to make difficult decisions on how and 

what we buy, and to sustain our needed contributions to the joint 

team. 

Secretary Donley and I established five priorities shortly after 

taking office to ensure that our entire force was focused on the 

right objectives. Most of the initial efforts centered on reaffirming 

our long-established standards of excellence and recommitting ourselves in areas where our focus had waned. I am pleased to report 

to you today that our dedicated and talented airmen broadly understood our intent and delivered in meaningful fashion. 

Although these priorities were not designed to change from year 

to year, our progress with the nuclear enterprise is such that we 

can now shift our efforts to sustaining the progress that we’ve 

made. Thus, our first priority is to continue to strengthen excellence in the nuclear enterprise. The rigor of our nuclear surety inspections demonstrates a renewed commitment to the highest level 

of performance. But we must and we will do more to ensure 100 

percent precision and reliability in our nuclear operations and logistics as close to 100 percent of the time as such a human endeavor will allow. 

For our second priority, and that is partnering with the joint and 

coalition team in today’s fight, Secretary Donley mentioned several 

ways that our airmen are providing critical air and space power for 

the joint and coalition team. Your airmen are also performing admirably wherever and whenever our joint teammates require, inVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:37 May 06, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00470 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\62155.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
465 

cluding providing battlefield medical support and evacuation, ordnance disposal, convoy security, and much more. 

Our third priority remains to develop and care for our airmen 

and their families. We initiated the Year of the Air Force Family 

shortly after our testimony last year in recognition of the vital role 

that our families fulfil in mission accomplishment and their contributions. Their sacrifice is perhaps less conspicuous, but their efforts are no less noble and certainly their contributions no less substantial. 

Modernizing our inventories, organizations, and training, our 

fourth priority, is among the most difficult tasks that our service 

has undertaken in the last 18 months. In order to achieve the balance that Secretary Gates has envisioned for our force, we are compelled to decisions and to action. The budget represents a continuation of that effort. We set forth on a plan last year to accelerate 

retirement of some of the older fighter aircraft. This year we will 

not be retiring additional fighters, but we are transitioning from 

some of our oldest and least capable C–130s and C–5s. We will 

modernize where we can, but where modernization no longer is cost 

effective, we will pursue recapitalization. 

KC–X is one example. With the delivery of the RFP last week, 

our top acquisition effort to procure the next generation refueling 

aircraft passed another significant milestone. 

A similar imperative is the JSF. I want to underscore Secretary 

Donley’s comment by noting that this weapons system will be the 

work horse driving much of our Air Force and the joint force forward. 

Long-range strike is the last program I number among our top 

priorities. The Air Force fully supports the development of the family of systems providing both penetrating and standoff capabilities 

for the next 2 or 3 decades, as described in the QDR. 

Finally, recapturing acquisition excellence, our fifth priority, is 

now beginning to pay dividends with our acquisition improvement 

plan at the heart of our reform efforts. While promising, the initial 

successes must continue for a number of years before we can declare victory on this front. But we are fully aware that we must 

wring every bit of capability and value that we can from the systems that we procure. So this effort will require sustained focus on 

acquisition excellence. 

Mr. Chairman, the Air Force will continue to provide our best 

military advice and stewardship, delivering global reach, vigilance, 

and power for America. Thank you for your continued support of 

the United States Air Force and particularly our airmen and their 

families. 

As the uniformed member at the table, sir, may I reinforce the 

comments concerning Erin Conaton. Secretary Donley and I came 

into these jobs about 18 months ago. I think we both work pretty 

hard. But I have had the benefit of a four-star deputy throughout, 

General Fraser, now General Howey Chandler. The Secretary has 

been without a deputy and that does need to be remedied. 

Finally, sir, on behalf of the Secretary, myself, and the entire Air 

Force, we’d like to offer our sincere condolences to the family of 

Terry Laughlin, with whom we have worked for many years and 

for whom we have the greatest respect. 

466 

Chairman LEVIN. General, thank you so much, and thank you for 

your reference to our professional staff member and friend on the 

Senate Armed Services Committee, Terry Laughlin for your condolences, and in joining us in those feelings. We and his family certainly appreciate it. 

Let’s try a 7-minute first round here. 

First as to the nomination, I just want to make it clear for the 

record, in addition to the Air Force nominees on which there have 

been holds placed since December, the two that you mentioned, Mr. 

Secretary, we also have Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Frank Kendall, who has been held up since 

last December. We have an Assistant Secretary of the Army, an Assistant Secretary of the Navy, and General Counsel for the Navy, 

who have been held up now for over a month. We’re going to do 

our very best to bring those holds to an end. They are unconscionable. They are not supported by any substantive opposition to these 

nominees. They fly in the face of the unanimous vote of this committee. We’re going to press this issue very, very hard on the floor, 

and we again would urge all the members of this committee to join 

in that effort for the reasons that are obvious to us who spend so 

much time on these issues, as well as the reasons that were given 

by our Secretary here this morning and by General Schwartz. 

First, let me ask you about the issue of the C–5A aircraft. Is it 

the intent of the Air Force, maybe I can start with you, Mr. Secretary, and then ask General Schwartz, to retire C–5A aircraft in 

fiscal year 2011? 

Mr. DONLEY. It is, sir. I believe the proposed number to retire 

is 17. To do that, we owe you a couple of reports. 

Chairman LEVIN. Under WSARA, we require, if we’re going to 

succeed, better systems engineering, better cost estimates, more 

mature technologies, and better developmental testing. Is the Air 

Force on track, Secretary Donley, to rebuild the systems engineering, cost estimating, and developmental testing capabilities as required by WSARA? 

Mr. DONLEY. Sir, we’re making good progress on that, I believe. 

As I mentioned in my statement, we have several thousand additions planned over the next 5 years in our acquisition workforce. 

We added over 700 personnel last year, and we’re on track to continue to grow that in the future in the areas that you mentioned: 

cost estimating and systems engineering. We’ve added nine program executive officers to our acquisition structure, which will reduce the span of control and give the senior officers more time to 

spend on fewer numbers of programs, and this will align us much 

more with how the Army and Navy have been doing business recently. 

Chairman LEVIN. The Air Force is requesting an Active Duty end 

strength of 500 more personnel than last year and a Reserve end 

strength of 1,700 more personnel than last year. Why does the Air 

Force need additional Active and Reserve end strength, and what 

are the specific purposes that it would be used for? Let me start 

with you, Secretary, and then go to General Schwartz. 

Mr. DONLEY. Let me give you a broad overview, Mr. Chairman, 

and then provide some more specifics for the record. In general, the 

Air Force is attempting to hold its Active Duty end strength relVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:37 May 06, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00472 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\62155.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
467 

atively constant. We do not plan to grow the Air Force in any significant numbers going forward. 

But while we have an essentially fixed top line for Active Duty 

end strength, we do face demands for growth. We’ve needed to put 

additional personnel on the nuclear enterprise. We have needed to 

bring in and restructure the force to support the ISR buildup that 

we have underway with the new Reaper and Predator UAVs coming on board. That means crews, that means providing operations 

and maintenance for their support, and it means providing additional intelligence personnel to do the analysis from all the data 

pulled down by the sensors from those capabilities. 

We have growth in several areas. Cyber is another area where 

we’re anticipating growth. 

Chairman LEVIN. If you want to supplement that for the record, 

we’d appreciate it. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

The difference between the 331,700 Active Duty (AD) end strength authorized in 

the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2010 and the 

332,200 AD end strength the Air Force requested in the fiscal year 2011 President’s 

budget is 500 AD. The 500 AD will support the Defense Health Program (DHP) specifically due to the NDAA for fiscal year 2008 reversal of planned military-to-civilian 

conversions for DHP. 

The Air Force Reserve military manpower increase of 1,700 personnel between fiscal year 2010 and fiscal year 2011 is a result of the fiscal year 2010 President’s Decision Memorandum III Reserve end strength increase, which increases Air Force 

Reserve Command manpower in association with AD end strength growth. Specifically, the manpower increases were utilized in the following areas: nuclear operations (∼70), Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (∼930), modernizing organizations to include Total Force Integration initiatives (∼400), and stressed career 

fields (∼300). 

Chairman LEVIN. General, anything you want to add to that? 

General SCHWARTZ. Sir, again I would just say that there are two 

countervailing pressures here. One is that we do have additional 

demand in certain mission areas. Certainly ISR is one. At the same 

time, we recognize that personnel costs are a very substantial part 

of our budget, and if we’re not careful as we grow, we will force 

out other essential content in the portfolio. 

This is the tension we face. As the Secretary suggested, I personally do not favor growing the force except marginally, if at all, and 

that we will have to adjust internally and find ways to reallocate 

our manpower to the most pressing missions. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you. 

Relative to ‘‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,’’ Admiral Mullen testified that 

he and the service chiefs are in support of Secretary Gates in repealing this program and expressed his personal and professional 

belief, in the case of Admiral Mullen, that allowing homosexuals to 

serve openly would be the right thing to do. 

First, Secretary Donley, do you support Secretary Gates in this 

decision? 

Mr. DONLEY. I do, Mr. Chairman. I support the President’s efforts to change the policy and change the law in this area. There 

is an additional point I’d like to make on this. As it happens, I was 

actually in this seat in 1993. I know many members were also 

around when this change was made. I think Secretary Gates’ approach this year has put us in a much better situation than we 

were in 1993. I think a full review of all the potential implications 

468 

of this change, done by the community that is most affected by 

these changes, puts us in a stronger position to reach sound judgments and develop sound advice going forward on how to do this. 

Chairman LEVIN. Subject to that qualification, you support repeal? 

Mr. DONLEY. I do. 

Chairman LEVIN. General, do you support repeal of the policy? 

General SCHWARTZ. Mr. Chairman, the President has clearly articulated his intent and, should the law change, your Air Force will 

implement the new statute and policy faithfully. I do have concern, 

however, with respect to what I consider inadequate current scholarship on this issue and certainly insufficient current survey data 

on our airmen and their families. 

Secretary Gates’ effort to carefully evaluate and study this issue 

I think is obviously essential to our getting to the right spot on 

this, and that it’s important that we carefully investigate the facts, 

circumstances, potential implications, the possible complications, 

and potential mitigations. 

I do have two firm convictions on two matters. One is that this 

is not the time to perturb a force that is stretched by combat operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and important missions elsewhere, 

without due deliberation. Second, that Air Force standards, should 

the law change, will continue to apply to all airmen. That is, standards of conduct will continue to apply to all airmen, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you. 

Senator McCain. 

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I didn’t intend to begin my questioning with ‘‘Don’t Ask, Don’t 

Tell,’’ but I will follow up. In other words, General Schwartz, as 

you said, this is not the time to disturb the force, when we are in 

two wars. Contrary, in all due respect, to what the chairman just 

said, Admiral Mullen did not testify that the Joint Chiefs supported, the chiefs of services supported, repeal. In fact, the Commandant of the Marine Corps has just come out in opposition to repeal. You have just stated your concerns about disturbing the 

force.q 

Should this survey, study, and in-depth evaluation be about how 

to repeal ‘‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,’’ or should it be about the effect 

of the repeal of ‘‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell’’? General Schwartz, what is 

your view on that? 

General SCHWARTZ. Senator McCain, it is important to understand what the consequences of the change would be. There are 

things that have not been thoroughly thought through in my view 

in terms of benefits, in terms of cohabitation, in terms of discipline 

and such. 

Senator MCCAIN. So a moratorium would be foolish? 

General SCHWARTZ. I think, sir, that any interim change would 

not be wise. 

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you. Again, I want to point out that you 

reflect basically the views of General Casey, General Conway, yourself, and we have yet to hear thoroughly from Admiral Roughead. 

So this idea out there that’s being pushed that the service chiefs 

somehow support a campaign promise made by the President of the 

United States is obviously untrue. We need to look at this very, 

469 

very carefully, and we do not want to disturb the force, particularly 

since we are in two wars at this time. 

Also, General, I would like to congratulate you and the other 

service chiefs, who have basically stood up under intense pressure, 

including coming from your right. I’m very proud of the uniformed 

service chiefs in the way that they have said that an in-depth review is an absolute necessity before we change the policy. Clearly, 

a moratorium would be a change in the policy, just a back door way 

of doing it. 

I’d like to return a second to the JSF. First of all, do you support 

the Secretary of Defense’s call for cancellation of the C–17 aircraft, 

Mr. Secretary? 

Mr. DONLEY. I do. 

Senator MCCAIN. General Schwartz? 

General SCHWARTZ. Yes, sir, I do. 

Senator MCCAIN. All right. Maybe you could give us a statement 

for the record as to why that is necessary. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

The recent release of the Mobility Capability Requirements Study validated that 

our current strategic airlift program of record exceeds the most demanding scenarios 

modeled. Continuing to grow a fleet that is already postured to meet national defense strategies diverts resources from other critical programs needed to enhance 

the security of the Nation. For this reason, the Air Force believes it is prudent to 

close the C–17 line and end production at the currently planned 223 aircraft. 

Senator MCCAIN. I want to get, in the few minutes I have remaining, to the JSF. As a strong supporter of the JSF, as a person 

who supported the termination of the F–22 because of the viability 

and necessity of the JSF as a partial replacement, I’m very disturbed at what has been the process here. We have not, I believe, 

members of the Armed Services Committee or Congress, been adequately informed of the full extent of the difficulties with this program. 

Now, according to published reports, there’s going to be at least 

a 2-year delay in the production of the JSF. Is that true, Secretary 

Donley? 

Mr. DONLEY. Sir, I think what has been established in the acquisition decision memorandum (ADM) that Dr. Carter, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, issued 

is that the delay in development is going to be about 13 months. 

Senator MCCAIN. What impact does that have on fulfilling the 

mission requirements of our fighter aircraft? 

Mr. DONLEY. We’re working on that. As part of the restructuring 

that the Secretary announced earlier in the year, we added dollars 

to extend development. We moved, I think, four aircraft from initial 

production back into the test program to see if we could accelerate 

the flight test program, which is behind, and to see if we could recapture time there. We have lowered the production ramp. That 

doesn’t mean we have stopped production. We have, I think, 22 

production aircraft in the budget for this year. But, we have lowered the rate of growth in that production ramp over the next several years. 

DOD took out about 122 jets from its previous estimate of last 

year and about half of those are Air Force jets. We’re working 

through the implications of that going forward for completion of the 

470 

test program and also the IOC date that is out in front of us. It’s 

up to General Fraser at Air Combat Command to work through the 

IOC date with the program office to determine the content that he 

needs in those production jets. 

If I can make one other point here, in restructuring the program, 

we’re also restructuring the contract and putting, I think, additional pressure and incentives on the contractor to buy back some 

of the schedule slips that have been forecast by the independent estimates. 

Senator MCCAIN. I thank you, Mr. Secretary. The chairman has 

graciously, and I think very appropriately, agreed that we need to 

have a hearing or hearings on this issue, so I’ll pursue further 

questioning on it at that time. 

I just want to say that it’s disappointing to all of us, in these 

very difficult economic times, when we see these kinds of delays 

and cost overruns. Hopefully, the legislation we passed will help 

remedy some of these problems. But maybe, Mr. Chairman, in 6 

months, a year, or so we ought to look at the effect of the legislation that we passed, because there are still significant problems 

with the consolidation of the defense industry, which has led to 

lack of competition and lack of real brakes on cost overruns in acquisition of our weapons systems large and small. 

I’d love to see a success story some time, and maybe you know 

one and would bring it to the committee’s attention. Go ahead, 

General. 

General SCHWARTZ. It’s a modest one, but there is one, and it’s 

the MC–12 ISR aircraft. It does both full-motion video and signals 

intelligence. From a cold start to first delivery was 8 months. There 

are things out there that are, I think, representative of the kind 

of execution you expect. 

Senator MCCAIN. Good. Maybe you could provide us with some 

of the detail on how that program succeeded. We’d be very interested in that. I know we focus on the failures rather than the successes, and we’d like to give the successes a little more visibility. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

The MC–12W Liberty Project Aircraft program has proven that rapid acquisition 

tools can deliver a product effectively, efficiently, and at an affordable price, and 

still meet the warfighter’s immediate requirements. This effort was an immediate 

response to the Secretary of Defense’s demand for the Services to provide additional 

intelligence, reconnaissance and surveillance (ISR) capability to combat forces. The 

Air Force, working through its specialized, rapid reaction, acquisition program management team, and the ISR Task Force, developed the MC-–12W Liberty concept to 

deliver an ‘‘80 percent solution’’ quickly, and continue to improve the system with 

feedback from operators in the fight. These operator inputs are rapidly rolled into 

both hardware/software and training in real time. The ISR Task Force provided 

oversight to set and hold requirements, and provide immediate funding. The MC– 

12W Liberty concept leveraged commercial off-the-shelf systems integrated on a 

readily available and highly reliable manned airframe, by a responsive and cooperative prime contractor with proven past performance. Acquisition professionals and 

operators, working hand-in-hand from the beginning, enabled the deployment of a 

full combat squadron directly into the war zone in less than 10 months after receipt 

of requirement. MC–12W aircraft have flown over 11,000 combat sorties since June 

2009. Of the 37 M–12W aircraft, 30 are deployed in the overseas congtingency operations fight while the other 7 are dedicated trainers—an unheard of ratio for a traditional aircraft program of record. The MC–12W Liberty is a benchmark for Air 

Force rapid acquisition. 

471 

Senator MCCAIN. I thank you both. General Schwartz, again I 

want to thank you and the other uniformed chiefs for standing up 

for the men and women in the military and acknowledging that 

‘‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell’’ is an issue that has to be examined very 

carefully, with an eye to our battle effectiveness and effect on the 

performance of the men and women in our military. I want to 

thank you very much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator McCain. 

Senator Lieberman. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. 

Again, thanks, Mr. Secretary and General Schwartz for your 

great leadership. It’s hard to resist not asking a question or two 

about ‘‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell’’ because it is before us now. I want 

to do it quickly and then move on to the acquisition programs. 

General Schwartz, you said something that I think is very important as part of this discussion of repealing ‘‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,’’ 

which is that there must be an understanding that—I believe you 

used the term ‘‘standards of conduct’’—the standards of conduct for 

Air Force members and, for that matter, members of the other 

three Services cannot be altered in any way if ‘‘Don’t Ask, Don’t 

Tell’’ is repealed. We’d be eliminating one policy, but then everybody in the military has to live by those standards of conduct. 

I just wanted to say to you as an advocate of repeal that I totally 

agree with that. I think that the ultimate question I want to just 

ask you both and, I understand what you’ve said, that the repeal 

effort raises is whether one believes that men and women in uniform who are otherwise capable and living by the standards of conduct of the military should be discharged from the military solely 

because of their sexual orientation. Secretary Donley, do you believe that men and women in uniform should be discharged solely 

because of their sexual orientation? 

Mr. DONLEY. My personal view is no, they should not. I’d like to 

come back to the issue that the Chief raised just briefly on conduct. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Go ahead. 

Mr. DONLEY. The Chief and I at our level have the opportunity 

and the duty to review dismissal cases from the Air Force, the 

highest level of review in the Air Force before officers are dismissed from service. My experience in this is that these cases do 

not depend on gender or orientation, but rather the issue of good 

order, discipline, unit cohesion; it depends on conduct. That’s my 

experience in this job. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thank you. 

General Schwartz, it’s a direct question, but I think it is ultimately the question: Do you believe men and women in uniform 

should be discharged solely based on their sexual orientation? 

General SCHWARTZ. Sir, I have to tell you that the answer to that 

question is more complex than a yes or no. It is dependent on the 

consequences, given a change in the policy. I would reiterate that 

it is very important for us to understand what’s in each of the four 

corners of this issue. I would submit to you, sir, respectfully, that 

I’m not sure that is the case at the moment. 

For example, have we had an opportunity to understand what 

the thinking of our airmen and their families is? I have not done 

472 

that. I cannot give you a sense of what their current views are. We 

need to know, and we need to understand what the puts and takes 

are. 

I take a pragmatic view of this, sir, not the philosophical view 

perhaps that you’ve explored here. We need to be pragmatic. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Do you have a personal feeling on the underlying question? I understand what you’ve said about the potential impact of it. 

General SCHWARTZ. Senator, my personal feeling is acting now is 

premature. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Good enough for now, and we’ll continue the 

discussion as we go. 

Mr. DONLEY. I would like to reinforce what has been said. I think 

the Secretary of Defense has put us in a good place by calling for 

this review. This is an important change to our military, and we 

need to have the time and the space to work through the implications of this in ways that have not, to be honest, sir, fully been 

worked through in other parts of our society in many dimensions. 

It would have particular impacts on our military. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Understood. My own reading and hearing of 

what Secretary Gates said when he testified before the committee, 

and of course Admiral Mullen backed it up in very strong testimony, was that, based on the decision of the Commander in Chief, 

the President, in favor of repeal, that the question in Secretary 

Gates’ mind is not whether to repeal, but essentially when and 

how. 

The bill that we put forward yesterday contemplates the time 

going by with the study. It states a principle or goal, which is repeal, but it contemplates the time passing. In fact, it embraces a 

delayed time schedule to see that it’s implemented correctly. 

I’m going to stop this one here for now. I think I appreciate the 

sincerity of the answers. Let me go in the time remaining to other 

issues. I’m really interested in what you said about cyber, but I 

want to just briefly talk to you about Joint Surveillance and Target 

Attack Radar System (JSTARS). I’ve had a long-term interest in 

the JSTARS program and the unique capability that the program 

has as a ground moving target indicator. 

This is all about the re-engining of the program. I was very 

pleased when last September, Under Secretary Carter issued an 

Acquisition Decision Memorandum designating JSTARS as a special interest program and directing the Air Force to proceed immediately with re-engining. The final fiscal year 2010 Defense Appropriations Act provided $185 million for JSTARS, including $62 million to procure one engine set. This fiscal year 2011 budget request 

provides $168 million in research, development, test, and evaluation funding and $176 million on procurement. That’s $344 million 

total. 

In the Air Force posture statement, General Schwartz, you note 

that the Service will begin an analysis of alternatives (AOA) to determine the future of ground moving target indicator capability this 

year, although the Air Force previously indicated that that would 

begin by April of last year. I want to ask you this question. My 

time is running out. I was surprised to see in the justification materials supplied in support of the budget for the Air Force for fiscal 

473 

year 2011 that although there are a total of 18 aircraft to be modified with procurement funds, the Service has only funded 4 of those 

18 aircraft through the Future Years Defense Program and only 2 

aircraft are funded this year, preventing the program from attaining economies of scale that would be achieved at the 4 ship sets 

per year. 

I want to confirm that the re-engining program for the JSTARS 

fleet remains, as the Air Force justification book for procurement 

indicates, in your opinion a valid requirement. 

General SCHWARTZ. We received guidance from Secretary Carter 

to execute—both to complete the development that included two 

ship sets—and to acquire two production ship sets, for a total of 

four, as you indicated. The backdrop on this, Senator, is that you 

have a couple of issues, one related to the JSTARS airframes that 

were used. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right. 

General SCHWARTZ. The pedigree on those airframes is not as 

solid as we’d like it to be. Just a case in point. One of the birds 

we had deployed forward had a cracked upper rear spar recently, 

tail number 122 I believe it was, and we had to bring it back for 

repair. There are issues with respect to the longevity of these airframes that raise questions in our mind. 

Second, the question about the AN/APY–7 sensor for JSTARS. Is 

that the sensor to go forward with or is there a better package to 

do both the mechanized movements on the ground as well as movements of humans on the ground? They are different requirements. 

Third, the issue has to do with the fundamental question on 

where should we invest for the future. That’s where the AOA is 

supposed to help us. Should it be an unmanned system, for example, or should it be manned as currently? 

The bottom line is, I think the wise thing to do here is to proceed 

cautiously, to re-engine the four airplanes that we’ve been directed 

to re-engine, and get the AOA and decide what the best way forward is for us. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Okay. My time is up, and we’ll continue the 

discussion. Obviously, I hope the AOA can go forward as quickly 

as possible and that the four engine sets can go forward as quickly 

as possible as well. 

Thank you. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator Lieberman. 

Senator Chambliss. 

Senator CHAMBLISS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General Schwartz, let me echo the comments of Senator McCain 

with respect to the ‘‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell’’ repeal. I know there’s 

tremendous pressure on you from the administration and other 

arenas to promote this change, and we look forward to continuing 

this debate and to the study. I’m very pleased to hear you say that 

you’re going to go down to the very lowest levels of the enlisted personnel in the Air Force because, at the end of the day, we need to 

hear from everybody on this. I thank you for your courage there. 

Mr. Secretary, in your response to Senator McCain, I want to 

make sure I’m clear on this. The IOC date on the F–35 has slipped 

2 years, is that correct? 

474 

Mr. DONLEY. Sir, the IOC decision is up to General Fraser, who 

is the commander of Air Combat Command. We think meeting the 

fiscal year 2013 date that had been on the books for a couple of 

years is going to be very difficult, and our guidance to General Fraser and Under Secretary Carter’s guidance to us at this point is to 

have the operating community, represented by General Fraser, 

working with the acquisition community and with the program office, to work through the implications of the restructure for IOC. 

Senator CHAMBLISS. The restructure plan anticipates a 2-year 

slippage, correct? 

Mr. DONLEY. The restructure plan did not address that specifically. It just told us to go work the IOC issues. 

Senator CHAMBLISS. So what do you think the slippage is? 

Mr. DONLEY. I have indicated that it’s going to be very hard to 

meet 2013. 

Senator CHAMBLISS. Just answer my question, Mr. Secretary. 

What’s going to be the slippage in your opinion? 

Mr. DONLEY. As I have indicated, certainly beyond 2013. General 

Fraser’s task is to establish the definition of what IOC is and to 

work with the program office to determine the content of the program going forward. 

Senator CHAMBLISS. Are we going to reach a Nunn-McCurdy 

breach this year with the F–35? 

Mr. DONLEY. I believe we will. I have indicated that in my testimony. The content of that, again, we have not worked through 

completely. But since the restructuring decision was made earlier 

in the winter, we have been undertaking, and the program office, 

under Under Secretary Carter’s direction, has been undertaking, 

all the actions as if the program were in a Nunn-McCurdy breach. 

We’re working through all the mitigation steps necessary. 

Senator CHAMBLISS. The Joint Estimating Team (JET) prepared 

a report on the F–35 in the fall of 2008 that indicated that the F– 

35 would be significantly over cost and behind schedule relative to 

the joint program office’s prediction. Are you aware of that report? 

Mr. DONLEY. I am. 

Senator CHAMBLISS. About a week after the vote in the Senate 

last year to terminate the F–22, the JET prepared another report 

that said exactly the same thing. Were you aware of that report? 

Mr. DONLEY. Yes. 

Senator CHAMBLISS. Were you aware of both those reports when 

you came to this committee and testified that there would not be 

a slippage in the IOC date on the F–35, and that it would meet 

test and production requirements? 

Mr. DONLEY. Yes. This is where we were last year. 

Senator CHAMBLISS. Why didn’t you tell us that the JET was 

going to come out with a report that disagreed with the IOC date 

being met? 

Mr. DONLEY. This concentrated review of the program has been 

a 2-year process. We received the JET report in 2008 indicating 

there was a difference between the program office, as you have described, and the independent estimate. DOD reviewed that and 

ended up adding dollars to the fiscal year 2010 budget for more 

system development and demonstration. It did not recognize all the 

475 

changes in the independent estimate at that time, but it set in motion another review, which delivered at the end of last year. 

So we’ve had a close 2-year review of this program. I would say 

that the restructure represents, in part, the work of this committee 

and the House on the weapons system’s evaluation process and 

how to better accommodate independent cost estimates, more realistic cost estimates in our program. 

Senator CHAMBLISS. Why didn’t you tell this to the committee? 

Mr. DONLEY. DOD’s judgment at the end of the year was that we 

need to recognize this disconnect and fund closer to the independent cost estimate, and that judgment was reached at the end 

of the review. 

Senator CHAMBLISS. Why didn’t you tell this committee last year 

when we had testimony on the termination of the F–22 program 

that the JET was going to come back with a report a week after 

the vote last year on the floor of the Senate that confirmed their 

conclusions in the fall of 2008 that there was going to be a 2-year 

slippage in this program? Why didn’t you tell us that? 

Mr. DONLEY. Sir, I cannot speak to the specific dates you’re referencing. I don’t recall the precise sequence of when reports came 

in or when testimony was taken. 

Senator CHAMBLISS. General Schwartz, were you aware of those 

two reports last year when you came before this committee? 

General SCHWARTZ. I was aware of the substance of the reports, 

yes, sir. 

Senator CHAMBLISS. Was there any reason you didn’t disclose 

that to this committee when we were discussing the termination of 

the F–22 program? 

General SCHWARTZ. Those, the independent estimates, at that 

time had not received a level of validation that I felt was compelling. 

Senator CHAMBLISS. This week, the Air Force awarded a $223 

million contract for the first two re-engining ship sets for the 

JSTARS re-engining effort. I would certainly hope that it’s the Air 

Force’s intent to procure these engines and install them on 

JSTARS aircraft. Is that the Air Force’s intention? 

General SCHWARTZ. It is for the four ship sets, sir. 

Senator CHAMBLISS. The fiscal year 2011 Air Force budget includes funds for two additional JSTARS re-engining ship sets. 

Since this is in the President’s budget request, I assume that you 

both support that; is that correct? 

Mr. DONLEY. I do. 

General SCHWARTZ. Yes, sir. 

Senator CHAMBLISS. Are you fully committed to obligating and 

executing these funds as soon as you’re able to, assuming they are 

authorized and appropriated? 

General SCHWARTZ. We are, sir. I would only indicate that there 

is a need for a bit of reprogramming in order to execute the fiscal 

year 2011 program, about $20 million. 

Senator CHAMBLISS. But you intend to make that request? 

General SCHWARTZ. We intend to request that approval, yes, sir. 

Senator CHAMBLISS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Chambliss. 

Senator Akaka. 

476 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, I want to begin by 

thanking you for your leadership and your distinguished service to 

our country. I want to recognize and thank our airmen and civilians serving around the world and their families that support 

them. 

Secretary Donley, it is impossible to overstate the importance of 

our military engagement in the Asia Pacific region. We know that 

there are six of the world’s largest militaries that operate in this 

region. Our conventional adversaries are getting stronger, and it is 

critical that we maintain our superiority in this region. 

Mr. Secretary, given the many demands on the Air Force budget 

and the unique mission in the region, the question is how does the 

Air Force and the Air Force’s budget impact our military readiness 

in the Pacific? 

Mr. DONLEY. Certainly, Senator, we recognize the importance of 

this region and, while we have been focused understandably on the 

current work in the CENTCOM AOR, we’ve been very busy in the 

Pacific working with Admiral Willard on his vision for that region. 

Many of the systems that we are procuring and have deployed are 

part of his plans for this region, both in terms of peacetime engagement and in terms of wartime planning as well, such as our longrange strike platforms, our mobility platforms, our tanker assets, 

the future fighter attack capability when we eventually field and 

deploy in the F–35, for example. We also have our space assets and 

our ISR assets. 

There are a broad range of Air Force capabilities that are important to this region and that are getting support in the program 

that we’ve tabled this year. 

Senator AKAKA. I’m glad to know that the F–22s are being sent 

to Hickam Air Force Base and the Pacific area, as well as Alaska. 

General Schwartz, the Air Force is increasing its use of UAVs. 

You mentioned in a speech recently that the Air Force wants to acquire an additional 320 units over the next 5 years and deploy 

most of them on combat air patrols. The men and women who operate the UAVs face unique mental health challenges as they experience the realities of combat remotely. 

General, how does the Air Force plan to help UAV operators deal 

with these unique mental health challenges, and any other remarks on that? 

General SCHWARTZ. Sir, I would say that I would take the question a bit more broadly. Certainly those remotely piloted aircraft 

operators have a special challenge in that they, for some part of 

their day, are in the midst of combat and, in some parts of their 

day, they are much removed from that, in a more domestic setting. 

But more broadly, the question is how do we sustain the resilience of our airmen? That is, how do we prepare them both physically and mentally to withstand the rigors of today’s demanding 

missions, whether they’re forward deployed or whether they’re in 

the rear? We have several programs underway to reinforce our efforts to make sure that our airmen have the psychic support, the 

medical attention, to ensure that there is a chaplaincy which is 

readily available and accessible, as well as commanders who care, 

477 

so that we can assure the resilience of this talented and precious 

pool of airmen. 

We are concerned, for example, about suicide rates, which were 

higher last year than they were the year before, and we’re running 

ahead again this year, both with our civilian and military personnel. This is another application of our efforts to improve resilience among our Air Force members, both civilian and military 

members. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you. 

Mr. Secretary, I’m happy to hear about the progress you have 

made in enhancing the acquisition workforce. Can you discuss any 

improvements within the Air Force acquisition system to help prevent a requirements creep and obtain the best possible estimates? 

Mr. DONLEY. Senator, I think there are several efforts underway 

here. But I think the one that I would mention front and center 

is KC–X. As the Air Force went back to define the requirement, the 

mandatory requirement set for KC–X, we were very careful to include those things that we needed to go to war on day 1. There is 

a bit of acquisition reform in this as well in the manner in which 

we have done this. We would expect to get that capability right off 

the production line and not to have to send an aircraft back for 

modifications any time soon. We would not expect to have to negotiate additional capabilities with who ever is selected for that airframe. But we have designed the requirements to be what we need 

on day 1 and to limit that defining very precisely. 

Senator AKAKA. General Schwartz, President Obama has called 

on Americans to lower our reliance on fossil fuels and change the 

way we produce energy. The Air Force’s energy strategy is to reduce demand, increase supply, and change its culture. General, 

please tell us about the status of efforts to meet the Air Force’s 

strategic energy goals by reducing fuel demand, increasing energy 

supplies, and changing Air Force culture? 

General SCHWARTZ. Sir, there are a couple of parts to this. We, 

as you well know, are the largest consumer of hydrocarbons in 

DOD. There are things that we can do as a matter of course that 

reduce our demand for those hydrocarbons. In fact, over the last 

several years we’ve reduced our demand in the double digits 

through process, through procedures, through careful mission planning, and so on. 

That is part of the deal here, which is reminding our people that 

hydrocarbons are a precious resource, they are a cost driver in our 

cost of operations, and they must use these petroleum products judiciously. That’s one part. 

The other thing we’ve done, as you probably know, is we have 

qualified a number of our aircraft—the KC–135, the C–17, the B– 

52; the F–22 is pending—on mixes of fuel, hydrocarbon and synthetic derivatives, for which we think there is a market for that 

fuel. We don’t want to be the producer, but we can be the consumer 

of those blended fuels, which we know will work in our airplanes 

and certainly will enhance availability. 

The third part of this is the fundamental question of whether we 

can get beyond hydrocarbons. Our research laboratory is working 

that aspect as well. Hydrogen is one example, and there are a number of other promising technologies. 

478 

I would conclude by saying that this is not just about airplanes. 

Our installations are large consumers of electricity and so on. An 

example of one initiative is the solar farm at Nellis Air Force Base, 

where over 50 percent of the electricity consumed at Nellis now is 

produced via solar. That’s again representative of our efforts across 

the board, sir. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Akaka. 

Senator Sessions. 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I remain deeply, deeply troubled by the process that resulted in 

this dramatic alteration of the RFP for the KC–X tanker aircraft. 

It’s such a dramatic change that it has, I think, stunned the entire 

contracting world. I believe that the Air Force correctly chose the 

preferred airplane the last time. There were technical problems 

with the way that RFP went forward, and it was legitimate to come 

back and look at it again. But to have 11 significant changes and 

9 of those favor one aircraft, to change the RFP to a degree that 

when you have two aircraft, each offering different values, and to 

craft the RFP so it directly favors only one aircraft is a stunning 

development. I think is going to have ramifications throughout the 

defense community. 

I believe no matter if the Northrop team decides to bid—and I 

hope they do, I hope they do, but I don’t know that they will—it’s 

still going to be a problem that is not going away. There is now 

a perception, and I believe a correct one, that politics somehow influenced the changes that were made. 

I took notice from my colleagues in the Seattle Times after the 

new RFP came out. This is the lead sentence in that article: ‘‘The 

final RFP for the long-delayed $40 billion Air Force refueling tanker contract, issued Wednesday, appears to heavily favor Boeing’s 

Everett-built 767 plane over the rival.’’ 

It goes on to quote Ashton Carter, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, as saying: ‘‘This is 

not a price showdown.’’ But they note: ‘‘But analysts noted that 

only in very limited circumstances will credit be given for extra capabilities.’’ 

The article goes on to say: ‘‘The much larger Airbus 330 can deliver more fuel per trip than the Boeing 767 and carry extra troops 

and cargo, but the evaluation process will credit those items only 

if the two bids are within 1 percent of each other on cost.’’ 

Lauren Thompson, defense industry analyst at the Lexington Institute, said: ‘‘This becomes nothing more than a cost competition 

and a bigger plane costs more.’’ He goes on to say: ‘‘It’s Boeing’s 

competition to lose. This is playing out just the way Northrop 

feared.’’ 

I’m a believer in DOD. I believe in the integrity of DOD, but I 

am very troubled. I remember with great clarity Senator McCain 

challenging the Air Force’s decision with Darleen Druyun to give, 

in effect, a sole source contract to Boeing, and what did we find 

out? Ms. Druyun went to jail and members of the leadership team 

at Boeing had to resign, if not be prosecuted. I think some were 

prosecuted. It was a very, very sad thing. 

479 

Politics should not enter into this. I just would tell you, I know 

it was made an issue in the campaign. Senator McCain, who saved 

$8 billion by advocating that this not be a sole-source contract for 

DOD, was criticized in the campaign for his activity that virtually 

this whole committee supported. Senator Levin supported it. We required a bid. We passed a law that said this will be bid. There are 

only two bidders in the world. So, if you doctor a bid that favors 

only one configured aircraft over another and don’t consider the 

total value to the Country, then you’ve I think done something that 

frustrated, really, the intent of Congress. 

Secretary Donley, don’t you feel that in a procurement of this 

size that the Air Force should insist that the aircraft chosen not 

only just the cheapest price—that’s not the only thing—but also 

that we should consider the other capabilities that the Air Force 

has and that the RFP should be crafted in such a way that those 

extra capabilities are given legitimate weight in the evaluation? 

Mr. DONLEY. Senator, we’ve had this conversation and, with all 

due respect, I think we probably disagree on how to characterize 

the RFP. DOD has been very careful about how it structured this 

competition and how it structured the requirements and the acquisition strategy. We believe this is a fair approach, it’s balanced, 

and it has favored no one. 

Senator SESSIONS. So you believe that? 

Mr. DONLEY. The Deputy Secretary, Under Secretary Carter, and 

I have played this, DOD has played this, straight down the middle 

as best we possibly can, given all the pressures on both sides of 

these arguments. 

I would also like to remind the committee that in the context of 

the acquisition strategy, the capabilities of the aircraft are evaluated in the wartime model, in the peacetime fuel burn, and in the 

needed military construction (MILCON). So we have multiple evaluations of the aircraft involved in the evaluation upfront. That is 

part of our work. 

We’ve been very careful to identify what we need to go to war 

on day 1. 

Senator SESSIONS. So you would disagree with the paper’s reporting? 

Mr. DONLEY. Air Mobility Command has been scrupulous in the 

way this has been put together. 

Senator SESSIONS. The article says the evaluation process will 

credit those extras only if the two bids are within 1 percent of each 

other. 

Mr. DONLEY. Sir, I understand that there are extra capabilities 

beyond the 1 percent gate. But before the 1 percent gate, the costs 

and benefits of smaller airplanes and larger airplanes are measured in the warfighting model, in the peacetime operating model, 

and in the MILCON costs. So the advantages of one plane over another in that evaluation is undertaken before you get to the 1 percent gate. 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you. My time is up. I don’t agree. This 

is not going to go away, and I just feel it’s just so sad that we’re 

in this. I think anybody in DOD or the Air Force who have talked 

to me about this bid process will know I never asked for any special advantage. I simply said you should craft a process to select 

480 

the best value, not just the more expensive or cheaper aircraft, but 

the best value for the Air Force. 

I think there was a dramatic change in this bid process after you 

took office than there was previously, and I think it’s resulted in 

a troubling situation. That’s just my assessment. I have to say it. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Sessions. 

Senator Bill Nelson. 

Senator BILL NELSON. The wisest man in the world, King Solomon, faced the problem of who a baby’s parent was between two 

women that said the baby was theirs. King Solomon solved the 

problem by saying: ‘‘Well then, we’ll just cut the baby in half and 

give a half to each.’’ Then, of course, the real mother of the two 

said: ‘‘No, no, your majesty; please give the baby to her.’’ King Solomon then knew whose baby it was. 

Maybe the rumors are true out there that you’re going to give 

this tanker aircraft contract to both contractors, and that’s percolating. So I’d be interested to find out where the truth is here. 

I want to ask you for the record, because I have such a little bit 

of time, and if you’ll just get back to me for the record, on space 

infrastructure. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

The Air Force is implementing the Launch Enterprise Transformation to support 

increasing launch demand. Ongoing range modernization and sustainment efforts 

are improving range reliability, availability, and maintainability. These efforts are 

enabling the Air Force to divest excess range infrastructure in favor of optimally 

sited, more reliable, and sustainable assets. Additionally, the Air Force is 

transitioning to greater use of on-board systems for tracking and command functions essential to range safety. In the near term, the Air Force is moving from primary reliance on radar tracking to a combination of on-board Global Positioning 

System (GPS) and inertial guidance tracking. Over the longer term, the ranges will 

transition from ground-based safety processes and systems to on-board autonomous 

flight safety systems. The decreased reliance on ground-based infrastructure increases range agility and enables the ranges to better satisfy the demands of changing launch schedules. 

In addition to these efforts, the Air Force is pursuing several initiatives to achieve 

greater launch flexibility. These include improving the launch manifesting process 

to maximize launch slots, optimizing launch vehicle throughput, and investigating 

the feasibility of launching GPS satellites from the west coast. 

The Commander, Air Force Space Command (AFSPC/CC) and the Director, National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) chartered a Tiger Team to recommend a revised 

way ahead for the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) program. Among the 

items the Tiger Team is evaluating are a more flexible and transparent contract 

structure, and multi-vehicle procurement to include an fiscal year 2011 pathfinder 

‘‘Block Buy’’ of launch services with the NRO and the National Aeronautics and 

Space Administration. The Tiger Team is also looking at various pre-planned product improvement and sustainment options for EELV. 

The team is also reviewing a more flexible manifesting process. This ‘‘Whitetail’’ 

concept would manifest and start the manufacturing of an EELV that could launch 

any of several different spacecraft. Specific spacecraft assignment would occur later, 

thereby using finite launch opportunities more efficiently. This concept was utilized 

in the most recent Current Launch Schedule Review Board. As a result, some of the 

EELV’s manifested for launch in the next year have multiple spacecraft assigned 

for the same launch date. This provides flexibility in the event a specific spacecraft 

slips from its assigned launch date, then another spacecraft has the opportunity to 

launch. 

The results of the Tiger Team efforts will provide the basis for the fiscal year 

2010 congressional reports required for both EELV sustainment and multi-vehicle 

procurement. The estimated completion date for a new acquisition strategy is on or 

about June 1, 2010. 

481 

Senator BILL NELSON. Our Air Force range system is not as flexible as it needs to be to ensure the growing number of launches that 

are required. I want you to respond to us in writing, what are your 

thoughts to upgrade the ranges and to support more flexible approaches to space launch? What are you looking at with regard to 

the buying of launch vehicles, and the fact that 80 percent of communications for the military now go on commercial satellites. What 

is the right mix, and is the Air Force discussing any future plans 

to increase military satellite communications capacity beyond the 

current generation of Wideband Global Satellite and Advanced Extremely High Frequency satellites? 

Next is the issue of space situational awareness. What are the 

ramifications for ensuring space situational awareness if your increased request in your budget is not appropriated? 

[The information referred to follows:] 

Ensuring our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines have reliable, consistent access to communications is critical to successful military operations. The fielding of 

Wideband Global Satellite and the upcoming launch of Advanced Extremely High 

Frequency greatly improves access to Satellite Communications (SATCOM). However, these constellations cannot by themselves satisfy 100 percent of demand and 

commercial SATCOM will continue to provide needed service to the warfighter. The 

Air Force and the Department of Defense are reassessing SATCOM requirements 

and the Military Satellite Communications (MILSATCOM) architecture, to include 

an analysis of the balance of commercial and military SATCOM. 

The increased funds proposed in the fiscal year 2011 President’s budget would 

keep the development of new SSA capabilities, specifically Space Fence, Space 

Based Space Surveillance (SBSS) Follow On, and SSA Environmental Monitoring 

(SSAEM) on schedule to replace the existing aging Space Surveillance Network infrastructure, and to maintain continuity of SSA services. Failure to fund these efforts will slip the delivery of these new capabilities and result in: (1) risk of a loss 

of near earth small object detection (Space Fence); (2) loss of Deep Space monitoring 

and tracking (SBSS) upon end of life of SBSS Block 10, and (3) loss of key environmental capabilities (SSAEM) that affect all space services to the warfighter. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Then, I have questions about operationally 

responsive space. What are your thoughts on increasing support to 

that? 

[The information referred to follows:] 

The fiscal year 2011 President’s budget request of $94 million for ORS continues 

to fund the enablers needed to build an ability to rapidly reconstitute, augment, and 

surge space capabilities. We believe this level of funding supports the enabling capabilities. We continue to closely monitor the ORS–1 satellite development and are 

prepared to address execution issues should they arise. 

Senator BILL NELSON. I would just add my comments on 

JSTARS, and I’d like to be kept in the loop, that, given the importance of this asset to the current fight, I’d like to have a timeline 

for a decision on the ground moving target indicator requirement, 

and on the re-engining. So if you’d put me in that information loop. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

Ground Moving Target Indicator (GMTI) requirements will be evaluated as part 

of the Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) Mission Area 

Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) which was formally initiated on March 16, 2010. The 

AoA will determine what GMTI sensors and platforms are best suited to address 

the Department of Defense’s current capability gaps. Results from this effort are expected to be available in March 2011 to support the Air Force’s fiscal year 2013 

budget preparation. 

In parallel, the JSTARS program office is taking steps to address recommendations of the Air Force Fleet Viability Board (FVB) with regard to E–8C structural 

condition. The Air Force has recently placed Boeing on contract to determine the 

service life of the underlying 707–300 structure on which the E–8Cs were built; preVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:37 May 06, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00487 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\62155.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
482 

1The committee notes the difference would be 207 personnel. 

liminary results of this effort are expected to be available in September 2010. Additional FVB remediation activity such as documentation review and a vertical stabilizer teardown will continue through early 2012. 

Development activity is ongoing for the JSTARS re-engining program. The first 

two production shipsets are expected to be available in July 2012, at which time 

they will be installed on E–8C aircraft to support operational testing. Problems, 

however, have been identified with the new engine’s bleed air design. The bleed air 

redesign is expected to be complete by July 2012. If the bleed air redesign is not 

complete in time for the engine delivery then a post delivery retrofit will be necessary. The fiscal year 2011 President’s budget requests funding for two additional 

shipsets for purchase in 2011—these would be available for install in early fiscal 

year 2014. 

If the results of the AoA and E–8C structural analysis indicate that the JSTARS 

should be modernized, the Air Force will have the opportunity to include additional 

E–8C engine production in the fiscal year 2013 President’s budget. Execution of 

such funding would be contingent on a successful operational test in March 2012. 

If, based on the AoA and structural analysis, the DOD decides to replace the 

JSTARS with a different GMTI capability, the Air Force would continue to sustain 

the E–8C while that replacement is designed, produced, and fielded. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Now, the remaining time that I have, I 

just want to say that last night I got a disturbing phone call about 

the Air Force’s proposal to shut down 48 F–15s at Tyndall Air 

Force Base and that the job loss is not 594 personnel as originally 

expected. Last night, I found out it’s 801 personnel. I’ve been told 

the change is due to factors that were unaccounted for during your 

June 2009 study. But there’s been no change in the number of departing aircraft. 

This is 15 percent of the total workforce at Tyndall Air Force 

Base that’s going to be gone under your present plans. I would say 

that this hasn’t been particularly well managed, particularly in 

light that there’s not a follow-on mission there. We had been advocating to get F–35s to replace those F–15s, and now you’ve already 

testified that the F–35s are going to be considerably delayed. 

You know the excellent base that we have. You put the F–22s 

there for pilot training because of the huge Gulf Training and Testing Range that we have, which by the way I will continue to protect; in spite of the Air Force and the Navy’s efforts, I will continue 

to protect so that you don’t have the invasions there so that you 

can’t test, train, and drop live ordnance. 

I would appreciate very much if you would check out this followon mission for Tyndall Air Force Base. 

Do you have any comments? 

General SCHWARTZ. Senator Nelson, just a bit of background on 

the 594 to 801 increase in personnel cuts. There were a couple of 

factors involved in this, but the largest one was an expectation that 

we would in-source the F–22 back shop maintenance. In other 

words, it’s currently done by contract, and the expectation was we 

would migrate that into blue suits, which would help maintain blue 

suit manpower at Tyndall. 

For a number of reasons, we’re not prepared to do that. We may 

well do it in the future, but it’s not the right time. That is the largest component of the reason for the 174, I guess, increase in the 

numbers, from 594 to 801.1

I did share this in person yesterday with another member of the 

Florida delegation. Please forgive me for not getting to you in time. 

483 

2General Schwartz intended to refer to Tyndall Air Force Base, as indicated by the later remarks. 

Tyndall is a very important place. The F–22 would not be there 

if it were not. As you suggested, the range availability there is precious. 

We have not made decisions on training space. It is true, the recent restructure of F–35, has pushed a little bit to the right decisions about where we would bed down the second training location. 

The first one is—— 

Senator BILL NELSON. At Eglin. 

General SCHWARTZ.—at Eglin, and it’s 59 aircraft. The environmental impact statement is underway as we speak. 

It is clear to me that there’s capacity at Eglin 2 and we as an Air 

Force need to make prudential use of that capacity. We just haven’t 

gotten to the point where we’ve decided exactly what that is. But 

it’s well understood. 

Senator BILL NELSON. You said ‘‘Eglin,’’ but you meant ‘‘Tyndall.’’ It’s clear to you that there is capability at Tyndall. 

General SCHWARTZ. Tyndall. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Right. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Nelson. 

Senator Thune. 

Senator THUNE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Secretary, General, thank you very much for your service in 

performing very difficult jobs. We keep making more and more demands and resources get more and more constrained all the time. 

I think the discussion this morning is a good example of that. 

General Schwartz, I wanted to ask you about, among other 

things, you placed the B–1 bomber high velocity maintenance funding as number one on your unfunded priority list. I understand 

that a part of that, the B–1 portion of this item, is around $25 million. Can you explain your rationale as to why this important 

maintenance for the B–1 wasn’t funded in the base budget? 

General SCHWARTZ. Sir, the background on high velocity maintenance is, the basic principle comes from the commercial sector, 

where you take airplanes into depot-level maintenance more frequently, in this case maybe every 18 months as opposed to every 

4 or 5 years, and the net result of that is you have much less discovery; when you have airplanes come in after long intervals, then 

you discover things that are wrong that you didn’t know about, 

such as with the structure and so on and so forth. 

The principle in the commercial sector demonstrates that looking 

at airplanes more frequently at the depot level can save you 

money. It is an appropriate initiative. But the bottom line was we 

were pressed. Just as in a case in point, we deferred in our budget, 

trying to make balance all the demands, 109 depot visits of aircraft 

and 163 engine overhauls. That unfunded priority request helped 

bring some of those overhauls back, including the high velocity 

maintenance on the B–1s. 

I mean, think about this, Senator Thune. We’re asking for additional dollars for sustainment, not for a platform, not for something 

you would expect, but to maintain our machines and to make sure 

484 

that we maintain readiness. But the bottom line is we have pressures, we made choices, and the number one unfunded priority is 

sustainment. 

Senator THUNE. How many B–1s do you think would be impacted 

by that requested funding? 

General SCHWARTZ. We have 66, sir, and ultimately it would be 

all of them. 

Senator THUNE. General, the integration of the Sniper Advanced 

Targeting Pod into the B–1 bomber, and other Air Force aircraft, 

has contributed greatly to effective close air support in Afghanistan. However, there seems to be a lack of these advanced targeting pods for training because they’re in such high demand in 

theater. Crews then are using these advanced targeting pods overseas in combat. However, they’re having a limited ability to train 

on them here at home. 

Does the Air Force have a need for additional advanced targeting 

pods for training use? 

General SCHWARTZ. Sir, you make a good point. The program of 

record which is funded is to grow to 375 sniper pods in the Air 

Force. We’ve had 241 delivered thus far. When we get to the full 

program, we will be able to dedicate the pods to specific tail numbers. But until we get there, typically what we are doing, it is true, 

is bringing the pod to the unit that will be deploying 3 to 4 months 

in advance of their deployment, so they can refine their skills and 

such with respect to the precision targeting. 

Again, this is a matter of a temporal issue. This is not a funding 

issue. We will get well as the additional pods are delivered. 

Senator THUNE. Due to General McChrystal’s directive restricting close air support operations, my understanding is that B–1 

crews are frequently being used,instead of for their sniper pod capability, to provide ISR to ground troops without resorting to any 

sort of kinetic strike. Do you have any idea or notion of how frequently air crews are being utilized by ground troops in Afghanistan simply for ISR purposes? 

General SCHWARTZ. Frequently, sir, I don’t think that we should 

find that to be a problem. If the aircraft are airborne and they do 

not have a valid target to engage, to support our folks on the 

ground with the view from above and be able to provide that view 

via datalink to folks with Rover terminals on the ground, is exactly 

what we should be doing. 

I can understand why folks would ask this; they know their primary mission is delivering iron on target. If it’s not needed during 

that sortie, certainly we should make the best possible use of the 

capability of the airplane, including the sniper pod. 

Senator THUNE. General Schwartz—and Secretary Donley, I direct this to you as well—with regard to the Future Years Defense 

Program force structure set out in the new QDR for the Air Force, 

there is a proposal for 5 long-range strike wings with up to 96 primary mission aircraft. According to the latest Air Force Almanac, 

the Air Force currently has 153 bomber aircraft. 

Now, when I posed a question about the substantial cut to the 

bomber force to Admiral Mullen a few weeks ago, he said there is 

currently consideration for a reduction in the number of overall 

bombers in relation to the START follow-on treaty. That’s cause for 

485 

concern in my view because I have long expressed the fear that it 

would be proposed by the administration in effect as a way to negotiate the bomber leg of the nuclear triad away. 

Are these not substantial cuts to the bomber force as are being 

envisioned by the QDR? 

General SCHWARTZ. Sir, there actually are 162 bomber platforms, 

B–1 and B–52 and B–2. The 96 are what we call combat-coded aircraft. So you have training aircraft, you have attrition Reserve. It’s 

a complicated formula. In reality, 96 translates to the current fleet 

of 162. 

But with respect to potential changes in mission, I do not foresee 

a reduction in B–52 force structure if there is an adjustment to nuclear tasking. As you are well aware, the B–1 is not a nucleartasked platform; the B–52 is. If there is a requirement for fewer 

B–52s on the nuclear side, we will still require their capability on 

the conventional side. They simply will no longer be dual tasked. 

Senator THUNE. Do you think that the cuts to delivery vehicles 

contemplated in the START Treaty, though, in those negotiations, 

are likely to come primarily out of the bomber force? 

General SCHWARTZ. Sir, I don’t think that’ll be the case. I do not. 

Senator THUNE. I think my time is up, Mr. Chairman. But if I 

have one quick question, can I ask? 

Chairman LEVIN. All right, yes. 

Senator THUNE. General Cartwright indicated—and this is 

quick—that we run the risk of making the triad a diad if we go 

below 800 delivery vehicles in the follow-on START. Do you share 

that concern? 

General SCHWARTZ. The issue for the Air Force, sir, is what I 

would call critical mass, both on the bomber side and the missile 

side. This has less to do with being able to meet targeting requirements than it does to be able to maintain the talent pool, the expertise in the nuclear enterprise that we need. If you get too small, 

you don’t have enough people to fill the enterprise with the kind 

of talent you need. 

So for me, there is a minimum size that really is driven by 

human capital concerns, less than sort of traditional sort of targeting concerns. 

Senator THUNE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Thune. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Senator Nelson, I’m going to have to leave 

for a few minutes. If I’m not back, I’d appreciate your calling on 

the next person. Thank you. 

Senator BEN NELSON [presiding]. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Will 

do. 

Gentlemen, I appreciate your service and the men and women in 

uniform and civilians that do such a great job on behalf of the 

American people through the Air Force and through your leadership. 

The 55th Wing at Offutt Air Force Base in Nebraska operates a 

fleet of uniquely equipped RC–135 aircraft. Of course, they’re individually equipped with unique combinations of ISR collections systems. Up to now, these collection capabilities are not fully supported by unmanned aircraft systems (UAS). 

486 

In the budget request in fiscal year 2011, the request includes 

$2.2 billion for UASs and supports an increase in combat air patrols from 37 to 65 by 2013. Obviously, the primary focus of this 

expansion is via ISR, and it’s been on UASs. My question is: As the 

Air Force budgets to meet these mission requirements and begins 

divesting itself of older airframes to pay for new technologies and 

programs, how do you see the technology of remotely piloted platforms affecting platforms like the RC–135? Perhaps, General 

Schwartz, you’d like to respond to that first. 

General SCHWARTZ. Sir, I would say that is not an immediate 

concern. The issue for us right now really is the high-altitude transition between the U–2 and the Global Hawk, and getting the Global Hawk, particularly the so-called Block 40 Global Hawk, which 

has a radar sensor—the Block 30 is the more signals intelligencebased platform—getting those fielded. That is the real issue that 

we are dealing with. 

I do not foresee remotely piloted aircraft beginning to supplant 

the large fixed-wing capability that particularly resides in the RC– 

135 in the near term. 

Senator BEN NELSON. What efforts are underway in fiscal year 

2011 to modernize the RC–135 to obviously keep it at the highest 

level of performance? 

General SCHWARTZ. Sir, I’d like to take that question and give 

you a detailed answer for the record, if that’s okay. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Yes, I don’t want to use all my time on 

that. 

General SCHWARTZ. This airplane continues to improve. Certainly the sensor capability on the machine improves. We have initiatives there to deal with new signals, new modes of collection, 

and what have you, as well as the airframe, re-engining, and such, 

that you’re aware. But I’ll get you a detailed answer on that. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

Fiscal year 2011 will see the continued development and upgrade of the RC–135. 

These upgrades ensure the RC–135 remains operationally viable and tactically relevant in its ability to collect, process, analyze, and disseminate evolving and emerging adversarial threats—specifically the collection of advanced digital low-power systems used by terrorists and insurgents worldwide. These programmed upgrades will 

enable the RC–135 to continue to rapidly and reliably respond to national Intelligence Community taskings, as well as the time-sensitive threat warning and force 

protection requirements of commanders in the field. 

Fiscal year 2011 modernization efforts will be the start of the largest technology 

refreshment ever introduced in a single RC–135 baseline upgrade and will include 

the following: 

1. CORVUS: Replaces the Automatic ELINT Emitter Locator System (AEELS) 

which has been on-board the RC–135 since 1991. Due to diminishing vendor 

inventories, the AEELS is at a critical juncture and must be replaced or 

faces potential mission failure in the near future. CORVUS significantly improves the probability to intercept signals from integrated air defense systems, surface-to-air missile systems, and advanced adversary fighter aircraft. 

2. Digital Multi-threaded Collection Architecture (DMCA): Fields a common 

digital hardware and software architecture for all core communications exploitation applications to include searching, copying, and geo-locating highpriority targets of interest. 

3. Wideband Global Satellite (WGS): Accomplishes initial engineering test and 

hardware integration for WGS receiver equipment on-board the RC–135. 

WGS will provide the bandwidth needed for nearly all near-term distributed 

operations capabilities. Currently the single greatest barrier to enhanced 

487 

enterprise integration for the RC–135 is lack of data link connectivity bandwidth. WGS will fix this shortcoming. 

4. Ship-wide Interphone: Full replacement of cockpit and reconnaissance compartment interphone, voice radio access, and recon audio access/control 

functions for communications; allows timely support to national and theater 

intelligence consumers. 

5. External Communications Suite Upgrade: Deploys new NSA software (Radiant Mercury), providing a data guard that allows multi-level secure communications. Ensures tactical data links are segregated without compromising 

the integrity and security of any network (collateral links from SCI networks). Fields an upgraded suite of digital line-of-sight and SATCOM radios 

compatible with current and programmed strategic and tactical secure communications networks. 

6. General Technology Refreshment: Re-hosts 51 of 54 computer processors, 

ensuring state-of-the-art capability to keep pace with ever-changing enemy 

technologies; purchases new digital recorders to archive collected data for 

real-time and post-mission analysis and reporting; purchases new Local 

Area Network (LAN) switch mainframes; and replaces legacy communication receivers with state-of-the-art digital tuners. 

7. Signal Search Research and Development (Special Signals): Upgrades legacy 

equipment, ensuring continued collection capability against advanced, digital, high-capacity special signals of interest. This upgrade purchases enhanced recording functions and upgrades existing analysis systems. This 

upgrade ensures the RC–135 continues to have one of the most technologically advanced mobile signals search and analysis capability of all fielded ISR platforms. 

8. Maintenance Upgrades: Equipment replaces aging maintenance equipment, 

including new cooling systems for multiple computer processors, allowing 

sustained system reliability. 

9. Enhanced Network Centric Collaborative Targeting (NCCT): Capability provides highly precise fused national/tactical geo-location to theater and battlefield commanders. 

10. Expanded Aircrew Capability Extension System Applications: Supports distributed operations with ground collection and processing; net-centric enabler 

integrates the RC–135 into national intelligence processing, analysis, and reporting systems; supports in-garrison linguist training and expanded combat 

proficiency. 

Senator BEN NELSON. That would be helpful. 

In that connection, I understand that there is no effort underway 

right now to grow the end strength. But as we bring in new missions, new technology, and retain existing technology and existing 

systems, there’s going to be pressure on personnel and the human 

capital will obviously be affected by that. Are you planning training 

differences or is there a reduction in force required for certain systems over other systems? 

General SCHWARTZ. Sir, let me give you a quick example and perhaps the Secretary will want to amplify. Right now we have put 

more than 4,000 people, airmen, into the ISR mission. That is, as 

the Secretary suggested earlier, both operators and maintainers 

and a very substantial number of intel folks to process the data 

take. We cannot sustain that indefinitely. We can’t go from 50 to 

65 percent and keep doing it just the same way. 

What that suggests is technology has to help us. For example, at 

the moment we have one pilot and one sensor operator, fly one 

platform with one sensor on it, looking at one spot on the ground. 

So it’s a one to one to one to one relationship. What we need to 

be able to do is get to the point where one operator can operate 

multiple aircraft, maybe as many as four, perhaps more, and gain 

efficiencies there. 

Likewise, we need on the processing side to use the kind of software that we know is available, that you and I saw when we were 

488 

watching the Olympic Games or when we watch football on Sundays. We need to have automation in the process of watching video, 

picking out the relevant pieces of video and so on. That will reduce 

the manpower demand. 

Part of this is right now doing what we have to do. This is not 

the way that this needs to be structured indefinitely. 

Senator BEN NELSON. I appreciate that. 

Mr. DONLEY. Just to amplify on the personnel side, I think our 

Air Force has a very strong reputation for the relationship that we 

have between the Active, the Guard, and Reserve components, a 

very close lashup among the Reserve components with the ActiveDuty component. We’ve applied that in many different mission 

areas. 

One of the initiatives I put out this year, and we hope to get 

some results on further along in the calendar year, is taking those 

success stories at individual locations and establishing for the Air 

Force as an institution a little bit better business case analysis, a 

little bit better model for the cost effectiveness of our total force initiatives across all components, especially in some areas where we 

have many airmen involved but who do not always deploy abroad. 

There may be a slice of the force that requires deployment forward 

at any given time, but in many ways CONUS-based operations or 

static operations, if you will, even though they’re in support of the 

combatant commanders, need us to find out whether or not we can 

get better, cost-effective combinations of our Active, Guard, and Reserve personnel, and our civilian workforce as well. 

We’re looking for better cost-effective models in that broad area 

going forward. 

Senator BEN NELSON. There’s one other question. My time’s out. 

I’d like you to respond back in writing on this. I noticed in the Air 

Force’s unfunded requirements under MILCON an entry item of 

$57.1 million to address Guard and Reserve vehicle replacement 

and equipment. I know the Army in its posture hearing last week 

expressed some concerns about being able to deal with the 

MILCON requirements for the Guard and Reserve. Perhaps you 

can outline to me whether or not the Air National Guard (ANG) 

is suffering from the same facility requirements and shortfalls as 

well. Obviously, as we use the Air Force and the Guard as Operational Reserves, their MILCON requirements are going to be increasing over a period of time. 

I thank both of you for your time. Did you have a response to 

that? 

Mr. DONLEY. Sir, we can give you a more specific response for 

the record, but we have been taking increased risk in our infrastructure. Tactical and administrative vehicles is an area that also 

gets typically less attention and is an area where we take risks. 

These are things that affect all of our force. But we’ll get you a 

more specific answer on the Guard. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

In our fiscal year 2011 budget request, we had to make a number of difficult 

choices, including continued risk in some of our infrastructure accounts. However, 

we believe that these risks are necessary, given numerous other priorities that we 

face in this time of conflict; and, we have ensured that our budget request remains 

aligned to our fundamental priorities. Therefore, the Air Force is placing its most 

urgent military construction projects in the Future Year’s Defense Program (FYDP) 

489 

and we are working to ensure that all critical requirements are met. We will reexamine the requirements for both Active and Reserve components during the fiscal 

years 2012 to 2017 FYDP development. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Thank you. Thanks, both of you. 

Senator Udall. 

Senator UDALL. Thank you Mr. Chairman. 

Welcome, gentlemen. General Schwartz, your comments about 

the Olympics and the technology there made me think about our 

Olympic team, almost another form of an Air Force, Olympic Air 

Force, though a lot of them operating without chutes and nets. 

What a great result we had in Vancouver. 

I was at another hearing in the Energy and Natural Resources 

Committee, and I missed the exchange on ‘‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell.’’ 

I understand it was healthy and frank, and I want to compliment 

everybody involved in this important discussion for being forthcoming with their point of view. 

I remain a stalwart supporter of the Lieberman-Levin legislation. 

I have no doubt, given the exemplary fashion in which human resources operate in the military, that once we decide how to implement this change, that the military will do it in a way that makes 

us proud. Thanks to both of you for being clear with your points 

of view. 

If I might, let me turn to the legacy aircraft retirement situation. 

You’ve announced plans to retire legacy aircraft in order to, as I 

understand, fund a smaller, more capable force and redistribute 

those personnel to higher priority missions. The plan raised some 

questions here, and I’d like to ask you in that context if you have 

a plan to recapitalize the ANG units, which are performing air sovereignty alert missions and whether there are concerns you have 

about potential gaps in the homeland defense systems? 

General SCHWARTZ. Sir, we certainly do have a tight coupling, as 

the Secretary suggested, with the ANG. With respect to the air sovereignty alert, there are 18 locations, 2 of which are Active Duty, 

16 are covered by the ANG. Of those, we have two of which are 

soon to be F–22 locations. You have, if I recall correctly, six are F– 

16, and the remainder are F–15 covered. 

The bottom line is that that mission will not diminish in coverage as a result of the reductions that we’ve recommended, and 

that we will make sure that the air sovereignty mission and the 

North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD)-U.S. 

Northern Command (NORTHCOM) requirements are satisfied 

through either reallocation of assets if we have to or service life extension if that’s required. Clearly, some of that coverage will be 

performed by F–35s in due course. 

Senator UDALL. I think it wouldn’t surprise you and the Secretary to know that the Guard, whether it’s the ANG or the Army 

Guard, are always keen to take advantage of equipment that may 

be available. They make the most with equipment that often has 

been used. 

General SCHWARTZ. I think and I do believe that our Guard and 

our Reserve are models for complete integration within the larger 

total force context of our Air Force, and I certainly would expect 

that as we get additional equipment and personnel and modernize, 

I would say both in terms of the tankers and in terms of the fightVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:37 May 06, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00495 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\62155.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
490 

ers, you will see an appropriate contribution from the Guard and 

the Reserve in both those mission areas. 

Senator UDALL. Good luck in that regard. By the way, I think 

Boeing and Northrop are both great companies. 

Let me move to the space posture review. Senator McCain mentioned we required in the National Defense Authorization Act for 

Fiscal Year 2009 a report by December 1 last year. I understand 

it won’t be completed until the summer. Can you tell us anything 

about what’s in the works that’s been performed so far, the QDR 

process, and how that might have affected modernization and investment plans for security space systems? Mr. Secretary, do you 

care to comment, or General Schwartz? 

Mr. DONLEY. I wouldn’t want to preempt the policy discussions 

that are underway, but I’ll just highlight that they do reflect 

themes that are familiar to this committee and to prior year testimony from the Air Force, and from Air Force Space Command in 

particular, about the importance of this domain to our national security establishment. We need to set the right balance between 

U.S. and partner capabilities as we think about those aspects of 

our major mission areas like missile warning, satellite communications systems, weather, intelligence and surveillance, all these are 

mission areas within the space domain, and what kind of capabilities we need as a military going forward. We also must find the 

right balance between those that we need to own and those that 

we can buy or lease from others, how to set up more effective partnerships with our international partners, and our commercial partners going forward. 

These are roughly the themes that you will see. Space is more 

crowded than it was 20 or 30 years ago, more congested and more 

contested. The importance of space situational awareness as a 

foundation for our work going forward I think is very important. 

We need to have the capabilities in place that help us understand 

what is happening in that domain with full knowledge of all the 

actors and capabilities that are operating in that domain and to be 

able to attribute actions in that domain that could potentially impact U.S. capabilities. 

Senator UDALL. I look forward to the report, obviously. 

Let me, in the remaining time I have move to cyberspace. We 

have the 24th stood up at Peterson Air Force Base. We’re honored 

to be able to host the 24th and Peterson in general. Can you give 

us a little bit of an update on the 24th and the cyberspace mission 

in general? 

General SCHWARTZ. Just to clarify that, of course, Air Force 

Space Command at Peterson is the senior headquarters to the 

24th. Actually, the 24th is based in San Antonio, sir. 

Senator UDALL. I thank you for that clarification. I didn’t want 

to suggest to my friends from Texas that the 24th is in Colorado. 

General SCHWARTZ. I understand. 

I think the key thing about 24th is that it is the focus for our 

efforts in cyberspace. There are two major components of that. One 

is defending the net, defending our networks, because they are not 

just administrative entities; they are command and control, they’re 

involved in command, control, operations, and so on. Defending the 

491 

net is a major obligation and they have infrastructure and people 

in the command relationship to execute that mission. 

In addition, there is the question of what I would refer to as the 

offensive use of cyber. That is, use of cyber in ways that would support other aspects of the Air Force mission. For example, if you are 

trying to neutralize an integrated air defense system, you can do 

that with kinetic weapons or perhaps, perhaps, you could do it with 

some cyber capabilities. 

So the 24th is focused on that part, not more broadly, but to 

those kinds of capabilities that would enable other Air Force missions. That’s the basic theme for 24th. They’re growing. They will 

have the talent of our Air Force with respect to all things cyber, 

and it will also be the Air Force component command, for the subunified Cyber Command (CYBERCOM) when it’s established. 

Senator UDALL. Thank you, General. 

One final comment. My time has expired. There’s an interesting 

analogue here between the conversation we’re having about offensive activity in space and offensive activity in cyberspace. I think 

there are probably lessons that we can learn and discussions that 

will parallel each other as we grapple with those tough, but very 

serious, questions. 

Thanks again, gentlemen, for being here. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Udall. 

Senator Hagan. 

Senator HAGAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, thank you so much for 

your service and for your testimony today. The Air Force contributes so much to today’s irregular warfare environment in substantial ways, and our airmen do an excellent job in providing situational awareness and air-ground integration on the battlefield. 

I also want to emphasize the contributions of our Air Force Special Operations combat controllers who conduct combat search and 

rescue operations, set up air assault zones, and manage the air 

space. 

Lastly, I want to thank you for the Air Force contributions to the 

efforts in Haiti. I understand there were 600 airmen supporting 

over 120 flights a day and handling at least 12 million pounds of 

relief supplies and emergency response equipment. The 21st Special Tactics Squadron from the Pope Air Force Base did a fantastic 

job in managing the air space and ensuring the flow of supplies. 

I thank you for that. 

Secretary Donley, I wanted to follow up a little bit, too, on the 

cyber security issue. You mentioned that the Air Force is investing 

additional personnel in cyber security. I understand Senator Udall 

might have just asked some of the questions concerning cyber security, but how is the Air Force consolidating efforts to protect our 

computer networks and how is the Air Force Space Command 

going to work with the newly created Cyber Security Command? 

Mr. DONLEY. Well, as the Chief mentioned a few moments ago, 

the 24th Air Force standup in San Antonio is the focus, and has 

been the focus, of our effort of consolidating our network operations 

and network defensive capabilities. 24th Air Force reports to Air 

Force Space Command and 24th Air Force will be the Air Force 

492 

component to the CYBERCOM which is being created at Fort 

Meade. So that’s the institutional and the operational relationship. 

Space Command has done a tremendous job in overseeing the 

standup of 24th Air Force in the last year, and especially in the 

development and consolidation of career fields for this important 

area, so that we are well positioned with the right kind of talent 

and the right kind of backgrounds. 

We’re anticipating that the future demand for how much and 

precisely what kinds of capabilities need to be developed will await 

the standup of CYBERCOM. We’ll get the demand signal from the 

joint community on that, probably later this year. We’re undertaking the actions that we can and should within our Air Force, 

but we think there’s more work to be done on the joint side, and 

we’ll probably get tasked more specifically later. 

General SCHWARTZ. Ma’am, if I can just elaborate on one point. 

You may wonder why we aligned the 24th with Air Force Space 

Command. The reason is because space and cyber, I would argue, 

are both fundamentally engineering disciplines. You have a command that is focused on space and cyber. There was a lot of synergy between the two, as Senator Udall suggested, and we think 

that that was the right institutional alignment, as the Secretary 

suggested. 

Senator HAGAN. What about the career development and finding 

the right people to go into this area? Can you explain a little bit 

further on that? 

General SCHWARTZ. Sure. There are two aspects to this. One is 

creating organic capability, and so there are joint courses. The 

Navy runs a major course at Pensacola, for example. We also have 

courses at Keesler Air Force Base in Mississippi that will prepare 

our airmen with the skills in order to do this work. There’s advanced kinds of things which other agencies within DOD to help 

us train and maintain the readiness of our airmen. 

The other part of this, though, is recognizing that it is unlikely 

that DOD will ever be able to have all the cyber talent it needs and 

that actually, the predominance of that talent’s going to be in the 

private sector. One of the things we’re doing, which I think has lots 

of merit is, let’s say we have an ANG unit in the State of Washington and its purpose is cyber. It can access the talent pool in 

Everett or in Seattle with Microsoft and elsewhere or, in the case 

of California, in Silicon Valley, where we can have folks that every 

day do their work in the cyber business, but also serve in the ANG 

or the Reserve. We think that is a high payoff strategy. 

Senator HAGAN. Let me mention, too, that North Carolina has an 

excellent Research Triangle Park with a lot of talent that might be 

utilized also. 

One of the most important issues to me is ensuring family support programs across the services are appropriately resourced. Improving the quality of life for our airmen and their families is extremely important. How is the Air Force’s family support program 

keeping pace with our current operations and what are some of the 

latest initiatives with respect to family support? 

Mr. DONLEY. We have a number underway, Senator, and this is 

an extremely important area for our Air Force, especially given the 

pattern of deployments that we’ve experienced over the past sevVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:37 May 06, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00498 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\62155.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
493 

eral years. We have underway an Air Force Year of the Family 

that is completely reviewing the whole set of capabilities and programs that we have with respect to spousal support and education, 

with respect to housing, with respect to health, child care, et 

cetera. We have a full range of programs in place already. 

A couple that we have bumped up in importance over the last 

year or so involve greater focus on families with exceptional family 

members who need additional support as they move from installation to installation for their particular family member to meet 

those special needs of those family members. 

We’ve focused more attention on the key spouses program in our 

Air Force and the support network of spouses that support our airmen and their families when airmen are deployed forward. It’s an 

extremely important early warning network for us. It’s an extremely important reinforcing of the Air Force community at the 

local level. 

General SCHWARTZ. If I might add, ma’am, we’re also paying attention to schools. Schools are the coin of the realm to most families. So that is a very important aspect of making bases attractive, 

ensuring that schools there to support the education of the youngsters in the best possible way. 

Senator HAGAN. Secretary Donley, you mentioned about spouses 

and education. It has come to my attention that so many people 

have registered and taking advantage of that program there might 

have been a hold put on participation. Can you elaborate on that? 

Mr. DONLEY. We are familiar with this. This is a program administered at the DOD level which was so popular that it became overwhelmed, and so there was a need to take a pause and that is underway. But I know Dr. Stanley, Under Secretary of Defense for 

Personnel and Readiness, is working this very hard with the rest 

of the manpower community to determine the proper way forward 

there. 

Senator HAGAN. I think a lot of the people who were currently 

receiving tuition assistance had not been notified that a hold has 

been put on that, and I think that there’s a lot of consternation and 

a lot of upset spouses at the moment. 

Mr. DONLEY. We understand. 

Senator HAGAN. What’s the plan going forward? 

Mr. DONLEY. We don’t have that plan worked out just yet. The 

OSD folks are working on that with the rest of the manpower community. We can get back to you as soon as we have an answer from 

DOD. I have not heard in the last 48 hours the future plan for that 

particular program. 

Senator HAGAN. I would appreciate that, because there are a lot 

of spouses in North Carolina that are calling my office. Thank you. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

Last month, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) placed the My Career 

Advancement Account (MyCAA) spouse tuition assistance program on hold. As of 13 

March, MyCAA resumed operations for military spouses with currently existing accounts. These spouses are able to submit and receive approval for financial assistance. OSD is still developing long-term program options and expects to announce 

details soon. Until that time, no new accounts can be created. OSD/Military Community and Family Policy has advised the Air Force it is reviewing software applications, financial assistance documents, and the overall program, and that the short 

pause in the program will allow it to better assess the program and ensure it is 

494 

meeting the goal of providing spouses access to education and training for portable 

high-growth careers. 

Thank you. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Hagan. 

Senator Begich. 

Senator BEGICH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Secretary, thank you. General Schwartz, good to see you 

again. I consider you an Alaskan from many aspects. But thank 

you very much for being here today, and especially in your position. 

I didn’t think, back when you were in Alaska and I was on the city 

council and then later mayor, that we would probably visualize us 

both here across the table. It’s an amazing thing, but it’s good. 

Let me, if I can, just lay a little bit out, following up on Senator 

Udall’s and others in regards to the retiring of the F–15s. You’re 

very familiar, obviously, with this. For Elmendorf Air Force Base 

there are 24 aircraft that will be totally retired and literally go to 

the lower 48 States to another Guard unit or Guard units, however 

you determine that and deploy that. 

You understand the importance of the F–15 as part of the 19th 

Fighter Squadron. It’s dedicated solely for air sovereignty alert 

missions. That is run by NORAD in partnership with Canada. Putting that over here for a second, recognizing the retirement that’s 

occurring in regards to those, the F–15s, we also have the 36 F– 

22s, which we’re very proud of, in the two squads there. But the 

reality is, those are used on multiple missions. One squad seems 

to always be down in Guam, for some of the work that’s there, 

training, maintenance, and a variety of other requirements for the 

F–22s. 

How are we going to accomplish the mission that the F–15s have 

been so successful at and have been literally from Alaska’s perspective, and I think from the Nation’s perspective, a real shining 

bright star? How are we going to have that mission, knowing that 

the F–22s are already being in some cases maximized in their utilization, at least from our perspective, in the work that they do for 

Pacific Command as well as NORTHCOM? 

General SCHWARTZ. Sir, as I indicated earlier, this is both true 

in Alaska and Hawaii, and while there is a deployment requirement, and the F–15s actually had a deployment mission as well, 

over the last decade or two, since Operations Desert Shield/Desert 

Storm, there’s been a relatively modest need for air superiority 

kind of deployments. The bottom line is that both in Alaska and 

in Hawaii the F–22s will support the air sovereignty mission. 

With respect to whatever capacity is left, and it will be substantial, they will be available for deployment for other missions in 

support of other combatant commanders. But I have no doubt that 

those machines will support the air sovereignty requirement that’s 

specified by NORAD and NORTHCOM. 

Senator BEGICH. Can you walk me through the force restructuring? I know, and I can’t remember the exact timing, but the 

force restructuring, the capability gaps, and the whole report that’s 

due at some point. Can you give me an update? 

General SCHWARTZ. In fact, the report was, if I’m not mistaken— 

perhaps the staff can confirm—delivered yesterday. I read it one 

495 

last time on Sunday cover to cover, and at least in my view it 

makes a pretty compelling case. 

Senator BEGICH. I guess the thing I recognize, and you understand the uniqueness of what we have in Alaska, so I just want to 

underline my concern still because of the capacity and the amount 

of responsibility that our units have up there. I agree with Hawaii, 

too, but I want to underline my concern there. 

If I can move to maybe three other areas very quickly. First, and 

this is more of a comment, when Senator Bill Nelson was talking 

about launches and so forth, we would underline that Kodiak is a 

great investment that the military has made and we would encourage you to continue to look at that as an asset. I know some might 

think because of the cost, and question if it is the right location 

and so forth, but in a lot of cases it is. I would hope that you would 

consider the Kodiak Launch Complex as an important asset in how 

you utilize assets around the country for launches. 

We know they have done some incredible work and the military 

and the Federal Government have put an enormous investment in 

that. We would not want to see that become an idle investment 

when there’s a value for it, especially as we move into more and 

more space activity. 

I know you know this, and I always get to do this, my friend 

from Colorado, Senator Udall, I always get to do this when he’s out 

of the room. We have superior air space in our State. He’ll tell me 

later—the last time I said something about the mountains and he 

harassed me and I told him Colorado has hills; we have mountains. 

Chairman LEVIN. You realize, Senator, these proceedings are 

being recorded. 

Senator BEGICH. Absolutely, and my Alaskans will appreciate it. 

[Laughter.] 

But I know there is a lot of discussion ongoing about utilization 

of air space and making sure we have enough air space and uninterrupted air space. That is becoming a growing problem for every 

branch. So again, I know there’s a lot of work the Air Force has 

been focused on and looking at Alaska in some respect. I just want 

to continue to keep that point clearly on your radar screen. I know 

it is because you’re very familiar with the air space there. 

I don’t know if you have any comments you want to dare to dive 

into, knowing the chairman will probably add about his air space, 

too, and my colleague to the right will, too. 

General SCHWARTZ. Senator, clearly there are a couple of places 

in the country that are extraordinary in terms of the availability 

of air space. Alaska is one. Clearly, the Barry Goldwater Range in 

Arizona is another. The Nellis Range in Nevada, the Utah Testing 

and Training Range in Utah. There are others, but those are the 

major ones. 

I would just make the point that it is very important, it is a national imperative, that we manage this air space carefully. There 

are pressures from development to energy, numerous, numerous 

pressures. We have to be very, very careful about eroding those 

very precious places where we have, as you said, continuous, contiguous air space that allows us to train, that allows us to test in 

a controlled fashion, and again, underwrites the readiness of all the 

forces. 

496 

Senator BEGICH. Very good. Thank you. 

My time is up, and I’ll just leave you this for the record, if you 

could. You folks recently provided me some information on radars 

and the air defense mission for fiscal year 2010. In there, there’s 

about $31 million, give or take a few dollars of unfunded tasks for 

some of the projects, as well as contractor-required parts. Can you 

give me, again for the record, what the strategy is there to deal 

with that underfunding and long-term ability to make sure we continue to move ahead on the maintenance issues, which only get 

more expensive as time goes on. Delayed maintenance just means 

delayed costs, increase means increased costs. Please, if you could 

do that for the record. 

General SCHWARTZ. Just to clarify, sir. 

Senator BEGICH. Sure. 

General SCHWARTZ. You’re talking about long-range radar sites? 

Senator BEGICH. Yes. 

General SCHWARTZ. Yes, got it. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

Currently, the Air Force supports numerous long-range radars, including 15 FPS– 

117 radars in Alaska. These radars are a key component in the defense of our Nation and provide support to Operation Noble Eagle. To ensure they remain fully 

operational, the Air Force added $19.7 million in the fiscal year 2010 President’s 

budget for the replacement of long-range radar essential parts. The Air Force continued its commitment by including $34.9 million in the fiscal year 2011 President’s 

budget for the replacement of essential parts and an additional $12.75 million for 

the long-range radar service life extension program. 

Senator BEGICH. Great. Thank you very much. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Begich. 

Senator Burris. 

Senator BURRIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Last but not least, gentlemen. I don’t know if there will be another round, but I just want to extend my thanks for your service, 

Mr. Secretary and General Schwartz. Just one little comment, because I know I have several points here. Mr. Chairman, I certainly 

will submit my other questions for the record. 

Mr. Secretary, I want to commend you on your position with 

‘‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell.’’ I would just like to ask the General. You 

seem like a young man, much younger than I am. But General, in 

terms of the service, we did not have the best and brightest in the 

service prior to the integration and President Truman making his 

statement, making his executive order. Though we had separate 

services, you saw the Tuskegee Airmen, how they performed under 

very adverse conditions because they were committed to the service 

and to the survival of this great Country of ours. 

I also learned since I’ve been in the Senate, and I did not even 

know anything about it, but Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison from 

Texas spoke about the Women’s Air Force that came together, paid 

their own way to Texas, had to pay their way back home to train 

because we had so many men in the military that they couldn’t fly 

the missions and women flew the missions. There was also discrimination against women, discrimination against blacks. 

All the Services, General, have adjusted to this to get the best 

and the brightest. We’ve had an African-American Chairman of the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff. Now, under that program if we had started 

studying and waiting Colin Powell never would have made it, probVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:37 May 06, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00502 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\62155.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
497 

ably never would have made it, because of the delays in the understanding a need to integrate. 

So General, I just hope, in the interest of consideration, that you 

would think about this, that a person’s sexual orientation has absolutely nothing to do with his or her ability and commitment. 

They’re already lying to get in to serve this Country voluntarily, to 

defend this Country, and they have to lie to do it. I agree with the 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Admiral Mullen, who made the statement that—that’s where I got the statement from—that they lied. 

So just keep that in mind as you go through your thoughts, General, and consider the decision. 

General SCHWARTZ. I absolutely will, sir. 

Senator BURRIS. I appreciate that. 

Now, General, Scott Air Force Base is the home of three major 

commands, whose missions include providing strategic airlift and 

aerial medical operations in support of Iraq and Afghanistan. An 

increase in the missions and personnel on the base presents some 

challenges to providing base services down there. In your operations and maintenance request, what priorities did you have or 

did you give to the requirement for Scott Air Force Base in terms 

of the demands being placed on that facility? 

General SCHWARTZ. Certainly, Scott Air Force Base, being the 

headquarters for both our Air Mobility Command and the Joint 

Transportation Command, is a location that has at least an equal 

distribution of our support dollars relative to other installations. A 

case in point is there’s a new facility there at Scott which is absorbing one of the component commands of the Transportation Command, in this case the Army’s component command, that moved to 

Scott as a result of base closure. There’s a new facility, and there 

was a consolidation of Transportation Command elements from 

around the base, which were important. The opening, the grand 

opening, if you will, will occur in July of this year. 

Senator BURRIS. General, as I understand it, there are some construction projects that are underway, but there might be some 

delays. I just hope those are funded. I don’t know whether or not, 

Mr. Secretary, but there is a need for covering some expansion, for 

the growth of the facilities and land acquisition down there. I hope 

that that’s also covered in the 2011 budget. Is that correct? 

General SCHWARTZ. As the Secretary suggested, Senator Burris, 

we are tight on military construction. There’s no question about 

that. This is a case of first priority. We will offer for you the exact 

profile of what’s happening at Scott for the record, but I can assure 

you that with a unified command and an Air Force major command 

at that installation, they are getting at least equal treatment. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

Scott Air Force Base, IL 

[In millions of dollars] 

Fiscal Year 

2007 ADAL/TRANSCOM Consolidation (BRAC) ..................................................................................... 83.8 

2007 Addition To EOD Facility ............................................................................................................. 0.9 

2007 Contractor Logisitics Support Storage Facility .......................................................................... 4.4 

2007 Dormitory (120 Rm) .................................................................................................................... 20.0 

2007 Mobility AF(MAF) Logistics Support Cen(LSC), Phase II (BRAC) ............................................... 8.8 

498 

Scott Air Force Base, IL—Continued 

[In millions of dollars] 

Fiscal Year 

2007 Squadron Operations Facility ..................................................................................................... 10.2 

2008 Child Development Center .......................................................................................................... 8.2 

2008 Construct Pavements And Grounds Facility ............................................................................... 1.5

2008 Security Forces Operations ......................................................................................................... 16.7 

2009 USTRANSCOM Joint Intelligence Operations Center ................................................................... 14.0 

2010 Aeromedical Evacuation Faciuty ................................................................................................ 7.4 

Senator BURRIS. General, you mentioned something, because I 

was down at Scott and you talked about the school facilities, and 

we got a little bit more money for the impact that they would 

make. I was down there and saw what Scott Air Force Base is 

doing for the community of Mascoutah, IL, which is the closest 

school district to Scott Air Force Base. We actually dedicated or 

broke the ground for a new high school, and the colonel was there 

at the groundbreaking. The Scott Air Force Base personnel are 

very involved in the community, and that just really excited me, to 

see that type of support. 

General SCHWARTZ. I would just emphasize, sir, that this is an 

example of a cooperative effort. It may be the lasting thing that 

comes out of our Year of the Air Force Family, is to make our installations more inviting, more accommodating to families, to make 

them magnets for folks that want to live at a place where they can 

still leave their doors unlocked, where their kids can be safe. 

Senator BURRIS. I wish that would happen. Don’t come to Chicago. 

General SCHWARTZ. I understand. But where kids can play, you 

don’t have to fret, and you can get good education for your kids. 

We’re working hard on it. That will be, I think, one of our lasting 

accomplishments. 

Senator BURRIS. I grew up about 30 miles from Scott Air Force 

Base. My hometown is Centralia. So I am really glad to see that 

the Air Force is doing a lot for that facility. 

Did you want to say something, Mr. Secretary? 

Mr. DONLEY. Sir, I’d just like to follow up just very quickly, to 

reemphasize the point that you made and that Senator Hagan 

made about the Air Force support to operations in Haiti, and especially at Scott, the importance of the Tanker Airlift Control Center. 

It is playing a critical role right now in the surge and in helping 

Air Mobility Command and Transportation Command manage the 

tremendous pressure on the transportation system to deliver capabilities to theater. It’s a tremendous capability. 

As we put the operation together in Haiti, it played a key role, 

along with our 1st Air Force and our 12th Air Force as well. It was 

a tremendous team effort across the Active and Reserve components as well. So Scott has played, and plays a critical role, and 

I believe does get good support from our Air Force. 

Senator BURRIS. Mr. Chairman, just one last question if I may, 

Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Sure. 

Senator BURRIS. Thank you so much. 

499 

I’m concerned about the cancellation of the C–17. Isn’t that going 

to impact our readiness and our ability, because all those C–130s? 

I mean, I flew in one of those things in Iraq. It shook me to death. 

It was about 40 years old, and they’re using spit, wire, and glue 

to keep the thing together. How are we going to be ready if we cancel the C–17? Please help me. 

General SCHWARTZ. Sir, the C–130 that you flew on is a little different place in the inventory than the C–17s. The logic is that too 

much aluminum is as bad as not enough. By that, I’m saying if you 

have more airplanes than you need in a surge scenario, you are 

using resources and people in a way that, in a situation where you 

have limited resources, limited manpower, is not the most efficient 

way. 

Our view is that 223 C–17s is enough and that the remaining 89- 

plus C–5s, which will be both re-engined and non-re-engined 

versions of the C–5, will satisfy the requirements that we have for 

surge transportation. 

Senator BURRIS. General, I’ll just have to take your word for it. 

I’m concerned about our ability to transport our troops in the field 

with equipment that’s not broken down and needing repairs. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Burris. 

General, first of all, Senator Burris’ eloquent comments reflect 

my own views and a number of others, obviously not all the members of the committee. But in addition to taking to heart his heartfelt comments, I would also hope that, if you haven’t already done 

so, you talk to some airmen who have been discharged solely because of their sexual orientation, who have led units and been 

highly decorated. I have met with those men and women, and I 

think it’s just an unconscionable policy. Other allies of ours do not 

follow that policy and have had no problems of morale or cohesion. 

I would hope that you would, in addition, again listen very carefully to what Senator Burris’ comments on our history were, that 

you would also take some time to talk to some of these discharged 

men and women. They’d be very happy to talk to you. 

Finally on that subject, while you’re looking and determining 

whether there are any impacts from a change in policy, I also hope 

you give some thought to the unfairness that would be involved in 

discharging people now solely for sexual orientation while we’re 

considering whether to end this policy. To me, it’s just unconscionable that someone’s going to be discharged next month for sexual 

orientation and nothing else if 6 months or 8 months from now, 

that person would not be discharged, and when we know that there 

is either likely to be a change or there’s going to be a serious effort 

to make a change and when the Commander in Chief and the 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs think it is wrong to discharge people 

solely for sexual orientation. 

I hope you would also give some thought to this interim issue as 

to whether we should not suspend the discharges while we are 

going or you are going through this process of assessing impacts. 

If you’d give that some thought, too, I’d appreciate it. 

Senator Burris, do you have any additional comments? 

Senator BURRIS. No. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you. We will stand adjourned. 

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[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN

ALTERNATE ENGINE FOR THE JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER

1. Senator LIEBERMAN. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, in his statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee 

on May 2, 2009, said, ‘‘the facts and analysis simply do not support the case for adding an alternate engine program. There are several rationales for this conclusion: 

First, even after factoring in Congress’ additional funding, the engine would still require a further investment of $2.5 billion over the next 5 years. Second, the additional costs are not offset by potential savings generated through competition.’’ Secretary Gates cited additional factors before concluding that ‘‘we have reached a critical point in this debate where spending more money on a second engine for the [F– 

35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF)] is unnecessary, wasteful, and simply diverts precious 

modernization funds from other more pressing priorities. Accordingly, should Congress add more funds to continue this unneeded program, I will strongly recommend 

that the President veto such legislation.’’ Do you agree with the Secretary’s conclusion that continued development of the alternate engine would be unnecessary and 

wasteful? 

Secretary DONLEY and General SCHWARTZ. The Air Force supports Secretary 

Gates’ conclusion to not pursue a competitive engine. Maintaining two engine suppliers will result in increased development, production, and support costs in the 

near-term. The Air Force maintains that the risks involved with a single engine 

supplier are acceptable, and savings associated with competition, which may be realized in the future, will not sufficiently offset the upfront development costs when 

competing against existing Department priorities. Recent experience with engine development for the F–22 and F/A–18/E/F indicates that sole source risks are modest 

and acceptable. Despite the recognized developmental issues and schedule delays experienced so far, the F135 Pratt & Whitney engine continues to meet or exceed the 

stringent performance requirements associated with the F–35 propulsion system. 

2. Senator LIEBERMAN. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, do you also agree 

with the Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) office conclusion that 

even if Congress were to continue funding the development alternate engine, we 

have not yet passed the halfway mark in terms of the total funding the alternate 

engine would require before it could be competed against the current JSF engine? 

Secretary DONLEY and General SCHWARTZ. We agree with the CAPE office assessment that the program will require approximately $2.9 billion to get to a competition culmination point. Their estimate includes development funding, but also considers the production funding necessary to perform directed buys and the support 

costs associated with maintaining the additional engine. It is reasonable to include 

all the costs associated with the alternate engine as the Services would incur these 

costs to continue the alternate engine program. 

3. Senator LIEBERMAN. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, do you support 

Secretary Gates’ recommendation that the President veto any bill that contains 

funding for the alternate engine? Please explain. 

Secretary DONLEY and General SCHWARTZ. We support the Secretary’s decision 

not to pursue an alternate engine. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR DANIEL K. AKAKA

PERSONNEL TRAINING

4. Senator AKAKA. Secretary Donley, our Nation and military must grow our foreign language capability. In a recent speech, you mentioned the Air Force Culture, 

Region, and Language Flight Plan as a means to help our airmen understand other 

cultures and languages. How will this plan address the development of language 

skills and cultural knowledge for our airmen to better perform warfighting and nonwarfighting activities? 

Secretary DONLEY. The Air Force Culture, Region, and Language Flight Plan provides a framework to ensure our strategy, requirements, and force development policy and programming are synchronized to achieve the desired end-state of all airmen 

being developed and sustained with appropriate levels of culture, region, and language knowledge. 

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The plan’s overarching objective is to develop airmen capable of influencing the 

outcomes of U.S., allied, and coalition operations, and to maximize our operational 

capabilities through building partnerships. One of the ways we do this is by ensuring all airmen receive appropriate culture and language training prior to deployments. Specific to language skills, we will continue to focus on our cryptolinguist 

and regional affairs strategist capability, but we will also execute the Language Enabled Airmen Program. This program will build surge capability and ensure our 

ability to meet current taskings by building a ready foreign language capability 

across all specialties. Execution of the program will include identifying individuals 

with a propensity to study languages, based on overall academic standing, demonstrated foreign language proficiency and foreign language aptitude and motivation, through recruiting and U.S. Air Force Academy (USAFA) and Air Force Reserve Officer Training Corps (AFROTC) commissioning programs, providing these 

individuals with initial and recurring training, and sustaining their capabilities 

throughout their career. These personnel will be utilized for missions across the 

spectrum, from building partnerships to combat. Additionally, all airmen are receiving culture education and training through professional military education as well 

as prior to deployments with the goal of developing cross-culturally competent airmen. 

5. Senator AKAKA. Secretary Donley, it is vitally important that our citizens, both 

in and out of uniform, understand the importance of saving, debt reduction, planning for retirement, and understanding investments. It is also important that our 

troops be protected from predatory practices of some companies that specifically target them. Can you tell me what the Air Force is doing to educate its members to 

become more financially literate? 

Secretary DONLEY. The Air Force recognizes that many airmen enter the Service 

young and with little to no prior financial education or training, making them vulnerable to financial difficulties. Because of this, we begin financial readiness training at Basic Military Training, instructing airmen on financial readiness fundamentals such as personal financial responsibility, budgeting, saving, and investing. New 

airmen are again given mandatory financial readiness training at their first duty 

station, including more in-depth discussions of saving and investment, estate planning, consumer protection, debt, credit management, and awareness of predatory 

trends and/or practices. Throughout their careers, airmen and their families are also 

eligible for one-on-one financial counseling services or topic seminars via our Airman and Family Readiness Centers which educates and assists with financial management needs by offering free training and counseling to help airmen and their 

families achieve their financial goals. Additionally, Air Force installations actively 

participate in ongoing financial awareness campaigns, such as Military Saves, to reinforce the message of responsible spending and saving. This year during Military 

Saves week, over 4,500 airmen took the ‘‘Savers Pledge’’ and participated in more 

than 100 financial presentations, seminars, and activities across the Air Force. 

ACQUISITION PROCESS AND PERSONNEL

6. Senator AKAKA. Secretary Donley, last April, Secretary Gates announced a 

multiyear plan to increase the Department of Defense (DOD) in-house acquisition 

workforce by 20,000. That number included an allocation of more than 4,800 positions for the Air Force, of which 3,400 positions will come from contractor-to-civilian 

conversions. Such action is needed to reduce costs and increase efficiencies. Another 

way to address cost overruns is to limit the expansion of initial requirements and 

existing performance requirements for items that are obtained through the Air 

Force acquisition process. Can you give me an update on your hiring efforts, as well 

as any efforts to enhance the Air Force acquisition process to help prevent requirements expansion and obtain the best possible cost estimates? 

Secretary DONLEY. We started on our journey to strengthen the acquisition process back in September 2008. A major part of this endeavor was to ensure that we 

had the right number of people that were adequately trained and experienced to 

meet the acquisition mission demands in support of warfighter needs. 

To date, the Air Force has programmed over 5,200 new civilian acquisition workforce positions by the end of the Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP), starting with 

1,100 civilian positions in fiscal year 2010. With the help of Expedited Hiring Authority and the resources provided through Defense Acquisition Workforce Development Fund, the Air Force has been and is projecting to be successful in both hiring 

this acquisition workforce growth and replenishing the normal workforce. Moreover, 

the Acquisition Improvement Plan (AIP) directs the implementation of six actions 

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to improve the requirements generation process and help prevent requirements expansion: 

1. Ensure acquisition involvement and leadership in support of the lead command 

early in the development of program requirements; 

2. Require that the Service Acquisition Executive and when appropriate, the 

Commander Air Force Materiel Command or Commander Air Force Space 

Command certify that the acquisition community can successfully fulfill the requirements in the warfighter command’s requirements document; 

3. Require the Program Executive Officers to coordinate the system requirements 

document used in conjunction with a Request for Proposal with the lead user 

Command Commander or his/her designee based on acquisition category level; 

4. Carefully minimize the number of Key Performance Parameters (KPP) and 

other requirements to the appropriate level for each program, and ensure all 

requirements are finite, measurable, prioritized, and can be evaluated during 

a source selection; 

5. Require consideration of incremental acquisition strategies that reduce cost, 

schedule, and technical risk, and produce operational capability earlier; and, 

6. Freeze program requirements at contract award, and require subsequent 

changes to Major Defense Acquisition Program (MDAP) KPPs be accompanied 

with adequate funding and schedule considerations that are reviewed and 

agreed upon by the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, and similarly require 

changes to other requirements be reviewed or proposed by the lead Major Command (MAJCOM) commanders (or his/her designee). 

These six AIP institutionalized improvements will continue to pay dividends for 

years to come. 

In addition, the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 requires that the 

Director, CAPE, and the Directors of DOD component cost agencies, state the confidence level used in establishing the cost estimate for MDAPs and Major Automated Information Systems programs, the rationale for selecting the confidence 

level, and if the confidence level is less than 80 percent, the justification for selecting the lower confidence level. 

STRATEGIC CAPABILITIES

7. Senator AKAKA. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, it is crucial that 

America protect and defend its vital interests in the realm of cyberspace. A recent 

memorandum to all airmen stated that cyberspace is critical to today’s fight and to 

the future U.S. military advantage over our adversaries. This memo also stated that 

the Air Force would provide a full spectrum of cyberspace capabilities to Joint Force 

Commanders whenever and wherever needed. What unique capabilities does the Air 

Force bring to this vital domain and are any additional resources required to help 

Joint Force Commanders fully confront the cyber-related challenges of today and tomorrow? 

Secretary DONLEY and General SCHWARTZ. The U.S. Air Force is evolving and integrating the unique capabilities we bring to the Joint fight. Headquarters Air Force 

Space Command (HQ AFSPC), as the lead Air Force Major Command for cyber, has 

the following activities underway: 

• Positioning the Air Force with enhanced and differentiated capabilities complementing those of our sister Services, executed through our 24th Air Force at 

Lackland AFB, TX. 

• The Air Force will seek to develop cyber capabilities that complement 

those of other Services and will explore the combination of cyber with other 

non-kinetic capabilities to achieve synergies. 

• Assuring the mission by securing the Air Force portion of DOD’s information networks under one commander, the 24th Air Force commander who 

is also the Commander of Air Force Network Operations. 

• The Air Force will establish an integrated cyber operations center that 

is fully integrated with those of our joint partners to serve as the intersection for a full range of cyber capabilities. 

• Fusing cyber and intelligence functions to create seamless operations. 

• The Air Force will work to integrate space and cyberspace indicators and 

warnings to develop an advanced early warning architecture across the Air 

Force information networks. Like offense and defense in the other operational domains, operations and intelligence in cyberspace must not be separated. 

• Institutionalizing a cyber culture and mindset. 

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• The Air Force is changing its cultural mindset in the day-to-day execution of cyber operations. The importance of cultivating a new mindset demands a fundamental shift in leadership that encourages creative, yet critical thinking, and rewards innovative activities and solutions. Cyberspace 

does not function independently of other capabilities provided by the Air 

Force or other DOD agencies. In addition, we are working to integrate 

cyberspace into permanent doctrine development, accession and advanced 

training, professional military education, exercises, wargames, recruitment, 

and day-to-day operations. 

• The fiscal year 2011 President’s budget request appropriately funds and resources Air Force priorities in this domain and places us on the correct path 

to increase the Nation’s capacity and capability in cyber. 

8. Senator AKAKA. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, it is my understanding that China is investing heavily in fourth-generation fighters and advanced 

surface-to-air missiles. F–22s are being phased into U.S. Pacific Command 

(PACOM). F–22s are in Alaska and are scheduled to be at Hickam Air Force Base 

(AFB) in Hawaii in the future. Can you discuss the importance of having these assets in the Pacific given recent developments in the PACOM area of responsibility 

(AOR)? 

Secretary DONLEY and General SCHWARTZ. As the threats in the Pacific theater 

continue to mature, our F–22s in Alaska already provide essential fifth generation 

capability to PACOM. Additionally, those soon to be delivered to Hawaii will add 

to this capability. Future F–35 procurement is vitally important to ensure sufficient 

Joint air dominance in the event of a contingency. Finally, forward basing of F–22s 

in the Pacific AOR provides the PACOM commander rapid access to critical fifth 

generation capability. 

9. Senator AKAKA. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, please provide an update on the Hickam AFB schedule for F–22s. 

Secretary DONLEY and General SCHWARTZ. The transition to the F–22 Raptor at 

Hickam AFB is on track. Hawaii’s F–15 mission is drawing down this year to support the F–22 build up starting this fall. The Hawaii Air National Guard (ANG) will 

receive 20 F–22s from Langley AFB, VA, with the first 2 aircraft arriving in July 

2010. The remaining aircraft will arrive throughout calendar year 2011. 

ACTIVE DUTY AND GUARD COOPERATION

10. Senator AKAKA. General Schwartz, the current mission of the Active Duty 

15th Airlift Wing is to partner with the ANG in Hawaii to provide strategic and 

tactical airlift capability to support local and worldwide missions of combat support 

and humanitarian or disaster relief. How has this partnership effort between Active 

Duty and the ANG worked? 

General SCHWARTZ. The Total Force partnership between the 15th Airlift Wing 

and the 154th Wing is working effectively. These airmen’s collaborative efforts have 

supported strategic and tactical airlift in response to recent short-notice humanitarian relief efforts, flying Operation Pacific Wave missions to aid tsunami-stricken 

American Samoa and Operation Unified Response missions supporting earthquakeravaged Haiti. These missions delivered key personnel and 1.7 million pounds of 

vital relief supplies and equipment. The association was also able to provide airlift 

for the recent Pacific Angel humanitarian deployment, further developing Pacific Air 

Forces and PACOM building partnership capacity programs. Additionally, the wings 

teamed to support critical combat missions sustaining Operations Enduring and 

Iraqi Freedom, and support Theater Security Cooperation exercises Cope Tiger in 

Thailand, Talisman Saber in Australia, and Cope India. With the current surge operation in Afghanistan, the partnership between the two wings has enabled Pacific 

Air Forces to fully support increased future requirements from U.S. Transportation 

Command. The success of this partnership was further evidenced during the preparations for and execution of the 2009 joint 15th Airlift Wing and 154th Wing Operational Readiness Inspection, where both wings received ‘‘Excellent’’ ratings, validating their wartime readiness. 

11. Senator AKAKA. General Schwartz, what are some of the challenges that remain in partnering Active Duty and ANG forces? 

General SCHWARTZ. The partnership between the Air Force’s Active and Reserve 

components has made good progress in the recent past; however, partnering challenges still exist. Within the fiscally constrained budget, prioritization and reallocaVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:37 May 06, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00509 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\62155.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
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tion of scarce manpower and equipment resources is difficult. The Air Force is carefully analyzing a number of factors with respect to future partnering opportunities, 

with the goal of optimizing our delivery of combat capability to the joint team. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR E. BENJAMIN NELSON

C–135 SUSTAINABILITY

12. Senator BEN NELSON. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, the next generation tanker program aims to recapitalize nearly half of your aging tanker fleet 

by 2020. What effects will significantly reducing the size of the KC–135 fleet have 

on the long-term sustainment and affordability of the remaining KC–135 tankers, 

as well as your other remaining C–135 class aircraft? 

Secretary DONLEY and General SCHWARTZ. Based on the fiscal year 2011 President’s budget, we expect the delivery of 79 KC–X aircraft between 2015 and 2020. 

We have not programmed the retirement of any KC–135s as we receive KC–X aircraft. The Aerospace Maintenance and Regeneration Group and Oklahoma City Air 

Logistics Center are in the process of conducting a 6-year tear-down study on three 

retired KC–135 aircraft to identify future sustainment and modification costs for the 

remaining KC–135s in the inventory. The study focuses on identification of structural integrity and corrosion issues. Upon completion of this study in fiscal year 

2015, we will have a more complete picture of future sustainment costs and a 

stronger basis for programming future KC–135 retirements as KC–X enters the inventory. 

13. Senator BEN NELSON. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, as you field 

next generation tankers, do you have an estimated timeline and strategy for how 

the ANG units that have KC–135s will be rolled into the fielding plan? 

Secretary DONLEY and General SCHWARTZ. Basing locations for the next generation tanker are dependent upon results of the Air Force strategic basing process. 

The Air Force is accomplishing an ‘‘Enterprise-Wide Look’’ for the basing of the new 

Tanker aircraft to ensure an objective review of all potential operational and training basing options. Air Mobility Command (AMC), as the lead major command, is 

developing operational and training criteria that, upon approval by the Secretary of 

the Air Force and the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, will be used to evaluate all 

Air Force installations. The first phase of the tanker operational and training basing 

criteria should be completed and released in the coming months. Based on the results of these initial efforts, the Air Force plans to announce the preferred alternative locations by late summer of 2011 with a final basing decision expected in fall 

2012. 

HUMAN CAPITAL

14. Senator BEN NELSON. General Schwartz, from a human capital perspective, 

one of the biggest challenges facing the Services will be managing expanding and 

new missions while maintaining a fixed end-strength. The Intelligence, Surveillance, 

and Reconnaissance (ISR) mission is an area that is seeing a great deal of growth 

across all of the Services due in large part to the significant expansion of unmanned 

aerial vehicles (UAV) or remotely piloted aircraft. What is the current state of your 

training pipeline for operators and analysts? 

General SCHWARTZ. The Air Force continues to use all available resources to meet 

training requirements as we surge to meet the 65 MQ–1/9 Combat Air Patrol (CAP) 

goal by the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2013. In addition to continuing to crossflow 

experienced aviators from other airframes into the MQ–1 and MQ–9, we have begun 

providing Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA) assignments to our new Specialized Undergraduate Pilot Training (SUPT) graduates. 

Last year, the Air Force also initiated a test program to train non-SUPT graduates in RPA employment. This program is geared towards taking officers without 

aviation experience and training them to employ an RPA, and will reduce the need 

to use experienced aviators as RPA pilots by developing a core group of officers dedicated to this career field. Our first group of graduates has successfully completed 

the required training to become RPA pilots and some have begun flying operational 

sorties. The Air Force is currently reviewing the first group’s performance. 

Our analyst training is also at surge capacity and is supported by active duty and 

ANG trainers. Training occurs at Goodfellow AFB, TX with crypto linguists attending the Defense Language Institute in Monterey, CA, prior to arriving at Goodfellow. After qualification from the basic course, Initial Mission Qualification trainVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:37 May 06, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00510 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\62155.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
505 

ing will occur either at Air Force Distributed Common Ground System (DCGS) Formal Training Units (FTU), Goodfellow AFB, and/or at their first duty location. 

15. Senator BEN NELSON. General Schwartz, how are you expanding ISR and 

UAV training to meet demand? 

General SCHWARTZ. The Air Force continues to use all available resources to meet 

training requirements as we surge to meet the 65 MQ–1/9 CAP goal by the fourth 

quarter of fiscal year 2013. In 2005, the FTU at Creech AFB trained 40 crews. In 

recent years, the Air Force has opened FTUs at both March AFB and Holloman 

AFB to increase the throughput to 400 crews a year starting in fiscal year 2011. 

16. Senator BEN NELSON. General Schwartz, what kind of retention rates are you 

seeing in UAV pilot and sensor operators and intelligence analyst specialties? 

General SCHWARTZ. The UAV [now classified as the Remotely Piloted Aircraft 

(RPA)] pilots do not yet have a core ID with which to track retention because this 

career field is very new. Historically, 68 percent of all rated officers at the 8-year 

point will stay through their 14th year of service. We will closely follow the RPA 

force as these operators progress through their careers. 

The RPA Sensor Operator career field was created at the end of April 2009, and 

the first class of non-prior service airmen graduated in December 2009. Retention 

data for the career field will not be available until late 2010 or early 2011. The sensor operator career field is being manned as quickly as possible given its vital nature to the Air Force’s ISR mission. 

The career field most heavily involved in RPA intelligence analysis currently is 

the Geospatial Intelligence Analyst career field; it is currently at 108 percent of its 

retention goal. 

UNMANNED AIRCRAFT

17. Senator BEN NELSON. General Schwartz, with regard to mission effectiveness, 

how are you coordinating efforts with the Army to integrate your unmanned and 

manned aircraft with their growing fleet of medium altitude UAVs into concept of 

operations that will ensure safe and effective mission execution? 

General SCHWARTZ. All aviation operations—manned and unmanned; Air Force, 

Army, Navy, Marine or Coalition—are coordinated with the Combined Forces Air 

Component Commander (CFACC) using Joint doctrine procedures to ensure safe 

mission execution. Joint Doctrine also addresses effective mission execution, and the 

processes to provide and prioritize the CFACC allocated assets. With regard to unmanned assets, Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and Air Force 

Air Combat Command (ACC) signed the Army-Air Force Unmanned Aircraft System 

(UAS) Enabling Concept document that describes how the Services will integrate 

theater-capable, multi-role unmanned aircraft. This document will be added to the 

existing Joint Concept of Operations for UASs which was published by Joint Forces 

Command. To further increase the Air Force’s direct contribution to ground forces, 

we have deployed additional ISR liaison officers with our Expeditionary Air Support 

Operations Squadrons—the units we assign to provide tactical command and control 

of air power and liaison between the CFACC and directly supported Army field 

units. These individuals provide greater expertise in ISR operations to assist Army 

commanders with the planning and execution of their missions. 

18. Senator BEN NELSON. Secretary Donley, what process does the DOD have to 

produce a comprehensive plan to integrate policy and requirements across the Services for unmanned aircraft programs? 

Secretary DONLEY. The responsible organization for DOD policy and requirements 

integration for unmanned programs is the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition (USD [AT&L]). USD (AT&L) established the UAS Task Force (and subordinate 

Integrated Product Teams (IPTs)) to focus on policy and requirements in the areas 

of airspace integration, interoperability, frequency and bandwidth, payloads and 

sensors, and research and engineering. The Air Force participates in the working 

groups (and leads several IPTs). 

Additionally, we developed an Air Force UAS Flight Plan to harness the increasing automation, modularity, and sustainability of unmanned systems to maximize 

combat capabilities for the Joint Force. Our Flight Plan vision is to collaborate with 

the other Services, our Allies, academia, and industry to capitalize on the unique 

unmanned aircraft attributes of persistence, connectivity, flexibility, autonomy, and 

efficiency, and work with the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) to chart a 

course to address the future requirements of combatant commanders. 

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR EVAN BAYH

READINESS AND MAINTENANCE

19. Senator BAYH. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, in the fiscal year 2011 

budget request unfunded priorities list (UPL), you have included $337.2 million for 

depot maintenance activities such as service life extension programs (SLEPs), special structural inspections, and engine overhauls. I commend you for placing an emphasis on improving readiness and vital depot maintenance requirements across the 

Active Duty, Air Force Reserve (AFR), and ANG forces. However, even if the Air 

Force’s unfunded maintenance priorities and weapon system sustainment programs 

were fully funded, the result would still be well below 100 percent of needed funding. Even with baseline, overseas contingency operations (OCO), and UPL funding, 

Air Force depots would still only be funded at 84 percent for the Active component, 

89 percent for the ANG, and 90 percent for the AFR component. How much risk 

are we accepting by not fully funding our maintenance requirements and do the depots have the capacity to accept and execute 100 percent of the Air Force’s maintenance requirements? 

Secretary DONLEY and General SCHWARTZ. With the requested UPL and OCO 

funds, 85 percent of the Air Force Weapon System Sustainment requirement is 

funded. The remaining 15 percent equates to $2.0 billion in unfunded requirements, 

which represents a manageable level of risk in the form of materiel readiness. This 

$2.0 billion includes a mix of Depot Purchase Equipment Maintenance (DPEM), 

Contract Logistics Support, Sustaining Engineering, and Technical Order requirements. This risk is mitigated through enterprise-wide prioritization to fund the 

highest priority platforms/systems in year of execution. 

Between contract and organic capabilities, Air Force can execute 100 percent of 

the required funding; however, depots would need time to ramp up to address manpower, infrastructure, and parts constraints. In addition, the Air Force would not 

be able to complete all funded work in fiscal year 2011 (causing a temporary increase in carryover), and this effort would require careful balancing to maintain 

compliance with legislation (50/50 + DPEM floor). 

20. Senator BAYH. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, what are the risks in 

terms of long-term sustainment, reduction of the expected service life, and the burden of increased flying hours related to combat operations in Afghanistan? 

Secretary DONLEY and General SCHWARTZ. There is manageable risk in terms of 

long-term sustainment, reduction of the expected service life, and the burden of increased flying hours related to combat operations in Afghanistan. With few exceptions (e.g. sand damage/foreign object damage and increased engine overhauls), the 

Air Force does not have a precise means of attributing increased maintenance due 

to contingency operations. We are, however, seeing depot-level workload increases 

above planned work packages. 

21. Senator BAYH. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, the Navy has issues 

with deferred maintenance and currently has a backlog of depot maintenance. Does 

the Air Force have a similar backlog? 

Secretary DONLEY and General SCHWARTZ. The Air Force does not currently have 

an issue with deferred depot-level maintenance, as defined as maintenance that 

was: not performed when it should have been or when it was scheduled, and which 

therefore, is put off or delayed. We currently have a manageable backlog of maintenance work at our three Air Logistics Centers. Backlog is a different management 

category than deferred maintenance. 

The Air Force made decisions not to perform some depot-level maintenance on aircraft targeted for retirement and defer depot-level maintenance on aircraft required 

to support on-going contingency operations. These decisions are made in accordance 

with applicable guidance and technical data. Additionally, aircraft waived from 

depot maintenance due to operations are reinserted into the Programmed Depot 

Maintenance schedule as soon as possible. 

22. Senator BAYH. General Schwartz, why is depot maintenance funding critical 

to the Air Force’s mission and what are the specific impacts of not receiving the fiscal year 2011 unfunded depot maintenance requirements? 

General SCHWARTZ. Depot maintenance funding is a critical component of the Air 

Force Weapon System Sustainment (WSS) strategy. Underfunding creates potential 

aircraft/engine deferrals and backlogs, and impacts aircraft availability required by 

warfighters. Funds to support OCOs and funds to support UPL requirements help 

mitigate this risk. The Air Force requested $337.2 million in UPL funding to fund 

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additional aircraft Programmed Depot Maintenance (PDMs) and engine overhauls. 

Specifically, the UPL is programmed to fund 16 aircraft PDMs, 6 engine overhauls, 

and Air Force Space Command software maintenance requirements. 

23. Senator BAYH. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, what are the impacts 

to Air Force readiness if you do not receive unfunded aircraft depot maintenance 

requirements in fiscal year 2011? 

Secretary DONLEY and General SCHWARTZ. Depot maintenance funding is a critical component of the Air Force WSS strategy. Underfunding creates potential for 

aircraft and engine deferrals, and thereby a potential decrease in aircraft availability for the warfighter. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN

INITIAL OPERATING CAPABILITY

24. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, when Secretary 

Gates testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee in February 2010, he 

said that the JSF program is holding schedule in terms of when the Services can 

expect to take delivery of fighters with ‘‘initial operating capability’’ (IOC). However, 

just a couple of days ago, you announced that the Air Force would be extending that 

IOC date from 2013 to 2015. To me, that suggests that even over the last few weeks 

the amount of risk associated with the program was probably not fully appreciated. 

Please explain what the current expected IOC date is and why the Air Force is extending that IOC date from what was announced just weeks ago. 

Secretary DONLEY and General SCHWARTZ. The IOC date for the Air Force is still 

being evaluated in light of the program restructure, but is currently estimated to 

be in 2016. The Air Force is extending the expected IOC date because it is closely 

associated with Block 3 capability that will not complete operational testing until 

early 2016. The Air Force still expects to receive its first operational F–35 in 2013. 

25. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, how many fighters 

with IOC will be delivered to the Air Force at the new IOC date and exactly what 

kind of capability will they have? 

Secretary DONLEY and General SCHWARTZ. If the President’s budget is supported 

by Congress, the Air Force will have approximately 102 F–35 Block 3 aircraft by 

the end of 2015, including 12 aircraft that will be used for operational test. 

26. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, what effect, if any, 

will this decision have on the unit cost of buying the Air Force’s version of the JSF? 

Secretary DONLEY and General SCHWARTZ. None. IOC is not a factor in the unit 

cost of the aircraft. 

27. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, what effect, if any, 

will this decision have on the Air Force’s anticipated fighter shortfall? 

Secretary DONLEY and General SCHWARTZ. The delayed F–35 IOC will minimally 

impact the Air Force’s anticipated fighter shortfall. As reported in the Air Force’s 

Report to the Congressional Defense Committees, House Report 2647 (Public Law 

111–84) Sec 1075 (Fighter Force Structure Shortfalls), the Air Force is investigating 

actions to increase the service lives of our A–10 and F–16 fleets which are the legacy aircraft the F–35 is intended to replace. The Air Force has already taken the 

required steps, to include full scale fatigue testing and ‘‘thick skin’’ wing replacement to ensure our A–10 fleet will remain viable until the year 2030. The Air Force 

is also conducting full scale fatigue testing to determine the feasibility and cost-benefit of extending our F–16 Block 40s and 50s beyond their current estimated service 

life. 

28. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, looking ahead, exactly what milestones do you believe the Joint Program Office and prime contractor 

must complete on time and on budget to achieve the Air Force’s IOC date? 

Secretary DONLEY and General SCHWARTZ. In order to achieve the Air Force’s IOC 

date, the Joint Program Office and prime contractor must, first and foremost, deliver the test and production aircraft as currently planned. In addition, they must 

successfully complete developmental test for the program, releasing and testing each 

increment of capability (i.e. Block 1, Block 2, or Block 3) on time. This on time delivery will allow the Air Force to successfully complete operational test. 

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COST GROWTH

29. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, do you expect that 

additional cost growth in the JSF program arising from Secretary Gates’ decision 

to restructure the program in December 2009 will trigger a Nunn-McCurdy breach? 

Please explain your answer. 

Secretary DONLEY and General SCHWARTZ. The restructure was accomplished 

under the premise that the program was already going to experience a critical 

Nunn-McCurdy breach. The restructure was designed to baseline the program to a 

higher confidence cost and schedule and mitigate future cost and schedule increases 

by properly resourcing the program. As noted in the 2009 Selected Acquisition Report the program added development and procurement risk funding consistent with 

the Joint Estimate Team assessment, including less airframe commonality than 

originally envisioned. Also, the planned Multi-Year Procurement was delayed to 

2016, and the production quantities were updated to reflect DOD and International 

Partner procurements. We believe these actions should result in an executable cost 

and schedule and thus an executable program. 

30. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, after the breach, 

how much will it cost per unit to buy the Air Force’s variant of the JSF? 

Secretary DONLEY and General SCHWARTZ. As reported in the 2009 Selected Acquisition Report, the Average Procurement Unit Cost (APUC) for a Conventional 

Take Off and Landing (CTOL) is $71 million in Base Year 2002 dollars. However, 

consistent with Nunn-McCurdy statutory requirements, a complete Independent 

Cost Estimate is in process. The Department expects this analysis will result in increases to the stated Program Acquisition Unit Cost (PAUC) and APUC estimates. 

The projected range of estimates for all variants are $97–$115 million PAUC and 

$79–95 million APUC in Base Year 2002 dollars. 

TESTING AND ENGINEERING ISSUES

31. Senator MCCAIN. General Schwartz, Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) 

effectively determined a few weeks ago that the Marine Corps and the Navy’s 

version of JSF might end up being too expensive to operate, with each flight hour 

ultimately costing about $31,000, compared with about $19,000 per flight hour for 

current F/A–18 Hornets and AV–8B Harriers. Have you independently reviewed and 

validated NAVAIR’s analysis, and if so, do you agree with its finding on expected 

operating costs? 

General SCHWARTZ. The Naval Air Systems Command cost team brief on total 

ownership costs was developed to inform leadership of ongoing technical analyses, 

and provide options and consequences as we work to deliver affordable programs. 

In a program such as the JSF, these analyses are constantly evolving. The brief is 

an internal pre-decisional document and provides points for discussion in support 

of achieving successful and affordable fielding of all variants of the JSF. 

As the CTOL variant of the F–35 transitions to developmental testing, the Air 

Force is conducting necessary assessments to ensure readiness to affordably support 

introduction of this critical capability, including reviewing the NAVAIR brief and its 

implications for the CTOL. Deployment and sustainment plans are being reviewed 

to identify cost drivers and develop mitigation strategies. All elements of operating 

and support cost are under thorough review, including those driven by program requirements as well as the effects of changes in the global aerospace industry. 

32. Senator MCCAIN. General Schwartz, what does the NAVAIR analysis mean for 

the Air Force’s JSF program? 

General SCHWARTZ. The Naval Air Systems Command cost team brief on total 

ownership costs was developed to inform leadership of ongoing technical analyses 

and provide options and consequences as we work to deliver affordable programs. 

In a program such as the JSF, these analyses are constantly evolving. The brief is 

an internal pre-decisional document, and provides points for discussion in support 

of achieving successful and affordable fielding of all variants of the JSF. 

As the CTOL variant of the F–35 transitions to developmental testing, the Air 

Force is conducting necessary assessments to ensure readiness to affordably support 

introduction of this critical capability. This includes reviewing the NAVAIR brief 

and its implications for the CTOL. Deployment and sustainment plans are being reviewed to identify cost drivers and develop mitigation strategies. Additionally, all 

elements of operating and support cost are under thorough review, including those 

driven by program requirements as well as the effects of changes in the global aerospace industry. 

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33. Senator MCCAIN. General Schwartz, what is being done to mitigate the potential JSF flight hour costs going forward? 

General SCHWARTZ. As the CTOL variant of the F–35 transitions to developmental 

testing, the Air Force is conducting necessary assessments to ensure readiness to 

affordably support introduction of this critical capability, including reviewing the 

NAVAIR brief and its implications for the CTOL. Additionally, we are reviewing deployment and sustainment plans to identify cost drivers and develop mitigation 

strategies. All elements of operating and support cost are under thorough review, 

including those driven by program requirements, as well as the effects of changes 

in the global aerospace industry. 

AIR FORCE REQUIREMENT FOR TACTICAL FIGHTERS

34. Senator MCCAIN. General Schwartz, with the Quadrennial Defense Review 

(QDR) now complete, what is the Air Force’s current total requirement for tactical 

fighters? 

General SCHWARTZ. The Air Force reviewed its force structure requirements following the QDR. The Air Force requires approximately 1,200 Primary Mission Aircraft Inventory/2,000 Total Active Inventory to meet the National Defense Strategy 

objectives at a moderate level of risk. 

35. Senator MCCAIN. General Schwartz, what is the Air Force’s total requirement 

for JSF? 

General SCHWARTZ. The Air Force’s total requirement for JSF remains unchanged 

with a planned buy of 1,763 CTOL F–35As. This inventory was determined during 

the 1997 QDR, and reconfirmed during the 2006 and 2010 QDRs. These F–35As will 

replace our aging fleets of F–16s and A–10s, which are approaching the end of their 

Economic Service Life (ESL). In addition, the Air Force has included sufficient numbers of aircraft for homeland defense missions, initial aircrew and maintenance 

training, United States Air Force Weapons School and advanced tactics training, follow-on capability testing and validation, and program life cycle attrition. 

MILITARY CONSTRUCTION

36. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Donley, the President’s budget request for fiscal 

year 2011 contains three military construction projects for the Air Force totaling 

over $76 million that will support the stationing of JSF squadrons in 2013. Does 

the potential slippage of JSF IOC dates affect the timing that these projects will 

need? Please explain your answer. 

Secretary DONLEY. The three fiscal year 2011 JSF Military Construction 

(MILCON) projects will not be early to need. Aircraft delivery schedule slippage affects aircraft delivered to the second operations and third training location and beyond. The three fiscal year 2011 projects are needed to stand up the first operations 

and second training locations, which will have their first F–35s delivered in calendar year 2013. 

37. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Donley, does the slippage affect the date for which 

the Air Force has targeted for the completion of the environmental impact study 

(EIS) and records of decision regarding bases for training and operations of Active 

and ANG personnel? Please explain your answer. 

Secretary DONLEY. The IOC slippage does not affect the EIS and Record of Decision (ROD) timeline because they are required to support the MILCON timeline necessary for receipt and beddown of the first operational and training F–35 aircraft. 

The first operational aircraft will be delivered to the first operational location in the 

summer of 2013. The 25 Air Force training aircraft for Eglin AFB or the first aircraft for the second training location will be delivered fall 2013. fiscal year 2011 

MILCON is required to support beddown at these to-be-determined locations. This 

requires the operations and training locations be announced by operations and 

training EIS RODs in January/February 2011. 

EARNED VALUE MANAGEMENT

38. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, as the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics indicated, the earned 

value management (EVM) system is the best way of managing cost and schedule 

on major weapon systems. I understand that DOD has had major problems with the 

JSF prime contractor’s EVM system and has held out the possibility of decertifying 

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that system (thereby disabling the contractor from being able to obtain new defense 

contracts) if it does not demonstrate progress that it was fixing documented deficiencies. What is your assessment of the prime contractor’s EVM system and how 

close is DOD to formally allowing the Defense Contract Management Agency to decertify the system pending a demonstration of progress in fixing documented deficiencies? 

Secretary DONLEY and General SCHWARTZ. The Air Force is committed to obtaining and using quality earned value information as the best way for the Government 

and Contractors to manage cost and schedule on major weapons systems. We support OSD as they determine if the concerns warrant de-certification. 

OVERSEAS CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS BUDGET REQUEST

39. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, among the items 

in the fiscal year 2011 OCOs Supplemental Budget Request is a request for one JSF 

aircraft. I understand that this aircraft is intended to replace an F–15E fighter 

plane from the 336th Fighter Squadron that crashed while conducting combat operations in eastern Afghanistan in July 2009. I also understand that the existing 

ground rules for determining what projects can be funded with the supplemental 

allow for the replacement of combat equipment because of loss during combat operations. Nevertheless, I have been told that because the Air Force can no longer procure F–15E aircraft from the prime contractor, you elected to procure a fighter aircraft currently in production. 

I am troubled by this request. This JSF request in the supplemental should be 

included in the base budget—not the supplemental. The JSF aircraft you are proposing to buy here will cost $205 million. That is about double what I understand 

the unit cost of a JSF to be (about $100 million) and considerably more expensive 

than how much it costs to buy one F–15E. More importantly, the very earliest that 

the Air Force can accept delivery of a JSF with IOC will be 2013, with development 

not expected to be completed until a few years later. Exactly why is the Air Force 

asking $205 million for that one JSF aircraft in the supplemental? 

Secretary DONLEY and General SCHWARTZ. In early summer 2009 we were asked 

to provide an estimate for a fiscal year 2011 OCO F–35 aircraft. At that time, the 

estimate was $204.9 million. This cost control was subsequently used to develop the 

detailed cost breakout that appeared in DOD’s fiscal year 2011 PB Justification. If 

Congress approves the additional OCO aircraft, the unit cost for 23 aircraft (fiscal 

year 2011 22 aircraft plus 1 OCO aircraft) would be approximately $182.5 million. 

OCO funds appropriated above this amount will be used for initial spares associated 

with the OCO F–35. The table below reflects the numbers which were submitted 

in the fiscal year 2011 PB documentation for the base and OCO request, and what 

the OCO numbers should have been in the documentation for the same weapon system unit cost ($182.5 million). 

Fiscal Year 2011 Budget Docs (As Submitted) Fiscal Year 2011 

OCO Should Read 

Proc Quantity ........................................................................... 22 (base) 1 (OCO) 1 (OCO) 

Cost (in millions of dollars) .................................................... 3729.2 204.9 170.8 

Advance Proc Cost ................................................................... 257.0 11.7 

Weapon System Cost ............................................................... 3986.2 204.9 182.5 

Initial Spares ........................................................................... 263.6 22.4 

Total Proc Cost ........................................................................ 4249.8 204.9 204.9 

Weapon Sys Unit Cost ............................................................. 182.5 204.9 182.5 

40. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, would you agree 

that the ground rules for determining what projects can be funded with the supplemental were never intended for the DOD to replace combat loss with a system that 

will not—for at least another 6 years—be fully integrated and capable with all the 

weapons systems and sensors needed to serve in a combat role? 

Secretary DONLEY and General SCHWARTZ. OSD/Office of Management and Budget (OMB) policy is that DOD may request replacements for combat losses. If the 

original item is currently in production it should be used as the replacement. If not, 

an upgraded capability may be requested if it provides replacement capability for 

the combat loss. 

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41. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, will supplemental 

funds be used in the future to fund JSF requests? 

Secretary DONLEY and General SCHWARTZ. If future OMB and OSD direction remains consistent with the fiscal years 2011–2015 OSD Integrated Program and 

Budget Submission Guidance, and additional aircraft are lost in combat, we will request supplemental funds for future JSF procurements that meet these combat loss 

replacement criteria. 

42. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, as a cost effective 

alternative to buying a JSF aircraft here and to ensure timely fielding of needed 

strike fighter capability in the combat theater, did you explore the possibility of ‘‘refixing’’ a legacy F–15E intended for retirement, or one that has actually been retired—under, for example, the Air Force’s Combat Air Forces Restructure Plan? 

Secretary DONLEY and General SCHWARTZ. The F–15Es are some of the newest 

fighters in the Air Force active inventory. We have not retired nor do we plan to 

retire any for the foreseeable future. Additionally, the Air Force is making investments in F–15E modernization to ensure its combat capability well into the future. 

AIR FORCE 2010 FORCE STRUCTURE ANNOUNCEMENT

43. Senator MCCAIN. General Schwartz, on June 26, 2009, the Air Force formally 

announced force structure realignments for fiscal year 2010, which outlined increases and decreases to manpower at units around the country. It contained the 

following announcement for the Arizona ANG at Davis-Monthan AFB: ‘‘The 214th 

Reconnaissance Group has an increase of 217 drill positions to meet validated [Predator UAV] MQ–1 shortfalls. Total impact is an increase of 217 drill positions.’’ From 

this statement, the Air Force clearly identified a need to meet validated MQ–1 mission shortfalls. Can you describe the nature and details of the validated MQ–1 

shortfall that was described in the announcement? 

General SCHWARTZ. The Air Force fiscal year 2010 Force Structure Announcement 

(fiscal year 2010 FSA) released in June of 2009 included information on MQ–1 manpower changes at the 214th Reconnaissance Group. The impact to ANG units as a 

result of the Combat Air Force restructure was minimal and did not require a manpower adjustment to the 214th RG. The unit is currently manned to their program 

of record, which is to support one steady-state CAP and zero surge CAPs (‘‘1+0’’); 

they have sufficient manning for that requirement. For the past 2 years, the 214th 

RG has volunteered to ‘‘surge’’ to a second MQ–1 CAP, and have done an extraordinary job in doing so. As additional ANG units transition to MQ–1 operations, the 

214th RG will return to normal operations. 

44. Senator MCCAIN. General Schwartz, given the extremely high demand placed 

on personnel in MQ–1 squadrons, are these units adequately and uniformly manned 

across the Air Force? 

General SCHWARTZ. The Air Force is working to fill every available Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA) pilot and sensor operator training slot to meet mission requirements. Unit manning (as of 4 Mar 10) is provided below. Low numbers in some 

units are due to recent unit activations, increased manpower requirements, and/or 

limited training availability. These numbers will steadily increase as requirements 

stabilize, and more pilots and sensor operators complete training. In addition to the 

units listed below, six ANG and Air Force Reserve units are in the process of activation. 

Location Unit Position Authorized Assigned Percent 

Creech AFB ...................... 11 Recon Sq ................... Pilot ................................. 44 36 82 

Sensor Operator .............. 59 68 115 

15 Recon Sq ................... Pilot ................................. 86 57 66 

Sensor Operator .............. 126 131 104 

17 Recon Sq ................... Pilot ................................. 92 72 78 

Sensor Operator .............. 110 110 100 

30 Recon Sq ................... Pilot ................................. 29 17 59 

Sensor Operator .............. 54 31 57 

42 Attack Sq ................... Pilot ................................. 89 47 53 

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Location Unit Position Authorized Assigned Percent 

Sensor Operator .............. 133 102 77 

Cannon AFB .................... 3 Spec Ops Sq ................ Pilot ................................. 103 118 115 

Sensor Operator .............. 128 136 106 

33 Spec Ops Sq .............. Pilot ................................. 37 27 73 

Sensor Operator .............. 51 34 67 

Holloman AFB .................. 6 Recon Sq ..................... Pilot ................................. 41 13 32 

Sensor Operator .............. 53 23 43 

29 Attack Sq ................... Pilot ................................. 41 22 54 

Sensor Operator .............. 54 36 67 

45. Senator MCCAIN. General Schwartz, other than adding manpower to the 

214th, what is the Air Force doing to address this issue of high demand on MQ– 

1 squadron personnel? 

General SCHWARTZ. The MQ–1 personnel are in high demand and will continue 

to be so as we expand to 65 MQ–1/9 CAPs. The Air Force has planned ahead to 

mitigate this increased demand in three ways. First, we have increased our MQ– 

1 combat capability by increasing the size and numbers of units. In addition to manning increases at the 214th at Davis-Monthan, five other ANG and Air Force Reserve MQ–1/9 units have been or are being stood up. Second, we have increased the 

MQ–1 training pipeline with the start of the new FTU at Holloman in October 2009, 

which graduated its first class in December. Third, while ANG and AFRC MQ–1 individuals were mobilized through December 2009, we will continue to support surge 

CAPs through volunteerism and active duty augmentation through December 2010 

to minimize involuntary mobilizations. 

46. Senator MCCAIN. General Schwartz, what is the status of the action for the 

214th and when will the positions be filled? 

General SCHWARTZ. The reference to an increase of 217 drill positions for the 

214th Reconnaissance Group in the fiscal year 2010 Force Structure Announcement 

(fiscal year 2010 FSA) was an error—those positions were not placed on the unit’s 

manning document and were a direct result of attempting to mitigate the loss of 

manpower due to a fiscal year 2010 Combat Air Forces restructure proposal affecting Arizona that was not enacted. The unit is currently manned to their program 

of record, which is to support one steady-state CAP and zero surge CAPs (‘‘1+0’’); 

current manning is sufficient for that requirement. 

47. Senator MCCAIN. General Schwartz, what process does the Air Force undertake to ensure that Force Structure Announcements are accurate and definitive? 

General SCHWARTZ. The Air Force goes through a very detailed and deliberate 

process to ensure Force Structure Announcements are accurate. The major commands submit manpower and aircraft moves for every Air Force installation to 

Headquarters Air Force. The major commands’ inputs are compiled into a single 

draft document, checked for consistency, and then briefed to the Strategic Basing 

Executive Steering Group and Air Force Board. The proposed final Force Structure 

Announcement is then staffed through every major headquarters staff directorate 

and the major commands to ensure accuracy and completeness. Finally, the Force 

Structure Announcement is approved by both the Secretary of the Air Force and 

Chief of Staff of the Air Force prior to public release. 

INTERNATIONAL PILOT TRAINING

48. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Donley, many of our allies choose to conduct fighter pilot training here in the United States for various reasons ranging from the 

availability of adequate ranges to cost and the quality of training. This obviously 

affords the Air Force an outstanding opportunity to partner and train with NATO 

and other allied pilots. I am proud to note that most of this training is conducted 

by the Arizona ANG at the 162nd Fighter Wing operating out of Tucson International Airport, AZ. How is the process supposed to work for a partner nation’s 

selection of the best location among candidate bases? 

Secretary DONLEY. The US Air Force provides tuition-based pilot training at 14 

locations, and each location, with the exception of undergraduate pilot training, is 

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the sole provider of tuition-based training for a particular aircraft. For example, all 

F–16 tuition-based training is done at Tucson ANGB, AZ, through the 162nd Fighter Wing and their assigned F–16 aircraft and instructor pilots. 

When a partner nation desires to beddown its own aircraft at a CONUS AFB, 

Deputy Under Secretary of the Air Force for International Affairs (SAF/IA) provides 

options based on the country’s requested training needs and budgetary requirements. When presented with available locations, training capabilities, and pricing 

information, we expect the partner nation to choose the training venue that best 

meets their needs. The U.S. Air Force is committed to providing the most effective 

training venue available for our international partners consistent with their training needs and budget by dispassionately providing the facts and costs for the available training. 

49. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Donley, does the White House or OSD normally 

guide or influence decisions for where to train? 

Secretary DONLEY. No. 

50. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Donley, would OSD have any reason to provide 

guidance to the Air Force to encourage an allied nation to remain at a certain location, regardless of the cost or quality of training? Please provide specific circumstances, if applicable. 

Secretary DONLEY. There are occasions when discussions take place between the 

appropriate DOD offices and a partner nation concerning their choice of a bed down 

training location, usually when information is requested by the partner nation. Cost 

and quality of training are always considered in these discussions and are provided 

on all available training locations. Once the data is provided, we expect the partner 

nation to make a decision that best meets their training needs and budgetary requirements. 

51. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Donley, has the Air Force received direction or 

guidance in 2010 to influence an allied partner to select a certain base, regardless 

of the cost or other benefits? If this has occurred, what was the intent of the guidance? 

Secretary DONLEY. The Air Force provides cost and other benefit-related information to partner nations supporting base selection for beddown and tuition-based 

training. There are occasions when discussions take place between the appropriate 

DOD offices and a partner nation concerning their choice of a beddown location, but 

once DOD provides available options to the partner, we expect the partner nation 

to make an appropriate decision that best meets their training needs and budgetary 

requirements. 

INCREASED MAINTENANCE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE F–22 RAPTOR

52. Senator MCCAIN. General Schwartz, the President’s budget submission for fiscal year 2011 contains a request of $8.8 million to add a hangar bay at Langley AFB 

for additional requirements related to the maintenance and restoration of F–22 low 

observable (LO) aircraft surfaces. The budget justification states, ‘‘the existing LO 

repair facility has two bays that operate at a 97 percent usage rate and cannot handle an increased LO repair load as the aircraft matures and packaged maintenance 

plans become more extensive.’’ I note that Langley AFB currently is home to about 

half the number of F–22s as was originally planned and yet the existing facilities 

need to be expanded. What trends are emerging concerning the time, manpower, 

and resources required to maintain the F–22? 

General SCHWARTZ. The requested funds are for facilities within the current F– 

22 Facilities Requirement Plan (FRP). Reference F–22 FRP pg 6–44 (dated December 2008), F–22 bases with one 18–24 Primary Aircraft Inventory (PAI) squadron 

of aircraft require two aircraft-size booth inserts/bays, while bases with more than 

one squadron of aircraft assigned will need one additional bay per 18–24 PAI squadron to support increased LO restoration and on-equipment composite repairs. By 

this criteria, Langley requires three LO Bays. While LO materials initially imposed 

a greater workload than anticipated, improved materials have increased their durability and sub-system reliability enhancements have decreased the frequency of LO 

panel removal, resulting in reductions to the initially unforeseen LO maintenance 

requirements. 

514 

53. Senator MCCAIN. General Schwartz, can you estimate how these trends translate into increased operating and maintenance costs for the F–22 over what was 

originally planned when the aircraft first entered the Air Force inventory? 

General SCHWARTZ. F–22 Program estimates for life cycle mission personnel costs 

in 2004 were $5.7 billion dollars and currently are estimated at $9.0 billion dollars. 

The majority of the increase in mission personnel costs was due to LO manpower 

increases, greater than forecasted military pay increases, and the addition of ANG 

and Air Force Reserve units, which were not part of the 2004 Program Office Estimate. 

In addition to manpower, the rise in O&M costs can be attributed to subsystem 

reliability and the corresponding increase in LO maintenance recovery time. The Reliability and Maintainability Maturation Program modifications will alleviate many 

of the issues but will take time. Furthermore, the use of contract field teams (CFT) 

to augment the units has also driven up the cost of the program. The CFT is being 

used as a LO manning stop gap and will be required until the active duty manning 

authorizations are filled and experience levels have matured in the field. The F–22 

Program Office is working diligently with Lockheed Martin and the Air Force manpower community to accelerate the effort as much as possible. 

54. Senator MCCAIN. General Schwartz, are you satisfied with the mission capable 

rates of the F–22 and the maintenance hours compared to flying hours? 

General SCHWARTZ. The fiscal year 2009 F–22 fleet average mission capable rate 

was 65 percent and the current rate is 67 percent. Direct Maintenance Man Hours 

(DMMH) per flight hour are also heading in the right direction. The current goal 

for DMMH is 12.4 or less, and we are exceeding the goal and holding steady at 11.0. 

We are satisfied with the trends and the current improvement efforts (Reliability 

and Maintainability Maturation Program) will continue the upward trends. 

MILITARY CONSTRUCTION IN THE AIR FORCE

55. Senator MCCAIN. General Schwartz, you mention in your opening statement 

and in your comments at today’s hearing that the Air Force is assuming risk in the 

proposed investment levels for facilities and infrastructure. The President’s budget 

for fiscal year 2011 for Air Force MILCON totals almost $1.5 billion, but barely 12 

percent of that amount addresses the recapitalization of existing facilities, while the 

rest goes to other new mission priorities. As a result, the AFR, which accounts for 

71,263 members of the Total Force, 3 numbered Air Forces, and over 2,890 facilities 

supporting 348 aircraft, will benefit from exactly one project totaling $3.4 million 

at Patrick AFB in Florida. At that pace, it would take about 1,000 years to replace 

each existing facility in the AFR. The lack of investment in existing facilities and 

infrastructure has a direct impact on military readiness and is a substantial risk. 

How long can the Air Force sustain the acceptance of this risk before it becomes 

a threat to military operations and readiness? 

General SCHWARTZ. The Air Force has taken increased risk in infrastructure 

across the entire Active and Reserve component, without significant impacts to 

readiness. We will not allow risk taken in our facilities and infrastructure to jeopardize our ability to conduct critical operations from our installation weapon systems. This year, as in past years, we have had to make hard decisions in order to 

fund our most critical mission requirements. We have done our best to balance 

shortfalls fairly between Active, ANG, and AFR forces. We continue to mitigate this 

risk by funding facility sustainment to the 90 percent level to ensure that we preserve the quality of our facilities. We will closely examine the requirements of the 

Active and Reserve components as part of this mitigation strategy as we build the 

fiscal year 2012 Program Objective Memorandum. 

56. Senator MCCAIN. General Schwartz, how do you plan to address this risk of 

underinvestment in existing facilities in the future? 

General SCHWARTZ. The Air Force will continue to carefully balance risk in infrastructure against other pressing requirements. Each budget cycle, we carefully 

evaluate facility requirements to ensure that those most critical to operations and 

readiness are funded. We remain committed to ensuring a minimum level of investment in our facilities and will minimize any impacts to readiness. We continue to 

mitigate risk by funding facility sustainment to the 90 percent level to ensure that 

we ‘‘keep our good facilities good.’’ 

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MILITARY SPACE

57. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Donley, is the Air Force committed to its space 

acquisition mission? 

Secretary DONLEY. Yes, the Air Force is committed to space. We currently manage 

35 space programs, and 7 of those are in the top 20 of largest Air Force acquisition 

programs with $8 billion total space investment in fiscal year 2011. The cornerstone 

to effectively managing the Air Force Space portfolio is the AIP, published in May 

2009, which serves as the strategic framework for re-instilling excellence in space 

systems acquisition. The Air Force AIP focuses on five major initiatives: workforce, 

requirements generation, budget discipline, source selection, and lines of authority. 

We will complete these 5 initiatives and the 33 associated tasks this spring with 

the intent to have the Air Force Audit Agency inspect our efforts after 1 and 2 years 

to verify that they have taken hold. This plan has postured the Air Force for success 

in Space Acquisition. 

58. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Donley, I understand that the roles and responsibilities for the Air Force in space policy are currently under review by OSD and 

the Air Force. When do you plan to define these roles and responsibilities and do 

you intend to designate an executive agent (EA) for space? 

Secretary DONLEY. Last fall, I directed a review of Headquarters Air Force Management of Space Responsibilities. In December 2009, I asked Rich McKinney, an 

experienced Space acquisition expert (prior Director for Air Force Space Acquisition 

and a retired Air Force Colonel), to examine how the Air Force headquarters should 

be organized in light of the multiple changes within the Department in this area 

since 2001. In preparing his analysis, Mr. McKinney has interviewed many members of the space community—both inside and outside the Air Force. Upon review 

of this report and in coordination with OSD, I will select the best option to manage 

Air Force space responsibilities to include planning and programming, acquisition 

oversight, and coordination with other DOD components and agencies. 

59. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Donley, I understand the Space Posture Review, 

originally due to Congress last December, is going to be considerably delayed, perhaps up to a year late. Please explain in detail the cause or causes for this delay 

and what steps are being taken to remedy the problem. 

Secretary DONLEY. DOD and DNI submitted an Interim Space Posture Review to 

Congress on March 15, 2010. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)) 

is the lead for DOD on this effort, but we understand the final report will be submitted in mid-summer 2010. 

60. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Donley, how informed can the fiscal year 2011 

budget be without any strategy for our short- and long-term space needs? 

Secretary DONLEY. Over the past year, the Air Force has been intimately involved 

in multi-agency strategic discussions regarding the development of a new National 

Space Policy and the Space Posture Review. This experience informed Air Force 

funding decisions for fiscal year 2011 with regard to national security space priorities. In addition, we routinely engage the combatant commanders, OSD, and the 

Joint Staff to provide a clear understanding of the threat environment and any associated capability shortfalls. 

AIR FORCE NEXT GENERATION BOMBER PROGRAM

61. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Donley, at an April 6, 2009, news conference on 

recommendations he was making for the proposed fiscal year 2010 defense budget, 

Secretary Gates announced, among other things, that he would recommend deferring the start of a Next Generation Bomber (NGB) program, since much of today’s 

inventory will remain relevant through 2040. As the Air Force modernizes the existing bomber fleet to provide long-range strike capability, simultaneous investments 

in Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) for a follow-on bomber will 

be required. In your view, does Secretary Gates’ decision last year on NGB require 

upgrading the current B–52, B-l, and B–2 fleets? 

Secretary DONLEY. Yes, and the Air Force is programming for upgrades to these 

fleets to ensure they remain capable. 

62. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Donley, how are NGB and EMD decisions reflected in your budget request for fiscal year 2011? 

Secretary DONLEY. The fiscal year 2011 President’s budget reflects the Department’s plan to invest $1.7 billion of Research Development Testing and Evaluation 

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funding across the FYDP to support a future Long Range Strike (LRS) program. 

Funding requested in fiscal years 2011 and 2012 would provide approximately $200 

million each year to keep the technology industrial base active and viable in the 

near-term. This funding would provide capability improvements in the areas of 

strike responsiveness, survivability, lethality, connectivity, and affordability. Investment areas of interest include advanced sensors, electronic warfare and countermeasures, survivability, manufacturing readiness, net-ready communications, open 

systems and multi-level security architectures, mission management, weapon effectiveness and survivability, and combat identification. 

The Air Force would invest fiscal year 2011 funds using a three-tiered approach: 

Tier 1: Reduce risk for enabling technologies with LRS application. 

Tier 2: Enable at-risk critical industry skills while reducing program and technical risk through integration and demonstration efforts applicable to LRS capabilities. 

Tier 3: Refine LRS requirements and develop concepts with engineered, costdriven capability options. 

63. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Donley, are there sufficient resources in the fiscal 

year 2011 budget to sustain the long-range strike aircraft fleet? 

Secretary DONLEY. The fiscal year 2011 President’s budget (PB) contains sufficient resources to maintain current operations and maintain capabilities of the legacy bomber fleet. In addition, the legacy bombers (B–1 and B–2) are included as 

part of the Weapon System Sustainment Unfunded Priority List to increase aircraft 

availability. 

The following modernization programs for each legacy bomber are funded 

throughout the FYDP: 

B–52: 

CONECT (Combat Network Communications Technology) 

SR2 (Strategic Radar Replacement) 

EHF (Extremely High Frequency) 

1760 Internal Weapons Bay Upgrade 

B–2: 

RMP (Radar Modernization Program) 

DMS (Defensive Management System) 

EHF (Extremely High Frequency) 

B–1: 

IBS (Integrated Battle Station) 

RMIP (Radar Reliability and Maintainability Improvement Program) 

INS & GSS (Inertial Navigation System & Gyro Stabilization System) 

64. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Donley, please describe where the Air Force is 

going to make these investments in long-range strike capability this fiscal year and 

in the coming years. 

Secretary DONLEY. The fiscal year 2011 funds complement and further expand the 

Air Force’s fiscal year 2010 technology investment plan, and supports the 2010 QDR 

directed studies and vision as the DOD defines future LRS requirements. This coordinated plan maximizes use of previous work and best positions the Air Force for 

future LRS program efforts. 

Fiscal year 2011 investments would be used to reduce technology risk, preserve 

critical industrial base skills, and refine requirements for a future LRS ‘‘family of 

systems’’ (FoS). Investment areas of interest include: advanced sensors, electronic 

warfare, survivability, manufacturing readiness, net-ready communications, open 

systems and multi-level security architectures, mission management, weapon effectiveness and survivability, and combat identification. 

The Air Force would invest fiscal year 2011 funds using a three-tiered approach: 

Tier 1: Reduce risk for enabling technologies with LRS application. 

Tier 2: Enable at-risk critical industry skills while reducing program and technical risk through integration and demonstration efforts applicable to LRS capabilities. 

Tier 3: Refine LRS requirements and develop concepts with engineered, costdriven capability options. 

The fiscal year 2011 and beyond investments will be tailored as a result of the 

DOD directed studies that define LRS requirements and the Air Force will program 

appropriately in future budget submissions. 

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65. Senator MCCAIN. General Schwartz, please describe what sort of characteristics and requirements the Air Force and the combatant commanders are considering 

in a replacement aircraft for long-range strike. 

General SCHWARTZ. ACC and Air Force Global Strike Command (AFGSC), assisted by Headquarters Air Force, have led the effort within the Air Force to develop 

and document LRS platform requirements and attributes based on the appropriate 

threat scenarios and target sets. Specific attributes of interest include: survivability, 

range, payload, manned or unmanned configuration, and nuclear capability requirements. Additionally, in the fiscal year 2011 President’s budget, OSD directed OSD/ 

Policy to lead a post-2010 QDR study to further refine the LRS platform requirements and attributes, as part of an LRS Family of Systems that includes a penetrating aircraft, standoff cruise missiles, and conventional prompt global strike capabilities. The results of this follow-up QDR study are expected in September 2010. 

66. Senator MCCAIN. General Schwartz, given the decision on NGB, what concerns, if any, do you have about increasingly relying on the old B–52 platform to 

satisfy our long-range strike capability beyond the 2018 threshold? 

General SCHWARTZ. While the B–52 is the oldest Air Force bomber, robust design 

and structural upgrades have extended the B–52’s service life (currently projected 

beyond 2040) and will allow it to remain in flyable condition well beyond 2018. The 

Air Force has a rigorous maintenance program to keep the B–52 flying, including 

a thorough Programmed Depot Maintenance (PDM) refurbishment program during 

which each jet is inspected (and defects corrected) every 5 years. Despite its age, 

the B–52 maintains the highest mission capable (aircraft availability) rate and has 

the lowest operating cost of any Air Force bomber. 

In addition to the focused aircraft maintenance program, the Air Force ensures 

mission relevance through modernization and sustainment modification initiatives. 

The B–52 has programs to address issues with communications, navigation, electronic attack, and weapons delivery systems, as well as programs for integrating 

new weapons. While the B–52 is not survivable against advanced air defenses, it 

continues to provide standoff weapons capability in the advanced threat environment, as well as direct attack capability in lower threat environments. These modifications enable the B–52 to continue as a responsive, flexible, adaptive, and lethal 

platform to support a share of the Nation’s long-range strike requirements. 

C–5 GALAXY CARGO AIRCRAFT

67. Senator MCCAIN. General Schwartz, do you anticipate that the new Mobility 

Capabilities Requirements Study (MCRS) will call for additional strategic airlift or 

do we have enough capability to meet National Military Strategy? 

General SCHWARTZ. We have adequate capability to meet the National Military 

Strategy and do not need additional strategic airlift. The latest study, MCRS–16, 

stated that the current National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 

Program of Record of 223 C–17s, 52 C–5Ms, and 59 C–5As exceeded the demand 

required in the 3 scenarios it examined. Accordingly, C–5 retirements requested in 

the fiscal year 2011 PB are based on this excess capacity and the strategic airlift 

fleet should not grow based on MCRS–16. Since this result is consistent with guidance in the recently released QDR, we also do not see a need for a new study of 

strategic lift in this quadrennial cycle. 

68. Senator MCCAIN. General Schwartz, it is my understanding that there have 

been several recent studies done by DOD, Air Force, and even one directed by Congress that have looked at the strategic airlift question and whether the Nation has 

sufficient strategic airlift capability currently available. Can you comment on whether any of these studies establish a requirement for additional new strategic airlift 

aircraft this year? 

General SCHWARTZ. In 2009, the Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA) released the 

‘‘Study on Size and Mix of Airlift Force.’’ Results of this study indicated the existing 

Program of Record (POR) (fiscal year 2009 PB enacted) was both sufficient and cost 

effective. More recently, DOD released the ‘‘Mobility Capabilities and Requirements 

Study 2016’’ (MCRS–16). This study was aligned with the QDR and examined QDR 

relevant cases. MCRS–16 highlighted an excess in strategic airlift and influenced 

recommended fiscal year 2011 strategic airlift force reductions. 

69. Senator MCCAIN. General Schwartz, do any recent studies conclude that we 

need additional C–17s? 

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General SCHWARTZ. None of the current studies indicate that we need additional 

C–17s. The current strategic airlift program of record (POR) exceeds the most demanding scenarios/cases found in all recent mobility studies. The Air Force is aware 

of two recent studies that looked at strategic lift. In 2009, the Institute for Defense 

Analysis (IDA) released the ‘‘Study on Size and Mix of Airlift Force.’’ Results of this 

study indicated the existing POR was both sufficient and cost effective. More recently, DOD released the ‘‘Mobility Capabilities and Requirements Study 2016’’ 

(MCRS–16). This study was aligned with the QDR, and examined QDR relevant 

cases. MCRS–16 validated the current strategic airlift POR exceeds all examined 

cases. 

70. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, I have heard that 

the C–5M Galaxy Cargo modernization program is progressing well and that the Air 

Force is pleased with its performance. I understand the C–5Ms also have demonstrated some very impressive operational capabilities, including setting 42 world 

records as part of their operational test and evaluation. Can you share your impression on whether the C–5 Reliability Enhancement and Re-engining Program is 

meeting Air Force’s expectations? 

Secretary DONLEY and General SCHWARTZ. The C–5M modernization program is 

progressing well and is tracking to the AT&L-directed cost and schedule. Operational test and evaluation (OT&E) was completed in January 2010, and included 

a 30-day ‘‘surge.’’ During OT&E, 175 missions and 1,336 hours were flown, including 

23 days of maintenance demonstrations. This OT&E also included cold weather testing at Eielson AFB, AK. The C–5M did set 42 records—these assessments were 

sponsored by the vendor and conducted on a non-interference basis during operational testing. 

71. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, is the Air Force 

satisfied with the C–5M’s operational performance? 

Secretary DONLEY and General SCHWARTZ. The Air Force is satisfied with the C– 

5M’s performance. Three development C–5Ms have demonstrated the capability to 

move a wartime cargo load 5,000 statute miles unrefueled while decreasing closure 

time via reduced en route stops. They also have improved take-off performance, resulting in approximately 20 percent more cargo per mission and 27 percent improvement in range. These enhancements translate into fewer landings, less aerial refueling, and more rapid delivery of cargo. 

72. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, what is the estimated reduction in total ownership costs for the C–5M Galaxy Cargo aircraft? 

Secretary DONLEY and General SCHWARTZ. The Cost Analysis Improvement Group 

(CAIG) Independent Cost Estimate (ICE) projected reduction in total ownership 

costs for 52 C–5Ms and 59 C–5As (111 C–5 aircraft) is $10.7 Billion in Base Year 

08. 

73. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Donley, I am concerned that the Air Force has not 

properly addressed the future of the C–5A aircraft. What action is the Air Force taking to address modernization of the ANG and AFR C–5As? 

Secretary DONLEY. The Air Force has fully funded the Avionics Modernization 

Program (AMP) for all ANG and AFRC C–5As not projected for retirement in the 

fiscal year 2011 President’s Budget. The AMP program implements communications, 

navigation, surveillance and air traffic management (CNS/ATM) upgrades, and 

mandated safety modifications. 

74. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Donley, over the last 4 years, Congress has added 

44 C–17s, at a cost of over $14 billion. It is my understanding that these earmarks 

have now created a potential excess of Air Force strategic airlift capability and, because of this, the Air Force is being forced to consider retiring perfectly capable C– 

5 aircraft that, according to the Air Force Fleet Viability Board, could serve this Nation or our allies for another 30–40 years. Is my analysis correct? 

Secretary DONLEY. The current strategic fleet exceeds all requirements from the 

newly released Mobility Capabilities and Requirements Study-2016 (MCRS–16). The 

increase of 15 C–17s in fiscal year 2008 influenced the decision to upgrade only 52 

of the 111 C–5s with the Reliability Enhancement and Re-engining Program 

(RERP). Since that time, 18 more C–17s have been added. By retiring some of the 

older, less capable C–5As, we are able to fund the permanent bed down of 16 C– 

17s within the Air Reserve component and appropriately size our strategic airlift 

fleet to meet the Nation’s requirements. 

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75. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Donley, to what extent is the Air Force looking 

at alternatives to simply getting rid of perfectly good cargo aircraft, such as storing 

them in a backup inventory status, or giving them to trusted allies who desperately 

need out-sized lift, or selling them to a U.S.-flagged Civil Reserve Airlift Fleet provider? 

Secretary DONLEY. The C–5A aircraft requested to retire in the fiscal year 2011 

PB exceed capability requirements validated by the Mobility Capabilities and Requirements Study 2016 (MCRS–16). Maintaining them as Backup Aircraft Inventory 

(BAI) incurs unnecessary sustainment and avionics modernization costs plus 

stresses limited ramp space. The Air Force will use these retired aircraft to support 

the actively flying C–5 fleet as a ready source for aircraft parts. Further analysis 

of BAI conversion will be provided in the C–5 retirement report required by Section 

137 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010. 

For aircraft to be made available for security assistance purposes, they must be 

declared Excess Defense Articles (i.e., they must be excess to the requirements of 

the DOD). Retiring C–5 aircraft will continue to support the actively flying fleet as 

a ready source for aircraft parts and will not be excess to Department requirements. 

Finally, CRAF capacity exceeds all MCRS–16 scenarios. Currently, DOD regulations prohibit the transfer or sale of C–5 aircraft for commercial purposes. 

KC–X TANKER REPLACEMENT PROGRAM

76. Senator MCCAIN. General Schwartz, as the Air Force’s fleet of tanker aircraft 

ages, new tankers will be needed to provide in-flight refueling support for U.S. military aircraft and for aviation forces of coalition partners. Under the current draft 

request for proposal, the Air Force plans to procure 109 new KC–X tankers by 2020. 

Is the current tanker fleet of KC–135 and KC–10 tankers robust and stable to last 

until 2040, as has been reported in the Air Force’s report, Tanker Replacement 

Study 2005, and other recent studies? 

General SCHWARTZ. The current fleet of KC–135 and KC–10 tankers have been 

robust and stable to date due to the impact of regularly scheduled maintenance. 

Maintaining the KC–135 and KC–10 fleet until year 2040 has been, and will continue to be, a multi-faceted and aggressive approach involving KC–135 Programmed 

Depot Maintenance (PDM), KC–10 Contracted Logistics Support, and select investment/modernization programs that will ensure safety of flight and access to the 

global airspace system. 

77. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Donley, do you anticipate that additional resources 

will be necessary to fill seams or gaps in the tanker replacement plan? 

Secretary DONLEY. No additional resource needs are anticipated at this time, and 

investment and sustainment funding is programmed for the tanker fleet through the 

FYDP. 

ACROSS-THE-BOARD PAY RAISE AND INCENTIVE BONUSES

78. Senator MCCAIN. General Schwartz, the Air Force intends to add 500 ActiveDuty airmen and 1,700 reservists in fiscal year 2011. You note in your written 

statement for today’s hearing that the Air Force budget includes a 1.4 percent 

across-the-board pay raise, but you request $645 million for recruiting and retention 

bonuses targeted at critical wartime skills. Please explain where the personnel 

shortfalls are in the Air Force and how the combination of these approaches (a pay 

raise and bonuses) will work to shape the Air Force to its best advantage. 

General SCHWARTZ. The fiscal year 2011 Air Force Recruiting and Retention budget for the Total Force is $644.8 million. This budget focuses on targeted, critical career fields that are difficult to recruit and retain, or are new and emerging missions 

requiring urgent, immediate increases. The annual across-the-board pay raises help 

tremendously as individuals calculate their service and retirement benefits. This 

twofold strategy addresses both our targeted, critical personnel and the force as a 

whole. 

Active Duty: $480.1 million 

Although the Air Force is experiencing high retention in broad areas of the force, 

the Air Force has focused needs within the combat and critical skills (both officer 

and enlisted) and in the health professions. For non-medical officers, the Air Force 

has a Critical Skills Retention Bonus (CSRB) budget of $20.2 million which will continue bonuses for special operations forces and contracting officers, and will start 

bonuses for 6 stressed career fields: Intelligence, Civil Engineer, Public Affairs, OSI 

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(Cyber), Airfield Operations, and Logistics Readiness. Additionally, the Air Force 

has budgeted $97.1 million in Aviation Continuation Pay to shape its rated force 

by retaining aviators in specified year groups and at critical career decision points. 

Included in this effort are critical bonuses used to move personnel from traditional 

aviation specialties to new mission areas in remotely piloted aircraft (RPA), special 

operations, and ISR, which are increasing rapidly without additional manpower authorizations. For the enlisted force, the Air Force manages a Selective Reenlistment 

Bonus budget of $248.2 million, targeting critical skills in 91 air force specialty 

codes, ranging from: sensor operators, intelligence analyst specialists, combat controllers, pararescue personnel, vehicle maintainers, civil engineering specialists, security forces personnel, and contracting specialists. 

Recruiting and retention of the health professions specialties are particularly dif- ficult. For accession bonuses, we are using over $14 million to attract surgeons, 

nurses, mental health specialists, and other health professions to the Air Force Medical Service. The retention bonuses are critical to the career longevity of those 

skilled practitioners with years of military and medical expertise. It often takes 

years of intensive training to create a skilled health care provider or surgeon that 

can provide life and limb-saving care under austere, battlefield conditions, in tent 

operating theaters, and state-of-the-art medical centers. Once trained, it is imperative we keep these experts. Therefore, we have programmed $65 million in 

multiyear contractual retention bonuses at selectively targeted health care fields 

such as our physician and dental surgeons, operating room nurses, mental health 

providers, and other skilled healthcare professions. The health professions career 

fields have some of the lowest retention rates in the Services, and often leave at 

their first opportunity after their educational obligations are fulfilled. 

Reserves: $47.7 million 

The Air Force will recruit and retain personnel in combat related and medical career fields, specifically survival, evasion, resistance and escape (SERE), pararescue, 

explosive ordnance disposal, aerial gunners, logistics, and a number of other career 

fields deemed vital to mission success. 

Air National Guard: $117.0 million 

The Air Force will recruit and retain personnel in critical skills, combat related 

and medical career fields, specifically aircraft maintenance/systems, civil engineering, air battle managers, remotely operated aircraft, physicians, pharmacists, nurses 

and surgeons. 

COMBAT SEARCH AND RESCUE HELICOPTER REPLACEMENT PROGRAM

79. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, I am concerned by 

recent press reports and testimony from Air Force officials indicating that the Air 

Force is considering a multi-billion dollar sole-source procurement to replace its 

aging fleet of HH–60G Pave Hawk search and rescue helicopters with newer models 

of the same aircraft. If true, this may raise serious questions regarding the Air 

Force acquisition process. Is the Air Force considering a sole-source procurement to 

recapitalize its fleet of HH–60G helicopters? Please explain why. 

Secretary DONLEY and General SCHWARTZ. No decisions on an acquisition strategy 

for HH–60 recapitalization have been made at this time. The Air Force is currently 

working with OSD and the Joint Staff to finalize requirements and acquisition 

strategy for this needed capability. 

80. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, how did the Air 

Force arrive at its decision to purchase newer models of the same aircraft when better alternatives for combat search and rescue (CSAR) are available? 

Secretary DONLEY and General SCHWARTZ. The Air Force will procure newer HH– 

60 models to replace aircraft lost in combat (Operational Loss Replacement). No decisions have been made on aircraft types for the HH–60 recapitalization program, 

which will replace the entire HH–60 fleet. The Air Force is currently finalizing the 

requirements and acquisition strategy for this program through close coordination 

with OSD and Joint Staff. 

81. Senator MCCAIN. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, has the Air Force 

abandoned plans for a modern CSAR helicopter fleet? 

Secretary DONLEY and General SCHWARTZ. No, the Air Force has a need to recapitalize the existing HH–60G fleet. The fiscal year 2011 President’s budget begins the 

program as a new start in fiscal year 2011, and begins procurement funding in fiscal 

year 2012. 

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE

RISK ASSESSMENT OF FIGHTER AIRCRAFT INVENTORIES

82. Senator INHOFE. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, as stated in your 

opening remarks, the Air Force has been engaged in continuous combat and expeditionary operations since August 1990, which means we are coming up on 20 years 

of persistent operations over places like Southwest Asia, Somalia, the Balkans, 

Haiti, Iraq, Afghanistan, as well as the air bridge between the United States and 

every location we have U.S. forces. The mass retirement of so many legacy fighters 

concerns me because the Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force fighter gaps are only 

growing more quickly each year with no fix in sight. Can you give me an overall 

risk assessment of the Air Force? 

Secretary DONLEY and General SCHWARTZ. In April 2008 congressional testimony, 

the Air Force projected a fighter gap of over 800 aircraft. Since that time, three key 

assumptions unpinning the 2008 analysis have changed. First, the Air Force elected 

to accept increased warfighting risk. Second, the planned F–35 procurement rate 

was increased from 48 to 80 aircraft per year in fiscal year 2016. Third, the Air 

Force refined its approach to fighter service life computations. The combination of 

these changes significantly reduced the projected fighter force structure shortfall. 

Actual risk level and an expanded discussion are available in a study the Air Force 

submitted in response to House Report 2647 (Public Law 111–84) Section 1075. 

83. Senator INHOFE. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, are there any missions you feel are at high risk? 

Secretary DONLEY and General SCHWARTZ. The greatest challenge continues to be 

performance across all core missions in the high end of the Range of Military Operations against a near-peer competitor. As we continue to rebalance the force structure, we must guard against over-optimization of the force for today’s fight at the 

expense of capability against this near-peer threat. These risks are exacerbated in 

anti-access, area denial and electronic attack environments. In this environment 

some of our current weapons are losing ground in both capability and sufficiency 

to rapidly improving near-peer capabilities. Underpinning this challenge is the 

growing risk to our airborne ISR mission. This is due primarily to the increasing 

vulnerabilities of the satellite communication architecture. As the Air Force transitions to a greater reliance on remotely-piloted aircraft for the preponderance of its 

airborne ISR capability, the security of our satellite communications has become increasingly critical to the enterprise. This includes not only the maintenance of robust and secure satellite communication links, but the protection of space assets 

themselves against a growing array of potential adversary threats. 

84. Senator INHOFE. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, is the Air Force still 

predicting shortfalls in its fighter and attack aircraft inventory? 

Secretary DONLEY and General SCHWARTZ. Yes, given current requirements, the 

Air Force is predicting a modest shortfall in its fighter inventory. In April 2008, the 

Air Force informed the Congress of a projected fighter force structure gap of over 

800 aircraft in 2024. Since that testimony, 3 key force structure assumptions have 

changed significantly, reducing the fighter shortfall in 2024 from ∼800 aircraft to 

∼182 aircraft. First, the Air Force elected to accept increased warfighting risk, going 

from ‘‘low-to-moderate’’ to ‘‘moderate.’’ Second, the planned F–35 procurement rate 

was increased from 48 to 80 aircraft per year. Third, the Air Force refined its approach to computing fighter service life. The Air Force is closely monitoring fighter 

force structure, and will review the potential need for SLEPs as part of the fiscal 

year 2012 budget process. 

85. Senator INHOFE. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, can the ANG continue to support the current 18 Air Sovereignty Alert sights with proposed inventory 

and budget cuts? 

Secretary DONLEY and General SCHWARTZ. Yes. ANG can cover the 18 sites with 

the fiscal year 2010 Combat Air Forces (CAF) Restructure. Operation Noble Eagle 

Ground Alert is not affected by the fiscal year 2010 CAF Restructure. 

FIGHTER AIRCRAFT

86. Senator INHOFE. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, the Air Force will 

not have its first unit of combat-ready JSF until at least 2015. F–22 production will 

end at 187 aircraft, leaving approximately 120 combat-coded aircraft to ‘‘prevail in 

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frames . . . [including] the ability to prevail against two capable nation-state aggressors’’ as stated in the 2010 QDR. Moreover, foreign surface-to-air missiles and integrated air defense systems continue to improve and proliferate; Russia and China 

continue their military build-up and modernization to include development of the J– 

12 fighter aircraft in China and flight testing of the PAK–FA fighter in Russia; and, 

Prime Minister Vladimir Putin said Russia will start building a new strategic bomber and announced that the Russian military will commission 1,500 new military aircraft and helicopters so that the air force will have 80 percent modern aircraft by 

2020. What is the status of our fighter fleet and its ability to respond to these 

threats? 

Secretary DONLEY and General SCHWARTZ. The fiscal year 2011 budget includes $12.5 billion over the FYDP to sustain America’s air superiority advantage. Building 

on the multi-role nature of our most advanced aircraft, we are also adding precision 

attack capabilities such as the Small Diameter Bomb. The Air Force will also continue the development and procurement of air-to-air munitions and defenses for the 

F–22 such as the AIM–9X, AIM–120D, and electronic warfare capabilities. We assess that by the time these aircraft are fielded, our investment in fifth generation 

aircraft, associated weapons and defensive architectures will allow us to maintain 

an acceptable level of risk. 

87. Senator INHOFE. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, what plans does the 

Air Force have in place if the JSF continues to slip to later dates in the future? 

Secretary DONLEY and General SCHWARTZ. The Air Force believes the restructured F–35 program provides a realistic schedule, however, the Air Force has postured the A–10 and F–16 fleets to accept potential delays in the F–35 program 

which is designed and being fielded as their replacement. Legacy aircraft SLEPs 

and modernization are significantly more cost effective means to mitigate any risks 

from potential gaps in fighter force structure capacity. The Air Force has also refined our ability to quantify aircraft service life. The most accurate depiction of the 

Combat Air Force status is achieved using ESL, which is based on MIL STD 1530C 

and captures both the capability and structural integrity of an aircraft constrained 

by economic reality. 

In 2006, the Air Force conducted a fleet viability review of the A–10 because of 

a requirement to fly the aircraft until approximately 2028. The Fleet Viability Board 

(FVB) concluded that with proper care, investment, and fleet management, the Air 

Force can keep the fleet viable. Structural fatigue testing for the wings was conducted in the late 1970s and early 1980s, and the Air Force has recently completed 

component structural tests on the fuselage and empennage to 16,000 hours. The Air 

Force is drafting the final report, which will recommend future inspection and repair processes. The Air Force is also conducting Scheduled Structural Inspections 

(SSIs) every 2,000 flight hours after the initial SLEP inspection conducted at approximately 8,000 flight hours. In addition, A–10s manufactured with ‘‘thin-skin’’ 

center wing panels will be modified with new wings that have ‘‘thick-skin’’ center 

wing panels as part of the fully funded A–10 wing replacement program. These inspections and modifications will ensure the A–10 fleet is viable to the ESL of 14,000 

equivalent flight hours (EFH) which equates to approximately 2030. 

More information regarding F–16 service life is in development and the Air Force 

is currently conducting fleet viability assessments for the F–16C/D fleet. The first 

FVB for Block 25, 30, and 32 aircraft will conclude by the end of fiscal year 2010. 

Immediately following the initial FVB, the Air Force will conduct FVBs for the 

Block 50/52 and then Block 40/42 aircraft, and they are scheduled to conclude by 

the end of fiscal year 2011. The Air Force is also requesting funds in the fiscal year 

2011 President’s budget to initiate a full-scale fatigue test (FSFT) on an F–16 Block 

50 airframe specimen, which will be stressed to 24,000 hours. This test is expected 

to complete by the end of fiscal year 2013. Analysis of structural components and 

failure modes relevant to the Block 40–52 fleet will determine the exact structural 

modifications necessary to extend the service life beyond 8,000 hours. The FVBs and 

FSFT will provide the Air Force with information and data pertinent to extend the 

service life of the F–16 fleet beyond the ESL of 9,000 EFH for the Block 25–32s and 

8,000 EFH for Block 40–52s. 

88. Senator INHOFE. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, what will be the impact on legacy aircraft if JSF production slips further than currently planned? 

Secretary DONLEY and General SCHWARTZ. Further slips to JSF production are expected to have minimal impact to legacy aircraft. The Air Force has believes the restructured F–35 program provides a realistic schedule, however the Air Force has 

postured the A–10 and F–16 fleets (aircraft the F–35 is designed to replace), as well 

as the F–15E Strike Eagle, to be able to accept delays in the F–35 program. The 

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A–10 ESL is 14,000 EFHs and, at current usage rates, it has planned viability until 

approximately 2030. A majority of the A–10 fleet is already receiving new wing replacements with ‘‘thick skin’’ center wing panels, and all aircraft are undergoing 

regular Scheduled Structural Inspections (SSIs) every 2,000 flight hours after the 

initial SLEP inspection conducted at 8,000 flight hours. 

Further delays to F–35 production may impact the Air Force’s ability to retire additional older model F–16s (Block 30/32s), however, more information regarding F– 

16 service life is in development. The Air Force is currently conducting Fleet Viability Boards (FVBs) on the F–16 fleet that will be completed by the end of fiscal year 

2011. The F–16 ESL is 9,000 EFH for Block 25–32s and 8,000 EFH for Block 40– 

52s. The Air Force has requested funds in the fiscal year 2011 President’s budget 

to initiate a Full-Scale Fatigue Test on an F–16 Block 50 test article to determine 

structural modifications necessary to extend the F–16 Block 40–52 service life beyond 8,000 hours. This testing starts in fiscal year 2011 and is estimated to be complete by fiscal year 2013. These aircraft are expected to remain in service until at 

least 2025. The FVB and FSFT will prepare the Air Force to extend the life of the 

F–16 fleet, and the Air Force will continue to evaluate options each budget cycle 

to mitigate the impacts from potential F–35 program slips on the aging F–16 fleet. 

The F–15E Strike Eagles are some of the newest fighters in the Air Force active 

inventory. The F–15E has an ESL of 13,500 EFH, and as of today, none of them 

have been retired or are planned to be retired. Further, the Air Force is making 

steady investments in F–15E modernization to ensure its combat capability well 

into the future. 

89. Senator INHOFE. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, what is the current 

cost estimate of the JSF overall and per aircraft? 

Secretary DONLEY and General SCHWARTZ. As of 26 April 2010, the total cost of 

the program is $328.3 billion (Then Year Dollars) and the Average Procurement 

Unit Cost (APUC) for all variants of the JSF is $79 million (Base Year 2002 Dollars)/$113.6 million (Then Year Dollars) as reflected in the 2009 Selected Acquisition 

Report (SAR). However, Consistent with Nunn-McCurdy statutory requirements, a 

complete Independent Cost Estimate is in process. The Department expects this 

analysis will result in increases to the stated Program Acquisition Unit Cost 

(PAUC) and APUC estimates. The projected range of estimates for all variants is 

$97–$115 million PAUC and $79–95 million APUC in Base Year 2002 dollars. 

90. Senator INHOFE. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, do you expect cost 

estimates to change based on cost increases or decreases in the number to be procured? Please explain why. 

Secretary DONLEY and General SCHWARTZ. Production profile changes did impact 

the unit cost estimates as reported in the F–35 December 2009 SAR. However, these 

changes were necessary to institute an optimized ramp rate commensurate with the 

Independent Manufacturing Review Team recommendation. 

Any further reduction of fiscal year 2011 Low Rate Initial Production 5 jets would: 

• Increase unit costs of remaining fiscal year 2011 DOD and Partner jets; 

• Increase FYDP costs due to learning curve effects; 

• Delay Services’ fielding of critical capability; 

• Exacerbate Tactical Air Force structure shortfalls; 

• Increase F–35 FYDP unit costs; and 

• Likely cause further delays in some partner procurements, which in turn 

would further increase DOD unit costs 

Executing the optimized F–35 procurement ramp is key to: (1) lowering F–35 unit 

cost by capitalizing on learning, manufacturing efficiencies and economies of scale; 

and (2) addressing the Services’ force structure shortfalls. 

COMBAT SEARCH AND RESCUE HELICOPTER REPLACEMENT

91. Senator INHOFE. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, the fiscal year 2010 

budget terminated the Combat Search and Rescue Helicopter Replacement (CSAR– 

X) program. In announcing the termination, Secretary Gates questioned the need 

for a single service, single purpose program. Until CSAR–X was terminated, it was 

the Air Force’s number-two acquisition priority right behind KC–X. It now appears 

that the Air Force is moving away from platforms that are more capable to lower 

end platforms as more of a budget decision than what provides our forces the best 

capabilities. Joint Forces Command directed study validated the need for a new 

CSAR helicopter in even greater numbers than previously planned. In addition, the 

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Air Force has performed thousands of joint and coalition recoveries in Central Command’s AOR. Is CSAR still a core competency for the Air Force? 

Secretary DONLEY and General SCHWARTZ. Yes, CSAR is an important mission for 

the Air Force. In accordance with guidance set forth by Secretary Gates, CSAR now 

falls under the Service Core Functions of Personnel Recovery (PR). The Air Force 

released the Operational Concept for PR in September 2009 as part of a continuing 

effort to adapt to the current irregular warfare environment and to meet all the 

Joint force requirements for personnel recovery. In these challenging fiscal times, 

the Air Force is working to provide our forces with the best capabilities possible. 

The current HH–60 Operations Loss Replacement and subsequent recapitalization 

program will allow the Air Force to continue to support Joint MEDEVAC, 

CASEVAC, CSAR, and other PR missions. The Air Force will continue to work with 

OSD to ensure that the right numbers of aircraft with all the required equipment 

are getting to our warfighters. 

92. Senator INHOFE. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, what was the result 

of the Air Force’s 2002 study for a new CSAR platform? 

Secretary DONLEY and General SCHWARTZ. The Air Force Combat Rescue Analysis 

of Alternatives (AoA) was conducted to provide DOD acquisition decision makers 

one or more affordable upgrade or replacement options for the HH–60G recovery vehicle. After careful consideration among five concepts and over 25 alternatives, the 

AoA study team recommended a new medium-lift helicopter as the best concept for 

a replacement of the HH–60G. 

93. Senator INHOFE. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, what are the current plans for replacing the aging fleet of HH–60G Pave Hawks? 

Secretary DONLEY and General SCHWARTZ. The current plans for replacing the 

HH–60G fleet involve two efforts, HH–60G Operational Loss Replacement (OLR) 

and HH–60 Recapitalization. HH–60G OLR is the Air Force’s plan to replace HH– 

60G Pave Hawks lost in combat and other operational missions to sustain the current HH–60 fleet strength. HH–60 Recapitalization will be a long-term recapitalization effort to replace the entire fleet. 

94. Senator INHOFE. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, will this Nation be 

getting the most capable CSAR platform for our airmen or are we compromising 

based on available budget? 

Secretary DONLEY and General SCHWARTZ. The Air Force is working with OSD 

and Joint Staff to finalize requirements and an acquisition strategy that supports 

an HH–60 recapitalization program to replace the fleet of aging HH–60Gs. Initial 

program funding is contained in the fiscal year 2011 President’s budget. A Request 

for Information has been released to obtain industry’s ability to provide the Air 

Force with a CSAR platform. The Air Force will procure a CSAR platform that 

meets warfighter requirements. 

JOINT CARGO AIRCRAFT

95. Senator INHOFE. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, the DOD plan in 

2008 was to acquire 75 C–27s for military transport. That number was dropped in 

2009 to 38 aircraft and eight were funded in the fiscal year 2010 budget. The fiscal 

year 2011 budget requests another eight aircraft. From my understanding, the Joint 

Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) validated the requirement for the Joint 

Cargo Aircraft (JCA) and a minimum number of 75 JCA. What is the current requirement for C–27s? 

Secretary DONLEY and General SCHWARTZ. A June 2007 Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Acquisition Decision Memorandum 

concerning this issue stated, ‘‘The Acquisition Program Baseline shall reflect an initial procurement quantity of 78 aircraft (54 Army, 24 Air Force).’’ This quantity 

matches the aircraft procurement through 2013, as presented to the Joint Requirements Oversight Committee and the Defense Acquisition Board. Resource Management Decision 802 assigned the Direct Support Time Sensitive/Mission Critical (TS/ 

MC) mission to the Air Force and revised the total number of C–27s to 38. The 

transfer of the TS/MC airlift mission is intended to capitalize on efficiencies gained 

by operating the tactical airlift fleet under a single Service, thereby maximizing the 

robust capabilities resident in the existing intra-theater airlift fleet to ensure all requirements are met. 

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96. Senator INHOFE. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, what mission or 

missions are driving the required number of C–27s? 

Secretary DONLEY and General SCHWARTZ. Resource Management Decision 802 

assigned the Army’s time sensitive/mission critical (TS/MC) mission to the Air 

Force, and revised the total number of C–27s to 38. The Air Force will use the C– 

27 primarily for TS/MC missions supporting the U.S. Army. As an Air Force asset, 

the C–27s can also be operated and managed through the Global Force Management 

process to answer all intra-theater airlift requirements (general support in addition 

to direct support). 

97. Senator INHOFE. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, how will JCAs support homeland security missions such as natural and manmade disasters? 

Secretary DONLEY and General SCHWARTZ. The C–27 will be an ANG asset and 

will be incorporated into the Global Force Management process to support the needs 

of states (Title 32) and geographic combatant commanders (Title 10). Airlift requirements in support of homeland security and disaster assistance will be met utilizing 

the Global Force Management process to ensure the combatant commander receives 

the most effective airlift platform. The C–27 will operate similar to ANG C–130 

units in response to preparation and recovery efforts. 

NUCLEAR MODERNIZATION

98. Senator INHOFE. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, your posture statement highlights Air Force actions over the past 2 years to reinvigorate Air Force 

stewardship over the ground and air legs of the nuclear triad. The fiscal year 2011 

budget request shows a planned investment of $295 million over the FYDP to keep 

the aging Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) operational. How 

long do you expect this missile type to stay in the operational force? 

Secretary DONLEY and General SCHWARTZ. The Air Force is committed to sustaining and modernizing the current Minuteman III ICBM through 2030, per congressional direction. 

99. Senator INHOFE. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, at what point must 

we make a decision to begin development of a follow-on ICBM to the Minuteman? 

Secretary DONLEY and General SCHWARTZ. As long as the Nation requires an 

ICBM, the Air Force will steward that capability to ensure we always have safe, 

secure, and reliable systems. An analysis of alternatives will be performed during 

this FYDP to assess alternatives for 2030 and beyond. 

100. Senator INHOFE. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, is there funding 

in the fiscal year 2011 request for a follow-on ICBM? 

Secretary DONLEY and General SCHWARTZ. There is no funding in the fiscal year 

2011 budget. The Air Force is working to define attributes and characteristics for 

a follow-on capability beyond 2030. 

101. Senator INHOFE. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, do you believe it 

is necessary to continue to maintain the ICBM leg of the Strategic Nuclear Triad? 

Secretary DONLEY and General SCHWARTZ. Yes. ICBMs remain an important part 

of the Nation’s nuclear deterrent with attributes that ensure the TRIAD is balanced, 

responsive, and adaptable. The foundation of America’s strategic and nuclear deterrence effectiveness depends on the balance of overall TRIAD capabilities. As such, 

specific ICBM attributes include: high readiness, responsiveness, survivability, positive control, rapid retargeting, and day-to-day stability. 

102. Senator INHOFE. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, $800 million is requested over the FYDP to modernize the B–52 and B–2 bombers to ensure survivability against increasingly capable air defense systems. $200 million is requested 

for research and development for the next-generation bomber. You state, ‘‘the proliferation of area denial and anti-access capabilities will challenge the ability of . . . 

legacy bombers to penetrate contested airspace.’’ Will our current U.S. strategic 

bombers be able to fulfill their nuclear deterrent missions given the antiaccess 

threat? 

Secretary DONLEY and General SCHWARTZ. We are actively sustaining and modernizing all strategic Air Force bomber and fighter platforms to fulfill the demands 

of strategic deterrence and conventional warfare missions into the future. 

The ongoing B–2 radar, defensive management, and strategic communications 

system upgrades will ensure penetrating capability into the mid-term, while B–52 

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computer system architecture, strategic radar, and strategic communication improvements will keep our legacy long-range strike force operationally relevant 

through at least 2035. We are also in the early stages of examining a follow-on airlaunched cruise missile which will permit our legacy platforms to fulfill their nuclear deterrent mission in future threat environments. 

103. Senator INHOFE. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, there does not appear to be funding in the fiscal year 2011 request to make JSF dual-capable. Are 

there plans to request such funding in the future? 

Secretary DONLEY and General SCHWARTZ. Yes, the Air Force remains committed 

to our strategic deterrent mission and will ensure the JSF will be dual capable in 

time to meet strategic requirements. Dual capable aircraft (DCA) capability for the 

F–35 were not funded in the fiscal year 2011 President’s budget due to weapon maturity and availability issues. The Air Force has multiple options within our legacy 

fighter fleet to ensure seamless DCA mission capability while transitioning to the 

F–35. This includes monitoring the legacy fighter force structure closely for any potential need for service life extensions. The Air Force continues to evaluate the necessary programmatic initiatives to include integrating DCA capability on the JSF 

in the fiscal year 2012 budget submission. 

104. Senator INHOFE. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, how will the 

United States be able to deliver tactical nuclear weapons without a dual-capable 

JSF? 

Secretary DONLEY and General SCHWARTZ. The Air Force will maintain the ability 

to employ tactical nuclear weapons through proper management of the F–16 and F– 

15E fleets. The ability of these aircraft to penetrate sophisticated adversary air defenses, however, will continue to be challenged as anti-aircraft radar and missile 

systems technology proliferates. Therefore, the Air Force continues to pursue dualcapable aircraft (DCA) capability on the JSF. F–35 integration will maintain this 

mission capability, enabling the United States to seamlessly provide extended deterrence and meet its treaty and alliance commitments. 

105. Senator INHOFE. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, what implications 

will a non-dual capable JSF have for U.S. security guarantees to our European allies? 

Secretary DONLEY and General SCHWARTZ. The 2010 NPR affirmed the United 

States’ commitment to strengthening regional deterrence and reassuring U.S. allies 

and partners. The Air Force remains committed to replacing the current inventory 

of F–16s with a dual capable JSF, ensuring there is no gap in the dual capable mission as the JSF becomes operational in this mission area. 

NEXT GENERATION BOMBER

106. Senator INHOFE. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, in February 2006, 

DOD called for a new long-range bomber to be fielded by 2018. Prior to release of 

the fiscal year 2010 budget request, Secretary Gates announced on April 6, 2009, 

that DOD ‘‘will not pursue a development program for a follow-on Air Force bomber 

until we have a better understanding of the need, the requirement, and the technology.’’ From my understanding, the Air Force conducted numerous studies and 

analyses with the assistance of the Institute for Defense Analyses and the Defense 

Science Board to determine ‘‘if’’ and ‘‘what type’’ of new bomber platform was required to meet future threats. I also believe the JROC approved an Initial Capabilities Document and an acquisition strategy was formulated and approved by the 

Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics in late 2008. 

Finally, I believe efforts were underway to seek approval by the JROC of the Capabilities Development Document in 2009. If all these reviews have been done, why 

is more time needed to study the bomber platform again to determine what type 

is needed? 

Secretary DONLEY and General SCHWARTZ. As stated, the Secretary of Defense 

(SECDEF) delayed the development of an Air Force follow-on bomber until the DOD 

could better understand the need, requirement, and technology associated with the 

weapon system. To satisfy his concerns about developing a new LRS platform, the 

SECDEF directed the formation of a Tiger Team. This team, part of the High End 

Asymmetric Team (HEAT), took an in-depth look at long-range strike—including 

the LRS need, requirement, and technology—all within the larger 2010 QDR process. The team’s conclusions were supportive of pursuing a new LRS platform, but 

identified the need for additional analysis to explore options for reducing costs and 

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accelerating fielding timelines. Based upon the need for additional analysis, the 

SECDEF chartered a subsequent study to examine a broader array of long-range 

strike issues and options including: the appropriate mix of long-range strike capabilities; upgrades to legacy bombers; manned and unmanned force structure numbers; stand-off and penetrating platform ratio; stand-off cruise missile requirements; 

ISR demands; and conventional prompt global strike needs. 

The DOD’s rationale for the study is that expanded analysis is needed to fully understand how all potential LRS options could contribute the country’s national defense and national military strategies and objectives before large amounts of funding are committed to the program. The results of the study are expected in fall 2010. 

107. Senator INHOFE. General Schwartz, General Corley, Commander of ACC, has 

said that the fleet of B–2 bombers is too small for persistent attacks in heavily defended airspace, and the B–1s and B–52s are not survivable in heavily defended airspace. Lieutenant General Klotz, Air Force Global Strike Command, said there will 

continue to be a need for long-range strike capabilities. You said to expect major 

work to start on a new LRS platform in 2013 but the timing was not definitive. 

What do you mean by expect major work to start by 2013? 

General SCHWARTZ. Work beginning in 2013 is dependent on finalizing requirements and establishing and funding a program of record that would lead to further 

design, development, and production. Work prior to that would be focused on technology maturation, risk reduction, concept development, and requirements definition. 

108. Senator INHOFE. General Schwartz, if work started in 2013, when will we 

see a new bomber? 

General SCHWARTZ. If focused system level design work begins in 2013, a new 

bomber could be in flight test in the 2021–2025 timeframe with operational capability coming on-line in the 2025–2030 timeframe. 

109. Senator INHOFE. General Schwartz, will we be able to sustain the current 

fleet of bombers to meet national security requirements until the next generation 

bomber is operational? 

General SCHWARTZ. Yes, the current fleet of bombers will be maintained to continue to meet national security requirements until a future LRS capability is operational. Current modernization efforts focus on lethality, responsiveness, survivability, and sustainment. Very little can be done to make the B–1 or the B–52 survivable against today’s modern air defenses; however, the B–1 and B–52 will be 

equipped with extended range munitions to mitigate risk from advanced integrated 

air defense systems in the future. Some efforts like Defensive Management System 

(DMS) Modernization can improve the B–2’s survivability, but the B–2 will still face 

survivability challenges in the mid-term against emerging advanced air defenses. 

The ongoing OSD-led ‘‘Analysis of LRS Options’’ study directed by the 2010 QDR 

will inform senior leadership on future LRS investments to address these survivability concerns. The following modernization programs are currently programmed 

throughout the FYDP: 

B–52: 

CONECT (Combat Network Communications Technology) 

SR2 (Strategic Radar Replacement) 

EHF (Extremely High Frequency) 

1760 Internal Weapons Bay Upgrade 

B–2: 

RMP (Radar Modernization Program) 

DMS (Defensive Management System) 

EHF (Extremely High Frequency) 

B–1: 

IBS (Integrated Battle Station) 

RMIP (Radar Reliability and Maintainability Improvement Program) 

INS & GSS (Inertial Navigation System & Gyro Stabilization System) 

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JEFF SESSIONS

KC–135 DEPOT MAINTENANCE

110. Senator SESSIONS. Secretary Donley, 2 years ago, Boeing was awarded the 

KC–135 Programmed Depot Level Maintenance contract over Alabama Aircraft Industries Incorporated (AAII). AAII is awaiting a ruling from the U.S. Court of Appeals concerning this contract, and we will let the legal process run its course. My 

concern is with the Birmingham, AL, aerospace industrial base should Boeing retain 

the contract. This industrial base has a skilled workforce of 800 employees who have 

a reputation for on-time completion with the fewest faults. What is the Air Force 

doing to preserve this military industrial base? 

Secretary DONLEY. Throughout our dealings with the industrial base, the Air 

Force must rely on the free and open competition afforded to all companies. 

ROLES AND MISSIONS WITH UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEMS

111. Senator SESSIONS. General Schwartz, 2 years ago when General Moseley was 

Chief of Staff of the Air Force, he tried unsuccessfully to make the Air Force the 

EA for Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) as well as placing operational control of 

these assets under the regional Air Component Commander. Instead, then-Deputy 

Secretary of Defense Gordon England stood up a DOD UAS Task Force. Last time 

we talked about this issue, you assured me that there was no intent to move from 

the status quo. Unfortunately, I am hearing rumblings that this contentious issue 

may yet again surface. Please provide me an update regarding UAS roles and missions in the Air Force and how you are coordinating these functions with the Army. 

General SCHWARTZ. The Air Force strongly believes in the tenets of Joint doctrine 

that establishes the Joint Force Commander as the authority for the use and 

prioritization of UAS or Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA). The Joint Force Air Component Commander executes the Joint Force Commander’s operational objectives 

using assigned Joint air assets. The intent of the 2007 proposal to establish an Executive Agent (EA) for UAS was to establish a Joint organization to specifically address the myriad outstanding UAS/RPA issues to include Joint concepts of operation 

to integrate all Service component UAS/RPA systems, airspace control, air defense, 

and acquisition, standardization, and interoperability. Since September 2007, the 

Air Force has been, along with the other Services, an active participant on the OSD 

AT&L UAS Task Force that was established by the Deputy Secretary of Defense in 

lieu of an EA for UAS. I believe it is essential for the Air Force and other services 

to continue working together to collectively determine the optimal way ahead for 

UAS/RPA. 

The Air Force is actively engaged with OSD, the Joint Staff, and the other Services in determining how to maximize the capabilities that various RPA provide. 

Service responsibilities are to organize, train, and equip combat forces for use by 

Joint force commanders. Combat operations are guided by established Joint Doctrine that stipulates that priorities for use of Service component forces are determined by the JFC–Services do not direct or establish Joint force employment priorities. The role of the Combined or Joint Force Air Component Commander is to execute air operations in accordance with the priorities of the Combined or Joint Force 

Commander to meet his specified mission objectives. 

More specifically dealing with RPAs, last year the Army’s Training and Doctrine 

Command (TRADOC) and the Air Force’s ACC signed the Army-Air Force UAS Enabling Concept that describes a concept for how theater-capable, multi-role UAS 

should be integrated. This document will be added to Joint Forces Command’s Joint 

Concept of Operations for UAS. 

JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER BASING

112. Senator SESSIONS. General Schwartz, the Air Force published the Notice of 

Intent concerning JSF basing on December 30, 2009. I understand that the decision 

on which ANG units will receive the first JSFs was very difficult. I am concerned 

with the fact that the aging F–16 fleet will begin reaching the end of their service 

life at the end of this decade. Can you give me some indication as to when the next 

round of JSF ANG basing assignments will be announced and how many additional 

units will be on this list? 

General SCHWARTZ. Yes. The first basing decisions will identify the training and 

operational basing for delivery of F–35 aircraft between 2013 and 2017. Formal environmental impact surveys will be completed for the preferred locations and reasonable alternatives, with records of decision issued in 2011. The Air Force has curVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:37 May 06, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00534 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\62155.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
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rently programmed to purchase up to a total of 1,763 aircraft between 2013 and 

2035. Consequently, the basing process will be repeated every 2 years for future 

bases, and will consider both the Active and Reserve installations. 

ACTIVE ASSOCIATION UNITS

113. Senator SESSIONS. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, last time we 

spoke, you strongly supported the active Association Program where ANG and AFR 

serve alongside Active Duty personnel. I am hearing that while Active Duty billets 

currently exist at ANG and AFR units, no personnel have been assigned to these 

positions. In light of this, can you tell me whether the Air Force is still committed 

to this concept and process? 

Secretary DONLEY and General SCHWARTZ. Yes, the Air Force remains committed 

to the Total Force integration process. Active duty personnel have been serving in 

active associations in the ANG/AFR units since 2007. Our desired end state is a 

leaner, more capable, and more efficient Air Force that leverages the strengths of 

our Active and Reserve components. We fully expect to create more associations, 

both active and classic, as we continue to transform our Air Force for the future. 

114. Senator SESSIONS. Secretary Donley and General Schwartz, when should 

these units expect to see their first Active Duty personnel arrive? 

Secretary DONLEY and General SCHWARTZ. The Active Duty Air Force is committed to Total Force Integration Initiatives and has been manning positions in the 

ANG/AFR units since 2007. The table below shows two examples of active duty personnel who are already in place, one unit from the Mobility Air Forces (KC–135) 

and the other unit from the Combat Air Forces (F–16). The 99th Air Refueling 

Squadron at Birmingham ANG, AL, is currently manned at 100 percent for officers 

(7 authorized/7 assigned) with another 8 inbound as the unit gains more billets; enlisted manning for the same unit is currently 50 percent (60 authorized/30 assigned) 

with an additional 33 inbound. Similarly, the 157th Fighter Squadron at McEntire 

Joint National Guard Base, SC, is manned at 100 percent for officers and 87 percent 

for enlisted. 

Platform Location Unit Position Authorized Assigned Percent Comments 

KC–135 Birmingham ANG, AL 99th Air Refueling 

Recon Sq.

Officer .. 7 7 100 8 add’l inbound 

Enlisted 60 30 50 33 add’l inbound 

F–16 ..... McEntire Joint National Guard Base, 

SC.

157th Fighter Squadron.Officer .. 9 9 100 

Enlisted 8 7 87 1 add’l inbound 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR DAVID VITTER

BARKSDALE AIR FORCE BASE

115. Senator VITTER. Secretary Donley, I want to again express my deep appreciation that the Air Force chose to locate Global Strike Command (AFGSC) at 

Barksdale AFB in Louisiana. How important do you view AFGSC in the Air Force’s 

long-term plans? 

Secretary DONLEY. ‘‘Continuing to Strengthen the Nuclear Enterprise’’ is the Air 

Force’s top priority. Establishing a new command dedicated to this effort was essential to strengthening the Nuclear Enterprise. 

The fundamental mission of Air Force Global Strike Command is to provide safe, 

secure, and effective forces for strategic deterrence and for global strike capabilities 

both to deter aggression against the United States and to provide assurance to our 

allies. 

AFGSC is critical to the Air Force’s contribution to strategic deterrence. Over the 

past year, we transferred 8th Air Force and 20th Air Force to AFGSC along with 

their associated nuclear-capable bombers and ICBMs. These forces represent twothirds of our strategic nuclear Triad and are vital to the day-to-day deterrence operations for our Nation. 

116. Senator VITTER. Secretary Donley, is there consideration by the Air Force to 

make AFGSC a four-star command? 

530 

Secretary DONLEY. There is no consideration at this time to make AFGSC a fourstar command. 

117. Senator VITTER. Secretary Donley, I understand that the Air Force has decided to wait until the conclusion of a Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) 

follow-on and the Nuclear Posture Review to make a final decision on whether or 

not to execute the recertification of the Weapons Storage Area (WSA) at Barksdale 

AFB, despite Congress appropriating $77 million for the project to fulfill the Air 

Force’s fiscal year 2010 budget request. Can you give me some insight as to what 

scenarios and outcomes might preclude the Air Force from moving forward with the 

re-certification of the Barksdale WSA? 

Secretary DONLEY. The New START treaty reduces U.S. nuclear force structure. 

The Air Force has elected to delay a final decision on the Barksdale WSA until the 

New START treaty force structure is decided. Once a final force structure is determined, we will work closely with the Commander of Air Force Global Strike Command to determine the requirements and operational considerations required to 

support the revised force structure. 

SPACE AND CYBERSPACE VULNERABILITIES

118. Senator VITTER. General Schwartz, last month you stated that our space and 

cyberspace missions are at risk. We are increasingly reliant on our technology that 

helps make our military the best in the world, and we clearly need to address potential vulnerabilities. Please describe the most prominent space and cyberspace 

vulnerabilities that concern you. 

General SCHWARTZ. The details of adversary threats to our space systems are classified at numerous different levels. At an unclassified level, we’ve seen a demonstrated anti-satellite kill capability and a historic well-developed counter-space 

program threatening our strategic communications, navigation/timing, and overhead 

collection satellite missions. On a broader scale, due to the widespread proliferation 

of satellite communication and Global Positioning System jammers among multiple 

other nations, U.S. tactical military advantage on the battlefield in local conflicts 

can be degraded. 

Conceptually, just as effective is a cyber attack on the satellite system ground infrastructure that serves command and control, and data links. Cyber attack on the 

ground networks could potentially degrade an individual satellite or an entire constellation. DOD depends on a robust command and control, and information sharing 

network. Our adversaries know this and undoubtedly seek to deny us this capability. 

The Air Force has a significant program underway to evolve to one Air Force network. Additionally, with the establishment of 24th Air Force under Air Force Space 

Command, the Air Force is refining its command and control relationships for network operations, not only within the Air Force, but with the Joint Information Enterprise as well. This single network, reporting to one Air Force Network Operations 

Commander, reduces our vulnerabilities, and leads to a more efficient and effective 

command and control, and information sharing construct. 

119. Senator VITTER. General Schwartz, are you confident that the President’s 

budget request fully addresses potential vulnerabilities that concern you? 

General SCHWARTZ. The President’s budget request addresses these vulnerabilities 

and is based on inputs from the combatant commanders, and guidance from OSD 

and the Joint Staff to prioritize our capabilities and warfighting dependencies. 

Armed with a clear understanding of the threat environment and associated capability shortfalls, we developed an optimized investment strategy aimed at reducing 

risk in our highest priority programs. 

120. Senator VITTER. General Schwartz, do you think the budget request is ambitious and forward-looking to address vulnerabilities in space and cyberspace? 

General SCHWARTZ. In building the fiscal year 2011 President’s budget request, 

we conducted rigorous enterprise-wide assessments that considered the threats of a 

future operating environment, capability shortfalls, space and cyberspace system solutions, and reasonable fiscal projections, with the goal of maximizing Air Force contributions to national defense in these increasingly contested domains. The budget 

request is designed to reduce risk in our highest priority programs, while accepting 

more risk where feasible. 

531 

121. Senator VITTER. General Schwartz, are there other space or cyberspace investments or initiatives that should be funded that were not included in the President’s budget? 

General SCHWARTZ. Consistent with national imperatives and space and cyber policy objectives, we have put forward a budget request that reflects our strategy of 

sustaining current capabilities while also delivering new capabilities to combatant 

commanders and national agencies. 

AIR FORCE PERSONNEL RECRUITING

122. Senator VITTER. Secretary Donley, military recruiting picked up last year as 

Services met and exceeded goals. To what do you attribute this success? 

Secretary DONLEY. Air Force Recruiting Service (AFRS) continued success with 

enlisted accessions goals can be credited to the numerous opportunities we provide, 

as well as the Air Force reputation and lifestyle. Additionally, our highly-motivated, 

trained, all-volunteer recruiting force enthusiastically gets the word out to the 

young men and women in the Nation to be a part of the Air Force team. For some 

of our harder to fill specialties, a vital element for successful recruiting is the ability 

to offer bonuses and incentives where we have traditionally experienced shortfalls. 

123. Senator VITTER. Secretary Donley, do you believe that the Air Force can meet 

or exceed recruiting goals this year? 

Secretary DONLEY. The Air Force is on track to meet its enlisted goal and is currently at 100 percent (12,950 of 12,950) of the October through February goal. Officer accession is projected at 92.4 percent (4,604 of 4,979) for the yearly goal. Of the 

4,979 goal, USAFA, AFROTC, AECP, and other programs account for 3,276 accessions (66 percent). The remaining 1,703 is the Air Force Recruiting Service’s share, 

which accounts for health professions, chaplains, and OTS candidates. Of that 

group, recruiting fully qualified health professionals continues to be a challenge. As 

of 28 Feb, we have accessed 16.4 percent (130 of 794). The Health Professional 

Scholarship Program allows us to ‘‘grow our own,’’ and continued funding is critical 

to the success of this program because Health Professional Scholarship Program accessions are historically better than recruiting fully qualified health professionals. 

The program received more bonus dollars this year, but still not enough to match 

bonuses to accession requirements. For example: 65 Pharmacist requirements and 

only 45 bonuses; 43 Public Health requirements and 10 bonuses; 60 Psychologist requirements and 15 bonuses. 

The Air Force Reserve is on track to meet its enlisted and officer goals; it is currently at 100.4 percent (4,265 of 4,250) and 96.5 percent (410 of 425) respectively, 

of the October through February goals. 

The ANG is on track to meet its enlisted goal and is currently at 111.7 percent 

(3,041 of 2,722) of the October through February goal. Officer accessions, currently 

at 45.4 percent (470 of 1,036) of the October through February goal, remain a challenge. The Guard has issued a national incentive-eligible list of critically manned 

skills, and has provided the Retention Office Managers real-time capability to review data and make national updates. 

[Whereupon, at 12:01 p.m., the committee adjourned.] 

(533) 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION 

FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 

2011 

TUESDAY, MARCH 9, 2010 

U.S. SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, 

Washington, DC. 

U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND, U.S. AFRICA COMMAND, AND 

U.S. JOINT FORCES COMMAND 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:03 a.m. in room SH– 

216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin (chairman) 

presiding. 

Committee members present: Senators Levin, Lieberman, Reed, 

Bill Nelson, Udall, Hagan, Burris, McCain, Inhofe, and LeMieux. 

Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk. 

Majority staff members present: Jessica L. Kingston, research assistant; Michael J. Kuiken, professional staff member; Gerard J. 

Leeling, counsel; Jason W. Maroney, counsel; William G.P. 

Monahan, counsel; John H. Quirk V, professional staff member; 

and William K. Sutey, professional staff member. 

Minority staff members present: Joseph W. Bowab, Republican 

staff director; Paul C. Hutton IV, professional staff member; Michael V. Kostiw, professional staff member; Daniel A. Lerner, professional staff member; and Lucian L. Niemeyer, professional staff 

member. 

Staff assistants present: Christine G. Lang, Hannah I. Lloyd, 

Brian F. Sebold, and Breon N. Wells. 

Committee members’ assistants present: James Tuite, assistant 

to Senator Byrd; Christopher Griffin, assistant to Senator 

Lieberman; Carolyn Chuhta, assistant to Senator Reed; Greta 

Lundeberg, assistant to Senator Bill Nelson; Roger Pena, assistant 

to Senator Hagan; John Richards, assistant to Senator Begich; Sandra Luff, assistant to Senator Sessions; Jason Lawrence, assistant 

to Senator Chambliss; Jason Van Beek, assistant to Senator 

Thune; Erskine Wells III, assistant to Senator Wicker; and Victor 

Cervino and Brian Walsh, assistants to Senator LeMieux. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN 

Chairman LEVIN. Good morning, everybody. Today’s hearing is 

the first in a series of hearings that our committee will hold over 

the coming weeks with our combatant commanders to receive their 

534 

testimony on the U.S. military strategy and operational requirements in their areas of responsibility (AORs). This is part of the 

committee’s review of the National Defense Authorization Request 

for Fiscal Year 2011. 

This morning, the committee receives testimony from Admiral 

James Stavridis, Commander, U.S. European Command (EUCOM) 

and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) Supreme Allied Commander Europe; General William Ward, Commander, U.S. 

Africa Command (AFRICOM); and General James Mattis, Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM). 

First let me take this opportunity on behalf of the committee to 

request that you pass along our gratitude to the men and women 

in your command and to their families for their commitment and 

their sacrifice in carrying out the missions of our commands. 

While Admiral Stavridis is not new to appearing before this committee, this is his first time testifying as EUCOM Commander and 

Supreme Allied Commander Europe. EUCOM’s engagement with 

our allies and partners in Europe is an essential component of the 

trans-Atlantic relationship. Nowhere are the benefits of this relationship more clearly demonstrated than in Afghanistan, where 43 

countries and nearly 40,000 non-U.S. troops, the vast majority of 

which come from countries in the EUCOM AOR, are participating 

in the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). 

EUCOM’s efforts to build the capacity and interoperability of our 

allies and partners in Europe are an important contribution to 

ISAF’s mission to bring security and stability to Afghanistan. 

We welcome the increased commitment of forces by our ISAF coalition partners since President Obama announced the commitment 

of additional U.S. forces in December. In addition, ISAF soldiers 

from Britain, Denmark, Estonia, and Canada joined U.S. soldiers 

and marines and Afghan troops in the recent combat operations in 

Helmand Province, and more than a dozen ISAF troops have died 

in that operation. We honor their sacrifice and the sacrifice of their 

families. 

At the same time, an issue that I want to get into further this 

morning is the continuing shortfall by our NATO allies to provide 

the additional trainers the NATO training mission in Afghanistan 

needs to build up the Afghan National Army and Police. It’s apparent that growing the Afghan security forces so that they can take 

responsibility for ensuring their country’s security is essential for 

the success of our counterinsurgency strategy and for meeting the 

July 2011 date that President Obama has set for the start of the 

reduction of U.S. troops in Afghanistan. There is no shortage of recruits for the Afghan Army, thanks in part to that July 2011 date, 

which has energized Afghanistan’s leaders to bring in more recruits. 

According to General Bill Caldwell, the head of our training mission in Afghanistan, a major problem is the continuing shortage of 

trainers to provide the initial basic training. Training the Afghan 

Army is a mission that our NATO allies should embrace, regardless 

of their ability or their willingness to be on the front line of the 

fight. Yet, at a recent conference to generate forces NATO members 

pledged fewer than half of the approximately 1,200 additional 

535 

NATO trainers sought by General Caldwell. That is more than disappointing; it is unacceptable. 

EUCOM faces a number of other security challenges within its 

AOR. President Obama’s new plan for missile defense in Europe, 

the Phased Adaptive Approach, is supported by our NATO allies. 

In addition, later this year NATO plans to complete a revised strategic concept for how the alliance should adapt to today’s security 

challenges, the first major revision of NATO’s strategic concept 

since the events of September 11. 

General Ward, the challenges in the AFRICOM AOR are staggering, from the conflicts that rage across borders to fragile governments, to nations where peacekeeping or peace-enforcing forces are 

the best and sometimes only hope for security and stability, and to 

the spread of violent extremism. 

While confronting some of these issues falls squarely in the lap 

of a military command, many do not. Your command is being directed to assist in nontraditional ways where the jurisdictional 

lines between the Departments of State and Defense are blurred at 

best. The committee looks forward to your testimony on these 

issues and AFRICOM’s activities designed to confront and to 

counter them. 

The threat of terrorism from Africa, and particularly the potential for havens and recruiting grounds for terrorists in ungoverned 

or undergoverned areas, are cause for deep concern. The attempted 

Christmas Day bombing of an airliner reminds everybody that al 

Qaeda and violent extremists who share their ideology are not just 

located in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region, but in places like Somalia, Mali, Nigeria, and Niger. The committee is eager to hear 

how AFRICOM is working to confront those very real threats. 

Turning to JFCOM, General Mattis is responsible for the training, certification, and mission readiness of our Armed Forces as the 

joint force provider for present and future operational needs. I hope 

that General Mattis will discuss how JFCOM has changed and promoted Department of Defense (DOD) practices that result in more 

efficient and effective policies and coordination with respect to joint 

operations, as well as meeting the anticipated threats of the future. 

We’re also interested in hearing about the role of JFCOM with 

respect to the drawdown of forces in Iraq. Specifically of interest 

would be your views on: how the withdrawal of U.S. forces from 

Iraq will have an impact on JFCOM’s ability to source the combatant commander’s requirements in the future; how the Services and 

other Government agencies are preparing to execute the drawdown, 

and how well the Services are meeting their expected dwell times 

to restore readiness rates. 

In addition, as persistent conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq continue to stress our Armed Forces, our committee is interested in 

hearing your assessment, General, of the readiness of deploying 

forces. 

Again, we thank our witnesses for their dedicated and continued 

service and we look forward to your testimony. 

Senator McCain. 

536 

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN 

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank all the 

witnesses for being here today. I’m grateful for your service and 

that of all the brave men and women under your commands. 

Many of my colleagues and I have been strong supporters of our 

trans-Atlantic partnerships in the NATO alliance. During the Cold 

War, NATO succeeded, as we all know, in promoting and protecting 

freedom and democracy in Europe and we won. But today the alliance is facing a number of very significant challenges. Secretary 

Gates rightly said in his speech at the NATO strategic concept 

seminar last month, ‘‘Unless the strategic concept spurs operational and institutional changes, it will not be worth the paper it’s 

printed on.’’ 

Right now the alliance has serious budgetary problems and is facing a budget shortfall of some $900 million. The problem is not 

just the current underfunding of NATO. Over the years, NATO and 

the national defense budgets consistently have declined to where 

only 5 of its 28 member states are obligating the required defense 

spending of 2 percent of gross domestic product. 

While the war in Afghanistan has shown a light on NATO’s diminished capacity, these shortcomings are not new. For years before Afghanistan NATO, due to its limited budgets, has let its capabilities decline. For example, NATO lacks the cargo airlift, the helicopters, aerial refueling tankers, and intelligence, surveillance, and 

reconnaissance (ISR) platforms needed to be effective in Afghanistan or in any other future conflict. 

Member states should be explaining to their parliaments and to 

their citizens that NATO faces common threats and shares common 

goals. I am concerned that they continue to allow the idea to build 

up among their publics that NATO is fighting wars because the 

Americans are making them do it. The alliance must be about more 

than fulfilling our obligations under Article 5, as essential as that 

is. It must also serve to deter potential adversaries and build partner capacity within the alliance and beyond. Only then can we 

begin to collectively transform our alliance from one of common defense to one of common security. 

Admiral Stavridis, I look forward to hearing your thoughts on 

the future of defense spending among our NATO allies and your 

prescription for developing and better leveraging NATO’s capabilities to meet future threats. 

I strongly believe it’s important to nurture and scrutinize old 

friendships. It’s equally important to develop and foster new ones. 

Africa is a continent full of potential friends and allies. We often 

grow too complacent and lack the foresight to prepare for the 

things we don’t expect, and that’s why I’m glad we have 

AFRICOM. Africa, as we know, has always been vulnerable to illicit trafficking due to widespread corruption, poor governance, and 

abject poverty. 

Somalis continue to flow into Yemen and train with al Qaeda 

and its affiliates, and we don’t have to look any further than the 

Christmas Day bomber, a Nigerian, as proof that violent extremists 

exist in many places we’re not thinking about or fighting a war. 

But we have partners in the region. Malian troops have launched 

an offensive against al Qaeda along its northern border with 

537 

Algieria and lost as many as 13 troops last summer. African nations are vulnerable to a variety of threats, narcotrafficking, piracy, 

and terrorism, any of which would further weaken an already fragile region. 

So, General Ward, I look forward to hearing your testimony and 

your command’s need for trainers, forces, and resources. 

General Mattis, your leadership of JFCOM comes at a time when 

our troops are engaged more than ever in joint operations. The 

branches of our Armed Forces are expected not only to team with 

one another, but with allies and host nation troops, as we have 

seen most recently in the offensive in Marjah. The committee is interested in understanding how JFCOM is preparing our troops to 

operate jointly and what steps you believe the Services should be 

taking in this regard. I’m also curious about how the rapidly changing feedback from the field in Iraq and Afghanistan will be incorporated in JFCOM’s future doctrinal development. 

You’re all highly decorated and highly respected members of the 

military. I appreciate your service and weigh your opinions, requests, and predictions heavily, so I look forward to hearing all of 

your testimonies. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Senator McCain follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and thank you to the witnesses. I am grateful for your 

service, and that of all of the brave men and women under your command. 

Many of my colleagues and I have been strong supporters of our trans-Atlantic 

partnerships and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) alliance. During 

the Cold War, NATO succeeded in promoting and protecting freedom and democracy 

in Europe—and we won. But today, the alliance is facing a number of problems. 

Secretary Gates rightly said in his speech at the NATO Strategic Concept Seminar last month, ‘‘ . . . unless, the Strategic Concept spurs operational and institutional changes . . . it will not be worth the paper it is printed on.’ ’’ 

Right now, the alliance has serious budgetary problems and is facing a budget shortfall of some $900 million. The problem is not just the current underfunding of 

NATO. Over the years, NATO and national defense budgets consistently have declined to where only 5 of its 28 member states are paying the required defense 

spending of 2 percent of gross domestic product. 

While the war in Afghanistan has shined a light on NATO’s diminished capacity, 

these shortcomings are not new. For years before Afghanistan, NATO—due to limited budgets—has let its capabilities decline. For example, NATO lacks the cargo 

airlift, the helicopters, aerial refueling tankers and the ISR platforms needed to be 

effective in Afghanistan or any other future conflict. 

Member states must explain to their parliaments and to their citizens that NATO 

faces common threats and shares common goals. They cannot continue to allow the 

idea to build up among their publics that NATO is fighting wars because the Americans are making them do it. The alliance must be about more than fulfilling our 

obligations under Article 5, as essential as that is. It must also serve to deter potential adversaries and build partner capacity within the alliance and beyond. Only 

then can we begin to collectively transform our alliance from one of common defense 

to one of common security. 

Admiral Stavridis, I look forward to hearing your thoughts on the future of defense spending among our NATO allies and your prescription for developing and 

better leveraging NATO’s capabilities to meet future threats. 

While I strongly believe it is important to nurture and scrutinize old friendships, 

it is equally important to develop and foster new ones. Africa is a continent full of 

potential friends and allies. We often grow too complacent and lack the foresight to 

prepare for the things we don’t expect. That is why I am glad we have Africa Command. 

Africa has always been vulnerable to illicit trafficking due to widespread corruption, poor governance and abject poverty. Somalis continue to flow into Yemen and 

train with al Qaeda and its affiliates and we don’t have to look any further than 

538 

the Christmas Day bomber, a Nigerian, as proof that violent extremists exist in 

many places we’re not thinking about or fighting a war. 

But we have partners in the region. Malian troops have launched offensives 

against al Qaeda along its northern border with Algiers and lost as many as 33 

troops last summer. African nations are vulnerable to a variety of threats: narcotrafficking, piracy and terrorism. Any of which could further weaken an already 

fragile region. So, General Ward, I look forward to hearing your testimony and your 

command’s need for trainers, forces and resources. 

General Mattis, your leadership of Joint Forces Command comes at a time when 

our troops are engaged more than ever in ‘joint’ operations. The branches of our 

armed services are expected not only to team with one another but with allies and 

host-nation troops, as we have seen most recently in the offensive in Marjah. The 

Committee is interested in understanding how Joint Forces Command is preparing 

our troops to operate ‘jointly’ and what steps you believe the Services should be taking in this regard. I am also curious about how the rapidly changing feedback from 

the field in Iraq and Afghanistan will be incorporated in Joint Command’s future 

doctrinal development. 

You are all highly decorated officers, and I appreciate your service and weigh your 

opinions, requests and predictions heavily. So, I look forward to hearing all of your 

testimonies. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator McCain. 

We’ll start with you, Admiral Stavridis. 

STATEMENT OF ADM JAMES G. STAVRIDIS, USN, COMMANDER, 

U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Thank you very much, Senator Levin, Senator McCain, and all the members of the committee who are taking 

the time to hear from my two very good friends and wingmen this 

morning, General Kip Ward and General Jim Mattis. I feel as a 

Navy Admiral very safe between these two distinguished combat 

veterans. 

I want to thank Congress, I want to thank this committee, for 

the support you give us in all of our operations. It’s vital and it 

translates directly to our men and women, and we thank you for 

it. 

I’ll be glad to talk about all of the things that were raised by the 

chairman and the ranking member. In Afghanistan, I would say 

that I am cautiously optimistic. I think Secretary Gates yesterday 

in Afghanistan put it very well: We have some challenges ahead, 

but we are seeing some bits and pieces of good news. I’ll be glad 

to talk about some of those. 

Senator Levin, I agree completely that we need to focus like a 

laser on trainers for the NATO forces. I’m committed to doing that 

and I’ll talk about it as we go along. 

I did want to mention also we’re very engaged from a EUCOM 

perspective in the Balkans. We don’t talk a lot about that these 

days, but I think we see a real success story emerging in the Balkans. If we look back 10 years ago when we had almost 30,000 U.S. 

troops in the Balkans, today we’re down to about 1,200, and our 

allies are working very hard in the Balkans as we move toward a 

safer and more secure area there. 

I’d also like to touch on cyber and some of my concerns there, 

talk a little about Iran and potential threats to Europe, touch on 

our relations with Russia, and then talk a bit about some of the 

initiatives we’re undertaking at EUCOM which focus on interagency, international, private-public partnering, and the use of effective strategic communications. 

539 

Sir, I’ll close by saying I represent here 80,000 brave men and 

women from EUCOM. They’re all proud to serve. They’re all volunteers. They thank you for your support. 

Thank you, sir. 

[The prepared statement of Admiral Stavridis follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY ADM JAMES G. STAVRIDIS, USN 

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member McCain, and distinguished members of the committee, I would like to thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to 

share with you the challenges and successes achieved by the men and women of 

both European Command and Allied Command Operations. Although I have only 

been at the helm of these Commands for less than a year, I am happy to report 

we are making great progress and we are moving assertively toward stronger partnerships for our shared security. Truly, the most important activities we have undertaken in the past year have been those in which we worked together with our 

Allies and partners to build their capacity, as well as our own, to ensure security 

in the European theater and defend our homeland forward. These kinds of activities 

demonstrate the three essential pillars I believe are necessary for success. 

First, we must understand the military is but one link in the chain anchoring our 

national security. Those of us in uniform are well trained and capable of performing 

a wide range of duties, but many of the dangers posed to our national security elicit 

more than just a military response. Instead, they call for a ‘‘whole-of-government’’ 

approach that requires partnering with other agencies such as the Department of 

State (DOS) leading diplomacy, U.S. Agency for International Development leading 

development, Department of the Treasury, Department of Energy, Department of 

Homeland Security, and other departments and agencies of our Government to ensure we use all the means available to ensure our national security. Several U.S. 

Departments and Agencies either have representatives at our headquarters in Stuttgart or will have them in place this fiscal year. More than a tool or a method, 

‘‘Interagency Partnering’’ is an expanding paradigm at EUCOM and we are intent 

on serving as a model of interagency cooperation. 

Second, not only must we work with our interagency partners, we must also cooperate closely with our international partners as well. Our aim is to undertake 

international security cooperation in a way that recognizes and leverages the histories, cultures, and languages of our allies and partners, and enhances our collective capability. 

Finally, it is important that we employ effective strategic communication in everything we do. Our deeds and words should communicate clearly and credibly our values and priorities to allies, partners, friends, and even enemies. 

Our partnerships in Europe are strong. We share a great deal of history and culture based on democratic values. Our own democracy was born of the great European thinkers from Plato to Voltaire, and great works that shaped our own Constitution, like the Magna Carta. Waves of immigrants from Europe have helped 

build our country, and many of the families of those immigrants still have strong 

ties to societies on the European continent. These strong personal transatlantic ties 

unite us in common goals and enduring partnerships. 

540 

During the past year, European Command’s 80,000 soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and civilians have executed many programs, side-by-side with our allies and 

partners, which have truly made us ‘‘Stronger Together.’’ Let me summarize some 

key European Command accomplishments and initiatives: 

• Provided predeployment training to thousands of Europe-based U.S. forces and 

over 100 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Operational Mentoring 

and Liaison Teams slated for deployment in Afghanistan 

• Provided forces and critical support for the movement of equipment and personnel between the Continental United States and the Central Command Region in support of overseas contingency operations 

• Provided a world class medical center, Landstuhl Regional Medical Center, used 

as the primary trauma facility supporting U.S. forces in Europe and the Middle 

East 

• Executed 38 major exercises involving nearly 50,000 U.S., allied, and partner 

nation personnel and 45 partner nations 

• Conducted 151 security assistance projects in 19 countries 

• Reorganized to better engage and collaborate with NATO, the interagency, academia, the private sector, think tanks, and international and nongovernmental 

organizations 

PROGRESS

Think of U.S. European Command as part of a bridge: one that spans the broad 

North Atlantic. Our fundamental purpose is to defend the United States of America. 

To do so, we must keep that trans-Atlantic bridge strong. 


309ful1.eps 309ful2.eps
541 

In a dynamic region, European Command continues achieving success by 

partnering with allies to increase their capacity and ours to contribute to international security-enhancing solutions. Below are some examples highlighting this 

approach: 

Joint Multi-National Readiness Center 

The Joint Multi-National Readiness Center supports European Command and 

Central Command operations by providing predeployment training to Europe-based 

U.S. forces and NATO Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams slated for deployment to Afghanistan. Currently, the Center provides enduring Observer/Controller 

support to the United States Security Coordinator (USSC) Israel to train the Palestinian National Security Forces. Joint Multi-National Readiness Center observer/ 

controllers were also instrumental in the successful predeployment training of the 

Jordanian 2nd Ranger Battalion for operations in support of Afghanistan’s national 

elections. We have trained almost 4,000 soldiers thus far. Through these training 

efforts, EUCOM enabled partner nations in making contributions to the effort in Afghanistan. However, we require expanded long-term authorities and funding to enhance and continue these efforts. 

Georgia Deployment Program-International Security Assistance Force 

Marine Forces Europe directly supports the Republic of Georgia’s 2-year program 

to deploy Georgian forces alongside Marine Forces to Afghanistan. The Georgia Deployment Program-International Security Assistance Force will deploy four rotations 

of a Georgian battalion with a Marine Corps Marine Expeditionary Brigade to Afghanistan. As capabilities improve, Georgian forces are expected to be able to operate independently. By using Georgian shadow instructors Marine Forces Europe will 

create a Georgian training group that will largely take over the Partnership Training Program by their fourth rotation. 

The National Guard State Partnership Program 

The National Guard State Partnership Program links individual State National 

Guard organizations with a particular European nation. The National Guard of Illinois, for example, partners with Poland. The State Partnership Program makes 

large multi-faceted contributions to security both within and outside Europe. The 

21 European State Partnerships undertake a broad range of projects, including a 

capacity-building program generating 4 enduring European Command State Partnership Program Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams conducting combat operations in Afghanistan. This program has the additional benefit of building critical 

long-term personal and professional relationships between the States and European 

nations because many of the same personnel return year after year to train with 

their counterparts. 


309ful3.eps
542 

Support to NATO Response Force 

We are providing personnel to support multiple 2009 training and certification 

events through U.S. European Command. This effort enhanced the training and certification of the Land Component Command and assisted the NATO Response 

Force’s Joint Logistics Support Group in reaching advanced operational capability. 

This high level of operational acumen is key to ensuring the Force maintains the 

deployment capability required to execute its core mission. 

Support to Operation Joint Guardian, Kosovo 

The United States’ continuing support to NATO’s Kosovo Force Operation Joint 

Guardian helps maintain stability in Kosovo and advances security progress alongside our NATO and European Union partners. European Command supports Kosovo 

Force through our land component, U.S. Army Europe, and leverages National 

Guard Bureau forces to source Task Force Falcon (Multi-national Task Force-East), 

Regional Mentoring and Liaison Teams, NATO Training Teams, elements of the 

Kosovo Force Headquarters, as well as augmenting the Kosovo Force Military-Civilian Advisory Division by providing mentors and advisors. In June of last year, the 

North Atlantic Council approved the plan to begin a drawdown from Focused Engagement (current force structure) to a Deterrent Presence. Accomplishment of Deterrent Presence, which will reduce NATO force presence from approximately 14,000 

to 2,500, began in January 2010 and, based on a coordinated review of political and 

security conditions on the ground may occur in three phases. Today Kosovo remains 

stable and secure—a real allied success, but NATO’s North Atlantic Council will 

continue to evaluate further drawdown. 

Reduction of U.S. presence in Bosnia-Herzegovina 

European Command has played a significant role in Bosnia’s progress since the 

1995 implementation of the Dayton Accords. At the height of Operation Joint Endeavor in 1996, more than 20,000 U.S. servicemembers served in Bosnia. The September 2009 deactivation of Task Force Dayton, the last U.S. entity operating in 

Bosnia-Herzegovina, marked a significant milestone for U.S. European Command. 

Less than 20 U.S. personnel now remain in Bosnia assigned to the NATO Headquarters-Sarajevo and the U.S. Balkans National Support Element. European Command continues building partnership capacity with Bosnia through focused security 

cooperation initiatives to include International Military Education and Training, 

Foreign Military Financing, Joint Contact Team Program familiarizations, and the 

State Partnership Program with Maryland’s Army National Guard. In a show of its 

increasing capacity, Bosnia assumed a key leadership role during European Command’s 2009 Combined Endeavor exercise involving 39 countries and 1,200 personnel. European Command is also developing a bilateral exercise program to further focus on defense reform, Euro-Atlantic integration, support to Overseas Contingency Operations, and capacity building. Because of the progress in Bosnia, the Nation contributed consistently to the coalition effort in Iraq between 2005 and 2008 

and will deploy personnel to Afghanistan in the near future. 


309ful4.eps
543 

Multi-National Joint and Interagency Exercises 

The most intensive form of peacetime interaction with our allies and partners occurs in the conduct of joint exercises. European Command maintained a robust bilateral and multilateral exercise program last year, executing 38 major exercises involving nearly 50,000 U.S., allied, and partner nation personnel and 45 partner nations. The exercises focused on preparing partner nations for ongoing coalition operations to include International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan, NATO 

interoperability, and improving our military capability and interoperability with 

Israel. 

In support of NATO, European Command provided forces for 12 NATO and NATO 

Partnership for Peace events in the Baltics. U.S. Naval Forces Europe also executed 

Exercise Baltic Operations, a longstanding multinational maritime exercise including 14 nations focused on maritime and amphibious interoperability. In the Balkans, two major exercises, Medical Central and Eastern Europe Exercise 2009 and 

Combined Endeavor, discussed above, bolstered partner capabilities and eased regional tensions. Medical Central and Eastern Europe Exercise 2009, U.S. European 

Command’s first large scale exercise in Serbia, included 14 nations and focused on 

medical readiness and disaster response. This exercise also supported the U.S. 

Agency for International Development’s Preparedness, Planning and Economic Security program that has been making Serbian municipalities more resilient to crises 

and disasters. 

Of particular note, European Command conducted a theater-wide Exercise, Jackal 

Stone, a Special Operations Headquarters and Field Training Exercise executed in 

Croatia and distributed locations throughout the theater involving more than 10 nations and 1,500 partner nation Special Operation Forces personnel. This event, 

along with other special operations exercises and Joint Combined Exchange Training events in over 30 countries, directly supported U.S. and partner Special Operations Forces readiness and contributions to International Security Assistance Force 

and other endeavors. 

European Command continues a high level of engagement with Israel, conducting 

500+ theater security cooperation events annually and chairing four bi-lateral, biennial conferences spanning planning, logistics, exercises, and interoperability. The 

U.S.-Israel exercise portfolio also includes eight major reoccurring exercises. European Command leadership and staff maintain uniquely strong, recurring, personal 

and direct interactions with counterparts on the Israel Defense Force. These regular 

and direct relationships have paid dividends as the placement of the AN/TPY–2 

radar in Israel resulted in a dramatic uptick in both senior level and operator level 

interaction. European Command Headquarters executed Austere Challenge 2009, 

the premier joint force headquarters exercise in the European Command Theater, 

with a crisis action planning phase in January 2009 and an operations phase in 

May 2009. 

Building on the success from Southern Command’s exercise Blue Advance 2008, 

European Command benefitted from the participation of an Integration Planning 

Cell with representatives from the U.S. Department of Agriculture, the Department 

of Justice, and the U.S. Agency for International Development. The Department of 

State’s Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization led the Integration Planning Cell, which also featured the first-time participation of the newly 

formed Advance Civilian Team, which was colocated with EUCOM’s Joint Task 

Force headquarters. Together, the Integration Planning Cell and Advance Civilian 

Team comprised the largest interagency involvement to date in any Combatant 

Command exercise. The benefits of this structure are clear: most real-world challenges require an interagency approach to solve and our robust exercise program reflects this understanding. 

Austere Challenge 2010 will feature multiple event-driven scenarios requiring 

multiple joint task forces and will involve a Combined Joint Air Coordination Center 

led for the first time by the French Air Force. On a smaller scale, Flexible Leader 

is a Command Post Exercise, focusing on Foreign Consequence Management and 

Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief planning and operations, and strengthening our ‘‘whole-of-government’’ approach through engagement with various U.S. 

agencies as well as partner nations and nongovernmental organizations. 

None of these events would be possible without Commander Exercise Engagement 

and Training Transformation Funding. The support from Joint Forces Command 

Joint Warfighting Center is also a keystone to this command’s capability to plan, 

manage, and execute these challenging joint exercises. In addition to the extensive 

engagement European Command has with partner nations, there are additional 

major projects. 

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Logistical Support to Contingency Operations from Spain 

In support of ongoing overseas contingency operations, European Command continues providing critical coordination and support for the movement of key U.S. 

equipment and personnel between the Continental United States and the Central 

Command region. 

Exercising Nuclear Command and Control 

In May 2009, the Joint Staff conducted a Staff Assessment Visit on the European 

Command Joint Operations Center and Joint Nuclear Operations Center, and the 

Joint Staff inspectors rated both centers’ performance as ‘‘excellent,’’ a repeat from 

last year’s positive assessment. 

Assistance to Turkey 

Increased intelligence sharing with the Turkish General Staff has increased the 

effectiveness of Turkish cross-border counterterrorism operations in Northern Iraq, 

leading to more precise Turkish action that reduces potential collateral damage and 

increases stability in the region. 

Humanitarian Assistance Programs 

European Command’s Humanitarian Assistance programs directly benefit the Nations where they are executed and consist of the Humanitarian and Civic Assistance 

Program, the Humanitarian Assistance-Other Program, and Humanitarian Assistance Program-Excess Property. 

Projects funded through these resources complement U.S. Agency for International Development efforts, enhance regional security cooperation, and advance 

U.S. interests throughout the region. They also bolster a country’s own capability 

to respond to disasters, thereby diminishing the need for future U.S. involvement, 

and provide an example of the value of a military during times of peace. While the 

European Command Humanitarian Assistance budget is relatively small, it has a 

disproportionately high and positive impact. Last year, the command executed over 

$9 million in Humanitarian Assistance Project funding for 151 security assistance 

related projects in 19 countries. 

Whole-of-Government/Whole-of-Society Approach 

Our Nation’s success in developing conventional combat power has driven our 

adversaries to other forms of warfare, necessitating a whole-of-government/whole-ofsociety approach. Interagency and international military partnering is the ‘‘heart of 

the enterprise’’ for this command. 

Embassy Country Teams, a perfect example of interagency partnering themselves, 

are our primary engagement entities for the 51 countries in our region. At the theater or regional level, however, the Geographic Combatant Commands can serve as 

a platform for hosting interagency partners wishing to coordinate their activities 

with the U.S. military. European Command presently hosts interagency representatives from the Department of State, Department of the Treasury, Agency for International Development, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement, and the Global Center for Security Cooperation; we will soon add repVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:37 May 06, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00550 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\62155.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB

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resentatives from Department of Homeland Security, Customs and Border Protection, Department of Energy, and the Drug Enforcement Administration. This cooperation helps us interact with allied and partner militaries who perform many 

nontraditional military activities: patrolling borders; responding to natural disasters; providing coastal security; and performing civilian air traffic control. 

We recently changed the organizational structure of European Command to better 

facilitate integration of our interagency partners. Starting at the top, we established 

a civilian deputy, an office now filled by Ambassador Kate Canavan, who in addition 

serves as European Command’s Political Advisor. Additionally, European Command’s newly formed J9 Interagency Directorate engages and collaborates with 

international and nongovernmental organizations, academia, the private sector, 

think tanks, and military organizations. We gain many advantages by leveraging 

the knowledge and fresh thinking of academics and business professionals, and 

international organizations and nongovernmental organizations have capabilities, 

access, and credibility in areas where the military does not. 

For example, we are in the very early stages of pursuing a whole-of-government/ 

whole-of-society approach in addressing regional narcotics and terrorism threats in 

Europe and Eurasia, similar to the interagency effort led by Joint Interagency Task 

Force-South in Key West. This would synchronize multiple combatant commands 

(European Command, Central Command, Africa Command) and the multitude of 

agencies working border control, counternarcotics, counterterrorism and trafficking 

of weapons of mass destruction, creating synergies that would add considerable capability and trust for our international partners while defending our Homeland forward. 

EUROPEAN COMMAND SERVICE COMPONENTS

U.S. Army Europe, U.S. Marine Corps Forces Europe, U.S. Naval Forces Europe, 

U.S. Air Forces in Europe, as well as European Command’s functional subordinate 

unified command for special operations, Special Operations Command Europe, are 

responsible for supporting our Theater Campaign Plan and implementing our Theater Security Cooperation programs across the region. The Service components provide the capabilities necessary to build military capacity among our partners and 

allies, conduct military operations, and promote vital national security interests. Reductions in their forces imposed by budget constraints necessarily diminish what 

they can accomplish. 


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With over 69,000 Active-Duty, Reserve, and civilian employees operating in 10 

main Army communities, U.S. Army Europe leads and supports 11 brigades postured in geographically-separated locations throughout Central Europe, from Mons, 

Belgium to Livorno, Italy. U.S. Army Europe provides key tactical and operational 

forces to include full spectrum combat units and strategic enablers for European 

Command, Operation Iraqi Freedom, Operation Enduring Freedom, and the International Security Assistance Force. The command currently has 25 percent of its 

soldiers operationally deployed but still continues to lead daily to build partner capacity and execute Theater Security Cooperation in support of USEUCOM’s strategy 

of active security and global requirements. U.S. Army Europe directly participates 

in cooperative efforts with over 80 percent of the countries that have forces actively 

serving in partnership with the United States in Overseas Contingency Operations. 

Activities with Allies and Partners 

U.S. Army Europe’s Joint Multinational Training Command in Germany is pivotal 

to the Building Partner Capacity mission. Joint Multinational Training Command 

builds expeditionary competencies and increased interoperability between partner 

nations’ militaries through collective multinational training and through certifying 

U.S. and coalition forces for deployments to International Security Assistance Force, 

Operation Iraqi Freedom, and Kosovo Force missions. Additionally, Joint Multinational Training Command has qualified over 500 soldiers from 21 nations in 

Counter-Improvised Explosive Device training and conducted mission rehearsal exercises for International Security Assistance Force North, South, and Central Regional Commands. 


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U.S. Army Europe leads Task Force-East as a European Command vehicle for fulfillment of the Theater Security Cooperation mission requirements set forth by the 

Defense Department and to reaffirm the U.S. commitment to our Black Sea allies. 

The command continuously maintains Task Force-East facilities and support services, and can quickly transition the facilities to support an increased posture for all 

European Command components and partners. Task Force-East provides important 

training opportunities not only for the U.S. military, but also to new Allies close to 

their forces’ home station. U.S. Army Europe’s forward presence in Romania and 

Bulgaria continues to facilitate NATO efforts to build and maintain an Alliance for 

the 21st century. 

This year, U.S. Army Europe participated in 26 major exercises in 22 different 

countries with 34 participating nations, of which 6 were in direct support to U.S. 

Africa Command. These exercises enabled U.S. Army Europe to meet European 

Command’s priority of sustaining the relevance of, and U.S. leadership within, 

NATO; assisting NATO countries with the capability to conduct out-of-area operations and ensuring a successful transition of U.S. Africa Command into a fully 

operational combatant command. U.S. Army Europe also acted as the lead organization in Austere Challenge 2009, a comprehensive command post exercise involving 

over 3,400 European Command forces, which certified European Command’s Combined Joint Task Force. 

U.S. Army Europe continues supporting Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring 

Freedom. In 2009, over half of U.S. Army Europe’s units trained and deployed to 

or returned from these operations. Currently, the 1st Armored Division Headquarters, 173rd Airborne Brigade Combat Team, and 2nd Stryker Cavalry Regiment 

are deployed in support of Overseas Contingency Operations. V Corps inactivation 

was delayed in order to deploy to Afghanistan, where it currently forms the core 

of International Security Assistance Force’s 3-star level command and control headquarters. 


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U.S. Army Europe also continues contributing significant operational support and 

sustainment forces in support of Overseas Contingency Operations in the U.S. Central Command and U.S. Africa Command region. Additionally, the 2nd Stryker Cavalry Regiment provided rotational forces for Task Force East in Romania and Bulgaria while at the same time supporting Denmark in their train-up for NATO Response Force-14. The 172nd Brigade Combat Team and 2nd Brigade, 1st Armored 

Division, which recently reflagged as the 170th Brigade Combat Team, redeployed 

from Iraq and are preparing for possible future rotations while completing their 

reset and dwell. 

Activities Conducted Unilaterally 

U.S. Army Europe continues executing its title 10 responsibilities through transformation planning initiatives in support of modernization and efficient basing. This 

past year, U.S. Army Europe transformed into a Theater Army functional staff configuration. This restructuring will result in European Command losing one of its 

Full Spectrum Joint Task Force/Joint Forces Land Component Command capable 

headquarters. This loss, combined with significant force requirements in support of 

Overseas Contingency Operations outside the European Command region, makes retaining one Tactical Intermediate Headquarters and four Brigade Combat Teams 

critical to U.S. Army Europe’s and European Command’s mission. Without the four 

Brigade Combat Teams and one tactical intermediate headquarters capability, European Command assumes risk in its capability to conduct steady-state security cooperation, shaping, and contingency missions. Deterrence and reassurance are at increased risk. 

While U.S. Army Europe is transforming, it is also optimizing its footprint and 

gaining basing efficiencies by consolidating across six Main Operating Bases in Germany and Italy by 2015. In support of this initiative, this past year U.S. Army Europe returned eight sites to host nation control. U.S. Army Europe projects a decrease in 1,400 soldiers this year as it continues to consolidate forces. 

With only a small service component headquarters, Marine Forces Europe very 

effectively leverages the capabilities of the Marine Corps in support of European 

Command objectives. Marine Forces Europe’s engagement in the region follows 


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three lines of operation: (1) building partner capacity, particularly through combined 

exercises; (2) utilizing expeditionary forces to contribute to conventional deterrence; 

and (3) supporting operations in Afghanistan. The primary focus of Marine Forces 

Europe Theater Security Cooperation activities is defense sector reform and 

professionalization of partner nations’ militaries in the Caucasus. The primary focus 

of Marine Forces Europe Theater Security Cooperation activities is defense sector 

reform and professionalization of partner nations’ militaries in the Caucasus. 

Collective Training Programs 

Engagements in Task Force East, Bulgaria and Volos, Greece 

Marine Forces Europe, in coordination with U.S. Naval Forces Europe, employed 

over 2,000 marines and sailors of the 22d Marine Expeditionary Unit between May 

and June 2009 on a scale not seen since Operation Iraqi Freedom. 

Maritime Prepositioning Force exercise, Loyal Midas 

Loyal Midas improved prepositioning equipment in support of expeditionary operations; a core competency. Loyal Midas experimented with procedures for tracking 

offloaded cargo from a prepositioning ship using new wireless technologies, and significantly improved European Command’s ability to rapidly deploy and assemble expeditionary forces in the region. 

Marine Corps Prepositioning Program-Norway 

Using this program, the Marine Corps worked with the Norwegian Defense Staff 

and Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps, and the European Command staff to develop 

a plan that enhances access to prepositioned equipment ashore. Participants analyzed joint U.S.-Norwegian agreements, and initiated a long-range plan for instituting an operating concept for the prepositioning facility. 

Georgia Deployment Program-International Security Assistance Force 

This program supports the sustained deployment of a Georgian infantry battalion 

to Afghanistan to operate as part of the Marine Expeditionary Brigade for 2 years. 

The initial deployment occurs this coming spring. 

Coalition Embarkation Support 

Personnel from the Marine Forces Europe Strategic Mobility section used this European Command-led International Security Assistance Force effort to familiarize 

partner nations with U.S. embarkation procedures. Partner nation self-deployment 

to Afghanistan or other regional contingencies is the overall goal of the program. 

Marine Forces Europe is planning for a company-sized rotational force to deploy 

to Task Force East this summer. This force, which is a proof of concept for the Marine Corps’ Security Cooperation Marine Air Ground Task Force, plans to accomplish in only 90 days what previously required a full year of Theater Security Cooperation activity by forward-deploying and utilizing the forward operating site in 

Romania. 

Force Posture 

Despite these successes, the lack of a sustained Amphibious Ready Group/Marine 

Expeditionary Unit in the European Command region curtails engagement opportunity with Allies and partners and detracts from active deterrence. Resuming a 

sustained presence in the European Command region would deter adversaries and 

assure allies and partners of our commitment to stability in Europe. 

With more than 8,000 Active-Duty, Reserve, and civilian employees operating 

from 5 main installations supporting rotational surface, air, submarine and expeditionary forces, U.S. Naval Forces Europe conducts the full range of maritime operations and Theater Security Cooperation in concert with coalition, joint, interagency 


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and other partners to advance security and stability in Europe. NAVEUR continues 

to strengthen relationships with enduring Allies and emerging partners while maintaining naval leadership and combat readiness. U.S. Naval Forces Europe leverages 

its maritime expertise to support and improve regional maritime safety and security. Through ballistic missile defense, anti-submarine warfare, expeditionary force 

engagement, a continuing surface presence, and other activities, U.S. Naval Forces 

Europe enhanced maritime safety, security and cooperation throughout the European Command region in 2009. 

Theater Security Cooperation and other Activities with Allies and Partners 

Through military-to-military activities demonstrating our naval commitment, U.S. 

Naval Forces Europe promotes maritime domain awareness, maritime security operations, security assistance, NATO interoperability, and information sharing. 

Taken together, U.S. Naval Forces Europe’s anti-submarine warfare program, 

Ballistic Missile Defense initiatives, and partner capacity building efforts are improving maritime stability and ensuring U.S. and partner access to the maritime domain. Theater Security Cooperation highlights include: 

Afloat Ballistic Missile Defense 

A survivable sea-based ballistic missile defense system is an important component 

of the phased adaptive approach to defend the Homeland, as well as allies and partners in Europe and Eurasia. U.S. Naval Forces Europe is developing the necessary 

ballistic missile defense command and control architecture while mitigating 

vulnerabilities to the sea-based ballistic missile defense network with air and undersea capabilities. A U.S. Naval Forces Europe Flag Officer commanded Juniper Cobra 

2010, a joint missile defense exercise with Israel, incorporating all aspects of both 

land and sea-based missile defense and stands as a hallmark of the future of our 

ballistic missile defense program. 


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Enhanced Theater Anti-Submarine Warfare Capability 

In partnership with our allies, U.S. Naval Forces Europe continues upgrading procedures, training and qualifications to enhance theater anti-submarine warfare capability through Commander, Task Force 69. 

Explosive Ordnance Disposal 

Naval Forces Europe’s Explosive Ordnance Disposal Mobile Unit Eight provides 

extensive military-to-military training programs with the partner nations’ expeditionary forces and provides explosive ordnance disposal support to International Security Assistance Force contributors. In addition to supporting U.S. and NATO exercises throughout the region, the unit provided real-world explosive ordnance disposal to several European nations. 

Response to Piracy 

Maritime Expeditionary Security Detachment provides shipboard security teams 

to U.S. military support vessels, participates in exercises and contributes to theater 

security cooperation engagements. 

Construction Support 

Naval Construction Forces (Seabees) completed a diverse array of construction 

projects emphasizing humanitarian civil assistance and military-to-military engagements as well as construction support to exercises Baltic Operations, Medical Training Exercise in Central and Eastern Europe, Seabreeze, and Jackal Stone. The Seabees completed construction of operation centers, training infrastructure, and quality of life projects, including a Military Operation Urban Terrain facility used for 

Close Quarters Combat training in Zadar, Croatia, and renovation of the Padarevo 

Kindergarten facility in Padarevo, Bulgaria. 


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Maritime Domain Awareness 

U.S. Naval Forces Europe-Sixth Fleet continues actively developing and validating 

advanced maritime domain awareness procedures. Several maritime domain awareness exercises, including Autumn Blitz 2009, were conducted with NATO’s Maritime 

Component Command-Naples to advance the interoperability and information processing necessary for effective planning and conduct of maritime operations, such as 

NATO’s Operation Active Endeavour, between NATO and U.S. commands. 

Eurasia Partnership Capstone 

In 2009, U.S. Naval Forces Europe’s primary Black Sea-Eurasia region engagement vehicle took place at Souda Bay, Crete. Personnel from 11 nations participated. 

Port Visits 

Ship visits demonstrate U.S. Naval Forces Europe’s commitment to improving 

maritime safety and security and strengthen partner relationships through training 

activities with host nation militaries. For example, following Joint Warrior 2009, the 

three participating U.S. ships conducted Theater Security Cooperation port visits in 

six countries. 

Exercises with Allies and Partners 

U.S. Naval Forces Europe participated in 19 exercises with 25 allies and partners 

covering the full range of maritime activity. Highlights include: 

• Exercise Baltic Operations 2009: U.S. Naval Forces Europe-Sixth Fleet 

sponsored and executed the 37th annual Baltic Operations with 43 ships 

from 12 participating nations. This European Command-directed multinational exercise enhanced maritime safety and security in the Baltic Sea 

by increasing interoperability and cooperation among regional allies. 

• Phoenix Express 2009: Members of the U.S. Naval Forces Europe-Sixth 

Fleet Staff, USS Mount Whitney and USS Robert G. Bradley along with several European and North African navies conducted the 2-week Exercise 

Phoenix Express 2009, leveraging the capability of European and African 

partnerships in order to enhance stability in the Mediterranean region 

through increased interoperability and cooperation. 

• Exercise Frukus 2009: U.S. Naval Forces Europe-Sixth Fleet staff and 

USS Klakring participated in Exercise Frukus 2009 (France, Russia, United 

Kingdom, and United States). This confidence-building exercise focused on 

resuming the maritime partnership between NATO’s major Navies and the 

Russian Federation Navy. 

• Reliant Mermaid 2009: USS Stout and members of the U.S. Naval Forces 

Europe-Sixth Fleet staff participated in the trilateral maritime search and 

rescue exercise Reliant Mermaid 2009 with maritime forces from Turkey 

and Israel. This annual exercise contributed to overall joint readiness in response to possible humanitarian assistance efforts or maritime search and 

rescue operations in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea and helped improve 


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engagement between Turkey and Israel, key U.S. allies and partners in the 

region. 

• Way ahead: Our efforts will remain focused on the Black Sea-Eurasia and 

eastern Mediterranean regions and follow European Command Country 

Campaign Plans. U.S. Naval Forces Europe is also embarking on an effort 

to establish a Mediterranean Sea Fleet Commanders Forum to enhance 

interoperability among capable allies and partners and increase efficiencies 

in the international military partnership realm. 

With more than 42,000 Active-Duty, Guard, Reserve, and civilian employees operating from 7 main installations supporting 8 wings and 80 geographically separated 

locations, U.S. Air Forces, Europe is a key force provider of tactical combat air 

forces, tanker, and airlift assets for European Command, Operations Iraqi Freedom 

(OIF), Enduring Freedom (OEF), and the International Security Assistance Force. 

Crucially, it also provides a large number of forces for building partnership capacity 

on a daily basis, with approximately 740 annual events that promote enduring relationships and increase security within and beyond Europe. 

Additionally, U.S. Air Forces in Europe provides full-spectrum air, space, and 

cyberspace capabilities promoting regional stability through focused theater engagement and supporting combat operations, humanitarian assistance, and Ballistic Missile Defense. U.S. Air Forces in Europe is also European Command’s lead agent for 

personnel recovery, theater air mobility, and aeromedical evacuation. They execute 

the EUCOM mission with forward-based air power to provide forces for global operations, ensure strategic access, assure allies, deter aggression, and, key to our approach overall, build partnerships. 

Provide Forces for Global Operations 

U.S. Air Forces in Europe’s top priority to partner with the joint and combined 

team to win today’s fight. They do this by providing expeditionary forces as well as 

a warfighting headquarters that can plan, deploy, command, control, and coordinate 

air, space, and cyberspace capabilities across the full range of military operations. 

Ensure Strategic Access 

Forward basing of air assets and the establishment of mobility hubs in the European theater ensure strategic access for operations in Europe as well as to the U.S. 

Central Command and U.S. Africa Command regions. U.S. Air Forces in Europe 

maintains robust support for U.S. Transportation Command’s enroute locations, enabling global operations by permitting the full spectrum of passenger and cargo 

movement through bases throughout Europe. In addition, the command has enhanced strategic flexibility by opening up new access points through engagement 

with new NATO partners. 


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The activation of the Strategic Airlift Consortium at Papa Air Base, Hungary exemplified this, with NATO members Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, the 

Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Romania, Slovenia and the U.S., as well as Partnership for Peace nations Finland and Sweden. The result was the creation of a 12- 

member Heavy Airlift Wing consisting of 3 C–17 Globemaster IIIs. The Strategic 

Airlift Consortium is a watershed event in international military cooperation. 

Assure Allies and Deter Aggression 

U.S. Air Forces in Europe continues building and sustaining a credible capability 

to dissuade aggressors. Its interoperability with alliance partners through exercises 

and operations remains crucial for ensuring primacy of the Alliance and the U.S. 

leadership role. 

U.S. Air Forces in Europe is EUCOM’s lead agent for Integrated Air and Missile 

Defense. It operates a Command, Control, Battle Management, and Communication 

suite to provide the commander with Ballistic Missile Defense situational awareness, early warning, and possible defensive countermeasures. The suite is designed 

to be interoperable with NATO systems in order to support the Presidential decision 

to employ a Phased Adaptive Approach to the Ballistic Missile Defense of Europe. 

NATO remains the primary security institution in Europe. Forward U.S. presence 

and interoperability with Alliance partners is crucial for ensuring primacy of the Alliance and a U.S. leadership role. The planned basing of new systems such as Global 

Hawk, 5th generation fighter capabilities on schedule with our allies, and the potential for a future Light Attack/Armed Reconnaissance aircraft capability in theater 

will provide opportunities for the United States to display its commitment and resolve, provide critical tools for engagement, and enhance allied and partner contributions to global operations. In accordance with NATO’s strategic concept, the 

U.S. Air Forces in Europe fulfills the U.S. commitment to allied extended nuclear 

deterrence with Dual Capable Aircraft, and personnel who ensure the custody, safety, and reliability of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe. 

Build Partnerships 

In a program with long-term benefit, U.S. Air Forces in Europe’s efforts build 

partner capabilities, increase their ability to counterterrorism, protect homelands 

and common interests, and counter emerging threats. Their ‘‘Building Partnerships’’ 

program contributes to the building of key relationships, promoting U.S. strategic 

interests, providing for essential peacetime and contingency access and enroute infrastructure, and improving information exchange and intelligence sharing. Within 

the past 12 months, the command conducted approximately 740 building partnership events with 51 partners and allies, including theater security cooperation 

events, exercises, aerial events, and military-to-military engagements. In addition to 

partner engagement, they actively engage, in accordance with European Command 

direction, to advance regional stability. 


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Exercises with Allies and Partners 

U.S. Air Forces, Europe develops increased Alliance capability to support Overseas Contingency Operations through participation and leadership in 20 combined 

exercises and operations, including Unified Engagement, Medical Training Exercise 

in Central and Eastern Europe, Combined Endeavor, Austere Challenge, Juniper 

Cobra, and the Baltic Region Training Exercises, as well as the Tactical Leadership 

Program. Key cross-border programs include: 

• Baltic States Air Capability Development. U.S. Air Forces, Europe led a 

series of four-nation symposia with Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia to develop the basis for establishing fundamental air combat capabilities leading 

to ministerial-level buy-in of a concept of operations and a long-term strategy for aviation excellence and eventual self-reliance. 

• Enhancing Nordic States interoperability with NATO. In 2009, U.S. Air 

Forces in Europe led and fostered efforts to enable the Swedish and Finnish 

Air Forces to participate in NATO and coalition air operations. 

• Developing capability of ‘‘near-4th generation fighter’’ nations. U.S. Air 

Forces, Europe placed strong emphasis on helping these partner nations 

transition smoothly to 4th-generation operations. To support Poland’s new 

force of 48 F–16s, a very successful sister-wing relationship between the 

52nd Fighter Wing, Spangdahlem AB, Germany and the Polish AF was established. It is now instrumental in spreading lessons-learned and best 

practices, as the Polish AF strives toward its goal of expeditionary F–16 operations. Additionally, deployments to Bulgaria and Romania fostered those 

countries’ efforts to adopt NATO-interoperable tactics, techniques, and procedures. 

• Build/Sustain Joint Terminal Attack Controllers capability. Working to 

increase the number of Joint Terminal Attack Controllers available to deploy to International Security Assistance Force, U.S. Air Forces in Europe 

trained 25 new partner nation Controllers in 2009 and estimates training 

30 more in 2010. Work with Poland will provide an organic regional Air 

Ground Operations School training capability. Continuing training relationships with French pilots enable them to train with native English speakers 

prior to deploying into Afghanistan. 

U.S. Air Forces in Europe’s forward-based forces provide the Nation a 3-for-1 efficiency by providing forces for global operations, promoting regional stability (with 

capabilities to deter aggressors and assure allies), and building partnerships. Unfortunately, the reduction of 24 fighter aircraft will significantly limit the resources 

available for these activities. As we move forward, we must ensure that our forwardbased posture is adequate to support our Nation’s strategic objectives. 


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Special Operations Command, Europe, comprised of more than 1,600 Active-Duty, 

Reserve, and civilian employees operating from two main locations, remains the preeminent U.S. Special Operations Force provider to the International Security Assistance Force; provides such forces for Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom; contributes significantly to the development of allied and partner special operations forces; and stands, prepared and ready, to defend against transnational 

threats and rapidly respond to unforeseen contingencies within the EUCOM Area 

of Responsibility. 

Special Operations Command, Europe’s capacity building efforts relies on three 

elements: the Partner Development Program, support to the NATO Special Operations Forces Coordination Center—now evolving into the NATO Special Operations 

Headquarters—and deployments in support of NATO International Security Assistance Force operations. Special Operations Command, Europe remained heavily engaged throughout 2009, conducting 29 Joint Combined Exchange Training events, 

8 bilateral training activities, 9 military-to-military engagements, and 6 counternarcoterrorism missions in 18 countries. Along with these activities, the Command 

conducted numerous staff and key leader engagements. These events focused on developing more capable and professional American and Allied Special Operations 

Forces, while building the relationships required to increase the support and commitment of European political and military leadership. 

Activities and Exercises with Allies and Partners: 

Partner Development Program 

Partner Development Program allows Special Operations Command, Europe to 

link disparate programs and training venues to build partner Special Operations 

Forces capacity. It focuses on those allies and partners that demonstrate willingness 

to deploy Special Operations Forces in support of NATO operations in Afghanistan 

and the capability over time to sustain their increased Special Operations Forces 

capacity. Poland, Romania, Hungary, and Lithuania are a few of the countries that 

have participated in this program and have deployed Special Operations Forces for 

the benefit of the alliance. 

The Command’s exercise program exemplifies Partner Development Program’s 

utility. The annual Special Operations Command, Europe capstone exercise, Jackal 

Stone 2009, brought together approximately 1,500 Special Operations Forces 

servicemembers from 10 countries—9 out of 10 currently contribute Special Operations Forces to International Security Assistance Force operations, or have indicated a willingness to do so in the future. 

Special Operations Command, Europe Support to the NATO Special Operations 

Headquarters 

The second critical element of American Special Operations Forces capacity building objectives in Europe is Special Operations Command, Europe support to the 

NATO Special Operations Headquarters. The NATO Special Operations Headquarters, now being established from the NATO Special Operations Forces Coordination Center, is already making significant contributions to Special Operations 

Command, Europe and Allied efforts by developing common NATO Special Operations Forces standards and encouraging allied integration. 

Special Operations Command, Europe Support to International Security Assistance Force 

Since 2007, Special Operations Command, Europe has maintained a Special Operations Task Group (one U.S. Special Operations Company and associated staff officers) under NATO command in Afghanistan, separate from Operation Enduring 

Freedom. Special Operations Command, Europe deployments to International Security Assistance Force also showcase ‘‘best practices’’ to our Special Operations Forces 


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partners and encourage equally capable Special Operations Forces allies to mentor 

other developing partners. 

As a direct result of Partner Development Program and NATO Special Operations 

Headquarters initiatives, European national Special Operations Forces contributions 

to International Security Assistance Force have steadily increased providing strategic relief for already committed U.S. and allied Special Operations Forces. Special 

Operations Command, Europe, through European Command, Special Operations 

Command, and the Department of Defense, continues to work with the Department 

of State and Congress to develop the mechanisms necessary to advance to the next 

stage of partnership cooperation. 

Defense Against Transnational Threats 

Special Operations Command, Europe contributes to American, Allied, and partner nation efforts to defend against transnational threats through sharing information, building capacity, reinforcing strategic communications messages, and, if required, conducting or supporting kinetic special operations. For example, throughout 

2009, Special Operations Command, Europe sponsored a weekly video teleconference, allowing Department of Defense and other Government agencies from around 

the globe to share intelligence and evidentiary information that closed intergovernmental and international seams and synergized law enforcement and military operations against complex non-state global networks. 

Preparation for Contingency Operations 

Though the European continent is relatively stable, it has numerous potential 

flashpoints from the Balkans to the Caucasus. In 2010, the Command plans to increase regional security through 36 different engagement events with 30 countries. 

The Partner Development Program will begin to focus on filling collective rotary 

wing aviation gaps, combining efforts with Department of State to take a lead role 

in the development of interoperable Special Operations Forces aviation capacity. 

CHALLENGES

Afghanistan 

Of the 43 nations contributing forces to the International Security Assistance 

Force besides the United States, 80 percent of them (36 nations) come from the European Theater and those 36 nations represent approximately 42 percent of the coalition’s personnel. Many nations are making particularly large contributions of 

forces and have suffered high casualty rates relative to their populations. Our partners understand the importance of this mission and they are willing to send their 

sons and daughters in harm’s way alongside our own to bring peace, security, and 

prosperity to the people of Afghanistan. Many of these nations wish to contribute 

more capability and other nations have the will to join the International Security 

Assistance Force but lack the capacity to do so. Within the European Theater itself, 


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European Command’s primary focus is to lend whatever support it can to these 

other nations as they seek to contribute to security and stability efforts in Afghanistan. Within the framework of contributing to international efforts in Afghanistan, 

and within the boundaries and authorities set by law and regulation and by international agreements, this support involves providing training, equipment, logistical 

assistance, and personnel augmentation to nations that desire to contribute to the 

International Security Assistance Force. 

Terrorism in Europe 

Our role in the fight against transnational terrorism in the region is primarily 

one of engagement and intelligence sharing. Terrorist networks use Europe principally to recruit fighters, garner financial and logistic support, and provide sanctuary. They cooperate closely with criminal networks and engage in numerous illegal activities as fund raising mechanisms. Well-established and commendable European civil liberties and the loosening of border controls provide opportunities for terrorist support and logistic activities. Nonetheless, Europe is not immune to al Qaeda 

affiliated terror attacks or the threat of them. Al Qaeda has consistently and recently stated a desire to strike directly against our European allies. The reverse flow 

of foreign fighters out of Iraq and Afghanistan coupled with the bona fides and experience these fighters will have gained there may increase the terror threat in Europe in the future. 

The possibility of a terrorist attack using weapons of mass destruction adds another dimension. Al Qaeda has consistently striven to incorporate weapons of mass 

destruction into their attacks and the majority of the world’s nuclear weapons are 

within the European Command’s area of responsibility. The security of these weapons and weapons material is a significant aspect of European Command’s efforts to 

counter weapons of mass destruction. 

The biggest impact we can have on terror networks in Europe is through enabling 

and partnering with our friends and allies. A good example of this is our intelligence 

sharing with Turkey regarding Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) terrorists. In addition to partnering with other nations in Europe, we are also closely partnering with 

other arms of the U.S. Government, where appropriate, to ensure all the levers of 

our national power are applied against these networks in a coordinated fashion. 


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Potential Regional Conflicts 

In spite of European integration, European Command continues to face an environment in fluid transition, and we are coping with the insecurity associated with 

21st century challenges and unsolved 20th century security problems. The outbreak 

of conflict between Georgia and Russia served as a reminder that war has not disappeared from the European Command Theater. 

Secessionist pressures, unresolved or suspended conflicts, and ethnic and religious 

tensions make European Command’s Black Sea and Eurasia regions the most conflict-plagued area along the Euro-Atlantic perimeter. Russia’s North Caucasus remains an area of persistent conflict. Armenia and Azerbaijan are at a stalemate 

over Nagorno-Karabakh. The South Ossetia and Abkhazia regions of Georgia are a 

continuing source of tension between Georgia and Russia, the more so given the 

Russian military presence in those regions and Russian recognition of their independence from Georgia. Little progress has been made toward a settlement of the 

Transnistrian conflict, which divides Moldova and hinders solely needed economic 

development. Conflict persists between Israel and Palestinian groups. The sources, 

complexities, and significant tertiary effects of these regional conflicts require an integrated interagency approach in concert with our European partners and security 

organizations. 

Russia 

The complexities of managing a military-to-military relationship with Russia are 

high. On one hand, there are many areas of potential cooperation and partnership, 

including Afghanistan, arms control, counterterrorism, counterpiracy, counternarcotics, and eventually missile defense. On the other hand, many of our allies and 

friends in the region remain concerned about Russian actions, including the conflict 

with Georgia in the summer of 2008, exercises on their borders like the Zapad series 

in 2009, and Russia’s continuing suspension of implementation of the Conventional 

Armed Forces in Europe Treaty. 

Working with Russia is about balance and seeking to find the potential for cooperation, while maintaining an honest and open dialogue about all aspects of our 

relationship, including where we disagree. While a great deal of engagement with 

Russia is handled either by State Department in the diplomatic realm or directly 

by the Joint Staff and Office of the Secretary of Defense, we at European Command 

are ready to pursue military-to-military communication, engagement, and even 

training and operations with Russia where and when appropriate. 

Energy Security 

A massive amount of energy is produced in or transits through European Command’s region. Russia, Azerbaijan, Norway, and other countries produce large 

amounts of hydrocarbons. Approximately 3 million barrels of oil transit the Bosporus and the Dardanelles each day. 

European Command is and must be a major participant in the interagency efforts 

to ensure the security of energy flows to, from, and through our region. The Command already has several interagency representatives on staff to better synchronize 

our efforts. We are already working to promote integrated planning and exercises 

and build up the capabilities of our European partners through technical assistance, 

the Partnership for Peace program, and other train and equip efforts. The Command 

is also collaborating with other U.S. Government partners and like-minded NATO 

allies to develop a framework to develop common solutions for major energy security 

issues. Finally, we view Russia as a key partner in these efforts and will work with 

Moscow in areas of common interest. However, where our interests do not intersect, 

we will work with other European partners to develop solutions for all of Europe. 

The Arctic 

Changes in the Arctic create both challenges and opportunities. Climate changes 

may result in open shipping routes, which link Asia to Europe, cutting the distance 

on these routes by up to 40 percent and transit time by 10 days. 

The Arctic is emerging as a complex but potentially productive region for oil, gas 

and new industrial activity. Unresolved issues will become more pressing as economic activities expand. For example, there are eight bilateral boundary issues involving all states in the region, and the northernmost extension of the continental 

shelves in the Arctic is unresolved. 

560 

States, particularly the traditional great powers, will play a key role in determining patterns of cooperation and tension within the Arctic. Russia’s activities in 

the Arctic include producing and modernizing icebreakers, resuming submarine and 

long-range aviation patrols, stationing more researchers throughout the region, and 

asserting extensive territorial claims. Russia’s latest Arctic policy paper states that 

the Arctic must become Russia’s top strategic resource base by 2020. It further 

states that they must complete geological studies to prove their claim to Arctic resources and create a new group of forces to ensure military security under various 

political-military circumstances. 

As the Arctic emerges as a region of economic significance and we develop our relationship with Russia, there may be opportunities for increased military activities 

with Russia to directly support U.S. policy initiatives. We see the Arctic as not an 

area of confrontational challenges but one of shared opportunities for cooperation 

and partnership that will benefit all states of the region. Early investment in an 

open and meaningful interagency dialog with Russia in the very near future, could 

avoid potential conflict in the more distant future. 

Force Posture 

The interrelationship of U.S. forces, their footprint, and our relationships with 

other nations, is key to achieving national objectives in the European Command 


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Theater. The presence of U.S. forces—air, land, and sea—in Europe fosters relationships and deepens partnerships in multiple ways, including the shared use of training facilities and other building partner capacity and international military 

partnering events. 

The nations within the European Command region are of significant importance 

to U.S. global strategic interests as evidenced by the overwhelming number of ISAF 

troop contributing nations from the EUCOM AOR. Our ability to develop coalitions 

and the capabilities of European coalition partners are central to advancing our national security priorities. Building partnerships and building partnership capacity is 

therefore job number one for European Command. 

The forces stationed in Europe today are a key element of America’s strength and 

they promote our values, protect our interests, and are tangible reminders to friends 

and foes alike of our dedicated commitment to a strong trans-Atlantic relationship 

based on cooperation and adherence to fundamental ideals. As the post-Cold War 

security environment changed, the size of our forces required to maintain our leadership role also changed. The number of U.S. personnel in Europe has gone from 

300,000 during the Cold War to less than 80,000 today. European Command forces 

assure our Allies and deter and dissuade our adversaries, and are the most visible 

indication of the ongoing U.S. commitment to the NATO Alliance. 

European Command’s footprint is pivotal to U.S. global operations. Sites and installations in Europe provide superb power projection facilities for the support of coalition operations and overseas contingency operations. Installations in the European Command region coupled with longstanding and emerging relationships contribute to assured access and strategic reach to and from Europe. 

Force posture initiatives for European Command support building the capability 

and capacity of partner nations in Europe, increased expeditionary capability from 

Europe, and achieve basing efficiencies. Our posture initiatives support two major 

categories: operational capability development and improvements for basing efficiencies in sustainment and Quality of Life. Operational capability development initiatives include assessments for stationing of forces anticipated to deploy to the European theater and a new prepositioning strategy that transforms portions of European Command prepositioning equipment to support soft power employment for 

missions such as Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Response. 

Other force posture initiatives focus on achieving basing efficiencies through coordinated review of infrastructure capacity as well as supporting service component 

efforts to optimize resources supporting of European Command forces. Sustainment 

initiatives include the continuous review of Quality of Life requirements such as 

education and housing services for European Command personnel and their families. 


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European Command has aligned its posture planning processes to support the Department’s efforts in addressing global force posture. The European Command staff 

coordinates strategic assessment, implementation feasibility, and theater 

prioritization of force posture issues through a posture forum that maximizes outreach and integration in posture development among Combatant Commands, our 

European Command Service Component Commands, and our interagency partners. 

Our posture planning necessarily involves coordination across the whole of government, as we integrate Defense Department posture overseas with State Department 

representatives and ultimately our relationships with European hosts. 

OPPORTUNITIES

Many of our challenges also present opportunities for international military 

partnering that bring benefit to today’s issues such as Afghanistan but also for 

those that we will face tomorrow. 

Afghanistan 

Supporting the International Security Assistance Force has given European Command the opportunity to deepen its relationship with our Allies and partners using 

our expertise and experience to inculcate an expeditionary mindset and train deploying partnered-country forces in irregular warfare. The contributions and sacrifice of Eurasian and European nations in Afghanistan have demonstrated the 

credibility, legitimacy, and effectiveness of international military cooperation. The 

scale of Allied and partner force contributions to the International Security Assistance Force has allowed the hand-over of significant responsibility for regional operations to coalition partners. NATO’s Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams program directly supports the development of the Afghanistan National Army and the 

Police Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams program supports the expansion 

of the Afghan National Police. Under these programs, European Allies and partners 

are currently providing approximately 50 percent of the number of teams required 

to train Afghanistan’s security forces. Right now, U.S. Forces assigned to European 

Command are deployed to Afghanistan and make vital contributions on a daily 

basis. However, within the European theater itself, European Command’s primary 

focus is to lend whatever support it can to other nations as they seek to contribute 

to the security and stability efforts in Afghanistan. 


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Engagement with Russia 

In 2009, European Command authored a framework document to resume military-to-military cooperation with Russia in an equal, pragmatic, transparent, and 

mutually beneficial manner. This framework not only addresses crisis response operations, but also seeks to promote interaction and ensure mutual support in conducting counterterrorism and counterpiracy operations; peacekeeping; missile, space, 

and ballistic missile-defense; as well as search and rescue. This framework document was signed by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Russian Chief 

of Defense during the July 2009 Presidential Summit in Moscow. This framework 

begins to rebuild a structure for our bilateral defense relationship with Russia that 

allows wide-ranging and candid engagement on all issues of concern. 

In rebuilding the bilateral relationship with Russia, however, European Command 

will work with NATO and partners to develop an integrated and inclusive security 

cooperation architecture beneficial to all participants that does not come at the expense of Allies and partners. 

European Missile Defense 

European Command looks forward to operationalizing the recently announced 

Phased Adaptive Approach, a complete revision of how the U.S. manages ballistic 

missile defense of Europe. The phased implementation of the proposed network of 

sensors, interceptors and associated Command and Control structures will provide 

a regional capability that is flexible, scalable, and responsive. The architecture aims 

to provide the right level of capability, at the right time, in the right location based 

on the emerging threat. The new approach provides increased opportunity for interagency and international military partnering. European Command is actively cooperating with the Department of State, Department of Defense, Missile Defense 

Agency, and others as the United States builds the plan for international engagement in the region. The capabilities delivered with the new phased, adaptive approach will serve as a catalyst to develop a cooperative solution with our allies and 

partners in the region. 

Balkans: Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo 

Today, almost 15 years after the Dayton Peace Accords and 10 years after the 

NATO military campaign to end atrocities in Kosovo, Bosnia-Herzegovina and 

Kosovo still evince the problems present throughout this volatile region: endemic 

corruption, organized crime, deep-rooted ethnic divisions, decrepit infrastructures, 

and weak economies with little foreign direct investment. Such an environment invites organized criminals and limits the capabilities of governments to effectively 

provide essential services. Despite these challenges, the United States remains committed to bringing lasting stability to the Balkans, and we have been making steady 

progress in the region, as exemplified by the April 2009 admission of Croatia and 

Albania into NATO and recent democratic elections in Kosovo. 

In this region, European Command focuses on enhancing transatlantic security 

through defense modernization and reform efforts; defense institution building activities to improve the organic capacity of countries to recruit, train, and sustain 


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their own military forces; humanitarian assistance operations; and demilitarization 

of unexploded ordnance to eliminate the threat to lives, property, and government 

stability. 

Significant political and cultural divisions remain in both Bosnia and Kosovo. In 

Bosnia, uncompromising, ethnic-based rhetoric continues to stall reform efforts. 

While the ‘‘Butmir Talks’’ last fall were a step in the right direction, Bosnia will 

need to progress politically toward stability. Although many problems in Kosovo are 

simply growing pains of a new state, the institutions in Kosovo face stark challenges 

to strengthen weak government institutions, combat corruption and illicit trafficking, and improve provision of essential services. Most of our military-to-military 

engagement is at a basic level, such as training the Kosovo Security Force and the 

provision of personal equipment like boots and uniforms. The programmed reduction 

of NATO and European Union forces in the Balkans may induce additional risk and 

requires continued monitoring to guard against others in the region from exploiting 

weaknesses. 

Despite these challenges, there are solid prospects for success given that we are 

prepared to devote the necessary attention and resources to the region. Bosnia and 

Kosovo, like their Balkan neighbors, generally hold the United States in high regard. To be effective, we must continue to coordinate our efforts with our European 

Allies and partners. We must expand our efforts to persuade NATO and European 

Union partners to persevere in these efforts. Maintaining stability at the southeastern corner of Europe remains an important transatlantic interest. 

Cyberspace 

Cyberspace enables and supports all of the efforts, challenges, and opportunities 

above. The cyberspace domain and the ability to operate freely in Cyberspace are 

of great importance to European Command. The 21st century and many events of 

the 20th century will be defined or redefined by the development, movement, and 

consumption of information in a holistic and collaborative environment. Our ability 

to freely operate and shape that environment has significant implications on both 

our leadership and partnerships in Europe. 

European Command is already building that advantage and defining that success. 

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termine how and to what extent these actions increase the risk to security and stability, and build the ability to maintain freedom of maneuver in the cyber domain 

for ourselves, our friends, and the voices of truth. We have established a Network 

Warfare Center to provide a fused cyber operations, intelligence and defense capability. We have also reached out to NATO and other partners to establish cyber information sharing agreements. These agreements provide great value by enhancing 

awareness, building common understanding and developing operational trust. Finally, European Command continues to see the need for continued investment and 

development of both joint and multi-national cyber capabilities. These capabilities 

must be integrated, layered, responsive, and assured. U.S. European Command sees 

great promise in the continued development and use of cyberspace in Europe both 

as a mission enabler and as a common interest area with European allies and partners. 

Innovation Cell 

Because innovation is so important to maintaining effectiveness, we have established a small, dedicated innovation cell. In the first 6 months, this team closed a 

gap in U.S.-foreign partner security cooperation. As a result, it uncovered an interesting human detection technology in the Slovak Republic, accelerated a project 

with the French Armaments Agency to put a wireless internet router in space, and 

connected over a dozen different organizations together to demonstrate innovative 

ways to build partner nation and public-private partnerships to counter piracy. 

Building Partner Capacity Center 

Building Partner Capacity is at the heart of EUCOM’s mission and the key to 

strengthening stability in our region and the regions to which we project military 

forces. It requires, however, complex and astute interactions with our allies and 

partners, and the application of lessons learned in many different regions. For those 

reasons, we are investigating the establishment of a Building Partner Capacity Center that will bring together subject matter experts in a way that makes their knowledge accessible to all and facilitates an in-depth examination of the issues. 

Counternarcotics Task Force 

In another very critical area, EUCOM and its naval component have conducted 

a full mission analysis for a Counternarcotics Task Force and have begun establishing one. U.S. Naval Forces Europe is initially staffing the Task Force from its 

intelligence directorate. The Task Force has initiated preliminary outreach to the 

Maritime Analysis and Operations Center-Narcotics in Lisbon and with the Center 

for Combating Smuggling in the Mediterranean (CeCLAD) in Toulon. To accelerate 

establishment, Naval Forces Europe will resource the task force with its own personnel and funding and has set aside additional funding for fiscal year 2010 as 

start-up money. 

Regional Approach to Stockpile Reduction 

In the last decade, Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Serbia, and Ukraine have experienced accidental explosions of their aging conventional munitions, destroying infrastructure and causing military and civilian casualties. The amount of unexploded 

ordnance (UXO), excess, and unstable munitions in our theater is great and of serious concern. We are working with the Department of State, the Federal lead for 

weapons removal and abatement, to enhance their recent stockpile reduction initiative and address with a greater sense of urgency these stockpiles that are aging, 

destabilizing, and exploding unintentionally. Together we want to preclude another 

incident that would threaten lives and decrease stability. 

TAKING CARE OF EUROPEAN COMMAND PERSONNEL

Quality of Life 

European Command is committed to support and maintain a quality of life for our 

assigned personnel commensurate to the Nation we serve and defend. We also recognize that forward deployed forces are better able to focus on the mission when 

their families are properly cared for through quality living quarters, educational opportunities for their children, and medical care. 

Deployment, Behavioral Health and Compassion Fatigue Support 

Protracted combat operations, multiple deployments, insufficient dwell time and 

casualties have critically increased the immediate and future demand for Behavioral 

Health Specialists for our servicemembers and their families. Multiple studies, for 

example the Department of Defense Mental Health Task Force, have identified the 

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ponent commanders have identified the need for additional behavioral health providers and technicians for European Command military and family members. 

As we continue to maintain mission readiness, our warriors and families require 

access to these vital programs and services without stovepipes in a stigma-free environment. A 360-degree review of programs and the connection between at-risk indicators and catalysts is needed to eliminate gaps in support. The goal is alignment 

of focused care-giver teams with corresponding indicator data systems to ensure the 

health of our force and family. 

European Command community caregivers providing warfighter and family support continue to show signs of stress, burnout and compassion fatigue. European 

Command, with funding from European Regional Medical Command, contracted to 

develop and deliver a comprehensive compassion fatigue program titled Providing 

Outreach While Enhancing Readiness—Caring for the Caregiver, which focuses on 

providing caregivers with tools and strategies to prevent the risk of burnout, stress 

and compassion fatigue. 

Dependent Education 

The quality of the President’s school system, managed by the Department of Defense Education Activity, is a major contributor to the Quality of Life of European 

Command members. European Command’s system is a benchmark for other school 

systems and we need your continued support and funding to ensure we maintain 

high educational standards. 

We continue to work collaboratively with the Department of Defense Education 

Activity to ensure funding for programs such as The Virtual School for our approximately 2,000 students in the European Command region located in areas with no 

school. Because funding for educational support in remote areas has not kept pace 

with new mission requirements, we need your support for this leading edge educational system for our youth. We are now just beginning to see the effect of nearly 

$100 million to replace our schools, many of which are 1950s barracks. We must 

continue funding this endeavor in future years. 

We look forward to sustaining the recent accomplishments in Quality of Life and 

base infrastructure. Taking care of people enhances readiness. In the short term, 

this includes ensuring the capability of the community support base to deploy 

servicemembers and support their families. In the long term, it enables the military 

services to attract and retain the high quality force our mission demands. 

EUROPEAN COMMAND INFRASTRUCTURE AND LOGISTICS

As a large organization with responsibilities spanning Europe, European Command has major infrastructure and logistics responsibilities. 

Theater Infrastructure 

At enduring locations, we must continue to sustain and recapitalize our infrastructure through responsible use of both the Sustainment, Restoration, and Modernization program and the Military Construction program. At non-enduring locations, we must optimize use of all available resources to ensure these installations 

remain fully mission effective until the installations are removed from the inventory. 

Thanks to strong congressional support, previous annual Military Construction 

authorizations and appropriations have enabled European Command to address a 

balanced mix of our most pressing mission, mission support, quality of life, and 

housing requirements. The Kaiserslautern Military Community Housing project is 

nearing completion and is one of several showcase examples of the impact that Military Construction program support has for our community. Continued support of 

these investments will enable us to eliminate inadequate housing and this will pay 

dividends as we divest non-enduring bases and consolidate our forces into more efficient communities. European Command’s future requirements will appear in our 

Theater Posture Plan and military construction requests. 


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Strategic Mobility and Maneuver 

Because facilities and forces must be effectively linked, dependable and available 

sealift, strategic and tactical airlift, and ground transportation systems are essential 

elements of European Command’s strategy. The fielding of the Joint High Speed 

Vessel and its assignment to the region will significantly enhance our capability to 

deploy and transport forces along sea lines of communication. The ability of the 

Joint High Speed Vessel rapidly to transport large volumes of material will provide 

a critical engagement platform to support Military Partnership activities and improve our ability to respond to potential contingencies such as non-combatant evacuation operations. 

European Command’s fleet of C–130s is currently undergoing an important upgrade from 17 older C–130E aircraft to 14 new, more capable C–130Js. The payload, 

capacity, and range constraints of even these aircraft limit European Command’s 

ability rapidly to deliver forces or materiel across our theater. 

Strategic airlift is also an important force enabled in the region. We applaud the 

stand-up of the Strategic Airlift Consortium-Heavy Airlift Wing that commenced operations July of 2009 at Papa Air Base, Hungary. The wing operates 3 C–17 aircraft, shared by a consortium of 10 NATO and 2 Partnership for Peace nations, and 

is the product of a groundbreaking building partner capacity initiative that provides 

European Command with access to robust theater-based strategic lift capability. European Command will continue to pursue increased organic lift capability to enable 

the full range of engagement and contingency activities. 

European Command’s principal contribution to global logistics throughput in support of ongoing operations is to the Central Command region. For example, lines of 

communication and distribution routing for logistics support through the European 

region should be able to support all of the International Security Assistance Force 

logistics requirements in the event other routes are unable to maintain the required 

capacity. European Command continually coordinates logistics planning with Transportation Command and the Defense Logistics Agency as well as Central Command 

to ensure global air, sea, and land lines of communication are identified and maintained to support global operations. 

Prepositioned Equipment 

Prepositioned equipment reduces demands on the transportation system and appreciably shortens crisis response time by providing a scalable capability and enabling the assembly of deploying forces with equipment already staged in the European Command’s region. Continued support of the Services’ Prepositioned War Reserve Materiel programs also demonstrates commitment through presence and preserves a broad spectrum of response options, from that of traditional crisis response 

through support of Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief. As we transition 

to a more expeditionary posture, there is a heightened need for Prepositioned War 

Reserve Materiel equipment configured to support both kinetic and nonkinetic operations, positioned in strategically flexible locations, and enablers such as the Joint 

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pacity with allies and provides ready assets for units arriving in theater for training/engagement and security cooperation missions. 

All four Services maintain Prepositioned War Reserve Materiel in the European 

Command’s region, either on land or afloat. U.S. Air Forces, Europe maintains 

Prepositioned War Reserve Materiel at main operating bases within the theater, 

with centrally managed storage sites in Norway and Luxembourg. U.S. Marine 

Forces Europe maintains Marine Corps Prepositioning Program-Norway and assets 

afloat in the Mediterranean via Maritime Prepositioned Force ships. U.S. Army Europe maintains propositioned stocks via the Department of the Army’s Heavy Brigade Combat Team prepositioned set at Camp Darby near Livorno, Italy. 

Prepositioned War Reserve Materiel currently requires upgrade. Over two-thirds 

of the Marine Corps’s Prepositioning Program-Norway stocks were withdrawn in direct support of Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom. Army preposition 

stocks at Camp Darby have also been reduced to support these operations as well 

as the International Security Assistance Force. We do not expect this equipment to 

reset until at least 2015. 

European Command is actively involved in Defense Department-led studies examining the global disposition of Prepositioned War Reserve Materiel and is working 

to ensure that these studies incorporate our strategic direction and operational requirements. 

NATO has been the anchor of Trans-Atlantic security for more than 60 years ensuring the security of its members, enhancing peace and stability throughout Europe, and countering threats across the globe. It is inescapable in any alliance that 

differences will emerge, consensus becomes difficult, and perpetual challenge makes 

members weary; thus making NATO’s success that much more impressive, though 

not surprising. The Alliance endures because the principles it defends are timeless 

and the determination to safeguard freedom is boundless. 

In the relative comfort of this success, set against an extraordinary amount of 

post-Cold War challenges, it would be tempting to address European security as a 

less pressing matter. U.S. commitment, distinguished by force levels in Europe and 

leadership positions throughout the NATO command structure, will remain a critical piece in Trans-Atlantic security in the 21st century. 

The NATO Secretary General began a multi-faceted review of NATO’s Strategic 

Concept with an eye to the future—the results of which will ensure NATO continues 

being relevant and responsive to future security needs and clearly acknowledges 

that its most significant contributions still lie ahead. Thanks to the efforts of former 

Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and the 12-member Group of Experts, who 

at the request of the Secretary General are leading an exercise of reflection and consultation among allies, partner nations, NGOs and others interested in the future 

of NATO, careful examination of threat perceptions, future challenges to our security, and NATO’s role in meeting them is underway. 

Whatever the Alliance’s level of ambition, we need to align policy and resourcing 

in the same timeframe. NATO does not maintain a permanent set of forces; as such, 

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tions develop and maintain. Regardless of the willingness of members to contribute, 

the burden of deployed operations is, and will be, borne by those nations whose 

armed forces are structured for expeditionary warfare. 

NATO needs to be capable of making decisions that may defuse a crisis. There 

are an infinite number of challenges we may face in the next decade and we must 

be ready to respond with appropriate capability across the full spectrum. This does 

not mean we should be looking first for military solutions; instead, we will require 

creative work, unparalleled cooperation and active partnerships. Whatever the final 

solutions, there is no substitute for clear objectives and an honest commitment to 

achieve them. 

Comprehensive Approach 

Since the Riga Summit in 2006, NATO has become increasingly committed to implementing a Comprehensive Approach towards crisis management. The mission in 

Afghanistan, in particular, has emphasised the necessity to align security, governance and development activities to achieve holistic benefit. Governance, development and security are inextricably linked and cannot succeed without complementing each other through the collaboration between military and civilian agencies 

and organisations. However, while the aspiration for a Comprehensive Approach is 

noteworthy and the principle agreed universally, it is somewhat more difficult to realize. 

The principle of cooperation is universally accepted, however, without enlightened 

and firm leadership, will not be realized and optimal progress enjoyed. As the most 

accepted and legitimate organization, the United Nations must be encouraged to 

take a greater and more robust lead in a truly Comprehensive Approach. While 

there is cooperation on the ground between NATO, Security, Governance and Development organizations and agencies at national, regional and global levels, senior 

United Nations leadership must act with determined resolve. I would encourage our 

Government to advocate for a High Commissioner who is willing to embrace the 

leadership necessary to see this critical mission through. 


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NATO-EU Relations 

The European Union is another potential partner for NATO in its Comprehensive 

Approach. However, political differences continue to hamper greater collaboration. 

There is a genuine need to enhance NATO-EU cooperation, whether within or beyond the 2003 ‘Berlin Plus’ framework. Currently, NATO and the European Union 

may conduct parallel military and civilian operations with no established or formalized mechanisms for coordination and cooperation. Field commanders then resort to 

informal but pragmatic ad hoc arrangements to harmonize their missions. Although 

these arrangements are a means to an end, they cannot fully harness the true potential effects of NATO-European Union collaboration during all phases of crisis 

management. NATO and the European Union may offer capabilities that are complementary for addressing a given situation. The challenge is to find an appropriate 

mechanism for achieving unity of effort without unnecessary duplication. 

From a military perspective, we do our very best to collaborate both in terms of 

planning and execution. However, we will not be able to deliver a complementary, 

holistic effect without high level political agreement between NATO and the European Union. While I am confident that NATO’s Secretary General and his European 

Union counterpart are doing their utmost to resolve the matter, it will take time 

and patience before we reach a meaningful and efficient level of cooperation. 

While paving the way to the future, NATO must balance the urgent with the important and commanding forces is my highest priority. Since its first military intervention in 1995, NATO has been engaged in an increasingly diverse array of operations. Today roughly 100,000 military personnel are engaged in NATO missions 

around the world, successfully managing complex ground, air and naval operations 

in all types of environments. 

Kosovo 

Today, approximately 10,000 troops from NATO’s Kosovo Force are deployed in 

Kosovo to help maintain a safe and secure environment, preserving the peace that 

was imposed by NATO nearly a decade earlier. Following Kosovo’s declaration of 

independence on 17 February 2008, the Alliance reaffirmed that Kosovo Force shall 

remain in Kosovo on the basis of UN Security Council Resolution 1244. NATO and 

Kosovo Force will continue to work with the authorities and will cooperate with and 

assist the UN, the EU, in particular Eulex, the EU Rule of Law mission in Kosovo, 

and other international actors, as appropriate, to support the further development 

of a stable, democratic, multi-ethnic and peaceful Kosovo. 


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NATO and Iraq 

At the Istanbul Summit in June 2004, the Allies agreed to be part of the international effort to help Iraq establish effective and accountable security forces. The 

outcome was the creation of the NATO Training Mission in Iraq (NTM–I), which 

to date has trained over 14,000 Iraqi security sector personnel. NTM–I is involved 

in police training, establishing and mentoring Iraq’s military academies, and facilitating substantial equipment donations and regular out-of-country training hosted 

by NATO Allies. All NATO Allies contribute to the training effort through deployment of trainers, provision of equipment, or NATO’s financial contribution. The Government of Iraq regularly praises NTM–I, and continues to request its continuation 

and expansion. 


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Active Endeavor 

Under Operation Active Endeavour, NATO ships are patrolling the Mediterranean 

and monitoring shipping to help detect, deter and protect against terrorist activity. 

The operation evolved out of NATO’s immediate response to the terrorist attacks 

against the United States of 11 September 2001 and, in view of its success, is continuing. As the Alliance has refined its counterterrorism role in the intervening 

years, the experience that NATO has accrued in Active Endeavour has given the 

Alliance unparalleled expertise in the deterrence of maritime terrorist activity in the 

Mediterranean Sea. NATO forces have hailed over 100,000 merchant vessels and 

boarded 155 suspect ships. 

By conducting these maritime operations against terrorist activity, NATO’s presence in these waters has benefited all shipping traveling through the Straits. Moreover, this operation is also enabling NATO to strengthen its relations with partner 

countries, especially those participating in the Alliance’s Mediterranean Dialogue. 

Supporting the African Union 

Well beyond the Euro-Atlantic region, the Alliance continues to support the African Union (AU) in its peacekeeping missions on the African continent. Since June 

2007, NATO has assisted the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) by providing airlift support for African Union peacekeepers. Following renewed African 

Union requests, the North Atlantic Council has agreed to extend its support by periods of 6 months on several occasions. NATO also continues to work with the African 

Union in identifying further areas where NATO could support the African Standby 

Force. NATO’s continuing support to the African Union is a testament to the Alliance’s commitment to building partnerships and supporting peacekeeping and humanitarian efforts beyond the Euro-Atlantic region. 

Operation Ocean Shield 

Building on previous counterpiracy missions conducted by NATO beginning in 

2008 to protect World Food Program deliveries, Operation Ocean Shield is focusing 

on at-sea counterpiracy operations off the Horn of Africa. Approved on 17 August 

2009 by the North Atlantic Council, the current operation continues to contribute 

to international efforts to combat piracy in the area. It is also offering, to regional 

states that request it, assistance in developing their own capacity to combat piracy 

activities. 

NATO Special Operations Forces 

The U.S.-led NATO Special Operations Forces Coordination Centre has continued 

to serve as a dynamic engine of transformation within the Alliance. As a result, in 

September 2009, the North Atlantic Council approved its reorganization into the 

NATO Special Operations Headquarters. The NATO Special Operations Headquarters, projected to be fully operational in 2012, will continue to provide coordination, support, training, and enabling functions for NATO SOF, but will also fill a 

void in the Alliance’s crisis response options, establishing an assured, rapidly 

deployable SOF command and control capability, by providing the core elements of 


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a deployed special operations headquarters. Evolving to a headquarters will better 

enable the synchronization of SOF across the Alliance, enhance NATO SOF unity 

of effort, and provide Allied SOF with a multinational out of area command and control capability. 

The NSHQ’s SOF Communications Network underpins Allied and Partner SOF 

collaboration by providing an unprecedented vehicle for command, control, communications, and intelligence sharing for networked operations. The NSHQ’s Special 

Operations Forces Fusion Cell (SOFFC) in Kabul, Afghanistan is demonstrative of 

the operational impact among Allied and Partner SOF. This stakeholder run enterprise, manned by some 40 personnel from 11 nations and several agencies, focuses 

on garnering information from a multitude of Allied and Partner sources, fusing 

that information with operational requirements to produce and disseminate actionable intelligence to ISAF SOF Special Operations Task Groups (SOTGs) and our Afghan partners. 

The NSHQ is building enduring operational capabilities, collaborative policies and 

procedures, and networked command, control, and communications mechanisms 

among NATO SOF. Collaborative training and exercises reinforce this framework to 

ensure Allied and Partner SOF are interoperable in order to operate more effectively 

in designated combined operations well into the future. 

Afghanistan 

NATO’s operation in Afghanistan currently constitutes the Alliance’s most significant operational commitment to date. America’s Allies in NATO have shared the 

risks, costs and burdens of this mission from the beginning. They have contributed 

to International Security Assistance Force and the Afghan National Security Forces, 

as well as significant non-military contributions. 

The situation in Afghanistan today is complicated and challenging. As the President has stated, Afghanistan is the epicenter of the violent extremism practiced by 

al Qaeda. For this reason, I strongly support the President’s new strategy for Afghanistan and I will continue to work with our allies as we all contribute to this 

challenge. Our allies have already contributed a great deal to this war, fighting, 

bleeding, and dying side-by-side with our own troops. Many have committed further 

contributions following President Obama’s announcement, strengthening their resolve and partnership. 

I believe there are four areas in which we must succeed in order to win in Afghanistan. First, we must strike the right balance between our civilian and military efforts. Success cannot be achieved solely by the military. In addition to strong military and police forces to ensure security, Afghanistan needs a credible government 

taking active, visible steps to show that it is stamping out corruption, improving efficiency and delivering necessary services to its people effectively. This is where concentrated civilian efforts are needed the most, for it is they who have the expertise 

and credibility on topics such as rule of law, economics, and agriculture—three 

areas that are critical to Afghanistan’s reconstruction and development. 

Second, if Afghanistan is to become a secure and stable nation, the Afghans themselves must be at the center of this effort. Our allies must partner with Afghan security forces and civilian personnel to mentor and develop their own capabilities to 

conduct these critical activities on their own. The Afghan people must assume responsibility for the well-being of their country and they must feel confident in their 

own government’s ability to provide basic security and services absent of corruption 

and tribal favoritism. 

Third, strategic communication will be a key method of ensuring that the Afghans, as well as our enemies, understand the United States and our allies are committed to a secure and stable Afghanistan. 

Finally, the most important role that the military can play in this strategy is to 

increase the size and capability of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), 

through training and mentoring, to be able to take the lead responsibility for securing their country. 


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Again, the challenges facing Afghanistan today are serious and complex. However, 

I am confident that the Afghan people will prevail. We have the right strategy and 

resources in place to partner successfully with the Afghans to develop their capacity 

to self-secure. 

A recent survey conducted in Afghanistan by the Afghan Center for Socio-Economic and Opinion Research underscores how our strategy is indeed bringing us 

closer to our goals in Afghanistan. That survey revealed that nearly three out of 

four Afghans interviewed expect things to be either somewhat better or much better 

in a year. That sentiment reflected a 51 percent improvement over the year prior 

and is indicative of a spreading feeling of hope, not hopelessness. 

The survey also revealed that 85 percent of Afghans interviewed rate the work 

of Afghanistan present government as either fair, good, or excellent, and nearly 90 

percent also rated their provincial governments as fair, good or excellent. Both the 

Afghan National Police and the Afghan National Army received an 89 percent approval rating, indicative that our investments in training these security forces are 

paying off. 90 percent of Afghans interviewed also said they would rather have Afghanistan’s current government in place than the Taliban or another government 

and 69 percent said they considered the Taliban the biggest danger to Afghanistan. 

These are all good news indicators that validate our effort to put the Afghan people at the center of the equation in Afghanistan. We need to continue giving the 

Afghan people hope that they are not destined to live under the yoke of tyranny 

and offering them every opportunity to live in an Afghanistan with a future worthy 

of their sacrifices. 

CONCLUSION

The soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and civilians at European Command and 

Allied Command Operations contribute to our national security everyday with their 

professional engagements with our allies and partners in the European theater. As 

we look forward to continued success, I ask for your continued support of these men 

and women and their families to ensure they receive the care and benefits they deserve. 

Operationally, we must continuously strive to find flexible authorities and funding 

mechanisms to build the capacity of those partner nations willing to fight side-byside with us. This has become increasingly important because of the recent surge 


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in activities in Afghanistan and the need to get our allies and partners more involved. Your continued support and expansion of authorities like the National Defense Authorization Act, section 1206, particularly allowing their use for partner nation forces deploying to Iraq and Afghanistan, has been absolutely pivotal in enabling our strategic efforts in the European theater. With these programs, we are 

able to provide our allies and partners with the training and equipment necessary 

to achieve interoperability with our own forces engaged in ongoing overseas contingency operations. They will be able to arrive in theater better prepared to assume 

the responsibilities they have committed their forces to undertake, further reducing 

the risk of injury and loss of life. 

Furthermore, our efforts to fulfill this short-term task of building enduring capability are vital to ensuring the long-term stability and security of Europe. In addition to increasing the contributions of our allies and partners to operations outside 

Europe, building partner capacity allows us to make significant progress toward 

achieving strategic objectives within the AOR. For example, we have been able to 

conduct security sector reform assessments in Albania, an interagency effort critical 

to integrating Balkan countries in the European community. We also have numerous programs targeted at countering the proliferation of WMD throughout the theater such as the Proliferation Security Initiative and the Global Initiative to Combat 

Nuclear Terrorism. But we cannot stop there. With greater flexibility, these authorities can achieve greater strategic goals in support of our theater and national objectives. 

European Command and Allied Command Operations serve as important links between the United States and our friends in Europe, effectively ‘‘bridging’’ the Atlantic. We are building and strengthening relations with our European partners that 

will help us ensure the security of the United States at home and abroad. 


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Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Admiral. 

General Ward. 

STATEMENT OF GEN WILLIAM E. WARD, USA, COMMANDER, 

U.S. AFRICA COMMAND 

General WARD. Good morning, Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, 

and distinguished members of the committee. It’s great for me to 

be here this morning as well alongside my two great friends, the 

Admiral and the General, who we’ve come to partner with over 

time, and I think our collaboration has been good for our men and 

women who serve with us as well as for our Nation. 

I am very happy to be here to address the points that you’ve 

raised as well as others, and I’d like to start off by just thanking 

this committee for the great support that has been provided to my 

command and its men and women as we have carried forth our 

mission on behalf of our Nation. 

We do what we do in AFRICOM to protect American lives and 

to promote American interests, and we do it by supporting security 

and stability programs in Africa and its island nations. We concentrate our efforts on helping African states build capable and 

professional militaries that respect human rights, adhere to the 

rule of law, and more effectively contribute to stability in Africa. 

We are assisting our African partners in building capacities to 

counter transnational threats from violent extremist organizations, 

to stem illicit trafficking, to support peacekeeping operations, and 

to address the consequences of natural disasters. 

Supporting the development of professional and capable militaries contributes to increased security and stability in Africa, and 

allows African nations and regional organizations to promote good 

governance, expand development, provide for their common defense, and better serve their people. 


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The Africa Partnership Station, which includes our European 

and African partners as members of the staff, is now on its fifth 

deployment and has expanded from the initial focus in the Gulf of 

Guinea to other African coastal nations. Africa Endeavor, a continental-wide command and control (C2) exercise, has been seeing a 

steady increase in participation and will amount to 30 nations participating this year. Exercise Natural Fire, conducted by the Nations in East Africa, is a tremendously successful program that 

looks at how these nations respond collectively to a natural disaster. 

These programs reflect the willingness of our partners to work 

with us and with each other against common threats and reflect 

that our programs and activities are indeed producing tangible results. My focus is on activities, programs, and communications that 

support our national interests and also reinforce success in ways 

that assure progress toward the long-term goals our African partners have established for themselves as they align with our national security objectives. 

We closely harmonize our activities with our colleagues at the 

Department of State (DOS), USAID, and other agencies. Our service components are in fact maturing. Our Office of Security Cooperation, defense attaches, the network of forward operating sites 

and cooperative security locations, including Camp Lemonnier in 

Djibouti, are tremendously valuable as we pursue our U.S. security 

interests. 

It’s my honor to serve with the very distinguished uniformed and 

civilian members of DOD and our command who work every day 

alongside our interagency partners making a difference in this vitally important part of the world as we look to cause their work 

to lead to more effective global stability. 

Their dedicated efforts exemplify the spirit and determination of 

the American people, and they do contribute to the strength of our 

Nation and the security and stability on the African continent, directly supporting our interests there. 

I’m pleased to also say that, representing those men and women, 

I brought along today our Command Sergeant Major, the command’s senior enlisted leader, Command Sergeant Major Mark 

Ripka as someone who just exemplifies the goodness of that great, 

great team. 

So again I thank you for your support. I thank you for what you 

do to cause our mission to be successful, and I stand ready to add 

any additional information that I can. Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of General Ward follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY GEN WILLIAM E. WARD, USA 

INTRODUCTION

It is my privilege as Commander of U.S. Africa Command to present to Congress 

our Posture Statement for 2010. U.S. Africa Command’s operations and programs 

protect American lives and interests, in Africa and in the homeland, by supporting 

security and stability in Africa and its island states. We concentrate our strategy 

and efforts on helping African states build capable and professional militaries that 

are subordinate to civilian authority, respect human rights, and adhere to the rule 

of law. We are assisting our African partners in building capacities to counter 

transnational threats from violent extremist organizations; to stem illicit trafficking 

in humans, narcotics, and weapons; to support peacekeeping operations; and to adVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:37 May 06, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00583 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\62155.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
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dress the consequences of humanitarian disasters—whether man-made or natural— 

that cause loss of life and displace populations. 

Supporting the development of professional and capable militaries contributes to 

increasing security and stability in Africa—allowing African states and regional organizations to promote democracy, to expand development, to provide for their common defense, and to better serve their people. In his address in Ghana last July, 

President Obama reaffirmed Africa’s strategic importance to the United States and 

our national interests. He identified four priorities for the U.S. Government’s (USG) 

engagement efforts: 

• Supporting strong and sustainable democracies and good governance 

• Fostering sustained economic growth and development 

• Increasing access to quality health and education 

• Helping to prevent, mitigate, and resolve armed conflict 

Through sustained security engagement with African militaries, U.S. Africa Command is supporting U.S. national interests and both the President’s priorities and 

our African partners’ objectives—now and in the long-term. 

In this report, I provide an overview of the strategic environment in Africa, explain our strategic approach, and show how our security cooperation efforts, designed and executed in close coordination with our interagency partners, are promoting stability in Africa in support of U.S. foreign policy and national security objectives. 

STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

The challenges and opportunities in U.S. Africa Command’s Area of Responsibility 

(AOR) are complex and dynamic. The application of only military means is insufficient to help our partners address them. U.S. Africa Command seeks to be part of 

a coordinated effort that integrates all tools available to our international and interagency partners. 

Our discussion of the strategic environment in Africa begins with the key Defense 

Department concerns noted by the President: the potential for conflict, transnational 

threats, and other threats to peace and security. It is followed by an overview of 

the important issues faced by our African partner militaries as they seek to confront 

these threats. 

Nature of the Environment 

Africa is a large and diverse continent whose land mass is about three and a half 

times the size of the continental United States. The distance from Africa’s northernmost tip to its southernmost tip is roughly equal to the distance from New York 

to Moscow. Its 53 countries each have unique histories. 

Africa is home to 1 billion people, divided among 800 ethnicities and speaking 

about 1,000 different languages. Ethnic ties are strong, and ethnic dynamics often 

influence national politics. Africa’s population growth rate is the highest in the 

world. Of the 40 countries worldwide with the highest rates of growth, 34 are African. 

While an increasing number of African states are conducting elections, many of 

the requirements of enduring liberal democracies, such as the rule of law, protection 

of individual rights, and a vibrant civil society, are nascent or non-existent. Additionally, in some countries previously demonstrating liberalization and democratization, increasing examples of authoritarianism are emerging. 

Areas of Potential Conflict and Impacts on Peace and Security 

Africa is still dealing with the effects of widespread conflict that engulfed the continent following the independence movements of the last half of the last century, 

with some still ongoing today. The effects of armed conflict in Africa are severe. The 

African Union (AU) estimates that Africa has the world’s largest number of forcibly 

displaced individuals, with close to 3 million refugees and approximately 11.6 million internally displaced persons in 19 countries across the continent. According to 

a 2007 study by Oxfam International on the economic impact of armed conflict, 23 

African countries lost an estimated $284 billion in revenue between 1990 and 2005 

as a result of armed conflict. Oxfam estimated that an armed conflict in Africa contracts a country’s economy on average by 15 percent. Conflict is a major obstacle 

to development and the delivery of basic services, such as health and education. 

Today, 8 of the 17 ongoing peacekeeping operations or political missions administered by the United Nations (UN) are on the African continent. The eight missions 

in Africa account for approximately 75 percent of the UNs’ military, police, and civilian peacekeepers deployed worldwide. The number and scale of peacekeeping missions increasingly strain donor states and regional organizations. Therefore, it is in 

579 

our interests to help our African partners improve their capabilities and broaden 

their capacities. While the number of violent conflicts in Africa has decreased over 

the past 10 years, significant potential for new and continued conflict remains. 

• In Sudan, Darfur remains insecure, violence has increased in Southern Sudan, 

and tensions continue in border areas. 

• Somalia remains a country in armed conflict, as its Transitional Federal Government (TFG) battles violent Islamic extremists. 

• Despite pressure by the Ugandan People’s Defense Forces (UPDF), scattered 

elements of the Lord’s Resistance Army continue to operate and commit atrocities against civilian populations in the Central African Republic, northern 

Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and Southern Sudan. 

• In the DRC, independent local militias, the insurgent Democratic Forces for the 

Liberation of Rwanda, and some ill-disciplined Congolese armed forces remain 

destabilizing forces in the country’s eastern region. 

Transnational Challenges 

Threats to stability do not necessarily manifest themselves in conflict, but can 

nevertheless have a corrosive influence on the development of good governance, viable market economies, and effective security sectors. Weakly governed spaces provide favorable operating environments for violent extremism, piracy, and trafficking 

of humans, weapons, and drugs, posing direct threats to the U.S. homeland and our 

interests abroad. 

Violent Extremism 

Violent extremism by transnational terrorist organizations is a major source of regional instability. In the last year, al Qaeda and terrorist groups in Africa appear 

to have strengthened their collaboration. Al Qaeda operatives are active in East Africa, while al Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) operates across 

the trans-Sahara region of Northern and Western Africa. The leaders of Somaliabased Al-Shabaab have publicly aligned themselves with al Qaeda, having issued 

public statements praising Osama Bin Ladin and linking Somalia to al Qaeda’s 

global operations. Al-Shabaab also announced its support to al Qaeda in the Arabian 

Peninsula (AQAP) at the same time that AQAP activities increased in Yemen, separated from Somalia by the 20-mile wide Bab-el-Mandab Strait. Al-Shabaab continues to operate multiple terrorist training camps in Somalia with al Qaeda participation. 

Al Qaeda and al Qaeda affiliates also target the United States and our European 

and African partners across North Africa and the Sahel. Terrorist activities, kidnapping, illicit trafficking of all types (humans, weapons, drugs), and the existence of 

undergoverned spaces in the Sahel contribute to the region’s vulnerability and make 

it susceptible to extremist influences. 

Countries of the Maghreb, like Algeria and Morocco, partner with the United 

States to respond to terrorism and check the western extension of al Qaeda and its 

affiliates. Yet, enhancing security depends upon regional cooperation and the development of stable and growing economies to undercut the recruiting activities of violent extremist organizations. 

Illicit Trafficking 

Narcotics trafficking is a growing concern in Africa. West Africa is a node for 

Latin American drugs transiting to their primary destination in European markets. 

In addition, drugs originating in Asia are transported through South and East Africa on their way to Europe. The destabilizing and corrupting influence of narcotics 

trafficking threatens to turn Guinea-Bissau into a narco-state and helps to expand 

the Latin American cartel’s network and influence throughout the region. Many African countries lack the capability to interdict the flow of narcotics—on land, air, 

or sea. While not as directly impacted by narcotics flows through Africa as our European allies, the United States has a vested interest in countering the destabilizing 

impacts of drug trafficking on security, stability, and development in Africa. 

Many Africans also remain vulnerable to human trafficking in the forms of forced 

labor, child labor, child soldiers, and slavery. While some countries are making 

strides to counter trafficking in persons, many lack the law enforcement capacity 

to address this problem. 

Piracy 

Incidents of piracy in the Horn of Africa and Gulf of Aden have continued to receive international attention. In 2009, pirate attacks continued to escalate in frequency and expanded their geographic range in the western Indian Ocean out to 

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port counterpiracy operations through the employment of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles 

and Maritime Patrol Aircraft temporarily based in the Seychelles. 

Public Health, Economic Development, and Democratization 

Public health, economic development, and democratization challenges continue to 

significantly impact the security environment in Africa. 

Public Health Sector 

African populations remain at great risk to a host of infectious diseases, including 

2009 H1N1 Influenza. The Human Immunodeficiency Virus/Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (HIV/AIDS), tuberculosis, and malaria are the leading causes of 

adult mortality in Africa. Most African countries lack adequate capacity and capability to contain or mitigate the threat of pandemic diseases. 

Pandemic disease is not only a human security issue, but also a military readiness 

challenge. For example, some of our African partners have professional and capable 

militaries that contribute thousands of soldiers to UN and AU missions in Somalia, 

Sudan, DRC, and elsewhere. However, they would have even greater peacekeeping 

capacities if it were not for the high rates of HIV/AIDS incidence found in their military forces. 

Economic Development 

Until the global economic crisis of late 2008, Africa as a whole experienced a 10- 

year trend of sustained economic growth, averaging over 5 percent growth in gross 

domestic product per year. High oil prices enabled some African oil-producing countries to achieve economic growth that rivaled the world’s highest rates. However, 

countries solely dependent on oil and extractive commodities revenue were vulnerable to falling prices. In many cases, undiversified economies, high unemployment, 

and corruption, have prevented the wealth generated by Africa’s natural resources 

from finding its way to the neediest segments of African societies. The UN identified 

Africa as the world’s most impoverished continent, containing 25 of the world’s poorest countries. 

Democratization 

Over the past 20 years, many African countries have moved toward democratic 

processes, good governance, and the rule of law. In January 2009, Ghanaian voters 

conducted their fourth free and fair presidential election in 15 years. For the second 

time, the ruling party was peacefully replaced by the opposition. In April 2009, over 

13 million South Africans went to the polls and elected Jacob Zuma, the country’s 

fourth president since the end of apartheid, and Botswana, in October 2009, held 

its 10th democratic presidential election since independence—the most of any postcolonial sub-Saharan African country. Since the 1990s, many African states have 

also moved from dictatorship toward democracy. 

The African Security Sector 

Although African countries have consistently expressed a strong desire to provide 

for their security and address these various challenges themselves, many lack sufficient means to do so without foreign assistance. The challenges they face can be 

broadly described as: 

• Militaries have frequently been used as tools of authoritarian regimes to 

protect their leaders and suppress the opposition. This has led to corruption 

and distrust by the populace. 

• Increased professionalization of many African militaries remains a work 

in progress. Traditionally, the development of maritime and air components 

has lagged that of land components in most African militaries. 

• The legacy of Cold War politics flooded Africa with competing streams of 

military equipment, tactics, and doctrine. Much of what remains is poorly 

functioning and ill-suited for confronting today’s challenges. 

• Although regional cooperation has improved tremendously, combined efforts to confront transnational challenges are limited. Domestic politics can 

inhibit a government’s willingness to take strong action against a violent 

extremist organization or other direct threats. 

• The AU’s African Standby Force and its five Brigades have shown continued development, but are not yet fully mission capable. They lack sufficient 

enablers to become self-sustaining as a peacekeeping and crisis response 

force. National peacekeeping capabilities are similarly lacking, although 

some countries have made regular and substantial contributions to international peacekeeping missions. 

581 

U.S. AFRICA COMMAND’S APPROACH

Our approach is founded in our overall national security interests on the continent as outlined by the President and Secretaries of State and Defense. The 

United States and our African partners have strong mutual interests in promoting 

security and stability on the continent of Africa, its island states, and maritime 

zones. Advancing these interests requires a unified approach that integrates our efforts with those of other USG departments, agencies, and our African and other 

international partners. 

Our programs and activities support U.S. national interests as well as pursue four 

defense-oriented goals expressed by our African partners: 

First, that they have capable and accountable military forces that perform professionally and with integrity; 

Second, that their forces are supported and sustained by effective, legitimate, and 

professional security institutions; 

Third, that they have the capability to exercise the means nationally and regionally to dissuade, deter, and defeat transnational threats; 

Fourth, that they have the capacity to increase their support to international 

peacekeeping efforts. 

Fostering stability supports the pursuit of these goals, and allows further opportunities to reinforce success. 

Our approach is subordinate to overall USG policy goals. We work in concert with 

our interagency partners, such as the U.S. Department of State (DOS) and U.S. 

Agency for International Development (USAID), to ensure our plans and activities 

directly support U.S. foreign policy objectives. 

Africa’s challenges require a holistic view of security that includes defense, law 

enforcement, and customs and border security. Addressing defense-related challenges must be pursued in concert with other USG and partner security-related endeavors to sustain unity of effort. 

Our activities must provide immediate benefits and help our partners progress toward their long-term goals. Our mission is ‘‘sustained security engagement’’; providing programs and activities that build for the future and reinforce success. 

Regional cooperation is critical, whether it be neighboring countries working together against mutual threats, or region-wide efforts to establish common security 

networks, such as the AU’s cooperative security architecture. Our approach focuses 

on mutual interests, fostering interoperability and common situational awareness, 

regionally-oriented capacity building, and enhancing relationships built on trust and 

cooperation. The more the countries of Africa work together, the greater the likelihood that the continent will achieve lasting stability. 

These goals support our national security interests. Increasing African partner capability to identify and interdict threats emanating from the continent enhances the 

security of the U.S. homeland. Enhancing the capacity of African forces to respond 

to threats to peace and stability on the continent allows the United States to use 

its forces for other operations. The development of capable and professional military 

forces can support efforts to consolidate democratic principles and good governance 

by fostering transparency and accountability in the military, which historically has 

been one of the most important institutions in modern African societies. 

U.S. AFRICA COMMAND PROGRAMS AND ACTIVITIES

U.S. Africa Command’s programs and activities support the development of capable, professional partner military forces, and are integrated and coordinated with 

the DOS, U.S. Chiefs of Mission, and our international partners. Africa Command 

conducts several categories of activities to support our four primary goals and address current security challenges that threaten stability. The primary purposes of 

our activities can be categorized as follows: 

• Building the capacity of partner conventional forces 

• Supporting capacity building of partner security forces 

• Building the capacity of partner enabling forces 

• Fostering strong strategic relationships 

• Conducting defense sector reform 

• Fostering regional cooperation, situational awareness, and interoperability 

• Countering transnational and extremist threats 

• Contributing to stability in current zones of conflict 

• Addressing conditions that contribute to instability 

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Building Capacity of Partner Conventional Forces 

U.S. soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines are terrific trainers and exemplary examples of military professionalism and our core national values. The training and 

exercises they conduct encourage the development of partner security capabilities 

and the instilling of professional ethos among African military elements. Moreover, 

most of these activities can be performed with small numbers of U.S. forces. Some 

examples of our recent activities include: 

Natural Fire, Uganda 

In October 2009, U.S. Africa Command, with U.S. Army Africa (USARAF) as the 

lead component, brought together more than 1,200 soldiers and civilians from 6 

countries for Exercise Natural Fire 10 in Uganda. The exercise improved interoperability and helped build African partner capacity to respond to complex humanitarian emergencies. The region jointly exercised contingency plans designed to address a global health threat of pandemic influenza. Approximately 550 U.S. personnel and 650 soldiers from Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda participated. 

Africa Partnership Station 

Africa Partnership Station (APS) is U.S. Africa Command’s primary maritime security engagement initiative and is now a program of record. In cooperation with 

partner states and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), APS builds maritime security capabilities in our Africa partners using sea-based training platforms to provide predictable regional presence with a minimal footprint ashore. Our training 

and assistance focuses on strengthening four pillars of maritime sector development: 

a competent and professional maritime security force; secure infrastructure to sustain maritime operations; maritime domain awareness; and maritime response capability. Our African partners view APS as a successful maritime initiative and are 

enthusiastic participants. 

From January through May 2009, the Command employed the USS NASHVILLE 

to support APS. With representatives from 9 European allies, 10 African countries, 

and Brazil, APS doubled the number of partners participating in the planning and 

execution compared to previous engagements. APS conducted 10 engagements in 7 

countries—Senegal, Liberia, Ghana, Nigeria, Cameroon, Sao Tome and Principe, 

and Gabon. U.S. Marines and their counterparts from Spain and Portugal conducted 

security cooperation events with over 800 African military professionals in Senegal, 

Liberia, Ghana, Nigeria, Cameroon and Gabon. Over 1,750 African professionals 

were engaged in 64 workshops and seminars. 

The success and effectiveness of our engagements was demonstrated when the 

Benin Navy boarded and freed a pirated tanker without loss of life. APS in Benin 

was a principal enabler for that mission. Benin’s Navy participated in APS instruction focused on Visit, Board, Search and Seizure, small boat operations, Anti-Terrorism/Force Protection, and use of the Automated Information System (AIS), which 

was installed during their training. The Benin Navy used maritime domain awareness tools provided by APS to guide one of its ships to assist the tanker, allowing 

its Navy to take action against a threat affecting the interests of Benin, the United 

States, and the international community. 

U.S. Naval Forces, Africa (NAVAF), is building on the success of the APS in West 

Africa by conducting similar activities in East Africa. APS-East will work to build 

our African partners’ capabilities in small boat operations. Our partners include 

Kenya, Mozambique, the Seychelles, Mauritius, and Tanzania. The activities of the 

USS Bradley and the USS Arleigh Burke in 2009 served as a pilot deployment for 

APS-East and made great inroads in South and East Africa. In addition, the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF–HOA) established a maritime center 

of excellence in Mombasa, Kenya, to provide maritime training to African states. 

Both DOS and DOD approved a section 1206 (National Defense Authorization Act 

for Fiscal Year 2006, as amended) program to provide small boats, AIS, and surface 

search radars to Djibouti, Mozambique, Kenya, Tanzania, the Seychelles, Mauritius, 

and Comoros. The latter effort will establish a basic surveillance capability along 

the entire East African coast. We plan to sustain and supplement this project 

through Foreign Military Financing (FMF). 

African Lion, Morocco 

African Lion is an annual exercise with Morocco, a key regional ally and active 

contributor to international peacekeeping operations. U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Africa (MARFORAF) is U.S. Africa Command’s lead component for the exercise, which 

focuses on U.S.-Morocco interoperability, air and ground combined arms training, 

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sponse training, public affairs training, and humanitarian civic assistance operations. Last year, during African Lion 09, medical teams conducted humanitarian 

civic assistance in 5 villages, treating over 17,000 Moroccans and over 9,500 livestock. Numerous fiscal year 2010–2011 Exercise Related Construction projects are 

scheduled to improve training ranges, strategic access, and delivery of logistics support in support of African Lion. U.S Air Forces Africa (AFAFRICA) will spearhead 

its participation in African Lion through the State Partnership Program, with the 

Utah Air National Guard providing KC–135 tankers and personnel. 

Building effective noncommissioned officer (NCO) corps 

Several African countries have underdeveloped NCO corps, which in some cases 

are vulnerable to corruptive influences. Our African partners recognize that effective 

NCO corps as essential to developing capable and sustainable units, which will contribute to overall stability and security. They have turned to us for assistance. By 

helping partners develop their NCO corps, we have an opportunity to instill the 

qualities and character that will allow them to train and guide their own development in this area. 

Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and Foreign Military Sales (FMS) 

A particular challenge many of our partners face is the lack of serviceable equipment—from individual military gear to vehicles to other major systems. FMF and 

FMS are two programs we are leveraging to help address these shortfalls. U.S. Africa Command is working with U.S. country teams to develop and implement FMF 

programs to procure systems that increase interoperability among African partners, 

international allies, and the United States. U.S. Africa Command is employing the 

Excess Defense Articles program under FMS to supply trucks, personal soldier 

equipment, and uniforms to support the deployment of peacekeeping battalions to 

Darfur, Somalia, and Liberia. 

Supporting Capacity Building of Partner Security Forces 

Achieving security and stability in Africa requires more than the contributions of 

the military alone. Security is a holistic function that includes nonmilitary elements 

such as law enforcement, border patrol, customs, and judiciary. U.S. Africa Command works closely with USG departments and agencies to ensure that we plan and 

conduct our efforts as seamlessly as possible. 

African Maritime Law Enforcement Partnership (AMLEP) 

AMLEP is a cooperative maritime law enforcement program with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. U.S. Coast Guard and host nation Law Enforcement 

Detachments (LEDET) embark on U.S. and host nation ships and law enforcement 

vessels to provide the vessel with the necessary authorities and capabilities to conduct boardings, search, seizure, and arrests within the participating African country’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). 

AMLEP operations were conducted with Senegal, Morocco, Sierra Leone, and 

Cape Verde, with the support of DOS, French Maritime Air Forces, and the U.S. 

Coast Guard. Collectively, our operations accomplished the following: Maritime Law 

Enforcement and small boat training for LEDET personnel; the integration of 

French Maritime Patrol Aircraft capability; and vessel boardings led by the respective country’s LEDET team. 

The highlight of our engagements occurred in August when the Republic of Sierra 

Leone’s Armed Forces Maritime Wing detained the 750-ton Taiwan F/V YU FENG 

102 for fishing illegally in the Sierra Leone EEZ. The YU FENG’s 11 crewmembers 

were deported to Taiwan and the Feng was impounded by the Government of Sierra 

Leone. The Sierra Leone forces again demonstrated their resolve and capability by 

seizing four vessels for violation of Sierra Leonean law during December AMLEP 

operations. 

Security Sector Assessments 

An integrated and harmonized assessment of a partner nations’ requirements is 

helpful in developing effective and coordinated activities. This past year, U.S. Africa 

Command participated in DOS-led Security Sector Assessments in Senegal, GuineaBissau, Ghana, Togo, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Cape Verde, and Mozambique. The resulting interagency plans will ensure our military engagements with these countries 

are consistent with policy objectives and mutually reinforce the activities of other 

USG departments and agencies. 

Building Capacity of Partner Enabling Forces 

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ations independently. Developing similar enablers or enabling capabilities among 

African countries can help reduce their dependence on foreign assistance when conducting military operations. Many of our capacity building activities in this area add 

tremendous value while requiring only a minimal commitment of U.S. personnel. 

Logistics Capacity Building 

Our African partners recognize the importance of logistics and have benefitted 

from several U.S. Africa Command training events and symposia in this area. For 

example, experts from U.S. MARFORAF provided vital logistics support and guidance to assist the Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces in packaging and loading 

a UN ship in preparation for their first United Nations-African Union Mission in 

Darfur (UNAMID) deployment. 

The Africa Deployment Assistance Partnership Team (ADAPT) develops African 

military logistics capacities to enable them to manage and support peacekeeping operations. ADAPT training provided by U.S. Africa Command’s Army and Air Force 

components enabled the Rwandan Defense Force to load and deploy vehicles, equipment, and supplies to support UNAMID. ADAPT also allowed the Ugandan People’s 

Defense Force to certify Ugandan soldiers to load equipment on U.S. military aircraft (C–130 and C–17), strengthening their ability to support peacekeeping operations and disaster response operations employing U.S. or UN cargo aircraft. These 

soldiers will also serve as co-trainers for future ADAPT activities. ADAPT activities 

are planned in Nigeria and Tanzania in 2010. 

In 2009, U.S. Africa Command conducted the first Partnership for Integrated Logistics, Operations, and Tactics (PILOT) symposium with 25 African participants. 

PILOT is an operational-level seminar jointly designed and funded through partnership with the Canadian Ministry of Defense, Canadian Pearson Peacekeeping Center. PILOT focuses on familiarization with the legal and ethical aspects of peacekeeping; the roles, missions, and functions of the AU and the UN in peacekeeping; 

planning logistics staff estimates for PKO; planning Reception, Staging, Onward 

Movement and Integration operations; planning Force Deployment Planning and 

Execution; and an overview of the Joint Operational Planning Process. 

Intelligence Capacity Building 

Military intelligence is an essential capability for all professional militaries. The 

ability to collect, analyze, and synthesize information is key to developing effective 

military plans. U.S. Africa Command’s Intelligence Security Cooperation and Engagement (ISCE) Program seeks to build sustainable military intelligence capacity 

in designated partner nations and regional organizations. ISCE develops and implements common military intelligence doctrine and procedures. It emphasizes the rule 

of law, respect for human rights, and civil authority in order to reverse the historical stigma associated with many African intelligence and security services. Program 

activities include familiarization seminars; senior intelligence officer visits; Director 

of Military Intelligence conferences; intelligence exchanges and analyst roundtables; 

and a series of officer and noncommissioned officer intelligence training courses. 

The Military Intelligence Basic Officer Course-Africa (MIBOC–A) is a course offered to junior military intelligence officers, primarily from north and west Africa. 

In addition to teaching professional intelligence skills, it promotes relationships 

among the intelligence communities that encourage greater cooperation in the future. U.S. Africa Command conducted two MIBOC–A courses in fiscal year 2009 and 

one so far in fiscal year 2010. 

Communications Systems Development 

One way to foster regional cooperation is to establish means by which partner 

militaries can reliably and effectively communicate with each other. However, because African communications infrastructure is underdeveloped, U.S. Africa Command is developing programs that improve the communications architecture among 

African military leaders. 

The AU Command, Control, Communications, and Information Systems initiative 

is an effort to enable the AU’s command and control of its Standby Force. This initiative achieved its first milestone with the recent ribbon-cutting of the new AU 

Peace Support Operations Center, and will continue by establishing similar command and control nodes at the regional Standby Brigade Headquarters, planning 

cells, and logistics cells. This initiative is also pursuing connectivity with the AU 

Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). 

We are also supporting two other regional initiatives. The Economic Community 

of Western African States’ (ECOWAS) Regional Information Exchange System provides workstations, internet access, and telephone services to senior defense leaders 

in 11 ECOWAS countries, and this will soon expand to 13. Meanwhile, the Multinational Information Sharing Initiative has just begun, and it will provide similar 

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mobile capabilities to the Operation Enduring Freedom-Trans Sahara (OEF–TS) 

countries over the next 3 years. 

De-Mining Capacity Building 

U.S. Africa Command conducts ‘‘Train-the-Trainer’’ Humanitarian Mine Action 

missions to build our partners’ anti-mine capacities and support broader U.S. and 

international efforts to eliminate landmines and other explosive remnants of war. 

We initiated programs in Kenya, Burundi, Mozambique, and Namibia in 2009, and 

will expand mine action programs to the Democratic Republic of Congo, Senegal, 

and Chad in 2010. We are also working with Uganda to develop anti-mine capabilities in support of Ugandan peacekeeping deployments to AMISOM. 

Special Staff Programs 

Efforts to establish capable and accountable forces involve mechanisms that allow 

the partner military leadership to establish and enforce standards of conduct and 

readiness. These mechanisms should be transparent to ensure equal treatment, fairness, and common expectations. Through mentoring and information exchanges, our 

inspector general, chaplain, legal counsel, surgeon, public affairs, and other special 

staff elements work closely with partner countries to build capacity in these areas 

in support of improving the military’s standing with its government and people. 

Fostering Strong Strategic Relationships 

Strong strategic relationships are important enablers for sustaining the positive 

gains of our capacity building activities. They encourage our partners to assume 

greater ownership of their newfound capabilities. They provide ready opportunities 

to reinforce success through follow-on activities and open communication links that 

facilitate new or evolving requirements. They also encourage dialogue with other 

partners. 

The National Guard State Partnership Program 

The State Partnership Program is a superb tool that fosters a variety of militaryto-military, military-to-civilian, and civilian-to-civilian engagements using National 

Guard and U.S. States’ capabilities. Eight African countries currently partner with 

U.S. states through this program: Tunisia-Wyoming; Morocco-Utah; Ghana-North 

Dakota; South Africa-New York; Nigeria-California; Senegal-Vermont; LiberiaMichigan; and Botswana-North Carolina. 

The benefits of this program from the past year are many and impressive. For 

example, in Tunisia, the Wyoming Guard is helping the Tunisian Government integrate Ground Surveillance Radar into border patrol operations. In West Africa, U.S. 

Africa Command’s Air Force Component, U.S. Air Forces Africa (AFAFRICA), 

partnered with the Deputy Under Secretary of the Air Force for International Affairs, the Tennessee Air National Guard, and the Warner-Robins Air Logistics Center to coordinate military-to-military efforts to rebuild the first of four Nigerian C– 

130s. In Botswana, the North Carolina Air Guard demonstrated its Modular Airborne Firefighting System capability; an event of key importance to Botswana due 

to the annual range fires that destroy grazing land and the habitat for one of Botswana’s most important national resources—its wildlife. 

The State Partnership Program delivers programs and activities that build broad 

capabilities with our African partners. The habitual relationships this builds adds 

tremendous value to our efforts. This program is very valuable to U.S. Africa Command, and we look forward to expanding it as our African partners request greater 

participation. I urge your continued support. 

International Military Education and Training (IMET) and Expanded IMET 

(E–IMET) 

Professionalizing militaries and reinforcing the democratic value of elected civilian 

authority are among the benefits of the DOS-led IMET and E–IMET programs. 

These comprise the most widely-used military assistance programs in U.S. Africa 

Command’s AOR. Approximately 900 military and civilian students from 44 African 

countries received education and training in the United States or their own countries valued at $19.8 million. Many officers and enlisted IMET graduates go on to 

fill key positions in our African partners’ militaries and governments, and the relationships built in the academic environment directly contribute to stronger bi-lateral 

military relationships between the United States and partner countries. 

IMET funded regional seminars with a Defense Institute for International Legal 

Studies Military Education Teams (MET) for Chad, Cameroon, DRC, Mauritius and 

Sierra Leone, and also supported a Center for Civil Military Relations MET for 

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ports long-term U.S. interests and relationships in Africa. It is one of our most desired and productive programs. 

Military-to-Military Engagement Programs 

U.S. Africa Command uses military-to-military (mil-to-mil) programs to strengthen key relationships and familiarize partners with U.S. military techniques, tactics, 

and procedures they can employ to address a broad range of security challenges, including conducting peacekeeping operations and countering terrorism. Mil-to-mil 

also assists partners in improving deployment procedures, logistics systems, maintenance operations, force protection, and the conduct of their own training. In fiscal 

year 2004, the initial year of the program, less than $500,000 was spent in Africa 

for mil-to-mil programs. Today the mil-to-mil program is the cornerstone of U.S. Africa Command’s engagement activities, with $6.3 million allocated and 431 events 

planned in 40 countries in fiscal year 2010. This is a relatively small investment 

with substantial dividends. 

Conducting Defense Sector Reform 

U.S. Africa Command is a key contributor to the long-term development of professional defense forces as part of broader security sector reform efforts led by the Department of State. 

Liberia 

To solidify gains made under the DOS’ Security Sector Reform program, U.S. Africa Command commenced a 5-year mentorship program with the Armed Forces of 

Liberia (AFL) Headquarters Staff and Liberia’s 23rd Brigade. We have 56 military 

mentors in Liberia to continue the professional development of the AFL. Onward 

Liberty is one of three lines of effort in our overarching Defense Sector Reform program in Liberia. We are also working with the U.S. Coast Guard to help the AFL 

re-establish a Coast Guard-like capability, and with the Office of the Secretary of 

Defense to mentor the Liberian Ministry of Defense. 

Democratic Republic of Congo 

At the request of the Department of State and DRC, U.S. Africa Command is 

training and equipping a battalion of the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic 

of the Congo (FARDC) in support of USG objectives and priorities established by 

Secretary of State Clinton during her visit to the DRC in August 2009. We will help 

the FARDC to: (1) improve its capacity to lead, manage, and sustain its force; (2) 

enhance its ability to investigate and prosecute its personnel accused of human 

rights violations and other crimes; and (3) reduce sexual and gender-based violence 

(SGBV) by the military. 

The third objective, mitigating SGBV, is important to helping heal the wounds of 

past conflicts in DRC. We are working closely with the country team and USAID 

to identify opportunities to provide support to survivors of SGBV. We are pursuing 

funding for the completion of a maternity hospital in the capital city of Kinshasa 

that will also provide counseling for SGBV survivors and perform fistula repairs. In 

South Kivu Province, we are seeking to secure funding for two projects: the construction of a primary school, whose pupils will consist of HIV orphans or survivors 

and children of SGBV; and a Reference Hospital in Wolungu serving a large, rural 

population that includes SGBV survivors. 

Fostering Regional Cooperation, Situational Awareness, and Interoperability 

The spirit of cooperation is growing very strong among African states. Over the 

past 2 years, participation by African countries has increased steadily in many of 

our regional activities. All of our activities seek to capitalize on this spirit by bringing partners together to develop collaborative solutions to shared security challenges. The following activities are noteworthy in their emphasis on interoperability. 

Exercise Africa Endeavor 

Africa Endeavor is our premier communications interoperability exercise that involves the greatest number of partner countries, and it continues to grow. Exercise 

Africa Endeavor 09 in Gabon brought together 25 countries and 3 regional organizations (the AU, ECOWAS, and the Economic Community of Central African States). 

Focusing on information sharing among African states via communication networks, 

the exercise developed communications links with the United States, NATO, and 

other countries with common stability, security, and sustainment goals for the region. Participation in this summer’s Africa Endeavor 10 exercise in Ghana is expected to expand to 30 African states. 

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Exercise Phoenix Express, North Africa 

Phoenix Express is a multinational maritime security exercise led by U.S. NAVAF 

and focused on maritime interdiction, communications, and information sharing. Algeria, Libya, Morocco, and Tunisia increased their participation in the exercise this 

past year. 

Working With Partners to Counter Transnational and Extremist Threats 

Transnational challenges in Africa are a threat to the United States, our partners, 

and our allies. Transnational threats exacerbate difficult circumstances for local 

populations and complicate efforts to create a secure and stable environment conducive to development. We conduct operations and capacity building programs and activities to address the threat of terrorism, piracy, narcotics, and other illicit trafficking. 

Counter-terrorism Efforts in North Africa and the Sahel—Operation Enduring 

Freedom-Trans Sahara (OEF–TS) 

Special Operations Command, Africa (SOCAFRICA) conducts OEF–TS to counter 

the terrorism threat in North and West Africa. OEF–TS supports the DOS-led 

Trans-Sahara Counter Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP) by increasing our partners’ 

capabilities to deny safe havens to terrorists, improving border security, promoting 

democratic governance, and reinforcing regional as well as bilateral military ties. 

OEF–TS activities are designed to defeat violent extremist organizations throughout 

the region. 

U.S. Africa Command works closely with the DOS and U.S. embassies to ensure 

we provide the military support needed to meet the objectives of TSCTP, including 

the following major elements: information operations; train, advise and assist activities; intelligence capacity building; coalition development; military exercise programs; and development and establishment of a regional computer-based information network. All OEF–TS activities are closely coordinated with the State Department and our U.S. embassy country teams. 

SOCAFRICA remained very active last year with OEF–TS. Military Information 

Support Teams assisted DOS public diplomacy efforts in countering extremist ideology in Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Chad, and Nigeria. OEF–TS created High Frequency-Radio Tactical Communications Interoperability between Algeria and Niger, 

and Mobile Training Teams (MTTs) trained new Counter-Terrorism (CT) light infantry companies in Mali. The MTTs also trained existing CT units in Tunisia, Morocco, Nigeria, and Senegal. OEF–TS Military Intelligence courses trained students 

from 7 OEF–TS countries, and the Trans-Sahara Security Symposium civil-military 

course trained nearly 100 students from 4 OEF–TS partner countries. Additionally, 

OEF–TS Civil-Military Support Elements have completed or are planning 79 humanitarian assistance projects. 

In the last year, political conditions have allowed us to resume engagement with 

Mauritania, to include our efforts to build a CT company. Mauritanian security 

forces lack the capability to logistically sustain themselves during operations. Helping Mauritania develop a logistics capacity will provide Mauritanian security forces 

with the capability to push supplies and personnel to its forward-deployed CT companies, which operate hundreds of miles away in extremely austere territory. 

Through U.S. assistance, Mauritania will be able to sustain CT operations within 

its borders and in partnership with other regional forces. 

In West Africa, we are building on efforts in Mali, Nigeria, Senegal, and Burkina 

Faso. Our activities range from training and equipping specialized CT units to increasing intelligence capabilities and information sharing to supporting efforts that 

counter extremist ideology in the region. We are working with Mali to develop an 

intermediate level maintenance and vehicle repair capability, and to improve its air 

mobility, intelligence, and reconnaissance capabilities. These two programs will bolster the ability of Malian security forces to take direct action against AQIM. 

Counterterrorism Efforts in East Africa 

In East Africa, U.S. Africa Command’s CJTF–HOA conducts operations to counter 

violent extremists throughout the region to protect U.S. and coalition interests. In 

cooperation with other USG departments and agencies, CJTF–HOA focuses its operations on building regional security capacity to combat terrorism, deny safe havens, 

and reduce support to violent extremist organizations. It accomplishes these objectives through the use of Civil Affairs Teams, Seabee construction teams, military 

advisors, and by importing security courses of instruction. 

U.S. Africa Command has focused the majority of its CT capacity building activities in East Africa on Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Uganda, which—aside from Somalia—are the countries directly threatened by terrorists. For example, in Kenya, 

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the Command is assisting in establishing a Ranger Strike Force and a Special Boat 

Unit, which will become the country’s primary CT and border security forces. 

SOCAFRICA completed training two companies of the Kenyan Ranger Strike Force, 

and our Special Operations Forces (SOF) maritime efforts have created a nascent 

Kenyan Special Boat Unit capability to enhance Kenyan maritime security. When 

completed, Kenya will have a significantly improved capacity to counter the terrorist 

threat emanating from Somalia. 

In Djibouti, U.S. Africa Command is assisting with training of the Djiboutian 

counter-terrorism unit, the Groupe d’Intervention de la Gendarmerie Nationale. We 

are helping with the repair and transfer of 12 vehicles from the AU to Djibouti. The 

vehicles are specifically for counter-terrorism and border security operations. The 

Uganda People’s Defense Forces (UPDF) is one of the region’s most professional 

militaries. It is a reliable partner in combating terrorism and, in collaboration with 

regional partners, is leading operations against the Lord’s Resistance Army. Uganda’s peacekeeping force in Somalia has played a critical role in providing the TFG 

an opportunity to establish itself. U.S. Africa Command and CJTF–HOA continue 

to work with the UPDF to enhance peacekeeping and CT capabilities through Africa 

Contingency Operations Training Assistance (ACOTA), IMET, and PKO funded 

training. 

Counter-Narcotics Programs 

Our counternarcotics programs train, equip, and support partner nation law enforcement, paramilitary, and military units that have a counternarcotics and 

narcoterrorism mission. They build partner capacity to conduct the full range of 

counter-drug activities, such as sharing information, detecting threats, and interdicting and seizing vessels. 

One success from the past year was the construction of a multi-national and interagency fusion center in Cape Verde, funded by our Counternarcotics Division. The 

center incorporates U.S. law enforcement, International Police, and Cape Verde law 

enforcement agencies and maritime forces, and U.S. FMS projects will provide vessels. Our naval component, along with the U.S. Coast Guard, is providing maritime 

interdiction training and familiarization. The U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency, Department of Justice, and Department of State are also significant contributors. The 

goal is to develop a Cape Verde maritime force capable of detecting and interdicting 

illicit traffickers, and sharing critical law enforcement information with the United 

States and the international community. 

Operation Objective Voice (OOV) 

OOV is U.S. Africa Command’s information operations effort to counter violent extremism by leveraging media capabilities in ways that encourage the public to repudiate extremist ideologies. OOV is closely coordinated with U.S. embassies, DOS, 

and USAID, and employs a variety of messaging platforms, such as the African Web 

Initiative, to challenge the views of terrorist groups and provide a forum for the expression of alternative points of view. OOV also supports local outreach efforts to 

foster peace, tolerance, and understanding. Examples included a ‘youth peace games’ 

in Mali and a film project in northern Nigeria. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the 

enhanced dialogue has had a positive impact. We are currently collecting baseline 

data and developing assessments to quantify the overall effects. 

Contributing to Stability in Current Zones of Conflict 

Long-term efforts to build security capacity can only succeed in an environment 

of sufficient stability. The United States is supporting African efforts to stabilize 

current and potential zones of conflict through peacekeeping missions and the 

growth of robust peacekeeping capacity that includes the AU’s African Standby 

Force. 

Sudan 

U.S. Africa Command is closely working with USG stakeholders to support implementation of the comprehensive U.S. Strategy for Sudan. In Southern Sudan, the 

Command supports professional military education and non-commissioned officer 

development programs, HIV/AIDS courses and seminars, as well as familiarization 

events across professional military skills and functional areas. Additionally, we are 

examining ways in which our assets and resources can strengthen the UN missions 

operating in the country, and how we can continue to provide support to DOS-led 

Security Sector Reform efforts. 

Somalia 

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nerable to terrorist exploitation, and fosters a permissive environment for piracy 

and other illicit activities. It also exacerbates a severe humanitarian crisis. 

AMISOM, the multilateral AU Mission in Somalia, is severely under-resourced, but 

is essential to securing key TFG locations. The USG’s support to AMISOM includes 

training, equipping, and logistical support for Ugandan and Burundian forces. Additionally, U.S. Africa Command provides military mentors to ACOTA pre-deployment 

training for AMISOM forces. Before deploying, each battalion receives staff training 

and soldier skills training tailored to PKO and the operational environment in Somalia. 

We also provide support to U.S. Central Command operations to address the increase of piracy in the western Indian Ocean. Counter-piracy training is also a part 

of our maritime capacity building efforts in east and southern Africa, such as Africa 

Partnership Station-East. 

Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) 

GPOI is a DOS program that builds peacekeeping capacity in targeted partners 

and organizations. The GPOI-funded ACOTA program is regularly supported by 

U.S. Africa Command with officers and non-commissioned officers that serve as 

trainers and mentors. ACOTA has trained and provided equipment for Ugandan 

and Burundian forces for AMISOM, and trained Rwandan, South African, Zambian, 

and Tanzanian Forces for UNAMID. 

For fiscal year 2010, U.S. Africa Command has requested GPOI funding to support training programs to enhance the capabilities of the AU peacekeeping staff, the 

Economic Community of West African States, the Economic Community of Central 

African States, and the Southern African Development Community Standby Brigade 

Headquarters. We have also sought funding for designated member states’ tactical 

units pledged to the respective Regional Standby Brigades. 

Addressing Conditions that Contribute to Instability 

The U.S. military has a number of civil-military programs that promote good civilmilitary relations, provide military training benefits, and help develop the humanitarian capacity of African countries. They complement civilian development efforts 

and are closely coordinated with U.S. embassy country teams. 

Exercise MEDFLAG 

In August 2009, MEDFLAG 09 was conducted with the Umbutfo Swaziland Defense Force as a joint Medical/Dental/Veterinary Capabilities Exercise. U.S. Army 

Africa and U.S. Air Forces Africa designed a mass casualty scenario that exercised 

the Defense Force’s response capabilities and its interoperability with civilian firstresponders. The exercise assisted the Swazi ministries of Health and Defense in 

jointly examining their emergency response plans and procedures. MEDFLAG 09 

helped improve Swaziland’s capacity to support future regional AU or UN PKO missions, while highlighting our support for this region of the continent. 

Pandemic Response Program 

Because infectious disease outbreaks have the potential to rapidly become global 

crises, U.S. Africa Command works with African partner countries, the interagency, 

international organizations, and NGOs to build partner military capacity to mitigate 

the effects of a pandemic. Our efforts are reinforced with 3 years of funding from 

USAID, which cooperates with the International Federation of the Red Cross and 

Red Crescent Societies and other partner organizations in African countries. 

Human Immunodeficiency Virus/Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (HIV/ 

AIDS) Program 

U.S. Africa Command’s military HIV/AIDS program is aimed at mitigating the 

impacts of the disease on African military readiness. The program includes activities 

that help prevent the escalation of HIV/AIDS infection rates within African security 

forces, and provide care and treatment for the servicemembers and families infected 

or affected by the disease. DOD activities that support African militaries’ fight 

against HIV/AIDS now reach 39 African countries. During the first half of fiscal 

year 2009, U.S. Africa Command’s programs reached over 117,000 African troops 

and family members with prevention messages, and provided counseling and testing 

services for 114,430 servicemembers and their families. In addition, 111 senior military leaders have been trained on HIV/AIDS policies, and 2,396 peer educators and 

517 health care workers have received HIV/AIDs training. Over 19,000 individuals 

are on antiretroviral treatment as a result of these collaborative efforts. The fight 

against HIV/AIDs in Africa is having an impact. Recently, a leader of a southern 

African country remarked that, 3 years ago, he was conducting burials everyday for 

an HIV related death; however, today he conducts one burial every 8 to 10 days. 

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Shared Accord, Benin 

When possible, we integrate civil-military operations into our exercises. Shared 

Accord is one example. Conducted by U.S. MARFORAF, Shared Accord’s primary 

purpose is to train for peacekeeping and peace support operations, and the exercise 

successfully integrated two Beninese Infantry Companies with two Marine Corps Infantry Companies. An additional component of the exercise was a Medical/Dental 

Civic Action Program, which treated 7,370 patients during visits to three villages 

over an 8 day period. A separate Veterinary Civic Action Program treated 92,410 

animals while visiting 7 villages over the same period. An exercise-related construction project to increase the Beninese capacity to conduct peacekeeper training at the 

Bembereke Peace Keeping Training Center was also completed. 

U.S AFRICA COMMAND COMPONENT AND SUBORDINATE COMMANDS

U.S. Africa Command has four component commands, one sub-unified command, 

and the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa. Our components are newly established and have inherited legacy efforts that they must mold to fit the Command’s strategy. U.S. Africa Command’s components and subordinate commands are 

the primary implementers of our programs and activities on the continent. Since our 

components have no assigned forces, we rely on the DOD Request for Forces process 

for the resources necessary to support our engagements in Africa. 

U.S. Army Africa (USARAF) 

On 1 October 2009, the Secretary of the Army designated U.S. Army Africa as 

the Army Service Component Command (ASCC) to U.S. Africa Command. USARAF 

will be fully operational capable (FOC) as an ASCC in fiscal year 2012, and has doubled in size during the last 15 months. USARAF is heavily involved in the professional development of African land forces, which remain the dominant military force 

in most African states. USARAF’s goal is to help transform our partners’ land forces 

into contributors to peace and stability, with the capabilities and capacities required 

to accomplish their missions in support of legitimate authority. 

USARAF continues to forge cooperative relationships and enduring partnerships 

that contribute to self-sustaining African security capacity. Key to USARAF’s success is collaborating with both military and non-military partners. USARAF is fostering new partnerships and enhancing existing ones, to include partnerships with 

other USG agencies. 

USARAF sponsored NATURAL FIRE, the largest exercise on the continent last 

year. It brought together U.S. forces from Europe and the United States to join with 

forces from five African states in a Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief exercise 

in Uganda. 

U.S. Naval Forces, Africa (NAVAF) 

NAVAF’s primary mission is to improve the maritime security capability and capacity of our African partners. Beyond APS, law enforcement operations, and Theater Security Cooperation activities, NAVAF is working to enhance maritime security by focusing on the development of maritime domain awareness, trained professionals, maritime infrastructure, response capabilities, regional integration, and a 

comprehensive approach for planning and execution. These capabilities will improve 

maritime security and contribute to development and stability by allowing our partners to take advantage of the resources in their exclusive economic zones. 

NAVAF, located in Naples, Italy, supports the creation of an environment where 

all African countries take a proactive interest in their own maritime security and 

in the overall security of the region. NAVAF utilizes maritime engagement activities 

to build trust, mutual cooperation, and respect in order to protect U.S. interests, reduce demand for U.S. resources, and ensure reliable and open access to ports, territorial waters, and other resources required for conducting sustained maritime operations. 

U.S. Air Forces, Africa (AFAFRICA/17AF) 

The 17th Air Force is the Air Force component to U.S. Africa Command. 

AFAFRICA continues its growth in capacity to command and control air forces in 

Africa for the purpose of conducting security engagement and operations, and to 

promote development, air safety, and security. 

AFAFRICA is organized into an Air Force Forces (AFFOR) staff and the 617th 

Air and Space Operations Center (AOC). AFAFRICA’s AFFOR staff reached FOC 

on 1 October 2009. The 617th AOC is expected to achieve FOC on 1 June 2010. The 

AOC provides continuous air command and control capability for all theater security 

cooperation exercise and engagement activities and crisis response operations such 

as foreign humanitarian assistance and non-combatant evacuation operations. EvenVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:37 May 06, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00596 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\62155.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
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tually, the AOC will provide a common operating picture of all air and space missions over the continent. Located at Ramstein Air Base, Germany, the 300-person 

command is administratively assigned to the U.S. Air Forces Europe for DOD funding support. AFAFRICA answers directly to U.S. Africa Command for operational 

assignments and joint support. 

One of AFAFRICA’s key programs is the Air Domain Safety and Security (ADSS) 

program, which is a long-term Air Force program of record with fiscal year 2010 

funding of $2.6 million. Funding is projected to grow to $3.1 million in fiscal year 

2011. AFAFRICA will expand ADSS significantly in 2010, by utilizing general purpose air forces and working together with USG departments and agencies and other 

partners to develop African capacity to provide regional air safety and security solutions to the civil and military air domains. Discussions with Rwanda, Uganda, Nigeria and Ghana are underway, and will lay the foundation for a common regional 

air picture. 

U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Africa (MARFORAF) 

MARFORAF, located in Stuttgart, Germany, conducts operations, exercises, training, and security cooperation activities throughout the AOR. In 2009, MARFORAF 

participated in 15 ACOTA missions aimed at improving partners’ capabilities to provide logistical support, employ military police, and exercise command and control 

over deployed forces. As the executive agent for the Non-Lethal Weapons program, 

MARFORAF conducted a very successful capabilities exercise attended by 11 African countries. This exercise highlighted a wide range of weapons that can limit the 

escalation of force and increase a tactical commander’s ability to control a situation 

short of lethal force. 

MARFORAF conducted mil-to-mil events in 2009 designed to familiarize our African partners with nearly every facet of military operations and procedures, including use of unmanned aerial vehicles, tactics, and medical skills. MARFORAF, as the 

lead component, continues to conduct Exercise African Lion in Morocco—the largest 

annual Combined Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) exercise on the African continent— 

as well as Exercise Shared Accord 10, which will be the first CJCS exercise conducted in Mozambique. 

U.S. Special Operations Command, Africa (SOCAFRICA) 

On 1 October 2008, SOCAFRICA was formed as a Special Operations Forces 

(SOF) Functional Sub-Unified Command for U.S. Africa Command. SOCAFRICA is 

colocated with U.S. Africa Command at Kelley Barracks, Stuttgart, Germany. 

Also on 1 October 2008, SOCAFRICA assumed responsibility for the Special Operations Command and Control Element-Horn of Africa, and on 15 May 2009, 

SOCAFRICA assumed responsibility for Joint Special Operations Task Force TransSahara (JSOTF–TS)—the SOF component of Operation Enduring Freedom—TransSahara. 

SOCAFRICA’s objectives are to build operational capacity, strengthen regional security and capacity initiatives, implement effective communication strategies in support of strategic objectives, and eradicate violent extremist organizations and their 

supporting networks. SOCAFRICA forces work closely with both U.S. Embassy 

country teams and African partners, maintaining a small but sustained presence 

throughout Africa, predominantly in the OEF–TS and CJTF–HOA regions. 

SOCAFRICA’s persistent SOF presence provides an invaluable resource that furthers USG efforts to combat violent extremist groups and builds partner nation CT 

capacity. 

Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF–HOA) 

In East and Central Africa, CJTF–HOA is critical to U.S. Africa Command’s efforts to build partner capacity to counter violent extremists and address other regional security challenges. Its mission to counter violent extremism and its location 

at Camp Lemonnier remain of utmost importance given the rising regional threat 

from al Qaeda and al Shabaab in Somalia and al Qaeda in Yemen. To counter extremist influences, CJTF–HOA works along several lines of effort: 

Fostering Regional Security Cooperation: CJTF–HOA works in close coordination 

with coalition members, African partners, other USG departments and agencies, 

and NGOs operating in the Joint Operations Area. CJTF–HOA fosters regional security cooperation through support to the East African Standby Force, the International Peace Support Training Center, the Humanitarian Peace Support School, 

ACOTA, the East African Community, and the East African regional disaster preparedness exercises Natural Fire and Golden Spear. 

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mote the legitimacy of their governments and military forces. Coordinated with 

USAID and DOS, civil affairs activities help mitigate the underlying stresses that 

can contribute to regional instability. CJTF–HOA also strengthens partner security 

capacity by supporting APS; providing opportunities for our African partners’ militaries to work closely with our CA Teams; developing Maritime Safety and Security/ 

Counter-Piracy capability and capacity; and by providing opportunities for African 

military liaison officers to serve on the CJTF–HOA staff. 

CJTF–HOA’s support for Djibouti’s efforts to train Somali TFG soldiers and support to the East African Standby Force Field Training Exercise has improved 

Djibouti’s capacity to assume a larger role in promoting peace in the Horn of Africa. 

COMMAND ENABLERS: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

The breadth and scope of U.S. Africa Command’s programs and activities in Africa 

are significant and growing. Our ability to sustain forward progress toward our 

long-term goals in Africa is dependent on several factors that enable our efforts. 

Some, such as limits on authorities, present us with challenges where we seek assistance. Others, such as interagency integration, present opportunities for growth 

and development of new or improved programs and activities that we wish to sustain. 

Authorities 

Sustaining our long-term security cooperation programs and activities in Africa 

requires flexible, multi-year authorities. Existing authorities are designed to support 

the conduct of individual short-term activities or long-term programs, but do not 

support the transition from the former to the latter. They are also insufficiently responsive to changing conditions, such as when train and equip efforts initiated in 

response to emergent threats highlight the need for long-term capacity building. 

The authorities and programs we currently use for building partner capacity are 

essential, and I ask for your continued support in the following areas: 

• Full support of the President’s budget request for the global train and 

equip program. 

• Support of the Department of State’s request for programs in Africa. 

• Support of the Combatant Commander’s Initiative Fund, with increased 

flexibility for foreign military education and training activities. 

We encourage dialogue on ways to streamline or modify legislative authorities to 

enable sustained security engagement with our African partners, ranging from train 

and equip programs that respond quickly to changing conditions to long-term partner capacity-building, especially in countering violent extremism. 

Theater Infrastructure and Posture Requirements 

U.S. Africa Command’s theater posture was inherited from the three previous 

commands that formerly had DOD responsibility for Africa. U.S. Africa Command, 

in close cooperation with DOS, is evaluating and refining its access needs based on 

our theater-wide requirements. This centers primarily on gaining and maintaining 

the access and freedom of movement necessary to conduct both day-to-day security 

cooperation activities and, if required, crisis response operations. We are working 

with our components, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and DOS to identify 

the network of Cooperative Security Locations (CSLs) and supporting agreements 

required to enable the Command to carry out these activities. Currently, 10 CSLs 

have been identified, 8 of which were previously established by U.S. European Command and U.S. Central Command. The Command’s posture plan and facilities master plan are designed to address our emerging support requirements. 

Forward Operating Sites (FOS) and Cooperative Security Locations (CSLs) in 

U.S. Africa Command’s AOR 

Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti (CLDJ) is an enduring location essential to U.S. security interests in East Africa and the greater Indian Ocean basin. This facility supports efforts in the Gulf of Aden as well as U.S. Central Command’s objectives for 

Yemen. Colocation with Djibouti Airport and proximity to Djibouti’s seaport make 

CLDJ an ideal site for supporting U.S. Africa Command operations throughout the 

region, and of equal importance is the Camp’s ability to support DOD’s global transportation infrastructure network as a key node. Camp Lemonnier also supports our 

international partners as we work together to counter piracy in the region. 

We are transitioning CLDJ from its previous contingency footing to an enduring 

presence through the construction of permanent facilities funded through a military 

construction program of record. The first series of projects will improve security and 

safety. Subsequent projects will improve the capacity to sustain operations. 

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The second of our two FOSs, Ascension Island, is also critical to the strategic 

transportation network supporting U.S. Africa Command—extending our operational reach to the west and south Africa. U.S. Africa Command is working with 

U.S. Transportation Command to develop the infrastructure of this FOS so that it 

can provide broader support to the Command’s mission. 

Enroute Infrastructure outside U.S. Africa Command’s AOR 

In addition to the transportation infrastructure inside our AOR, U.S. Africa Command continues to depend on adjacent command infrastructure and main operating 

bases in Rota (Spain), Sigonella (Italy), Aruba (Lesser Antilles), Souda Bay (Greece), 

and Ramstein (Germany) for logistical support. Although these sites are located in 

other geographic combatant command AOR, they are critical intermediate nodes 

that support operations in Africa. 

Command, Control, Communications, and Computer System (C4S) Infrastructure 

All the above leads to a requirement for significant investment in the development 

of its C4S capabilities for our enduring locations—Camp Lemonnier, FOSs, CSLs, 

and enroute locations. The expanse of the African Continent and U.S. Africa Command’s limited forces necessitate a steady-state C4S requirement met by limited 

commercial capability or deployed tactical networks. The migration and improvement of legacy C4S, as well as tactical networks, to a robust and sustainable infrastructure will continue to be an investment priority for U.S. Africa Command. 

Resources 

The level of funding for programs under the authority of DOS that are available 

to Africa has increased since the creation of U.S. Africa Command, and we request 

continued funding to allow us to fully pursue the defense aspects of the President’s 

stated priorities. The countries in our AOR are among the poorest in the world. 

Many of their militaries are inappropriately trained, equipped, and prepared for 

their primary missions—the defense of their state or participation in peacekeeping 

operations. Movement of U.S. and African military personnel and equipment to 

meet emergent threats, conduct capacity building activities, and respond to crises, 

is heavily dependent on U.S. military air and sealift. 

Fully funding DOS-led programs is necessary to assist our partners in maintaining stability that fosters development, while helping them transform their security 

sectors. The greatest needs include the following. 

Funding for the FMF Program 

Fiscal year 2011 FMF request totals for Africa are approximately $38 million, of 

which $14 million is allocated to Tunisia and Morocco. If we are to achieve our strategic objectives and avoid undesirable long-term consequences, we must fully fund 

our requested FMF commitment to the African continent. FMF is critical to accomplishing the U.S. mission in Africa and constitutes a long-term investment in critical 

relationships. Inadequate funding of our FMF request or inconsistent year-to-year 

distribution can compromise our efforts, turn our partners towards other sources, 

and inhibit peacekeeping operations. FMF is fundamental to our strategy of preventative rather than reactive response. 

Funding for Exercises 

A key component of our capacity building is our Joint and Combined Exercise program. This program is conducted under the auspices of the CJCS exercise program, 

and is dependent upon funding from the Combatant Commander’s Exercise and Engagement and Training Transformation (CE2T2) Program. As the command continues to mature and our exercise program expands to meet the readiness needs of 

U.S. forces and partner militaries, U.S. Africa Command will place increasing demands for limited CE2T2 funds. We ask for your continued support of the Department’s request for the Combatant Commander’s Exercise and Engagement and 

Training Transformation Program. 

Funding for Counternarcotics Efforts 

Revenue from the sale of illegal narcotics trans-shipped through Africa directly 

benefits the same drug cartels who resolutely distribute narcotics on the streets of 

the United States. The influence of drug money in developing states breeds corruption and instability, which may threaten the availability of African natural resources critical to the U.S. and global economy. Countering the flow of narcotics 

through Africa has direct relevance to U.S. national security, and we urge you to 

consider giving this program your full support. 

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Interagency Integration and Contribution 

The construct of U.S. Africa Command is based on the premise that interagency 

partner integration leads to better planning and greater unity of effort by all USG 

stakeholders. As mentioned in this statement, our national interests have benefited 

from U.S. Africa Command’s interagency collaboration. Our collective efforts have 

produced significant positive results in the areas of security sector reform, military 

professionalization, peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, disaster preparedness, 

pandemic response programs, counternarcotics, and counterterrorism. 

U.S. Africa Command is working to improve and expand its interagency partner 

integration. Currently U.S. Africa Command has memoranda of agreement with 11 

departments and agencies. Opportunities are expanding with the recent addition of 

the U.S. Geological Survey, the Department of Energy, the U.S. Department of Agriculture, the Department of the Interior, and the Transportation Security Administration. 

Challenges of successfully embedding interagency personnel in the Command 

have been identified recently through a comprehensive internal survey. As a result, 

initiatives are being implemented to address training issues, collaborative exercise 

planning, and the education of DOD personnel concerning interagency capabilities. 

We understand that other USG agencies have different obligations and objectives, 

and that interagency cooperation is a two-way street. In all we do, we seek to ensure that the programs and actions of this Command support overall U.S. policy in 

Africa. We continue to work diligently to ensure that interagency participation with 

U.S. Africa Command is beneficial to all participants and, particularly, to our national interests. 

Increases in funding for defense-related programs must be accompanied by adequate resourcing of parallel efforts in diplomacy and development programs. Adequate TSCTP funding enables civilian agency efforts to help our partners develop 

and sustain conditions to counter violent extremism. We encourage Congress to support USG efforts in their entirety when it comes to diplomacy, development, and defense. 

Well-Being Programs 

Our Quality of Life (QoL) Office promotes accessibility, equity, and an increased 

quality of life through services and programs for the U.S. Africa Command family. 

To help us identify QoL focus areas, Africa Command Families on the African Continent conferences are held to address challenges faced by families living in Africa. 

To assist our team members and their families in solving problems resulting from 

deployments and other family changes, we have implemented the Military and Family Life Consultant Program. Concerning education, our partnership with the Department of Defense Education Activity and the Department of Defense Dependent 

Schools, Europe, ensures educational support to all U.S. Africa Command members. 

U.S. Africa Command will continue to support and expand these initiatives in fiscal 

year 2011. 

The Command will continuously assess the theater-wide environment in order to 

identify emerging and unusually sensitive QoL challenges. We will strengthen our 

strategic partnerships to leverage best business practices and collaborate on solutions to mitigate or resolve quality of life issues. We continue to focus our efforts 

on our members and their families, both on and off the African continent, to ensure 

their quality of life remains a priority and is funded properly. 

CONCLUSION

U.S. Africa Command’s priority is to conduct effective and sustained security cooperation programs and military operations to advance and protect U.S. interests 

in Africa. Our programs are helping our African partners assume an ever-increasing 

role in addressing the security concerns of the continent and its island states. By 

focusing on long-term capacity building, we are implementing a preventative strategy that serves the interests of the United States, our African partners, and our allies. 

The United States achieves its greatest effect when all U.S. Government agencies 

work collaboratively in applying the tools of diplomacy, development, and defense 

to meet our national security objectives. Congress can modernize our Nation’s approach to emergent challenges made evident in the first decade of this new century 

by supporting funding and further development of the other USG departments and 

agencies with whom we partner and support. Revising security assistance authorities will allow all agencies that contribute to our foreign policy and national security 

effort to improve our unity of effort, and thus ensure we outpace transnational 

threats that know no lawful limits. 

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I am grateful for the outstanding congressional support to U.S. Africa Command 

(AFRICOM). Your continued devotion to the men and women from DOD and other 

U.S. Government departments and agencies assigned to the Command will allow 

their good work to protect and advance the interests of the United States. I am 

proud to serve on the U.S. AFRICOM team with these dedicated Americans. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you so much, General. 

General Mattis. 

STATEMENT OF GEN. JAMES N. MATTIS, USMC, COMMANDER, 

U.S. JOINT FORCES COMMAND 

General MATTIS. Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, members of 

the committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify, and I request my written statement be placed in the record. 

Chairman LEVIN. It will be. 

General MATTIS. Over the course of this past year, JFCOM has 

continued to provide combat-ready forces to combatant commanders to support the military operations and continue to prepare 

for future conflicts while looking ahead. After an historic change of 

command in NATO, which got handed over to the Supreme Commander, Allied Command Transformation, we continue to ensure 

JFCOM remains closely linked with our allies and partners in 

NATO. 

The character of this current conflict remains different or, better 

said, irregular. We have continued to adapt our forces in stride and 

become increasingly confident in irregular warfare. Across the 

board, JFCOM has significantly adapted to this new environment. 

Our watchword is balance. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and 

the Secretary of Defense have stated that we must not lose our conventional superiority in the process of adapting. Even as we continue to prepare and deploy forces in the irregular fights in Iraq 

and Afghanistan, we cannot permit dormancy of our conventional 

ability. 

Our forces are achieving balance and will continue to do so as 

dwell times build with the Iraqi drawdown. Through effective 

training and education across the force, we can strike the appropriate balance while ensuring our current and future combat readiness. 

I returned a week ago from Afghanistan and our field commanders there confirm that our troops are superbly trained for the 

fight, even as we use lessons learned to further improve our readiness and not fall back on complacency. Based on the reality of current active operations and future trends outlined in our work on 

the future, JFCOM’s top priority continues to reflect this balance 

between support for the current fight and our constant assessment 

of the future to ensure we remain the most capable military in the 

world. 

Thank you, sir. 

[The prepared statement of General Mattis follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY GEN. JAMES N. MATTIS, USMC 

INTRODUCTION

Mr. Chairman, ranking member, and distinguished members of the committee, 

thank you for the opportunity to report on Joint Forces Command. Joint Forces 

Command is comprised of 1.16 million Active Duty, National Guard, and Reserve 

soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines. Our command provides combat-ready forces 

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to our Nation’s geographic combatant commanders around the globe in support of 

today’s fight, while we simultaneously prepare the joint force for future conflicts. 

Successful accomplishment of our mission ensures we field the most capable and 

ready joint force the world has ever known. At the same time we keep a weather 

eye on the future to ensure our Nation has the fewest regrets when future surprises 

occur, as they surely will if history is a guide. 

JOINT OPERATING ENVIRONMENT AND CAPSTONE CONCEPT FOR JOINT OPERATIONS

Our thinking about how to prepare our forces for the future must be informed by 

the past. No one has a crystal ball to accurately predict the threats and challenges 

we could face. But if we’re to reduce the potential for being caught flat-footed, we 

must explore the strategic and operational depths of the future to provide the most 

reasoned mental framework within which will come the challenges that our political 

and military leaders will confront in the future. Developed at Joint Forces Command for defense planners and decisionmakers, The Joint Operating Environment 

(JOE) provides a framework of trends, contexts, and strategic implications as a 

basis for thinking about the world over the next quarter century. Its purpose is not 

to predict, but to suggest ways leaders might think about the future. 

First published in 2008, the JOE was updated and will be re-released later this 

month. This new edition of the JOE continues to be historically informed and forward looking, and this year the JOE includes a new section that looks at the world’s 

tenuous financial stability, a growing U.S. national debt, and what this all might 

mean for future national security and defense planning. By considering how global 

trends will drive change, we draw general conclusions about the military implications. Those implications set the framework for our concept development. 

If the JOE is the ‘‘problem statement’’ for the future joint force, then the Capstone 

Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO) is the ‘‘solution.’’ The CCJO is the Chairman 

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s statement for how the joint force will operate in the 

future threat environment described in the JOE. As the Capstone Concept, it was 

drafted with active engagement of the Joint Chiefs and combatant commanders 

under the guidance of the Chairman. This past summer a series of war games tested the CCJO and found it conceptually sufficient. The games also highlighted several key areas that require focus and improvement for the joint force and informed 

the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). 

Throughout history every military organization that has successfully adapted has 

done so by clearly articulating the problem as we have in the JOE, and then resolving the problem as the Chairman has outlined in the CCJO. With the QDR, JOE 

and the CCJO providing our backdrop, Joint Forces Command remains focused this 

year on prevailing in the current conflict, preparing for a wide range of future contingencies, and preserving and enhancing the joint force, including its ability to 

work harmoniously with other elements of the U.S. Government and allies. 

PREVAIL IN TODAY’S CONFLICTS

Supporting the current active operations overseas commands much of our effort. 

We are engaged in training and deploying forces, analyzing and applying lessons 

learned, and overseeing the development of joint capabilities in response to our 

warfighting commanders needs. These activities demand a sense of urgency. It is 

imperative that we adapt and evolve the force to confound our enemies, keeping our 

forces at their top effectiveness. 

As the joint force provider, Joint Forces Command is responsible for providing 

trained and ready forces to combatant commanders in support of current operations 

and global contingencies. This mission area has the most immediate and visible impact on current joint operations. During the past year, we responded to more than 

390 rotational and emergent requests for forces from combatant commanders resulting in the sourcing of more than 398,000 personnel supporting numerous global missions. Key among these is the troop increase in Afghanistan, while continuing to 

satisfy requirements in Iraq and other regions. 

In reserve, as a shock absorber for unpredictable events like the surprises outlined in the JOE, Joint Forces Command maintains the Global Response Force 

ready to respond to unforeseen crises at home or abroad. This force, most recently 

deployed in support of Haiti, provides the Commander in Chief with flexible options 

to respond to a variety of crises while we simultaneously fulfill our commitments 

in Iraq, Afghanistan, the Horn of Africa, and elsewhere around the world. 

The character of ongoing operations has resulted in unusual stress on ‘‘high-demand, low density’’ assets and requires accelerated force structure changes. In some 

cases the demand requires new capabilities be developed. The work associated with 

the QDR resulted in considerable gains in identifying shortfalls and validating the 

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need to balance the force. Although the Services are continuing to increase these 

capabilities, persistent shortfalls exist in electronic warfare, civil affairs, engineering, military intelligence, military police, and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities. 

While we cannot accurately predict the type warfare in which we must be ready 

to engage in the future, we recognize that we cannot adopt a single, preclusive view 

of war. Balance is key. Our forces must be tailored to provide the maximum flexibility to deal with a wide range of conflicts and contingencies, because today’s strategic and operational environment is characterized by the constants of rapid change 

and complexity. Today, we recognize that the force must be balanced to effectively 

meet various challenges to U.S. interests and an irregular threat, without compromising our nuclear deterrent or conventional capabilities and at a time when the 

distinctions between types of warfare are blurring. Our military leaders and our 

forces will need to be the most versatile in our Nation’s history. 

In support of this line of thinking, in March of 2009 Joint Forces Command published a vision for Irregular Warfare (IW) and established a set of goals and objectives to advance counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, and stability operations capabilities as a core competency within the General Purpose Forces (GPF). Our Joint 

Irregular Warfare Center is the command’s catalyst and driving force behind establishing IW as a core competency for the joint force. This team is building bridges 

across the Services, Service labs, industry, academia, civilian partners, and with allies to harvest the best ideas on how to address this challenging form of warfare 

and steal a march on our enemy. 

The non-state, insurgent and terrorist adversaries we face today in the Middle 

East and elsewhere have chosen approaches to warfare that avoids our conventional 

strengths. We have adapted to these changing approaches to war and will continue 

to do so across the joint force. The asymmetric approach of our enemy has in some 

cases negated our technologically superior, iconic weapon systems, putting the preponderance of enemy engagements in the hands of our ground troops in close quarters combat. In this unforgiving environment, our ground units are employed every 

day, and this is where over 80 percent of our casualties occur, often in the initial 

firefights. 

Across all warfighting communities, training advances have been significant, yet 

the use of advanced simulation technology has not yet achieved for infantry training 

what we take as routine for aviation, armor or maritime simulation training. While 

there are a host of reasons, and the different combat training regimes pose notably 

different simulation challenges, dramatic advances in immersive simulation, artificial intelligence, and gaming technology must now be harnessed to bring state-ofthe-art simulation to small infantry units. Though the rudimentary simulation designed for close combat currently affords units some level of challenge, it does not 

yet approach the level of sophistication deemed essential in other disciplines. 

The Deputy Secretary of Defense has directed funding to the Services and Joint 

Forces Command to support the urgent development of infantry immersive training 

simulators as part of a broader national effort for small unit excellence. As our 

troops are engaged around the world and assigned a variety of missions confronting 

insurgents on the ground, the development of a close combat/infantry immersive 

training simulator is a national priority in terms of creating top-performing small 

units able to take advantage of joint surveillance and fire support. Our immediate 

task is to create prototype immersive training simulators as a means to enhance 

warfighter survivability, amplify exposure to joint and combined assets, improve the 

employment of our joint-asymmetric capabilities, and increase the overall effectiveness of our close combat/infantry small unit performance to defeat the enemy while 

protecting the innocent intentionally jeopardized by our enemies’ tactics. 

Focusing efforts to enable small units to combine initiative, critical thinking, and 

joint warfighting experience will allow for brilliance in combat skill basics and agile 

responses to the enemies we face. Casualty reduction, fewer ethical missteps, psychological resilience and enhanced mission success rates are the goals. We will remain responsive and innovative to confront the challenges our close combat and 

small infantry units encounter today and tomorrow. Other communities have demonstrated that simulator training is an effective tool to increase operational effectiveness. America’s close combat/infantry forces will get our best effort to provide 

them every advantage and prepare them fully to achieve success in battle. 

In addition to improved simulation training capabilities, Joint Forces Command 

continues its efforts to enhance small unit effectiveness. We have brought together 

the trainers, coaches, educators, social and human scientists, academia, and technical and cognitive assessment experts to form a community of interest that will improve the combat effectiveness of our small units. Paramount to this effort is the 

development of leaders who are capable of operating against a broad spectrum of 

598 

threats, while retaining and enhancing their ability to lead in a more conventional 

environment. The complex and dynamic security environment demands that we 

have small units and leaders that are able to take advantage of fleeting opportunities on the battlefield. These small units and leaders must be able to operate independently, possessing the full knowledge and ability to employ joint and combined 

capabilities, and subsequently be empowered to make critical decisions under stressful conditions—the same attributes we anticipate will be required on future battlefields, conventional or otherwise. 

Working with the Services, Joint Forces Command has developed a Concept for 

Joint Distributed Operations in support of experimentation to be conducted this 

summer. This concept describes how joint enabling capabilities can be made more 

effectively and efficiently available to smaller distributed units and that these joint 

capabilities can be pushed to lower echelons. Current operations demonstrate that 

distributed operations are becoming more the norm, and this experiment will draw 

on lessons learned and best practices from recent experience to determine what solutions should be incorporated into future joint force capabilities. 

In Afghanistan, U.S. airpower represents one of our joint force’s greatest asymmetric advantages over the enemy. The employment of air-based joint fires, used 

properly, will wreak havoc on enemy forces. In the fluid environment of a counterinsurgency fight, the decision to employ these joint air-based fires will come from 

leaders who understand that to be effective these fires must be employed rapidly 

and precisely against the enemy while avoiding civilian casualties. Effective employment often requires persistent observation, integrated intelligence, surveillance, and 

reconnaissance, and shortened approval procedures. Our airpower is unmatched in 

the world, however today’s approach of loitering multi-million dollar aircraft and 

using a system-of-systems procedure for the approval and employment of airpower 

is not the most effective use of aviation fires in this irregular fight. A Light Attack 

Armed Reconnaissance (LAAR) aircraft capability has the potential to shift air support from a reactive threat response, to a more proactive approach that reduces sensor-to-shooter timelines, with immediate and accurate fires, providing surveillance 

and reconnaissance throughout a mission, while providing communication and navigation support to troops on the ground. Additionally, a LAAR capability can provide 

a means to build partner capacity with effective, relevant air support. This year 

Joint Forces Command will closely follow a project called Imminent Fury where the 

Navy and Air Force will employ a LAAR capability to reinforce our asymmetric advantage over the enemy. 

Presently, one of the enemy’s most effective weapons is the Improvised Explosive 

Device (IED). Joint Forces Command is collaborating closely with the Joint IED Defeat Organization to defeat this enemy capability, sharing lessons learned and 

adapting our operating concept and training efforts. Joint Forces Command continues to prepare the joint force to conduct operations in urban environments to defeat adversaries who are embedded and diffused within a population without causing catastrophic damage to the functioning society. In collaboration with the Services and international partners, we will strive to leverage relevant efforts that address gaps in our ability to effectively operate within cities and complex terrain. 

The joint force has learned and adapted to counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, 

and required stability operations conducted in a complex environment. Recently, the 

Services and Joint Forces Command completed an initial assessment of U.S. GPF 

readiness and proficiency for irregular warfare. This first effort provides a primarily 

qualitative assessment of proficiency and readiness, and will serve as a baseline for 

future work. As we incorporate IW—relevant tasks, skills, and experiences into our 

tracking mechanisms and further institutionalize the enduring lessons learned from 

Iraq and Afghanistan, subsequent assessments will provide a more quantitative and 

focused picture of the GPF’s proficiency and readiness for IW. 

The complex series of coincident challenges continues to demand highly educated 

warriors and leaders. Joint Forces Command continues to provide a robust Mission 

Rehearsal Exercise (MRX) program to support the training of deploying headquarters elements to Afghanistan. These have included the 101st Airborne Division 

and the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force Forward. These exercises are continually 

improved to stress cultural awareness and the decisionmaking skills required in the 

irregular warfare environment, including interagency, coalition and Afghan Security 

Force representatives in attendance. During 2009, the exercise support to Central 

Command’s Combined Transition Command-Afghanistan helped prepare that staff 

to assist the Afghan National Army to assume national responsibilities. The exercises remained tightly linked to our joint and NATO lessons learned processes, and 

feedback from the field continues to shape the scenarios and operational problems 

within which we train and evaluate deploying commanders and their staffs. 

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Through Joint Knowledge Development and Delivery Capability (JKDDC) and 

Joint Knowledge Online (JKO), Joint Forces Command continues to provide virtual 

classroom training to cover a wide array of training topics. The JKO Portal hosts 

more than 330 courses, including many developed by coalition partner nations to 

build partner capacity through sharing information and security related training. 

The portal also offers basic language training and tailored pre-deployment training 

for Individual Augmentees (IAs) and coalition partners participating in operations 

in Iraq and Afghanistan. Many resources found on the JKO Portal also are available 

to interagency, international and nongovernmental organizations. To date, JKO reports over 100,000 registered users and 230,000 course completions. In 2009 JKDDC 

invested in research and development for advanced technology capabilities that targeted specific training gaps. These fielded and available applications include the 

Virtual Cultural Awareness Trainer and the Small Group Scenario Trainer, specifically addressing operations, tailored cultural awareness training, and small group 

training capability needs. These applications provide some rudimentary capabilities 

to satisfy basic warfighter training needs. 

COALITION EFFORTS

The United States will seldom choose to go it alone. Allies and coalition partners 

play a key role across the full range of military operations today and those anticipated in the future. The presence of allies and partners will likely exert a major 

influence on the military balance in future operations. Our friends can and do provide critical support. We must continue to broaden and deepen relationships with 

capable security partners. Joint Forces Command continues to strengthen partnerships through engagement with DOD and NATO, via Allied Command Transformation (ACT), and representatives from other nations assigned to the command. 

The command remains actively linked to ACT, not only because of its proximity, but 

also because of the productive working relationships fostered between the headquarters’ staffs. As of December 2009, Joint Forces Command routinely collaborates 

bilaterally with representatives from 48 nations. These relationships are critical to 

building the trust and interoperability necessary to build and sustain strong alliances and coalitions. 

The Joint Forces Command led Multi-National Experiment (MNE) 6 is a 2-year, 

multinational and interagency effort to improve coalition capabilities against enemies employing a mix of irregular operational methods, adaptive technologies, and 

hybrid approaches to warfare through a whole-of-government approach. Participants 

include military and civilian sectors of 18 NATO and non-NATO nations, NATO’s 

ACT, and U.S. Special Operations Command. MNE 6 produced draft products on the 

assessment of operational progress and cross-cultural awareness in the first year. 

The remainder of the experiment is focused on developing and implementing at national and international levels solutions for coordination of partner efforts to solve 

a crisis, assess campaign progress with valid metrics, and develop a strategy for information sharing and situational understanding. 

A common, often daunting, task for the geographic combatant commander is 

strengthening indigenous security forces. As articulated in the QDR report, Security 

Force Assistance (SFA) is a cornerstone for establishing regional security. Effective 

indigenous security forces can preclude or minimize conflict and thereby strengthen 

the collective security against threats and security challenges, reducing the potential demand for U.S forces. While Security Force Assistance expertise traditionally 

resides within Special Operations Forces (SOF), some aspects of SFA are well suited 

to GPF. Transitioning portions of these responsibilities will relieve pressure on our 

over-extended SOF. The GPF possesses robust capability that can be used more effectively to provide full spectrum SFA support. For example, a maritime SFA possesses the expertise to support everything from low-end opportunities such as small 

boat engine maintenance, to ballistic missile defense, one of the most complex aspects of modern warfare. 

Presently, the joint force is not optimally trained and organized to advise and assist with building partnerships, although real progress has been demonstrated. As 

the provider of the majority of the GPF to the combatant commanders, we remain 

fully engaged with Special Operations Command to expand these capabilities, particularly the emerging role of SFA. We envision selected SFA executed by GPF in 

small units, task organized for the mission, operating in a distributed manner and 

building partner security capability in support of theater campaign plans. This vision includes SFA support within the ground, air and maritime domains. Our maritime forces are uniquely positioned to support this mission, by providing SFA from 

the sea, thereby sustaining U.S. influence while minimizing the U.S. footprint 

ashore, and maintaining the security of the global commons. To support this vision 

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of an expanded GPF role, we have adapted the global force management process to 

account for SFA, and are addressing this capability in joint concept development 

and experimentation like the Joint Distributed Operations experiment, ensuring the 

Services have a model for these operations and highlighting Service strengths, such 

as our asymmetric naval capabilities. 

PREPARE

Where deterrence fails and enemies threaten our national interests, the joint force 

must have the capacity and capability to apply force. It must be prepared to operate 

with success in a wide range of contingencies. Preparing the joint force for these 

future contingencies is the focus of Joint Forces Command’s effort supporting the 

development of fully interoperable joint warfighting capabilities and concepts. 

Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) is the means to develop our future 

leaders for the complexity of the threat environment in which those leaders will find 

themselves. Viewed broadly, JPME is a strategic asset for our Nation that shapes 

the understanding of not just American officers, but also for preparing and building 

personal relationships and trust with our allied or partner nations whose officers 

also attend our schools. Today, JPME is essential to understanding the multiplicity 

of state and non-state actors, the nature of warfare, and building partner capacity 

to operate in an era of persistent engagement. The complexities of today’s complex 

security environment demand the most innovative and versatile leaders to execute 

a strategy that demands melding military, civil and cultural factors. A trained 

warfighter must perform acceptably against a range of threats and in dynamic security environments, which demand highly-educated warriors who can adapt 

opportunistically in order to prevail. A critical thinker/warrior will know how to acquire knowledge, process information from multiple sources, and make timely, accurate decisions in complex, ethically challenging and ever-changing environments. We 

now place greater emphasis on the study of history, culture and language beyond 

their broad incorporation into training and exercise scenarios, including efforts employing the latest modeling and simulation technology. 

We are taking concrete steps to translate battlefield adaptations into rapid institutional change. Our maturing relationship with the National Defense University 

(NDU) is one effort to improve JPME and ensure it is aligned properly with the current realities and future challenges that we pick up in lessons learned, mission rehearsal exercises, and concept development. Results from the ongoing House Armed 

Services Committee Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee, National Defense 

University, and Service school evaluations of the entire JPME program can provide 

insights to transform JPME, making it more effective and relevant to meet the demands of both the present and future operating environments. In conjunction with 

Special Operations Command and NDU, we will stand-up an Irregular Warfare Academic Center of Excellence to provide a capability which harnesses the work of the 

many academic institutions studying counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, stability 

operations, unconventional operational methods, and hybrid approaches to warfare 

and to make their lessons relevant and available to the joint force. I strongly urge 

your continued support of our efforts to expand allied and partner access to our educational institutions to further build trust and interoperability among our forces, 

while broadly sharing our ethical grounding. We are also swiftly incorporating battlefield lessons learned into rehearsal exercises and senior leader education programs like the Pinnacle, Capstone and Keystone courses. Participants’ surveys consistently note the relevance of both lessons learned and interaction with senior level 

warfighters who bring a wealth of experience to bear. 

As a means to promote the necessary cognitive approaches, the application of 

‘operational design’ will help leaders understand the problem, understand the environment, design an approach to solve the problem, and reframe the problem when 

circumstances change. Joint Forces Command has initiated a program to move operational design forward at the tactical, operational and strategic levels; focused on 

a cognitive approach vice procedural approach; built with the best of breed; developed in a joint context; and in collaboration with all the Services, while leveraging 

the Army’s mature work along these lines. 

During the past year, Joint Forces Command examined the adequacy of the joint 

force to execute the precepts outlined in the Capstone Concept for Joint Operations. 

Through wargaming activity, and drawing on the extensive experience and broad 

perspective of participants who included seven ambassadors; four former combatant 

commanders; active flag and general officers from the United States, United Kingdom, and Australia; subject matter experts from all services and combatant commands; and representatives from relevant U.S. Government departments and the 

National Security Council, this examination identified risk areas where the joint 

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force’s ability to achieve its mission are most vulnerable, and evaluated potential 

mitigating actions. 

The CCJO wargame identified force development implications in order to address 

the changing nuclear landscape, gaining and maintaining access around the globe, 

interagency integration, situational understanding, and overcoming digital dependence. Detailed insights and recommendations from the experiment were provided to 

joint and Service policy and decisionmakers and helped inform the QDR. The CCJO 

and related experimentation are also shaping the development of supporting concepts focused on combat, security, engagement, and relief and reconstruction, which 

in turn will update our guiding doctrine. 

We have no sense of complacency. The enemy doesn’t rest, nor will we as we move 

to check his capabilities. With the proliferation of inexpensive and capable technology, our enemies are gaining precision capability, and this is no longer an exclusive advantage of U.S./NATO forces. This precision capability will allow modestly 

funded states or non-state actors to acquire long-range precision munitions, project 

power from farther out, and with greater accuracy. We are just now scratching the 

surface on how best to defend against and defeat this threat and overcome the antiaccess threat they constitute. 

During the 2006 Israeli-Hezbollah conflict, Hezbollah employed unmanned aerial 

vehicles on several occasions. This use of low cost, tactical unmanned aerial vehicles 

demonstrated that sophistication is not the sole realm of developed states. Again, 

the proliferation of relatively cheap and capable technology is creating threats we 

must be prepared to reckon with. Presently, our Joint Unmanned Aerial Vehicles 

Center of Excellence, in conjunction with the Joint Integrated Air and Missile Defense Office, is developing a concept of operations to address challenges and evaluate capabilities associated with countering adversary unmanned aerial systems. 

With almost a decade of fighting in Afghanistan and Iraq, it is inevitable that 

some currently unused capabilities may atrophy. In many cases, there are now joint 

warfighters who have never assaulted a beach or hit a drop-zone by parachute. Because of this, we are seeing a decline in our ability to conduct forcible entry operations, operations that can reassure our friends and temper our adversaries’ designs. Additionally, the continued development and proliferation of longer range, 

precision guided munitions challenge our ability to perform these operations in the 

contested littorals around the globe. The battle for access may prove not only the 

most important, but the most difficult, requiring forcible entry capabilities and 

sustainment capabilities. Couple this readiness issue with aging ships, aerial tankers and strategic bombers, and our ability to gain access and influence actions over 

strategic distances needs to receive increased attention. Seabasing is a highly relevant supporting effort as we look toward our asymmetric strengths to create costimposing dilemmas on future enemies. 

Joint Force Commanders require robust command and control (C2) capabilities 

that enable agile decisionmaking and information flow from the operational to tactical level across today’s global domain. This domain encompasses cyberspace, all 

wired and wireless communications, and fixed and mobile warfighting customers, to 

include the networks that support them down to the tactical edge. Robust C2 implies a degree of reliability, redundancy, and agility necessary to effectively operate, 

both independently and with our coalition partners and allies, in degraded and/or 

austere conditions. Developing enhanced, robust C2 capabilities in the near-term requires adoption of an integrated C2 triad network approach; specifically the blending of surface (including maritime), air and space systems into a resilient network. 

We are working to develop an operational context for objective joint analysis, assessment and training, and common standards to verify operational effectiveness of information exchanges and interoperability. 

As the C2 capability portfolio manager, Joint Forces Command is responsible for 

leading a number of efforts across the C2 Joint Capability Area which directly supports the establishment of an integrated C2 triad network. These integration efforts 

will enhance our wired and wireless cyberspace capabilities, while leveraging and 

creating cyberspace opportunities. To better enable our small units operating at the 

wireless tactical edge in austere and/or hostile environments, we are working in coordination with Special Operations Command, Strategic Command, the Joint Staff 

and the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information Integration 

to develop C2 On-the-Move and Joint Aerial Layer Network capabilities. Central to 

this effort is the stand-up of the Joint Systems Integration and Interoperability Lab 

to conduct full-spectrum C2 capability analyses and up-front Joint Systems Engineering to improve joint interoperability and integration. Finally, we continue to advocate on behalf of the warfighter ensuring the sustainment and synchronization of 

our C2 legacy systems as we migrate to objective joint C2 capabilities, including an 

Adaptive Planning and Execution capability that strives to reduce the time required 

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for warfighter plan development to under a year, and accelerate plan execution to 

near real time. 

In Iraq and Afghanistan our opponents have displayed considerable capacity to 

learn and adapt in both the political and tactical arenas. We anticipate we will see 

more of this in the future; more sophisticated opponents of U.S. military forces will 

certainly attack perceived American vulnerabilities. It is highly likely that attacks 

on our computers, space and communications systems will severely degrade command and control of U.S. forces. Thus, those forces must possess the ability to operate effectively against denial operations and in degraded conditions. 

For this reason our leaders must understand that, first and foremost, C2 is a 

human endeavor. C2 must be leader-centric and network-enabled to facilitate initiative and decisionmaking at the lowest level possible. While materiel solutions, processes, and engineering can enable decisionmaking, command and control is not synonymous with network operations nor the employment of advanced technology. The 

joint force must have the flexibility to exploit both. Commanders must be skilled at 

crafting and articulating their intent, enabling junior leaders to exercise initiative 

and take advantage of fleeting opportunities in the decentralized operations we anticipate, vice centralizing decisionmaking at high levels. This is vital in both conventional force-on-force warfare and decentralized operations that we observe in the 

combat zone. 

PRESERVE /CONCLUSION

We must continue to seek ways to ensure the vitality and the quality of the AllVolunteer Force. As the joint force provider, I have a vested interest in the vitality 

and quality of the force. Our number one priority remains supporting the 

warfighters around the globe to prevail in today’s wars. Essential to this effort is 

sustaining the All-Volunteer Force to maintain the combat effectiveness of our 

warfighting formations. 

Our guiding principle is balance as we craft our approach to countering any specific threat or scenario while protecting against the surprises that are sure to come. 

Our force must be designed with the aim of having the fewest regrets when surprises strike. From applying lessons learned to our current efforts, to guiding sound 

concept development and experimentation to build future combat power, with your 

support, Joint Forces Command will continue to press ahead in our efforts. 

On behalf of the men and women of U.S. Joint Forces Command, I thank you for 

the opportunity to report. I look forward to working with you to ensure the continued security of America. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, General. 

Let’s try an 8-minute first round of questioning. 

Admiral, there have been a number of reports about the performance of the Afghan Army during the recent operation to clear the 

Taliban from Central Helmand Valley. Marine Brigadier General 

Larry Nicholson said that Afghan forces are not cosmetic; they are 

in the fight. But at the same time, there have been anecdotal accounts of Afghan soldiers looting the bazaar in Marjah, smoking 

hashish, and failing to help our marines in fortifying their positions. 

Admiral, give us your assessment of the performance of Afghan 

soldiers that are partnered with coalition forces in the fighting in 

Helmand? 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Sir, as you can imagine, I discuss this frequently with General Stan McChrystal, my NATO subordinate, 

who is directing operations. I also receive reports on a daily basis. 

I am satisfied with the progress of the Afghan National Army and 

overall its performance I think has been effective in Marjah. 

As you recall, Senator, when we went south about a year ago the 

ratio of ISAF troops to Afghan troops was 10 of the ISAF for every 

1 of the Afghan. In this particular operation, we are at one ISAF 

troop and about just less than one Afghan. So we’re approaching 

that 1 to 1 ratio. The quantity piece has improved dramatically. 

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As for the quality piece, I think General Nicholson is spot on. 

We’re seeing them actually in the fight. We’re also seeing instances 

where the Afghan troops are stepping ahead of the coalition forces 

and saying, let me go through that door first, let me go up that 

road first. We’re seeing that kind of shoulder-to-shoulder effective 

combat fight out of our Afghan partners. 

In terms of individual instances or anecdotes, we follow up on 

every one of those. We report them. Action is taken by the Afghan 

chain of command. But overall, Senator, I am satisfied with the 

progress we’ve seen over the course of the year and I think the operation in Marjah shows that. 

Chairman LEVIN. Well, that’s important news. I want to just 

focus for a minute on that ratio. When we were there the first time, 

maybe a year ago now, and got into this issue, it was a five to one 

ratio, five of our marines for one Afghan. We heard that in Marjah, 

for that effort it was about two of ours to one of theirs. 

Now you’re telling us that it was actually a lot better than that, 

closer to 1 to 1, which is very significant and important news, because that’s critically important, not just in terms of the turning 

over of responsibility for Afghan security to the Afghans, which is 

surely a major part of our mission, but also in terms of the credibility of what we’re doing there to the people who live there, but 

also to the training of Afghan troops, so that we can have that 

close training relationship. The closer that ratio is, not just 1 to 1, 

but two of theirs to one of ours, the closer we are to our own standard and our own goal. 

We read in the paper this morning that, however, when that effort was undertaken that Afghan troops, or perhaps it was some 

marines, left a nearby area without adequate protection at all and 

a number of the Taliban just simply moved next door. Can you tell 

us anything about that and, if that was happening, why was there 

not a plan, particularly given the size of the Afghan Army, to have 

Afghan forces secure places where other combat troops were leaving in order to succeed in the fight in Marjah? 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Senator, I’ll have to take that one for the 

record and get back to you on that particular incident. I’m not familiar with it. 

Chairman LEVIN. You’ll see a report in this morning’s paper. 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Thank you. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

General McChrystal has implemented a population centric counter-insurgency 

strategy that calls for focusing coalition and Afghan security forces in and around 

population centers; specifically those population centers most threatened by insurgents. Despite the build-up of U.S. and coalition forces and the increasing size and 

capability of the Afghan Army, we cannot focus our forces everywhere. I can assure 

you that Zabul Province has not been abandoned to the Taliban as the article suggests; however, our focus is on protecting the people of Afghanistan and not on attempting to track down individual Taliban members moving around the countryside. 

Chairman LEVIN. As I mentioned in the opening statement, 

NATO members are falling short once again. At the most recent 

force generation conference, they fell short in meeting the NATO 

mission requirements, in particular the 1,200 trainers that Lieutenant General Caldwell needs and NATO has committed to provide. 

604 

Can you give us any kind of assurance as to whether the NATO 

countries that have fallen short of their commitments and obligations are going to be forthcoming? 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. First of all, let me give you the exact numbers. We’re looking for an additional 1,278 and we have pledges at 

this point for 541. So it is absolutely correct to say that NATO has 

fallen short in providing these vital trainers. 

What we are doing about it is taking further steps in terms of 

contacting each of the Nations individually and going one by one 

through the precise requirement for each of the Nations in terms 

of where they could most effectively fill in the trainer mix. That effort is going on in real time both from my headquarters and up in 

Brussels, where the Secretary General is very engaged at the political level. So we will continue to hammer away at this until we fulfil that commitment, and I will continue to place it, as I told you, 

Senator Levin, at the top of my priority list. 

Chairman LEVIN. We appreciate that. General Caldwell, at a 

press conference last week, said that Afghan Army recruitment is 

very, very strong. I think he said there was an 800 percent increase in army recruitment over the last 4 or 5 months. But they 

can’t put them into basic training right away because of the shortage of trainers, and that is totally unacceptable. It’s almost unbelievable to me that we can’t get NATO allies to carry out that kind 

of commitment, which is not the most dangerous of the positions 

that they need to fill. It’s training. There’s obviously danger anywhere, but compared to being in combat, it falls well short of that. 

We need to do everything we can, and I’m not sure what more we 

can do, but if there is anything more we can do, Admiral, please 

let us know. 

In your judgment, can the recruiting trend, which is to a great 

extent due, according to General Caldwell, to the efforts of the Afghan leadership to stimulate recruiting, as well as an increase in 

pay, but he attributes the large increase more to the leadership of 

the Afghans than to the pay increase when we met with him. But 

will that recruiting trend in your judgment be maintained or is it 

maintainable right into the spring? 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. I believe it will be maintained, Senator. I am 

also very focused on the other end of that equation, which is the 

retention piece, which is not going as well. We have to continue to 

focus on retaining, just as we do here in the United States, it’s so 

important to have the retention along with the recruitment piece. 

I’m confident we will continue to be strong on the recruiting side. 

I’m working very hard with Stan McChrystal and Bill Caldwell to 

focus on the retention side as well. 

Chairman LEVIN. There’s a new missile defense plan in Europe 

called Phased Adaptive Approach that the Obama administration 

has announced and begun to implement. Does NATO support that 

new missile defense plan? 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. NATO is beginning that conversation. At the 

moment what we have is a ballistic missile defense C2 nascent 

structure, which is being explored to decide where, when, and how 

NATO could connect into this if the alliance decides to do so. I anticipate there will be a significant discussion about that at the defense ministerial, which will be in the May timeframe, and I’m hopVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:37 May 06, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00610 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\62155.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
605 

ing to see a decision taken toward the time of the summit, which 

is in Lisbon in November. So it’s very much an active conversation. 

I don’t want to prejudge the political decisions of the Nations, but 

it’s certainly on the agenda. 

Chairman LEVIN. From what you know, can you say that there 

seems to be a positive response to it? 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. I think overall that would be fair to say. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much. 

Senator McCain. 

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Admiral, as I understand, the President’s proposal was that we 

would be adding approximately 30,000 troops and our allies, including in and out of NATO, would be adding an additional 10,000. 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Yes, sir. 

Senator MCCAIN. How are we on track for that 10,000? 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Sir, we’re in pretty good shape. We’re at 

9,500 troops. If I can get the additional 700 trainers that I just 

talked to the chairman about, then that would put us over the 

10,000 mark overall. 

Senator MCCAIN. Does that include the 2,000 Dutch troops that 

are scheduled to leave? 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. No, sir, it does not. 

Senator MCCAIN. So you’re really talking about 7,500 troops. You 

don’t have any illusion about the Dutch troops remaining, do you? 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. My sense is, listening to the political dialogue out of The Netherlands, that they will be leaving. 

Senator MCCAIN. So we’re really not on track, then. It’s nice to 

say, but if you’re going to lose 2,000 Dutch troops, who are, by the 

way, great fighters from my visits, it’s not 9,500; it’s closer to 

7,500. There are others of our allies whose commitments have certainly not been firmed up yet. 

The Afghan Army, as I understand, needs to be around 300,000 

troops and 100,000 police; is that the right numbers that we would 

like to see over time? 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. I think over time, yes, sir. 

Senator MCCAIN. How do we expect over time to pay for the Afghan Army? 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. I think the international community will 

have to be in a position to continue to support it for a great deal 

of time to come. 

Senator MCCAIN. Roughly how much would that cost be on an 

annual basis? 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. I don’t have that number at my fingertips, 

but it would certainly be in the billions, probably in the low billions. 

Senator MCCAIN. We would expect our allies to foot the bill for 

that? 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. I think it is fair to say that it’s an international effort and we would hope that all in the international community would continue to support it moving forward. 

Senator MCCAIN. Overall, the operation in Marjah was successful? 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. I think it is going very successfully, certainly 

through the clearing phase. We’re now in the build and hold phase, 

606 

which I think will be challenging. But I am confident that the 

plans that we have in place will give us a very good chance at overall success as we go through clear, build, hold, and ultimately transition. 

Senator MCCAIN. What presence did our NATO allies have in the 

Marjah operation? 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. The Marjah operation, of the ISAF forces, 

was around 25 to 30 percent. 

Senator MCCAIN. That was in direct combat roles? 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Largely, yes, sir. 

Senator MCCAIN. So some of our allies are fighting very well. 

Some of them have very restrictive rules of engagement, right? 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. We have 22 nations that have no caveats and 

we have about 20 nations that have caveats, yes, sir. 

Senator MCCAIN. Some of these caveats are very disturbing. 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Some of them are very restrictive and we 

work very hard to try and reduce those wherever we can. 

Senator MCCAIN. I thank you. There’s a lot going on in NATO 

and in Europe and we appreciate the great work you’re doing. 

General Ward, this sounds like perhaps a question that need not 

be asked, but should we be looking as part of AFRICOM at some 

headquarters located in Africa? 

General WARD. Senator, the work of the command is in its programs, its activities, and its exercises. The things that we do across 

the continent to help the nations of Africa increase their capacity. 

The headquarters location, quite candidly, doesn’t affect that work, 

where we plan those activities, where we look to resource those activities. It’s not something that the leaders in Africa are asking me 

about and at this time it is my estimation that any great efforts 

to locate an American-size headquarters of that nature would probably be more counterproductive than productive. 

Senator MCCAIN. Because? 

General WARD. Because of perceptions, because of the reactions 

to neighbors, and to parts of the continent where the headquarters 

might not be located. Many unintended consequences I think would 

fall out from that type of a move. 

Senator MCCAIN. Could you tell us a couple of countries that are 

of your greatest concern, General Ward? 

General WARD. Senator, as we look at the continent, clearly the 

challenges are there. There are also opportunities. But when we 

talk about what’s going on—— 

Senator MCCAIN. What countries are of your greatest concern, 

General? 

General WARD. There is what’s going on in Somalia, what’s going 

on in Sudan, what’s going on in Nigeria, the extrajudicial means 

of changes of government that we saw in Niger, and in Guinea. 

Those activities are concerning. 

Senator MCCAIN. Since it’s not in the news, perhaps it’s obvious 

we are making some progress on the piracy issue. 

General WARD. We are making progress from the standpoint of 

addressing the threat at sea. The weather lately also helped because of the high sea state and the inability of those small skiffs 

to go out and operate freely. The coalition that occurs at sea is an 

607 

effective coalition. It is a big ocean, however, as you are aware, and 

so these skiffs do in fact go around and get through. 

That piracy threat is not just in the Gulf of Aden and the East 

Indian Ocean. It’s also in the west coast of Africa. Our work to help 

these African nations increase their capacity to deal with their territorial waters is certainly making a difference. In addition to that, 

I would offer that the work that would need to occur on land, especially pertaining to good governance or governments that are more 

than less able to control their territories, will also contribute to increased stability and reducing the effects of piracy. 

Senator MCCAIN. The main area of piracy operations is where? 

General WARD. Predominantly the Gulf of Aden. 

Senator MCCAIN. What country? 

General WARD. Somalia. 

Senator MCCAIN. Somalia, an incredibly unstable country. 

General WARD. Yes, sir. 

Senator MCCAIN. Very little prospect for stability in the future. 

General WARD. It’s a work in progress, to be sure. Small things 

are happening now, but much work needs to be done. 

Senator MCCAIN. Could you just make a comment about Ethiopia 

and the situation there? 

General WARD. Ethiopia remains a friend and a partner in our 

efforts to help produce stability there in the region. The work that 

the Ethiopians do in the counterterror business, as well as in the 

work of their participation in peacekeeping operations, is important 

work, and I think our partnering with the Ethiopians as well as 

other East African nations is something that we would continue to 

look at in ways of helping to produce stability in that part of the 

world. 

Senator MCCAIN. I thank you, General. 

Thank you, Admiral. Thank you very much, General Mattis. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator McCain. 

Senator Lieberman. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. 

Thanks to the three of you for your extraordinary service. General Ward, let me just pick up where Senator McCain was, particularly in Somalia. We know from experience that where there’s no 

government, trouble grows, either as piracy or the provision of 

space for terrorists, Islamist terrorists particularly, to operate. 

I gather that there is an attempt by the provisional government 

to retake the capital city of Mogadishu, and I wonder if you could 

give us both your estimate of how that’s going and to what extent 

we’re able to be supportive of that effort? 

General WARD. Senator, Somalia has been an ungoverned space 

for almost 20 years. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right. 

General WARD. What we’re facing today is clearly not new. What 

I will say is the current Transition Federal Government (TFG), 

being supported by the African Union’s (AU) Mission in Somalia 

(AMISOM), and being supported by others of the international 

community, including the United States, is an effort that I would 

continue to endorse and think that it has for now our best potential 

608 

for helping to turn around some of the instability and lack of governance that we’ve experienced there. 

What’s going on in Mogadishu with respect to the desires of the 

transition government to reclaim parts of Mogadishu is a work in 

progress. I’m not aware of the specifics. I’ll have to come back to 

you, sir, with the specifics on what that current operation looks 

like. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

Operations intended to relieve pressure on the Transitional Federal Government 

(TFG) and African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) in Mogadishu are planned. 

The intent of these operations is to clear extremist-held areas. 

• On 10 and 11 March 2010, TFG and AMISOM forces clashed with alShabaab militia in eastern Mogadishu. The TFG, supported by AMISOM, 

ultimately lost that skirmish-probably due to poor command and control, 

and insufficient logistics. 

• TFG operations, under constant Islamic insurgent assault, remain hamstrung by weak command and control, supply, and administrative systems, 

and clan and personality-based governance dysfunction. 

General WARD. To the degree the TFG can, in fact, reexert control over Mogadishu with the help of AMISOM and others I think 

is something that we would look to do and support, as well as the 

other provisions of the Djibouti process that look to instilling governance, instilling developmental things that will serve the benefit 

of the Somali people to cause that situation to reverse itself. 

We look to participate with those who also support them, the 

other nations and the neighbors who contribute to the AMISOM 

mission, in particular Uganda and Burundi. We support their work 

and try to lend the hand that they lend to the TFG to increase stability. So those efforts are ongoing. It’s an effort that I think we 

would certainly support and we would look to do it in ways that 

add to stability in that part of the continent. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Let me go to the Sudan. There’s a lot of continuing concern here about the situation in Sudan. We’re in a critical period in the coming year with national elections next month, 

which are the first in more than 2 decades. Then there’s a referendum in the south in January 2011. 

I’d like to hear first what your command is doing to support the 

United Nations (U.N.)–AU force in Darfur, where unfortunately the 

human rights abuses are continuing; and then second, what 

AFRICOM can and is doing to support implementation of the comprehensive peace agreement of January 2005? 

General WARD. Senator, our support to the UN–AU Mission in 

Darfur (UNAMID) is in the form of training assistance, logistics assistance, and support to those forces who have been declared a part 

of that UNAMID mission. We provide logistics, lift support, as I’ve 

mentioned, and we continue to do that in support of the peacekeeping effort there in Darfur. 

We have no direct, on-the-ground involvement there. Those processes as a part of the comprehensive peace agreement are essentially political processes that we certainly support. We do support 

the formation of the Southern Liberation Army in southern Sudan, 

some of their professional development initiatives, some of their 

training initiatives, and we do that through and in conjunction 

with DOS, working with the Special Envoy and doing those things 

609 

that help increase the professionalism of that southern Sudanese 

force. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Let me ask you how you would suggest that 

we interpret the statements that President Bashir has made that 

essentially the war is over? How should we interpret those? 

General WARD. Senator, the cooperation that we see emerging 

between Chad and Sudan, between President Debi and Bashir, I 

think we would look to that as an encouraging sign. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. So it’s real? Something is changing there? 

General WARD. Something is changing. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. For the better? 

General WARD. It’s for the better. It’s still fragile. It’s not irreversible, to be sure. But I think we should be encouraged by those 

signs and we look forward to more of that as this political dialogue 

continues. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Admiral Stavridis, let me ask you about 

Bosnia-Herzegovina. Senator McCain and I and a couple of colleagues visited there last month. I think we feel a sense of pride 

about what the United States was able to do in the 1990s to stop 

the aggression and genocide there. But as you indicate in your posture statement, the problems continue, particularly the ethnic divisions. It’s not what it was in the 1990s, of course, but you have 

some really explosive situations and people there, particularly Mr. 

Dodek in the Republika Srpska. 

I will tell you that the one most encouraging experience that we 

had was visiting with the military of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and I 

think EUCOM has had a lot to do with that. You have all the ethnic groups in there. They’re functioning together. They’re at a higher level. 

I want to quote from something which you said in your statement because it’s really the question I want to ask after your evaluation. You warn that ‘‘the programmed reduction of NATO and 

European Union forces in the Balkans may induce additional risk 

of instability in the region.’’ I’d like to ask you to evaluate the situation, but then specifically would you counsel now that the programmed reduction of NATO and European Union forces in the 

Balkans should not go forward, that it involves too much risk? 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Thank you, Senator. The context of the reduction of U.S. troops in the Balkans is really quite remarkable; 

20,000 in Bosnia alone. We’re down to 20 there now. In Kosovo we 

had as many as almost 10,000. We’re down to about 1,200 troops 

there now. 

In Bosnia, you correctly hit on I believe a central element, which 

is the security force there, the armed forces. Moving them in a direction that is integrated I think will be very encouraging to the 

body politic in Bosnia-Herzegovina. 

In terms of Kosovo, we had 15,000 NATO troops there as recently as December. We’ve been able to draw down to about 10,000 

NATO troops there now, again about 1,200 U.S. troops. The next 

step in that process is for me to provide military advice to the Secretary General about whether to take the step to go from 10,000 

down to 5,000. I’m evaluating that very carefully. There is still tension, understandably, between Serbia and what they perceive as a 

breakaway province of Serbia, but what the United States and 62 

610 

other nations have recognized as the independent country of 

Kosovo. 

So I think we need to move carefully in the Balkans so that we 

don’t fall back. The progress has been extraordinary. We don’t want 

to let it unravel. I will be looking very carefully in Kosovo. We’ll 

continue our encouraging efforts in Bosnia. Overall, I’m confident 

we’ll continue to move in a good direction, but it requires watchful 

approaches. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. I appreciate that. I’m encouraged by it. I 

guess I’d encourage you to err on the side of caution. 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. I agree. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. I understand the pressure to reduce, but we 

may look back and really regret it. 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Yes, sir. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Just to end on a bright note, I remember 

one of the stories we were told by the commander of the military 

in Bosnia-Herzegovina was that at one point Dodek from Srpska 

called on all the Serbian members of the Bosnia-Herzegovina 

armed forces to return home and no one came. That’s a great comment and a tribute also, I think, to EUCOM’s role in training that 

force. 

Thanks, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Lieberman. 

Senator Inhofe. 

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Since Senator Lieberman ended on a bright note, I’ll start on a 

bright note. Some of the things that are working—and we’ve talked 

about this before, in fact every time we have a hearing or a meeting in private, like the train and equip program, 1206, 1207, 1208, 

the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program, the Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP), 

and the Combatant Commander Initiative Fund (CCIF), those programs are working well. 

Admiral Stavridis, I would ask you, with some of these things 

that have been changed recently, like in the 1207, the whole reason 

for structuring these programs the way they’re structured with 

DOD is so that they can be activated quickly and get an immediate 

response. Now we’re kind of going the other direction with the 

1207. Do you want to comment on that? 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Senator, first of all, I completely agree that 

the 1206 and the IMET programs have been superb. I think each 

of the combatant commanders has testified to that over the last 

couple years, and I’ve benefited from them greatly in 3 years at 

U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) and continue to be a 

strong advocate here at EUCOM. 

The 1207 money is kind of dual-keyed between DOS and DOD. 

I think that any time there’s a dual key it’s going to take a little 

bit longer to work through the challenges. So some of that immediacy that is so valuable in the 1206 funding is not as readily available in the 1207. But we’re committed to work with our partners 

in DOS to make it go as rapidly as possible. 

Senator INHOFE. Of course, I understand that’s civilian-to-civilian. 

Are you satisfied with the funding level of the CCIF program? 

611 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Yes, sir. 

Senator INHOFE. All right. General Mattis, with all the great 

things that are happening in simulation and modeling now, yesterday we broke ground on the new building for the Joint Fires and 

Effects Trainer System (JFETS) program. By the way, I appreciate 

very much your personal attention, going down and watching that. 

We have people from all over the world there under our IMET program. I think some 250 coalition members are being trained by this 

JFETS program. 

So that’s just another example of how IMET is working, and also 

an example of how the JFETS program is working. Why don’t you 

just give us an update as to what you think is happening in terms 

of things with the JFETS program? 

General MATTIS. Thanks, Senator. This is an issue near and dear 

to my heart. In preparing our troops, which is ultimately my responsibility, we cannot do it as efficiently or as effectively or as 

cheaply as we can in the real world as we could using simulation. 

One of the biggest challenges we face is breaking the old paradigm 

that somehow simulators are good for Navy submarines, good for 

aviation, good for ship drivers, good for ballistic missile defense 

preparations, but somehow we leave the people who take 80 percent of our casualties off the ledger. 

So we are going forward very strongly with this from the small 

unit level, to how we integrate joint intelligence, reconnaissance, 

and surveillance (ISR) and more importantly joint fires, because as 

we distribute our forces more broadly on the battlefield we need to 

reduce the risk to them. That means they can access joint ISR and 

know what’s over the next hill. That means they can access and 

use joint fires. 

The installation out in your district I’ll just tell you, sir, is absolutely critical to the maturation of this. 

Senator INHOFE. I think the best way to break that paradigm is 

to get the people out there to see it. 

General MATTIS. Yes, sir. 

Senator INHOFE. Because it’s one of these things that you can’t 

explain to someone, the actual conditions that they experience out 

there. It’s mind-boggling. 

General MATTIS. Yes, sir. We have a couple of programs to do 

that right now, and we’re getting a lot of interest. We’ve actually 

had significant support from this committee. 

Senator INHOFE. Good. 

General Ward, as you well know, I’ve been very interested in Africa. In fact, I’ve been criticized for the amount of time that I spend 

in Africa. Back when we had it, it was hard for me to understand 

why we would have Africa under three commands as we did. Now 

things I think are working. 

As I’ve told you before, I would have preferred to have the headquarters in Africa someplace down there. I know the political problems that come with that. I was recently in Djibouti. I talked to 

Admiral Fitzgerald and to Rear Admiral Kurta. It’s heavy lifting 

over there. But everything is happening there. Briefly tell us what 

is happening in Djibouti and what are some of the successes there? 

612 

General WARD. Thank you, Senator, and thank you for your support to the command and also to our security efforts on the continent. We feel that and we appreciate it. 

In Djibouti, the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa 

(CJTF–HOA), we assumed responsibility for C2 when we became 

a fully endorsed unified command a little over a year ago. 

Djibouti’s programs, or the CJTF–HOA programs, that we undertake in the eastern part of the continent, but also in other places 

as I determine a skill set that they possess that’s required, provide 

the type of training support, the type of mentoring, coaching, the 

type of programs that we are using, along with our civil affairs activities, to help the Nations in Africa concentrate their efforts in 

causing a degree of harmonization of the training, the professionalism, as well as the regionalization of security assistance and 

cooperation programs that I think are proving very, very beneficial 

insofar as moving to the next level the capacity of many of these 

African nations to increase their military and security capacity. Because of our long-term approach to doing business, doing it in ways 

that fully integrate the elements of diplomacy, development, as 

well as defense. Not that we do those things, Senator, but because 

we understand the importance of those activities being a part of 

this dynamic, the comprehensive approach, it is working. 

Senator INHOFE. I want to expand on that a little bit. But first, 

on the cuts that were there on your information operations program, are they going to hurt you? Is that serious? 

General WARD. It is serious. The information programs that we look to do, where we were cut by $3 million, that was about a third 

of what we wanted to do. The focus for those additional programs 

would have been in the East Africa region, to complement what 

we’re doing in the Sahel and in North Africa. 

Senator INHOFE. It’s a huge area. I think people just don’t really 

comprehend that. 

How about in the other equipment? At first there were some 

problems there. Do you feel fairly comfortable with the resources 

that you have? 

General WARD. We are always looking for resources, Senator. 

What they have are sufficient to do the work that we want to do. 

We could enhance that with additional resources, but the work that 

we are able to do working with those nations, to include assisting 

them through the various programs, the 1206 program, are very 

important and beneficial, as we have worked with the nations on 

their territorial security as well as their maritime security and capacity-building. 

Senator INHOFE. I’m running out of time here. But do this for 

me. The reason that our activity in Djibouti is acceptable with the 

rest of the continent is because we were already there. It’s more 

difficult if you were to start anew. I have felt that, as large as that 

continent is, we ought to have something probably in Ghana. The 

Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) is there 

now. 

Lastly, I’ve been heartened a little bit by some of the new faces 

in Zimbabwe that have been on the other side of Mugabe. I feel for 

the first time in many years somewhat optimistic that these new 

faces that want to bring that country hopefully back to where it 

613 

was at one time, the breadbasket of sub-Saharan Africa. Do you 

share that there is room for optimism now in Zimbabwe? 

General WARD. I do. I had a conversation with our new ambassador who’s been posted there and he is going there, Senator, with 

that same sense of optimism to look to take advantage of what 

might be a changing political environment. 

Senator INHOFE. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Inhofe. 

Senator Reed. 

Senator REED. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, thank you for your distinguished service. Admiral 

Stavridis, not to be overly simplistic, but the last several years 

have forced us operationally, in our budgets and in acquisition, to 

become expeditionary. Has that same fever caught on in the NATO 

countries? Can you describe their budget acquisition and military 

policy? 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Senator, I think a little bit would be the answer. There’s more of a sense of expeditionary, and this is part of 

what General Mattis tried to work so hard, and I think he successfully moved the Europeans somewhat in this direction when he was 

the Supreme Allied Commander for Transformation, and I think 

that work continues in that side of the NATO organization. It’s had 

some salutary effect. 

Just the thought that we today have 100,000 NATO troops engaged on 3 continents speaks to a certain level of expeditionary, including counter-piracy, including the Balkans, which is enormously 

expeditionary, but somewhat of course in Afghanistan. 

So I think there’s movement in that direction, and I really commend the work of JFCOM and Allied Command Transformation. 

We need to continue to encourage that and move it forward, because the nature of threats in this 21st century is going to demand 

more than just sitting behind our borders. 

Senator REED. Has the military and political leadership got the 

idea and now is it a question of implementation? Or is it still something that’s unresolved and under debate? 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. I think it is under debate, but I think increasingly the forces of security, the demands of these non-traditional threats, these trans-border threats, are moving the Europeans in this direction. I’m confident as the NATO strategic concept is unveiled in Lisbon in the fall we’ll see further movement in 

that direction, sir. 

Senator REED. General Mattis, if you want to comment on that. 

General MATTIS. Yes, Senator, and I completely agree with where 

Admiral Stavridis assessed this effort. In an explanation to the Nations, I made the point that Italian troops going to Afghanistan or 

Italian troops going to the Baltics would have to deploy about the 

same distance, when you look at what the alliance is trying to do 

under Article 5. So it’s not an either-or. If you want the alliance 

to defend more than its own home turf, each army in its own country, they must be expeditionary. 

I think that is becoming politically more acceptable, where at one 

time it was seen more along the lines of what Senator McCain 

brought up, that it was the Americans trying to get the Europeans 

614 

to fight an American war. I don’t think the expeditionary argument 

is any longer characterized like that. So I am optimistic, like Admiral Stavridis. 

Senator REED. Let me turn to one aspect of the way forward in 

Iraq, and that’s the advise and assist brigades. I wonder if JFCOM 

has had a chance to evaluate these brigades. They’ve been configured to retain combat power, but also, as the name implies, to essentially be a trainer, mentor, and integrator with Iraqi forces. Our 

success in drawing down our forces and stabilizing Iraq rests on 

their performance. I wonder if you at JFCOM have done any work? 

General MATTIS. Senator, we leave that tactical training, of 

course, to the Chief of Staff of the Army. However, we have looked 

closely at it and it is the behavior of the troops as much as any 

significant shift in their capabilities that is important. What I 

mean to say is that when those troops go in they will focus on the 

train and assist, but it would be ill-advised for the enemy to mess 

with them. They will still have their capability to fight and, should 

the Iraqis ask for it or should force protection demand it, these 

forces are quite capable of rocking the enemy back on their heels. 

But they are going in with the mission and the troops are trained 

and adjusted to a train, advise, and assist mission to the Iraqis. 

Right now, from our perspective these troops are exactly the right 

thing at the right time, and their preparation looks sound. 

Senator REED. Just a follow-up question, because part of this is 

sustaining this effort with the best, highest quality forces we can. 

Is it your impression that within DOD, particularly the Department of the Army, that this mission is highest priority and they 

will organize these brigades in a way that we have the best possible component elements? 

General MATTIS. Sir, obviously we’re having to juggle a number 

of very high priorities. We also send combat troops in that can 

partner in Afghanistan. But the theme that we’re seeing more and 

more now is that all of our troops going in must have this ability 

to fight in a coalition atmosphere and be able to partner, whether 

it be with Estonians, Afghans, or Iraqis. This is part of the shift 

that Secretary Gates and Chairman Mullen have directed, where 

the entire military force is becoming more attuned to this advise 

and assist effort, whether it be in Africa, Afghanistan, or Iraq. 

I believe because of that there will be no lowered priority on 

something that is now considered an inherent part of the primary 

mission. 

Senator REED. Can we assume that this model will be adapted 

into Afghanistan also, that as we make progress in terms of reducing the capabilities of the Taliban that we’ll be able to put more 

of these type of units on the ground? 

General MATTIS. Sir, I’d go so far to say that the units we’re 

sending over there now into the area that Admiral Stavridis spoke 

about in Marjah are completely capable on their own as combat 

units of partnering with the Afghans. We are learning. As a British 

prime minister put it, once we’ve exhausted all the alternatives 

we’ll do the right thing. We have it right this time and we are 

using these lessons learned to change the very makeup of the unit 

training. 

Senator REED. Thank you, sir. 

615 

General Ward, can you describe the nature of the partnership between AFRICOM and the AU Standby Force of five brigades? 

General WARD. The command, Senator, has a relationship where 

we have a presidential determination being put in place that allows 

us to work with these five standby brigades. Currently that determination is in place for the Southern African Standby Force and 

the West African Standby Force. We’re working on one for the East 

African Standby Force. 

We see that these regional alignments for peace are very critical, 

and where they don’t exist we still work on a bilateral basis with 

the nations who would send forces to these standby brigades to increase their capacity as well. So it’s a training relationship, in some 

instances it is an equipping relationship. In some instances it is a 

doctrinal relationship where we provide that type of assistance to 

these standby forces that are part of these regional economic communities. 

Senator REED. Do we have an ongoing liaison with them in terms 

of personnel on the ground on a day-to-day basis? 

General WARD. We have a liaison officer with the AU, which is 

obviously the continental organization. We have a liaison with 

ECOWAS and their standby force. We do not have a permanent liaison with the Southern African Developmental, or with the East 

African. But we do have a day-to-day relationship in East Africa 

with those East African forces as well. We have supported each of 

them as they conducted training, exercises, and other things to 

help increase their capacity to bring these brigades together, yes, 

sir. 

Senator REED. I want to thank you, General Ward. I also want 

to thank you for your service, because it’s a long time since we 

taught together at West Point and I’m awfully proud of what you’ve 

accomplished for the military and for the Army. Thank you, sir. 

General WARD. Thank you for the support, Senator. Thank you. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator Reed. 

Senator LeMieux. 

Senator LEMIEUX. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, General Ward. Admiral Stavridis, nice to see you 

again. General Mattis, thank you for your service to the country. 

Thank you for being here to answer our questions today. 

Admiral Stavridis, I want to talk to you about a report that came 

out, I guess it was last week, where a Spanish judge accused the 

Government of Venezuela of maintaining illicit ties with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia and ETA terrorists planning 

to kill senior government officials in Spain, including President 

Uribe. The reason I’m asking you, not only because of the Spanish 

connection, but your previous work at SOUTHCOM. 

Is there good cooperation between your command and 

SOUTHCOM to make sure that we’re staying in front of these 

issues? 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Yes, sir, very much so. I’m in quite a bit of 

dialogue with General Fraser. Another example would be since the 

earthquake in Haiti, he and I have been in close coordination in 

terms of support from the many European nations who have 

pitched in and helped. There is a very strong relationship there, 

and also a strong relationship with AFRICOM. Those three comVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:37 May 06, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00621 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\62155.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
616 

batant commands—EUCOM, AFRICOM, and SOUTHCOM—tend 

to work together very closely. It’s partially the propinquity of geography, partially the personal friendships, and partially the geopolitical issues that you correctly highlight. 

Senator LEMIEUX. I have a concern that touches this issue that 

I just raised, with potentially an assassination plot against President Uribe running through Spain. It is also geopolitical, as you 

said, with the concern that Iran, with projecting its influence 

through Spain and also through Latin America, is becoming a destabilizing force. Certainly Europe is tremendously important for 

our security interests, and if we have a nuclear-armed Iran that’s 

going to impact your AOR. 

Can you speak to that issue? 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Senator, I find Iran alarming in any number 

of dimensions, not the least of which is, as you mentioned, increasing Iranian influence throughout Latin America and the Caribbean, 

drawing on my previous experience, their very active sponsorship 

of terrorism, and their pursuit, not only of a nuclear weapon, but 

also of ballistic missiles which can deliver such weapons. It’s one 

of the reasons I think missile defense is particularly important, and 

I think a concerned international effort to focus on the dangers of 

Iran is well warranted. 

Senator LEMIEUX. The administration recently made a decision 

about ground-based interceptors and not pursuing that in the 

Czech Republic and in Poland. Do you feel that the plan going forward to make sure that we have an adequate missile defense to 

protect Europe and the United States is adequate? 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Yes, sir, I do. I think the Phased Adaptive 

Approach is timely and flexible. It will provide the capability and 

be able to step up, hence the phased and adaptive aspects of the 

title, as the Iranian ability to use ballistic missiles goes forward. 

It is being well received in Europe. We’re in dialogue with a variety of the potential partners for emplacement of it. Secretary Ellen 

Tauscher is in charge of that particular effort. She’s doing a very 

good job working with the allies to move forward on it. So overall, 

yes, I am a supporter of it and I believe that it will be very effective in defending Europe over time, as well as the United States, 

of course. 

Senator LEMIEUX. Thank you, Admiral. 

General, can you give us an update of the status of al Qaeda in 

Africa? 

General WARD. We look at al Qaeda in Africa, Senator, in two 

locations essentially, although it is likely that they’re in more, but 

predominantly East Africa al Qaeda and al Qaeda Islamic 

Maghreb. We see in the northern part of the continent al Qaeda 

Islamic Maghreb. They are operating, conducting kidnappings, and 

other sorts of activities that certainly threaten our interests and 

the interests of our partners in the region. 

In the eastern part of the continent, we see East Africa al Qaeda. 

Recently the claims of a merging between the Al Shabab in Somalia with East Africa al Qaeda are there, and linkages between East 

Africa al Qaeda and al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. I would 

say that we certainly see indications of the presence of al Qaeda 

617 

in Africa, predominantly in the East Africa region, as well as in the 

Sahel in the greater Sahara part of the continent as well, sir. 

Senator LEMIEUX. Is it a growing influence? Are they becoming 

more organized? 

General WARD. I would not characterize it there. I would like to 

come back with something for the record with more specific detail. 

But I would also offer that, based on what they are saying, they 

are seeking to expand their influence in the East Africa region as 

well as in the North Africa region. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

Al Qaeda’s influence in Africa has grown in recent years, as demonstrated by its 

increased ties with extremist groups in both East and North Africa. As al Qaeda 

becomes less focused on operations in Iraq, the group’s influence on the continent 

of Africa is likely to expand. 

• On 11 September 2006, the Algeria-based Salafist Group for Preaching 

and Combat (GSPC) officially merged with al Qaeda, becoming al Qaeda in 

the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). Since the merger, AQIM has developed into al Qaeda’s regional arm, increasingly adopting al Qaeda-style 

tactics, ideology, and propaganda. While primarily focused on North Africa 

and the Sahel, AQIM is attempting to increase its reach into West Africa 

and Europe, expanding al Qaeda’s presence. 

• A limited number of al Qaeda operatives, notably Harun Fazul, likely remain active in East Africa. 

• Over the past 18 months, al Qaeda leaders in Afghanistan/Pakistan and 

al-Shabaab leaders in Somalia have exchanged messages of mutual support. 

• A growing number of foreign fighters are entering Somalia to train and 

fight with al-Shabaab against the African Union Mission to Somalia and 

Somali Transitional Federal Government forces. Al Shabaab and the foreign 

fighters increasingly use tactics and methods typically associated with al 

Qaeda. 

Senator LEMIEUX. General, this weekend we learned that 500 

people, including women and babies, were massacred in Nigeria. 

What’s our current strategy to curtail human rights abuses in Africa? 

General WARD. As we conduct our military-to-military relations 

with the various nations of Africa, we encourage the promotion of 

human rights. We encourage the conduct of militaries in professional ways. Obviously, those activities that you described, I’ve 

seen nothing to point that they were committed by the military of 

Nigeria. Clearly the role that’s been taken by the Nigerians to go 

in and stop that action is something that we applaud. We certainly, 

like all others, deplore that type of activity, the killing of any innocent people. We would certainly encourage the work that’s being 

done by the Government of Nigeria to address those atrocities, 

those who are responsible, to arrest them, and do their very best 

to prevent that. But we clearly see that as something that is deplorable and we certainly regret the loss of innocent life to those 

means. 

Senator LEMIEUX. Thank you, General. 

General Mattis, there was a London Times article earlier this 

week which talked about our European allies and their vulnerability to a cyber attack and the rise of China as a hostile cyber 

combatant. What are we doing to strengthen our allies’ defenses 

and safeguard the sensitive information that we share with them? 

General MATTIS. Senator, I’d have to take that for the record to 

give you more data. U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) is our 

main effort on the cyber effort, and we’re in constant contact with 

618 

them. We also work on the concepts. Frankly, we’re scrambling to 

find a concept that takes into account how best to protect our networks, and obviously we must maintain an exploitation capability 

against the enemy. It is hard to come up with a theory that also 

includes the constitutional issues within our own country as far as 

how we do this protection. 

Our first step is to protect our DOD networks. We work closely 

with our NATO allies, but also some other allies in the world, who 

work with us on putting these concepts together. We’re drawing a 

fair amount of traction with STRATCOM now that they’ve been assigned this and they’re maturing it. I’d have to get back to you 

with more detail, which I can do. But I will do so by going to 

STRATCOM to make sure I’m current. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

Cyber defense is a critical warfighter challenge in today’s joint and coalition operational environment. The recent Quadrennial Defense Review identified cyber as a 

priority area for the Department of Defense and we are working with our partners 

to mitigate cyber vulnerabilities, increase the resilience of key U.S. and coalition 

command and control infrastructures, and develop a shared cyber doctrine to facilitate the sharing of information and technology. In coordination with U.S. Strategic 

Command, the Joint Staff, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), we have incorporated cyber operations into the 

wargaming, limited objective experiments and training events that we conduct with 

our allies. Future interactions will take advantage of NATO’s Cooperative Cyber 

Defence Centre of Excellence to advance cyber defense capabilities of U.S and other 

NATO nations and enhance our interoperability in the field of cooperative cyber defense. 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Senator, may I just add that in Europe 

NATO has established a center for cyber. It’s in Estonia, which is 

appropriate since they suffered a severe cyber attack 2 years ago. 

I think, as General Mattis says, it’s indicative that all of these organizations are reaching to build the first nascent structures that 

can focus on this problem. But I believe it’s vital, and it is something we think about a lot in EUCOM. I know all the combatant 

commanders do. 

Senator LEMIEUX. Thank you. I think it’s vital, too, and I appreciate getting a follow-up on that. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator LeMieux. 

Senator Hagan. 

Senator HAGAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Admiral Stavridis, you recently discussed your concerns with me 

on cyber security and in the broader context how you view the 

vastness of this realm as a cyber sea. In a recent paper that you 

authored, I want to give a quote that really paints a picture of this 

sea for me. You wrote: ‘‘The seas I refer to, however, are not of 

water and waves, but of zeros and ones, optic fibers and photons, 

routers and browsers, and satellites and servers. The cyber sea is 

the new global commons and it is untamed.’’ 

Two recent examples that I can think of for cyber security attacks is when the Iraqi insurgents recently intercepted video feeds 

from a Predator unmanned aerial vehicle using off-the-shelf software, and then a second one concerning Google claiming that Chinese hackers stole some of its computer coding and attempted to 

break into Chinese dissidents’ emails. 

619 

Will you describe your principal concerns with cyber security and 

how you think we can best mitigate our exposure? 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Thank you, Senator. I completely agree with 

the thrust of Senator LeMieux’s questions, as well as General 

Mattis’s response. I think that today we have a billion devices that 

are accessing the Internet. Our economies are fundamentally intertwined in this cyber sea, and it is an outlaw sea. We do not have 

the norms, the buoy systems, the navigation, or the satellites. 

Nothing really exists to develop norms of behavior in the cyber 

world. 

So I think that there’s a military component to this, but it’s actually a much larger problem. This is a classic example of whole of 

society approach must really be taken into account here. It’s not 

even whole of government. As you point out, Google and many 

other private companies are very engaged in this. 

From the military perspective, what we’re trying to do in 

EUCOM and in NATO is to highlight the challenges ahead, put in 

place initial structures, do the kind of damage control that General 

Mattis is talking about to initially at least protect ourselves, and 

then I think what’s necessary is to think our way forward through 

a process that can create these kind of global norms. 

That may be a process that brings a lot of nations together to 

have this conversation. Just as we gather to talk about the climate 

and have a global summit on the climate, I think at some point 

there needs to be a very global conversation on this challenge. 

Senator HAGAN. Well, I understand that in the summer of 2009 

EUCOM held an exercise called the Combined Endeavor, which included a mix of international, interagency, and public-private entities focused on computer network defense. I also understand that 

NATO recently established a cooperative cyber defense center of excellence in Estonia to enhance the capability, cooperation, and information-sharing among NATO nations and our partners in cyber 

defense. 

How can this endeavor serve as a model for the development of 

multi-national policies to ensure continued unimpeded and lawful 

access to cyber space? 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Thank you for highlighting those activities of 

EUCOM. I hasten to say that each of the combatant commanders 

is taking this on. I know General Ward is doing this. I know obviously STRATCOM is at the very heart of it, as General Mattis said. 

We’re all grappling with this. I think that the more we cross-communicate and cross-level our efforts at this stage, the more effective we’ll be in dealing with this. 

So I believe that exercises that bring international, inter-agency, 

and private-public actors together as we try to do a combined endeavor need to be elevated and taken to a higher level by the nations that want to connect on this. We’re working that very hard, 

as you mentioned, on the NATO side through the center in Estonia. 

Senator HAGAN. I’m very concerned about this because I see numerous examples going forward of where we will be subject to 

much more attack on the cyber sea. 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Yes, Senator. 

Senator HAGAN. General Ward, the U.N. peacekeeping mission in 

the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) is the largest and 

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most expensive, and reportedly the U.N. could begin withdrawing 

its troops from the western portion of the country as early as June 

2010. Additionally, the U.N. peacekeeping mission reportedly plans 

to begin withdrawing from the unstable eastern portion of the 

country in June 2011. 

Studies estimate that up to 1,200 people die each day from conflict-related causes as well as diseases and malnutrition. Rampant 

corruption and pervasive weak government allows members of the 

national army and members of armed groups alike to abuse civilians. 

Can you please describe the effects that a U.N. peacekeeping 

mission withdrawal from the DRC would have on the stability of 

the country and region, and what plans are in place to counter the 

Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) that’s focused on destabilizing the eastern portion of the DRC? I’ll be happy 

to repeat any of that. 

General WARD. Well, thank you, Senator. I am sure if I don’t get 

to everything you’ll remind me. 

First, as President Kabila talks to the U.N. on the withdrawal 

of those forces from the DRC, I too think it would not be a good 

idea for that to occur too quickly. The conditions that you described 

with respect to the corruption, the professionalism of the armed 

forces of the DRC, their activity, the lawlessness in the eastern 

part of the country to be sure, all contribute to abuses to the population and to instability. 

The U.N. force that’s there has clearly been a force for good in 

addressing those conditions. Large as that contingent is, given the 

size of the DRC, it is still not covering that entire country. But any 

place where those forces are reduced would have I believe a negative effect. Right now the western part of the country is in fact the 

most stable, so it would probably be least affected with the withdrawal of U.N. forces. But clearly in the eastern part of the country, where the majority of the things occur against the people, either being committed by rebel groups who operate in that region 

or in some cases by the armed forces of the DRC itself, I think the 

removal of U.N. forces would have a detrimental effect on those 

overall conditions. 

As we work with DOS and others with the Congolese as they address in a comprehensive way the plethora of conditions that contribute to the instability and the lawlessness, our focus now is moving ahead with training of a battalion that hopefully can serve as 

a model for what professional behavior is and what it could lead 

to for other parts of the armed forces of the DRC. 

We have begun that program in earnest about 2 weeks ago. It 

will run about another 6 or 7 months, and should it prove successful there’s potential that it could be expanded to other battalions 

as well to help a process of increasing professionalism and ability 

of the armed forces of the DRC to move ahead. 

The work being done by the FDLR in the east, the Congolese are 

addressing that through some of their activities, supported by the 

U.N., and I think that too is important work as a part of the overall comprehensive way that those rebel groups have to be addressed. As we’ve also seen, I might add, with the cooperation that 

has existed between Uganda, the Congo, Rwanda, as well as the 

621 

Central African Republic in a regional way to address these common threats is something that we also will continue to encourage. 

Senator HAGAN. Well, I’m extremely concerned about the number 

of people that are dying every day and certainly the abuse of their 

men and women is just reprehensible. But thank you for your testimony. 

Thank you. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Hagan. 

Senator Burris. 

Senator BURRIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I too want to add my 

thanks to these three distinguished Americans who’ve dedicated 

their lives to protecting us. So from me to you, thank you, gentlemen. 

I will submit, Mr. Chairman, some questions for the record, because I have a whole list of them here, and I’m going to start with 

General Ward. General, your command was designed to employ the 

whole-of-government approach to executing theater security cooperation and to facilitate counterterrorism efforts within the African nations. General, what is the future role of the JTF–HOA and 

the military base in Djibouti? 

General WARD. Sir, Camp Lemonnier is I believe a very critical 

part of our national structure in that part of the continent. It 

serves four combatant commands, not just mine. It also serves U.S. 

Central Command (CENTCOM), U.S. Special Operations Command, as well as U.S. Transportation Command as a logistics hub, 

as an infrastructure point, as well as a training platform. 

I think it is in the long-term interest of the United States to 

maintain that facility to the degree that we have and continue to 

improve upon it, that will allow our activities in support of our missions in that part of the world to be facilitated. It is very important 

to us. I think it has great long-term meaning for us and I will 

clearly endorse it over the long term. 

JTF–HOA, which is my force that’s there right now, continues to 

do work in the region insofar as helping build the capacity of those 

nations in East Africa to counter the terror threat, as well as to 

be able to deal with the threat of terror by increasing their capacity. We are providing training assistance, equipping assistance, 

mentoring assistance, professionalization of their militaries, as well 

as helping to bring them together in a regional way as they continue to work together to address that common thread. 

So both activities and the platform itself, being Camp Lemonnier, 

are important. The work being done by the JTF–HOA as it executes its programs, fully aligned with the goals and objectives of 

AFRICOM are also very, very instrumental in promoting that degree of professionalism in East Africa and in other parts of the continent where we see those unique capabilities that could be applied, 

in particular the civil affairs work. 

Senator BURRIS. General, do you feel, since you’re the last command to be stood up here, that you are fully operative and fully 

personnel-staffed correctly? Or do you really need additional staff 

personnel? 

General WARD. Senator, we always look for more. The Deputy 

Secretary of Defense has written to all of his colleagues asking for 

additional interagency support. Not that we would do the work of 

622 

the interagency, but so that the interagency input to our work 

could be further assuring that what we do in fact is in keeping 

with supporting the overall comprehensive work being done by 

other parts of our Government. 

We don’t have all that we would like to have, but there is a recognition on the part of our interagency partners that they should 

be and want to be a part of this command, and as we continue to 

move forward we see that occurring. That’s why I endorse all that 

the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman says about increasing 

the capacities of our interagency partners as well, so that they can 

in fact participate. 

Senator BURRIS. Are you going to get Egypt into your AFRICOM? 

When do you anticipate that taking place? 

General WARD. Egypt, as you pointed out, Senator, is aligned 

with CENTCOM. But for matters of the continent of Africa, currently we can work with Egypt. In fact, I will be in Egypt in a matter of a couple weeks working with them on matters of the continent. 

Senator BURRIS. Also, General, the reason why we have not been 

able to locate AFRICOM in an African country is because of the 

politics of these countries and locating the right country would be 

a major undertaking. Is that the reason why we have not located 

it there and it’s still in Stuttgart, or can we find a very friendly 

African country to headquarter AFRICOM on the continent of Africa? 

General WARD. Senator, that is very complex. The reasons that 

you cite are part of it. But it’s more than that. At this point in 

time, I think if our work is to be about increasing the capacity of 

African nations, it’s our programs and our activities that we do in 

about 38 different countries right now. That’s the important part, 

and the effort to find a location with all the other associated issues 

would be distracting to the real work of the command, that is 

through our programs. 

Senator BURRIS. Admiral, theater engagement seems to be a 

major tool used by the command when partnering with the nations 

within your AOR. How is the National Guard’s State partnership 

program integrated into your theater engagement strategy? 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Deeply, deeply engaged. This State partnership program, which brings the State Guard into individual nations 

to partner with their militaries, is fundamental to what we’re 

doing. We have 26 of them around EUCOM, and I’d highlight just 

one among many, which is the Georgia Guard, which is partnered 

with the military of the Republic of Georgia. The two of them are 

working hand in hand to prepare a deployment of the Republic of 

Georgia’s brave soldiers. They’re going to send 750 to Afghanistan. 

So multiply that by 26 programs around the theater and you get 

a sense of how important this is, sir. 

Senator BURRIS. Thank you. 

General Mattis, you have a completed draft document, ‘‘Education and Employment Principles for Interagency Operations and 

Integration.’’ One of your working concepts is to stand up an exploratory civilian force. What is the mission and employment of the 

expeditionary civilian force? 

623 

General MATTIS. Sir, there are two expeditionary civilian forces 

that we’re looking at. One is inside DOD, and this is where you actually take DOD civilians who can fill certain jobs overseas on 

these joint coalition interagency staffs in these irregular wars. 

I think the one you’re referring to there is the one where we 

work with Ambassador Herbst in Secretary Clinton’s DOS, and 

that is where we are putting together, with their help, concepts 

that would integrate better the civilian-military interface when we 

enter into these kinds of wars that cannot be won by military 

means alone. There will be an immediate response force that’s 

being built. These will be people who have been trained. It’s their 

primary job. Their packs are packed. They have their shots. 

They’ve been through various exercises with the military, and are 

ready to go on short notice. 

Then there will be a response force of members of various agencies, and they will be ones who are basically trained. They’re like 

the reserves. They go to some training every year. They’re maintained as far as health records and deployment records, and they 

know what to do. But it would take us anywhere from 30 to 90 

days to get them deployed. 

Then there’s a larger force of people that we would endeavor to 

train as well, and that would be the sustainment force that would 

replace these others. 

Senator BURRIS. We are using contractors for some of this service, are we not, for these forces? The private contractors that you 

see in the theater. 

General MATTIS. The ones we’re looking at, that I just described, 

are under DOS, Ambassador Herbst’s effort, and those are all Government employees. Contractors would be a separate issue, and we 

do that when we have to fill the gaps when we don’t have the Active Duty or active government civilians that we can put in. 

Senator BURRIS. My time has expired, so I will yield, Mr. Chairman. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Burris. 

Senator Bill Nelson. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, thank you for your public service. Tomorrow in our 

Emerging Threats Subcommittee we’re going to look at the comprehensive way that the military, integrating with the civilian 

agencies, can best project U.S. power and interests. This is particularly applicable to General Ward and Admiral Stavridis, not only 

with regard to your present interests in Afghanistan, Admiral, but 

also your previous command of SOUTHCOM. General Ward, clearly AFRICOM is taking this comprehensive approach. 

Mr. Chairman, I was not very satisfied when we had the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Ms. Flournoy, come to talk to us about 

the policy. It didn’t seem to me that DOD had its act together on 

integrating, and it was like there were the same old answers about 

stovepipes that we’re trying to break down. 

You give your commanders on the ground the opportunity that 

they have a certain amount of CERP funds that they can go out 

and dig a well or build a school. But above that, an integrated approach, which is key to Afghanistan, which is key to Africa, which 

is key to Latin America, things like wells, education, training for 

624 

jobs, the position of women, medical, all of these things that for us 

to be successful in third world areas like we are projected, there 

has to be a holistic approach. 

The military has been so good as the one who leads it, and that 

of course is what is the thrust of AFRICOM and, Admiral 

Stavridis, your former command. I’d like to have you reflect, because I’m worried about Afghanistan that once we get beyond those 

CERP funds that these courageous young officers can go in and utilize, that then we get right back into the old stovepipes. 

I have the head of USAID coming in in the morning and I want 

to talk to that person about this. So can the two of you give me 

some advice, and also advice for our Emerging Threats Subcommittee, which it’s the subject of our hearing tomorrow, Mr. 

Chairman. 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Senator, I fully share your prescription, 

which is that we have to put together a comprehensive approach. 

It’s a whole of society approach. It really is interagency, international, private-public, and it all has to be connected in a way 

that we have not been terrifically effective at in any of these theaters. 

We will never deliver security in Afghanistan from the barrel of 

a gun. It has to be some as a result of all of these mechanisms 

working together. To that end, I just met with Dr. Shah, the Administrator of USAID. He’s extremely impressive, highly energized 

and energetic, and he’s coming out of the Gates Foundation, which 

gives him a very significant grounding in this private-public kind 

of connection. 

We’re exploring with him how we can better partner. State Department, as General Mattis is talking about, is working very hard 

at this with Ambassador Herbst and his team. We have a long way 

to go, but I believe that this precise issue is the most important 

security issue for the United States moving forward in this 21st 

century. 

Back to the cyber piece, if you look at cyber as one of these 

emerging threats, it’s a classic example of why this comprehensive 

approach is needed. It is fully validated. I believe all of the departments should continue to be pushed very hard to integrate their efforts at all levels, and that getting that balance of civilian, military, 

private, public, and interagency is crucial to our security going forward. 

Kip? 

General WARD. Senator, I clearly concur with what Admiral 

Stavridis just indicated. We know that it’s something that’s important to do. We have not broken the code on how to do it at each 

echelon. We do it fairly well on the ground. The country teams in 

the countries where DOS, USAID, and other members of the interagency who are there working with the military component, do a 

fairly good job of harmonizing the activities that occur on the 

ground. We need to do better at how we plan those endeavors. In 

my command, as we bring in members of the interagency to help 

us with our planning, it’s a two-way street because through their 

understanding of us, their input back to their parent organization 

can help ensure a harmonization of the planning that occurs. 

625 

As the Secretary has pointed out, we think that the capacity of 

some of the interagency partners to do that needs to be more robust. So we support those efforts that would in fact increase their 

capacity to participate in the planning as well as in the execution 

of these programs that bring the comprehensive effects to stability 

that you address. 

So we recognize it’s an issue. It works more, better than not, at 

the lower echelon. We need to expand that through every echelon 

so that at the inception of our work we have done a better job of 

combining what we call this 3D approach, the issues of development—obviously, a public-private partnership—the issues of diplomacy, which includes obviously good governance and those things 

that address how a society is governed; and defense, those security 

aspects that need to be there so that those other things can in fact 

work. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Well, what advice should I give to the 

head of USAID tomorrow? What questions should I ask in our 

hearing tomorrow that would get around USAID, they go out and 

they contract with somebody to do this, let’s say it’s digging wells, 

but there’s clearly need for education over here—let’s take Afghanistan—and a medical clinic and training for jobs. 

How do we get the comprehensive approach? You have each of 

these nongovernmental organizations and they want to do their 

thing. How do we get it all combined in an approach? 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Two thoughts. One is the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR), which is what USAID and 

DOS are working together now; this is happening in real time. So 

I think that that’s an opportunity to work on the integration, the 

alignment, and the partnering between USAID and DOS and how 

that marries up with the QDR, the DOD document, is a place 

where you could get the three main actors in this security mix coordinating their plans at the very highest level. 

If you click down one, General Ward has it exactly right, which 

is it’s the planning. It’s the planning that we ought to go after, because that’s where our other agencies are off doing their plans and 

we’re doing our plans, and then we meet in Afghanistan and the 

plans aren’t particularly aligned. 

I think bringing together a layer of planning below that strategic 

layer represented by the QDR and the QDDR, I think in terms of 

how we can encourage the agencies to do plans together, to have 

transparency in planning, to show across the board what the big 

muscle movements are country by country, and integrate those 

plans, so there is not duplication. 

So as General Ward says, one level down, now we’re at the tactical level, it’s seamless. It proceeds from the strategic through the 

operational planning down to the tactical execution. I’d focus in on 

that planning piece, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Nelson. 

Senator Thune. 

Senator THUNE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General, Admiral, General, thank you very much for being here 

and thank you for your outstanding service to our country. 

General Mattis, I wanted to get your views on the development 

of the air-sea battle concept. The new QDR directs the Navy and 

626 

the Air Force to develop a joint air-sea battle concept for defeating 

adversaries with sophisticated anti-access and area denial capabilities, which in turn will help guide the development of future capabilities needed for effective power projection operations. 

Could you provide your views on the development of this new airsea battle concept so far and where does JFCOM fit into the development, evaluation, and implementation of this concept? 

General MATTIS. Yes, Senator. Thank you. The air-sea battle concept grew out of identification of a military problem, and that problem is how do we work together jointly in order to maintain control 

of one of the commons, the sea lanes. The situation is changing. It’s 

always changing security-wise and adapting to that problem has 

brought these two Services together. 

JFCOM is part of this effort. We’re monitoring it right now, but 

we’re monitoring it to make sure that what we’ve done in past experiments and concept development guides this forward and also 

that we harvest from them the lessons that they’re learning as they 

come to grips with this problem broken down into bite-sized pieces. 

What we’re seeing is more and more this integration at every 

level of war. At one time we basically integrated at the strategic 

level and that was good. Then we got into the operational level of 

integration. You saw that in Operation Desert Storm and certainly 

in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)–1. We’re now integrating down 

at the tactical level. No longer can any service go into even one of 

its primary domains—the Army on the land, the Navy at sea, the 

Air Force in the air—and not integrate with others. 

It’s the nature of warfare today, it’s the nature of a lot of things, 

that you have to integrate more than ever in this age. So it’s going 

forward well. I think the identification of the problems is maturing 

well. I would say we’re in very good shape on that. The solutions 

are not completely clarified yet, and we will also uncover additional 

problems as we go forward. 

Ultimately we will see an increased reliance on naval forces as 

we look toward the future security situation. It must be that way 

for matters of limited access in certain areas for political or military reasons, and to bring the Air Force and the Navy together I 

think is a very healthy thing at this point, even though we have 

not completely got all the problems outlined. But we’re getting 

there. 

Senator THUNE. In your opinion how will long-range strike capabilities fit into this new air-sea battle concept? 

General MATTIS. Sir, we look at these issues in phases. Certainly 

during phase zero, when we’re engaging along the lines of what 

AFRICOM has been testifying to here today, what we’re doing is 

we’re trying to deter enemies and potential adversaries from ever 

doing something that we don’t want them to do that would be disadvantageous to international stability. 

When you put together a strong capability like this, you temper 

our potential adversaries’ designs. Should it go into a combat 

phase, the planning for this comes under something called campaign design. In that area, the strike capability that would be built 

would be fundamental to ensuring that we deter our enemies and 

reassure our friends that we can get through to them and support 

them. 

627 

Senator THUNE. Do you foresee in any future budget requests 

changes based on this new concept? For example, equipment requests with regard to this new concept? 

General MATTIS. Sir, I’d like to take a pause on that one, because 

I think first we need to get the concept right before we come to you 

asking for money. Certainly the strike capabilities will have to be 

maintained at the cutting edge. But I can’t really forecast until we 

get the concept right, which is based on a very clear problem statement of what we’re trying to solve, whether or not that will mean 

new programs. 

Senator THUNE. Admiral, advanced weapons systems designed 

for anti-access and area denial are being proliferated throughout 

the world, including in the EUCOM AOR. Russia’s developing advanced surface-to-air missile systems, advanced fifth generation 

type fighter aircraft, and even hinting at plans to develop a new 

long-range bomber. 

While the likelihood of conflict with Russia is low, it seems more 

likely that we will be involved in a future conflict against adversaries who possess advanced anti-aircraft and area denial weapons 

systems sold to them by the Russians. What are your views on 

these activities by the Russians to develop and proliferate anti-access and area denial systems? 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Senator, we continuously evaluate globally 

all of the threat systems that are emerging, and indeed Russia is 

developing some very sophisticated ones that you mentioned, along 

with some, I would add, subsurface, submarine kinds of capabilities. So clearly we have to pace that. Clearly we have to maintain 

our superiority at all levels as we go forward, and I think that applies not solely to Russia, but really looking globally at all the 

threats that’s a fundamental responsibility of the Department. 

Senator THUNE. Do you view Russia’s development of a fifth generation fighter aircraft as a cause for concern? 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. I do. 

Senator THUNE. How about their planned development of a new 

long-range bomber? 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Yes, I would put that again in the category 

of a wide variety of emerging global threats. But those would be 

among them. 

Senator THUNE. I have one other question I wanted to ask. The 

Russians are seeking to link missile defense to a follow-on Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) and negotiations, as we understand, have stalled over the Russian demand for the option to 

withdraw from the treaty unilaterally if they determine that our 

missile defenses would threaten its nuclear missile force. 

To the best of your knowledge, is there any effort to negotiate a 

side agreement with the Russians on this issue? 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Sir, I have no idea. That would be squarely 

in the purview of DOS. 

Senator THUNE. All right. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you all very much. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator Thune. 

628 

We expect votes just about now. There’s four votes coming. So 

let’s try to have a second round for everybody. Do you have additional questions, Senator Burris? 

Senator BURRIS. No, Mr. Chairman. I’m just trying to listen to 

these distinguished gentlemen. 

Chairman LEVIN. Okay, great. I just have a few and then we can 

turn it over to Senator Inhofe. 

You’ve spoken about your support, Admiral, of the new Phased 

Adaptive Approach for missile defense. One of the possibilities 

being considered is to ask Russia to cooperate in the European missile defense effort with their radar information as a way to enhance 

security against shared missile threats. Do you support that idea? 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. I do, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. If we were able to achieve it, what would it be? 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. First, it would create a zone of cooperation 

with Russia, which I think is an important good as I look at the 

military-to-military responsibilities I have in EUCOM. 

Second, I think it could technically add to the early warning time 

because of the location of the system. 

Then third, I think it creates confidence-building measures between ourselves and the Russians. 

Chairman LEVIN. Does the Polish Government now support the 

missile defense approach? 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. I think it’s fair to say in general terms they 

do, yes, sir. I would not speak for the Polish Government. 

Chairman LEVIN. All right. Have they spoken on it yet? 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. They have not. That’s my intuition based on 

my conversations, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. Is there discussions or agreements with the 

Polish Government relative to the deployment of a Patriot training 

battery in Poland? 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Yes, sir, there is. 

Chairman LEVIN. Has that been completed yet, those discussions? 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. I think we are literally signing the final 

memorandum of understanding this week, and I anticipate that deployment going forward in the next 30 days. 

Chairman LEVIN. The AFRICOM manning issue has been raised, 

General, as to whether or not you have enough personnel. You’ve 

indicated you’d like some more if you can get them. But my question has to do with this. Apparently your Service components are 

not assigned to you as assigned forces; is that correct? 

General WARD. The Service components are assigned, sir. They 

have no assigned forces under them, but my components are assigned to me. 

Chairman LEVIN. Okay. But underneath them there are no 

forces; do I have that right now? 

General WARD. That’s correct. 

Chairman LEVIN. Those forces are generally provided through a 

global force management and request for forces system. Have you 

applied for forces? Have you made that request through that system? 

General WARD. I have. I use the global force management process, as do the other combatant commands as well, for satisfying my 

629 

requirements for forces to do our missions that we have to undertake on the continent. 

Chairman LEVIN. Finally, the Department is currently in the 

process of updating the guidance for employment of the force (GEF) 

which establishes the Department’s strategic objectives for campaign planning and security cooperation and the priorities to be established. There’s an ongoing rewrite of the GEF. It’s the first, I 

think, since AFRICOM was established. Is AFRICOM receiving a 

fair hearing under that revision process? 

General WARD. Yes, Senator. I’ve been a part of that process and 

I’m fully aware that DOD, as it looks at its revision of the GEF, 

is looking at ensuring that the requirement that we have for resources to conduct the very essential building partner capacity is 

being treated at a level of priority different than the past, so that 

those forces that are required to do that mission will enjoy a higher 

priority than has been the case in the past. We are participating 

in that process. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much. 

Senator Inhofe. 

General MATTIS. Can I just associate myself with General Ward 

on that particular issue. I think it is a bit of a sea change in the 

Department and it’s a good one. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you. 

Senator Inhofe. 

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Admiral Stavridis, there’s only one area where I disagree with 

you, and I’ve told you this before. But I’d like to have you tell me 

where I’m wrong on this. Our intelligence tells us that Iran would 

have the long-range ballistic capability somewhere between 2015 

and 2020. I’d say 2015 then, as serious as that is. The SM–31B, 

which is short- and medium-range, that would be 2015, but it 

doesn’t matter. That doesn’t have the capability, nor does the 2A 

variety, which would get into intermediate, and that’s supposed to 

be somewhere around 2018. 

The SM–32B, which is supposed to be comparable to what we 

would have had—at least I think this is the case—if we had had 

and kept the ground-based system or the ground-based interceptor 

in Poland, there is no date on that. 

I objected to that first budget of the President just for the terminating of all these programs, such as the F–22, the C–17, and the 

Future Combat System. But the thing I found most objectionable 

was when he pulled the rug out from under Poland and the Czech 

Republic. I was with Vaclav Klaus this last Friday. 

I understand the argument that we have the ground-based system in Alaska and California. I don’t have the confidence that that 

would have that coverage that far for the eastern United States. 

I guess I would just say, just briefly, what am I overlooking? 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Senator, I’m going to ask to take that one for 

the record and come back to you. I think it’s a technical issue that 

I would like to provide you a little more data on. I will say that, 

as a naval officer who has commanded multiple Aegis ships at sea, 

I am extremely impressed, naturally given my background, with 

the Aegis system and its ability to adapt. So part of my confidence 

comes out of my grounding in my many years at sea operating with 

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that system and my belief that it can be successfully transitioned 

ashore. 

Having said that, I want to provide you the hard data on this 

and I’d like to take that for the record to do that, sir. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

[Deleted.] 

Senator INHOFE. That’s all right, and I don’t disagree with you. 

I’ve been a strong supporter of the Aegis system. But we’re talking 

about long-range intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). Okay, 

fine, we’ll get that for the record. 

General Ward, I was appreciative of the fact that you said some 

good things about Ethiopia in the response to, I believe it was, the 

chairman’s question. Specifically, I know that the one who has been 

under attack in Ethiopia more than anyone else is Prime Minister 

Meles. My personal feeling is he has a tough job, but he’s a tough 

guy and he’s been able to do it. 

Would you make the same comments about his leadership as you 

would just Ethiopia in general? 

General WARD. Senator, I meet with Prime Minister Meles quite 

regularly and I have a huge respect for his leadership and the work 

that he does, especially as it pertains to addressing the threat of 

terror and cooperating with those who also address that threat of 

terror in East Africa. 

Senator INHOFE. The fact that he was there with us when the Somalia thing happened—I think he’s taking a bum rap is my position. 

You talked, when you were talking to Senator Hagan, about the 

cooperation between Rwanda, Uganda, and the DRC. I personally 

have talked to Museveni and Kagame and Kabila on their cooperation with each other, but in another area, and that is the area of 

the LRA in northern Uganda, or wherever they are right now. We 

made a point to go over to East Africa to Goma thinking that was 

about where he was last seen, and he’s had another reign of terror 

since that time. 

We have legislation right now that is going to try to give more 

assistance to those presidents and those countries to try to end 

what I call one of the worst reigns of terror I’ve ever personally observed, and I’ve been there and have observed it. Do you think we 

should be helping with more resources to end that particular LRA 

problem? Would you support me on that? 

General WARD. Yes, sir. The work being done by that group of 

countries to combat the atrocities that the LRA has committed for 

over 25 years is work that’s important and I think our support to 

those ongoing efforts is important support. 

Senator INHOFE. I think most of the members on this committee 

are actually co-sponsors of the legislation that we have that would 

be helpful to resolve that. One of the problems we have is that all 

three of these presidents came from a military background and 

there’s always a little bit of a concern over, is this reflecting that 

I can’t do it myself? But I think we’re finally in a position to jointly 

work on this thing. 

Let’s see. Is there anything else in terms of what is taking place 

right now in Africa? Maybe you can give us a couple of examples 

631 

of the improvements you’ve made working with the African militaries, some of the successes there. 

General WARD. Thank you, Senator. There are several. As an example, as we work with the littoral nations on their maritime safety and security, our various programs, one we call the AFRICOM 

Maritime Law Enforcement Program, it’s an interagency construct. 

We bring in members of Homeland Security and the Coast Guard 

working with African nations and their legal systems such that 

they have a better ability to provide for the territorial integrity of 

their waters. That is working. 

We conducted an exercise in East Africa whereby we had five 

participating nations, the first time ever. They came together jointly working to help address a natural disaster or humanitarian assistance scenario. But as was pointed out to me by a chief of defense of one of these nations, as convoys moved through that part 

of the continent 10 years ago you would not have thought that they 

would have come together to link up and then move to a common 

objective that was conducted in the north of Uganda, where the 

LRA had just 3 short years ago been running with abandon and 

devastating the populations there. 

Those are happening all over the place. We had a training operation in Mali. In the chairman’s opening statement he mentioned 

what went on in Mali last summer. A member who received training this past January said had he had that training prior to that 

last July situation where the Malians encountered al Qaeda in the 

Islamic Maghreb forces, he said that would not have happened. 

So our work to train and assist these countries so that they can 

be in a better position to address these threats themselves is paying off. 

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I applaud all three of you for the great work you’re doing. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Inhofe. 

I’m going to have to leave now, so I’ll turn the gavel over to Senator Lieberman. 

Thank you all very much for your service. 

Senator LIEBERMAN [presiding]. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. 

General Ward, I just wanted to say to you first how impressed 

I am as I hear you answer the questions about what’s happening 

within the African continent and your involvement in it, your 

knowledge of it, and how important it is, that we created 

AFRICOM, because I think we were paying too little attention to 

this critically important continent. 

I think you’re bringing to it the same kind of critical relationship 

with the leaders there. In some of the regions of the world, the 

most important person in the region really is our regional commander. Now, as you said to me when I began this conversation 

before the hearing, it’s only in a sense the door in and it hopefully 

leads to other relationships, diplomatic, political, economic, 

etcetera. 

Anyway, I wanted to thank you for the way in which you’ve done 

your job, and it’s been very important. 

Admiral Stavridis, I know you’ve been asked already about missile defense. In your role, you are going to be responsible for operating the early stages of the Phased Adaptive Missile Defense SysVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:37 May 06, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00637 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\62155.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
632 

tem for Europe. I thought I’d ask you first for an analysis, if you 

will, or a report on what the state of European public opinion is 

about missile defense? In other words, do the Europeans feel vulnerable now? There have been times in the not so distant history 

where I think they haven’t. Do they feel vulnerable, and if so who 

are they worried about firing missiles at them? 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Sir, I think there’s a growing appreciation in 

Europe for the danger specifically from Iran. I think they look at 

the nature of that regime, clearly a state sponsor of terrorism, 

working hard to develop a nuclear device. Additionally, I think 

there’s a great deal of understanding that the ballistic missile technology that the Iranians possess is moving apace. So that is having 

a salutary effect on the European proclivity to be engaged with us 

in missile defense. 

It varies from country to country, and there are a number of factors that range from geography to relationships with the United 

States to general world outlook that shape it. But I think in my 

opinion it’s fair to say that we are seeing a growing appreciation 

of it. Again, I have to applaud assistant Secretary Ellen Tauscher, 

who is moving forward on the diplomatic side of this thing. She’s 

an expert in all of this and she’s doing, I think, a very credible job 

of forging the practical partnerships which I believe over time will 

grow into a fully integrated missile defense. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. I appreciate that, and I appreciate the work 

that Ellen Tauscher has done, as you do. 

There was some concern here on Capitol Hill when the decision 

was made to pull back from the Polish-Czech plan. How are we 

doing? I know you’ve answered this in part, but how are we doing 

on the development of the alternative system? Are you confident 

that it will meet the target dates we’ve set so it will provide adequate defense? 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. I’m certainly confident that the first stage 

will. It’ll be sea-based and, as you heard me say to Senator Inhofe, 

I have a great deal of confidence in that part of it. Given the track 

record of that system and the technology embedded in it, I am reasonably confident that it will be adapted and will transition to a 

shore-based system within the targets that are set for it. 

Nobody can predict the delivery of defense technology. We’ve all 

been surprised on that occasionally. But given the track record of 

the system and given my understanding of where we are, I think 

it’s very reasonable to expect that we will hit those bells as we 

move forward. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. That’s good to hear. 

There was a related article in the Washington Post this morning 

about the Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS). It says, 

‘‘After several failed attempts, the Army is trying again to cancel 

the $19 billion missile defense system that the United States is developing in partnership with Italy and Germany. Known as 

MEADS, it has been in the works for more than a decade and is 

designed to replace in part the Army’s aging Patriot system.’’ 

I wanted to ask you whether you’ve been involved in discussions 

with your Army colleagues about this program and what your opinion of it is, and ultimately the unique feature of this is that we 

have a couple of our European allies, not only involved, but picking 

633 

up a big chunk of the bill—whether you see the MEADS as part 

of the phased adaptive missile defense system that you’re now 

helping to implement? 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. I have not gone into detail on MEADS with 

my Army brethren who are developing that here in the United 

States. I will tell you in Europe there is a sense that the system 

can be a functioning part of a missile defense system. I recently 

spoke with several chiefs of defense from the participating nations 

who mentioned that. 

I think, Senator Lieberman, it’s also indicative of the relationship between the United States and Israel, where we are working 

and looking at some of the Israeli capabilities that you’re aware of, 

the Iron Dome System and the Arrow System. I think we in the 

United States do not have the market cornered on all the smart 

technology. We would be well served by reaching out to our allies 

and finding what can be integrated. I think MEADS potentially is 

in fact a player in that. 

So I will continue to follow the MEADS story as it unfolds. But 

I think it’s more important as an example of how additional technologies can be adapted to the Phased Adaptive Approach, which 

is one reason it’s an attractive system. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. So at this point you’re inclined to favor the 

continuation of the MEADS program? 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. I don’t know enough about MEADS to make 

that statement, sir. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right, okay. But I agree with you. There’s 

a growing appreciation among allies in Europe, in the Middle East, 

and in Asia of the missile threat, particularly from Iran and North 

Korea. It just makes a lot of sense for us to operate, as we have 

been, cooperatively. 

You’re right, the last time I was in Israel I saw some video of 

testing of the Iron Dome System, which is a defense against shortrange missiles or rockets. It was quite impressive. We’re partners 

in that with the Israelis and we’ll have full benefit, I think, from 

its technologies in terms, for instance, of protecting American personnel and bases in places like Europe or the Middle East from potential short-range missile rocket attack. 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Yes, sir. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. That’s it for me. I have to go over to vote. 

It’s been a very informational and encouraging hearing. I’m sure 

the committee, as it normally does, will try our best to authorize 

to a level that will continue to allow the three of you and the many 

men and women in uniform who serve under you to do the job that 

we ask you to do in defense of our security and our freedom. 

Thank you very much. The hearing is adjourned. 

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR CARL LEVIN

U.S. ARMY POSTURE IN EUROPE

1. Senator LEVIN. Admiral Stavridis, pending the review of the North Atlantic 

Treaty Organization’s (NATO) Strategic Concept and an accompanying U.S. assessment of our European defense posture network, the Quadrennial Defense Review 

(QDR) recommended maintaining four brigade combat teams (BCTs) and an Army 

Corps headquarters forward stationed on the European continent. In your written 

statement, you stated ‘‘without the four BCTs and one tactical intermediate headVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:37 May 06, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00639 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\62155.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
634 

quarters capability, European Command (EUCOM) assumes risk in its capability to 

conduct steady-state security cooperation, shaping, and contingency missions. Deterrence and reassurance are at increased risk.’’ How important for your priority initiatives is it to retain four BCTs forward stationed on the European continent? 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. EUCOM’s forward stationed forces and bases are critical elements of U.S. national security and diplomatic strategy. They are important symbols of continued U.S. support for and leadership of NATO. Our forces provide essential elements of U.S. assurance, dissuasion, and deterrence across the entire European and Eurasian theater. They also provide superb power projection facilities 

for the support of coalition operations and contingencies in Europe, Eurasia and Africa. 

Taking into account the demands of a dynamic and complex security environment; 

directed tasks associated with U.S. defense strategy; requirements to sustain robust 

levels of engagement with allies and friends; the need for forces, bases, and access 

and treaty agreements to support global operations; and a recognition that posture 

decisions are more often than not, irreversible, it is my opinion that the four BCTs 

and a Corps Headquarters is the minimal forward stationed Army force requirements for the theater. 

2. Senator LEVIN. Admiral Stavridis, what would be the impact of redeploying two 

BCTs out of Europe on EUCOM’s ability to engage with our European allies and 

maintain the transatlantic relationship? 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Should the two heavy brigades return to the continental 

United States (CONUS), the impact on EUCOM’s ability to engage with our European allies and maintain the transatlantic relationship would be significant. Their 

physical presence in Europe serves to further assure our allies of the longstanding 

U.S. commitment to NATO and the region in general. U.S. Army forces located in 

Europe, in between their out-of-area deployments, are available for training and security cooperation events with our NATO allies and aspiring NATO members. These 

activities are part of the Building Partnership Capacity priority for EUCOM and encourage the development of partners to increase capability and capacity for expeditionary operations in support of global security strategies. 

Furthermore, in-theater forces can respond to short-fused opportunities that could 

not be performed by rotational forces. EUCOM realizes that both brigades have not 

yet converted to the modular BCT formation. Ideally, these two brigades can be converted such that EUCOM would have assigned each of the four types of Army BCTs 

to maximize our capability with respect to interoperability training with our allies 

and friends. These two BCTs do everything stateside forces do . . . plus they build 

relationships; assure, deter, and dissuade, provide operational flexibility, ensure 

global access, provide our forces multinational training opportunities, and build 

partner capacity at a marginal cost. 

Additionally, with Army force generation requirements and rotation goals, maintaining these additional BCTs in Europe reduces deployment stress on the Army’s 

BCTs. Maintaining the four BCTs in theater ensures a BCT in ready status for contingency operations and security cooperation activities while another is in reset and 

the remaining two are deploying, redeploying and/or conducting out-of-area operations. 

3. Senator LEVIN. Admiral Stavridis, if these units remain on the continent, what 

is your assessment of the condition of the facilities that will house them and whether you have adequate facilities to conduct the necessary training to maintain these 

units? 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. If retained, the 170th Infantry Brigade and 172nd Infantry 

Brigade will remain stationed at their current locations. The 170th Infantry Brigade 

is at Baumholder, Germany, and the 172nd Infantry Brigade will complete consolidation at Grafenwohr, Germany, by the end of 2010. Facilities at both locations are 

generally in very good condition and suitable to meet unit requirements; however, 

a significant portion of the Military Family Housing at Baumholder is in need of 

recapitalization. Accordingly, U.S. Army Installation Management Command Europe began execution of a multi-year housing recapitalization program in fiscal year 

2010. It is important to note that Baumholder will remain an enduring location 

even if the 170th Infantry Brigade returns to the CONUS. 

Training areas currently available to these units are world class. Both 

Baumholder and Grafenwohr have their own maneuver and training areas where 

the BCTs can conduct all required training. In addition, the Joint Maneuver Training Center (JMTC) at Hohenfels, Germany, provides the same fully instrumented 

training capability as the National Training Center in Fort Irwin. The Grafenwohr/ 

JMTC training facilities were originally designed for a much larger number of forces 

635 

than there will be with just four BCTs. Those four BCTs will have far more opportunity to conduct combined and collective training than CONUS units waiting their 

turn for National Training Center or Joint Readiness Training Center. Additionally, 

our European based U.S. forces train with their European partners utilizing both 

U.S. controlled and host nation facilities. 

NUCLEAR POSTURE IN EUROPE

4. Senator LEVIN. Admiral Stavridis, as NATO continues its work on a new Strategic Concept, do you see any consensus developing on the future role, if there is 

one, for nuclear weapons in NATO? 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. The future role of nuclear weapons in NATO is being discussed as part of the Strategic Concept deliberations. We expect the new Strategic 

Concept to be released this Fall. Until its release, I cannot speculate on what the 

final document will state. 

AL QAEDA IN THE LAND OF THE ISLAMIC MAGHREB

5. Senator LEVIN. General Ward, the failed Christmas Day airline bombing reminded the counterterrorism community that al Qaeda is not an organization limited to the rugged terrain of Afghanistan and Pakistan, but is a global terrorist organization with an insatiable desire to strike targets anywhere they can. In northwest Africa, U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) is dealing with one of al Qaeda’s affiliate organizations, al Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). Governments in northwest Africa have not demonstrated a consistent commitment to work 

on a regional basis to combat this threat. This provides AQIM with a broader operational space. Would you say the ambitions of AQIM are different from those of al 

Qaeda in Pakistan or al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula? 

General WARD. There is no fundamental difference in the ambitions of AQIM and 

al Qaeda elements in Pakistan and the Arabian Peninsula. Both groups devote significant energy towards attempting to overthrow apostate governments in their respective regions. The distinction between the organizations is a difference in operational capability, focus, and tactics. 

• Since merging with al Qaeda on 11 September 2006, AQIM has emerged 

as al Qaeda’s regional arm in North Africa and the Sahel. This transformation has been reflected in AQIM’s tactics, ideology, and propaganda, 

which now more closely align with those of al Qaeda. Although AQIM remains intent on targeting the Algerian Government and other regional governments—especially Mauritania-AQIM is increasingly targeting Western 

interests, as evidenced by recent kidnappings in Mali. 

• AQIM aspires to conduct operations outside of Africa but has yet to demonstrate a significant capacity to project force beyond its traditional operating areas in North Africa and the Sahel. 

• Over the next year, AQIM will likely concentrate on expanding the 

group’s operational reach in North Africa, the Sahel, and West Africa. 

• AQIM has limited influence in Europe and no known capability in the 

United States. However, AQIM is willing to support operational planning 

in Europe and may be willing to support operational planning in the United 

States if the opportunity arises. 

6. Senator LEVIN. General Ward, what is your assessment of the prospects for regional counterterrorism cooperation in northwest Africa? 

General WARD. [Deleted.] 

7. Senator LEVIN. General Ward, what programs has AFRICOM initiated to address this burgeoning threat, and are they adequately resourced? 

General WARD. [Deleted.] 

SOMALIA

8. Senator LEVIN. General Ward, much of the training assistance provided today 

is through the African Union Mission to the Transitional Federal Government in Somalia. Very little, if any, assistance is provided to Somaliland and Puntland forces. 

Do you see a role for AFRICOM in providing train-and-equip assistance either directly or via contractors to Somaliland or Puntland? 

General WARD. [Deleted.] 

636 

PROGRAM FOR SMALL UNIT EXCELLENCE

9. Senator LEVIN. General Mattis, last year U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) 

began the Program for Small Unit Excellence which focuses on specialized training 

for squad- and fire team-sized elements as well as developing better concepts and 

researching small unit training. How does the Program for Small Unit Excellence 

differ from what is already being conducted by the Services and to what extent are 

the Services already conducting squad- and fire-team level training? 

General MATTIS. JFCOM did not institute a Small Unit Excellence program in 

2010 because the programmed funding was not appropriated in the fiscal year 2010 

Appropriations Bill. JFCOM acknowledges the outstanding work the Services are 

doing in preparing small units for ground combat, but also recognizes the Irregular 

Warfare (IW) environment places unique demands on the tactical, behavioral, and 

ethical decisionmaking capabilities of small units. While the Services continue to 

perform squad and fire-team level training, JFCOM seeks to complement Service 

training by providing a joint context, amplifying the exposure of small units and 

their leaders to joint command and control; joint intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR); and joint fires. The goal is to develop small units who are 

knowledgeable of employment of the full array of joint capabilities to defeat the 

enemy, while also improving small unit cognitive competencies, increasing individual survivability, decreasing ethical missteps in combat, and bolstering psychological resilience. 

10. Senator LEVIN. General Mattis, how has JFCOM been able to rapidly field 

immersive infantry trainers and simulators with realistic environments and how 

can such trainers and simulators improve small-team close combat effectiveness? 

General MATTIS. Presently, JFCOM is working closely with the Services to support their efforts to field immersive infantry trainers and simulators that possess 

realistic environments that are fully integrated with joint enablers such as joint ISR 

and joint fires platforms. JFCOM has partnered with the USMC to integrate realworld Afghan terrain data into an immersive simulator, the USMC-developed Virtual Battlespace version 2 (VBS2). In turn JFCOM also fielded the terrain data capability to a Fort Bragg-based Army unit in preparation for their upcoming deployment to Afghanistan. 

As the combatant command sponsor for the Future Immersive Training Environment (FITE) Joint Capability Technology Demonstration (JCTD), JFCOM has initiated a program to holistically integrate technological advances across the DOD to 

create capabilities focused on immersive infantry trainers and close-combat simulators. These capabilities will enable resource efficient solutions that replicate the effects and conditions of the operational environment. 

On March 8, the Deputy Secretary of Defense signed out a letter directing the Department to immediately develop a state-of-the-art simulation capability for training 

of ground forces to meet the urgent requirements demanded by the current fight. 

This letter specifically directs JFCOM to contribute to the integration efforts in the 

development of this capability, while also providing the joint context (joint C2, joint 

ISR, joint fires) to the creation of the virtual environments. JFCOM will also work 

with the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) to focus 

on incorporation of the counter IED challenge. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR ROLAND W. BURRIS

SUPPLEMENTAL REQUEST

11. Senator BURRIS. Admiral Stavridis, there is a $20 billion supplemental request 

for fiscal year 2010 in addition to $102.2 billion Overseas Contingency Operations 

(OCO) request for fiscal year 2011. If the supplemental is being replaced by the 

OCO request, then why is there such a large disparity? 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. The answer to this question is more appropriately answered 

by the Department of the Army or Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD) Comptroller. 

THEATER ENGAGEMENT STRATEGY

12. Senator BURRIS. Admiral Stavridis and General Ward, theater engagement 

seems to be a major tool used by combatant commands when partnering with the 

Nations within each of your areas of responsibility (AORs). What assets do you have 

and where are they located? 

637 

Admiral STAVRIDIS and General WARD. U.S. Marine Corps Forces Europe, U.S. 

Naval Forces Europe, U.S. Air Forces in Europe, and U.S. Army Europe, as well 

as EUCOMs’ functional subordinate unified command for special operations, Special 

Operations Command Europe, are responsible for supporting our Theater Campaign 

Plan and implementing our Theater Security Cooperation programs across the region. The Service Components provide the capabilities necessary to engage with and 

build military capacity among our partners and Allies. These forces are located on 

nineteen Main Operating Bases, twelve Forward Operating Sites and seven Cooperative Security Locations across the European continent. EUCOM’s ability to operate 

from locations in Germany, Italy, England, Benelux, Spain, Greece, Cyprus, Greenland, Turkey, Portugal, Bulgaria, Romania, and Poland creates openings for the 

United States to work together with allies and partners on shared regional and 

global security opportunities and challenges. 

13. Senator BURRIS. Admiral Stavridis, how is the National Guard’s State Partnership Program integrated into your theater engagement strategy? 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. The National Guard State Partnership Program is completely 

integrated into EUCOM’s theater engagement strategy. The National Guard is the 

force provider for the State Partnership Program and is critical for supporting and 

strengthening regional security and stability in 21 partner nations in EUCOM’s 

area of focus. The State Partnership Program accounts for over 35 percent of all 

military-to-military engagements in EUCOM’s area of focus and is mightily engaged 

in civil security cooperation. 

NATO’S ROLE IN AFGHANISTAN

14. Senator BURRIS. Admiral Stavridis, in your predecessor’s 2009 posture statement, building partner capacity is a means for providing flexible response to this 

broad spectrum of threats. NATO continues to work with EUCOM to support partnership efforts with its member nations and former Warsaw pact nations. Will 

NATO play a greater role in the ongoing efforts in Afghanistan? 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. NATO already plays a huge role in Afghanistan and our Allies continue to make additional contributions. Right now, there are almost 40,000 

non-U.S. troops in AFG as part of the International Security Assistance Force 

(ISAF). We have also had a recent surge of commitments from our Allies following 

the President’s announcement of the new strategy for Afghanistan. So far, the nonU.S. additional pledges total 9,500. 

NATO has also provided over a thousand trainers, which are critical to increasing 

Afghan capacity to lead their own efforts. European Allies and partners provide approximately 50 percent of the Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams required to 

train the Afghan National Army. Also, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and 

Poland have already deployed Police Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams to train 

Afghan National Police. 

Our Allies also hold key leadership positions and carry significant regional authority throughout ISAF. For example, Germany leads RC–North, Italy leads RC– 

West, and Turkey leads RC–Capital. The Netherlands, Canada, and the United 

Kingdom have rotational responsibility for RC–South. 

In addition to this direct support to combat and training, our Allies are also contributing to stability and development efforts in Afghanistan through participation 

in Provincial Reconstruction Teams and other civilian and private ventures throughout the country. 

15. Senator BURRIS. Admiral Stavridis, will NATO lessen their national level caveats for forces they deploy to Afghanistan to allow them to take a more active role 

in combat operations? 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Caveats are imposed and controlled by individual NATO 

member countries in response to their internal political situation. Overall, the trend 

is positive. We have 22 of 43 nations completely caveat-free. There are 56 total caveats, down from 83 since April 2008. The caveats are not a significant impediment 

to operations in AFG. That said, I am committed to engaging NATO members and 

partners to reduce or remove caveats on their forces. It is my expectation that the 

positive trends concerning caveats will continue and provide COMISAF with greater 

operational flexibility. 

638 

PROVIDING SERVICES TO AFRICOM PERSONNEL

16. Senator BURRIS. Admiral Stavridis, are there any significant impacts of providing various military and family services to AFRICOM personnel by the various 

military communities that are currently under your control? 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. U.S. EUCOM partners with our Stuttgart neighbor, U.S. 

AFRICOM, in a tenant support relationship which extends services to staff and families who call Germany their home away from home. 

We also collaborate with U.S. AFRICOM on an Executive Agency level through 

our naval component, U.S. Naval Forces Europe, who oversees previously brokered 

longstanding cross service agreements which support the infrastructure needs of 

Camp Lemonier in Djibouti from which Commander, Joint Task Force Horn of Africa (CJTF–HOA) operates. 

PERSONNEL

17. Senator BURRIS. General Ward, AFRICOM is the newest unified command 

and has been fully operational capable since October 2008. As of October 2009, you 

also have approximately 1,200 personnel in your headquarters. Do you have enough 

personnel in your headquarters to provide adequate staff and command oversight 

over the missions within your AOR? 

General WARD. U.S. AFRICOM is an economy of force operation. We have a relatively small staff in Stuttgart compared to the amount of activity the command is 

tasked to oversee on a daily basis. The personnel assigned to our headquarters on 

manpower documents include the sub-Unified Command Special Operations Command-Africa as well as all military assigned to support our ambassadors in our African embassies. As we build our programs and capabilities in support of engagement 

on the continent, we continue to assess our needs for manpower, anticipating additional personnel requirements. 

18. Senator BURRIS. General Ward, what personnel from other Government agencies are part of your permanent staff? 

General WARD. 

• There are 27 interagency personnel integrated across the command in 

long-term assignments. 

• Five members are Senior Executive, or Senior Foreign Service personnel 

with strategic decisionmaking roles. 

• The remaining 22 personnel are GS–15 equivalent or junior personnel, 

and are embedded within the headquarters planning staff. 

• They provide subject-matter expertise to the planning process. • Currently, there are 15 interagency personnel temporarily assigned to the 

command to support specific planning events. 

• U.S. AFRICOM, through the Deputy Secretary of Defense, has requested 

an additional 33 personnel from other U.S. Government departments and 

agencies to support the command. 

EGYPT

19. Senator BURRIS. General Ward, will Egypt eventually transition from U.S. 

Central Command (CENTCOM) to your AOR? 

General WARD. There are no immediate plans to transfer Egypt from CENTCOM 

to U.S. AFRICOM. The Unified Command Plan (UCP), which addresses the boundaries of Combatant Commands, is reviewed every 2 years. This formal UCP review 

process affords us ample opportunity to review and modify the existing arrangement 

with regard to Egypt should we believe a change is necessary. Currently AFRICOM 

has a standing memorandum of understanding (MOU) with CENTCOM whereby 

AFRICOM goals and objectives on the continent vis-a ́-vis Egypt are addressed directly with Egypt in close coordination with the Office of Military CooperationEgypt. We have conducted senior leader visits, participated in the US–Egypt Military Cooperation Council, and have held action officer-level planning meetings to 

continue to develop our engagement with the Egyptians. 

RISK INVOLVED IN ACCOMPLISHING MISSION SETS

20. Senator BURRIS. General Ward, AFRICOM’s AOR encompasses 53 countries 

and water space that equates to the over four times the size of the CONUS. How 

would you describe the risk involved in accomplishing your various mission sets? 

639 

General WARD. [Deleted.] 

PARTNERSHIP WITH AFRICAN NATIONS

21. Senator BURRIS. General Ward, AFRICOM was designed to employ a wholeof-government approach to executing theater security cooperation, and to facilitate 

counterterrorism efforts with the African nations. How has the African Contingency 

Operations Training and Assistance program assisted in this effort? 

General WARD. Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) 

is an extremely important engagement tool for building military capacity and professionalism-both of which are essential ingredients for executing theater security cooperation and in developing forces capable of successful counterterrorism efforts. Focused on developing self-sustaining peacekeeping training programs with African 

partner nations, ACOTA enables African partners to support UN and AU peacekeeping missions and, as a by-product, directly supports USAFRICOM’s theater security cooperation goals and objectives. 

Through the development of peacekeeping units and partner capacity to train 

their own peacekeepers, ACOTA training directly supports DOD’s Guidance for Employment of the Force theater strategic end states for Africa: 

• To enable African countries to provide their own security and contribute 

to security on the continent; 

• To assist African countries maintain professional militaries that respond 

to civilian authorities, respect the rule of law and abide by international 

human rights norms. 

In addition to training with partners throughout Africa, ACOTA is being used to 

develop National Peace Mission Training Centers (PMTCs). This investment in 

training centers will allow our partners to develop the capacity to generate their 

own peacekeeping units, and eventually develop the ability to sustain those forces 

when deployed. 

AFRICOM coordinates closely with the Department of State (DOS) as ACOTA 

partners are identified and looks for ways to supplement ACOTA training with uniformed U.S. military servicemembers. Much of ACOTA’s equipping programs are coordinated through AFRICOM’s Offices of Security Cooperation. 

22. Senator BURRIS. General Ward, what countries are prime candidates for a successful Security Sector Reform (SSR) program? 

General WARD. DOS has the lead for SSR. A successful SSR requires a comprehensive analysis and approach. U.S. AFRICOM, in cooperation with the DOS, examines countries for the attributes that may lead to successful SSR and Defense 

Sector Reform (DSR) efforts. 

Those attributes include, but are not limited to: (1) the country is of strategic importance to the United States; (2) the country in question is committed to reform 

and is ready to take ownership of reform programs with which the U.S. and other 

partners will assist; (3) the level of resources required to conduct SSR/DSR can be 

met by the recipient and donor nations; (4) the recipient is also making improvements in other sectors of the government necessary for successful SSR/DSR such as 

the justice sector and interior ministry; (5) the potential recipient has the ability 

to sustain reforms in the future. 

We are pleased with the progress in Armed Forces of Liberia given the level of 

U.S. Government investment there, but remained concerned about other elements 

of the Liberia’s security sector such as its police forces and its inability to secure 

its maritime domain. Our collaborative efforts, with the State Department may well 

be a model for SSR efforts of similar scale elsewhere on the continent. AFRICOM’s 

Defense Sector Reform effort with Liberia, Operation Onward Liberty, provides experienced military mentors to the nascent Armed Forces of Liberia. We’re also working to help develop a Liberian Coast Guard that will enhance maritime domain 

awareness to address illicit trafficking while providing maritime security and safety. 

The Secretary’s Defense Institution Reform Initiative is assessing the requirement 

for ministerial-level reform efforts and is equipped to provide skilled mentors if necessary. Taken as a whole, the successes we’ve realized in Liberia is a result of a 

whole-of-government approach with a willing partner. 

However, in some cases we may be directed to initiate limited SSR activities in 

environments where our prospects of success may be less certain, such as Southern 

Sudan and Somalia. AFRICOM will continue to provide our best military advice and 

support to all SSR efforts in which we participate. 

640 

23. Senator BURRIS. General Ward, what are some examples where the militaryto-military engagement has led to enhancing the professionalism of any of the African partner nations? 

General WARD. Support to the Ethiopian Defense Command and Staff College 

(EDCSC) has been one of the U.S. Government’s most successful security engagement programs in Ethiopia, allowing U.S. military daily access to and influence over 

future ENDF leaders. The U.S. provides three O–5 instructors to the EDCSC via 

the Foreign Military Financing program. In an attempt to increase Ethiopian ownership, these U.S. officers are assuming an advisory role to Ethiopian instructors and 

our presence will scale back to two senior assistants to the Commandant in fiscal 

year 2011 and one senior assistant to the Commandant in fiscal year 2012. 

U.S. AFRICOM supports efforts to improve the capabilities of the Sudan People’s 

Liberation Army (SPLA) in accordance with the U.S. Strategy for Sudan. Through 

AFRICOM’s Military Advisor to the SPLA and Security Assistance Program Manager in Juba, the Command conducts mil-to-mil events, Counterterrorism Fellowship-funded seminars, International Military Education and Training (IMET) 

courses and mentor/advisor training. Cross-functional military familiarization 

events with the SPLA have been conducted on a variety of topics to include: border/ 

riverine security; military intelligence; HIV/AIDS programs and stockpile management. Additionally, Noncommissioned Officer (NCO) development is one area of 

focus for the Command. CJTF–HOA currently has eight NCOs deployed to the NCO 

Academy in Mapel, Southern Sudan for 1 year to assist in training and mentoring 

the SPLA instructors. 

In fiscal year 2009, U.S. AFRICOM engaged over 800 African military intelligence 

partners in a variety of seminars, familiarizations, and conferences designed to instill military intelligence professionalism and further enhance bilateral relationships. This investment in training and capacity building will pay dividends as these 

graduates begin to assume key positions in partner country military units. In fiscal 

year 2010, U.S. AFRICOM expects to reach approximately 1,500 military intelligence participants in these events. 

• U.S. AFRICOM has trained 106 African partners in the Military Intelligence Basic Officers Course and 42 in the Military Intelligence Professionals Course. 

24. Senator BURRIS. General Ward, what is the future role of Joint Task ForceHorn of Africa (JTF–HOA) and the military base in Djibouti? 

General WARD. [Deleted.] 

25. Senator BURRIS. General Ward, are there any plans to have a greater presence 

in your AOR, beyond JTF–HOA? 

General WARD. [Deleted.] 

ROLE AS JOINT FORCE PROVIDER

26. Senator BURRIS. General Mattis, your role as the Joint Force Provider makes 

you responsible for providing forces to all commands and agencies in the Department of Defense (DOD) and other Government agencies throughout the world. What 

are the challenges you face meeting the requests in a timely fashion? 

General MATTIS. During fiscal year 2010, JFCOM identified and assigned over 

480,000 personnel to fulfill Combatant Commander (CCDR) requirements. These 

480,000 personnel represent over 90 percent of the overall CCDR requests. The 

main challenge is fulfilling the final 10 percent of CCDR requirements. 

Shortfalls fall into one of four general areas: lack of capability, lack of inventory, 

policy restriction, or lack of process architecture. When JFCOM receives a request 

for a capability that does not exist, units may be temporarily converted from one 

core mission to fill another. An example might be tasking an artillery unit to fill 

a CCDR requirement for a security forces unit. Units temporarily converted along 

these lines are designated ‘‘In-Lieu-Of ‘‘(ILO) sourcing solutions. In some situations, 

JFCOM builds new units from the ground up by moving individual personnel from 

several standing units to form a new ‘unit’ to meet CCDR requirements. These are 

designated ‘‘Ad Hoc’’ units. Sourcing CCDR requirements using either ILO or Ad 

Hoc units requires time and training to ensure the unit has the ability to accomplish the desired mission. JFCOM also participates in a force sufficiency process to 

address requirements for cases where a capability exists, but in insufficient numbers to satisfy overall CCDR demand. 

Department and personnel policy sometimes constrains force providing. DOD and 

Service personnel deployment policies exist to maintain the long-term morale, 

641 

health, and welfare of the force, while others exist to ensure undue hardship is not 

placed on the force or that personnel or equipment are not unnecessarily placed at 

risk. Examples of policies impacting force-providing include: Boots on the Ground 

(BOG) limits (limitations on deployment duration) and dwell requirements (minimum time at home between deployments). These policies can constrain the force 

supply to meet CCDR demand for forces, but these policy restrictions also ensure 

that short term requirements do not supersede the maintenance and long term 

health of the force requirements. 

Though improvements have been made, the processes and technical capabilities 

required for force management continue to challenge the force providing mission. 

Since being assigned the mission, JFCOM has established a Force Management Integration Project (FMIP) Team to develop and execute a plan to integrate and synchronize policy, processes, authoritative databases and technology affecting Joint 

Force sourcing and Global Force Management (GFM). While challenges will inevitably continue to arise, the improving processes, policies and technical capabilities 

working together are producing a robust global force management capability for the 

Department. 

27. Senator BURRIS. General Mattis, what other Government agencies, other than 

the military, do you provide forces to? 

General MATTIS. While JFCOM provides forces to Geographic Combatant Commanders, many of those forces support other Government agencies while under the 

operational control of a CCDR. As an example, JFCOM provides forces to 

USNORTHCOM for their use in direct support of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). JFCOM 

provided forces to USSOUTHCOM for their use in direct support of USAID in Haiti 

following the earthquake. JFCOM does not provide forces directly to other Government agencies, but forces provided to CCDRs do perform missions in direct support 

of other agency missions. 

JOINT QUALIFIED SERVICES

28. Senator BURRIS. General Mattis, what percentage of the Military Services are 

joint qualified? 

General MATTIS. USD P&R is responsible for the policy of Joint Officer Management and the Joint Staff J1 is involved in tracking joint qualified officers. JFCOM 

does not track the numbers of joint qualified members across the Services. I have 

passed your question to the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness. A copy of my letter to him is next under. 

29. Senator BURRIS. General Mattis, if there are disparities in the joint education 

opportunities between Active and Reserve component forces, what are they? 

General MATTIS. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Services can 

probably provide a more thorough response as they control all phases of Joint Professional Military Education. Steps have been taken to increase the opportunities 

for members of the Reserve Component (RC) to receive joint education. Advanced 

Joint Professional Military Education (AJPME) is a RC course taught at Joint 

Forces Staff College (JFSC) that is similar in content to the in-residence JFSC 

JPME Phase II course. It is only offered to RC officers. As a pre-requisite AJPME 

students must have completed JPME Phase I. The subsequent AJPME course then 

builds upon the foundation established in JPME Phase I. It prepares RC officers (O– 

4 to O–6) for joint duty assignments. RC officers may complete AJPME in lieu of 

JPME Phase II. In addition to AJPME, RC officers are still provided quotas in the 

JPME Phase II course. 

MISSION READINESS EXERCISES

30. Senator BURRIS. General Mattis, how are mission readiness exercises valueadded to deploying commanders and staffs? 

General MATTIS. JFCOM’s mission rehearsal exercise (MRX) program addresses 

the mission-essential training requirements for commanders and staffs deploying to 

Afghanistan, Iraq and the Horn of Africa. JFCOM is partnered with ISAF, USF– 

I and AFRICOM in designing, planning, and executing each MRX event to ensure 

MRX training reinforces existing theater policies and guidance. The formal and informal feedback from training audiences indicates a high level of satisfaction with 

the MRXs. 

642 

JFCOM’s forward deployed support elements, Joint Center for Operational Analysis (JCOA) teams, Joint Enabling Capability Command elements, and Deployable 

Training Teams all undergird the MRX program with timely training requirement 

feedback. When enemy tactics and techniques shift, or theater Commander policies 

or command and staff processes and procedures change, JFCOM captures these insights and lessons learned through persistent interfaces. For example, during the 

recent MRX at Fort Campbell for the 101st ABN (AASLT) Division, MRX planners 

dynamically introduced vignettes that drove the commander and staff to work 

through ISAF Commander’s most recent night raid directive, which was published 

2 days prior to start of the MRX. 

The Afghanistan training community of interest (COI) meets biweekly and is comprised of participants from across the Joint Training Enterprise. The COI provides 

the latest updates and training recommendations for troops deploying into theater 

during these sessions. COI issues such as reduction of civilian casualties, escalation/ 

de-escalation of force and rules of engagement have been incorporated into the MRX 

program. JFCOM is currently working with ISAF planners to ensure the latest 

guidance regarding development and leverage of the Afghanistan Mission Network 

is being built into the MRX program. This will ensure commanders and staffs, and 

subordinate units and their equipment are properly set and aligned during pre-deployment training for theater specific C4I interoperability requirements. 

MRXs are conducted in partnership with DOD, U.S. Government, and multi-national partners to continuously exchange and incorporate theater lessons learned 

and training requirements. During the most recent MRX for the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), the commander and staff were able to work with the actual 

French and Polish Brigades who will be joining them in theater, and also with the 

Afghanistan Army Brigade Commanders and staffs who will operate in their sector. 

Also personnel from over 30 different agencies participated in the mission rehearsal. 

MULTI-NATIONAL COLLABORATION

31. Senator BURRIS. General Mattis, what is your role in providing multi-national 

collaboration to NATO and non-NATO nations? 

General MATTIS. The multi-national program at JFCOM fulfills the command’s 

Unified Command Plan responsibility to support multi-national integration of joint 

training, concept development and experimentation, and capability development. 

JFCOM provides a joint context for multi-national collaboration. JFCOM’s geographic co-location with NATO’s Allied Command Transformation (ACT) in Norfolk, 

VA, continues to facilitate opportunities for JFCOM to be actively engaged with 

NATO’s training, experimentation, and capability development efforts. 

In addition to NATO, JFCOM’s current multi-national program consists of bilateral agreements with 19 partner nations represented by 29 liaison and exchange officers. Another 14 nations have requested partnership with JFCOM. Their agreements are in various stages of review. These agreements forge military-to-military 

relationships that create greater opportunities for training, concept development 

and experimentation, and capability development, all within a joint context provided 

by JFCOM. These agreements also build operational interoperability with foreign 

militaries and trust. 

JOINT TRAINING

32. Senator BURRIS. General Mattis, I understand that in order to train a joint 

warrior, joint education and training has to be a core competency for the command. 

What technology and tools are you employing to better facilitate joint training? 

General MATTIS. Primarily, communications technology enables JFCOM to conduct training in a distributed manner by moving data instead of people, thus saving 

cost and time. The Joint Training and Experimentation Network (JTEN) is a communications technology tool that provides persistent long-haul network connectivity 

for the following types of joint training information: scenario data, live-range data, 

Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance data, exercise control information, voice communications (operational 

and exercise control), video teleconferencing (VTC), e-mail, and after-action reporting data. Opposing force technology ensures enemy forces are accurately replicated 

and portrayed in training. Modeling and Simulation (M&S) technology enables 

JFCOM to integrate joint enablers into joint training to overcome constraints of 

time, distance, and resource availability. JFCOM also relies on M&S to support the 

joint warfighter in the areas of testing, training, and experimentation. 

643 

JFCOM fields, maintains and continuously enhances the Joint Knowledge Online 

(JKO) distance learning capability to provide online training for U.S. and multi-national command, interagency, and intergovernmental partner personnel preparing 

for joint operations. Online training courses and curriculums are tailored to areas 

of deployment including Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Horn of Africa. The combatant 

commands and other stakeholders are also actively engaged in shaping JKO to meet 

their ongoing operational training needs. Recently, JFCOM introduced a targeted 

culture awareness training application utilizing immersive, media-rich training 

technologies. Also in development is a cultural trainer for Afghanistan. This webbased, game-based system trains language translation in the context of specific mission scenarios, each of which were identified by subject matter experts with direct 

experience in the respective region. 

33. Senator BURRIS. General Mattis, is there a timeline for getting military personnel joint trained? If so, what is that timeline? 

General MATTIS. The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, 

the Services, and Joint Staff J1 maintain and monitor the Joint Officer Management Program. This program provides guidance on the timing of officers meeting 

gates and criteria to attain different levels of joint qualification, which includes 

training and education. 

For the past decade, JFCOM has supported senior leader education in the form 

of Operations Modules for the NDU-sponsored Capstone, Keystone, and Pinnacle 

programs. While these programs and other forms of Joint Professional Military Education address officer development, JFCOM sees a growing requirement for joint 

skills and competencies at ever lower tactical echelons, requiring Service personnel 

to receive joint training earlier in their careers and at lower ranks. 

There is no single, all encompassing timeline for getting joint training to all levels 

of military personnel, nor is there a mechanism to displace critical Service training 

requirements with joint training requirements. Any timelines for training are driven 

by deployment schedules as well as the throughput capacity of training centers and 

schools. JFCOM is working to identify that specific joint knowledge, and those skills 

and abilities that are required at lower Service echelons and are developing tailored 

methods to ensure that the appropriate personnel receive required joint training. 

Depending on the nature of the required skills and the specific audience that requires training, this individual training may be accomplished through distributed 

training employing our Joint Knowledge Online (JKO) courses, through support to 

Service training programs leveraging the Joint National Training capability, or 

through the mission rehearsal exercise program and support to the Combatant Command exercise program. 

EXPEDITIONARY CIVILIAN FORCE

34. Senator BURRIS. General Mattis, you have completed draft doctrine, education, 

and employment principles for interagency operations and integration. One of your 

working concepts is to stand up an Expeditionary Civilian Force. What is the mission and employment of the Expeditionary Civilian Force? 

General MATTIS. The DOD Civilian Expeditionary Workforce (CEW) is a program 

implemented and administered by the OSD. The purpose/mission of the program is 

to establish a DOD civilian workforce that is organized, trained, and equipped to 

ensure their readiness to deploy in support of Department of Defense contingency 

operations including emergency operations, humanitarian missions, disaster relief, 

restoration of order, drug interdiction and stability operations. CEW has provided 

a useful pool of willing professionals to JFCOM force providers to satisfy some 

CCDR requirements. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN

BUILDING PARTNERSHIP CAPACITY

35. Senator MCCAIN. General Ward, with respect to the interagency or legislation, 

what is the greatest obstacle your command faces in building partnership capacity 

on the continent? 

General WARD. Our greatest obstacle is, in a word, responsiveness. When our African partners request training, assistance or material from AFRICOM, with the exception of natural disaster and/or humanitarian crises, we are unable to respond in 

a timely manner. 

644 

In many cases, our African partners’ governmental institutions have not developed to the point where planning for an exercise or engagement at a relatively distant point in the future is a simple matter. Often, when we receive assistance requests from our partners, they desire to engage with us in the near term-in a matter of weeks, or only as far out as several months from the request. Planning a year 

or more in advance is generally not possible for many of our partners due to financial instability or other reasons. The U.S. Government mechanisms currently in 

place to provide funding and/or authority for security cooperation activities are not 

responsive or flexible enough to meet partner nation’s time-lines. In addition, 

AFRICOM does not yet have immediate access to assigned or rotationally allocated 

forces, and is required to use DOD’s global force management/request for forces system, which requires long lead times. As global demand for forces eases in the coming years, we believe the Command will see improvement in its ability to access responsive forces. For example, the U.S. Marine Corps is working to provide the command a special purpose task force to carry out the command’s steady state activities 

on the continent. The U.S. Army is likewise seeking to identify BCTs to routinely 

make available for security force assistance. 

The Combatant Commander’s Initiative Fund is our most responsive funding 

source; however, it is extremely limited in funding and overall flexibility. Other frequently used options are Section 1206 funding, which may require a full year from 

request to execution, and Title 22 programs, such as Foreign Military Finance and 

International Military Education and Training (IMET), which may require 2 or 

more years from request to execution. 

AFRICOM’s inability to respond quickly to partner needs may increase risk to enhance the capacity of our partner nations and organizations in Africa. We are working closely with the Joint Staff, OSD, and our partners in DOS to develop solutions 

to these challenges. 

36. Senator MCCAIN. General Ward, over the past decade, the African Union has 

taken on several difficult missions (e.g. Sudan, Somalia, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo). Given the demands on U.S. troops, how will AFRICOM enhance 

its partnerships and build greater professionalism among the continent’s militaries? 

General WARD. AFRICOM has several title 10- and 22-funded tools at its disposal 

to build professionalism and enhance partnerships. 

• The DOS funded Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance 

(ACOTA) is an extremely important engagement tool for building military 

capacity and professionalism and for developing forces capable of conducting successful peacekeeping efforts. We partner with DOS to the extent 

possible in implementing ACOTA. 

• We will build partner capacity through the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program, which trains foreign military personnel at U.S. facilities. Approximately 900 military and civilian students 

from 44 African countries received education and training in the United 

States or their own countries valued at $19.8 million. It remains the premier program in building professionalism over the long term. 

• Additionally, we will select carefully and assist African partners to train 

and mentor other African militaries. 

• We provide partner nations with the opportunity to participate in the Africa Partnership Station (APS) and the Africa Maritime Law Enforcement 

Partnership (AMLEP)-key programs aimed at developing the capabilities of 

coastal forces. 

• We have expanded the National Guard State Partnership Program to 

eight African countries, a program that builds habitual relationships over 

a sustained period while delivering broad capacity building programs. 

• We also conduct a vigorous series of exercises that have continued to 

grow in magnitude. These programs build the capacity of the participants, 

improve our partnerships, and enhance partner activities between participating African states as well. 

• Additionally, our military-to-military engagement program was funded at 

less than $500,000 in fiscal year 2004, but has now expanded to $6.3 million for fiscal year 2010 with 431 events planned in 40 countries. This program assists partners in improving deployment procedures, logistics systems, maintenance operations, force protection, and the conduct of their 

own training. 

• U.S. AFRICOM addresses African intelligence capability challenges 

through bilateral and regional training, emphasizing respect for the rule of 

law and civilian authority. 

645 

RESOURCES AND FORCES

37. Senator MCCAIN. General Ward, with personnel primarily located in Germany 

and Djibouti, are you comfortable with AFRICOM’s ability to execute a noncombatant evacuation operation anywhere on the continent? 

General WARD. A successful noncombatant evacuation operation (NEO) requires 

a well-trained combatant command staff, defined and rehearsed procedures that 

have been coordinated with U.S. embassies, and the forces necessary to carry out 

the actual operation on the ground. The Command has developed the staff skills required, and has developed a NEO plan. Two of the Command’s Service components—Naval Forces Africa and U.S. Army Africa—are capable, with some augmentation, of successfully directing Noncombatant Evacuation Operations in our 

AOR. Finally, while U.S. AFRICOM has not been assigned dedicated forces, in the 

event of a NEO the Department of Defense would make the required forces immediately available to the Command. 

38. Senator MCCAIN. General Ward, are your component commands adequately 

staffed and resourced to execute AFRICOM’s mission? 

General WARD. The Services’ efforts to staff our Service components appropriately 

continues. For example, the U.S. Army has designated U.S. Army Africa as an Army 

Service component and is working to round out the manning. Both the U.S. Marine 

Corps and the U.S. Army are seeking to have security force capacity building assets 

routinely identified in support of AFRICOM. The U.S. Navy’s commitment in support of the Africa Partnership Station program remains firm. The U.S. Air Force has 

methodically supported U.S. Air Forces Africa requirements in resourcing the 17th 

Air Force and associated air operations requirements. Given global demands for 

forces, the Services are also doing their best to support requests for forces required 

to carry out our theater security cooperation activities and our named operations. 

Combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa is adequately staffed to conduct its assigned missions. 

U.S. ARMY POSTURE IN EUROPE

39. Senator MCCAIN. Admiral Stavridis, the 2009 QDR recommends keeping four 

U.S. Army BCTs in Europe, pending the review of NATO’s Strategic Concept and 

an accompanying U.S. assessment of our European defense posture. This recommendation is a change from the 2003 Integrated Global Posture Review, which 

called for most Europe-based BCTs return to the United States, leaving two BCTS 

in Europe—one in Germany and one in Italy. If a decision is made to keep two additional BCTs in Europe, where will they be stationed? 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. The two brigades in question are the 170th Infantry Brigade, 

currently home stationed in Baumholder, Germany, and the 172nd Infantry Brigade 

which will be consolidated in Grafenwoehr, Germany, by the end of this year. If they 

are permanently retained, they will remain stationed at these locations. Both of 

these installations contain excellent training ranges and maneuver areas. 

40. Senator MCCAIN. Admiral Stavridis, regarding the review of NATO’s Strategic 

Concept, to what degree will Army BCTs in Europe support NATO missions and 

qualify for funding support under the NATO Security Investment Program? 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Ground forces in Europe will continue to support NATO as 

part of any Article V action. Additionally, forces assigned to EUCOM are part of the 

global force pool and will deploy as ordered to support any global requirement as 

determined by the department’s global force management process, which includes 

such operations as those under the ISAF. Furthermore, U.S. Army Europe forces located in Europe in between their out-of-area deployments are available for training 

and security cooperation events with our NATO allies and aspiring NATO members; 

these activities are part of the Building Partner Capacity priority for EUCOM, and 

encourage the development of NATO partners to increase capability and capacity for 

expeditionary operations in support of global security strategies. 

To be eligible for funding support under the NATO Security Investment Program, 

requirements must be linked to an approved NATO capability package. Requirements supporting Army BCTs in Europe cannot be readily linked to any existing 

capability packages. NATO’s evolving role in out of area operations and the ongoing 

review of the NATO Strategic Concept may present an opportunity for development 

of new or revised capability packages that open the door to NATO funding of Army 

BCT requirements. 

646 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JEFF SESSIONS

EUROPEAN MISSILE DEFENSE

41. Senator SESSIONS. Admiral Stavridis, the Phased Adaptive Approach to missile defense in Europe calls for fielding land-based SM–3 Block IB missiles in Europe starting in 2015. Is the IB missile on schedule, and have you identified the 

two countries that will host its deployment in 2015? 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Yes. The SM–3 Blk IB development and testing remain on 

schedule. The first flight test, Flight Test Maritime-16, is scheduled for the second 

quarter of fiscal year 2011. 

EUCOM is in full support of DOS-led efforts to conclude the negotiations and appropriate basing agreements with Host Nations. Romania and Poland are the initial 

intended host countries for European Aegis Ashore with land-based SM–3 capability. 

42. Senator SESSIONS. Admiral Stavridis, last year Secretary Gates testified that 

the two-stage Ground-Based Interceptor (GBI) will continue development as a hedge 

against technical difficulties with the SM–3 Block IIA and IIB missiles. Is this still 

the plan? 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Any decision to shift from or change the Phased Adaptive Approach strategy to include elements of the previous European missile defense strategy would be done through close consultation and coordination between the NSC, 

DOD, DOS, and DNI and executed by the Missile Defense Agency. 

EUCOM recommends that questions pertaining to two-stage GBI capabilities and 

the associated development schedule milestones be forwarded to the Missile Defense 

Agency. 

43. Senator SESSIONS. Admiral Stavridis, how and when would we know that it 

is necessary to substitute the two-stage GBI for the SM–3 Block II missile? 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Any decision to shift from or change the Phased Adaptive Approach strategy to include elements from the previous European missile defense 

strategy would be done through close consultation and coordination between the 

NSC, DOD, DOS, and DNI and executed by the Missile Defense Agency. Such a decision would only be precipitated due to a revised assessment of Iranian ICBM missile capability and development timeline. 

44. Senator SESSIONS. Admiral Stavridis, what has been Russia’s reaction to the 

new missile defense plans for Europe? 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. While initially somewhat better than the reactions to the previous plan, the current reaction from the Russian Government has been one of suspicion. 

Russian representatives have stated that in their view the threat that a rogue 

may attack is largely theoretical. In their analysis, therefore, the United States and 

Europe must have ulterior motives. This view, taken in conjunction with Russia’s 

heavy reliance on its aging nuclear missile force, casts some light on their negative 

reactions. 

As an example, in Russia’s new military doctrine, strategic missile defense will 

‘‘undermine global stability and destroy the balance of power in the nuclear missile 

sphere.’’ 

45. Senator SESSIONS. Admiral Stavridis, I’ve seen press reports that Russia may 

now be concerned that the SM–3 Block II missile may be a threat to their strategic 

forces and that Russia will seek to limit its deployment in the ongoing Strategic 

Arms Reduction Treaty (START) follow-on negotiations. What can you tell me? 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Boris Gryzlov, Speaker of Russia’s Lower House of Parliament, has said that the new treaty would have to contain tough language linking 

the need to limit defensive weapons with any reductions of offensive missiles. ‘‘Without that, there is no chance the treaty will be ratified in the Duma.’’ 

Keeping that in mind, EUCOM will act in accordance with President Obama’s 

Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR) (www.defense.gov/bmdr) which states the 

United States will: 

‘‘Conduct a substantive and sustained dialogue with Russia on all dimensions of the missile defense issue. However, the United States will not negotiate restraints on U.S. BMD capabilities.’’ 

The BMDR also states that the Ground-based Midcourse Defense system does not 

have the capacity to cope with large scale Russian missile attacks and is not intended to affect the strategic balance with Russia. 

647 

46. Senator SESSIONS. Admiral Stavridis, the administration’s new approach to 

missile defense in Europe hopes to solicit allied participation. We are hearing, however, that NATO is facing a funding crisis due to the operational demands related 

to Afghanistan. How likely is it that we can expect European contributions to the 

defense of their territory against medium- and long-range ballistic missiles? 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. The Alliance recognizes that ballistic missile proliferation 

poses a significant threat to the Allies. NATO believes that Missile Defense plays 

an important role for the Alliance as part of a broader response to counter this 

threat. NATO has welcomed the new Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA) introduced 

by the United States and is exploring the potential for linking its systems to those 

of the United States. 

EUCOM is cautiously optimistic that NATO will accept territorial BMD as a valid 

mission during the November NATO Summit in Lisbon, Portugal. Such a decision 

would represent the political will required by NATO militaries and the first step in 

gaining traction for NATO commitment. It should be noted however, that European 

contributions are already taking place outside of NATO. Poland and Romania have 

offered to host land-based SM–3 capabilities. EUCOM is in full support of the DOSled efforts to negotiate the necessary agreements with these important allies. 

MISSILE DEFENSE AND FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION

47. Senator SESSIONS. Admiral Stavridis, it was reported by the Information Telegraph Agency of Russia on February 15 that Under Secretary of State Ellen 

Tauscher told journalists that the United States has no plans to deploy missile defense elements in the Black Sea, to include Aegis ships and sea-based missile defense components. The Aegis ballistic missile defense (BMD) capability is currently 

installed on 4 cruisers and 16 destroyers. All Arleigh Burke class destroyers and 

nine of the Ticonderoga Class cruisers are planned to receive BMD capability—a 

significant portion of our cruiser and destroyer fleet. 

Aegis class ships have sailed into the Black Sea seven times over the past 5 

years—the last such deployment occurring in July 2009. Ms. Tauscher’s comments 

are disturbing because it would seem to indicate a new policy to restrict U.S. Aegis 

ship deployments into the Black Sea—presumably in response to Russian missile 

defense concerns. Are there any restrictions in deploying U.S. Aegis class destroyers 

and cruisers into the Black Sea? 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. EUCOM and the U.S. Embassy in Ankara, Turkey are unaware of any policy decision to ‘prevent’ the deployment of Aegis equipped vessels 

from deploying to the Black Sea. 

48. Senator SESSIONS. Admiral Stavridis, are you aware of any plans to change 

this policy? 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. EUCOM is not aware of any policy changes as to restricting 

Aegis BMD ships from the Black Sea in response to Russian missile defense concerns. 

49. Senator SESSIONS. Admiral Stavridis, is it important that the United States 

maintains the right to transit ships, including Aegis class ships, into the Black Sea? 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. Freedom of Navigation is one of the pillars of U.S. maritime 

policy. 

The only statutory or policy limit on the deployment of U.S. naval forces to the 

Black Sea is the Montreux Convention, which has been in force since 1936. This 

Convention has played an essential role in maintaining stability in the Black Sea, 

particularly throughout the period of the Cold War. It is the policy of the United 

States to support the Montreux Convention. The Convention, while it assures the 

free transit of safe commercial shipping, sets some limits on the ability of non-Black 

Sea states to deploy naval forces in the Black Sea. These limits do not prevent the 

transit of Aegis-equipped vessels to the Black Sea, but they limit the maximum tonnage of warships which are part of the fleets of non-Black Sea states. None of the 

U.S. Navy ships equipped with Aegis exceed this tonnage limit. 

AFGHANISTAN-LOCAL DEFENSE INITIATIVES

50. Senator SESSIONS. Admiral Stavridis, I think we would all agree that the 

Anbar Awakening during the Iraq war was a great success and signaled the beginning of stabilization in that troubled theater. A Washington Post article that appeared on January 22 highlights CENTCOM’s use of local defense initiatives (LDIs) 

to similarly train local militias as security forces to bridge the gap until more AfVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:37 May 06, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00653 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\62155.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
648 

ghan army and police forces can be trained. Recent estimates imply that 32,000 soldiers need to be added over the next 10 months in order to meet the stated goal 

of 134,000 troops by the end of the year. While not all lessons from the Iraq war 

can be applied to Afghanistan, former Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf recently wrote, ‘‘Afghanistan for centuries has been governed loosely through a social 

covenant between all the ethnic groups, under a sovereign king. This structure is 

needed again to bring peace and harmony.’’ Would you agree that this program will 

spread coalition influence into remote regions and bridge the gap until we can recruit and train adequate Afghan army and police forces? 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. [Deleted.] 

51. Senator SESSIONS. Admiral Stavridis, do you think the Afghani Government 

can be persuaded to support this program or is this something that will have to be 

implemented independently? 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. [Deleted.] 

52. Senator SESSIONS. Admiral Stavridis, what is your opinion on our ability to 

adequately screen militia candidates for this program to ensure that we are not 

training the wrong folks? 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. [Deleted.] 

53. Senator SESSIONS. Admiral Stavridis, the Post article addressed differences 

between DOD and DOS concerning implementation timeline. General McChrystal 

has already implemented this program on a small scale using existing funding. In 

order to fully implement, Ambassador Eikenberry must release additional funds. 

How are existing Commander’s Emergency Response Program funds being used to 

support this program and are these funds adequate to fully implement LDIs? 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. [Deleted.] 

54. Senator SESSIONS. Admiral Stavridis, what support is needed from DOS and 

what is DOD doing to resolve these differences in a timely manner? 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. [Deleted.] 

AFGHANISTAN-CLOSE AIR SUPPORT

55. Senator SESSIONS. Admiral Stavridis, an article in the Atlanta Journal from 

last weekend talked about a change in policy concerning limiting night raids by coalition forces. This follows on the heels of a decision to also limit airstrikes in the 

Afghan theater. While I understand the sensitivities over collateral damage resulting from airstrikes and local population concerns over the use of night raids, I am 

concerned that policies that limit the use of force prevent us from supporting our 

troops in contact with the enemy. Will either of these policies prevent us from responding when our troops are in direct contact with the enemy? 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. The new policies described above in no way prevent us from 

responding when our troops are in direct combat with the enemy. Under the rules 

of engagement troops retain their inherent right of self-defense at all times and may 

defend themselves against hostile acts and they may defend themselves from individuals or groups demonstrating hostile intent. 

The Tactical Directive does not completely prohibit the use of combined arms support for our troops. The restrictions on combined arms support only apply against 

residential compounds inhabited by civilians and only then under limited circumstances. The Night Raids Tactical Directive has no practical effect of limiting 

force in self-defense. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR ROGER F. WICKER

ANGOLA

56. Senator WICKER. General Ward, Angola’s oil exports have been growing at a 

fast pace. The exports have grown so large that Angola has even overtaken Saudi 

Arabia and Iran to become China’s biggest oil supplier. How is Angola’s sporadic 

economic growth affecting the politics in sub-Sahara Africa? 

General WARD. [Deleted.] 

57. Senator WICKER. General Ward, with this growth tied so closely with Angola’s 

debt to China, what are the political and security implications of China in Africa? 

General WARD. [Deleted.] 

649 

FRANCE AND NATO

58. Senator WICKER. Admiral Stavridis, last year, France made the historic motion to rejoin NATO. France also has one of the largest military budgets in the 

world. In July 2008, France embarked on an in-depth overhaul of its security and 

defense strategy. This strategy has it building up the force, with a more expeditionary strategy, and integrating more with Europe. Some advocate for the European Union to become an organization that is a major player in international security and is an organization not led by the United States. As France grows as a security leader in Europe, urging countries to be more involved in European security, 

does this come at the detriment to NATO’s strength? 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. No, European countries generally depend on the primacy of 

NATO for their security. Resources committed to European defense institutions do 

not necessarily have to come at a cost to NATO. 

A complementary capability on the part of the Europeans generally and the 

French specifically may allow for greater geopolitical burden-sharing that does not 

cost the U.S. taxpayer although it benefits U.S. security. While NATO can offer high 

level force projection capability, the EU can fill gaps in areas of policy where the 

NATO and the U.S. may not be interested or willing to operate. 

As an example, France participates in European defense institutions that provide 

stability in areas of interest to NATO and the U.S. (Balkans) as well as in areas 

that may be less accessible to NATO or the U.S. (Democratic Republic of Congo). 

Operation Althea in Bosnia Herzegovina, launched December 2004, has seen the EU 

deploy 7,000 personnel and still acts within its peace enforcement mandate supporting the Dayton/Paris Peace agreement today. When Europeans are able to provide their own security in their own backyard on their own terms, we all benefit. 

In Kosovo today, allies provide 8,800 of the 10,000 troops there. A second large military operation, the first EU military mission outside of Europe, was Operation 

Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo, involving about 1,500 personnel and 

led by France. Certainly, the U.S. and NATO cannot provide coverage for all of Africa, but where Europeans are able to operate and provide coverage, the United 

States can benefit. 

59. Senator WICKER. Admiral Stavridis, will France’s efforts to increase their own 

national defense challenge NATO’s relevance? 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. No. France is a full and active member of NATO. If France 

is successful in restructuring its national defense posture and increasing its expeditionary capabilities, it becomes a more effective and valuable member of the alliance. The United States should welcome all efforts of any member to meet the 

NATO national defense expenditure goals. A capable NATO is a relevant NATO. 

60. Senator WICKER. Admiral Stavridis, in your professional opinion, does France 

want to create a European Union-centric security force? 

Admiral STAVRIDIS. France has been a driving force behind EUROCORPS and 

supports the Common Security and Defense Policy of the EU. It currently hosts the 

EUROCORPS headquarters in Strasbourg, France. EUROCORPS is not an EU Defense organization, but is the closest thing to it composed of five framework nations 

of France, Belgium, Germany, Spain, and Luxembourg. 

The important takeaway, though, is that an EU-centric security force can support 

U.S. and NATO security goals. EUROCORPS will deploy in 2012 to Afghanistan in 

support of ISAF. There have been no indications that France is forming military 

units and capabilities that can only support EUROCORPS and not NATO missions. 

In the future, EUROCORPS may be deployed to out-of-area operations where the 

United States might not have an abiding interest to contribute forces through a 

NATO mission, but where the United States would nonetheless benefit from and 

welcome security and stability. 

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY SENATOR DAVID VITTER

61. Senator VITTER. General Ward, please provide me with an update on 

AFRICOM integration with non-defense U.S. actors such as DOS and the U.S. 

Agency for International Development (USAID). In this update, please provide an 

assessment of DOS and USAID capabilities in regards to their stability operations 

role in Africa. 

General WARD. Interagency personnel, DOS and USAID in particular, are integrated into U.S. AFRICOM’s staff through multiple mechanisms—in particular 

through having interagency personnel on the Command and their regular communication and coordination with their home agencies. We have developed strong relaVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:37 May 06, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00655 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\62155.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
650 

tionships with these agencies, and we continue to seek ways to improve them. We 

coordinate our activities with DOS to ensure our actions are complementary to 

broader U.S. Government efforts. Our assigned interagency experts play a vital role 

in informing our activities and plans, and as a result, our planning efforts are better 

advised and more effective. 

• As of 15 January 2010, there were 27 interagency personnel integrated 

across the command in long-term assignments. Currently, the Deputy Secretary of Defense has requested an additional 33 personnel from other U.S. 

Government departments and agencies be assigned to the command. 

• Five members are Senior Executive, or Senior Foreign Service personnel 

with strategic decisionmaking roles. 

• The remaining 22 personnel are GS15 equivalent or junior personnel, and 

are embedded within the headquarters planning staff. 

• Currently, there are 15 interagency personnel assigned to the command 

for temporary assignments related to specific planning events. 

• Additionally, we have had a significant number of personnel on temporary duty from other agencies over the last 2 years. These personnel 

come by invitation or voluntarily to determine how they can best work in 

the command. 

Concerning operations, our interagency partnerships have made significant contributions that otherwise would have not been possible: 

• The AMLEP Operation, employing a U.S. Coast Guard cutter with members of Sierra Leone’s armed forces, conducted the first successful seizure 

by Sierra Leone of a vessel operating illegally in the country’s waters. 

• The command’s U.S. Treasury Department Advisor from the Office of 

Terrorism and Financial Intelligence coordinated and developed counterterrorist and illicit financing collaborative initiatives between Treasury and 

USAFRICOM. 

• Through the efforts of our humanitarian assistance team (led by a USAID 

employee,) USAFRICOM’s humanitarian efforts complement and support 

USAID’s lead on development initiatives. 

DOS and USAID capabilities and their partnership, advice, significantly contribute to everything that USAFRICOM does in support of our primary DOD mission, as well as our supporting role to U.S. Government activities where they are 

the lead agency. However, I will echo the Secretary of Defense’s call for continued 

congressional support for DOS and USAID efforts to increase their capacity to carry 

out their missions, including conducting stability operations. 

[Whereupon, at 11:12 a.m., the committee adjourned.] 

(651) 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION 

FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 

2011 

THURSDAY, MARCH 11, 2010 

U.S. SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, 

Washington, DC. 

U.S. NORTHERN COMMAND AND U.S. SOUTHERN 

COMMAND 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:09 a.m. in room SD– 

G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin (chairman) presiding. 

Committee members present: Senators Levin, Lieberman, Reed, 

Bill Nelson, Udall, Hagan, Begich, Burris, McCain, Inhofe, 

Chambliss, Thune, LeMieux, Burr, and Collins. 

Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk. 

Majority staff members present: Richard W. Fieldhouse, professional staff member; Creighton Greene, professional staff member; 

Jessica L. Kingston, research assistant; Michael J. Kuiken, professional staff member; Gerald J. Leeling, counsel; Peter K. Levine, 

general counsel; and William K. Sutey, professional staff member. 

Minority staff members present: Joseph W. Bowab, Republican 

staff director; Adam J. Barker, professional staff member; Daniel 

A. Lerner, professional staff member; David M. Morriss, minority 

counsel; and Dana W. White, professional staff member. 

Staff assistants present: Paul J. Hubbard, Christine G. Lang, 

Brian F. Sebold, and Breon N. Wells. 

Committee members’ assistants present: James Tuite, assistant 

to Senator Byrd; Christopher Griffin, assistant to Senator 

Lieberman; Carolyn A. Chuhta, assistant to Senator Reed; Jennifer 

Barrett, assistant to Senator Udall; Michael Harney, assistant to 

Senator Hagan; Lindsay Kavanaugh, assistant to Senator Begich; 

Roosevelt Barfield, assistant to Senator Burris; Anthony J. 

Lazarski, assistant to Senator Inhofe; Sandra Luff, assistant to 

Senator Sessions; Matthew R. Rimkunas, assistant to Senator 

Graham; Jason Van Beek, assistant to Senator Thune; Brian 

Walsh, assistant to Senator LeMieux; Kevin Kane, assistant to 

Senator Burr; and Chip Kennett, assistant to Senator Collins. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN 

Chairman LEVIN. Good morning, everybody. 

652 

The committee meets today for two hearings. The first hearing 

will be to receive testimony from the combatant commanders of the 

U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) and the U.S. Southern 

Command (SOUTHCOM). Then, at the conclusion of that hearing, 

we’ll take a very brief break and start a second hearing, with four 

senior Department of Defense (DOD) officials and a witness from 

the Government Accountability Office, to consider the Joint Strike 

Fighter aircraft program. 

Before we start this hearing, I just want to remind DOD that formal statements of witnesses before the committee are due 48 hours 

before the hearing. Now, we make this requirement very clear in 

our formal communications with the Department, and it’s important that that rule be met. We understand that there are circumstances beyond the control of individual witnesses, that are the 

cause frequently, so we’re not using this hearing to target or single 

out this panel, or any member of this panel. We’ve had this problem in a number of recent hearings, and I would just simply ask 

our witnesses and representatives of DOD to take this message 

back to the Department. 

We welcome General Gene Renuart, the Commander of 

NORTHCOM, and also of the North American Aerospace Defense 

Command (NORAD); and General Doug Fraser, the Commander of 

SOUTHCOM. 

General Renuart is nearing the completion of his tour of duty as 

commander, and he’s planning to retire later this year. We understand that this could be his last appearance before this committee. 

We give him, therefore, a special welcome and a special thank you 

for his long service. 

General Fraser is appearing before us for the first time as the 

SOUTHCOM commander. We thank you, General, for your many 

years of dedicated service to the Nation. 

We, again, want to just offer you our best wishes, General 

Renuart, as you conclude your long and outstanding career. 

We also would ask both of you to convey our gratitude to the 

men and women who serve in your commands, and to their families 

for their commitment and their sacrifice in carrying out the missions of the commands, and the commands in which they now serve 

and have previously served. 

NORTHCOM was created following the terrorist attacks of September 11. It is charged with two primary missions: defense of the 

United States and providing defense support to civil authorities in 

circumstances where the U.S. military is needed to respond to natural or manmade disasters. 

The commander of NORTHCOM is also dual-hatted as the commander of NORAD, our binational command with Canada that provides aerospace warning and control, and maritime warning for 

North America. As indicated in our letter of invitation, we hope 

that General Renuart will describe the synergies between these two 

interrelated commands. In addition to Canada, Mexico is also in 

the NORTHCOM area of responsibility (AOR); and given the continuing high level of drug-related violence in Mexico and the attendant risks to our southern border region, we hope that General 

Renuart will update us on his view of the current situation, relative to Mexico. 

653 

Finally, General Renuart is the combatant commander responsible for the operation of the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense 

(GMD) system that has interceptors deployed in Alaska and California to defend our Nation from long-range missile attack. That 

system has been of considerable interest to this committee, and we 

look forward to discussing it today. 

Turning to SOUTHCOM’s AOR, General Fraser and Lieutenant 

General Keene, his deputy commander, and commander of the 

Joint Task Force (JTF) in Haiti, have spent much of the last 2 

months responding to the devastating human tragedies in Haiti, 

and, more recently, to a lesser extent, in Chile. The scope and scale 

of these tragedies remains difficult to imagine, but the stories that 

have emerged have captured all of our hearts, have called our people to action, and have put the Haitian and the Chilean people in 

our thoughts and our prayers. We applaud the work of tens of 

thousands of soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines who responded 

quickly and provided much-needed emergency relief to the people 

of Haiti. 

Beyond Haiti and Chile, General Fraser, the other challenges 

that we face in our hemisphere remain complex and interwoven. 

The drug trade in South and Central America continues to boom, 

and the illicit southward flow of guns and money continues to foster violence, corruption, and political instability. The region is not 

without its bad political actors, as well. President Chavez continues 

to work to undermine U.S. interests in the region, to do everything 

possible to maintain his own power and align himself more closely 

with countries of concern, like Iran. President Chavez’s activities, 

coupled with the money, corruption, guns, and violence in the drug 

trade, are cause for great concern. 

The SOUTHCOM AOR does, however, have a good news story, 

as well. The Colombian Government continues to consolidate the 

gains of Plan Colombia by expanding security in government services to the farthest reaches of Colombia. Later this year, the Colombians will head to the polls to elect a new president, following 

a Constitutional Court decision that prevented President Uribe 

from running for a third term. 

So, gentlemen, again, we thank you. We look forward to your testimony. 

Senator McCain. 

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN 

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you Mr. Chairman. I want to join you 

in welcoming our witnesses today. 

I know that executing two wars in the U.S. Central Command 

(CENTCOM) AOR has robbed other combatant commands of the 

sustained attention of Congress and the American people. However, 

I want to make it clear that the success of your commands’ daily 

operations, and the fact that we don’t hear about you every day in 

the news, is a credit to you. It means that Americans are safe 

along our northern and southern approaches. So, I thank you both 

for your long years of service and for the service of all the courageous soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines under your command. 

654 

General Renuart, as was mentioned, this is your last appearance 

before the committee. We thank you for your years of dedicated 

service to this Nation. 

There’s no doubt that NORTHCOM and NORAD play a vital role 

in the defense of our Homeland. Whether it’s dispatching jets to respond to unidentified intrusions into our airspace or providing support to civil authorities in the aftermath of a chemical, biological, 

nuclear, or radiological attack, the resources and capabilities that 

NORTHCOM brings to the table are invaluable. Since its creation, 

NORTHCOM has experienced growing pains common to a new 

combatant command. 

I’m interested, General, in hearing what steps you’re taking to 

better operate in today’s security environment, particularly those 

outlined in the recent Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). I also 

look forward to hearing how the command is improving coordination and reliable communication interoperability between local, 

State, and Federal authorities so that we avoid the confusion of 

September 11th. 

Not only as ranking member of this committee, and a member 

of the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 

but as representing the State of Arizona, I’m also particularly concerned about how NORTHCOM coordinates with the Department 

of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Government of Mexico to confront the growing scourge of violence along our southern border 

and the growing threat of the drug cartels to the very existence of 

the Government of Mexico. 

The increasingly capable and lethal drug cartels threaten not 

only our border States, like Arizona, but the entire country. I believe there’s no more important mission than protection of the 

homeland, and I look forward to your testimony. 

General Fraser, it’s been a trial by fire for you. The Senate confirmed you less than a year ago, and your AOR has experienced 

two of the worst earthquakes on record in the region, little more 

than a month apart. So, I want to congratulate you and your team 

for the exceptional work you have all done supporting the international relief effort in Haiti and providing needed communications 

and cargo airlift support to the Chilean Government as it rebuilds 

in the aftermath of its 8.8-magnitude earthquake last month. 

We have a number of interests in the Caribbean and Central and 

South America, but none so important than helping a neighbor in 

need. I’m proud of SOUTHCOM’s efforts, and proud of the men and 

women serving on the USNS Comfort, whom I am sure take for 

granted how critical they are to the lives of not only our wounded 

warriors, but to the innocent victims of natural calamity around 

world. 

So, I look forward to hearing about how SOUTHCOM is coping 

with the unexpected costs associated with these efforts, a status report on our military-to-military relations in the region. I’ve long believed that consistent engagement is the key to enhancing security. 

By improving partner capacity, we can help the region decrease 

gang violence, drug trafficking, and human trafficking, all of which 

threatens both regional and global stability. 

I look forward to your testimony. 

Thank you Mr. Chairman. 

655 

[The prepared statement of Senator McCain follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I join you in welcoming our witnesses today. I know 

that executing two wars in the Central Command area of responsibility (AOR) has 

robbed other combatant commands of the sustained attention of Congress and the 

American people. However, I want to make clear that the success of your commands’ 

daily operations and the fact that we don’t hear about you every day in the news 

is a credit to you, because it means that Americans are safe from the air, the sea, 

and from our northern and southern approaches. So, I thank you both for your long 

years of service and for the service of all the courageous soldiers, sailors, airmen, 

and marines under your command. 

General Renaurt, there is no doubt that Northern Command (NORTHCOM) and 

NORAD play a vital role in the defense of our homeland. Whether it is dispatching 

jets to respond to unidentified intrusions into U.S. airspace, or providing support to 

civil authorities in the aftermath of a catastrophic chemical, biological, nuclear or 

radiological attack, the resources and capabilities that NORTHCOM brings to the 

table are invaluable. Since its creation, NORTHCOM has experienced the growing 

pains common to any new combatant command. I am interested in hearing what 

steps the command is taking to better operate in today’s security environment, particularly those outlined in the recent Quadrennial Defense Review. 

I also look forward to hearing how the command is improving coordination and 

ensuring reliable communication interoperability between local, State, and Federal 

authorities so that we prevent similar mistakes of September 11. Not only as ranking member of this committee and as member of the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, but as the Senator from Arizona, I am also particularly concerned about how NORTHCOM coordinates with the Department of Homeland Security and the Government of Mexico to confront the growing scourge of violence along our southern border. 

The increasingly capable and lethal drug cartels operating to our south threaten 

not only Border States, like Arizona, but the entire country. There is no more important mission than the protection of the homeland and I look forward to your testimony. 

General Fraser, it’s been trial by fire for you. The Senate confirmed you less than 

a year ago and your AOR has experienced two of the worse earthquakes on record 

in the region—little more than a month apart. So, I want to congratulate you and 

your team for the exceptional work you all have done supporting the international 

relief effort in Haiti and providing needed communications and cargo airlift support 

to the Chilean Government as it rebuilds in the aftermath of its 8.8 magnitude 

earthquake last month. 

We have a number of interests in the Caribbean, and Central and South America, 

but none so important than helping a neighbor in need. I am proud of 

SOUTHCOM’s efforts, proud of the men and women serving on the USNS Comfort, 

whom I am sure take for granted how critical they are to the lives of not only our 

wounded warriors but to the innocent victims of natural calamity around the world. 

I look forward to hearing about how SOUTHCOM is coping with the unexpected 

costs associated with these efforts as well as get a status report on our ongoing engagements in the region. I’ve long believed that continuing engagement in the region is the key to enhancing security. By improving partner capacity, we can help 

the region decrease gang violence, drug-trafficking, and human trafficking all of 

which threatens both regional and global stability. I look forward to your testimony. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much Senator McCain. 

Let me start with General Renuart. 

STATEMENT OF GEN. VICTOR E. RENUART, JR., USAF, COMMANDER, U.S. NORTHERN COMMAND, AND COMMANDER, 

NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND 

General RENUART. Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, members of 

the committee—— 

You’d think I’d have learned that by now. 

Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, members of the committee, 

good morning. As you are so kind to mention, this may be my last 

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appearance before the committee, and I want to thank all of the 

members of the committee for the sustained support that you’ve 

provided to not only our commands, but, of course, the men and 

women serving in our military today. 

It is good to be back with you today and represent the men and 

women of both of our commands, and to talk about some of the developments that we’ve had over the last year, and to mention some 

areas where I think we can continue to grow and improve. 

Of course, we have to thank the men and women who serve, each 

day, who wear the uniform, the cloth of our Nation, as they defend 

our homeland, both here and abroad. It’s also important that we 

recognize the contributions of our senior enlisted leaders. I’m 

pleased to have with me today my command’s senior enlisted leader, Chief Master Sergeant Allen Usry, seated here behind me. 

Chief Usry is the first National Guard senior enlisted leader selected for NORTHCOM. I would say that was a competitive selection across Active, Reserve, and Guard, senior noncommissioned officers, and we’re pleased to have Chief Usry as part of the team. 

I’m also very pleased to sit next to my good friend Doug Fraser. 

As you both mentioned, during the past months our commands 

have partnered substantially across a broad variety of areas. First, 

to fight the narcoterrorism in our region, the movement of drugs, 

to support law enforcement to ensure that illicit trade and trafficking is reduced in our region. But, we’ve also partnered together 

to support SOUTHCOM in their efforts to provide the military support to humanitarian relief efforts in the wake of the devastating 

earthquake in Haiti. We’re pleased to be part of Doug’s team. 

As Commander of both NORAD and NORTHCOM, I really have 

two principal missions. Chairman Levin, you mentioned those, so 

I won’t repeat them. But, it’s important to ensure that, across a 

broad spectrum of missions—from air sovereignty, to maritime 

homeland defense, to ballistic missile defense, to support the law 

enforcement along our borders, and to support Federal agencies, 

both in natural and manmade disasters, as well as large-scale 

events, like the Vancouver Olympics—our two commands have created a synergy between each other that is now inseparable. From 

warning to consequence management, that spectrum of activity is 

really the symbol of what these two commands have grown to be. 

I’m pleased to talk about those both today. 

It’s important also to note that we’re members of a combined national response in many of these areas. We don’t do it alone. DOD 

should not be the lead in many of these areas, but is an integral 

and important partner. We’ve worked very hard with our teammates in both Federal and State agencies. We’ve spent a great deal 

of time on the ground talking to adjutants general in the States, 

to the Governors, and to their senior emergency managers to ensure that we create an integrated team for success. 

It’s also important to note that we have excellent relations with 

our international partners. Both the chairman and Senator McCain 

mentioned Mexico; certainly Mexico is in a difficult struggle, continuing to work hard on countering the drug-trafficking organizations in their country. We work very closely with our Mexican military and their interagency partners to ensure that the lessons 

we’ve learned in other places around the world are shared so that 

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we can create strong capacity within the Mexican military and 

within their governmental agencies to allow them to succeed. They 

face significant challenges. We’ll continue to work with them aggressively. I look forward to discussing that with you here today. 

As for our Canadian teammates, they stand shoulder by shoulder 

with us on the battlefields of Afghanistan, but also here in this 

hemisphere. We work very closely with them in air sovereignty. 

They partner with us in the Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF)- 

South to counter drug-trafficking. We’ve worked very closely to provide support to them in special events in their country. I mention 

the Vancouver Olympics one more time. 

Finally, I want to thank the committee for the support you’ve 

provided for the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation (WHINSEC). WHINSEC is an important element to both 

of our commands. It allows us to establish relationships with senior 

military and civilian leaders from other countries, and it has allowed us, then, to bridge into some of these tough topics that we’ll 

talk about maybe a little later in the hearing. So, we both feel that 

WHINSEC is critical to our ability to interoperate in our region. 

Thanks for your support also to keep the personal security, the 

individuals attending these schools, confidential. It allows them to 

speak openly, to understand and maintain that academic freedom 

that we value in our institutions. 

Our commands train hard to ensure our operational readiness 

and our mission effectiveness are always the best they can be. Protecting our families, our Nation, and our communities is the most 

important mission we have, and we take that very seriously. 

Mr. Chairman, as I complete my service to the Nation, I want 

to tell you that this past 3 years in these two commands has been 

an extraordinary experience, much more complex than I would 

have imagined, and it created challenges that we are meeting and 

successfully achieving every day. 

I have to close by saying thank you to my family. For 39 plus 

years, my wife has quietly endured the moves, the changes, the 

challenges, from Operation Desert Storm to Operation Enduring 

Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom to here today in the homeland. So, I want to go on the record to say thank you to her for 

her support, and our two sons, who are both serving in their own 

way. 

Mr. Chairman, I look forward to answering your questions here 

today. Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of General Renuart follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY GEN. VICTOR E. RENUART, JR., USAF 

Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, distinguished members of the Committee, 

thank you for this opportunity to report on the posture, challenges, and future direction of North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) and U.S. Northern 

Command (NORTHCOM). Every day, the Commands’ soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, coastguardsmen, National Guardsmen, reservists, and civilians defend the 

United States and Canada from external threats and aggression-protecting our citizens, national power, and freedom of action. Due to their efforts, North America enjoys continued security and freedom. 

HOMELAND DEFENSE IS OUR HIGHEST PRIORITY

NORAD and NORTHCOM are inextricably linked Commands that have complementary missions and work closely together to protect our homelands. IncorVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:37 May 06, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00663 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\62155.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
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porating an integrated headquarters staff, our Commands have forged an 

indispensible partnership operating within a common security environment, and together are dedicated to defending the United States and Canada. The synergies that 

exist between these two Commands enable us to conduct our missions with a sense 

of urgency in the face of very real threats. 

NORTHCOM is responsible for homeland defense, sustaining continuous situational awareness and readiness to protect the United States against a range of symmetric and asymmetric threats in all domains. NORTHCOM’s area of responsibility 

(AOR) includes air, land, and sea approaches and encompasses the continental 

United States, Alaska, Canada, Mexico, Saint Pierre and Miquelon (French Territory off the northeast coast of Canada), The Bahamas, Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin 

Islands, and three British Overseas Territories: Bermuda, Turks and Caicos Islands, 

and British Virgin Islands, as well as the surrounding water out to approximately 

500 nautical miles, the Gulf of Mexico and the Straits of Florida. NORTHCOM is 

also responsible for leading the Department of Defense’s (DOD) efforts for theater 

security cooperation with Canada, Mexico, and Caribbean nations within the 

NORTHCOM AOR. 

Day to day, we are focused on deterring, preventing, and defeating attacks against 

the United States. We also stand ready to support primary agencies, when directed 

by the President or Secretary of Defense, in responding quickly to natural and manmade disasters. To accomplish our civil support mission, we stay close to our Federal partners to anticipate and plan for how and when the DOD can assist in preventing and minimizing loss of life, suffering, and property damage. We continually 

assess threats to our security, improve our homeland defense and civil support plans 

and capabilities, and strengthen relationships with our mission partners. We work 

diligently to ensure our Nation’s military is ready and immediately accessible to 

support our fellow citizens when called upon. 

NORAD is the binational U.S. and Canadian command charged with the missions 

of aerospace warning, aerospace control, and maritime warning for North America. 

Aerospace warning includes the detection, validation, and warning of attack against 

North America—by aircraft, missiles, or space vehicles—through mutual support arrangements with other commands. Aerospace control includes ensuring air sovereignty and air defense of the airspace of the United States and Canada. The renewal of the NORAD Agreement in May 2006 added the maritime warning mission, 

which entails a shared awareness and understanding of the activities conducted in 

U.S. and Canadian maritime approaches, maritime areas, and internal waterways. 

INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

To perform our missions, we rely on the sharing of intelligence among Federal, 

State, and local agencies. NORTHCOM’s Joint Intelligence Operations Center 

(JIOC–North) coordinates the acquisition, analysis, and fusion of intelligence, counterintelligence, and appropriate DOD-related law enforcement information for the 

NORTHCOM AOR, and shares that information with organizations at the national, 

State, and local levels. JIOC-North maintains a dual focus on monitoring both nonstate and nation-state threats to North America. 

In countering transnational terrorism, we continue to rely on our established connections within the intelligence and Federal law enforcement communities, seeking 

as much legally appropriate information as possible. NORTHCOM maintains liaison 

officers with the National Counterterrorism Center, the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) National Joint Terrorism Task Force, and the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Office of Intelligence and Analysis. Beginning in 2009, DHS’s 

Office of Intelligence and Analysis placed a liaison officer with JIOC-North. In the 

wake of the Fort Hood shootings in November 2009, we established a daily terrorism and force protection information sharing group to improve the manner in 

which potential threats are identified, assessed, and acted upon. We perform our intelligence activities with a focus on safeguarding the civil rights and civil liberties 

of U.S. citizens and adhering to appropriate statutes and DOD regulations. 

HOMELAND DEFENSE OPERATIONS—PROTECTING WHAT AMERICANS VALUE MOST

NORTHCOM may be known best for leading the DOD response to disasters in 

our AOR; however, we remain vigilant in our number one responsibility, homeland 

defense, as we monitor an average of 12–20 potentially dangerous events each day. 

Through our operational missile defense program and our maritime and air defense 

activities, NORTHCOM maintains a high state of readiness to respond as necessary 

against manmade threats. 

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Ballistic Missile Defense 

NORTHCOM is responsible for ballistic missile defense operations within our 

AOR and other areas as directed to protect the homeland, allies, friends, and other 

national interests from potentially hostile acts. Our ability to carry out this mission 

continues to mature. The Ballistic Missile Defense System has been in nearly continuous operations since 2006 against potential threats to the defended area. Although it is a Missile Defense Agency (MDA) asset, the Sea-Based X-Band radar capability has also been included in our operational baseline during heightened threat 

periods since 2008. 

Our missile defense crews are trained and our procedures are continuously validated and exercised, so that we can meet the high standards required to defend the 

Nation. Furthermore, NORTHCOM is active in the ground and flight testing programs to ensure the tests are more operationally realistic. Our immediate challenge 

is balancing a real-time defensive capability with requirements of MDA’s Research, 

Development, Test, and Evaluation activities. 

NORTHCOM is working closely with the other Combatant Commands to develop 

a Global Force Management Plan to address the Phased Adaptive Approach and improved capabilities to defend the homeland. This effort will assess operational planning, force structure, and budgetary implications to better meet global ballistic missile defense requirements. We are working with MDA to ensure that the Phased 

Adaptive Approach includes upgraded sensor systems with real-time discrimination 

capability; improved deployable and fixed-site interceptors; enhanced command and 

control systems that provide a common operating picture across the strategic, operational and tactical levels; and an additional Fire Control node at Fort Greely, AK. 

MDA’s Concurrent Test, Training, and Operations and Simultaneous Test and Operations, with the additional Fort Greely equipment, will bridge the gap between operational capability and Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation activities. 

Operation Noble Eagle 

Operation Noble Eagle began immediately after the September 11 attacks and 

continues today to protect and defend the United States and Canada with airspace 

surveillance, ready alert forces, and the U.S. National Capital Region (NCR) Integrated Air Defense System. Air National Guardsmen and Air Force reservists have 

flown more than 80 percent of the more than 55,000 Operation Noble Eagle missions. 

The security and defense of the NCR against terrorist air threats is one of our 

highest priorities. NORAD works closely with DHS, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), and the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) to ensure the skies over the NCR 

are protected. We are prepared to provide a rapid, reliable response as incidents unfold. As part of the NCR Integrated Air Defense System, NORAD and the USCG 

provide air patrol and alert aircraft to counter fast- and slow-moving air threats 

that may penetrate the NCR Air Defense Identification Zone. 

NORAD also provides tailored air defense for National Special Security Events 

(NSSE) in the United States and similar events in Canada. 

We are implementing a ‘‘risk assessment’’ model as recommended in the GAO– 

09–184 report ‘‘Actions Needed to Improve Management of Air Sovereignty Alert 

Operations to Protect U.S. Airspace.’’ This risk assessment will enhance NORAD’s 

ability to determine and apply appropriate requested levels and types of units, personnel, and aircraft. 

Northern Sovereignty Operations 

During 2009, NORAD launched fighter aircraft on 14 occasions in response to 

TU–95 Bear and TU–160 Blackjack aircraft not on international flight plans that 

penetrated North America’s Air Defense Identification Zone. Because these flights 

did not violate U.S. or Canadian airspace, they were not considered threats to national sovereignty. The response was a means of identifying unknown aircraft operating in relative proximity to U.S. and Canadian sovereign airspace. In 2009, for 

the first time, a NORAD representative was included at the annual U.S.-Russia Prevention of Incidents over the High Seas staff talks. We anticipate continued NORAD 

and Russian Long Range Aviation dialog in 2010 to reduce the ambiguity of Russian 

military flights near our borders and promote safe flight operations within international airspace. NORAD operations in Alaska will remain a key avenue for positive interaction with Russian military counterparts during the reset of relationships 

between our Nations; continued support for military-to-military engagement opportunities is essential to maintain this professional dialog. 

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Maritime Domain Awareness 

Maritime Domain Awareness is the comprehensive understanding of the global 

maritime domain as it relates to the security, safety, economy, and environment of 

the homeland. 

In the fall of 2008, a Russian Surface Action Group, led by a KIROV class cruiser, 

transited the NORTHCOM AOR en route to participate in a naval exercise with 

Venezuela and a port visit in Cuba. Additionally, in the summer of 2009, we were 

involved with monitoring the activity of a Russian support ship and a pair of nuclear-powered Russian submarines patrolling covertly off our Eastern seaboard. Although these vessels were not considered a threat to our homeland, their presence 

off the coast of the United States cannot be ignored and requires naval assets to 

be in a readiness posture to respond in any way necessary to defend the homeland, 

if required. 

NORTHCOM has aggressively pursued interagency and partner-nation cooperation for Maritime Domain Awareness. NORTHCOM has partnered with Mexico to 

better integrate regional efforts by initiating the development of an automated identification system architecture, which will contribute to increased information exchange and Maritime Domain Awareness. This will have a positive impact on our 

combined capability to combat illicit traffic. 

NORTHCOM is the Operational Manager for two Joint Capability Technology 

Demonstrations, which transitioned to Programs of Record in 2009. These complementary programs—Maritime Automated Super Track Enhanced Reporting and 

Comprehensive Maritime Awareness—automatically fuse maritime-related intelligence to allow joint and interagency analysts to provide decisionmakers, planners, 

and operators the capability to rapidly evaluate and respond to potential maritime 

threats. These programs are fully operational and are employed in the NORAD and 

NORTHCOM Command Center, as well as the Navy’s maritime operations centers. 

As the Arctic emerges as an area of increased activity, NORTHCOM has taken 

steps to evaluate DOD’s ability to maintain Maritime Domain Awareness in the region. To establish this foundation, NORTHCOM has commissioned a surveillance 

study with the intent of identifying current capabilities to determine where gaps 

exist. The study will be completed in the fall of 2010. 

NORAD Maritime Warning 

The NORAD maritime warning mission continues to evolve as NORAD planners 

work in close coordination with Canadian and interagency partners. Collaboration 

on several planning documents with these many organizations established and reaffirmed formal and informal relationships required for binational and bilateral 

maritime operations. 

The past year’s accomplishments and ongoing efforts have resulted in enhanced 

bi-national information sharing and comprehensive understanding of the maritime 

domain among our mission partners. We worked aggressively to address gaps and 

seams documented in an internal Information Sharing Architecture study that identified barriers to achieving full mission capability status. The study further identified critical steps and processes necessary to close these gaps within the NORAD 

maritime warning mission. We have also moved forward in the development of a 

shared binational common operating picture of the maritime domain. We continue 

to be challenged in a constrained environment to match the Canadian manpower 

commitment to this important mission area. 

Maritime Homeland Defense 

Commander, NORTHCOM (CDRNORTHCOM) is the operational commander responsible for Maritime Homeland Defense within the AOR. Commander, U.S. Fleet 

Forces Command is under the operational control of CDRNORTHCOM for Maritime 

Homeland Defense. Maritime threats, particularly asymmetric maritime threats in 

close proximity to the homeland, require defensive capabilities ready to respond on 

extremely short notice. NORTHCOM is developing a short-notice maritime response 

concept of operations that will provide an anti-ship defeat capability for short-range 

emergent threats leveraging U.S. interagency and partner-nation capabilities. 

NORTHCOM faces a wide spectrum of maritime vulnerabilities that warrant a 

comprehensive analytic study of ‘‘Short-Notice Maritime Response’’ to identify Maritime Homeland Defense capability gaps from a whole-of-government perspective. 

The nation’s ability to respond to a maritime threat in the NORTHCOM AOR requires the full integration of DOD maritime operations with those of interagency 

partners and, where appropriate, international partners, anchored on the principle 

of unity of effort. To respond to a maritime threat within the NORTHCOM AOR, 

the Nation depends on synchronized security efforts at the operational level along 

the approaches to and within the United States. The capability to intercept vessels 

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of interest beyond their ability to impact population centers, critical infrastructure, 

and key resources, and the ability to respond quickly to maritime indications and 

warning are essential to protecting the United States from external threats and aggression. In sum, a whole-of-government approach is required to leverage 

NORTHCOM maritime partner capabilities and resources. 

Mine Countermeasure Contingency Operations 

The Maritime Operational Threat Response (MOTR) Plan outlines roles and responsibilities that enable the U.S. Government to respond quickly and decisively to 

threats against the United States and its interests in the maritime domain. In accordance with the MOTR Plan, NORTHCOM is responsible for Mine Countermeasure (MCM) operations in U.S. waters. In 2009, in order to consolidate logistics 

and maintenance infrastructure, the Navy completed the homeport shift of all surface MCM forces (minesweeping vessels) to San Diego, CA, and all Aviation MCM 

forces (mine sweeping helicopter squadrons) to Norfolk, VA. In May 2009, an experiment conducted in the port of Corpus Christi, TX confirmed that surveys and port 

folders completed prior to a mining incident can significantly reduce the time required to mitigate the mining threat and restore port operations. 

Anti-Terrorism and Force Protection (AT/FP) 

NORTHCOM protects DOD assets in our AOR by executing a comprehensive allhazards approach to the AT/FP mission that provides DOD personnel (active duty, 

reservists, civilians, and family members), assets, facilities, installations and infrastructure protection from the full spectrum of threats in order to ensure mission accomplishment. NORTHCOM has established theater policy, standards, and training, 

and verifies program execution and compliance through an exercise program and AT 

Program Reviews. We also integrate operational protection efforts with DHS to create a synchronized defense strategy for the AOR. 

NORTHCOM supports new processes and technologies that sustain the force protection mission. During the past year, we participated in a pilot program, with the 

Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas’ 

Security Affairs, to identify a suspicious activity reporting and sharing capability for 

the DOD. The unclassified FBI eGuardian system is anticipated to be the DOD suspicious activity reporting system when designated by the Deputy Secretary of Defense. The eGuardian system will share potential terrorist threats, terrorist events, 

and suspicious activity information with State, Local, Tribal, Federal Law Enforcement Agencies, State Fusion Centers, and the FBI Joint Terrorism Task Forces. The 

eGuardian system will provide a continuous law enforcement force protection threat 

information sharing environment to identify emerging threats to DOD. 

Critical Infrastructure Protection/Critical Resource Protection 

The Secretary of the DHS is responsible for coordinating the national effort to enhance the protection of critical infrastructure and key resources (CI/KR) in the 

United States. The DHS Secretary serves as the Principal Federal Official to lead, 

integrate, and coordinate implementation of CI/KR protection efforts among Federal 

departments and agencies, State and local governments, and private sector. 

NORTHCOM continues outreach with DHS and infrastructure sector partners to ensure effective critical infrastructure information sharing for the execution of its missions. 

As assigned by the Secretary of Defense, combatant commands act to prevent or 

mitigate the loss or degradation of DOD-owned critical assets within their AOR. For 

non-DOD owned critical assets, combatant commands act to prevent or mitigate the 

loss or degradation only at the direction of the Secretary of Defense, with the exception of responding to a time-critical event that requires specific actions by military 

forces to prevent significant damage to mission-critical infrastructure. 

NORTHCOM retains DOD Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) focus in three 

areas: (1) AOR or those DOD assets that are owned, leased, or managed by DOD; 

(2) Area of Influence to include the Defense Industrial Base; and (3) Area of Interest 

that is non-DOD assets that are critical to sustaining U.S. military operations. 

CIVIL SUPPORT—HELPING THOSE IN NEED

When directed by the President or Secretary of Defense, NORTHCOM supports 

the primary agency, typically DHS, in responding to natural and manmade disasters 

by conducting operations to save lives, reduce suffering, and protect the infrastructure of our Homeland. The Department of State may request DOD support in response to requests from other countries within and outside the NORTHCOM AOR. 

DOD is prepared to support primary agencies with military-unique capabilities such 

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as fixed- and rotary-wing airlift, search and rescue teams, mobile medical facilities, 

communications infrastructure, and catastrophic planning expertise. 

A key component of NORTHCOM’s support is Incident Awareness and Assessment to provided critical imagery for local responders. Military aircraft over disaster 

sites provide Full Motion Video and still imagery to give responders on the ground 

their first look at affected areas. At the request of the primary agency, NORTHCOM 

is prepared to provide a variety of aircraft and satellites to gather photos and video 

that allow Federal, State, and local response assets to quickly respond to situations. 

We conduct these Incident Awareness and Assessment activities while simultaneously safeguarding the civil liberties of American citizens and adhering to appropriate statutes and DOD regulations. 

Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosives Consequence 

Management. 

Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosives (CBRNE) 

incidents pose a great and foreseeable challenge to the security of the American people. A terrorist attack on U.S. soil or an accidental CBRNE incident could create 

catastrophic results that would likely exceed the response capabilities of civil authorities. As a result, DOD established a requirement for CBRNE Consequence 

Management Response Forces (CCMRF) to be trained and ready to respond to requests from civil authorities to save lives, help mitigate pain and suffering, and reduce property damage. 

A CCMRF is a brigade-sized task force that operates under the authority of Title 

10 of the United States Code. CCMRFs are self-sustaining and may be tailored to 

any CBRNE event. A CCMRF is composed of Army, Air Force, Marine, and Navy 

units with unique CBRNE training and equipment, as well as general purpose units 

trained to operate in a CBRNE environment. CCMRF capabilities include event assessment, robust command and control, comprehensive decontamination of personnel and equipment, hazardous material handling and disposal, medical support, 

air and land transportation, aerial evacuation, mortuary affairs, and general 

logistical support for extended operations. The CCMRF augments the consequence 

management efforts of State and local first responders, National Guard forces, and 

Federal agencies by providing complementary and unique capabilities when the effects of a CBRNE event exceed their capabilities. 

In November 2009, NORTHCOM and Army North (ARNORTH), NORTHCOM’s 

Army Component Command, conducted the Vibrant Response 10.1 Field Training 

Exercise (VR 10.1 FTX), the first full-scale, full-deployment exercise for a CCMRF, 

confirming the CCMRF’s capability to deploy to and support a catastrophic CBRNE 

Consequence Management event from a standing alert status. VR 10.1 FTX involved 

a simulated Improvised Nuclear Device detonation at Muscatatuck Center for Complex Operations near Camp Atterbury, IN. This challenging scenario is one of the 

15 National Planning Scenarios established as a common interagency baseline, and 

the exercise set the stage for CCMRF 10.1 to fulfill its assignment through the remainder of fiscal year 2010. 

Joint Task Force-Civil Support (JTF–CS), a NORTHCOM subordinate command, 

plans and integrates DOD support to the designated primary agency for domestic 

CBRNE consequence management operations. When approved by the Secretary of 

Defense and directed by CDRNORTHCOM, JTF–CS deploys to the incident site and 

executes timely and effective command and control of designated DOD forces, providing support to civil authorities to save lives, prevent injury and provide temporary critical life support. Some typical JTF–CS tasks include incident site support, 

casualty medical assistance and treatment, displaced populace support, mortuary affairs support, logistics support, and air operations. 

The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2008, section 

1082, as amended by the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2010, section 1034, directed DOD 

to establish an advisory panel to carry out an assessment of the capabilities of DOD 

to provide support to U.S. civil authorities in the event of a CBRNE incident. This 

advisory panel was sworn in on 15 September 2009 and will submit their report 

with recommendations to Congress within 12 months. NORTHCOM hosted the Advisory Panel’s second meeting at our Headquarters on 23 November 2009 in closed 

session for classified command mission briefings and discussions. The Command will 

continue to engage with the Advisory Panel throughout its efforts and we look forward to assisting them in additional research and insight into the Department’s 

CBRNE consequence management mission sets. 

Response to Haiti Earthquake 

NORTHCOM is supporting U.S. Southern Command’s (SOUTHCOM) response 

and support for Haiti Earthquake relief efforts. NORTHCOM and our components 

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contributed more than 170 people. Air operations experts from Air Forces Northern 

(AFNORTH), assisted SOUTHCOM by transforming the 601st Air Mobility Division’s Regional Air Movement Control Center into the Haiti Flight Operations Coordination Center to control the smooth flow of aircraft into Port-au-Prince Airport. 

AFNORTH’s Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers, Air Force Reserve officers 

assigned to respond to natural and man-made disasters in the United States, were 

onsite at facilities set up in the Southeast Region to support Haitian earthquake relief efforts. ARNORTH’s Defense Coordinating Officer/Element worked closely with 

Federal, State, tribal, and local officials to determine which DOD capabilities can 

assist in mitigating the effects of the Haiti disaster. 

Cyber Operations 

NORAD and NORTHCOM continue to rely on data systems, the Internet, and 

networked commercial and military infrastructure to accomplish our missions. 

Cyber threats to these infrastructures include nation-state actors, terrorists, and 

criminal organizations, and are increasing in sophistication and occurrence. These 

cyber threats pose potentially grave damage to the ability of NORAD and 

NORTHCOM to conduct aerospace, maritime, and homeland defense, as well as 

DSCA missions. Our dependence on critical information systems leaves us vulnerable to potentially pervasive and sustained cyber attacks from global actors. 

The Commands partner with U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM), the Military 

Services, DOD agencies, DHS, and other Federal agencies to share cyber threat and 

related information, reduce cyberspace vulnerabilities, and defend against information infrastructure attacks. Efforts such as the U.S. Government’s plans to increase 

information sharing with the private sector, and its migration to trusted Internet 

connections for the government and military networks, will help promote situational 

awareness and reduce vulnerabilities. 

In 2009, NORTHCOM, along with DHS, STRATCOM, and other mission partners, 

developed a plan tailored to provide rapid assistance to DHS and other Federal 

agencies for cyber-related events. This DOD cyber support would fall under our 

DSCA mission area and be provided in a similar fashion as hurricane relief, wildfire 

support, and responses to other national disasters. NORTHCOM is also conducting 

an analysis of providing a cyber response under our homeland defense responsibilities. 

H1N1 Operations 

NORTHCOM is executing Phase 1 of our Pandemic Influenza response plan. As 

part of our response, we identified five Regional Joint Task Force (RJTF) Headquarters. The RJTFs, along with NORTHCOM subordinate commands, continue to 

prepare to assist the primary agency. To date, NORTHCOM has not received any 

requests from the primary agency for DOD capabilities. 

In addition, NORTHCOM is the DOD lead for globally synchronizing military efforts to minimize contamination and prevent further spread of pandemic influenza. 

The DOD Global Synchronization Plan for Pandemic Influenza provides guidance to 

all the Geographic Combatant Commands, Functional Combatant Commands, Services, and DOD Agencies to assist in development of regional plans addressing operations in a pandemic influenza environment. Our efforts are focused on ensuring our 

military remains combat ready while taking care of interagency actions to keep military families safe at home. 

Support to the 2010 Vancouver Olympics 

The 2010 Winter Olympics began on 12 February 2010 in Vancouver, British Columbia. The Canadian Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness was 

charged with overall security for the Games and delegated the Royal Canadian 

Mounted Police (RCMP) as the lead agency for this task. At the same time, the Minister formally requested Canadian Department of National Defence assistance for 

the RCMP. As a result of this request, the Canadian Chief of Defence Staff, General 

Walter Natynczyk, tasked CDRNORAD with the aerospace warning, aerospace control, and maritime warning for this event. 

Inland Search and Rescue (SAR) Coordinator 

In addition to defending our freedom, our lives, and our territory, SAR is a priority mission for NORTHCOM. On 4 November 2009, the Secretary of Defense designated CDRNORTHCOM as the U.S. Inland SAR Coordinator, which made 

NORTHCOM responsible for civil SAR involving the inland portion of the 48 contiguous States. NORTHCOM stands ready to coordinate the full spectrum of SAR, from 

normal SAR, such as searching for a lost hiker, to responding to catastrophic incidents, such as a large-scale earthquake, through our Rescue Coordination Center 

(RCC). The RCC is our key node for inland SAR and is under the purview of 

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NORTHCOM’s Service Component Command, AFNORTH. In addition, our Joint 

Personnel Recovery Center at Tyndall AFB, FL, allows us to have experts in place 

for routine SAR missions and to have those same experts at AFNORTH lead the 

way for a catastrophic incident SAR mission. The fiscal year 2011 President’s budget request for recapitalization of the Air Force’s current rotary-wing SAR capability 

supports the continued viability of our SAR mission. Full funding of this fiscal year 

2011 request keeps us on a path to continue providing SAR support to American 

citizens in those critical early hours of a crisis when aerial life support is a no-fail 

mission. 

SUPPORT TO LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES

Joint Task Force-North Operations 

Joint Task Force-North (JTF-North), a NORTHCOM subordinate command, provides military support to Federal law enforcement agencies to assist in the identification and interdiction of transnational threats within and along the approaches 

to the United States. During fiscal year 2009, JTF-North coordinated 61 missions 

in support of Federal law enforcement agencies. In accordance with DOD policy for 

supporting law enforcement counterdrug efforts, JTF-North employed joint air, 

ground, and maritime sensors along the Nation’s Southern and Northern borders 

and coasts; conducted detection and monitoring of suspected trafficking threats; provided for information and intelligence sharing among law enforcement agencies; 

supported Customs and Border Protection’s (CBP) request for enhanced tactical infrastructure along the Southwest border; assisted with building planning capability 

within CBP; and provided Federal law enforcement with other support such as 

transportation, tunnel detection capabilities, and basic military skills training. 

At the request of DHS Assistant Secretary Alan Bersin, JTF-North provided support to the Alliance to Combat Transnational Threats, a multi-agency operation, in 

the State of Arizona. JTF-North facilitated intelligence and operational planning, 

and provided sensor capabilities during execution of this intelligence-driven operation. 

Through JTF-North’s missions and activities, NORTHCOM continues to sustain 

important relationships with Federal law enforcement agencies in securing our Nation’s borders against drug traffickers and their associated activities. Robust collaboration exists today between JTF-North and operational-level leaders in CBP, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Drug Enforcement Administration, and the FBI. 

Counternarcotics (CN) Programs 

NORTHCOM’s CN Program is an integral part of the defense and security of our 

Nation. We continue to build NORTHCOM’s capabilities and establish coordinated 

efforts supporting our partner agencies and partner nations to address the illicit 

narcotics trafficking threat to the homeland. 

NORTHCOM’s CN efforts support Law Enforcement Agencies through information collection, analysis, fusion, and sharing, as well as theater security cooperation 

and partnership programs. These efforts are closely coordinated among the 

NORTHCOM staff and subordinate commands. 

In addition to our southwest border, there are ongoing efforts with our Canadian 

partners along our 5,000 mile long northern border. This U.S.-Canadian cooperation 

has uncovered and is addressing widespread illicit narcotics trafficking in our 

shared land, air, and sea domains that does not currently exhibit the level of violence as on our border with Mexico, but nevertheless remains a serious 

transnational threat to the United States. Illicit trafficking also poses a threat to 

The Bahamas, Virgin Islands, and Puerto Rico, which are now in the NORTHCOM 

AOR. Accordingly, we are exploring how to better coordinate CN efforts with 

SOUTHCOM in this region. 

NORTHCOM has also made tremendous strides in supporting national CN efforts 

by the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) and the Interdiction Committee (TIC) as part of their coordination with DOD. TIC membership consists of 

17 agencies and commands led by a chairman appointed by the ONDCP Director. 

TIC provides advice to ONDCP on activities and threats posed by all illicit drug 

trafficking that threatens the United States and its interests in the Western Hemisphere. NORTHCOM is now represented quarterly as a TIC participant with JTFNorth. 

Counter-Tunnel Initiative 

NORTHCOM is working with DHS, other combatant commands, and coalition 

partners to explore, map, and characterize illicit subterranean structures. Among 

these enhanced capabilities are seismic-acoustic and linear fiber-optic sensors, robotics, and other technologies. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Engineer Research 

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and Development Center, is the technical lead for this initiative and continues to 

work in support of multiple combatant commands to solve this difficult problem. 

Within the past year, DOD support has resulted in the preemptive interdiction of 

two unfinished tunnels on the Southwest border. The Southwest border is a perfect 

test-bed for this capability. Results of this initiative benefit all combatant commands 

and help our interagency partners in their border security mission. 

THE NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES—OUR PARTNERS

National Guard and Reserve Forces are critical to NORTHCOM’s ability to carry 

out our assigned homeland defense and civil support missions. As such, 

NORTHCOM advocates for National Guard and Reserve capabilities in support of 

the Command’s mission. In each of our annual Integrated Priority List and Program 

Objective Memorandum submissions to the DOD, we advocate for and support resolution of National Guard and Reserve capability concerns. We further advocate for 

changes to DOD policies that allow for more collaborative planning to ensure proper 

resourcing for National Guard and Reserve units’ equipment, personnel and training 

for civil support operations. We also advocate for and support key issues such as 

equipment modernization in the Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams. 

We recognize the National Guard as a fundamental partner in the Total Force 

and essential to the security and defense of our Nation. The Air National Guard 

provides the bulk of NORAD’s operational force for Air Sovereignty Alert missions, 

and is developing additional capabilities in support of domestic requirements. The 

Army National Guard provides all of the manning at our Ground-Based Interceptor 

sites in support of missile defense requirements. Additionally, the Army National 

Guard provides the bulk of personnel for ground-based air defense capabilities protecting the National Capital Region. 

The National Guard has made a significant investment in personnel assigned to 

NORTHCOM. In fact, NORTHCOM has the largest concentration of Title 10 National Guard officers in a joint organization outside of the National Guard Bureau. 

There are over 50 full-time National Guard authorizations in NORTHCOM HQ; 

however, only 39 of those positions are filled. In addition, Guard general officers 

serve in nominative positions as my NORTHCOM Deputy Commander, Director of 

Operations, and one Deputy Director of Plans and Policy. Our ongoing partnerships 

with the National Guard have increased our ability to coordinate and integrate joint 

and interagency operations. While we still have work to do, I am pleased to report 

our collaboration with the National Guard has never been better, and the experience 

gained by Guard members serving throughout NORTHCOM ensures we have a 

strong foundation for enhancing this relationship as these servicemembers progress 

through their careers. 

PLANS—THE CORNERSTONE OF OUR SUCCESS

NORTHCOM’s homeland defense and civil support plans are vital to our Nation’s 

ability to deter, detect and defeat threats to our security, and assist civil authorities 

when called upon by the President or Secretary of Defense. Our plans are modified 

as threats, observations, and lessons learned from exercises and real-world operations dictate. 

On 2 November 2009, the Secretary of Defense established a Civil Support Plan 

category of DOD plans that may be shared with State, local, tribal, and other Federal authorities that play a mission-critical role in the development, review or execution of the plans. This Civil Support plan category of DOD plans contains seven 

NORTHCOM plans. 

The NORTHCOM Theater Campaign Plan provides the framework for all of our 

planning efforts and is the primary means by which we synchronize day-to-day operations for homeland defense, civil support, and theater security cooperation activities. The operations and activities outlined in the campaign plan place strong emphasis on anticipating threats, improving our homeland defense and civil support 

capabilities, and strengthening relationships with our mission partners, at home 

and in the North American region. We continually assess the campaign plan to 

evaluate our progress toward achieving the long-term goals and objectives outlined 

in national and DOD strategies. 

THEATER SECURITY COOPERATION

Our top theater security cooperation priority is to build the capacity of allies and 

partners to help create an environment in North America that is inhospitable to terrorism. NORTHCOM’s long-range vision focuses on establishing a comprehensive 

defense architecture where the United States works with its international partners 

to deter, prevent, and if necessary, defeat mutual threats. To achieve this, we plan, 

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execute, and assess theater security cooperation programs, events, and activities 

with The Bahamas, Canada, and Mexico to support national and Command goals 

and objectives. This requires us to direct theater security cooperation activities toward improving partner-nation defense capacities, using a capacities-based planning 

approach, to promote regional cooperation and enhanced interoperability. 

The focus for our efforts is on building partner capacities with The Bahamas and 

Mexico and on enhancing coordination and interoperability with Canada. Our goal 

is to strengthen homeland defense through mutually beneficial partnerships in the 

AOR that counter terrorism, trafficking of weapons of mass destruction and illicit 

narcotics and other transnational and irregular threats and their consequences, 

while contributing to national security objectives. 

We have worked over the past year with the Department of State, U.S. Agency 

for International Development, the U.S. Geological Survey, Federal Emergency 

Management Agency (FEMA), and the Environmental Protection Agency to 

strengthen those relationships to further North American security and prosperity. 

Recent, ongoing, and planned initiatives include building relationships and capabilities and creating enduring partnerships that result in enhanced safety and security 

along our common borders and within the region. Activities have focused on developing and improving procedures to prepare for and respond to potentially catastrophic events such as pandemic influenza outbreak, mass exposure to dangerous 

chemicals and/or materials, and natural and/or manmade disasters. 

Canada 

The relationship among NORAD, NORTHCOM and Canada Command is a tremendous example of the strong and mutually beneficial military-to-military ties between our Nations. I reported last year that we had signed the Canada-United 

States Civil Assistance Plan, which is the framework for forces from one nation providing support to forces of the other nation for timely, effective, and efficient support 

to their respective civil authorities. We used the Civil Assistance Plan in our deliberate planning process, as the U.S. Government responded to requests from the 

Government of Canada for NORTHCOM support to Canada Command when they 

supported Royal Canadian Mounted Police security efforts for the 2010 Olympic 

Games in Vancouver. 

NORAD and NORTHCOM continue to develop our relationships with Canada 

Command. This past year, we concluded a comprehensive Tri Command Study that 

examined future roles, missions and relationships to increase North American defense and security while enhancing the valued relationship between Canada and the 

United States. The Tri Command Study identified several initiatives to further integrate and synchronize our operations and created a Framework for Enhanced Military Cooperation among NORAD, NORTHCOM, and Canada Command that highlights fundamental relationships and underscores individual command responsibilities for mutual support and cooperation. 

Mexico 

NORTHCOM leads Theater Security Cooperation and Building Partnership activities with Mexico to promote specific U.S. security interests and support the development of Mexican military capabilities for self-defense and coordinated operations. 

Our military-to-military relationship with Mexico is growing stronger, with full respect for Mexican sovereignty and a shared responsibility for countering the 

transnational illicit trafficking activity affecting our Nations. 

As one essential element of the U.S. whole-of-government approach, 

NORTHCOM’s most significant contribution is in strengthening the operational capacity of the Mexican Army, Air Force, and Navy. Our engagement goes beyond providing hardware and the associated training; it also focuses on developing the ability to analyze and share the information that will allow the Mexican military to conduct operations against the drug trafficking organizations to systematically dismantle them. We are committed to a long-term military partnership with Mexico 

that is beneficial to both nations. 

NORTHCOM works in partnership with the Mexican military to support its efforts to increase capacities and execute its current strategy to counter Mexico’s security threats. The level of communication, interchange, cooperation, and training exchanges between U.S. and Mexican armed forces has increased dramatically over 

the last 2 years and represents a historic opportunity for long-term strategic improvement of the U.S.-Mexico security partnership. 

Through our Theater Security Cooperation Plan and activities, NORTHCOM plays 

a significant role in supporting the Mexican military and improving the security situation in Mexico through the execution of the following programs: 

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• The Me ́rida Initiative: $415.5 million appropriated in fiscal year 2008 and 

fiscal year 2009 Foreign Military Financing funds to purchase aircraft (up 

to eight Bell 412 helicopters, up to five Sikorsky UH–60M helicopters and 

up to four CASA aircraft) to improve the Mexican military’s ability to deploy rapid-reaction forces quickly in support of police operations against 

drug cartels, and to conduct maritime surveillance in an effort to deny the 

use of the eastern Pacific and western Caribbean to transnational criminal 

organizations, including drug traffickers and potential terrorists. In addition, funding will procure ion scanners to help detect illicit drugs. 

NORTHCOM’s actions are in coordination with efforts to build up the capabilities of Mexico’s civilian law enforcement entities by the U.S. Department 

of State and other agencies. 

• Section 1206 assistance: $14.0 million for equipment such as Night Vision 

Goggles, Rigid-Hull Inflatable Boats, personal protective equipment, digital 

media forensics, tactical communications equipment, and specialized training. 

• Section 1004 counterdrug support: $18.0 million for pilot training, specialized skills training, and intelligence training. 

• Overseas Humanitarian Disaster Assistance and Civic Aid: $3.0 million 

in fiscal years 2008–2010 for hazardous materials response, flood early 

warning and emergency management training. 

• Facilitated training support in the areas of Night Vision Goggle maintenance, Explosive Ordnance Disposal/Hazardous Material team training, and 

Aviation Training. Additionally, our Service components are actively engaged with their Mexican counterparts in subject matter exchanges and 

sharing lessons learned from our experiences in the areas of civil-military 

relations and urban operations. 

I have engaged with senior officers in the Mexican armed forces over the past few 

months who have expressed an interest in more detailed discussion and training in 

the areas of military justice and operational law (and inherent human rights issues) 

and administrative law. As a result, we are developing Subject Matter Expert Exchange and Mobile Training Team events (in conjunction with the Defense Institute 

for International Legal Studies) in order to enhance respect for the rule of law and 

human rights within the Mexican armed forces. For example, NORTHCOM attorneys and attorneys from the Mexican armed forces have already participated in conferences designed to develop curricula for the professional development of military 

attorneys. Additionally, senior attorneys from the Mexican armed forces have visited 

various U.S. military entities to get a first-hand view of how the U.S. military is 

organized and trained for the administration of military justice and for conducting 

operations in compliance with domestic and international law. 

NORTHCOM continues to support the Department of State’s ‘‘Beyond Me ́rida Initiative.’’ NORTHCOM has partnered with the Mexican military in support of disrupting the capacity of organized crime to operate and institutionalizing capacity to 

sustain the rule of law, thus helping to build strong and resilient communities on 

both sides of the border. 

We will continue to work proactively with our mission partners and with the 

Mexican military to achieve the joint goals of the United States and the Government 

of Mexico. It is important to recognize that while we are currently working with 

Mexico to develop and strengthen its military’s capability to defeat the drug trafficking organizations, our long-term goal is to establish an enduring relationship— 

built upon trust and confidence—so that we can cooperate in the future on other 

mutual security issues. 

The Bahamas 

On 17 December 2008, Theater Security Cooperation responsibility for The Bahamas was transferred from SOUTHCOM to NORTHCOM. This Unified Command 

Plan transfer enhances our homeland defense mission through our partnership with 

the Royal Bahamas Defence Force (RBDF), and strengthens our civil support missions with Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands. This past year, my staff coordinated closely with SOUTHCOM and RBDF staffs to ensure smooth planning and 

execution of this shift in mission and responsibilities. We have developed a comprehensive Bahamas engagement plan as part of our Theater Campaign Plan that 

will enhance the U.S.-Bahamian relationship and integrate The Bahamas as a participant in the President’s Caribbean Basin Security Initiative. 

Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation 

NORTHCOM representatives participated in the WHINSEC Board of Visitors in 

June and December 2009. We worked closely with the WHINSEC staff to ensure 

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their curriculum is fully compliant with U.S. Code and supportive of human rights. 

I have tasked WHINSEC to provide human rights training to the Mexican armed 

forces in the upcoming months; however, I continue to believe that open disclosure 

of the names of all WHINSEC graduates intrudes upon students’ privacy and, more 

importantly, would assist drug trafficking organizations or terrorist groups to target 

the best and the brightest graduates from Latin America. 

INTEROPERABLE COMMUNICATIONS

For mission success, our communications activities are focused on ensuring DOD 

interoperability with our DHS, State, and local partners to rapidly and effectively 

share information to ensure a prompt, coordinated response in the aftermath of a 

disaster. 

In partnership with the Defense Information Systems Agency, each year we sponsor the VITAL CONNECTION Communications Exercise (VCCE), which provides a 

realistic, controlled environment for DOD and its partners to train and collaborate 

on communications systems and capabilities that facilitate effective and efficient 

interoperability. 

In 2009, there were four venues where DOD, State, and local first responders developed and refined their techniques and procedures to improve interoperability in 

the event of a natural disaster or national emergency. 

NORTHCOM continues to partner with FEMA and the National Guard in the employment of Deployable Cellular-Based Suites, which include cellular towers, satellite communications connectivity, Land Mobile Radio interfaces, and ancillary devices to improve interoperability and service to emergency responders. NORTHCOM 

procured four additional Incident Awareness and Assessment/Full Motion Video 

communications suites through the Combatant Commander Initiative Program that 

are positioned within AFNORTH Headquarters and Air Combat Command Communication Squadrons to provide enhanced Incident Awareness and Assessment/Full 

Motion Video capabilities to incident commanders. These suites provide additional 

capability to enhance situational awareness during disasters and emergency events 

for both incident on-scene commanders and our national leadership. 

EXERCISES, TRAINING, AND EDUCATION

NORAD and NORTHCOM continue to derive exceptional training value from our 

participation in the National Exercise Program (NEP). In 2009, we participated in 

each of the Tier I and Tier II NEP exercises, including the National Level Exercise 

in July that represented the capstone event for the first-ever New Administration 

Transition Training program. 

Our own two major exercises, Ardent Sentry 09 (AS 09) in June 2009 and Vigilant 

Shield 10 (VS 10) in November 2009, represented extraordinary training opportunities with scores of Federal, State, local, tribal, non-government organizations, private sector, and multi-national partners. 

In AS 09, we ran agro-terror and other asymmetric exercise incidents in Iowa and 

three surrounding States, a Deployable Homeland Air and Cruise Missile Defense 

scenario off the coast of Oregon, and a nuclear weapon accident/incident vignette in 

Wyoming, all while simulating loss of the use of our primary operations facility and 

having to move to an alternate location. 

In VS 10, we linked to the main Canadian exercises supporting preparation for 

the 2010 Vancouver Winter Olympics (including how we would provide civil support 

if requested), and simultaneously conducted an earthquake exercise in up-State New 

York. Each of these major exercises was linked to a Vigilant Guard exercise, the 

series we conduct in support of State National Guard Headquarters and Joint Task 

Forces. 

In 2010, we will again participate in the National Level Exercise, and Ardent Sentry 10 will further exercise our civil support mission. We will also practice our 

homeland defense missions in Vigilant Shield 11, linked to STRATCOM’s exercise 

Global Thunder 11. We are also continuing a series of Pandemic Influenza exercises 

in preparation for future DOD-wide and U.S. Government-wide Pandemic Influenza 

exercises. 

All in all, we annually conduct or participate in approximately 50 exercises of 

varying type, length, and complexity, to maintain our readiness across diverse 

NORAD and NORTHCOM mission sets detailed in over 10 Concept Plans. We engage our training partners at every level of Federal, State, tribal, and local government to employ the most comprehensive and realistic scenarios. 

The newest complement of our civil support series of training courses is our DSCA 

Senior Executive Seminar. Hosted in our Headquarters, this 2-day seminar provides 

a great opportunity for me to meet with State Governors and The Adjutants General 

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(TAGs) (ranging from one to five at a time), for them to receive capabilities briefs 

from various staff Directorates regarding DSCA operations, and orient themselves 

to NORTHCOM’s missions. 

PARTNERSHIPS

Working with our mission partners is essential to ensuring the American people 

receive assistance during times of need, whether at the international, interagency, 

or State and local level. Our Nation’s Governors take very seriously their role as 

Commanders in Chief of their State and we respect that authority. Our job is to 

support our Nation’s Governors in responding to emergency situations and threats 

in their States. 

States and Territories 

In an effort to understand each State’s risks and capabilities and in order to anticipate the best response for DOD requested assets, I participated in the initial 

meeting of the congressionally-directed Council of Governors and have also separately engaged with Governors, Lieutenant Governors, various State Directors of 

Emergency Management and the TAGs. Since taking command, I have met with a 

total of 27 State Governors and/or Lieutenant Governors. I have also met individually with 37 different States’ TAGs and have addressed all 54 TAGs at various National Guard senior leader conferences. The most recent conference was the 2010 

National Guard Bureau/NORTHCOM Hurricane Planning Workshop, 18–22 January 2010, in Tampa, FL, where several hundred representatives from 30 States and 

for the first time senior officials from DHS and FEMA addressed hurricane emergency response preparedness. Next year, we plan to expand the scope of the planning conference to include all hazards. These engagements strengthen the relationships between the State and DOD, improve mutual understanding of the critical 

balance each State must maintain between its requirements and resources to ensure 

support of the State’s civil authorities during a major disaster, crisis, or NSSE; enhance sharing of information and lessons learned from previous responses to disasters and events; and support the State’s understanding of NORAD and 

NORTHCOM and our missions. 

NORAD and NORTHCOM provide a training and exercise program that actively 

engages the States and Territories. The Vigilant Guard Joint Regional Exercise Program is sponsored by NORTHCOM and executed in conjunction with the NGB. Four 

Vigilant Guard (VG) exercises are conducted each year, and when feasible, two are 

linked to NORAD and NORTHCOM-sponsored exercises (VG Iowa with Ardent Sentry 09 and VG New York with Vigilant Shield 10). All VG exercises include some 

degree of local/county government participation. 

Interagency Community 

NORAD and NORTHCOM have strong relationships with many non-DOD Federal 

Agencies and Departments. Agency representatives and NORTHCOM liaison officers provide an established reach-back capability to their parent organizations. 

These relationships provide the essential interagency context during operations 

planning and execution, while also providing the DOD’s perspective to external 

agencies. 

Private Sector 

Our Private Sector Engagement Team has worked closely with DHS, particularly 

FEMA, to support a comprehensive outreach program to non-profit and nongovernmental organizations (NGO), businesses, academia, faith-based organizations, and 

public-private partnerships throughout the country. The tremendous capabilities, resources, and willingness of the private sector and NGOs community are essential 

to successful disaster response. Achieving unity of effort is our goal. 

CHALLENGES

We are aggressively tackling impediments to our efforts to improve air and maritime domain awareness, interagency information sharing, and consequence management operations. As we move forward with these efforts and others this year, we 

solicit and appreciate your continued support. 

Aircraft Recapitalization 

Legacy fighters, tankers, and airborne early warning aircraft in use today adequately meet all aspects of the Air Sovereignty Alert mission; however, recapitalization of these legacy aircraft is critical to the future success of the NORAD mission 

set. 

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Legacy fighters are aging and will be stressed to maintain reliability and capability as we move into the 2015–2030 timeframe. Recapitalizing the fighter, tanker, 

and airborne early warning aircraft will remain a challenge, given the DOD’s postSeptember 11 long-term mission requirements. NORAD’s mission readiness will be 

affected if Air Sovereignty Alert aircraft are not recapitalized in accordance with the 

fiscal year 2011 President’s budget request. 

Unmanned Aircraft Systems in the National Airspace 

NORTHCOM is fully engaged with the Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) community through our membership on the Joint UAS Center of Excellence Advisory 

Council; Office of the Secretary of Defense, Acquisition, Technology & Logistics-led 

UAS Task Force; and our participation on the Policy Board for the Federal Aviation 

UAS Subgroup. NORTHCOM is also an advisory member to the newly formed UAS 

Executive Committee, co-chaired by the FAA and DOD, which is addressing the numerous national airspace access issues for public users. We are eager to team with 

our partners in the interagency community as they expand their UAS operations to 

achieve synergy in our homeland defense and civil support efforts. We continue to 

work with the FAA on finding the best way forward on employing UAS in the National Airspace outside restricted airspace. 

Deployable-Integrated Air Defense System 

One of the greatest challenges facing the Commands is the lack of an integrated 

air and cruise missile defense capability to counter threats from low-flying aircraft, 

UAS, and cruise missiles. As these threats grow, it becomes increasingly important 

to develop an integrated air and cruise missile defense system-of-systems to defend 

the homeland. In the past year, NORAD and NORTHCOM worked closely with the 

Joint Air Defense Operations–Homeland Joint Test Team as the operational sponsor 

in developing tactics, techniques, and procedures for a Deployable-Integrated Air 

Defense System capability, which could be employed to protect a particular venue 

or city which may be threatened or at risk. 

National Security Implications of Arctic Change. The 1982 Convention on the Law 

of the Sea is a seminal agreement of the extensive international legal framework 

that applies to the Arctic Ocean. Global interest in the Arctic region shows no hint 

of ebbing, evidenced by the summer 2009 transit of two German-owned cargo vessels through the Northern Sea Route, westbound from the Atlantic to the Pacific 

Ocean. Increased activity necessitates that the United States become party to the 

Convention in order to protect and advance national interests in the Arctic by enhancing our national security (including the maritime mobility of our Armed 

Forces), securing U.S. sovereignty rights over extensive marine areas (including the 

valuable natural resources they contain), and giving the United States a seat at the 

table when rights vital to our interests are debated and interpreted. 

To bolster our efforts for the Arctic region, I support the stated desires of our respective U.S. and Canadian civilian defense leadership to reinvigorate the Permanent Joint Board on Defense as highlighted by Secretary of Defense Gates’ and Minister McKay’s November 2009 Halifax Security Talks. 

FUTURE CAPABILITIES

As we investigate existing technologies and capabilities for innovative uses, we 

are also focusing on emerging technologies to meet our requirements. We urge Congress to support the following initiatives. 

Air Domain Awareness 

In March 2007, the National Strategy for Aviation Security (NSAS) was published 

to enhance public safety and economic growth by promoting global aviation security 

through reducing vulnerabilities. The NSAS states: ‘‘Together, the Strategy and 

seven supporting plans present a comprehensive national effort to prevent hostile 

or illegal acts within the air domain, promote global economic stability, and protect 

legitimate aviation activities.’’ 

To achieve the objectives of the NSAS, the whole-of-government must be committed to the guidance provided within the NSAS and supporting plans to achieve 

global air domain awareness (ADA). ADA crosses many Departments and Agencies 

within the government, thus requiring a coordinated approach. Historically, the 

operational synergism and cost efficiencies associated with the principle of unity of 

effort have not been completely realized for ADA because neither an interagency 

governance mechanism nor an information sharing infrastructure has yet been established. 

To meet this challenge, NORAD and NORTHCOM have teamed with DHS and 

other organizations across the U.S. Government to collaboratively develop solutions 

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and lay the foundation for ADA. The desired end-state is development and implementation of a work plan leading to a joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and 

multinational ADA governance mechanism, interdepartmental capabilities and 

resourcing roadmap, and information sharing infrastructure to synchronize the disparate efforts of ADA mission partners. 

DHS, NORAD, and NORTHCOM hosted an Interagency ADA Summit on 13–14 

January 2010 bringing together senior leaders from numerous Federal agencies. The 

summit leadership provided guidance to three working groups facilitating development of processes for governance, information sharing, and capabilities and resources. Additional summits are planned at 6-month intervals and will bring in participation from industry, State, local, tribal, and international partners. 

NORAD and NORTHCOM Defense Surveillance Gap Filler Strategy 

Wide-area surveillance is a key component of Air Domain Awareness and is critical to air and missile defense of the homeland; however, NORAD and NORTHCOM 

lack adequate real-time, persistent, multi-domain surveillance. The NORAD and 

NORTHCOM Surveillance Gap Filler Strategy proposes to rectify this problem by 

providing the Commands with a foundation to develop a family of systems permitting persistent wide-area air and maritime surveillance to enhance defense against 

threats in the interior of and in the approaches to North America. 

The C2 Gap Filler Joint Capability Technology Demonstration will demonstrate 

a capability that enables efficient, secure, timely and trusted exchange of information resulting in enhanced C2 capabilities for NORAD and NORTHCOM. 

A second effort is the Next Generation Over-the-Horizon Radar (OTHR) Technical 

Risk Reduction Initiative (TRRI) Phase 1 project. TRRI was developed to minimize 

the technical risks of building a next generation OTHR prototype while simultaneously raising technical readiness levels of advanced radar technologies. Over-thehorizon radars are proven, wide-area surveillance systems with the ability to detect 

and track thousands of air and maritime targets at ranges exceeding 1,500 miles 

from the radar site. When completed, these initiatives will improve wide-area surveillance around North America. 

Radar Interference 

Comprehensive Air Domain Awareness will not be attained unless we can resolve 

the growing issue of radar interference. As such, NORAD and NORTHCOM support 

the establishment of an interagency process to allow the accurate assessment of existing and future plans for obstructions that potentially disrupt various radars within our area of operations. A formal vetting process is required with the necessary 

authorities to prevent projects from interfering with the defense of North America, 

while supporting the expansion of alternative energy sources, such as wind farms. 

To that end, NORAD has taken the initiative to form a radar obstruction evaluation 

team to quantify the impacts of proposed wind energy projects in close proximity 

to our radars. 

Long-Range Radar Sustainment and Future Plans 

DHS, NORAD, and NORTHCOM use long-range radars to detect and monitor 

non-cooperative targets. Many of these radars are 1950s vintage technology and in 

some cases are well beyond their life expectancy. To help with the maintenance of 

these radars, the Service Life Extension Program (SLEP) was approved, has been 

funded since fiscal year 2006, and again requested in the fiscal year 2011 President’s budget. Upgrades to the radars are currently being completed. The goal is to 

sustain the existing systems another 15–20 years and use modern technology to 

play an integral part in the SLEP. 

FINAL THOUGHTS

NORAD and NORTHCOM have demonstrated our ability to meet emerging 

threats to the homeland and support civil authorities in times of crisis. We are committed to remaining strong and reliable partners, working together to protect and 

defend our Nations, people, and way of life. 

Our Commands’ success depends on the dedication, professionalism and sacrifice 

of our service men and women. We appreciate what the members of this committee 

have done to ensure the men and women of NORAD and NORTHCOM have the 

best possible resources to maintain world-class capabilities. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, General, for your testimony. Thank 

you for bringing Chief Master Sergeant Usry with you, as a matter 

of fact. We welcome him, as well. 

General Fraser. 

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STATEMENT OF GEN. DOUGLAS M. FRASER, USAF, 

COMMANDER, U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND 

General FRASER. Good morning, Chairman Levin, Senator 

McCain, distinguished members of the committee. I’m honored to 

have this opportunity to appear before you today and provide my 

assessment of SOUTHCOM and our assigned area of responsibility. 

I’m joined this morning by my wife, Rena. I just want to echo 

what General Renuart has said. Her dedication, her support has 

been immense throughout, so I just appreciate that continued support. 

It’s also my privilege to share this table with my good friend and 

mentor, General Renuart, because our appearance together represents the close coordination, alignment, and relationship between 

our two combatant commands. I also want to thank the members 

of this committee for your continued strong support of 

SOUTHCOM and your outstanding soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and coastguardsmen, and the civilian personnel, whom I’m 

privilege to lead. 

I’ve personally seen what these outstanding men and women are 

capable of doing during the response to the earthquake that struck 

Haiti on January 12, 2010. The devastation was tremendous. Latest U.N. estimates indicate that over 222,000 people were killed, 

300,000 people injured, and 1.2 million people displaced by the 

earthquake. The U.S. response was swift, coordinated, and aggressive and comprised Federal, State, military and civilian agencies 

and units, exemplifying joint and interagency teamwork, all under 

the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) 

as the lead Federal agent. 

Fortunately, several DOD and U.S. Government assets were in 

the vicinity of Haiti when the earthquake happened. As you mentioned, Chairman Levin, Lieutenant General Keen, the Deputy 

Commander of SOUTHCOM, was visiting Haiti when the earthquake happened. He remains in place, commanding JTF-Haiti, providing superb leadership to the JTF-Haiti. 

Within the 24 hours of the earthquake, a U.S. Coast Guard cutter was off the coast of Port-au-Prince, and a U.S. Coast Guard C– 

130 was on the ground supporting relief efforts. Air Force elements 

began surveying the international airport. U.S. Navy P–3 aircraft, 

from our cooperative security location at Comalapa, El Salvador, 

conducted the first U.S. aerial reconnaissance of the area affected 

by the earthquake. Members of SOUTHCOM’s Standing Joint 

Force Headquarters landed and began the initial assessments. The 

first U.S. Urban Search and Rescue (US&R) Team, a 72-member 

unit from Fairfax County, VA, arrived. U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) and Air Mobility Command had established 

an air bridge. Additionally, the aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson 

and the USS Bataan Amphibious Ready Group with the 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) embarked were ordered to make 

best possible speed to Haiti. Joint, interagency, Federal, and State 

responders, all these agencies were working to support the people 

and Government of Haiti before the first 24 hours had elapsed. 

Over the span of the next 3 weeks, the size and scope of the military response grew to a peak of just over 22,000 personnel involved 

in the relief effort, including an Airborne Brigade Combat Team, 

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the hospital ship USNS Comfort, a second MEU, as well as engineer, planning, communications, and medical experts. They coordinated with the U.S. Embassy, USAID, the United Nations, and 

other international organizations to determine where the capabilities of the military could rapidly be brought to bear to support the 

Government of Haiti. 

Supported by TRANSCOM, U.S. Joint Forces Command, and 

every branch of our Armed Forces, our forces dramatically expanded the airport’s capacity and opened the seaport to enable the 

vital flow of supplies. JTF-Haiti forces distributed 2.6 million liters 

of water, 2.2 million meals, and 149,000 pounds of medical supplies, performing 1,025 surgeries, and assisting the World Food 

Programme in distributing 17 million pounds of bulk food. 

As the capabilities of the Government of Haiti, USAID, U.N., and 

nongovernmental organizations have increased, and as the relief 

needs have been met, we are transitioning many of our functions 

to capable partners, and are conducting a deliberate, conditionsbased drawdown of our forces. 

The men and women who deployed to Haiti have performed magnificently and are the very embodiment of the teamwork and the 

jointness across DOD. They have been outstanding representatives 

of our military with their professionalism, sense of urgency, focus, 

and compassion. They continue to make us all extremely proud. 

I would not have been able to perform this mission to the level 

of success we achieved without the support of the other geographic 

commanders, and unified combatant commanders, the Services, 

Joint Staff, and the Office of Secretary of Defense. General Gene 

Renuart and NORTHCOM provided invaluable assistance. We 

could not have accomplished so much so quickly without the personnel his command and others sent to augment our staff, both in 

Miami and on the ground in Haiti. 

Less than 2 months after the catastrophe in Haiti, tragedy once 

again struck in the region, when an 8.8 magnitude earthquake 

shook Chile. Working through military liaison personnel assigned 

to the U.S. Embassy, SOUTHCOM offered to assist in whatever 

manner the Government of Chile needed. Within a day of the 

earthquake, we distributed imagery of the affected areas to the 

Chileans, and sent satellite phones. Additionally, we are supporting 

Chile with transport aircraft, a field hospital, and a port survey 

team. As the U.S. Embassy coordinates with the Government of 

Chile to determine what additional support is needed, we stand by 

to assist whenever possible. 

While the majority of our attention and resources recently has 

been focused on responding to natural disasters in Haiti and Chile, 

we continue to address other challenges in our region. Illicit trafficking, narcoterrorism, gangs, and potential for the spread of 

weapons of mass destruction pose the principal security threats in 

the region. The region remains very dynamic. Brazil continues its 

rapid emergence as a regional leader with global influence. 

Globalization of information, markets, resources, and financial 

transactions remain a force for change in the region, both positive 

and negative. Competing ideologies within the region are stressing 

democratic and human rights advances. The increasing engagement of international players from outside the region, such as 

674 

China, Iran, and Russia, continues to broaden the regional outlooks 

and positions. 

Addressing the challenges of our region requires the truly wholeof-government approach in which DOD normally plays a supporting 

role. To that end, SOUTHCOM works not only to strengthen partner capability and capacity, but also to build important cooperative 

security relationships throughout the region with our partners, foreign and domestic, military and civilian, in the public and private 

sector. For the most part, our military-to-military relations 

throughout the region remain strong. 

Finally, I’d like to thank this committee for your continued 

strong support for the WHINSEC and for the hard work of my fellow board members who sit on this committee. As a customer of 

WHINSEC, I can attest to its critical role in our security cooperation, especially in its focus on human rights. 

Let me close by saying that the tragedy in Haiti is a stark reminder of the nature and potential severity of challenges we face 

in the region. The culture of cooperation, openness, and transparency we have developed, the relationships we have built 

through our enduring and consistent engagement throughout the 

region, and the emphasis SOUTHCOM has placed on partnering in 

the past few years have all paid a particularly high return on the 

investment in Operation Unified Response (OUR), the largest humanitarian assistance and disaster relief mission ever conducted in 

the region. 

I think also, Mr. Chairman, it’s important to recognize that General Keen attended the Brazilian Staff College. One of his classmates was the commander of the Brazilian United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH)—or the U.N.-led 

MINUSTA force on Haiti, so the relationship had started a long 

time ago, and paid huge dividends during OUR. 

Once again, thank you for your interest in our vital region, and 

your support of SOUTHCOM. I look forward to answering your 

questions. 

[The prepared statement of General Fraser follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY GEN. DOUGLAS M. FRASER, USAF 

INTRODUCTION

Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, and distinguished members of the committee, 

thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the U.S. Southern Command and our area of responsibility in Latin America and the Caribbean. 

It is my privilege to report to you on the successes and accomplishments of our men 

and women over the past year, and to share our appreciation for the outstanding 

support Congress has shown us. The devastating earthquake in Haiti has shown 

how suddenly the strategic environment can change; but it has also shown how your 

investments in U.S. Southern Command through the years enable us to respond to 

such challenges. With your continued support, we will build upon this foundation 

and strengthen the bonds of security cooperation throughout this region. 

The nations of the Americas are strongly linked together in ways beyond physical 

and sociological proximity: our hemisphere is linked demographically, economically, 

socially, politically, culturally, linguistically and militarily. These shared qualities 

and beliefs connect us and provide the basis for addressing the common challenges 

that affect the security and stability of all nations in the region, today. These common traits also enable strong partnerships and serve as the foundation for the enduring relationships we will need as we face the future together. 

As globalization trends continue, our security will depend upon expanding cooperative engagement with multinational, multiagency and public-private partners in 

our hemisphere. We will be better able to meet complex challenges of the 21st cenVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:37 May 06, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00680 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\62155.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
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1 Economic Interdependence 2008 Trade Figures (www.census.gov/foreign-trade). ∼38 percent 

to Western Hemisphere versus ∼31 percent to PACRIM and ∼21 percent to Europe. 2 Energy Information Administration (www.eia.doe.gov) Aug 2009 Figures: More than 52 percent from Western Hemisphere (incl CAN and MEX), 30 percent from LATAM (incl MEX), 19 

percent from AOR, versus 13 percent from Persian Gulf. 3Panama Canal Authority (www.pancanal.com) 5 percent of world trade transits the canal/ 

16 percent of U.S. trade transits the canal, two thirds ships transiting Panama Canal are going 

to/from U.S. ports. 4 Inter-American Development Bank, Press Release, Migrant Remittances, October 18, 2009, 

December 7, 2009, http://www.iadb.org/NEWS/articledetail.cfm?Language=En2&artType+ 

PR&artid=3348. 5Source: Pew Research Center, U.S. Population Projections: 2005–2050: February 2008. 

tury security environment by building robust, enduring partnerships now. Together 

we are stronger and more effective than working as a single organization or nation 

operating individually. Our vision embodies this belief. 

THE REGION—ENDURING AND EVOLVING

U.S. Southern Command is responsible for conducting military operations and 

promoting security cooperation in Central America, the Caribbean and South America in order to achieve U.S. strategic objectives. Successfully accomplishing this mission enhances the security and stability in the Western Hemisphere and ensures the 

forward defense of the United States. 

The Americas, a home we share, is a strategically vital, culturally rich, and widely 

diverse and vibrant region. Since taking command 9 months ago, I have traveled 

extensively throughout the region and have witnessed the challenges facing regional 

leaders and their people. I have also learned that many of these challenges are 

shared by all of us. Although our Nations may at times disagree on political and 

economic matters, we are united by a common view that we can settle our problems 

through negotiated agreements. This view provides the key for security for our citizens and requires a steadfast dedication to protecting our fundamental liberties and 

defending our common commitment to maintaining democracy and the rule of law. 

International commerce and trade between the United States and Latin American 

and Caribbean countries is strong, and experts forecast this growth to continue. The 

Western Hemisphere is the United States’ largest market with nearly 38 percent 

of U.S. trade travelling north and south, equating to $1.5 trillion.1 We obtain more 

crude oil imports—52 percent—from this region than from the Persian Gulf, which 

only provides 13 percent.2 The Panama Canal is paramount in strategic and economic importance as nearly two-thirds of ships transiting the Canal are going to or 

coming from a U.S. port, carrying 16 percent of U.S. trade; expansion of the Canal 

is expected to almost double the capacity to approximately 600 million tons a year.3

The Commerce Department reports the overall sum of U.S. foreign direct investment in the hemisphere (minus Canada) is 17.8 percent of our total foreign direct 

investment worldwide. Further, 10 of the 17 U.S. Free Trade Agreements are with 

countries in the Americas. In terms of percentage, our total foreign direct investment in the hemisphere (including Canada) equals our direct investment in Asia, 

the Middle East and Africa, combined. Additionally, Inter-American Development 

Bank (IADB) studies estimate $42.3 billion in remittances flowed from the U.S. to 

the region in 2009, slightly more than two-thirds of the IADB’s estimated worldwide 

total of remittances.4 Economic partnerships are strong today, and according to 

Commerce Department and World Trade Organization data, by 2011, U.S. trade 

with Latin America is expected to exceed trade with Europe and Japan. 

In addition to demographic and economic ties with Latin America and the Caribbean, we share social and political views rooted in a common commitment to democracy, freedom, justice and respect for human rights. Compared to three decades ago 

when the form of government in the majority of these countries was nondemocratic, 

most nations in the region now subscribe to democracy and agree that free governments should be accountable to their people in order to govern effectively. 

We are fortunate to share similar main languages and interwoven cultures. Although there are many different dialects, people of the region use four primary languages: English, Spanish, Portuguese and French. While the United States is 

thought of as a primarily English-speaking nation, we are also the fifth largest 

Spanish speaking country in the world. Our significant cultural ties will grow 

stronger in the decades ahead, as by 2050, the number of people in the United 

States citing Hispanic heritage will comprise approximately 30 percent of the total 

U.S. population.5

Despite the constant ebb and flow of political tides in this hemisphere, U.S. 

Southern Command has been fortunate to maintain strong professional relationships with our military and security force counterparts in almost every nation in 

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the region. We engage with these nations continuously during peacetime through 

numerous bilateral and multilateral exercises, conferences, and other training engagements designed to prepare for the host of challenges that may confront us. Regional partnerships with and among our partner forces directly enhance hemispheric security and stability, as evidenced by the outstanding professional teamwork and unity of effort displayed by the region’s militaries as part of the United 

Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) and Operation Unified Response. 

In addition to our more than 20 large-scale joint and combined exercises annually, 

we host and sponsor hundreds of unit and individual exchanges, and assist with arrangements for approximately 5,000 students from Latin America and the Caribbean who attend U.S. military schools and training sessions throughout the region. 

Future senior military leaders interact with U.S. military personnel at the Western 

Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation, Center for Hemispheric Defense 

Studies, the Inter-American Defense College, and the Inter-American Air Forces 

Academy. The camaraderie developed and the school’s strong emphasis on democratic values and respect for human rights contribute to the professionalization of 

military establishments who are subordinate to civilian control and capable of effective combined operations. 

Despite the number of enduring linkages we share with our neighbors in the region, we are also in a period of profound strategic change. Globalization has enabled 

nations, non-state actors, multilateral institutions and nongovernmental organizations to affect—both positively and negatively—the condition of millions throughout 

our region and across the globe. Our world is shrinking. The Atlantic and Pacific 

oceans are not the borders or barriers they once were. There are multiple approaches in several domains—including, increasingly, cyberspace—by which adversaries can enter the United States. At U.S. Southern Command, we remain committed to helping achieve hemispheric security by developing and maintaining 

strong partnerships to meet the dynamic and uncertain future. 

CHALLENGES

The nations within our area of responsibility are largely at peace with one another and have formally foresworn the development of weapons of mass destruction 

(WMD). Military spending on a per capita basis remains lower in Latin America and 

the Caribbean than anywhere else in the world. The likelihood of conventional 20th 

century military threats also remains low for the foreseeable future. However, we 

do face nontraditional challenges that threaten security and stability throughout the 

hemisphere. 

These challenges are multiple and complex and include a broad and growing spectrum of public security threats, the possibility of natural and manmade disasters, 

and an emerging class of issues, such as those relating to the environment. More 

specifically, illicit trafficking, transnational terrorism, crime, gangs and the potential spread of WMD pose the principal security challenges within the region, none 

of which fall to DOD to take the lead in confronting. Most of these issues, in turn, 

are fueled by the endemic and underlying conditions of poverty, income inequality 

and corruption. Thus, our primary focus is on doing what we can to support other 

agencies of our government and our partner nations as they confront these problems 

and try to prevent them from becoming issues that require the military to address. 

Poverty and Income Inequality 

Perhaps the single factor contributing most to unrest, insecurity and instability 

in our region is the pervasive nature of poverty. According to the United Nations 

Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), in 2009, the 

number of people living in poverty in Latin America and the Caribbean—defined as 

living on less than $2 a day—rose for the first time in 6 years, increasing by 1.1 

percent over the previous year, from 180 million to 189 million people, or just over 

34 percent of the population. The number of truly destitute—those living in extreme 

poverty, defined as living on less than $1 a day—increased from 71 to 76 million. 

That is an additional 9 million people living in poverty and 5 million living in extreme poverty. These figures illustrate in very real terms the enormous challenges 

faced by our partner nations and neighbors in the region. Coupled with this poverty 

is a disparity in income levels that is, according to the World Bank, the most unequal subregion in the world. The richest 10 percent of the Latin American population earns 48 percent of the region’s income, 30 times the percentage of the poorest 10 percent, which earns 1.6 percent. 

Areas with lower levels of economic investment, development, and growth can provide a breeding ground for illicit trafficking, other related criminal activities, and 

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ments or hope for a better life, are easy prey for illicit traffickers, terrorist organizations and political demagogues. They provide fertile soil in which international 

criminals and terrorists can recruit, take root, and flourish, thus directly undermining State sovereignty, threatening public safety, and contributing to rising regional instability. 

Illicit trafficking 

The confluence of money, power, and the ability to breach the integrity of national 

borders makes the illicit trafficking problem a significant security challenge for nations throughout the Americas. Border insecurity, increased violence, public fear, 

corruption, weakening support for democratic institutions, and heavily burdened 

local, county, and State agencies are the by-products of this illegitimate and criminal activity, which is estimated to cost legitimate economies more than $245 billion 

annually. Furthermore, the same routes and networks by which illicit traffickers 

smuggle 1,250–1,500 metric tons of cocaine per year around the region, could be 

used wittingly or unwittingly to smuggle weapons, cash, fissile material or terrorists. As a threat to our homeland and the long-term stability of the region, illicit 

trafficking is of critical concern as it provides a possible nexus for transnational terrorism and the potential proliferation of WMD. 

Internal and cross-border—via air, land and/or sea—trafficking in drugs, weapons, 

human beings, money and terrorists poses a threat to every nation’s security and 

stability. Revenue from illicit trafficking has weakened state structures throughout 

the region, subverted the rule of law, and ripped apart the fabric of social order. 

I am particularly troubled by the progressively negative impact of these activities 

on the Caribbean and Central America regions. As progress in Colombia continues, 

air and maritime interdiction efforts are increasingly effective, and the Government 

of Mexico continues to apply pressure to drug trafficking organizations, these traffickers are being progressively squeezed out of their previous operating locations. 

This resultant ‘‘balloon effect’’ causes the trafficking organizations to seek safe havens in ‘‘undergoverned spaces’’ like the Pete ́n in Guatemala, the Miskito Coast in 

Honduras and Nicaragua, and the Darie ́n regions in Panama. Similarly, our Caribbean neighbors are also seeing an increase and return of illicit trafficking organization presence in their territories, particularly the island of Hispaniola. The governments and institutions in these countries contend with the onslaught of violence, instability and insecurity associated with illicit trafficking as best they can, but they 

do not yet possess the capability or capacity to do so without help. 

Underlying all this is the illegal narcotics industry. According to the Drug Enforcement Administration, 31,000 deaths in the United States each year are attributed directly to drug-induced causes. The demand for drugs in the United States 

remains strong and creates incentives for illegal activities. The Andean Ridge produces nearly all of the world’s cocaine and it and Central America are increasingly 

providers of heroin consumed in the United States. Of the approximately 1200 metric tons of export quality cocaine that shipped from source countries in South America in 2009, approximately 60 percent of that was headed north, destined for the 

United States; in addition, we are seeing a growing amount (approximately 30 percent) heading to new and expanding markets in Europe and the Middle East, as evidenced by Spain becoming the world’s largest per capita drug user. 

This is not simply an issue of supply and demand for illegal narcotics, however. 

Traffic is bidirectional and equally congested in both lanes with contraband. As traffickers exchange drugs for arms and services in the transit zones, transit nations 

become drug consumers as well. Brazil provides an illustration of how such an evolution can occur, as it is now the second largest consumer of cocaine in the world 

behind the U.S. While drugs and people tend to go out from the region, increasingly, 

we are seeing money, arms and technology/know-how (from communications gear to 

gangland tactics) flowing back into the region. This cycle has expanded to become 

more than a localized or even regional issue—it has become a global enterprise and 

thus requires a global strategy to countermand it. While partner nations are willing 

to work with us to develop regional approaches to counter the production and trafficking of illegal narcotics, effective and sustainable counter illicit trafficking operations severely test the capabilities and capacity of their thinly stretched forces. I 

see the illicit trafficking threat as a multi-faceted equation—demand, production, 

transit and finances—all supporting micro-markets of instability and violence. 

The Drug Enforcement Administration estimates the illegal worldwide trafficking 

industry to be a $394 billion per year industry. In addition to illegal narcotics, illicit 

human trafficking nets approximately $32 billion per year; illegal arms smuggling 

nets roughly $10 billion per year, and the exotic wildlife industry nets a surprising 

$80 billion a year. Traffickers are constantly developing new means of preventing 

interference with their illegal activities. As we modify our tactics, drug producers 

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6Latinobaro ́metro. 7Los Costos Econo ́micos de la Violencia en Centroame ́rica (The Economic Cost of Violence in 

Central America), El Salvador, 2008, pp. 13–14. In 2008, the National Public Security Council 

of the Salvadoran presidency’s office commissioned a study compiling the excess direct spending 

and losses caused by violence in five Central American countries in four areas, namely: increased health care; increased government spending for crime prevention, law enforcement and 

justice; spending on private security; and, material losses from crime. This landmark analysis 

found that in 2006, violent crime cost the combined States $6.5 billion—equivalent to 7.7 percent of GDP. Though all nations suffered significant losses, the total cost of violence varied between countries: $2.9 billion in Guatemala (7.7 percent GDP); $2.01 billion in El Salvador (10.8 

percent GDP); $885 million in Honduras (9.6 percent GDP); $790 million in Costa Rica (3.6 percent GDP); and, $529 million in Nicaragua (10.0 percent GDP). 

and traffickers find innovative methods to develop the drugs as well as alternative 

trafficking routes to transport them. The traffickers of yesterday have become much 

more lethal today, and this trend is expected to continue. 

Terrorism 

The blurring of the lines that used to separate terrorists from narcotics traffickers 

can be seen in groups like the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and 

Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) in Peru. These entities define a category of 

‘‘narco-terrorists’’ and they derive a majority of their funding and power from their 

involvement in the illicit drugs industry. These organizations and a number of extremely violent gangs have driven up the rates of homicide and kidnappings 

throughout the region and do not operate within traditional nation-state boundaries—they live among and terrorize the populace, and take advantage of 

ungoverned and undergoverned spaces without any regard or respect for national 

sovereignty. 

As these two threat vectors merge into one new hybrid, so must our efforts to 

counter it. We thank Congress for providing the dedicated resources necessary for 

this mission and for working with us in the specific case of Colombia to authorize 

flexible funding sources that allow us to adapt and stay ahead with a blending of 

counterterrorism (CT) and counternarcotics (CN). This expanded authority and flexibility is essential to helping us rapidly address emerging capability gaps with our 

partners as the strategic situation continues to evolve. We now need to ensure that 

we have this authority in other areas as appropriate where we see this nexus potentially occurring, such as Peru. 

Crime and gangs 

A close corollary of the spread of illegal trafficking is the alarming growth of 

criminal violence in the region. Rising crime, coupled with corruption, exacerbates 

the conditions of poverty and inequality, hampering development efforts and reducing an already fragile economic growth environment. One out of every three homicides in the world takes place in our region, as does one out of every two 

kidnappings. According to United Nations data, Latin America and the Caribbean’s 

annual homicide rate is one of the highest in the world, with more than 27 homicides per 100,000 people—murder now ranks as one of the five main causes of death 

in several Central American countries. Central America is the region with the highest levels of non-political crime worldwide, with an average murder rate of 33 per 

100,000 inhabitants last year, three times greater than the global average, according to the UN Development Program (UNDP) Report on Human Development in 

Central America 2009–2010. These reports all emphasize the toll—both human and 

economic—of insecurity, violence and crime on the day-to-day decisions of the population, making insecurity a clear impediment to development and a destabilizing element for many nations in the Western Hemisphere. For example, in recent surveys 

of the region, delinquency and lack of personal security rank as the top social ill 

for the majority of countries.6

The growing presence and influence of gangs contributes to rising crime rates and 

severely challenges personal security in many areas. In Central America, Jamaica, 

and major cities in Brazil, gangs are infecting society’s ability to provide basic functions and necessities, and are thus becoming a significant security priority. The 

overall gang population is estimated to reach into the hundreds of thousands, primarily filling their ranks with disenfranchised youth. According to a comprehensive 

study conducted by the National Public Security Council in El Salvador in 2008, violent crime cost the five countries examined a combined $6.5 billion, equivalent to 

7.7 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP).7 The GDP losses to crime came at 

the expense of government investment in social services like spending on development, infrastructure, public safety and education. Increasingly, the threat posed by 

gangs reaches beyond Latin America and the Caribbean—the more sophisticated 

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groups operate regionally and even globally with deep reach back into the United 

States from California to Washington, DC, and increasingly into Europe. 

The compounded effects of urban violence and transnational gangs are an undeniable threat to our national security and to the larger long-term security and stability of the region. The Departments of State, Justice, Homeland Security, and the 

U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) each have programs that fit together to augment the efforts of the Nations most affected by youth violence. In 

each case, U.S. Southern Command closely coordinates with and supports the lead 

Federal agency and the U.S. Ambassador; at the same time, we continue working 

arm-in-arm with partner nation military and security forces in the region to build 

the necessary capabilities to enable them to provide their own national security and 

be able to provide responsible support to civilian authorities when required. 

Competitive Marketplace 

Because of globalization and its inherent empowerment of new actors, the United 

States can no longer take for granted that our way of life is the sole ideology of 

choice in this region. We must now actively compete to ensure our message is accurately transmitted and received by the appropriate audience. Populism, socialism 

and democracy are all now prevalent ideas within the region. Money, trade, and 

other interaction from expanding players like China, Russia and Iran exist in Latin 

America and the Caribbean. We are also beginning to see a renewed polarization 

in the region. All of these factors combine to form a competitive marketplace of 

ideas, within which nontraditional actors have become very adept at operating. 

To compete in this venue, we engage proactively and counter anti-U.S. messaging 

with persistent demonstrations of our goodwill, competence and professionalism. We 

convey the strength of our ideas in both words and deeds by training and working 

with our regional partners to improve security, provide humanitarian assistance, 

and respond to disasters. We remain engaged in this marketplace through dialogue 

and open discussion with partners within the region as well as players external to 

our AOR. 

China’s evolving relationship with Latin America through a growing number of 

linkages and longer-term investments is impacting the strategic landscape in the region and further emphasizes the interconnectedness of the 21st century. According 

to the International Monetary Fund, total bilateral trade between China (excluding 

Hong Kong) and Latin America has risen from $39.3 billion in 2004 to almost $147 

billion in 2008. China is already the second largest user of the Panama Canal. The 

rapid growth of China’s trade with Latin America and the Caribbean shows the likelihood China could become an enduring part of the economic landscape of the Americas. 

We have also noticed a marked increase in military-to-military and technologybased relations between China, Russia, Iran, and the region. China is conducting 

more military training and educational exchanges, entering into a larger number of 

technology transfers agreements, and selling sophisticated defensive military items 

such as air surveillance radars and military aircraft. China is also finding new 

areas for cooperation in the commercial space sector as seen in the China-Brazil 

Earth Research Satellite program. Russia has followed suit, with arms sales and a 

naval tour of the Caribbean. Russia has publicly stated that improving relations 

with Latin America is a top priority, focused primarily on Cuba and then Venezuela. 

They have also increased their outreach to other countries in the region as evidenced by signing a military and scientific bilateral agreement with Peru, offering 

increased support to Bolivia’s counter-narcotics operations, and seeking a Free 

Trade Agreement with Chile. 

Iran, too, is strengthening its ties to the region, focusing primarily on Venezuela, 

while developing relationships with other nations, as evidenced by opening 11 new 

embassies with a 12th expected to open in the Caribbean later this year. Iran’s 

trade activities have thus far focused on infrastructure development, medical exchanges, agriculture, mining and the oil industry. Finally, a Trade Memoranda of 

Understanding between Iran, Cuba, and Venezuela since 2005 has now surpassed 

$7 billion. 

As we face this complex, dynamic and continually evolving security environment 

at Southern Command, we are constantly reminded that achieving our desired end 

state of secure stable, democratic and prosperous States throughout the Americas 

requires a wide variety of tool sets beyond pure military activity. We continue to 

look for creative ways to approach partnerships throughout the region. We seek innovative ways to organize, plan, train, and operate; to adapt new technology to everchanging challenges; and to communicate, including how we describe and frame our 

challenges both with our partners and with the public in general. 

680 

STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK: INITIATIVES, EXERCISES AND OPERATIONS

Our strategic approach is balanced and prioritized—confronting the most pressing 

and probable threats to the Nation today, while at the same time, posturing the 

joint, combined and multinational force to prevent, and if necessary, defeat the most 

consequential threats to tomorrow. We take a regional, global, and long-term view 

of our strategic environment, our objectives, and the implications for strategic risk. 

It is imperative we remain capable of executing our plans, while still engaging 

throughout the region at the appropriate levels: building, complementing or enhancing, as appropriate, partner capability and capacity; improving international and 

interagency cooperation; and, fostering both security and stability. 

As we confront the considerable range of challenges before us in our AOR, we continually ensure coordination across multiple levels in more than one agency and in 

more than one nation. This is a prerequisite for any project, exercise, initiative or 

operation within our region: each issue needs to be assessed as part of an interconnected and unified strategy. For example, the illicit trafficking issue cannot be 

adequately addressed in isolation from issues of illegal narcotics, migration, arms 

trafficking, money-laundering, and radical ideological terrorists. Furthermore, our 

strategic approach is based on the affirmation of common values held throughout 

the hemisphere: democracy, liberty, and human rights. 

In terms of military-to-military contact, Latin America and the Caribbean represent many opportunities of U.S. engagement. We have witnessed numerous positive results from nontraditional approaches to partnering that integrate talents and 

capabilities from foreign and domestic, military and civilian, public and private sector entities. These efforts may be relatively low visibility, but they have a huge impact on U.S. military and partner nation military and security force readiness, particularly when they are accomplished in a consistent and enduring manner. We pursue a host of programs in support of other lead agencies and government entities 

to include numerous training exercises, educational programs, technology sharing, 

intelligence sharing, security procurement assistance, humanitarian aid, among others. Our evolving engagement strategy commits us to build or enhance the security 

capability of our military counterparts and to expand the capacity for all of us to 

work together. Joint, international, interagency, and public-private is the essence of 

everything we do. 

Joint Interagency Task Force-South 

At the tactical and operational level within U.S. Southern Command, a model for 

this regional engagement and international and interagency coordination is Joint 

Interagency Task Force-South (JIATF-South) located in Key West, FL. JIATF-South 

exists to spearhead the effort to fight one of the most pressing challenges facing the 

region—illicit trafficking—with an acknowledged potential nexus with narco-terrorism. This interagency task force, which celebrated 20 years of excellence last 

year, is led by a U.S. Coast Guard Rear Admiral and is comprised of truly amazing 

individuals from all 4 branches of the military, 14 different agencies, and 13 partner 

nations. This group, beyond doubt, is a team: a joint, interagency, international, 

combined and allied team—a creative and innovative body that defines ‘‘synergy’’, 

the blending of experience, professionalism and knowledge being greater than the 

sum of its individual parts. 

JIATF-South continues to make incredible headway, producing extraordinary results every year. For example: JIATF-South’s joint operating area (JOA) covers 

nearly 42 million square miles, almost 21 percent of the Earth’s surface; in the 20 

years it has been conducting operations in this region, 2,500 metric tons of cocaine 

have been seized, 705,000 pounds of marijuana interdicted, 4,600 traffickers arrested, 1,100 vessels captured, and a grand total of approximately $195 billion taken 

out of the pockets of the drug cartels. They have accomplished these results while 

possessing zero assets of their own—every aircraft and vessel involved with detection, monitoring, interdiction and apprehension is allocated through the Department 

of Defense Global Force Management process, Department of Homeland Security 

Statement of Intent, and International contributions that place the assets under tactical control (TACON) of JIATF-South, which can be recalled by their service provider or operational control (OPCON) authority if unexpected circumstances warrant, such as Haiti relief efforts, search and rescue (SAR), or other national interests. In 2009, JIATF-South had TACON of USCG, USN, and international ships for 

a total of 2,915 on-station days, equating to an approximately 8.0 surface asset 

laydown on any given day within the JIATF-South JOA. Similarly, JIATF-South 

had TACON of Customs and Border Patrol (CBP), USCG, DOD and international 

long range maritime patrol aircraft (MPA) for a total of 9,446 on-station hours, 

equating to an approximately 3.0 air asset laydown on any given day within the 

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8 2009 Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute (DEOMI) Organizational Climate 

Survey: JIATF-South surpassed the national average in every category (13 of 13). 

JIATF-South JOA. Based on JIATF-South’s analysis, a 14.0 surface asset laydown 

and a 5.0 air asset laydown are required to meet the National Interdiction goal of 

40 percent. 

In addition to the need for organic surface and air assets, additional challenges 

that restrict JIATF-South from realizing their full effectiveness include: policy limitations on the amount and degree of intelligence and other data that can be shared 

with partner agencies and nations; structural and technological hurdles in situational awareness, particularly Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA); and, an unequal 

level of ‘‘end game’’ capabilities present in the military and security forces in the 

AOR. Still, in 2009, JIATF-South was responsible for greater than 61 percent of all 

global transit zone seizures and disruptions, and 45 percent of all cocaine seizures 

in the world; additionally, they were responsible for the interdiction of 226 metric 

tons of cocaine, equivalent to a net $4.5 billion loss for the cartels and traffickers. 

While doing all this, JIATF-South set the benchmark for workplace quality in a recent organizational study.8 This kind of success demands total commitment from the 

entire organization—inspirational leadership, complete integration, collaboration 

and partnership which exists at every level throughout the command. JIATF-South 

is the standard for integrating and synchronizing ‘‘whole of government’’, ‘‘whole of 

nation’’, and ‘‘whole of many nations’’ solutions in confronting challenges to our national and shared regional security. 

Exercises 

Southern Command is committed to being a good partner—more to the point, we 

want to be the enduring partner of choice throughout the region. Day in and day 

out, year after year, we dedicate the majority of our resources toward strengthening 

the security capabilities of our partners, while working to encourage an environment 

of cooperation among all the Nations in the region. We conduct frequent and wideranging multinational exercises and international exchanges with our partners, 

send thousands of partner military and civilian experts to various leading academic 

institutions, and provide other critical security assistance to our friends in the region. All these activities focus on strengthening regional bonds and enhancing collective capabilities we believe are integral to U.S. national security and stability in the 

Western Hemisphere as a whole. These exercises focus on confronting regional 

threats such as maritime insecurity, terrorism, illicit trafficking, and illegal migration, while also increasing partner nation ability to support peacekeeping, disaster 

relief and humanitarian assistance operations. The fruit of these labors can be seen 

in the overwhelmingly positive and unified response in Haiti. 

Panamax, Unitas, and Fuerzas Commando 

Building confidence, capability, and cooperation within our AOR is essential to 

confronting today’s security challenges. Our exercise Fuerzas Aliadas (Allied Forces) 

Panamax has matured over the last 7 years and has become one of our flagship programs as well as the world’s largest multinational and multi-agency training exercise. Panamax focuses on improving the hemisphere’s ability to provide air, sea and 

land forces to assist the government of Panama in its excellent work of securing the 

Panama Canal and defending it from traditional and non-traditional threats. The 

exercise began in 2003 as a limited naval exercise with just three participating nations: Panama, Chile, and the United States. Due to past successes and efforts to 

expand partnerships, the exercise has grown to include a roster of more than 20 nations, several U.S. Government departments and agencies, international organizations, non-governmental organizations, and multiple military branches of Service. 

Another large-scale exercise we support that emphasizes such cooperation and integration is Unitas, which trains participating forces to ensure maximum interoperability in future coalition operations. We hosted the 50th iteration and celebration 

in Jacksonville in May 2009. Seven thousand international sailors and mariners 

participated, including personnel from Canada and Germany, making it the longest 

running multinational maritime training exercise in the world. 

Shortly afterward, U.S. Southern Command hosted Counter Terrorism Exercise 

Fuerzas Commando in Brazil in 2009. This unique exercise consisting of 21 partner 

nations involved a competition in counterterrorism (CT) skills by the elite CT units 

in the region as well as bringing together civilian counterterrorism leadership from 

each of the countries to exchange ideas on training and complementary evolutions. 

Exercises like Panamax, Unitas, and Fuerzas Comando provide excellent forums for 

military-to-military relationship building and I thank Congress for providing the 

flexibility in my Combatant Commander Exercise Engagement funds that allow us 

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to execute these kinds of exercises, as well as the funds designed to assist the participation of the developing countries within our AOR. 

Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief 

While our programs and initiatives focus primarily on security, increasingly our 

approach has broadened to support stability efforts as part of a larger national path 

to true partnering and engagement in the Western Hemisphere. A key element of 

these efforts is a variety of humanitarian goodwill activities that directly help those 

in need while providing needed training to our team. These engagement missions 

range from planned events such as the construction and/or refurbishment of wells, 

schools, community centers and medical facilities to rapid response missions in the 

wake of disasters. 

In 2009, as part of our annual operation Continuing Promise, USNS Comfort returned to our waters with the mission to bring short-term modern medical care, provide preventive medicine engagement, and conduct long-term medical training and 

education. With over 100,000 patient encounters, 1,600 surgeries performed, 135,000 

pharmacies dispensed, 13,000 animals treated and 37,000 students trained, we were 

able to engage on a scale previously unimaginable just 4 years ago. In 2010, through 

Continuing Promise in combination with our Medical Readiness and Dental Readiness Training Exercises (MEDRETEs and DENTRETEs, respectively), we hope to 

surpass the ‘1 million patient treatments’ mark since the inception of this program. 

The impact of Continuing Promise on the Host Nations has been greater than just 

numbers, however; the types of procedures performed and training conducted speak 

to the long-term positive effects on society and citizen security as our joint, combined and integrated crews focused on hysterectomies, thyroids, cataract removals, 

and education on disease prevention. The impact has been more than just the USNS 

Comfort, as well. On the engineering side for example, Construction Battalions (SeaBees) personnel repaired and improved five hospitals and clinics; provided refurbishments to seven schools; and renovated one baseball field. Additionally, in direct support of existing USAID projects, USNS Comfort personnel assisted in a laboratory 

completion in the Dominican Republic and assisted in dock repairs in Panama that 

buttressed a USAID eco-tourism project. 

Access to health care is a critical component of security and stability and the 

Comfort’s mission is only one of many medical outreach efforts. As mentioned previously, U.S. Southern Command also sponsors MEDRETEs and DENTRETEs, consisting of military medical teams that treat over a quarter of a million patients annually in the region, focusing primarily on needy rural, isolated populations. These 

unique training exercises have had tremendous impact inland throughout the AOR 

over 75 separate locations—changing lives, providing alternative perceptions, and 

spreading goodwill through quality donated medical assistance. In 2009, 89 

MEDRETEs were conducted in 18 countries, treating over 220,000 patients, performing almost 1,200 surgeries and inoculating and treating more than 31,000 animals. More than just a medical deployment, these humanitarian assistance missions 

have also provided dental care to approximately 50,000 patients, conducted medical 

training for almost 60,000 host nation students and medical providers, and sponsored over 40 construction and restoration projects at local schools and health care 

facilities. These visits also extended veterinarian services throughout their journeys, 

treating and vaccinating thousands of animals, which constitute the livelihood of 

many families. 

Throughout the year, U.S. Southern Command’s Humanitarian Assistance Program augments traditional military-to-civilian engagement activities in order to increase our partner nations’ ability to respond independently to natural and manmade disasters. New Horizons (Andean Ridge) and Beyond the Horizons (Caribbean 

and Central Americas) are a series of joint and combined humanitarian assistance 

exercises that U.S. Southern Command conducts with Latin American and Caribbean nations to provide readiness training for U.S. Engineer, Medical, and Combat 

Service Support units, but also provide great benefit to the host nation. Each exercise lasts several months and usually takes place in remote areas. We strive to combine these efforts with those of host nation doctors and civic personnel. Our programs help local populations who can benefit from completed projects such as 

schools, clinics, community centers, orphanages, emergency operations centers, disaster response warehouses, wells, and potable water systems. In 2009, we conducted 

these exercises in 6 countries in the AOR, supporting the renovation, construction, 

and repair on 12 schools, 2 community centers, 4 health clinics, 3 water wells, 2 

sports complexes, 2 road repairs, and 1 pedestrian bridge, in addition to providing 

critical training programs for first responders, disaster managers, firefighters, and 

disaster warehouse managers. 

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These examples of our consistent and enduring engagement throughout the region 

further advance our strategic messaging and help build confidence, capability, and 

goodwill in numerous countries in the region, bring renewed hope to those enduring 

hardship and challenging conditions, and serve as a visible and lasting counterweight to anti-U.S. messaging. The cumulative effects of our humanitarian assistance missions have directly and indirectly touched and bettered the lives of several 

hundred thousand throughout our shared home, as well as laying the foundation for 

relationships and experience that pays large dividends when the United States responds to a humanitarian crisis in the region . . . as we did and are still doing in 

Haiti. 

HAITI—OPERATION UNIFIED RESPONSE

On January 12, the nation of Haiti experienced a 7.0 magnitude earthquake with 

an epicenter located approximately 10 miles WSW of its capital city, Port au Prince. 

The size and destructive capability of this temblor was made even worse by several 

contributing factors, namely: the earthquake was relatively shallow, making the 

shockwaves much more pronounced; the capital city was overcrowded and over-developed with construction standards inconsistently applied and loosely enforced; 

and, much of Haiti was still recovering from a string of three hurricanes and one 

tropical storm that struck during a 23-day period in the summer of 2008. It had 

been almost 150 years since an earthquake of this magnitude had struck Haiti and 

the devastation was tremendous. Latest U.N. estimates indicate over 222,517 people 

were killed, 300,000 injured, and 1.2 million displaced by the earthquake and the 

59 subsequent aftershocks. Thirteen of the 15 government ministry buildings were 

completely destroyed. Between 40–50 percent of all buildings sustained significant 

damage in Port au Prince and surrounding villages, with some suffering as much 

as 80 percent damage as in Leogane. The airport control tower was rendered inoperable and more than half the seaport was left in ruins. Later that night, the President of Haiti declared a national state of emergency and in doing so, requested the 

United States assist in providing humanitarian assistance and disaster relief aid. 

The U.S. Ambassador to Haiti responded by issuing a disaster declaration, confirming the situation warranted U.S. Government assistance. 

The U.S. response was swift and comprised of Federal, State, military, and civilian agencies and units. There were several DOD and U.S. Government assets already in the vicinity of Haiti. Just before dawn the next morning, 13 January, the 

USCG Cutter Forward arrived off the coast of Haiti, established a liaison with the 

Haitian Coast Guard facility at Killick to conduct damage assessments, set up critical command and control procedures, and began providing humanitarian assistance, 

helping the most seriously wounded, and evacuating injured American citizens. 

Shortly thereafter, two USCG C–130 aircraft also arrived to support U.S. relief efforts. 

At 10:20 that morning, President Obama expressed ‘‘the deep condolences and declared the unwavering support of the American people’’ and ordered a ‘‘swift, coordinated and aggressive effort to save lives’’ with USAID designated as the Lead Federal Agency. During the course of the day, an Air Forces Southern (AFSOUTH) assessment team landed in Port au Prince to survey the airport while elements of the 

First Special Operations Wing arrived to reopen Port au Prince International Airport. A U.S. Navy P–3 aircraft from the Cooperative Security Location of Comalapa, 

El Salvador, conducted the first U.S. aerial reconnaissance of the area affected by 

the earthquake. DOD officials ordered the aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson and 

USS Bataan Amphibious Readiness Group (ARG) with the 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit (22nd MEU) embarked to make best speed to Haiti. The first U.S. 

urban search and rescue team, a 72-member unit from Fairfax County, VA, arrived 

in Haiti before even 24 hours had elapsed. 

Later that day U.S. Southern Command deployed two planeloads of personnel 

from our Standing Joint Forces Headquarters (SJFHQ) element, an organic, freestanding, deployable joint military headquarters, which included experts in the field 

of engineering, operational planners, communications specialists, medicine, interagency coordination, and a command and control group. They arrived and began coordinating with the U.S. Embassy in Port au Prince, as well as United Nations and 

other international personnel who were leading the initial recovery efforts. In addition, this core team began conducting assessments of damage and determining areas 

where the unique capabilities of the military could rapidly be brought to bear in 

support of the Government of Haiti. 

On 14 January, the size and scope of DOD’s response grew as more forces flowed 

to the assistance and relief effort. Four more USCG Cutters and the USS Higgins 

arrived off shore. Throughout the day, P–3s continued aerial reconnaissance. An enVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:37 May 06, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00689 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\62155.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
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gineering assessment team arrived and determined the pier and wharf at Port au 

Prince port were inoperable for movement of bulk stores. Later that night, the Secretary of Defense ordered the USS Nassau ARG with the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit (24th MEU) embarked, the XVIII Airborne Corps, 2nd Brigade Combat 

Team 82nd Airborne Division, and the hospital ship USNS Comfort to deploy to 

Haiti. As elements of these assets and others arrived over the course of the next 

4 days, they formed the core of DOD’s overall contribution to the massive humanitarian assistance mission—providing unique capabilities and an initial surge capacity in what became our primary lines of operation: security, critical engineering, 

medical and logistics. To organize the response of the military forces, we established 

Joint Task Force-Haiti (JTF–H) under the command of my Deputy, Lieutenant General Keen, who was already on the ground in Haiti for previously scheduled meetings. 

The mission of JTF–H was to conduct Foreign Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (FHA/DR) in support of U.S. Government efforts in Haiti, in order to 

mitigate near-term human suffering and accelerate recovery. We would not have 

been able to perform this mission to the level of success we have achieved if not 

for the more than 500 augmentees we requested and received from every other geographic combatant command, U.S. Special Operations Command, U.S. Transportation Command, the Services, the Joint Staff and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The General and Flag Officers, Action Officers and civilian personnel we received were immediately value-added and were instrumental in helping us develop 

well-coordinated planning efforts that translated into unity of effort on the ground. 

These personnel were also distributed to JTF–H in the form of planning staffs, the 

Joint Information Center (JIC), assessment teams, Joint Center Operational Analysis (JCOA) teams, and many other teams. The men and women of these contributing units have performed magnificently and been the very embodiment of teamwork and jointness across the Department of Defense. They have been outstanding 

representatives of your military with their professionalism, sense of urgency, focus 

and compassion. They continue to make all of us extremely proud. 

Security 

Apart from isolated looting incidents, small-scale crime and demonstrations which 

parallel the security environment prior to the earthquake, the situation in Haiti remains relatively calm. U.S. military personnel are engaged primarily with safeguarding humanitarian supplies and distribution networks in support of 

MINUSTAH, who has maintained a peacekeeping presence since 2004, comprised of 

primarily Latin American military forces under Brazilian leadership. They have 

been working with the Haitian government to provide security and build the capacity of the Haitian National Police (HNP). Our JTF Commander and the Brazilian 

MINUSTAH Commander have had an outstanding personal and professional relationship. This has permeated all levels of interaction and engagement between the 

two forces, alleviating many of the potential frictions that could arise from two parallel military command structures operating in the same vicinity. A division of labor 

was established whereby JTF–H military forces would provide local security for humanitarian assistance missions, while MINUSTAH and the HNP maintained overall 

responsibility for security in the country. To underscore the scope of responsibility, 

on 19 January, the U.N. Security Council authorized the expansion of MINUSTAH’s 

force size by 2,000 military and 1,500 police personnel. 

Critical Engineering 

Initial assessment teams determined that although there was no physical damage 

to the airport runway, taxiway and field operations, the field was unusable because 

of no power and structural damage to the control tower. Similarly, a team of U.S. 

Army Corps of Engineers assessed the entire sea port at Port au Prince was unusable for large vessels, with buildings, cranes and piers damaged, and debris and 

containers in the water. The roads remained largely impassable except by motorcycle and foot traffic. Communication services in Haiti were severely degraded, with 

the power grid, radio, landline, and cellular telephone services working sporadically 

in pockets. 

Assessments and emergency repairs continued throughout Haiti, but the primary 

focus of initial effort was the seaport in Port Au Prince. Haiti has other port facilities throughout the country, but due to proximity to the most affected areas and 

the depth of water, Port au Prince was critical to the relief efforts. The North pier 

was completely destroyed and the South pier, missing 700 feet, was determined to 

be non-operational. To address this requirement, U.S. Transportation Command 

(TRANSCOM) immediately deployed Joint Task Force-Port Opening (JTF–PO), a 

unit capable of port command and control and operations, followed closely by service 

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contributions in the form of Joint Logistics Over the Shore (JLOTS). The JLOTS capability consisted of boats, literage, cranes and crane ships allowing for rapid cargo 

offload at other locations within the harbor, thus overcoming the logistical hurdles 

caused by damage. TRANSCOM also contracted with marine engineering experts 

from Crowley Marine to begin installation of a combination of barges and cranes 

that would eventually restore operational capability to the port. Utilizing this combination of JLOTS and commercial capability, the seaport capacity exceeded prequake offload capacity by 22 January and steadily increased as additional over-theshore assets arrived. 

The current container per day capacity, based only on the in-place commercial capability, exceeds demand, thus enabling the GOH, the U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and USAID to manage flow based on the requirements on the ground while also enabling Haitian commercial capabilities to resume. Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster and Civic Aid Appropriation (OHDACA) 

funded repairs to the South Pier are underway, as are contracted removal of a gantry crane and other debris which had fouled the port during the earthquake. In addition, U.S. military engineer teams continue to assess critical infrastructure, including port facilities and piers, airfields, roads, bridges, water wells, and electrical 

grids to determine how best to assist repair and restore these essential needs. Future U.S. Southern Command-sponsored MEDRETEs, New Horizons and Beyond 

the Horizons medical, construction and engineering exercises will provide a consistent and continuing assistance to the Haitian people as part of our larger Theater 

Security Cooperation program. 

Medical 

The magnitude of the catastrophe necessitated the rapid deployment of military 

assets with sufficient medical capability to help alleviate suffering and save lives 

in the wake of the disaster. U.S. Southern Command responded by requesting the 

deployment of needed medical capability to Haiti. The USS Carl Vinson arrived on 

15 January; the USS Bataan and JTF–B Forward Surgical Team (FST) on 18 January; the USNS Comfort on 20 January; and, the 24th Medical Group Expeditionary 

Medical Support (EMEDS) on 24 January. USNS Comfort arrived on station just 6 

days after the initial mobilization order; she and her nearly 1000 medical personnel—including medical and surgical teams from Project Hope, Operation Smile, 

Red Cross translators and support personnel, and medical schools around the U.S.— 

joined other DOD assets already on station to provide an immediate surge triage 

capability and 1400-plus bed capacity to help cope with the enormity of the task. 

We are fortunate to have worked with many of these professionals previously; they 

had come together to provide humanitarian assistance and preventative medical 

treatment and training as part of our annual Continuing Promise which visited 

Haiti in the summer of 2009 and will return to the many countries of the AOR during the summer of 2010. As of 28 February, DOD personnel were directly responsible for performing 964 total surgeries and treating 9,985 patients. 

The GOH Ministry of Health initial priorities outlined to JTF–H were medical 

supplies and emergency/trauma medical care. Numerous field hospitals were established by international partners including Argentina, Canada, China, Colombia, 

France, Israel, Jordan, Mexico, Russia, Spain, and Turkey, in addition to the six 

Haitian hospitals that remained operational and another nine that were partially 

operational. Combined afloat and ashore medical professionals provided medical 

evacuation and care to thousands of injured Haitians daily and conducted hundreds 

of complex surgical procedures as part of the concerted international effort. The Program on Essential Medicine and Supplies (PROMESS) warehouse continues to be 

a key institution in post-earthquake Haiti. U.S. military medical logistics experts 

assisted in the initial setup and organization of PROMESS, which has now become 

a nerve center for distribution of supplies to healthcare facilities throughout Port 

au prince. 

The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) supported USAID in its 

coordination of the U.S. medical and public health response and later activated the 

National Disaster Medical System (NDMS) to facilitate the transfer of non-U.S. citizens to medical facilities in the United States. As of 28 February, 189 Haitian citizens in need of higher levels of care have been transferred via U.S. military aircraft 

to healthcare facilities within the United States. Despite initial fears, there was no 

indication of widespread communicable diseases and no report to indicate an imminent epidemic. Public health experts from the HHS Centers for Disease Control and 

Prevention continue to monitor health conditions related to water safety, food supply, shelter conditions and other health threats in order to prioritize immediate 

interventions aimed at preventing major health-related crises. The capability of offshore medical treatment by our surface assets has largely been assumed by the 

686 

GoH, U.N. and nongovernmental organization expertise on the ground and we anticipate being able to release these assets in the near future. 

Logistics 

Joint Task Force-Haiti, in support of the lead Federal agency, USAID, focused on 

expanding and securing aid distribution networks to speed delivery of relief supplies 

to the Haitian people. With the port damaged, the only means of initially flowing 

relief supplies in—and evacuating U.S. citizens and eligible family members, orphans, and medical patients out—was through the Port au Prince airport. Although 

the control tower was destroyed, the runway was intact. We therefore immediately 

requested specialized capabilities to rapidly open the airport to receive relief supplies, equipment, personnel, and forces. This included the combat controllers of the 

720th Special Operations Group who were on the ground within 26 hours of the 

earthquake, providing critical Air Traffic Control capabilities as well as directing 

ramp operations. From zero inbound traffic hours after the quake, these battlefield 

Airmen had the airport back operating at 60 flights per day within 72 hours, approximately triple the normal capacity before the earthquake. These specialists 

worked all-day, all-night, and in all weather conditions . . . and they did all this 

without any radar. The special operators were followed closely by aviation elements 

from TRANSCOM as part of their JTF–PO deployment. To meet the tremendous demand, we also worked with the government of the Dominican Republic and opened 

additional air and sea ports of entry within their territory and contracted commercial carriers to move supplies and equipment overland from these airfields into 

Haiti. 

Working with Haitian aviation administration officials, JTF–H personnel established the Haiti Flight Operations Coordination Center which constructed a phone, 

then web-based, system for flight slot allocation scheduling. This greatly increased 

our scheduling efficiency and tracking effectiveness, quickly bringing the airfield to 

a 120–140 flights per day average. The total number of flights eventually began a 

steady decline at the airport as demand decreased and efforts to reopen the seaport 

steadily progressed to eventually exceeding pre-quake delivery capacity. Today the 

majority of flights are being controlled by Haitian air traffic controllers. On 18 February, we safely and successfully evacuated the last of 16,412 U.S. citizens and eligible family members, perhaps the largest ever peacetime single evacuation of U.S. 

citizens. Beginning 19 February, commercial air service from American Airlines resumed with 3 daily flights between Haiti and the United States and twice a week 

Air France flights between Paris and Haiti. The return of service is a positive indicator of stability and signals to the international community that the situation is 

normalizing. 

In addition to airlift assistance, elements of JTF-Haiti continue delivering supplies, equipment, and personnel. As of 26 February, DOD has distributed 2,292,431 

meals and 2,615,888 bottles of water, in addition to assisting in expanding and securing aid distribution networks to speed delivery of relief supplies to the Haitian 

people. The demand for JTF assistance in the distribution of supplies has dropped 

significantly as the capacity of the U.N., USAID, and nongovernmental organizations has increased. Our personnel continue to coordinate with USAID and OCHA 

to define areas in which U.S. military support is required. 

Under the leadership of the GoH, the WFP began a targeted and systematic food 

distribution effort using predetermined distribution locations. In consultation with 

the GoH and interested stakeholders, 16 different sites around the capital were 

identified to serve as fixed distribution points, instead of attempting to deliver to 

different settlements throughout the city. U.S. military forces from the 82nd Airborne Division and the 22nd and 24th MEUs worked closely with MINUSTAH 

forces and Haitian National Police personnel to ensure locations, routes and distribution of aid was calm, orderly and without incident. In total, the program provided humanitarian assistance (in quantities of 15-day rations) to approximately 

9,000 families per site, per day. The initial 14-day operation was a large success in 

establishing a sustainable and predictable food distribution program that reached 

over 2.9 million Haitians, exceeding their original goal by almost 1 million people. 

WFP’s Food Surge 7-day Phase 1B concluded on 20 February with an estimated 

19,000 families reached. The WFP estimates that the Port-au-Prince area consumes 

16–20 metric tons of rice per month. Through the combined efforts of the U.N., 

USAID, eight nongovernmental organizations, and U.S. forces, the surge was able 

to provide approximately two-thirds of the rice needed in the Port-au-Prince area 

for the past 30 days. The WFP began their current phase of operations on 6 March 

and has stated no U.S. military presence or other support was needed, as 

MINUSTAH and HNP personnel would be utilized exclusively. 

687 

Overall Assessment 

It has been 2 months since the earthquake and signs of recovery are emerging. 

The massive outpouring of international relief efforts, with strong support from 

Latin America and Caribbean countries, has not only sped up the recovery but also 

enabled the building of a better Haiti. The overall security situation remains stable 

and continues to improve, with only sporadic incidents of small-scale violence occurring. MINUSTAH forces, in conjunction with a revitalized Haitian National Police 

force, have a presence throughout the country with specific emphasis on historical 

hot spots like Cite Soleil and other areas in and around Port au Prince. 

Consistent and predictive aid distribution remains the single-most important factor in maintaining the relatively calm security situation. The immediate needs of 

food and water have been replaced by the more enduring stability requirements of 

adequate shelter and proper sanitation, particularly as the rainy season approaches. 

Infrastructure repairs have begun and are primarily being carried out by civilian 

engineering experts under contract, like the arrangement between Crowley Marine 

and the National Port Authority (APN). Beginning 25 February, Crowley brought 

their own temporary barge, placed it in the inner harbor, and then the following 

day the M/V Crowley Shipper delivered 50 foot sections to be used as ramps. On 

27 February, APN Blue—the Crowley temporary next to the north pier of Port au 

Prince achieved initial operational capability (IOC) for the first time since the earthquake. As a result of such relief efforts, airport and seaport commerce are returning 

to pre-earthquake or higher levels of business. From all sources, there are no indications an external mass migration is imminent. 

Our original mission assigned to us was conduct Foreign Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (FHA/DR) in support of U.S. Government efforts in Haiti, 

in order to mitigate near term human suffering and accelerate recovery. As we near 

achievement of that mission, I am taking a broader look at how we will support the 

larger U.S. Government and U.N. through more traditional security cooperation 

means to sustain security and stability. Although we have made great strides, coordinated planning and on-going communications toward unity of effort remains a 

challenging task; these are critical enablers to ensuring the conditions are right for 

our transition. The Armed Forces will continue to execute the mission in support 

of USAID and the international community in providing humanitarian aid and disaster relief. We do not intend to leave a large military footprint, but we will continue to plan for and remain prepared to respond with a range of options to contingency situations, such as another natural disaster, which may necessitate a return 

to Haiti in the future. 

When the appropriate conditions are met, we will effectively transition our relief 

efforts to other U.S. Government agencies, the U.N., and nongovernmental organizations, thereby demonstrating the ability to conduct an effective transfer of responsibility to civilian authority. The culture of cooperation, openness and transparency 

we have developed; the relationships we have built; and, the emphasis U.S. Southern Command has placed on partnering in the past few years have all paid a particularly high return on investment in Operation Unified Response, the largest humanitarian assistance and disaster relief mission ever conducted in this region. 

Haiti may serve as a rare unifying event, not only for the agencies and departments 

of the U.S. Government, but also for the Nations of this region—at the end of the 

day, we are all here for one reason: the people of Haiti. 

Finally, I offer one personal observation: I have now made five different trips to 

Haiti—one before the earthquake and four since—and on each occasion, I continue 

to be amazed by the strength, courage and resiliency of the Haitian people. Their 

collective character is evident throughout this tragedy. This is a powerful display 

of stoic determination—accepting and enduring the reality of the present, while foreseeing, believing in and taking the first basic steps to ensure, the promise of a better future. The citizens of Haiti have shown themselves to be a proud, strong, and 

persevering people. 

REQUIREMENTS

Illegal trafficking, associated criminal activity, gangs, terrorist financing and recruitment, natural disasters—none of these recognize national sovereignty or stop 

at a nation’s border. These challenges to collective security, stability and prosperity 

cannot be overcome by any one nation alone; they require transnational solutions. 

They cannot be overcome by the military alone; they require a truly integrated 

interagency, non-governmental organization and even private sector approach. 

To that end, U.S. Southern Command works not only to build partner capability 

and capacity, but also to build strategically important cooperative security relationships throughout the region. Among the military and security forces in the region, 

688 

we focus on helping to build greater capability and capacity, as well as striving to 

improve our collective ability to plan, direct, and operate. Within the interagency 

community, we endeavor to enhance cooperation while advocating for our partner’s 

greater capability and capacity at every opportunity. Finally, with the private sector, business community, and non-governmental organizations, we seek to leverage 

their skills and expertise to greatly improve our combined impact and effect. 

Supporting Interagency Partners 

While remaining fully ready for combat operations, diplomacy dominates so much 

of what we do, and development is a mandatory requisite feature of true, long-term 

stability and prosperity. We support our interagency partners who have the lead in 

addressing the significant illicit trafficking and crime challenges in the region. To 

that end, we support initiatives to increase the pool of resources available to our 

partner agencies who are the leads and experts in these arenas. As we engage and 

support the lead efforts of the State Department, USAID, DHS, Justice, and others 

in the field, we also lend our advocacy for increased resources for these agencies to 

more effectively deal with the endemic problems in the region, improve the capabilities of partner nations’ police and law enforcement agencies, and strengthen judicial 

systems and institutions. 

Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance 

U.S. Southern Command has a continuous requirement for persistent intelligence, 

surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), defined as having the right asset able to observe and understand what is going on, especially in denied areas. Whether conducting CN/CT operations or large-scale foreign humanitarian assistance and disaster relief missions, we need fast, flexible and properly vetted information that 

then becomes actionable intelligence and we pinpoint the locations where our forces 

and resources can do the most good—with sufficient time to get them there. However, this requires improved imagery intelligence, wide area coverage, sensor integration, signals intelligence, moving target indicators, layered ISR architecture and 

management tools, biometrics, counterintelligence and human collectors. The combined products create a common operating picture that can and needs to be shared 

with our partners and allies whenever possible. This requires, then, all-source synthesis-node sensor resource management. We continue to work with the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency and industry for innovative solutions to address 

additional ISR sources to gain improved situational awareness. 

Throughout Operation Unified Response, ISR assets have been an invaluable resource. UAVs and other assets have provided outstanding situational awareness and 

early warning indicators in areas of potential violence, determining status of critical 

infrastructure, assessing gathering crowds, analyzing internally displaced person 

camps, determining traffic ability of lines of communication, and security at WFP 

distribution points. ISR assets have had a positive impact on decisionmaking by enabling the efficient use of scarce resources. 

In particular, the information provided has assisted in placing only the necessary 

number of USAID and nongovernmental organization workers at distribution sites, 

scheduling the movement of supplies and personnel along the most efficient routes, 

and when and where to deploy security forces. 

We conduct varied and diverse detection and monitoring operations that require 

a high state of readiness and a joint effort to link multi-intelligence collectors targeted against strategic, operational and tactical requirements. Expanding the melding of organic and national collection resources will improve operations and fulfill 

the ongoing requirement for continuous and persistent intelligence, surveillance and 

reconnaissance (ISR). This effort requires the appropriate awareness systems, namely: unmanned aerial craft with rapid response and good transit and loiter capability; 

remote light detection and ranging for foliage penetration; high-speed, unmanned 

surface vessels for detection and identification to support maritime domain awareness; commercial satellite sensors with the ability to detect ‘go-fast’ boats; next generation ‘over the horizon’ radars; non-electro-optical imagery that enables change detection; and, novel applications of existing technology to facilitate cross-domain 

awareness. 

Continued Commitment to Colombia 

One of the most dramatic examples of U.S. Southern Command working to build 

partner nation capability and capacity in our AOR can be found in our enduring engagement through providing training, logistical, and technical support to the military and security forces of Colombia. Colombia is a strategic ally, an important 

friend, and a crucial anchor for security and stability in the region. Unfortunately, 

they are also the world’s predominant source of cocaine and home to the narco-terrorist group the FARC. 

689 

Over the last 8 years, the Colombians have done a magnificent job of reclaiming 

their nation from both right-wing and left-wing illegal armed groups. Through its 

own military and whole-of-government efforts, and a steady stream of resources and 

support from the U.S., Colombia has made great strides towards building security 

and stability. Today, the approval rating of the democratically elected government 

led by President Uribe is just under 70 percent. The approval rating of the FARC, 

on the other hand, is less than 2 percent. Despite this dwindling public support, the 

FARC still maintains approximately 8,500 fighters in the field, down from approximately 18,000. They remain kidnappers, torturers, murderers, and drug dealers. 

This is essentially their ‘business model’ and they are unfortunately and definitively 

still in business. 

The government’s and military’s efforts against the FARC have also significantly 

impacted drug cartels, as Colombia has extradited more than 900 drug traffickers 

to the United States. Although cocaine production is still a critical concern, interdiction and seizures of cocaine headed to the United States and to other destinations 

in the region and abroad, have more than doubled in the last 10 years. This increase 

indicates improved state control, successful government strategies, and overall better interagency and international coordination and collaboration. These efforts have 

helped contribute to the fastest sustained economic growth in a decade—greater 

than 5 percent annually from 2006–2008, providing a sense of positive momentum 

for the entire country. 

We must now capitalize on the successes achieved thus far to ensure Colombia 

remains a long-term strategic regional and global partner. Continued U.S. commitment and support for the Colombian Armed Forces’ campaign to defeat the FARC, 

as well as for Colombian interagency efforts to bring governance and economic opportunity to areas recaptured from the FARC, is essential. This support can come 

in many forms but should entail continued training and development of key capabilities we are seeing showcased in their cooperation with Mexico and deployment 

to Haiti, and human rights programs to continue the significant improvements in 

human rights by the Armed Forces in recent years. With U.S. help, a stable and 

secure Colombia is achievable in the near term as they emerge as a strategic partner, positive exporter of security and democratic model for the region, directly increasing the security of all citizens of the Americas. 

Countering Illicit Trafficking 

The November 2009 Central American and Caribbean Chiefs of Mission Conference held at our headquarters in Miami highlighted the need for a regional, synergistic whole-of-many-governments approach to counter illicit trafficking. Just as 

the successes of the Governments of Peru and Bolivia in reducing coca cultivation 

in their countries during the 1980s and early 1990s caused a shift in cultivation and 

production to Colombia, we are concerned that current eradication and interdiction 

successes in Colombia are causing a corresponding increase in Peruvian and Bolivian cultivation. For example, according to the most recent crop estimate from the 

U.S. Government, potential cocaine production in Columbia dropped 39 percent between 2007 and 2008. The potential production of pure cocaine fell from an estimated 485 metric tons in 2007 to 295 metric tons in 2008. Further, the area under 

cultivation dropped 29 percent during the same timeframe while Peruvian cultivation increased by 14 percent and Bolivian cultivation by 8 percent in the same time 

period. Furthermore, from 2000–2008, Peru’s total area under illicit coca cultivation 

increased by 30 percent, while Bolivia’s has nearly doubled. 

Similarly, as President Calderon takes the fight to illicit trafficking organizations 

in Mexico, Central America is experiencing an increase in activity as traffickers are 

squeezed between Colombia and Mexico. This movement is exacerbated by successes 

of aerial and maritime interdiction efforts, which are pushing traffickers to favor 

land routes through the Central American isthmus. As traffickers and their support 

networks relocate to Central America, they also bring with them the associated ills 

of government corruption, crime, and gang activity which undermine good governance and threaten public security. 

As a result of the discussions during the Chiefs of Mission Conference, we are 

working with the Intelligence Community to produce an analysis of the larger, regional and global illicit trafficking enterprise, looking at networks, routes and organizations throughout the entire region, as opposed to just one or two countries. The 

construct we are using encompasses the production, acquisition, storage and/or 

transfer of illicit drugs; illegal arms trafficking; money laundering; human trafficking and smuggling of special interest aliens; WMD and WMD precursors; and, 

all of their supporting activities. 

This analysis will help the Department of State and the interagency community 

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tivities in the Western Hemisphere. The Department of State already has several 

excellent sub-regional strategies to address this challenge such as Beyond Merida, 

the Central American Regional Security Initiative, the Caribbean Basin Security 

Initiative, and the Colombia Strategic Development Initiative. U.S. Southern Command performs Theater Security Cooperation activities that are in support of 

Merida Initiative and Caribbean security initiative efforts, and help to build partner 

nation military capability and capacity in Central America and the Caribbean. Lessons learned from U.S. support to Colombia show the importance of an integrated 

and unified overarching strategy to address insecurity and instability caused by the 

combined ills of illicit trafficking. 

CONCLUSION

During my 9 months of leading the outstanding men and women of U.S. Southern 

Command, I have been fortunate to work closely with our civilian and military leaders, as well as with our partners to the south, to improve the security and stability 

of our region. Together we are continuing the great work of those who have gone 

before us and building upon the foundation of their efforts in seeking multinational, 

‘‘whole of government’’ and in some cases ‘‘whole of society’’ approaches to create a 

secure and stable environment that set the conditions for long-term prosperity for 

the Americas. 

This region plays a critical role in the security and prosperity of the United 

States. Despite some challenges, I believe that through the sharing of ideas, economic interdependence, cultural understanding and harnessing innovation, we can 

strengthen existing ties of friendship to build an integrated approach to partnering 

that will ensure U.S. Southern Command is a welcomed military partner of choice 

in this hemisphere. There are many opportunities ahead to improve hemispheric security cooperation. We will continue to pursue multinational, multi-agency and public-private partnerships to confront the challenges and embrace the opportunities of 

the Americas. We will continue to dedicate the majority of our resources to building 

and complementing the security capabilities of our partners while encouraging an 

environment of cooperation among the Nations in the region. We will continue to 

defend the United States, foster regional security, and be an enduring partner to 

help enhance regional hemispheric security and stability. The mutual benefits of 

these partnering efforts are profound. 

Ultimately, our success in pursuit of these objectives depends upon our military 

and civilian personnel and their families, as well as those men and women serving 

with us from our partner agencies. I thank you again for your continued interest 

in, dedication to and support of the men and women of U.S. Southern Command 

and their families—they are volunteers and patriots, and I am humbled to lead 

them and serve with them every day. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, General Fraser. 

We welcome, also, your wife here, but she must be a little bit 

jealous when she hears General Renuart’s wife is going to have her 

hubby back full-time. 

Let me ask you some questions, General Renuart. First, one of 

the major objectives in the creation of NORTHCOM was to create 

a dedicated command to support civil authorities. DOD is now 

standing up a subunified Cyber Command (CYBERCOM), under 

U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM), that—it appears that that 

command is going to provide direct support to civil authorities in 

cyberspace, both in defense of the government and in defense of 

commercial networks. Is there a role for NORTHCOM in 

cybersecurity? If so, what is it? 

General RENUART. Mr. Chairman, there absolutely is a role, and 

I think we have developed a very strong relationship with 

STRATCOM. As CYBERCOM fully stands up, we’ll continue that 

relationship with them. 

Our role is, if you will, a consumer of the cybersecurity that 

STRATCOM and CYBERCOM have been designed to provide. We 

have a unique circumstance, in that many of our mission partners 

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691 

ment. So our partnership with DHS, as they provide protection to 

the dot-gov [.gov] domains, and then with the commercial privatesector partners, like Google and Microsoft and others, we are building a close relationship. We then determine the requirements that 

STRATCOM must meet in order to provide that security. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you. 

I forgot to mention, let’s have an 8-minute first round of questioning. 

General Renuart, the administration has a policy of requiring 

operationally-realistic testing of missile defense systems, and there 

is a new Missile Defense Master Test Plan, that’s designed to collect the data necessary to provide confidence in the operational effectiveness of all of our missile defense systems, including the 

GMD system. First, do you agree it is necessary to have operationally realistic testing? Do you agree with the Missile Defense Agency (MDA), that the new test plan will provide operationally realistic data and will provide the basis for having confidence in the 

capability and the reliability of the GMD system over its service 

life? 

General RENUART. Mr. Chairman, I do support that, and I do believe it will give us good data to support the systems, and we work 

closely with the MDA on this. 

Chairman LEVIN. Last year, Secretary Gates decided to cap deployment of the GMD system in Alaska and California at 30 operational ground-based interceptors (GBIs), and to make significant 

improvements in their reliability. This committee and Congress approved that plan. Do you agree with Defense Secretary Gates that 

deploying 30 operationally effective and reliable GBIs would provide an effective defense against the Intercontinental Ballistic Missile threat from North Korea and Iran? 

General RENUART. Mr. Chairman I do believe it provides us that 

capability. I’m confident in the capabilities of the systems. I think 

the phased adaptive approach identified by the Secretary will allow 

us to grow a broader system of capability against potential growing 

Iranian threats. 

Chairman LEVIN. As you just mentioned, the President announced a new missile defense plan for Europe that had been 

unanimously recommended by Secretary Gates and the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff. That plan includes a number of elements that are 

intended to enhance defense of the United States against potential 

future long-range Iranian missiles: a forward-deployed radar in 

southeastern Europe, and development of an improved version of 

the Standard Missile-3 Block II for deployment in Europe. Do you 

agree that this phased adaptive approach that’s being planned for 

Europe will improve our capability to defend the homeland against 

potential future long-range missiles from Iran? 

General RENUART. Mr. Chairman, I absolutely do agree. I think 

there is, and we’ll continue to see the testing and development of 

the systems as they mature, but initial information looks very 

promising. 

Chairman LEVIN. All right. Finally, on this subject, there was a 

recent GMD flight test—it was at the end of January, I believe— 

where the system failed to achieve an intercept. Can you tell us 

why it failed? 

692 

General RENUART. Mr. Chairman, I’m not a true expert at this, 

but my understanding, as the operational commander, is that the 

integration between the sea-based X-band radar and the missile— 

the test intercept vehicle itself—had a software glitch in there 

which prevent information from reaching the interceptor in an important phase of that flight test. I know that General O’Reilly is 

working very carefully to correct the software issues there, and we 

look forward to the FTG–07, which will be the next test, coming 

up in the not too distant future. 

Chairman LEVIN. We understand there were two issues there, 

and if you would submit, for the record, whether that’s accurate; 

and if so, what the second problem was. 

General RENUART. Chairman, if I could, can I take that for—— 

Chairman LEVIN. Yes, for the record. 

General RENUART. Please, and we’ll get that specific detail back 

to the committee. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

The recent Ground-Based Midcourse Defense flight test number -06, conducted on 

31 January 2010, did not result in an intercept. There were two issues and early 

indications are that either issue could have led to a failed intercept. The two issues 

appear unrelated at this time. 

The first issue observed in the test was the Sea-based X-Band Radar stopped operating prior to providing adequate information needed by the interceptor in an important phase of the flight. The second issue observed in the test was the interceptor did not successfully complete the final phases of flight required for an intercept. 

The Missile Defense Agency has an extensive investigation ongoing to determine 

the causes of the failure to intercept. 

Chairman LEVIN. That would be fine. 

General Fraser, last month the Colombian Constitutional Court 

ruled that President Uribe would not be permitted to run for a 

third term. Has there been a fallout from that? Is there enough 

time to have an appropriate election? It’s a fairly short period, apparently, before that election takes place. Are things calm? Are 

there any concerns? 

General FRASER. Chairman Levin, I do not have any concerns. I 

think there is adequate time to hold the election. The election process has been going on while their Supreme Court was deliberating 

on its decision, so I think there’s adequate time. There’s a number 

of candidates who are actively running, and so, I’m confident that 

Colombia will be able to run a fair and equitable election. 

Chairman LEVIN. General Fraser, the—relative to Cuba—as I 

understand it, we have almost no military contact with Cuba. The 

only ongoing contact is apparently this low-level, kind of, monthly 

fence talks, I guess they’re called. But, there’s also a case-by-case 

cooperation in the antidrug efforts, particularly at sea. Apparently, 

there’s notice if there’s fast boats going through Cuban waters. I’m 

wondering, assuming that there is no prohibition in law—and we 

don’t think Helms-Burton does have a prohibition of that kind of 

contact with the Cubans—is there any value in increased U.S. military contact with the Cuban military? 

General FRASER. Chairman Levin, there is, as you mentioned, 

tactical-level interaction—fence-line talks—and the U.S. Coast 

Guard has a liaison in the U.S.-interest mission there in Havana. 

Our understanding—and I’ll go back and check this—is that miliVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:37 May 06, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00698 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\62155.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
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tary-to-military relations are prohibited until the Government of 

Cuba elects a democratically-elected government, and does not include either Fidel Castro or President Raul Castro in as part of 

that government. So that’s our understanding of it, from an engagement with militaries, we look to engage with every military organization within the region. We continue to do that with all our 

partners. So if the opportunity is presented for us to do that, we 

would welcome that opportunity. 

Chairman LEVIN. All right. Well, doublecheck Helms-Burton, if 

you would, because—— 

General FRASER. Yes, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN.—we don’t read it that way. We welcome your 

testimony. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

Senator, our understanding is Helms-Burton does not prohibit military-to-military 

contact with the Government of Cuba. Certainly, placing a U.S. servicemember at 

the Interest Section in Havana, could conceivably offer an opportunity to build rapport and trust. However, current Department of State and U.S. Government policy 

is that such military-to-military meetings and contact with the Government of Cuba 

are restricted as part of a U.S. Government effort to ensure consistency of message 

and to deny the Cuban regime the opportunity to mischaracterize contacts between 

U.S. and Cuban officials. 

General Fraser, there’s a—in terms of the situation in Haiti, I 

believe you—you’ve mentioned that there’s some redeployments 

now that are going on, and that will continue, but there’s some 

enablers that SOUTHCOM apparently will leave, some capabilities 

that you’re going to leave in Haiti. Can you just describe that briefly? 

General FRASER. Mr. Chairman, we’re still early in the discussion and planning of that. It’s an evolving situation. The focus right 

now on the ground is helping make sure shelter, sanitation, and security needs are met, especially for the numbers of displaced people. That is the evolving situation right now. So, we’re looking to 

support USAID, the other international efforts, with the right types 

of capability. So, I don’t have good definition for you right now of 

what that will be. 

Chairman LEVIN. All right. 

Let me ask both of you, on a subject which we’ve spent some 

time on, and obviously will be considering, and that’s the possible 

repeal of ‘‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell.’’ Let me just ask you your personal 

views, essentially. 

General Renuart, let me start with you. What are your personal 

views as to whether we should continue that policy or whether we 

ought to repeal it? 

General RENUART. Mr. Chairman, I think—my personal view, I 

think, probably is very close to what you heard with General 

Petraeus, his testimony a short time ago. I believe that we have 

all served, through the course of our tenure, with individuals who 

were gay or lesbian, and who were not allowed to talk about that. 

I think those individuals served honorably. I think the importance 

of maintaining the standards of discipline is critical to our military. 

But, I believe that we should not hold, if you will, those individuals 

‘‘hostage’’ because of the policy we have. 

694 

So, I think it’s appropriate that we conduct the detailed study 

the Secretary has asked us to conduct and—so that we understand 

the implications, and then we move forward. 

Chairman LEVIN. Okay. 

General Fraser, do you have a personal view? 

General FRASER. Chairman Levin, my views very much correspond to that of General Renuart, and that is that I think it’s 

really appropriate that we do a very deliberate understanding of 

what the President’s intent is in relation to ‘‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell.’’ 

So I support what General Renuart said. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much. 

Senator McCain. 

Senator MCCAIN. Well, thank you Mr. Chairman. 

Obviously all of us have served with people who are of that sexual orientation. They have served honorably. That’s not the question. It’s the question, which I think you have answered, and I 

guess I’d ask you to repeat, is that we have to understand the implications of repeal before we make a decision on repeal. Would 

that be an accurate reflection of your views? 

General RENUART. Senator McCain, it would be. 

Senator MCCAIN. General Fraser? 

General FRASER. Senator McCain, I agree. 

Senator MCCAIN. So, a moratorium would obviously be a de facto 

repeal of the policy before we have understood the implications for 

battle effectiveness on the men and women in the military. So, 

I’d—I appreciate your views, and I share them. For the Congress 

of the United States to take action before we have had a thorough 

review of the policy, not of the way to repeal the policy would be 

the best way to proceed, would you agree? 

General RENUART. Senator McCain, just to be clear, I guess. Is 

it my view that we should have a moratorium? 

Senator MCCAIN. Yes. 

General RENUART. I think we ought not to have a moratorium 

while we conduct this. I think, as the Secretary and the Chairman 

and the Service Chiefs have all indicated, that would cause, I 

think, some confusion in that process. So I think, better to let the 

study go, and then make a decision. 

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you very much. Unfortunately, there are 

efforts to impose a moratorium, which would be tantamount to repeal. But, I’d like to move on. 

General Renuart, could you describe to me, in—as short as possible, but terms that perhaps Americans can understand, how dangerous the situation is on our southern border vis-a-vis the drug 

cartels, the existential threat to the Government of Mexico—I’m 

asking you to make it short, but speak to the problems of corruption, and the possibility that that violence can spill over onto our 

side of the border. This is an issue that I—I don’t know why we 

haven’t—Americans haven’t had the visibility of how great a threat 

and danger this is to the very existence of the Government of Mexico, and the effect that it’s having on public opinion in Mexico. 

General RENUART. Senator McCain, thanks for that question. 

This is, as you mentioned, really the principal struggle that the 

Government of Mexico is undergoing. President Calderon has courageously put his military in the field to take this on, where local 

695 

law enforcement officials have been corrupted or intimidated. 

That’s not the traditional role of the Mexican military, and it does 

put some strain on them, but we are working very closely to share 

the lessons we’ve learned, in places like Afghanistan and others, to 

do that. 

The violence in places like Juarez has been substantial. I think 

we are close to 7,000 murders that occurred in 2009. 

Senator MCCAIN. At 7,000 murders. 

General RENUART.—7,000, and I must say, drug-related murders 

that generally were cartel-on-cartel, but that spills over into the 

population. The Mexicans—— 

Senator MCCAIN. Murders of individuals who are part of the 

Mexican drug enforcement and military and others; they’ve singled 

them out for assassination, including those that have been trained 

by the United States. 

Is that true? 

General RENUART. Senator, I’m not sure about the last statement, ‘‘including those trained.’’ I know we’ve had some people that 

we have trained in the past that were involved and corrupted— 

Senator MCCAIN. No, I meant who were assassinated. 

General RENUART. Senator, I believe there are a small number 

that were U.S.-trained Mexicans. But, certainly your other statement is absolutely correct. These are individuals who are competing for, if you will, market share in the drug business. Cartels 

are very aggressively taking each other on to, if you will, build the 

distribution process, the market share. 

So, that continues, and we are working aggressively with our 

Mexican partners to help build an interagency capacity for Mexico 

to deal with this. I’m cautious, when we talk about the level of 

threat to the Mexican Government, because I think President 

Calderon is strong, I think he enjoys support, and I think he’s aggressively working this, and growing an interagency team that can 

be effective. 

Senator MCCAIN. I don’t mean to interrupt you, but isn’t it also 

true, though, that Mexican public opinion, because of this level of 

violence, is beginning to turn, frankly, in the wrong direction? Is 

that—— 

General RENUART. Yes. 

Senator MCCAIN. Do you have—— 

General RENUART. We have—— 

Senator MCCAIN.—indications of that? 

General RENUART.—seen that the public opinion polls have come 

down, on this regard. Although, I will say, in recent—in just the 

recent month, I’ve seen some numbers where the Mexican people 

have continued to express their support in Calderon’s efforts. So, 

it’s a little bit of a balance in that regard. 

Finally, Senator, just very quickly with respect to the border 

area, here—— 

Senator MCCAIN. Would you also mention the problem of corruption? 

General RENUART. Absolutely. Across—especially in the local police areas, the local governing officials, that element of corruption 

has become significant. It is the means by which the cartels, if you 

will, create their influence on government, essentially to leave 

696 

them alone, to not interfere with the drug-trade business. There 

has been a substantial effort placed by the Mexican government to 

replace corrupt officials in the towns and communities; but it takes 

time to build those credible leaders back up, and that’s still a work 

in progress. 

Senator MCCAIN. Would you, for the record, provide the committee with recommendations of what more you think we need to 

do, including the success or failures of Plan Merida? I’d appreciate 

that. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

Senator, I believe the way ahead for Plan Merida is to focus a greater part of our 

effort on Central America via the Central American Region Security Initiative in an 

overall strategic framework to enhance our Central American partners’ territorial 

control capabilities in the maritime, land, and air corridors. The end state would 

be to maximize our effectiveness to fight criminal organizations by assisting our regional partners in the disruption of illicit activities such as drug, weapons, and 

human trafficking that adversely impact the sovereign control of their territories 

and threaten the southern approaches to the United States. We have been successful by accelerating the expansion of the maritime interdiction capabilities of five of 

our Central American partners. 

Senator MCCAIN. I understand we’re spending about $400 million 

in a year cooperating with the Mexican Government on this issue. 

General RENUART. Yes, sir. That’s correct. Senator McCain, if I 

could, for the record, give you a much more detailed look, both in 

that area and our cooperation with law enforcement along the border, because I think there’s a good news story there. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

Through the Merida Initiative, $415.5 million in Foreign Military Financing funds 

was appropriated in fiscal years 2008 and 2009 for the purchase of the following 

military equipment for Mexico: 

• $200 million for four CASA maritime surveillance aircraft • $110 million for three UH–60M helicopters • $105 million for eight Bell 412 helicopters, seven of which are funded. • Congress is withholding 15 percent of the fiscal year 2009 Omnibus ap- propriation ($5.85 million) due to their concerns over the Mexican military’s 

human rights record 

• $500,000 for 13 handheld ion scanners 

These deliverables will provide the Mexican military with urgently-needed capabilities in the areas of tactical rapid troop transport, overwater surveillance, and 

drug detection to support Mexican law enforcement. I believe they will be valuable 

additions to the Mexican military’s capabilities that will immediately be used to 

help tackle illicit narcotics trafficking operations. As long as the Mexican military 

has a leading role in Mexico’s national campaign to disrupt the capacity of organized 

crime to operate and manage their land and maritime borders, my belief is that 

they will continue to need these kinds of assets. This is a national-level campaign 

that requires national-level capabilities. 

The Mexican Government has embarked on a long-term effort to rebuild their security institutions. Training is a major component of this initiative and focused 

equipment is necessary to building security capacity. Along these lines, they will 

need a large infusion of additional support to build the kinds of capacities needed 

to defend Mexican territorial sovereignty and counter transnational threats like illicit trafficking. Their most urgent needs are troop and equipment airlift; secure 

communications; information collection, analysis, sharing, and fusion with U.S. and 

Mexican law enforcement communities; riverine and littoral operations; border surveillance; and military justice reform (for dealing with an internal security situation 

for which they are not designed to handle). The Merida Initiative thus far has been 

an excellent injection of needed support under a shared U.S.-Mexican agreement. 

But, it’s not the final solution to Mexico’s security requirements. 

The Mexican military is a transitional security force, working now in the cities 

and communities to make gains in combating the cartels until the Mexican law enforcement agencies are retooled and ready to rejoin the fight. When that happens, 

the deliverables provided by the Merida Initiative and related support should well 

697 

position the Mexican military to focus their emphasis on defending Mexico’s territorial sovereignty, their air and maritime approaches, having the all-domain awareness to detect threats at a distance and interdict them before they reach Mexican 

land. This creates a layered defense for the United States and enables a more effective security partnership. For that mission, assets such as those from the Merida 

Initiative will assist in developing national-level capacities for all domain awareness, command and control, interdiction of threats such as weapons of mass destruction and other illicit materials. 

[Deleted.] 

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you very much. 

General Fraser, could I turn to Cuba, a second? They, just in the 

last week or so, a young man named Orlando Zapata died on a 

hunger strike, as a political prisoner in Cuba. After a brief experimentation with a small amount of free enterprise, the Cuban Government has cracked down. They have even been more brutal in 

their repression of human rights, and their prisons have a large 

number of political dissidents who have simply sought to exercise 

their rights as human beings. Is that true? 

General FRASER. Yes, Senator, that’s true. 

Senator MCCAIN. Isn’t there also evidence that, from time to 

time, there has been the Cuban government and military facilitating the drug trade? 

General FRASER. Senator, I can’t confirm that. I’ll have to take 

that for the record. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

I have no evidence that the Cuban Government or military facilitate the drug 

trade. 

Senator MCCAIN. Has there been any cooperation that you know 

of on the part of the Cuban government in trying to restrain the 

drug trade? 

General FRASER. Senator, we have had cooperation, as I mentioned—and I’m not the expert on this, because it’s really within 

the U.S. Coast Guard—as we look at migration as well as the drug 

trade there within the straits around Cuba. 

Senator MCCAIN. Is there any doubt that the—that Raul Castro 

and Fidel have been more repressive in the last year or 2 than they 

were in the past? 

General FRASER. Senator, I think they have continued to remain 

fairly strict on the populace, but I can’t quantify whether that has 

been more restrictive over the last couple of years than before. So, 

I need to also get back to you on that. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

Since Raul Castro replaced his brother Fidel Castro as chief of state, the government’s human rights record has been essentially unchanged. When comparing the 

last two to three years of each Castro’s rule, the frequency of government crackdowns under Fidel (2003 and 2005) are consistent with Raul’s directed crackdowns 

(2006, 2008, 2010), averaging one government crackdown on dissent every 2 years. 

More than 200 political prisoners are currently detained in Cuba; most began their 

sentences under Fidel’s reign. For example, in the ‘‘Black Spring’’ of March 2003, 

the government arrested 75 human rights activists on various charges, ranging from 

aiding a foreign power to violating national security laws. As of March 2010, 54 of 

the original 75 prisoners remained incarcerated. 

Senator MCCAIN. Well, then let me commend, for your reading, 

various human rights organizations who have written and testified 

that the Cuban Government is even more repressive. I strongly 

suggest you read that, General. It might be illuminating for you. 

698 

Finally, how do you assess the threat of the cooperation between 

Iran and Venezuela? Last week Spain’s high court said the Venezuelan Government facilitated contacts between the Revolutionary 

Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and ETA to plan the assassination of Colombian officials visiting Spain, including President 

Uribe. Do you have any information on that and other activities on 

the part of the Venezuelan Government? 

General FRASER. Senator, I do not have any direct information 

on that. We have continued to watch very closely for any connections between illicit and terrorist organization activity within the 

region. We have not seen any connections, specifically, that I can 

verify that there has been a direct government-to-terrorist connection. We are concerned about it. I’m skeptical. I continue to watch 

for it. 

Senator MCCAIN. You have seen evidence of the relationship between FARC and the Venezuelan Government. I mean, that’s been 

published many times. 

General FRASER. Senator, I know that there’s evidence of FARC. 

Senator MCCAIN. I mean, they have the hard drives. When they 

raided the FARC camp on the Venezuelan side of the border. 

General FRASER. Sir, the raid where that happened—— 

Senator MCCAIN. Excuse me. On the other side of the border. 

General FRASER. Yes, sir. 

Senator MCCAIN. Yes. 

General FRASER. So, there has been some old evidence, but I 

don’t see that evidence. I can’t tell you, specifically, whether that 

continues or not. 

Senator MCCAIN. My time is expired. 

I thank the witnesses. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator McCain. 

Senator Lieberman. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. 

Thanks, to both of you, for your service and leadership. 

General Renuart, let me add my personal thank you to you for 

four decades of service to our country. You’ve done it with real 

honor and excellence, and personally, it’s been a pleasure to get to 

know you. I wish you the best in your next chapter. I know your 

wife, as you said, will be happy with your retirement, but having 

watched others retire, I would say, on her behalf, that I hope you 

at least get a part-time job. 

General RENUART. Senator I’m going to work on that. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Okay. I wish you the best. 

Let me begin with you, General. I am, of course, as chair of the 

Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, very interested and appreciative of the way in which NORTHCOM has organized and consolidated the U.S. military’s involvement in homeland defense. You bring unique and critically important skills together with DHS. 

DOD has been standing up three brigade-size Consequence Management Response Forces (CMRFs) to respond to a chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear attack by terrorists or others on our 

Homeland. I’ve been very impressed by that, and appreciative of it. 

699 

I was unsettled a bit when the recent QDR said that it would basically scrap the second and third of those, and replace them with 

10 smaller Homeland Response Forces to be put in each of the 10, 

basically, Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) regions 

around the country, under DHS. I mean, the regional forces have 

some appeal, but I’m troubled by the loss of those two brigade-sized 

Response Management Forces because of the tremendous skills and 

specialties that they would have brought wherever an attack on 

our country, of this serious nature, might occur. So, I wanted to 

ask you as you depart this command, how you feel about that 

change and whether you feel it—these regional forces can do a— 

as good a job of homeland defense as the three brigade-sized 

CMRFs. 

General RENUART. Senator, thanks. This is an issue that obviously went through a lot of discussion within the QDR. We’ve 

worked very hard to create those brigade-sized forces, over the last 

few years, and, with both the support of the committee and the 

Secretary, have crafted two of those. The third was to be made 

operational this year. 

The concern within the discussions of the QDR is that these 

forces may not be as responsive as a force that is, if you will, deployed and lives out in each of these FEMA regions. After much 

discussion, the Secretaries made a decision to adjust this format a 

bit. 

I think our role in this has been certainly involved in the discussions, but—to take the concept that was developed through the 

QDR discussions and turn it into an operational construct that is 

effective and executable. That work is ongoing today, Senator 

Lieberman. I think that there is some work to do, still, to ensure 

that, not only do you have trained and equipped forces in these regional areas, but they are accessible and agile and deployable 

enough to meet the expectations and the assumptions that were 

central to the QDR discussions. 

We still have a little work to do on that. Is it possible that they 

will be as effective? Yes, sir, I think it is. It really depends on the 

fact that we will make a commitment to train and fund and make 

these integratable, if you will, into a capable force when a largescale event occurs. That’s our role in NORTHCOM. We’re working 

hard on that. We still have work to do before I can give you a definitive answer. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Okay. Well, we’re going to keep in touch on 

that, because—and you phrased it exactly in terms of my concerns, 

which is whether these 10 regional forces will be able to quickly 

deploy with the range of skills to the site of an attack where we’ll 

need something as large as a brigade, or two or three, to protect 

the people and stand up the region again. 

I want to understand—make, just, clear for the record—will the 

one brigade-sized force remain in effect? 

General RENUART. Yes, Senator, it will. In fact, it will grow—— 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Yes. 

General RENUART.—by about 700 individuals of—with those 

same critical lifesaving skill sets. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right. 

700 

General RENUART. So, that will remain. It will be focused on an 

Active Duty brigade, so it gives you the most rapid access to 

that—— 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right. 

General RENUART.—to that force. In addition, then, we will have 

two smaller forces that will be predominantly the command and 

control, the logistics, the joint reception, and some immediate lifesaving capability in those two smaller forces. But, they’re really designed to receive so-called general-purpose forces in a large-scale 

event. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Okay. 

Let me move on to the GMD system that has been mentioned. 

In the move to the phased adaptive system that we’re going to now, 

the—there’s some question about the future of the two-stage GBI. 

I know there’s supposed to still be some testing of it going on. 

I wanted to ask you, as you sort of prepare to retire, whether you 

believe we should continue to develop and test the two-stage GBI, 

for instance, as a hedge against a possible Iranian breakout, and 

whether—particularly in regard to the homeland defense, whether 

NORTHCOM has studied options for deploying a two-stage GBI in 

the United States to give another layer of defense to our homeland. 

General RENUART. Senator, the operational test program does 

continue to include both the two- and the three-stage test. We are 

fully supportive of that. As we have had discussions with both 

DOD and with the MDA, our support for the phased adaptive approach is strong. We’re confident that it has real potential, but 

we’ve also asked the Secretary and received, I think, budgetary 

support to not foreclose the capabilities that might be resident in 

a two- or a three-stage interceptor. So, we do support that continued testing; and my information is, that continues to stay on track. 

With respect to the phased adaptive approach, I think that the— 

certainly the information, so far, looks very positive, a very capable 

system. So, we’re supportive of that. We think it gives us great 

added depth to our homeland defense capability. Again, we don’t 

want to foreclose any possibilities in the future, so continuing that 

testing is important to us. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Good. Good to hear. I agree with that totally. 

General Fraser, let me ask you a big-picture question, because I 

think we often find that the regional commanders have some of the 

best views of the regions in which they lead, because of the comprehensiveness of their context with the region. So, as you step 

back and look at SOUTHCOM, Latin America generally, plus, 

there seems to be, here, as in other parts of the world, an ongoing, 

sort of, conflict or competition between the forces of freedom, generally speaking, and the forces of dictatorship; the forces of socialist 

economies, and free economies; friends of the United States, and 

enemies of the United States. So, at this moment, where would you 

say the momentum is? Who’s winning? How are we—and, in a 

more direct sense, how are we doing in the area of your responsibility? 

General FRASER. Senator, I think, overall, we are doing well. We 

continue to have positive relations with most of the Nations within 

the region, especially from military-to-military standpoint; we see 

701 

that very directly. There’s only a couple of instances where that 

has really been reduced. Our relations with the military in Venezuela is one of those; also, with the military in Bolivia, is another. 

But, overall, those relations remain good. 

I see a real competition, as you mentioned, within the region, for 

various ideologies, and they’re coming from various different directions. That competition continues today. 

Really, I see the view of the United States growing. There’s a 71- 

percent approval rating of the U.S. image within the general populace within Latin America. So, I see a positive trend from our relations within the region growing. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thank you for that. That 71-percent appreciation of the United States in Latin America may be higher than 

the appreciation of the United States in America today. I hope we 

can catch up with them. 

Thank you. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Lieberman. 

Senator Inhofe. 

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

First of all, let me echo the comments everyone’s made about 

your great service, and how much I appreciate both of you, your 

great wives, and all that stuff. 

General Fraser, let me tell you what I’m not going to ask you. 

I’m not going to ask you if we ought to close Gantanamo Bay 

(GTMO). But, I do want to get something in the record here, of my 

personal feelings. I’ve had a chance to really get into it. I’ve studied 

it. There’s never been a case of water-boarding, and the conditions, 

the treatment of the people, are good down there. It’s a secure location. There are approximately 200 terrorists left. The low-hanging 

fruit is gone. Of that low-hanging fruit, about 20 percent have 

the—have been back in the fight, according to reports that I have. 

Once the terrorists are physically in the United States, there 

should be no doubt to anyone in this room that these terrorists will 

gain additional constitutional rights and fall within the jurisdiction 

of the Federal courts. 

The attacks leading up to September 11 were not the result of 

holding detainees in GTMO. The attacks of September 11 were not 

the result of holding detainees. The repeated attempts to attack 

this country were not a result of holding detainees. 

Moving detainees held in GTMO to the United States would not 

stop future terrorist attacks to this country. Those guys hate us. 

They want to kill everyone in this room. 

The Americans across the country, they understand this. The 

polling is showing that 2-to-1 say that it shouldn’t be closed. All 

these people who are coming up with these great ideas on what we 

can do to bring the terrorists to the United States for either incarceration or for trial go to all elaborate detail as to how we can do 

this, what it’s going to cost, how we’re going to build the courts. 

There’s a simpler answer, just leave it open. 

Now, again, I’m not going to ask you that question. But, I would 

ask you this. You have had opportunity to go there, General Fraser. Just very briefly, in terms of your impression of the operations 

and of the treatment of detainees, do you have any comment to 

make? 

702 

General FRASER. Thank you, Senator Inhofe. 

Our responsibility in SOUTHCOM is for the safe, legal, transparent, and humane treatment of the detainees at the facility in 

GTMO. 

Senator INHOFE. Are they being treated that way? 

General FRASER. Yes, sir, they are very much being treated that 

way. I’m very proud of the men and women from the military who 

come and provide that—— 

Senator INHOFE. Okay, you don’t need to elaborate. There’s a 

Sergeant Major Carter from Fort Sill who had been stationed there 

several times. Her comment to me—she’s in charge of the prison 

system we have at Fort Sill, and she said, ‘‘I don’t know what’s 

wrong with those people in Washington. Go back and tell them, 

that is a jewel that’s been run properly.’’ She’s the one who has actually been there. I don’t want to belabor that, because that’s a decision that was made by your Commander in Chief, and I don’t 

want to put you in an awkward position. 

But, following up on something that has been said by Senator 

Lieberman, General Renuart, I—you and I talked about this in my 

office. It is true that I was very strongly in support of the third site 

in Poland. That’s a site that would have given us the capability of 

knocking something down. At the time, by 2012—with slippage, 

maybe 2015—ironically, that’s when we think that the Iranians are 

going to have the capability of sending something over. Now, I 

know, in response to the Chairman’s question, that we have a lot 

of ground-based stuff out there. It’s in California and Alaska. I’m 

not comfortable, when I look at these maps. So, I won’t ask you 

how you would stand on going back to that position with the—with 

Poland and the Czech Republic, but I would say that, since we’re 

looking at the SM–3 2B, out there someplace, to be determined— 

we don’t have a date on that yet; we do have a date on the SM– 

3 2A, but that’s for short and medium range—of 2018. I still believe that we should reconsider that. I would only ask you this 

question. Are you at all concerned that we’re going to have the— 

well, it would have to be the 3M—SM–3 2B capability soon 

enough? 

General RENUART. Senator, the intelligence estimates on when 

the Iranians will field a real capability obviously have moved 

around a bunch. So, we want to make sure that we are providing 

sufficient capability to defend our own country. I believe, with the 

current Alaska-based and Vandenberg-based systems, we can meet 

that need. If we see proliferation of capabilities from Iran, we certainly need to consider expanding that capability. 

Senator INHOFE. All right, that’s good enough. Now, since you’re 

going to be bailing out of this—and we have talked about that. I 

certainly wish you luck. It’s been 39 years, is that how long? 

General RENUART. That’s correct, Senator. 

Senator INHOFE. Goodness. Well, that’s great. It’s been a great 

service. I would ask you, just in the remainder of the time that I 

have, now that you’re going out and you can reflect back, and General Fraser knows, how strongly I feel about our partnership programs, our train-and-equip programs, my concern that I had, that 

perhaps the—some of these programs were not—like the 1207, the 

703 

civilian-to-civilian, maybe should have been left where it was. 

That’s my own personal opinion. 

But, in terms of one-size-fits-all, we’re talking about the trainand-equip programs, International Military Education Training 

(IMET), the Combatant Commander’s Intiative Fund programs, the 

Foreign Military Financing (FMF), the Foreign Military Sales 

(FMS), and all of that. What’s your thought about, between countries, the tailor-making of these things? Any thoughts you’d like to 

leave with us on that subject? 

General RENUART. Senator Inhofe—— 

Senator INHOFE. It’s a good program. We all agree with that, I 

think. But, can it be better if we could figure out a way to tailor 

it better? 

General RENUART. Yes, sir. This is key and essential to all of our 

operations around the world. I spent 13 years in the North Atlantic 

Treaty Organization (NATO), I’ve spent 51⁄2 years in southeast— 

southwest Asia as part of the CENTCOM AOR, and, of course, in 

the Pacific, as well. In every case, those combatant commanders 

would tell you that the 1206, 1207, 1208, FMF, FMS, all of those 

building-partnership-capacity programs are critical to allow us to 

do just what General Fraser said, where Ken Keen and the Brazilian counterpart know each other because they’ve worked together, they’ve been to school together, we’ve created training relationships together. We have to absolutely keep those programs intact, and support them, and work through the department-to-department challenges between, primarily, State and Defense, on 

making them easier to take advantage of. They are critical to a 

combatant commander’s success. 

Senator INHOFE. I’ve spent a disordinate amount of time in some 

of the African nations, and I’ve left—not just there, but in the Balkans, and everyplace else—with the idea that we made a mistake, 

at one time, on our IMET program. We had a—we’re kind of treating it as if we’re doing them a favor by allowing them to come here 

to our country to train, and train with our people. I became pretty 

convinced, after a period of time, that we should have lifted, which 

we did, the article of response—requirement that we had before allowing them to come in, that it was really to our benefit more than 

it is to their benefit, that once these people come in, they train— 

whether it’s a—it doesn’t matter what facility it is, but train with 

our people, get that quality training—an allegiance is formed that 

never leaves. Do you think that’s right? 

General RENUART. Senator, very shortly, absolutely. I—my 

youngest son spent 27 months in Senegal in the Peace Corps, and 

he will tell you, firsthand, that the relationships of American outreach to these countries are incredible. 

Senator INHOFE. Yes. Well, my time’s expired, but, General Fraser, do you generally agree with our conversation here, and our 

opinions? 

General FRASER. Yes, Senator, I completely agree. 

Senator INHOFE. All right. Thank you very—thank you Mr. 

Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator Inhofe. 

Senator Reed. 

Senator REED. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

704 

Thank you, gentlemen, for your service and your dedication to 

not only the American military but to the Nation. So, thank you 

very much. 

General Renuart, a disturbing phenomena seems to be the increasing sophistication in armaments of the Mexican drug cartels— 

assault weapons, antitank weapons, sophisticated night-vision devices, sophisticated communication devices. Where are all these 

coming from? 

General RENUART. Senator, thanks. On the very first meeting 

that I had in Mexico, their senior military leadership outlined their 

concern over what they called ‘‘U.S. trafficking of weapons into 

Mexico.’’ Clearly, there is no doubt that there are weapons moving 

north to south into Mexico, and we partner very closely with our 

law enforcement friends to help provide information from the Mexican military, as they’ve collected the forensics of these, so that we 

can, in fact, prosecute. There have been over 40 prosecutions, over 

the last 2 years, of—I’ll call them ‘‘weapons dealers.’’ But, certainly 

we see an involvement from here in this country with respect to illicit weapons trade. We’re also seeing that move from other nations 

around the world, as well. 

So, I think this is a hemispheric problem—both General Fraser 

and I have talked about this—and something we need to continue 

to work. 

Senator REED. But, do you think we’re taking effective steps? 

Again, what seems to be very ironic is that, in some of these recorded incidents, the drug cartels outgun the military and the police. That’s unfortunate. 

General RENUART. Yes, sir. In fact, we see 50-caliber weapons, 

we see rocket-propelled grenades, we see a variety of those things 

being used. That is increasingly of concern to the Mexican military. 

It has resulted, by the way, in them being much more forthcoming 

with serial numbers and that sort of thing, so it allows our law enforcement to really take some action. 

Senator REED. Do we have to do much more on our side of the 

border to control? 

General RENUART. Yes sir, I believe we do. I think our law enforcement partners are very eager to do that. It’s continuing that 

information-sharing between the two nations that will assist. 

Senator REED. On the other side—we’re supplying both sides, essentially, in this battle. Under the Department of State’s Merida 

Initiative, we provided the helicopters and light attack aircraft, inflatable boats, et cetera. Can you tell us if that’s being used effectively? 

General RENUART. Senator, I can, and it is. The Mexicans were 

very appreciative that we accelerated that process to help meet the 

Merida objectives. We delivered the first five of the Bell helicopters 

this past December. We’ll deliver two or three more this year. Patrol aircraft, computer systems that will allow them to fuse information to do border security, to communicate better—all have been 

put in place—night-vision goggles. The Mexicans are also reaching 

out to us for the training associated with integrating these to be 

effective, and we’ve made great progress in that regard. We need 

to continue that effort. Merida shouldn’t just be a 1- or 2-year 

event, but it’s a relationship over time. 

705 

Senator REED. Is there a danger of some of the border States of 

Mexico becoming ungoverned spaces that would invite not just 

narco-gangs, but more sophisticated international terrorists to set 

up shop? 

General RENUART. Senator, I think there’s—I would not characterize ‘‘ungoverned spaces,’’ because I think there’s— 

Senator REED. I don’t want to—I don’t want to suggest that the 

Government of Mexico isn’t competent, capable down to every level, 

but it’s just the turmoil there, I guess, which— 

General RENUART. There is significant turmoil, and certainly 

local governance is corrupted in some places, but that’s very much 

on the focus of President Calderon and his senior—both attorney 

general, as well has his senior military leaders. That’s allowed him 

to push—or it’s enabled him to push forces out to try to help reduce 

that. We have a very good relationship with the Mexican borderstate commanders, as well. 

Senator REED. Thank you. 

General Fraser, your comments on, sort of, the flow of weapons 

and other items, not from the United States, but from other areas 

in the hemisphere. 

General FRASER. Senator, thank you. 

We find that there is a flow. A lot of the flow is headed towards 

Colombia right now, but it also is into Central America. A lot of 

the weapons that are flowing originating—are originating in Central America from weapons that were sold there in the 1980s, but 

we also see a flow that’s coming out of the United States in that 

direction, also. 

Senator REED. Thank you. 

Just—let me switch back to General Renuart, to the chemical, biological, radiological, high-yield explosive (CBRNE) teams that 

you’ve put together, and the CMRF. Can you give us an update of 

their deployment. There’s two, I believe. 

General RENUART. There are, sir. Just very quickly, we actually 

exercised one of those forces this year from a standing start; we 

mobilized them, deployed them, and put them into action in a very 

realistic scenario in Indiana, earlier—at the end of last year. Comments from the US&R Association, the professionals in this business, were that it was as good as any they’ve seen—the Fairfax 

unit, for example, that we’ve talked about—any they’ve seen in the 

world. So, I’m very happy with the quality and capability of these 

forces. 

As I mentioned to Senator Lieberman, as we continue to grow 

this concept that has come from the QDR, we want to maintain 

that standard of capability for the people of this country, and we’ll 

work hard at that. 

Senator REED. Let me ask you a general question, General 

Renuart, and that is the status of the equipment for National 

Guard. Since they’re a major partner in your efforts in 

NORTHCOM, can you give just a general view of—— 

General RENUART. Yes. Very quickly—and what I’ll do is, if I 

may, provide some more data for the record. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

For the Army National Guard, dual-use equipment (items identified as critical to 

domestic missions) is currently at 83 percent. Approximately, 65 percent of the dualVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:37 May 06, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00711 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\62155.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
706 

use equipment is available to the Governors after accounting for items that are deployed in support of Federal missions. 

General RENUART. But, the National Guard, on the average 

across the country now, is up from 40- or 50-percent equipage, now, 

to 70, 70-plus. That’s new equipment. The training quality is up. 

We’re especially pleased that the equipment related to these homeland support missions is close to 100 percent in most of the States. 

Senator REED. Thank you. 

General Fraser, you have many roles, both air, sea, and land, 

but, can you kind of brief us about SOUTHCOM’s Naval Force’s 

Southern Commmand, the naval forces and counternarcotics operations? 

General FRASER. Senator, the DOD mission within counternarcotics is to support the detection and monitoring of the transit 

of illicit goods, if you will, primarily through the maritime environments, the Caribbean and the Eastern Pacific. So, working through 

JIATF-South, an interagency group, we support the detection and 

monitoring in those areas. The U.S. Navy ships do that, as well as 

U.S. Coast Guard ships, as well as aircraft. Then, once those are 

detected, then hand them off for intercept and detention to the law 

enforcement organization. 

Senator REED. Just a quick followup. We all read recently about 

the growing use of submersible vehicles and submarines to move 

drugs around. Is that a continuing upward trend? 

General FRASER. Actually, Senator, it’s decreased. We saw 68 

movements primarily in the Eastern Pacific in 2008. Last year, we 

saw 46. So, we’ve seen a decline. Now, that’s just a 1-year sample 

size. 

Senator REED. Right. 

General FRASER. But, that’s the most recent data, and that’s the 

first decline we’ve seen. 

Senator REED. Thank you, sir. 

General, thank you. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Reed. 

Senator LeMieux. 

Senator LEMIEUX. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I 

want to thank you for your opening comments that discussed the 

connections between Iran and Venezuela. I know Senator McCain 

spoke about that, too. 

General Fraser, you and I have had an opportunity to speak a 

lot about that. So, that’s a topic that I want to explore today. 

Start off by saying, thank you both for your service. 

General Renuart thank you—39 years, that’s incredible. Thank 

you, to both of your spouses. We put our spouses through a lot. So, 

I’m appreciative of them, as well. 

In speaking about the growing projection of influence of Iran in 

the region, I recently had an opportunity to visit Colombia and to 

visit with our military folks there who are assisting with the military leaders in Colombia in the fight against the FARC. There is 

this concern. Senator McCain spoke about the recent revelations of 

the judge in Spain, about the assassination attempt on President 

Uribe. We know that the drug-trafficking flights are flying over 

Venezuela to get to Central America to bring those drugs into the 

United States. Do you consider Venezuela to be the biggest stabiVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:37 May 06, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00712 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\62155.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
707 

lizing—destabilizing factor in the region, in terms of our national 

security interests? 

General FRASER. Senator, I don’t know if I would take it as far 

as the ‘‘biggest destabilizing factor.’’ They are continuing on a pursuit of reducing U.S. influence in the region. They are working 

with various countries and entities to try and enable that. 

Senator LEMIEUX. Let me try it this way. Is there a country in 

Latin America that is working against our interests as much as 

Venezuela? 

General FRASER. Senator, I would argue that, as we look at 

Cuba, they’re also in that same vein. 

Senator LEMIEUX. We’ve seen some recent articles even calling 

it ‘‘Venecuba,’’ that there are Cuban military officials working within the Venezuelan Government. The concern I have—and I think 

this touches on both of your focuses, with you, General Renuart, 

having the focus on Mexico, as well—is that we have this whole 

Central American region that runs—we have Colombia, obviously, 

on the tip of South America, and then it runs up through the region into Mexico. We have these drug trafficking chains. Some have 

described it to me as, ‘‘We squeeze the balloon in one place, they 

find another way to go.’’ If we shut down the semisubmersibles, or 

we work against that, they take more air flights. If we stop them 

at sea—which, you just had a recent success, General—then they 

come over land. I know our Ambassador in Panama is concerned 

about the increased traffic through the isthmus there. 

So what’s your focus—and I assume that there’s coordination between the two of you—what’s the focus, and what’s the plan, going 

forward, to combat this narco-drug trafficking? Do you have any 

concerns that, with the projection of influence of Iran in the region—the idea that we know that Hezbollah and Hamas are—have 

set up shop in the region—that there could be a combination between those groups and the narcotraffickers? 

General FRASER. Senator, if I could start with that. From a destabilizing standpoint, the biggest concern I have in the region is 

illicit trafficking. I think it’s growing as a regional issue throughout, and spreading to other parts of the region. Brazil is now the 

second largest cocaine user in the world. So, it is—the criminal elements of that is the illicit trafficking that really is my biggest concern. What we are looking to do is the—our national Intelligence 

Community is taking an opportunity to look at illicit trafficking as 

a regional enterprise, not just what’s affecting individual countries, 

so that we have the opportunity to understand that enterprise, as 

an enterprise, to try and push on all sides of the balloon, if you 

will, rather than just on one part of that balloon, to see if we can 

start squeezing that balloon effect down. So, that’s really the efforts 

that were ongoing. That’s in direct correlation and coordination 

with NORTHCOM, JIATF-South, JTF-North. Everybody is working 

this—in addition, with law enforcement—to try to get a better understanding. 

Senator LEMIEUX. General Renuart? 

General RENUART. Senator, I’d first agree that—with General 

Fraser’s comment, that this is an enterprise. We have to approach 

it as an enterprise. I’d add, that starts in our own cities; 230 cities 

in our country have seen increases in drug-related gang violence. 

708 

We need to work that internally. But, in addition, coordination 

from the supply through the demand is critical if you’re going to 

really make a difference. Our two commands work very closely, and 

have partnered with Mexico from the south and the north, for example, to try to arrest some of that flow. The Mexicans have been 

increasingly eager for that coordinated support from both of us. 

So, I think there’s a real opportunity, and we’re going to—we’re 

both committed to continue working that. More importantly, we 

have support from our friends in Customs and Border and the 

Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) and the other Federal agencies. 

Senator LEMIEUX. Well, I appreciate that. I appreciate your good 

work on that. I know, in traveling to Colombia, that now the Colombian military’s going to be training some folks from Mexico on 

helicopter operations, so I think that’s a good step. 

I want to just—and I—General Fraser, you and I have discussed 

this, in private—is that—I want you to stay focused, if you will, on 

Iran’s projection of influence in the region, because I’m worried 

that those trafficking chains could be used for other purposes. We 

had an Emerging Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee hearing 

yesterday, chaired by my colleague Senator Nelson, and, to a person, everyone acknowledged that Iran is the world’s number one 

State sponsor of terror. When I see Ahmadinejad traveling the 

world, including spending several stops in Latin America, whether 

it’s Venezuela or even some of friendly nations down there, I’m concerned about it. So, I want you—if you would, please keep a focus 

on that. 

General FRASER. Senator, we’re focused on that. 

Senator LEMIEUX. Right. 

Let me ask you a question, General Fraser, about Colombia, specifically. We’ve been trying to pass this Colombia Free Trade 

Agreement. I think it’s an agreement that has implications beyond 

trade. I think it has implications to our alliances and our friendship with Colombia. Do you see that, in terms of our national security interests, as being a positive step forward, if we could get that 

agreement ratified? 

General FRASER. Senator, I think it would be a very positive step 

forward. One of the things that supports security within the region 

is the opportunity to have stable economies, and vibrant economies. 

Colombia has that. I think a Free Trade Agreement would enhance 

that capability and give an alternative to the illicit traffickers. 

Senator LEMIEUX. I would assume you would agree that a Free 

Trade Agreement with Panama would also be productive. 

General FRASER. Yes, Senator, I would. 

Senator LEMIEUX. Right. 

General Renuart, just to switch gears a little, you—in your opening statement that I reviewed, you refer to Russian Bear Tu-95 

flights probing American and Canadian airspace. Can you comment 

on the activities of the—those Russian airplanes? I know they 

weren’t—they were probing our airspace, maybe not specifically in 

it. You sent up some fighters, I guess, in response. Can you talk 

to that a little bit? 

General RENUART. Senator, just very quickly, we’ve seen an increase, in the last few years, of Russian—their words, ‘‘long-range 

training flights’’ approaching our sovereign airspace. In our 

709 

NORAD role, we have been conducting this surveillance and response mission for over 52 years. We have trained, well-equipped 

capabilities to monitor our airspace. Really, we attempt to identify 

any aircraft that is not on a flight plan, unidentified, not talking 

to people on the radio, so that we understand their intentions. We 

continue to do that. We’ve had a couple instances this year where 

the Russians have flown close to our airspace in the Aleutian 

Chain. Nothing is threatening us, their aviators act professionally. 

But, again, we want to make sure that we don’t allow any aircraft 

from any source to enter our airspace without being identified. 

Senator LEMIEUX. Do you have an assessment of their intentions? 

General RENUART. I think the Russians have neglected their 

bomber force for many years. I think, because of financial concerns, 

they are—the influx of energy money has allowed them to refocus 

some of that, and we’re seeing more of the training that they used 

to conduct, not at the levels of the Cold War days, but certainly 

enough to keep pilots proficient. That—I think it characterizes the 

most—the bulk of what they’re doing. 

Senator LEMIEUX. Okay. Thank you both. 

Thank you Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator LeMieux. 

Let me just quickly mention, since we’ve talked about Chile, that 

there’s a report that, right in the middle, apparently, of President 

Pinera’s inauguration ceremonies, there was a magnitude-7.2 

quake reported in Chile. So, it’s not as bad as the earlier one, obviously, but it’s still a significant-size earthquake. 

Senator Begich. 

Senator BEGICH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Actually, I thought I wouldn’t have time, and I snuck around. I 

broke some rule, I’m sure. Doug, I gave your wife a hug. I hope— 

behind your back, I want you to know that, in all full disclosure. 

But, it’s good to see you again, and Rena. 

General Renuart, I have a couple questions first, and then I’m 

going to have a couple for General Fraser. 

But, first with the Arctic and some of the work that’s now going 

on, especially—on two fronts, one is the climate change that’s occurring, and the Arctic ice melting, and that you have three commands, really, that kind of manage the Arctic. Is there discussion, 

or is there an opinion you have in regards to this, that—my personal view—and I leave it to the military to figure this out—that 

we probably have to unify this in—at some point, like we did—I 

think it was with—Africa Command was a similar situation, two 

or three commands. 

Is there discussions now about trying to figure this out, as we 

move more and more into understanding what opportunities, but 

also, really, challenges—and I think Senator LeMieux just mentioned one of those, but that’s in the Aleutian. Some would think 

that’s close to Alaska. It is, but it’s hundreds of miles from the 

north. But, are you now, as an organization, starting to think about 

this, or can you give me some thoughts on that? 

General RENUART. Senator Begich, you bet. I was a former vice 

commander of Pacific Air Forces, in fact. Doug Fraser was the commander of 11th Air Force, and he wore four hats. 

710 

Senator BEGICH. I know. 

General RENUART. I always felt that it was important for 

NORTHCOM and NORAD to try to help reduce the number of hats 

that we asked him to wear. 

We continue that effort. We will have some discussions this year 

with the Chairman and the Service Chiefs in the unified command 

plan discussion, to help streamline that process. 

Certainly, there is concern that we provide for an active defense 

capability for Alaska. During World War II, the Aleutian Chain 

were invaded and held by the Japanese. That’s something we don’t 

want to repeat. The missions of that homeland defense falls in 

NORTHCOM. So, we want to partner with Pacific Command and 

with the Chairman and the Joint Chiefs, to try to better streamline 

that process. So, maybe we can take one hat or two hats off, and 

get down to just a manageable amount. 

Senator BEGICH. Do you agree, as the Arctic continues its process—as we know, problem in 30 years, is the estimate, that all 

summer will be ice-free, that there’s going to be a lot of other activity, civilian and military, by other countries, within that region, 

and thinking now about it is probably to our advantage, rather 

than thinking 10 years or 15 years down the line. Is that a fair 

statement? 

General RENUART. Senator, absolutely. The Arctic—none of us 

are expert enough to know how much open water, for how long. 

But, certainly we’re going to see more navigable water in the Arctic. It’s an area where we had not focused our attention—national 

attention for quite a period of time. Before the last administration 

left, they published a paper indicating strategy for the Arctic. I 

think that’s a great start. We need to continue that effort and, I 

think, partner with the Arctic Council nations on a common strategy for research and for development, to settle disputes. 

Then, finally—and I know the Senate will continue to consider 

this—the U.N. Law of the Sea Treaty is something that is critical 

to give us a seat at the table to be involved in these discussions. 

Senator BEGICH. The Law of the Sea. 

General RENUART. We very much support ratification of that 

treaty as soon as we can. 

Senator BEGICH. You have my next question, which was Law of 

the Sea. I guess one question that comes up—and tell me, if you 

can—very short answer—some are concerned that—by the United 

States being a part of that—the Law of the Sea—that we will give 

up some of our sovereignty. Do you believe that statement? 

General RENUART. No, sir, I don’t. I think U.S. sovereignty is 

something we hold and protect very dearly, and I don’t believe we 

would give that up. 

Senator BEGICH. Very good. Let me ask you, if I can, on the missile defense system in Alaska. Great debate last year, ‘‘Should it be 

40-plus, or should it be 30?’’ The decision was, through mutual discussions—and I think this committee did a lot of work to get to the 

agreement of 30—and do you still agree with that statement, that 

it should be 30 operational GBIs there? 

General RENUART. Yes, Senator, I think 30 is the right number. 

I would point out that the additional missiles that will be conVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:37 May 06, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00716 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\62155.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
711 

structed are not restricted from being used, if we were to need 

them. 

Senator BEGICH. Correct. 

General RENUART. I think that gives us some capacity—— 

Senator BEGICH. Right. 

General RENUART.—to plus, if that would be required. 

Senator BEGICH. Right, and I had wanted to comment on that. 

I want to thank you for that, because I think one of the things you 

have done, especially in the last 4 or 5 months, maybe 6 months, 

is create that flexibility that, depending on the situation, you could 

plus-up and have a situation available, or infrastructure available, 

to handle that, is part of the plan. Is that a fair statement? 

General RENUART. That’s a fair statement. Yes, sir. 

Senator BEGICH. In that regard, one of the things that I want to 

make sure—I know, in the 2010 budget, there’s probably, I—I want 

to say—this might be close number—$13-, $14 million to continue 

to deal with Field 2 up there, to get it completed. We know, 

through our work and through your agencies—or agency of DOD, 

that it needs closer to about $100 million to finish out all the work 

that’s necessary to keep that flexibility as they close down Field 1, 

which is just—was kind of a test site of six. How do you think 

you’ll be able to go about making sure those revenues, those resource are there to continue to make sure the base infrastructure 

is available to take care of the Field 1, which is in deplorable condition? Give me your—— 

General RENUART. Senator—— 

Senator BEGICH.—those are my words. I know those aren’t the 

technical words, but— 

General RENUART. If I could—let me provide you some more detail for the record. 

Senator BEGICH. Okay. 

General RENUART. But, we work very closely with General 

O’Reilly. I believe his view is that he has sufficient flexibility to be 

able to ensure that we can keep Field 2 on track, and—but let us 

get back to you with some more specifics on that. 

Senator BEGICH. That’d be great. I just want to echo that, please, 

whatever he could do to keep that moving along, because the mobilization of the equipment and the people are working. When you 

demobe, it just is more costly, and this is a huge opportunity. So, 

I—I know he has a lot of flexibility, because the way we wrote that 

last year was to give him the flexibility, as he saw fit. So, if you 

could get us that that’d be great, and I’d encourage him to move 

forward. 

General RENUART. Yes, sir, will do. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

The fiscal year 2011 President’s budget requested the funding needed to continue 

the operations, sustainment, and maintenance of Missile Field 1 and to complete 

Missile Field 2 in a 14-silo configuration. The request reflects funds required in addition to fiscal year 2009 funds previously appropriated for work on Missile Field 

2 and fiscal year 2010 funds previously appropriated to suspend work on Missile 

Field 2. On February 17 2010, the Missile Defense Agency submitted a reprogramming request to the Department’s Comptroller for the realignment of $72.8 million 

of fiscal year 2009 research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) funds and 

$16 million of fiscal year 2010 RDT&E funds within the Ballistic Missile Defense 

System Midcourse Defense program element for the continuation of Missile Field 2. 

712 

Senator BEGICH. Last question then. Doug—I don’t want to leave 

you out—General Fraser. But, one—as more and more alternative 

renewable energy is being debated in Alaska, one of the big issues 

is wind turbines. General Renuart, this is the last question for you. 

Are you dealing with that and understanding—and I know it’s a 

very small—but, I know we’re starting to hear some concerns that 

it may interfere with the mission and airspace. Are you working 

with the civilian population to make sure we manage this correctly? Are there things we need to be looking out for as we deal, 

for example, with an energy bill and making sure that the military 

is not forgotten in this equation? 

General RENUART. Senator, that’s a great question. Very quickly, 

there is a challenge, as we develop, particularly, wind farms, but 

we also see with new building construction, where those—that development has—interferes with the send/receive capability of our 

ground-based radars. I sent a letter to Secretary Gates asking for 

a formal body to be formed, allowing us to review these, so that a 

developer has a place to come to ask these questions. 

Senator BEGICH. Oh, great. 

General RENUART. Secretary’s committed—Assistant Secretary of 

Defense for Homeland Defense, Paul Stockton—to lead that effort 

for that Department. We’re partnering with the Federal Aviation 

Administration and others. But, we are—we need to continue to 

make this process mature. We’ve had questions from Senator Webb 

and others on similar issues, and we know that’s a real concern, 

and we’re committed to work that aggressively. 

Senator BEGICH. Great. Please keep us informed on that. That’d 

be—that’s great to hear that. 

General RENUART. Yes, sir. 

Senator BEGICH. General Fraser, I feel like I have to ask you a 

question, because I don’t want to leave you there. You are a great 

addition to our Alaska team up there, and I know you’re doing a 

great job in SOUTHCOM. We’ve had some great discussion in regards to that. 

One of the things I want to just ask—you and I have had a conversation about a special unit within your organization that deals 

with, kind of, the humanitarian component and the work you do. 

Do you—and we talked briefly about—about how it’s appropriate 

for your command, it may not be as appropriate for other commands—but, have you found that component, that unit, of high 

value for your command, in assisting you with some of the unique 

situations you have in Central America in the SOUTHCOM section? Maybe you could just expand a little bit on that. 

General FRASER. Yes, Senator—— 

Senator BEGICH. I found it very intriguing that you had this underneath your—— 

General FRASER. You’re talking human rights or—— 

Senator BEGICH. Yes. 

General FRASER. Yes. We have a human rights office that was— 

has been in existence for quite a number of years now, has a 

human rights initiative in which 34 countries from around the region have all signed up to. A very active program. Has made and 

helped enable a lot of significant progress throughout the region. 

Colombia has come up fairly dramatically in their efforts and their 

713 

focus on this. Guatemala has the same. They’re very much connected within this. So, it’s a very vibrant office, and is out actively 

pursuing and enabling and enriching human rights discussions 

throughout the region. 

Senator BEGICH. It’s unique to SOUTHCOM, is that correct? 

General FRASER. SOUTHCOM is the only combatant command 

that has one of these, and it’s a resource that’s available to any of 

the combatant commanders. 

Senator BEGICH. Very good. I, again, want to thank you for our 

conversation, especially during the earthquake, and the work you 

have done there, and your troops have done, and all the affiliated 

services that, kind of, came to the call immediately. As—I had 

heard great descriptions of your capacity to stay up many long 

nights, and sleep on whatever’s available, in order to continue to 

keep the command working. I just wanted to thank you and the 

troops for doing such a good job under a very unique situation, and 

how fast you mobilized. 

General FRASER. Senator, it’s a great team effort. Thank you. 

Senator BEGICH. Very good. 

Good to see you both. General, thank you very much. 

Thank you Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Begich. 

Let me just announce that, when we begin the second hearing, 

we will follow the same order of recognition that we’ve been following for the first hearing. We’re not going to start a new or 

changed order, in terms of recognition of Senators, so that everybody can know where they stand. 

Senator Collins. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. Thank you Mr. Chairman. 

General, let me thank you for your 39 years of extraordinary 

service. I assume that, now that you’re retiring, you will be able 

to get to Maine’s Franco-American Festivals, that we’ve talked 

about before, to celebrate your heritage. I look forward to being 

your personal guide in any of those festivals. 

I want to bring up an issue that is an increasing problem in my 

State, and that is the problem of drug trafficking across the northern border. There’s been a great deal of focus, and indeed discussion this morning, about the problem with the Mexican drug cartels. Fortunately, the violence level at the northern border isn’t 

anything close to what we’re seeing at the southern border, but 

that doesn’t mean that drug trafficking is not a problem. Indeed, 

it’s such a problem that, last December, Maine’s Federal judges 

met with me to express their alarm about the enormous increase 

in drug trafficking, particularly of methamphetamine, across the 

Canadian border. They told me that Canada is now one of the 

world’s top producers of meth, and that this dangerous drug is increasingly being smuggled across the border in Maine. 

I understand that the violence associated with the Mexican drug 

cartels demands that the majority of the resources be focused on 

that. But, I’m concerned about whether there is a sufficient focus 

on the smuggling of meth and other dangerous drugs into the State 

of Maine. 

714 

Could you give me more information on what you’re doing to 

counter what you call, in your testimony, ‘‘a serious transnational 

threat to our country’’? 

General RENUART. Senator, first, I look forward to having you 

host me at a great event in Maine in the coming days. That would 

be wonderful. 

I think you hit on a very important element. We do tend to focus 

on drug trafficking south to north, and if—as I talk to my Canadian counterparts, both in the military and in the Royal Canadian 

Mounted Police (RCMP), they also indicate an alarming increase in 

drug activity, drug-related violence, in Canada. We have our JTFNorth, who is focused on DOD support along the borders, both 

north and south, as well as in the maritime. This year, we actually 

are increasing the number of small but effective operations that we 

will conduct along the northern border, in partnership with both 

our Federal law enforcement—DEA and others—and our RCMP 

friends. 

Let me get that data with more specifics, and I’ll take that question, if I may, for the record and get that back to you specifically 

as it looks to Maine. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

[Deleted.] 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. I also noted that, in your testimony, you indicated that you had taken steps to identify threats 

similar to the threat posed by Major Hasan at Fort Hood. Have you 

specifically directed your personnel to do more training on the 

signs of violent radicalization, particularly Islamist radicalization 

within the ranks? 

General RENUART. Senator, Secretary Gates directed a fairly detailed study of the Hasan case. Out of that, there are a number of 

recommendations. They’re primarily pushed to the Services, because they have the responsibility for organize, train, and equip. 

Our role is to ensure that, if you will, facilities are then provided 

the right kinds of information so that their local officials can focus 

on—focus their attention on specific events. To that degree, we 

have worked very closely with our friends in the law—in the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) on information-sharing of a nature that would be important to our military facilities. We’ve increased that kind of activity over the last, really, couple years and 

certainly accelerated some of the programs after the Hasan case. 

So, I—our role is to look at how these Services all view these. 

We’re comfortable that the recommendations out of the Secretary’s 

investigation committee make a lot of sense, and we’re continuing 

to support those. 

Senator COLLINS. General Fraser, do you have anything to add 

on that issue? 

General FRASER. No, ma’am. We’re very much in the same position as General Renuart. So, it’s really focused—the only other 

piece I would put in—those people who are assigned to our organizations, especially the headquarters, then we do have a specific 

focus on supporting their needs. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. 

715 

Finally, I want to associate myself with the comments that Senator Lieberman made about the change and the new teams that 

are going to take the place of two of the three CBRNE CMRFs. I’m 

very concerned about whether adequate resources are going to be 

invested so that we can respond effectively to a weapon of mass destruction. My specific question is how the new Homeland Response 

Forces (HRFs) would coordinate, plan, train, and exercise with the 

regional FEMA offices. I worked very hard to create a regional 

FEMA response team that would be across agency lines in response 

to the failed response to Hurricane Katrina. So, that kind of coordination is very important if we’re going in a different direction. 

General RENUART. Senator, again, just very quickly, we have 

been asked to create the concept of operations that ensures just 

that kind of coordination is done. I think there will be a resourcing 

element of that, that we have to focus on very clearly, because 

these HRFs are hosted by—under the command of a Governor. So 

on a day-to-day basis, we have to ensure that, across the enterprise 

of consequence management, all of those are talking. By the way, 

they are also connected to the Federal agencies, like FEMA. So, 

this is a bit of work in progress. We owe the Secretary back a concept brief at the end of this month, and I think we’ll have identified 

some of those very issues that you mentioned. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator Collins. 

Senator Udall. 

Senator UDALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Good morning, Generals. 

General Renuart, thank you for taking the time to visit with me 

yesterday. As I thought more about your plans to retire in Colorado, I was struck by the old adage that a—at least for us elected 

officials, a statesman is a dead politician. We—some wag said, ‘‘We 

need more statesmen,’’ but I’ll leave that for another conversation. 

I don’t know your long-term plans are, I don’t know what the 

equivalent in the military is, but we’re looking forward to the benefit of your advice and your senior retired status. Although you 

don’t look senior to me; you’re fit. I know we welcome you as a permanent resident in Colorado. 

General RENUART. Thanks, Senator. 

Senator UDALL. I’m going to lean on you for further insights and 

advice. 

Would you talk about the National Guard commission recommendations, and specifically how you’ve increased guardsmen at 

the headquarters, and how they’ve been incorporated? I think you 

and I have talked about what a great opportunity this is to further 

enhance the role of the Guard, to better understand how we utilize 

and deploy the Guard. I want to tip my hat to you, in the Northern 

Command, for what you’ve done in that regard, but please elaborate. 

General RENUART. Senator, we’ve—we have 50 full-time National 

Guard positions in our headquarters; 45 of those are filled. We’ve 

grown that number over time. That’s very effective. But, across my 

headquarters, a substantial percentage of the military—Active military have served in a position where they’ve been associated with 

716 

either the Reserves or the Guard. A substantial percentage of my 

civilians have—are former members of the National Guard or the 

Reserve. So, we have a very good flavor and footprint in that regard. 

In fact, the State of Colorado has been particularly supportive, 

as we have 25 Colorado guardsmen who are a part of that full-time 

support. I just hired a new military assistant for NORAD, and he 

will come from the Colorado Air National Guard. So, we’ve built a 

close relationship, and I’m very pleased with that. 

I think we need to continue to look for opportunities to bring our 

Reserve component in as active participants in our headquarters. 

We have over 130 positions that could be filled, and we’re working 

closely with both the Reserves of our Services, as well as National 

Guard Bureau, to try to keep those all as full as is possible. 

So, we’re very proud of our relationship. I think we’ve built a 

closer relationship with the National Guard Bureau itself than 

we’ve ever had before. 

Senator UDALL. Kudos to you. I think you and I share a philosophy, and I think General Fraser does, as well, that the Reserves 

and the Guard in this era of the All-Volunteer Force, and as powerful and as sophisticated as it is, there’s a tendency for it to become 

isolated from society. The Reserves and the Guard provide that 

pipeline, if you will, and that connection between civilians and 

those who serve us so ably in the military. 

Let me turn to educational opportunities. General Fraser, I want 

to ask you to comment, as well. I know General Renuart’s really 

been interested in this, particularly in the area of homeland security. Do you think the Joint Command educational opportunities 

should be expanded, maybe to include Ph.D. programs? In your experience, are those advanced degrees truly effective at bringing 

back a level of expertise to the force? If so, could they be enhanced? 

Maybe, General Renuart, start with you, and then—— 

General RENUART. Senator, I think—— 

Senator UDALL.—General Fraser, if you’d like to—— 

General RENUART.—the—in our traditional paradigm, the Services, each of them, direct the education programs for their individual people. As we’ve seen the growth of joint commands, I think 

that there is an opportunity for joint combatant commands to focus 

educational opportunities on skill sets that are unique to them. In 

our case, with homeland defense, homeland security, civil support, 

many of those skills don’t traditionally reside in our service-focused 

education programs. So I think there is an opportunity for us to 

relook this paradigm and look for opportunities to allow combatant 

commanders to target, a small number potentially, but a number 

of unique education programs that will then benefit their commands. Then, I think we have to work the personnel system to 

allow us to take advantage of that. We do that, currently, with 

Chairman Mullen’s initiative on the AfPakans, where we’re developing, if you will, area experts in Afghanistan and Pakistan. 

Senator UDALL. General Fraser, do you care to comment? 

General FRASER. Yes, Senator, thank you. 

I agree with General Renuart, and I would probably add on another part to that, especially as we’ve just—working through our 

experience in Haiti—and that is to also include an interagency part 

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to that. Because it’s not only the joint piece, but it is understanding 

the other parts of our interagency, our counterparts there, that will 

have great benefit as we apply a whole-of-government approach in 

many of the situations that we face in the future. 

Senator UDALL. Yes, that’s helpful. General Renuart and I talked 

yesterday about DHS and the Mexican border situation and what’s 

unfolding there. 

Final question, General Renuart—and I think, in a sense, this 

is—strikes right at your legacy. Talk just a little about the relationship between the two commands that you oversee, NORAD and 

NORTHCOM. Why is it important to have a common commander 

and staff, in the future? 

General RENUART. Well, I think, when the two commands were 

formed, there was clearly an opportunity there to create a transparent—or a transition from warning of threats, that NORAD has 

traditionally provided, to the real operational defense of the homeland, whether its missile or maritime homeland defense, into consequence management of a natural disaster or manmade event. 

Over the years, the relationships between those two commands 

have become truly interdependent. Today, you can’t separate the 

functions of warning from the functions of defense actions from the 

functions of consequence management. The structure that it takes 

to operate in that spectrum is consistently tied at every level. 

While there is certainly a difference between the binational command, NORAD, and our—the operations there, and the U.S. national authorities for NORTHCOM, the opportunity to keep them 

connected, almost at every level, provides great synergy for the Nation. 

In terms of the commander, I believe that it would be difficult 

not to have the same person in command of both of those headquarters because it—because of that synergy. I think we’ve seen, 

in the last 3 years, a real move to operationalize that. I think the 

results speak for themselves. We are increasingly effective in that 

regard, and very proud of that. 

Senator UDALL. Thank you for that—insights. Again, thank you 

for your service. 

Thank you, to both of you, for taking care of our hemisphere— 

the American Hemisphere and all the opportunities we have here, 

and in maintaining our leadership role. 

Finally, a shout out to the Canadians, who’ve been such great 

partners of ours, and we’re so fortunate to have them on our northern border, and to share a common culture and values and outlook. 

General, you’ve maintained, enhanced, and nurtured that relationship. I know they’re—I’ve talked to some of the Canadian general 

officers, and they are sorry to see you go, because you’ve had such 

a great relationship with them. 

General RENUART. Well, it’s in my family blood, so I have to. 

Thank you. 

Senator UDALL. That’s right. That’s right. Yes. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Udall. 

Senator Chambliss. 

Senator CHAMBLISS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

718 

Thanks to both of you for your great leadership, your service to 

our country. 

General Renuart, as you wind down these 37 years—I know it’s 

been a long time since your commissioning in 1972, but what great 

leadership, what great selfless service you have provided to our 

country. You’re certainly a model to that next generation of leaders 

in every branch of our Service. So, thanks for your commitment. 

Thanks for your service. Personally, thanks for your friendship 

over the years. You’ve been a great asset to me as we’ve traversed 

through any number of issues. So, we appreciate you very much. 

We’re not going to let you retire yet, General Fraser. We’re going 

to keep you around a while, so——[Laughter.] 

Senator CHAMBLISS. General Fraser, in highlighting the importance of partnering in partnership with nations in SOUTHCOM 

area of operations, currently one of the best ways that we have to 

build and sustain those partnerships is through WHINSEC. I was 

pleased to see both of you comment on that in your opening statements, as well as your written statement. 

Senator Levin and I are pleased to serve on the board for 

WHINSEC, and I’ve seen, firsthand, the value of the training that 

WHINSEC conducts and the partnerships with our southern allies 

that it helps to create. What are your thoughts regarding 

WHINSEC? How does it help you carry out your mission? What 

does it provide to nations that choose to send personnel to 

WHINSEC? 

General FRASER. Senator, thank you for that question. It’s a very 

important institution for us. It provides a lot of capability-building. 

It has a real focus on democratic values, on human rights instruction. In fact, 10 percent of the course load is specifically focused on 

human rights. But, as you mentioned, it’s really that partnershipbuilding. It’s not only partnership-building with members of the 

U.S. military, but it’s across all the militaries who attend those 

courses. 

So, much like we’ve experienced in Haiti, where I’ve had at least 

a couple of instances where the U.S. officers had gone to school 

and—with, one case, a Canadian counterpart, in another case, a 

Brazilian counterpart, and they understood one another right 

away, and it really facilitated the operations in the future. So, no 

matter where we go, in a partnership-building capacity throughout 

the region, or specifically in working each—in working together on 

crises, it makes a huge difference for us. 

Senator CHAMBLISS. The current Defense authorization bill contains a provision requiring public disclosure of names and—of students and instructors who attend WHINSEC, as well as their countries of origin. In your opinion, what effect will this provision have 

on foreign countries’ willingness to send students, as well as instructors, to WHINSEC? What effect will it have on WHINSEC’s 

ability to help SOUTHCOM carry out its mission? 

General FRASER. Senator, I’m concerned that it will have a negative impact on it, that we have gone out and at least looked, and 

discussed with some of our partners there; they would be concerned 

if those names were released. I’m concerned, even for the U.S. military personnel and their families who support WHINSEC, with the 

719 

release of that. So, I personally do not support the release of 

names. 

Senator CHAMBLISS. Thank you. 

General Renuart, as you complete your third year as the commander of NORAD and NORTHCOM, as we look forward, what do 

you think are the biggest challenges out there for these respective 

commands? 

General RENUART. Senator, I think, as we see in many of the 

Services, recapitalization of our infrastructure is important to us. 

The age of our Air Sovereignty Fighter Force obviously is growing, 

and we want to continue to monitor very closely the development, 

the fielding of new systems that can allow us to maintain the air 

sovereignty of our two nations. The radar sites also are aging, and 

we have initiatives in place. So continuing to support the modernization of those are the things that I think are very important 

for the NORAD role. 

For NORTHCOM, I think continuing to work more closely with 

our border security partners, our interagency partners, continue to 

work closely with Mexico, especially in this area of countering illicit 

trade and traffic, I think are some of the future challenges. As Senator Collins and Senator Lieberman mentioned, making sure that 

the CMRF is well-organized, trained, and equipped, and executable 

for the Nation. Because we don’t know when one of those events 

will occur, we have to be ready at any moment. 

Senator CHAMBLISS. In November 2007, over 450 F–15s were 

grounded due to structural concerns, a number of them under your 

command. As a result of that, in NORTHCOM we had to call on 

the Canadians, who flew CF–18s, to fill in for F–15s for a period 

of about 3 weeks. As our F–15 platforms continue to age—and 

they’re a part of that aging fleet that you alluded to—and they 

make their way towards retirement, are you concerned about available assets and the level of acceptable risk in the conduct of your 

air sovereign mission? 

General RENUART. Senator, I’m very concerned that we maintain 

an acceptable force level so that we can keep that mission intact. 

The Air Force is conducting a—if you will, a fighter force review 

that will target, not only the assignment of its aircraft in places, 

but where we invest money, from the Air Force’s perspective, in 

maintaining that fighter force, as new systems come aboard. I 

think you’re going to have a hearing about one of those in just a 

few minutes. I do monitor that very carefully. I’ve said, often publicly, on the record, that the baseline force that we have has to be 

maintained. I’m very comfortable, so far, that DOD—and certainly 

Department of the Air Force—are committed to maintaining that. 

But, it’s something we monitor as you see adjustments in delivery 

rates or in aging rates of each of our systems. 

Senator CHAMBLISS. Well, you’re right, we’re going to be talking 

about the F–35 here a little later on this morning. You and I have 

had opportunity to visit, relative to the performance of the F–22. 

I’d like for you to comment on that, as you have seen it firsthand. 

Second, what effect or impact will a slippage in the initial operational capability on the F–35 have on NORTHCOM? 

General RENUART. Senator, first, on the F–22, it has proven itself 

to be an excellent weapon system. We’ve used it in our air defense 

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missions in Alaska and have found it to be a very capable system. 

I think the Department is committed to continue its spiral development into the modern versions of the airplane that were planned. 

So, I’m very comfortable that it give us a capability that’s much 

needed in our Air Force. 

With respect to the F–35 timing, again, if we see that program 

delay, then it’s—of—it will be of interest to me to ensure that we 

maintain the quality and capability of our existing F–16, F–15 

fleet—again, to maintain that air defense. For right now, I am 

not—I don’t feel there’s an unacceptable level of risk, because I 

think the two match pretty well. But, obviously if something 

changes, we’ll monitor that very carefully. 

Senator CHAMBLISS. Okay. Thank you very much. 

Thanks, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Chambliss. 

We’re ready to proceed, I believe, now, to our second hearing. 

Senator Collins, if you don’t have an additional question. 

We thank you both. We are, again, very appreciative of the service that you have always provided this Nation; your families’ great 

support, we thank them for that. 

Again, General Renuart, all the best to you on your upcoming retirement. 

General RENUART. Thank you Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. We’re going to take a 3-minute recess. 

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR BILL NELSON

HAITI RECONSTRUCTION RELIEF

1. Senator BILL NELSON. General Fraser, it is my understanding that the USNS 

Comfort has departed Haiti and we are in the process of drawing down our forces 

to approximately 8,000 over the next couple of days. What will be the biggest challenge as we draw down U.S. forces in Haiti and turn over responsibilities to the 

United Nations (U.N.) Peacekeeping Force? 

General FRASER. Our greatest challenge as we draw down U.S. forces in Haiti is 

to ensure, together with our U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), 

U.N., and nongovernmental organization (NGO) partners, sufficient engineering improvement in Internally Displaced Person (IDP) camps to weather the upcoming 

rainy season. We also may need to assist in the movement of as many as 9,000 atrisk people prior to the rainy season in order to prevent potential loss of life due 

to flash flooding and mud slides. For this reason, our drawdown will be somewhat 

slower than originally contemplated and we intend to maintain some capacity in 

Haiti through the hurricane season. 

2. Senator BILL NELSON. General Fraser, what are your greatest security concerns 

in Haiti post-earthquake i.e. drug trafficking, gangs, general instability? 

General FRASER. First let me say that the security situation in Haiti remains stable; however, challenges persist. 

The most immediate security issue is the overcrowded camps due to the thousands of internally displaced Haitians living there, and in many cases, lacking adequate sanitation and internal camp security. Anecdotal reporting indicates crime 

within these camps, most prevalent after dark, ranges from petty theft to rape. I 

would note that the U.S., Government of Haiti, and the international community 

are taking steps to improve camp security, including additional police patrolling and 

physical improvement such as lighting. 

Finally, I would like to say the Haitian populace has demonstrated a remarkable 

level of patience since the January 12th earthquake. While it is possible that general instability could result from the rainy season or hurricane season, we believe 

this is unlikely. 

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3. Senator BILL NELSON. General Fraser, a recent New York Times article on 

Haiti reports that, ‘‘according to a U.N. map of greater Port-au-Prince circulating 

among recovery teams, 21 out of the 500 makeshift settlements are considered high 

risk for flooding, landslides, or overcrowding. Seven—home to 150,000 to 200,000 

people—are deemed life-threatening.’’ With the rainy season officially beginning on 

April 15, what are we doing to help internally displaced Haitians in and around 

Port-au-Prince with shelter and sanitation? 

General FRASER. Shelter and sanitation continue to be the top priorities for the 

Government of Haiti. Operation Unified Response personnel qualified in building 

damage assessment recently trained Haitian responders in damage assessment, enabling them to continue assessments of buildings and homes across Port au Prince 

with an eye towards urging Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) to return to those 

homes deemed structurally safe. The distribution of shelter material continues to be 

a high percentage of total relief supplies distribution. 

The International Organization for Migration (IOM) is working closely with the 

Haitian Government, U.N., and NGO partners, and camp populations to establish 

a real-time sanitation monitoring system. The system will track the sanitary situation in displacement sites and detect immediate and structural challenges. Over the 

coming weeks, IOM’s environmental health and sanitation unit will train residents 

in several camps to report on crucial health issues such as water, sanitation and 

hygiene issues. The teams will also focus on fighting mosquitoes in order to prevent 

malaria and dengue fever, as well as environmental hazards, especially flood and 

mud-slide risks. 

Over the last several weeks, U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) and others 

have undertaken engineering projects at the most vulnerable camps to reduce the 

risk of flooding. At this point we believe that perhaps 9,000 IDP residents will need 

to be moved to safer sites. 

4. Senator BILL NELSON. General Fraser, are you satisfied that our civilian agencies will pick up the slack on the humanitarian operations—including the security 

of food distribution—when the U.S. military departs? 

General FRASER. Yes, I am satisfied that the Government of Haiti assisted by the 

U.N., USAID, and NGOs can and will successfully conduct the full range of needed 

humanitarian assistance as U.S. military forces continue to depart. I would stress 

that we have always linked any reduction of DOD forces to the clear capacity on 

the ground of other organizations to assume our activities. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR ROLAND W. BURRIS

DEFENSE SUPPORT TO CIVIL AUTHORITIES

5. Senator BURRIS. General Renuart, I understand that you provide command and 

control for Defense Support to Civil Authorities (DSCA) as part of your mission to 

conduct civil support operations. How do you integrate the forces of the National 

Guard and the Reserves of all Services into DSCA operations? 

General RENUART. National Guard forces will normally respond to a catastrophic 

event in State Active Duty or Title 32 Status, under the command of a Governor. 

U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) coordinates with the National Guard to 

synchronize and integrate Federal and State military operations to avoid duplication 

and achieve unity of effort. 

NORTHCOM integrates Title 10 Reserve units and individuals into DSCA operations when they are mobilized or activated. For example, the Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officer (EPLO) program consists of more than 400 Reserve officers who 

belong to the Services (Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps) and have volunteered to support DSCA operations. As reservists, EPLOs possess unique knowledge 

about their regions and States, including: capabilities, key infrastructure, transportation systems, and local geography. NORTHCOM will normally request EPLO activation before, during, or after an incident or event to assist the Defense Coordinating Officer and our components in coordinating DOD’s response. Additionally, 

NORTHCOM sponsors an annual workshop to train and educate EPLOs on DOD 

and NORTHCOM policies, plans, and procedures. 

6. Senator BURRIS. General Renuart, are there any restrictions? 

General RENUART. Yes, in accordance with Title 10, Army, Navy, Air Force, and 

Marine Federal reservists are only available for civil emergencies while in voluntary 

inactive duty for training status. To eliminate this restriction, we support a statutory change to allow the Secretary of Defense to order Army, Navy, Air Force, and 

722 

Marine reservists to active duty to provide assistance in large-scale, manmade, natural, and accidental disasters or catastrophes when the response capabilities of Federal, State, and local civilian agencies have been, or will be, exceeded. This authority will enable the nearest unit, which is often Reserve, to respond—saving time, 

money, and American lives. 

7. Senator BURRIS. General Renuart, what specific roles does the Coast Guard 

play in DSCA? 

General RENUART. DSCA is conducted by the Department of Defense (DOD). 

Though a military service, the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) is a part of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and therefore does not conduct DSCA. However, 

NORTHCOM and the USCG are mission partners in responding to domestic contingency operations. Additionally, the USCG, due to its statutory responsibilities, is engaged daily in civil support well before DOD assistance is requested. 

NORTHCOM and the USCG coordinate routinely to ensure unity of effort in the 

area of civil support operations. Regular missions performed by the Coast Guard include maritime Search and Rescue, Port Waterways and Coastal Security, and waterways management, including prevention and response to natural and man-made 

disasters in the U.S. marine transportation system. 

There are 20 full-time USCG positions, including one flag officer (Deputy Director 

of Operations), within the NORTHCOM headquarters. 

8. Senator BURRIS. General Renuart, how many personnel from other government 

agencies are permanently assigned to your command? 

General RENUART. Thirty-one people from non-DOD government agencies are permanently assigned to North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) and 

NORTHCOM. In addition, there are 20 agency representatives, who reside with 

their parent agency, but are permanently assigned as the primary liaison between 

NORAD and NORTHCOM and their agency. 

9. Senator BURRIS. General Renuart, what are the advantages of having these 

agencies assigned versus detailed to your command? 

General RENUART. Having agency representatives permanently assigned to 

NORTHCOM allows for a truly ‘‘collaborative’’ environment in which agencies jointly develop and execute integrated plans and operations, and processes which fuse 

our cultures together in a common purpose. Permanently assigned agency representatives throughout NORAD and NORTHCOM provide interagency synchronization. 

They assist and facilitate coordination of interagency issues, initiatives and operations between the NORAD and NORTHCOM Battle Staff, components, deployed 

assets and external agencies. Resident agency representatives also facilitate interagency information sharing. 

Interorganizational representatives are the primary enablers in coordinating additional or refined connectivity as required with key external partners to ensure 

NORTHCOM is connected correctly to support day-to-day exercise and contingency 

operations. These representatives are essential for providing interagency context to 

our decisionmaking process, providing the interagency perspective to the 

NORTHCOM staff and providing the DOD perspective back to their parent organizations. This level of action and insight is only realized when an agency is fully integrated into the Command. 

10. Senator BURRIS. General Renuart, what role does Joint Task Force-Civil Support (JTF–CS) play in DSCA? 

General RENUART. JTF–CS plans and integrates DOD support to the designated 

primary agency for domestic chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or high-yield 

explosive (CBRNE) consequence management operations. When approved by the 

Secretary of Defense and directed by the Commander of NORTHCOM, JTF–CS deploys to the incident site and executes timely and effective command and control 

of designated DOD forces, providing support to civil authorities to save lives, prevent injury and provide temporary critical life support. 

JTF–CS focuses on responding to the effects of a CBRNE incident after civilian 

resources have been utilized first and fully. Some typical JTF–CS tasks include incident site support, casualty medical assistance and treatment, displaced populace 

support, mortuary affairs support, logistics support, and air operations. 

JTF–CS accomplishes its consequence management mission in strict adherence to 

existing Federal law, which carefully balances the support capabilities within the 

U.S. military with the needs of civil authorities during emergencies. In most instances, JTF–CS and its designated forces are deployed only after a State or territorial Governor requests Federal assistance from the president. In any domestic setVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:37 May 06, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00728 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\62155.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
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ting, JTF–CS remains in support of the primary agency throughout the CBRNE consequence management operation. 

JTF–CS can also conduct non-CBRNE DSCA missions at the direction of 

NORTHCOM. However, due to the unique capabilities that JTF–CS affords the national-level CBRNE response, considerations will be made at all levels to select alternative capabilities to meet non-CBRNE mission requirements. 

11. Senator BURRIS. General Renuart, is there a plan to give the civil support 

teams the ability to provide mission support and advice to the combatant commanders, in addition to their role to support the governors? 

General RENUART. There is no plan to have Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil 

Support Teams (WMD–CSTs) provide direct mission support to combatant commanders. However, WMD–CST situation reports do currently flow from the States 

to NORTHCOM through the National Guard Bureau. 

LABORATORY PERSONNEL DEMONSTRATION PROGRAMS

12. Senator BURRIS. General Renuart, the command has permanently assigned 

members of the National Guard and the Reserves. Do you feel the mix of Active and 

full-time Reserve component personnel is sufficient to carry out the mission of the 

command? 

General RENUART. There are over 50 full-time Reserve component authorizations 

in NORTHCOM headquarters; however, only 45 of those positions are filled. More 

work is needed to fund and fill these important positions. Our mix of Active Duty 

and Reserve component is about right, if we can get the current positions filled. We 

have a Reserve component presence in every staff directorate in my headquarters 

working alongside their Active Duty brethren with the heaviest concentration in the 

Operations Directorate. I’m confident the Reserve component is represented in everything we do in the headquarters. I would submit that any change would be driven by funding and availability. I need either Active Duty manpower to fill valid positions or the Reserve Component funding to compensate for active duty shortages. 

The mission will not suffer depending on the type of manpower, but a lack of manpower could increase risk. The National Guard has made a significant investment 

in personnel assigned to NORTHCOM. In fact, NORTHCOM has the largest concentration of Title 10 National Guard officers in a joint organization outside of the 

National Guard Bureau. 

13. Senator BURRIS. General Renuart, how do you interface with the DHS and are 

you in support of their efforts? 

General RENUART. NORTHCOM routinely works with the DHS on operational 

planning, training and execution of homeland defense and civil support missions. 

For defense support of civil authorities missions, NORTHCOM supports requests 

from the DHS in accordance with direction from the President and the Secretary 

of Defense. 

14. Senator BURRIS. General Renuart, illegal drugs continue to be problematic in 

the Southwest Border (SWB) States. You have a role to play in providing support 

to that effort. How long do you anticipate that the SWB mission using National 

Guard troops will be required? 

General RENUART. In order to effectively counter the threat of transnational criminal organizations in the SWB region, the U.S. Government needs to leverage the 

potential synergies among many agencies with homeland security, law enforcement, 

and defense missions while deepening the U.S. strategic alliance with the Government of Mexico. 

The Joint Staff advised NORTHCOM in 2009 of a request for forces from the DHS 

for military support along the SWB. The request was in anticipation of potential 

spill over violence by Mexican Drug Trafficking Organizations attempting to solidify 

control of territorial smuggling corridors. The request for DOD support was patterned after Operation Jump Start (2005–2007) to bridge capabilities until U.S. Customs and Border Protection could train new personnel to cover the expansion of requirements along the northern and southern borders of the United States. 

NORTHCOM has not been tasked by the Secretary of Defense to fill those positions 

with Title 10 forces. The National Guard Bureau, through the Joint Staff, has been 

tasked with planning how to support DHS with Title 32 forces. 

724 

15. Senator BURRIS. General Renuart, how effective is your joint intelligence fusion cell in providing actionable intelligence/information to various law enforcement 

agencies? 

General RENUART. [Deleted]. 

16. Senator BURRIS. General Renuart, within the mission to provide theater security cooperation, what specific training programs do you provide Mexico? 

General RENUART. NORTHCOM coordinates the following kinds of training for 

the Mexican military: 

• Professional development • Professional military education in U.S. War Colleges and Staff Colleges • English language training • Anti-Terrorism/Force Protection • Combat medical training • Port Security training • Logistics, supply, and warehouse training • Combat strategic intelligence training • Human rights training • Military justice/Rule of Law training • Tactical intelligence training • Public Affairs training • Information Systems training • Naval operations training • Patrol craft operations training • Ship repair training • Initial helicopter pilot training • Helicopter maintenance training • Aircraft pilot upgrade training • Aircraft maintenance training (hydraulics, electronics, pneumatics, corrosion control) 

• Maintenance supervisor training • Operational law training • Anti-corruption workshop/training • Aviation safety training • Joint training • Ship inspection and container security training • Ship power plant—maintenance training • Civil-Military operations training • Urban operations training • Riverine training • Counter Terrorism fellowship training • International Dynamics of Terrorism courses • Senior executive level courses on global security threats • Aircrew weapons director training • Aircrew simulator training • Counter Narcotics Operations training • Aviation survival training • Pilot instrument procedures training • Army Ranger training • Jumpmaster training • Dive training • Search and rescue training • Hemispheric security and defense training • Psychological operations training 

17. Senator BURRIS. General Renuart, what specific programs and DSCA support 

do you cooperate with Canada along our northern border? 

General RENUART. Defense Support of Civil Authorities is not conducted outside 

of the United States and its territories. However, NORTHCOM has signed the Canada-U.S. Civil Assistance Plan (CANUS CAP) with Canada Command 

(CANADACOM) establishing the framework for the military of one nation to support the military of the other nation pursuant to an exchange of diplomatic notes. 

If support is provided to civil authorities, it is still under military-to-military support, that is, the military forces of one nation supports the military forces of the 

other nation that are providing military support of civil authorities. The CANUS 

CAP was used during crisis action planning in the 2008 hurricane season, and for 

deliberate planning in response to requests from the Government of Canada for support during the Vancouver 2010 Winter Olympic Games. During the 2010 Olympic 

725 

Games, NORTHCOM was prepared to provide support to CANADACOM as they 

supported Public Safety Canada. 

DISASTER RELIEF IN HAITI AND CHILE

18. Senator BURRIS. General Fraser, I want to commend your command for providing the initial support to the relief efforts in Haiti and your potential support 

to Chile. What impact will these operations have on your other efforts within your 

Area of Responsibility (AOR)? 

General FRASER. Due to the increased operational tempo required of the Southern 

Command (SOUTHCOM) staff and its components as a result of the Haitian and 

Chilean crisis, we canceled two of our Foreign Military Interaction exercises this 

year, Fuerzas Aliadas Humanitarias and the command post exercise portion of 

Peacekeeping Operations-Americas (PKO–A). Although these training opportunities 

were lost for this year, we anticipate executing them as planned next year, so there 

will not be any long term impact to the region. Other exercises will require some 

modification. 

In order to support the U.S. effort in Haiti, 12 of the SOUTHCOM’s Medical 

Readiness and Training Exercises (MEDRETEs) were refocused on Haiti (6 previously programmed in Haiti, 4 reprogrammed from other countries, and 2 were created). Although redirecting four MEDRETEs from their original countries impacted 

our original theater security cooperation priorities, the high level of need in Haiti 

demanded the change. More significantly, with the tremendous support of the Louisiana National Guard, we created an additional New Horizons exercise for Haiti. 

This Humanitarian Civic Assistance exercise includes engineering, construction, and 

medical projects, selected in consultation with USAID and the U.S. Embassy in 

Haiti that will complement the U.S. relief effort while providing U.S. troops realistic 

training. 

With regard to SOUTHCOM Humanitarian Assistance Program, our ability to engage with other partner nations in the region and to fund potential disaster response operations throughout the AOR has been diminished until the Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid baseline is restored by the pending Haiti supplemental request. 

JOINT CAPABILITY TECHNOLOGY DEMONSTRATIONS

19. Senator BURRIS. General Fraser, I understand that you have been approved 

to conduct Joint Capability Technology Demonstrations (JCTD) to address a permanent solution for responding to foreign disasters. What are the objectives and expected outcomes of the JCTD? 

General FRASER. SOUTHCOM is the operational lead or co-lead for three Joint 

Capability Technology Demonstrations (JCTDs) pertaining to military support for 

humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) activities. While it is not possible to field a permanent solution to the multitude of HA/DR challenges, we expect 

each of these JCTDs to improve our ability to support interagency and international 

efforts when disasters strike. 

Transnational Information Sharing and Cooperation (TISC) JCTD has an objective of adapting best-of-breed information sharing capabilities to facilitate collaboration with traditional and non-traditional partners in complex environments. It 

leverages Internet Web 2.0 technologies, such as interactive forums, chats, blogs, 

wikis, etc., to facilitate timely information sharing among U.S. and partner nation 

militaries, government agencies, non-governmental and international organizations, 

and other interested stakeholders. Central to TISC is a customized implementation 

of the All Partners Access Network (APAN), based on the Asia-Pacific Area Network 

hosted by the U.S. Pacific Command. TISC is in operational use today and has already yielded great dividends in Haiti. Within hours of the January 12, 2010 earthquake, a dedicated Haiti HA/DR community of 1,900+ registered members began 

sharing situational information, and quickly transitioned to using TISCs tools to coordinate actions. 

The Cooperative Security (CS) JCTD goes beyond TISC/APAN information sharing, with an objective of providing harmonized activity planning, execution monitoring, and feedback between DOD and the many U.S. Government interagency organizations and cultures; and eventually provide interfaces to support other national and international stakeholders. Currently under development, the CS design 

is projected to incorporate further refinements to APAN, and integrate advanced 

knowledge management and decision support capabilities. 

726 

The Pre-positioned Expeditionary Assistance Kits (PEAK) JCTD recently kicked 

off with an objective of developing a modular, easy to transport kit that provides 

deployable water purification, renewable energy, basic situational awareness, and 

essential communications capabilities. PEAK will support a full spectrum of operations, to include HA/DR, bare-base deployments, peacekeeping operations, and support to law enforcement and civil authorities. The first six prototype units are projected to be available on or about June 30, 2010, less than 4 months from idea to 

fielded capability. 

RESERVE COMPONENT FORCES

20. Senator BURRIS. General Fraser, are you taking advantage of the civilian acquired skill sets that the Reserve component forces have to offer? 

General FRASER. Yes, the Reserve components brings a wealth of experience and 

knowledge that SOUTHCOM uses every day. In Haiti, we leveraged this extensive 

pool of experience by filling critical hard-to-fill positions with reservists trained as 

surgeons, pilots, logisticians, and, search and rescue experts. 

In addition, Reserve component civilian acquired skill sets are key to ensuring 

successful State Partnership Programs (SPPs) projects. For example this year 

events have been executed focusing on the following civilian skills: 

• Full time civilian teachers who are soldiers at the New Hampshire National Guard and the Ministry of Education from El Salvador conducted a 

training project focused on improving the techniques of teachers of special 

education. 

• Soldiers who work as divers for the New Hampshire police conducted exchanges on underwater search and rescue operations with El Salvador Police department. 

Many projects are conducted in Latin America that are focused on developing the 

civilian capabilities of our partner nations in managing disaster response utilizing 

our National Guard members who work as civilians in U.S. government disaster 

management agencies. 

Throughout the years, Reserve Component forces have also participated in 

projects focused on agricultural development, city planning, well digging and many 

more civilian acquired skill sets that have been key for engaging with our partner 

nations throughout SOUTHCOM. 

SECURITY SECTOR REFORM PROGRAM

21. Senator BURRIS. General Fraser, what countries are prime candidates for a 

successful security sector reform program? 

General FRASER. SOUTHCOM participates in broader U.S. Government security 

sector reform (SSR) efforts through interagency review of U.S. Embassy requests for 

Section 1207 funds to support host nation SSR programs. Haiti, Colombia, Panama, 

and Paraguay received 1207 funding, and remain viable candidates for further security sector reform programs. In addition, Peru, Guatemala, El Salvador, Costa Rica, 

Honduras, and Jamaica are prime candidates for security sector reform programs. 

The security challenges posed by illicit trafficking in Peru, Central America, and Jamaica adversely affect the security of these States and their people. In addition, 

gangs in Central America and Jamaica contribute to serious security challenges. Integrating defense and police against illicit trafficking organizations and gangs, including measures to increase their effectiveness of their joint operations, is critical 

to the security of these countries and ultimately, the United States. 

As one aspect of security sector reform, SOUTHCOM has worked with the defense 

establishments of various partners in the region, including Colombia and Panama, 

at their request, to realize more efficient and streamlined structures to manage 

their defense efforts. Professional militaries are a touchstone of stable and secure 

societies and professionalization begins at the individual level. To that end, DOD 

hosts a number of foreign defense establishment students at educational facilities 

such as the Western Hemisphere Institute of Security Cooperation and the Center 

for Hemispheric Defense Studies, where DOD provides its best practices on a range 

of issues, including strategic planning, resource management, and human rights. 

727 

COUNTERNARCOTICS AND COUNTERTERRORISM EFFORTS

22. Senator BURRIS. General Fraser, can you identify some examples where the 

military-to-military engagement has led to enhancing the U.S. counternarcotics and 

counterterrorism efforts? 

General FRASER. SOUTHCOM continues to coordinate and implement a focused 

Counter Narcotics (CN) program, a basic element of which supports the development of a more robust Partner Nation air/maritime interdiction capability. The intent of this effort is to enable Partner Nations to respond independently or in concert with other Partner Nations against the CN threat. When integrated into Joint 

Interagency Task Force-South’s (JIATF–S) overarching CN architecture this capability provides needed synergy to a diminishing number of US air/maritime interdiction assets. Examples where this effort is proving its worth include the following: 

Through the Enduring Friendship (EF) Program, SOUTHCOM has assisted Partner Nations in the Caribbean and Central America to enhance their maritime intercept and C2 capability to conduct counter illicit trafficking operations. In fiscal year 

2009, SOUTHCOM delivered interceptor boats to the Bahamas (2), Belize (2), Dominican Republic (4), Honduras (4), Nicaragua (4), and Jamaica (2). Additionally, 

SOUTHCOM provided C2 capability: Harris HF/VHF radios (land based and shipboard), Over the Horizon Tactical Tracking System and Cooperating Nations Information Exchange System, a maintenance and spare parts package for boats and radios, and a training package consisting of command, control and communications 

(C3), tactical boat operations and equipment maintenance. Nicaragua is an excellent 

example of how this maritime interdiction capability is being used, as security forces 

from that nation consistently respond to JIATF–S cued intelligence to support Law 

Enforcement Agencies in the interdiction and apprehension of illicit traffickers. 

Colombia Maritime Interdiction Capability—DOD purchased Midnight Express 

interdiction boats were delivered beginning in 2006 concurrent with the development of multiple supporting infrastructure projects on both the Pacific and north 

coast of Colombia. The initial 12 DOD purchased boats all actively engaged in CN 

maritime interdiction missions responding to Colombian/JIATF–S cued intelligence. 

Colombian Navy has purchased an additional 14 boats with their own funds with 

delivery of the first 6 scheduled in July of this fiscal year. Long-term sustainment 

for the capability has shifted to the Colombian Navy with minimal additional support from the Department of State Narcotics Affairs Section in Colombia. The boats 

have been active against the Self-Propelled Semi-Submersibles threat particularly 

on the Pacific Coast in/around Buenaventura. JIATF–S and the Colombian Navy 

work closely in coordinating operations that employ the Midnight Express boats as 

a force multiplier in the maritime interdiction environment. 

SOUTHCOM maintains military-to-military relationships and enhances Host Nation Military Counter Narcotics/Counterterrorism abilities with countries throughout the AOR by conducting a series of recurring engagements which include: Joint 

Combined Exchange Trainings, Combined Multinational Exercises, Counternarcotics 

Assistance Missions, Humanitarian Assistance Programs, Intelligence Sharing and 

Intelligence Cooperation, and Security Assistance Programs. These engagements 

serve as the foundation to the SOUTHCOM Commander’s Theater Campaign Plan 

and directly enhance and assist these countries’ Counter Terrorist Forces and Counternarcotics Forces’ effectiveness while enhancing the U.S.’s own counternarcotics 

and counterterrorism efforts. 

STATE PARTNERSHIP PROGRAM

23. Senator BURRIS. General Fraser, how is the National Guard’s SPP integrated 

into your theater engagement strategy? 

General FRASER. The National Guard’s SPP is integrated in the SOUTHCOM’s 

Theater Security Cooperation Strategy through a balanced approach of military to 

military, military to civil, and civil to military activities that sustain positive trends, 

reinforce successes, and cooperatively meet shared transnational challenges. It creates opportunities to develop capabilities within partner countries that support conditions to advance democracy, promote regional security, support hemispheric cooperation, foster future economic opportunities, and build partner nation capacity. 

In addition through the office of the Governor, institutional and people-to-people 

relationships are developed that can be sustained over the long term. The State facilitates local government, academic, and economic contacts, as well as National 

Guard and civilian community involvement in people-to-people contacts with the 

Partner Nation. This involves linking the right people, with the right skills and 

qualifications, at the right time to accomplish the mission and support my 

SOUTHCOM Strategy 2020. 

728 

At this time 20 nations in the region are partnering with the National Guard from 

17 States. Over the past year Guard units have participated in engagement opportunities such as engineering and medical exercises. Most recently, I am pleased to 

note Louisiana and Haiti are about to finalize the details of an SPP relationship. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JEFF SESSIONS

GROUND-BASED MIDCOURSE DEFENSE

24. Senator SESSIONS. General Renuart, although the Missile Defense Agency 

(MDA) has established a Stockpile Reliability Program to ensure ground-based midcourse defense (GMD) reliability over its service life, there appears to be very little 

emphasis on actual flight testing. Instead, MDA believes it can utilize ground-tests 

and inspections, coupled with modeling and simulation, to assess the reliability of 

the ground-based interceptor (GBI). This obviates the need for flight testing, reducing the number of required GBIs, which in turn reduces costs. The GMD program 

manager and the MDA Executive Director have briefed staff that MDA plans to acquire only 52 GBIs: 30 will be deployed, while the remaining 22 will be used for 

testing. By fiscal year 2019, MDA assumes developmental testing will be complete 

and that three GBIs will remain for stockpile reliability testing through 2032. In 

other words, MDA concludes that only three GBI flight tests over 12 years will be 

sufficient to maintain system reliability. As the combatant commander responsible 

for defending the Homeland against ballistic missile attack, have you been asked 

to concur on MDA’s stockpile reliability plan for the GMD system? 

General RENUART. No, we are aware of the Missile Defense Agency’s Stockpile Reliability Program, but have not been asked to formally review the plan. 

25. Senator SESSIONS. General Renuart, do you agree with MDA’s position that 

only three GBIs are required between 2019 and 2032 to conduct flight testing to assure the reliability of the GBI and the GMD system as a whole? 

General RENUART. We believe that a reliability program does need to be based on 

a representative sample of empirical missile tests at the full up round and component level. In order for MDA to be able to do an increased number of tests, additional funding is required to procure an adequate number of new missiles. This empirical testing, coupled with a comprehensive modeling and simulation approach to 

assess system reliability, can be combined with the lessons we learn through the 

Integrated Master Test Plan (IMTP). The IMTP is not a replacement for a continued 

reliability assessment program. However, it is a useful tool for the warfighter, U.S. 

Strategic Command (STRATCOM) (as the Functional Manager and Synchronizer), 

and the combatant commands to work with MDA to develop a comprehensive longterm testing and reliability program. 

26. Senator SESSIONS. General Renuart, if three to four flight tests are required 

for intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-launched ballistic missiles 

every year to assure the Commander of STRATCOM and the Secretary of Defense 

that our nuclear deterrent remains reliable, why are only three GBI flight tests necessary over the course of a dozen years? 

General RENUART. We believe that an effective stockpile reliability program is 

contingent on a sufficient number of items for testing as demonstrated by the reliability programs used by the individual Services for missiles like our ICBMs, Patriot, or current fleet of Standard Missiles. If further evaluation indicates a need 

for additional quantities, my understanding is that MDA can make that buy as late 

as fiscal year 2013 without incurring a production line break. 

27. Senator SESSIONS. General Renuart, will you personally examine the MDA’s 

plan for GMD stockpile reliability to ensure sufficient flight testing is built into the 

program to maintain system reliability over the life of the GMD system? 

General RENUART. Yes, I look forward to reviewing and provide comments to the 

GMD stockpile reliability plan. Additionally, in coordination with MDA, I will work 

with STRATCOM and Joint Forces Component Command, Integrated Missile Defense as the functional manager and synchronizer to ensure our homeland defense 

requirements continue to be addressed throughout the life of the GMD program. 

[Whereupon, at 11:06 a.m., the committee adjourned.] 

(729) 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION 

FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 

2011 

TUESDAY, MARCH 16, 2010 

U.S. SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, 

Washington, DC. 

U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND AND U.S. 

CENTRAL COMMAND 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:34 a.m. in room SH– 

216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin (chairman) 

presiding. 

Committee members present: Senators Levin, Lieberman, Reed, 

Akaka, Bill Nelson, E. Benjamin Nelson, Webb, McCaskill, Udall, 

Hagan, Begich, Burris, Kaufman, McCain, Inhofe, Sessions, 

Chambliss, Graham, Thune, Wicker, LeMieux, Brown, Burr, Vitter, 

and Collins. 

Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk. 

Majority staff members present: Howard H. Hoege III, counsel; 

Jessica L. Kingston, research assistant; Michael J. Kuiken, professional staff member; Gerald J. Leeling, counsel; Jason W. Maroney, 

counsel; William G.P. Monahan, counsel; Michael J. Noblet, professional staff member; Roy F. Phillips, professional staff member; 

and William K. Sutey, professional staff member. 

Minority staff members present: Joseph W. Bowab, Republican 

staff director; Adam J. Barker, professional staff member; Christian D. Brose, professional staff member; David M. Morriss, minority counsel; Lucian L. Niemeyer, professional staff member, and 

Dana W. White, professional staff member. 

Staff assistants present: Paul J. Hubbard, Christine G. Lang, 

and Brian F. Sebold. 

Committee members’ assistants present: James Tuite, assistant 

to Senator Byrd; Vance Serchuk, assistant to Senator Lieberman; 

Carolyn A. Chuhta, assistant to Senator Reed; Nick Ikeda, assistant to Senator Akaka; Greta Lundeberg, assistant to Senator Bill 

Nelson; Ann Premer, assistant to Senator Ben Nelson; Gordon I. 

Peterson, assistant to Senator Webb; Jennifer Barrett, assistant to 

Senator Udall; Roger Pena, assistant to Senator Hagan; Brady 

King, assistant to Senator Burris; Halie Soifer, assistant to Senator 

Kaufman; Anthony J. Lazarski, assistant to Senator Inhofe, Sandra 

Luff, assistant to Senator Sessions, Clyde A. Taylor IV, assistant 

730 

to Senator Chambliss; Jason Van Beek, assistant to Senator 

Thune; Erskine W. Wells III, assistant to Senator Wicker; Brian 

Walsh, assistant to Senator LeMieux; Kevin Kane, assistant to 

Senator Burr; Kyle Ruckert, assistant to Senator Vitter; and Chip 

Kennett, assistant to Senator Collins. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN 

Chairman LEVIN. Good morning, everybody. 

Before we begin the hearing, I want to take this opportunity to 

welcome one of our three new members to the Armed Services 

Committee. Senator Kaufman is the first Senator from the First 

State, which is Delaware’s famous name; he’s the first one to serve 

on this committee, according to our Senate historian. We know 

Senator Kaufman for his long, valuable service to the Senate, both 

as a Senator and before that as a member of the Senate staff. 

A special welcome to you, Senator Kaufman. We’ll welcome the 

others when they get here, but a special welcome to you. Delighted 

to have you. 

The committee receives testimony this morning from General 

David Petraeus, Commander, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), 

and Admiral Eric Olson, Commander, U.S. Special Operations 

Command (SOCOM). Today’s hearing continues the committee’s review of the missions and operational requirements of our combatant commanders, in light of the priorities that are set out in the 

President’s fiscal year 20ll budget request. 

Nowhere will the President’s budget priorities have a greater impact than with the soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines in the 

CENTCOM area of responsibility (AOR), including a significant 

portion of our Special Operations Forces (SOF). The men and 

women of CENTCOM and SOCOM have been engaged in major 

military operations for nearly 81⁄2 years, most having served multiple deployments. Our SOF are facing the highest operational 

tempo in their history. Yet, in Afghanistan and Iraq, our troops’ 

morale is very high, they are dedicated to their mission, and they 

are serving with courage and distinction. 

General Petraeus and Admiral Olson, thank you for your leadership, and, on behalf of this committee, please pass along our gratitude to the troops that serve under your command. 

The next 12 months will be critical in both Afghanistan and Iraq. 

The challenges are significant. In Afghanistan, the military operations in the central Helmand River valley are just the opening 

salvo, as General Petraeus has said, of a long campaign, under 

General McChrystal’s command, to implement the President’s 

counterinsurgency strategy. As General Gates told Afghan soldiers 

in Kabul last week, this conflict is their fight to win, and Afghanistan’s future is in their hands. 

Key to this effort is the partnering of Afghan soldiers with U.S. 

and coalition forces living and operating together in the planning 

and conduct of military operations. Last week, the North Atlantic 

Treaty Organization (NATO) Supreme Allied Commander Europe, 

Admiral James Stavridis, said that the partnering ratio in 

Helmand Province had improved to nearly 1 to 1; close to one Afghan soldier for each coalition soldier in the fight. 

731 

General Petraeus, I hope you’re going to update us this morning 

on the progress of our partnering efforts in Afghanistan. 

I have been deeply concerned, however, that the effort to grow 

the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Police is being slowed by a 

lack of trainers. Earlier this month, Lieutenant General Bill 

Caldwell, the head of the NATO Training Mission in Afghanistan, 

reported an almost 900 percent increase in Afghan Army recruits 

in training, from 830 in September to 7,400 in January of this year. 

But, at the same time, he reported that the NATO Training Command remains at just over half of the number of instructors and 

advisers required. At a recent conference to generate forces, NATO 

members pledged fewer than half the approximately 1,200 additional NATO trainers that are needed. As a result of this shortfall, 

Afghan Army recruits are having to wait to receive their basic 

training course. 

General Petraeus, the committee would be interested in any recommendations that you might have for addressing these resource 

shortfalls. 

Our SOF in Afghanistan are also faced with resource challenges, 

particularly due to the lack of enabling capabilities, such as rotary 

wing aircraft support. We’d be interested in hearing from our witnesses as to what is being done to address this issue for our SOF 

in theater today. 

I believe there are reasons for cautious optimism. An ABC/BBC 

public opinion survey in Afghanistan in January found that 70 percent of the Afghans polled believed their country was headed in the 

right direction. In terms of governance, the Afghan Government is 

apparently now working better with local leaders in Helmand to 

deliver services, which surely improves the chances of building support in the country for the Afghan Government. 

With regard to Afghanistan’s long-term economic future, President Karzai recently announced that a soon-to-be-released U.S. Geological survey report will show that Afghanistan has nearly a trillion dollars in petroleum reserves and mineral deposits, which are 

in great demand. 

The coming months will also be important for the President’s 

strategy in Iraq. By September 1, the U.S. combat mission in Iraq 

will end and U.S. forces will transition to the role of advising and 

assisting the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). According to General 

Odierno, our commander in Iraq, the ISF performed well during 

the recent parliamentary elections, and that only a catastrophic 

event, in his words, would prevent the drawdown of U.S. forces 

from 96,000, currently, to 50,000 by the end of August. The drawdown of those forces will be an important milestone on the way to 

withdrawing all U.S. forces from Iraq by the end of 2011, redefining the U.S.-Iraq strategic relationship, and transferring responsibility for Iraq’s security to Iraqis, while keeping the pressure on 

Iraqi leaders to reach the political settlements and decisions so essential to achieving security in Iraq. 

While our conventional forces reduce their footprint in Iraq, the 

requirement for SOF and the unique skills they bring to the effort 

will continue. Special operators will have a continuing requirement 

for support from their general-purpose force counterparts, including 

for airlift, medical evacuation, and intelligence, surveillance, and 

732 

reconnaissance (ISR), as those SOF continue throughout the U.S. 

drawdown to provide support to the ISF. 

The attempted Christmas Day airline bombing near Detroit reminded every American that al Qaeda is a global organization that 

continues to threaten harm to anyone that does not share its radical views. That nearly catastrophic incident also focused attention 

on Yemen, a country with an uneven record on counterterrorism 

and large ungoverned spaces that serve as attractive sanctuaries 

for al Qaeda and its recruits. 

General Petraeus, I hope that you will let us know this morning 

what, in your opinion, our Government is doing to support Yemen’s 

capacity to respond to the al Qaeda threat and to stabilize its territory, and your recommendations for what more can be done. 

Because the threat of violent extremism is not confined to Yemen 

or the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region, SOCOM maintains a 

global focus. SOCOM personnel are deployed to dozens of countries 

around the world, working to address the underlying causes of violent extremism and helping to build the capacity of other nations 

to address the mutual threats that we face. Working with U.S. ambassadors in priority countries, these special operators engage in a 

variety of training, civil affairs, and information operations (IO) intended to counter the spread of violent ideology. 

Admiral Olson, we hope that you’ll update the committee on the 

progress of those efforts to address violent extremism globally. 

Finally, Iran remains a major security challenge. Iran continues 

to work to undermine stability in the Middle East and to stoke 

fears across the region. The brutal tactics and human rights abuses 

of the Government of Iran in its efforts to silence the voices of the 

people of Iran are of deep concern. As the administration continues 

its push for more significant sanctions against Iran, it will be critical to continue to work with our partners in the CENTCOM AOR 

on robust sanctions enforcement. This is going to require intense 

coordination and collaboration with other nations in the region. 

General Petraeus, we look forward to hearing your assessment of 

the willingness of other nations in the region to cooperate in the 

robust enforcement of current sanctions against Iran and support 

even stronger sanctions against Iran until they comply with United 

Nations (U.N.) resolutions relative to the Iranian nuclear program. 

Nuclear arms in possession of Iran, in violation of those U.N. resolutions, will threaten the stability of the region and cannot be accepted by the world community. 

I understand, now, that another new member of our committee 

has joined us. We welcome Senator Brown; he’s the newest member 

of the Senate. He brings a very valuable perspective of having 

served for more than 30 years in the Massachusetts Army National 

Guard, and that is a very, very important contribution to us. We 

all welcome you to a committee which is famous for working on a 

bipartisan basis. We all enjoy working here, for many reasons; obviously, the security of this country being our common mission, but 

it’s also because we work so well together across party lines. So, 

we welcome you. 

We’ve already welcomed Senator Kaufman, and there’s just one 

other Senator. If Senator Bingaman is not here yet, we will welcome him when he arrives. 

733 

Senator McCain. 

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN 

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I join you in welcoming an old and dear friend, Senator Kaufman 

of Delaware, who I’ve known for many, many years. 

I would also like to welcome Senator Brown, a member of the 

Massachusetts Guard for 30 years, and all of that is very good 

news. Unfortunately, he joins Senator Graham as a lawyer. 

[Laughter.] 

But, we welcome him to the committee. He brings knowledge and 

expertise of the challenges that our men and women serving in the 

military face on a day-to-day basis as we are engaged in two wars. 

I thank our witnesses today, Admiral Olson and General 

Petraeus, for joining us. Let me extend my thanks to the men and 

women serving under your command, especially the families, who 

endure so much for the security and betterment of our country. 

Amid the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and the ongoing fight 

against violent Islamic extremism, the focus of the U.S. military, 

especially our lead forces, is the Middle East and South and Central Asia. Obviously, this is the responsibility of CENTCOM and 

the chief priority of SOCOM. So, it’s fitting and important that 

both combatant commanders are here today together. 

I’ll keep my remarks brief and to the point. I’m concerned at 

what appear to be dangerous and growing doubts about U.S. power 

and commitment on the part of both our friends and our enemies 

in the broader Middle East today. On the one hand, this perception 

is profoundly unjustified. America enjoys a position of extraordinary power and influence in this region. The United States did 

not abandon Iraq when the going got tough. Instead, we succeeded 

in turning it around, in large part, thanks to your leadership, General Petraeus. 

A moderate majority was empowered in Iraq to turn the tide 

against violent extremists, and today the emergence of a democratic Iraq that can defend and sustain itself is becoming a hopeful 

new presence in an unstable region. I might add, Iraq is the only 

country in the Middle East, outside of Israel, that has a contested 

election. 

In Afghanistan, thanks to President Obama’s decision to increase 

our civil-military commitment, the United States and our allies are 

now in a position to break the momentum of the insurgency and 

help our Afghan friends to secure their own country. 

As you’ve noted before to this committee, Admiral Olson, our 

SOF are making major strides in targeting the Taliban’s leadership 

and keeping the pressure on al Qaeda; not just in Afghanistan, but 

also in places like Pakistan and Yemen. 

At the same time, as you have noted before, General Petraeus, 

the United States is building an elaborate and robust security architecture in the broader Middle East, including shared earlywarning systems, ballistic missile defenses (BMD), and major sales 

of defensive weapons that enhance the capabilities of our friends to 

defend themselves and to deter our enemies. Though we admittedly 

face many difficult challenges in the broader Middle East, the fact 

734 

is, the U.S. capability and lead in this region is strong and enduring. 

Yet, military capability is not the only measure of leadership. 

There’s also the perception of our political resolve, and this is what 

concerns me. I’m concerned that the Government of Iran has 

spurned the President’s offer of engagement. Not only has it experienced no real consequences for doing so, our deadlines for actions 

have slipped from September of last year to the beginning of this 

year, and now it’s mid-March, and still there have been no consequences. 

So, too, with the Syrian Government. There’s been plenty of U.S. 

engagement since the beginning of last year, but seemingly few 

changes to Syria’s destabilizing behavior in the region as a result. 

Instead, the Syrian President is openly mocking U.S. leaders while 

meeting with the President of Iran and the head of Hezbollah. 

Meanwhile, despite constant refrains about cutting off the supply 

of arms to Hezbollah, the fact remains that Hezbollah is better 

armed today than ever before. When our allies and friends in the 

Levant and the Gulf look at these events, I worry that it feeds a 

lack of confidence in America’s commitment to regional security. 

In South Asia, meanwhile, the pledge to begin withdrawing our 

forces by July 2011 has injected unnecessary doubts about U.S. 

commitment in the minds of friends and foes alike, from Afghan 

fence-sitters to Pakistan’s leaders to our strategic partners in 

India. Reports over the weekend that reconciliation with Taliban 

leaders is now being explored before the vast majority of the 

30,000-troop surge has even arrived in the country only feed the 

perception in the region that the U.S. Government is more eager 

to leave Afghanistan than to succeed there. 

In short, I’m concerned that we are heading toward a situation 

in the broader Middle East where our friends don’t trust us and 

our enemies don’t fear us, because both doubt our staying power, 

our determination, and our resolve. We may be heading there, but 

we aren’t there yet. Though this perceived lack of U.S. commitment 

may take a lot of time and effort to reverse, I’m confident that it 

can be reversed. As I said, the U.S. capacity to lead remains strong; 

what’s more, our country is blessed with some truly first-rate civilian and military leaders, individuals like our two distinguished 

witnesses today and the brave men and women under their command. It’s our job, here in Washington, to support their needs, including the resources they require to succeed in their missions on 

our behalf. I look forward to hearing from our witnesses how we 

will all work together to address the serious challenges we face, especially in this vital part of the world. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator McCain. 

We now have a quorum of our committee; and so, I would ask 

the committee to consider three civilian nominations and a list of 

802 pending military nominations. 

First, the civilian nominations: I ask the committee to consider 

the nominations of Jessie Hill Roberson, Joseph F. Bader, and 

Peter Stanley Winokur to be members of the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board. Is there a motion to favorably report these 

nominees? 

735 

Senator MCCAIN. So moved. 

Chairman LEVIN. Is there a second? 

Senator REED. Second. 

Chairman LEVIN. All in favor, say aye? [Chorus of ayes.] 

Opposed, nay? [No response.] 

The ayes have it. 

Next, I ask the committee to consider a list of 802 pending military nominations. They’ve been before the committee the required 

length of time. Is there a motion to report these nominations? 

Senator MCCAIN. So moved. 

Chairman LEVIN. Second? 

Senator REED. Second. 

Chairman LEVIN. There’s a second. 

All in favor, say aye? [Chorus of ayes.] 

Opposed, nay? [No response.] 

The motion carries. 

Admiral, I think we’ll start with you this morning. 

Admiral Olson. 

STATEMENT OF ADM ERIC T. OLSON, USN, COMMANDER, U.S. 

SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND 

Admiral OLSON. Good morning, Chairman Levin, Senator 

McCain, and other distinguished members of the committee. Thank 

you for the opportunity to appear again before this body to highlight the posture of SOCOM. 

It’s a pleasure to join General Petraeus here this morning. 

Your continued support and oversight of SOCOM and its assigned forces has ensured that our Nation has the broad special operations capabilities that it needs and expects. 

With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I’ll submit my written posture statement for the record, and open with a briefer set of remarks. 

Chairman LEVIN. That’ll be fine. 

Admiral OLSON. SOCOM’s Service Component Commands—those 

being the Army SOCOM, the Air Force SOCOM, the Naval Special 

Warfare Command, and the Marine Corps Forces SOCOM— 

through them, SOCOM organizes, equips, trains, and provides 

fully-capable SOF to serve under the operational control of regional 

combatant commanders around the world, and, as you noted, by a 

wide margin, our forces are most heavily committed to supporting 

operations in the CENTCOM AOR under the operational command 

of General Petraeus. 

On an average day, though, over 12,000 members of the SOF are 

present in about 75 countries. They conduct a wide variety of activities. You listed several, Mr. Chairman. They range from civilmilitary operations, like local infrastructure development in relatively benign environments, to counterterrorist operations under 

extremely demanding conditions. These indirect and direct actions 

conducted by SOF are intended to support each other in contributing to environments where security and stability can be further 

developed and sustained by local organizations and forces. In fact, 

nearly every mission performed by SOF is in support of an indigenous partner force. 

736 

SOF do what other military forces are not doctrinally organized, 

trained, or equipped to do. The powerful effects of SOF in the areas 

where they are properly employed are often recognized as gamechangers. Our force operates very effectively in small numbers, in 

remote regions, often with a low profile, under austere conditions. 

The deployment rate of SOF is high. Although the demand is 

outpacing the supply, I remain firm in limiting our request for 

manpower growth to the range of 3 to 5 percent per year. 

If approved, the President’s fiscal year 2011 budget would grow 

SOF personnel by 4.5 percent. The overall baseline budget for 

SOCOM would grow by about 5.7 percent, to just over $6.3 billion, 

with most of that increase in the operations and maintenance 

(O&M) account. 

Significantly, the overseas contingency operations funds would increase by $464 million, compared to 2010, bringing that account 

to about $3.5 billion, for a total 2011 SOCOM budget of $9.8 billion. This is sufficient to support our current level of special operations-peculiar activities around the world, as long as we are able 

to depend on the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps for 

service-common items and support. 

The budget and acquisition authorities held by the Commander 

of SOCOM are similar to the military departments, although not 

on the same scale. They are essential to meeting the emergent 

needs of an innovative force with a unique mission set, and this applies equally to SOCOM’s research and development authorities, 

which enable rapid application of science and technology to meet 

urgent operational needs. 

In my role as the commander responsible for the readiness of the 

SOF, I give high priority to training and education programs and 

to influencing, where I can, the career development of special operations personnel. Along with the pure operational skills that enable 

success in very complex and demanding operational environments, 

language skills and subregional expertise remain primary focus 

areas. 

The special operations community, of course, includes the families of our service men and women, and caring for our injured and 

wounded, and for the families of those killed in action, is among 

our most solemn responsibilities. We are proud of our many successes in returning wounded warriors to their teams and of our 

lifelong commitment to those who are unable to do so. 

You, on this committee, and all Americans, can be fiercely proud 

of your SOF. They are fit, focused, supremely capable, and incredibly courageous. They have impact well beyond their relatively 

small numbers, and I’m deeply honored by this opportunity to represent them to you today. 

I stand ready for your questions, sir. 

[The prepared statement of Admiral Olson follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY ADM ERIC T. OLSON, USN 

INTRODUCTION

Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the committee, thank you for this 

opportunity to update you on the U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM). It 

is an honor to do so for the third time as Commander. 

Over 2 decades ago, Congress directed the establishment of a headquarters dedicated to prepare Special Operations Forces (SOFs) to carry out assigned missions. 

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in support of Geographic Combatant Commanders. Since then, the forces and the 

missions have expanded and changed in response to very dynamic global conditions 

and threats. 

In this ‘new normal‘ in which our forces operate, emerging security challenges to 

our Nation come evermore from agile and elusive adversary networks versus traditional, uniformed military formations. Therefore, the value of adaptive SOFs is at 

least as much in their mindset as in their skill set. 

U.S. SOF respond to the sound of guns with a combination of speed, discipline, 

and tenacity. They also apply their knowledge and experience well ahead of the 

sound of the guns to prevent violence from erupting whenever and wherever possible. These are warriors who can act swiftly with precision and lethality, yet remain simultaneously capable of building long-term relationships and trust with 

international partners. 

RESOURCING: FORCE AND MISSION

On an average day, in excess of 12,000 SOF and SOF support personnel are deployed in more than 75 countries across the globe. An invaluable ingredient is our 

Reserve element, about 14 percent of SOF‘s total manpower. 

Currently, 86 percent of deployed SOF are in U.S. Central Command’s 

(CENTCOM) area of responsibility under the operational control of General 

Petraeus. The rest of the deployed force—along with over 3,000 members permanently stationed in Europe and the Pacific—are serving the other Geographic Combatant Commanders. 

To support special operators and their capabilities, the President‘s proposed budget request for fiscal year 2011 is about $6.3 billion in baseline and $3.5 billion in 

Overseas Contingency Operations funding. Managing these funds is my responsibility. 

Along with SOCOM‘s Major Force Program (MFP)-11 funding—one intended to 

fund SOF-peculiar requirements—the Command is heavily dependent on each of the 

Military Services for key enablers to special operations. Within our organic structure—both to provide sufficient speed of response and a degree of reliable sustainability—SOCOM is growing organic combat service and service support assets for 

SOFs, to include: communications, information support specialists, forensic analysts, 

military working dog teams, intelligence experts, and more. The fiscal year 2011 

budget proposes a total manpower increase of 2,700 people across the Force, a 4.6 

percent growth from the previous fiscal year. 

Working closely with Joint Force Commanders, senior Department of Defense 

(DOD) leaders, and Congress, SOCOM also develops SOF-specific doctrine, and advises on policy and legislation supporting these activities. 

SOCOM is tasked to synchronize planning for global operations against terrorist 

networks. The 7500 series of Concept Plans (CONPLANs), crafted at SOCOM and 

approved by the Secretary of Defense, continue to function as both the framework 

for planning within DOD and a supporting mechanism within the interagency environment for combating global terror networks. The plans are supported by regional 

plans formulated by each of the Geographic Combatant Commanders specific to 

threats within their areas of responsibility. 

In our role, SOCOM receives, analyzes, and prioritizes these regional plans, and 

makes recommendations to the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs 

of Staff on force and resource allocations. We also serve as an extension of the Joint 

Staff in coordinating SOF programs and operations with our interagency partners. 

The authority most often referred to as ‘Section 1208’—unique to SOCOM since 

2005—is a key tool for our widely dispersed and often isolated SOFs around the 

world. This authority enables SOF to train and equip indigenous forces, both regular and irregular, and to enable them to support ongoing counterterrorism operations. Indigenous forces—while serving a leading role and supported by SOF—provide essential access to locations, populations, and information otherwise inaccessible. Support to indigenous forces through section 1208 reprioritization of funding 

has resulted in many successful counterterrorist operations. 

STRATEGY: DIRECT AND INDIRECT APPROACHES

CONPLAN 7500 calls for the use of both a direct and indirect approach to fighting 

terrorist networks. The direct approach to violent extremists consists of SOF efforts 

that disrupt terrorist organizations by capturing, killing, and interdicting extremist 

networks and resources, thereby preventing them from harming us in the near 

term. These actions include denial of access and use of weapons of mass destruction. 

The direct approach is urgent, necessary, and largely kinetic. In the last year, 

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tial losses against the leadership and operational capacity of al Qaeda and its violent extremist affiliates. These effects—while significant in the short term—are not 

by themselves decisive. 

The enduring results come from indirect approaches—those in which we enable 

partners to combat extremist organizations themselves by contributing to their capabilities through advising, training, and—when authorized and funded—equipping. 

This includes efforts to deter active and tacit support for violent extremist organizations in areas where the existing government is either unwilling or unable to remove terrorist sanctuaries. 

Central to SOCOM‘s contribution are our career, multi-dimensional operators, individuals adept in defense, diplomacy, and development. SOF operators are often locally grounded in their areas of responsibility, diplomatically astute, and experts in 

specialized tactical skills. It is demanding work. 

The number of individuals both eager and qualified to serve as SOF operators is 

limited. Overall, SOF personnel growth continues to be managed at about 3 percent 

annually, a strategy intended to retain the best while adding additional manpower 

only as it can be recruited, trained, absorbed and deployed. 

Still, direct and indirect approaches must be carefully balanced. While the direct 

approach is often necessary and has immediate impact, it essentially creates time 

for the indirect approach to achieve lasting outcomes through other means. 

Security Force Assistance (SFA) remains a highlight of SOF indirect action. SFA 

is a collaboration engine for the Command to include: security cooperation, security 

assistance, foreign internal defense, internal defense and development, and security 

sector reform. 

SFA enhances the military capabilities and capacities of our allies and partners 

via training, advising, assistance, and—as authorized—equipping and supporting 

foreign military and security forces. ‘‘Build[ing] the security capacity of partner 

states’’ is directly referenced within the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) 

as one of six key missions. 

The paradigm of national sovereignty is challenged by the trends of crime, migration, extremism, and the competition for resources which drive populations and provoke conflict. Recognizing this, the Command‘s engagement efforts through the ‘Sovereign Challenge‘ Program continue as a unique method of establishing relationships with senior military leaders from around the world. The program—in collaboration with the U.S. Department of State—aims to provide venues in which robust 

dialog about threats to sovereignty can take place. In this indirect and mutually 

beneficial approach to military relationships, long-term success is measured by other 

countries’ actions in their own and the region‘s security interests. 

GLOBAL SYNCHRONIZATION

As previously stated, SOCOM is designated as the command responsible for synchronizing planning for global operations against terrorist networks. In this ongoing 

Global Synchronization Process, SOCOM coordinates with other combatant commanders, the Services, and—as directed—appropriate U.S. Government agencies 

and international partners to deter, disrupt, and defeat terrorism across the globe. 

Regular meetings, video teleconferences, and ‘community of interest‘ forums facilitate planning, promote situational awareness, and enhance synergy within the overall war on terror effort. The Command‘s Global Synchronization Workshops—now 

5 years old—unite hundreds of planners from across the Global Synchronization 

Process Community. 

ENABLERS: MOBILITY

While attention is first given to operators conducting missions around the globe, 

these individuals are supported by a set of essential mobility capabilities that allow 

SOF to move, influence the environment, share information, and strike when necessary. In challenging settings and situations, success can depend upon these capabilities. For example, in Haiti‘s Operation Unified Response this mobility allowed 

SOF to open a closed and damaged airfield to enable relief efforts. This was accomplished within 26 hours of the earthquake, and 28 minutes of being on the ground. 

SOF personnel subsequently assisted with medical and humanitarian assistance to 

include rescue of trapped citizens, injury treatment, and continuous broadcasting of 

relief locations and protocols. 

I‘ve paid particular attention to mobility enabling capabilities, making them a 

focal point of the SOCOM Strategic Plan. This importance is echoed by the Secretary of Defense in the 2010 QDR, calling to ‘‘increase key enabling assets for 

SOFs.’’ 

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For the Special Operator, mobility enhancements mean a variety of improved 

strategic and tactical capabilities. These provide, for example, quick strike capabilities regardless of terrain. In cooperation with the Army, we will grow SOCOM‘s helicopter fleet by eight MH–47 Chinooks by fiscal year 2015. We are also nearing 

fielding completion of upgraded MH–47G and new MH–60M helicopters, improvements that provide SOF with modernized helicopters specifically adapted to SOFpeculiar requirements like aerial refueling, advanced night operations, and terrainhugging flight profiles. 

Growth is also evident in the Tilt/Hybrid Wing Aircraft Programs. The CV–22 Osprey offers high-speed, long-range insertion and extraction of SOF. SOCOM currently has 12 CV–22s, growing to 50 by fiscal year 2016. 

In their first combat deployment, 6 CV–22s logged over 600 flight hours, performing 45 direct action assault force missions and 100+ combat service support 

missions in the process. A recent national contingency mission used three of these 

aircraft for combat search and rescue, personnel recovery, and quick reaction force 

support. 

Our goal is to accelerate delivery of CV–22s to better support the forces requiring 

them. We are looking to add five more CV–22s in the coming year. 

The C–130—in several variants—remains the workhorse of the SOF, fixed-wing 

mobility fleet. C–130s provide SOF with important tactical lift and precision fire for 

our ground and maritime forces. Ongoing efforts to recapitalize the oldest of these 

airframes are a current top priority for Air Force SOCOM, our air component. 

Finally, the Non-Standard Aviation Program supports Theater SOCOM mobility 

requirements worldwide. This program includes short takeoff and landing, light and 

medium, intra-theater aircraft. The fiscal year 2011 budget request includes funds 

to procure nine additional light and medium aircraft plus associated spares and repair parts. 

On land, a new Mine Resistant Ambush Protected All Terrain Vehicle will increase ground mobility for SOF. The new model—funded through the Joint Program 

Office—provides improved safety, visibility, control, and storage. 

In the maritime environment, SOCOM remains committed to developing undersea 

submersible platforms that will provide assured, clandestine access to denied and 

politically sensitive areas while enabling persistent intelligence, surveillance, and 

reconnaissance (ISR) in support of high-priority SOF requirements. The Advanced 

SEAL Delivery System Program (ASDS)—one well-supported by Congress—delivered these operational capabilities until it suffered a significant lithium-ion battery 

fire. 

As noted in last year’s National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, 

the Office of the Secretary of Defense is coordinating with the Director of National 

Intelligence to assess the feasibility of establishing a cost-sharing agreement for 

ASDS follow-on capabilities. If approved, these capabilities are expected to capitalize 

on improved battery technologies, ones recommended to the Navy by the investigation panel reviewing the ASDS lithium-ion battery fire. The fiscal year 2011 budget 

request includes funds to conduct research and development on the Joint Multimission Submersible which will provide these capabilities. 

ENABLERS: INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE

These efforts are complemented by planned upgrades to SOF‘s Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) portfolio. ISR remains an invaluable asset, most 

notably in the CENTCOM area of responsibility. The ISR program is not about platforms; it is about complete systems including the people who operate them. 

Proposed plans—contained within a Joint Staff-approved capabilities document 

and seconded by the Secretary of Defense within the 2010 QDR (‘‘expanding manned 

and unmanned systems for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance’’) entail expansion of the Program‘s inventory to include both manned and unmanned systems. 

These systems will be supported by Processing, Exploitation and Dissemination capabilities, and robust communication architecture. Airborne ISR remains complemented by maritime capabilities. 

ENABLERS: INFORMATION SHARING

Effective use of ISR, however, can only occur on communications systems and networks designed to handle the large amounts of information developed. Our evolving 

mission sets form a difficult and increasingly expensive information sharing reality, 

with data residing on, and transiting through, a variety of systems under varying 

security criteria. 

Recognizing this problem, SOCOM is moving toward a globally responsive network capable of cross-domain data sharing. SOCOM‘s SOF Information EnvironVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:37 May 06, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00745 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\62155.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
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ment (SIE) is our portion of DOD‘s Global Information Grid. The SIE is a SOF information technology enterprise that will offer permissions-based, single sign-on access 

to SOF resources from anywhere on the globe. 

ENABLERS: SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

SOCOM‘s modernization, research and development and acquisition enabling 

processes are interconnected to ensure needed technological agility. The Command‘s 

Rapid Exploitation of Innovative Technology (REITS) Program provides SOCOM 

with the ability to identify, assess and exploit emerging technologies for SOF-peculiar applications. 

REITS funds are assisting in the development of next generation software and antenna design for ‘‘on-the-move,’’ mounted and dismounted geo-location technology. 

This new capability will conform to both current tactical vehicles and radio frequency systems, while providing organic, small unit find, fix, and finish capabilities 

within a single tactical ground asset. 

ENABLERS: AGILE ACQUISITION PROCESSES

Rapid fielding of the Dragon Spear Precision Strike Platform (PSP) is an example 

of the benefits of an acquisition process designed for flexibility and agility. This system benefits from the Combat Missions Needs Statement (C–MNS) process which 

quickly addresses critical capability gaps that put missions or lives at risk. Funding 

execution responsibilities for C–MNS reside with the Joint Acquisition Task Force, 

meaning faster operational implementation. 

By design, PSP is a modular, scalable weapons system, one flexible enough for 

many platforms and configurations. Four Dragon Spear systems are currently being 

fielded. Ongoing MC–130W Dragon Spear improvements include upgrades to its 

sensors, a Standoff Precision Guided Munitions system and supporting 30mm gun, 

a sensor operator console, and communication equipment and flight deck hardware. 

SOF MC–130 console reconfigurations enable aircrews to operate more efficiently 

and effectively. Improved infrared warning systems result in better threat detection. 

Updated line-of-sight antennae produce more communications capacity with improved reliability. All are modernization initiatives designed to cost-effectively optimize current SOF aircraft. 

ENABLERS: EDUCATION

The unique nature of special operations enables us to focus people on specific regions more so than other forces can. This ensures we are doing the best we can with 

what we have. 

SOCOM—partnered with the Services—is intensifying its efforts in training and 

personnel management to create opportunities for our personnel to truly build productive and enduring relationships with our partners. DOD Directive 5100.1 aims 

to address many of these issues by enhancing SOCOM‘s ability to influence management of our assigned manpower. 

Our culture and language programs are supplemented with increased attention to 

interagency collaboration and information sharing, with specific emphasis on subregional and microregional knowledge. 

I‘ve directed SOF schools to pay more attention to curricula dedicated to advanced 

language skills and regional expertise. Specifically, we will ensure better alignment 

of language skills, career management, and incentives within our force. 

To prepare SOF for the challenges ahead, we‘re prioritizing career development 

toward areas best suited for irregular environments with emphasis on specialized 

versus generalized operator performance. This entails building creative, adaptive 

and flexible leaders at every level of the enlisted and officer ranks. 

SOCOM‘s Lessons Learned Program supplements these efforts with vital, in the 

field knowledge. This program emphasizes analysis and information sharing relevant to the SOF Community, one that now includes research, development, technology and experimentation activities. 

CARE COALITION

We cannot sustain combat effectiveness without the enduring support of our families. Our operators are asked to do a great many things to protect our Nation, and 

all of them place additional demands on those who are closest to us. Continuing care 

for our wounded or injured operators—and for the families of those who have been 

seriously injured or killed—is among our most solemn responsibilities. The 2010 

QDR highlights the importance of such programs: ‘‘caring for our wounded warriors 

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is our highest priority, and we will work to provide them top-quality care that reflects their service and sacrifice.’’ 

SOCOM‘s Care Coalition currently supports over 2,800 wounded SOF operators 

by matching medical needs with available providers. The goal of this clearinghouse 

– via advocacy, education, treatment, recovery, and rehabilitation – is to increase 

the likelihood of returning to duty and/or succeeding in post-military service. Additional efforts include proactive programs by SOCOM to identify, treat and prevent 

mental health care problems before they arise. 

Along with its SOCOM headquarters-based staff, eleven hospital liaisons help extend Care Coalition‘s reach across the country and globe. These efforts are also supplemented by support from over 70 partner organizations. 

When supporting our wounded, ill and/or injured and their families, our job is 

never done. We still need to improve synchronization among the various government 

agencies supporting these individuals, also refine legislation to fund them. 

Your support is essential. Over the past couple of years alone, SOF operators benefited from legislation that introduced a cognitive rehabilitation pilot program, pay 

and allowance continuation for wounded operators, care giver training and compensation, expansion of invitational travel orders for families of wounded, traumatic 

serviceman group life insurance, and memorial service support to our surviving families. 

LOOKING FORWARD

The three priorities on which SOFs need to focus—mission, people, and equipment—are enduring. Through direct action, we deter, disrupt and defeat terrorist 

threats across the globe. In tandem, indirect action creates and sustains environments to empower longer-term success. 

As we remain prepared for urgent, bold and decisive action, we recognize that it 

is high-quality, low-profile, long-term engagement that fosters trust and enables essential partnerships. In this regard, we should measure success by how well we 

have prepared others to face their security challenges, not by what we do for them. 

We also recognize that as we look forward, success increasingly depends upon the 

larger combination of defense, diplomacy, and development activities. In relaying his 

sentiments on the Afghanistan conflict, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff ADM 

Mullen indicated that ‘‘winning is not solely the responsibility of the U.S. Military.’’ 

‘‘Success,’’ he said, ‘‘will come by and only through a concerted effort by other agencies and partners.’’ We applaud policy and funding that provide other agencies the 

capabilities to contribute to this effort. 

As always, SOCOM and SOF—with your continued support—will answer the 

needs of operational commanders. Technology areas seen as vital to short- and longterm intervention will continue as focus areas for SOCOM research and development. Key enabling mechanisms across all terrains will yield the most effective, 

strategic, and tactical implementation of our forces. 

SOCOM will emphasize even more precise methods for gathering, analyzing, processing and sharing of information and intelligence about these domains. We will 

continue to engender existing relationships with interagency partners while exploring opportunities to further improve them. Our technology investments will permit 

us to better locate, tag and track threats before they strike. 

Sufficient infrastructure is essential to supporting our operators, and many of our 

existing facilities are in need of expansion or upgrade. The military construction 

program proposed for fiscal year 2011 will help to improve this situation. Muchneeded construction and modernization on 19 different projects at 9 different installations will sustain SOF operations support, operational communications, aircraft 

maintenance and capabilities, and intelligence functions. 

The contributions of this force amaze me every day. While relatively small in 

number, their dramatic, positive impact is of the greatest magnitude. They remain 

the world‘s most precise and lethal counterterrorism force, and the most effective 

special operations trainers, advisors and combat partners. It is a profound honor to 

be associated with this extraordinarily capable and uniquely innovative force and 

to represent them before this committee. 

Our successes are only possible because of this committee‘s active advocacy for the 

Command and its mission. Speaking on behalf of the entire community, your visits 

to the theater and to troops in recovery are deeply appreciated. Your support of the 

President‘s budget will enable special operations to continue to meet our great 

Nation‘s highest expectations. Again, thank you. 

Chairman LEVIN. Admiral, thank you so much. 

General Petraeus, welcome. 

742 

STATEMENT OF GEN DAVID H. PETRAEUS, USA, COMMANDER, 

U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND 

General PETRAEUS. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain, 

members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to provide an update on the situation in the CENTCOM AOR, and an opportunity to discuss CENTCOM’s strategy and priorities for the 

year ahead. 

It is a pleasure to be here with my colleague and good friend, Admiral Olson. 

I, too, have submitted a written statement for the record, and 

will summarize it here. 

CENTCOM is now in its ninth consecutive year of combat operations. It oversees the U.S. efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq and the 

assistance to Pakistan, as well as a theaterwide campaign against 

al Qaeda. We are also, of course, working on numerous contingency 

plans, and we continue the effort to build partnerships throughout 

the AOR, working in concert with our diplomatic colleagues as part 

of whole-of-government approaches to help increase the capabilities 

of partner-nation security forces. 

Meanwhile, the conditions and dynamics that shape the security 

environment continue to evolve. Today, I’ll briefly discuss these developments and our ongoing missions, as well as some of the dynamics that shape activities in the CENTCOM AOR. 

First, Afghanistan. As President Obama observed in announcing 

his new policy, ‘‘It is in our vital national interest to send an additional 30,000 U.S. troops to Afghanistan.’’ As he noted, these forces 

will provide the resources that we need to seize the initiative while 

building the Afghan capacity that can allow for a responsible transition of our forces out of Afghanistan. 

Clearly, the challenges there are considerable, but success there 

is, as General McChrystal has observed, both important and 

achievable. Our goals in Afghanistan and in that region are clear. 

They are to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda and its extremist allies, and to set conditions in Afghanistan to prevent reestablishment of transnational extremist sanctuaries, like the ones al 

Qaeda enjoyed there prior to September 11. 

To accomplish this task, we are working with our International 

Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and Afghan partners to improve 

security for the Afghan people, to wrest the initiative from the 

Taliban and other insurgent elements, to develop the Afghan security forces, and to support establishment of Afghan governance that 

is seen as legitimate in the eyes of the people. 

We spent much of the past year working to get the inputs right 

in Afghanistan; establishing the structures and organizations needed to carry out a comprehensive civil-military campaign plan; putting our best leaders in charge of those organizations; developing 

the right concepts to guide our operations—the comprehensive campaign plan, the ISAF counterinsurgency guidance, and the tactical 

directive issues by General McChrystal; and providing the authorities and deploying the resources needed to achieve unity of effort 

and to implement the concepts developed. 

These resources include the forces deployed in 2009 and the 

30,000 additional U.S. forces currently deploying, some 9,000 more 

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ing to enable our operations in the training and equipping of 

100,000 additional Afghan security force members over the next 

year and a half. I should note that the flow of additional forces and 

associated equipment would not have been possible without your 

continued support, in general, and your support of our expeditionary military construction program, in particular. 

With the inputs largely in place now in Afghanistan, we are 

starting to see the first of the outputs. Indeed, the recent offensive 

in central Helmand Province represented the first operation of the 

overall civil-military campaign plan developed by ISAF and its civilian partners, together with Afghan civilian and security force 

leaders. 

Central to progress in Afghanistan will be developing the Afghan 

National Security Forces (ANSF), an effort made possible by your 

sustained support of the Afghan Security Forces Fund. Expansion 

of Afghanistan’s security forces is now underway in earnest in the 

wake of the Afghan and international community decision to authorize an additional 100,000 security force members between now 

and the fall of 2011. 

This effort is facilitated considerably by the recent establishment 

of the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan, led by Lieutenant General Bill Caldwell. ISAF-member nations are now working hard to 

field the additional trainers, mentors, partner elements, and transition teams to enable the considerably augmented partnering, training, and recruiting that are essential to the way ahead in this important area. 

The civil-military campaign on which we have embarked in Afghanistan will unfold over the next 18 months, and as many of us 

have observed, the going is likely to get harder before it gets easier. 

As we seek to expand security for the people and to take from the 

Taliban control of key areas, the enemy will fight back. Moreover, 

we are not likely to see the kind of dramatic reduction in violence 

that we saw about 6 months into the surge in Iraq; in part, because 

the levels of violence in Afghanistan are nowhere near those of Iraq 

at the height of the sectarian violence, though they clearly are at 

levels that make progress in certain areas very difficult. 

In any event, 2010 will be a difficult year, a year that will see 

progress in a reversal of Taliban momentum in important areas, 

but also a year in which there will be tough fighting and periodic 

setbacks. 

We have seen important change in Pakistan over the past year. 

During that time, the Pakistani people, political leaders, and clerics 

united in recognizing that the most pressing threat to their country’s very existence was that posed by certain internal extremist 

groups; in particular, the Pakistani Taliban. Pakistani citizens saw 

the Taliban’s barbaric activities, indiscriminate violence, and repressive practices in the Northwest Frontier Province and Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATAs), and even in some of Pakistan’s so-called settled areas, and they realized that the Taliban 

wanted to take Pakistan backwards several centuries, not forward. 

With the support of Pakistan’s people and leaders, the Pakistani 

military has carried out impressive counterinsurgency operations 

over the past 10 months. The Army and the Frontier Corps have, 

during that time, cleared the Taliban from Swat District, which I 

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visited 3 weeks ago, and from other areas of the Northwest Frontier Province, as well. Now, they are holding, building, and beginning to transition in those areas. 

They have also carried out impressive operations in South 

Waziristan, home to the former Baitullah Mehsud, the leader of the 

extremist elements that assassinated Benazir Bhutto and blew up 

thousands of innocent Pakistanis and security force members in recent years. They have carried out good operations in some other 

areas of the FATA as well, including in Baijaur Agency most recently. 

These latter operations have been carefully coordinated with 

ISAF and Regional Command (RC)-East, and that coordination enabled RC-East elements to engage extremists who fled Pakistani 

operations and crossed the Durand Line into Afghanistan. In short, 

Pakistani forces have been carrying out an impressive campaign, 

and the Pakistani forces and people have suffered tough losses during the course of it. 

We recognize the need for considerable assistance to Pakistan as 

they continue their operations, and we will continue to work with 

Congress in seeking ways to support Pakistan’s military. 

Our focus has been on supporting the Pakistani forces. They are 

doing the fighting. We are providing various forms of assistance. 

Our task, as Secretary Gates has observed, has to be to show that 

we are going to be a steadfast partner, that we are not going to 

do to Pakistan what we’ve done before, such as after Charlie Wilson’s War, when we provided a substantial amount of assistance 

and then left precipitously, leaving Pakistan to deal with a situation we’d helped create. 

It is, therefore, important that we provide a sustained, substantial commitment, and that is what we are endeavoring to do, with 

your support. The Kerry-Lugar-Berman bill does that by providing 

$1.5 billion in economic assistance per year for 5 years. The provision of coalition support funding, foreign military financing, the 

Pakistani Counterinsurgency Fund, and other forms of security assistance provide further critical assistance for Pakistan’s security 

forces. Together, this funding and our assistance demonstrate 

America’s desire to strengthen this important strategic partnership 

and help our Pakistani colleagues. 

In the 3 years since the conduct of the surge, security in Iraq has 

improved significantly. Numbers of attacks, violent civilian deaths, 

and high-profile attacks are all down by well over 90 percent from 

their highs in 2006 and 2007. With the improvements in security 

has also come progress in a variety of other areas: in the repair of 

infrastructure damaged during the violence; in the provision of 

basic services; in attracting international investment; and even in 

various social and political areas. 

The conduct of the elections on March 7, during which an impressive turnout of Iraqi voters defied al Qaeda attempts to intimidate them, provided the latest example of Iraq’s progress since the 

sectarian violence of 2006 and 2007 ripped apart the very fabric of 

Iraqi society. As always, however, the progress in Iraq is still fragile, and it could still be reversed. Iraq still faces innumerable challenges, and they will be evident during what will likely be a difficult process as the newly-elected Council of Representatives seVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:37 May 06, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00750 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\62155.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
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lects the next prime minister, president, and speaker of the council, 

and seeks agreement on other key decisions, as well. 

Our task in Iraq is to continue to help the ISF—in part, through 

the Iraqi Security Forces Fund—as we continue to draw down our 

forces in a responsible manner. This task has been guided by the 

policy announced by President Obama about a year ago. Since that 

announcement, we have reduced our forces in Iraq by well over 

30,000, to some 97,000, and we are on track to reduce that number 

to 50,000 by the end of August, at which time we will also complete 

a change in mission that marks the transition of our forces from 

a combat role to one of advising and assisting Iraq Security Forces. 

As we draw down our forces in Iraq and increase our efforts in 

Afghanistan, we must not lose sight of other developments in the 

CENTCOM AOR. I want to highlight the developments in two 

countries in particular: Yemen and Iran. 

In Yemen, we have seen an increase in the prominence of al 

Qaeda as it exploits the country’s security, economic, and social 

challenges. The threat to Yemen, to the region, and indeed to the 

U.S. Homeland, posed by what is now called al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, has been demonstrated by suicide bombers trying 

to carry out operations in Yemen’s capital, by the attempt to assassinate the assistant Minister of Interior in Saudi Arabia, and by 

the attempted bombing of a U.S. airliner on Christmas Day. 

In fact, a number of us have been increasingly concerned over 

the past 21⁄2 years by the developments we have observed in 

Yemen. Last April, I approved a plan, developed in concert with 

our ambassador in Yemen, U.S. intelligence agencies, and the State 

Department, to expand our assistance to key security elements in 

Yemen. With Yemeni President Saleh’s approval, we began executing that plan last summer, and this helped strengthen the capabilities demonstrated by the Yemeni operations that were carried 

out against al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula in mid-December, 

and that have been executed periodically since then, as well. With 

your support, we are working toward expanded, sustained levels of 

assistance in Yemen. 

In fact, our efforts in Yemen should not just be seen as part of 

our overall counterterrorist campaign, but also as part of what 

might be termed preventive counterinsurgency operations, for our 

efforts not only help develop key security forces in Yemen, they 

also contribute to the overall effort to help Yemen deal with challenges that could become much more significant if not dealt with 

early on. 

Iran poses the major state-level threat to regional stability in the 

CENTCOM AOR. Despite numerous U.N. Security Council resolutions and extensive diplomatic efforts by the P5-plus-1 and the 

International Atomic Energy Agency, the Iranian regime continues 

its nuclear program. Indeed, Iran is assessed by many analysts to 

be engaged in pursuing a nuclear weapons capability, the advent 

of which would destabilize the region and likely spur a regional 

arms race. 

The Iranian regime also continues to arm, fund, train, equip, and 

direct proxy extremist elements in Iraq, Lebanon, Gaza, and, to a 

lesser degree, Afghanistan. It continues significant intervention in 

the domestic politics in each of those locations, as well. 

746 

The Iranian regime’s internal activities are also troubling, as its 

violent suppression of opposition groups and demonstrations in the 

wake of last years’ highjacked elections has made a mockery of the 

human rights of the Iranian people and fomented further unrest. 

Those internal developments have also resulted in greater reliance 

than ever on Iran’s security services to sustain the regime’s grip on 

power. 

Having discussed the developments in these countries, I’d now 

like to explain the importance of two key enablers in our ongoing 

missions, and to raise one additional issue. The Commanders’ 

Emergency Response Program (CERP) continues to be a vital tool 

for our commanders in Afghanistan and Iraq. Small CERP projects 

are often the most responsive and effective means to address a 

local community’s needs. Where security is challenged, CERP often 

provides the only tool to address pressing requirements. 

In the past year, we have taken a number of actions to ensure 

that we observe the original intent for CERP, and also to ensure 

adequate oversight for use of this important tool. I have, for example, withheld approval for projects over $1 million, at my level, and 

there has only been one such project since late last September. In 

the past year we’ve asked the Army Audit Agency to conduct audits 

of the CERPs in Iraq and Afghanistan. We’ve established guidelines for the number of projects each CERP team should oversee, 

and we have coordinated with the military Services to ensure adequate training and preparation of those who will perform functions 

connected with CERP in theater, while we have also established 

procedures to take cash off the battlefield. 

Beyond that, the Department of Defense (DOD) is currently performing an internal assessment and undertaking additional initiatives. With the force increases in Afghanistan, CERP funding priority has understandably shifted from Iraq to Afghanistan. We 

pledge to continue aggressive oversight of the CERP as this shift 

takes place. In addition, we will continue to seek innovative mechanisms and authorities to allow for greater cost-sharing and to spur 

the development of similar counterinsurgency tools by coalition and 

host-nation partners. 

In the past year, CENTCOM has pursued several initiatives to 

improve our capabilities in the information domain, and we have 

coordinated these actions closely with the State Department’s 

Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy, Judith McHale. This past 

year, we made significant headway in improving our ability to 

counter adversary IO, including establishing a full-fledged Joint IO 

Task Force in Afghanistan. Nonetheless, we still have a long way 

to go, and we desperately need to build the capabilities of a regional IO task force to complement the operations of the task force 

that has done such impressive work in Iraq, and the one that is 

now beginning to do the same in Afghanistan. 

In the broader CENTCOM AOR, Operation Earnest Voice (OEV) 

is the critical program of record that resources our efforts to synchronize our IO activities, to counter extremist ideology and propaganda, and to ensure that credible voices in the region are heard. 

OEV provides CENTCOM with direct communication capabilities 

to reach regional audiences through traditional media, as well as 

via Web sites and regional public affairs blogging. In each of these 

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efforts, we follow admonition we practiced in Iraq, that of being 

first with the truth. Full and enduring funding of OEV and other 

DOD IO efforts will, in coordination with State Department initiatives, enable us to do just that, and, in so doing, to communicate 

critical messages and to counter the propaganda of our adversaries. 

Cyberspace is becoming an extension of the battlefield, and we 

cannot allow it to be uncontested enemy territory. Indeed, in the 

years ahead, extremist activities in cyberspace will undoubtedly 

pose increasing threats to our military, and our Nation as a whole. 

DOD and other elements of our Government are working to come 

to grips with this emerging threat. Clearly, this is an area in which 

we need to develop additional policies, build capabilities, and ensure adequate resources. I suspect that legislation will be required 

over time, as well. 

Within DOD, the establishment of the U.S. Cyber Command, 

proposed by Secretary Gates, represents an essential step in the 

right direction. This initiative is very important, because extremist 

elements are very active in cyberspace. They recruit there, they 

prosthelytize there, they coordinate attacks there, and they share 

tactics and techniques there. We have to ask ourselves if this is 

something that we should allow to continue; and, if not, then we 

have to determine how to prevent or disrupt it without infringing 

on free speech. 

In conclusion, there are currently some 210,000 soldiers, sailors, 

airmen, marines, and coastguardsmen serving in the CENTCOM 

AOR. Day after day, on the ground, in the air, and at sea, these 

courageous and committed troopers perform difficult missions 

against tough enemies under the most challenging of conditions. 

Together with our many civilian and coalition partners, they have 

constituted the central element in our effort to promote security, 

stability, and prosperity in the region. These wonderful Americans 

and their fellow troopers stationed around the world constitute the 

most experienced, most capable military in our Nation’s history. 

They and their families have made tremendous sacrifices, and 

nothing means more to these great Americans than the sense that 

those back home appreciate their service to our country. 

In view of that, and on behalf of all those serving in the 

CENTCOM AOR, I want to take this opportunity to thank the 

American people for their extraordinary support of our men and 

women in uniform. I also want to take this opportunity to thank 

the members of this committee and of Congress overall for their 

unwavering support and abiding concern for our troops and their 

families. 

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of General Petraeus follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY GEN DAVID H. PETRAEUS, USA 

I. INTRODUCTION

Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, and members of the committee, U.S. Central 

Command (CENTCOM) is now in its ninth consecutive year of major combat operations in an area of the world critical to the interests of the United States and our 

allies. With our national and international partners, CENTCOM promotes security 

cooperation among nations; responds to crises; deters or defeats state and non-state 

aggression; and supports development and, when necessary, reconstruction in order 

to establish the conditions for regional security, stability, and prosperity. Typically, 

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executing this mission and achieving U.S. national goals and objectives in the 

CENTCOM Area of Responsibility (AOR) involves more than just the traditional application of military power. In many cases, a whole-of-government approach is required, one that integrates all the tools available to international and interagency 

partners to defeat transnational groups that pose a threat to the United States or 

our partners; to secure host-nation populations; to conduct comprehensive 

counterinsurgency and security operations; to counter the proliferation of weapons 

of mass destruction (WMD); to help reform, and in some cases build, governmental 

and institutional capacity; and to promote economic development. 

These are challenging missions, and the conditions and dynamics shaping the region’s security environment are constantly evolving. In the past year, there have 

been several important developments in the AOR—some representing progress, others presenting challenges. These changes include increased operations by the Pakistani military against groups that threaten the writ of governance in Pakistan, as 

well as continued improvements in the capabilities and self-reliance of the Iraqi Security Forces coupled with the degradation of the capabilities of militant groups in 

Iraq. We have also seen increased insurgent violence in Afghanistan and Pakistan, 

a general diminution of al Qaeda in the region despite an increase in the prominence of al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula in Yemen (AQAP), the emergence of 

significant domestic unrest and opposition in Iran accompanied by the regime’s continued intransigence over its nuclear program and its support to militant proxies, 

an increase in piracy in the Gulf of Aden and off the coast of Somalia, and the continuing fallout from the global financial crisis. 

The progress we have seen has not simply happened of its own accord. It is, to 

a great extent, the result of the work of U.S., partner, and coalition forces operating 

in the AOR over the past year. Since the delivery of last year’s Posture Statement, 

CENTCOM has worked to implement national policies as well as the recommendations of the comprehensive strategic review we conducted last winter. We have 

begun the responsible drawdown of forces from Iraq, working to sustain the hardwon security gains achieved since the summer of 2007 and placing us on track to 

have 50,000 troops in Iraq after this August. We are implementing the President’s 

strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan, to include an increase in forces and non-military resources. Having put into place the proper organizations, people, and concepts 

for the civil-military campaign in Afghanistan, we are currently deploying additional 

resources to halt the downward spiral in security and expand the size and capabilities of the Afghan security forces. We have placed great pressure against al Qaeda’s 

networks and senior leadership, and we have also made good strides in developing 

a Regional Security Architecture to address common security threats in the region. 

All the while, CENTCOM forces have continued to provide military support to major 

diplomatic initiatives in the region and to maintain a ready posture to respond to 

unforeseen crises. 

Building on our past successes and achievements and responding to the region’s 

dynamics, CENTCOM will focus on the following priority tasks in the coming year: 

• Reversing the momentum of the insurgency in Afghanistan and training 

Afghan security forces to regain the initiative against militants and to increase public confidence in the government; 

• Helping our Iraqi partners build on their progress while sustaining hardwon security gains, reducing U.S. forces in the country, and transitioning 

to a new mission of advising and assisting the Iraqi security forces; 

• Maintaining persistent kinetic and non-kinetic pressure to degrade and 

counter transnational terrorist and militant organizations that threaten the 

security of the United States and our allies; 

• Expanding our partnership with the Pakistani military, supporting its operations against militant groups, and assisting in the development of its 

counterinsurgency capabilities; 

• Countering destabilizing Iranian activities and policies; 

• Countering the proliferation of WMD and related material, technology, 

and expertise, while building the capacity and interoperability of our partners to prevent and, if necessary, respond to the use of WMD; 

• Bolstering the military and security capabilities of our partner nations’ 

security forces; 

• Working with our partners to counter piracy, illegal narcotics trafficking, 

and arms smuggling; 

• Bolstering oversight and ensuring responsible expenditure of U.S. funding; and 

• Working with the U.S. military services to reduce the strain on our forces 

and the cost of our operations. 

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The intent of the remainder of this Posture Statement is to address these priorities and the broader, long term solutions they support by providing a more detailed 

overview of the AOR, a description of our strategic approach to defending and advancing our interests, assessments of the situation in each of the AOR’s major subregions, and comments on the programs and systems that enable our operations. 

II. OVERVIEW OF THE CENTCOM AOR

A. Nature of the AOR 

The lands and waters of the CENTCOM AOR span several critical and distinct 

regions. It stretches across more than 4.6 million square miles and 20 countries in 

the Middle East and South and Central Asia and contains vital transportation and 

trade routes, including the Red Sea, the Northern Indian Ocean, and the Arabian 

Gulf, as well as strategic maritime choke points at the Suez Canal, the Bab el 

Mandeb, and the Strait of Hormuz. The AOR encompasses the world’s most energyrich region, with the Arabian Gulf region and Central Asia together accounting for 

at least 64 percent of the world’s known petroleum reserves, 34 percent of its crude 

oil production, and 46 percent of its known natural gas reserves. 

Social, political, and economic conditions vary greatly throughout the region. The 

region is home to some of the world’s wealthiest and poorest states, with annual 

per capita incomes ranging from $800 to over $100,000. Despite important pockets 

of affluence, many of the more than 530 million people living in the AOR suffer from 

inadequate governance, underdeveloped civil institutions, unsettling corruption, and 

high unemployment. 

As a result of these contrasts and the proliferation of global communications and 

mass media, many people in the AOR are struggling to balance modern influences 

with traditional social and cultural authorities and to manage change at a pace that 

reinforces stability rather than erodes it. For the past century, the sub-regions of 

the AOR have been torn by conflict as new states and old societies have struggled 

to erect a new order in the wake of the collapse of traditional empires. These conflicts have intensified in the past three decades with the emergence of al Qaeda and 

its Associated Movements, the specter of nuclear weapons, and enormous wealth derived from petroleum and illegal narcotics. Today we see stability in the AOR 

threatened by interstate tensions, the proliferation of ballistic missile and nuclear 

weapons technology and expertise, ethno-sectarian violence, insurgencies and substate militias, as well as horrific acts of terrorism. 

B. U.S. Interests and the Most Significant Threats to Them 

Because of the CENTCOM AOR’s geography, control of much of the world’s energy 

reserves, and propensity for instability, the United States has substantial strategic 

interests in, and related to, the region. Chief among these are: 

• the security of U.S. citizens and the U.S. Homeland; • regional stability; • international access to strategic resources, critical infrastructure, and 

markets; and 

• the promotion of human rights, the rule of law, responsible and effective 

governance, and broad-based economic growth and opportunity. 

The most serious threats to these interests lie at the nexus of militant groups, 

hostile states, and WMD. Across the AOR, al Qaeda and its Associated Movements 

are fueling insurgencies to reduce U.S. influence and to destabilize the existing political, social, and economic order. Meanwhile, some countries in the AOR play a 

dangerous game of allowing or accepting terrorist networks and facilitators to operate from or through their territory, believing that their own people and governments 

will be immune to their threat. Efforts to develop or acquire nuclear weapons and 

delivery systems magnify the potential dangers of the marriage between some states 

and their militant proxies. Indeed, the acquisition of nuclear arms by hostile states 

or terrorist organizations would constitute a grave threat to the United States, our 

allies, and the countries of the region and would likely spark a destabilizing arms 

race. 

In the near term, the greatest potential for such a threat to arise is found in the 

instability in South Asia, the activities and policies of the Iranian regime, the situation in Iraq, and the growth of AQAP in Yemen. 

• Instability in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The insurgencies in Afghanistan 

and Pakistan constitute the most urgent problem set in the CENTCOM 

AOR. Al Qaeda, the Taliban, and the syndicate of militant groups operating 

in the border region between Afghanistan and Pakistan are engaging in an 

increasingly violent campaign against the people and Governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan. Both states face a serious threat from these 

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groups, and though some of these organizations perpetrate acts of terrorism 

against local targets and others operate internationally, these groups have 

increasingly cooperative, even symbiotic, relationships. As a result, the control by any of these groups of major population centers or significant economic or financial resources would present an enormous challenge to security in the region and across the globe. 

• Iran’s Destabilizing Activities and Policies. The activities and policies of 

the Iranian regime constitute the major state-level threats to regional stability. Despite repeated International Atomic Energy Agency findings of Iranian violations of non-proliferation obligations, five United Nations Security 

Council 

• Situation in Iraq. Security in Iraq has improved significantly since the 

peak of the sectarian violence in mid-2007, but the gains there remain fragile and reversible, though increasingly less so. In Iraq, a number of factors 

continue to pose serious risks to U.S. interests and have the potential to 

undermine regional stability, disrupt international access to strategic resources, and frustrate efforts to deny terrorist safe havens and support 

bases. Internally, fundamental issues such as the distribution of political 

power and resources remain to be settled. The Iraqi state is still developing, 

and numerous challenges confront its leaders and people, 

• Instability in Yemen. The inability of the Yemeni Government to effectively secure and exercise control over all its territory offers AQAP a safe 

haven in which to plan, organize, and support terrorist operations. This 

network poses a direct threat to the U.S. Homeland, as evidenced by recent 

plots, including the attempted bombing of a U.S. airliner on Christmas Day 

2009. At the same time, the Yemeni state faces challenges from separatist 

movements in the South and a 6-year conflict with Houthi rebels, which despite the cease-fire in February could reignite and again spill over into 

Saudi Arabia. Moreover, the influx of refugees from Africa, pervasive arms 

smuggling, a deteriorating economic situation, and piracy continue to challenge the capabilities of the Yemeni Government. 

C. Cross-cutting Challenges to Security and Stability 

While this statement will describe in greater detail the dynamics and challenges 

in the sub-regions of the AOR, there are a number of cross-cutting issues that serve 

as major drivers of instability, inter-state tensions, and conflict. These factors can 

serve as root causes of instability or as obstacles to security. 

• Insufficient progress toward a comprehensive Middle East peace. The enduring hostilities between Israel and some of its neighbors present distinct 

challenges to our ability to advance our interests in the AOR. Israeli-Palestinian tensions often flare into violence and large-scale armed confrontations. The conflict foments anti-American sentiment, due to a perception of 

U.S. favoritism for Israel. Arab anger over the Palestinian question limits 

the strength and depth of U.S. partnerships with governments and peoples 

in the AOR and weakens the legitimacy of moderate regimes in the Arab 

world. Meanwhile, al Qaeda and other militant groups exploit that anger 

to mobilize support. The conflict also gives Iran influence in the Arab world 

through its clients, Lebanese Hizballah and Hamas. 

• Militant Islamist movements. The CENTCOM AOR is home to militant 

Islamist movements that threaten states in the region, exploit local conflicts, and foster instability through acts of terrorism. The most significant 

of these is al Qaeda, which, along with its Associated Movements, seeks to 

impose its 

• Proliferation of WMD. The AOR contains states and terrorist organizations that actively seek WMD capabilities and have previously proliferated 

WMD-related material, technology, and expertise outside established international monitoring regimes. In addition, regional states are increasingly 

interested in the development of nuclear programs, which, if not properly 

managed, could lead to the proliferation of illicit nuclear material or a regional arms race. 

• Ungoverned, poorly governed, and alternatively governed spaces. Weak 

civil and security institutions and the inability of certain governments in 

the region to exert full control over their territories are conditions that insurgent groups can exploit to create physical safe havens in which they can 

plan, train for, and launch operations or pursue narco-criminal activities. 

We have seen these groups develop, or attempt to develop, what might be 

termed sub-states, particularly in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Lebanon, Iraq, 

Yemen, and the Palestinian territories. 

751 

• Significant sources of terrorist financing and facilitation. The AOR remains a primary source of illicit funding and facilitation for global terrorist 

organizations and other militant groups. All this financing is transmitted 

through a variety of formal and informal networks, which include financial 

operatives and front companies throughout the region. 

• Piracy. The lack of governance in Somalia has allowed piracy to grow off 

the coast and in the Horn of Africa threatening the flow of commerce 

through the region. Since the spike in piracy in 2008, we have worked in 

close cooperation with the international community to counter this trend by 

focusing on increasing international presence, encouraging the shipping industry to adopt best practices to defend against piracy, and establishing a 

sound international legal framework for resolving piracy cases. Despite 

some reduction in the number of successful pirate attacks in the region, piracy remains lucrative—increasingly so, as the ransom rates have nearly 

doubled over the previous year’s—and pirates continue to modify their area 

of operations and techniques to avoid coalition presence. 

• Ethnic, tribal, and sectarian rivalries. Within certain countries, the 

politicization of ethnicity, tribal affiliation, and religious sect serves to disrupt the development of national civil institutions and social cohesion, at 

times to the point of violence. Between countries in the region, such rivalries can heighten political tension and serve as catalysts for conflict and insurgency. 

• Disputed territories and access to vital resources. Unresolved issues of 

disputed territorial boundaries and disagreements over the sharing of vital 

resources, such as water, oil, and natural gas, serve as sources of tension 

and conflict between and within states in the region. 

• Criminal activities, such as weapons, narcotics, and human trafficking. 

Weapons smuggling, narcotics trafficking, and associated criminal activities 

undermine security, spur corruption, and inhibit legitimate economic activity and good governance throughout the AOR. In particular, state-sponsored 

weapons trafficking in support of groups like Lebanese Hizballah, Hamas, 

and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad undermines regional security and the 

Middle East Peace Process. 

• Uneven economic development and lack of employment opportunities. Despite substantial economic growth rates throughout much of the region over 

the past few years, significant segments of the population in the region remain economically disenfranchised, under-educated, and without sufficient 

opportunity. In addition many countries in the region face growing ‘‘youth 

bulges’’ that will strain their economies’ abilities to produce sufficient employment opportunities. The recent global economic downturn has heightened these problems. Without sustained, broad-based economic development, increased employment opportunities are unlikely given the growing 

proportions of young people relative to overall populations. 

• Lack of regional and global economic integration. The AOR is characterized by low levels of trade and commerce among countries, which diminish 

prospects for long term economic growth, as well as opportunities to deepen 

interdependence through increased political, commercial, social, and cultural ties. 

III. REGIONAL STRATEGY

To help defend and advance our national interests, CENTCOM executes a strategy that promotes security and stability in our AOR. In cooperation with our partners and in concert with national policy, we work to deter aggression as well as 

eliminate the conditions that foment conflict. Given the complexities of the AOR and 

its many security challenges, we have adopted a strategy that consists of active engagement in the region as well as prudent preparation for contingencies. The following sections describe the highlights of this strategy by outlining the strategic vision we seek to achieve and the guiding principles and major activities that characterize our approach. 

A. Strategic Vision. 

The conditions needed for security, stability, and prosperity in the region constitute the strategic vision we are working toward and the ultimate goals of our activities. They reflect our desire to strengthen the international system, while promoting effective and responsible governance and broad-based economic development 

throughout the region. Specifically, we seek a region 

• that is at peace with itself and its neighbors; 

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• that is focused on common security and cooperation; • with stable governments that are responsive to the needs of their people; • with patterns of economic development that advance people’s well-being; • where nuclear proliferation is not a threat and where nuclear energy use 

is verifiable and for peaceful purposes; 

• with unhindered international access to strategic resources, critical infrastructure, and markets; and 

• from which, and within which, groups such as al Qaeda do not threaten 

the United States or our allies. 

Working towards these objectives, in concert with the Department of State, is the 

most feasible and acceptable strategy for addressing the threats to our interests. To 

be sure, these objectives are broad and far-reaching, but they are nonetheless attainable. 

B. Strategic Approach. 

Achieving this vision and establishing these conditions necessarily requires changing—in some respects significantly changing—the security environment in the region, and as a result, our activities must be guided by the principle that our security 

solutions be comprehensive, cooperative, and enduring. This guidance recognizes 

that we must simultaneously address security, political, and economic challenges in 

the region; that we cannot do this through military means alone or without the cooperation of our partners in the region and the broader international community; 

and that these changes must be longlasting and, eventually, self-sustaining. 

• Comprehensive Solutions. Because instability and insecurity in the AOR 

stem from a complex mix of security, political, and economic challenges, we 

must pursue comprehensive solutions to problems in the region. This requires us to apply whole-of-government approaches that fully integrate our 

military and non-military efforts and those of our partners. For example, 

to address the threat posed by insurgent groups we are dismantling their 

networks and leadership, often through the use of security forces, while also 

working to eliminate their sources of support by protecting populations 

from these groups, disrupting their financial networks and sources of financing, delegitimizing their methods and ideologies, and addressing legitimate grievances to win over reconcilable elements of the population. We 

constantly strive to understand the complexities of these challenges and tailor our approaches to the unique circumstances on the ground. 

• Cooperative Solutions. Because the challenges in the region are often 

transnational ones and because no nation can protect itself from these 

threats without cooperation from others, we must pursue cooperative, multilateral solutions. We seek collective action and an atmosphere of broad 

inclusivity and partnership to attract the needed pool of resources and to 

leverage each country’s 

• Enduring Solutions. Finally, because we want lasting conditions of security and prosperity, we must seek long term, enduring solutions to the challenges in the region. To this end, we work to address the root causes of instability rather than apply quick fixes to their symptoms. Also, to achieve 

the cooperation described above, we pursue strategic partnerships with the 

Nations of the region rather than short-term transactional relationships. 

Lastly, we strive to increase integration and interdependence in the region 

in many different areas—diplomatic, commercial, social, and cultural— 

under the belief that increased interaction is a positive-sum game that benefits all parties and reduces the incentives for conflict. All of our efforts require sustained commitments of our attention, energy, and, in some cases, 

resources. 

Adhering to these principles in our strategic approach and in the execution of our 

operations places a premium on unity of effort at all levels and with all participants. 

At the combatant command level, this means working with our interagency and 

international partners to develop joint action or campaign plans that establish appropriate missions and objectives for our subordinate elements, from major commands such as U.S. Forces-Iraq and U.S. Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR–A) to our 

country-based offices of military cooperation. To effectively carry out these plans, we 

work carefully to coordinate our military elements with the corresponding State Department envoy or ambassador as well as our international and host nation partners. 

C. Major Activities 

In addition to our ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, our forces are engaged in numerous, wide-ranging endeavors designed to establish the conditions deVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:37 May 06, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00758 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\62155.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
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scribed above for security, stability, and prosperity in the region. Chief among these 

major activities are our efforts designed to do the following: 

• Defeat al Qaeda and its Associated Movements 

• Deny sanctuaries and disrupt support for insurgent groups 

• Counterproliferation of WMD and associated technology 

• Deter and counter state-based aggression and proxy activities 

• Support the peaceful resolution of longstanding interstate conflicts 

• Build bilateral and multilateral security partnerships 

• Develop partner nation security capacity 

• Help nations protect their critical infrastructure and support infrastructure development 

• Bolster at-risk states 

• Respond to humanitarian crises, when called upon by our Ambassadors 

• Counter arms smuggling 

• Protect freedom of navigation 

IV. CRITICAL SUBREGIONS OF THE CENTCOM AOR

The complexity and uniqueness of local conditions in the CENTCOM AOR defy 

attempts to formulate an aggregated estimate of the situation that can address, 

with complete satisfaction, all of the pertinent issues. Thus, the best way to approach the challenges in the AOR is through a disaggregation of the problem set 

into six sub-regions, described as follows: 

• Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India (though India does not lie within the 

boundaries of the CENTCOM AOR) 

• Iran 

• Iraq 

• The Arabian Peninsula, comprised of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, 

Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Yemen 

• Egypt and the Levant, comprised of Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan (as well 

as Israel and the Palestinian territories, which do not lie within the 

CENTCOM AOR) 

• Central Asia, comprised of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, 

Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan 

A. Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India 

Instability in Afghanistan and Pakistan poses the most urgent problem set in the 

CENTCOM AOR and requires complementary and integrated civil-military, wholeof-government approaches. The two countries are linked by tribal affiliations and a 

porous border that permits terrorists, insurgents, and criminals to move relatively 

freely to and from their safe havens. Indeed, al Qaeda, the Taliban, and other insurgent groups operating from the border region are engaged in an increasingly violent 

campaign against Afghan and coalition Forces and the developing Afghan state. 

However, while it is important to note that the problem sets are related, the United 

States must forge a unique partnership with each country. 

Afghanistan 

The past year was marked by a shift in strategic focus in Afghanistan. Over the 

course of the conflict, the Afghan insurgency had expanded its strength and influence—particularly in the South and East—and 2009 levels of violence were significantly higher than those of 2008. The Taliban have been resilient, with their activities fueled by revenues from outside the region as well as from narcotics-trafficking, 

the freedom of movement they enjoy in the border region between Afghanistan and 

Pakistan, ineffective governance and services in parts of the country, as well as by 

contributions from other militant groups outside Afghanistan and Pakistan. To reverse this momentum and the downward spiral in security, we have embarked on 

a new 12-to-18-month civil-military campaign plan, and coalition forces and their 

Afghan partners are fighting to retake the initiative from the insurgency. The main 

goals of our strategy, announced by President Obama last December, include the following: 

• reversing Taliban momentum through sustained military action, 

• denying the Taliban access to and control of key population and production centers and lines of communication, 

• disrupting the Taliban outside secured areas and preventing al Qaeda 

from regaining sanctuary in Afghanistan, 

• degrading the Taliban to levels manageable by the Afghanistan National 

Security Forces (ANSF), 

754 

• increasing the size and capability of the ANSF and employing other local 

forces selectively to begin a conditions-based transition of security responsibility to the Afghan Government by July 2011, and 

• supporting U.S. Government efforts to build the capacity of the Afghan 

Government, particularly in key ministries. 

To implement this strategy, we and our North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

(NATO) partners have spent a great deal of effort putting into place the right organizations and command and control structures needed to carry out a comprehensive 

civil-military campaign. This includes the capabilities for targeting of insurgents’ resources and finances, detention operations, ministerial capacity building, border coordination, strategic communications, and the conduct of reconciliation efforts. This 

began by ensuring the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Commander 

was dual-hatted as both a NATO Commander and the commander of U.S. forces, 

which helped to reduce many of the organizational firewalls between ISAF and Operation Enduring Freedom elements. We created the ISAF Intermediate Joint Command (IJC), a three-star headquarters to oversee operational execution of the 

counterinsurgency campaign. We established a Joint Task Force to address detainee 

operations and help develop rule of law capacity within the Afghan Government, 

from policing and incarceration to trials and convictions. We developed a Force Reintegration Cell within the ISAF headquarters to support the reintegration and reconciliation process at the national level. We established an interagency threat finance cell, an intelligence fusion cell, and a full-fledged Joint Information Operations Task Force to conduct strategic communications. We formed the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan and made several other command and control adjustments, 

such as the integration of mentoring teams under the IJC and its battle space commanders and the restructuring of Army brigades, to improve our ability to train, advise, and assist Afghan security forces. Lastly, we formed the Pakistan-Afghanistan 

Coordination Cell on the Joint Staff and inaugurated the Afghanistan-Pakistan Intelligence Center of Excellence at CENTCOM to better organize our resources here 

at home. All of these organizations tie together and support the numerous activities 

taking place at the unit level across the country as our operations move forward 

over time, and to run them we have hand-selected some of nation’s best civilian and 

military leaders, all of whom have been involved with counterinsurgency operations 

for quite some time. 

Just as critical, we have strengthened our counterinsurgency approach and established a wide-spread understanding of the critical concepts guiding and governing 

our operations. First and foremost in this approach is a commitment to protecting 

and serving the people. This focus is captured in Ambassador Karl Eikenberry and 

General Stanley McChrystal’s Integrated Civil-Military Campaign Plan, which directs our military and civilian components to take a residential approach and, in 

a culturally acceptable way, live among the people, understand their neighborhoods, 

and invest in relationships. General McChrystal has also published counterinsurgency guidance, has pushed to achieve greater unity of effort, has aggressively 

pursued the mission of partnering with the Afghan security forces, and has issued 

appropriate guidance on detention, reintegration, joint night raids, and tactical driving. All of these concepts are designed to secure the Afghan people, to reduce civilian casualties, and to build their trust in ISAF forces and the national government. 

Critical to the organizations, leaders, and strategies we have put in place in Afghanistan are the resources needed to support them, in this case, 30,000 additional 

U.S. forces, additional civilians experts, and appropriate funding, each of which was 

announced by the President in December at West Point. Just as important are the 

additional commitments from other NATO and coalition partners totaling more than 

9,000 troops. These resources are starting to flow into the country, and they will 

allow us to better expand the security presence in population centers and along 

major lines of communication, to better hold areas cleared of insurgent groups, and 

to build a new level of Afghan governmental control. 

As a part of this approach, we will also invigorate efforts to develop the capabilities of the ANSF, including the Afghan National Army, the Afghan Uniform Police, 

the Afghan Gendarmerie Force, the Afghan Border Police, specialized counternarcotics units, and other security forces. We recognize the fact that international 

forces must eventually transfer security responsibility to Afghan security forces. In 

January 2009, the ANSF numbered 156,000; today, there are over 206,000 assigned, 

but significant work remains in improving the quality of the Afghan force through 

enhanced partnering, training, and recruiting. General McChrystal has placed a 

premium on comprehensive partnering with the ANSF, an emphasis that is being 

demonstrated in the ongoing Operation Moshtarak, in which ISAF and ANSF operate at close to a 1-to-1 ratio. Of equal importance, ISAF and ANSF leaders worked 

together in partnership to plan all aspects of the operation, a signal of ANSF develVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:37 May 06, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00760 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\62155.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
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opment that goes beyond the number of ANSF boots on the ground. A properly 

sized, trained, and equipped ANSF is a prerequisite for any eventual drawdown of 

international forces from Afghanistan, and through our support and the assistance 

of the Afghan Security Forces Fund, the ANSF will continue to expand so that they 

will be more able to meet their country’s security needs. 

In addition, we, along with our civilian colleagues, will bolster the capabilities and 

the legitimacy of the other elements of the Afghan Government—an effort in which, 

in much of Afghanistan, we will be building, not rebuilding. We will do this through 

our support to local government at the provincial and district levels, utilizing the 

new structure of civilian representatives at each level of our deployed military. 

These, along with the efforts of Provincial Reconstruction Teams and national level 

civil-military and ministerial capacity building teams are empowering Afghans to 

solve Afghan problems and promoting local reintegration where possible. Most recently, we are supporting governance and development efforts as part of ongoing operations in Helmand Province. 

Another major component of our strategy is to disrupt narcotics trafficking, which 

provides significant funding to the Taliban insurgency. This drug money has been 

the ‘‘oxygen’’ in the air that allows these groups to operate. With the extension of 

authority granted to U.S. forces to conduct counter-narcotics operations, we are able 

to more closely work with the Afghan Government to disrupt the illicit narcotics industry though interdiction of the narco-trafficking network. To complement this effort, we support and promote viable agricultural and economic alternatives and the 

requisite infrastructure to help Afghans bring licit products to market for sale and 

distribution. 

Executing this strategy requires clear unity of effort at all levels and with all participants. Our senior commanders (and I) have worked with Ambassador Richard 

Holbrooke, the U.S. Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan; Ambassador Eikenberry, the U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan; Stefan di Mistura, the 

United Nations Special Representative of the Secretary General for Afghanistan; 

Ambassador Mark Sedwill, NATO’s new Senior Civilian Representative in Afghanistan; and the Afghan leadership to improve and synchronize the whole-of-government approach. Our security efforts have been integrated into the broader plan to 

promote political and economic development. We have urged partner nations to continue the invaluable support they are providing and to seek additional support as 

required for mission accomplishment. 

The changes in approach launched in 2009 and 2010 (e.g., greater military and 

civilian resources, enhanced unity of effort and partnering) can help turn the tide 

over time, but we must manage expectations as we continue the buildup in our 

forces. Progress will be incremental and difficult. In 2010, the Taliban and other insurgent groups will attempt to build on their previous momentum and create further instability in the Afghan provinces, particularly in the South and East. We will 

endeavor not only to prevent that but to wrest the initiative from the Taliban. 

Pakistan 

The possibility of significant instability in Pakistan poses a serious threat to regional and global security, in large part, because Pakistan remains a critical strategic foothold for al Qaeda and is important to the organization’s efforts to rally supporters worldwide. Although al Qaeda senior leaders are under considerably more 

pressure in Pakistan than in previous years, the Federally Administered Tribal 

Area (FATA) still serves as al Qaeda’s principal sanctuary. More important, these 

leaders continue to plan and inspire regional and transnational operations from the 

FATA, while maintaining the ability to function as a structured organization, and 

foreign fighters continue to travel to Pakistan for training and to join al Qaeda. Additionally, Pakistan continues to face a serious insurgency fueled by militants operating from the country’s tribal areas with casualties from violent incidents in Pakistan, particularly bombings and suicide attacks having increased dramatically over 

the past year. 

However, the people and leaders of Pakistan have increasingly grown to see these 

groups as serious threats, and the Pakistani security forces have stepped up operations against insurgents, showing impressive determination and skill. They have 

conducted operations in the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) and the FATA on 

an unprecedented scale, successfully re-taking territory from the insurgent groups. 

Pakistan has sustained very tough losses in this effort, and it is clear that the country’s leaders are keenly aware of the severity of the threat posed by these groups 

to the people and government. 

We are working to forge a stronger partnership with Pakistan and to support its 

efforts in two ways. First, we aim to strengthen the military’s capacity to target insurgent groups through the development of Pakistan’s counterinsurgency capabiliVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:37 May 06, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00761 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\62155.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
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ties. Second, we support Pakistan’s governmental and economic development. Our 

efforts have helped as the Pakistani military has made progress in its 

counterinsurgency operations. The Pakistani Army and Frontier Corps have cleared 

many areas of militant groups. However, the hold and build phases of these operations and the subsequent transition to civil authority challenge the army and Pakistan’s civil institutions. In fact, these institutions will be pressed by militant efforts 

to reassert control over the territory gained in 2009, risking a reversal of the past 

year’s gains. The passage of the Kerry-Lugar-Berman Bill, the Pakistan 

Counterinsurgency Capability Fund, the $11.3 billion International Monetary Fund 

grant, and other key initiatives temporarily pulled Pakistan back from the brink of 

an impending economic collapse a year ago and helped increase Pakistan’s capacity 

for counterinsurgency operations. Continued support for these initiatives is critical 

to enabling the Pakistan to continue its fight and to expand the writ of governance. 

Finally, we are working to reduce regional tensions to enable adequate focus on 

the existential threat of militant Islamist movements in Pakistan. Though Indo-Pakistani tensions have eased since 2008, they could easily reignite in 2010, particularly in the event of another significant terrorist attack in India. A major escalation 

in these tensions would almost certainly result in the immediate redeployment to 

the east of Pakistani forces currently deployed to confront militants in the West, 

risking forfeiture of gains in FATA and the NWFP. This suggests a need for India 

and Pakistan to continue discussions begun on February 25 in order to reduce the 

strategic tension and the risk of miscalculation between these nuclear states. 

B. Iran 

The Iranian regime is the primary state-level threat to stability in the region. 

Throughout much of the region, the regime pursues a dual-track foreign policy. 

Overtly, the Iranian Government cooperates with regional states through bilateral 

arrangements to promote Iran as an economic, political, and military power. In parallel, the regime entrusts the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-Qods 

Force to execute covert aspects of its foreign policy using political influence, covert 

businesses, lethal and non-lethal aid, and training to militants supportive of the regime’s agenda. The Qods Force is active throughout the region, and, in fact, controls 

Iranian foreign policy in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and Gaza and influences heavily in 

Afghanistan and the Gulf Region. Through Qods Force soft power initiatives and destabilizing activities, such as coercion and direct attacks, Iran is subverting democratic processes and intimidating the nascent governments of our partners. The regime continues to intervene in the Israeli-Palestinian situation through its support 

to Hamas and Lebanese Hizballah, and it remains in violation of six United Nations 

Security Council Resolutions regarding its nuclear program and arms transfers. 

Iran’s nuclear program is a serious, destabilizing factor in the region and is widely believed to be a part of the regime’s broader effort to expand its influence. Although the regime has stated the purpose of its nuclear program is exclusively for 

peaceful, civilian use, Iranian officials have consistently failed to provide the assurances and transparency necessary for full international confidence. This includes 

failure to provide verification as required by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, 

to which Iran is a signatory, and failure to implement the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) Additional Protocol, which would allow for more comprehensive inspections. The regime’s obstinacy and obfuscation have forced Iran’s neighbors and the international community to conclude the worst about the regime’s intentions, as confirmed by the recent IAEA Board of Governors’ near unanimous censure of Iran’s recent disclosure of a secret nuclear facility near Qom. It appears that, 

at a minimum, Tehran is keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons. Iran 

continues to develop and improve its uranium enrichment infrastructure and is likely to use its gas centrifuges to produce fissile material for a weapon, should it make 

the political decision to do so. This pattern of conduct coupled with its rejection of 

international responsibilities is troubling, especially when viewed in the context that 

other regional states have recently announced their intentions to develop nuclear 

power programs. This behavior poses a clear challenge to international nonproliferation goals due to the possibility of such technologies being transferred to terrorist 

groups and the potential for a regional arms race, as other regional states may seek 

nuclear parity. 

Domestically, the regime is taking dramatic steps to maintain power in reaction 

to the persistent civil unrest sparked by the apparent election manipulation leading 

to President Ahmadinejad’s re-election in June 2009. The aftermath of the presidential election created a political rift among regime elites and further hardened 

certain leaders’ views toward the U.S. and the West over alleged involvement in 

supporting a ‘‘soft revolution’’ in Iran. Tehran has deployed significant numbers of 

security forces, mainly comprised of Basij militia, to crack down on street protests 

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and conduct mass arrests of protestors. The regime has also taken sweeping steps 

to control the information environment by slowing or shutting down the internet, 

telephone networks, and other forms of social media used by protestors to organize, 

execute, and publicize their efforts. The opposition movement, led by former regime 

insiders, poses the most serious political challenge to the regime since the advent 

of the Islamic Republic. 

The Iranian regime has also attempted to thwart U.S. and international efforts 

to bring stability to Iraq, Afghanistan, and the broader region. In Afghanistan, the 

Iranian regime appears to have hedged its longstanding public support for the 

Karzai Government by providing opportunistic support to the Taliban. In Iraq, however, the Iranian regime has embarked on a broad campaign led by the IRGC-Qods 

Force to influence Iraqi politics and support, through various means, parties loyal 

to Iran. The Qods Force also maintains its lethal support to Shia Iraqi militia 

groups, providing them with weapons, funding, and training. Additionally, al Qaeda 

continues to use Iran as a key facilitation hub, where facilitators connect al Qaeda’s 

senior leadership to regional affiliates. Although Iranian authorities do periodically 

disrupt this network by detaining select al Qaeda facilitators and operational planners, Tehran’s policy in this regard is often unpredictable. 

Pursuing our longstanding regional goals and improving key relationships within 

and outside the AOR help to limit the negative impact of Iran’s policies. A credible 

U.S. effort on Arab-Israeli issues that provides regional governments and populations a way to achieve a comprehensive settlement of the disputes would undercut 

Iran’s policy of militant ‘‘resistance,’’ which the Iranian regime and insurgent groups 

have been free to exploit. Additionally, progress on the Israel-Syria peace track 

could disrupt Iran’s lines of support to Hamas and Hizballah. Moreover, our development of a cooperative Regional Security Architecture, which includes a regional 

network of air and missile defense systems as well as hardening and protecting our 

partners’ critical infrastructure, can help dissuade aggressive Iranian behavior. In 

all of these initiatives, our military activities will continue to support our diplomatic 

efforts, and we will remain vigilant across a wide range of contingencies. 

C. Iraq 

Iraq made steady progress throughout 2009, a year that brought significant 

change in the security situation and in Iraqi politics. A broad backlash against the 

Islamist parties that have dominated the Iraqi Government since 2005, along with 

the Iraqi people’s increasing preference for emerging secular, nationalist parties and 

leaders, yielded a stunning result in January 2009’s largely violence-free provincial 

elections and a peaceful transfer of power in every province that held an election. 

Various internal dynamics, however, have exacerbated the Arab-Kurd dispute over 

Kirkuk and other territories, and this issue now looms as the greatest potential 

Iraqi flashpoint. 

The security situation in Iraq remained stable during the implementation of the 

U.S.-Iraqi security agreement, the handover of lead responsibility to the Iraqi Security Forces, and the drawdown of U.S. forces from some 130,000 in March 2009 to 

96,000 today. The level of violence generally remained at record lows following the 

withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraqi cities in June, demonstrating the Iraqi Security 

Forces’ growing capability to handle security responsibilities independently. November witnessed the lowest number of civilian deaths since spring 2003, and December 

was the first month since the March 2003 invasion in which no U.S. forces died in 

combat in Iraq. A number of high-profile attacks in the second half of 2009 showed, 

nonetheless, that the Iraqis still have much work to do in developing 

counterterrorism capabilities. While al Qaeda in Iraq’s (AQI) attempt to discredit 

and destabilize the government through massive bombings did not succeed, it did 

demonstrate AQI’s resilience. At the same time, the Arab-Kurd dispute has lent new 

life to Ba’athist-related insurgent groups in northern Iraq, which have attempted to 

ignite a conflict along the Green Line. As we continue to draw down our forces in 

a responsible manner and comply with our commitments under the U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement, key to further improving the security situation and mitigating remaining risks will be continuing to help the Iraqi Security Forces and developing 

their capabilities through our advisory and security assistance programs and the 

Iraq Security Forces Fund. 

This year will bring far-reaching developments in Iraqi politics and the U.S.-Iraq 

relationship. Just this month, Iraqis took to the polls and expressed their political 

will in parliamentary elections made possible by the security provided by the ISF. 

The significance of the elections was clearly evidenced by the strong voter turnout 

across the country and the political maneuvering—including the campaign by some 

Shia Islamists officials to ban a number of former Baathists and secularists from 

running—leading up to election day. The formation of the new national government 

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following the election will shape the resolution of outstanding fundamental issues 

about the nature of the Iraqi state, including the Arab-Kurd question and the balance between central and provincial authority. As such, we expect Iraq’s internal 

political landscape to continue to face evolutionary challenges. We will continue to 

work with the new Iraqi Government to implement the Strategic Framework Agreement and strengthen our bilateral relationship. 

D. The Arabian Peninsula 

The Arabian Peninsula commands significant U.S. attention and focus because of 

its importance to our interests and its potential for insecurity. These Arab states 

on the Peninsula are the Nations of the AOR most politically and commercially connected to the United States and Europe. They are more developed economically than 

any of their neighbors, collectively wield substantial defense forces, and are major 

providers of the world’s energy resources. However, the Peninsula has, in the past, 

been a significant source of funding and manpower for terrorist groups and foreign 

fighters. Where governments face internal challenges, the situation is often aggravated and intensified by external factors, such as the Iranian regime’s destabilizing 

behavior, instability in the Palestinian territories and southern Lebanon, political 

and security troubles in Iraq, and weapons proliferation. 

Over the past few years, we have worked with the countries of the Arabian Peninsula, as well as other partners in the region, to develop a Regional Security Architecture to address common security challenges. This architecture is made up of an 

array of major components including a Shared Early Warning system; an increasingly integrated air and missile defense network; and an extensive array of ground, 

maritime, aviation, and special operations exercises each designed to respond to different types of threats. All of these cooperative efforts are facilitated by the critical 

base, port, and training facilities provided by Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, the UAE, and 

others throughout the AOR. 

This emerging but, nonetheless, significantly developed collection of partnerships 

improves our interoperability and our overall effectiveness in ongoing multi-lateral 

operations and security initiatives. The mechanisms and capabilities put in place to 

coordinate efforts in one area, such as piracy, smuggling, and littoral security, can 

often be employed to respond rapidly to crises in other areas. Moreover, progress 

made in generating cooperation on one set of issues can serve as an opening for engagement on other issues, thereby promoting greater interdependence in the region. 

Contributions of funding and forces by regional partners to our operations in Afghanistan evidence some of these positive spillover effects. Now that our Gulf partners have begun working closely to address common threats, the logical next step 

is to expand the model and encourage the integration of Iraq with our Gulf partners. Such a step would benefit the entire region. 

Yemen stands out from its neighbors because of its underdeveloped governmental 

institutions and weak economy and because of its numerous security challenges, 

which include the Southern secessionist movement, the Houthi tribal rebellion, and 

the presence of AQAP. Yemen’s strategic location facilitates AQAP’s freedom of 

movement and allows it to threaten not only Yemen’s neighbors but also the United 

States and Europe. In recent months we have seen several terrorist attacks attempted within and emanating from Yemen, the spillover of the Houthi rebellion 

into Saudi Arabia, the resurgence of Yemen’s Southern secessionists, and the negative influence of al-Shabaab in Somalia. In view of these developments, we are 

working toward expanded, sustained, and predictable efforts to help build Yemen’s 

security, counterinsurgency, and counterterrorist capabilities, and we seek to nearly 

double U.S. security assistance to the country in the coming year. 

E. Egypt and the Levant 

The Levant and Egypt subregion is the traditional political, social, and intellectual heart of the Arab world and is vital to security and stability in the CENTCOM 

AOR. Because of its history as a primary battleground between rival ideologies, the 

dynamics of this sub-region, particularly with regard to Israel, influence the internal and external politics of states outside the region as well. In addition, U.S. policy 

and actions in the Levant affect the strength of our relationships with partners in 

the AOR. As such, progress toward resolving the political disputes in the Levant, 

particularly the Arab-Israeli conflict, is a major concern for CENTCOM. Through a 

significant expansion of our engagement program, capacity building efforts, training 

exercises, deployment of Navy vessels to the Red Sea, and information sharing, we 

are working with our partners in Egypt and the Levant to build the capabilities of 

legitimate security forces, defeat transnational and sub-state militant groups, combat the spread of WMD and related materials, and disrupt illegal arms smuggling. 

759 

In addition, we will work to develop the mechanisms of security and confidence 

building to support efforts to achieve a comprehensive Middle East peace. 

Egypt remains a leading Arab state, a staunch U.S. ally, and a key actor in the 

Middle East Peace Process. In recent years, however, the Egyptian Government has 

had to deal with serious economic challenges and an internal militant Islamist 

threat; as such, U.S. foreign aid has been a critical reinforcement to the Egyptian 

Government. At the same time, concern over the possibility of the spillover of instability in Gaza has led Egypt to play a pivotal role in international efforts to address 

the situation there, to improve border security, and to interdict illicit arms shipments to Palestinian militants. In partnership with U.S. Africa Command, we are 

working with Egypt to combat militancy and smuggling across the Red Sea, Horn 

of Africa, Nile basin, and northern Africa. 

Jordan continues to be a key partner in the region. The Kingdom’s forces participate in many regional security initiatives and are at the forefront of police and military training for regional security forces. In addition to its regular participation in 

multilateral training exercises, Jordan promotes regional cooperation and builds our 

partner nations’ security capacity through its recently opened King Abdullah Special 

Operations Training Center, Peace Operations Training Center, International Police 

Training Center, and Cooperative Management Center. We support these efforts, as 

they are critical to the continued development of legitimate security forces throughout the region, especially in Lebanon and the Palestinian territories and, as a consequence, will be important to the long term viability of the Middle East Peace Process. 

In Lebanon, Hizballah’s rearmament following its conflict with Israel in 2006, particularly its rocket and missile stocks, portends continued instability in the region. 

Hizballah continues to undermine the authority of the legitimate Lebanese security 

forces, threaten Israel, and provide training and support to militant groups outside 

the country. Stabilizing Lebanon ultimately requires strengthening the capabilities 

of the Lebanese Armed Forces, fully implementing United Nations Security Council 

Resolutions, including 1559 and 1701, ending Iran’s illegal support to Hizballah, 

and assisting the Lebanese Government in developing a comprehensive national defense strategy through which the government can exercise its sovereignty, free of 

external intervention. 

Last, despite continued support to Hizballah, interference in Lebanese internal 

politics, and accommodation of foreign fighter networks and facilitators operating 

from and through its territory, the Asad regime in Syria appears to be slowly seeking rapprochement with its neighbors and the United States. 

F. Central Asia 

Central Asia is a pivotal region on the Eurasian continent between Russia, China, 

Iran, and South Asia, has extensive national resources, particularly hydrocarbons, 

and serves as a major transit route for regional and international commerce and for 

supplies supporting coalition efforts in Afghanistan. Ensuring stability in Central 

Asia requires abandoning the outdated, zero-sum paradigms of international politics 

associated with the so-called ‘‘Great Game,’’ replacing them with broad partnerships 

to address common challenges such as terrorism, WMD proliferation, and illegal 

narcotics trafficking. There are numerous opportunities in Central Asia for cooperation that can simultaneously advance the interests of the Central Asian States and 

their neighbors. 

However, public and civic institutions in Central Asia are still developing in the 

aftermath of decades of Soviet rule, and they present challenges to our efforts to 

promote security, development, and cooperation. Although there is interdependence 

across a broad range of social, economic, and security matters, these nations have 

not yet fully established a productive regional modus vivendi. Overcoming these 

challenges requires incremental approaches that focus on the alleviation of near 

term needs, the establishment of better governance, the integration of markets for 

energy and other commercial activity, and grass-roots economic development. 

Over the past 2 years, a primary focus of our engagement with the Central Asian 

States has been the development and expansion of our Northern Distribution Network (NDN), which supports coalition forces in Afghanistan. Through diligent work 

by the State Department and U.S. Transportation Command, we have improved the 

flexibility, efficiency, and reliability of our logistical support to our operations in Afghanistan by diversifying the routes, approaches, and contracts that comprise the 

logistical network. In 2010, we anticipate expanding our use of the NDN as additional routes and methods of delivery become available. In addition to improving our 

regional access and logistics capabilities, work on the NDN has significantly increased our contact with our regional partners and provided opportunities to engage 

on numerous common causes and to increase our commercial ties. 

760 

In addition to increasing our engagement with the Central Asian States through 

the NDN, we continue to help build the capabilities of indigenous security forces, 

as well as the mechanisms for regional cooperation. We provide training, equipment, 

and facilities for various army, national guard, and border security forces through 

our Building Partnership Capacity programs. In addition, we continue to work with 

national level organizations to facilitate dialogue on security and emergency response issues through numerous bilateral training exercises and initiatives such as 

our annual Chiefs of Defense Conferences and the multilateral Exercise Regional 

Cooperation. 

V. CRITICAL MISSION ENABLERS

Success in our ongoing missions and achieving comprehensive, cooperative, and 

enduring solutions to our challenges in the AOR, all the while maintaining a credible, responsive contingency capacity, requires the support of several key mission 

enablers. The effects of these capabilities range from the tactical to the strategic, 

and CENTCOM fully supports their continuation, expansion, and improvement. 

In requesting and employing these enablers, we recognize the critical importance 

of proper oversight to ensure their proper usage, particularly for funding authorities. In many cases, we have established control mechanisms that exceed those mandated by Congress, including numerous additional outside audits and command reviews. This oversight helps us know whether these programs are being properly implemented and, equally important, whether these programs are effective. 

A. Building Partnership Capacity 

Our security cooperation and security assistance efforts are critical to improving 

security and stability in the region. They help strengthen our relationships and 

build the security and response capabilities of our partners in the AOR. Continued 

strong support for global train and equip resources; Coalition Support Funds; and 

the State Department’s Foreign Military Financing (FMF), Foreign Military Sales 

(FMS), and counter-narcotics security assistance and reimbursement programs are 

essential to generating comprehensive and cooperative solutions to defeat insurgent 

groups. FMF and FMS remain our mainstay security assistance tools, but the International Military Education and Training program is also an important contributor 

to developing partner nation capabilities and enduring ties, particularly for the officers of nascent security forces and from Pakistan, with whom we must reestablish 

personal bonds and trust after years without substantive interaction. While these 

programs are reasonably successful in meeting needs in a peacetime environment, 

we support the reformation of the security assistance programs and processes described in this year’s Quadrennial Defense Review to create new, more responsive, 

long term mechanisms for developing our partner nations’ security capacity. 

Additionally, in the face of enduring conflict in the region, we look to expanded 

special authorities and multi-year appropriations to quickly meet the emerging 

needs of counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, and Foreign Internal Defense/Security Force Assistance activities. Multi-year programs-of-record that provide training, 

equipment, and infrastructure for our partner nations’ security forces enabled our 

successes in Iraq and are of prime importance if we are to achieve comparable 

progress in Afghanistan and Pakistan. These critical programs include the Iraq Security Forces Fund, the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund, the Pakistan 

Counterinsurgency Fund, and the Cooperative Defense Program. 

B. Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) 

CERP continues to be a vital counterinsurgency tool for our commanders in Afghanistan and Iraq. Small CERP projects can be the most efficient and effective 

means to address a local community’s emergent needs, and where security is a challenge, it is often the only immediate means for addressing those needs. CERP 

spending is not intended to replace longer term development assistance administered by agencies such as the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) 

but rather to complement and potentially serve as a catalyst for these projects. In 

Iraq as the security situation has improved and allowed USAID full access, CERP 

funding has been reduced commensurately. However, we fully support ongoing efforts to enhance U.S. humanitarian assistance programs in other parts of the 

CENTCOM AOR, particularly in Pakistan. In concert with the State Department, 

we also seek innovative mechanisms and authorities to allow for greater cost-sharing and to create similar counterinsurgency tools for use by coalition and host nation partners. These tools should allow for a variety of funding sources, to include 

contributions from nongovernmental organizations, international governmental organizations, and partner governments. 

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Critical to CERP is its proper oversight. We support the ongoing Department of 

Defense internal assessment of the program and its consideration of establishing a 

Department-wide CERP coordinator. We will continue to sponsor outside audits and 

to work with the Services to ensure proper pre-deployment training for CERP managers and contracting personnel. 

C. Information Operations 

Operation Earnest Voice (OEV) is the critical program of record we use to synchronize and oversee our Information Operations activities, to counter our adversaries’ ideology and propaganda in the AOR, and to amplify credible voices in the 

region, all in close coordination with the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy. OEV provides CENTCOM direct communication capabilities to a regional audience through traditional media as well as trans-regional websites and public affairs regional blogging. Strategic, long term effects are achieved through our supporting Building Partnership Capacity programs, humanitarian relief efforts, 

demining activities, Cooperative Defense Initiatives, and counterterrorist operations. 

The audience analysis and assessment component of OEV provides critical cultural 

understanding required to connect with the region’s population, tell us which techniques are effective over time and which are not, and gives us the long term ability 

to assess our success or failure in the war of ideas. Full and enduring funding of 

OEV and other Defense Department information operations efforts will best enable 

us to communicate our strategic messages and to counter those of our adversaries. 

D. Force Protection and Countering Improvised Explosive Device (IEDs) 

Initiatives focused on countering the threat of IEDs are of paramount importance 

to our operations in the AOR. IEDs continue to be the primary threat to our ground 

forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, and efforts to expedite the acquisition and fielding 

of personal protective equipment, IED jammers, route clearance vehicles and equipment, and the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) family of vehicles, which 

includes the MRAP All Terrain Vehicle, have saved countless lives. An urgent priority for us is the rapid fielding of MRAPs to support the increase in U.S. and coalition forces in Afghanistan. Because we expect IEDs to remain a key weapon in the 

arsenals of militants and insurgents for years to come, we urge continued support 

for the Joint IED Defeat Organization; the Services’ baseline sustainment for the 

MRAP family of vehicles, base defense initiatives, and Counter-IED efforts; and Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation funding and procurement of equipment 

to counter IED tactics and networks. 

E. Intelligence 

Detailed and timely tactical, operational, and strategic level intelligence collection 

and analysis remain vital to all aspects of our operations. While we continue to balance the allocation of our Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) assets and to refine and optimize our procedures and existing architecture, changes 

in the operating environment and the expiration of old systems will require new, 

improved, or increased intelligence capabilities. We support the Department of Defense’s planned growth in human intelligence and counterintelligence specialists, interrogators, and intelligence analysts, but we also have come to recognize the importance of non-traditional specialists such as threat finance analysts, human terrain 

teams, and document exploitation specialists. In addition, our requirements for signals intelligence geo-location capabilities, Ground Moving Target Indicator information, and aerial imagery from remotely piloted systems, including sea-based ISR, 

continue to grow. We also look to Operationally Responsive Space to temporarily fill 

the space-based reconnaissance gap to be created as several current systems reach 

the end of their operational lives. Finally, managing these capabilities and fully harvesting the information they provide requires innovative databases (such as the 

Combined Information Data Network Exchange system), applications, and communication systems. 

F. Adaptable Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4) Systems 

Continued operations across a dispersed AOR call for a robust, interoperable, 

high-volume theater C4 infrastructure. We are working to meet C4 requirements for 

current operations and to posture enduring theater C4 capabilities to meet post-conflict requirements as well as prepare for contingencies. Concurrently, we are working to expand our information sharing and to improve our partners’ commercial and 

military C4 capabilities. 

We aggressively seek greater bandwidth capacity to improve the reliability and 

diversity of our C4 networks. CENTCOM currently utilizes all available bandwidth 

to full capacity, but theater fiber networks are vulnerable to single points of failure 

in the global information grid. Military Satellite Communications capabilities are 

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critical to theater operations, and the acceleration of transformational upgrades to 

these systems would reduce our reliance on commercial providers. 

We are also pursuing the means to extend Joint Theater Expeditionary Command, 

Control, and Communications support and services to disadvantaged users throughout the AOR. Some of these means include our sponsorship of Joint Capability Technology Demonstrations (JCTDs). Under the JCTD Tactical Service Provider (TSP) 

program, we developed the capability to more effectively manage available bandwidth and provide coverage to frontline units. We continue to field and further develop the Distributed Tactical Communications System, which leverages new technologies to deliver reliable, critical communications capabilities to the most remote 

users. Additional fielding and technology efforts include the Radio over Internet Protocol Routed Network and the Joint Airborne Communications System. Despite tremendous actions by the Department of Defense to help us overcome our communication and network challenges, to be more effective and efficient, we require a fully 

integrated space and terrestrial communications infrastructure that supports all 

joint and potential partner nation users. 

G. Cyberspace Capabilities and Authorities 

The openness of the global cyber commons exposes us to low risk, low cost threats 

from our adversaries. Our networks are constantly threatened by a range of actors 

from hackers to criminal organizations to state-sponsored saboteurs. This activity is 

aimed at retrieving sensitive information, exploiting our public domain information 

to gain an operational advantage, and disrupting our networks. In addition, our adversaries use the internet for command and control, recruiting, and fund raising. 

To help address these challenges, we welcome the development and institutionalization of cyberspace capabilities to help us protect and operate within these critical 

systems. The formation of U.S. Cyber Command and other Defense Departmentwide cyberspace activities will facilitate the fusion of intelligence, operations, and 

communications essential to our computer network operations. At the combatant 

command level, we have created our own Cyberspace Warfare Cell composed of intelligence, operations, and communications personnel to synchronize our cyberspace 

activities and to integrate with national level efforts. 

H. Joint and Multinational Logistics 

The primary focus of our logistics efforts is the timely deployment, equipping, and 

sustainment of units engaged in combat operations. With our multinational and 

strategic national logistics partners, we continue to work toward an efficient and effective logistics architecture that supports our forces and operations and minimizes 

costs. Our logistics posture consists of pre-positioned inventories, air and sealift capabilities, and access to bases with critical infrastructure, all of which are key logistics components that support operational flexibility. To maintain this posture and 

our readiness, we must quickly reconstitute our Army and Marine Corps pre-positioned stocks and properly reset returning forces. Moreover, this logistics posture 

enables the increase in forces in Afghanistan while simultaneously supporting the 

drawdown of forces from Iraq, both of which remain on track to meet the President’s 

timelines. 

The Joint Contracting Command for Iraq and Afghanistan continues to support 

CENTCOM, USF–I, and USFOR–A by providing responsive contracting of supplies, 

services, and construction, and lays the groundwork for the capacity building efforts 

within Iraqi and Afghan ministries. As a result, in fiscal year 2009, the Joint Contracting Command for Iraq and Afghanistan executed over 33,000 contract actions 

and obligated a total of $5.4 billion. Over 36 percent of this funding went to Iraqi 

and Afghan firms. CENTCOM is transitioning the Joint Contracting Command to 

a Joint Theater Support Contracting Command, an initiative that will enhance 

management and synchronize contracting across a greater portion of the AOR. We 

continue to improve contractor oversight through other initiatives such as increasing 

the in-theater presence of Contracting Officer Representatives and Quality Assurance Representatives, early identification and training of these representatives for 

deploying units, and mandating the use of automated Letters of Authorization for 

contractors. 

In an effort to lessen our reliance on the ground supply lines through Pakistan, 

we are moving an increasing amount of non-military supplies into Afghanistan via 

an air and surface intermodal NDN, which transits through the Central Asian 

States. We have also established routes to transport military equipment from Iraq 

through Turkey merging with the NDN for onward movement to Afghanistan. Continued expansion of the NDN and additional host nation access remain logistics priorities as we shift more sustainment from the routes through Pakistan to the NDN 

and optimize the Pakistan routes for units and equipment supporting the increase 

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in forces in Afghanistan. Our relationships with the Central Asian States continue 

to improve as a result of our NDN efforts, and this is supported by legislation that 

allows us to expand our partnerships by locally purchasing supplies for forces in Afghanistan and elsewhere in the region. 

I. Overseas Basing and Theater Posture 

CENTCOM’s overseas basing strategy and its associated overseas Military Construction projects are developing the infrastructure necessary for the conduct of ongoing operations, as well as supporting global access, projection, sustainment, and 

protection of our combined forces in the AOR. Fully functional Forward Operating 

Sites and Cooperative Security Locations are essential to our ability to conduct the 

full spectrum of military operations, engage with and enable partner nations, and 

act promptly and decisively. Prepositioned stocks and reset equipment provide critical support to this strategy but require reconstitution and modernization after having been partially expended to support operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

Even with generous Overseas Contingency Operations budgets, military construction timelines are too slow to respond to changes in a combat environment. Major 

events such as the approval of the Strategic Partnership Agreement with Iraq and 

the recent decision to send additional forces to Afghanistan show how rapidly basing 

requirements can change. Expanded Contingency Construction Authorities made 

available across the entire CENTCOM AOR can serve as partial, interim solutions 

because they push construction decisionmaking authority to our engaged commanders in the field. Also, increasing the Operations and Maintenance construction 

threshold for minor construction in support of combat operations across the AOR 

would increase the ability of our commanders to quickly meet mission requirements 

and fully support and protect our deployed forces. 

J. Adaptive Requirements, Acquisition, and Technology Processes 

The technical community writ-large has responded exceptionally well over the 

past few years to the needs of our warfighters in the CENTCOM AOR. While the 

Services, Joint Staff, and Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) have responded 

to our calls for assistance, the Joint IED Defeat Organization, the Rapid Equipping 

Force, and Army Material Command’s Fielded Assistance in Science and Technology 

programs have been particularly helpful in ensuring that our troopers receive the 

best, most advanced equipment and tools to make them effective and to keep them 

safe during the execution of their missions. In addition, several organizations under 

OSD-Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics and OSD-Defense Research and Engineering, in cooperation with the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, have 

been instrumental in the discovery, rapid development, and early fielding of critical 

operational capabilities, such as more capable ISR systems, human terrain mapping 

and analytical tools, and improved ballistic protection for MRAPs. Last, the Quick 

Reaction Test Program has helped us use existing technologies in new and more efficient ways. 

The Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell (JRAC) has proven important to addressing noncounter-IED rapid acquisition needs for our operations, and we will continue to use 

the Joint Urgent Operational Needs (JUON) process to support our warfighters. 

However, because the JUON process requires execution year reprogramming by the 

Services, we found in the past that the Rapid Acquisition Fund (RAF) was a useful 

JRAC tool for supporting immediate needs. When the authority existed, the JRAC 

used the RAF to field capabilities such as radio systems used for Afghanistan-Pakistan cross-border communications, which were procured in less than 4 months from 

the initial identification of the need. The JRAC has also used RAF funding to initiate the fielding of critical biometrics equipment until the JUON process could further source the program, significantly reducing the time required to deploy the technology. Reinstating RAF funding and using it as a complement to the JUON process 

would allow CENTCOM to more quickly resolve warfighter needs. 

K. Personnel 

Having appropriately trained personnel in sufficient quantities for our commands 

and Joint Task Forces (JTFs) is critical to accomplishing our assigned missions and 

achieving our theater objectives. The CENTCOM headquarters has been satisfactorily manned through temporary augmentation but may require additional permanent manpower for enduring mission sets as well as mechanisms for quickly generating temporary manpower for contingency operations. Within our JTFs and deployed units, there continue to be shortfalls in many low-density, high-demand occupational specialties and enabling force structures. Most notably, critical shortages 

of intelligence specialists, counterintelligence and human intelligence collectors, interrogators, document exploitation specialists, detainee operations specialists, engineers, and military police continue to degrade mission effectiveness. As operations 

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continue in Afghanistan, we see a critical need for increased public affairs and information operations personnel to improve our strategic communications capabilities. 

Moreover, as we complete our combat mission in Iraq, we will require non-traditional enabling capabilities such as leaders to augment newly formed advisory assistance units, personnel to follow money trails in support of our threat finance 

cells, and an increased number of multi-functional logisticians to man critical logistics units. At the same time, we support a significant expansion of the U.S. Government’s vital, deployable civilian capacity, particularly in the State Department and 

USAID. 

Quality of life, family support, and retention programs remain important to our 

operations in the AOR. The Rest and Recuperation program continues to be a success, having served over 875,000 since its inception in September 2003. We also continue to depend heavily on entitlement programs such as Combat Zone Tax Relief, 

Imminent Danger Pay, and Special Leave Accrual to support our deployed 

servicemembers. 

VI. CONCLUSION

There are currently over 220,000 soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and coast 

guardsmen serving in the CENTCOM AOR and soldiering magnificently against 

tough enemies during challenging operations in punishing terrain and extreme 

weather. Together with our many civilian and coalition partners, they have been the 

central element to the security, stability, and prosperity we have increasingly promoted throughout the region. They will be the key to achieving further progress in 

Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan and other locations where serious work is being 

done. These wonderful Americans and their fellow troopers around the world constitute the most experienced, most capable military in our Nation’s history. They 

and their families have made great sacrifices since September 11, and nothing 

means more to these great Americans than the sense that those back home appreciate their service and sacrifice. 

All those in CENTCOM thank the American people for their extraordinary support of our military men and women and their families. We thank the Members of 

Congress for their unwavering support and abiding concern for our troopers and 

their families as well. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, General Petraeus. 

We’re going to try a 6-minute round of questions, given the large 

turnout this morning. 

General Petraeus, Iran’s actions and lack of willingness to comply with U.N. resolutions regarding their nuclear program continues to undermine security in the region. I believe that stronger 

U.N. sanctions against Iran are not only essential, it’s critically important that they be enforced. 

The President has—rightly, in my judgment—kept a military option to take against nuclear facilities in Iran on the table, should 

they be used for production of nuclear weapons in violation of U.N. 

resolutions. I also believe that the possibility of a blockade or quarantine of Iran’s oil exports and refined petroleum product imports 

should also be on a list of possible options for action. Can you comment on what actions you think might be successful in terms of 

sanctions against Iran, should they continue to violate U.N. resolutions relative to their nuclear program, but also as to whether we 

ought to keep those other options on the table? 

General PETRAEUS. First of all, Senator, as you noted, the President has explicitly stated that he has not taken the military option 

off the table. As you noted in your statement earlier, we have 

worked hard in the region to build the so-called regional security 

architecture, to build a network of shared early warning, of BMD, 

and of other security relationships and partnerships that have been 

brought about in large measure because of concern by those states 

with whom we are carrying out these activities, about the developments in Iran that I spoke of in my opening statement. 

765 

With regard to specific contingency plans or activities, that would 

obviously be something that we would want to do in a closed session. But, clearly now, having given Iran every opportunity—not 

just the United States, but all of the countries engaged in this effort—the focus is shifting to what is termed the pressure track, and 

there is a variety of sanctions included that are now being discussed in the administration. I don’t want to get ahead of them in 

discussing those particular items. 

Chairman LEVIN. We are going to have a full hearing on Iran, 

and we’ll have both an open hearing, as I’ve mentioned to you in 

my office, as well as a closed hearing on that subject. 

General Caldwell, who’s the head of our NATO training mission 

in Afghanistan, has reported a very large increase in the number 

of Afghan Army recruits that are awaiting training. There’s a 

shortage of trainers. We’ve gone into that, and I think you would 

agree that, one way or another, we have to get those trainers 

present to increase the speed with which the size of that army is 

increased. 

What General Caldwell told us when we visited him is that there 

were a number of reasons for that significant increase in the number of recruits, that one of them was the increase in pay, but he 

also said that a very significant cause of that increase in the number of Afghan recruits was that the Afghan leaders are reaching 

out to the people in the provinces to increase, significantly, the 

number of recruits that are coming in. One of the things that focused the mind of the Afghan leaders to do that was the decision 

of the President to set that July 2011 date to begin to reduce the 

presence of American forces; not to pull our forces out, not to have 

a total exit in any sense, but simply to begin reductions as a way 

of focusing the minds of the Afghan leaders on their responsibility 

to provide for their own security and to transition more of that responsibility to them. 

Do you both support the 30,000 troop surge, and do you also support the setting of that July 2011 date by the President? 

General PETRAEUS. That is correct, Mr. Chairman. There is a 

shortage of trainers. Admiral Stavridis and the NATO Secretary 

General did a force-generation effort. They got about half of those 

pledged. As you noted, we have to figure out how to get the rest 

of those, and we are looking at various options for doing that, on 

the U.S. side, while still urging NATO to generate the remainder. 

The surge in recruits, I think, was a result of two factors: One, 

the increased pay, without question, but also a sense by Afghan 

leaders that they do have to get on with it. In the speech at West 

Point, the President sent two messages. One was additional commitment, the other was urgency. The urgency component of that 

was connected to the July 2011 date. It has concentrated the minds 

of Afghan leaders, to a degree, while we have also sought to reassure leaders in the region that that is not a date when we bolt for 

the exits, but it is, rather, a date on which we begin a conditionsbased process of transitioning some tasks to Afghan forces and 

begin a responsible reduction of our forces. 

Chairman LEVIN. Do you personally support that? 

General PETRAEUS. I did. Yes, I have stated that on the record, 

many times. 

766 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much. 

Senator McCain. 

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I thank the witnesses. 

General Petraeus, I want to talk about the issue with you that 

has dominated the news in the last few days, and that is the increased tensions between the United States and Israel over the settlements issue, the timing of it, and the implications of it. I note 

there’s been increased Palestinian demonstrations and violence in 

the last day or 2 in Gaza and West Bank. First of all, I understand 

that you have the greatest confidence in Senator Mitchell and his 

work to try to bring about progress in the Palestinian-Israeli peace 

process. Is that true? 

General PETRAEUS. That is absolutely true, Senator. 

Senator MCCAIN. I just wanted to get that on the record. 

General PETRAEUS. That’s why we’ve invited him to every single 

conference that we have hosted with CENTCOM, with ambassadors, with commanders, and so forth. 

Senator MCCAIN. The present issue is over some increased construction of settlements in Jerusalem, which Israelis view within 

the State of Israel when the peace process is concluded; Palestinians view it as part of a new Palestinian state. Isn’t the issue not 

the issue of settlements as much as it is the existence of the State 

of Israel? Its neighbors, with exceptions, have dedicated themselves 

to the extermination of the State of Israel. Ahmadinejad has said, 

time after time, they want to wipe Israel off the map. Isn’t it true 

that the Israelis left Gaza on the presumption that then there 

would be progress, and instead they got rocket attacks? So, maybe 

you could put this in a larger context for us of what needs to be 

done to reduce the tensions between the United States and Israel, 

our closest ally and friend, in many respects. We’d like to hear a 

little bit about your views on that situation and what needs to be 

done to defuse it. 

General PETRAEUS. Thanks, Senator. 

First of all, just a reminder for all, neither Israel nor the Palestinian territories are in the CENTCOM AOR. 

Having said that, we keep a very close eye on what goes on 

there, because of the impact that it has on that part of CENTCOM 

that is the Arab world. In fact, we’ve urged, at various times, that 

this is a critical component. It’s one reason we invite Senator 

Mitchell to brief all of the different conferences that we host, and 

seek to support him in any way that we can when he’s in the 

CENTCOM part of the region, just as we support Lieutenant General Dayton, who is supporting the training of the Palestinian security forces from a location that is in the CENTCOM AOR, as well. 

Asking for the Palestinian territories to be added to the 

CENTCOM AOR, I have never made that a formal recommendation for the Unified Command Plan, and that was not in what I 

submitted this year, nor have I sent a memo to the White House 

on any of this. Some of this was in the press, so I welcome the opportunity to point that out. 

Clearly the tensions, the issues, and so forth, have an enormous 

effect. They set the strategic context within which we operate in 

the CENTCOM AOR. My thrust has generally been to encourage 

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that process that can indeed get that recognition that you talked 

about, and indeed get a sense of progress in the overall peace process because of the effect that it has on what I think we would term 

the moderate governments in our area. That really is about the extent of our involvement in that, Senator. 

Senator MCCAIN. Do you believe that a policy of containment 

would be an effective option for dealing with a nuclear-armed Iran? 

General PETRAEUS. Sir, I think that is a big policy hypothetical 

that I would like to go around, rather than into. I think the policy 

right now is very clear. The President has said that Iran cannot 

have nuclear weapons. 

Senator MCCAIN. Are you concerned about the fact that the 

President’s plan was 30,000 American troops, with 10,000 additional ally contributions. We now have the Dutch obviously going 

to remove 2,000 troops. As Senator Levin pointed out, we don’t 

have a sufficient number of trainers. Do we have any plans for the 

additional troops that are necessary? Can we accommodate for 

what is clearly a shortfall of the number of troops that was, in my 

view, a minimum of what was recommended by General 

McChrystal? 

General PETRAEUS. Senator, part of that is why we sought the 

additional 100,000 authorization for the ANSF, which came in the 

wake of the policy announcement. 

It is also why Secretary Gates asked for and received some flex 

factor that he has discussed. That is in the background there; if 

there came to be an emergent emergency need that is available, as 

well. 

Senator MCCAIN. Finally, General and Admiral Olson, do you believe that Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell (DADT) needs a thorough review 

before action is taken? 

General PETRAEUS. Senator, can I give my statement on that? 

Senator MCCAIN. We’re short of time, but please, go ahead. 

Chairman LEVIN. How long is that statement? 

General PETRAEUS. About 8 minutes, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. No, no. 

General PETRAEUS. Sir, this is not a sound-bite issue. 

Chairman LEVIN. I understand. 

Senator MCCAIN. It’s a pretty straightforward question, though. 

Chairman LEVIN. We respect, believe me, the thoughtfulness that 

you are applying to it. We’ve read your public statements. But, an 

8-minute answer, unless someone else wants to use all of their time 

for it, I’m afraid would violate the spirit of our rules. 

I would suggest, however, that if nobody asks you that question 

and their time is used for that purpose, that you make that part 

of the record. But, someone may very well ask you. I just don’t 

think it would be right, because of our time limit, to take 8 minutes 

out of someone else’s time. 

General PETRAEUS. I understand. 

Senator MCCAIN. I think you’ve just made it very unlikely that 

you’ll be asked, if it’s 8 minutes. [Laughter.] 

Admiral, do you want to make a comment? My question is pretty 

straightforward, to be honest with you. Do you believe that a thorough review of the policy and the legislation needs to be conducted 

before repeal? 

768 

Admiral OLSON. Yes, sir, I do. 

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you. 

General PETRAEUS. Senator, let me just answer that. I believe 

the time has come to consider a change to DADT, but I think it 

should be done in a thoughtful and deliberative manner that 

should include the conduct of the review that Secretary Gates has 

directed; that would consider the views in the force on a change in 

the policy; that would include an assessment of the likely effects 

on recruiting, retention, morale, and cohesion; and would include 

an identification of what policies might be needed in the event of 

a change, and recommend those policies, as well. 

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you very much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you. 

As you’ve said, I believe, in my office, the likely effects could go 

in either direction, either negative or positive, the study could 

show. 

General PETRAEUS. It could, it could. 

Chairman LEVIN. Okay. 

General PETRAEUS. Yes, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much. 

Senator Lieberman. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. 

Thanks, to both of you, for your leadership. 

General Petraeus, I just want to ask you a couple of quick questions about Iran, first. I thought your prepared testimony was very 

strong and clear, here. You describe Iran as ‘‘the primary statelevel threat to stability in the region,’’ add that its nuclear program 

is, to use your words, ‘‘serious,’’ and ‘‘part of the regime’s broader 

effort to expand its influence.’’ I agree, of course. 

You also mentioned, just in response to questions, that President 

Obama has said that the military option remains on the table. It’s 

not our first choice, obviously; that’s why we’re pursuing economic 

sanctions. 

I just want to reinforce the fact that previously you’ve said that 

in the exercise of your responsibility at CENTCOM, you are working on actual military plans with regard to Iran, which, we all 

hope, you never have to use, but as the military works on contingency plans for a host of scenarios around the world. Is that correct? 

General PETRAEUS. Sir, probably best for a closed session, but we 

get paid to prepare for contingencies; it would be irresponsible if 

we didn’t do that. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right. 

General PETRAEUS. We try not to be irresponsible. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Because I know how responsible you are, I 

assume you’re working on plans. So, I’ll leave it at that for now. 

Let me go to Iraq. We’ve watched the election that’s going on 

there now with great satisfaction. It’s not a perfect situation, but 

when you think about the fact that, a little more than 3 years ago, 

it looked like Iraq was going to descend into chaos, and now we 

have a government operating, an economy coming together, and increasing self-defense by ISF. I was struck by the success of the 

769 

united parties, as it were, the nonsectarian parties, and I look forward to continued progress there. 

There was a time when we’d say gains in Iraq were fragile and 

reversible. Today, I note in your statement, you say, ‘‘Gains in Iraq 

remain fragile and reversible, but increasingly less so.’’ I appreciate 

those four additional words. 

I wanted to ask you, in light of all that, but understanding that 

our gains in Iraq remain fragile and reversible, whether it is still 

going to be possible to draw down to 50,000 American troops in 

Iraq by September 1 of this year. It’s a drawdown required by the 

Status-of-Forces Agreement with Iraq. It’s a good goal, but I’m sure 

you’d be the first to say that we don’t want to arbitrarily go to it 

if we think there’s significant risk of reversal as a result. Give me 

your sense, at this moment, of whether we’re going to be able to 

get down to the 50,000 by September 1. 

General PETRAEUS. I think we will be able to do that, Senator. 

I think that we may reconfigure the force a bit over what we originally were thinking it would look like 4 months ago or so. We’re 

constantly tinkering with it. There’s a possibility that we may want 

to keep an additional brigade headquarters, as an example, but 

then slim out some of its organic forces and some of the other organic forces elsewhere. Headquarters really matter because they’re 

the element of engagement. If we think that there’s a particularly 

fragile situation in a certain area in the north, then we might do 

that. That’s something that we are looking at. But, we still believe 

that we will be able to stay on track to get down to that 50,000 

figure. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Okay, that’s encouraging. That would mean, 

I assume, that there’d potentially be a 7th Brigade headquarters. 

General PETRAEUS. That’s correct. That is one option that we are 

looking at, but still within the broad 50,000. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. I take it, from what you’ve said, that that 

probably would be in the areas of Kurdish-Arab conflict around 

Kirkuk, where I know that our forces, working with other forces 

there, have really helped to maintain stability. 

General PETRAEUS. That’s correct, sir. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. I appreciate that. 

Let me go to Afghanistan with this question. There’s been a lot 

of public discussion recently about reconciliation with senior 

Taliban leaders. Some senior officials in our coalition seem to be 

pushing really aggressively on the idea that we should try to cut 

some sort of deal with the Taliban, perhaps with the help of historic allies of theirs in Pakistan. Personally, I worry that these 

ideas are ill-advised, although I’m sure we all look forward to the 

time when there can be reconciliation, particularly beginning with 

lower-level Taliban, or probably not zealots. In that regard, I agree 

with Secretary Gates, that we need to first make the Taliban understand that they are destined to lose this fight, before any serious consideration of reconciliation at the higher levels can take 

place. Therefore, I worry that the current public talk about reconciliation is counterproductive. I want to ask you what your view 

is on that. 

General PETRAEUS. I agree with Secretary Gates on that, Senator. Certainly, thinking ahead to that moment when perhaps senVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:37 May 06, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00775 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\62155.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
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ior-level Taliban can be integrated, because there has been what’s 

called reintegration at low- and mid-levels. In fact, yesterday there 

were open reports about a couple of Taliban leaders coming in with 

their hands up. It is not an uncommon event over there; but there 

are many low- and mid-level leaders. That’s part of the strategy, 

is reintegration with our Afghan partners to try to break off from 

the greater-Taliban movement, those who might become part of the 

solution instead of a continuing part of the problem. 

On the other hand, reconciliation at the senior levels, as Secretary Gates has observed, is probably a bit unlikely, at the conditions that the Afghan Government has established for it if they are 

not feeling a considerably greater amount of pressure than they 

probably are right now. That’s what’s behind Secretary Gates’ view, 

and that happens to be my view, as well. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. I appreciate that, and that’s reassuring. 

Thank you very, very much. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Lieberman. 

Senator Inhofe. 

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I wasn’t going to ask this question, but General Petraeus, you 

spent quite a bit of time talking about the CERP, and my favorite 

program is the partner programs that train and equip—1206, 1207, 

1208 and the Combatant Commander Initiative Fund (CCIF) and 

International Military Education and Training (IMET) and all that. 

General PETRAEUS. Right. 

Senator INHOFE. The whole reason for this, initially, was to get 

more authority to the commanders in the field to be able to do 

things, to respond. We’ve had some testimony that talks about how 

much more effective it is if you’re able to do this without going 

through a lot of the bureaucratic time delays that would come otherwise. I’d like to know, since they’re talking about 1207, which is 

the civilian-to-civilian portion of this, now kind of reverting more 

back to the way it was before, or at least having a greater State 

Department influence in it, do you see this creating any kind of a 

problem, number one? Number two, do you think, starting with 

this, that it may spread to some of the other elements of train-andequip? 

General PETRAEUS. CERP is hugely important. We want to continue it. We want to make sure we have the oversight that can 

guarantee to you and to the other committees that we’re responsibly overseeing the expenditure of taxpayer dollars. We are trying 

to work very closely with our partners in the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and other civilian elements, to 

make sure that we do coordinate what we are doing in the field. 

One of the achievements in RC-East, in particular, of ISAF, has 

been to build a civilian chain that parallels the military chain all 

the way back to Kabul, and allows them to coordinate much more 

closely in their thresholds for various levels as you go up. I think 

that’s working well. I think we have to continue it. We also want 

to make sure that it can be the responsive tool that it is; so, we’re 

sensitive to a sense, if there’s too much bureaucracy building up, 

then that would defeat the purpose of it in the first place. We’re 

trying to find that balance between a sufficient amount of coordinaVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:37 May 06, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00776 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\62155.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
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tion and oversight and still allowing the free use of it in the way 

that it was intended. 

Senator INHOFE. If you see that the effectiveness is impaired at 

all, if you’d let us know, that would be very helpful. 

Would you agree with his comments, Admiral Olson, first of all, 

on all of these programs; and second, his comments about what 

changes might be coming, and what to look for? 

Admiral OLSON. Absolutely, sir. I agree 100 percent. I think the 

1206, 1207, 1208, and, as you mentioned, but which is often neglected in the conversation, the IMET funding, are absolutely key 

to success. I applaud the initiative for CERP. I think that combatant commanders responsible for military success in the region 

ought to have the kind of responsiveness that CERP funds provide. 

Senator INHOFE. You also agree, then, because you have a broader responsibility, that the CCIF in other areas is a good program. 

Admiral OLSON. Yes, sir, I do. 

Senator INHOFE. Admiral Olson, I’ve always been very sensitive 

to the training process in Afghanistan, and one reason is that, way 

back, probably 5 or 6 years ago, our Oklahoma Guard over there 

was very active in the training of the trainers. Right now you have 

Special Forces and conventional forces that are involved in the 

training. How is that broken up? 

Admiral OLSON. Sir, the cleanest way to divide it is that the Special Forces trainers are training their Afghan counterparts. They’re 

in a program that originated as a commando training program, selecting battalions, kandaks, from the ANA and putting them 

through a 12-week training course that then created a commando 

program within the ANA. That’s now been expanded recently to include a special forces counterpart within the ANA. Most of the 

training of the ANA—the raising of the army, if you will—is being 

done by our general-purpose force trainers. 

Senator INHOFE. Good. 

In terms of your responsibility in the special operations, the fact 

that you’re not only dealing with an asymmetric threat, but also 

with the more conventional threats posed by North Korea and Iran; 

do you have the resources to be able to confront those threats, in 

your opinion? 

Admiral OLSON. Yes, sir. Depending on Army, Navy, Air Force, 

and Marine Corps for service com and support, we are in the tracking and planning business. To go beyond that, I think we should 

go into closed session. 

Senator INHOFE. What’s the ratio right now of special operations 

to conventional forces that are deployed in numbers of personnel? 

Admiral OLSON. SOF number about plus or minus 10 percent. 

Senator INHOFE. Roughly 10 to 1. 

Admiral OLSON. Roughly 6,000 troops each in Iraq and Afghanistan, relative to just about 100,000 conventional forces in Iraq now, 

as that draws down and as Afghanistan moves up again. 

Senator INHOFE. So, when the drawdown occurs, would you see 

somewhat of a proportional drawdown? Do you have any thoughts 

on that? 

Admiral OLSON. No, sir. We don’t expect to see that. In all my 

conversations with General Odierno and General Petraeus, it’s my 

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expectation that the level of Special Operations Forces will remain 

about constant in Iraq. 

Senator INHOFE. As we continue to fund Pakistan’s efforts, a concern has resonated, at least with me, that we might be inadvertently getting those fundings to the wrong places, like the Pakistanbased jihadists, either through the madrassas or the Federal funds 

going to Pakistan. What kind of precautions are we taking to make 

sure they don’t get to the wrong people? 

General PETRAEUS. The security force funding elements are going 

directly to the security forces. Any of the different categories of 

funding that we have for them—whether it’s foreign military financing, IMET, Pakistani Counterinsurgency Capability Fund, 

1206, whatever—these all buy either equipment, training, or education for members of the Pakistani military. 

Senator INHOFE. Okay. 

General PETRAEUS. I’m confident that money is going where it 

should. 

Senator INHOFE. That’s good. There have been a few articles that 

have been written that have drawn some question to that, and I 

felt that was the case. 

Thank you very much. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Inhofe. 

Senator Reed. 

Senator REED. Thank you very much. 

Gentlemen, thank you for your service. 

General Petraeus, can you give us your initial evaluation of the 

election in Iraq? It appears that in terms of the sectarian lines, 

there has been a lot of discussion of these nonsectarian alliances, 

but the results of the votes appear to strengthen some of the sectarian positions. 

General PETRAEUS. Prime Minister Maliki’s State of Law coalition is the leader, overall, and it will certainly not get a majority; 

it will get a plurality. Second, interestingly, although it’s very close, 

is former Prime Minister Allawi’s coalition. He is a Shia leader of 

a coalition that has substantial Sunni backing. His was the leading 

coalition in many of the Sunni-majority provinces. Very close to 

him is the coalition of the Supreme Council and Sadrists and Prime 

Minister Jaafari’s party, Chalabi’s party, so that is in there, as 

well. Then the overall number of Kurdish votes is in there, also. 

At the end of the day, clearly there will have to be, at the very 

least, cross-ethnic coalitions. There will certainly have to be Arab 

and Kurd, without question. I think what remains to be seen is 

how much cross-sectarian coalition-building will take place. That 

will be the dynamic, I think. 

Senator REED. You expect this process of selecting a new government to stretch for several months? 

General PETRAEUS. Yes, we do. 

Senator REED. One of the interesting results is the apparent success of Sadr and his party, or at least his grouping. 

General PETRAEUS. I don’t know if it would be a surprise, candidly. I think those who watch it would have predicted that. I think 

the fact that Maliki’s coalition is higher, actually, is quite significant. 

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The parties don’t have to stay with their coalition. They can join 

other coalitions. That’s going to be the interesting dynamic that 

plays out. 

Senator REED. One final question about the elections. The Iranians were involved, at least in the sense of supporting, financially, 

some of the parties. What influence do you think they’ll have, given 

what we know preliminarily? 

General PETRAEUS. I think Iran, in the past, has had influence 

when it comes to deal brokering. They’re not alone in influencing 

those, certainly. Other actors in the region will have some degree 

of influence, as well. I’m sure that they will continue to try to exercise that. The fact, however, that they were not able to succeed in 

getting all of the Shi’a major parties to run as one coalition was 

quite significant, as that was a goal of theirs. The fact that, in the 

January 2009 elections, the parties most associated with them did 

not do all that well, was significant. Frankly, the fact that there 

was a strategic agreement is quite significant in that regard, as 

well. 

You still have this dynamic that Ambassador Ryan Crocker used 

to talk about, that there is a certain degree of self-limiting aspect 

to some of Iran’s influence, given that Iraq does not want to be the 

51st state, if you will, of Iran, in that it is very conscious of its 

Arab identity, versus the Persian identity. 

Senator REED. Thank you. 

Admiral Olson, can you comment about Yemen? I know it’s an 

area that you’re concerned with. Then I’ll ask General Petraeus 

afterwards. It is a country beset with huge problems. They’re depleting their oil resources; they’re depleting their water resources; 

they have demographic challenges; a youthful population; and they 

have a civil war, despite al Qaeda. With that good news, besides 

saving money on your car insurance, what can you tell us? [Laughter.] 

Admiral OLSON. Sir, Yemen is clearly a place that’s being challenged. I second what General Petraeus said about the rising presence of al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and their focus on 

Yemen as a place where they are seeking some sanctuary. 

Our involvement, from the special operations community, is relatively low-level. We have a relatively small training engagement 

with certain Yemeni forces. But, beyond that, I think we’d have to 

go into closed discussion. 

Senator REED. General Petraeus, you want to comment further? 

General PETRAEUS. I’d just second the motion. 

Senator REED. Very good. 

Let me switch to Pakistan. The Quetta Shura appears to be dispersing to Karachi and elsewhere. Is that a result of what you 

talked about, the different orientation of the Pakistani Armed 

Forces and Security Services? Are they putting real pressure on the 

Quetta Shura? 

General PETRAEUS. I think there’s a number of factors in play. 

That may be one of them. Certainly, pressure—just in Afghanistan—is yet another factor, and just perceptions or fears that have 

resulted from the campaign by the Pakistani Army and Frontier 

Corps targeted at the Pakistani Taliban, as distinguished from the 

Quetta Shura or Afghan Taliban. But several Afghan Taliban shadVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:37 May 06, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00779 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\62155.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
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ow governors, Mullah Baradar and others, are detained in Pakistan, just as there have been some also in Afghanistan. I think just 

feeling a bit more pressure, worried about what might be out there 

in the future, has resulted in some of this dispersal. 

Senator REED. Thank you very much. 

Thank you, gentlemen. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Reed. 

Senator Chambliss. 

Senator CHAMBLISS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, as we continue down this road of trying to make sure 

that we recruit and retain the finest men and women that America 

has to offer, it’s the two of you guys that our junior officers, midlevel career folks continue to look to; you’re providing the right 

kind of leadership that’s going to allow us to retain those folks. So, 

thank you for the great work you do. 

General Petraeus, I want to go back to what Senator Lieberman 

was talking about, relative to meeting this goal of 50,000 troops in 

Iraq by the end of August. General Odierno, as well as General 

Cucolo, has recently expressed some concern about the fact that 

we’re going to need some probably buffer-zone-type troops, maybe 

a brigade combat team, in the northern end, because of the Iraqi 

National Forces and the Kurdish Regional Forces issue up there. 

Is that going to be a part of this plan that you’re talking about, 

from a disbursement standpoint, is this going to be additional 

troops we’re going to need? 

General PETRAEUS. No. Our goal right now, and we think we’re 

on track to achieve it, is to reach the 50,000 possibly with some 

rescoping. With possibly a 7th Brigade headquarters, not necessarily all of the brigade’s elements; we don’t need all of those. 

What we need are headquarters. Headquarters matter enormously 

when you’re coming down, because they are the engagement element that is there, and particularly in an area where our contributions, as honest brokers and so forth, are important. That is seen 

as an option that we’re looking at. No decision has been made on 

that yet. The intent would be to do that within the 50,000, so it 

would be a rescoping of the force, rather than an increase. 

Senator CHAMBLISS. Okay. 

General, two of the issues that we’ve had ongoing in Afghanistan 

are the rule of law, or lack thereof, as well as a corruption issue 

in the government. Can you bring us up-to-date on both those 

issues, please? 

General PETRAEUS. For the rule of law, there are three elements 

of that. As always, much more emphasis on not only training police, but also on partnering with them and insisting that before 

they actually put the uniform on, they receive training. This is all 

part of getting the inputs right and the concepts right. Those are 

among those. 

The detention side of that, the corrections side, we’re working 

hard to help them. The Bureau of International Narcotics and Law 

Enforcement Affairs (INL) does it with the Afghans directly. We’re 

doing it with an element that will eventually be able to take over 

the detention facility that we have at Bagram, a goal that we have 

for early next year; and that is on track so far. 

775 

Then, the judicial leg of the three-legged stool of rule of law is 

an area that I think everyone agrees there needs to be greater effort. There have been additional resources and partnering activities 

carried out, with a special element in Kabul that has been productive; supported by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and 

the Department of Justice (DOJ), as well. We think that is an effort, overall, that is going to need to expand over time, just as we 

had to do in Iraq. 

With respect to corruption, President Karzai announced his 

anticorruption campaign. There have been some actions taken to 

remove corrupt individuals, and there is no question that there 

need to be more. 

Senator CHAMBLISS. With respect to prisoners that we have arrested and are being detained at Bagram, the President looks like 

he’s committed to moving down a path of closing Guantanamo. 

What are we going to do with all those battlefield combatants that 

we have picked up and are now being housed at Bagram? 

General PETRAEUS. What we’re doing with respect to those that 

are at Bagram is preparing a plan to transition control of that to 

an Afghan corrections force that we are training, equipping, and 

will mentor and partner with. We won’t just hand it to them and 

leave; we will provide continuing partnering with them for some 

period of time. That’s the plan for what we want to do in Bagram. 

Senator CHAMBLISS. At this point in time, are you confident that 

we’re going to be able to take those prisoners who are comparable 

to the remaining prisoners that we have at Guantanamo, and that 

the Afghans are going to be able to deal with them a way that 

doesn’t put them back on the battlefield, either in Afghanistan or 

potentially in some other country around the world, including 

maybe the United States? 

General PETRAEUS. That is certainly what we’re endeavoring to 

do. That also includes rehabilitation efforts; it includes engaging 

tribal leaders and mullahs and families as we did in Iraq. I might 

note that, in Iraq yesterday, we transitioned the Taji detainee facility. We’re now down somewhere in the 2,000 to 2,500 number of 

detainees from some 27,000 that we had there during the height 

of the surge. That is quite an accomplishment for those of our elements that have been engaged in that, including at various times, 

Colonel Lindsey Graham, U.S. Air Force, but also very much the 

Iraqi security force elements that are in charge of that now. We 

don’t just hand off to them; we train, we equip, we mentor, we 

monitor, and so forth. 

Senator CHAMBLISS. I’m always concerned about the security of 

our country when Colonel Graham is in theater over there. [Laughter.] 

Chairman LEVIN. Let me give Senator Graham an extra minute 

on his time. [Laughter.] 

Senator CHAMBLISS. He needs more than that to defend himself. 

[Laughter.] 

The glide path for troop strength in Afghanistan and the collateral issue of training the security forces in Iraq, are we on the 

right glide path? Are we going to be able to meet that goal of next 

year? 

General PETRAEUS. You’re talking about Afghanistan? 

776 

Senator CHAMBLISS. Yes, Afghanistan. 

General PETRAEUS. Not in terms of the deployment of the additional forces, we made the commitment to the President to have 

them all there by the end of August, with the exception of a division headquarters that’s not needed by that time, so it’s about 99 

percent of the 30,000. We are on track to do that. I can tell you 

that Transportation Command, the logisticians of the world, and 

others, have done absolutely magnificent work to enable that, and 

to also get their equipment into theater so that they have what 

they need shortly after they get there or beforehand. That’s on 

track. 

We’re somewhere close to the 10,000 mark of the 30,000. It’s increased a good bit recently. That’s on track. 

With respect to the ANSF, we are behind a bit on the ANA side, 

somewhere around 1,300 or so below the glide path that we need 

to be on to take us to that additional figure that we’ve talked about 

out in the future for them. As I mentioned, the combination of additional army and police will be somewhere around 100,000 over 

the next 18 months or so. 

Clearly there’s going to have to be greater recruiting and better 

retention on the part of the ANA. That’s the goal. It is an important reason that Afghan leaders have to grip this, and that’s exactly what they have done, as I think Senator Levin mentioned. We 

also have to expand the training capacity there, and that’s linked 

to the need for the additional trainers; there’s no question about 

that. That is part of General Caldwell’s plan with NATO Training 

Mission-Afghanistan. 

Senator CHAMBLISS. Thank you very much. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Chambliss. 

Senator Akaka. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to add my welcome to Admiral Olson and General 

Petraeus and thank you very much for your leadership and your 

distinguished service to our country. Also, thank you, the men and 

women that you lead, and also their families, for the support that 

they give our troops. We’re really grateful. 

General Petraeus, Afghan forces are taking an important part in 

operations. Many times, leading and even making up the bulk of 

forces involved, Afghan soldiers and police forces must not only expand greatly in a short amount of time, but they must be trained 

to a higher standard in order for them to gain the trust and confidence of the people. I believe a well-trained and properly-sized 

ANA and Afghan National Police (ANP) forces are a prerequisite 

to America leaving Afghanistan. 

My question to you, General, is, what are the most difficult obstacles to successfully building the ANA and ANP? How are we 

coping with these obstacles? 

General PETRAEUS. Senator, you’re exactly right, this is a critical 

component of the overall strategy. Among the challenges is insufficient training capacity. Right now, with this authorization of the 

additional forces, we need to ramp up the capacity to train them. 

That’s not just basic recruit training, but it’s also branch training 

for the different elements of the military and the police, it is leader 

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training, it’s development of institutions, as well as just basic trainees. 

A challenge there, beyond needing more trainers and, in some 

cases, more facilities, is also the challenge of illiteracy. Illiteracy 

runs somewhere in the 70-or-so-percent range in Afghanistan, a bit 

less in the cities, a bit more in the rural areas; and obviously that’s 

a challenge if you want the police to be able to read the laws that 

they should be enforcing. So, there is actually going to be a modest 

component of literacy training made part of the training plans. It 

will be brought in a bit at a time, and we’ll work with this, but 

to see if that can help with the effort as we go forward, as well. 

I think that the facilities, the equipping, and the other components are generally surmountable. I think it comes back to the 

issues of having the numbers of trainers and then partner elements 

over time. Then dealing with a culture in which there is an acceptance of a degree of corruption in which tribal norms, and so forth, 

intrude as well. 

Senator AKAKA. Admiral Olson and General Petraeus, since you 

mentioned the culture, I believe we must grow our foreign language capability. There seems to be an emphasis within DOD to 

improve these capabilities so that our servicemembers can better 

perform counterinsurgency and stability operations. Admiral and 

General, what are your impressions regarding DOD’s efforts to develop servicemembers’ cultural knowledge and foreign-language 

skills to better perform traditional and nontraditional warfighting 

activities? 

Admiral? 

Admiral OLSON. Sir, I applaud the efforts of the Department and 

the Services to increase language skills, and regional and subregional and microregional expertise along with it. I think that 

they are progressing in that regard. I think that they are demonstrating much more effectiveness in projecting a relatively shallow level of language and regional skills across a very broad force. 

We’re still challenged to steep people in the environments, develop 

true expertise, native-level language and native-born regional 

skills, if you will. But, the discussions are taking place, and I think 

the latest Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and the latest budget submission highlight those requirements. 

Senator AKAKA. General Petraeus? 

General PETRAEUS. Senator, I also agree with the need. It’s not 

just language, it’s cultural awareness and appreciation, as well. 

There have been a number of initiatives pursued, some of them at 

a fairly shallow level but that is very, very helpful for our forces. 

Beyond that, there are other initiatives, including targeted recruiting, reenlistment bonuses, proficiency pays, and others, to try to 

demonstrate the Department’s recognition of the importance of language proficiency. 

With respect to Afghanistan and Pakistan, there’s a program 

called the Af-Pak Hands Program, led out of the Joint Staff, but 

with both of our headquarters involved in it, and the Services, as 

well, to develop individuals who have a real understanding of the 

culture, language, history, and so on of Afghanistan and Pakistan 

and then do repetitive tours, either out in the region or in assignVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:37 May 06, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00783 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\62155.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
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ments back in the States, that keep them working in that particular arena. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator Akaka. 

Senator Graham. 

Senator GRAHAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The 96-hour rule, I understand that’s under review, and we’re 

getting some relief from that rule. Is that correct? 

General PETRAEUS. There is, Senator. The Secretary of Defense 

has approved, in a sense, a U.S. caveat that goes along with our 

transitioning of authority of U.S. Forces to NATO control, and it 

includes up to 14 days for interrogation, for analysis, and then, in 

some cases, for those who need longer detention, that is also available, as well. 

Senator GRAHAM. I want to thank you for leading that charge, 

because I think our warfighters will appreciate that, particularly 

the marines down south. Has that been well-received by the force? 

General PETRAEUS. It has, sir. If you want to live your values, 

you have to set conditions in which our troopers can do just that. 

Senator GRAHAM. Thank you. Yes, I’m glad you’ve been given 

some relief, because the old rule just didn’t make a whole lot of 

sense. I think the new way forward does make sense. 

We’ve talked a little bit about Iran. From your point of view, how 

much time is available to the world before Iran gets a nuclear 

weapon, given what they’re doing today? 

General PETRAEUS. Again, probably best for a closed session. 

Senator GRAHAM. Gotcha. 

General PETRAEUS. But it has, thankfully, slid to the right a bit, 

and it is not this calendar year, I don’t think. 

Senator GRAHAM. Okay. But, it’s not forever, either. 

General PETRAEUS. It is not infinite. 

Senator GRAHAM. Okay. 

Now, my favorite topic: detainees. I just want to let the committee know that you and Doug Stone and others involved with 

Camp Bucca is probably one of the great, great success stories of 

Iraq, maybe military history, really, turning a prison around that 

was a recruiting center for the enemy and becoming part of the 

counterinsurgency operations. I just want to put on the record how 

much I appreciate what you all were able to do with Camp Bucca, 

to turn it into a model military prison that would rehabilitate people. Those that were irreconcilable were segregated out, and it is 

a great success story. 

But, that takes us now to Afghanistan. Detention operations over 

there are part of this surge, I would think. Is that correct? 

General PETRAEUS. They are, Senator. In fact, your former 

wingman, Brigadier General Mark Martins, is a full-time resident 

of the area of Bagram at the detention facility there, now called the 

Parwan detention facility. He is spearheading the effort to ensure 

absolutely the same kinds of initiatives are pursued there that you 

saw firsthand in Iraq, and then to help develop the concepts, and 

then implement the concepts, for Afghan Forces to be trained, 

equipped, and then take on the tasks there, increasingly, so that 

779 

we can step back in a number of areas in which over time we’ll 

need to step back. That’s the plan for there. 

His boss, Vice Admiral Harward, out of the SEAL community, is 

the overall Task Force 435 commander. General Martins is the 

deputy. Vice Admiral Harward is overseeing the overall effort, also 

working more with our State Department colleagues, INL and others, to ensure that the Afghan facilities outside Kabul and 

Kandahar and other places are also conducting their business appropriately. There are also partnerships of the future in some of 

the other rule-of-law areas, as well. 

Senator GRAHAM. Thank you. 

Do we have people in the Bagram confinement facility that are 

non-Afghan foreign fighters? 

General PETRAEUS. We do. Yes, sir. 

Senator GRAHAM. Is it fair to say, we need a closed session, eventually, about this, Mr. Chairman, but just put out for public consumption, the best I can, that we have a dilemma in this war; 

we’re running out of jail space for certain people, and we need to 

find confinement facilities that work. Would you support sending 

Guantanamo Bay detainees to Afghanistan, to Bagram? Is that a 

good idea? Some have suggested that. 

General PETRAEUS. I think that, at the very least, over time, 

that’s an idea that we need to go sit under a tree until it passes, 

I think. 

Senator GRAHAM. I’ll take that to be, ‘‘That’s not a good idea.’’ 

General PETRAEUS. If we transition this to Afghan control, as we 

should—— 

Senator GRAHAM. But, I’m talking about taking Guantanamo 

people here, and sending them to Afghanistan. Wouldn’t that create great problems for the Afghan Government if you did that? 

General PETRAEUS. This is why I think that we need to think 

pretty hard about that. We’re going to transition this facility to Afghan control. 

Senator GRAHAM. Right. 

General PETRAEUS. We’re going to do it in the relatively near 

term, in the course of a year. 

Senator GRAHAM. These foreign fighters that we’re talking about, 

are the Afghans willing to take them? 

General PETRAEUS. Sir, I’d defer to DOJ or others, because this 

is a big policy issue. 

Senator GRAHAM. Isn’t it fair to say, General, there are some 

prisoners in Afghanistan, that are non-Afghan, held by the American military, that it may be very difficult to convince the Afghans 

to take them, or it may not be wise to send them to the Afghans. 

Is that a fair summary? 

General PETRAEUS. Sir, you’re the lawyer. 

Senator GRAHAM. Just say yes, then. [Laughter.] 

General PETRAEUS. The fact is that those individuals broke the 

laws in Afghanistan. 

Senator GRAHAM. Yes. 

General PETRAEUS. So, as we’re transitioning to Afghanistan, 

that’s an Afghan legal issue. But, I’ll be happy to defer to the legal 

community. 

780 

Senator GRAHAM. Okay. Admiral Olson, we catch somebody in 

Yemen. Where do we send them? 

Admiral OLSON. Sir, that’s a question that, on so many levels, we 

would have to go into a closed session. 

Senator GRAHAM. Okay, fair enough. 

Last question. General Petraeus, you’ve indicated in the past— 

and, I think, very eloquently—that Guantanamo is counterproductive to the war effort and, if possible, should be closed. Could 

you tell me why you believe that? 

General PETRAEUS. Rightly or wrongly, and probably wrongly, 

because I think that facility—and many of you have visited it—actually is conducted in an appropriate manner, but, at the very 

least, it has a symbol attached to it that is one that is used in our 

AOR against us. It, in some cases, is even lumped in with Abu 

Ghraib. Completely different case, there’s no reason to do that, but 

again, it has become iconic in certain respects, and those are not 

helpful respects in the CENTCOM AOR. 

Senator GRAHAM. One last, very simple question. Isn’t it true 

that some of our allies refuse to turn prisoners over to us if they 

believe they could work their way to Guantanamo? 

General PETRAEUS. Sir, I don’t know the answer to that question. 

Senator GRAHAM. You’ve never had an ally tell you that, ‘‘We 

can’t turn a prisoner over to the Americans if they’re going to go 

to Guantanamo?’’ 

General PETRAEUS. I’m not sure we’ve sent anybody to Guantanamo on my watch as the CENTCOM Commander. 

Senator GRAHAM. We haven’t sent anybody to Guantanamo on 

your watch? 

General PETRAEUS. I don’t think so. 

Senator GRAHAM. I think you’re right. I think you’re right. 

Okay, thanks. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Graham. 

Senator Ben Nelson. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, gentlemen, for your service and for being here with 

us today. 

General Petraeus, we’ve heard from all of the Services that combatant commanders have difficulty getting enough ISR. This budget starts to address that by adding more unmanned aerial vehicles 

(UAV), but the focus has primarily been on the number of aircraft 

and not on the personnel required to operate the aircraft and analyze the intelligence collected. In some respects, it seems to me that 

the easier part may be getting the UAVs, the tougher part may be 

in manning the UAV mission, in terms of staffing as well as intelligence. Can you give us your opinion on this overall picture of ISR 

personnel versus equipment? 

General PETRAEUS. I’d be happy to, sir. There’s something called 

the F3EAD process; that is find, fix, finish, exploit, analyze—or assess—and disseminate (F3EAD). Of that, the hardware you’ve just 

talked about, what might be on a UAV, is a subset of that. It’s a 

very, very critical subset. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Yes. 

General PETRAEUS. But without all the people that do the tasks 

associated with the F3EAD process, it is not fully exploited to the 

781 

extent that we need to. We have actually spent quite a bit of time 

pulling back up to strategic level, when folks start talking procurement issues, and talking about the overall intelligence process that 

involves these various platforms, and a whole host of other platforms and capabilities. I think that the Air Force is to be commended for the enormous shifts that it has made, in particular, to 

man all of these different elements, and the same for the other 

Services, and the Intelligence Community (IC) more broadly. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Between the Army and the Air Force the 

fiscal year 2011 budget request includes about $1.6 billion to buy 

77 Predator-class UAVs. By 2016, both Services project to have 

spent $10.2 billion on 499 of these UAVs. In looking at the unmanned platforms and the requirements for staffing to fit all of 

those requirements, is there adequate coordination between the 

Services to get that done so that we don’t end up with a 

stovepiping of each branch having its own approach to dealing with 

this? 

General PETRAEUS. There is, sir. In the Office of the Secretary 

of Defense (OSD), there’s an ISR task force that looks at this very 

broadly and analyzes it, together with the Services, all the way 

down to the tactical level and up to the strategic level. It is a 

hugely important element of what we need out there. Hardware 

without the people is not sufficient, and they’re addressing that. 

Senator BEN NELSON. In achieving the goals, sometimes referred 

to as benchmarks, can you take two of the major benchmarks and 

give us your impression of how we’re doing on achieving those 

goals—two of the most important ones? 

General PETRAEUS. I hate to go back to hardware, but hardware 

is one of them, because I think we’ve literally maxed out the production capacity. There’s been intense scrutiny on where every one 

of these platforms are. Then there’s been equal scrutiny on what 

is termed the back end. It’s everything that allows it to stay in the 

sky, a line, as we call it, to stay in the sky for 24 hours a day, to 

provide the unblinking eye. 

In each of those areas, I think we’ve pushed industry about as 

far as it can go, is my understanding. The personnel pipeline has 

been expanded dramatically, not just in terms of those who pilot 

these unmanned systems, but also in terms of all of the others who 

are doing the exploit, analyze, disseminate piece. 

Fusion. Because the real breakthrough in intelligence in recent 

years has been fusion of imagery, human intelligence, signals intelligence, and measurement intelligence. It’s been pulling all of that 

together. That’s the real key. 

Senator BEN NELSON. We’re in the midst of implementing a new 

missile defense plan in Europe, called Phased Adaptive Approach. 

One of the benefits of this is it allows for an immediate missile defense system against Iran. What impact does the approach have affecting regional stability in the AOR? 

General PETRAEUS. We’re looking at the BMD in the AOR itself. 

We have made our requirements known to the Department, and 

also there’s an effort to tie in what we do, because now it’s all 

about shared early warning, and sharing across combatant commands. So, as the deployment sequences are sorted out, we will 

782 

then tie in with our European Command brethren in making sure 

that what we see, they see, and vice versa. 

Senator BEN NELSON. An area that has more intrigue perhaps 

than others is piracy in the vicinity. How much of our time and our 

financial resources and personnel and equipment would be assigned to dealing with piracy in the vicinity that is within the 

AOR? 

General PETRAEUS. It’s not a substantial portion of Naval Forces 

CENTCOM, but it is an important mission that the naval component of CENTCOM performs. But, it does so, together with a coalition maritime force, and also with European Union (EU), NATO, 

and even independent elements, including China; and Russia has 

been out there, as well. Ultimately, Senator, the key there is going 

to be maritime shipping companies taking more defensive measures, including up to, we think, at some point armed security elements. 

We have changed our tactics and so forth, as well. We’ve learned 

a lot about the networks that carry out the pirate attacks, which 

are really quite extraordinary; in some cases up to 600 nautical 

miles off the coast of Somalia, in very open boats with big, huge, 

55-gallon drums of fuel throughout them, and their other paraphernalia. 

But, it’s a very challenging mission, because we have the authorities relative to pirates only that police have relative to an alleged 

criminal. This is not the declared hostile enemy for a military force; 

it is a reduced set of authorities that we have in this arena. So, 

if you then detain a pirate, you are right back to the question of, 

who do you turn them over to? There are not authorities in Somalia that will deal with them. We’ve made arrangements with some 

neighboring countries in the region, but some of their facilities are 

starting to get fairly full. 

Senator BEN NELSON. With respect to those authorities—and my 

time is up—is that something we should be looking at, in terms of 

rules of engagement, if we’re going to be patrolling and protecting 

those arenas? I realize it’s very sensitive. 

General PETRAEUS. It is a sensitive one, sir. We’ve offered this 

to the policy arena. It becomes an international legal issue and so 

forth. I think the U.N. has given about the authorities that, generally, the international community is willing to provide. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Thank you. 

Thanks to both of you. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Nelson. 

Senator Thune. 

Senator THUNE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Admiral and General, thank you very much for your extraordinary service to our country during some very interesting and 

dangerous times. 

General Petraeus, the advanced weapons systems designed for 

anti-access and area-denial are being proliferated through the 

world, including in the CENTCOM AOR. Iran, for example, is seeking to purchase one of the latest, most advanced surface-to-air-missile systems, the Russian S–300. I’m interested in what your views 

are with regard to the activities by the Iranians to pursue some of 

these anti-access and area-denial strategies. 

783 

General PETRAEUS. With respect to the S–300, I think you know 

that has not been delivered. There’s quite a bit of focus on that, 

whether it will be delivered, because it would represent a significant increase in the air and missile defense capability of the Iranian forces. 

There’s no question that they are trying to increase their antiaccess capabilities against maritime as well as air threats. It’s 

something that we watch, and that regional partners and others in 

that area watch very closely, as well. 

Senator THUNE. What’s your view on this strategy by Iran, and 

how it would affect our ability to project power in the Middle East; 

specifically, in the Gulf of Iran and the Strait of Hormuz? 

General PETRAEUS. We have the most capable military in the 

world. We can deal with the threats that are there, but they make 

it more difficult. That’s basically the short answer to that, without 

getting into the specifics of each type of system and what we have 

in return. 

We think, for example, that we could keep the Strait of Hormuz 

open, in the event of a crisis, if we are properly positioned, and so 

forth. But, that would be a challenging task. These are the kind of 

tasks that we have to be prepared to perform. 

Senator THUNE. General, I wanted to get your views, too, on the 

development of the air-sea battle concept that’s currently underway 

in the Pentagon. The new QDR directs the Navy and the Air Force 

to develop a joint air-sea battle concept for defeating adversaries 

with some of these anti-access and area-denial capabilities that I 

just mentioned, which, in turn, will help guide the development of 

future capabilities that will be needed for effective power-projection 

operations. Some of these anti-access and area-denial weapons can 

be low-tech weapons, such as mines or small boats using swarm 

tactics, and sometimes can be just as effective in creating these denied areas. Could you give us your views on the development of 

this new air-sea battle concept so far? Where does CENTCOM fit 

into the overall concept and development and evaluation, and ultimately, the implementation of that concept? 

General PETRAEUS. We are being consulted on that, but I can’t 

really give you all that much, because it is very much in the early 

conceptual stages at this point in time. The truth is, our focus, as 

a combatant command, is on dealing with what we know exists 

right now, and could exist in the near-term with what we have 

right now, and know we’ll have in the near-term. That really is our 

focus, although we do get the opportunity to contribute to the Services developing these concepts. 

Senator THUNE. Okay. I assume they’re consulting and there are 

discussions that are occurring. 

General PETRAEUS. Absolutely. 

Senator THUNE. Do you have a view about how long-range strike 

capabilities would fit into an air-sea battle concept? 

General PETRAEUS. Unless we get into real specifics, I’m not sure 

where I would head with that. 

Senator THUNE. Okay. 

General PETRAEUS. We have a variety of long-range strike capabilities. 

Senator THUNE. Right. 

784 

General PETRAEUS. Some, quite impressive. We’ve used some of 

those in recent years, certainly. 

Senator THUNE. Okay. 

Let me ask one other question, if I might, having to deal with 

Afghanistan. It has to do with the military intelligence operations 

there. I’d direct this both to you, General, and to you, Admiral. 

Major General Michael Flynn, who’s the top military intelligence 

officer in Afghanistan, published what he titled, ‘‘A Blueprint for 

Making Intelligence Relevant in Afghanistan.’’ The report notes 

that, ‘‘Our intelligence apparatus still finds itself unable to answer 

fundamental questions about the environment in which we operate 

and the people we’re trying to protect and persuade.’’ I would pose 

this question to both of you, do you agree with General Flynn’s 

overall assessment in this report? What actions are you taking in 

response to that report, and have any of the initiatives that he directs in the report been carried out? 

General PETRAEUS. When we conducted the strategic assessment 

that’s customary with a new commander coming in to a position 

like that of CENTCOM, one of the biggest of the big ideas was that 

our capacity and capability for Afghanistan and Pakistan was not 

adequate. I went to Admiral Blair early on and asked if he would 

appoint a mission manager for Af-Pak; he did one better, he appointed an associate deputy director of national intelligence for 

that. We then set about beefing up the capability and capacity 

there, including sending General Flynn there, among others to help 

build that. We formed a Center of Excellence for Af-Pak in the 

Joint Intelligence Center at CENTCOM. The Af-Pak cell has also 

done the same. So, what we’ve tried to do, as part of the overall 

effort, is just to build the capability that we had. This is not unlike 

what we did in Iraq, as well. In early 2007, one of the first requests 

I made, before even going to take command of Multi-National 

Force-Iraq was a substantial augmentation of our intelligence capability. We got that, and we’ve been working on providing that kind 

of augmentation in Afghanistan, as well. 

Senator THUNE. Okay. 

Anything to add, Admiral? 

Admiral OLSON. Sir, I think it’s natural for the early energy of 

the IC to be focused on identifying the immediate threats to our 

force, but as the battlefield has evolved, the transition into using 

intelligence capabilities to better develop our understanding of the 

environment, and to seek opportunities for engagement, is a transition that I applaud. 

Senator THUNE. Okay. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator Thune. 

Senator Bill Nelson. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, thank you for your continued service to our country. 

I’m especially proud that both of you reside in my State, in the 

wonderful area of Tampa. 

Gentlemen, last week I did a hearing for the chairman in our 

Emerging Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee on the increased 

radicalization of young men and the extremist elements that are so 

bedeviling the civilized world. The conclusion that came out of a lot 

785 

of the testimony in this hearing was that we could continue to do 

everything that the military is doing, just exceptionally well, particularly in the responsibility that you give to these young officers 

with the CERP funds, that they can go in and help a village, a 

community, and it helps us, ultimately, from our military objectives. We talked about how all the other agencies of government, 

working with the military in a place like Afghanistan—agriculture, 

health, digging wells, education—all of these things are so important, but that if you don’t get right to it, about the radicalization 

of young men by presenting Islam as something that is not taught 

in the Koran, you’re still going to have these extremists that’ll go 

out and blow themselves up and threaten stability. I’d love to have 

your comments on that conclusion. 

General PETRAEUS. Senator, I think this really gets at the heart 

of one of the big ideas out there, which is that it takes much more 

than just military security activities, it takes whole-of-government 

approaches. Not just our Government, but host-nation governments 

and all other partners. You have to get at the conditions that give 

rise to extremism, to the kind of discontent and unfulfilled expectations and all of the rest of that, that can give rise to extremism, 

and you have to get at the issues of actual education, which in 

some cases creates fertile ground for the planting of extremist 

seeds. That takes a very comprehensive approach; it is one that 

some of our partners in the region have actually done quite well 

in recent years, if you look at some of the countries in the Arabian 

Peninsula, in particular; some others have not. But, that is the 

kind of approach that is necessary to this overall challenge. 

Admiral OLSON. Senator, I agree with that completely. I’d just 

add that the DOD plan for addressing a violent extremist threat 

does include actions led by the military, as you laid it out, to conduct the traditional military kinds of actions, but it also lends 

strong military support to the whole-of-government, whole-of-nations approach to dealing with the environment. 

Senator BILL NELSON. If you are as successful as you have been, 

certainly in Iraq and, we hope, in Afghanistan, and now in our relations through the Pakistani Government, that they are successful, too—but if young men are led astray as to what the Koran 

teaches, and they’re willing to go and commit suicide, that is going 

to continue to be a great hindrance to us. I think we have to look 

at this through our Northern Command as well, the radicalization 

of young men here, inside the United States. But, that means we 

have to be able to find clerics who know what true Islam is and 

are willing to go out and educate the ones that are being 

radicalized. How do we do that? 

General PETRAEUS. Sir, I think the answer has to lie, needless 

to say, in the Islamic world. It has to start there. It has to be Islamic leaders who identify the issue that you have just raised 

about the importance of religious leaders who have the courage to 

deny extremism as an aspect of Islam. Those leaders are out there; 

they are carrying out some of these initiatives. Some of their countries were threatened enormously by this extremism, correctly diagnosed the threat, and have then taken appropriate actions in the 

wake of that. That has to continue to spread to address this threat 

of extremism as you’ve laid it out. 

786 

Senator BILL NELSON. All right, you take a country like Saudi 

Arabia, they can deal with the radicalization problems by going to 

the tribes, which is the family of the young fellow that’s been 

radicalized, and work at it that way. They’ve had some measure of 

success in doing that. But, in other countries you can’t do that, you 

can’t work through the tribes. 

I want to lay the problem out. I want to continue to work with 

both of you and with the overall problem that’s in this country, as 

well. 

General PETRAEUS. Senator, just a follow up. Saudi Arabia has 

not just worked it through the tribes. That’s been an important 

component, but they’ve done a very whole-of-government approach 

to this overall issue. It has been quite impressive for a country 

that, 5 years ago, was seriously threatened by extremists who blew 

up their Ministry of Interior building, so threatened foreign-oil 

workers that thousands of them departed, took over our consulate 

in Jeddah, and so forth. What they have done has been quite impressive. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Thank you, gentlemen. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Nelson. 

Senator Sessions. 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you. 

Thanks to both of you for your service to our country. The more, 

I think, the American people see our men and women in uniform 

perform, the prouder they are of them. I continue to talk to them 

in airports and places like that, and they’re just an inspiration to 

me. But, good leadership is important, it does make a difference, 

and you’re providing that. Thank you so much. 

With regard to the training of the Afghan military and police, 

General Petraeus, your second tour in Iraq was to come back and 

train there, and you spent a year or so training a force. I’m sure 

you developed some ideas about how that ought to be done. It 

seems to me that, if you have a local defense force that’s willing 

to defend their community against Taliban or al Qaeda, perfect 

training, if it’s going to delay dramatically the ability of those people to be effective is a danger. I recall the al Anbar model, where 

we quickly got Sunni tribal leaders to empower their local young 

men to turn on al Qaeda, and that was an effective part of that 

effort. 

My question to you is, I see there’s some tension in the State Department, or other people within the military, about how much 

training by the central government they need before they can be 

allowed to defend their home territories, and with a little salary 

and support of a good tribal leader or mayor or a community leader, much good can be done. Do you understand? Where are we? Are 

we demanding too much centralized training before we join with 

friendly local leaders? 

General PETRAEUS. We are trying to take advantage of that in 

cases where that’s appropriate, Senator, and to empower, in some 

cases, with good oversight and partnering some local elements. It’s 

called the Community Defense Initiative. Now I think there’s eight 

or nine or so that are ongoing, these great Special Forces elements 

that are typically the ones partnering with them, tied into the AfVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:37 May 06, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00792 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\62155.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
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ghan Ministry of Interior, because it’s very important that we not 

just empower warlords to stand up their forces, given the effort 

that it took to disperse and disarm a number of those elements. 

Really, it is the same dynamic that we had in Iraq; different terrain, different culture, different social makeup and so forth. It’s 

every valley, as opposed to larger tribal areas, say, in Anbar. But 

in Anbar over time—and we knew this in the beginning—the situation in Iraq was so desperate that we were willing to just take individuals who were willing to oppose al Qaeda, and then we would 

figure out afterwards how we were going to mesh them into the 

greater Iraqi structure. It has taken us quite some time to do that, 

but it has happened; and Iraq now pays the salaries of all of the 

remaining so-called Sons of Iraq who still have not been provided 

jobs in various ministries, or what have you. A number of them 

have already transitioned in that form. 

So, that’s what we have to be sensitive to here, as well; and recognizing that Afghanistan is a country that doesn’t have the financial means that Iraq has. That’s yet another dynamic that we’re 

wrestling with. 

But, we are taking advantage of some of these opportunities in 

very careful ways in partnership with our Iraqi colleagues. 

Senator SESSIONS. This is a large country—25, 23 million people—we’ll soon be drawing down our troop levels, many of them 

now are going to have to be concentrated in some of the more dangerous areas, and that leaves a lot of areas that we don’t have any 

presence in, or very little presence, so it seems to me that we may 

be desperate enough, we may have to take some chances with leaders we believe are pretty good local leaders, and see if we can’t support them. Do you agree? 

General PETRAEUS. Some of this is going on naturally. There are 

areas in which Afghans are the security forces, and have been for 

some time. These are areas in the north, for example, where we 

have virtually no other presence than perhaps the force protection 

elements that work with the Provincial Reconstruction Teams. So, 

there’s a variety, as always; these endeavors are somewhat of a 

patchwork quilt. What you’re trying to find is the right answer for 

that particular location, and then to try to figure out how to make 

it an enduring answer. 

Senator SESSIONS. General Petraeus, with regard to the shortage 

of trainers, perhaps our trainers can be a little less skilled as trainers or something? It seems to me that would be one area you really 

don’t want to be short on. How long will it be before we can get 

to sufficient number of trainers there? 

General PETRAEUS. What we would like to see right now is for 

our NATO partners to generate the additional trainers that have 

been requested. In the theory of always having contingency plans, 

there are thoughts about how to fill that, if we have to, in other 

ways. 

Senator SESSIONS. Admiral Olson, with regard to the CERP and 

how you train our SOF, isn’t it true that we believe the best policy 

of our Government is to have a seamless relationship between government aid and our SOF and that we use all of those factors— 

political, financial, as well as military—to achieve maximum 

progress toward our goals? 

788 

Admiral OLSON. Senator, I’d say it’s certainly true that the more 

interagency cooperation there is, the better the outcome typically 

is. 

Senator SESSIONS. With regard to the aid that’s going through 

USAID and State Department and other things, it seems to me 

that when you have a skilled SOF team in an area, and they really 

have little or no other U.S. Government presence there, aren’t they 

sort of the representative of the United States? Do you feel like 

they’re empowered sufficiently, financially, to make commitments 

with those leaders to say, ‘‘If you will do this, we’ll do this’’? If 

they’re empowered greater, could they be more effective in reducing 

violence and protecting the lives of our own people? 

Admiral OLSON. Sir, I’d leave the answer regarding sufficiency to 

General Petraeus, because the money flows through him, for the 

most part. 

It is true that SOF often are somewhat more remote and do become, if not diplomats, at least representatives of the U.S. presence. It is important that they be able to apply benefits in the regions where they live. So, within the special operations community 

resides the Active component of the civil affairs capability of the 

Army and strengthening a relationship between USAID and the 

special operations community in many of those regions. 

Senator SESSIONS. General Petraeus, do you feel like we’ve made 

progress in that area, and can we make more? 

General PETRAEUS. I think we’ve made progress, but I think we 

can make more. One of the important elements of General 

McChrystal’s overall approach is to achieve greater unity of effort. 

That means conventional forces, special forces, civilian elements, 

and so forth, all working together to a common aim, trying not to 

duplicate efforts, and trying to do it in a way that is as little bureaucracy as necessary, but recognizing that some of that is necessary. There is a need to do more in this area, and that is one 

of General McChrystal’s thrusts in his effort. 

Senator SESSIONS. I strongly support that. 

Thank you. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Sessions. 

Senator Hagan. 

Senator HAGAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Admiral Olson and General Petraeus, as other members of the 

committee have already said, I thank you for your service to our 

country and for your testimony today. 

I am proud that North Carolina is home to the Joint Special Operations Medical Training Center at Fort Bragg. All special joint 

operations combat medics are trained at this facility to obtain the 

skills they need on the battlefield. Just several months ago, I had 

the opportunity to visit this facility and witness the great training 

that’s taking place there. But, I understand that combat medics 

need to have the capability to perform complicated procedures, 

often in the dark, in the middle of the night, and under hostile livefire conditions in remote locations. I also understand that DOD 

sees tremendous value in live-tissue training, especially since 

they’re faced with the task of taking these young men and women, 

with no prior medical schooling, and transforming them into combat trauma specialists in 26 weeks. 

789 

While simulators may hold promise, according to OSD, simulators currently lack the realism and the ability to replicate combat 

wounds and the emotional stress found on the battlefield. Also, 

moreover, all patients don’t bleed the same or react to medical procedures in the same fashion. 

Admiral Olson, can you describe the operational and the institutional impact we would see if live-tissue training was stopped? 

Admiral OLSON. Senator, there are many compelling examples of 

how live-tissue training has directly contributed to the preservation 

of human life on the battlefield. I have not been exposed to any 

simulation, any technology that adequately substitutes for live-tissue training. 

Senator HAGAN. Thank you. 

I’m also pleased that the U.S. Army SOCOM and the Marine 

Corps SOCOM have developed a close relationship with the University of North Carolina (UNC). UNC recently signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with both Special Operations 

Commands. This MOU includes, but is not limited to, cultural 

awareness and linguistic training, business practices, degree-completion opportunities, and a senior service college fellowship program. 

My question is, Admiral Olson, can you provide your view on the 

educational needs of our special forces and how public and private 

universities can assist, and are you interested in creating a fellowship in counterterrorism and public policy for members of the U.S. 

Special Operations community? 

Admiral OLSON. The way you’ve highlighted it really is a good 

example of how the military and the academic communities are 

interacting. The kind of relationship that we’ve developed enables 

us in areas where we simply don’t have the capacity within the 

military forces to perform that kind of training, that kind of education. I certainly would support an effort to create similar kinds 

of fellowships for specialized kinds of education, as you’ve described. 

Senator HAGAN. Around the Fort Bragg area, the UNC system 

has 16 public universities, with Fayetteville State, NC State, and 

Chapel Hill all very close, and then we have some excellent private 

universities, too, such as Duke University and Wake Forest, that 

do excellent work. So, I think this MOU will go a long way to helping, from educational needs, especially from the linguistics and cultural, for our men and women in the special operations in these 

special forces. 

I also wanted to talk about the Iranian influence in Iraq. Despite 

the fact that the Iraqis are increasingly expressing their discontent 

with Iranian influence in Iraq, we need to keep in mind that Iran 

has people in Iraq that it uses to drive a wedge between the Sunnis 

and the Shi’ites in Iraq, and these actions ignite the ethnosectarian 

tensions. These Iranian actions can undermine Iraqi security in the 

delicate political situation. How do you foresee DOD using its future relationship with the ISF to steer Iraq’s defense strategy and 

acquisition of weapon systems in order to avoid Iranian meddling 

that could jeopardize Iraq’s stability? 

General PETRAEUS. Senator, I don’t think we’ll have to steer at 

all. Iraq’s leaders and its security force leaders share a concern 

790 

about neighbors who arm, train, fund, equip, and direct proxy elements on their soil. They have continued to carry out operations 

against these illegal elements, and I’m confident that they will continue to do that in the future, even as we draw down. They’ve conducted a number of unilateral operations against these elements, 

as well. 

Senator HAGAN. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Hagan. 

Senator Wicker. 

Senator WICKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General Petraeus, Chairman Levin began early on asking about 

Iran. He mentioned the U.N. resolutions and asked about being 

more explicit about the possibility of a blockade or quarantine. You 

said that the President was explicit not to take the military option 

off the table. You recently talked about combining engagement 

with Iranian leaders, backed up by the threat of further sanctions. 

I think this is a quote of yours: ‘‘That puts us in a solid foundation 

now to go on what is termed the pressure track. That’s the course 

on which we’re embarked now.’’ You alluded to that, but if you 

could explain a little more about what the pressure track will involve, and if you could tell us, has anything the international community done so far yielded positive results? Do we have any success stories at all, with regard to all of these sanctions and options 

and all of the talk that we’ve done about Iran? Then, after that, 

I want to ask you about the dissidents in Tehran. But, if you’d answer the first part of it, I would appreciate it. 

General PETRAEUS. Senator, first of all, over the course of last 

year, the effort has focused on the diplomatic track. All the countries of the world have given Iran ample opportunity to discuss the 

issues that are out there, and to try to resolve them. Of course, 

that has not happened. 

Senator WICKER. Then it’s totally unsuccessful. 

General PETRAEUS. That has led to what the President and others have termed the pressure track. That is the effort now, with 

the U.N. Security Council, other countries, and other organizations, 

as well. The EU is involved in this, countries do it as single actors 

in a variety of different ways, everything from on the U.S. side, 

Treasury designations and a host of financial and trade restrictions, and so forth. That is now about to ramp up, needless to say; 

that’s what the increased pressure will result from. 

With respect to what this has done in the past, indeed some of 

these actions have resulted in the interdiction of money, weapons, 

technology, and so forth. It has limited even the travel of some of 

the leaders of the key security elements. So, there have been. 

Now, has it dissuaded them from the path that some analysts believe they’re on, in terms of developing the components of a nuclear 

weapon? There may have been some initiatives that have made 

that more difficult; a good bit more difficult perhaps; but, I think 

the assessment of all that continues to march on. 

Senator WICKER. Have we squandered precious time? 

General PETRAEUS. I don’t think so. In fact, I think that this has 

given us a very firm foundation from which to work as we transition to the pressure track. No one can say that Iran has not had 

791 

every opportunity made possible to them, including the reaching 

out of the open hand, and they have not grasped that. The response 

has been the opposite. Again, that provides that now no one can 

say that the United States and the other countries of the world 

have not given that every opportunity. Therefore, I think, that 

translates into the greater possibility that the pressure track could 

come up with meaningful actions. 

Senator WICKER. The actions on the pressure track will have to 

be agreed to by the United States and a number of our allies or 

would it be solely American action? 

General PETRAEUS. It depends which action you are talking 

about. If you’re talking about U.N. Security Council resolutions, it 

obviously has to be the Perm-5 and then there have to be nine total 

members. So, either abstention or for, in the case of the Perm-5, 

and then nine total votes in the affirmative, as I understand it. 

But, I’d be happy to defer to the State Department on that. 

Senator WICKER. How public have we been about what form 

these actions might take? 

General PETRAEUS. Again, I’d defer to the State Department on 

that. A lot of this is understandably, I think, going on behind 

closed doors; that’s how that is generally best pursued. 

Senator WICKER. Okay, well, you may want to defer to the State 

Department on this next question. 

General PETRAEUS. Okay. 

Senator WICKER. But, I do want to ask it. It’s been said in this 

committee, and it’s been said on the floor, we should be showing 

our moral support for the reformers in Iran, for the people who are 

willing to take to the street and stand up and risk their lives and 

safeties. If you were a reformer in Tehran, what you would be hoping the United States would do? Do we need to send some signals 

as to the limits of what can be expected of us, as we try to give 

some sort of moral support, but we also try to be realistic about 

what we can do to help these people who are striving for freedom 

and democracy? 

General PETRAEUS. As you suggested, Senator, with respect, I 

think that’s one for the State Department and the folks who pull 

together all the different strands of this policy, because I think just 

talking about one element of this without talking about the others 

in a comprehensive approach could be misleading. 

Senator WICKER. All right. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Wicker. 

Senator McCaskill. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Following up on some of the sanction stuff on Iran, the Iran 

Sanctions Act was passed 14 years ago, and we’ve never enforced 

it. Recently there has been some attention given to this. One example, of many examples, is a very large South Korean engineering 

firm that entered into a contract with Iran to upgrade oil fields in 

Iran, in 2007. It was a $700 million contract. In 2009, the U.S. 

Army gave the same company a contract for $100 million to build 

housing for our Army in South Korea. Then, just a few months 

after that, they entered into another contract with Iran. 

792 

I understand that we have not enforced this law because our European allies squawked about it when it was first passed. Then, 

when we tried to enforce it with a company in Japan, Japan 

squawked and said, ‘‘you didn’t enforce it against the European 

countries.’’ Brazil, we just gave a huge export/import loan to, in an 

effort to try to get some oil out of Brazil, as opposed to all of it 

being in the Middle East. Then, what do they do? They turn 

around and have Ahmadinejad come to town and kiss and hug. 

I’m a little worried that our talk of sanctions has been too much 

talk, and that we haven’t even followed up within our military contracts to make sure we’re not contracting with people who are 

doing business with Iran, especially in the oil and gas and the petroleum sector. 

Do you have any take on that, General Petraeus, and whether 

or not this is something that is being driven through the State Department, as opposed to whether or not the military is taking a 

look at their contractors and whether or not we’re doing business 

with the wrong people? 

General PETRAEUS. I honestly don’t. I’m not in the contracting 

business. I don’t know what it takes to get someone on a blacklist, 

where they can’t compete for a contract, and what that process is, 

and why, for example, a particular country that has done something in Iran is not on that list. It’s not my area of expertise. My 

apologies. 

Senator MCCASKILL. I’ll continue to follow up on it, but I think 

it’s maybe one of the reasons Iran is not taking us as seriously as 

they should. Because we talk about the carrot and stick, and using 

the stick, and frankly, I don’t think we’ve used the stick very effectively in a law that’s been on our books for 14 years. 

Let me talk also a bit about the size of the military. You and I 

had a chance to talk after I got back from Afghanistan, but I want 

to put this on the record, Mr. Chairman, because I think it’s important that this be talked about, the size of the army we’re building 

and Afghanistan’s ability to sustain that military. If you’re over 

there, the Afghans say that they want 400,000 troops. I think we’re 

at the number 300,000 troops, and there has been no indication 

that we’re going to build an army above 300,000. But, even if we 

keep it at 300,000, General Caldwell briefed me that that’s going 

to be somewhere around $5.5 billion to sustain that level of military in Afghanistan. Their gross domestic product, depending on 

which number you look at, is somewhere between $10 and $12 billion. I’d like to put on the record your response to that problem and 

whether or not we have signed up for the American people to do 

the heavy lifting, in terms of sustaining the Afghanistan military 

for decades to come? 

General PETRAEUS. I’m not aware of anyone signing up to do that 

for decades to come, but clearly we are helping Afghanistan build 

a military force to which we can transition tasks so that our forces 

can go home. It’s a lot more expensive to maintain our forces in Afghanistan than it is to maintain even the comparable number of 

Afghan forces that might be able to replace our forces in that country. In a business sense, I think there is some logic to continuing 

to support—although obviously no commitments have been made in 

that regard—but continuing to support, over time, a substantial 

793 

ANSF, and indeed, one that they will not be able to pay all the expenses for over that time. 

Senator MCCASKILL. I did notice much more of an international 

presence there than I did in Iraq, and I guess we can continue to 

hope that our friends in NATO will step up, although so far while 

they’re there and they’re making a bigger commitment, in terms of 

monetary support, we are still shouldering the vast majority of 

that. Isn’t that correct? 

General PETRAEUS. It is. You should note that there are some 

very important non-NATO nations, as well. Japan, I think, I would 

single out as providing quite substantial resources also. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Right. 

Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), the radical terrorist group in Pakistan— 

I know this is more of a priority for the Pacific Command than 

your command—but all indications are that one of the very destructive bombs that went off recently in Kabul was LeT. As we’ve 

made great progress against the Taliban in Afghanistan and the 

Taliban in Pakistan and the al Qaeda that we have successfully 

targeted and gone after, I’m worrying that this organization is 

growing in strength. I know it’s tricky because of the historical connection between LeT and the Pakistani military and their government, because of the Kashmir area, but I do want to sound an 

alarm that I’m concerned about LeT and whether or not it is high 

enough on our priority list. Are we putting enough pressure on 

Pakistan? They’ve responded, I think, well in terms of their military going after terrorism in their country now, but I wonder if 

we’re pushing hard enough on that front. 

General PETRAEUS. It certainly has been a source of dialogue. 

The real issue in this regard was the bombing in Mumbai, which 

by all accounts was carried out by LeT. I think different elements 

of our Government have had quite a bit of interaction with the 

Government of Pakistan over this. Obviously, India has expressed 

its concerns, as well. 

There’s no question that there are elements in Pakistan that 

have not yet been the focus of the Pakistani counterinsurgency efforts, but there’s also no disputing the fact that the Pakistani Army 

and Frontier Corps have a lot of short sticks and a lot of hornet 

nests right now in the Northwest Frontier Province and the FATA. 

They are continuing those campaigns. They are not just holding 

what they have; they do continue their efforts. I know what the 

plan is, and it is impressive. They’ve taken very tough losses in the 

course of this, as has their civilian population. 

Senator MCCASKILL. I know I’m out of time. Let me briefly say 

there’s some good news. Premature to say how effective it’s going 

to be. But, compared to when I went to Iraq on contract oversight, 

the systems that are in place in Afghanistan are much better. I 

want to compliment you and General McChrystal and everyone for 

realizing that we had the wild west of contracting in Iraq, in terms 

of logistical support and a lot of other contracting issues. I think 

we have the structures in place now. Now, it remains to be seen 

whether those structures are going to provide the oversight that we 

need, but at least we have the right people gathered in the right 

rooms. 

794 

I have some significant questions about CERP, big projects and 

continuity, but I’m out of time. So, what I will do, Mr. Chairman, 

is I will make those questions for the record. I know 67 percent of 

the CERP money is going to projects over $500,000. 

General PETRAEUS. Actually, Senator, I need to give you numbers 

on that, because the average project in fiscal year 2010 is somewhere around $20,000 per project in Iraq, and $40,000 in the other 

country. Or is it vice versa? I’m looking at my J8. Anyway, the average is somewhere around $30,000 this year. 

Senator MCCASKILL. So we’re pulling back down from—— 

General PETRAEUS. We have pulled way down. 

Senator MCCASKILL. That’s great. 

General PETRAEUS. I think I mentioned that in my opening state- ment, that I retain approval authority for the $1 million projects 

and above. I’ve only approved one of those in quite some time. 

That’s right. 

Senator MCCASKILL. I knew that there was a bunch of them because some of the folks I talked to over there talked about the continuity and the problem as units would rotate out, the big CERP 

projects that started before, they didn’t want to finish those, because they weren’t going to get credit for them, they wanted to 

start ones that they thought they could finish on their watch and 

some stuff was sitting on the shelf, and so forth. 

General PETRAEUS. I think we have good oversight and a rational 

approach. We’re trying to find that right balance between not too 

much bureaucracy, but enough, and not such high level that they’re 

doing USAID’s work instead of USAID. I’ll pass on your comments 

to those who are in the contracting business. We do try to be a 

learning organization, and we’ve learned a great deal about contracting over the course of the last decade or so. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Over the course of the last 3 years. 

General PETRAEUS. That, too. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Thank you, General. I’ll get my questions to 

the record. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, General Petraeus, for that continuing effort at oversight. It’s very important to this committee. 

We want to especially thank Senator McCaskill for her special efforts in this regard. They’re very, very important to the citizenry 

of our country. 

Senator Brown. 

Senator BROWN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to first thank you for your warm welcome. I appreciate 

your recognition of my service. 

Just to correct the record a little bit, General and Admiral, I 

started out as an enlisted man and was branch-qualified as an infantry officer at Benning and then quarter master, now I’m a 

Judge Advocate General (JAG) and a head trial defense attorney 

in Massachusetts, so I have some knowledge that I don’t think the 

average attorney understands, just being a traditional JAG. 

One of the things that Senator Graham was commenting on that 

I have great concern about, because when I hear about the guardsmen serving from Massachusetts and throughout New England, 

they are confused a little bit as to how they treat folks when they 

are captured. I also want to go on the same vein. I’m concerned 

795 

about how we treat the detainees and where we send them. What 

rights are they actually given? Then, do we send them to Afghanistan, do we keep them where they’re captured, do we bring them 

to U.S. soil, do we get them to Guantanamo? I know I’m new here, 

but, being in the military, these are the questions that my troops 

are passing on to me when I’m representing them. If there’s any 

insight you can give as to where we’re heading with that, or if it’s 

an offline conversation, I’m all ears, because I think it’s creating 

indecision with our soldiers as to what to do with the folks when 

they’re captured. 

General PETRAEUS. Senator, let me talk about that, because I 

don’t think there’s indecision in Iraq or Afghanistan, and I’m not 

aware of us detaining people anywhere else in quite some time. 

When someone’s detained in Iraq or Afghanistan, there are quite 

clear procedures that are done. By the way, we don’t detain virtually any at all in any significant number in Iraq at this point. 

The operations are generally led by ISF, and they are now warrant-based there. We believe in the rule of law, and we are helping 

the Iraqis. They have taken the lead in terms of making arrests 

based on warrants, except in the cases where obviously someone 

has threatened our soldiers directly or you have a case of self-defense or an immediate threat response. 

In Afghanistan, as I explained to Senator Graham, we have clear 

rules. Now, they have recently been implemented for all of our 

forces that have transitioned to NATO, and we are able to hold 

them for 14 days, if necessary, and can send them to Bagram if 

they hit a certain category after that. Then, we’re working hard at 

Bagram over time to transition that facility and the tasks of running it to our Afghan partners so that over time that transition can 

take place. 

But, we’ve worked very hard, because of the idea that you have 

to create conditions in which your soldiers can live our values. One 

of those values has to be, if someone puts his hands in the air, you 

detain him instead of shoot him. But, if you think he’s going to be 

back on the street within 96 hours, or something like that, because 

of a catch-and-release policy, then it becomes much more difficult 

to live your values. We take that very seriously. We’ve worked this 

very hard. As Senator Graham highlighted, this policy has gone 

into place. 

Senator BROWN. There’s more in Afghanistan than Iraq. I know 

in Iraq that that’s been settled somewhat. But, Afghanistan, I 

know there was a transition period, and there had been some concerns. I’ll speak to Senator Graham about some additional questions that he and I were discussing, and maybe we can, offline, 

touch base. 

But, I am chairing a hearing on Afghan police training next 

week, and I’m concerned and wondering if the mission has lagged 

as it’s been divided between the State Department and DOD. 

General PETRAEUS. I think, candidly, that there’s a reason that 

we have, over time, transitioned tasks from traditional executive 

branch elements to the military, and that is because we have more 

capacity and capability. I stood up the Multi-National Security 

Transition Command-Iraq, and, over time, we took on more and 

more responsibility because the capacity of our partners in some of 

796 

these areas. There’s a bunch of heroes in INL, but they are armies 

of one, in many cases. 

Now, we are going to transition the police task back to the State 

Department in Iraq, and we believe that that process can work. 

But, with respect to Afghanistan, we have taken on more and more 

of that, and we are now going to oversee the training aspect of 

that, as you probably know. 

Senator BROWN. Great. Thank you, General. 

Thank you, Admiral. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator Brown. 

We thank you both. We will have a hearing on Iran. With whoever our witnesses will be, and they’re not yet determined, we will 

have an executive session at that time, taking up some of the questions that you left for the executive session. It’s possible that some 

of our questions for the record to you may relate to Iran, that you 

could perhaps answer, even though you won’t be there, in a classified way for that executive session. 

General Petraeus, you have spent a lot of time on the DADT 

issue, thinking about it, and we would welcome your statement for 

the record, but we leave it up to you. Usually we don’t do that, we 

just simply ask people for a statement for the record, but in this 

case, I think I’ll just simply say we would welcome that statement 

for the record, leaving it up to you as to whether you would prefer 

to do it that way, which means it would be immediately made public or whether you’d prefer to give your thoughts in a different form 

at a different time. We didn’t give you that opportunity, because of 

our schedule here, to do that. So, that’s something we would just 

leave up to your good judgment. But, we would very much welcome 

that statement, and if so, then it would be made public at that 

time. 

General PETRAEUS. Thank you. 

Chairman LEVIN. Just again, Admiral, thank you so much for 

your service. All of us feel very deeply about the men and women 

that you command and that you work with. We thank them 

through you. 

We will stand adjourned. 

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JIM WEBB

CONTRACTING IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN

1. Senator WEBB. General Petraeus, I have long been concerned with the systemic 

problems related to wartime-support contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, including 

continued instances of waste, fraud, and abuse revealed by inspector general investigations and the Commission on Wartime Contracting. A March 13, 2010, New 

York Times article reported that investigators have opened more than 50 new reconstruction fraud cases in Iraq in the last 6 months. A March 17, 2010, Defense News 

article stated contractors still lack sufficient oversight by trained personnel. 

The Commission on Wartime Contracting’s June 2009 report stated the effectiveness of contractor support of expanded U.S. operations in Afghanistan is compromised by the failure to apply lessons learned in Iraq. The Commission later reported in its September 2009 special report that weak control systems must be 

strengthened and defense agencies must improve their oversight of contractor business systems to reduce waste, fraud, and abuse. 

What specific actions has U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) taken to address 

the Commission on Wartime Contracting’s issues of immediate concern and other 

time-sensitive recommendations contained in its June 2009 report? 

797 

General PETRAEUS. CENTCOM has taken several actions to address the Commission’s findings and recommendations from the June 2009 report. CENTCOM has 

transferred several lessons learned from Iraq to Afghanistan aimed at reducing 

fraud, waste, and abuse. We’ve formed the Armed Contractor Oversight Division 

(ACOD), which implements the Department of Defense’s (DOD) ACOD policies and 

procedures, and oversees Private Security Contractors (PSCs). We’re transitioning 

Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan (JCC–I/A) to a Joint Theater Support 

Contracting Command (JTSCC) for better synchronization and efficiency of contracting in the theater. We’re applying acquisition strategies that have increased 

firm fixed-price competitive contract awards with reduced reliance on the Logistics 

Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP). JCC–I/A continues to refine its processes 

by leveraging Rock Island Arsenal on contracts that are complex, resource intense, 

and require a detailed Source Selection process. 

CENTCOM and DOD have improved Contracting Officer Representative (COR) 

resourcing and training. Defense Acquisition University (DAU) initiated online and 

resident courses to train our CORs, and the Department of Army directed deploying 

units to identify and train their CORs prior to deployment. The number of CORs 

in Afghanistan has dramatically increased with fill rates now of over 90 percent. 

The CORs are better trained not only in general contract management, but are specifically selected for their technical expertise to oversee contractors performing services such as food preparation, water purification, and fuels distribution. 

We are teaming with the Procurement Fraud Task Force to combat corruption, 

and we are consulting with Contracting/Procurement and Financial Management 

experts to strengthen the business environment within the area of responsibility 

(AOR) and enhance resource control. 

2. Senator WEBB. General Petraeus, what assurances and examples of strengthened contracting oversight can you provide that demonstrate the lessons learned in 

contracting in Iraq are being applied in Afghanistan to reduce the incidence of 

waste, fraud, and abuse? 

General PETRAEUS. CENTCOM transferred lessons learned from Iraq to Afghanistan specifically aimed at reducing fraud, waste, and abuse. We’ve formed the 

ACOD, which implements DOD’s ACOD policies and procedures and oversees PSCs. 

We’re transitioning JCC–I/A to a JTSCC for better synchronization and efficiency 

of contracting in theater. We’re applying acquisition strategies that have increased 

firm fixed-price competitive contract awards with reduced reliance on LOGCAP. 

JCC–I/A continues to refine its processes by leveraging Rock Island Arsenal on contracts that are complex, resource intense, and require a detailed Source Selection 

process. This allows the contracting officer on the ground to pay attention to more 

tactical contractor oversight. 

CENTCOM and DOD have improved COR resourcing and training. DAU initiated 

online and resident courses to better train our CORs, and the Department of Army 

directed deploying units to identify and train their CORs prior to deployment. The 

number of CORs in Afghanistan has dramatically increased with fill rates now over 

90 percent. The CORs are trained not only in general contract management, but are 

specifically selected for their technical expertise to oversee contractors performing 

services such as food preparation, water purification, and fuels distribution. Defense 

Contract Management Agency (DCMA) and Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) 

have also increased the number of personnel in Afghanistan to improve contract 

oversight. 

CENTCOM has ordered the use of the Synchronized Predeployment and Operational Tracker (SPOT) reporting for contractors performing valid work in the 

CENTCOM AOR. This system will increase the quality and reliability of contractor 

data thereby avoiding instances such as fraudulent duplication of numbers on task 

order contracts and over-provisioning of DOD food and supplies based on ineligible 

contracting personnel. 

To facilitate the integration of contractors when defining the strategic plan for future CENTCOM operations, documents such as the National Defense Strategy 

(NDS) and the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) will feature a greater emphasis 

on contractor requirements. Other Field Manuals, DOD Instructions, and new Joint 

Doctrine support the growing importance of integrating contract support into operational planning. 

798 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR CLAIRE MCCASKILL

COMMANDERS’ EMERGENCY RESPONSE PROGRAM

3. Senator MCCASKILL. General Petraeus, while the Commanders’ Emergency Response Program (CERP) is considered an essential tool for General McChrystal and 

other senior commanders on the ground in Afghanistan, there have been problems 

with the program. Since 2004, Congress has provided $1.6 billion to DOD for CERP 

in Afghanistan for programs primarily designed to fund small-scale projects to meet 

urgent humanitarian and reconstruction needs at the community and provincial levels. For fiscal year 2011, DOD has requested $1.3 billion in CERP funds DOD-wide, 

but about $1 billion of that money will go to Afghanistan. A May 2009 Government 

Accountability Office (GAO) report recommended that the Secretary of Defense direct CENTCOM to evaluate workforce requirements and ensure adequate staff to 

administer CERP and establish training requirements for CERP personnel administering the program. GAO further recommended that the Secretary of Defense and 

the Administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) collaborate to create a centralized project-development database for use by U.S. Government agencies in Afghanistan, including establishing specific milestones for its 

development and implementation. What is CENTCOM doing to train CERP managers in the types and scale of projects that they will handle in Afghanistan? 

General PETRAEUS. The entire CERP community has worked diligently to 

strengthen the oversight and training of personnel who administer CERP in theater. 

Commanders in theater, working with Army CENTCOM, have improved in-theater 

training. In September 2009, I wrote to the Chief of Staff of the Army and to the 

Commandant of the Marine Corps, and requested that they develop and implement 

pre-deployment training for all who will have CERP responsibilities. General Casey 

directed that units must identify and train all key CERP personnel prior to deployment. The Army and Marine Corps have coordinated on training materials and they 

have made the CERP curriculum available for individuals to access world wide. 

4. Senator MCCASKILL. General Petraeus, which of GAO’s recommendations from 

the May 2009 report have been implemented? 

General PETRAEUS. The May 2009 GAO Audit of CERP in Afghanistan contained 

three broad recommendations for the Department to consider. Two of the recommendations address sufficient staffing and training for administering CERP. The 

Army and CENTCOM have worked to implement both recommendations and will 

continue to evaluate progress. The third recommendation requested the Department 

and Administrator of USAID collaborate on a centralized project development CERP 

database. DOD’s Business Transformation Agency is working to develop an unclassified interface that will allow USAID to access CERP data via the World Wide Web. 

5. Senator MCCASKILL. General Petraeus, what is the status of the creation of the 

common USAID/DOD database to track projects? 

General PETRAEUS. DOD’s Business Transformation Agency is working to develop 

an unclassified interface that will allow USAID to access CERP data via the World 

Wide Web. The most recent process improvements can be obtained from the Business Transformation Agency. 

6. Senator MCCASKILL. General Petraeus, how will DOD’s current review of CERP 

affect the timeline of the implementation of the GAO recommendations? 

General PETRAEUS. I do not see the current DOD review of CERP affecting the 

implementation timeline for recommendations contained in the May 2009 GAO 

audit report. The Department has focused on strengthening the oversight and management of CERP. All recognize a need for continued program assessment and the 

potential of additional process improvements. 

7. Senator MCCASKILL. General Petraeus, how many CERP projects does 

CENTCOM currently have that are over $500,000 and how many are under $5,000? 

General PETRAEUS. For the first quarter of fiscal year 2010, Iraq and Afghanistan 

reported a total of 13 projects over $500,000 and 1,432 projects under $5,000. 

8. Senator MCCASKILL. General Petraeus, how are those figures affected by microloans and what is the average project size when the micro-loans are subtracted? 

General PETRAEUS. USAID oversees the micro-loans program. DOD CERP does 

not allow micro-loans, but it does allow micro-grants. The desired goal of microgrants is to stimulate economic activity that supports stability operations with a 

focus on areas underserved by other micro-credit and assistance programs. The avVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:37 May 06, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00804 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\62155.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
799 

erage project size, after subtracting micro-grants, in fiscal year 2010 (first quarter) 

CERP Report from Iraq and Afghanistan is $47,200. During the same timeframe, 

there were 280 micro-grants issued out of 1,445 CERP projects. 

9. Senator MCCASKILL. General Petraeus, how are large-scale CERP projects vetted within the greater framework of reconstruction in Afghanistan to ensure their 

utility and prevent duplication or unneeded projects? 

General PETRAEUS. CERP projects greater than $1 million are vetted through review boards at several levels within the chain of command before a recommendation 

for approval is forwarded to CENTCOM. The review board includes members from 

interagency groups (USAID, Department of Agriculture) and U.S. Embassy personnel to prevent duplication and to ensure projects are inline with the strategic 

goals for Afghanistan. Sustainment of projects is coordinated through Memoranda 

of Agreement with donor nations, nongovernmental organizations, or Government of 

the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) officials. 

10. Senator MCCASKILL. General Petraeus, what is the largest CERP project being 

conducted in Afghanistan, who is overseeing it, and how long will it take to implement? 

General PETRAEUS. As of 16 Mar 10, the largest fiscal year 2010 CERP project being conducted in Afghanistan is the $9.5 million Spin Boldak road project. The 

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers-Afghanistan Engineering District is providing the 

program management and oversight for this project. It is estimated the project will 

take 8 months to complete. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MARK BEGICH

AFGHANISTAN

11. Senator BEGICH. General Petraeus, some experts have suggested increasing 

the size of the Afghan National Army (ANA) to as large as 250,000 and the Afghan 

National Police (ANP) to 150,000, respectively. What is the planned number of Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), and is it sufficient for a country the size of 

Afghanistan? 

General PETRAEUS. The planned numbers for the ANSF are listed in the following 

table: 

10 FEB 10 31 OCT 10 JUL 11 OCT 11 

Afghan National Army .......................................................................... 104,296 134,000 159,000 171,600 

Afghan National Police ......................................................................... 98,256 109,000 123,000 134,000 

Total Afghan National Security Forces ........................................ 202,561 243,000 282,000 305,600 

We will conduct an assessment in 2011 to determine if these planned numbers 

are sufficient to protect the population, which is essential in conducting counterinsurgency operations. 

12. Senator BEGICH. General Petraeus, Afghanistan cannot financially support its 

security forces. Raising additional security forces or increasing the pay of the security forces will require the United States or other international donors to absorb this 

cost. What are your best estimates on the cost and for how long the ANSF will have 

to be financially supported by the United States, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), or other international partners? 

General PETRAEUS. The annual programmed cost to maintain the ANSF at 305,600 personnel is projected to cost $6.2 billion. Our ultimate goal of the ANSF 

at a combined strength (ANA/ANP) of 400,000 personnel has an estimated annual 

cost of $10.3 billion. The need for the ANSF to be supported by the international 

community will continue into the foreseeable future. The growth of Afghanistan’s 

economy is the key to self-sustainment of the ANSF. 

13. Senator BEGICH. General Petraeus, what attempts are being made to enable 

the government in Afghanistan to bring in revenue? 

General PETRAEUS. This question is best answered by my colleagues within the 

State Department. I respectfully refer you to the ‘‘Afghanistan and Pakistan Regional Stabilization Strategy’’ which is a comprehensive and collaborative document 

updated in late February 2010, authored by the State Department. According to the 

International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, and other authorities, internallyVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:37 May 06, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00805 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\62155.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
800 

derived revenues from Afghanistan have steadily increased since 2005. Looking only 

at 2008 and 2009, revenues from taxes increased from $317 million to $414 million; 

customs revenues from $270 million to $347 million; and non-tax revenues $199 million to $227 million. 

14. Senator BEGICH. General Petraeus, helping to rebuild the Afghan Government, economy, and security forces, while helping the Pakistan people improve their 

economy, government, and security, is likely to be a significant effort over many 

years. How long do you expect the United States to have significant levels of troops 

in Afghanistan and be providing significant amounts of funding for Afghanistan and 

Pakistan, and how much do you expect this to cost? 

General PETRAEUS. I expect the United States to have significant troop levels in 

Afghanistan for the next few years. Beginning in July 2011, as the President stated 

in his 1 December 2009 speech, we will begin a withdrawal of our forces. This will 

be a conditions-based withdrawal, and the rate at which we will withdraw will be 

determined by the readiness of the ANSF to protect their population, and by the 

level of governance established by the Afghan Government. While we have significant troop levels, we must continue to provide funding to enable our allies and partners to support our efforts in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Due to our conditionsbased withdrawal, we are unable to estimate the cost because there are too many 

unknowns. 

15. Senator BEGICH. General Petraeus, what should we expect in terms of NATO’s 

and international partners’ contributions and length of commitment to the region? 

General PETRAEUS. NATO and our international partners are currently providing 

significant levels of support for the war in Afghanistan, with total troop strength 

totaling approximately 44,500. Almost all of the troop contributing nations have expressed their commitment to stay in Afghanistan until our objectives have been attained. Of the 43 troop contributing nations, each sets its own timeline for troop rotations, and force increases or decreases. The Netherlands has announced the withdrawal of combat forces no later than the end of 2010, and Canada has announced 

its withdrawal in 2011. All of the other nations remain committed for the foreseeable future. 

16. Senator BEGICH. General Petraeus, initially, there was a 400 civilian personnel requirement to assist with efforts in Afghanistan. What is the requirement 

now? 

General PETRAEUS. This might be more appropriately addressed by the Department of State (DOS), but as far as the reports I have seen, the requirement, currently in staffing now, is over 1,000 U.S. Government civilians. 

17. Senator BEGICH. General Petraeus, please provide an update on the status of 

civilians supporting the efforts in Afghanistan. 

General PETRAEUS. While I respectfully defer to our partners at DOS and USAID 

as the leads, let me share what I know from reports I see from the department and 

agency. As of 1 April, approximately 1,000 U.S. Government civilians are in Afghanistan, more than triple the level from a year ago. They are assigned both at the U.S. 

Embassy and out in the field and are integrated at every level with the International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) and U.S. Forces, Afghanistan (USFOR– 

A) to include at the Regional Commands, Brigade Task Forces, Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) and Agricultural Development Teams (ADT), District Support Teams (DST), and numerous interagency organizations such as the Border 

Management Task Force. Within that overall figure, we count some 350 civilians in 

the field, up from 67 a year ago. They live and work along side their military counterparts in the same field conditions and level of danger. I would expect civilians 

to deploy in growing numbers to Afghanistan in the coming year as a critical component of the President’s Afghanistan strategy. According to the requests we have 

seen from Embassy Kabul, staffing would increase by an additional 20 to 30 percent 

by the end of 2010 and 40 to 50 percent by the end of 2011. 

18. Senator BEGICH. General Petraeus, what are the plans to enhance coordination of civilian, military, and international efforts in Afghanistan? 

General PETRAEUS. The strategy for enhanced coordination in Afghanistan is detailed in the U.S. Government Integrated Civilian-Military Campaign Plan for Support to Afghanistan (August 2009). The Plan represents the collaborative efforts of 

all the U.S. Government departments and agencies operating in Afghanistan and 

the range of different equities, resources, and approaches. It is based on close collaboration with the ISAF as well as the United Nations Assistance Mission in AfVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:37 May 06, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00806 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\62155.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
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ghanistan (UNAMA) and partner nations to build effective civilian and military 

mechanisms for integrated assistance. The Plan’s most important component is a 

strong partnership with the GIRoA to build the capacity needed to provide Afghanistan with a stable future. 

In April 2010, we completed a civilian-military coordination conference in Kabul, 

Afghanistan. Participants came from across the interagency and the international 

communities including USFOR–A, ISAF, the U.S. and partner nation embassies, 

and key GIRoA ministries. The primary objectives of the civilian-military coordination conference were program integration between US Embassy and USFOR–A/ 

ISAF, and improved coordination between GIRoA, U.S. Embassy, ISAF, UNAMA, 

and the rest of the international community. The interagency civilan-military working groups established to support the civilan-military coordination conference will 

endure to ensure continuing coordination and integration of our civilan-military efforts. 

19. Senator BEGICH. General Petraeus, to your knowledge, have there been any 

civilian assistance requests made to other allied nations? 

General PETRAEUS. I do not know of any civilian assistance requests made to 

other allied nations. These requests would normally be handled by NATO and submitted to allied nations. Since U.S. forces are operating in support of ISAF, these 

requests are not usually routed through CENTCOM. 

IRAQ

20. Senator BEGICH. General Petraeus, the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) are not yet 

fully capable of protecting themselves from external threats. What steps are you 

taking to enable Iraq to defend itself from external threats? 

General PETRAEUS. Our U.S. forces in Iraq continue work on improving the ISF 

capabilities through increased training and equipping. The ISF continue to make 

progress towards attaining the Minimum Essential Capability (MEC) necessary to 

defend Iraq’s sovereignty on land, at sea, and in the air. 

The Iraqi Army continues progress toward MEC but will not achieve a foundation 

for defense against external threats before December 2011 due to equipment procurement timelines and subsequent training requirements. Specifically, equipping, 

training, and combined arms integration of the M1A1 fleet, artillery units, and key 

mechanized enablers will not be complete prior to December 2011. 

The Iraqi Navy is on track to achieve MEC by December 2011, although there 

are risks if shortfalls in manning, C4ISR, maintenance, and infrastructure are not 

adequately addressed in coming months. The Iraqi Navy will assume responsibility 

for protection of the oil platforms in 2011; however, the importance of these oil terminals to the Iraqi economy requires an even higher level of capability. A requirement for a regional presence that can respond to emergencies in support of the Iraqi 

Navy as it matures from MEC to a fully capable force is anticipated. 

The Iraqi Air Force is on the path to achieving MEC by the end of 2011 in all 

mission categories except airspace control and fixed-wing airlift. Specifically, multirole fighter, long-range radar, and C–130J delivery and fielding will not be complete 

prior to December 2011. The Iraqi Air Force’s December 2011 goal is the development of a capability to support ISF counterinsurgency (COIN) operations and have 

an initial air sovereignty capability in place. Delayed execution of the Iraqi Air 

Force Service Plan and lack of funding for acquisitions, accessions, contract logistics 

support, and sustainment of current fleet all present obstacles to achieving the capability to conduct minimal air sovereignty operations by December 2011. 

Although the ISF are not on track to achieve full MEC for external security by 

the end of 2011, the Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq will continue to support 

Iraqi efforts toward achieving that goal through training and equipping. 

21. Senator BEGICH. General Petraeus, will there be additional military cooperation after January 1, 2012, to support the ISF? 

General PETRAEUS. We anticipate additional military cooperation will continue 

after January 1, 2012, through an Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq under Title 

22 authorities. Support provided to the ISF will continue with training and equipping programs that contribute to a mutually beneficial bilateral security relationship with the Government of Iraq from 2012 and beyond. 

22. Senator BEGICH. General Petraeus, how are those efforts to support the ISF 

reflected? 

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General PETRAEUS. Efforts to support the ISF after January 1, 2012, will be provided through an Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq under Title 22 authorities. The 

Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq will directly support DOS efforts with continued 

security training and equipping programs for the ISF. Planning efforts are still ongoing to adequately define the size and composition necessary to fully accept the responsibilities essential to continued ISF development. 

23. Senator BEGICH. General Petraeus, what type of equipment is the United 

States transferring to the Iraqis and what impact will the transfer of that equipment have on the availability of equipment for our forces? 

General PETRAEUS. Equipment being transferred is generally categorized as either 

excess or non-excess. Excess equipment is that which has been determined to have 

no required use by U.S. forces, as such, its transfer has no impact on equipping U.S. 

forces. Excess equipment comprises a wide range from office equipment to machinery. Non-excess equipment comprises major end items which have been identified 

as essential to Iraq’s MEC. The Services have determined that transferring the nonexcess equipment identified in Iraq’s MEC presents no adverse impact to equipping 

U.S. forces. 

24. Senator BEGICH. General Petraeus, how much revenue does oil bring to Iraq? 

General PETRAEUS. The Government of Iraq relies on oil exports for approximately 

91 percent of its revenue. Of the total revenues planned for fiscal year 2010, approximately $49 billion is attributed to oil exports. This is based on 2.1 million barrels/day at an average market price of $62.50/barrel. Additional revenue of approximately $4.9 billion in revenue is expected to come from a combination of public service fees, personal and corporate taxes, customs duties, interest, and profit from 

state-owned enterprises. 

25. Senator BEGICH. General Petraeus, with billions of dollars in oil revenue, how 

much longer will the United States provide financial assistance to Iraq? 

General PETRAEUS. The length of time the United States will provide financial 

support to Iraq is uncertain because it depends on numerous factors such as, but 

not limited to, oil production, oil prices, and budgetary outlays. Iraq is dependent 

on oil revenue for 85 percent of government funding and annual budgets are vulnerable to significant oil price fluctuations. In 2009, Iraq’s budget contained a 34 percent deficit and relied on bond financing, World Bank loans, and an IMF Stand-By 

Loan Arrangement. Iraq’s Ministry of Defense requested $8 billion in the Government of Iraq 2009 budget request, but only received $4.1 billion (50 percent) of funding requested. Budget shortfalls left critical budget gaps in logistic support units 

and sustainment areas of Iraqi Army and Air Force fleets. In an effort to close existing gaps, DOD requested $1 billion in the fiscal year 2010 supplemental and $2 billion in fiscal year 2011. DOS controlled Foreign Military Financing should address 

fiscal requirements beyond 2011. 

26. Senator BEGICH. General Petraeus, has the distribution of revenues issue been 

addressed and has progress been made? 

General PETRAEUS. Iraq’s Council of Representatives has yet to approve the Iraq 

Hydrocarbon Law. Nevertheless, progress has been made in the absence of new legislation to address distribution of revenues through interim sharing mechanisms 

and agreements established between the central government and the regions. Additionally, new interim measures are routinely offered. For example, we are aware of 

a proposal submitted to the parliament to approve a $1/barrel return to each local 

region for the oil exported. These types of provisional arrangements demonstrate the 

practical aspects to address revenue sharing while the final laws are codified and 

adopted. 

However, in the absence of new hydrocarbons legislation, both the Kurdistan Regional Government and the Government of Iraq have separately pursued development contracts with international oil companies. Fundamental differences remain in 

Iraq over Federal and regional authority to contract and manage the oil and gas 

sector. Therefore, in the long term, it is essential that the Government of Iraq enact 

laws governing hydrocarbons and revenue sharing to permanently codify future control of resources and allocation of revenues. 

For further revenue questions, I respectfully recommend you refer to DOS which 

follows Iraq’s economy closely. 

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TERRORISM

27. Senator BEGICH. Admiral Olson, what additional authorities might you need 

to combat terrorism and manage your command? 

Admiral OLSON. I have a need for greater involvement in the preparedness, promotions, assignments, retention, training, and professional military education of 

Special Operations Forces (SOF) personnel; the Department is currently taking actions to provide me with such authorities. 

Title 10 assigns the responsibility for the combat readiness of SOF to the Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM), and the 2009 National Defense Authorization Act (section 901) directed me to develop a SOF personnel management plan to improve SOF readiness. In response to this requirement, I submitted a report to the Secretary of Defense on 09 May 2009, wherein, I proposed 

that Title 10 language be modified to give Commander, SOCOM ‘‘coordinating’’ rather than ‘‘monitoring’’ responsibilities for the readiness of SOF. There is a subtle yet 

important difference between these two terms. The former term implies my active 

involvement in significant SOF personnel decisions; whereas the later term implies 

that I am merely an observer to the process. 

The Deputy Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff proposed, rather than modifying legislation, that the same effect would be achieved by 

modifying DOD Policy. The Service Chiefs concurred with this proposal, as have I. 

A revised DOD Directive 5100.01, Functions of DOD and its components, is currently in staffing and includes a requirement for the Services to ‘‘coordinate’’ with 

SOCOM on issues affecting the personnel readiness of SOF. Once approved, it will 

be sufficient to implement much of the substance of the SOCOM plan for the personnel management of SOF. 

AFGHANISTAN-PAKISTAN BORDER

28. Senator BEGICH. Admiral Olson, what can you tell me about the AfghanistanPakistan border region and the cooperation of the respective Pakistani defense and 

intelligence communities? 

Admiral OLSON. The Afghanistan-Pakistan border region remains as a sanctuary 

for Taliban, local militants, and foreign fighters. Al Qaeda senior leaders likely remain in the region despite operations being conducted against numerous militant 

compounds. Having said that, however, credit must be given to Pakistan for aggressively moving against extremist elements on the Pakistan side of the border. Pakistan has conducted military operations on an unprecedented scale within its tribal 

region over the past 2 years disrupting critical strongholds of the Pakistani Taliban 

and foreign terrorist elements. U.S. military cooperation with Pakistan has expanded and the Pakistani military have embraced training efforts by the U.S. SOF 

community. Recent attention has been placed on the arrests of senior Afghan 

Taliban officials within Pakistan. While the full impact of this is yet to be determined, it does indicate a more flexible response from Pakistan, its military, and its 

intelligence service to work in cooperation with the United States. This border region will remain problematic for the foreseeable future with regard to efforts to expand good governance on both sides of the Durand line. 

INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE

29. Senator BEGICH. Admiral Olson, what are SOCOM’s intelligence, surveillance, 

and reconnaissance (ISR) needs for prosecuting its mission? 

Admiral OLSON. SOCOM requires the support of a robust mix of persistent ISR 

capabilities: air, ground and maritime-based collection, accompanying processing, 

exploitation, and dissemination (PED) capabilities, and supporting integrated ISR 

architecture. 

SOF requires the ability to sense and exploit, to detect/identify/track through 

cover and weather in high-clutter environments, and the ability to track high value 

individuals (HVIs) over global distances. SOF requires collection platforms which 

have long on-station loiter times, support multiple sensors, have sufficient room for 

expansion for future sensors, have suppressed visual and acoustic signatures, and 

are all-weather/day/night capable. 

SOF at all echelons, from JSOTF down to team level, has a high demand for readily exploitable data, from numerous data sources to include finished products, partially exploited data, and raw feeds. SOF requires the support of a highly scalable, 

worldwide integrated ISR architecture, interoperable with service, Intelligence Community (IC) and coalition/partner systems. This ISR architecture must enable seamVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:37 May 06, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00809 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\62155.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
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less dataflow, efficient workflow and effective decisionmaking, starting from collection at each individual sensor, through all phases of PED and mission execution. 

SOF partner nation/host nation train, equip, and advise activities increase the requirement for ISR architecture (collection, PED and communications) which 

seamlessly enables information sharing. 

30. Senator BEGICH. Admiral Olson, what is the SOCOM ISR requirement beyond 

the CENTCOM AOR? 

Admiral OLSON. The CENTCOM AOR is ideally suited to Full Motion Video 

(FMV) collection and Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA) operations—more diverse 

operational environments outside the CENTCOM AOR, i.e. weather and heavy foliage will drive sensor and PED requirements beyond FMV. Basing, airspace, and 

host-nation limitations will also drive an increased reliance on both manned and 

maritime-based ISR platforms. 

SOCOM requires the support of a robust mix of persistent ISR capabilities: air, 

ground and maritime based collection, accompanying PED capabilities, and supporting integrated ISR architecture. 

SOF requires the ability to sense and exploit, to detect/identify/track through 

cover and weather in high-clutter environments, and the ability to track HVIs over 

global distances. SOF requires collection platforms which have long on-station loiter 

times, support multiple sensors, have sufficient room for expansion for future sensors, have suppressed visual and acoustic signatures, and are all weather/day/night 

capable. 

SOF at all echelons, from JSOTF down to team level, has a high demand for readily-exploitable data, from numerous data sources to include finished products, partially exploited data, and raw feeds. SOF requires the support of a highly scalable, 

worldwide integrated ISR architecture, interoperable with service, IC and coalition/ 

partner systems. This ISR architecture must enable seamless dataflow, efficient 

workflow and effective decisionmaking, starting from collection at each individual 

sensor, through all phases of PED and mission execution. SOF partner nation/host 

nation train, equip, and advise activities increase the requirement for ISR architecture (collection, PED and communications) which seamlessly enables information 

sharing. 

IRAQ, AFGHANISTAN, AND THE HORN OF AFRICA

31. Senator BEGICH. Admiral Olson, please discuss the nature of the conflicts in 

Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Horn of Africa. How are they similar, how are they different, and what challenges are unique to each location? 

Admiral OLSON. The ongoing conflicts in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Horn of Africa are difficult problems that will continue to challenge the United States and our 

regional allies for some time to come. In each case, there is a confluence of challenges including limited or non-existence governance combined with the introduction 

of a largely foreign ideology of Islamic extremism. In each case, we face a challenge 

from local extremists with their own grievances, and in each case, this challenge is 

exacerbated by Islamic extremists inspired by, and with varying connections to, the 

al Qaeda network. The greatest difference we face in each area is the ability and 

commitment of our local partners to address these challenges. The Iraqi Government continues to expand and improve its ability to address its security challenges, 

and as that happens, it is requiring less assistance from U.S. forces. In Afghanistan, 

the Afghan Government, army, and police force have not progressed as far as their 

Iraqi counterparts, but they are improving and enhancing their ability to address 

Afghanistan’s problems is an instrumental element of our role there. We face the 

greatest challenge in this area in the Horn of Africa. The Transitional Federal Government in Somalia only controls a very limited section of territory inside Somalia 

and they are heavily dependent on assistance from other African nations to achieve 

that. In the long run, enhancing the ability of our local allies to address their 

unique challenges will be the most important element to address the challenges in 

each of these areas. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR ROLAND W. BURRIS

PIRACY

32. Senator BURRIS. Admiral Olson, how is SOCOM integrated in the anti-piracy 

strategy? 

805 

Admiral OLSON. SOCOM is a force provider, responsible for organizing, training, 

and equipping personnel who may be called upon by the geographic combatant commands to conduct anti-piracy operations. This would most likely be done in conjunction with geographically-oriented naval forces under NAVCENT control in the 

CENTCOM AOR. Otherwise, SOCOM has no direct involvement with these operations unless the line between piracy and terrorism begins to blur. 

33. Senator BURRIS. General Petraeus, what is the current policy for captured pirates with regard to detention and prosecution? 

General PETRAEUS. Once a U.S. Navy vessel captures a suspected pirate, the individual is held onboard and given due care. To ensure safe and humane treatment 

is provided to suspects temporarily held aboard U.S. Navy vessels, crews undertake 

training such as in-depth guidance on use-of-force and responding to the religious 

needs of suspects. 

In terms of due process, while a suspected pirate is held onboard, evidence is compiled and the case examined for validity. Concurrently, the State Department determines where to send the individual for prosecution should the evidence support a 

likely conviction. In determining location, the State Department looks to an affected 

state to both favorably consider and make appropriate effort to prosecute a suspect. 

Affected states include the following: the state whose flag is flown by the attacked 

ship; the state(s) from which the ship’s owners originate; and the state(s) from 

which the crew or passengers originate. In certain cases, where all affected states 

are unable or unwilling to prosecute, the case could be prosecuted in a national 

court in the region where the act of piracy occurred, with appropriate enabling support. 

If there is subsequently no interest by any of the affected states, the U.S. Government has the option to use the Memorandum of Understanding with the Government of Kenya (signed 16 January 2009) concerning the transfer of suspected pirates. Upon reasonable request by the United States, the Republic of Kenya will accept custody of any person suspected of committing (or attempting to commit) an 

act of piracy or armed robbery against ships. 

Under these circumstances, Kenya will review the case and indeed may opt not 

to prosecute based on the evidence provided and the strength of possible conviction. 

If Kenya chooses not to prosecute, the suspect will then be released by the warship 

in which he or she is being held. 

ILLEGAL TRAFFICKING

34. Senator BURRIS. General Petraeus, what are the concerns with regard to the 

trafficking of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in your AOR? 

General PETRAEUS. State-sponsored WMD programs and extremists seeking to acquire such weapons pose a grave threat to our allies and interests in the U.S. 

CENTCOM AOR. We must understand the motivations of those who pursue or 

stockpile these weapons and team with our partners to stop such activity. Where 

appropriate, we must implement incentives to encourage states to change their attitudes toward WMD and offer other security alternatives. Several regional countries 

maintain WMD stockpiles. When coupled with advanced delivery means, such as 

long-range rockets or ballistic missiles, these weapons pose significant offensive 

threats and serve as strategic deterrents. Such programs affect current and future 

behavior of regional leaders, create tensions, and undermine regional stability. 

Countries such as Iran and Syria continue to import dual-use, WMD-related technologies to remain relevant and exert influence in the region, while non-state actors 

desire these weapons to inflict mass casualties. We remain at a cross-road with Iran 

and Syria regarding their WMD programs and their relationship with surrogates. 

To counter the increasing threat of WMD proliferation and related technology, we 

must leverage all-domain interdiction processes and capabilities to identify proliferation networks and then track and interdict suspected shipments. To aid in these efforts, we must seek regional support or participate in counter-proliferation agreements, activities, and exercises. We recognize that U.S. counter-proliferation efforts 

will be significantly enhanced by the increased awareness of partner nations and 

their willingness to take action with respect to interdiction and border security. To 

this end, CENTCOM, through its Cooperative Defense Program, continues to conduct numerous engagement activities with select partner nations along the lines of 

interdiction, border security, consequence management, and chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear defense to assist in increasing their counter-proliferation capabilities. 

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35. Senator BURRIS. Admiral Olson, how is SOCOM supporting the combatant 

commands in their counter-trafficking efforts? 

Admiral OLSON. SOCOM supports the combatant commands in their counter-trafficking efforts with the allocation of resources and SOF. These forces routinely train 

partner nation personnel or enhance combatant commands capabilities to address 

the unique challenges of trafficking networks operating in their AOR. Specially 

trained and equipped to deal with irregular warfare, SOF brings unique expertise 

and operational know-how to properly train or support efforts against the shadowy 

elements involved in illegal trafficking. 

Because the trafficking of weapons, drugs, or people routinely follows a path that 

crosses multiple international borders or combatant commands’ boundaries, SOCOM 

studies these networks from a global perspective. SOCOM looks at gaps and seams 

between the commands and makes combatant commands aware of opportunities and 

trafficking networks’ vulnerabilities. Major trafficking networks could not be significantly dismantled or destroyed if addressed only with isolated regional actions. 

SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND

36. Senator BURRIS. Admiral Olson, how have things developed or changed since 

you took command of SOCOM? 

Admiral OLSON. During my tenure as its commander, arguably the most significant evolution for our command and force was a strategic one, reorienting approaches to address more fluid environments and adversaries. We have referred to 

this shift as the reality of a new normal, where the greatest security challenges to 

our Nation reside in agile and elusive enemy networks versus traditional, uniformed 

military formations of the past. 

In this shift, however, we did not forget our origins. To be successful in this ‘‘new 

normal’’ requires consistent pressure to kill and capture our adversaries with even 

greater precision and potency while simultaneously addressing indirect approaches 

and building capacity in our partners. Conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan currently 

necessitate an increased manpower commitment to this region to accomplish assigned tasks and missions. This commitment has placed unprecedented demands on 

SOF, where maintaining an enduring presence and global footprint across the remaining combatant commands is a constant challenge. 

More than ever, the command has maximized Security Force Assistance (SFA) as 

a vital element to enhance the military capabilities and capacities of our allies and 

partners via training, advising, assistance, and—as authorized—equipping and supporting foreign military and security forces. As we move forward, we should measure our success by how well we have prepared others to face their security challenges, not by what we do for them. 

In this environment of increasing partnership, we have emphasized the command’s role in synchronization, improving the sharing of information across various 

government, DOD, intelligence, and partner nation organizations to increase expediency and effectiveness. This includes the direct embedding of SOF personnel in 

these organizations to provide subject matter expertise and planning support. 

Fiscally, we have carefully maximized our unique funding authorities, such as 

Section 1208 and Combat Mission Needs Statements (CMNS), to produce enabling 

SOF-specific capabilities required by the combatant commanders—we’ve recently 

upgraded and/or replaced critical mobility, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, and precision strike platform capabilities. 

Last and perhaps most importantly, the command continues to improve in the 

execution of one of its most solemn duties: the care of our wounded warriors and 

their families. With the reality of nearly a decade of continuous combat, the increases in strain and debilitating injuries such as post-traumatic stress disorder and 

traumatic brain injuries have required increased emphasis in both policy and practice to ensure the mental and physical well-being of our operators. 

37. Senator BURRIS. Admiral Olson, what are the biggest challenges facing the 

command in the near future? 

Admiral OLSON. The challenges that we foresee over the short- to mid-term are 

presented in three areas: the enemy in our current wars, how SOF are employed, 

and how we will prepare the force for future operations. These challenges manifest 

themselves in our responsibilities as a force provider, our traditional Title 10 responsibilities (Organize, Train, and Equip Special Operations Forces), and as the 

synchronizer of plans and planning in the war against al Qaeda and other violent 

extremist organizations (VEOs). 

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Enemy challenges—countering the adaptive, asymmetric, and increasingly networked 

enemy. 

• We must ensure we have a comprehensive strategy addressing the root 

causes of the irregular threat, while fully developing indirect approaches 

that mobilize friendly networks to counter the enemy’s network. We must 

diligently work to integrate all elements of national power while continuing 

to apply direct lines of operations to ensure disruptive pressure is brought 

to bear. 

• The scope of the enemy challenge dictates partnering with others that 

have shared interests against violent extremists. We must also act to build 

the capacity of nation states so they are capable of containing the violence 

while long-term actions have time to show effect. 

Force Employment 

• ‘‘Prevail in today’s wars’’ using the correct application of conventional 

forces and SOF skills is the county’s highest priority. This priority cannot 

be separated from another priority of ‘‘prevent and deter future conflict’’ 

(both detailed in the Chairman’s Risk Assessment)—we must work to reemphasize the unique nature of SOF in preventing future conflict in fragile 

regions that are currently under-resourced. In SOF terms, this means persistent engagement to the places where we can influence or have effect on 

the upstream factors that lead to violent extremism. Building of these enduring relationships is the key to our success in building partner capacity 

to minimize the threats to U.S. interests and protecting our Homeland. 

• SOCOM must work with the geographic combatant commanders, the 

Joint Staff, DOS, and other U.S. governmental agencies to identify, synchronize, and properly resource united efforts against both current and future challenges. This is particularly important in the areas of interagency 

cooperation, planning, authorities, and strategies. 

Force Development and Preparation 

• We must enhance our understanding of the strategic environment and develop sound human capital, force development, and agile acquisition strategy that get ahead of resourcing issues in an environment likely to include 

increasing budget pressures. We must anticipate the activities, mission 

areas, and geographic regions most likely to present problems, and strive 

for the agility to respond effectively. 

• We must provide for the proper enabling of SOF to assure mission success. SOF must be enabled by inherent organic enablers, but we cannot succeed without service partner support and enablers as well. 

• We must remain committed to caring for our wounded warriors and their 

families. As casualties rise through the years of combat so too must our 

funding of programs that help our operators restore their lives or assist 

family members to cope and endure with loss. 

To meet these challenges SOCOM must present the force to the geographic combatant commanders with the proper structure and skills to fulfill an array of strategic options against a variety of missions. 

Organize: 

• While meeting today’s enemy and employment challenges we are aware 

of the increasing appetite for the use of SOF in an irregular environment. 

Our special skills often make us the force of choice. We must ensure rapid 

growth does not dilute the very skills that are required to accomplish our 

mission. As stated in my testimony, we must manage our growth, ‘‘only as 

it can be recruited, trained, absorbed, and deployed.’’ 

• A potential retention challenge for the near future may arise as we move 

from many of the kinetic activities to the more commonplace skills of presence, engagement, and capacity building. We must also be mindful of the 

‘‘SOF for life’’ skills our operators possess and can be used after they remove the uniform. 

Train: 

• The Chairman indicated, ‘‘winning is not solely the responsibility of the 

U.S. Military.’’ With this in mind, SOF must be prepared to operate in a 

synchronized ‘‘Diplomacy, Development, Defense’’ environment, possessing 

the advanced education and maturity to deal with complexity and ambiguity. We must train our operators in this multi-dimensional application of 

national power to have greatest effect. 

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• The infrastructure and institutional requirements are essential to supporting the operators who must meet the challenging demands. My testimony points to many construction and modernization programs focused on 

sustaining SOF operations support. 

Equip: 

• I spent considerable time in my testimony discussing the essential enabling aspects to SOF. Many of these are my responsibility in the allocated 

MFP–11 budget process. As SOF is not a separate service, we also rely on 

service provided enablers that are just as essential for mission success. Increasingly, my expenditures are beginning to cover shortfalls in enablers 

that the Services have difficulty funding. This equipping issue may become 

more acute if overseas contingency operations funding falls short of helping 

the military meet its commitments. 

• Our enemies, as I stated at the outset, are adaptive and increasingly use 

available technologies against us. Our acquisition processes must become 

more agile to meet the enemy, force employment, and force development 

challenges. Our ability to field, adapt, and out maneuver the enemy can be 

hamstrung by the acquisition process. 

Synchronizer: 

• Addressing the enemy challenges from a DOD perspective is difficult 

enough. To fully realize a synchronized whole-of-government effort against 

our enemies requires continued emphasis on understanding and cooperation 

from all elements of our national power structure. From strategies, through 

the operational art to the tactical level our strategic messaging must have 

a more consistent voice/deed alignment. Along with budgeting issues this is 

where Congress and our national leadership can have the greatest effect. 

Certainly, these are not the only challenges facing SOCOM and SOF for the near 

future. These issues identified will give us the agility and unity of effort to help confront these challenges and respond to unexpected challenges as well. 

AFRICA

38. Senator BURRIS. Admiral Olson, please describe how SOCOM is supporting 

U.S. Africa Command’s (AFRICOM) efforts in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) 

Trans Sahara and the Joint Task Force Horn of Africa? 

Admiral OLSON. SOCOM provides forces to execute activities as directed by Commander, AFRICOM. SOF elements support OEF Trans Sahara, JTF Horn of Africa, 

and other efforts totaling 55 activities in 16 countries across the African continent; 

this equates to approximately 4 percent of the globally deployed SOF. The focus of 

SOF operations in AFRICOM is to build partner nation capacity and regional stability through both persistent engagement and episodic training; we provide persistent elements such as Civil Military Support Teams and Military Information 

Support Teams in nine countries while Army Special Forces, Marine Special Operations teams, and Naval Special Warfare elements provide training to build the capacity of partner nations in the region. 

CONTRACTOR OVERSIGHT

39. Senator BURRIS. General Petraeus, private contractor support continues to receive increased scrutiny in light of recent abuses in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Contractor fraud, waste, and abuse are not only financially damaging, but our strategic 

efforts are undermined as well. How will CENTCOM provide better oversight of private contractors’ efforts? 

General PETRAEUS. CENTCOM has taken several actions to provide better oversight of private contractor efforts. We’ve formed the ACOD, which implements 

DOD’s Armed Contractor policies and procedures and oversees PSCs. We’re 

transitioning JCC–I/A to a JTSCC for better synchronization and efficiency of contracting in the theater. We’re leveraging Rock Island Arsenal on contracts that are 

complex, resource intense, and require a detailed Source Selection process. This allows the contracting officer on the ground to pay attention to more tactical, day-today issues affecting the warfighter. 

CENTCOM and DOD have improved COR resource and training. DAU initiated 

online resident courses to train our CORs, and the Department of Army directed 

deploying units to identify and train their CORs prior to deployment. The number 

of CORs in Afghanistan has dramatically increased with fill rates now over 90 perVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:37 May 06, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00814 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\62155.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
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cent. The CORs are trained not only in general contract management, but are specifically selected for their technical expertise to oversee contractors performing services such as food preparation, water purification, and fuels distribution. DCMA and 

DCAA have also increased the number of personnel in Afghanistan to improve contract oversight. 

CENTCOM has ordered the use of the SPOT reporting for contractors performing 

valid work in the CENTCOM AOR. This system will increase the quality and reliability of contractor data thereby avoiding fraudulent duplication of numbers on 

task order contracts and over-provisioning of DOD food and supplies based on ineligible contracting personnel. 

To facilitate the integration of contractors when defining the strategic plan for future CENTCOM operations, documents such as the NDS and QDR will feature a 

greater emphasis on contractor requirements. Other Field Manuals, DOD Instructions, and new Joint Doctrine support the growing importance of integrating contractors. 

40. Senator BURRIS. General Petraeus, could the missions being fulfilled by private contractors be better handled by military personnel? 

General PETRAEUS. While our military forces are exceptionally well-trained and 

capable, a contract work force allows us to increase and decrease capacity very 

quickly. It takes years to build military personnel capacity with the requisite experience level. Contractors bring to the table the required experience at the required 

time without the commitment to growing end strength. 

41. Senator BURRIS. General Petraeus, could reservists and guardsmen provide 

this type of support? 

General PETRAEUS. Reservists and guardsmen are already contributing essential 

skill sets to the operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. While our Guard and Reserve 

forces are exceptionally well-trained and capable, a contract work force allows us to 

increase and decrease capacity very quickly. It takes years to build military personnel capacity with the requisite experience level. Contractors bring to the table 

the required experience at the required time without the commitment to growing 

end strength. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JEFF BINGAMAN

AIR FORCE SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND

42. Senator BINGAMAN. Admiral Olson, your testimony describes the rapid prototyping that took place to convert the Air Force Special Operations Command’s 

(AFSOC) C–130W aircraft to gunships. Does SOCOM need any additional authorities to help its rapid prototyping efforts? 

Admiral OLSON. The Dragon Spear project was successful due, in part, to strong 

congressional support and authorities afforded SOCOM to rapidly field technology 

to the SOF warfighter. The specific authorities that benefitted the Dragon Spear 

project included the ability to execute a CMNS and congressional support for AboveThreshold Reprogramming (ATR) requests to fund pulling available technology into 

the Precision Strike Package (PSP) and to fund modification of the entire MC–130W 

fleet. SOCOM appreciates the continued congressional support through authorities 

such as CMNS, ATR support, and capital leasing to rapidly acquire new technology 

and field capability to respond to emergent mission requirements. 

A slight modification to the existing Below Threshold Reprogramming (BTR) language would further help SOCOM rapidly acquire and field innovative technology. 

Reverting back to the (pre-2004) BTR language which provided the command the 

authority to reprogram funds to the RDTE threshold of $10 million, the procurement threshold of $20 million, or 20 percent of the item, whichever is greater will 

allow SOCOM to reprogram MFP–11 funds to support emergent SOF requirements 

and quickly react to meet Secretary of Defense priorities. The 2004 change in language to read ‘‘whichever is less’’ is restrictive as the SOCOM budget is smaller 

than traditional service budgets. 

The command continues to succeed in rapidly fielding capability in support of SOF 

emergent requirements. The support provided by Congress has been a critical enabler to SOCOM’s mission success. The enhanced reprogramming authority described in this response would provide SOCOM the flexibility to redirect already approved MFP–11 funding to rapidly acquire new technology to adjust to changing 

mission requirements. 

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43. Senator BINGAMAN. Admiral Olson, your testimony describes SOCOM’s efforts 

in the area of ISR. I am particularly interested in AFSOC’s use of the MQ–1 Reaper 

aircraft given that it will eventually be phased out of the inventory—are there plans 

to replace it? 

Admiral OLSON. SOCOM continues to monitor USAF MQ–1 Predator to the MQ– 

9 Reaper transition plans. SOCOM currently has 26 MQ–1 Predators and four MQ– 

9 Reapers. We expect to receive three additional MQ–9 aircraft in 2010, nine in 

2011, four in 2012, two in 2013, and three in 2016. SOCOM’s inventory end state 

is 26 MQ–1s and 25 MQ–9s by fourth quarter 2016. 

44. Senator BINGAMAN. Admiral Olson, in your testimony you describe the acquisition of nonstandard aircraft so that SOF can be inserted without attention. Does 

AFSOC plan to acquire or lease these aircraft and can you tell me the trade-offs 

in each case? 

Admiral OLSON. SOCOM’s Non-Standard Aviation (NSAV) inventory comprises 

both light and medium category mobility platforms for intra-theater cargo airlift. 

Since the beginning of SOCOM’s NSAV program in fiscal year 2008, nine NSAV 

Lights (eight PC–12s and one M–28) were procured and delivered to the AFSOC. 

NSAV Medium procurement funding did not begin until fiscal year 2010; as such, 

SOCOM leased four Bombardier Q200s to meet the interim medium mobility mission requirement. Although the Q200s do not fully meet the NSAV Medium requirements, this specific lease allows SOCOM to partially meet the capability gap until 

the procured NSAV Mediums are delivered beginning in fiscal year 2011. 

Regarding the acquire versus lease trade-off, SOCOM has an enduring requirement for intra-theater mobility to remote locations that makes procurement of aircraft more cost effective and advantageous over leasing. 

45. Senator BINGAMAN. Admiral Olson, my understanding is that General Stanley 

McChrystal is emphasizing daylight operations as part of a counter-insurgency 

strategy in Afghanistan. What do you need to better equip and train your SOF for 

daylight operations given that night time operations have been a hallmark of SOF 

and AFSOC, in particular? 

Admiral OLSON. Irregular warfare activities such as Key Leader Engagement, 

SFA, and Foreign Internal Defense are typically conducted during daylight hours 

and should not be significantly affected by an emphasis on daylight operations. 

Some SOF operations, however, such as direct action missions to capture key 

enemy leadership and disrupt enemy networks, are normally conducted at night; 

this allows SOF to take advantage of the natural concealment of darkness and optimize circadian rhythm relative to the enemy. Through the use of specialized equipment, SOF is able to overcome low/no-light situations which provide a further advantage. Daylight operations offset these tactical advantages, placing SOF at increased risk. 

Changes to the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) employed in such missions are being implemented to mitigate the risks associated with daylight execution. With appropriate changes to TTPs, the overall operational risk is manageable 

in most cases and daylight execution does not appear to have a significant impact. 

SOCOM has efforts underway to expand ISR capabilities and increase human intelligence capacity; such efforts will provide deployed SOF with increased situational 

awareness of geographic objectives, enemy capabilities, and intentions, and further 

mitigate operational risk in daylight operations. Additionally, the command is exploring equipment that can reduce the warning time at the point of action, and turn 

‘‘day’’ into ‘‘night’’ for the other senses; examples of such equipment include: advanced phone/radio/noise jammers, directed energy (sound) equipment, and low-signature (noise) packages for air or ground mobility assets. 

SOF aviation has engaged in limited operations during daylight hours. SOF aviation typically flies during darkness due to the risk to the aircraft at the objective 

during daylight. Current programs to field Hostile Fire Indication Systems, Lightweight Ballistic Protection Systems, fire and forget missiles, missile warning receiver and countermeasures, digital-aided close air support technologies and laser 

designation systems will help mitigate the riskier daylight operations. 

WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

46. Senator BINGAMAN. Admiral Olson, a critical area of SOCOM pertains to countering WMD. Do you feel with the demands of the ongoing operations overseas that 

this area could use more support? 

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Admiral OLSON. Yes. The Nation must prepare for the evolving WMD threats of 

tomorrow. The continuing progress of science and technology can be expected to 

present opportunities to develop new and even more troublesome means of perpetrating mass destruction. The Nation will need to invest in anticipating and preparing to preempt or counter such developments as it strives to ensure that our 

worst fears about the proliferation and use of WMD remain unfulfilled. 

Counterproliferation is one of SOCOM’s core mission areas. Due to the high tempo 

of ongoing overseas operations, SOCOM has had to balance counterproliferation 

training and equipping with the more immediate demands of the current fight. 

SOCOM continues to evolve to meet these emerging threats and strives to achieve 

the appropriate balance between the current fight and the ability to get out in front 

of future threats. 

Currently, SOCOM has the capability to conduct counterproliferation activities 

but the capacity is limited. Ongoing global contingency operations have SOCOM 

counterproliferation forces conducting counterterrorism missions. The result is a reduction in the number of forces available for counterproliferation and reduced 

counterproliferation expertise due to decreased level of training. 

The threat of proliferation and use of WMD by an extremist organization is greater now than at any other time in history. As U.S. efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan 

wind down, SOCOM’s role with regard to counterproliferation needs to be redoubled. 

In order to do this, we need to redeploy, reconstitute, and retrain forces returning 

from overseas. In the interim, SOCOM needs to train and equip additional forces 

to accomplish some portions of the counterproliferation mission in order to increase 

capacity. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN

AFGHANISTAN/PAKISTAN-—TALIBAN RECONCILIATION

47. Senator MCCAIN. General Petraeus, last week while in Afghanistan, Secretary 

Gates said this about the prospects of reconciliation with Taliban leaders: ‘‘I do believe that the senior Taliban are only going to be interested in reconciling in terms 

that are acceptable to the Afghan Government, and those of us supporting it, when 

they see that the likelihood of their being successful has been cast into serious 

doubt. My guess is they’re not at that point yet.’’ Do you believe we are now at a 

point where the Taliban doubt their likelihood of success and would be willing to 

reconcile on acceptable terms? 

General PETRAEUS. [Deleted.] 

48. Senator MCCAIN. General Petraeus, what would be the minimally required 

changes to the security conditions on the ground in Afghanistan before the United 

States would enter into or support substantive reconciliation talks with senior 

Taliban leaders? 

General PETRAEUS. [Deleted.] 

49. Senator MCCAIN. General Petraeus, how do you interpret Pakistan’s recent 

successes in capturing senior Afghan Taliban leaders in Pakistan? 

General PETRAEUS. The arrests of Afghan Taliban Senior Leadership (TBSL) figures most likely represent an effort to capitalize on the positive developments following the London Conference. Islamabad seeks to minimize Indian influence in Afghanistan, establish Pakistan’s role in shaping Afghan Reintegration and Reconciliation (R2), and enhance their strategic relationship with the United States. Pakistan has used the arrests to demonstrate its unique capability to influence reconciliation (due to proximity and access to TBSL), something India cannot offer Afghanistan. Further, Islamabad has demonstrated to TBSL that Pakistan at present plays 

reluctant host, not a strategic partner or sponsor to the Afghan Taliban. Pakistan’s 

concerns—as expressed in their recent visit to Washington, DC, for strategic dialogue—remain firmly centered on countering Indian regional ambitions. Although 

the United States and Pakistan have agreed to a framework of working group discussions to mitigate a number of lesser concerns, Pakistan ultimately seeks a lasting strategic partnership with the United States. With respect to Afghanistan and 

the eventual U.S. withdrawal, Pakistan’s desired end-state remains unchanged: a 

friendly Afghanistan Government independent of Indian influence—fully integrated 

with ethnic Pashtun representation—and recognizing the Durand line as the national border. 

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AFGHANISTAN/PAKISTAN—KANDAHAR

50. Senator MCCAIN. General Petraeus, in the aftermath of the recent operation 

in Marjah, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs recently said: ‘‘Kandahar will be next.’’ 

Other senior leaders have said the same. Can you tell me what to expect in the coming months in Kandahar? 

General PETRAEUS. Operations in Kandahar will build on the momentum created 

in Central Helmand. Unlike Central Helmand, Kandahar is urban, densely populated and has some, albeit weak, Afghan Government ANSF structures. One of the 

requirements for securing the population and delivering governance is the correct 

force density, both ANSF and coalition, in order to secure the population. The key 

to this will be to ensure that the U.S. Marine Corps, together with Afghan and 

United Kingdom forces, continue comprehensive COIN operations in Marjah and 

Nad ‘Ali in order to strengthen the authority of the Afghan Government in Central 

Helmand. In parallel, we have started deliberate COIN operations to set conditions 

in Kandahar province during the coming months. 

Our intention is to expand the security zones in Kandahar and the surrounding 

districts, thereby bringing a significant portion of southern Afghanistan’s population 

under Afghan Government control, as well as denying the insurgents vital terrain, 

limiting their freedom of movement and access to key population centers. 

Progress in Kandahar is the next step in convincing Afghans of their government’s capacity and resolve to succeed. The insurgents recognize the threat of a 

more credible Afghan Government and the ISAF’s COIN approach and will likely 

react aggressively to prevent coalition success in Kandahar. Kandahar underpins 

the Taliban power base and holds significant importance as the Taliban’s former 

capital; they still have a disproportionate effect on the population and continue to 

exert control through intimidation and shadow governance structures. 

51. Senator MCCAIN. General Petraeus, how would you describe the objective and 

the strategy to achieve that objective? 

General PETRAEUS. The objective of Hamkari Baraye Kandahar (Cooperation for 

Kandahar) is to provide credible, transparent, inclusive, and representative governance connected to the population, enabled by steady, incremental improvements to 

overall security, providing space for governance to develop. To achieve this objective, 

the ISAF strategy is focused on improving governance and political engagement, addressing inequality and corruption, facilitating stabilization and reconstruction, and 

providing security. To improve governance and political engagement, ISAF is conducting multi-layered political engagement and outreach to obtain Government of 

Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) commitment, to strengthen government capacity, to reduce parallel influences, and to build representative structures. ISAF is 

also working with GIRoA to visibly demonstrate the government’s intent to distribute wealth more evenly, to regulate parallel governance structures, and to 

counter corruption. 

52. Senator MCCAIN. General Petraeus, do you believe the current Marine Corps 

operations in Helmand are constraining our forces from conducting the necessary 

operations in Kandahar? 

General PETRAEUS. Operations in Helmand are not constraining the effort in 

Kandahar but, in fact, will provide necessary momentum upon which to build. Unlike Central Helmand, Kandahar is urban, densely populated and has some, albeit 

weak, Afghan Government structures. One of the requirements for securing the population and delivering governance is the correct force density, both ANSF and coalition, in order to secure the population. The key to this will be to ensure that the 

U.S. Marine Corps, together with Afghan and United Kingdom forces, continue comprehensive COIN operations in Marjah and Nad ‘Ali in order to strengthen the authority of the Afghan Government in Central Helmand. In parallel, we have started 

deliberate COIN operations to set conditions in Kandahar province during the coming months. Far from constraining operations in Kandahar, Marine Corps operations in Helmand are a critical precursor and enabler to success there. 

53. Senator MCCAIN. General Petraeus, do you believe we can be successful in 

Kandahar without committing significant numbers of U.S. and NATO troops into 

Kandahar City? 

General PETRAEUS. A significant portion of the anticipated U.S. and NATO force 

uplift will be allocated to Kandahar. Currently, there are 6,900 ISAF personnel and 

5,300 ANSF personnel in Kandahar. By August, there will be 11,850 ISAF personnel and 8,500 ANSF in the region. Kandahar is a very different situation than 

the GIRoA and ISAF faced in Marjah. While there are clearly security challenges, 

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Kandahar is not a city that must be ‘‘taken back’’ with major clearing operations, 

but rather an area where a thickening of existing forces and more robust partnering 

with ISAF forces will contribute to security gains over time. However, more important than the number of forces flowing into the area is what they will be doing. The 

campaign for Kandahar is designed to leverage existing security structures, incoming ISAF forces, and ANSF to improve security to bring stability and improved governance. Over the next 9 months, ISAF will continue to partner with GIRoA and 

the international community to assist in improving governance and political engagement; addressing inequality and corruption; facilitating stabilization and reconstruction; and providing security. To develop governance and political engagement, ISAF 

is conducting multi-layered political engagement and outreach to obtain GIRoA commitment, strengthen government capacity, reduce parallel influences, and build representative structures. 

ISAF is also working with GIRoA to visibly demonstrate the government’s intent 

to distribute wealth more evenly, regulate parallel governance structures, and 

counter corruption. Security within Kandahar City will be layered to control movement in and around the city. The core and inner layers are being built upon the 

existing police substation structure that delivers security through community policing, supported through more effective surveillance and information sharing among 

ISAF, National Directorate of Security, ANP, and ANA. The outer ring is composed 

of an increased ANSF footprint on the periphery of Kandahar City, partnered with 

ISAF elements, that controls movement into and out of the city, establishing quick 

reaction forces to address more significant threats inside the city. There are some 

police districts inside Kandahar City contested by either insurgents or a mix of insurgents and criminal elements; Provincial Governor Wesa’s plan is to clear these 

areas of insurgents and, over time, remove criminal elements through ANP-led security operations. 

MILITARY CONSTRUCTION IN AFGHANISTAN

54. Senator MCCAIN. General Petraeus, why is over $1.2 billion requested in the 

fiscal year 2011 budget for military construction projects to support current operations in Afghanistan when many of these projects won’t be completed until the 

summer of 2012, a full year beyond the date set by the President to initiate a drawdown of forces? 

General PETRAEUS. The military construction projects are needed to support deployment, sustainment, and redeployment of U.S. forces throughout the drawdown 

of U.S. forces from Afghanistan. The projects will also enhance our transition of forward operating bases from U.S. forces to Afghan forces. 

IRAN

55. Senator MCCAIN. General Petraeus, what effect would a nuclear-armed Iran 

have on the broader Middle East? 

General PETRAEUS. A nuclear-armed Iran would dramatically shift the balance of 

power between Iran and key regional nations. A nuclear-armed Iran would likely 

spark a regional arms race as Iran’s neighbors seek to redress the imbalance. 

56. Senator MCCAIN. General Petraeus, do you believe that a policy of containment would be an effective option for dealing with a nuclear-armed Iran? Please explain why or why not. 

General PETRAEUS. As Secretary Clinton has said, U.S. interests are inextricably 

linked to the future of the Middle East. Preserving stability, human rights, preventing proliferation of WMD, maintaining security and availability of energy and 

energy transport routes, protecting critical infrastructure, supporting democratic 

ideals, and the rule of law are key U.S. interests in the Middle East. In agreement 

with international non-proliferation goals, the President clearly has said he is committed to preventing a nuclear-armed Iran. A containment policy is currently outside the framework of the stated U.S. policy toward Iran’s nuclear intentions and 

makes the very idea of a containment policy hypothetical. In support of ongoing U.S. 

Government efforts, CENTCOM’s military activities will continue to support the 

diplomatic efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation in Iran. We will also remain vigilant across a wide range of contingencies to support U.S. and regional security objectives. 

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57. General Petraeus, how do you assess the stability of the Iranian Government 

in the aftermath of the June 12, 2009, election and the popular uprising that followed? 

General PETRAEUS. The Iranian Government remains stable despite ongoing political rifts among regime elites, namely the conservatives and ultraconservatives, and 

regime legitimacy issues created by the June 2009 presidential elections and the opposition movement. Although public dissent centered on the reelection of President 

Mahmud Ahmadi-Nejad, the behind-the-scenes wrangling was believed to have also 

focused on the political and religious legitimacy of Supreme Leader Khamenei for 

openly supporting Ahmadi-Nejad. Reformists could not muster enough support 

among regime elites to challenge the Supreme Leader, eventually causing reformist 

leaders, such as Ayatollah Rafsanjani, to back down and at least publicly reconcile 

with the regime. Concurrently, Supreme Leader Khamenei appears to have consolidated his circle of advisors, consulting only with those conservatives who share his 

views of clerical rule. Despite having fewer people involved in decisionmaking, the 

process remains divided, as ideological differences and personality conflicts arise 

more frequently. Following the initially large protests, Iranian security forces, led 

by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), prevented the opposition from 

coalescing into a viable near-term threat to the regime and inhibited the opposition’s 

ability to communicate and organize anti-regime protests. Supreme Leader 

Khamenei used the post-election political dynamics and the IRGC to consolidate his 

power and suppress what he believed was a Western-backed ‘‘soft-power revolution’’ 

against the Islamic Republic. Khamenei’s handling of election unrest demonstrated 

his dominance over the security apparatus and his dependence on the IRGC to 

maintain regime survivability and his own political position. The regime realized 

lessons from the 1979 Islamic Revolution and prevented the IRGC from overreacting 

to opposition protests and creating a continual cycle of violence, as occurred between 

the Iranian population and the Shah’s security services in 1978 to 1979. 

58. Senator MCCAIN. General Petraeus, the focus of U.S. policy toward Iran is 

now shifting to sanctions. Should we be preparing to deploy every sanction at our 

disposal against the Iranian regime or should we be holding back some in reserve 

for the future? 

General PETRAEUS. Although Iran is in our AOR, questions concerning our national policy toward Iran and how we use the various tools available are better 

posed to the administration and the State Department. Regarding security concerns, 

Iran continues to present a profound and complicated challenge. I would note that 

Ambassador Burns eloquently addressed our efforts regarding Iran in his April 14, 

2010, Senate Armed Services Committee testimony. President Obama has sought to 

strengthen our diplomatic options for dealing with the challenges posed by Iran, and 

has made it clear the United States is prepared to deal with the Islamic Republic 

on the basis of mutual respect and interest. As Iran remains recalcitrant, we now 

see a broader international consensus about the urgency of the Iranian threat and 

new frustration among even some of Iran’s friends and trade partners. As the President said in Prague recently, we must insist that Iran face consequences because 

it has continually failed to meet its obligations. Ambassador Burns recounted that 

the United States is moving with a sense of urgency toward a new U.N. Security 

Council Resolution. Meanwhile, the United States continues to work with our regional partners as they develop mechanisms to better manage the political, diplomatic, and security challenges Iran poses. We have launched intensive diplomatic 

outreach efforts to other key states to discuss the need for additional pressure to 

bring Iran back to the negotiating table. Equally important to Iran are the informal 

expressions of international censure, including the voluntary departure of longstanding foreign investors and trade partners, and growing isolation. Neither formal 

penalties nor increasing international ostracism will alter Iran’s agenda overnight, 

but the mounting weight of political and financial pressures can persuade Iran’s 

leadership to reassess their approach to the world. 

IRAQ

59. Senator MCCAIN. General Petraeus, in a recent interview, your former partner 

in Baghdad, Ambassador Ryan Crocker, voiced concern with the President’s plan to 

have U.S. forces down to 50,000 by August of this year. He said this: ‘‘The [Status 

of Forces Agreement] I helped negotiate had an intermediate timeline to have forces 

out of cities and towns by mid-2009, which was accomplished, and full withdrawal 

by 2011. The August 2010 date was not part of that agreement. I would have preferred to see us keep maximum flexibility with the Iraqis between now and 2011.’’ 

815 

Are you confident that we are on track to meet this 50,000-troop benchmark in light 

of the recent election? If so, please explain why. 

General PETRAEUS. I am confident we are on track to meet this 50,000-troop 

benchmark. The Iraqis are increasingly providing for their own security and are 

achieving the security and governance goals that were established. This will allow 

the United States to continue to decrease troop levels to 50,000 in August 2010. Although the overall troop strength goal is 50,000, the mix of forces in that number 

is still capable of performing missions throughout Iraq. This provides the flexibility 

needed to adjust to any new developments or unexpected circumstances. 

60. Senator MCCAIN. General Petraeus, when I was in Baghdad in January, General Raymond Odierno said he had drawn up a contingency plan to keep an extra 

brigade in Iraq, which would leave more than 50,000 U.S. forces in Iraq beyond the 

President’s August 2010 deadline. Has this request been made? If not, do you expect 

it to be? 

General PETRAEUS. We are on target to meet the 50,000 forces requirement in 

Iraq by August 31, 2010. The USF–I request has been made to retain an Advise 

and Assist Task Force (AATF). This force will be comprised of 962 personnel, much 

smaller than a brigade, but with inherent force protection and engagement elements. The AATF provides the essential capabilities we need and keeps us on track 

to meet the 50,000-troop benchmark. 

IRAQ COUNTERTERRORISM LAW

61. Senator MCCAIN. General Petraeus, what is the status of the counterterrorism 

law pending in the Iraqi parliament? 

General PETRAEUS. A counterterrorism law was read once in the Council of Representatives but was not voted upon. At the end of last year, we observed some Iraqi 

politicians pushing for a more comprehensive national security law in which a 

counterterrorism law was merely one subcomponent. However, until the newly-elected Council of Representatives is seated, it is unlikely there will be any progress in 

this area. 

62. Senator MCCAIN. General Petraeus, do you expect any action to be taken on 

this legislation in the near term? 

General PETRAEUS. Until the newly elected Council of Representatives is seated, 

it is unlikely there will be any progress in this area. 

63. Senator MCCAIN. General Petraeus, what are the implications of this legislation not being enacted? 

General PETRAEUS. Without passage of a counterterrorism law, there remains the 

possibility that Iraq’s population will perceive the Counterterrorism Service as overly aggressive, or worse, a ‘‘secret police’’ under the direct control of the Prime Minister. Further, this could heighten sectarian tensions within Iraq. Additionally, the 

lack of clear organizational structures and specific legal guidelines for decisionmaking may negatively impact the budgetary and administrative processes necessary for an effective, transparent, and legally-compliant force. Notwithstanding 

Iraqi’s historical sensitivities to human rights abuses by previous regimes, the 

Counterterrorism Service appears to act upon internal threats based on fact and impartiality. This is evidenced by operations in heavily-populated Shia provinces as 

well as targeting Shia extremist networks. Fortunately, the Government of Iraq, as 

a whole, recognizes the need for an effective Counterterrorism Service and supports 

the agency’s requirements. 

LASHKAR-E-TAIBA

64. Senator MCCAIN. Admiral Olson, Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) has demonstrated its 

ability to plan and execute large-scale attacks with the potential to upset the already tenuous balance between Pakistan and India. During a recent visit to New 

Delhi, Secretary of Defense Gates assessed the threat posed by such groups as one 

that could ‘‘destabilize not just Afghanistan, not just Pakistan, but potentially the 

whole region.’’ What is your assessment of LeT’s capability and intent? 

Admiral OLSON. LeT remains the most capable and dangerous terrorist organization in South Asia and retains the capability to conduct attacks against targets 

across India with little to no notice. LeT remains focused on its goals to liberate 

Kashmir, and establish Islamic states in Afghanistan, Bangladesh, and India. LeT 

has demonstrated their ability by conducting numerous attacks against Indian GovVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:37 May 06, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00821 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\62155.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
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ernment, military, commercial, and transportation infrastructure targets through 

bombings and small unit assaults in Kashmir and major cities across India. LeT has 

demonstrated their ability to infiltrate by both ground and sea. LeT utilizes criminal 

smuggling networks and legitimate businesses to move funds, supplies, and personnel. Although several high-value members have been detained since the 2008 

Mumbai attacks, including LeT’s operations chief, LeT remains capable of destabilizing the region in order to attain their goals. 

65. Senator MCCAIN. Admiral Olson, what level of support does LeT receive from 

the Pakistani Government? 

Admiral OLSON. There is no evidence that LeT receives active overt organizational 

support from the Government of Pakistan. Although the Government of Pakistan 

has detained several members in the wake of the 2008 Mumbai attacks and temporarily closed some businesses and facilities associated with LeT, LeT continues to 

operate. LeT is a large and adaptive organization that has the capability to operate 

independently due to its public service and commercial enterprises, such as Jamaat 

ud-Dawa (JUD), LeT’s Humanitarian Service Organization and its public face. JUD 

operates schools, reading rooms, mosques, medical clinics, and ambulance services 

across Pakistan. JUD, through their humanitarian efforts, have become an integral 

part of Pakistani society and they operate openly throughout Pakistan. LeT also receives donations from foreign donors and income from businesses, public and private, criminal and legitimate, that its members and sympathizers operate throughout South Asia, South East Asia, the Arabian Peninsula, the Far East, Europe, and 

North and South America. LeT also receives donations from members of the Pakistani Diaspora from all over the world. This has apparently made the Government 

of Pakistan reluctant and unable to eliminate support to LeT and has allowed LeT 

to survive. Although the Pakistani Government may not actively support LeT, it 

passively supports it by not being able to control it. 

66. Senator MCCAIN. Admiral Olson, have we, in coordination with partners in 

the region such as Bangladesh, been effective in constraining LeT’s freedom of 

movement and sphere of influence in the region? 

Admiral OLSON. Yes, cooperation between regional partners, in particular India 

and Bangladesh, have been instrumental in constraining LeT’s ability to plan and 

conduct attacks. Building the capacity to counter threats posed by groups like LeT 

promotes regional stability and builds trust. We must continue to build the capacity 

of all nations in South Asia to enable them to counter the threats posed by groups 

like LeT. Building the counterterrorism capabilities in our regional partners is a 

long term effort and requires long-term commitment. We must continue this effort 

to build and develop capacity in other partners in the region such as Nepal, Sri 

Lanka, and the Maldives. SOF continue to lead this effort through recurring training events and persistent engagement. However, building military capabilities is 

only one aspect in building regional stability. Law enforcement and information 

sharing are also crucial issues that will enable our regional partners to mitigate the 

threats posed by terrorist organizations like LeT. 

FORCE ENABLERS

67. Senator MCCAIN. Admiral Olson, concerns have been raised about the availability of enabling forces to support SOF in both Iraq and Afghanistan, such as 

transportation, ISR, and logistics. You have stated, ‘‘ . . . the non-availability of these 

force enablers has become our most vexing issue in the operational environment.’’ 

What steps are you taking to mitigate the lack of these force enablers in Iraq and 

Afghanistan? 

Admiral OLSON. U.S. Forces-Iraq (USF–I) commanders have stated that they will 

continue to provide existing enabler support to SOF without degradation. Logistics 

support, ISR, and mobility assets will continue to be backfilled to support SOF remaining in Iraq. Other enabling support will be mitigated through the use of ISF 

or additional local contracting. 

68. Senator MCCAIN. Admiral Olson, are you confident that there will be sufficient 

support forces remaining in Iraq to support essential SOF following the drawdown 

of conventional forces later this year? 

Admiral OLSON. Yes, we continue to work very closely with CENTCOM to ensure 

sufficient support remains in Iraq to support those SOF who will continue to train, 

advise, and assist ISF units. USF–I plans to provide existing enabler support to 

SOF without degradation. USF–I will provide logistical, medical, and basing support 

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as well as sustainment to any remote areas which SOF may operate in. Drawdown 

planning is fluid based on Iraqi elections and we will continue to monitor its impacts to ensure adequate support for SOF exists as it is currently planned. 

69. Senator MCCAIN. Admiral Olson, where do you envision the largest strain on 

enabling forces? 

Admiral OLSON. Our greatest strain on enabling forces continues to be ISR platform support, and enhanced mobility capability. ISR remains an invaluable asset in 

low or limited-access battle spaces, most notably in the CENTCOM AOR. Enhanced 

mobility, for instance, results in quick strike capabilities regardless of terrain. Significant enhancements are underway for SOCOM’s helicopter, CV–22 Tilt Rotor aircraft, and light/medium nonstandard aviation fleets. Additional enhancements are 

also needed in mine resistant ambush protected (MRAP) vehicles. These assets are 

in high demand and are rarely available in sufficient numbers. SOCOM will continue to rely on support by conventional forces which possess the majority of these 

assets. 

70. Senator MCCAIN. Admiral Olson, do you plan to use contractors to provide any 

enabling support to SOF in Iraq once the bulk of conventional forces depart? 

Admiral OLSON. Yes, some enabling support is already contracted. For example, 

interpreters and security forces are currently provided through a combination of 

contracted support and military forces. Any further reduction in U.S. military forces 

will require enabling support from Iraqi military forces or local contracting. 

CAPABILITY OF INDIGENOUS SECURITY FORCES

71. Senator MCCAIN. Admiral Olson, SOF plays a large role in the training of indigenous security forces, particularly elite counterterrorism units. What is your assessment of the capabilities and professionalism of Iraqi Special Operations Forces 

(ISOF)? 

Admiral OLSON. The ISOF have shown remarkable progress in a relatively short 

period of time. Since ISOF have trained with both U.S. and coalition forces to acquire the needed skill sets to provide security, their learning curve has been tremendously steep. Undaunted, ISOF have overcome many obstacles and surpassed expectations. They have shown great potential and have demonstrated a high degree of 

professionalism while supporting combat operations. These results are directly attributable to the confidence they have in their mission, their men, and their country. 

72. Senator MCCAIN. Admiral Olson, how is ISOF affected by the counterterrorism 

law not being enacted? 

Admiral OLSON. The effect on ISOF of the counterterrorism law not being enacted 

is detrimental. Without clear guidance from legislation, ISOF’s ability to support the 

government will undoubtedly turn into an ebb and flow scenario with many fits and 

starts. Unfortunately, the real casualty will be the Iraqi people, and their security, 

as ISOF employment becomes more of a political issue for debate rather than a 

dedicated security force. 

73. Senator MCCAIN. Admiral Olson, what is your assessment of the capabilities 

and professionalism of the Afghan Kandak commando units? 

Admiral OLSON. Since the conception of the Afghan Kandak Commandos, enormous strides have been made to build operationally effective units. Afghan Commandos are now typically in the lead in the operations that they conduct with U.S. 

support, compared to years past where U.S. forces led all operations with Afghan 

Commando support. Afghan Commandos play a critical role in capturing or killing 

insurgent leaders and bomb makers. There have been operations in which civilian 

deaths have been blamed on Afghan Commandos, but these cases are typically unfounded. The Afghan Commandos are a very professional fighting force that receives 

recurring and extensive training from U.S. instructors who encourage discipline and 

attention to detail. 

74. Senator MCCAIN. Admiral Olson, how are the Afghan Kandak Commando 

units perceived by the Afghan population? 

Admiral OLSON. The Afghan Kandak Commando units are perceived by the locals 

as elite fighters compared to the ANA and the ANP. While a majority of the Afghan 

population believes that the ANA are not a fully professionalized force and the ANP 

are corrupt and provide little in the way of protection to the population, the Afghan 

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lation. Additionally, the population views the Commandos as a more cohesive force, 

uniting members from different ethnic groups. 

REQUESTED INCREASE IN COMBAT MISSION NEEDS STATEMENT AUTHORITY

75. Senator MCCAIN. Admiral Olson, SOCOM is requesting an increase in its Combat Mission Needs Statement (CMNS) authority to $50 million, a $30 million, 

or 150 percent, increase over its currently authorized level. In what ways is the currently authorized level of $20 million inadequate to address the needs of SOCOM 

to meet emerging requirements in theater? 

Admiral OLSON. The $50 million request is based on the command’s historical experience with CMNS requirements, as well as projected requirements based on recent Request for Forces to support ongoing and surge operations. 

a. Historically, SOCOM has received and approved CMNS over and above the $20 

million appropriated in the baseline for use in overseas contingencies. In fiscal 

year 2006 and fiscal year 2007, this line item was substantially increased by 

reprogrammings and supplemental appropriations—an increase of $66 million 

and $158 million, respectively. The majority of the CMNS were submitted on 

behalf of Joint Special Operations Task Forces working in the CENTCOM 

AOR. Examples include sensors and tracking devices, signals intelligence 

equipment, MRAP vehicles, nonstandard commercial vehicles, vehicle and body 

armor, weapons and munitions, aircraft, and jammers. 

b. In fiscal year 2009, I approved the MC–130W PSP modification CMNS (Dragon Spear). The estimated cost to modify the MC–130W fleet (12 aircraft) was $415 

million. Because the PSP requirement was urgently needed for current operations, I used the fiscal year 2009 Combat Mission Requirements funds ($20 

million) and $1 million of other baseline procurement to immediately initiate 

this urgent combat capability. The Department provided the sources for the remaining aircraft modifications, to include over $63 million of fiscal year 2007 

supplemental funds for ammunition. 

c. In the past year, SOCOM has received several short-notice requests for additional forces and equipment to support surge operations in the CENTCOM 

AOR. The command reprogrammed over $8 million of procurement funds from 

other baseline priorities in fiscal year 2009 to ensure deploying forces were 

properly equipped with items identified through the CMNS process. 

The additional $30 million in the fiscal year 2011 OCO request will provide the 

command with the resourcing flexibility needed to quickly address future surge requirements approved via the CMNS process, which will result in providing deploying forces with equipment needed to prevent loss of life or mission failure. If appropriated, the command will provide Congress the specific equipment purchased with 

these funds in the Quarterly CMNS Report. 

76. Senator MCCAIN. Admiral Olson, what circumstances have arisen to necessitate a 150 percent increase in CMNS authority? 

Admiral OLSON. See answer to question #75. 

COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM EFFORTS

77. Senator MCCAIN. Admiral Olson, following the attacks on September 11, 2001, 

SOCOM was designated as the lead synchronizer for countering violent extremism 

(CVE) efforts for DOD. These efforts encompass both kinetic and nonkinetic efforts. 

Concerns have been raised about the ineffective coordination internally and between 

the relevant interagency stakeholders. What is SOCOM doing to ensure that our efforts both on the ground and in the strategic communication arena are synchronized? 

Admiral OLSON. I see SOCOM’s role in CVE as two-fold: as a force provider, we 

leverage SOF’s persistent presence in over 75 countries to conduct high quality, low 

profile, long-term engagements in SFA. These actions foster trust, and enable partners to directly combat extremist organizations through advising, training, and— 

when authorized and funded—equipping of forces. Functionally, this is executed by 

providing SOF to GCCs, and in some cases, authorized via a funding mechanism 

commonly referred to as section 1208. This mechanism affords the training and 

equipping of indigenous forces, both regular and irregular, in support of ongoing 

U.S. counterterrorism operations. 

Second, we work as a synchronizer for DOD for the global campaign against terrorist networks, and so we look across the spectrum of what our partners do in 

CVE. SOCOM plays a large role in synchronization through the crafting of DOD 

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strategy that ensures all GCCs are executing regional/country plans within the architecture of the larger global plan, and that are applying similar and consistent 

metrics across regions to determine the best application of SOF resources. The current version of DOD CONPLAN 7500 recognizes that to achieve success requires a 

broader focus, one which addresses the underlying causes of extremism. The strategy reflects the primacy of indirect approaches, both to deter active and tacit support for VEOs and to erode extremist support for VEO ideology. Specifically, the 

focus must include indirect and ideologically-based activities CVE, while building organic capacities toward this end among our allies and partners. This plan in turn 

supports the National Implementation Plan for the War and Terror (NIP), sponsored 

by the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC). The NIP is comprised of four pillars, one of which CVE underpins the other three: protection and defense of the 

homeland, preventing terrorist acquisition of WMD, and attacking terrorists and 

their capacity to operate. 

In our role as synchronizer, we conduct semi-annual forums where we bring together our partners in DOD, in the interagency, and our partners in certain international countries to begin to work together to apply the strategy and translate that 

into operational actions. From these work groups come specific tasks that various 

communities of interest accept, and strive through a variety of venues to provide 

an acceptable resolution for all involved. 

The command believes in cultivating credible influence to build the foundation for 

change, one which promotes ideologies that reject extremist affiliation and action. 

In tandem, we undercut the resources and recruitment efforts of VEOs to limit both 

their sustainment and freedom of action. 

The Expanded Trans-Regional Psychological Operations Program (ETRP) is the 

mortar in this ideological foundation, one providing a uniform set of objectives available to all GCCs to conduct CVE-centric, psychological operations (PSYOP) activities 

in support of CONPLAN 7500. Within ETRP is a system of checks and balances, 

an approval process to ensure DOD-conducted PSYOP activities are executed with 

full awareness and approval of the appropriate DOS representative. This includes 

U.S. ambassadors within countries where these capabilities are employed. 

SOCOM’s program of record, ETRP–MIST (Military Information Support Team), 

provides the resourcing and deployment mechanism for the forces executing these 

operations. ETRP–MIST is currently supporting 25 SOCOM MISTs, units deployed 

at the specific request of U.S. ambassadors around the globe. Working closely with 

and authorized by embassy public affairs and diplomacy staffs, MISTs—usually 

small in number—conduct local information programs via local media in service to 

ETRP and DOS Mission Strategic Plan CVE goals. 

SOCOM’s Joint Military Information Support Command (JMISC) provides operational planning, analytic research and production support for all of the GCCs. 

JMISC produces six military-to-military journals, one for each GCC, with particular 

topical emphasis on CVE and regional security. In tandem, the JMISC’s four regional influence web sites counter Internet-based misinformation supporting extremism, while synchronizing DOD’s web-based messages on CVE topics. 

As a point of distinction, SOCOM remains steadfast in distinguishing between 

DOS diplomacy efforts and DOD-led influence campaigns. While both directly address CVE, our efforts are specifically designed to deter, prevent, and disrupt violent 

extremists. Still, we recognize and appreciate the logic of coordinating and synchronizing these endeavors toward a common objective of reducing the appeal of violent 

extremism. 

While the military is not the lead in this effort, SOF Civil Affairs teams conduct 

a diverse set of activities promoting development and goodwill through building of 

infrastructure, job skill training, and the provision of medical, dental, and veterinary care in areas where existing governance structures are unable or unwilling to 

provide these services. Again, as with SFA, the focus of SOF Civil Affairs is on longterm capacity building within local and national structures. 

The paradigm of national sovereignty is challenged by the trends of crime, migration, and extremism, and the competition of resources which drive populations and 

provoke conflict. Recognizing this, SOCOM’s engagement efforts through the Sovereign Challenge Program continue as a unique method of establishing relationships 

with senior military leaders from around the world. The program, in collaboration 

with the DOS, aims to provide venues in which robust dialogue about threats to sovereignty can take place. In this indirect and mutually beneficial approach to military relationships, long-term success is measured by other countries’ actions in their 

own and the region’s security interests. 

Finally, the command simultaneously strikes at the financial center of VEOs, 

serving as the DOD lead in Counter Threat Finance. In close partnership with other 

combatant commanders, the Services, and—as directed—appropriate U.S. GovernVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:37 May 06, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00825 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\62155.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
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ment agencies and international partners, we spearhead DOD efforts to identify, 

track, and dry up this flow of capital in the interest of national security. 

78. Senator MCCAIN. Admiral Olson, what is your assessment of the effectiveness 

of current U.S. efforts to CVE? 

Admiral OLSON. Current U.S. efforts to CVE have had some successes but they 

still have a way to go in combating the multi-pronged ideological appeal of our enemies. By highlighting the violence against Muslim civilians and the oppression associated with violent extremist in Iraq and Afghanistan, our efforts have helped undercut the appeal of VEOs and al Qaeda. Despite these successes, our enemies have 

demonstrated a great deal of effectiveness by appealing to regional frustration over 

the continued delays in the Middle East peace process, and by raising questions 

over the legitimacy of other regional governments. Those issues have been endemic 

to the region for decades, and will continue to pose a challenge to U.S. efforts to 

undermine the appeal of VEOs. 

79. Senator MCCAIN. Admiral Olson, where can DOD and its civilian counterparts 

improve coordination and eliminate redundant efforts? 

Admiral OLSON. I can only speak to this issue from my perspective as Commander, SOCOM; however, our working arrangement with most of DOD provides 

me with some unique insight on this central question. 

We have a number of activities at HQ SOCOM that address this matter daily to 

include our Interagency Task Force (IATF). Interagency coordination is one of the 

responsibilities assigned to SOCOM in DOD’s CONPLAN 7500. This CONPLAN 

outlines the Department’s campaign to deter, disrupt, and defeat al Qaeda and 

transnational terrorist organizations and it directs SOCOM to serve as the global 

synchronizer for such efforts within the U.S. Government. 

Our interagency relationships are further enhanced by the Special Operations 

Support Teams, a network of IATF-managed liaison and advisory experts with deep 

Special Operations backgrounds, posted at the headquarters and activities of key 

interagency organizations and command partners across the whole of government. 

We believe the coordination mechanisms and processes are robust and working 

well, and that we can typically collaborate across the interagency spectrum in a 

timely and effective manner. SOCOM has an excellent track record over the past 

5 years of coordinating and resolving contentious issues and new requirements by 

leveraging senior leader-to-action officer engagements such as: combatant command 

and interagency planning conferences, working groups, the SOCOM Global Synchronization Conference for counterterrorism, strategic planning forums, and JCS OSD 

plans reviews. What we have less ability to do is influence matters of redundancy 

in policy, planning, and implementation matters beyond our statutory and post-September 11 policy authorities. There are routine issues involving SOF that are clearly 

both functional (our job for force preparation, posturing, delivery/replacement, and 

support) and geographic (the primary purview of the GCCs). Here, where these domains intersect at the operational level, we collaborate with the GCCs and with the 

Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOCs); examples of this collaboration include reviews of the theater operational plans, analytical and assessment support 

to theater and TSOC activities employing SOF, and SOF support to the Provisional 

Reconstruction Teams (PRT). We see much less redundancy in these areas than in 

more macro-level, national policy generated initiatives. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JEFF SESSIONS

CERP FUNDS

80. Senator SESSIONS. Admiral Olson and General Petraeus, when you compare 

the effectiveness of DOD in implementing CERP funds versus DOS/USAID in implementing the same type of funding, which agency is the most effective? 

Admiral OLSON. I am not in a position to provide you with an informed answer 

as SOCOM does not manage CERP funds. CENTCOM is better positioned to compare the effectiveness of the DOD and DOS/USAID programs. 

General PETRAEUS. CERP and DOS/USAID programs are complementary in nature and we work together to ensure the most effective application of resources. 

Metrics to determine which agency is more effective in implementing the same type 

of funding do not exist. 

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81. Senator SESSIONS. Admiral Olson and General Petraeus, compared to CERP 

funding, does DOS/USAID get a disproportional percentage of DOD Section 1207- 

type funds than they should based on value added in the field? 

Admiral OLSON. SOCOM does not execute funding provided under the 1207 program. Additionally, beginning with the fiscal year 2011 President’s budget request, 

all funding for the 1207 program was transferred to DOS. 

General PETRAEUS. Given a lack of formal metrics for a comparison basis, it would 

be difficult to determine if DOS/USAID receives a disproportionate percentage of 

DOD Section 1207 type funds. Any formal assessment as to the sufficiency of 1207 

type funds for DOS/USAID should be provided by that agency. 

82. Senator SESSIONS. Admiral Olson and General Petraeus, are the policy objectives of DOS and DOD tied closely enough when executing foreign and security assistance programs? 

Admiral OLSON. At the strategic level, the policy objectives of DOD and DOS are 

nested in support of the National Security Strategy. We have achieved good results 

in the building of ISF and are moving toward a sustainable program in Afghanistan. 

The difficulty is between policy goals and program execution. While policy objectives 

are aligned in areas outside of Operation Iraqi Freedom and OEF, the execution of 

foreign and security assistance programs are not achieving enduring results. Geographic combatant commands and U.S. embassies are challenged with Cold War-era 

security assistance programs that, while sufficient for the threat at that time, are 

not responsive or broad enough to adequately address current threats. 

General PETRAEUS. Yes, DOD and DOS policies on foreign and security assistance 

programs are closely integrated at every level. The DOD personnel within the country team assist in the development of the Mission Strategic Resources Plan and 

DOS personnel assist DOD in security cooperation planning. For grant recipient 

countries, DOS and DOD personnel jointly develop the foreign military financing 

budget. Both departments closely coordinate on Foreign Military Sales and International Military Education and Training Programs. DOS and DOD cooperate on 

the Global Peacekeeping Operations Initiative programs to improve partner capacity 

in responding to U.N.-brokered peacekeeping missions and additionally, programs 

planned for partner nations under the Global Train and Equip authority are developed in synchronization with, and are approved only after, concurrence from DOS. 

A particularly notable example of the strong cooperation between DOS and DOD is 

the execution of section 1206 projects which receive dual Departments of Defense 

and State vetting with the country teams, then continued dual vetting from the action officers to the Secretary level within the departments. 

During the Theater Strategy and Campaign plan development, CENTCOM uses 

DOS policy guidance and Mission Strategic Resources Plans in order to synchronize 

our efforts with DOS elements within our AOR. Finally, we routinely invite leaders 

in the State Regional Bureaus and Chiefs of Mission to participate in conferences 

and strategic discussions in order to integrate our efforts and benefit from the full 

range of political-military perspectives and insight. 

AFGHANISTAN

83. Senator SESSIONS. General Petraeus, is there enough emphasis on stabilization progress in remote locations as compared to heavy population areas? 

General PETRAEUS. The stabilization/reconstruction efforts of the coalition and 

nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in Afghanistan consist of building physical 

infrastructure, fostering economic development, and promoting good governance. 

Showcasing CENTCOM’s involvement are the 27 U.S. and Coalition PRTs and 9 

U.S. Agribusiness Development Teams (ADT) operating in 31 of Afghanistan’s 34 

provinces. 

While it is true that these are headquartered in the most populated areas, that 

is by design. As General McChrystal, Commander of the ISAF stated in his Initial 

Assessment of August 2009, our COIN efforts are concentrated in high-population 

areas because they’re the most highly contested with the insurgency. Similarly, stabilization activities are focused in those locations because their existing infrastructure can be leveraged for maximum gains. 

We would always like to do more; and, as opportunities arise, we’re expanding our 

efforts. In March, a 13th U.S. PRT began operation in Kapisa province. In July, the 

Republic of South Korea is establishing a PRT in Parwan. Turkey is working to assume PRT duties in Jowzjan and Sar-I Pul, freeing Sweden to concentrate its focus 

on Balkh and Samangan. In March a ninth ADT moved into Zabul. In addition, a 

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ment experts in theater from roughly 300 to 1,000 since January 2009, with an additional 20 to 30 percent increase anticipated by the end of this year. 

In order to ensure we have a balanced perspective on apportioning efforts between 

rural and developed areas, the coalition is increasingly relying on the Government 

of Afghanistan to decide where those activities are focused. Across the board, implementing partners are working with 26,000 Afghans to institute stabilization activities, including the USAID’s Office of Transition Initiatives, which is establishing 

links with 264 local representatives at districts/village level. In addition, DOS’s Afghanistan and Pakistan Regional Stabilization Strategy has set goals of: authorizing 

six Afghanistan ministries to receive direct U.S. assistance by December 2010; channeling at least 40 percent of U.S. Government development assistance through the 

Afghanistan Government and local Afghanistan NGOs by December 2010; increasing local procurement of supplies to 20 percent by July 2011; ensuring 200,000 

farmers and entrepreneurs have access to credit; establishing District Development 

Working Groups in 6 pilot districts in Regional Commands East and South; providing block grants to mayors in 42 municipalities to improve delivery of services; 

expanding the ability of Afghanistan’s core ministries to oversee and implement programs; implementing and monitoring new flexible funding strategies, such as the 

Performance Based Governors Fund, in 2010; and developing a plan to mitigate indirect effects of corruption resulting from increased military and civilian presence. 

Partnering between national, provincial, district, and community officials will best 

address each level’s needs. This won’t maximize achievements at any given level, 

but it will optimize gains across the whole of Afghanistan. 

84. Senator SESSIONS. General Petraeus, to what degree does success in the remote locations affect our overall objectives? 

General PETRAEUS. In line with the COIN doctrine, the main effort will be directed to the centers of population and expanding the security zones in these areas 

and the surrounding districts. This will bring a significant portion of the population 

under the GIRoA control, as well as denying insurgents vital terrain, limiting their 

freedom of movement and access to key population centers. However, as a result, 

insurgents are likely to move to the less populated and more remote areas. In doing 

so, they are separated from the population and have less ability to negatively influence them. Moreover, in remote areas, the insurgent is easier to identify, he is separated from the majority of his arms caches, and he can be tracked as he moves into 

the populated areas to undertake his attacks. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR ROGER F. WICKER

RIGHTS OF WOMEN IN AFGHANISTAN

85. Senator WICKER. General Petraeus, I recently traveled to Afghanistan, and 

during that travel I visited Garmsir, the Helmand provincial capital just weeks before the start of the recent Helmand offensive. One particular thing that struck me 

as I walked freely around, without a flak jacket, was the absence of women. I was 

in an open marketplace, yet there were no women to be found. Knowing that a key 

component of the COIN model is the reintegrating of the Taliban into Afghanistan 

society, do you see the future rights of women as a cause for concern? 

General PETRAEUS. CENTCOM supports the current efforts of the DOS as they 

work with the GIRoA to develop effective governance that includes and respects the 

rights of women. This is consistent within the greater COIN context focused on protecting the entire population. 

The Women’s Action Plan which Secretary Clinton announced at the London Conference is comprehensive and signals our sustained commitment to improving women’s rights. This is a key component of our efforts to strengthen Afghan communities 

against the effects of extremist ideologies. The ISAF is working with Embassy Kabul 

to ensure reintegration efforts incorporate elements of these programs and continue 

to advance women’s rights. More broadly, as the President emphasized in his State 

of the Union Address, our policies in Afghanistan will also reflect our national values, including support for universally recognized human rights. 

The prevailing imperative remains to provide security so development can occur. 

Violence against women and girls is endemic and much remains to be done including increased access for women to institutions of justice, civic education, and prosecution of crimes. Further, we must work with DOS and USAID to implement programs as soon as the security situation will allow in all regions. The women of Afghanistan are critical to progress and stability in their war torn country. 

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Of important note, we have seen some success toward Afghan women’s rights over 

the last 8 years. These gains include businesses’ ownership, voting, positions in government and professions such as medicine, law, and academia, but are mostly limited to the urban areas. Embassy Kabul is intensifying their efforts to help women. 

One example is a new $27 million fund of small, flexible, rapid response grants targeted to empower Afghan women-led NGOs at the local level to serve their fellow 

citizens. The grants provide technical assistance and support for programs ranging 

from economic development, literacy, training, and health care. 

SYRIA

86. Senator WICKER. General Petraeus, recently Ambassador Robert Ford was 

nominated to be the next Ambassador to Syria. We withdrew the U.S. Ambassador 

from Damascus in 2005 because of terrorism issues. As early as last year you discussed that Syria was allowing or accepting terrorism facilitators to operate from 

and through Syrian territory. In your opinion, is this the right time to send an ambassador to Syria? 

General PETRAEUS. I believe it is the right time. The U.S. Government seeks to 

improve engagement with Syria in the international arena and the essential element to restarting a relationship is an in-country ambassador to coordinating U.S. 

Government policy. We need to reestablish our ambassadorial presence to permit access and recurring state-to-state engagement between Syria and the United States. 

87. Senator WICKER. General Petraeus, how does engagement with a nation aiding terrorists help your position in the region? 

General PETRAEUS. Engagement with Syria demonstrates to our Arab partners in 

the region that we are committed to regional stability and our engagement enables 

increased opportunities to explore mutual interests with Syria. Only through direct 

engagement can we build the foundation for a stable partnership that challenges 

violent extremism, contributes to stability in the Middle East, and encourages Syria 

to broaden its national objectives and become a cooperative nation that pursues policies to enhance stability and economic opportunity in the region. 

YEMEN

88. Senator WICKER. General Petraeus, despite internal challenges that include a 

rebellion in the north and a secessionist movement in the south, you have mentioned in the past that Yemen has made security improvements with regard to combating terrorism. However, as is well known, Yemen has long been a refuge for terrorists. Despite U.S. funding for counterterrorism, I see little progress in that country to fight terrorism. Just last month you mentioned that Saudi Arabia and the 

other Middle East peninsula countries have continued to make gains with the obvious exception of Yemen. What is really needed to help Yemen make substantial security gains? 

General PETRAEUS. Yemen faces internal threats with a rebellion in the north and 

a secessionist movement in the south. The conditions in Yemen must improve to 

deny al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) access to sanctuary and training 

camps—like the one used by the Christmas bomber. Since December 2009, Yemen 

has had some success in counter-terrorist operations against AQAP. Currently, the 

Republic of Yemen, under President Saleh, is maintaining a cease-fire with the 

rebels in the north who are adhering to the conditions set forth by the government. 

This cease-fire brings some stability and now permits the Government of Yemen to 

increase its focus on combating terrorism. 

In the past year, U.S. counterterrorism funding for Yemen has more than doubled 

from $67.2 million in fiscal year 2009 to $137.2 million in fiscal year 2010. This increase aligns with CENTCOM’s plan to enhance the capability and capacity of the 

Yemeni security and counterterrorism forces. However, the challenges associated 

with Yemen’s counterterror operations capability and capacity require a long-term, 

sustained commitment to a whole-of-government approach that addresses governance, security, and economic development. This program must include persistent 

U.S. Government engagement and security assistance to address these challenges. 

We must also continue to encourage other nations, both regionally and around the 

world, to assist Yemen with its security challenges and provide increased economic 

opportunities which address the conditions necessary for improved security. 

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TAJIKISTAN

89. Senator WICKER. General Petraeus, Tajikistan recently held parliamentary 

elections in which the ruling party won almost 72 percent of the vote. Most outside 

observers, including the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, described the election as ‘‘failing on many basic democratic standards.’’ The results 

also reveal some of the problems within this country. From what I have read, over 

70 percent of the population in Tajikistan live in abject poverty and over half of the 

labor force actually works in Russia or Kazakhstan. Some have predicted it is on 

its way to becoming a failed state. Since it shares over 800 miles of border with 

Northern Afghanistan, what occurs in Tajikistan is important to our efforts in Afghanistan. What is your assessment of the situation in Tajikistan? 

General PETRAEUS. Tajikistan is considered the poorest country from the former 

Soviet Union. Economic growth is limited due to extremely harsh environmental 

conditions, extremely limited sources of income, and rampant corruption. It is the 

second-most mountainous country in the world, and is routinely plagued by earthquakes, blizzards, floods, droughts, locust infestations, and extreme weather. Parts 

of the country are frequently cut off by snow, landslides, and avalanches. Floods in 

May 2009 caused an estimated $100 million in damage and required large amounts 

of immediate international assistance. Tajikistan remains heavily reliant on the 

Tajik Aluminum Company plant as its major source of foreign income, despite a 

one-third reduction in aluminum prices world wide. Its second-most important income source, remittances from citizens working in Russia, Kazakhstan, and other 

countries, has also been affected by the worldwide economic slowdown, which had 

some effect on the Russian and Kazakhstani economies. Furthermore, policies in 

Russia are forcing some Tajikistanis to return to Tajikistan or pay more in costs 

to live in Russia. Corruption at all levels causes international investors to view 

Tajikistan as a remarkably difficult place to do business. Tajikistan is also a major 

processing and transportation hub for narcotics emanating from Afghanistan. 

Tajikistan requires international assistance to meet its development and humanitarian needs. 

In addition to its economic and environmental plight, Tajikistan’s government 

struggles to advance political reforms or improve governance to a level acceptable 

by western standards. There is little in the way of an organized opposition in the 

country. The upper military leadership is hand-picked and loyal to President 

Rahmon. Although the Tajiks are the best news is that Tajikistan remains mindful 

of the damage caused to its society by the civil war in the 1990s and there is a 

broad consensus that all want to avoid a relapse into such violence. The power-sharing arrangement that ended the civil war has gradually eroded over time. 

Tajik elections routinely fail to meet basic democratic standards, situation in Central Asia. Tajikistan does have a government-authorized political party formed specifically around an Islamic identity, the Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan led 

by Muhiddin Kabiri. Recently, the government appeared to be increasing pressure 

on foreign religious organizations. Political parties in Tajikistan will require international assistance to reach effective political mobilization, and Tajikistan’s laws 

have made rendering this assistance problematic. 

Internationally, the Government of Tajikistan is most enthusiastic about cooperation with the United States on counterterrorism, border security, and counternarcotics. Tajikistan joined the Global Peacekeeping Operations Initiative, and is 

committed to fielding a peacekeeping company by 2010. Tajikistan agreed to our request to allow transit of non-lethal supplies to our forces in Afghanistan. Continued 

security cooperation and improved economic assistance to Tajikistan not only contributes to regional stability by helping one of Afghanistan’s neighbors, but also 

builds opportunity for other international assistance to address socio-economic and 

political freedom issues in Tajikistan. 

90. Senator WICKER. General Petraeus, are you concerned that Tajikistan could 

be a possible refuge for Taliban fighters and possibly other terrorist elements? 

General PETRAEUS. Tajikistan is an unlikely refuge for Taliban fighters and would 

not provide a sanctuary similar to the Federally Administered Tribal Areas in Pakistan. Although historical precedent indicates some Central Asian terrorist groups, 

such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, have used Tajikistan for refuge, current terrorist elements in Tajikistan are limited and small in number. The primary 

concern regarding Tajikistan is its use as a trafficking route for narcotics, weapons, 

and other illicit items that can be used to support and facilitate the insurgency in 

Afghanistan. Tajikistan has become a key route for smugglers due to a lack of resources to apply to border security; however, the Government of Tajikistan actively 

825 

combats concentrations of suspected militants within its borders as evidenced by 

several operations against alleged extremists in the past year. 

ISRAEL

91. Senator WICKER. General Petraeus, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is obviously 

a central issue in the Middle East. Yet, Israel is the one Middle Eastern country 

not within your AOR. In some cases, like India and Pakistan, it can be very helpful 

to divide the AORs along political lines. Why should Israel be a part of U.S. European Command (EUCOM) and not CENTCOM? 

General PETRAEUS. Historically, Israel has been part of EUCOM. They have an 

established relationship that goes back many years that includes a long period of 

continuous contact enabling effective engagement with Israel on military-to-military 

activities. While some could argue the value of moving Israel into the CENTCOM 

AOR based on geography and the important role Israel plays in Middle Eastern 

events—I believe that the present arrangement best serves U.S. interests. The current theater boundaries allow CENTCOM to interact effectively with the current 

countries in our AOR. Any adjustments in the boundary now could have significant 

consequences and might negatively impact our access to key areas that support military operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the effort to counter piracy. 

92. Senator WICKER. General Petraeus, do you support moving Israel into 

CENTCOM? 

General PETRAEUS. I support the current COCOM boundary with Israel remaining 

assigned to EUCOM. CENTCOM has developed new relationships and strengthened 

partnerships across our region without the inclusion of Israel and believe there is 

no compelling reason to change the current arrangement. We coordinate very closely 

with EUCOM on significant events and issues that affect both our AORs, including 

those issues that center on Israel. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR GEORGE S. LEMIEUX

VENEZUELA

93. Senator LEMIEUX. Admiral Olson, President Chavez has considerably deepened his country’s cooperation with state sponsors of terror. Since 2007, there have 

been weekly Tehran-Damascus-Caracas flights that are not subject to appropriate 

checks. In January 2009 he called for, and the Venezuelan National Assembly obediently approved, a resolution calling for international recognition of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army as belligerent forces, rather than terrorist groups. In July 2009, the Colombian Government seized several sophisticated Swedish-made antitank rockets that had been 

originally sold to the Venezuelan army. The Venezuelan Government has yet to fully 

explain how these sophisticated weapons ended up in the hands of a terrorist organization for which President Chavez has ideological sympathies. On March 1, 2010, 

a Spanish judge accused the Basque separatist group ETA and Colombia’s FARC 

of plotting to kill Colombian politicians in Spain with Venezuelan Government cooperation. Is Venezuela behaving like a state sponsor of terrorism? 

Admiral OLSON. Since 1999, Venezuela, under President Hugo Cha ́vez, has increasingly demonstrated domestic and international behavior patterns which mirror 

similar past behavior patterns of the four current state sponsors of terrorism which 

include Iran, Syria, Sudan, and Cuba. President Chavez’s main international mission is to challenge U.S. interests in the Americas and around the globe. This mission is accomplished through the provisions of ‘‘passive’’ support to regional terrorist 

groups and paramilitary forces which presents an attractive safe haven or way-station for terrorists due to Venezuela’s unwillingness to deny terrorists use of its territory. Corruption within the Venezuelan Government and military, ideological ties 

with the FARC and ELN, maturing relationships with the other state sponsors of 

terrorism, easily obtainable travel documents, and weak international counternarcotics cooperation are all factors that have helped to fuel a permissive operating 

environment for terrorists and drug traffickers. These factors may also lead to the 

potential increase in transit to the United States and Europe of illicit goods and activities. 

Under President Cha ́vez’s direction, Venezuela has provided political and 

logistical support to the FARC. Specifically, he has permitted senior FARC officials, 

such as Rodrigo Granda, Marin Arango (aka Iva ́n Marquez), and Rodrigo London 

Echeverry (aka Timochenko or Timoleon Jiminez) to move freely within Venezuela 

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and across its international borders. Arango/Marquez currently plays an important 

role as an intermediary in developing international connections and support for 

FARC. 

On March 1, 2008, after a Colombian military strike against a FARC camp on Ecuador’s side of the shared border resulted in the death of FARC’s chief of staff, Luis 

E ́ dgar Devia Silva (aka Ra ́ul Reyes) and 24 FARC members and sympathizers, computers belonging to the FARC commander were retrieved. These computers yielded 

an intelligence bonanza for Colombia, including evidence from Reyes’ computers that 

Cha ́vez and his lieutenants were in frequent contact with FARC leaders and regularly discussing ways to assist the group with money, arms, logistical support, and 

strategic advice. Particularly worrisome was the readiness of Cha ́vez’s agents to propose up to $300 million in aid to FARC and to act as facilitators for FARC to acquire sophisticated weaponry, particularly surface-to-air missiles or manportable air 

defense systems. 

In September 2008, after a review of the intelligence collected from the Reyes 

laptops, the U.S. Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Asset Controls (OFAC) 

identified two senior Venezuelan officials—General Hugo Armando Carvajal Barrios, 

Director of Venezuela’s Military Intelligence (DGIM); and Henry de Jesu ́ s Rangel 

Silva, Head of the Directorate of Intelligence and Prevention Service (DISIP), Venezuela’s FBI; as well as former Justice and Interior Minister Ramo ́n Rodrı ́guez 

Chacı ́n—as materially assisting FARC narcotics trafficking under the Kingpin Act. 

Carvajal, in particular, has long figured as a primary intermediary between the 

FARC and the Cha ́vez Government. 

In July 2009, Colombian officials disclosed that their Army had recovered three 

anti-tank weapons from FARC. These weapons, AT–4 anti-tank rockets, were swiftly 

traced back to their Swedish manufacturer, which reported the weapons were sold 

to the Venezuelan army in the 1980s. President Cha ́vez at first called the entire 

report false. Later he reversed this position, claiming the weapons were stolen in 

1995 during a FARC raid into Venezuela. Cha ́vez could not explain why communications exchanges between FARC leaders in early 2007 that are documented in the 

Reyes laptops spoke of a recent transfer of ‘‘85mm antitank rockets’’ from Venezuela 

to FARC, precisely the weapons recovered by the Colombians. 

94. Senator LEMIEUX. Admiral Olson, in your opinion, should the United States 

designate Venezuela a state sponsor of terrorism? 

Admiral OLSON. According to the DOS, there are currently four countries officially 

designated as state sponsors of terrorism—Iran, Syria, Sudan, and Cuba. Venezuela 

is not on the official list but their cooperation in the international campaign against 

terrorism has steadily declined over the past several years. President Chavez has 

been vocal in his public criticism of U.S. counterterrorism efforts, championing Iraqi 

terrorists, and deepening ties with state sponsors of terrorism such as Iran, Syria, 

and Cuba through increased military, and/or commercial cooperation. 

In addition, President Cha ́vez’s ideological sympathy for the FARC and the National Liberation Army (ELN) limits Venezuelan cooperation with the United States 

and Colombia in combating regional terrorism. The FARC, ELN, and other paramilitary groups often use the Venezuelan border region to secure logistical supplies, 

as well as support the transshipment of arms and drugs. 

At this time, Venezuela does not represent a direct military or terrorist threat to 

the United States, but Venezuela’s ‘‘passive’’ support to regional terrorist groups 

and paramilitary forces, maturing relationship with state sponsors of terrorism and 

permissive operating environment for terrorists and drug traffickers suggest increased scrutiny by the United States is warranted. 

95. Senator LEMIEUX. General Petraeus, do you believe Iran is a growing threat 

to stability in our hemisphere based on their increased cooperation with Venezuela 

and other states hostile to the United States? 

General PETRAEUS. This assessment would be better answered by our intelligence 

agencies in conjunction with the Commander, U.S. Southern Command 

(SOUTHCOM). 

INFORMATION OPERATIONS

96. Senator LEMIEUX. General Petraeus, the insurgents seem to have a better network to get their messages out after an attack. To win the hearts and minds of the 

populace, we need to have a robust information environment that provides an accurate account of military operations; additionally, we need to be the first to admit 

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to mistakes that lead to civilian casualties. What are we doing to counter the inaccurate and negative accounts of military operations in your AOR? 

General PETRAEUS. Unlike our adversaries, our mission is to be ‘‘first with the 

truth.’’ Often times, getting to the truth takes time, but we’re working hard to decrease the time it takes us to get our word out. We are currently adding a team 

of communicators, including language specialists, to the ISAF Joint Headquarters 

Joint Operations Center in Afghanistan to provide a rapid response capability, similar to the capability we had in Baghdad. By positioning professional communicators 

in the Joint Operations Center, they can monitor operations unfolding and plan in 

advance for events that require messaging and responses. These personnel also 

monitor media reporting, and work to correct factual errors as appropriate, while 

also providing accurate information quickly to news organizations in the language 

of the medium. 

A major investment is also being made in our information operations capability 

in Afghanistan with the recent stand up of the Information Operations Task Force, 

or IOTF, operating in the realms of PSYOPS, electronic warfare, computer network 

operations, operations security, and military deception. We formed this Task Force 

based on the lessons we learned in Iraq with the IOTF we had there, but the Afghanistan version has been considerably adapted to better operate in the vastly different information environment of that country, where literacy is a significant challenge and traditional communication and radio dominate as means of dissemination. 

Since the establishment of USFOR–A’s IOTF, that organization is combating the 

insurgency’s narrative daily, attacking not only the adversary’s message but also attacking, both kinetically and nonkinetically, the adversary’s messengers and their 

networks. Since achieving full operational capacity shortly after the turn of this 

year, the IOTF has established three major efforts with seven subordinate operations that serve to counter the adversary’s propaganda, encourage the reintegration of low- to mid-level fighters back into Afghan society, target individual bad actors, and amplify the growing capacity and will of our uniformed partners in the 

ANA, the ANP, and Afghan Border Police as they assume more of the fight from 

U.S. and coalition forces. 

At CENTCOM headquarters, there are several communication activities we are 

currently engaged in to counter inaccuracies and negative reporting. We have implemented a headquarter-led Communication Integration Working Group that helps 

synchronize communication efforts across the AOR. This weekly collaboration and 

cross-purpose command function is a cornerstone activity that helps us effectively 

address communication issues and ensure more accurate reporting in the media and 

in social networks. We also have media watch personnel in the CENTCOM headquarters who monitor the press constantly while assessing press reporting. These 

analysts work hand-in-hand with senior military public affairs officers. A 24/7 operation, these media monitors also help to develop time sensitive press guidance and 

analysis on various issues. With all our communication activities, we continually 

strive to align our words, actions, and images to achieve desired outcomes. 

97. Senator LEMIEUX. General Petraeus, one of the tenets of SOF is the use of 

leverage to get results disproportionate to level of effort. Radio-in-a-box (RIAB) devices are currently being used to put out news and information including messages 

from U.S. forces. The last update I had on this program was over 1,500 of these 

sets had been distributed throughout Afghanistan. Has this been an effective strategy? 

General PETRAEUS. Use of RIAB is an effective strategy. Radio programming is 

the most common method of mass media in Afghanistan and reaches the largest audiences. This is due to high illiteracy rates (72 percent of the population), lack of 

infrastructure in rural areas to provide terrestrial TV, cost of TVs, low satellite TV 

installation and reception, and very low internet penetration. 

The estimate of 1,500 RIAB systems distributed across Afghanistan appears to be 

too high. According to ISAF Joint Command (IJC) there are currently 123 RIAB systems operating in Afghanistan. There are an additional 50 RIABs in various states 

of repair. 

The majority of the RIAB systems belong to battle space owners and are operated 

by their information operations personnel. Most systems are run by contracted local 

nationals who provide information in the local dialect making the content more acceptable to the local population. 

The RIAB is an effective tool used to disseminate news, public service announcements, and command information to the local population. Improvements are 

planned in training, maintenance, and message synchronization to improve RIABs’ 

usefulness to battle space commanders. 

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98. Senator LEMIEUX. General Petraeus, have we put enough out or do we need 

more and are there other information operations (IO) we should be exploiting, but 

are not? 

General PETRAEUS. We must expand our capability to contest extremist groups 

and adversaries in the IO battle space, in particular, fourth generation communications (4G) will play a critical role in the years to come. 4G provides a secure and 

comprehensive all-IP-based solution where services (gaming, multi-media, ultra 

broad band internet, and IP telephony) can be streamlined instantly to the end user. 

Many countries within our area of operations skip a generation of communication 

infrastructure and move towards faster, real-time information platforms. Our ability 

to stay competitive with our enemies’ dissemination of information is crucial to longterm success in the fight. Our adversaries understand the nature of this fight, and 

they use every method of influence available to them. The information space in 

which this war is fought has become increasingly complex with violent extremist 

groups displaying the ability to use emerging media conduits, including the expanded use of the Internet and Web 2.0 technologies (mobile communications devices, blogs, social networking sites, et cetera) to recruit forces, solicit funding, share 

tradecraft, and spread their ideology. Extremist groups realize they cannot effectively defeat us or overthrow governments in the region through conventional military operations. Thus, they use the information environment as a key line of effort 

for their campaigns, and they use kinetic attacks to enable their IO and to kill and 

injure our forces, our partners, and innocent civilians. 

99. Senator LEMIEUX. General Petraeus, what is the training pipeline for soldiers 

who conduct IO? 

General PETRAEUS. The Services have the mission of providing trained IO personnel to the combatant commanders. Each Service has a different method of accomplishing this task, based on its institutional history, mission, and organization. 

The Army has several Military Occupational Specialties (MOS) involved in IO for 

both officers and enlisted. Functional Areas (FA) within the IO construct include FA 

30 Information Operations Officer, FA 29 Electronic Warfare, FA 37A PSYOP Officer, and FA 59 Strategic Planner. There are school houses at various installations, 

such as Fort Leavenworth’s Combined Arms Center, that function as educational establishments and functional proponents. 

The Air Force, in contrast, does not have a dedicated IO Specialty Code. The Air 

Force IO Career Field is managed via Special Experience Identifiers (SEIs) and an 

Air Force Specialty Code (AFSC). These identifiers and codes are awarded for attending training, on the job experience, and based on a commander’s recommendation. 

The Navy has established the Information Dominance Corps to lead and manage 

a cadre of officers, enlisted and civilian IO professionals. IO personnel are given 

functional training, and acquire advanced education and significant experience. Officers are given an IO designation and enlisted personnel get Navy Enlisted Codes 

(NECs) upon accomplishing established prerequisites. 

The Marine Corps IO Force does not have a primary MOS, but does have four 

additional MOSs to designate IO specialists. Like the Air Force and Navy, the Marine Corps requires their IO specialists to meet educational goals, on the job training, and successful completion of Active Duty tours to be awarded specific MOSs. 

The combatant command has the responsibility to provide correct demand signals 

to the Services so they provide the right numbers of people, with the right skills, 

at the right time. This is done through the Joint Manning Document and Joint Lessons Learned. 

100. Senator LEMIEUX. General Petraeus, how is the private sector being utilized 

to help the military adopt the best practices for IO? 

General PETRAEUS. We place heavy emphasis on the best commercial solutions to 

achieve our military information objectives. Specifically, we have sought the largest 

and most successful global firms, and the most cutting edge technologies to provide 

the scope, breadth, and reach needed to effectively counter our adversaries. 

Some areas to which we have applied commercial best practices include a true ‘integrated,’ open source Web 2.0 (applications that facilitate interactive information 

sharing, interoperability, and collaboration, such as Facebook) multimedia platform 

and accompanying social networking platform with Consumer Generated Content 

Monitors to engage online social networks. This effort has provided the capability 

to counter rapid dissemination of extremist influence, reduce support for extremist 

ideology, methodology, and leadership. 

We continue to apply best industry practices and seek out commercial off-the-shelf 

solutions in the marketing realm to bridge the technological gap, and we will conVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:37 May 06, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00834 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\62155.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
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tinue to invest in research and development capacity to seek out and exploit emerging technology to stay ahead of our adversaries. 

101. Senator LEMIEUX. General Petraeus, how are we empowering the Afghans 

to spread news more rapidly to local populations? 

General PETRAEUS. There are three current IO programs that are designed to enhance communication throughout Afghan local populations. One program is conducted by Task Force 41 (TF41). Two programs are conducted by the Military Information Support Team (MIST), which is a seven-man team assigned to the U.S. Embassy in Afghanistan to provide military support to public diplomacy for the country 

team. 

Within the MIST, a program called ‘‘The Voices of a Nation’’ has been established 

to empower the Afghan population to spread news more rapidly. This program educates the Afghan population on principles of democracy, and provides students with 

the means to develop and disseminate moderate messages throughout Afghanistan. 

Voices of a Nation trains and equips Afghanistan university students to provide a 

native message to counter extremists and insurgent messaging. 

Another MIST initiative includes University Media Infrastructure Upgrades. 

These upgrades at Kabul University, Jalalabad University, Mazar-e Sharif University, Herat University, Kandahar University, and Khost University include structural construction and renovation, digital equipment upgrade, radio production and 

broadcast capability, television production capability, print production, and publication capability. Like Voices of a Nation, this initiative supports university students’ 

ability to counter insurgent messaging. DOD is providing only technical support to 

this effort which is led by DOS. 

102. Senator LEMIEUX. General Petraeus, I thought DOS was the agency in 

charge of public diplomacy; however, it seems like DOD is encroaching into public 

diplomacy through IO. Please explain how IO is not another form of the public diplomacy role that has always been associated with DOS. 

General PETRAEUS. It would not be accurate to characterize Military Information 

Operations as another form of Public Diplomacy, primarily because they have clearly different objectives. DOD, and particularly CENTCOM, focus our Military Information Operations toward fighting the enemy in the information domain. We see 

Public Diplomacy efforts focused primarily toward promoting U.S. polices and values 

abroad. Frankly, DOS has been under-resourced in this area. Clearly, there is overlap of domains, but not overlap of purpose. 

Our extremist adversaries are engaged in an information war for the hearts and 

minds of men and women throughout the CENTCOM AOR. To counter this threat, 

we must use IO to attack the enemy along four critical lines of operation: command 

and control, funding, recruiting, and training. We must also counter the violent extremist ideology that permeates and enables these four areas. 

To do this, IO exploit as many information conduits as possible to achieve desired 

effects against our enemy. 

103. Senator LEMIEUX. General Petraeus, I understand that you are requesting 

funding for IO—what is this funding for? 

General PETRAEUS. The funding is for Operation Earnest Voice (OEV), which is 

CENTCOM’s primary nonkinetic information operation tool to degrade enemy recruiting and fund raising support. Our adversaries are adept at exploiting misinformation and cultural differences to recruit and raise funds for their operations. 

OEV provides us the ability to degrade the enemy’s recruiting and funding efforts 

by directly countering their narrative and by amplifying the message of those who 

stand against violent extremist ideologies. 

Currently, we have two major ongoing operations: the Regional Web Interaction 

Program (RWIP) and Credible Voices Program (CVP). RWIP requires an additional 

$6.1 million for continued capability and expansion. RWIP focuses on informing and 

influencing foreign target audiences to counter violent extremist ideology and enemy 

propaganda, and amplify messages of credible voices to reduce VEO effectiveness in 

soliciting recruits and financial support for their operations. 

CVP line of operation requires an additional $38.5 million to effectively use webbased operations to link disparate credible networks and organizations to counter 

our adversaries’ messages of violence. The program’s objective is to expand and amplify moderate messages within the contested information space to reduce extremists’ effectiveness in soliciting recruits and gaining financial support. 

IO requires robust recurring funding in order to stop the enemies’ recruiting, 

training, and their financial support. Full funding for RWIP and CVP will put us 

830 

a step ahead of our enemies’ efforts and allow us many opportunities to stop terrorist activities before they happen. 

104. Senator LEMIEUX. General Petraeus, in fiscal year 2010, the Appropriations 

Committees of Congress cut your IO budget approximately in half. What operations 

were affected by a budget cut of this magnitude? 

General PETRAEUS. The areas affected by the budget cut are the two critical operational activities conducted at CENTCOM to interdict VEO recruiting and funding 

raising efforts. These activities are the RWIP and CVP. 

RWIP focuses on informing and influencing foreign target audiences to reduce 

VEO effectiveness in soliciting recruits and funding by countering violent extremist 

ideology and enemy propaganda, and amplify messages of CVP. 

To date, monthly assessments of the RWIP show the positive effects the program 

has on the tone of discussion threads by shifting sentiment away from support of 

VEO. We strongly believe this leads to decreases in recruits, funding support, and 

save havens, all of which are critical enablers to the enemy’s fighting capability. 

The budget decrement has impeded our ability to reach full operational capacity, 

and has delayed our ability to counter the violent extremist ideology that sustains 

their ability to fight, recruit, train, and gain funding. 

The CVP uses web-based operations to link disparate credible networks and organizations to counter our adversaries’ messages of violence. The program’s objective 

is to expand and amplify moderate messages within the contested information space 

to reduce extremists’ effectiveness in soliciting recruits and funding. 

The themes of CVP products directly counter VEO narratives to interdict their 

ability to seek recruits, funding, and additional support for their military objectives. 

PSYOPS doctrine requires long-term and repetitive messaging to change attitudes, perceptions, and ultimately behaviors. However, the current budget allocation 

prevents our ability to deliver a persistent capability to amplify CVP throughout our 

area of operation. 

NEW HEADQUARTERS FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND SOUTH AT HOMESTEAD AIR

FORCE BASE

105. Senator LEMIEUX. Admiral Olson, I understand the President’s budget includes $41 million in the Army military construction account to construct a new 

headquarters for Special Operations Command South (SOCSOUTH) at Homestead 

Air Force Base (AFB). Could you please explain the need for this new facility? 

Admiral OLSON. SOCSOUTH requires permanent facilities. They have been occupying temporary, hurricane-susceptible modular facilities on Homestead Air Reserve 

Base (ARB) ever since their relocation from Puerto Rico in 2004. 

106. Senator LEMIEUX. Admiral Olson, would you please explain why Homestead 

AFB was chosen as the preferred site? 

Admiral OLSON. It is ultimately the GCC’s decision where their TSOC headquarters will be located. Operationally and logistically, it makes the most sense for 

TSOCs to be located as close as possible to the GCC’s headquarters in order to facilitate command and control. SOCSOUTH has been occupying temporary modular facilities on Homestead ARB ever since its relocation from Puerto Rico in 2004. Homestead ARB provides SOCSOUTH the benefit of close proximity to the SOUTHCOM 

headquarters, while also effecting rapid and efficient access to the SOUTHCOM region. The proximity to the military airfield on Homestead ARB provides ample staging capability to facilitate rapid deployment of SOF into the SOUTHCOM AOR, as 

was demonstrated by the recent Haiti earthquake disaster response. 

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY SENATOR DAVID VITTER

NON-MILITARY STAKEHOLDERS

107. Senator VITTER. Admiral Olson and General Petraeus, as CENTCOM and 

SOCOM commanders, please provide your assessment of the evolving and growing 

relationship between DOD and non-military stakeholders such as the DOS and 

USAID. The efforts of these non-military entities are crucial to the overall success 

of virtually every major military effort we are engaged in today. In your assessment, 

please include an evaluation of the ability of DOS to execute its role as lead agency 

in stability operations. 

Admiral OLSON. The relationship between SOCOM and non-military stakeholders, 

such as DOS and USAID, has been evolving and deepening over the past years. The 

831 

level of success we have achieved thus far is a result of three main efforts: developing long-term relationships, creating and participating in predictable collaborative 

events, and education. Specific examples of success to date include the high level 

of coordination that was achieved between SOCOM and USAID during the recent 

Haiti earthquake disaster. Due to the fact that SOCOM and USAID had a developed 

and mature partnership program prior to the crisis, the two organizations were able 

to quickly and effectively respond. Other examples include SOCOM’s ongoing collaboration with Ambassador Benjamin’s office (DOS S/CT), NCTC, and other agencies in the development of deradicalization programs to counter violent extremists. 

Regardless of which organization has lead, operations—to include stability operations—are best executed when all organizations involved establish transparent collaborative events that seek to develop a common understanding of the problem-set, 

inform leadership of issues and impediments, and develop synchronized actions that 

leverage the full capabilities and authorities of the whole-of-government. 

General PETRAEUS. The interagency, whole-of-government approach has greatly 

improved since the start of OEF. In fact, it is now nearly impossible to believe that 

only one government agency has the ability to conduct successful stability operations by itself. Success requires the full strength and capabilities that only a wholeof-government approach can provide. DOS has made significant progress in improving their expertise available on the ground in Afghanistan. As of April 1, 2010, there 

are over 1,000 civilians in country. U.S. civilians have established DSTs in 32 of 

ISAF’s focus districts with an additional 8 DSTs scheduled for activation in 2010. 

CENTCOM is in constant contact with Ambassador Holbrooke and we hold weekly meetings to address critical civilian-military effectiveness issues. In fact, I believe 

that the partnership between the government agencies and departments working in 

Afghanistan is the strongest seen to date. To enhance our ability to work as a strong 

reliable partner, CENTCOM has embedded members of other U.S. Government 

agencies in our headquarters. These interagency experts provide key links into their 

parent organizations and are full members of the command that work closely to 

shape strategic-level planning on counterterrorism, counternarcotics, and humanitarian assistance. 

DOS is more than capable of taking over the lead role for stability operations in 

Afghanistan. As was proven after clearing operations for Operation Moshtarak, DOS 

along with USAID deployed several staff members, contractors, and coalition partners to initiate stability operations that included infrastructure repairs, agricultural 

initiatives, emergency humanitarian assistance, civil administration development, 

and political outreach. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR SUSAN M. COLLINS

AFGHANISTAN

108. Senator COLLINS. General Petraeus, last August when I traveled to Afghanistan with Senators McCain, Lieberman, and Graham, we received a bleak report 

from General McChrystal. In essence, he told us that the Taliban had the momentum and that the situation was serious and deteriorating. What is your current assessment of the situation in Afghanistan compared to the August assessment of 

General McChrystal? 

General PETRAEUS. The security situation in Afghanistan remains serious but is 

no longer deteriorating. We have made progress in Afghanistan since last August 

2009 in strategy, manning, and the overall situation on the ground. We have the 

right strategy that addresses building the ANSF and creates the security structure 

needed for good governance and development to take place. We have the troops 

ready to take the initiative and momentum away from the insurgency as we get 

close to having most of the 30,000 additional troops in place. The organizational, 

leadership, strategy, and resource initiatives we have worked this past year have 

already begun to change the dynamics in important ways. The loss of innocent life, 

for example, has been dramatically reduced in the past year. 

No doubt, 2010 will be a tough year and I expect that the endeavor in Afghanistan will, as was the case when we conducted the surge in Iraq, become harder before it gets easier. However, I believe we will soon begin to see the positive results 

of our planning and operational efforts. 

IRAQ

109. Senator COLLINS. General Petraeus, following last week’s Iraqi election, General Odierno said that the United States is sticking with its plan to draw down 

832 

troops to 50,000 by the summer and that the ISF will be ready by the end of next 

year to take complete responsibility for security in Iraq. However, there have been 

some recent reports that the Iraqis are hedging as to their commitment to ending 

U.S. military involvement in 2011 and Prime Minister Maliki raised the possibility 

of asking U.S. forces to remain beyond the 2011 deadline. In your opinion, will the 

Iraqis be ready to assume control when U.S. forces draw down to 50,000 troops? 

General PETRAEUS. The ISF are on track to achieve the MEC to assume full control of internal security on December 31, 2011; however, the ISF will require continued assistance as they progress towards the MEC necessary for external security. 

Through General Odierno and our U.S. forces in Iraq, we continue to work on improving their external security capabilities with increased training and equipping. 

The Iraqi Army continues to make steady progress toward MEC but will not 

achieve the necessary foundation for defense against external threats before December 2011 due to equipment procurement timelines and subsequent training requirements. Specifically, equipping, training, and combined arms integration of the M1A1 

fleet, artillery units, and key mechanized enablers will not be complete prior to December 2011. 

The Iraqi Navy is on track to achieve MEC by December 2011, although there 

are risks if shortfalls in manning, C4ISR, maintenance, and infrastructure are not 

adequately addressed. The Iraqi Navy will assume responsibility for protection of 

the oil platforms in 2011. Due to the importance of these oil terminals to the Iraqi 

economy, a higher level of capability is required. 

The Iraqi Air Force is on the path to achieving MEC by the end of 2011 in all 

mission categories except airspace control and fixed-wing airlift. Specifically, multirole fighter, long-range radar, and C–130J delivery and fielding will not be complete 

prior to December 2011. The Iraqi Air Force’s December 2011 goal is the development of a capability to support ISF COIN operations and have an initial air sovereignty capability in place. Delayed execution of the Iraqi Air Force Service Plan 

and lack of funding for acquisitions, accessions, contract logistics support, and 

sustainment of current fleet all present obstacles to achieving the capability to conduct minimal air sovereignty operations by December 2011. 

Although the ISF are not on track to achieve MEC for external security by the 

end of 2011, the Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq will continue the training and 

equipping process post December 2011 to attain MEC for external security. 

110. Senator COLLINS. General Petraeus, according to the Pentagon’s most recent 

quarterly report to Congress on Iraq, ‘‘Iran continues to fund, train, equip, and give 

some direction to residual Shia militias and extremist elements in Iraq.’’ How much 

influence does Iran have in Iraq? 

General PETRAEUS. Iran still has a significant amount of influence in Iraq which 

it exerts via the primary Shia militias it supports, such as Asa’ib al Haqq (AAH) 

and Kata’ib Hizballah (KH), as well as political influence through a variety of different Iraqi interlocutors within the Government of Iraq. However, Iran has experienced setbacks to its influence campaign, such as Prime Minister Maliki’s March 

2008 ‘‘Operation Charge of the Knights’’ where Iranian-backed Shia militias were 

forced out of key terrain in Iraq, and the passage of the U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement, which Iran vehemently opposed. 

The Iraqi election is a more recent case study on Iranian influence in Iraq and 

may illustrate Iran’s current ability to exert influence. Iran desires a weak Shiadominated central government in Iraq, amenable to Iranian influence. Iran would 

like the two rival Shia parties, Iraqi National Alliance (INA) and Prime Minister 

Maliki’s State of Law (SoL), to unite following the 7 March 2010 elections. Though 

it is still too early to tell whether Iran will be able to successfully mediate the disputes between INA and SoL, Iran’s ability to do so may produce an Iraqi Government willing to seek counsel and support from Iran. Regardless of whether such a 

union emerges, Iran will retain some degree of influence over the Iraqi Government 

through individual Iraqis with longstanding cultural, religious, political, and financial ties to Iran. 

There continues to be evidence of Iran’s support to multiple Shia militias in Iraq 

via the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps-Qods Force (IRGC–QF). The Government of Iraq’s willingness to confront Tehran, coupled with an aggressive U.S. force 

protection posture, did have an impact on IRGC–QF’s support to these militias. It 

appears the impact was temporary as both AAH and KH continue to receive training, funding, safe-haven, and guidance from the IRGC–QF. While we assess the 

quantity of IRGC–QF’s provision of lethal aid has decreased, the sophistication of 

the weaponry IRGC–QF provides has increased over the same period. 

833 

111. Senator COLLINS. General Petraeus, you testified that no captured terrorists 

in your AOR have been sent for detention in Guantanamo during the last 18 

months. Where are captured terrorists being held? 

General PETRAEUS. Captured enemy combatants who are not released or turned 

over to the host nation are held by U.S. forces in one of two theater internment facilities (TIFs). The U.S. TIF in Iraq, Camp Cropper, is located in Baghdad. The U.S. 

TIF in Afghanistan, also known as the Detention Facility in Parwan, is located on 

Bagram Air Field. 

[Whereupon, at 12:20 p.m., the committee adjourned.] 

(835) 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION 

FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 

2011 

FRIDAY, MARCH 26, 2010 

U.S. SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, 

Washington, DC. 

U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND, U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND, 

AND U.S. FORCES KOREA 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:04 a.m. in room SD– 

106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin (chairman) presiding. 

Committee members present: Senators Levin, Lieberman, Akaka, 

Ben Nelson, Kaufman, LeMieux, and Burr. 

Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk. 

Majority staff members present: Madelyn R. Creedon, counsel; 

Richard W. Fieldhouse, professional staff member; Jessica L. Kingston, research assistant; Jason W. Maroney, counsel; Roy F. Phillips, professional staff member; and Russell L. Shaffer, counsel. 

Minority staff members present: Michael V. Kostiw, professional 

staff member; Daniel A. Lerner, professional staff member; and 

Dana W. White, professional staff member. 

Staff assistants present: Jennifer R. Knowles, Brian F. Sebold, 

and Breon N. Wells. 

Committee members’ assistants present: James Tuite, assistant 

to Senator Byrd; Christopher Griffin and Vance Serchuk, assistants 

to Senator Lieberman; Nick Ikeda, assistant to Senator Akaka; 

Ann Premer, assistant to Senator Ben Nelson; Halie Soifer, assistant to Senator Kaufman; Lenwood Landrum, assistant to Senator 

Sessions; Clyde A. Taylor IV, assistant to Senator Chambliss; Victor Cervino and Brian Walsh, assistants to Senator LeMieux; and 

Kevin Kane, assistant to Senator Burr. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN 

Chairman LEVIN. Good morning, everybody. 

Today, we’re going to be hearing from three of our combatant 

commanders to receive testimony regarding the issues and the 

challenges that they face in their respective mission areas. 

On behalf of the committee, let me welcome back General 

Chilton, Commander of our U.S. Strategic Command 

(STRATCOM); Admiral Willard, Commander of the U.S. Pacific 

836 

Command (PACOM); and General Sharp, Commander of the 

United Nations Command (UNC), Combined Forces Command 

(CFC), and U.S. Forces Korea (USFK). 

This committee appreciates your many years of faithful service 

to this country and the many sacrifices that you and your families 

make in that cause. We would appreciate your thanking, on behalf 

of our committee, the men and women that you lead, both military 

and civilian, for their service, their patriotism, and their dedication. 

We also want to thank you for rearranging your schedules to be 

here this morning. We know these hours that you have here are 

precious, and we thought it would be better to go ahead today, even 

though our attendance is going to be less, rather than to bring you 

back at some future time, which would really disrupt your schedules. The rather arcane rule of the Senate that was used to prevent 

us from meeting on Wednesday is still a rule of the Senate, and 

as long as it’s there, somebody can exercise that right. It was exercised, and, as a result, inconvenienced you and many members of 

this committee, as well. But, that’s where we are, so thank you for 

your flexibility in this matter. 

Today’s hearing, we’re going to hear the views and assessments 

of senior U.S. Commanders in the Asia Pacific region, together 

with the global perspectives of STRATCOM for those issues that 

pertain across the combatant commands. 

First, on PACOM: U.S. PACOM’s geographic area of responsibility (AOR) is home to over half of the world’s population and to 

five of the world’s six largest militaries. Stability and security in 

this vast region is vital to our interests, as well as to the interests 

of our allies and our partners. While the region as a whole remains 

relatively stable, we cannot afford to take this stability for granted. 

We must remain vigilant in the region and reassure our allies that 

we will continue to work with them to further our mutual interests. 

The situation on the Korean Peninsula remains tense, although 

relatively quiet compared to a year ago, when North Korea’s aggressive rhetoric, multiple ballistic missile test launches, and nuclear detonation heightened regional concerns and resulted in a 

tightening of U.N. sanctions. 

In recent months, the United States and North Korea have had 

modest bilateral discussions in a effort to regain traction in the 

Six-Party process, but there’s been no meaningful progress so far. 

Since nuclear inspectors left North Korea last year, the status of 

North Korea’s nuclear program has been largely unknown. While 

the nuclear issue garners much of the international attention, also 

of concern is the apparent unstable nature of the North Korean regime, coupled with a conventional military capability that represents a significant threat to security on the peninsula. 

China’s influence continues to grow regionally and globally, and, 

at the same time, China continues to grow its military. It is important to anticipate and understand the intended and unintended 

consequences of these developments on the region at large. As China’s influence and military grow, traditional alliances and partnerships in the region may come under pressure from a perception 

that the balance of power is shifting, and other countries in the region may deem it necessary to grow their militaries, as well. Such 

837 

developments need to be understood and inform our decisionmaking. 

China’s growing involvement with Iran, including investment in 

the Iranian energy sector, is an example of China’s global influence 

expansion efforts. China is the primary obstacle to more stringent 

United Nations Security Council sanctions against Iran. 

In Japan, the installation of a new government last summer represented new challenges and opportunities in the longstanding defense relationship between our countries. For instance, the Defense 

Policy Review Initiative (DPRI), negotiated between our two countries over a number of years, and agreed to in 2006, has been the 

subject of renewed consideration by the Japanese, particularly as 

it relates to the movement of U.S. marines on Okinawa and the relocation of some of those marines to Guam. This matter needs to 

be resolved, as does the impact of the associated military buildup 

on Guam, and the details of the plan to ensure that the influx of 

military personnel and their families is done with due regard to the 

effects on the Island of Guam and their population. 

The committee is also interested in U.S. efforts in the Asia Pacific region to provide humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, 

to expand the already strong partnerships with friends like Australia and India and others, and to combat violent extremism, particularly in Southeast Asia. 

STRATCOM has global responsibilities that require it to work 

with all the combatant and regional commands. STRATCOM’s 

broad mission includes both operational and coordinating responsibilities. The Command has operational responsibility for strategic 

deterrence in space and cyberspace operations. It coordinates actions across the Commands in areas of missile defense, combating 

weapons of mass destruction (WMD), allocation of high-demand/ 

low-density intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets, such as unmanned aerial vehicles, and helps integrate information operations. Also, with the growing threat to cyberoperations, the new Cyber Command (CYBERCOM) is being established as a subunified command of STRATCOM. 

Very shortly, we expect to have a new treaty, which will be the 

successor to the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), and a 

new Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). Both of these are expected to 

bring about new and carefully considered changes to the role of nuclear weapons and national strategy, and the size of the stockpile 

to support that role. We hope to hold hearings on the NPR when 

both are submitted to Congress. General Chilton, as Commander of 

STRATCOM, will play an important role in the ratification process, 

and we look forward to working closely together in that process. 

A second domain over which STRATCOM has responsibility is 

space. As the leading spacefaring nation, the United States must 

sustain and protect its space assets. On the other hand, how these 

space assets actually contribute to military operations is not always well understood. Today we have an opportunity, with Admiral 

Willard and General Sharp here, to explore the importance of space 

systems and what would happen to our military capabilities if 

these assets were lost or degraded. 

Finally, the role of the military and combating WMD, and how 

these capabilities are integrated with other elements of the U.S. 

838 

Government and the international community, is an additional 

challenge confronting both STRATCOM and PACOM. 

The Asia Pacific region continues to be one of the hotbeds of proliferation for both nuclear and missile technologies. There is continuing evidence of nuclear smuggling in the region and around the 

world that each regional commander must address in a coordinated 

fashion. We look forward to hearing from our witnesses about that. 

It’s a pleasure to have each of you with us this morning. We look 

forward to your testimony and to the questions. I don’t—I know 

that General—that Senator McCain was unable to make it here 

this morning. 

Senator Burr. 

STATEMENT OF SENATOR RICHARD BURR 

Senator BURR. Mr. Chairman, thank you for the recognition. 

Before I ask that Senator McCain’s remarks be put in the record, 

since I feel somewhat personally responsible for this Friday hearing, I would like to say to the Chair and to my colleagues what I 

have said to our panel of witnesses privately, that I certainly do 

apologize for the delay in the hearing and causing this Friday hearing. Sometimes things are out of our control as it relates to the 

functions of the Senate. 

I would ask, at this time, that Senator McCain’s entire opening 

statement be included in the record. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you. It will be included in the record. 

[The prepared statement of Senator McCain follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I join you in welcoming our witnesses today. I am 

grateful to each of you for your long and distinguished service to our country, and 

I hope that you will convey my sincere appreciation to all the courageous men and 

women under your command. 

Our Nation faces significant challenges around the world—and in few places are 

those challenges more complicated than in the Asia-Pacific region. Asia’s economies 

and militaries are growing in strength and influence. Our Nation has long relied 

on our strong alliances with Japan, South Korea and Australia to promote security 

in the region—and increasingly, beyond it as well. Today, more than 2,000 troops 

from the Asia-Pacific region are serving and sacrificing alongside our men and 

women in uniform in Afghanistan. 

In addition, allies like the Philippines and partner nations like Indonesia are 

working with us to counter violent extremists in their own countries. The Filipino 

military has made great strides in combating Abu Sayyaf, an al Qaeda affiliate, in 

the southern Philippines. Despite a hiatus in our military relationship with Indonesia, the U.S.-Indonesia partnership has proven to be invaluable in the fight 

against violent extremists in the region. We should work to build our relationship 

with Indonesia into a genuine strategic partnership to tackle today’s global threats. 

Beyond combating terrorism, the United States must forge deeper and more comprehensive partnerships with other emerging powers in Asia—with Vietnam, Malaysia, and especially India, among others. Our relationship with New Delhi has never 

been simple, and it never will be, but the fact is, we are now expanding our strategic partnership with India to address issues not only of regional, but of global, importance: from nonproliferation and cyber security, to humanitarian assistance and 

the promotion of freedom. Our Nation has vital interests in the Asia-Pacific region, 

and it is imperative that we expand the circle of capable friends and allies who can 

help us share the burden of long-term security. 

General Sharp: I am encouraged by the progress that U.S. Forces-Korea has made 

in transitioning the U.S. Headquarters Command into a Combined Forces Command. I am also pleased to hear that South Korea will deploy 350 troops to support 

a Provincial Readiness Team in Afghanistan in July. I look forward to hearing your 

assessment of the current readiness of South Korean forces and your thoughts about 

the recent claim that North Korea has increased its missile arsenal by 25 percent 

839 

in the last 2 years, a total of some 1,000 missiles, including intermediate range missiles that can hit all of Japan and threaten Guam. 

Admiral Willard, our relationship with China is complicated. I believe that a U.S. 

partnership with a strong and successful China—a China that shares the responsibilities, not just the benefits, open regional and international order—can be an important force for stability in the 21st century. But many of China’s actions at 

present are very worrisome. 

I am concerned by Beijing’s ongoing and largely opaque military build-up, including anti-satellite and anti-access capabilities, as well as other new and significant 

tools of power projection. I am concerned about China’s irregular engagement with 

U.S. vessels and their aggressive sovereign aspirations in international waters—further exacerbating existing regional maritime disputes. I am deeply concerned by 

China’s increasing willingness to use its rising power to shield and support some 

of the worst behavior by some of the world’s most destabilizing actors, especially the 

Government of Iran. Admiral Willard, I look forward to your assessment of China’s 

growing capabilities, its strategic intentions, and its conduct in common global 

spaces—air, sea, land, and space. 

Finally, General Chilton, as Commander of U.S. Strategic Command, you are responsible for the health and readiness of our strategic deterrent. While we have yet 

to see the President’s delayed Nuclear Posture Review, the current condition of the 

nuclear complex is not sustainable. In order to responsibly reduce the size of our 

arsenal, we must provide the resources necessary to recapitalize and modernize the 

long-neglected infrastructure responsible for ensuring the safety, security, reliability, and credibility of our national deterrent. While the fiscal year 2011 budget 

request is a step forward in making the necessary investments for modernization, 

a sustained long-term commitment is essential. I look forward to hearing from you 

how well the proposed fiscal year 2011 funding addresses the vital needs of our 

stockpile. 

While our troops face many formidable challenges in the world, especially in Iraq 

and Afghanistan, we cannot lose sight of the need to enhance our global capacity 

to deter threats, defend friends, defeat enemies, and provide needed humanitarian 

assistance. All three of you are a credit to your service and to our Nation. I thank 

you all, and I look forward to your testimony. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Senator, it is very clear that the delay here 

was not your doing whatsoever. You had nothing to do with it, except you happened to be on the floor at the moment when someone 

else wanted to raise an objection, and you did what you are, I 

think, dutybound to do as a member of your caucus, which is to reflect that objection. But, it’s clear that you had nothing to do with 

it, except being at the wrong place at the wrong time, basically. 

So, we will now—I think we’re going to be calling on our witnesses in the order—going from our left to your right, I believe. 

So, General Chilton, we’re going to start with you and then we’re 

going to move down the table. 

STATEMENT OF GEN. KEVIN P. CHILTON, USAF, COMMANDER, 

U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND 

General CHILTON. Very good. Thank you, Senator. 

Chairman Levin, Senator Burr, and members of the committee, 

thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I assure you, sir, it’s 

no burden for us to reschedule and appear before this committee. 

It’s a great honor to represent the extraordinary men and women 

of STRATCOM. I’m privileged to showcase this joint team’s 

achievements, discuss our requirements, and highlight future national security challenges across our diverse and global mission 

areas. 

STRATCOM’s Active Duty, Reserve military members, civilians, 

and contractors form a superb joint team, whose dedicated planning, advocacy, and operational execution efforts advance our 

840 

warfighting priorities. We continue to strengthen and sharpen our 

focus on deterrence, while at the same time focusing on preserving 

our freedom of action in space and cyberspace. 

In all of these efforts, we greatly appreciate the support of Members of Congress, and particularly this committee and your staff, 

whose legislative investments across our mission areas enable us 

to deliver global security for America. 

Over the past year, we have actively supported the administration’s four major defense policy reviews, which uniquely impacted 

STRATCOM: the Quadrennial Defense Review, the NPR, the Ballistic Missile Defense Review, and the Space Posture Review, which 

is still in work. We also provided analytical and intellectual capital 

to the New START treaty negotiations. While not all yet completed, 

these reviews will shape the role of our strategic capabilities and 

define the investments necessary to recapitalize and sustain them. 

Their focus areas also highlight STRATCOM’s place at the nexus 

of today’s national security challenges. Global security in general, 

and the United States specifically, face a myriad of challenges 

today, from economic and political turmoil, nontraditional threats, 

terrorism, and continuing oversea contingency operations. Actors 

continue to seek ways to challenge the United States and our allies 

and the conventional and asymmetric means by which to do so. 

STRATCOM remains committed to conducting deterrence, space, 

and cyberspace operations, and advocating for the capabilities our 

national leadership and geographic commanders need each and 

every day in the areas of missile defense, information operations, 

ISR, and combating WMD. 

In the deterrence arena, our energetic exercise program conducted Exercise Global Lightning 2009 this past year, the most extensive nuclear command and control and communications field exercise in over a decade. Our forces’ success proved America’s wellplaced confidence in our Nation’s strategic deterrent and our—and 

demonstrated the success of this Command’s effort to reemphasize 

a culture of excellence across the nuclear enterprise. 

In space, our acceptance of the Space Situational Awareness 

Sharing Mission expanded the Command’s relationships with international and commercial partners toward ensuring a safe and responsibly managed space domain. Future space surveillance and 

situational awareness efforts and space investments must continue 

to build on recent advances, including greater collision avoidance 

analysis to ensure the availability of essential space-based capabilities for, not only the United States, but for our warfighters. 

Moreover, the Department of Defense (DOD) sustained its 

progress in defending DOD information networks by unifying 

STRATCOM’s components for network warfare and global network 

operations, by increasing the training of cyberprofessionals, and by 

welcoming the standup of service cybercomponents. We carefully 

planned for the standup of CYBERCOM and look forward to the 

confirmation of its first commander. Additionally, in the past year, 

we dramatically expanded our military-to-military outreach program to promote open dialogue and examine the possibility of new 

partnerships in space and cyberspace. 

Although not contained within the DOD budget, I would like to 

mention my support for the administration’s fiscal year 2011 reVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:37 May 06, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00846 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\62155.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
841 

1The six mission areas are: (1) defend the United States and support civil authorities at 

home, (2) succeed in counterinsurgency, stability, and counterterrorism operations, (3) build the 

security capacity of partner states, (4) deter and defeat aggression in anti-access environments, 

(5) prevent proliferation and counter weapons of mass destruction, and (6) operate effectively 

in cyberspace. 

quest for the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). 

The budget seeks nearly a 13-percent increase for NNSA to provide 

much-needed infrastructure, human capital, and stockpile management investments. I have long advocated for such critical investments, which help keep our stockpile safe, secure, and effective. 

Our deterrence credibility rests on such confidence, and I appreciate this committee’s support for the request. 

In the year ahead, STRATCOM will address the challenges I 

have mentioned above as we focus on further developing our workforce, sustaining a culture of excellence in the nuclear enterprise, 

and integrating our global missions. STRATCOM’s uniquely global 

missions support national objectives, whole-of-government solutions, and enhanced international cooperation. Our future success 

requires investments in deterrence, the standup of CYBERCOM, 

and expanding our awareness of, and sustaining our capability investments within, the space domain. 

As we move forward, I look forward to continuing to partner with 

this committee and your staff. Thank you again for the opportunity 

to testify before this committee today. I look forward to your questions. I would ask that my posture statement be accepted for the 

record. 

Thank you, Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, General. Your entire 

statement will be made part of the record. 

[The prepared statement of General Chilton follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY GEN. KEVIN P. CHILTON, USAF 

Chairman Levin, Ranking Member McCain, distinguished members of the Committee on Armed Services, thank you for the opportunity to testify today, representing the extraordinary men and women of U.S. Strategic Command 

(STRATCOM). I’m privileged to showcase this joint team’s achievements, discuss 

our requirements, and highlight future national security challenges across our mission areas. STRATCOM’s Active Duty and Reserve military members, civilians, and 

contractors form a superb joint team, whose dedicated planning, advocacy, and operational execution efforts advance our warfighting priorities. We continue to 

strengthen and sharpen our focus on deterrence while at the same time preserving 

our freedom of action in space and cyberspace. Before continuing, I must say that 

we appreciate your support, because legislative investments across our mission 

areas are essential to our providing global security for America. 

Admiral Mullen’s memorandum Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Guidance 

for 2009–2010 detailed the Joint Force’s strategic objectives through 2010. These objectives include defending our national interests in the broader Middle East and 

South Central Asia, considering ways and means to improve the force’s health, and 

balancing global strategic risks through deterrence. The uninformed observer might 

expect STRATCOM to aid the Joint Force only with deterrence, but this globally 

operational command does much more. In fact, the Quadrennial Defense Review 

(QDR) identified six key missions for the Department of Defense (DOD),1 and 

STRATCOM plays a role in each of these missions, whether by conducting operations, supporting and advocating for global warfighter needs, closing gaps in geographic seams, or building relationships across a growing range of partners. 

STRATCOM continues to support actively the DOD work on the QDR, Space Posture Review, Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), Ballistic Missile Defense Review 

(BMDR), and the new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) negotiations. 

These reviews and START will shape the role of our strategic capabilities and define 

the investments necessary to recapitalize and sustain them, while highlighting 

842 

STRATCOM’s place at the nexus of today’s primary national security challenges. We 

are now helping to translate these reports into the strategy and plans that our components and the joint force need. This year we will continue to focus on further developing our workforce, sustaining the highest possible standards in the nuclear enterprise, and integrating our global capabilities to support national and theater objectives. These efforts will require investing in the deterrent enterprise, identifying 

mechanisms to better integrate operations, plans, requirements, and activities 

among our components, standing up U.S. Cyber Command (CYBERCOM) to better 

execute our cyber mission, and sustaining the critical national security capabilities 

provided by on-orbit satellite constellations. 

U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND

As we address today’s challenges, STRATCOM has already devoted significant effort to align our priorities, plans, and investments across our components while simultaneously executing deterrence, space, and cyberspace operations. We have initiated and sustained several successful engagement efforts. STRATCOM’s reinvigorated military-to-military outreach programs, which included senior-leader discussions with key friends and allies, including the United Kingdom, France, Japan, 

South Korea, Australia, and Israel on such topics as deterrence, space, cyberspace, 

and missile defense. STRATCOM was honored to host the United Kingdom’s First 

Sea Lord, Admiral Sir Mark Stanhope; Australia’s Vice Chief of Defence Force, Lieutenant General David Hurley; France’s Chief of the Defense Staff, General JeanLouis Georgelin; and China’s Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission, 

Gen Xu Caihou. Gen Xu’s request to visit STRATCOM during his U.S. tour highlighted China’s recognition of STRATCOM’s global role, and our very positive exchange showcased the tremendous potential of military-to-military relationships to 

build confidence and understanding between our countries. These dialogues are important and must continue. 

Over the past year, we welcomed the stand-up of Air Force Global Strike Command and our components’ increased focus on the deterrence mission. In addition 

to maturing the adjustments we made in our headquarters staff, STRATCOM’s 

Global Thunder 2009 deterrence exercise constituted the most extensive nuclear 

command, control, and communications (NC3) field exercise in over a decade. It 

demonstrated the full range of nuclear deterrence capabilities by integrating submarine strategic deterrent patrols, more than 90 aircraft sorties, an ICBM test 

launch, and 5 days of continuous airborne command-and-control operations. Global 

Thunder’s success demonstrated the readiness of America’s strategic forces. Continued support for the joint training requirements and the established Combatant 

Commander Exercise Engagement (CE2) Defense-wide account is essential to ensuring future STRATCOM mission readiness. 

Today’s strategic mission requirements also demand the finest in command, control, and communications capabilities. Our 1950s-era headquarters falls short of providing the capabilities we need. We appreciate congressional support for the planning and design funds appropriated in fiscal years 2009 and 2010 and requested for 

2011. These investments move us closer to a 21st century headquarters and command center for deterrence, space, and cyberspace operations. 

In the cyber domain, the Secretary of Defense directed STRATCOM to establish 

CYBERCOM as a sub-unified command. This effort continued the reorganization of 

cyber forces that began with the Secretary’s direction in October 2008 to place 

STRATCOM’s Joint Task Force for Global Network Operations (JTF GNO) under 

the operational control of Joint Functional Component Command for Network Warfare (JFCC NW). From their inception, JFCC NW and JTF GNO had segregated offensive and defensive military cyber operations. This segregation detracts from natural synergies and ignores our experience in organizing to operate in the air, land, 

sea, and space domains. The establishment of CYBERCOM will remedy this problem in the cyber domain and create a robust sub-unified command to address the 

growing importance of the cyber domain to national security. We have already 

begun consolidating JTF GNO and JFCC NW in preparation for the formal establishment of CYBERCOM, which awaits confirmation of the nominated commander. 

We look forward to continuing to work with Congress and our Agency partners as 

we move forward to establish CYBERCOM. 

The Services are also reorganizing their cyber forces in order to present trained 

and equipped cyber operators to the Joint Force. Over the past year, each Service 

reshaped the alignment of its cyber forces into a more unified organization, and we 

welcome the stand-up of Army Forces CYBERCOM, Marine Corps Forces 

CYBERCOM, Fleet CYBERCOM, and the 24th Air Force. These forces will enhance 

843 

our ability to operate and defend DOD information networks and provide the President with response options in cyberspace. 

To enhance the level of global strategic dialogue and STRATCOM’s support to 

other combatant commands, we are more broadly engaging our military and nonmilitary partners. In 2009, STRATCOM launched new or renewed annual symposia 

for each of our three lines of operation. More than 5,000 attendees, representing 

multiple commands, universities, industry, and at least 10 other countries (including His Excellency Sergey Kislyak, Ambassador of the Russian Federation to the 

United States) held substantive discussions on challenges facing our deterrence, 

space, and cyberspace professionals. STRATCOM teams also deployed across the 

globe to provide in-theater subject-matter expertise. Our teams facilitated more effective employment of our capabilities in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), space, operational security, electronic warfare (EW), and cyber. These 

accomplishments, along with development of integrated missile defense (IMD) capabilities and increases in space situational awareness (SSA), represent just a small 

part of STRATCOM’s accomplishments. 

STRATEGIC CONTEXT

Last spring, President Obama stated that as the world ‘‘has become more interconnected . . . we’ve seen events move faster than our ability to control them.’’ Global 

economic and political turmoil, rapidly evolving information technology, nontraditional threats, continuing overseas contingency operations, and terrorism represent 

just some of the factors influencing global and regional security challenges. Moreover, state and non-state actors pursue traditional and asymmetric means to challenge the United States and our allies. With the exception of the United States, all 

nuclear weapon states continue to modernize their nuclear weapon stockpiles and 

in some cases grow them further. Although the United States and Russia are reducing their strategic arsenals, North Korea and Iran remain on a dangerous nuclear 

path. Additionally, we find increasing threats to our freedom of action in the global 

commons of space and cyberspace, even as the importance of these domains to our 

national security continues to grow. For example, Iran’s successful February 2009 

satellite launch and North Korea’s attempt a few months later illustrate the spread 

of space launch technology. However, successful space-launch vehicles can also represent progress toward an effective intercontinental ballistic missile capability. If 

perfected, such long-range ballistic missiles would place a larger area of the world 

at risk. 

Cyber networks weave through every facet of our lives and enable extraordinary 

communication, intelligence, and command and control capabilities. However, an adversary acting in cyberspace can steal critical information, thwart vital data transmissions, or create devastating effects beyond the cyber domain. Governments, militaries, corporations, universities, and the individual computer user must guard 

against vulnerabilities that are open to criminals, organized hacktivists, state actors, and insider threats. Addressing these challenges while capitalizing on the dramatic enabling capabilities of cyberspace requires an unwavering watchfulness, a 

dynamic defense-in-depth construct, a workforce that is carefully recruited, trained, 

and properly retained, strong partnerships, an infrastructure that supports global 

employment of DOD forces, and a realization that DOD’s cyber culture, conduct, and 

capabilities must change. 

STRATEGIC DETERRENCE

In an environment of such rapid economic, political, military, and technological 

changes, many wonder if ‘‘deterrence’’ is still possible. Today’s multi-polar and increasingly complex strategic environment, which includes threats posed by proliferation and terrorism, requires that we increase our focus on deterrence because effectively deterring threats to our Nation and our allies is not only possible, it is essential. 

Since the end of the Cold War, however, the serious study of deterrence theory 

and strategy has been inadequate. Much like our changing global context, modern 

deterrence challenges necessitate more complex approaches. The modern era of 

smart power requires a commitment to a whole-of-government deterrence effort that 

capitalizes on the full range of diplomatic, information, military, and economic activities. Despite this complex environment, we have skipped an entire generation of 

future policy makers, strategists, academics, and military professionals in terms of 

training and developing them in the field of deterrence. Preliminary work on the 

NPR and New START treaty revealed this shortage of human capital. STRATCOM’s 

first annual Deterrence Symposium, held this past summer in Omaha, was our initial public effort to revitalize attention to deterrence theory, thought, and practice. 

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Speaking in Prague last year, President Obama articulated his goal of moving toward a world without nuclear weapons, including a desire to reduce global nuclear 

dangers and the role of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy, while 

urging other nations to do the same. The President also asserted that ‘‘as long as 

these weapons exist, the United States will maintain a safe, secure, and effective 

arsenal to deter any adversary, and guarantee that defense to our allies.’’ Just days 

before the President’s remarks, the Strategic Posture Commission concluded that 

‘‘nuclear weapons are both the greatest potential threat to our way of life and important guarantors of U.S. security.’’ The commissioners agreed on two parallel 

paths forward: ‘‘one path which reduces nuclear dangers by maintaining our deterrence, and the other which reduces nuclear dangers through arms control and international programs to prevent proliferation.’’ As the command uniquely responsible 

for our nuclear deterrent and for synchronizing DOD combating weapons of mass 

destruction (CWMD) planning, STRATCOM finds itself actively engaged in all of 

these endeavors. 

Throughout the 65-year history of nuclear weapons, no nuclear power has been 

conquered or even put at risk of conquest, nor has the world witnessed the globeconsuming conflicts of earlier history. More than 180 state parties to the Treaty on 

the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) have either foresworn the pursuit 

of nuclear weapons (in many cases because of the promise of America’s extended deterrent umbrella) or pledged in good faith to move toward eventual disarmament. 

The United States and Russia have made steep reductions in their nuclear arsenals 

since the end of the Cold War (a seldom recognized but important demonstration 

of U.S. commitment) while joining together to pursue the goals of the Cooperative 

Threat Reduction Program. We have invested considerable intellectual effort toward 

a stable world order, where nuclear weapons seem at once dangerous, undesirable, 

expensive, a tempting source of power and prestige, and yet also essential to continued peace and stability. 

Today, our nuclear weapons and triad of delivery systems remain essential to our 

national security. Nonetheless, in light of the global security environment, we 

should continually consider to what degree nuclear weapons remain relevant, 

whether ours measurably encourage or discourage proliferation, and to what extent 

reductions and/or force size and posture changes enhance peace and strategic stability. At the end of the day, all of our actions must enhance the security of the 

United States, our most solemn responsibility. 

The role of our Nation’s nuclear weapons in maintaining peace and stability, and 

therefore the security of the United States, is deterrence. Our deterrence strategy 

is predicated on the effectiveness of six distinct facets that in the aggregate make 

our strategy credible. These six facets are weapons, delivery systems, threat warning, nuclear command and control (NC2), weapon production, and industrial base. 

I will briefly discuss each of these. 

Weapons 

Nuclear weapons remain fundamental to our deterrent capability. Increasing the 

safety, security, and long-term confidence in the U.S. nuclear arsenal remains a top 

priority. However, the weapons we rely on today for deterrence were designed for 

short operating lives in a different era with different safety and security requirements. While individual components may last for years, combining the components 

in a radioactive environment has effects that we cannot fully predict. As recently 

noted in government review of the stockpile assessment, our current approaches to 

delivery system sustainment are not tenable over the long term and, for the weapons themselves, they are also not tenable if we desire to implement improvements 

to safety and security features. 

As we ramp up to full-rate W76–1 production, we must also address promptly the 

B61 warhead life extension. By doing the B61 nuclear life extension now along with 

the funded non-nuclear life extension, we have an opportunity to save cost by avoiding a second life extension in the 2020s while increasing confidence in the safety, 

security, and effectiveness of the stockpile consistent with the President’s vision. We 

must act now to fit the life extension within the narrow window of opportunity in 

the production complex. 

We must also begin exploring sustainment options for the W78 intercontinental 

ballistic missile (ICBM) and W88 SLBM warheads. The Strategic Posture Commission noted that any options would require some combination of refurbishment, 

reuse, and replacement, with decisions best made on a case-by-case basis. The Nuclear Posture Review is examining the appropriate policy guidance for considering 

future choices between refurbishment, reuse, and replacement. A recent study by 

the JASON Defense Advisory Group concluded that only reuse or replacement options allow for the inclusion of intrinsic surety features that would be the last line 

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of defense against unauthorized use. I urge you to support life extension studies requested this year to best inform the administration and Congress for future decisions. 

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 created the Stockpile Management Program to increase safety, security, and long-term effectiveness 

of the U.S. stockpile without nuclear testing. I believe we can meet the goals of this 

program without seeking new military capabilities or resorting to nuclear testing. 

Reductions in the number of warhead types and in the size of the hedge stockpile 

are also possible. 

Delivery Systems 

The triad of diverse and complementary strategic delivery systems has supported 

our national security objectives in the past and will continue to do so well into the 

future. STRATCOM is actively working with the Services to validate proposals to 

recapitalize and modernize our forces. Our ICBM force celebrated its 50th birthday 

in 2009 and remains the most responsive and cost-effective leg of the triad. The Air 

Force is concluding a decade-long modernization effort to sustain the Minuteman III 

through 2020 and is continuing the necessary steps to meet the congressional mandate to sustain the system through 2030. STRATCOM actively supports current lifeextension programs and is working closely with the Air Force to determine the requirements of our next land-based strategic deterrent system. The Navy’s SLBMs 

constitute the triad’s most survivable and assured response element. A stealthy delivery platform and a highly reliable weapon system have proven an effective strategic deterrent combination, and STRATCOM supports the Navy’s efforts to design 

a replacement for the Ohio-class ballistic missile submarine and sustain the Trident 

II D5 ballistic missile to meet future deterrent requirements. Finally, our Nation 

will continue to require a nuclear-capable bomber’s inherent flexibility to address 

a variety of possible adversaries and contingencies. STRATCOM supports the Air 

Force’s efforts to sustain and modernize mission-critical B–2 and B–52 systems. We 

are also working with the Air Force to identify requirements for the next manned, 

nuclear-capable, long-range strike platform and air-delivered standoff weapon. 

Threat Warning 

Another key element of credible deterrence is threat warning that provides attribution. For decades, the Defense Support Program (DSP) and our early warning radars have provided the essential data necessary to ensure timely and informed decisions. They provide prompt and accurate data to the President and combatant commanders for detection, identification, and predicted impact point of ballistic missiles. 

Sustainment of our early warning radars and fielding of the Space Based Infrared 

Satellite (SBIRS) geosynchronous constellation are essential to maintaining timely 

threat warning and attribution. However, though SBIRS was originally programmed 

to launch in 2002 as a replacement for DSP, we have not yet launched a single 

SBIRS satellite, and current schedules forecast that the first will not be ready before December 2010. I encourage your continued support to ensure the successful 

deployment of this system. 

NC2 

For deterrence to be effective, potential adversaries must know that the President 

can direct our nuclear forces under all circumstances. This requires a reliable and 

secure NC2 architecture. Our NC2 systems deliver warning and attribution information, provide for positive control of nuclear forces, and ensure our ability to employ 

nuclear weapons per Presidential direction. To remain effective in the most hostile 

nuclear environment, our NC2 relies on resilient satellite communication constellations (MILSTAR and its replacement, the Advanced Extremely High Frequency 

(AEHF)), cryptographic protection, and hardening. Many of our current NC2 systems were built during the Cold War and therefore require new investment for upgrades or replacement. Additionally, continued delays in procurement of AEHF-related equipment are a concern. The vital task of fielding modern and survivable 

NC2 systems is worthy of your full support. 

Weapons Production 

The Strategic Posture Commission and JASON noted that regardless of which 

life-extension options we choose for existing warheads, success relies on maintaining 

and renewing expertise and capabilities in science, technology, engineering, and production techniques unique to the nuclear weapons program. The National Nuclear 

Security Administration’s (NNSA) aging infrastructure limits its sustainment capacity, forcing all life extension activities into a tight, sequential, and delicately balanced timeline that incurs undue risk. Moreover, our nuclear weapons design and 

manufacturing workforce is both aging and shrinking due to a lack of meaningful 

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work, unstable funding, and the perception that nuclear weapons work is not important. The custodians of America’s nuclear deterrent—NNSA and its National Laboratories—have long labored in deteriorating plutonium and uranium facilities that 

date to the Manhattan Project and that the Strategic Posture Commission termed 

‘‘decrepit.’’ Decrepit is unacceptable. We owe our people at NNSA and the National 

Laboratories better. We owe our Nation better. 

To sustain the nuclear deterrent and successfully execute the Stockpile Management and Stewardship Programs, we must invest in new plutonium and uranium 

facilities, strengthen the science, technology, and engineering base needed to sustain 

and certify the stockpile, and seek out and develop our very best scientists and engineers. The President’s 13 percent increase in requested NNSA funding represents 

a long-overdue investment in the nuclear complex and its people. I strongly urge 

you to support this request. 

Industrial Base 

Industrial base challenges complicate the sustainment of current and the development of future delivery systems. An inability to produce items such as solid rocket 

motors and advanced navigation and control systems would threaten our ability to 

maintain strategic platforms. Perishable skills and technologies are required to sustain current systems beyond their expected life span and to develop the systems required for the future. The NDAA for Fiscal Year 2010 requirement to develop a 

SRM industrial base plan is an important step toward ensuring essential skills and 

capabilities in that portion of the deterrent industrial base, and we look forward to 

the results of the Office of the Secretary of Defense led task force chartered to fulfill 

this direction. Sufficient funding to sustain a responsive industrial base is a critical 

element of maintaining the credibility of deterrence, and we ask for continued congressional support. 

GLOBAL STRIKE

A limited, credible conventional prompt global strike capability would provide the 

President a broader range of non-nuclear options to address emerging threats rapidly. However, we continue to lack the ability to promptly deliver conventional effects against targets in denied or geographically isolated areas. As we continue to 

make progress through research, development, test, and evaluation subprojects, I 

ask for your continued support for a PGS capability that will be carefully sized to 

avoid perturbing our strategic relationships with Russia and China. 

SPACE

Operations in the space domain continue to enable an increasing number of capabilities that are essential to military operations, as well as the U.S. and global economy. At the same time, events during the past few years have reminded the world 

that space is no longer a pristine or unchallenged domain, but one that is subject 

to consequential mishaps, whether malicious or unintended. This was apparent in 

the aftermath of last year’s Iridium/Cosmos satellite collision, which removed any 

uncertainty about the destructive threat of space objects. We need sustained investment to provide comprehensive SSA, actionable collision avoidance (conjunction) 

analysis, robust on-orbit space constellations, and modeling and simulation capabilities. 

The importance of SSA to effective and sustained space operations grows each 

day. Trackable space debris grows each time existing debris collides or breaks apart, 

new objects enter orbit, or our sensors improve to reveal increasingly smaller objects. Despite significant SSA investments and advances to ensure our freedom of 

action in space, debris growth (4,600 objects in 1980; more than 21,000 today) continues to outpace SSA upgrades. This places a new urgency on improving SSA sensors and the technical and human capital resources performing collision avoidance 

analysis. In addition to maintaining critical legacy capabilities, new investments 

must focus on sensors, data fusion, network linkages, and our human capital base. 

Most of today’s sensors reside on legacy missile-warning platforms in the northern 

hemisphere. This coverage remains important but is inadequate for today. We must 

continue to work with international partners to expand the few sensors that make 

up our current capability. Further, we must provide space operators the same situational awareness we expect in every other domain, along with the tools and information to operate and protect national assets. The next generation of SSA sensors will 

provide coverage from space itself—a new vantage point. The Space Based Surveillance System will provide such coverage, and we continue to support this important 

step forward. 

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2Moore’s Law, named for Intel co-founder Gordon E. Moore, is the observation that processing 

speed and memory capacity for commercially available computers tend to double about every 

2 years. 

A noteworthy SSA advancement began when Congress authorized the Air Force’s 

pilot program on the desirability and feasibility of providing collision avoidance data 

to commercial and non-U.S. Government partners. After the successful development 

of the Commercial and Foreign Entities (CFE) program, DOD transitioned operational responsibility for CFE from the Air Force to STRATCOM’s Joint Functional 

Component Command for Space (JFCC Space) in 2009. JFCC Space’s Joint Space 

Operations Center at Vandenberg Air Force Base now provides important data to 

prevent collisions between satellites, manned space craft, and debris. In this effort, 

cooperative relationships between DOD and owner-operators are essential to developing behavioral norms for responsible space-faring nations. STRATCOM will continue to refine collision-avoidance measures, sponsor agreements with space-faring 

nations and commercial entities, and foster greater mutual support through allied 

and partner engagements. 

Another consequential area of space interest lies in how we manage the 

sustainment of our current constellations. The past decade’s strong focus on improving efficiency and cost effectiveness now threatens the uninterrupted delivery of several essential capabilities, as requirements for increasingly complex and efficient 

systems push delivery timelines to the future, exhaust our stock of replacement vehicles, increase costs, and leave capabilities at risk. We worked closely in the last 

year with a variety of independent commissions, studies mandated by Congress, and 

DOD examinations that revealed shortfalls in capacity and capabilities in the next 

5 to 7 years. Program schedule delays, cost overruns, dwindling inventories, and 

over confidence derived from our highly successful launch record could create the 

circumstance where just a single launch failure creates a capability gap. 

Lastly, effective 21st century space operations will depend on our ability to accurately model the environment and employ simulators for training our operators. 

Modeling and simulation capabilities provide operators the ability to experiment, 

fail, adjust, and try again with a mere fraction of the resources. Once a robust simulation capability exists, new and increasingly complex exercises can demonstrate 

successes and vulnerabilities, facilitate new tactics, techniques, and procedures, and 

dramatically expand our understanding of, and ability to operate within, the space 

domain. The ability to experiment with new platforms and capabilities will enhance 

U.S. freedom of action and further improve U.S. space operations in a way that further aligns space and space-based capability requirements with those in every other 

domain. 

CYBERSPACE

Interest in the cyber domain grows daily. Most of this is positive, as technology 

connects the world and enables commerce, communication, transit, and research in 

ways never before imagined. The practical reality of Moore’s Law 2 is a world where 

many technological platforms seem obsolete just as they are widely fielded. Unfortunately, as Secretary of State Clinton noted in January, ‘‘these technologies are not 

an unmitigated blessing.’’ We can anticipate that adversarial actors will make cyberspace a battle front in future warfare. Even today, intrusions and espionage into our 

networks, as well as cyber incidents abroad, highlight the unprecedented and diverse challenges we face in the battle for information. 

In May 2009, the administration finished a detailed Cyberspace Policy Review. It 

concluded that ‘‘the architecture of the Nation’s digital infrastructure . . . is not secure or resilient’’ and ‘‘without major advances in the security of these systems or 

significant change in how they are constructed or operated, it is doubtful that the 

United States can protect itself.’’ Both the White House’s Cyberspace Policy Review 

and the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Commission on 

Cybersecurity for the 44th Presidency concluded that national cyber security requires dramatically enhanced policy and operational coordination. These reports 

highlighted the need for a uniform, rapid, dynamic, and machine-speed approach. 

Such an approach demands a culture of responsibility and an ‘‘always-on’’ enterprise 

infrastructure to support global employment of our military forces. 

STRATCOM is responsible for operating DOD information networks, planning 

against cyber threats, advocating for new capabilities, and coordinating with other 

commands and Agencies. I noted last year that cyberspace is our least mature line 

of operation, and it is likely to remain so for some time, as cyberspace presents new 

and unique challenges and opportunities. Cyber operations revolutionize the way we 

move information, conduct commerce, and fight wars. We have had technological 

848 

revolutions before, most notably a century ago when people first took to the skies. 

Some wondered why we would ever need to fly, but no one today can imagine life 

without air travel or national security without air forces. In the 1970s, few people 

felt they would ever need a personal computer, but a network outage today is a serious concern for the largest corporations, the smallest businesses, and most American households. Just as the United States mastered the air domain, we will continue to strive to preserve our freedom of action in cyberspace. 

Significant change seldom comes without a seminal event. In the strategic and 

space arenas, we have experienced nuclear procedure issues, the Iridium-Cosmos 

satellite collision, and China’s Anti-Satellite weapon tests. Last year, the cyberspace 

domain had just such an event as DOD information networks experienced a serious 

intrusion, resulting in a ban on removable media and other corrective actions. The 

event identified best practices and shortcomings in network security procedures and 

hardware accountability, causing us to ask not just what we knew about network 

health but how we knew it—and whether that information was reliable. Our forces 

developed new network monitoring and evaluation systems and grappled with the 

security needs of sprawling networks where low cost and efficiency have often taken 

priority over security. Cyberspace weaves through our lives in ways that make network problems a concern for everyone. Each and every individual user is a critical 

element of cyber defense. 

Our national defense capabilities are now underpinned by the assured availability 

of the enterprise IT infrastructure and our command-and-control and informationsharing systems. These constitute the DOD information networks. STRATCOM 

must continue to defend while actively improving DOD information networks— 

interdependent imperatives—with new and expanded cyber capabilities. The networks requires improved defense-in-depth measures from the perimeter down to individual users, like the Host-Based Security System (HBSS), and a shareable, common operating picture that allows for the free flow of information among the combatant commanders, Services, and Agencies. 

Additionally, we require continued congressional support for critical DOD programs and initiatives through which we build, operate, harden, and assure robust 

and resilient command-and-control and information-sharing systems. These programs and initiatives include globally diverse terrestrial and satellite communications networks, emerging commercial satellite communication capabilities, and the 

globally available enterprise IT services that reside on them. 

GLOBAL SYNERGY—JOINT ENABLING MISSIONS

Integrated Missile Defense 

Many rogue actors consider terror, blackmail, and weapons of mass destruction 

to be increasingly attractive capabilities. The recently completed BMDR notes the 

growing threat of ballistic missiles as they become more flexible, mobile, survivable, 

reliable, and accurate from greater ranges. Countering the growing desire among 

many states for such cost-effective weapons and symbols of national power requires 

sustained and carefully designed missile defense investments. 

As the lead combatant command for missile-defense advocacy, STRATCOM continues to work closely with the Services, Missile Defense Agency, and the Missile 

Defense Executive Board (MDEB) to shape investments. Improvements in sensor 

and shooter platforms, including upgrades to the Aegis weapon system and Standard Missile-3 (SM–3), production of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system, and fielding of the AN/TPY–2 forward-based X-band radar provide more effective capabilities for our geographic combatant commanders. However, these advances have required an increased focus at STRATCOM and within the MDEB and 

Global Force Management processes on how best to satisfy the requirements of multiple geographic combatant commanders while appropriately balancing theater and 

homeland defense efforts. Strong congressional support is enabling the rapid fielding 

of regional systems. 

One of the most significant recent missile defense developments is the administration’s Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA) to missile defense. Given necessary funding 

and timely fielding, PAA offers an effective and flexible way to address the growing 

Iranian threat. PAA also addresses the most urgent threats first with proven, costeffective platforms as we continue to defend our forward-deployed forces and allies. 

It also requires that missile defense becomes an increasing part of our international 

cooperation efforts. The total effect of PAA will provide significantly more capability 

to counter today’s regional threats and improve our ability to defend the United 

States against any future Iranian ICBM. 

A defensive system, however, will be ineffective if not supported by accurate and 

timely warning and intelligence. Ballistic missiles and space launch vehicles share 

849 

significant similarities, making launch characterization—the ability to rapidly determine a vehicle’s ballistic or orbital trajectory and therefore its intent—essential to 

recommending appropriate pre-launch postures and post-launch actions. 

STRATCOM’s ongoing efforts to refine this capability include sensor and communications upgrades and analytical expansion. As noted above, we face ongoing challenges to sustaining our missile warning constellation’s long-term health. The 

SBIRS geostationary orbit satellite constellation is critical to any missile defense architecture. Additionally, the two Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS) 

demonstrator satellites launched in late 2009 will validate key concepts for a future 

missile defense satellite constellation. The STSS has the potential to greatly improve our ability to detect, track, and defeat ballistic missiles. 

Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction 

The specter of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in the hands of terrorists 

poses a threat to the United States, our allies, and global security at large. 

STRATCOM is responsible to synchronize DOD-wide planning for counter-WMD 

(CWMD). Our CWMD campaign plan framework, detailing linkages between military strategic objectives and desired effects, has become the CWMD planning standard for geographic combatant commands. 

To further enhance regional combatant commander and interagency planning, 

STRATCOM has developed a Joint Elimination Coordination Element in order to 

support WMD elimination efforts. This unit will also support DOD efforts to establish a Joint Task Force-Elimination headquarters to provide specialized command 

and control for WMD elimination operations. Additionally, STRATCOM has advanced the development of the Interagency CWMD Database of Responsibilities, Authorities, and Capabilities (INDRAC) system to inform planning, training, advocacy, 

and other partnerships across the government. Further, we lead semiannual Global 

Synchronization Conferences to enhance CWMD planning across other commands, 

the broader whole of government, and our key allies and partners. 

To improve the Nation’s existing capabilities for nuclear forensics and attribution, 

we are sponsoring a Joint Capabilities Technology Demonstration for National Technical Nuclear Forensics (NTNF). It is designed to improve existing air- and groundsample collection capabilities. In coordination with U.S. Joint Forces Command, we 

have conducted a series of experiments to determine the best uses of active interrogation technology to extend the detection ranges of our nuclear and radiological passive detectors. DOD has proposed additional CWMD funding in its fiscal year 2011 

budget for DOD nonproliferation, counterproliferation, and consequence management programs to accelerate the closure of capability gaps. This additional funding 

would be applied to nuclear and biological threat reduction; combating nuclear terrorism; nuclear search, detection, and forensics; technical reachback and planning 

support for the combatant commanders; and integration of CWMD technical, operational, and intelligence expertise for improved WMD threat anticipation and response. We fully support these investments and the efforts of the Defense Threat 

Reduction Agency (DTRA). 

Finally, the STRATCOM Center for Combating WMD (SCC WMD) plays a key 

role in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), a proven counterproliferation architecture. This past year SCC WMD supported the embedding of PSI activities into 

a number of combatant commands’ exercise programs, developed international PSI 

training scenarios, and published the first PSI exercise planning handbook. We look 

forward to accelerating exercise engagements and increasing our focus on potential 

sources of proliferation. 

INFORMATION OPERATIONS

With the exception of psychological operations (PSYOP), STRATCOM plans, coordinates, supports, and advocates for information operations (IO) across geographic 

combatant commands’ areas of responsibility. We execute these responsibilities 

through our joint components: JFCC NW and JTF GNO for cyber operations; and 

the Joint Information Operations Warfare Center (JIOWC) for electronic warfare 

(EW), military deception (MILDEC), and operational security (OPSEC). 

This year, we will participate in reviews of joint and Service doctrine to evaluate 

and assess how we conduct warfare in the information environment. Additionally, 

we are conducting a Strategic Communication Capabilities Based Assessment 

(CBA), as tasked by the JROC. This CBA will identify requirements and capability 

gaps among the combatant commands and Joint Staff, including perspectives from 

the intelligence community, in order to standardize terminology and to resource appropriate DOD strategic communication capabilities. 

A wide range of military operations depend on unfettered access to the electromagnetic spectrum. For several decades, forces have taken advantage of relatively 

850 

uncontested access to the electromagnetic spectrum, but spectrum requirements are 

growing not only for DOD missions but across Federal agencies, state, and local governments and commercial industry. Further, rapidly expanding spectrum usage and 

technology evolution now threaten to impede our ability to conduct successful military operations. As regions of the spectrum continue to be crowded by commercial 

and scientific entities and other nations, the warfighter’s electromagnetic maneuver 

space will become more restricted. Future spectrum policy and use must carefully 

consider and balance national and economic security interests to enable commercial 

growth while protecting the equities of DOD and Federal agencies. 

To address these accessibility concerns and to preserve essential information 

transfer capabilities, the JROC approved the STRATCOM EW CBA. STRATCOM 

also produced a follow-on Initial Capabilities Document (ICD) that identified capability gaps and potential solutions. The ICD also emphasized the need for focused 

leadership in the EW area and a comprehensive joint investment strategy. In the 

coming year, and in conjunction with federally funded research and development 

centers, STRATCOM and U.S. Joint Forces Command will study approaches to responding to emerging electromagnetic threats. This review is intended to identify 

organizational and management approaches that will enable timely, prioritized, and 

effective EW resourcing decisions. 

INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE

Over the past decade, geographic combatant commanders’ requirements have increased ISR demand, as highlighted in Iraq and Afghanistan. New and irregular 

threats reshaped the battlefield and the information required to operate successfully. Today, rapidly increasing capabilities to support the warfighter remain a key 

geographic combatant commander priority. Determining the appropriate ISR force 

size is important, given limited resources and dynamic theater needs. STRATCOM 

is leading efforts to develop an ISR force-sizing construct for the Department. This 

initiative will develop a sound analytical foundation for future ISR allocation and 

procurement decisions. 

To date, DOD has rapidly expanded ISR platform acquisition and fielding, thereby 

broadening theater access to intelligence. To complement this initiative and as a key 

facet to meeting the rising demand for ISR products, DOD is also expanding our 

processing, exploitation, and dissemination (PED) capabilities. Rapid collection-capability growth challenges our ability to transform raw data into information of intelligence value and to disseminate it to combat forces in a timely fashion. 

STRATCOM continues to advocate for needed PED capabilities with the Services 

and combat-support agencies and is also developing methods to align ISR allocation 

with PED capacity to ensure collection effectiveness and to better integrate existing 

resources. Finally, new assets and new challenges require bases from which to access many regions, such as USAFRICOM’s Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti. This important facility deserves sustained support because it provides access to multiple countries and the Horn of Africa while enabling the employment of air and naval assets 

supporting DOD operations in the region. 

As new ISR capabilities come on line, we must transition legacy capabilities to 

new systems. The Air Force has fielded the first Global Hawk in theater, but challenges remain before it could replace today’s U–2 capability. Chief among these is 

sufficient wideband satellite communications to permit necessary throughput in the 

Global Hawk communications architecture. STRATCOM is working to make sure 

that a comprehensive communications capability is capable of providing worldwide 

support prior to the U–2 retirement. 

Whether making carefully nuanced deterrence recommendations, evaluating space 

capabilities, understanding the new and dynamic cyberspace domain, or sustaining 

our superior strategic capability knowledge base, intelligence provides operational 

context fundamental to every commander’s decision calculus. Since I assumed command of STRATCOM in the fall of 2007, my intelligence directorate has done tremendous work using limited resources to support our three lines of operations and 

our enabling missions. Recently, we received a modest but essential increase in intelligence billet authorizations to establish the STRATCOM Joint Intelligence Operations Center. This important investment will increase our headquarters capabilities to provide the level of strategic intelligence we require and to distribute appropriate capabilities to several of our components. We are also working with the Office 

of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence to establish a second Joint Intelligence Operations Center to support CYBERCOM. We appreciate continued congressional support for these initiatives. 

851 

CONCLUSION

STRATCOM continues to enhance our ability to deliver global security for America each and every day. We have re-emphasized the importance of our nuclear deterrence mission and proven America’s long held confidence in our nuclear forces, while 

also expanding capabilities crucial to operating in the space and cyberspace domain. 

We enable many space-based and cyberspace capabilities essential to military operations and daily life by sustaining our freedom of action in these domains. 

STRATCOM’s uniquely global missions support national objectives, whole-of-government solutions, regional requirements, and enhanced cooperation with our international partners. While many challenges remain in our increasingly interconnected 

and rapidly changing world, STRATCOM is fully engaged to address them. We 

greatly appreciate the support of Congress. 

Chairman LEVIN. Before I call on Admiral Willard, let me just 

say a word to my colleagues about a situation which has existed 

for far too long, which I’m going to do my best to correct this morning. I go to the floor at about 10:30, and if we’re still in session 

here at that time, Senator Lieberman was kind enough to say that 

he would be able to take over. 

We’ve had a general, who’s been nominated for a second star, 

who’s been on the Senate calendar since October. His name is General Michael J. Walsh. He was unanimously approved by this committee. But, there’s been a hold on his nomination, for a totally unrelated issue. Senator Vitter has been the one—he admitted—he 

acknowledges it, so I’m not disclosing anything which isn’t out 

there. But, it’s unconscionable. This is a military officer whose 

nomination—excuse me—whose approval of a second star is being 

held up by one Senator, for unrelated purposes. In about an hour, 

I’m going to go down and try and get unanimous consent that that 

nomination come off the calendar—that approval come off the calendar and be approved by the Senate. 

So, any of you who have some feelings on that subject, you may 

want to say something to Senator Vitter, or to his office. It would 

be appreciated. 

But, I believe that the committee should be, and I think is, 

united on this, by the way. I’ve talked to Senator McCain. Senator 

McCain agrees with me. He will be joining me in my unanimous 

consent request. But, I would ask any other members of the committee who feel strongly enough about this to get hold of Senator 

Vitter’s office, please do so. Because, again, I think that this committee’s jurisdiction and our obligation and responsibility to our 

men and women in uniform is really at issue here if we can’t get 

approval of a second star for a fully qualified brigadier general to 

be a major general. 

Admiral Willard. 

STATEMENT OF ADM ROBERT F. WILLARD, USN, COMMANDER, 

U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND 

Admiral WILLARD. Thank you, Chairman. 

So, that we can get to the committee’s questions, I’ll keep my remarks brief, but I also ask that my full statement be included for 

the record. 

Chairman LEVIN. It will be. 

Admiral WILLARD. Chairman Levin, Senator Burr, and distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity 

to appear before you today and to discuss PACOM and the Asia Pacific region. 

852 

Seated behind me is my wife, Donna, who’s been at my side for 

36 years. She’s an outstanding ambassador of our Nation, and a 

tireless advocate for the men and women of our military and their 

families. 

Chairman LEVIN. Special welcome to her. 

Admiral WILLARD. Thank you. 

I also would like to thank you for your interest in our AOR. I’ve 

either met many of you en route to the region or followed your 

travels with great interest. Your presence and interest sends a 

strong message throughout the Asia Pacific, and I invite all of you 

to stop by Hawaii either on your way into the region, so my staff 

and I may brief you on the security situation, or on your return 

trip, in order that I may gain from your insights from your engagements. 

Additionally, when in Hawaii, I’d be honored to entertain you in 

the quarters of a former Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command, Admiral John S. McCain, Jr. 

Today is my first posture hearing as the Commander of PACOM. 

Since taking command last October, I’ve had the chance to meet 

with many of my counterparts, travel throughout the region, and 

exercise a few of our contingency plans. 

When combined with my previous years of service in the Asia Pacific, these experiences have led me to the following conclusions, 

which I would hope we can expand on during today’s hearing. 

The Asia Pacific region is vital to our Nation, and it’s quickly becoming the strategic nexus of the globe, due to its economic expansion and great potential. Key to our commitment in the region is 

our forward-deployed and postured forces. We face challenges in 

building partner capacity under the current patchwork of authorities and programs designed to support our security assistance efforts. The United States remains the preeminent power in the Asia 

Pacific. Modernizing and expanding our relationships with our allies and security partners is also vital to maintaining stability and 

enhancing security in the region. 

China’s growing presence and influence in the region create both 

challenges and opportunities for the United States and for the regional countries. China’s rapid and comprehensive transformation 

of its armed forces is affecting regional military balances and holds 

implications beyond the Asia Pacific region. Of particular concern 

is that elements of China’s military modernization appear designed 

to challenge our freedom of action in the region. 

Finally, India’s strategic location, shared democratic values, 

growing economy, and evolution as a regional partner and power 

combine to make them the partner with whom we need to work 

much more closely. 

Mr. Chairman and members of this committee, the Asia Pacific 

is a region of great potential and is vital to the interests of the 

United States. Every day, the soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, 

and civilians of PACOM are working with our allies, partners, and 

friends to maintain this region’s security. Our success has been enabled by this committee’s longstanding support. You’ve provided us 

with the most technically advanced systems in the world and with 

a military quality of life worthy of the contributions of our All-Volunteer Force. On behalf of more than 300,000 men and women of 

853 

PACOM, thank you for your support and for this opportunity to 

testify on the defense posture of this Command. 

Thank you, and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Admiral Willard follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY ADM ROBERT F. WILLARD, USN 

INTRODUCTION

Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, and members of the committee, 

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the United 

States Pacific Command and our area of responsibility (AOR) in the Asia-Pacific. I 

am pleased to report that 2009 was a very productive year for us and, through your 

continued support, we anticipate 2010 to be the same. I also would like to thank 

you for your interest in the AOR. I have either met many of you en route to the 

region or followed your travels with great interest. Your presence and interest send 

a strong message, and I invite all of you to stop by Hawaii either on your way into 

the region so my staff and I may brief you on the security environment or on the 

return trip to share your impressions from your engagements. 

Today is my first posture hearing as the Pacific Command Commander. Since taking command last October, I have had the chance to meet with many of my counterparts, travel throughout the region and exercise a few of our contingency plans. 

Based on that experience, I would hope that we could expand our discussion on the 

following areas during my testimony: 

• The Asia-Pacific region is vital to our Nation; it is quickly becoming the 

strategic nexus of the globe due to its economic expansion and potential. 

• Key to our commitment to the region is our forward-deployed/postured 

forces. 

• We face challenges in building partner capacity under the current patchwork of authorities and programs designed to support our Security assistant efforts. 

• The United States remains the preeminent power in the Asia-Pacific. 

Modernizing and expanding our relationships with our allies and security 

partners is vital to maintaining stability and enhancing security in the region. 

• China’s growing presence and influence in the region create both challenges and opportunities for the United States and regional countries. 

• China’s rapid and comprehensive transformation of its armed forces is affecting regional military balances and holds implications beyond the AsiaPacific region. Of particular concern is that elements of China’s military 

modernization appear designed to challenge our freedom of action in the region. 

• India’s strategic location, shared democratic values, growing economy and 

evolution as a regional power combine to make them a partner with whom 

we need to work much more closely. 

For over 60 years U.S. Pacific Command has helped provide a secure environment 

within the AOR that has allowed the regional countries to focus on developing their 

economies and building strong government institutions. Today we see the benefits 

of these efforts as the global economic center of gravity shifts into the region in 

alignment with our own nation’s interests. Consider the following achievements over 

the past year: 

• On a combined basis, the Nations in the AOR had an estimated GDP (on 

an exchange rate basis) of $15.1 trillion; compared to total U.S. GDP of 

$14.3 trillion. 

• U.S. two-way trade in goods and services with countries in the AOR totaled nearly $1.3 trillion. 

• In 2009, China surpassed Germany as the world’s third largest economy 

behind the United States and Japan. 

• Five of our ‘‘Top Ten’’ trading partners are now Asia-Pacific countries. 

• The Strait of Malacca remains one of the world’s most strategic waterways with over 60,000 ships transiting annually, carrying half of the 

world’s oil and 90 percent of the oil imported by China, Japan and South 

Korea—our second, fourth and seventh largest trading partners, respectively. Due to the cooperative efforts of the Nations bordering this waterway, piracy has dropped from a high of 38 incidents a year in 2004 to just 

2 in 2009. 

854 

In my travels and discussions with leaders in the region both as the Commander, 

U.S. Pacific Fleet and now as the Commander, U.S. Pacific Command, I have found 

that our continuous regional presence is not only welcomed, but strongly desired. 

Maintaining such a posture is not a simple task given size and diversity of our AOR. 

For example, sitting in my headquarters in Honolulu, I am closer to New York City 

than Sydney, Australia. A soldier at Fort Lewis in Washington State is closer to Kuwait City than he is to Bangkok, Thailand. These vast distances make our forwarddeployed and forward-stationed forces all the more important if we desire to remain 

a highly effective influence in the region. The abilities of the more than 140,000 men 

and women—who represent our forward-stationed/deployed joint forces—to project 

credible combat power serves as an effective deterrent to those who would disrupt 

the Asia-Pacific security environment or threaten our friends and allies. In no other 

region of the world is the requirement for a properly postured, ready force with 

dominant high-end capabilities more vital than in the Asia-Pacific. The forward 

forces are the strongest statement of U.S. commitment to the region and any reduction in their posture, readiness or capability is regarded as waning interest and diminished U.S. influence. 

The military and government leaders that I have spoken with have also made it 

clear that we should not take our level of influence within the region for granted. 

Many countries, most notably China, see the same strategic opportunities that we 

do and are seeking to increase their level of access and influence throughout the 

Asia-Pacific by building and expanding economic, diplomatic and security relationships. While we remain the current ‘‘partner of choice,’’ leaders consistently tell me 

it’s growing more difficult to be a U.S. partner given the ‘‘constraints,’’ such as limitations of our security assistance programs that often accompany that partnership. 

Among our most powerful programs for the region are the security assistance programs that focus on building partner capacity in security-related areas. These programs expose future leaders of other countries to our values and culture through 

education and training; present opportunities for nations to purchase U.S. military 

equipment that enables greater interoperability in our combined operations; and 

provide engagement opportunities for our best ambassadors, our young servicemen 

and women, to develop relationships with the region’s military personnel and general populations. Unfortunately, these programs have not evolved much since the 

end of the Cold War. As reported by the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), these 

security assistance programs are constrained by a ‘‘patchwork of authorities, persistent shortfalls in the resources, unwieldy processes and a limited ability to sustain such undertakings beyond a short period of time.’’ I agree with this description 

and fully support the administration’s efforts to reform and enhance these important programs as essential to maintaining, and, in some cases, regaining our competitive edge. I hope you will support the administration efforts in this regard. 

I would like to discuss in detail some of my priorities for the region which include: 

allies and partners, China, India, North Korea, and transnational threats. 

ALLIES AND PARTNERS

Five of our Nation’s seven mutual defense treaties are with nations in the AsiaPacific region. We continue to work closely with these regional treaty allies—Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, Republic of the Philippines and Thailand—to 

strengthen and leverage our relationships to enhance security within the region. 

Australia 

Australia remains a steadfast ally that is firmly committed to enhancing global 

and regional security and to providing institutional assistance throughout the Pacific. Australia is particularly active leading the International Stabilization Force in 

Timor-Leste and the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands. Their contributions to global security are evident by their recently increased force presence 

in Afghanistan. As the largest non-NATO force provider, Australia has committed 

to contribute to our effort to stabilize Afghanistan. 

Australia highly values advancing interoperability and enhanced defense cooperation with the United States, particularly through training events and acquisition 

programs. Last year, Talisman Saber 2009, a large scale biennial, bilateral combined arms exercise that focuses on strengthening the U.S.-Australian military-tomilitary relationship, enjoyed unprecedented participation (of 24,000 U.S. and Australian military personnel). The exercise enhanced interoperability and our collective 

ability to provide security in the region by focusing heavily on combined command 

and control, amphibious operations, close combat and combined arms, and joint and 

coalition logistics. The U.S. and Australian militaries also collaborate extensively in 

many other areas including Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR), 

and Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HA/DR). 

855 

Japan 

Our alliance with Japan is the cornerstone of our security strategy in Northeast 

Asia. Despite some recent challenges related to U.S. basing in Japan, the military 

relationship, as well as the overall alliance, remain strong, as evidenced by Prime 

Minister Hatoyama’s recent pledge of support. That being said, we must make every 

effort—particularly as we celebrate the 50th anniversary of the alliance—to remind 

the citizens of both the United States and Japan of the importance of our alliance 

to enduring regional security and prosperity. 

U.S. Pacific Command remains committed to the implementation of the Defense 

Policy Review Initiative (DPRI). Initiated by the U.S. Secretaries of State and Defense with their Japanese counterparts in 2002, progress on Alliance Transformation and Realignment through the execution of the 2006 Roadmap for Realignment are critical next steps. Major elements of the Realignment Roadmap with 

Japan include: relocating a Marine Corps Air Station and a portion of a carrier 

airwing from urbanized to rural areas; co-locating U.S. and Japanese command and 

control capabilities; deploying U.S. missile defense capabilities to Japan in conjunction with their own deployments; improving operational coordination between U.S. 

and Japanese forces; and adjusting the burden-sharing arrangement through the relocation of ground forces. 

The rebasing of 8,000 marines and their dependents from Okinawa to Guam remains a key element of the Realignment Roadmap. Guam-based marines, in addition to those Marine Forces that remain in Okinawa, will sustain the advantages 

of having forward-based ground forces in the Pacific Command AOR. Currently the 

Government of Japan (GOJ) is reviewing one of the realignment elements that addresses the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) and related movement of Marine 

Corps aviation assets in Okinawa; an action which is directly linked to the relocation of marines to Guam and a plan to return significant land area to Japan. The 

GOJ has indicated it expects to complete its review by May of this year. The United 

States remains committed to the 2006 DPRI Roadmap as agreed to by both countries. 

The Japan Self Defense Force is advancing its regional and global influence. In 

the spring and early summer of 2009, Japan deployed two JMSDF ships and two 

patrol aircraft to the Gulf of Aden region for counter-piracy operations. Although 

their Indian Ocean-based refueling mission recently ended, Japan remains engaged 

in the region by providing civil and financial support for reconstruction and humanitarian efforts in Afghanistan and Pakistan for the foreseeable future. 

Although the Japanese defense budget has decreased each year since 2002, the 

Japan Self Defense Forces continue their regular bilateral interactions with the 

United States, and in some multi-lateral engagements with the United States and 

our other allies, such as the Republic of Korea and Australia. Last year witnessed 

the completion of several successful milestones in our bilateral relationship, including the completion of a year-long study of contingency command and control relationships and Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) testing of a third Japan Maritime 

Self Defense Force Aegis destroyer. Japan continues to maintain over $4 billion in 

annual Host Nation Support (HNS) to our Japan-based force. Japan HNS contribution remains a vital strategic pillar of respective U.S. and Japanese alliance commitments. 

Republic of Korea (ROK) 

The U.S.-ROK alliance remains strong and critical to our regional strategy in 

Northeast Asia. General Sharp and I are aligned in our efforts to do what is right 

for the United States and the ROK as this alliance undergoes a major transformation. I will defer to General Sharp’s testimony to provide the details of our relationship on the Peninsula, but note that General Sharp’s progress in handling the 

transition of wartime Operational Control (OPCON) to the ROK military has been 

exceptional as has his leadership of U.S. Forces Korea. 

The transformation of the U.S.-ROK alliance will ultimately assist the ROK to 

better meet security challenges both on and off the peninsula. The ROK currently 

maintains a warship in the Gulf of Aden in support of counter-piracy and maritime 

security operations, and has provided direct assistance to Operation Enduring Freedom, including demonstrating strong leadership in its decision to deploy a Provincial 

Reconstruction Team to Afghanistan this year. Of particular note is the evolving trilateral security cooperation between the United States, ROK, and Japan. Although 

there are still policy issues to be addressed in realizing its full potential, the shared 

values, financial resources, logistical capability, and the planning ability to address 

complex contingencies throughout the region make this tri-lateral partnership a goal 

worth pursuing. 

856 

Republic of the Philippines 

The Republic of the Philippines (RP) is simultaneously conducting a force-wide defense reform, transforming internal security operations, and developing a maritime 

security capability. These efforts in turn support important U.S. regional initiatives 

and contribute to a stronger Philippine Government capable of assuming a greater 

role in providing for its own regional security. 

In close partnership with the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), U.S. Pacific 

Command continues to support Philippine Defense Reform (PDR). Most significantly, the Philippines is actively working to transition their forces from a focus on 

internal security operations to territorial defense by 2016. 

Lastly, USPACOM continues to support the AFP in their counter-insurgency and 

counter-terror efforts in the south. 2009 marked some notable AFP successes and 

we have seen that its momentum has carried over to 2010. 

Thailand 

Thailand remains a critical Southeast Asian ally and engagement partner. In addition, we appreciate Thailand’s important global security contributions to overseas 

contingency operations, counter-narcotics efforts, humanitarian assistance and 

peacekeeping operations (such as their upcoming deployment to Darfur). 

In Thailand, U.S. PACOM forces enjoy unmatched access and support. We recently completed the 29th Exercise Cobra Gold which we co-host with/and in Thailand. Cobra Gold remains the premier U.S. Pacific Command multilateral exercise 

which this year had 6 participants and observers from more than 15 nations. 

The United States and Thailand share important mutual goals on democracy, regional stability, counterterrorism, and counterproliferation. Thailand is a positive 

contributor to the regional security environment and I am committed to strengthening and broadening our alliance even further. 

PARTNERSHIPS

Successfully managing the many security challenges in the region depends upon 

a collaborative approach between like-minded nations who appreciate the fundamental relationship between security and enduring prosperity. U.S. Pacific Command expends significant time and resources developing relationships with non-ally 

nations who understand the role common cause partnerships play in the establishment of regional security. While these relationships often begin or focus on narrow 

or specific areas of shared interest, as trust grows and common values are realigned, 

broader regional security contributions often result. U.S. Pacific Command appreciates that strong bilateral relationships advance in complexity and effectiveness on 

the basis of individual engagements and according to capacities, capabilities, and a 

partner-nation’s desire and national interest. That being said, there is regional security benefit provided by all of the partnerships we enjoy among the 36 Asia-Pacific 

nations. 

An example of such a partnership—one that has matured significantly in the past 

several years and one that contributes in many ways to enhanced regional security—is the one we share with Singapore. Initially a relationship focused on trade, 

maritime security, and a modest U.S. logistics presence, it has since expanded into 

other areas. In 2005, the relationship was formalized with the signing of a security 

agreement which identified Singapore and the United States as ‘‘Major Security Cooperation Partners.’’ Today Singapore is one of our strongest security partners in 

the region, hosting many of our transiting ships and deploying personnel, working 

with U.S. forces in Afghanistan, and commanding the multi-national, counter-piracy, Combined Task Force in the Gulf of Aden. 

Our rapidly developing relationship with Indonesia—the largest Muslim-majority 

democracy in the world—provides another excellent example of a partnership of 

great importance to enduring regional security. After years of limited engagement 

with the Indonesian armed forces (TNI), the significant level of transparency and 

extent of institutional reforms initiated by President Yudhoyono has provided impetus to renew and advance our military relationship. Based on a desire to contribute 

more to the regional security effort, the TNI now plays a larger leading role in multilateral events and exercises that focus on capabilities such as HA/DR and peace 

keeping. We are looking forward to supporting Indonesia’s developing security role 

in the region, particularly as the administration builds towards a new ‘‘comprehensive partnership.’’ 

CHINA

One cannot engage within the region without having a discussion about the Peoples Republic of China (PRC). Beijing’s national strategy remains primarily focused 

857 

on economic development which emphasizes domestic stability and maintaining an 

international security environment conducive to continued economic growth. This 

new found economic wealth is funding a military modernization program that has 

raised concerns in the region over the lack of transparency into Beijing’s emerging 

military capabilities and the intentions that motivate them—a concern shared by 

the United States. China’s interest in a peaceful and stable environment that will 

support the country’s developmental goals is difficult to reconcile with the evolving 

military capabilities that appear designed to challenge U.S. freedom of action in the 

region or exercise aggression or coercion of its neighbors, including U.S. treaty allies 

and partners. Reconciling the apparent gap between the PRC’s statements and its 

observed military capabilities serves to underscore the importance of maintaining 

open channels of communication and of building toward a continuous dialogue with 

China’s armed forces based on open and substantive discussion of strategic issues. 

However, that type of frank and candid discussion requires a stable and reliable 

U.S.-China military-to-military relationship—a relationship that does not yet exist 

with the Peoples’ Liberation Army (PLA). 

People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Modernization 

China has continued a rapid, comprehensive program of military modernization 

with supporting doctrine and a professionalization of the officer and enlisted ranks. 

This program of modernization has been supported by a military budget that has 

grown annually by double digits over the last decade. Beijing publicly asserts that 

China’s military modernization is ‘‘purely defensive in nature,’’ and aimed solely at 

protecting China’s security and interests. Over the past several years, China has 

begun a new phase of military development by beginning to articulate roles and 

missions for the PLA that go beyond China’s immediate territorial concerns, but has 

left unclear to the international community the purposes and objectives of the PLA’s 

evolving doctrine and capabilities. 

The PLA has placed increasing emphasis on attracting and retaining a professional cadre of officers and noncommissioned officers. Incentives include advanced 

training and education, as well as housing and post-service employment preferences 

that should lead to a more motivated, better trained and professional military capable of a broader range of combined arms missions. 

China continues to develop weapons systems, technologies and concepts of operation that support anti-access and area denial strategies in the Western Pacific by 

holding air and maritime forces at risk at extended distances from the PRC coastline. The PLA Navy is continuing to develop a ‘‘Blue Water’’ capability that includes 

the ability to surge surface combatants and submarines at extended distances from 

the PRC mainland. Modernization programs have included development of sophisticated shipboard air defense systems as well as supersonic sea-skimming anti-ship 

cruise missiles. 

China’s leaders are pursuing an aircraft carrier capability. In 1998 China purchased an incomplete former Soviet Kuznetsov class aircraft carrier, which began 

renovations in 2002 at its shipyard in Dalian. I expect this carrier to become operational around 2012 and likely be used to develop basic carrier skills. 

China continues to field the largest conventional submarine force in the world totaling more than 60 boats; while the quality of China’s submarine fleet is mixed the 

percentage of modern, quiet submarines in the fleet is growing. This fleet also includes a number of nuclear powered fast attack and ballistic missile submarines. 

China is also developing a new submarine launched nuclear ballistic missile, the 

JL–2, capable of ranging the western United States. 

China fields a growing number of sophisticated multi-role fighter aircraft, including the SU–27 and SU–30 purchased from Russia and indigenously produced 4th 

generation aircraft. The PLA Air Force and naval air forces have continued to focus 

on improving pilot and controller proficiencies in complex, multi-plane combat scenarios, including operations over water. The PLA has focused considerable effort on 

building up its integrated air defense capabilities and has deployed an increasing 

number of upgraded Russian SA–20 PMU 2 long range surface-to-air missile systems along the Taiwan Strait. China is also developing and testing a conventional 

anti-ship ballistic missile based on the DF–21/CSS–5 MRBM designed specifically 

to target aircraft carriers. 

Until recently, ‘‘jointness’’ in the PLA meant that different services operated toward a common goal in a joint or combined campaign with operations separated by 

time and distance. However, years of observing U.S. military operations and modern 

warfare campaigns have convinced PLA leadership of the need for greater integration between services to include enhanced joint operations at the tactical level. The 

PLA has adopted the concept of ‘‘Integrated Joint Operations’’ as a goal for the Chinese military to allow it to conduct integrated operations on a campaign level. AddiVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:37 May 06, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00863 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\62155.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
858 

tionally, the PLA has placed increased emphasis on training in more demanding 

conditions, such as complex electromagnetic environments. 

China’s Strategic Capabilities 

China maintains a nuclear force capable of ranging most of the world, including 

the continental United States. This capability has been enhanced through the development of increasingly sophisticated road mobile delivery systems as well as the development of the Type 094 nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (JIN-class 

SSBN). Despite assertions that China opposes the ‘‘weaponization’’ of space, the 

PLA is developing a multi-dimensional program to deny potential adversaries the 

use of space, an element of which was demonstrated in January 2007 when China 

intentionally destroyed one of its own weather satellites with a direct ascent antisatellite weapon. 

U.S. military and government networks and computer systems continue to be the 

target of intrusions that appear to have originated from within the PRC. Although 

most intrusions focus on exfiltrating data, the skills being demonstrated would also 

apply to network attacks. 

China’s Ongoing ‘‘Sovereignty’’ Campaigns 

Beijing remains committed to eventual unification with Taiwan, and has not ruled 

out the use of force to achieve that goal. The PLA’s continued military advancements sustain a trend of shifting the cross-Strait military balance in Beijing’s favor. 

The Taiwan Relations Act provides that it is U.S. policy ‘‘to provide Taiwan with 

arms of a defensive character and to maintain the capacity of the United States to 

resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan.’’ At the U.S. Pacific 

Command, we fulfill these obligations on a daily basis. 

Motivated by a need for indigenous natural resources and consolidation of selfproclaimed sovereignty limits, the PRC has re-asserted its claims to most of the 

South China Sea and reinforced its position in the region, including the contested 

Spratly and Paracel Islands. The PLA Navy has increased its patrols throughout the 

region and has shown an increased willingness to confront regional nations on the 

high seas and within the contested island chains. Additionally, China lays claim to 

the Senkakus, administered by Japan, and contests areas on its border with India. 

As an integral part of its strategy, the PRC has interpreted certain international 

laws in ways contrary to international norms, such as the U.N. Convention for Law 

of the Sea (UNCLOS), and has passed domestic laws that further reinforce its sovereignty claims. 

U.S./China Military Relationship and Security Cooperation 

U.S. Pacific Command is committed to the development of a stable and reliable 

military-to-military relationship with the PRC, which is critical to avoiding 

misperception and miscalculation and, ultimately, building the type of partnership 

that leaders in both countries aspire to. Although we are currently in a period of 

reduced engagement activity due to the PRC’s reaction to the notification of arms 

sales to Taiwan, last year’s military-to-military activities were highlighted by exchange visits by senior leaders from both sides. During his visit to Washington, DC 

in November 2009, General XU Caihou, Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission, agreed with Defense Secretary Gates to further develop the military aspect 

of the U.S.-People’s Republic of China (PRC) relationship. U.S. Pacific Command 

looks forward to working with the PLA on concrete and practical measures to 

strengthen our military relationship in order to improve the security interests of 

both the United States and China. These measures include senior leader visits, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief exercise observer exchanges, a naval passing exercise, and a military medical exchange. The PLA leadership has also shown 

a willingness to expand military engagement to areas such as counterterrorism, 

counter-piracy, maritime safety, and non-proliferation. 

As the Executive Agent for the U.S.-PRC Military Maritime Consultative Agreement (MMCA), U.S. Pacific Command co-led senior leader bilateral MMCA discussions last summer in Beijing. The MMCA forum was initiated in 1998 and is intended to improve safety for airmen and sailors when our Nations’ vessels and aircraft operate in proximity to one another. During the December 2009 Defense Policy 

Coordination Talks held in Honolulu, both sides agreed to reinvigorate the MMCA 

as a viable diplomatic mechanism through which we can manage issues related to 

maritime and air safety. 

859 

INDIA

The complexity, unique significance, and growing importance of the U.S.-India 

Strategic Partnership warrant considering this nation apart from the broader Allies 

and Partners focus previously discussed. Our Nation’s partnership with India is especially important to long term South and Central Asia regional security and to 

U.S. national interests in this vital sub-region. India’s leadership as the largest democracy, its rising economic power, and its influence across South Asia as well as 

its global influence attest to its pivotal role in shaping the regional security environment. We must continue to strengthen this relationship and, while our near-term 

challenges in Central Command are of great strategic importance, we must ensure 

the U.S.-India relationship remains rooted in our extensive common interests of 

which the Afghanistan-Pakistan issue is only one. U.S. Pacific Command is working 

hard to develop bonds that are trust-based, leverage our shared values, and endure 

beyond current conflicts. Such an approach is critical to taking advantage of the full 

potential of our relationship; and to effectively collaborating on the wide range opportunities available in an area of the world that is not only home to some of the 

most contentious geo-political and transnational challenges, but also to some of the 

most vital sea, air, and land lines of communication. 

Our relationship has grown significantly over the past 5 years as both countries 

work to overcome apprehensions formed during the Cold War era, particularly with 

respect to defense cooperation. Resolution of the long-standing End User Monitoring 

(EUM) issue removed a major obstacle to a more robust and sophisticated defense 

sales program. To date, for example, the Government of India has purchased Lockheed Martin C–130Js and Boeing P–8I aircraft; expressed their interest to acquire 

C–17s; and conducted flight tests of F–16s and F/A–18s (under consideration in the 

medium multi-mission role combat aircraft competition). The recent increase in defense sales, which exceeded $2 billion in 2009, not only enhances U.S. access to one 

of the largest defense markets in the world, but more importantly enables greater 

cooperation between our armed forces. 

The complexity of our exercises and training events is increasing and we are expanding our cooperation in the Indian Ocean and beyond. We currently engage together combating piracy in Gulf of Aden, countering terrorism, enhancing maritime 

security, expanding POW/MIA recovery missions, and conducting HA/DR events. 

One of our most notable accomplishments was last year’s bi-lateral Exercise Yudh 

Abhyas. Located in India, it included the largest deployment of U.S. Stryker vehicles outside of the Middle East. Such events offer unique training opportunities, 

allow for increased personal and professional interaction and relationship building, 

and improve our ability to work together across a sophisticated range of operations. 

We continue to search for new areas to cooperate as our relationship develops. 

One area that has been prominently mentioned in the QDR is managing the global 

commons. Threats in the maritime, air, space, and cyberspace domains will be of 

increasing concern to both our Nations; and we see many opportunities for U.S.- 

India cooperation to address broad threats to the region’s and the world’s common 

areas. 

As our relationship develops, U.S. Pacific Command remains mindful of the significance of India-Pakistan tensions, particularly as they relate to the broader security discussion and the management of geo-political challenges that span Combatant 

Commands (Pakistan resides within Central Command’s AOR and India resides in 

the Pacific AOR). We are keenly aware of the importance of a peaceful co-existence 

between these two nuclear-armed nations and stand ready to assist with this goal 

in conjunction with interagency partners. 

NORTH KOREA

As President Obama has said, ‘‘the path for North Korea to realize its future is 

clear: a return to the Six-Party Talks; upholding previous commitments, including 

a return to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty; and the complete, verifiable, and 

irreversible denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.’’ We remain convinced that 

our strong bilateral alliances with Japan and the ROK, as well as our growing trilateral cooperation, are critical to deterring the DPRK and to achieving the 

denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. We continue to work with our interagency 

partners to ensure military involvement in relevant areas such as PSI, operations 

to enforce UNSC resolutions, and multilateral non-proliferation exercises are synchronized with diplomatic approaches and that they contribute to the transmission 

of a clear and consistent message to the DPRK. 

860 

TRANSNATIONAL THREATS

CounterTerrorism 

U.S. Pacific Command has long employed a strategy of working ‘‘by, with, and 

through’’ regional partners to combat terrorism in the region. Our main effort, the 

Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines (JSOTF–P), operates in support of 

the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) in Southern Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago Region. The work of U.S. forces—advising, training, exercising, and informing—in conjunction with the resolute commitment and impressive abilities of 

AFP personnel, has resulted in great success. Over the past year the AFP has captured or killed more than a dozen Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) and Jemaah Islamiya 

(JI) leaders. Perhaps more importantly, the effort has resulted in enhanced quality 

of life and denial of safe haven to extremists in the area. 

Leveraging the lessons learned in Southeast Asia, and in concert with our interagency and regional partners, we are developing plans to combat extremism in 

South Asia. Our efforts there will undoubtedly require a whole-of-government approach and a coordinated multi-national effort given the extent of the problem and 

the variety of regional CT organizations, responsibilities, authorities, and policies. 

Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) 

Our main effort to counter the spread of WMD is through support for the State 

Department’s Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). Fifteen nations in the AOR 

have endorsed the PSI. Of particular note is the success by Thailand to enforce U.N. 

Security Council Resolution 1874 last December when they intercepted 35 tons of 

illicit weaponry that had originated from North Korea. 

In October 2009, Singapore hosted the 38th PSI Exercise, Deep Sabre II, in which 

U.S. Navy and Coast Guard personnel participated—with the armed forces of 18 

other nations—in maritime interdiction exercises designed to enhance the capabilities and improve the coordination of participating nations. We are looking forward 

to supporting future regional PSI Exercises. Additionally, and in support of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, we conducted Chemical, Biological, 

Radiological, Nuclear (CBRN) Defense and Consequence Management bilateral 

working groups with Japan and the Republic of Korea with the intent of improving 

interoperability and growing regional capability and capacity. 

NORTHEAST ASIA

Mongolia 

A strong partner, Mongolia continues to demonstrate support for U.S. regional 

and global policy objectives, while managing positive relations with its two neighbors, China and Russia. The Mongolia Defense Reform (MDR) assists the Mongolian 

Armed Forces with their transformation into a self-sustaining, international peacekeeping force capable of contributing to UN, international, and coalition missions. 

In support of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), which serves as the 

Executive Agent for MDR, U.S. Pacific Command implements bilaterally agreed-to 

initiatives and priorities further the defense relationship between the United States 

and Mongolia. 

Members of the Mongolia Armed Forces regularly participate in bilateral and multilateral for a such as the Pacific Army Management Seminar, Pacific Rim Air 

Chiefs Conference, Chief of Defense Conference, and NCO subject matter expert exchanges. 

Mongolia continues to support peacekeeping and coalition operations and, with assistance from the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI), continues to develop 

the Five Hills Training Center into a national, and eventually, a regional peacekeeping training center which hosts U.N.-certified training and component-level 

peacekeeping exercises for regional participants. Every year, the Mongolian Armed 

Forces partner with either U.S. Army Pacific or U.S. Marine Forces Pacific to host 

KHAAN QUEST. Following 2 years as the GPOI capstone peacekeeping exercise in 

2006 and 2007, KHAAN QUEST remains an important multi-lateral peacekeeping 

exercise. 

Finally, I would like to add that Mongolia committed to deploying 800 personnel 

to Chad in late-2009 in support of the U.N., while continuing to support the U.N. 

in Sierra Leone and other UN missions in Africa. A strong supporter in U.S. overseas contingency operations, in the fall of 2009, Mongolia deployed 200 troops in Afghanistan, with a security company and a mobile training team under Operation 

Enduring Freedom and a 40 soldier security detachment under the Germans as part 

of the International Security Assistance Force. 

861 

Russia 

U.S. Pacific Command coordinates all Russian security cooperation activities with 

U.S. European Command to ensure the efforts of both geographic combatant commands are mutually supportive. We seek engagement with Russia in areas of mutual interest such as counter-terrorism, peacekeeping, and search-and-rescue operations. U.S. Pacific Command contacts were re-established in 2009 when the USS 

Cowpens and USS Stethem conducted port visits to Vladivostok. These port visits 

were symbolic of the historic and positive relationship that has existed in recent 

years between U.S. Pacific Command and Russia’s Far East Command, particularly 

between our two navies. We plan to build on the success of these port visits by continuing to engage Russia in areas of mutual interest in accordance with the Military 

Cooperation Work Plan. 

SOUTHEAST ASIA

Malaysia 

Our military-to-military ties with Malaysia remain solid amidst a warming bilateral political relationship and enhanced ties between the U.S. and ASEAN nations. 

In 2009, U.S. Pacific Command developed closer ties to the Malaysian Joint Forces 

Command by participating in major command post exercises and by supporting their 

forces to enhance their capacity in maritime security operations. Malaysia maintains a strong leadership role in the region by being tough on terrorism, serious 

about maritime security, and committed to global peace and stability. We will continue to expand our cooperation with Malaysia and address our common security 

challenges. 

Cambodia is emerging as a strong supporter of U.S. policy in the region. The 

Cambodia Ministry of National Defense and Royal Cambodian Armed Forces are 

seeking U.S. engagement opportunities. In 2009, U.S. Pacific Command supported 

Cambodia’s major initiatives of counter-terrorism, maritime security, defense reform, HA/DR, and peacekeeping operations. In 2010, we will continue to assist Cambodia on its Defense Reform initiative; augment its counter-terrorism efforts with 

1206 funding; and, together with Australia and Japan, work with their defense establishment and interagency to achieve their maritime security goals. 

Laos 

With the U.S. Defense Attache ́ now in place, U.S.-Laos military-to-military engagement is expanding. The Joint Task Force Full Accounting recovery mission, led 

by the Joint POW/MIA Accounting Command (JPAC), continues to be an important 

focus in developing U.S.-Laos military relations. Laos has placed a priority on 

English language training to enable greater training opportunities and participation 

in bilateral or multilateral operations. In our bilateral defense discussions with the 

Ministry of National Defense, both sides agreed to explore greater engagement opportunities associated with military medical cooperation, civil military operations, 

training and education, and counter-narcotics cooperation. 

Vietnam 

As we prepare to mark the 15th anniversary of the normalization of U.S.-Vietnam 

relations, our military-to-military relationship with Vietnam continues to improve. 

Vietnam hosted several ship visits this year including the Seventh Fleet Flag Ship, 

the USS Blue Ridge, and its escort, the USS Lassen, whose commanding officer was 

born in Vietnam. In support of JPAC, USNS Bruce Heezen, with embarked Vietnamese scientists and personnel, conducted the first combined hydrographic survey 

in Vietnamese waters, successfully identifying potential crash sites. During his visit 

to Pacific Command last December, Vietnam’s Minister of Defense indicated a desire 

for activities that foster greater understanding and cooperation in various areas 

such as disaster management, conflict resolution, trafficking in persons, and improving relations with its neighbors. We look forward to Vietnam’s chairmanship of 

ASEAN this year and its desire to take a more responsible role in promoting peace 

and security in the region. 

Timor-Leste 

U.S. Pacific Command remains optimistic about the future of this young democracy. The Government of Timor-Leste managed to maintain control of the country 

and return home more than 10 percent of its population who were living in IDP 

camps. Timor-Leste is working with several other countries to begin critical institutional development which includes the Timor-Leste Defense Force (F–FDTL). Although its soldiers lack many basic capabilities, the F–FDTL leadership is developing a recruiting and training program to establish a legitimate, professional military. 

862 

U.S. Pacific Command’s interaction with Timor-Leste increased significantly in 

2009, highlighted by our first military-to-military bilateral discussions. The F–FDTL 

participated in the Marine Exercise Marex 09, a multilateral exercise with Timorese 

and Australian Defense Forces that concentrated on basic infantry skills and medical and dental readiness. Although current engagement with Timor-Leste is mostly 

in the form of medical and dental readiness exercises and engineer assistance by 

U.S. Navy Seabees, we are hopeful that engagements such as Marex 09 will form 

the basis of our relationship as the F–FDTL develops into a professional military. 

Burma 

Beyond the significant issues associated with their human rights record, Burma 

presents challenges to regional stability in a number of other areas, including a 

maritime border dispute with Bangladesh, narcotics trafficking, trafficking-in-persons, and potential for rapid spread of pandemic disease. The recently completed 

U.S. Government policy review and subsequent high level visits to Burma by seniorlevel members of the U.S. Government have not altered our military engagement 

with Burma. It remains essentially non-existent as a matter of policy and public 

law. That said, U.S. Pacific Command is prepared to re-engage in a military-to-military dialogue with the Burmese whenever U.S. policy allows. 

SOUTH ASIA

Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka 

The conclusion of the Government of Sri Lanka’s war against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) terrorist group in May 2009 brought about an uneasy 

peace to Sri Lanka. Concerns over the welfare of nearly 300,000 Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) initially caused the international community to pressure the 

Government of Sri Lanka to better provide for the IDPs while expediting the return 

to their homes. To its credit, the Government of Sri Lanka has taken steps to lower 

the number of IDPs in camps to a current estimate of around 100,000. 

As a consequence of allegations of human rights violations, all U.S. military-tomilitary engagement with Sri Lanka was halted in August 2009, with the exception 

of humanitarian assistance. In the meantime, we await development of a U.S. Government strategy that may include enhanced military-to-military. 

Republic of Maldives 

Since President Nasheed took office in November 2008, we have seen a marked 

increase with Maldives’ desire to interact with U.S. Pacific Command. Maldives 

strategic location astride key shipping lanes in addition to its archipelagic geography make it a key region for maritime security in the Indian Ocean. Maldives requested U.S. assistance in helping the Maldives National Defense Force transform 

itself into a force more capable of defending against the threats of terrorism, piracy, 

and illegal drug trafficking. In response to the Government of Maldives’ concerns 

that international terrorist organizations were actively recruiting Maldivian citizens, we provided assistance in development of a national intelligence capability enabling quicker responses across various agencies of their government. 

Nepal 

The resignation by the Maoist Government in May 2009 resulted in a political 

stalemate that continues to cast serious doubts as to whether Nepal’s Constituent 

Assembly can ratify a constitution by the May 2010 deadline. The Maoists, who still 

control a plurality of seats in the Assembly, have staged numerous walkouts and 

demonstrations, effectively impeding the Constituent Assembly and the constitution 

drafting process. 

Due to the potential for the current peace to unravel, U.S. Pacific Command’s 

focus is on humanitarian assistance and efforts to support the peaceful integration 

of members of the Maoist People’s Liberation Army into the Nepalese security 

forces. Senior level dialogue and defense sector reform events are the primary 

means to assist this change. Additionally, U.S. Pacific Command continues to assist 

Nepal in the development of its peacekeeping operations and training capabilities 

through GPOI. While PACOM is focused on humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping activities, we are also noting an increase in violence in the southern Terai 

region. These poorly governed areas are susceptible to exploitation by terrorist 

groups in South Asia. PACOM will continue to closely monitor this issue and stands 

ready to assist Nepal in building its CT capacity. 

People’s Republic of Bangladesh 

The return to democracy in Bangladesh, while a positive step, has also resulted 

in occasional civilian-military tension that could potentially destabilize this modVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:37 May 06, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00868 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\62155.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
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erate nation of 150 million people. U.S. Pacific Command has initiated several programs and events to assist in promoting civilian-military trust, transparency and cooperation. 

Despite their political issues, Bangladesh continues to be a strong partner who 

works closely with the United States to enhance regional security. The establishment of a naval counter-terrorism force and their hosting of a regional forum to 

counter violent extremist organizations are examples of Bangladesh’s commitment 

to improve their counter-terrorism capacity. We also continue to work closely with 

Bangladesh to expand and improve their peacekeeping, HA/DR and maritime security capabilities. 

OCEANIA

New Zealand 

New Zealand shares many U.S. security concerns such as terrorism, maritime security, transnational crime, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. 

New Zealand is supportive of our overseas contingency operations, deployed for the 

fourth round its Special Air Service (SAS) special operations troops to Afghanistan 

and has extended their commitment to lead the Provincial Reconstruction Team in 

Bamyan Province, Afghanistan until September 2010. 

While the New Zealand nuclear-free zone legislation and resultant U.S. defense 

policy guidelines constrain some bilateral military-to-military engagement, the New 

Zealand Defense Force participates in many multilateral events that advance our 

common security interests. In 2010, New Zealand will be an observer in ‘‘Rim of the 

Pacific’’ (RIMPAC)—the Pacific AOR premier multinational naval exercise. Our Marines continue to assist in New Zealand’s efforts to integrate their multi-role maritime patrol vessel into regional HA/DR operations. 

New Zealand remains active in global security initiatives, from stabilization efforts in Timor-Leste and the Solomon Islands, to operations in Korea, Sudan, and 

throughout the Middle East. Additionally, the New Zealand Defense Force supports 

our National Science Foundation efforts in Antarctica by serving as the primary 

staging area for the multinational Operation Deep Freeze. 

Compact Nations 

U.S. Pacific Command values our partnership with the three Compact Nations— 

the Federated States of Micronesia, the Republic of the Marshall Islands and the 

Republic of Palau. We meet our defense obligations to these nations under the Compacts of Free Association through implementation of our Homeland Defense planning and preparation. Additionally, we commend the professional Pacific Patrol Boat 

crews and fully support each nation’s initiatives to expand operations to protect 

their valuable EEZ resources. We also recognize the significant contributions of the 

proud citizens of these nations as they serve in the U.S. Armed Forces and Coast 

Guard in Operations such as Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom. 

Guam 

As a U.S. territory in a strategically important location, Guam is host to a variety 

of U.S. Joint Forces, critically important Navy and Air Force installations and the 

headquarters for Commander U.S. Forces Marianas. Efforts are ongoing to simultaneously prepare for increased Marine Corps presence on Guam, improve Navy and 

Air Force infrastructure, and improve the quality of life for servicemembers and 

their families stationed there. 

U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND ORGANIZATIONS

Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies 

While Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (APCSS) is not subordinate to U.S. 

Pacific Command, it is a Department of Defense academic institute that supports 

U.S. Pacific Command by developing professional and personal ties among national 

security establishments throughout the region. The Center’s focus is on multilateral 

approaches to security cooperation and capacity-building through its three academic 

components: executive education, conferences, and research and publications. In fiscal year 2009, 628 students joined the more than 4,000 fellows from nations in the 

Asia-Pacific region and beyond. The success of APCSS programs is regularly demonstrated through the courses and seminars that the center offers, and its extensive 

networking efforts (there are currently 45 alumni associations in as many nations). 

APCSS builds its programs to address areas of mutual interest and concern held 

by the United States and the countries in the Asia-Pacific region. 

864 

Joint POW/MIA Accounting Command 

Joint POW/MIA Accounting Command (JPAC) has the important mission of 

achieving the fullest possible accounting of Americans missing from our Nation’s 

conflicts. Last year, JPAC successfully completed 69 missions globally and, in cooperation with 16 nations on 4 continents, identified 93 Americans missing from the 

Vietnam War, Korean War, and World Wars I and II. We expect another successful 

year in 2010 and are projected to execute 75 missions. Of note, engagement with 

North Korea remains suspended, but we are prepared to resume discussions and operations as soon as conditions permit. 

Joint Interagency Task Force West 

Joint Interagency Task Force West’s (JIATF-West) mission is to conduct activities 

to detect, disrupt, and dismantle drug-related transnational threats in Asia and the 

Pacific by providing interagency intelligence fusion, supporting U.S. law enforcement, and developing partner nation capacity. The command was essential to several significant victories this past year that included JIATF-West Tactical Analysis 

Team support to law enforcement operations which dismantled several 

transnational criminal organizations. JIATF-West also worked directly with the 

Drug Enforcement Agency in the multi-ton seizure operation of Asian precursor 

chemicals destined to methamphetamine laboratories in Mexico and Guatemala. 

With respect to capacity building successes in 2009, JIATF-West supported the establishment of Vehicle Control Checkpoint (VCC) facilities in Sikhiu and 

Chumphon, Thailand. These VCCs were specifically set up to enhance border security and interdiction capacity in a region known for illicit trafficking. Also this year, 

JIATF-West executed 17 counter-narco-terrorism training missions which trained 

1,578 partner nation law enforcement officials from Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, 

Cambodia, and Vietnam in ground and maritime interdiction skills. 

Although JIATF-West’s authorities allow us to act against transnational criminal 

organizations, inclusion of Indonesia and the Republic of the Philippines under 1033 

authority would allow us to better support U.S. and partner-nation Law Enforcement Agencies. This authority would allow JIATF-West to provide tools and training 

to maintain operational maritime assets, and automated data processing and information technology networking equipment for JIATF-West—constructed interagency 

fusion centers. 

PROGRAMS

Security Assistance 

Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and International Military Education and 

Training (IMET), executed in partnership with the Department of State and our embassy country teams, are powerful engagement tools for building security partnerships with developing countries. FMF—the program for financing the acquisition of 

U.S. military articles, service, and training that support U.S. regional stability 

goals—continues to demonstrate its worth. It has been particularly important to 

supporting partners engaged in combating violent extremism, especially the Philippines and Indonesia. The IMET program—which provides education and training 

to students from allied and friendly nations—also continued to provide lasting value 

to all participants. The program is a modest but highly effective investment that 

yields the professional and personal relationships that are so important to regional 

security. 

Science and Technology 

The U.S. Pacific Command Science and Technology (S&T) Advisor actively engages with Service and Defense S&T organizations to identify potential solutions to 

operational problems that have a critical impact on combat readiness. This advisor 

is also responsible for executing the S&T Strategy in support of the lines of operation in our Theater Campaign Plan. That strategy focuses on improving partnership opportunities throughout the AOR and encourages cooperative S&T efforts 

through the extensive use of OSD’s Joint Capability Technology Demonstration 

(JCTD) and Coalition Warfare Program (CWP). 

Pacific Partnership 

One of the U.S. Navy’s newest cargo ships, USNS Richard E. Byrd (T–AKE 4), 

successfully deployed to Oceania on a five-country, 3-month humanitarian and civic 

assistance mission from June to September 2009. The mission travelled, for the first 

time to Samoa, Tonga, and Kiribati and returned for a second visit to Solomon Islands and the Republic of the Marshall Islands. This annual deployment is designed 

to build partner capacity and multilateral capability in medical, dental, veterinary 

and engineering disciplines to enhance regional security and better prepare particiVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:37 May 06, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00870 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\62155.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
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pating organizations to respond to regional crises. It is a remarkable multinational 

and multi-organizational evolution that, this year, involved personnel from 14 nations and countless international and host-nation Nongovernmental Organizations 

(NGOs). In all, the mission treated more than 22,000 medical and dental patients, 

conducted 116 community relations projects, and completed 17 engineering and infrastructure projects. This summer Pacific Partnership will return to the region 

aboard USNS Mercy, the Navy’s West Coast hospital ship, to deliver help and hope 

to the people of Indonesia, Timor Leste, Cambodia, and Vietnam. 

Pacific Angel 

Pacific Angel employs the exceptional capabilities of the Pacific Air Forces International Health Services to conduct humanitarian assistance and public diplomacy 

in less accessible areas of South East Asia. This unique C–17, C–130, and KC–135- 

based operation is designed to increase public health capacity as well as cooperation 

and understanding among the armed forces, NGOs, regional partners, and peoples 

of Vietnam, Indonesia, Timor-Leste, and the United States. Assisted by partner-nation and NGO medical personnel, Pacific Angel conducted six Medical Civic Action 

programs, cared for 14,978 medical and 1,010 dental patients, and completed 6 engineering civic-actions projects. 

NDAA Section 1206 

Congressional 1206 authority is the only partner capability/capacity building tool 

that we have to address urgent or emergent needs in the region. Last year U.S. Pacific Command contributed more than $31 million to the maritime security capabilities of Bangladesh and the Philippines. In fiscal year 2010, we intend to build upon 

the initiatives funded in 2009 and to expand counterterrorism capability/capacity in 

South and Southeast Asia. Given the success of these efforts to date, we very much 

support the President’s request. 

Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid 

In the Asia-Pacific, we respond to natural disasters about every 60 days. Overseas 

Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid (OHDACA) funds enable Pacific Command 

forces to respond quickly to those in need when these inevitable disasters occur. Additionally, OHDACA-supported activities promote interoperability and coalitionbuilding with foreign military and civilian counterparts, and improve basic living 

conditions for populations in countries and regions that are particularly susceptible 

to violent extremism. OHDACA projects offer a significant and sometimes unique 

opportunity in the region; and have been particularly helpful to decreasing the operating space of terrorists and violent extremists. OHDACA is a critical element in 

PACOM’s comprehensive approach to counter-terrorism in South Asia; specifically 

in Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. 

Global Peace Operations Initiative 

Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) is rooted in a G–8 commitment to address major gaps in peace operations around the world. The global initiative aims 

to build and maintain the capability, capacity, effectiveness of professional peacekeeping forces. Within the Asia-Pacific region, U.S. Pacific Command’s GPOI program leverages existing host-nation programs, institutions, policies, and exercises. 

We encourage long-term sustainment of qualified forces through a ‘‘train-the-trainer’’ approach, which enables standardization and interoperability, and works within 

the framework of United Nations guidelines. The GPOI program has been fully implemented by U.S. Pacific Command in Bangladesh, Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, 

Mongolia, Nepal, Thailand, and Tonga; and this year we will begin implementation 

in the Philippines. Also in 2010, U.S. Pacific Command will co-host with Cambodia 

the largest multinational peacekeeping capstone exercise conducted in the Asia-Pacific region. We expect participation in this exercise, Angkor Sentinel, more than 20 

of our regional GPOI partners. 

Multinational Planning Augmentation Team 

The Multinational Planning Augmentation Team (MPAT) program is a cooperative, multi-national effort to facilitate the rapid and effective establishment of a 

multinational headquarters in response to an HA/DR event in the Asia-Pacific region. The vision of the program is to develop a cadre of multinational military planners from regional nations. The MPAT effort—which currently involves more than 

30 nations—works to provide coalition and combined expertise in crisis action planning and seeks to develop procedures that promote multinational partnerships and 

cooperation in response to military operations other than war and small scale contingencies. Recent MPAT events have focused on building capacity for response to 

humanitarian crises and on developing standardized operating procedures. 

866 

CHALLENGES

Multi-National Information Sharing 

The ability to exchange information among DOD components, all levels of U.S. 

Government, coalition partners, and the private sector is becoming increasingly important to regional operations; and increasingly dependent on Multi-National Information Sharing (MNIS) efforts such as the Combined Enterprise Regional Informational Exchange Cross Enclave Requirement Program and the Improved 

Connectivity Initiative. 

Joint Information Environment 

Within DOD, Services IT architectures are often redundant or incompatible. In an 

attempt to address this issue, U.S. Pacific Command is partnering with the DOD 

Chief Information Officer, the Joint Staff, all Services, and Industry to develop a 

Joint Information Environment (JIE) that moves to a unified and integrated netcentric environment. When realized, this environment will eliminate the need for 

Joint Force Commanders to integrate networks; further, it will enable personnel access to the information with a single log-on from anywhere on a DOD network. 

Cyberspace 

U.S. Pacific Command faces increasingly active and sophisticated threats to our 

information and computer infrastructure. These threats challenge our ability to operate freely in the cyber commons, which in turn challenges our ability to conduct 

operations during peacetime and in times of crisis. U.S. Pacific Command, in conjunction with the newly established U.S. Cyber Command and other Service and 

Agencies, is working on solutions to detecting these attacks on our networks and 

to responding to them in near real-time. 

Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance 

Given the size and nature of the Asia-Pacific region, effective Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) is essential to obtaining critical insights into the 

plans, capabilities, and intent of our current and potential adversaries. We continue 

to work with the National Intelligence Community, the Undersecretary of Defense 

for Intelligence, and the Joint Staff to effectively address our intelligence collection 

priorities, capability gaps, deployments of assets, and processing, exploitation, and 

dissemination of information to maximize situational awareness and warning. 

Missile Defense 

To defend U.S. forces, interests, allies and friends from short-, medium-, and intermediate-range ballistic missiles, U.S. Pacific Command seeks a forward-deployed, 

layered, and integrated air and missile defense system capable of intercepting 

threat missiles throughout their entire time of flight. Additionally, we are coordinating with the Government of Japan to leverage the newest Japanese systems— 

such as PATRIOT PAC–3, AEGIS SM–3 capable ships and their associated radars. 

Piracy 

The U.S. Pacific Command continues to facilitate multilateral efforts to improve 

regional and global maritime security, especially in the Strait of Malacca, the 

archipelagic regions of South East Asia, and in the Gulf of Aden. In Southeast Asia, 

U.S. Pacific Fleet conducted the annual Southeast Asia Cooperation Against Terrorism exercise, which is designed to highlight the value of information sharing and 

multi-national coordination (participants included Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, 

Singapore, and Thailand; Indonesia participated this past year as an observer). Also 

of note is the cooperation between Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and most recently, Thailand, to patrol the Malacca Straits, an effort which has contributed significantly to reduced incidents of piracy in that vital choke point. Lastly, in the triborder area where Malaysia, the Philippines and Indonesia share common maritime 

boundaries, terrorist freedom of action has been curtailed as a consequence of improved maritime surveillance and response capabilities procured using 1206 authorities. 

Pandemic Influenza 

U.S. Pacific Command maintains a robust pandemic influenza (PI) response plan 

that supports force health protection, Defense Support of Civil Authorities, and Foreign Humanitarian Assistance. Advise, and Assess teams are available to provide 

assistance and to coordinate additional support for U.S. States and Territories. Additionally, we are postured to deploy teams to advise U.S. Country Teams and partner nations on PI response and to assess infectious disease control and surveillance 

programs, laboratories and response team capabilities. 

867 

This past year, we conducted more than a dozen PI-related events that included 

bi-and multi-lateral exercises and subject matter exchanges within our AOR. Highlights from the past year include the Joint Task Force-Homeland Defense exercise 

Lightning Rescue 2009, which tested the State of Hawaii’s PI response and validated domestic relationships and linkages to the U.S. Pacific Command PI plan. 

CLOSING

U.S. Pacific Command must be recognized as both an extension of U.S. military 

power as well as a committed and trusted partner in the Asia-Pacific. Our every 

endeavor must promote a region whose nations are secure and prosperous. Throughout the AOR, we are fortunate to have allies, partners and friends who willingly 

and effectively contribute to regional security and who seek to advance their partnerships with the United States on behalf of the 36 nations and 3.4 billion people 

who reside in the Asia-Pacific region. 

In closing, I would like to express my appreciation to the Committee for the longstanding support you have provided our military. Your efforts have provided our 

members with the most technically advanced systems and with a quality of life that 

recognizes the contributions our young men and women make to our Nation every 

day. On behalf of the more than 300,000 men and women of the Pacific Command, 

thank you for your support and for this opportunity to testify on the defense posture 

in the U.S. Pacific Command. 

Chairman LEVIN. Admiral, we thank you so much. Thank you for 

those comments, as well, about the work of this committee. 

General Sharp. 

STATEMENT OF GEN WALTER L. SHARP, USA, COMMANDER, 

UNITED NATIONS COMMAND, COMBINED FORCES COMMAND, U.S. FORCES-KOREA 

General SHARP. Chairman Levin, Senator Burr, and distinguished members of this committee, I really appreciate the opportunity to report to you today on the state of the UNC, CFC, and 

USFK. 

This year marks the 60th anniversary of the Korean war. Since 

1950, Congress and the American people have made an enormous 

investment in blood and treasure to first defeat and then deter 

North Korean aggression. The alliance continues to reap the returns of that investment. The Republic of Korea (ROK) bears the 

majority of the burden of defending itself, and in 2012, wartime 

operational control (OPCON) transitions from CFC to the ROK 

Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). 

Beyond its borders, the ROK has become an important part of 

the international efforts to keep peace and respond to disasters. 

With significant forces deployed to Lebanon, Haiti, the Horn of Africa, and on other missions, the ROK is fast becoming a global strategic ally envisioned by the 2009 Joint Vision Statement signed by 

Presidents Lee and Obama. With our long-term commitment of 

28,500 troops, we will continue to deter aggression and maintain 

peace, not only on the Korean Peninsula, but throughout Northeast 

Asia. 

Last year, I spoke about my three command priorities. Thanks 

to your support and funding, I am able to share with you the 

progress that we have made since then. 

First, the U.S. forces in the ROK-U.S. Alliance are prepared to 

fight and win. I flew here directly from our annual Key Resolve/ 

Foal Eagle combined exercise. This exercise demonstrated that the 

U.S. and ROK forces and staffs are trained and ready to fight, tonight, on the Korean Peninsula. 

868 

Second, the ROK-U.S. Alliance continues to grow and strengthen. 

Militarily, we will be prepared to transition wartime OPCON to the 

ROK JCS on 17 April 2012. In last year’s Ulchi Freedom Guardian 

exercise, we successfully stood up and tested many post-OPCON 

transition command-and-control structures. Through our Strategic 

Transition Plan, future Ulchi Freedom Guardian exercises, and the 

final certification exercise, we will ensure the readiness of the ROK 

JCS to accept wartime OPCON in 2012 and the ability for the U.S. 

Korea Command to become the supporting command. 

My third priority is improving quality of life for the command 

personnel. We are making substantial progress here, and, with 

Congress’s support, we will be able to achieve all of our goals. We 

are improving the quality of life through two main key initiatives. 

The first is the relocation of U.S. forces. By consolidating U.S. 

forces from 105 facilities that we maintained in 2002 to 48 sites in 

2 hubs, we will make better use of limited resources and be better 

positioned to support our servicemembers and families. 

The second initiative toward normalization goes hand-in-hand 

with the relocation. As we consolidate bases, we are building the 

world-class facilities and housing that are transforming USFK from 

a command where 1-year tours are the norm to one where single 

servicemembers serve for 2 years and those with families stay for 

3. In the last 2 years, the number of families in the Korean Peninsula has increased from approximately 1,600 to 3,900. By keeping 

trained personnel in Korea for normal lengths, we retain institutional knowledge, create a more capable force, and are better able 

to support the Alliance and deter aggression, and we demonstrate 

our commitment to Northeast Asia. At the same time, we are eliminating an unneeded unaccompanied tour and building the strong 

families that are key to retention and effectiveness in this time of 

ongoing conflict. 

To close, the ROK-U.S. Alliance has never been stronger. The Alliance has successfully deterred aggression on the Korean Peninsula for 57 years. In doing so, it has helped make Northeast Asia 

a remarkable—remarkably peaceful and prosperous place. With the 

ROK contributing a substantial portion of the Alliance’s cost, we 

are maintaining the combat readiness and improving the quality of 

life of our military personnel. 

I thank you for supporting our soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, 

and DOD civilians, and their families, serving in the great nation 

of Korea. 

This concludes my remarks, and I look forward to the committee’s questions. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of General Sharp follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY GEN WALTER L. SHARP, USA 

I. INTRODUCTION

Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the committee, I am honored to provide my statement to you. As the Commander, United Nations Command (UNC); 

Commander, Republic of Korea-U.S. Combined Forces Command (CFC); and Commander, United States Forces Korea (USFK), it is a privilege to represent the soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, Department of Defense (DOD) civilians, and their 

families who serve our great Nation in the Republic of Korea (ROK). On behalf of 

these outstanding men and women, thank you for your support of American forces 

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1The region of Northeast Asia is defined to include the following countries and special administrative regions: China, North Korea, Hong Kong, Japan, Macau, Mongolia, ROK, Russia, and 

Taiwan. 2 In terms of number of personnel in the armed forces, the world’s six largest militaries during 

2009 were: China (2.1 million personnel); United States (1.54 million); India (1.28 million); 

North Korea (1.2 million); Russia (1.02 million); and the ROK (687,000). Personnel data obtained 

from The Military Balance 2009, produced by the International Institute for Strategic Studies. 3Population percentage calculated with data obtained from the Central Intelligence Agency 

(CIA) World Factbook. Percentage is as of July 2009. 4Gross Domestic Product (GDP) at purchasing power parity in 2009 for the economies of 

Northeast Asia were: China-$8.7 trillion; Japan-$4.1 trillion; Russia-$2.1 trillion; ROK-$1.3 trillion; Taiwan-$693 billion; Hong Kong-$301 billion; North Korea-$40 billion (2008); Macau-$18 

billion; and Mongolia-$10 billion. GDP data obtained from the CIA World Factbook. 5 U.S. trade in goods during 2009 was valued at $366 billion with China, $147 billion with 

Japan, $67 billion with the ROK, $46 billion with Taiwan, $23 billion with Russia, $55 million 

with Mongolia, $24 billion with Hong Kong, $446 million with Macau, and $900,000 with North 

Korea. Trade data was obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau. 6The direct investment figure is on a historical cost basis and was obtained from data published by the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis. Countries/special administrative region included in the valuation are China, Hong Kong, Japan, Taiwan, and the ROK. 

stationed in the ROK and your commitment to improving the quality of life for Command personnel and their families. Your sustained support allows us to deter aggression against the ROK and promote peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, 

which in turn promotes peace and stability in the region of Northeast Asia and 

helps protect the national interests we share with regional partners. I appreciate 

this opportunity to report on the state of affairs on the Korean Peninsula, my Command priorities, the plans in place for organizational transformation of the commands I lead, and how this change will strengthen the ROK-U.S. Alliance. 

This year we mark the 60th anniversary of the start of the Korean War, a 3-year 

conflict that resulted in millions of military and civilian casualties and has yet to 

be concluded by a formal peace agreement. This year my commands will support a 

host of ROK led events to honor those who played a role in repelling North Korea’s 

aggression of six decades ago. Also this year we recognize the 57th anniversary of 

signing the ROK-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty. Serving as a cornerstone for the 

broader ROK-U.S. Alliance, mutual commitments under the treaty have allowed the 

Alliance to deter aggression against the ROK and promote peace and stability on 

the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia. 

The Korean Peninsula sits at the center of Northeast Asia—a dynamic region that 

has significant national interests for the United States. 1 Northeast Asia is home to 

four of the world’s six largest militaries in terms of personnel and two nuclear powers (China and Russia).2 The region contains 25 percent of the world’s population 

and is an economic powerhouse.3 In 2009, Northeast Asia housed 5 of the world’s 

19 largest economies that collectively accounted for 24.8 percent of global gross domestic product during that year.4 Countries in the region also accounted for 25.8 

percent of U.S. trade in goods during 2009.5 At the end of 2008, the U.S. direct investment position in Northeast Asia was valued at $220.7 billion.6

While Northeast Asia has grown into a major economic region, it is also characterized by uncertainty, complexity, and rapid change. Historical animosities, territorial 

disputes, competition over access to resources, and struggles for regional hegemony 

have combined to pose difficult and long-term security challenges not only for regional states but also for the international community. U.S. force presence in the 

ROK is a long-term investment in regional peace and stability and both maintains 

security commitments to the ROK established under the Mutual Defense Treaty and 

reinforces American engagement with actors throughout Northeast Asia. U.S. force 

presence in the ROK also helps set the conditions for denuclearization of the Korean 

Peninsula and eventual reunification of the two Koreas in a peaceful manner. A 

strong ROK-U.S. Alliance, with a meaningful U.S. force presence on the Korean Peninsula, is essential to meet the security challenges posed in the dynamic and economically growing region of Northeast Asia. As observed in the 2010 Quadrennial 

Defense Review, achieving core missions of American armed forces requires strong 

security relationships with allies and partners that are best enabled and maintained 

through long-term presence and sustained interaction. 

870 

7 In the ROK, Presidents serve a single, 5-year term of office without the possibility of re-election. 8The other four national goals are to develop a government serving the people, a lively market 

economy, active welfare, and a country rich in talent. See the ROK Office of the President (Blue 

House) Web site. 9Peacekeeping operations include UNIFIL (Lebanon), UNOMIL (Liberia), UNAMA (Afghanistan), UNMIS (Sudan), UNAMID (Darfur), UNMIN (Nepal), UNOCI (Ivory Coast), MINURSO 

(Western Sahara), UNMOGIP (India/Pakistan), Somalia, Haiti, and Afghanistan. 

II. STATE OF AFFAIRS IN KOREA

Assessment of the ROK 

Last month ROK President Lee Myung-bak marked the start of the third year of 

his 5-year term in office.7 President Lee Myung-bak has committed the ROK to taking on a more global orientation in its policies and to assume a greater role in the 

international community. Indeed, President Lee has made the development of a 

‘‘Global Korea’’ one of five national goals for the ROK.8 Later this year the city of 

Seoul will host a Group of 20 (G20) summit and at the end of 2009 the ROK officially joined the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development’s Development Assistance Committee, pledging to nearly triple its current level of official development assistance to a value that will equal 0.25 percent of gross national income in 2015. The ROK’s commitment to assume a greater role in the international 

community is evidenced by its participation in about a dozen peacekeeping operations around the world, its plans to form a 3,000 person military unit that can be 

rapidly deployed in support of such operations, and a general willingness to support 

international stability and reconstruction operations such as in Haiti and Afghanistan (where in Afghanistan the ROK will deploy a Provincial Reconstruction Team 

later this year).9

In June 2009 the ROK Government released a revision to its National Defense 

Reform 2020 plan. First written in 2005, the defense reform plan aims to modernize 

and restructure the ROK military through 2020 so that it is ready to address the 

future security environment and challenges. The revised plan focuses on developing 

capabilities to address North Korea’s asymmetric threats (identified as its nuclear 

and missile programs), successful transition of wartime operational control 

(OPCON) to the ROK military, enhancing jointness, developing network centric warfare capabilities, increasing managerial efficiencies to include the extensive use of 

civil resources, enhancing the ability to participate in operations sponsored by the 

international community, and contributing to development of the national economy. 

The objective is to develop an information and technology-intensive military force 

that can cope well with a comprehensive set of security threats. As stated by President Lee during his 1 October 2009 Armed Forces Day speech, the ROK military 

must transform into a highly efficient multi-purpose professional elite force that can 

support Korea’s bid to carry out roles commensurate with its growing international 

stature. Through 2020 the ROK plans on spending an accumulative 599.3 trillion 

won ($466 billion) on defense to include expenditures on this reform initiative. I 

fully support the ROK’s Defense Reform 2020 initiative and hope the plan is fully 

resourced throughout the life of the program. 

Assessment of North Korea 

North Korea continues to be a threat to regional as well as global security and 

prosperity. Over the past year, Pyongyang’s foreign policy alternated from provocative actions to a willingness to engage in some forms of dialogue. North Korea tested 

its nuclear and missile capabilities and continued attempts to proliferate conventional arms and other materials in violation of United Nations Security Council resolutions. Pyongyang has also maintained its aging but massive forward deployed 

conventional military force. North Korea will remain a serious security threat in the 

region and a significant concern for the U.S and the international community for 

the foreseeable future. 

Strategy, Goals, and Internal Dynamics 

Kim Jong-il’s strategic goal is the survival and continuance of his regime. North 

Korea’s efforts to build a nuclear arms program have become the key component of 

its strategy to guarantee regime survival. This program is now assessed to have 

enough plutonium for several nuclear weapons. Nearly 16 years after the signing 

of the 1994 Agreed Framework, Pyongyang continues to try to develop nuclear capabilities. In 2009, it announced a second nuclear test, made public statements about 

its plutonium reprocessing and weaponization activities, and announced progress in 

uranium enrichment. These efforts, along with the sustained development of a complementary missile delivery system, will likely continue into the foreseeable future. 

871 

North Korea appears to desire international recognition as a nuclear weapons state, 

which the United States, the ROK, and many members of the international community (including five members of the Six-Party Talks) have made clear is unacceptable. 

On the domestic front, Kim Jong-il appears to have recovered from an apparent 

stroke in the summer of 2008 and remains in full control of North Korea. Over the 

past year Kim has systematically introduced his third and youngest son—Kim Jongeun—as the heir apparent. Meanwhile, North Korea’s ruling elite, whose privileged 

position apparently rests upon continuance of the status quo, appears unwavering 

in its loyalty to Kim Jong-il. The role of the military in Pyongyang’s decisionmaking 

apparatus appears to be more prominent, as highlighted by last year’s expansion of 

the National Defense Commission authorities. North Korea’s conventional and 

asymmetric military forces remain the guarantor of Kim’s power. The regime manufactures the perception of an external threat—primarily from the United States— 

to maintain internal control and justify its ‘‘military first’’ policy. 

A Year of Pyongyang Provocations and Posturing 

Last year, North Korea initiated a series of provocative actions against the ROK, 

including announcing its unilateral nullification of the 1991 South-North Basic 

Agreement, restrictions of ROK activity at the Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC), 

and threats against ROK naval forces off the western coast of the Peninsula. 

Pyongyang in April launched a Taepo Dong-2 and in May announced that it conducted a second nuclear test in defiance of United Nations Security Council resolutions. North Korea also launched multiple shorter range missiles off its eastern 

coast, reversed disablement procedures at its Yongbyon nuclear facility, announced 

the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel to obtain additional fissile material, announced its withdrawal from the Six-Party Talks, and stated its intent not to abide 

by the 1953 Armistice Agreement. 

In August, Pyongyang released two detained American journalists, a detained 

South Korean KIC employee, and four detained ROK fisherman. Pyongyang also 

lifted its earlier imposed KIC border restrictions and allowed inter-Korean family 

reunions at Mount Kumgang. But in October, North Korea launched more missiles, 

announced that its uranium enrichment development program was in its final 

stages and that all plutonium had been harvested and would be weaponized, and 

provoked an inter-Korean naval skirmish. 

North Korea’s provocations during the first half of 2009 may have been intended 

to test the resolve of the new administration in Washington, create tension in ROK 

domestic politics, or set conditions internally for the introduction of a regime successor. Of North Korea’s true intentions, we know little. But what is clear is that 

these actions resulted in the North’s further isolation—highlighted by unanimous 

passage of additional United Nations Security Council sanctions—and pressure to 

return to denuclearization talks from all five parties, including China and Russia. 

After these events, North Korea launched a ‘‘charm offensive’’ in the second half of 

2009, inviting foreign visitors and business interests to visit the country. This has 

not yet led to any measurable progress towards the complete and verifiable 

denuclearization of North Korea. 

Last year, North Korea’s annual domestic food production remained dismal, with 

the country dependent upon international assistance to meet its basic subsistence 

requirements. Despite its serious economic problems, Pyongyang reportedly continued to divert precious national resources to its conventional and asymmetric military forces. At year’s end, North Korea announced a currency redenomination which 

appears to have confiscated what little wealth might have been accumulated by private farmers and traders and which many now regard as a failure. 

Though aging and technologically inferior, North Korea’s massive army and vast 

artillery forces continue to represent a substantial threat capable of initiating limited offensives against the ROK that could potentially cost thousands of lives and 

billions of dollars in damage. North Korea also continued to develop its missile 

forces by attempting a multi-stage space launch vehicle, as well as multiple theater 

ballistic missile launches. Pyongyang continued to focus resources on its conventional and asymmetric military forces despite food shortages and a faltering economy. North Korea’s missile capabilities remain a significant regional and global 

threat. 

North Korea Threat Outlook 

My number one concern will remain Pyongyang’s continuing attempts to develop 

its nuclear and missile capabilities. The full potential of these capabilities would 

threaten the United States, our regional allies, and the international community. 

We must also be mindful of the potential for instability in North Korea. Combined 

872 

with the country’s disastrous centralized economy, dilapidated industrial sector, insufficient agricultural base, malnourished military and populace, and developing nuclear programs, the possibility of a sudden leadership change in the North could be 

destabilizing and unpredictable. 

In the future, Pyongyang may continue its strategy of periodically heightening 

tensions. We must never be complacent about the possibility that North Korea 

might take additional provocative steps or even launch an attack on the ROK. To 

address this threat, UNC/CFC/USFK must maintain the highest level of readiness. 

III. COMMAND PRIORITIES

I have established three priorities for the commands. These priorities have remained constant and serve as the guiding principles for all key initiatives pursued. 

The three priorities are: (1) be prepared to fight and win; (2) strengthen the ROKU.S. Alliance; and (3) improve the quality of life for all servicemembers, DOD civilians, and their families. I will address each of these priorities and the key initiatives 

within each below. 

Prepared to Fight and Win 

My first priority as Commander of UNC, CFC, and USFK is to maintain trained, 

ready, and disciplined combined and joint commands that are prepared to fight and 

win. This has been the focus of U.S. forces stationed in Korea for more than 50 

years and for the CFC since it was established in 1978. Maintaining ‘‘fight tonight’’ 

readiness is the primary reason U.S. forces are stationed in the ROK, supporting 

the alliance between the American and Korean people in defense of the ROK. The 

Alliance stands ready to address the full spectrum of conflict that could emerge with 

little warning on the Korean Peninsula. This spectrum of conflict ranges from major 

combat operations under conditions of general war or provocation, to multiple possibilities of destabilizing conditions on the Peninsula, to humanitarian assistance operations, and even the elimination of weapons of mass destruction. Given these varied potential security challenges, it is imperative that our forces maintain the highest possible level of training and readiness. 

In order to address the full spectrum of conflict that could emerge on the Korean 

Peninsula, the Command has developed and constantly refines plans to deter aggression against the ROK, defeat aggression should deterrence fail, and respond to 

other destabilizing conditions that could affect the ROK. U.S. and ROK military personnel develop and maintain their warfighting skills through tough, realistic training to include theater-level exercises that leverage a variety of facilities and ranges 

located in the ROK. 

The Command conducts two annual exercises: Key Resolve/Foal Eagle and Ulchi 

Freedom Guardian. Key Resolve, a Command Post Exercise focused on crisis management, trains and sharpens skills on how we will fight today using existing organizational structures where CFC executes command and control over the combined 

force. Foal Eagle is a large-scale combined field training exercise that includes the 

strategic deployment of American forces from bases in the United States as well as 

the participation of thousands of ROK troops. Key Resolve and Foal Eagle ensure 

that CFC remains ready today to decisively defeat any aggression that is directed 

against the ROK. The second annual exercise—Ulchi Freedom Guardian—is a computer-simulated warfighting exercise that focuses on the development of Alliance 

command and control structures that will exist after the transition of wartime 

OPCON of ROK forces in April 2012. 

Maintaining ‘‘fight tonight’’ readiness can only occur when training is conducted 

that prepares forces to address the full spectrum of operations that characterizes today’s complex operational environment. It is vital that Command training facilities 

and events support the full transformation of U.S. military forces stationed in the 

ROK. The U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps possess adequate training resources 

in the ROK to maintain unit combat readiness to include the rehearsal of robust 

amphibious operations. But USFK still faces challenges with respect to the training 

of air forces located in the ROK. We have made progress with our ROK hosts in 

scheduling and maximizing use of limited ranges. However, there is still insufficient 

training range capability and capacity. A continued shortfall in electronic warfare 

training capability and restrictions placed on precision guided munitions training 

pose deficiencies that must be addressed. Deployments of U.S. air forces to training 

events outside the Korean Peninsula mitigate current training shortfalls and ensure 

the same standard of training and readiness as American combat air forces not located in the ROK. This is not a long-term solution, however, and I continue to work 

with the ROK Government to find a solution to this key training and readiness 

issue. 

873 

Strengthen the ROK-U.S. Alliance 

My second priority is to strengthen the ROK-U.S. Alliance. This supports the 

June 2009 ROK-U.S. Joint Vision statement that commits both nations to build an 

Alliance that ensures a peaceful, secure, and prosperous future for the Korean Peninsula, the Asia-Pacific region, and the world as a whole. 

The most significant Alliance strengthening initiative is the transition to ROKled defense on the Korean Peninsula. That is, the transition of wartime OPCON. 

Following the transition of peacetime OPCON in 1994, this initiative to transition 

wartime OPCON resumed in October 2005, when the ROK President stated that the 

time had come for Seoul to be responsible for its own defense. In early 2007, it was 

determined that the ROK would assume wartime OPCON of its forces by April 

2012. Under OPCON transition, the ROK and United States will disestablish CFC 

and stand up separate, but complementary, national commands consistent with the 

Mutual Defense Treaty to focus on combined defense of the ROK. After OPCON 

transition the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) will become the supported—or lead— 

command and the newly created U.S. Korea Command (KORCOM) will be the supporting command. OPCON transition will not result in independent OPCON nor require independent, self-reliant ROK forces. It also will not lead to a reduction in 

USFK forces or weaken the U.S. commitment to provide reinforcement to the Korean Peninsula. Rather, the Alliance will continue close strategic coordination and 

consultation to ensure the appropriate capabilities are in place to meet future 

threats. The United States will have the same commitment to the Alliance after 

OPCON transition that it does now—to include the provision of extended deterrence 

using the full range of military capabilities. 

The combined roadmap toward OPCON transition is laid out in the Strategic 

Transition Plan (STP). The STP summarizes 20 high level tasks and associated subtasks and milestones needed to develop appropriate ROK and U.S. organizations, 

plans, processes, and systems for the future Alliance military structure. It is a methodical approach that ensures the new command and control relationship between 

ROK and U.S. forces will be even more effective than the current CFC construct. 

To ensure that all tasks are completed to standard, a detailed certification process 

has been established. Both American and Korean external senior observers are 

being used to help evaluate the new commands. These advisors use a detailed 

checklist to report to the ROK JCS Chairman and U.S. KORCOM commander as 

well as to the U.S. Secretary of Defense and ROK Minister of National Defense during the annual Security Consultative Meeting. 

Additional evaluation and further development is conducted through the Command theater exercise program. The Ulchi Freedom Guardian (UFG) computer simulated warfighting exercise is the Command’s preeminent combined exercise to test, 

develop, and refine post-OPCON transition command and control arrangements. 

Two UFG exercises have already been conducted and two more will be held prior 

to a final OPCON transition certification exercise in 2012. These exercises help ensure that the new combined command structure will be trained and ready to fight 

and win on the day of OPCON transition. The STP is on track as planned and we 

are working hard to ensure that all conditions will be met for a smooth OPCON 

transition on 17 April 2012. 

The rationale for OPCON transition emanates from the tremendous changes that 

have occurred in the ROK since the Mutual Defense Treaty was signed in 1953. The 

ROK today is a secure democracy and a global economic leader. By assuming the 

lead for its own defense, the ROK will send a strong message not only to North 

Korea but to the rest of the world that it has a strong, competent, and capable military that can take the lead role in securing peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. South Korean leaders have proven their ability to lead forces in a changing 

regional and global environment. They are members of a combined task force and 

are participating in United Nations peacekeeping operations. Officers of the ROK 

military, who have grown up in the Korean culture and are well versed with relevant operations plans while also being familiar with the Korean Peninsula’s terrain, are best equipped to protect the Korean people. After OPCON transition occurs, the ROK military will be fully capable of leading the combined warfight in defense of its people and the United States will remain committed to ROK defense 

through its supporting role. 

Another key Alliance strengthening initiative was the conclusion of a 5-year 

(2009–2013) cost sharing agreement in January 2009. Known as the Special Measures Agreement (SMA), this cost sharing arrangement has the ROK provide USFK 

with valuable labor and logistics services as well as the design (paid for in cash) 

and in-kind construction of facilities and infrastructure needed for daily operation 

of the Command. Under the SMA, ROK support for the maintenance of USFK ensures that the Command maintains its ‘‘fight tonight’’ readiness, a factor that helps 

874 

10 U.S. dollar figure calculated by using a forecasted average 2010 won-$U.S. exchange rate 

of 1,191. This forecasted exchange rate was obtained from the U.S. DOD. 11The two primary hubs are centered on Osan Air Base/United States Army Garrison (USAG) 

Humphreys and USAG Daegu. The five enduring sites are Osan Air Base, USAG Humphreys, 

USAG Daegu, Chinhae Naval Base, and Kunsan Air Base. 

deter aggression against the ROK and preserves peace and stability on the Korean 

Peninsula. SMA contributions also help build the infrastructure needed for a longterm U.S. force presence in the ROK. SMA funds help stimulate the ROK economy 

through the payment of Korean national employee wages, Korean service contracts, 

and Korean construction contracts, serving as a source of economic growth for communities that host USFK facilities. During calendar year 2010 the ROK will provide 

USFK with 790.4 billion won ($664 million) in cost sharing support.10 Future increases in the ROK cost sharing contribution through 2013 are tied to changes in 

the ROK consumer price index. 

Finally, the Command’s Good Neighbor Program continues to make great progress 

in strengthening the ROK-U.S. Alliance. The purpose of the program is to conduct 

community outreach events that engage and connect the Command with the Korean 

community. Good Neighbor Program events educate, inform, and familiarize Koreans with the mission and purpose of USFK. This direct engagement allows Americans and Koreans to develop mutual understanding of one another’s cultures, customs, and lifestyles, often leading to the formation of lifelong friendships between 

members of the two communities. Examples of events conducted by the Good Neighbor Program include English-language camps, speaking engagements by U.S. military personnel, and tours of the Joint Security Area/Demilitarized Zone and USFK 

installations. The program promotes two-way exchange between USFK personnel 

and people of our host country. The program helps foster exchange, understanding, 

and cooperation between members of my Command and the Korean communities 

that exist alongside USFK facilities. In 2009 alone, 2,043 events were conducted 

with the participation of over 139,000 local nationals. The ROK Ministry of National 

Defense operates similar programs called Friends Forever and the Experience Korean Culture Program. Under these two programs, USFK personnel are given the 

opportunity to experience Korean culture by participating in various host-nation 

sponsored events and tours. These programs strengthen the Alliance at both the 

professional and personal levels. 

Improve Quality of Life for Command Personnel 

Improving the quality of life for servicemembers, DOD civilians, and their families 

is my third priority. My overall objective is to establish the infrastructure and operational climate that makes Korea the assignment of choice for DOD personnel. In 

order to achieve this objective and support this priority, the Command is currently 

implementing two key initiatives: the relocation of U.S. forces stationed in the ROK 

and tour normalization. 

Relocation of U.S. Forces in the ROK 

The Command is implementing two separate relocation plans. Once completed, 

American forces will be stationed in the ROK on two primary ‘‘hubs’’ of five enduring sites.11 The first plan—named the Yongsan Relocation Plan (YRP)—will move 

forces currently stationed in and around the capital city of Seoul to U.S. Army Garrison (USAG) Humphreys, which is located near the city of Pyeongtaek some 40 

miles south of Seoul. The majority of costs associated with this relocation plan will 

be paid by the ROK. The second plan, called the Land Partnership Plan (LPP), 

moves the 2nd Infantry Division from locations north of Seoul to areas south of the 

Han River and expands infrastructure at Osan Air Base and Camp Mujuk. Costs 

associated with the LPP will be shared between the ROK and United States. While 

the YRP and LPP programs are being executed, actions will be taken to maintain 

our current facilities at an acceptable standard in order to support current operations. 

The relocation of U.S. forces in Korea will occur in two distinct phases: consolidation and relocation. Phase I—consolidation—is currently underway. The current 

U.S. troop level of 28,500 personnel will remain on the Peninsula. The Command 

has returned 37 installations to the ROK so far, in the process giving thousands of 

acres of land back to the Korean people. In turn, the ROK has purchased land that 

is needed to accommodate USFK relocation. The ROK government has granted land 

at USAG Humphreys, an action that has enabled the ROK-U.S. Alliance to begin 

designing, planning, and construction of what will become one of the best Army installations in the world. The major facilities that will be constructed include medical 

facilities, headquarters buildings, family housing, schools, a communications center, 

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12 It should be noted that in August 2009 the standard length of tour for USFK civilian personnel was increased from 24-months to 36-months. 

and other operational and support infrastructure needed to accommodate the relocation of 2nd Infantry Division. 

Phase II of USFK relocation will involve the movement of Army forces to one of 

the two enduring hubs that will be located south of Seoul. Once this phase is completed, USFK forces will utilize 48 separate sites, well below the 104 facilities USFK 

maintained in 2002. The success of the relocation initiative will sustain USFK’s 

‘‘fight tonight’’ readiness. Unit moves in the relocation plan will be packaged and 

executed in manageable components, which will allow units to maintain their full 

spectrum of operational and support capabilities. Completion of the relocation initiative will be a great boon for the ROK-U.S. Alliance because it improves readiness 

and soldier quality of life, realizes stationing efficiencies, signals continued U.S. 

commitment to the region, improves the combined capability to deter and defend 

against aggression directed at the ROK, and optimizes use of Korean land by creating a less intrusive military footprint, thus enhancing force protection for USFK. 

Tour Normalization 

DOD approved plans to normalize the tours of all servicemembers in the ROK on 

December 1, 2008.12 As noted in the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, DOD’s longterm goal is to phase out all unaccompanied tours in Korea. This goal will mean 

all servicemembers stationed in the ROK will be on 36-month accompanied or 24- 

month unaccompanied tours. Single troops will serve 24-months. Prior to this policy 

change, the majority of U.S. military personnel serving in the ROK were on 1-year 

unaccompanied assignments. For military personnel with dependents, tour normalization means that they can be accompanied by their family members while serving 

our Nation in the ROK, something that has been done in Europe for decades. Once 

complete, there will be approximately 14,500 families in Korea. 

Phase I is currently underway and will run through fiscal year 2011. During this 

phase, the number of command sponsored families in the ROK will almost triple 

from the start of this phase, to 4,932. The length of accompanied tours offered in 

five locations—Seoul, Osan, Pyeongtaek, Daegu, and Chinhae—are now 36 months 

and for areas north of Seoul (Dongducheon and Uijeongbu, referred to as Area I) 

are 24 months. Single soldiers serve a 12-month tour. 

The tour normalization process will synchronize increases in the number of command sponsored (accompanied tour) servicemembers and their families with the expansion of necessary infrastructure such as housing, schools, medical facilities, and 

other infrastructure needed to accommodate this growth. Throughout the phased 

tour normalization process, the funding for needed infrastructure could come from 

three key sources: public and private ventures, appropriated military construction 

funds, and ROK cost sharing contributions where appropriate. 

The tour normalization initiative benefits the Command, DOD personnel serving 

in the ROK, military families, the ROK-U.S. Alliance, and U.S. national interests. 

Full implementation of this initiative improves force readiness and combat capability by keeping trained military personnel in place for longer periods of time, thus 

enhancing continuity, stability, and the retention of institutional, regional, and cultural knowledge. It will also reduce the stress placed on troops and units by frequent rotations and supports the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review’s ‘‘preserve and 

enhance’’ objective by establishing a sustainable rotation rate that helps protect the 

force’s long-term health. Quality of life for our servicemembers will be greatly improved through the elimination of needless separation from their families and the 

use of modern DOD standard design facilities. The ROK-U.S. Alliance will be enhanced by the more meaningful and deeper interaction between Americans and Koreans that can occur during a tour of longer duration. Finally, U.S. national interests are supported through the signal tour normalization sends on U.S. commitment 

to the long-term security and stability of the ROK as well as Northeast Asia as a 

whole. 

IV. FUTURE OF THE ROK-U.S. ALLIANCE

A key part of U.S. security policy in Asia is the construction of a comprehensive 

strategic alliance with the ROK as specified in the June 2009 Joint Vision statement. This comprehensive strategic alliance will be bilateral, regional, and global 

in scope and will be based on common values and mutual trust. We will maintain 

a robust defense posture backed by allied capabilities which support both nations’ 

security interests. Just as today, in the future the ROK-U.S. Alliance will remain 

vital to securing peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia 

876 

as a whole. The United States will maintain its commitment to the defense of the 

ROK through the employment of capabilities postured both on and off the Korean 

Peninsula. Similarly, the United States welcomes recent moves by the ROK to expand its role in the international community at a level that is commensurate with 

its growing international stature. The United States will continue to provide extended deterrence for the ROK using the full range of military capabilities to include the nuclear umbrella, conventional strike, and missile defense capabilities. As 

the ROK-U.S. Alliance evolves in the future, we will cooperate on a wide-ranging 

set of global security challenges that are of mutual interest to include peacekeeping 

activities, stabilization and reconstruction efforts, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief. 

Over the next decade or so the security component of the Alliance will experience 

some of the most profound changes since the Mutual Defense Treaty was signed in 

1953. Three of these key changes are the transition of wartime OPCON, relocation 

of U.S. forces stationed in the ROK onto two enduring hubs, and tour normalization. 

These transformational changes will strengthen the Alliance and enhance its stabilizing role on the Korean Peninsula and in the wider area of Northeast Asia. The 

process of change will also be supported by implementation of the ROK Defense Reform 2020 initiative. As the Alliance transforms, United Nations Command will continue to provide a coalition of 15 nations ready to provide support for defense of the 

ROK as well as conduct its armistice maintenance functions through the Military 

Armistice Commission. 

Through Alliance transformation we seek to build a better future for Koreans and 

Americans by establishing a durable peace on the Korean Peninsula and Northeast 

Asia and setting the conditions for peaceful reunification of the two Koreas. As Alliance partners, the ROK and United States will work together toward achieving complete and verifiable elimination of North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs. In the Asia-Pacific region the Alliance will work jointly with regional institutions and partners to foster prosperity, maintain peace, and improve the daily lives 

of people. To enhance security in the Asia-Pacific area the ROK and U.S. Governments will advocate for—and take part in—effective cooperative regional efforts to 

promote mutual understanding, confidence, and transparency regarding security 

issues among nations of this region. The two governments will also work closely to 

address the global challenges of the North Korean threat, terrorism, weapons of 

mass destruction proliferation, and piracy. The ROK and United States will also enhance coordination on peacekeeping operations and post-conflict stabilization and 

development assistance. In the end, the two countries will work toward achieving 

Alliance goals through strategic cooperation at every level. 

V. SUMMARY

This year marks the 60th anniversary of the start of the Korean War. Thanks to 

the sacrifice and selfless service of a countless number of Koreans, Americans, and 

people of other nationalities, North Korea’s aggression was repelled. This year also 

marks the 57th anniversary of signing the ROK-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty. 

Thanks to the peace and stability created by the Alliance structures that emanated 

from this mutual defense pact, the ROK has been able to develop into a democratic 

industrialized state with a high standard of living and a growing role in the international community. By promoting peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, the 

ROK-U.S. Alliance has not only set the conditions for successful development of the 

ROK over the last six decades, but also promoted peace and stability in the broader 

region of Northeast Asia—a region of key national interest to the United States. 

The ROK-U.S. Joint Vision statement of June 2009 looks to the future and sets 

out a path for taking the next step in Alliance development—building a comprehensive strategic alliance. My three command priorities of being prepared to fight and 

win, strengthening the Alliance, and improving the quality of life for Command personnel support this next step in Alliance evolution. In particular, the transition of 

wartime OPCON recognizes the substantial growth and development that has occurred in the ROK over the last 60 years, and rightly places the ROK in the lead 

position for its own defense. The relocation of U.S. forces in the ROK improves readiness and soldier quality of life. Finally, tour normalization greatly increases our capability and demonstrates long-term U.S. commitment to the Alliance, an Alliance 

that has served the Korean and American people so well for over half a century. 

I am extremely proud of the soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, DOD civilians, and 

their families serving our great Nation in the ROK. Their selfless service promotes 

peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula as well as in the broader region of 

Northeast Asia. Your support for them and the ROK-U.S. Alliance is greatly appreciated. I am certain you will agree that our men and women in uniform deserve the 

877 

very best working, living, and training environment that can be provided, and that 

we should do everything in our power to provide it. Thank you. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, General Sharp. 

We’ll have an 8-minute first round of questioning. 

General Chilton, let me start with you. STRATCOM is going to 

play an important role in the Senate’s consideration of a new 

START follow-on, the successor to START. Have you been involved 

in developing the force-structure positions in support of the force 

structure and the warhead discussions? 

General CHILTON. Senator, STRATCOM has been involved in 

supporting DOD in developing their positions with regard to the 

negotiating positions on START from the perspective of—we looked 

at what it would take to support the current strategy that’s in existence today, and then, from that, what force structure and weapons would be required to support that strategy, and then provided 

analysis for options that were being considered throughout the 

process. So, we were always consulted as those negotiations were 

going forward, and I think that was a healthy relationship we had 

through the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. 

Chairman LEVIN. Are you satisfied with the extent of those consultations? 

General CHILTON. Certainly with the extent of them, Senator, 

I’m satisfied with those. We don’t ever want to say we agreed on 

everything. 

Chairman LEVIN. Of course. 

General CHILTON. That’s, of course, appropriate, that we have 

areas of disagreement and discussions on those. But, I couldn’t be 

more satisfied with the level of participation that was offered to 

STRATCOM throughout the negotiating period. 

Chairman LEVIN. When the treaty is finally entered into and presented to the Senate, I presume, then, that you will be asked for 

your reaction; we can get into it at that time. 

General CHILTON. Yes, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. On the CYBERCOM issue, what is the plan for 

managing and dealing with the lines of authority and command between the intelligence operations and military operations? How’s 

that going to be handled? 

General CHILTON. I would see them as no different than today, 

Senator, for intelligence operations and military operations in any 

regional combatant command or any military area. Those monies 

that are appropriated for intelligence need to stay and be accounted for, and spent in the intelligence area; the same with those 

that are appropriated for other force structure and mission areas. 

We will rely, in the cyberspace domain, on intelligence; not just, 

I should say, from all-source intelligence, so from human intelligence to reconnaissance to signals intelligence to support, our— 

the development of our plans and operations for operating the networks, defending the networks, and, in crisis, utilizing them as 

part of the platform to support other operations. 

Chairman LEVIN. Are there going to be two separate approval 

and review processes through the two different chains of command? 

Will that remain? For approval of action from higher up—— 

General CHILTON. Right. 

878 

Chairman LEVIN.—or for review and oversight of action from either higher-up or from Congress. Is that going to remain the same 

for those two chains of command, intelligence— 

General CHILTON. I see no change in that, Senator. I mean, what 

I will be asked to do, as the combatant commander, will stay in the 

typical Title 10 lanes and under the Title 50 authorities that are 

normally afforded to combatant commanders, and flow down 

through the subunified command for that mission area. Those intelligence-area investments and decisions that are made would still 

flow down through the intelligence chain to the various intelligence 

committees and communities. 

Chairman LEVIN. You think those lanes are going to be clearly 

defined. 

General CHILTON. Yes, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. General Chilton, there’s a new approach, called 

phase adaptive approach (PAA), relative to the missile defense plan 

for Europe. I think your prepared testimony, and maybe your oral 

testimony, covered this; but, if so, I missed it. In your judgment, 

does the PAA give us an effective way to address the Iranian missile threat, which is a growing threat? 

General CHILTON. I do believe it does, Senator. I think it shifted 

our focus more toward addressing the shorter- and mid-range 

threats first, and last year, when we looked at the JCM–2 study, 

it recommended that we increase our investments in addressing 

those threats, with increased investments in Theatre High Altitude 

Area Defense and Standard Missile-3, which have been brought 

forward in this budget. But taking a look at the Iranian threat, it 

puts us in a position to address what is a growing short- and medium-range palpable threat—that’s measurable—sooner, and yet 

preserves the opportunity to address the longer-range threat, which 

we do have some capability against today, already. 

Chairman LEVIN. All right. I believe, in your written statement, 

you conclude by saying, ‘‘The total effect of the PAA will provide 

significantly more capability to counter today’s regional threats’’— 

I emphasize the word ‘‘today’s regional threats’’—‘‘and to improve 

our ability’’—and I’m quoting you, here—‘‘to defend the United 

States against any future Iranian intercontinental ballistic missile 

(ICBM).’’ Is that a capsule—— 

General CHILTON. Yes, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN.—of your—— 

General CHILTON. I think so. As you look to the future, we’ll 

have, I believe, more capability, in this plan, in the 2020 timeframe 

than we otherwise would have had with this approach, for both of 

those threats, both to the region and to the United States. 

Chairman LEVIN. So, is it fair to say that this plan, then, in your 

judgment, will provide a better defense of Europe, especially 

against those short- and medium-range missiles than the previous 

missile defense plan? 

General CHILTON. I think it will, Senator, because there will be 

more capability deployed, and also, I think it gives us an opportunity to do some further burden-sharing with our allies in the region, which—of course, they’re eminently interested in the defense 

of that region, as well. 

879 

Chairman LEVIN. A possible spinoff—still only ‘‘possible’’—of the 

plan might be the inclusion of information from radars—from Russian radars as part of a missile defense capability. That’s not yet 

a fact, but it, I gather, is still a possibility. My question to you is 

then, that if that occurred, if that cooperation with Russia took 

place, would that be in our interest? Do you think that it could 

send a powerful message to Iran that we are united, the world is 

united, in opposition to Iran’s threats to the region? 

General CHILTON. Senator, sensors are a key element of any missile defense system, and having additional sensor capability that 

would augment the defense of Europe from any potential aggression by Iran, I think, would be welcome. 

Chairman LEVIN. Is that additional sensor capability that you’re 

referring to the possible Russian additional sensor? 

General CHILTON. I think there’s opportunity to examine that. 

Chairman LEVIN. But, the sensors that you were referring to are 

the Russian sensors that we—that I referred to in my question? 

General CHILTON. Yes, and so, I would say that opportunities for 

additional sensors, to include Russians’, could be beneficial. But, I 

would also emphasize that the sensors that we provide are an essential element of this. Too often we get focused on just counting 

missiles. The sensors are very key. 

Chairman LEVIN. That’s an important—— 

General CHILTON. Part of the Missile Defense Agency’s (MDA) 

architecture. 

Chairman LEVIN.—an important point. Thank you. 

General Sharp—— 

Okay, my time’s up. 

Senator Burr. 

Senator BURR. Mr. Chairman. 

Again, welcome, to all three of our panelists today. 

General Chilton, as you continue your preparation for standing 

up CYBERCOM, to the degree that you can elaborate, what are 

some of the steps that are being taken in the short term to ensure 

the safety and security of our Nation’s computer networks? 

General CHILTON. Senator, we’ve done a lot of work to prepare 

for the standup of CYBERCOM, to include completing an implementation plan. Also, as part of our normal plan, independent of 

the standup of CYBERCOM, we took steps, this past year, to combine the Global Network Operations Team with the Network Warfare Team into a single entity so that we could bring together closer sharing of information and teamwork between those two entities 

that are responsible for operating and defending the networks, as 

well as preparing for contingency operations. 

I would remind this committee that what we are chartered to do 

at STRATCOM is to operate and defend military networks only. So, 

we do not have the responsibility for defending other U.S. networks 

that—those fall under the responsibility of the Department of 

Homeland Security. 

But, it will be essential, in any contingency in the future, that 

we preserve our military network so that we can conduct operations, should this—military operations—should our Nation come 

under attack. So, we have a laser-beam focus on doing that. I think 

we’ve made significant strides in three areas: 

880 

One, changing the culture of the military with regard to how we 

look at our systems. They are no longer systems used for convenience; they are systems that we require and are a necessity in warfare. So, changing that mindset, making it a commander’s business, 

not just the technicians’ business, to assure that our networks are 

ready and available to the warfighter, is absolute an important 

change. 

The way we conduct ourselves on the networks, improve training 

for our people, to make sure we tighten security for them, and 

teach them how to behave properly on the networks to minimize 

vulnerabilities, is the conduct part, as well as inspecting our units, 

globally, to make sure that they’re following instructions and directions put out to ensure Web security. 

Finally, increased investments in capabilities, which we greatly 

appreciate the support of this committee on, and technologies that 

allows us to get out in front of threats coming into the military networks, are absolutely essential. 

Senator BURR. Just very quickly, do you see the threat, specifically to the military infrastructure, from cybercapabilities as great 

as other threats that are more physical? 

General CHILTON. I do— 

Senator BURR. Specifically as it relates to our capabilities. 

General CHILTON. Well, I look at it just like I do the space domain. I don’t think we can imagine operations today—and I’ll defer 

to my colleagues to the left on this—but, I don’t think we can imagine military operations today without the advantages we have obtained from missile warning in space, global communications, GPS 

position navigation and tracking—or, timing. The same thing in 

cyberspace. The way we conduct our planning today, the way we 

issue orders, the way we assess our operations, so much rely on our 

military networks. So that is a capability that we depend on, and 

we must anticipate we will be challenged in these domains of space 

and cyberspace, in any military operation in the future. 

Senator BURR. Thank you, General. 

Admiral, we have approximately 49,000 military personnel, mostly marines, at Futenma Airbase in Japan, with an uncertainty 

about their future. According to a Reuters article posted yesterday, 

the Prime Minister has not made a final decision on his commitment to the 2006 Accord, in providing a location for the airbase at 

Okinawa to move. What’s the latest information that you can share 

on the matter? If you can, what’s the road ahead for us? 

Admiral WILLARD. Thank you, Senator. The first point I think I’d 

make is just to reaffirm the importance of the U.S.-Japan alliance 

as it exists today. It remains a cornerstone for security in Northeast Asia, and I think both nations recognize that. Prime Minster 

Hatoyama has come out reaffirming the importance in—that he 

places on the alliance, and certainly we do; and I state that frequently. 

With regard to this relatively tactical-level issue in Okinawa, 

which is the replacement of the Futenma Airbase, as you suggest, 

the Japanese have been deliberating on this now for several 

months. We have a commitment from the Japanese Government 

that they’ll disclose their options and decision regarding the review 

of whether the existing Futenma replacement facility (FRF) is 

881 

agreeable to them, by May of this year. We don’t know whether 

we’ll have disclosures of various options to consider before that, so 

I’m awaiting, with some interest, what the Japanese have to say. 

I would offer that we’ve been discussing Futenma replacement on 

Okinawa now for the better part of 17 years with the Japanese, so 

this is not a new issue for us. The agreement that was discussed 

and come to in 2006 on the FRF was very much an agreement 

where the Japanese had a majority vote—the people of Okinawa 

and the Government of Japan, both—and we continue to believe 

that the FRF in the current plan is the best locating option for that 

airfield in Okinawa. 

Senator BURR. But, you are confident that, in the next several 

months, there’ll be additional direction on how we move forward. 

Admiral WILLARD. Yes, I’m confident that the Government of 

Japan will meet their commitment to come forward with their assessment of this particular item and their options, or agreement, 

that the existing FRF is what they will advocate for. 

Senator BURR. Thank you, Admiral. 

General Sharp, I think I understand your goal of increasing the 

number of command-sponsored families and the tour-length increase of up to 3 years. I also understand that there are considerable limitations in funds and resources to support families; specifically, healthcare, schools, jobs for spouses, all of the things that we 

all look at to try to accommodate the service of our servicemembers. 

You talked a little bit about the process and how we’ve moved 

forward. Anything more you want to elaborate on that process? 

But, also, can you share with us any projected shortfalls that we’re 

going to have? 

General SHARP. Thank you, Senator. The process is—that is now 

ongoing is—as I’ve said, we have gone from about 1,600 families in 

the June 2008 time period to about 3,900 now. By this time—by 

next summer, by the end of next summer, we’ll be up to 4,900 families. Those are the families that I can handle with the infrastructure I have in place right now on the peninsula; infrastructure, 

meaning housing, schools, and hospital, primarily. 

What—the goal—to be able to go from that 4,900 to when all 

servicemembers can bring their families for 3 years, which will get 

us up to about 14,000 families, is really the process that’s going on 

right now in the deliberations in DOD for the program objective 

memorandum (POM) 12–17 submission. 

I tell my people, ‘‘I can’t get ahead of my own headlights.’’ I want 

to make sure that we have the proper infrastructure in place in 

order to be able to handle those families. That’s what you will see 

when the Department comes forward with the budget in January 

as we look out over the POM years. 

But, tour normalization is really making a huge difference in 

Korea, not only for the families, in eliminating another unaccompanied tour, but—and it greatly increases our capability there, and 

I think it really shows our long-term commitment to, not only the 

ROK, but all to—to all of Northeast Asia, which I think is important, not just looking at the Korean Peninsula, but how we are 

viewed for our long-term commitment in that very important part 

of the world. 

882 

Senator BURR. Great. Thank you, General. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator. 

Senator Lieberman. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. 

Thanks, to the three of you, for your service. 

I must say that Chairman Levin and I were just agreeing that 

the three of you, and the combatant commanders we see in this series of hearings, are really most impressive, and we thank you for 

your service. 

Now I’ll go on to ask critical questions, of course. [Laughter.] 

But no really Admiral, I thank you—Admiral Willard, I thank 

you for your overview, a quick overview of the region. I thought 

your prepared statement was really excellent, that you entered into 

the record. It reminds us, even though we’re focused, because of 

combat going on in Afghanistan and Iraq, on other parts of the 

world in Central Command (CENTCOM), that the Asia Pacific is 

really critical to us. You have some numbers in here that—it’s very 

important to remember that 5 of our top 10 trading partners are 

now Asia Pacific countries. China, Japan, and South Korea are the 

second-, fourth-, and seventh-largest trading partners. Obviously, 

an enormous number of people. We have, really, an excellent group 

of allies in the region. Japan, as you mentioned, foundation for a 

long time. South Korea, very important. Australia. Now, India really rising as a critically important ally. I want to thank you for your 

statement, and I repeat it, ‘‘India’s strategic location, shared democratic values, growing economy, and evolution as a regional power 

combine to make them a partner with whom we need to work much 

more closely.’’ I think the military-to-military relationship that— 

there can be critical. 

I wanted to focus, first, in questioning, on another of our great 

allies there, which is South Korea. Continuing—though we’ve been, 

as you say in your prepared statement, General Sharp, ‘‘North 

Korea undertook a charm offensive’’—‘‘charm,’’ of course, like most 

other human activities, is a relative concept, relatively—‘‘charming 

during the second half of 2009,’’ although, as you say, ‘‘it’s not yet 

led to any measurable progress towards the complete and verifiable 

denuclearization of North Korea,’’ end of quote. So, the North Korean threat remains. 

Here’s what I want to focus on. As you all know, in 2007, President Roh, of South Korea, and President Bush entered into an 

agreement, whereby transfer of wartime OPCON in the U.S.-ROK 

CFC will go to South Korea in 2012. I want to express to you my 

concern about that. I share what you’ve expressed, which is your 

faith, both Admiral Willard and General Sharp, in the professionalism skill of our South Korean allies, but I worry about the 

timing, because 2012 is a year in which both the United States and 

South Korea will hold presidential elections. We know, in our last 

presidential year, North Korea acted up. May have been coincidental; I don’t think so. I was struck—and North Korea has already said that they intend to make 2012 a special year. I believe 

it’s the 100th birthday—100th anniversary of the birth of the previous great leader. Then I saw, recently, Minister of Defense Taeyoung Kim, of South Korea, said, and I quote, late February, ‘‘The 

883 

military must always prepare for the worst, and the worst scenario 

is the transfer of wartime OPCON in 2012,’’ end quote. 

I wanted to ask both Admiral Willard and General Sharp whether this is inevitably going to happen, this OPCON transfer, whether we’re reviewing it. I worry about it, both in terms of the Korean 

Peninsula, but, frankly, also its impact on other areas of the world, 

including, particularly, Afghanistan and Pakistan, where they 

worry about whether we’re going to leave before the job is done, as 

it were. 

So, Admiral Willard, would you take a first stab at that? 

Admiral WILLARD. I will, Senator Lieberman. 

First, this alliance between the ROK and United States, as General Sharp indicated in his remarks, is as strong as I’ve ever witnessed it—— 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Admiral WILLARD.—bar none. We’ve been continually impressed 

by the ROK armed forces capabilities in the field and capabilities 

in leadership throughout the exercise series that General Sharp 

oversees. So, we’re convinced that operational transition—OPCON 

transition could clearly occur in 2012. 

As you suggest, this is a Government of Korea decision, or certainly OPCON transition will be considered by the Government of 

Korea for its import and its impact on the region. We think that 

it strengthens the ROK’s armed forces position on the peninsula to 

take overall OPCON of their own defense; and we think they’re 

ready for it. 

To the extent that the government would question that, I think, 

then, it becomes a government-to-government decision between the 

United States and the ROK. Our role in this—and General Sharp 

can be very specific regarding the many actions that he’s taken to 

help prepare for this transition to occur—has been to conduct a series of exercises and take all of the actions necessary to bring the 

moving parts together to make OPCON transition a reality, April 

12, 2012. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right. So, the transfer is not of OPCON to 

the South Korean military—is not inevitable. In other words, it— 

that is, for the 2012 timeframe. I appreciate what you’ve said, that 

if the Government of Korea has second thoughts about it—and, incidentally, I appreciate what you’ve said. Our relations with South 

Korea are probably better than they’ve ever been, today. This 

agreement, in 2007, was signed at a time when the relations 

weren’t as good as they are today. 

But, anyway, I hear you say that if the Government of the ROK 

has second thoughts about assuming OPCON in 2012, then that essentially gets bounced up to the political leadership of both countries. Is that correct? 

Admiral WILLARD. I think so, yes. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. General Sharp, do you want to add to that? 

General SHARP. Senator, a couple of things. First off, from a military perspective, I’m absolutely confident we will be ready to do 

OPCON transition on 17 April 2012. We are on the second version 

of the plan, the bilateral plan that both countries will agree to, that 

will determine what is the supporting/supported relationship that 

mission and forces of ours in the ROK would do in the defense of 

884 

the ROK. We are already starting to stand up the organizations 

that need to be in place in order for that to happen, both on the 

ROK side and on the U.S. side. 

We have exercised this several times in our Ulchi Freedom 

Guardian exercises. We have people that are working on this—the 

plans, organizations, processes, and systems—literally on a daily 

basis. I am confident in the ROK military leadership in the processes that need to be in place for an effective command-and-control 

relationship for us to be able to defend the ROK. 

Having said that, I also believe that it is the right thing to do. 

The number-one responsibility of any nation is to defend their own 

country. In a country that is advanced as Korea is, the 13th richest 

country in the world, a country that has a military that’s as strong 

as it is, it’s their responsibility to take the lead role in defending 

the ROK. 

I think it also sends a very strong message to North Korea and 

to other people in the region that the Korean military is so strong 

that the United States is willing to go in a supported-to-supported 

relationship, and willing to do it in 2012. To delay that time, I 

think, sends exactly the opposite signal, which I think is not the 

right thing to do, against North Korea or other parts of the—parts 

of Northeast Asia. 

Again, as Admiral Willard said, if North—if the ROK comes and 

asks for a delay, I’m sure that will be a discussion at the highest 

levels of both governments, because both governments agree to this 

timeline of 17 April 2012. To change that timeline, both governments will have to agree to change that. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. I appreciate your answer. Look, I agree that 

the transfer of OPCON is the right thing to do. The question I’m 

raising is whether 2012 is the right time to do it, and also, of 

course, to make clear, as I think you have, that if OPCON occurs 

then, or a year later or 2 years later, it doesn’t mean that the 

United States is exiting South Korea, or that part of the world. 

General SHARP. Exactly, sir. The commitment of 28,500 troops to 

the Korean Peninsula for the foreseeable future—the words Secretary Gates and the President have used—and I think it’s a great 

investment, and it has been for the last 60 years, to be able to 

maintain peace and security there. As we move forward in OPCON 

transition—one of the things that I think is misunderstood, especially on the Korean Peninsula, is, there is a belief that, after 

OPCON transition, the total responsibility for defending the ROK 

lies with the Korean military. That can’t be further from the truth. 

I’ve heard words of ‘‘independent, self-reliant forces’’ in South 

Korea. The fight—and the commitment—that we have to the ROK 

does not change. It will be a combined warfight, just like it is 

today, after OPCON transition. 

As Admiral Willard said, I’m very confident it will make the 

ROK military even stronger, just as it has been since 1994, when 

they took armistice OPCON of their military, and all the progress 

that has been made along those lines. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thank you both. 

Thanks, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Lieberman. 

885 

I just want to let you know, General Sharp, how much I welcome 

your comments about the importance of that transition date being 

sustained, and the reasons that you give for it. 

Senator LeMieux. 

Senator LEMIEUX. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Good morning, gentlemen. Thank you for your service. Thank 

you for being here this morning. 

The first question I have is to Admiral Willard, but, General 

Chilton, you may also want to respond to this. 

Last week, the Washington Times cited a 2009 Central Intelligence Agency report to Congress stating that assistance from Chinese and Russian entities had helped Iran move toward self-sufficiency in the production of ballistic missiles. What is your assessment of China’s support to Iran’s ballistic missile program? 

Admiral? 

Admiral WILLARD. I would probably defer to General Chilton to 

get his assessment of this. I would offer that, in the military-tomilitary relations that China has across the region, there are always oversight by us and concerns with regard to proliferation that 

might occur to accompany that. So, this is the issue of who is selling ballistic missile capability to whom. In the case of North Korea, 

that we’ve been discussing over the past few minutes, who might 

proliferate, worse than that. 

So, proliferation concerns, I would offer, certainly exist. In terms 

of specifics between China and Iran, I’m not prepared to discuss it. 

Senator LEMIEUX. General? 

General CHILTON. Senator, nor am I prepared to discuss specifics—and this would be out of ignorance—between China, specifically, and Iran. I share—agree completely with Admiral Willard’s 

comments, that proliferation, in general, is a concern. Certainly we 

have seen North Korea proliferating missile technology, and that 

has been a focus and an area of concern for us all. 

Senator LEMIEUX. Just as a followup to that, have you seen any 

evidence of Iran trying to project influence into your region? 

Admiral? 

Admiral WILLARD. Iran has military partnerships within our region. In that sense, yes. Iran’s influence in the region, by and large, 

has to do with Iran’s energy resources and the dependence by Asia 

Pacific countries on those resources. So, to a great extent, the economic relationship of a great many countries in the Asia Pacific 

with Iran has to do with oil. At the same time, there are, yes, military-to-military relationships that we monitor between Iran and 

some Asia Pacific countries. 

Senator LEMIEUX. Admiral, in terms of Islamic extremist groups, 

what gives you the most concern within your region? 

Admiral WILLARD. For the past half a dozen years, we’ve been 

working with the armed forces of the Philippines—in the Southern 

Philippines, against a variety of groups—Abu Sayyef group being 

predominant. 

With Indonesia, we work with the Indonesians with regard to 

their Jemaah Islamiyah concerns. In both these countries, we have 

been successful in our work with their respective armed forces and 

police forces in the conduct of counterterrorism. Right now our concern is the movement of Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), the terrorist group 

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that emanates from Pakistan that was responsible for the Mumbai 

attacks in India, and specifically their positioning in Bangladesh, 

Nepal, the Maldives, and Sri Lanka. We’re working very closely 

with the Indians, and we’re working within our own community to 

develop the necessary plans to counter that particular terror group 

as they migrate into the Asia Pacific region. 

Senator LEMIEUX. Are they a regional threat, or just a threat to 

India? 

Admiral WILLARD. We’re attempting to develop a further understanding of the extent to which they’re a regional threat. If you’ll 

recall, LeT was evidenced in Chicago, with the arrest of Headley, 

and we have, certainly, knowledge of their influence within the region, beyond the countries that I just mentioned. The extent of that 

influence is what we’re taking under study. They are predominantly a threat to India. 

Senator LEMIEUX. General Chilton, I want to talk to you about 

the importance of manned spaceflight and the work of the National 

Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), and how it impacts 

STRATCOM, and the relationship thereto. I know this is something 

you’re uniquely capable to speak about. 

The administration has proposed to abandon the Constellation 

program and abandon our short-term lower Earth orbit capabilities, rely instead upon the Russians to get us to the International 

Space Station. Does this have any concern to you as the combatant 

commander for STRATCOM? 

General CHILTON. There’s just one second-order effect of that, 

that I think we need to study, but, I’ll speak about it in a more 

broad sense, and that has to do with industrial-base issues. So, 

NASA was, in their plan for Constellation, going to use a large 

solid rocket motor as part of that architecture. Now I have to take 

that into context with—moving away from that—in the context of 

requirements for sustainment of the D–5 for our submarinelaunched ballistic missiles and for the Minuteman III, for the 

ICBM. So, I think it warrants us to then evaluate the impacts on 

the industrial base. I can’t say that there are clear impacts that 

would affect STRATCOM, but it warrants us to take a look at industrial—potential industrial-base issues with regard to that critical industrial base, which allows us to build large solid rocket motors for the strategic deterrent. 

Senator LEMIEUX. Beyond the industrial-base capabilities and 

the requirements that you need for your missiles, is there—it 

would occur to me that NASA’s innovation and the way that they 

bring new innovations to—not just space exploration, but to missile 

technology and other aerospace technologies, that that would have 

some impact upon what you do if they were no longer pushing the 

envelope in that regard. 

General CHILTON. Well, sir, I guess I can’t comment on whether 

NASA will continue to push the envelope or not. I suspect they 

will. They certainly—as we look through our history, we have benefited, not only in space, but in aeronautics, from the great research 

and development and technology that has been developed by NASA 

over the years. I look forward to them continuing to push the envelope in both domains, because we have benefited from that in the 

past. 

887 

Senator LEMIEUX. Admiral Willard, there was some discussion 

earlier about our relationships with China. We have China reacting 

to our military exchange with Taiwan, and they reacted previously, 

in 2008, when there was a similar exchange. Do you think there’s— 

this is business as usual for them, or are there any additional longterm ramifications to their response to our agreements with Taiwan? 

Admiral WILLARD. Well, certainly the suspension of military-tomilitary relationships is consistent with what we’ve seen in the 

past from China when they’ve had a disagreement with our Nation; 

in this case, with regard to an announcement of Taiwan arms 

sales. We’ve been in dialogue with China, prior to this particular 

suspension taking place, offering that the military-to-military relationship is worth continuing, worth sustaining, regardless of disagreements between our two nations. We believe that strongly. We 

think that across all of the engagement with China that’s currently 

occurring with the Departments of the United States, that the military-to-military relationship tends to lag behind the other forms of 

engagement, and that that shouldn’t be the case, so that we can, 

number one, find areas of common interest, where we can begin to 

advance our relationship into the future, and, second, so that we 

can have frank discussions about areas of disagreement, which, 

clearly, when we suspend military-to-military relationships, that 

dialogue stops. So, we think that it’s certainly in both countries’ interest. They get a vote, and they must see the value in it, as we 

do, I think, to see anything other than this predictable behavior occurring in the future. 

Senator LEMIEUX. Thank you very much, Admiral. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you. My time is up, but I would like to submit some questions for the record that I would have asked concerning cybersecurity. We know, recently, that Google has experienced attacks, and I was at a China Commission—bicameral commission meeting this week. It was not articulated directly by the 

folks from Google, but there certainly seems to be the indication 

that those attacks came from the—sponsored by the Chinese Government. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator LeMieux, for 

those questions, which I think will be important—the answers will 

be important to all the members of this committee and Congress, 

because you’ve pointed to an extremely important issue that is ongoing. 

Now, I understand that Senator Akaka has been happy to yield 

to Senator Nelson. 

Senator Nelson. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Well, thank you very much. 

Thank you, Senator Akaka, for your courtesies, extending me 

this opportunity to ask a question, because I have an airplane to 

catch here shortly. 

General Chilton, it’s a military construction question. For some 

time, you and I and others have talked about the need for a new 

STRATCOM headquarters building. So I’ve been very pleased with 

the progress that we’ve made towards addressing this vital need. 

The facility’s shortcomings and problems are well known. They’ve 

888 

put STRATCOM’s mission and its personnel at some risk. The existing headquarters was built in 1957; it’s weathered the five decades with little renovation. In recent years, the building’s experienced failures in electrical service, as well as some fires and flooding. The Air Force and the President have addressed these shortcomings so that, in fiscal year 2011, there’ll be money to complete 

the plan and design of the headquarters facility, with construction 

beginning in fiscal year 2012. When we talked last, I think you 

probably said it the best I’ve ever heard it, that STRATCOM headquarters is the nuclear command-and-control node for the United 

States, and we must make the appropriate investments. 

Can you speak to why this facility has been a priority for you, 

as combatant commander, and what you foresee as the value of a 

new headquarters, in terms of our capabilities? 

General CHILTON. Thank you, Senator. I’m happy to talk to it. 

When I got to the Command, of course, you first reviewed the 

working conditions and—for your people. I’ve walked the halls and 

the tunnels of the headquarters extensively. I think the context is, 

this headquarters was built with a large underground facility that 

extends seven floors below the surface, to our Global Operations 

Center, in a time—at the height of the cold war, when it was felt 

necessary to bury things as such. 

Since then, technology has evolved and we started using computers, bringing a lot of computer capability into this infrastructure 

that was absolutely not designed to handle that, so heat loads, 

working-space conditions are intolerable in some areas, for some of 

our people; and we are actually constrained in the capabilities that 

we would like to deploy in the building, both on how we would organize and implement the critical functions that we have, to include nuclear command and control, and add on to that the new 

mission sets that we’ve had. So, we’ve had mission growth in space 

and cyberspace, which also demands better support and integration. 

So, this is about not only the fact that we live in a building that 

was designed to—and occupied early on—over 50 years ago, for a 

different era and a different sole mission set, with different technologies. It’s about mission growth and it’s about doing what we 

need to do for the country, both as a nuclear command-and-control 

node, but as a cyberspace node and a space node for this Nation. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Now, would you—would it be safe to say 

that it’s a fairly large multistory bomb shelter? 

General CHILTON. There’s quite a bit underground, Senator. I 

don’t believe we need that anymore today. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Right. 

General CHILTON. I don’t believe we need the deep underground 

capability. We do need protections for our people in our command 

centers to withstand weather phenomenon in the area, and to ensure that it’s always there for America. So I think we have a— 

we’ve worked very hard on the design of a new infrastructure and 

facility to take us into the 21st century and what this command 

needs to do its missions in the future. I’m satisfied we’re on track. 

We appreciate your support and the support of this committee. 

Senator BEN NELSON. I want to thank you and the many personnel, both civilian and military, who make STRATCOM such an 

889 

important part of our national security and help keep us as safe 

as possible. 

I thank you, Admiral and General, for your commitment and 

your very diligent and impressive work, as well. 

Thank you, Senator Akaka. I appreciate that. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator Nelson. 

Senator Akaka. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to say aloha and welcome to Admiral Willard and General 

Chilton and General Sharp. I want to thank you very much for 

your distinguished service to our country, and also all the military 

personnel that serve under you to assure that the security is there. 

The posture of PACOM and also USFK is of particular interest 

to me because of the strategic location of Hawaii in the Pacific. The 

growing economies, also, of the Pacific region, and particularly 

China, India, and South Korea, present both opportunities and 

challenges. But, I continue to be interested in the readiness of our 

forces in the Pacific as challenges in other parts of the world continue to compete for military resources. Of course, we’re always 

looking at resources for our military and to be certain that we have 

it ready for our forces. 

Admiral Willard, India is becoming a growing economic and military power in the region. Last year, the United States and India 

reached agreements in military cooperation, space issues, and 

peaceful nuclear energy generation, during the visit of Secretary 

Clinton. Admiral, can you tell us how we are working with India’s 

military and about any future developments? Of course, I ask this 

for information that you can reveal in this forum. 

Admiral WILLARD. Aloha, Senator Akaka. 

Senator AKAKA. Aloha. 

Admiral WILLARD. Thank you very much for the question. 

Senator AKAKA. Also let me say welcome to Donna. 

Admiral WILLARD. Thank you very much, Senator, and happy to 

answer the question. 

The military-to-military relationship with India has been evolving now for most of the last decade, and really started at the tactical level, service-to-service-type interaction, some of which I experienced while I was the Seventh Fleet Commander in hosting executive steering groups with my counterparts in the Indian Navy. At 

the same time, we’ve had, in the past, modest exercise series with 

the Indians that have grown over the years to become, now, complex exercise series with the Indians. 

And as our military-to-military relationship has advanced, it’s 

also elevated itself such that we’re now holding strategic-level discussions with the Indians, and very complex military discussions 

regarding our respective advancements and our future, in terms of 

exercising together. Then there is a growing foreign military sales 

relationship with the Indians as they’ve expressed interest in acquiring United States-produced military hardware. So, in my engagement with India—and I just returned, about 3 weeks ago, from 

a military-to-military exchange with them—we discuss in great detail their interest in acquiring U.S. systems. 

890 

So, I would offer that not only is India now an economic and regional power, certainly in the Indian Ocean region, but it has global implications, as well, in the relationship between the United 

States and India has been evolving, through my experience, to a 

point where it’s very strong, at the moment. 

Senator AKAKA. Admiral, I want to commend you and our military for continuing to keep, as you were mentioning, the relationships between the military and our friendly countries, and also to 

try to continue to work with them in their exercises, as well. 

General Chilton, the establishment of U.S. CYBERCOM recognizes the growing importance of the cyberdomain to national security. This growing importance will require forces that are able to 

operate and defend DOD information networks and provide the 

President with response options in cyberspace. 

General, can you tell us how your organization is giving your 

personnel the knowledge and tools they require to operate effectively in this environment? 

General CHILTON. Thank you, Senator. You’ve hit on a very key 

point, and that is growing and sustaining cyber-expertise in the 

military. We have a couple of things that have happened over the 

past year, that have been very encouraging. One, all of the Services 

are now organizing in such a fashion as to present cyberforces to 

STRATCOM to do those critical missions of operating and defending the networks and responding, when required. I would point out 

the Navy’s new fleet organization, as well as the Air Force’s new 

Numbered Air Force, as two examples of this. What that means is, 

the individual Services who are responsible for organizing, training, and equipping forces for the combatant commanders are organizing in such a fashion to put focus on the training of those personnel. So, we will see the Services increase the tension on accessions and training and growing the expertise of individuals in the 

various Services, and making them available to STRATCOM to 

conduct our operations. 

Internal to the headquarters and STRATCOM, we are taking seriously educational opportunities and growth opportunities for the 

people, particularly our civil servants that work in the headquarters, who will be there for the long haul, for these very critical 

mission areas of space, cyberspace, and deterrence. So we’re paying 

attention to that. 

Lastly, Senator, I would say DOD, under the leadership of Secretary Gates, has increased the capacity of the joint school, down 

in Pensacola, that is run by the U.S. Navy, to provide increased 

educational opportunities for the personnel we will need, from all 

the Services, in CYBERCOM to execute our mission. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much for that information. If I 

have time, I’ll come back with further questions on cyberspace. 

General CHILTON. Thank you, Senator. 

Senator AKAKA. Admiral Willard, it is my understanding that 

China is investing heavily in fourth-generation fighters and advanced surface-to-air missiles. Admiral, F–22s are being phased 

into PACOM. They are in Alaska, and are scheduled to be in Hawaii in the near future. Can you discuss the importance of having 

these assets in the Pacific, and provide an update of the Hickam 

basing schedule? 

891 

Admiral WILLARD. Thank you, Senator. I think the statement 

that you made regarding China’s advancements in capability and 

capacities in some very high-tech areas, and their—particularly 

their investment in the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) air force 

assets, fourth-generation fighter capabilities, combined with their 

integrated air defense systems, which are, as well, very sophisticated, are illustrative of why the F–22 is particularly well suited 

to the Pacific, given its very unique capabilities. 

So, as the PACOM commander—and I know that General North, 

my Pacific Air Force commander, would attest, as well—we’re very 

pleased that the F–22 forces in Alaska, and eventually in Hawaii, 

will be made available to us. Again, a very unique capability that 

is particularly well suited to some of the potential contingencies in 

our AOR; and, as well, contributing to extended deterrence 

throughout the Pacific. So, we look forward to those assets. They 

have served in the Pacific, often a squadron in Guam, at Anderson 

Air Force Base, and they will play a key role, I’m sure, in our various Air Force operations in the Pacific. 

In terms of the timing for the Hawaii Air National Guard to acquire F–22s, without being definitive about a very specific date, I 

would offer that both in the Alaskan Command, as well as at 

Hickam Air Force Base, as you’re well aware, we’re currently expending the military construction funds, over the next several 

years, to equip both of these sites to accommodate the F–22. Provided those military construction funds are timely and we’re able 

to complete the advancements in ramp space, hangar space, and 

the necessary support facilities for that unique aircraft, then I’m 

hopeful that their laydown, both in Alaska, as well as Hawaii, will 

occur on time. 

Senator AKAKA. Thank you very much, Admiral. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator LIEBERMAN [presiding]. Thanks, Senator Akaka. 

Senator Burr, it’s my inclination to go a couple of more questions, if that’s okay. Obviously, give you the opportunity, as well. 

Senator BURR. That’s fine, Mr. Chairman. I have no additional 

questions at this time. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thank you. 

Admiral, I wanted to go back to China, and I appreciate the 

statements that you made in your opening statement, I quote again 

here, ‘‘China’s rapid and comprehensive transformation of its 

armed forces is affecting regional military balances and holds implications beyond the Asia Pacific region. Of particular concern is 

that elements of China’s military modernization appear designed to 

challenge our freedom of action in the region,’’ end of quote from 

your opening statement. 

So, it’s certainly my impression that, over the last year or so, 

there seems to have been a move up in the assertiveness of China, 

economically, diplomatically, and militarily. I take it, from that 

statement that I read from your opening statement, that you agree. 

If I’m right, why do you think this is happening now? 

Admiral WILLARD. Thank you for the question, Senator. I think 

that we have seen a change in tenor from the People’s Republic of 

China (PRC) in the last year or so, such that the exchanges that 

occur—in my instance, military-to-military, and often in other fora 

892 

with our Government and with regional partners—is a changed 

tone that, as you suggest, demonstrates more assertiveness on the 

part of the Chinese. 

It would be hard to speculate as to why that has occurred at this 

particular time. But, when you consider the very rapid growth of 

capability in the PLA armed forces over the past decade, combined 

with the economic growth of China and its growing global influence, there is a level of confidence, I believe, that comes with that 

pronounced assertiveness, that we’re all experiencing. 

I think it will be very important for the PRC to regard that level 

of influence and their responsibilities now as a very influential 

global partner, to dialogue with the international community and 

with the United States in a very responsible manner, and take 

their place at the table, to ensure that, rather than shrill exchanges, that we’re on common ground with regard to meeting our 

global responsibilities. I think they certainly have them. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Well, I agree with what you said, all parts 

of your statement, including, obviously, the fact that we acknowledge and respect the growth in China’s economy, its importance in 

the world. We seek a constructive, obviously a peaceful, relationship with them, but we also have both historic presence in the Asia 

Pacific region, and we have national security interests in the region, and very important allies that depend on us in the region. So, 

we have to both maintain the peacefulness of the relationship, but 

a clarity and an honesty in our relations with the Chinese. 

Tell me what you meant when you said that elements of China’s 

military modernization appear designed to challenge our freedom of 

action in the region. 

Admiral WILLARD. China has made a number of investments in 

a variety of anti-access-capability areas; area denial, perhaps another way to think about it. This ranges from integrated air defense systems off their coastline which stand off well beyond their 

territorial waters and airspace, to their investments in submarines, 

which is pretty profound, and that particular capability, now, that 

is ranging throughout the South China Sea, East China Sea, and 

Yellow Sea, and beyond, and other capabilities that, together, provide sizable area-denial capability. 

Over time, they have very much appeared to zero in on U.S. capabilities and the potential ability to counter those, as a framework 

for these investments. But, I would offer that they not only concern 

the United States, but our regional allies as well. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Admiral WILLARD. As you suggest, Japan, the ROK, our allies in 

Southeast Asia, the Philippines, and Thailand, and our partners in 

Vietnam and elsewhere in the region, all have to deal, now, with 

capabilities that could potentially infringe on their freedom of action throughout this very important part of the world. 

I would just remind that we’ve been present in these waters, and 

in this airspace, for the past 150 years. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right. 

Admiral WILLARD. We’ve been providing security for sea lines of 

communication that are moving over a trillion dollars of commerce 

per year, both back and forth to the United States and to our imVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:37 May 06, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00898 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\62155.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
893 

portant allies and partners in the region, which has also provided 

for the economic growth of China. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Correct. 

Admiral WILLARD. We don’t intend to cede any of that space, but, 

rather, continue to protect those sea lines of communication that 

are so vital to the United States and the Asia Pacific region as a 

whole. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. I appreciate that statement very much, and 

also the fact that China’s growth and assertiveness is not just a 

concern of ours, parochially, it is very much a concern of most of 

the rest of the countries in the region who are allies. I gather, unfortunately, that the kind of military-to-military relationships that 

have otherwise been quite useful in diminishing tension between 

countries has actually not done very well, yet, with the PRC. Now, 

if I’m not mistaken, the military-to-military contacts are suspended 

as a result of Chinese reaction to our recent arms sales to Taiwan. 

I wonder if you have anything to say about the state of our military-to-military relationship with China. 

Admiral WILLARD. You describe it accurately, Senator 

Lieberman, when you refer to the suspension and also the fact that 

our military-to-military relationship tends to lag behind the other 

engagements that we enjoy with the PRC. We believed that we 

were making progress last year, when General Xu, one of the very 

high-ranking members of the Central Military Commission, visited 

Washington, to include Secretary Gates, and agreed upon a method 

to advance our military-to-military relationship, and mature it. He 

stopped in Hawaii on his way back to Beijing, and he and I spent 

a day or so together, again revisiting the areas of common interest 

that we thought we could advance discussions and relations with, 

and also the opportunity that military-to-military dialogue provides, in terms of dealing with our differences. 

Regretfully, those engagements that had been agreed upon with 

the PRC are part of this suspension, to include the high-level visits—invitations extended to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Secretary Gates, and, lastly, myself—were part of this demarche. So, 

we believe strongly that China needs to revisit the value of a continuum of military-to-military relationship and dialogue with the 

United States and determine its value in their self-interest, which 

we believe strongly in, and we—we’re hopeful that they’ll have that 

internal discussion and ultimately we’ll be able to depart on a more 

continuous relationship. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Well said, thanks. 

General Chilton, one quick question. This morning, as I’m sure 

you know, President Obama and, I presume, President Medvedev 

will be announcing the successful conclusion of START negotiations, and that they’ll be submitting, in this case, the treaty to the 

Senate for consideration. Many of us here have been concerned 

that the Russians might try to bring into the treaty some limitations on our freedom of action with regard to defensive systems, 

missile defense systems, particularly. I gather that there’s a reference to defensive systems in the preamble, but nothing in the 

heart of the treaty, that the Russians are apparently going to say, 

publicly, in a separate statement, that they reserve the right to 

894 

leave the treaty if they think our defensive missile systems are, in 

some sense, threatening them. 

Do you agree that START should be a separate matter for consideration, which is basically the reduction of our nuclear weapons inventories, on both great powers, and leave the question of defenses 

separate from that? 

General CHILTON. Senator, I do. That’s the short answer. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. It’s a good one. 

General CHILTON. Missile defense—in spite of our—all our efforts—and we need to continue these efforts—the U.S. Missile Defense System has been fielded for two purposes; one, to counter a 

Korean capability—— 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right. 

General CHILTON.—that, in some future date, should we not have 

a missile defense, might put them in a position to deter the United 

States from meeting our responsibilities and our commitments to 

the people of South Korea. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right. 

General CHILTON. Likewise, to prevent Iran from fielding a system that they could blindly blackmail, or use to blackmail or 

threaten, our friends and allies, both in the CENTCOM region, but 

also in the European Command region. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Yes. 

General CHILTON. That is our focus. If you put on a pair of Russian shoes and look at it from their perspective, their concern is 

that there’s more to this than that, perhaps. So we need to continue dialogue with the Russians to assure them that is not the 

case, not only through dialogue, but through our actions. I think 

our actions to date have shown that we’re fielding a limited system, 

with focused capabilities, to address those two focused threats— 

those two specific threat areas. 

Again, this kind of circles back to the point on military-to-military discussions. Military-to-military discussions with Russia, as 

well as China, are important. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right. 

General CHILTON. Russia, on this particular topic, China, on this 

particular topic, as well as, certainly, others when we start talking 

about strategic deterrence and posturing for strategic deterrence 

between those three countries—the United States, China, and Russia. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thank you. 

Senator Burr. 

Senator Akaka, do you want to ask another question? 

Senator AKAKA. Mr. Chairman, may I? 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Please, go ahead. 

Senator AKAKA. Yes. 

Admiral Willard and General Sharp, I believe we must expand 

our foreign language capability, and also our cultural knowledge. 

There seems to be an emphasis within DOD to improve these capabilities within our forces. Admiral and General, what are your 

thinking of the Department’s efforts to develop servicemembers’ 

cultural knowledge and foreign language skills in order to better 

perform their roles in counterinsurgency and stability operations? 

895 

Admiral WILLARD. Yes, thank you, Senator Akaka. It’s an important question. In my previous assignment as the Vice Chief of 

Navy, I was a party to many of the discussions inside the Pentagon 

regarding the need to increase our investments in foreign language 

skills and cultural awareness, which was fundamentally an increase in the number of foreign area trained officers for very specific areas of the world, that each of the Services were making. We 

have made sizable investments within DOD to support those increases in language training and the increases in foreign area officers. As a PACOM commander, I’m enjoying the benefits of that, 

such that now a sizable number of my headquarters’ staff members—I know it’s true in the components, as well, having previously served as the Pacific Fleet commander—we’re enjoying 

greater language skills among our junior officers and senior enlisted personnel, such that, when they conduct their engagements 

and capacity-building around the Asia Pacific region, they’re much 

better able to converse across the wide number of languages and 

dialects that you’re more than familiar with exist in our part of the 

world. 

So, this has been a great investment, and I am assured the Services all will continue to make this investment, as I think we’ve 

learned some lessons regarding its importance to the work that we 

do out there. 

Senator AKAKA. General Sharp? 

General SHARP. I agree completely with Admiral Willard. I think 

the initiative that the Department has undertaken toward normalization of longer tours in Korea also greatly contributes to the cultural understanding and the capabilities that we have, specifically 

in the ROK. I was in the building at the same time as Admiral Willard, working on this same initiative, and agree with him that it 

is critically important for our Services to step up to this and make 

more language and cultural awareness among all of our forces. I 

think they’re doing very well at that. It’s critically important. 

Senator AKAKA. Well, thank you very much for those responses. 

I’m happy to hear that. 

Mr. Chairman, I asked the question because it goes back to 

World War II, when the Military Intelligence Services (MIS)—Japanese from our country—made a huge difference with General 

MacArthur in Japan and believed that they helped to build a base 

that has become what Japan has succeeded to be through their efforts and through the language and cultural skills that our military 

had at that time, and was able to deal with Japan. I look upon that 

as an important part of our future strategies as we work with other 

countries. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Akaka. 

General Chilton, Admiral Willard, General Sharp, thanks for 

your service, thanks for your testimony today, thanks for your patience with Senate procedure during the week. It’s been a really 

helpful and informative discussion this morning. I know I can say, 

on behalf of Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, Senator Burr, and 

everybody else here on this committee, that we appreciate very 

much what you’re doing for us in very important aspects of our security around the world, and we’ll try our best, in our authorization 

896 

responsibility, to give you the support that you, and all those men 

and women in uniform serving under you, deserve. 

So, thank you very much. 

The hearing is adjourned. 

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR E. BENJAMIN NELSON

INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE

1. Senator BEN NELSON. General Chilton, Secretary Gates testified that the combatant commanders have an insatiable appetite for intelligence, surveillance, and 

reconnaissance (ISR). This year’s budget request seems to address that need. Collectively, the Services are planning on spending $6.1 billion in fiscal year 2011 for new 

unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) capabilities. 

From my vantage point, it seems the focus has been on how many UAVs are in 

the field and how quickly we can get more, and, in doing so, we overlook critical 

aspects of expanding ISR- like how the Services plan to train the analysts that will 

be required to process the expanding volumes of data, and what infrastructure will 

be required to move data and share it with those that need it. The easy part is buying the next Predator—the hard part is exploiting and using the intelligence. 

A Governmental Accountability Office (GAO) report issued last week states that 

within U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), less than half of the electronic signals 

collected by Predator are exploited. The report identifies a shortage in analytical 

staff to process ISR data and limited bandwidth to disseminate intelligence as principle challenges. At the Air Force posture hearing this month, I asked General 

Schwartz about manning the ISR mission and he stated that the current manning 

structure to support UAV operations was unsustainable in light of projected growth. 

It doesn’t appear that the Department’s capacity to process, exploit, and disseminate 

intelligence has kept pace with its ability to collect it. 

Last week I addressed ISR shortfalls with General Petraeus, and he testified that 

the Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD) ISR Task Force is coordinating the activities among the Services to support operations in the CENTCOM area of responsibility (AOR). Could you comment on your role in these coordinating activities with 

the OSD ISR Task Force? 

General CHILTON. U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) is the DOD Joint Functional Manager (JFM) for ISR and associated processing, exploitation, and dissemination (PED). STRATCOM executes its command responsibilities through its Joint 

Functional Component Command for ISR (JFCC–ISR). As a point of reference, 

STRATCOM personnel were primary sources of information for the GAO report, 

ISR: Overarching Guidance is Needed to Advance Information Sharing, noted by 

Senator Nelson. As the JFM for ISR, STRATCOM works closely with the OSD ISR 

Task Force to identify current PED gaps and shortfalls, as well as forecast future 

PED issues with the acquisition of new platforms and sensors. This coordination 

helps to ensure any additional capabilities fielded look beyond the platform and take 

into account all aspects of collection, PED. 

To address the PED adequacy concerns raised by Senator Nelson, STRATCOM is 

developing a comprehensive plan to align PED with the allocation of ISR platforms 

to the combatant commands, ensuring PED capacity with an ultimate goal of better 

aligning with ISR collection. To this end, STRATCOM is working to formalize PED 

relationships with the Military Services and Combat Support Agencies in an attempt to maximize and target use of PED capacity as a DOD Intelligence Enterprise. 

STRATCOM is also conducting a assessment to determine overall PED capability 

and capacity across the DOD based upon a detailed analysis of the ISR/PED architecture. This assessment will help STRATCOM highlight gaps, shortfalls, or possible 

redundancies within the current system to the Services and Combat Support Agencies. The desired outcome is the ability to specifically identify bottlenecks and logjams to include any aspect from lack of bandwidth to types of linguist to proficiency 

of imagery analysts. 

2. Senator BEN NELSON. General Chilton, beyond the needs of CENTCOM, can 

you further speak to any shortfalls that you are seeing generally in ISR personnel 

and bandwidth? 

General CHILTON. Recognizing that the preponderance of available ISR capability 

and capacity are engaged in the CENTCOM AOR, the recent earthquake in Haiti 

highlighted challenges the Department faces in satisfying ISR and PED requireVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:37 May 06, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00902 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\62155.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
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ments in other geographic combatant commands. During the Department’s initial 

response to the humanitarian crisis in Haiti, Operation Unified Response (OUR), 

STRATCOM noted shortfalls related to processing, exploitation, and dissemination. 

Following the initial ISR deployments to support OUR, analysis revealed some 

limitations in our ability to establish an expeditionary ISR architecture during the 

early stages of the operation. Specific bandwidth and equipment issues prevented 

direct communication between ground-based personnel and airborne platforms, 

hampering the JTF-Haiti’s ability to respond to problem areas. STRATCOM in coordination with U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) developed an in-theater 

and beyond line of sight dissemination architecture for the full motion video capability, ensuring all collection was available to forward commanders. The challenges 

noted during this experience are not unique to SOUTHCOM and are applicable 

across multiple combatant commands. 

Airborne ISR requests for forces submitted by geographic combatant commands 

also show shortages in intelligence personnel with requisite language skills. As new 

collection systems are brought on line, fielding of the PED expertise to support their 

full employment lags behind. STRATCOM is partnered with the Defense Intelligence Operations Coordination Center to identify and where feasible mitigate intelligence personnel shortfalls and identify efficiencies within the DOD Intelligence 

Enterprise. STRATCOM is also working with the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence to help the combatant commands identify their key signals intelligence 

language requirements and help the military departments source the required manpower. 

3. Senator BEN NELSON. General Chilton, are these issues being addressed and 

do you have any recommendations as to how they should be addressed? 

General CHILTON. STRATCOM and its ISR component JFCC–ISR, continues to 

take a leading role within the Department in advocating for ISR capabilities to address current and future warfighting requirements. As the military co-lead for the 

Battlespace Awareness Portfolio, the Command conducts an annual ISR-related 

Senior Warfighter Forum (SWarF) to develop and prioritize needed ISR and PED 

attributes along with combatant command shortfalls and gaps for all ISR to include 

overhead systems. As an example, STRATCOM recently conducted a SWarF to develop a combatant command statement of urgent need for space-based ISR capabilities. The Command takes a global perspective and coordinates with the military departments, the combat support agencies, and the combatant commands in developing courses of action to address these issues. In essence, STRATCOM is the combatant commands ‘‘voice’’ to ensure the warfighters ISR shortfalls and gaps are addressed. 

To help to address the gap between growth in ISR requirements and projected 

ISR capabilities, STRATCOM is developing an ISR Force Sizing Construct to inform 

future ISR allocation and procurement. The combatant command focused ISR assessments construct and resulting ISR Measure of Merit is intended to give decisionmakers an analytical basis for a relative comparison of force mixes. The Force 

Sizing Construct will provide a scalable, tailorable, and repeatable process to determine regional combatant commander demands and expectations in order to better 

inform future acquisition decisions. 

4. Senator BEN NELSON. Admiral Willard and General Sharp, with regard to ISR 

personnel, can you discuss whether you are seeing shortfalls in ISR personnel and 

what is being done to address personnel shortfalls for analysts to process, exploit 

and disseminate intelligence? 

Admiral WILLARD. [Deleted.] 

General SHARP. [Deleted.] 

5. Senator BEN NELSON. Admiral Willard and General Sharp, what are your recommendations? 

Admiral WILLARD. Numbers are only part of the solution. Realizing the potential 

of our ability to process information requires changes in culture, policy, procedure, 

governance, and information technology. We continue to actively engage with the 

Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I)) and other Intelligence Community leaders to ensure they understand our requirements, capabilities and shortfalls. 

Additionally, we continue to work with the Services and the broader Intelligence 

Community to provide the right-sized, right-qualified, right-equipped ISR force. 

General SHARP. In order to compensate for military department intelligence billet 

shortfalls, United States Forces Korea is considering converting many more of these 

positions to Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) civilian billets. If DIA is unable to 

hire and fill civilian billets for the Combatant Command, that payroll should become 

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available to the Joint Intelligence Operations Center to pay for contractors or temporary duty assistance. Increase the priority fill for intelligence personnel working 

the North Korea problem at the operational, theater and strategic level. We ask for 

the committee’s support in this effort. 

Another challenge we face is the short tour lengths for both civilian and military 

personnel assigned to the Republic of Korea (ROK). One and 2 year tours have a 

negative effect on the continuity of our workforce. Standard tour normalization of 

3 years for personnel assigned to Korea will help to mitigate this problem. We ask 

that the committee support this effort as well. 

INTERAGENCY COORDINATION CYBER/INTELLIGENCE

6. Senator BEN NELSON. General Chilton, one thing that I commonly look for are 

stovepipes and whether the Services are duplicating efforts or truly enhancing overall mission effectiveness. Last year at the STRATCOM hearing, you highlighted the 

importance of sharing information among agencies, including the Department of 

Homeland Security, the Intelligence Community, and the Department of Defense 

(DOD), in addressing security risks in cyberspace. I want to ensure proper coordination is taking place between agencies to ensure that each agency is not creating its 

own unique defenses. If each agency builds their own protective walls, they will ultimately stifle collaboration and the ability to disseminate intelligence information 

among agencies, which has been our Achilles heel—an inability to share intelligence, connect the dots, and prevent future attacks. How are we doing at interagency coordination of cyber security and information exchange protocols? 

General CHILTON. I believe we are making progress in improving interagency coordination of cyber security and information exchange protocols. 

Efforts to improve our interagency coordination begin with our continued participation in Joint Interagency Task Force-Cyber (JIATF–Cyber). Current member organizations of the JIATF–Cyber include the National Security Agency/Central Security Service, DIA, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Joint Warfare Analysis Center, Office of the Secretary of Defense/Joint 

Staff, Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, Joint Functional Component Command-Network Warfare (JFCC–NW), Joint Task Force-Global Network Operations 

(JTF–GNO), Joint Functional Component Command for Global Strike, Joint Information Operations Warfare Center (JIOWC), Departments of Treasury (DOT), State 

(DOS), and Homeland Security and the combatant commands. 

As U.S. Cyber Command stands up, it will look to improve our coordination by 

transitioning JIATF–Cyber to a Joint Interagency Coordination Group—Cyber, a 

multi-functional, advisory element that represents civilian departments and agencies at U.S. Cyber Command and facilitates information sharing across the interagency and key partner nations. 

We intend to further coordination with the placement of liaison officers with the 

following organizations in coming year: FBI, CIA, DoT, DoS, the National Counter 

Terrorism Center (NCTC), and the combatant commands. Additionally, plans are 

developing to place LNOs with the United Kingdom, Australia, and Canada. 

U.S. Cyber Command will also leverage JTF–GNO’s full-time Law Enforcement/ 

Counter-intelligence (LE/CI) Center for coordinating LE/CI activities in support of 

defensive cyberspace operations. Today, DOD LE/CI agencies have assigned agents 

that support our efforts to improve cyber security, including Naval Criminal Investigative Service, Defense Criminal Investigative Service, Air Force Office of Special 

Investigations, Army Criminal Investigations Command, and Army Intelligence and 

Security Command. 

Finally, we continue to work hard at sharing information on cyber threats among 

a variety of DOD and interagency partners everyday. Establishing the connective 

tissue among our partners is a significant challenge, but one we see as essential to 

deter our adversaries and prevent future attacks. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR ROLAND W. BURRIS

ACTIVE AND RESERVE DUTY COMPONENTS

7. Senator BURRIS. Admiral Willard, General Chilton, and General Sharp, do you 

believe you have the right mix of Active Duty and Reserve component presence 

within your command? If not, what are your shortfalls in capabilities or skill sets? 

Admiral WILLARD. Yes, we have the right mix of Active Duty and Reserve component presence within the PACOM command. However, as an Active-Duty Force we 

see shortfalls in Foreign Area Officers, intelligence professionals and those with 

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skills sets in the areas of Security Cooperation, POW/MIA identification and accounting, and cyber active and passive defense. 

General CHILTON. U.S. Strategic Command’s global, operational missions demand 

several unique (often high-demand, low-density) skill sets. The Command continually balances mission and workforce requirement growth across our team through 

a robust and carefully managed total force approach. We are also dedicated to pursuing and advocating for expanded deterrence, space, and cyberspace professional 

development opportunities, to ensure we remain as fully capable of executing our 

missions as we are today. 

There always exists unsatisfied demands which stretch the limits of active duty 

resources, and reservists can provide the ability to quickly respond to address expertise or manning shortfalls until the operational requirement has passed. Our reserve utilization is aligned to STRATCOM’s global mission set that draws on highly 

specialized skills encompassing subsurface, land/sea, nuclear, space, and cyber warfare areas. 

Since the end of the Cold War and particularly since September 11, 2001, we have 

increasingly relied on the Reserve component as an ‘‘operational reserve.’’ In fact, 

STRATCOM’s reserve utilization rate has increased substantially in the last 3 years 

from 48,000 man days per year in 2008 to a projected 85,000 in 2010. The level of 

Active/Reserve integration within this command is such that there is no discernable 

difference operationally in the workplace. 

General SHARP. National Guard and Reserve component forces provide greater 

than 60 percent of the Combat Support/Combat Service Support units in support of 

our operations plan. Successful accomplishment of our objectives is not possible 

without them. Tour normalization for our Active component forces should reduce 

ramp-up time for maneuver and fires units while reducing risk to training and proficiency. At the same time, tour normalization provides continuity, ensures theaterspecific experience, and enhances interoperability with forces from the ROK. 

In spite of the steps we have taken, Combined Forces Command struggles with 

a number of personnel-related capability gaps. For example, the Korean Theater of 

Operations has endured a chronic shortage of trained Tactical Air Control Party and 

Joint Terminal Attack Controller (JTAC) personnel. The intense, complex training 

requirements, language skill requirements, and deployment operations tempo for 

that career field result in a capability void which we labor to bridge. The impact 

to the operations plan is a reduced ability to direct close air support for our forces 

on the forward line of our own troops and our forces in the rear area countering 

the threat posed by North Korean special operations forces. 

PACIFIC COMMAND DISASTER RELIEF EFFORTS

8. Senator BURRIS. Admiral Willard, Pacific Command (PACOM) played a tremendous role in the humanitarian operations following the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami. 

How are you working with the other combatant commands, such as U.S. 

SOUTHCOM following the earthquakes in Haiti and Chile, to better prepare for 

natural disaster response efforts? 

Admiral WILLARD. It is important to note that PACOM forces respond to a natural 

disaster on the average of every 60 days. That said, PACOM sent a five man planning team to assist SOUTHCOM for Operation Unified Response within days of the 

event. The team became the core planning element and assisted in the preparation 

of SOUTHCOMs Strategic Framework and Transition Strategy, as well as performing as the conduit for United Nations and interagency planning. The augmentation support mission also provided an opportunity for PACOM and SOUTHCOM to 

share their HA/DR response plans which further prompted a greater level of collaboration with European Command and Africa Command. 

ILLEGAL NARCOTICS AND HUMAN TRAFFICKING

9. Senator BURRIS. Admiral Willard, the trafficking of illegal narcotics, humans, 

and arms continues to be a priority for your command. What is your current strategy for countering these threats? 

Admiral WILLARD. These kinds of transnational threats are indeed a priority for 

the PACOM. Our strategy is to work through the Interagency to develop ‘‘whole-ofgovernment’’ approaches to build in the capacity of our regional allies and partners 

to counter these threats. 

The Joint Interagency Task Force West (JIATF–W) is the PACOM Executive 

Agent (EA) for DOD support to counterdrug initiatives in the PACOM AOR. As EA, 

JIATF–W uses delegated authorities and funding to combat drug-related 

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transnational organized crime in the Asia-Pacific region. JIATF–W sources capabilities from all five U.S. Military Services as well as the entire U.S. Intelligence Community. 

Strategic Goals: 

• Support ongoing and developing LE operations to disrupt and dismantle 

drug-related transnational criminal organizations. 

• Build partner nation capacity to combat drug-related transnational crime. • Enhance and support a cooperative network of partnerships across AsiaPacific to combat transnational crime. 

10. Senator BURRIS. Admiral Willard, how are you working with other combatant 

commands to address this concern? 

Admiral WILLARD. The Joint Interagency Task Force West (JIATF–W) participates in planning conferences hosted by other combatant commands counterdrug 

(CD) executive agents (EA). Each year we participate in the counterdrug and border 

security planning efforts of Joint Interagency Task Force South (JIATF–S), the CD 

EA for Southern Command, and Joint Task Force North (JTF–N), the CD EA for 

Northern Command. 

JIATF–W attends the DOD Combatant Command Counter-Narcoterrorism Conference hosted by OSD SO/LIC&IC&CN>. This is a Director level conference to 

discuss regional and national CD policy, strategy and programs. 

JIATF–W also coordinates and exchanges intelligence on a regular basis CD EA 

in Northern Command and Southern Command on the global movement of illegal 

drugs and drug precursors. 

PRIVATE CONTRACTORS

11. Senator BURRIS. General Chilton, private contractor support continues to receive increased scrutiny due to abuses in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Most recently, 

there were allegations of unauthorized intelligence gathering operations by contractors. Abuses by contractors continue to undermine our strategic efforts and bilk the 

taxpayers out of millions of dollars. How will STRATCOM provide better oversight 

of private contractors? 

General CHILTON. STRATCOM/J8 has a contracts branch within its headquarters 

which monitors STRATCOM contracts and will provide better oversight of private 

contracting as outlined below. They will ensure contract personnel are trained to 

oversee their respective contracts. As a result of recent allegations pertaining to contracts in Afghanistan, J8 has implemented a process in which all intelligence related requirements for new contracts and modifications to existing contracts must 

be reviewed by J8 and STRATCOM’s legal office. J8 has also implemented a second 

level of control by requiring a division chief or deputy division chief as an additional 

level of contract oversight above the trained personnel. A rigorous funding review 

process is also conducted before STRATCOM funding is approved. Organizations 

must submit a spend plan based upon an approved financial review by the 

STRATCOM Deputy Commander. Once the spend plan is approved by J8, funding 

documents are prepared and reviewed within the user’s office and by at least two 

other personnel within J8. The contracting and funding processes work hand in 

hand to ensure no ‘‘abuses’’ occur. 

Presently, there are three ongoing investigations looking into allegations relating 

to unauthorized intelligence gathering by contractors. None of these investigations 

are complete, so it would be premature to form conclusions as to the facts or findings these investigations will reveal. However, none of these are funded with 

STRATCOM funding. 

12. Senator BURRIS. General Chilton, could the missions being fulfilled by private 

contractors be better handled by military personnel? 

General CHILTON. The Deputy Secretary of Defense has implemented guidelines 

for managing functional and geographic combatant command’s manpower baselines. 

He has also established business rules to govern the management of manpower resource relationships among the Services, combatant commanders, and the combatant command support agents. These guidelines state that once the baseline is established, permanent military billets will only be adjusted based on approved programmed changes. In light of this STRATCOM is working hard with DOD to convert contractor positions into civilian billets based on in-sourcing guidance provided 

by the Secretary of Defense. Wherever possible, we are converting contractor positions to civilian billets based on cost effectiveness and whether the work is inherently governmental. However, there are certain functions that should continue to be 

901 

contracted because of specialized expertise which are not reasonably available within the military or civilian communities and which are not an inherently governmental function. 

CYBER COMMAND

13. Senator BURRIS. General Chilton, the President has stated that cyber security 

is ‘‘one of the most serious economic and national security challenges we face as a 

Nation.’’ As the new U.S. Cyber Command (CYBERCOM) continues to take form, 

what is your strategy for addressing the threat? 

General CHILTON. As CYBERCOM stands up it will need to continue to change 

our DOD cyber culture, build capacity; increase capability; and strengthen partnerships to effectively address the growing threats we face within cyberspace. 

With respect to changing culture, CYBERCOM will work with the combatant commands, Services, and DOD agencies to refine the way in which we execute our responsibilities and grow our cyber expertise. Through education and training, 

CYBERCOM will improve understanding among all DOD personnel that every 

networked computer is on the front line. Everyone who logs on is a cyber defender 

first. There are no ‘protected zones’ or ‘rear areas’; all are equally vulnerable. 

CYBERCOM will work with the Services and their designated cyber components 

to ensure we are able to build capacity through the recruitment and retention of 

a world-class cadre of military cyber forces. The skills required include operators, 

planners, analysts and engineers. These cyber forces will require focused training, 

just like other forces required to operate our most sophisticated and complex weapons systems. Fundamental to this effort will be an ability to manage this diverse 

but vital talent, and also to promote a culture of creativity and innovation that will 

allow us to maintain our technological edge in the cyberspace domain. 

CYBERCOM will also increase our capability to deliver integrated effects in cyberspace. These effects include building a shared situational awareness of DOD networks; developing faster and more comprehensive early warning; and improving our 

ability to plan and execute dynamic defense operations. These effects will enable a 

paradigm shift in the way we defend our networks—a move from a reactive and passive posture to a proactive, prepared one. 

Finally, CYBERCOM will focus on strengthening critical partnerships. While the 

primary mission of U.S. Cyber Command will be to secure our military’s classified 

and unclassified networks, the interconnected nature of these networks and the free 

flow of information across them will necessitate an active partnership between 

CYBERCOM and the other combatant commands, the Intelligence Community, departments and agencies across the U.S. Government, and our allies, to ensure that 

we work together to eliminate our collective vulnerabilities. In addition, given that 

the private sector controls the vast majority of our Nation’s cyber infrastructure, a 

strong and transparent partnership between U.S. Cyber Command and private industry will be critical to allow for the exchange and development of new technologies. 

14. Senator BURRIS. General Chilton, how will CYBERCOM work with other Federal and State agencies? 

General CHILTON. CYBERCOM Implementation Plan guidance directs the establishment of two interagency coordination bodies. One body will be focused on dayto-day operational planning, deconfliction and execution. The second body, comprised of senior leadership from the participating agencies, will meet periodically 

and review interagency posture, operations and plans, and offer a forum for issue 

resolution, communication facilitation, and the elevation of issues to senior U.S. 

Government leadership. 

CYBERCOM will also provide liaison officers (LNOs) to key interagency partners 

in order to facilitate information sharing and improve CYBERCOM’s understanding 

of their partners’ missions, operations, and staffs. While at their host organization, 

these LNOs will maintain routine contact with the CYBERCOM staff. Upon establishment, CYBERCOM will maintain the existing LNO relationships that are held 

by JFCC NW and JTF–GNO and will establish LNOs at other key organizations as 

additional resources become available. 

A Reserve component (RC) Joint Reserve Unit including elements from each Service component, the Army National Guard, and the Air National Guard, will be created at CYBERCOM. These elements will provide CYBERCOM staff support, coordinate and provide situational awareness, and ensure an understanding of unique 

roles and capabilities of the RC. 

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15. Senator BURRIS. General Chilton, how will you integrate the National Guard 

and Reserve Forces into CYBERCOM? 

General CHILTON. CYBERCOM will communicate and coordinate through the National Guard Bureau Joint Operations Coordination Center (JoCC) to leverage National Guard Title 32/State Active Duty cyber forces of the States and territories. 

The Army National Guard and Air National Guard maintain units that provide full 

spectrum information operations and cyberspace operations capabilities, including 

computer network defense, computer network exploitation, and computer network 

attack. These capabilities meet Service and combatant commander requirements 

and can be leveraged under state authorities to assist civil authorities in the National Guard’s Homeland Security and Defense Support of Civil Authorities role. 

A Reserve Component Joint Reserve Unit including elements from each Service 

component, the Army National Guard, and the Air National Guard, will be created 

at CYBERCOM. These elements will provide CYBERCOM staff support, coordinate 

and provide situational awareness, and ensure an understanding of unique roles 

and capabilities of the Reserve component. The need for additional CYBERCOM Reserve requirements and structure will continue to be analyzed as the Department’s 

understanding of the domain matures. 

THE STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATY

16. Senator BURRIS. General Chilton, Secretary of State Clinton said last week 

that the United States and Russia are on the brink of completing a new nonproliferation treaty. What are your biggest concerns with regard to nuclear security 

and the adoption of a new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) agreement? 

General CHILTON. My biggest concern is the modernization of our nuclear weapons infrastructure, and approval of the administration’s request for funding that 

modernization. The proposed investment in the infrastructure will enable improved 

security and reliability of our nuclear weapons while at the same time enabling further reductions in our hedge requirements, once the infrastructure improvements 

are achieved. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE

MISSILE DEFENSE

17. Senator INHOFE. General Chilton, while I am most concerned about Iran and 

North Korea and generally wary of China and Russia, rogue nation states and nonstate actors continue to pursue nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) capabilities. It is critical that the Nuclear Triad, as well as Missile Defense, remain a viable and effective mechanism for preventing those that mean this 

country harm from doing so. Our Trident submarines have an average age of 20 

years old, with replacement build not starting until 2019 and tentatively completed 

by 2028. The associated D5 missiles will undergo modernization as well. Our nuclear stockpile will undergo life extension programs for the W–76 warhead and the 

B–61 bomb. Both pre-date the 1960s with variants as late as the mid-1990s. Our 

strategic bomber fleet of B52s, B1s and B2s vary in age from 10–30 years. The Secretary of Defense recently stated that 2020 may be the first time we see a new 

bomber. $200 million has been requested for research and development (R&D) of a 

new strategic bomber, but it is unclear what the administration intends to do about 

a replacement for the 30 year-old nuclear Air Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM), a 

follow-on to the Minuteman Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM), and the F– 

35 ‘‘dual-capable’’ aircraft. Are we assuming too much risk by only modernizing our 

fleets and limiting the R&D necessary to keep our qualitative edge over current and 

future adversaries? 

General CHILTON. Efforts are underway with participation by STRATCOM to 

modernize the SSBN, Bomber, Cruise Missile, ICBM, and nuclear weapons. As part 

of our support to the NPR we developed and laid out our recommended capabilities 

in the triad. Specifically, our recommendations included to extend the Minuteman 

III ICBM through 2030 and conduct studies now to inform decisions on a followon ICBM; to replace the Ohio-class SSBN at the existing ships’ end of life; and to 

study future long-range bomber capabilities and also support moving forward with 

full-rate production for the W76–1 warhead for our submarine leg of the triad; fullscope (nuclear and non-nuclear) life extension of the B–61 bomb to sustain its strategic deterrence and extended deterrence role; and initiating studies to develop life 

extension options for the W78 ICBM warhead. In this latter effort, we should include the possibility of adapting the resulting warhead for sea launched ballistic 

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missiles and thereby reducing the number of warhead types. This blueprint would 

allow us to be adequately postured to deter strategic threats throughout the next 

20–30 years. 

18. Senator INHOFE. General Chilton, do you believe that the fiscal year 2011 

budget request adequately funds what is needed to maintain our deterrent and global strike capabilities? 

General CHILTON. Yes, the President’s budget provides adequate funding to address our Nation’s most critical needs to maintain our deterrent and global strike 

capabilities. Specific significant budget decisions included $561 million transferred 

from DOD to the Department of Energy ($160 million addition for B–61 life-extension) to ensure we maintain a safe, secure, and reliable nuclear stockpile, $493 million for the Ohio-class replacement SSBN, $130 million for ICBM mods and upgrades and a UH–1 helicopter replacement start, $240 million for required bomber 

upgrades and industrial base sustainment, and $33 million for joint ballistic missile 

advanced fuze technologies. 

19. Senator INHOFE. General Chilton, what impacts will the START follow-on 

agreement have on our deterrent and global strike capabilities? 

General CHILTON. We were involved and consulted in the development of the central limits of the New START treaty. I assess this Nation and our allies will continue to be safe and our forces sufficiently robust. New START retains U.S. global 

strike capabilities-necessary to meet our strategic deterrence requirements. 

20. Senator INHOFE. General Chilton, what is the plan for our stockpile of ALCM? 

General CHILTON. The current plan is to sustain our ALCM fleet (warhead and 

missile) until 2030 or until a replacement capability can be fielded. The Future 

Strategic Standoff Weapon Initial Capabilities Document is scheduled to complete 

in fiscal year 2010. Starting in fiscal year 2011, the Air Force will determine the 

need and capabilities for a follow-on cruise missile through an Analysis of Alternatives. 

REPUBLIC OF KOREA MISSILE DEFENSE

21. Senator INHOFE. General Sharp, North Korea is a threat and their pursuit of 

nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities should not be misinterpreted. Not only is 

North Korea pursuing their own capabilities but they are also selling missiles, material, and technology to other countries to include Iran. From the information I have 

been provided, I understand that North Korea can produce up to five nuclear bombs 

and are working on a two-stage missile that can range Alaska and Hawaii and a 

three-stage missile that could range the continental United States. As General 

Sharp outlined in his comments, a transition to a ROK-led defense on the Korean 

Peninsula, relocation and consolidation of U.S. forces into two areas, and the normalization of servicemember tours, will strengthen U.S.–ROK relations while still 

providing a strong deterrence against North Korean threats. 

With the changes you highlighted, as well as the U.S. military personnel cap of 

28,500, is the ROK adequately supported and/or prepared to defend itself against 

a North Korean ground, air, or missile attack? 

General SHARP. The short answer is ‘‘yes,’’ with our ROK allies, our prepared defenses, and considering the U.S. forces planned to flow into theater, Combined 

Forces Command is ready to repel a North Korean ground, air, or maritime incursion into ROK territory. However, there are notable capability gaps for which we 

either accept or must attempt to further mitigate risk. 

Specifically, North Korean ballistic missiles with chemical warheads remain the 

single greatest threat to our bases and the ROK civilian population in general. As 

you pointed out, the North Korean missile threat continues to grow in number and 

capability. It demands a combined and joint effort to provide a robust, active, layered theater missile defense. 

We need the capability to engage North Korean missiles at various stages of 

flight. Theatre High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) could provide the Korean Theater of Operations with a midcourse interceptor for SCUD and NoDong threats. As 

an area defense weapon, THAAD is capable of providing a layered defense as well 

as coverage to assets currently on the CAL but not the CAL. PATRIOTS contribute 

a terminal low-altitude layer of defense against short and medium range ballistic 

missiles. 

Currently, the Korean Theater of Operations only has PATRIOT for on-peninsula 

TBM threats and AEGIS/SM–3s for shots against targets outside the theater 

904 

1 Nam CH‘o’n-ung: ‘‘What is the U.S. Forces Relocation Aimed At?’’ DPRK Cabinet Paper on 

U.S. Strategy Behind Planned Relocation of U.S. Marines to Guam (U). Open Source Center. 

KPP20090324045005 Pyongyang Minju Joson (Electronic Edition) in Korean 24 Mar 09. 2 Ri Hyo’n-to; ‘‘Missile Madness that Brings Fiery Clouds of War’’ DPRK Party Organ: U.S. 

Missile Defense in Asia, ROK Aims at ’Preemptive’ Attack (U). Open Source Center. 

KPP20091007106001 Pyongyang Rodong Sinmun (Electronic Edition) in Korean 07 Oct 09. 

(Japan, Guam, Hawaii, and Alaska). North Korea has more missiles than we have 

counter-measures. We have the technology to counter the threat; we need to take 

the steps to field a layered ballistic missile defense in Korea which mitigates the 

risk to our assets and personnel. 

DEFENSE POLICY REVIEW INITIATIVE

22. Senator INHOFE. General Sharp, what, if any, response will we see from the 

North Koreans with the potential realignment of U.S. Marine forces from Okinawa 

to Guam and the deployment of U.S. missile defense capabilities to Japan, as part 

of the Defense Policy Review Initiative? 

General SHARP. North Korea likely has already begun to respond to the potential 

realignment of U.S. Marine Corps forces from Okinawa to Guam primarily by editorials denouncing the United States. 

The Korean People’s Army (KPA) likely will not perceive a realignment of U.S. 

Marine Corps (USMC) forces from Okinawa to Guam as a significant change to the 

U.S. posture or threats facing it. The added distance will somewhat increase USMC 

response times to a potential Korean Peninsula crisis, but added response time is 

of little benefit to the KPA since ROK forces are already responsible for and capable 

of halting an initial North Korean attack. The USMC realignment removes some 

U.S. forces from North Korean TBM range—thereby reducing the number of strategic targets available for Pyongyang to threaten. Guam likely remains within range 

of North Korea’s new long range theater ballistic missile. Additionally, North Korean intelligence operations will likely shift from Okinawa to Guam. 

North Korea has already attempted to score propaganda points about the USMC 

move from Okinawa to Guam although it has been unable to attract much attention 

to the issue. A recent Pyongyang editorial alleged that the U.S. is using global realignment to gain hegemony, and ‘‘respond rapidly to a ‘contingency’ on the Korean 

peninsula . . . ’’ 1 North Korea will continue to protest U.S. forces’ maneuvering and 

expansion of overseas bases as proof of hostile and malignant imperialistic intent. 

We expect to see editorials and pronouncements denouncing realignment that are 

read mostly by Pyongyang elites and international analysts—and believed by no 

one. 

North Korea will likely also portray the USMC as an unwelcome ‘Occupying 

Force’ that was finally expelled from Asia by the indigenous population (Pyongyang 

will likely avoid congratulating Japan or the Japanese directly). North Korea will 

attempt to use the USMC ‘expulsion’ as an example to encourage ‘Anti-Colonialist’ 

forces to expel Westerners and imperialist influence throughout Asia and worldwide. 

Pyongyang will also likely declare that the United States and USMC were cowed 

by the resolute KPA deterrence—thereby claiming the realignment as a North Korean victory to bolster its internal popular legitimacy. This particular line of propaganda reinforces North Korea’s self-portrayal as the defender of the true ethnic/cultural Korean Nation from imperialist Westerners. Pyongyang will attempt to rebut 

all U.S. military statements about force posture; U.S. statements that it remains 

ready to defend allies and interests will be portrayed as belligerence against North 

Korea; and U.S. statements that it is not threatening the North will be dismissed 

as lies intended to deceive the KPA. 

22a. Senator INHOFE. General Sharp, what, if any, response will we see from the 

North Koreans with the deployment of U.S. Missile Defense to Japan? 

General SHARP. North Korea will likely respond to further development of U.S. 

missile defense capabilities in Japan (which significantly impacts Pyongyang’s strategic capabilities) by attempting to negate missile defense capabilities and by vociferously complaining about the U.S. military buildup. 

North Korea will correctly perceive regional missile defense capabilities as negating hard-won North Korean strategic deterrence (TBM, IRBM) and rendering it vulnerable to strategic coercion without significant recourse. Most critically, North 

Korea might fear the U.S.–ROK–Japan alliance will be emboldened to attempt a ’Regime Change’ offensive campaign if Pyongyang loses its strategic deterrence,2 parVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:37 May 06, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00910 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\62155.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
905 

ticularly since the KPA conventional capabilities have atrophied relative to the 

ROK. 

North Korea will likely strive to develop countermeasures such as increasing 

numbers of missiles, changing strategic theater targets, developing missile defense 

countermeasures and asymmetric means, in order to circumvent, overwhelm, or defeat any missile defense system. Pyongyang has poured massive resources into developing its strategic strike capability to guarantee the regime and cannot allow 

that capability to be neutralized without adequate replacement. It is also likely that 

further development of strategic strike capability will add significant additional 

stress to the North Korean economy. Conversely, North Korea might view its TBMs 

as minimally sufficient to deter ‘Regime Change’ despite a Japanese-based missile 

defense and continue to rely on its developing a nuclear ICBM rather than expend 

resources on increasing its TBM capability. In the same manner, North Korea has 

declined to modernize the aging KPA and instead shifted its defense responsibility 

to a strategic nuclear deterrent. 

North Korea will criticize the U.S. and Japan for developing/fielding missile defense systems that threaten the ‘peace’ of Northeast Asia. Pyongyang will protest 

the expansion of regional U.S. capabilities and influence as further evidence of imperialism, and might attempt to mis-characterize U.S. defensive missile systems as 

having offensive strike capabilities. North Korea will likely criticize Japan for increasing its perceived offensive capabilities and for its complicity in U.S. efforts to 

expand its imperial influence in Asia. 

PACIFIC REGIONAL INFLUENCERS

23. Senator INHOFE. General Sharp, are there any other viable influencers within 

the region besides China? If so, what level of influence do they have? 

General SHARP. As the U.S. Forces Korea Commander, I will focus on the part 

of this question as it applies to the area of Northeast Asia. The region of Northeast 

Asia is defined to include the following countries and special administrative regions: 

China, Hong Kong, Japan, Macau, Mongolia, North Korea, ROK, Russia, and Taiwan. As noted in my Posture Statement, Northeast Asia is home to 4 of the world’s 

6 largest militaries in terms of personnel, 25 percent of the world’s population, and 

5 of the world’s 19 largest economies (that collectively accounted for 24.8 percent 

of global gross domestic product in 2009). Thus, when viewed collectively, the military, demographic, and economic power of the entities in Northeast Asia makes this 

area a major influencer in the Pacific region as a whole. This influence in the Pacific 

region is expected to grow over time as the countries in Northeast expand their 

economies, military power, and presence in regional diplomatic and political affairs 

as well as assume a growing role in regional multilateral organizations such as the 

Asia Development Bank. 

Within Northeast Asia, the ability of individual states—excluding China and its 

special administrative regions as specified in your question—to influence the Pacific 

region varies. As the world’s third largest economy in 2009 when gross domestic 

product is measured on a purchasing power parity basis, Japan exerts influence in 

the Pacific region due to its trade and foreign direct investment relationships with 

nations of the area. Tokyo’s political influence is moderated by 20th century historical issues that have yet to be resolved with many Pacific area states. Russia has 

the ability to exert influence in the Pacific through military sales and its large stock 

of natural resources which the growing economies of Asia are eager to purchase. 

Due to its relatively small economy and military, Mongolia’s ability to influence affairs in the Pacific is limited, although it has provided support to international 

peacekeeping operations. 

I expect that the ROK’s influence in Pacific affairs will grow over time. The current ROK President, Lee Myung-bak, has committed his country to taking on a 

more regional and global orientation in its policies and actions. Indeed, creating a 

‘‘Global Korea’’ is now a national goal. Later this year the city of Seoul will host 

a Group of 20 (G20) Summit and the ROK has pledged to triple its level of official 

development assistance to a value that will equal 0.25 percent of gross national income in 2015. Additionally, the country has increased its participation in international peacekeeping operations and plans to form a 3,000 person military unit 

that can be rapidly deployed in support of such operations. The ROK is also a major 

trading partner for many countries in the Pacific area and a source of foreign direct 

investment as well as a provider of developmental assistance/advice for regional 

states. Seoul has also increased its role and activity in regional multilateral organizations and groupings. Thus, in terms of diplomacy, security, and the economy, I 

906 

believe that the ROK is already exerting a degree of influence in the Pacific region 

and this influence will grow over time. 

On the flip side, North Korea exerts a negative influence in the Pacific region 

through its provocations, nuclear, missile, and proliferation activities. These activities inject instability and uncertainty into the Pacific area and create a security concern for regional states. Additionally, threats to security caused by North Korea’s 

behavior have a dampening effect on regional economic development. 

CHINA’S DEFENSE SPENDING

24. Senator INHOFE. Admiral Willard, Taiwan, along with Japan and South Korea, 

continues to be one of the strongest democratic partners of the United States in the 

Asia-Pacific region and serves as a model of freedom and democracy. I continue to 

be concerned about the friction over Taiwan’s status as a sovereign nation in the 

context of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense 

Review highlight of the continued concern over China’s missile buildup and increasingly advanced capabilities in the Pacific region, in particular the Taiwan Strait, reinforces my concerns. You have stated, ‘‘it is difficult to reconcile China’s developmental goals with its evolving military capabilities that appear designed to challenge U.S. freedom of action in the region or exercise aggression or coercion of its 

neighbors, including U.S. treaty allies and partners.’’ I fully support the recent decision to sell U.S. military weapon systems to Taiwan, even with the concerns voiced 

by China. However, I do not agree with the decision to not sell F–16s as part of 

this package. What effects are China’s significant increases in defense spending, foreign military sales (FMS), and use of soft power having in the PACOM region? 

Admiral WILLARD. China’s significant increases in defense spending, FMS, and 

use of soft power have challenged parts of the status quo and have the potential 

to challenge the relative stability at a time when the economic locus is shifting east. 

China’s rapid increases in defense spending have focused in large measure on developing China’s capabilities to deter Taiwan independence and eventually compel unification of Taiwan and mainland China. This increase in Chinese military capability 

vis-a`-vis Taiwan poses a continued military threat to Taiwan and remains a significant obstacle to improved cross-Strait relations. 

China’s increasing military budget and capabilities have also focused on power 

projection and area denial, both of which are of some concern to me at the U.S. Pacific Command. China is pursuing a variety of air, sea, space, and counter-space, 

and information warfare systems and operational concepts to deny other countries’ 

military forces—most notably those of the U.S. access to the air and sea space near 

China’s periphery. This capability could pose an increasing challenge to the U.S. 

military’s ability to operate in the Western Pacific during a crisis. The Chinese military’s focus on operating at greater distances from China is allowing Beijing to focus 

greater attention on perceived security issues in the East and South China Seas, 

and potentially in the Indian Ocean as well. This creates both opportunities for cooperation—as in the Gulf of Aden—and potential emerging challenges to the United 

States and its allies and partners as the Chinese military—the navy in particular— 

expands its area of operations. 

China’s military modernization is occurring alongside a broader Chinese effort to 

build its global influence and soft power, with a particular focus on countries within 

the PACOM AOR. China’s deepening economic relationships within the region remain its most potent levers of influence with its regional neighbors. One recent and 

salient example is the China-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (FTA), which went into 

effect in January 2010. This FTA will allow China to further deepen economic ties 

to Southeast Asia—a region of considerable and growing importance to PACOM. 

This expansion of Southeast Asia trade relationships is occurring alongside increasing Chinese trade ties with the region’s other major economic powers. China’s economic influence is not limited to trade ties; China regularly uses grants, low-interest 

loans, and Chinese-financed infrastructure projects as influence-building tools—particularly among the developing nations of Oceania, Southeast Asia, and South Asia. 

China’s military is a growing part of China’s influence-building effort. China conducted several first-ever bilateral exercises in region over the past 3 years—including exercises with India, Mongolia, Thailand, and Singapore. China continues to use 

FMS to developing countries of South and Southeast Asia as means to build influence. While China’s FMS in the PACOM AOR has been modest when compared to 

its sales to Pakistan, parts of the Middle East, and parts of sub-Saharan Africa, 

they nevertheless are significant to developing countries with modest defense budgets. 

907 

China’s expanding military power and growing influence in the region are having 

important effects on how countries in the region are viewing their own security situations as well as their relationships with the United States and their regional 

neighbors. China’s neighbors are uneasy about China’s military rise. Many have 

openly questioned China’s long-term strategic intentions and called on Beijing to be 

more transparent in explaining to the region for what purpose is China so rapidly 

developing its military capabilities. Some regional countries are rethinking their defense strategies and procurements to hedge against a more assertive China. While 

China’s neighbors are seeking greater diplomatic, economic, and military engagement with Beijing, these same countries are also continuing—for the most part— 

to call for a strong U.S. military presence in the region as a stabilizing force. 

1979 TAIWAN RELATIONS ACT

25. Senator INHOFE. General Sharp, do you have any concerns regarding our ability to comply with the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act and how it impacts relations with 

China and stability in the region? 

Admiral WILLARD. No. For more than 30 years the United States has fulfilled its 

obligations under the Taiwan Relations Act. By doing so, we are helping to ensure 

stability in the Taiwan Strait, and throughout the region. 

General SHARP. Issues such as this related to Taiwan fall outside my AOR and 

under the purview of PACOM. Thus, I will defer to Admiral Willard on this question. 

26. Senator INHOFE. General Sharp, where do we stand with respect to selling 

more advanced F–16 fighters to Taiwan? 

Admiral WILLARD. [Deleted.] 

General SHARP. Issues such as this related to Taiwan fall outside my AOR and 

under the purview of PACOM. Thus, I will defer to Admiral Willard on this question. 

U.S. FOREIGN ENGAGEMENT PROGRAMS

27. Senator INHOFE. Admiral Willard, your comments that ‘‘we cannot take our 

influence in the region for granted and that our status as the partner of choice is 

difficult to maintain given the constraints such as limitation of our security assistance programs’’ is quite telling and cannot be disregarded. Our military-to-military 

(1206), civilian-to-civilian (1207), small-scale special forces (1208), Commander’s 

Emergency Response Program (CERP), and Combatant Commander’s Initiative 

Fund (CCIF) have been incredibly successful in aiding developing nations, fighting 

terrorism, and providing resources for emergency situations. I was pleased to see 

an increase in 1206 funding in the fiscal year 2011 budget . . . increasing funding 

from $350 million to $500 million. I have voiced my concern about the level of funding of CCIF and movement of 1207 funds to the Department of State in the fiscal 

year 2011 DOD request. It is evident in your comments that you believe these programs are truly beneficial, yet suffer from being Cold War era programs subjected 

to a multitude of influencers; what constraints or concerns would you like to emphasize to ensure we do not lose our influence in the region? 

Admiral WILLARD. I would refer you to Secretary Gates’ speech to the Nixon Center in February where he laid out the following key principles that should be included in any security assistance reform effort: 

• The programs must be flexible, and able to respond to emergent crisis 

• There must be provisions for appropriate congressional oversight 

• Security Assistance programs must take the long view toward the political crisis of the day 

• The State Department’s leading role in crafting U.S. foreign policy must 

be reinforced 

• Capacity building programs must acknowledge that partnerships will always mean relinquishing some degree of control. 

28. Senator INHOFE. Admiral Willard, do you have concerns over the fiscal year 

2011 funding breakout for your engagement programs? 

Admiral WILLARD. Although we could always use more, I am generally pleased 

with the breakout of funding allocated to the Pacific Command in fiscal year 2010, 

and that projected for 2011. These are very important programs that provide an incredible return on our investment. 

908 

29. Senator INHOFE. Admiral Willard and General Sharp, can each of you give me 

an update on how these programs are doing in PACOM and in the ROK? 

Admiral WILLARD. Foreign engagement programs are the backbone of PACOM’s 

success in the region. Together with other U.S. Government agencies, PACOM has 

successfully protected our territory and interests. Showing countries their relevance 

to the AOR and building their capacity to protect their own interests, essentially 

helps the United States in solidifying trust and protecting shared interests with 

partner nations. Additionally, utilizing the whole-of-government approach, in concert with the interagency, gives us the ability to affect all sides of the Diplomatic, 

Information, Military, and Economic (DIME) construct. The result is that the Asia 

Pacific region is stable and secure. 

General SHARP. The Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and International Military 

Education and Training (IMET) programs are powerful engagement tools for building security partnerships with nations in the Asia-Pacific region. Since purview over 

these programs in Northeast Asia lies with United States Pacific Command, I will 

defer to Admiral Willard for an update on how these programs are progressing. I 

can, however, provide a brief update on the status of FMS to the ROK. Administered through the Joint United States Military Affairs Group Korea, the ROK has 

been a major purchaser of U.S. defense articles. During the years 2002 thru 2008 

the ROK spent over $5.6 billion on FMS defense articles and another $9.6 billion 

on direct commercial sales of U.S. defense products. From 2005–2008, the ROK 

spent over $47 million on military training in the United States via the FMS program. In 2009, the ROK sent 648 personnel to the United States for training in 987 

different courses. Currently, the ROK has an active FMS program of nearly 600 active cases valued at over $12 billion. Some of the major items purchased through 

the FMS program include the F–4, F–5, F–15, and F–16 fighters, AWACS, P–3 patrol planes, MLRS, Patriot, SM–2, and AEGIS combat system. The robust FMS program with the ROK as described above maintains a high degree of interoperability 

between U.S. and ROK military forces and in turn enhances the deterrent and 

warfighting capabilities of Combined Forces Command. 

Separate from the programs discussed above, my Command is conducting a wide 

array of engagement events with the ROK. Contained within our Good Neighbor 

Program, a host of activities are conducted that engage and connect the Command 

with the Korean community. Good Neighbor Program events educate, inform, and 

familiarize Koreans with the mission and purpose of USFK. This direct engagement 

allows Americans and Koreans to develop mutual understanding of one another’s 

cultures, customs, and lifestyles, often leading to the formation of lifelong friendships between members of the two communities. Examples of events conducted by 

the Good Neighbor Program include English-language camps, speaking engagements 

by U.S. military personnel, and tours of the Joint Security Area/Demilitarized Zone 

and USFK installations. The program promotes two-way exchange between USFK 

personnel and people of our host nation. The program helps foster exchange, understanding, and cooperation between members of my Command and the Korean communities that exist along USFK facilities. In 2009 alone, 2,043 events were conducted with the participation of over 139,000 local nationals. All of these events 

strengthen the ROK–U.S. Alliance at both the professional and personal levels. 

30. Senator INHOFE. Admiral Willard and General Sharp, with the movement of 

1207 funding to State, do you have concerns that the State Department will not be 

able to execute 1207 as rapidly as DOD has and how will you ensure all these programs continue to be synchronized between Defense and State? 

Admiral WILLARD. Turning over 1207 to State should not impact the speed of execution. State already had the lead on the 1207 process, with Defense coordinating 

at the Country Team level. Defense representatives at each Embassy will continue 

coordination with State at the local level and provide feedback to the Pacific Command to ensure overall synchronization with broader security assistance engagement activities. 

General SHARP. In the Department of Defense, offices that play a role in management and execution of the section 1207 program are the Office of the Secretary Defense, Joint Staff, and Combatant Commands. Thus, as a sub-unified commander, 

I do not participate in the operation of this program. Additionally, to date no 

projects have been conducted with the ROK nor do I know of any 1207 project proposals that involve the ROK. Thus, I will defer to Admiral Willard of U.S. Pacific 

Command on this question, where several 1207 projects have been conducted with 

countries in his AOR. 

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CYBER COMMAND

31. Senator INHOFE. General Chilton, you have made significant gains since our 

last discussion over cyberspace. I am specifically pleased to see that you have consolidated both the JTF–GNO and the Joint Functional Component Command for 

Network Warfare, which I know was an issue. I understand that Lieutenant General Keith Alexander, the current Director of the National Security Agency, is still 

pending nomination approval for Commander, CYBERCOM. What issues are you 

facing with the stand up of CYBERCOM? 

General CHILTON. Our primary concern is hiring the skilled workforce required 

for the cyberspace mission. The Department has placed a very high emphasis on 

training programs and we are working with the Services to ensure that standardized curriculums are in place. These programs are intense and require some of the 

greatest time commitments of any in the Department. We have increased the 

throughput of students at the school house to help solve this problem, but it will 

take some time to generate the capacity required. We continue to work on technical 

solutions to take advantage of the speed of maneuver required for cyberspace operations. Additionally, we need to improve the defensibility of our military networks 

as they exist today, to include building a shared situational awareness of DOD networks; developing faster and more comprehensive early warning on impending intrusions into our networks; and improving our ability to implement, plan and execute dynamic network defense operations. 

Moreover, we will need to focus on increasing our capability to deliver integrated 

cyber effects in support of combatant commander, to include developing an agile, 

transparent, and responsive cyberspace requirements process. 

Simultaneously, we must mature the command, building the staff, while working 

closely with the military departments and their designated cyber components to ensure that we are able to retain a world-class cadre of military cyber forces that we 

have trained and developed. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR SAXBY CHAMBLISS

CHINESE MILITARY MODERNIZATION

32. Senator CHAMBLISS. Admiral Willard, you comment in your written statement 

that ‘‘China continues to develop weapons systems, technologies and concepts of operation that support anti-access and area denial strategies in the Western Pacific 

by holding air and maritime forces at risk at extended distances from the PRC 

coastline.’’ From a tactical air and long-range bomber perspective, how confident are 

you that, if required, you will have the assets you need as a combatant commander 

to prevail in the event of a conflict? 

Admiral WILLARD. In the short term, I believe that U.S. forces have the ability 

to prevail in the event of a conflict in the PACOM AOR. However, we need to monitor carefully China’s developing ability to execute anti-access and area denial strategies and develop mitigating approaches. The developing Air-Sea Battle Concept is 

one such mitigation, and will need to be evaluated and, when mature, implemented. 

In the longer run, other mitigations for such strategies may need to be developed 

and acquired, including a new generation of aerial refueling aircraft and long-range 

strike systems. 

33. Senator CHAMBLISS. Admiral Willard, where do you see risks for the United 

States in this area? 

Admiral WILLARD. I think we see some risk in the development of anti-access and 

area denial capabilities that may come from China’s military modernization. Additionally, there may be some risk for the United States in the potential shift in the 

regional balance of power and increased competition over energy resources that 

could result from a rapid increase in Chinese military strength. I also think that 

the development of mitigating strategies and capabilities along with continued cooperation with regional allies and partners and engagement with China are vital 

to approaching these risks. 

34. Senator CHAMBLISS. Admiral Willard, thinking 5 to 10 years down the road 

and based on the trajectories of currently planned U.S. force development and projected Chinese force development, what is your assessment of the risks for the 

United States in that timeframe. 

Admiral WILLARD. Given the current rate of China’s military modernization in the 

areas of naval, air, missile, and space, China will develop a substantial power projection capability out to 300 nautical miles from its shores by 2015. They will have 

910 

the ability to rival U.S. military force presence in the Western Pacific. By 2020, Chinese capabilities will likely expand to directly challenge U.S. military force presence 

in the Western Pacific and the South China Sea. U.S. military forces have been in 

the Western Pacific since the end of the Second World War. Through the decades 

those forces have acted as a guarantor of security not only for U.S. interests, but 

for the entire region. A shift in the balance of power in East Asia due to the growth 

of Chinese military strength could risk a loss of confidence in U.S. security from regional U.S. partners and allies. This could result in regional powers hedging against 

China by building their own domestic military capabilities, making compromises 

with China over a range of issues, and potentially engaging in regional conflicts over 

vital energy resources. 

PACIFIC REGIONAL RELATIONSHIPS

35. Senator CHAMBLISS. Admiral Willard, your AOR is huge both in terms of area 

and population. As you look 20 and 30 years down the road, are there places within 

the PACOM AOR where the U.S. needs to be thinking about establishing closer relationships, perhaps to include basing rights, to ensure we can provide the kind of 

security and stability in the coming decades as we provide today? 

Admiral WILLARD. As you look out 20–30 years in the future, U.S. interests in 

South Asia will only increase. In fact, the importance of the Indian Ocean Region 

to global stability and economic revitalization has increased considerably over the 

past decade. India is crucial to maintaining stability and growth in the region. Our 

relationship with India continues to mature and it is important we work to sustain 

this. Working with India, there is an opportunity for the U.S. to play a vital role 

in establishing more robust and proactive regional cooperation with other South 

Asia partners, like Bangladesh, Nepal, the Maldives, and Sri Lanka, to root out violent extremism and their safe havens and to establish the infrastructure that provides the capability and capacity for these partners to respond effectively to provide 

humanitarian assistance and disaster relief in response to the many natural disasters that plague this region. In concert with CENTCOM, this regional cooperation 

needs to extend to Pakistan in order to foster the economic stability and then 

growth that will benefit all the countries in the region. The situation in each country is unique and pursuing basing rights will not necessarily facilitate closer relationships. But it will be necessary to assess what infrastructure and support is necessary for the capabilities and cooperation required to achieve true regional cooperation in which the U.S. is viewed as a viable partner. 

Southeast Asia is another critical region. Leaders in Association of Southeast 

Asian Nations (ASEAN) states have expressed a general agreement that a U.S. forward presence is essential to regional stability in view of a myriad of transnational 

security threats and the rise of China. In this context major Southeast Asia states— 

Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Vietnam—are seeking opportunities to expand bilateral, as well as multilateral engagement with the U.S. in the 

areas of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, maritime security and countering violent extremism. Long-term stability in the Asia-Pacific region will be directly dependent on the near-term success of the United States in building the needed relationships with major ASEAN states to become the enduring partner-of-choice. 

36. Senator CHAMBLISS. Admiral Willard, what do we need to be doing as a Nation now to lay the ground work for those relationships? 

Admiral WILLARD. The situation in each country is unique, but utilizing consistent messaging across the spectrum of civilian and military leadership, the 

media, and think tanks, we want to emphasize direct benefits to the individual 

country, vice stressing mutual benefits. This approach, along with continued patient 

and persistent engagement, will help the Nation lay the ground work for expanding 

and strengthening relationships. 

Vital tools for U.S. efforts in building allied and partner nation capacity include 

Exercise Related Construction, the Asia-Pacific Regional Initiative, the Combating 

Terrorism Fellowship Program, IMET, and the National Defense Authorization Acts 

(NDAA) 1206 and 1207. Increasing the funding and reliability of these programs 

will facilitate whole-of-government and multilateral relationships for U.S. access for 

needed training and operations. As a Nation, institutionalizing these key programs, 

and others like it, will be viewed as a commitment to U.S. presence in the region. 

911 

U.S. MISSILE DEFENSE

37. Senator CHAMBLISS. General Chilton, in your written statement you comment 

that ‘‘with the exception of the U.S., all nuclear weapon states continue to modernize their nuclear weapon stockpiles and in some cases grow them further.’’ In 

your view, what risks is the United States accepting by not modernizing our nuclear 

weapon stockpiles and what specific actions do you recommend in this regard? 

General CHILTON. The Nuclear Posture Review calls for sustained interagency and 

bipartisan efforts to address the risks associated with an aging stockpile and 

changes in the international security environment. PB11 begins the process to reduce these risks, as it supports: (1) Recapitalizing the nuclear weapons enterprise 

infrastructure—physical and human capital, (2) Timely warhead life extension programs that explore the full range of life extension options, and (3) Robust stockpile 

assessment and surveillance programs. These actions will ensure the United States 

sustains a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal. 

38. Senator CHAMBLISS. General Chilton, regarding prompt global strike, what are 

the specific barriers to pursuing this non-nuclear strike capability and, in your view, 

what is a feasible timeline for developing this capability that will—as you say—‘‘provide the President a broader range of non-nuclear options to address emerging 

threats rapidly’’? 

General CHILTON. There are no specific barriers in the pursuit of this capability; 

however the Department is utilizing an event based acquisitions approach that focuses on maturing critical technologies before executing Service-led Conventional 

Prompt Global Strike acquisition programs. Under USD AT&L leadership, the Department is making progress in efforts to mature important hypersonic strike technologies, which include: thermal protection structures, advanced materials, communications, flight controls, navigation and guidance and autonomous flight safety system. 

Planned flight experiments in fiscal year 2011 will provide the Department quantitative data regarding the maturity of technologies which will inform future potential timelines. 

39. Senator CHAMBLISS. General Chilton, in your written statement you refer to 

the Administration’s Phased Adaptive Approach to missile defense which seeks to 

address what are judged to be the most urgent threats first with proven, cost-effective platforms. There has not been universal acceptance in Congress of this approach. Any approach accepts a certain amount of risk. Could you offer your assessment of what risks the current Phased Adaptive Approach to missile defense may 

accept and the extent to which you believe accepting risk in these areas is wise and 

warranted? 

General CHILTON. As stated in the Ballistic Missile Defense Review, it is inherently difficult to predict the nature of the threat our Nation will face in the years 

to come; however, it is a fact that the threat from ballistic missiles—of all ranges— 

will continue to grow. The Phased Adaptive Approach should allow us to tailor our 

capabilities and associated architectures in response to the threat, and as such, 

allow us to manage technological challenges we may encounter during development, 

deployment or in operations. The National Intelligence Estimate has characterized 

short-range ballistic missiles as the most immediate threat to our deployed forces, 

Allies and friends. To adequately equip our missile defense forces to meet this 

threat, Joint Staff J8 has initiated a Joint Capability Mix (JCM) study to examine 

sufficiency needed to counter the threat. Additionally, STRATCOM and MDA conduct an annual review of capabilities being fielded versus the assessed threats. 

These reviews ensure the warfighter view of the threat and missile defense capabilities are presented to the OSD staff and OSD leadership. As the Phased Adaptive 

Approach is fielded missile defense will be flexible to meet the threat. To enhance 

regional defense of our deployed forces, Allies and friends, PB11 requests funding 

for MDA and Navy to add 10 AEGIS BMD ships between fiscal year 2010–2012 and 

funds the purchase of 436 SM–3 interceptors by fiscal year 2015. Additionally, PB11 

funds 9 THAAD batteries and 431 THAAD interceptors by fiscal year 2015. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOHN THUNE

LONG-RANGE STRIKE CAPABILITIES

40. Senator THUNE. Admiral Willard, you note in your prepared testimony that 

‘‘elements of China’s military modernization appear designed to challenge our freedom of action in the region’’ and that ‘‘China continues to develop weapons systems, 

912 

technologies and concepts of operation that support anti-access and area denial 

strategies in the Western Pacific by holding air and maritime forces at risk at extended distances from the PRC coastline.’’ As the combatant commander responsible 

for the Pacific theater, how important is it to you that the Air Force develops a new 

long-range bomber that is capable of penetrating these anti-access and area denial 

systems and technologies? 

Admiral WILLARD. My primary interest is ensuring that U.S. forces in PACOM 

have adequate freedom of action to ensure their ability to accomplish assigned missions, including in anti-access and area denial environments. Long-range strike capabilities are an important part of ensuring U.S. freedom of action. In addition to 

penetrating bombers, there are several other approaches to conducting long-range 

strike. A family-of-systems approach may be the most cost-effective to attaining the 

capabilities that are needed. 

41. Senator THUNE. General Chilton, how important is it to you as the head of 

STRATCOM that the Air Force develops a new long range bomber that is capable 

of penetrating these anti-access and area denial systems and technologies? 

General CHILTON. As we sustain and modernize the nuclear triad, our Nation will 

continue to require a nuclear-capable bomber leg’s inherent flexibility to address a 

variety of possible adversaries and threatening contingencies. We are working with 

the Office of Secretary of Defense’s Long-Range Strike study to identify requirements for the next long-range bomber that will meet combatant commander’s needs 

and ensure no gap in capabilities. 

42. Senator THUNE. General Chilton, you note in your prepared testimony that 

you are working with the Air Force to ‘‘identify requirements for the next manned, 

nuclear-capable long range strike platform.’’ My understanding had been that no decision had been made yet as to whether the next long range strike platform would 

be manned and whether it would be nuclear capable. Is it now set in stone that the 

new bomber will be manned and nuclear capable? 

General CHILTON. No decision on the platform characteristics has been made. 

STRATCOM is participating in the Secretary of Defense’s Long Range Strike Study, 

to identify and assess necessary capabilities and attributes for the new bomber. We 

anticipate the new study will be completed in time to inform decisions for the upcoming fiscal year 2012 budget submission. 

43. Senator THUNE. General Chilton, when was that decision made? 

General CHILTON. No decision on the platform characteristics has been made. 

STRATCOM is participating in the Secretary of Defense’s Long Range Strike Study, 

to identify and assess necessary capabilities and attributes for the new bomber. We 

anticipate the new study will be completed in time to inform decisions for the upcoming fiscal year 2012 budget submission. 

44. Senator THUNE. General Chilton, the new Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) 

report states that Secretary Gates has ordered a follow-on study with regard to expanding long range strike capabilities. Have you been involved at all with this new 

study, and if so, can you provide an update on the progress of this study to date? 

General CHILTON. STRATCOM has been involved from the very beginning of this 

study. I am a member of the Senior Working Group providing oversight and my 

staff is directly integrated into the study effort. We are working to fully understand 

how potential long-range strike options and supporting capabilities contribute to our 

Nation’s security goals. We anticipate the new study will be completed in time to 

inform decisions for the upcoming fiscal year 2012 budget submission. 

45. Senator THUNE. General Chilton, when do you expect this study to be completed? 

General CHILTON. We anticipate the new study will be completed in time to inform decisions for the upcoming fiscal year 2012 budget submission 

46. Senator THUNE. General Chilton, to the best of your knowledge, how many 

studies have been conducted by the Pentagon with regard to developing a followon long range strike platform? 

General CHILTON. During my tenure at STRATCOM since the fall of 2007, there 

have been a number of Service and OSD(AT&L)-led studies of required capabilities 

for long-range air-delivered strike. Significant studies include: The Air Force Bomber Force Structure study (May 2008), QDR Tiger Team (November 2009), and the 

ongoing Secretary of Defense directed Long Range Strike study. 

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AIR-SEA BATTLE CONCEPT

47. Senator THUNE. Admiral Willard, I wanted to get your views on the development of an Air-Sea Battle concept that is currently under way in the Pentagon. The 

new QDR directs the Navy and the Air Force to develop a new joint Air-Sea Battle 

concept for defeating adversaries with anti-access and area denial capabilities, 

which in turn will help guide the development of future capabilities needed for effective power projection operations. As you know, anti-access and area denial systems 

are being aggressively pursued by nations in your AOR. Could you provide your 

views on how this new concept will affect the way you currently operate and the 

way you will operate in the future? 

Admiral WILLARD. I am very interested in any concept that helps preserve and 

extend freedom of action in the PACOM AOR, especially in a contested environment, should that occur. The Air-Sea Battle concept is one of those. My staff continues to monitor the work of the joint Navy-Air Force Air-Sea Battle study group. 

This work will help the PACOM staff identify where unaddressed capability gaps 

exist, especially in countering anti-access/area denial strategies. These gaps may require development and acquisition of additional capabilities. 

48. Senator THUNE. Admiral Willard, where does PACOM fit into the overall development, evaluation, and implementation of this concept? 

Admiral WILLARD. Development of the Air-Sea battle concept is being performed 

by a joint Navy-Air Force study team. The PACOM Staff is monitoring its development with great interest, and we look forward to the study team’s report. Along 

with the other combatant commands, we expect to be active in evaluation of the 

study team’s recommendations and in its implementation when it achieves an appropriate level of maturity. 

49. Senator THUNE. Admiral Willard, in your view, how will long-range strike capabilities fit into this new Air-Sea battle concept? 

Admiral WILLARD. Long-range strike capabilities contribute to the Air-Sea battle 

concept by helping to eliminate or limit the effectiveness of adversary anti-access 

and area denial capabilities, whether they are land- or sea-based. 

50. Senator THUNE. General Chilton, have you been involved at all with the development of this new Air-Sea battle concept? If so, could you provide your views and 

activities in developing this new concept? 

General CHILTON. I and my staff are aware of this effort but to date have not materially participated. 

FOLLOW-ON START

51. Senator THUNE. General Chilton, the START follow-on agreement will include 

a ceiling on operationally deployed nuclear delivery vehicles of 700. What are the 

implications for each leg of the nuclear triad under these limitations? 

General CHILTON. While decisions on the planned force have yet to be finalized, 

the force structure flexibility within New START ensures the continued viability of 

all legs of the triad to meet strategic deterrent requirements. We are progressing 

as quickly as possible to provide the New START Treaty Framework and Nuclear 

Force Structure Plans as directed by Section 1251 of the NDAA of 2010 to Congress. 

52. Senator THUNE. General Chilton, according to the testimony of Admiral 

Mullen before this committee earlier this year, there is currently consideration for 

a reduction in the number of overall bombers in relation to the START follow-on 

treaty. I assume this means that the START follow-on treaty is likely to result in 

a reduction of deployed strategic bombers. How do you believe these reductions 

would be apportioned between the B–52 and B–2, and at what level of reduction 

do you become nervous about the viability of the bomber leg of the triad? 

General CHILTON. The START follow-on treaty did not require a specific reduction 

to either the B–2 or B–52. NPR guidance was to retain both bombers and convert 

some B–52H, to a conventional only role. The conversion of a portion of the B–52 

force to conventional only will allow the Air Force to retain sufficient dual-capable 

B–52s to support conventional requirements, and provide extended deterrence to our 

allies, deter our adversaries, and maintain a hedge against future uncertainty. 

Force structure flexibility within New START enables the enduring viability of all 

legs of the triad and will preserve our current global strike capabilities. We are progressing as quickly as possible to provide the New START Treaty Framework and 

914 

Nuclear Force Structure Plans as directed by section 1251 of the NDAA of 2010 to 

Congress. 

AIRBORNE LASER

53. Senator THUNE. General Chilton, on February 11 of this year, the MDA completed a successful destruction of a threat representative missile in its boost phase 

using a high energy laser beam from the Airborne Laser aircraft. This is a remarkable accomplishment. What are your views of this successful test of the Airborne 

Laser program, and do you think it marks the beginning of a revolution in military 

affairs? 

General CHILTON. The recent feasibility tests of the Airborne Laser Test Bed— 

that being, successful detection, tracking, and engagement of boosting threat-representative missiles—highlight the important work accomplished by MDA in the directed energy arena to this point. These tests are also illustrative of potential new 

capabilities that further development of this technology could provide to combatant 

commanders. 

Directed energy technology holds promise for boost-phase intercept and handling 

increasing raid sizes, and could contribute to an offsetting strategy for missile vs. 

missile which is cost imposing on adversaries. STRATCOM supports the continued 

research and development of directed energy projects, although the actual technology development is not a combatant command responsibility. 

U.S. Strategic Command fully supports the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) and 

Director of Defense Research and Engineering as they begin over the Future Years 

Defense Program (FYDP) to build on Airborne Laser Test Bed lessons and research 

and test operationally viable and affordable directed energy concepts and platforms. 

54. Senator THUNE. General Chilton, what are your views about how this program 

should move forward? 

General CHILTON. STRATCOM supports the continued research and development 

of directed energy projects, although the actual technology development is not a 

combatant command responsibility. 

STRATCOM fully supports the MDA and Director of Defense Research and Engineering as they begin over the FYDP to build on Airborne Laser Test Bed lessons 

and research and test operationally viable and affordable directed energy concepts 

and platforms. 

55. Senator THUNE. General Chilton, should we be aggressively leveraging this 

new technology? 

General CHILTON. Yes. The recent feasibility tests of the Airborne Laser Test 

Bed—that being, successful detection, tracking, and engagement of boosting threatrepresentative missiles—highlight the incredible work accomplished in the directed 

energy arena to this point, and portend the revolutionary capabilities further development of this technology could provide. 

Directed energy technology holds promise for boost-phase intercept and for handling of increased raid size, and offers an offsetting strategy for missile vs. missile 

which is cost imposing. STRATCOM supports the continued research and development of directed energy projects, although the actual technology development is not 

a combatant command responsibility. 

56. Senator THUNE. General Sharp, in light of the successful test of the Airborne 

Laser in shooting down a boosting missile, do you view its continued development 

as important to our future ability to defend the Korean theater? 

General SHARP. I believe key technological advances such as the Airborne Laser’s 

ability to defeat Theater Ballistic Missiles are uniquely suited for our Area of Operation. With the tremendous accomplishments the Airborne Laser has enjoyed in the 

last year, I feel that we need to continue to build upon this capability so that it 

is more reliable, less operationally constrictive and more responsive in nature based 

on conditions of limited warning. 

[Whereupon, at 10:43 a.m., the committee adjourned.] 

(915) 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION 

FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 

2011 

TUESDAY, APRIL 20, 2010 

U.S. SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, 

Washington, DC. 

BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE POLICIES AND 

PROGRAMS 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:34 a.m. in room SD– 

G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin (chairman) presiding. 

Committee members present: Senators Levin, Lieberman, Reed, 

Bill Nelson, E. Benjamin Nelson, Udall, Hagan, Begich, McCain, 

Inhofe, Sessions, Chambliss, Thune, Wicker, and LeMieux. 

Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk. 

Majority staff member present: Richard W. Fieldhouse, professional staff member. 

Minority staff members present: Joseph W. Bowab, Republican 

staff director; Christian D. Brose, professional staff member; and 

Daniel A. Lerner, professional staff member. 

Staff assistants present: Kevin A. Cronin, Jennifer R. Knowles, 

and Breon N. Wells. 

Committee members’ assistants present: James Tuite, assistant 

to Senator Byrd; Christopher Griffin, assistant to Senator 

Lieberman; Carolyn Chuhta, assistant to Senator Reed; Nick Ikeda, 

assistant to Senator Akaka; Ann Premer, assistant to Senator Ben 

Nelson; Patrick Hayes, assistant to Senator Bayh; Marta McLellan 

Ross and Gordon I. Peterson, assistants to Senator Webb; Tressa 

Guenov, assistant to Senator McCaskill; Jennifer Barrett, assistant 

to Senator Udall; Roger Pena, assistant to Senator Hagan; Lindsay 

Kavanaugh, assistant to Senator Begich; Anthony J. Lazarski and 

Rob Soofer, assistants to Senator Inhofe; Lenwood Landrum and 

Sandra Luff, assistants to Senator Sessions; Clyde A. Taylor IV, assistant to Senator Chambliss; Jason Van Beek, assistant to Senator 

Thune; Erskine Wells III, assistant to Senator Wicker; Brian 

Walsh, assistant to Senator LeMieux; and Kevin Kane, assistant to 

Senator Burr. 

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OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN 

Chairman LEVIN. Good morning, everybody. The committee 

meets today to consider the ballistic missile defense (BMD) policies 

and programs accompanying the President’s budget request for fiscal year 2011. We’re pleased to have four distinguished witnesses 

with us today to consider these matters. Dr. Jim Miller, Principal 

Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, has been deeply involved in all facets of the administration’s missile defense policy 

consideration and their efforts. This includes the Phased Adaptive 

Approach (PAA) to missile defense in Europe announced by the 

President last September, as well as the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), the Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR), and the 

recently released Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). 

Dr. Michael Gilmore is the Director of Operational Test and 

Evaluation (DOT&E) at the Department of Defense (DOD). His office plays a crucial role in the Nation’s ability to have confidence 

that our weapons systems work as intended, and this committee 

has sponsored many improvements in the DOT&E ability to assess 

the capabilities and testing of our missile defense systems. He has 

recently submitted to Congress a number of reports related to missile defense and his organization has been instrumental in the development of the new missile defense integrated master test plan 

(IMTP). 

Lieutenant General Patrick O’Reilly is the Director of the Missile 

Defense Agency (MDA), which is charged with designing, developing, and producing all the elements of the BMD system and ensuring that they work together effectively in an integrated fashion 

to defend our Homeland and our forward-deployed forces, our allies, and our partners. We will be interested to hear how the $8.4 

billion budget request for the MDA supports the policies and strategies presented in the BMDR. 

Rear Admiral Archer Macy is the Director of the Joint Integrated 

Air and Missile Defense Organization (JIAMDO) of the Joint Staff. 

His organization works with the combatant commanders to ensure 

that our missile defense programs are meeting their needs and to 

consider future needs for our missile defense capabilities. For example, several years ago his organization conducted an important 

analysis of our combatant commanders’ upper tier missile defense 

needs as compared to the threats facing them. This study, called 

the Joint Capabilities Mix Study, concluded that we needed to buy 

at least twice as many Standard Missile 3 and Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) interceptors as planned to meet the 

warfighters’ needs and that is what this administration plans on 

doing. 

We thank our witnesses for their service, their numerous contributions to the security of our Nation, including improving our 

missile defense policy and programs. 

The past year has been a busy one for missile defense. Last 

April, Secretary Gates announced a number of significant changes 

to our missile defense approach and programs, including the termination of a number of troubled programs and an increased focus on 

our regional missile defense. In September President Obama announced a new PAA to missile defense in Europe, which was 

917 

unanimously recommended by Secretary Gates and the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff. 

This February, along with the budget request, the administration 

submitted the QDR and the BMDR. The latter was born in this 

committee. Just a few weeks ago, the administration submitted the 

NPR, which was also initiated by this committee. 

I want to commend the administration and our witnesses today 

for their thoughtful and thorough approach to these missile defense 

matters. I think there are a number of significant improvements in 

missile defense that are consistent with this committee’s recommendations and they deserve strong bipartisan support. First, 

much greater emphasis on meeting the needs of the combatant 

commanders and in providing the capabilities to defend our forward-deployed forces, our allies, and partners against existing 

short- and medium-range missile threats from nations like North 

Korea and Iran. This focus is embodied in the PAA that is being 

used for Europe and other regions. In this regard, the good news, 

which sometimes seems overlooked, is that we are ahead of the 

threat in defending our Homeland. We already have a missile defense system in place for the United States, whereas those nations 

have not deployed long-range missiles that could reach our shores, 

and our system is being improved and will be supplemented by elements of the PAA in Europe. 

Second, the administration has adopted a policy of requiring realistic testing and operational testing to demonstrate that our missile 

defense systems work before we deploy them. This ‘‘fly-before-youbuy’’ approach is long overdue and brings missile defense into line 

with all of our other major defense acquisition programs. The new 

missile defense test plan reflects and supports this new policy and 

is a significant improvement. 

Third, the management and oversight of the MDA’s programs 

has been strengthened through the Missile Defense Executive 

Board and by making the MDA programs consistent with the 

Weapons Systems Acquisition Reform Act (WSARA) of 2009. The 

administration’s focus on fiscally sustainable missile defense is 

both realistic and essential. 

Fourth, the emphasis on international efforts and cooperation 

should help strengthen regional security against missile threats 

from nations like Iran and North Korea. This includes our work 

with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) on missile defense in Europe and with regional allies and partners in the Middle 

East and East Asia. In this context, I would highlight the possibility of missile defense cooperation with Russia. U.S.-Russia cooperation against Iran would send a powerful signal to Iran of the 

unity of the world against their threatening policies and programs. 

We have an important opportunity to improve our security through 

cooperation and I look forward to hearing about that potential from 

our witnesses. 

On a final note concerning the New Strategic Arms Reduction 

Treaty (START), the administration said from the beginning of the 

negotiations that the treaty does not limit missile defenses, the 

treaty is about reductions of strategic nuclear arms, and I hope our 

witnesses will comment on that. 

Before recognizing our witnesses, let me call on Senator McCain. 

918 

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN 

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I join you in welcoming our witnesses. 

Over the past year our national policy on missile defense has 

been substantially revised. I believed, and said so at the time, that 

this administration got off on the wrong foot with its plans for missile defense, undermining two NATO allies who had much at stake 

in our previous deployment of these capabilities in Europe. But 

with the BMDR and with an increased level of funding for missile 

defense in the fiscal year 2011 budget request, the administration 

appears to have embraced missile defense. Their proposal to establish a layered global missile defense architecture seems to be 

scaleable and flexible enough to address the threats of today and 

prepare for those of tomorrow. By rapidly pursuing the PAA, while 

also providing much-needed modernization, sustainment, and development funding for legacy systems, such as our Ground-based 

Midcourse Defense (GMD) System, this budget represents a seriousness on missile defense from this administration. 

Nonetheless, given their abrupt actions in the past, the administration must make a long-term commitment to missile defense and 

honor all of the long-term goals established within their BMDR, especially the development of the SM–3 Block II–B interceptor, which 

will provide additional defense to the Homeland. 

In the event that the proposed development and deployment of 

later generations of the SM–3 interceptor are not achieved within 

the planned 2018-to-2020 timeframe, it’s imperative that the administration fully support and fund the development of the twostage ground-based interceptor (GBI) as a technological hedge. 

The management of the MDA appears to be turning a corner, as 

recently highlighted by the Government Accountability Office. Still, 

there’s more to be done, including the establishment of key baselines across all programs and addressing both inadequate quality 

control and substandard contractor performance. Poor contractor 

performance has long plagued many of the Department’s multi-billion dollar acquisition programs, and I’m encouraged by the steps 

the MDA is undertaking to withhold profits from contractors responsible for unacceptable, poor, or substandard performance. 

To illustrate this point, the failed THAAD test in December is indicative of the financial and operational consequences that can result from one contractor’s carelessness. This critical test, one of the 

last necessary to certify the operational capability of this important 

missile defense system, required hundreds of hours to coordinate 

and over $50 million to field. However, the test was rendered useless when the air-launched target, as a result of blatant contractor 

error, failed to ignite, fell from the back of a C–17, and sank to the 

bottom of the Pacific Ocean. 

For far too long, contractors have attempted to cut corners on 

quality control at an increased cost to the taxpayer. This is simply 

unacceptable, and I look forward to hearing what more you are 

doing to ensure that all future contracts are structured to demand 

both accountability and performance. 

Missile defense is a key national security priority and its importance will only grow as we take responsible steps to reduce our nuclear arsenal. While the New START has not officially been transVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:37 May 06, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00924 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\62155.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
919 

mitted to the Senate, Secretary Gates has affirmed that this treaty 

will not ‘‘limit plans to protect the United States and our allies by 

improving and deploying missile defense systems.’’ Nonetheless, 

I’m concerned that the treaty may establish a low threshold for 

Russia to withdraw, citing future U.S. missile defense deployments 

as the rationale. Unilateral Russian statements to this effect are 

troubling. Missile defense is not and should not be viewed in Moscow as some new form of post-Cold War aggression. It is, rather, 

a reasonable and prudent response to the very real threats that the 

Iranian and North Korean regimes pose to the United States, our 

friends, and our allies. 

In the coming months we will have the opportunity to assess the 

treaty and confirm that nothing inhibits our ability to deploy defensive weapons to counter the missile threats of rogue states. Russia 

must not have veto power over U.S. decisions on our missile defense architecture and I will reject any attempts by this administration, or any future administration, to do so. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank the witnesses for their 

hard work. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator McCain. 

Let us start with Secretary Miller. 

STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES N. MILLER, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY 

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY 

Dr. MILLER. Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, distinguished 

members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify 

today. It is a pleasure to join my colleagues here on the panel. 

In February, as the chairman noted, DOD published the report 

of the first-ever BMDR. In requiring that DOD conduct this review, 

Congress stipulated that we started with an updated threat assessment. The ballistic missile threat today is increasing both quantitatively and qualitatively and is likely to continue to do so over 

the next decade. Several states are also developing nuclear, chemical, and-or biological warheads for their missiles. 

The threat to the U.S. Homeland from states like North Korea 

and Iran continues to develop. Neither has yet acquired intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) that could reach the United States, 

but both are working to acquire and/or develop long-range ballistic 

missile capabilities, including space launch vehicles which include 

many of the necessary technologies. 

The threat from short- and medium-range missiles has developed 

rapidly over the past decade. Both Iran and North Korea present 

a significant regional missile threat. These conclusions of the 

BMDR have been reinforced by a report submitted recently by 

DOD on the military power of Iran. This report notes that Iran is 

continuing to improve its missile capabilities and it is also ‘‘at a 

minimum, keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons if 

it chooses to do so.’’ 

Based on this threat assessment, the BMDR set six policy priorities for U.S. missile defense: First, the United States will continue 

to defend the Homeland against the threat of limited ballistic missile attack. The top priority for U.S. missile defense efforts is to defend the United States from the threat of missile attack by regional 

actors such as North Korea or Iran. The United States does not inVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:37 May 06, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00925 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\62155.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
920 

tend for missile defenses to affect the strategic balance with Russia 

or China. Through our missile defense programs, the United States 

seeks to dissuade states such as North Korea or Iran from developing an ICBM and, failing this, to deter them from using it or, if 

necessary, to defeat their attacks. 

The second policy priority is that the United States will defend 

against regional missile threats to U.S. forces while protecting our 

allies and partners and helping to enable them to protect themselves. As was noted in September 2009, based on the unanimous 

advice of the civilian and military leadership of DOD, the President 

endorsed a new PAA for missile defense in Europe. Since then we 

have concluded agreements with Romania and Poland to host the 

two planned land-based sites for BMD interceptors in 2015 and 

2018 respectively and, more broadly, we have worked closely with 

our NATO allies on the way ahead for the alliance on missile defense. 

The BMDR concluded that the United States should pursue a 

PAA not only in Europe, but also in other regions, particularly 

Northeast Asia and the Middle East, and that this approach will 

be tailored to the threats appropriate to those regions. 

The third policy priority stipulated by the BMDR was that before 

new capabilities are developed they must undergo testing that enables assessment under realistic operational conditions. As the 

chairman noted, we believe in ‘‘fly before you buy.’’ Flight testing 

under realistic operational conditions is needed to provide proven 

capabilities for the defense of the Nation and of our warfighters, 

and our other witnesses, including Dr. Gilmore, will have more to 

say about that. 

The fourth policy priority was that the commitment to new capabilities must be fiscally sustainable over the long term. Our investments in BMD, as in other areas, must be managed to ensure that 

there are sound capability improvements at reasonable cost and in 

overall balance with other defense priorities. 

The fifth policy priority is that the U.S. BMD capabilities must 

be flexible enough to adapt as the threat changes. Our BMD program is building systems that are mobile and modular to ensure 

that we can quickly reinforce capabilities in a given region and also 

so that we can successfully adapt capabilities as the threat evolves. 

We’re also taking a number of steps to hedge against potential increases in the threat, including, for example, completing Missile 

Field 2 at Fort Greely, AK. This will provide the ability to rapidly 

deploy eight additional GBIs if needed. 

Sixth and finally, the United States will lead expanded international efforts for missile defense. We are working with allies and 

partners to strengthen deterrence and build regional security architectures through improved missile defenses and through other 

measures, and my full statement includes many relevant details. 

These cooperative efforts are essential to the credibility of extended 

deterrence and reassurance of our allies and partners. 

In sum, the BMDR comprehensively considered U.S. missile defense policies, strategies, plans, and programs in the context of current and emerging ballistic missile threats to the U.S. Homeland, 

to our deployed forces, and to our allies and partners. It resulted 

in a $700 million increase in our BMD funding request for fiscal 

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year 2011 over 2010, and we believe that it provides a clear and 

sensible path forward for U.S. missile defenses. 

Before closing, I’d like to offer brief comments on the New 

START and U.S. missile defenses. As General O’Reilly’s statement 

makes clear, the New START does not constrain the United States 

from deploying the most effective missile defenses possible, nor 

does it increase cost or add inconvenience. Senator McCain commented on the Russian unilateral statement on missile defense associated with the New START and I ask to submit it for the record 

along with the related U.S. unilateral statement. 

Chairman LEVIN. It will be made part of the record. 

[The information referred to follows:] 


420ful1.eps
922 

Dr. MILLER. Thank you. 

I want to note here that these statements are not part of the 

treaty, obviously. That’s why they’re called ‘‘unilateral statements.’’ 

They’re not unilaterally binding. But they do provide some insight 

into Russian and U.S. thinking. I’ll take just a moment to speak 

to that. 

The Russian unilateral statement suggests that Russia would 

consider withdrawing from the New START if there is ‘‘a buildup 

in the missile defense system capabilities of the United States of 

America such that it would give rise to a threat to the strategic nuclear force potential of the Russian Federation.’’ That is not the 

case today, nor do we expect it to be the case in the future. 

In fact, both sides would have the right to withdraw from a New 

START if they deemed it necessary for their supreme national interest. The previous START and most other arms control agreements have similar provisions. 

The U.S. unilateral statement notes that, as we stated in the 

BMDR, U.S. missile defenses are not intended to affect the strategic balance with Russia. It then says quite directly and quite accurately that ‘‘the United States intends to continue improving and 

deploying its missile defense systems in order to defend itself 

against limited attack and as part of our collaborative approach to 

strengthen stability in key regions.’’ 

As this U.S. unilateral statement, the BMDR, and our budget 

proposals all make clear, this administration is committed to continuing to improve our missile defenses as needed to defend the 

U.S. Homeland, our deployed forces, and our allies and partners. 

I ask that my full written statement be entered into the record 

and I look forward to your questions. 

Chairman LEVIN. It will be made part of the record, as will all 

of the statements. Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Miller follows:] 


420ful2.eps
923 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY DR. JAMES N. MILLER

Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, distinguished members of the committee, 

thank you for inviting me here today to testify on the Department’s Ballistic Missile 

Defense (BMD) program. BMD is a key strategic issue for the United States and 

I look forward to testifying and answering your questions about our policies and 

plans. 

In February, the Department of Defense published the report of the first-ever Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR). The review comprehensively considered U.S. 

BMD policies, strategies, plans, and programs in the context of current and emerging ballistic missile threats to the Homeland, our deployed forces, and our allies and 

partners. It provides a clear and sensible path forward for U.S. missile defenses. 

We are here today to testify on the President’s fiscal year 2011 request for BMD 

and how it is aligned with the policies and strategies reported in the BMDR. We 

have taken many steps to ensure a close alignment of budgets with the Defense Department’s strategic reviews—not just BMDR but also the Quadrennial Defense Review and the Nuclear Posture Review, as it was being developed. 

I will first review the key recommendations of the BMDR, and then describe our 

actions to implement it. The committee has also asked that I address the European 

Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) in some detail. 

BALLISTIC MISSILE THREAT

In charging the Defense Department with the responsibility to conduct a BMDR, 

last year’s legislation clearly specified the starting point: an updated threat assessment. Accordingly, the review began with a review of the ballistic missile threat and 

key trends. 

The ballistic missile threat is increasing both quantitatively and qualitatively, and 

is likely to continue to do so over the next decade. Current global trends indicate 

that ballistic missile systems are becoming more flexible, mobile, survivable, reliable, and accurate, while also increasing in range. A number of states are also working to increase the protection of their ballistic missiles from pre-launch attack and 

to increase their effectiveness in penetrating missile defenses. Several states are 

also developing nuclear, chemical, and/or biological warheads for their missiles. 

The threat to the Homeland from states like North Korea and Iran continues to 

develop. Although neither has yet acquired or deployed intercontinental ballistic 

missiles (ICBMs), both are working to acquire and/or develop long-range ballistic 

missile capabilities, a threat that has proven to be inherently difficult to predict. 

Of particular concern, North Korea has demonstrated its nuclear ambitions, and 

it appears that Iran is determined to continue its longstanding defiance of its international obligations on its nuclear program. 

The threat from short- and medium-range ballistic missiles has developed rapidly 

over the past decade. Both Iran and North Korea present a significant regional missile threat. 

Iran has developed and acquired ballistic missiles capable of striking deployed 

forces, allies, and partners in the Middle East and Southern Europe. It is fielding 

increased numbers of mobile regional ballistic missiles and has claimed that it has 

incorporated anti-missile-defense tactics and capabilities into its ballistic missile 

forces. Iran has flight-tested a new solid-propellant medium-range ballistic missile 

(MRBM) with a claimed range of 2,000 kilometers. Iran is also likely working to improve the accuracy of its short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs). 

North Korea has developed a solid-propellant SRBM, and is developing a mobile 

intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM). It has also conducted test launches of 

multiple theater ballistic missiles, demonstrating a capability to threaten U.S. and 

allied forces. 

STRATEGY AND POLICY FRAMEWORK

The BMDR set the following policy priorities based on Presidential guidance: 

1. The United States will continue to defend the Homeland against the threat of 

limited ballistic missile attack. 

This remains the top priority for U.S. missile defenses, with a focus on the threat 

from limited ballistic missile attack by regional actors such as North Korea or Iran. 

The United States does not intend to affect the strategic balance with Russia or to 

undermine strategic stability with China. The United States seeks to dissuade 

states such as North Korea and Iran from developing an ICBM and, failing this, 

to deter them from using it or to defeat their attacks should deterrence fail. 

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2. The United States will defend against regional missile threats to U.S. forces, 

while protecting our allies and partners and enabling them to defend themselves. 

This policy has guided the development of U.S. capabilities since the emergence 

of the missile proliferation problem in the 1980s. The security of our deployed 

troops, and our allies and partners, requires this. 

3. Before new capabilities are deployed, they must undergo testing that enables 

assessment under realistic operational conditions. 

We believe in ‘‘fly before you buy.’’ Flight testing under realistic operational conditions is needed and cannot be conducted from facilities not equipped or properly located for this purpose. This will result in a posture based on proven technology with 

improved reliability, confidence, and cost control. 

4. The commitment to new capabilities must be fiscally sustainable over the long 

term. 

Our investments in this area must be managed to ensure that there are sound 

capability improvements at reasonable cost and in overall balance with other defense priorities. 

5. U.S. BMD capabilities must be flexible enough to adapt as threats change. 

Building capabilities that are mobile and modular ensures we can successfully 

adapt as the threat evolves, and our own technology advances. Hedging against potential changes in the threat is essential given the uncertainty associated with the 

ballistic missile capabilities of potential adversaries. 

6. The United States will lead expanded international efforts for missile defense. 

We will work with allies and partners to strengthen regional security architectures. This theme cuts across all of the Department’s policy and posture reviews. 

Cooperative efforts are essential to the credibility of extended deterrence and assurance of U.S. allies and partners. Our commitment to seeking strategic stability with 

Russia and China means that engagement with them is also needed. 

DEFENDING THE HOMELAND

The U.S. Homeland is currently protected against the threat of limited ICBM attack, as a result of investments made over the past decade in the system based on 

Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD). By the end of this fiscal year, the United 

States will deploy a total of 30 Ground-Based Interceptors (GBIs), at Fort Greely, 

AK, and Vandenberg Air Force Base, CA, along with a global architecture of sensors 

and command and control systems. The United States now possesses a capacity to 

counter the projected threats from North Korea and Iran for the foreseeable future. 

At the same time, because the threat is unpredictable, the United States must 

be well hedged against the possibility of rapid threat developments. The focus now 

must be on maintaining the current level of capability while developing future capabilities that will enhance Homeland defense if and as new threats emerge. We are 

taking the following steps to strengthen our hedging posture: 

1. Continue the development and assessment of a two-stage GBI. The two-stage 

GBI is only a development program and no decision has been made to acquire 

or deploy operational interceptors at this time. 

2. Complete construction of Missile Field 2 at Fort Greely, AK, to the originally 

planned configuration of 14 operationally-capable silos. Finishing Missile Field 

2 will allow us to replace older, inadequate silos from Missile Field 1, provide 

the most reliable and effective silo configurations to the warfighter, and establish a Reserve capability to rapidly deploy up to 8 additional interceptors if 

needed. 

3. Pursue advanced sensors to strengthen existing networks. MDA is currently 

developing air- and space-based sensors that will bring new capabilities to the 

fight by allowing us to detect enemy launches, handle larger raid sizes, and 

track them earlier and longer through all phases of their flight. 

4. Invest in advanced technologies such as directed energy and its potential use 

for missile defense, early-intercept capabilities that allow us to engage threats 

earlier in their flight, and the ability to launch interceptors and engage ballistic missiles based on information from external, forward-deployed sensors. 

5. Implement Phase 4 of the Phased Adaptive Approach in Europe which will provide supplemental capabilities for the protection of Europe and the Homeland 

from Middle East threats. 

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DEFENDING AGAINST REGIONAL THREATS

Over the past decade, significant progress has been made in developing capabilities for protection against attack from short- and medium-range ballistic missiles. 

Critical new systems have begun to be deployed. But these deployments remain 

modest in number in comparison to the rapidly expanding regional threat. The 

BMDR reflects the commitment to significantly accelerate the acquisition and deployment of these mature systems and to invest in follow-on capabilities. 

The benefits of improving capabilities are best ensured by tailoring regional deterrence and defense architectures to the unique requirements of each region. The effort to develop tailored approaches will be guided by the following key principles: 

1. Regional deterrence must be built on a solid foundation of strong cooperative 

relationships and appropriate burden sharing between the United States and 

our allies. While missile defenses play an important role in regional deterrence, 

other components will also be significant. As the Nuclear Posture Review has 

made clear, the U.S. nuclear umbrella will remain in place so long as nuclear 

threats to our allies remain. 

2. The United States will pursue a phased adaptive approach within each region 

that is tailored to the threats unique to that region, including their scale, the 

scope and pace of their development, and the capabilities available and most 

suited for deployment. 

3. Because the potential global demand for missile defense assets over the next 

decade may exceed supply, the United States will develop capabilities that are 

mobile and re-locatable. 

Let me further explain what we mean by ‘‘phased’’ and ‘‘adaptive.’’ The phases are 

designed to implement the best available technology to meet existing and potential 

threats. As more capable interceptor technology is tested, proven, and available, we 

will phase that technology in to counter the increasing range and complexity of missile threats we face. 

The approach is adaptive in that it relies largely on sea-based and other mobile 

capabilities that can be surged into troubled regions in times of political-military crisis. We must plan to surge for the simple reason that the potential demand for regional missile defense assets will exceed supply for years to come. Although the missile threat is developing at different rates in different regions, overall it is developing rapidly—both in quality and quantity. Today there are thousands of ballistic 

missiles and hundreds of launchers; roughly 90 percent of those missiles have 

ranges less than 1,000 kilometers. Against this threat, the United States currently 

has only a few hundred defensive interceptors deployed in multiple regions. To manage the supply/demand challenge, the military utilizes the Global Force Management process. This will help to ensure that our missile defenses can face the most 

pressing regional threats, and that we have capabilities that are responsive to 

changes in the threat environment. 

THE BMDR AND THE BUDGET

The Department’s budget request aligns with the policies identified in the BMDR 

and reflects an increased emphasis on strengthening our Homeland and regional 

missile defense capabilities. The fiscal year 2011 President’s budget requests approximately $500 million more than was appropriated in fiscal year 2010. Furthermore, our plan for fiscal years 2011–2015 is $3.2 billion above what was planned 

for last year. MDA Director O’Reilly will provide a more detailed overview of the 

programmatic investments in fiscal year 2011 and beyond. 

The legislation mandating the BMDR specifically posed a question about the 

needed balance between investments in Homeland and regional defenses. Clearly, 

we need strong investments in both areas. We also need to be well hedged in both 

against potential developments in the threat. We also need to accelerate the fielding 

and further development of capabilities to deal with regional threats because of the 

dramatic growth in that dimension. 

We have emphasized the following key investment priorities for fiscal year 2011 

and the 5 year defense plan: 

• To increase the inventory of near-term, mature systems, including interceptors, sensor networks, and command and control capabilities, in order to 

provide our military forces with what they need now. 

• To rigorously test our missile defense systems as they are developed to 

ensure we are investing in operationally-effective and reliable sensors and 

shooters. 

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• To invest in advanced technologies and follow-on capabilities so that we 

continue to outpace new developments in our adversaries’ ballistic missile 

capabilities. 

• To maintain and improve existing capabilities. 

We believe these increased investments are essential, and consistent with a key 

principle of the BMDR, fiscally sustainable. 

MISSILE DEFENSE IN EUROPE

In conducting the BMDR, we were also specifically directed to assess the pathway 

forward for missile defense in Europe. Having reviewed the threat and set out our 

policy priorities, that pathway forward emerged clearly. 

• The accelerating threat from short-, medium-, and intermediate-range 

ballistic missiles in the Middle East pointed to the need to accelerate missile defense protection of U.S. forces and allies in Europe. 

• The inherently unpredictable nature of the threat pointed to the need for 

a missile defense approach with flexibility to adapt to developments in the 

threat. 

• The need to hedge against future threats, whether to U.S. deployed 

forces, allies, or the Homeland, pointed to the need for an approach in Europe that could be adaptive to this purpose as required. 

• The commitment to lead expanded international efforts pointed to the 

value of a broader alliance approach that would enable effective sharing of 

burdens and risks. 

The previous ‘‘Third Site’’ approach scored poorly against these objectives. The 

small number (10) of interceptors meant that the system could be overwhelmed by 

the launch of as few as five missiles. The high expense of the interceptors limited 

future capability growth. The Third Site approach did not include any specific components for defending our allies and forces from the threat posed by short- and medium-range ballistic missiles. 

The BMDR developed a more adaptive approach, which utilizes proven technologies that are flexible and responsive to current and future threat developments. 

Based on the unanimous advice of the civilian and military leadership in the Department of Defense, the President endorsed the Phased Adaptive Approach to missile defense in Europe. 

It is useful to recall here the four phases described in the BMDR: 

• In Phase 1, out through the 2011 timeframe, existing missile defenses to 

defend against short- and medium-range ballistic missiles will be deployed. 

Phase 1 will be accomplished by deploying a forward-based sensor and utilizing BMD-capable Aegis ships carrying SM–3 Block IA interceptors. 

• In Phase 2, in the 2015 timeframe, improved interceptors and sensors to 

defend against SRBMs and MRBMs will be deployed. The architecture will 

be expanded with a land-based SM–3 site in Southern Europe and the deployment of SM–3 Block IB interceptors. 

• In Phase 3, in the 2018 timeframe, to improve coverage against mediumand intermediate-range ballistic missiles, a second land-based SM–3 site 

will be deployed in Northern Europe. This will include use of the more capable SM–3 Block IIA interceptors on land and at sea to cover all NATO 

Europe countries. 

• In Phase 4, a decade from now, to address the threat of potential ICBM 

attack from the Middle East, the next generation SM–3 interceptor, the 

Block IIB, will be available for land-based sites. This interceptor, with its 

higher velocity, is intended to provide the ability to engage longer-range 

ballistic missiles and to intercept threats in their ascent phase. 

IMPLEMENTING PAA IN EUROPE

Since the announcement of the new approach to missile defense in Europe in September 2009, the administration has worked to engage allies, both bilaterally and 

multilaterally, to begin to bring together the needed building blocks for this approach. Key milestones in this process to implement the EPAA are summarized 

below: 

• In September 2009, the Czech Republic expressed its continued strong 

support for missile defenses and stated its interest in being involved with 

the EPAA. As we consider ways to cooperate on areas related to the PAA 

over the longer term, including through research and development activities, we are already in the process of working with the Czechs to establish 

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a near-term arrangement for sharing information on ballistic missile 

launches. 

• In October 2009, Poland agreed to host a land-based SM–3 interceptor 

site on its territory, as called for in the Phase 3 of the EPAA (2018 timeframe). This site will be located at the same former military installation in 

northwestern Poland that would have housed the GBIs under the ‘‘Third 

Site’’ plan. The U.S.-Poland Ballistic Missile Defense Basing Agreement 

was signed in August 2008. In February 2010, the U.S. and Poland concluded negotiations on an amendment to that agreement to allow the deployment of a land-based SM–3 site in Poland. Additionally, in 2010, the 

Polish parliament ratified the U.S.-Poland supplemental Status of Forces 

Agreement required for the deployment of U.S. forces in Poland, including 

personnel associated with missile defense. 

• In February 2010, Romania agreed in principle to host the Phase 2 

Southern Europe land-based SM–3 interceptor site in the 2015 timeframe. 

The U.S. is preparing for negotiations with the Romanian Government concerning the details of hosting the site. 

• We are currently in discussions regarding the potential location of the 

forward-based AN/TPY–2 radar, which we would like to deploy in Southern 

Europe in the 2011 timeframe. As these discussions mature, we will be able 

to provide more information. 

• We are also working to coordinate our EPAA missile defense efforts with 

those of our NATO Allies that are seeking to counter shorter-range ballistic 

missile threats to deployed forces. Several NATO countries already possess 

or are acquiring such missile defense capabilities. For example, several 

have Patriot systems (Netherlands, Germany, and Greece). Some are working cooperatively with the United States to develop the MEADS system 

(i.e., Italy and Germany). Others have expressed interest in acquiring systems like Patriot, SM–3, and sensor technology. 

These bilateral efforts have been paralleled by multilateral efforts within NATO. 

The administration is working to ensure the EPAA is implemented in a strong 

NATO context—meaning it has NATO’s political support, complements current and 

future NATO efforts, and offers enhanced opportunities for cooperation. 

• The EPAA closely aligns with NATO political guidance on missile defense, issued unanimously in April 2009 by allied heads of State and Government, which states that ‘‘missile threats should be addressed in a 

prioritized manner that includes consideration of the level of imminence of 

the threat and the level of acceptable risk.’’ Accordingly, our NATO allies 

have responded positively to EPAA. NATO unanimously welcomed the PAA 

at its December 2009 Foreign Ministerial, a key first step in cooperation 

with NATO on European missile defense. 

• NATO is also developing a command and control network that will allow 

Allies to link their missile defense assets together, called the Active Layered Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (ALTBMD) program, creating a more 

efficient architecture. The United States is working to ensure U.S. assets 

will be interoperable with NATO’s ALTBMD program. NATO is also examining the implications and costs of potentially expanding ALTBMD to include command and control for territorial missile defense. ALTBMD and potential expansions for it would facilitate greater interoperability and shared 

situational awareness among Allied missile defense assets. 

In combination, these efforts have helped to generate a significant new level of 

alliance commitment to missile defense. As a result, there is greater potential for 

cooperation with NATO on a potential Alliance-wide initiative to protect NATO territory from ballistic missiles. 

It is important to understand that working to ensure protection of all NATO Allies does not give NATO a ‘‘veto’’ over the protection of the United States and our 

deployed forces. Interoperability with NATO command and control systems will not 

diminish our ability to defend U.S. deployed forces, our allies, and our partners. 

All of these efforts represent significant progress towards implementing the 

BMDR and PAA in Europe—in just over 6 months since the announcement of the 

new approach. 

THE PAA IN ASIA AND THE MIDDLE EAST

The European PAA is representative of our new approach to regional missile defense. It shows how we plan to apply in practice those policy priorities that we established in the BMDR. 

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However, it is important to note that the regions differ in the range, scale, and 

technical sophistication of the existing and potential threat. This variation has important implications for how phased adaptive approaches to missile defense are applied in each regional context. The regions also differ in terms of the U.S. role. In 

Europe, the United States engages as a party to a multilateral alliance; in East 

Asia, the United States cooperates through bilateral alliances and with key partners; in the Middle East, the United States has a number of key partners. The 

United States has deployed forces across the globe. Regional differences have important implications for the authorities under which the United States is able to operationally employ defenses in protection of local partners. 

We are also working in East Asia and the Middle East to implement the phased 

adaptive approach to missile defense in these regions. As I mentioned earlier, these 

approaches must be tailored to the specific threat and geopolitical characteristics of 

each region. 

• The United States and Japan have made considerable strides in BMD cooperation and interoperability in support of bilateral missile defense operations. Japan has acquired a layered integrated missile defense system that 

includes Aegis BMD ships with Standard Missile 3 interceptors, Patriot Advanced Capability 3 (PAC–3) fire units, early warning radars, and a command and control system. The United States and Japan regularly train together, and our forces have successfully executed cooperative BMD operations. One of our most significant cooperative efforts is the co-development 

of a next-generation SM–3 interceptor, called the Block IIA. This codevelopment program represents not only an area of significant technical cooperation but also the basis for enhanced operational cooperation to strengthen 

regional security. The U.S.-Japan partnership is an outstanding example of 

the kind of cooperation the United States seeks in order to tailor a phased 

adaptive approach to the unique threats and capabilities in a region. 

• The United States also has ongoing discussions with South Korea and 

Australia related to missile defense and we look forward to further cooperation should either country make the decision to acquire missile defense capabilities. 

• In the Middle East, we have a longstanding relationship with Israel on 

BMD. In addition to conducting a major missile defense exercise with Israel 

in November 2009, the United States and Israel continue to meet regularly 

and coordinate extensively on a wide range of missile defense issues. During a recent bilateral discussion in Tel Aviv in March 2010, ways in which 

elements of the BMDR would help our cooperative efforts to defend Israel 

were analyzed. This set of bilateral discussions on missile defense will be 

continued later this year in the United States. In addition to cooperating 

on plans and operations, our extensive support for Israeli missile defense 

programs continues to include the existing Arrow Weapons System and a 

new program for defeating short range ballistic missiles known as David’s 

Sling. Improvements in the U.S. missile defense posture as a result of the 

BMDR benefits regional stability and benefits Israel’s security. 

• The United States currently has a robust mix of BMD assets forward deployed to provide BMD for our troops and facilities in the Persian Gulf Region. This includes the command and control equipment, and personnel necessary to direct BMD engagements. Currently, a series of bilateral MD 

agreements between the United States and host GCC nations exist. Central 

Command continues to work on establishing a Regional Integrated Air and 

Missile Defense architecture for the GCC nations. 

COOPERATION WITH RUSSIA

As noted in the BMDR, the administration has given a special emphasis to renewing cooperation with Russia on missile defense. From discussions at the most senior 

levels, when Presidents Obama and Medvedev met at the July 2009 Moscow Summit, to technical discussions, we are making a concerted effort to identify areas 

where the United States and Russia can pursue meaningful cooperation. We are 

open to a wide-range of cooperative activities. 

Some examples of cooperation that we have recently examined with the Russians 

include sharing data gathered by existing U.S. and Russian radar installations; conducting collaborative missile defense flight-tests; and undertaking experiments that 

would combine data from U.S. ground- and space-based sensors with data from Russian sensors such as the radars at Qabala, Azerbaijan and at Armavir, in southern 

Russia. Pursuant to President Obama’s and President Medvedev’s agreement at 

their July 2009 summit in Moscow, the United States and Russia are conducting 

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a joint assessment of ballistic missile threats and challenges. Also, we are attempting to work with Russia to implement the 2000 Joint Data Exchange Center (JDEC) 

agreement. The JDEC agreement would establish a joint ballistic missile early 

warning center in Moscow. 

CONCLUSION

In the BMDR we have a new policy document outlining the administration’s approach to missile defense. We have accordingly shifted budgetary requests, increasing investments in missile defenses in the fiscal year 2011 budget. We have already 

begun to execute those policies as demonstrated by our progress on the implementation of the PAA in Europe, and we are working closely with other allies and partners. The threat posed by ballistic missiles is real, and it is growing. After years of development, our missile defenses today are also very real, and vital to coping with 

this growing threat. We look forward to working with Congress in ensuring continued progress. 

Thank you and I look forward to your questions. 

Chairman LEVIN. Dr. Gilmore. 

STATEMENT OF HON. J. MICHAEL GILMORE, DIRECTOR, OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

Dr. GILMORE. Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain, members of the 

committee, I’ll very briefly summarize my written statement. 

First, my characterization of demonstrated performance in BMD 

is contained in the report that I submitted to Congress this past 

February, which is required by law as part of the oversight regime 

that Congress and particularly this committee has created and the 

role that my office plays in overseeing testing progress in BMD. 

In that report I characterize the demonstrated performance of 

the elements of the BMD system using a one to six rating scale, 

with one being the lowest demonstrated capability and six being 

the highest. Generally, Aegis, THAAD, and Patriot—against shortrange ballistic missiles—are rated at the highest levels, from four 

to six. There has been relatively extensive testing against shortrange threats. Aegis, ground-based missile defense and THAAD 

against medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBM), intermediaterange ballistic missiles, and intercontinental-range ballistic missiles generally have demonstrated less capability, and the less capability is demonstrated as the range of the missiles increases. 

With regard to major events over the last year, of course, there 

was the successful shootdown of a threat-representative missile by 

the Airborne Laser. With regard to developments in test planning, 

as you noted, Mr. Chairman, there was the development of the 

IMTP, an exercise in which my office played a substantial role. The 

IMTP is, in my view, a rigorous plan for conducting the tests and 

collecting the information that will be needed to verify, validate, 

and accredit all of the models that will be absolutely essential to 

demonstrating confidence in the performance of the missile defense 

system, because we will never be able to test in live flight tests, 

the system throughout the entire battle space that will be relevant. 

With regard to challenges in the future, missile defense testing 

is some of the most complex testing that DOD conducts. It’s very 

difficult to execute these tests successfully. There have been failures in the past, both with regard to interceptors and to targets, 

and targets in particular are a real challenge, as I’m sure General 

O’Reilly will discuss. The realism and reliability of the targets is 

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something that needs work and General O’Reilly has a plan to 

work on that and to procure a new family of targets that we hope 

will be more reliable than the ones in the past. 

Thank you and I’ll be happy to respond to your questions. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Dr. Gilmore. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Gilmore follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY DR. J. MICHAEL GILMORE

Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, distinguished members of the committee, 

thank you for the opportunity to discuss the Ballistic Missile Defense System, or 

BMDS, its test program, recent results, and challenges. I will focus my remarks in 

three areas: 

First, my assessment of current missile defense programs, the details of which are 

in my annual report submitted to you on February 12; 

Second, the major events from last year that will shape the course of future 

BMDS testing; and 

Finally, the challenges to BMDS test and evaluation. 

CURRENT MISSILE DEFENSE PROGRAMS

Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) has not yet attempted an intercept of an 

intercontinental ballistic missile target. The intercept flight tests it has conducted 

on intermediate range missiles have been conducted under a limited set of operationally-realistic engagement parameters. 

GMD flight test FTG–05, conducted in the first quarter of fiscal year 2009, was 

the third successful intercept using the currently fielded operational capability. It 

was the first flight test requiring the GMD fire control to correlate multiple sensor 

inputs and supply a weapons task plan to the exo-atmospheric kill vehicle. FTG– 

06 was conducted in January 2010; it was the first flight test of an interceptor 

equipped with the Capability Enhancement II Exo-atmospheric Kill Vehicle and was 

meant to demonstrate the use of the sea-based X-band radar to perform tracking 

and discrimination. The intercept attempt failed for reasons that the MDA continues 

to investigate. 

Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense, or Aegis BMD, has demonstrated that it can detect, track, and engage simple non-separating and separating short-range ballistic 

missiles (those with ranges below about 1,000 kilometers). Using Aegis BMD 3.6 

hardware and software and SM–3 Block IA hit-to-kill interceptors, Aegis BMD has 

demonstrated it is operationally effective for performing midcourse intercept of 

short-range ballistic missiles. Additionally, follow-on operational testing of Aegis 

BMD 3.6.1 hardware and software demonstrated Aegis BMD’s capability to engage 

simple short range ballistic missiles in the terminal phase with modified SM–2 

Block IV warhead interceptors. 

During 2009, Aegis BMD completed two U.S. flight tests, Stellar Daggers and 

FTM–17. The two tests addressed midcourse-phase and terminal-phase engagement 

capabilities for Aegis BMD 3.6.1. Stellar Daggers performed a simultaneous engagement of a short range ballistic missile in the terminal phase of flight with a modified SM–2 Block IV interceptor, and a cruise missile target with a SM–2 Block IIIA 

interceptor. FTM–17 completed the planned follow-on operational test and evaluation flight testing phase for Aegis BMD 3.6.1. It also provided a venue for regression 

testing of midcourse-phase engagement capability following the upgrade from Aegis 

BMD 3.6 to Aegis BMD 3.6.1. The latter introduced the capability for terminal 

intercepts and merged anti-submarine warfare functionality into the system software. 

The Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) has demonstrated the ability 

to detect, track, and engage unitary and simple separating short-range ballistic missiles. In six flight tests, THAAD intercepted four of four unitary short-range ballistic 

missiles, and two of two simple separating short range ballistic missiles. One flight 

test demonstrated a salvo engagement of two THAAD interceptors against a single 

threat, consistent with plans for actual tactical operations. THAAD has also demonstrated a capability to intercept threat missiles both inside and outside the atmosphere, the only BMDS element specifically designed with this capability. Although 

THAAD has demonstrated the ability to detect, track, and successfully engage a target exhibiting medium-range, ballistic missile characteristics, it has not yet been 

tested against a true medium-range ballistic missile. 

During 2009, THAAD conducted flight tests FTT–10a and FTT–11. In March, 

THAAD successfully completed FTT–10a, a salvo of two THAAD interceptors 

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against a single separating short-range ballistic missile. The MDA ‘‘cold conditioned’’ the first THAAD interceptor before the test to simulate operations in a cold 

environment. The test was a combined developmental and operational test, with 

minimal contractor involvement. FTT–10a was also a BMDS-level test, with Aegis 

BMD providing a cue to THAAD as part of the engagement. In December, THAAD 

attempted FTT–11, an exo-atmospheric intercept of a complex separating shortrange ballistic missile. The target, planned as an air launch from a C–17 cargo aircraft, had a relatively low infrared signature and radar cross section. This was the 

first flight test to include all major tactical software builds planned for initial deployment, including radar advanced discrimination algorithms. Unfortunately, after 

the target was released from the C–17, it failed to deploy properly and was lost. 

DOT&E is assessing the extent to which the data that would have been collected 

during this test can be collected during subsequent testing. 

Command, Control, Battle Management, and Communications (C2BMC) has demonstrated the ability to command and control the AN/TPY–2 X-band radar in its forward-based mode, and provide track data to other BMDS elements for engagement 

support (GMD) and simulated launch-on engagements (Aegis BMD). C2BMC has 

provided situational awareness information to military command authorities during 

all three GMD flight tests. During the past 2 years, C2BMC has demonstrated Aegis 

BMD launch on Aegis BMD cueing in three ground tests, and simulated Aegis BMD 

launch on AN/TPY–2 cueing in four ground tests and two flight tests. THAAD does 

not currently have a launch-on-remote capability which will require modifications 

to the THAAD fire control software to achieve. 

MAJOR EVENTS

In the first quarter of fiscal year 2009, the MDA implemented an evaluation-based 

strategy for testing the BMDS, an approach that DOT&E has been advocating for 

the past several years. This approach emphasizes testing under so-called Critical 

Engagement Conditions (CECs), and collecting the data on system performance 

under those conditions necessary to verify, validate, and accredit (VV&A), the 

BMDS models and simulations to be used to assess overall BMDS capability. The 

MDA codified this approach in an Integrated Master Test Plan (IMTP) that documents their planned testing through the period spanning the Future Years Defense 

Program. The MDA staff, staff from the combatant commands and the BMDS Operational Test Agency participated in developing the IMTP, as did staff from DOT&E. 

DOT&E has been involved in the evolution of the evaluation-based strategy and 

the revised IMTP since General O’Reilly initiated its development in December 

2008. For example, DOT&E provided the MDA with critical operational issues the 

new test program must resolve. Over the next 6 months, the DOT&E staff reviewed 

with MDA staff the details underpinning all the CECs associated with resolving the 

critical operational issues, the ground and flight testing needed to collect the associated data, and the development of the final integrated test schedule. This effort culminated in an IMTP approved jointly by MDA and DOT&E in July 2009. 

In August 2009, when the President announced the phased, adaptive approach 

(PAA) for the defense of Europe, MDA initiated a revision of the IMTP to incorporate the testing needed to support the PAA. DOT&E participated in this effort 

in a manner analogous to its participation in the development of the previous IMTP. 

My office provided the MDA with a detailed test concept for Phase 1 of the PAA 

as well as a test concept outline for the remaining phases. That concept included 

the need for a test of Aegis Block 3.6.1 and SM–3 Block IA against longer-range 

threats than had previously been tested, as well as the need to test the use of 

launch-on-remote capability. 

In particular, when the President announced the PAA for the defense of Europe, 

a revision of the new IMTP became necessary. The PAA uses Aegis BMD and forward-based sensors to defend Europe and the United States from short-, medium-, intermediate-, and intercontinental-range ballistic missiles as Aegis BMD 

evolves with increasing capability. While the MDA has adequately demonstrated 

current Aegis BMD capability to defeat short range ballistic missiles, the MDA test 

program has not yet demonstrated current Aegis BMD capability to defeat medium 

or intermediate range ballistic missiles. The MDA must successfully complete flight 

tests against these longer-range threats to demonstrate ballistic missile defense of 

Europe. 

The revised IMTP, approved jointly by DOT&E and the MDA this past February, 

incorporates such tests. Phase 1 of the IMTP is the most detailed, as it concentrates 

on testing and fielding near term defenses by the end of 2011. Both Aegis BMD and 

THAAD will conduct flight tests to demonstrate capability against intermediate and 

medium range ballistic missiles respectively. The MDA will also conduct ground 

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testing of the command, control, and communications required to support Phase 1 

implementation. U.S. European Command is working to develop the operations concept and the tactics, techniques, and procedures that will be used during these 

ground tests. 

One other noteworthy event occurred recently. The Airborne Laser, now designated the Airborne Laser Test Bed, successfully engaged a boosting, threat-representative short range ballistic missile. This accomplishment demonstrates that it 

is technologically possible to ‘‘shoot down’’ a boosting, ballistic missile using a laser 

carried on a large aircraft. The program had to overcome difficult technological challenges, such as the effects of the atmosphere on the laser beam and the difficulty 

of holding the laser on the desired aim-point sufficiently long to cause the threat 

missile to fail. However, the engagement was not an operational test conducted 

under operationally-realistic conditions using an aircraft that is fully ready to conduct combat operations. For example, the Active Ranging System (ARS), a precision 

laser ranging system that is a key component of the detection and tracking system, 

was not available for the test. To compensate, the aircrew utilized the aircraft’s 

Wide Area Surveillance System as well as a priori knowledge of the threat missile 

launch location, timing, and aim point; this approach generally could not be used 

during combat. The incorporation of the ARS and numerous other capabilities would 

be necessary before the Airborne Laser (ABL) could be evaluated for operational effectiveness, operational suitability, and survivability when performing missile defense. The ABL would need to incorporate a laser with sufficient power to successfully engage, at operationally realistic standoff ranges and without a priori knowledge, a variety of threat missile types using countermeasures designed to defeat 

laser effectiveness. It must demonstrate reliability, availability, and maintainability, 

particularly during missions performed from deployed locations. It must also implement basic survivability features, including self-protection systems and airframe 

modifications to reduce the effects of damage caused by anti-aircraft weapons. If the 

Department should determine at a future time that it is appropriate to develop and 

field an Airborne Laser system, an extensive program of additional developmental 

testing culminating in realistic operational testing would be needed. 

CHALLENGES TO FUTURE BMDS TESTING. 

Targets 

THAAD flight testing has experienced target failures. The one flight test completed in 2009 was a successful repeat of a flight test first attempted in September 

2008 that suffered a target failure. The second flight test attempted in 2009 also 

ended with a target failure. When the targets have flown successfully, THAAD has 

successfully intercepted and destroyed them. These target failures have prevented 

THAAD from progressing to flight testing against threat-representative medium 

range ballistic missiles. 

GMD also has experienced target failures. Flight test FTG–03a was a repeat of 

FTG–03 that suffered a target failure. The target used for flight test FTG–05 did 

not deploy the associated objects needed to accomplish important test objectives. 

The MDA delayed flight test FTG–06 due primarily to readiness issues associated 

with the first-time flight of a new longer-range target. This new target flew nominally and correctly deployed its associated objects when FTG–06 was flown this past 

January. 

The MDA recognizes that its targets are very complex. This complexity is a key 

factor contributing to the failures that have occurred. Such failures may well be a 

fact of life for several more years until the MDA can transition from using its legacy 

targets and field a new set of more reliable targets. 

Executing the IMTP 

The IMTP is a rigorous plan for obtaining the test information needed to assess 

BMDS performance quantitatively. However, I am concerned that it is success-oriented with limited schedule flexibility and no incorporation of repeat, or backup, 

tests to compensate for test failures. The ripple effects of a test failure, such as the 

recent GMD flight test FTG–06, can be significant. An Aegis BMD test failure in 

the next year could affect the full implementation and assessment of Phase 1 of the 

phased, adaptive approach for the defense of Europe, as Aegis BMD would not have 

demonstrated capability against the longer-range threats that might need to be 

countered in that timeframe. 

Test Complexity 

Realistic BMDS testing is difficult. Assessing the capability of each phase of the 

PAA will require some of the most complex testing ever attempted by the Department of Defense. The majority of the testing is planned to be conducted on the PaVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:37 May 06, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00938 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\62155.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
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cific test ranges. The MDA will be challenged to replicate realistic radar acquisition 

and intercept geometries in the Pacific. In addition, testing of the command and 

control linkages and systems to be used for the first phase of European missile defense will have to be conducted using ground testing in the theater and surrogate 

testing elsewhere concurrent with development and implementation. Executing the 

first operationally-realistic combined test of Aegis BMD, THAAD, and Patriot in 

2012 will tax MDA’s capabilities for test planning and execution. In particular, performing the planning and marshalling the resources necessary to handle the safety 

requirements associated with what could be as many as 10 missiles—both targets 

and interceptors—in flight nearly simultaneously will be a substantial challenge, as 

will executing the actual test. 

CONCLUSION

The ability to conduct comprehensive and objective assessments of BMDS capability is still a number of years away. If the MDA can execute the revised IMTP, 

the data needed to validate models and perform quantitative assessments of BMDS 

performance will become available. However, it will take as many as 5 to 7 years 

to collect those data. 

This concludes my remarks and I welcome your questions. 

Chairman LEVIN. General O’Reilly. 

STATEMENT OF LTG PATRICK J. O’REILLY, USA, DIRECTOR, 

MISSILE DEFENSE AGENCY 

General O’REILLY. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Senator 

McCain, and other distinguished members of the committee. It is 

an honor to testify before you today on the MDA’s activities to continue developing and fielding an integrated layered BMD system to 

defend the United States, its deployed forces, allies, and friends. 

Under the oversight and direction of the DOD Missile Defense 

Executive Board, MDA proposes an $8.4 billion fiscal year 2011 

program that is balanced to achieve six policy goals of the BMDR’s 

report and the combatant commanders’ and the Services’ missile 

defense needs stated in the latest U.S. Strategic Command’s 

(STRATCOM) prioritized missile defense capabilities list. 

First, defense of the Homeland against limited attack. We continue to upgrade the GMD system to increase reliability, survivability, ability to leverage a new generation of missile defense sensors and testing to accredit our simulations. Missile fields in Alaska are in an optimum location to intercept missiles from either 

North Korea or Iran. The purchase of five additional GBIs and the 

production of components to support extensive reliability testing 

and missile refurbishment will sustain our production capability 

until 2016 and critical component manufacturing beyond 2020. 

Second, defense against regional threats. By 2015, we plan to 

buy 436 SM–3 I–A and I–B interceptors, 431 THAAD interceptors, 

14 AN–TPY–2 radars, 9 THAAD batteries, and have 38 BMD-capable ships available. Our regional missile defenses are adaptable to 

the unique circumstances of each combatant command. For example, we determined, based on updated intelligence estimates, that 

our previous plan for the defense of Europe could be rapidly overwhelmed and thus made ineffective by the large number of Iranian 

medium-range ballistic missiles today. Additionally, the previous 

program did not cover most of Southeastern Europe exposed to the 

ballistic missile threats today, would not have been available until 

2017, and was not adaptable to changes in future threats to Europe. Therefore we plan to deploy a larger number of interceptors 

934 

in Europe in four phases as missile threats from the Middle East 

evolve. 

Two phases in 2011 and 2015, respectively, provide protection 

against short- and medium-range ballistic missiles. The third phase 

in 2018 provides protection against intermediate-range ballistic 

missiles, and the fourth phase in 2020 provides capability to intercept ICBMs from the region in which they are launched. 

Third, prove the BMD system works. We have submitted a comprehensive IMTP signed by Dr. Gilmore, the Services’ operational 

test agencies, and the Commander of STRATCOM, to ensure we fly 

our missiles before we buy them. 

However, the two greatest challenges that we face in developing 

missile defense are acquiring cost-effective, reliable targets and improving quality control of all products. Over the past year, we have 

initiated a new target acquisition strategy to increase competition, 

improve quality control, reduce costs, and provide backup targets 

starting in 2012. 

However, the precision of missile defense systems requires stringent manufacturing standards. Until we complete planned competitions including the greater use of firm fixed-price contracts and defect clauses, we will have to motivate some senior industry management through intensive inspections, low award fees, issuing 

cure notices, stopping the funding of new contract scope, and documenting inadequate quality control performance to influence future 

contract awards. 

Fourth, hedging against uncertainty. In accordance with 

warfighter priorities, we are focusing our future technologies to develop more accurate and faster tracking sensors on platforms to enable early intercepts, enhanced command and control networks to 

rapidly fuse sensor data to handle large raid sizes, a more agile 

version of our SM–3 interceptor to destroy long-range missiles, reentry vehicles discrimination, and the development of high-energy 

lasers. 

Fifth, deploy new fiscally sustainable capabilities over the long 

term. MDA is complying with the WSARA of 2009 by establishing 

and managing six baselines, cost, schedule, technical, test, contract, 

and operational baselines, increasing service and combatant commander participation, and increasing emphasis on competition at 

all phases of a program’s acquisition life cycle. We are reviewing 

over $37 billion in new contracts for competition over the next 2 

years. 

Sixth, expand international missile cooperation. We are currently 

engaged in missile defense projects, studies, and analysis with 

many countries, including Japan, Poland, the Czech Republic, 

Israel, Australia, the United Kingdom, Germany, South Korea, 

NATO, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait. Additionally, Poland and Romania have agreed to host our 

Aegis Ashore sites and we are cooperatively developing the SM–3 

II–A interceptor with Japan, in which they are investing over $1 

billion. 

We also continue to support expert dialogue on cooperative efforts with the Russian Federation, whose location of surveillance 

radars would significantly enhance our ability to monitor ballistic 

missile development and flight testing in Southwest Asia. 

935 

Relative to the recently expired START, the New START actually 

reduces constraints on the development of the missile defense program. Unless they have New START-accountable first stages, 

which we do not plan to use, our targets will no longer be subject 

to START constraints, which previously limited our use of air-tosurface and waterborne launches of targets, which are essential for 

the cost-effective testing of missile defense interceptors against medium and intermediate-range ballistic missile targets in the Pacific 

area. In addition, under New START we no longer will be limited 

to five space launch facilities for launching targets. 

The New START also has no constraints on BMD system deployment. Article 5, section 3, of the treaty prohibits the conversion of 

ICBM or sea-launched ballistic missile launchers to missile defense 

launchers, and vice versa, while grandfathering five former ICBM 

silos at Vandenberg Air Force Base already converted for GBIs. 

MDA never had a plan to convert additional ICBM silos at Vandenberg. Moreover, we’ve determined that if more interceptors are 

added to Vandenberg Air Force Base it would be less expensive to 

build a new GBI missile field, which is not prohibited by the treaty. 

Regarding sea-launched ballistic missile launchers, some time 

ago we examined the concept of launching BMD interceptors from 

submarines and found it an unattractive and extremely expensive 

option. As the committee knows, we have a very good and significantly growing capability for sea-based missile defense on Aegis-capable ships. 

In conclusion, MDA is teamed with the combatant commanders, 

services, other DOD agencies, academia, industry, and international partners to address the challenges of managing, developing, testing, and fielding capabilities to deter the use of ballistic 

missiles and effectively destroy them once launched. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to answering your 

questions. 

[The prepared statement of General O’Reilly follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY LTG PATRICK J. O’REILLY, USA 

Good morning, Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, other distinguished members of 

the committee. It is an honor to testify before you today on the Missile Defense 

Agency’s support to the Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR) and our $8.4 billion fiscal year 2011 budget request to continue our mission to develop and field an 

integrated, layered, Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) to defend the United 

States, its deployed forces, allies, and friends against ballistic missiles of all ranges 

and in all phases of flight. This budget request reflects the strategy and policy stated in the BMDR report and the prioritized missile defense needs of our combatant 

commanders and the Services as stated in the latest U.S. Strategic Command’s 

(STRATCOM) Prioritized Capabilities List (PCL). 

The Missile Defense Agency has been operating in accordance with the principles 

outlined in last year’s Weapons System Acquisition Reform Act. This includes establishment of formal baselines for the system component managers, Service participation through the STRATCOM-led Warfighter Involvement Process, and increased 

emphasis on competition at all phases of a program’s acquisition life cycle. All of 

these steps, I believe, will maximize the return on the taxpayer’s investment dollar. 

Under the oversight and direction of the Missile Defense Executive Board 

(MDEB), chaired by the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and 

Logistics (USD(AT&L)), MDA proposes a fiscal year 2011 program that is balanced 

to achieve the six strategy and policy goals documented in the BMDR report: 

• Defend the Homeland against a limited ballistic missile attack 

• Defend U.S. forces, allies, and partners against regional threats 

• Deploy new systems only after effectiveness and reliability have been determined through testing under realistic conditions 

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• Develop new capabilities that are fiscally sustainable over the long term • Develop flexible capabilities that can be adapted as threats change • Expand international cooperation 

DEFENSE OF THE HOMELAND AGAINST LIMITED ATTACK

The Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system forms the foundation of our 

Homeland missile defense against limited ICBM attack today. We continue to upgrade GMD to increase reliability and survivability and expand the ability to leverage new BMDS sensors as well as test GMD to accredit our simulations. Since the 

beginning of fiscal year 2009, MDA has delivered five new GBIs, upgraded Fire Control and Command Launch Equipment software, completed construction of a second 

GBI missile field at Fort Greely, AK, and delivered a new silo and an additional 

In-Flight Interceptor Communication System Data Terminal at Vandenberg Air 

Force Base (VAFB), CA. Additionally, we are completing the missile defense upgrades to the Upgraded Early Warning Radar (UEWR) in Thule, Greenland, and we 

have transferred operation of the Cobra Dane Early Warning Radar and the Beale 

and Fylingdales UEWRs to the Air Force. We are continuing planning and design 

work to upgrade the Clear, AK Early Warning Radar. We are requesting $1.3 billion in fiscal year 2011 for GMD to continue our GBI 

refurbishment and reliability sustainment programs to: help sustain the fleet to 

2032 and support a service life extension decision around 2027; procure an additional 5 GBIs; complete Missile Field 2 in a 14-silo configuration to accommodate 

a contingency deployment of 8 additional GBIs; upgrade GMD Fire Control ground 

system software to ensure GMD leverages BMDS increased discrimination and 

tracking capability as sensor, data fusion and battle management network matures; 

and complete the installation of a second GMD command and control node at Fort 

Greely, AK. Additionally, we will continue operations and sustainment of the SeaBased X-band radar (SBX) platform to prepare for transfer of the SBX operations 

to the U.S. Navy in 2012. Finally, we will continue development of technologies to 

enhance Standard Missile 3 (SM–3) variants to protect our Homeland in the future 

by having the capability to intercept long-range ballistic missiles early in flight in 

the regions from which they were launched. To validate this concept, the Under Secretary of Defense (AT&L) requested the Defense Science Board independently assess 

the viability of developing capability for early intercept of ICBMs. Our GMD 

sustainment, refurbishment, and test strategy gives us the flexibility to adjust to 

the uncertainty in the future ICBM threat. Although, we experienced a GBI vendor 

production break after the last procurement of GBIs in 2006, the purchase of five 

additional GBIs, and supplying ‘‘limited life’’ GBI components for refurbishments 

will sustain our production capacity until 2016 and beyond. We will conduct stockpile surveillance of GBIs by testing all limited life components as GBIs are refurbished through 2032. Data collected from future GMD flight tests, results from the 

aging surveillance program, and future intelligence estimates regarding the pace of 

ICBM growth will inform decisions on the need to procure additional GBIs. 

DEFENSE AGAINST REGIONAL THREATS

Our fiscal year 2011 budget request balances the warfighter’s needs to develop 

new capabilities and grow our missile defense capacity. An integrated deployment 

of Aegis BMD and Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) forms an effective, layered, regional missile defense. The Aegis BMD is a mobile system, designed 

to defeat short- to intermediate-range missiles above the earth’s atmosphere, and 

the THAAD is a rapidly deployable system, designed to engage short- to mediumrange missiles both above and within the Earth’s atmosphere. Aegis has more than 

twice the engagement range of THAAD. Additionally, Patriot Advanced Capability 

3 can add an additional layer and point defense against Short-Range Ballistic Missiles (SRBMs). 

We are developing regional missile defense elements that can be adapted to the 

unique circumstances of each Combatant Command region. For example, we plan 

to deploy missile defenses in Europe in four phases as missile threats from the Middle East evolve over time. The Phase 1 capability (planned to begin deployment in 

2011) will provide initial protection for southern Europe from existing short- and 

medium-range threats using sea-based interceptors and forward-based sensors. 

Phase 2 (∼2015) deploys the SM–3 IB interceptor at sea and at an Aegis Ashore/ 

land-based SM–3 site. In collaboration with OSD Policy, STRATCOM, the Department of State, and U.S. European Command (EUCOM), we are preparing to begin 

negotiations with Romania to locate an Aegis Ashore/land-based SM–3 site on its 

territory in 2015. Phase 3 (∼2018) employs SM–3 IIA on land and at sea to protect 

NATO from SRBM, MRBM, and IRBM threats. Poland has agreed to host this Aegis 

937 

Ashore/land-based SM–3 site. The Phase 4 architecture (∼2020 timeframe) features 

the higher velocity land-based SM–3 IIB, a persistent sensor network, and enhanced 

command and control system to intercept large raids of medium- to long-range missiles from the Middle East early in flight. 

Since the beginning of fiscal year 2009, MDA has delivered 27 SM–3 Block IA 

interceptors and upgraded 3 additional ships (for a total today of 20 Aegis BMD 

ships); upgraded the USS Lake Erie with the next generation BMD fire control software that increases the number of threat missiles that can be simultaneously engaged and more effectively uses data from missile defense sensors external to the 

ship. We have also delivered two THAAD batteries (the first unit is planned to be 

operationally accepted by the Army by the end of this year). We have separately 

deployed one U.S.-operated X-band AN/TPY–2 radar to Israel on a contingency 

basis. We have also installed C2BMC hardware and software upgrades at command 

and control nodes at U.S. Pacific Command, STRATCOM, U.S. Northern Command, 

and EUCOM and began C2BMC installation in the U.S. Central Command. We are requesting $1.6 billion for Aegis in fiscal year 2011. We will continue the 

design, qualification, and testing of the SM–3 IB interceptor; manufacture 30 SM– 

3 IB test and production verification interceptors (we plan to procure a total of 436 

Aegis SM–3 IA and IB interceptors by 2015), and upgrade 3 additional Aegis BMD 

engagement ships (2 Aegis BMD 3.6.1 destroyers and 1 4.0.1 destroyer) for a total 

of 23 BMD capable ships by the end of fiscal year 2011 and 38 BMD capable ships 

by 2015. We will continue development and testing of the Aegis BMD 4.0.1 and 5.0 

fire control system to launch SM–3 IB and IA interceptors against threat missiles 

when they are beyond the range of the ship’s own radar. We also will continue the 

co-development of the SM–3 IIA interceptor with the Government of Japan to increase significantly the area defended by the Aegis BMD system with its 21-inch 

diameter rocket motors, two-color seeker, and increased kinetic warhead divert capability. We also will continue to design the first Aegis Ashore battery that will be 

installed for testing at the Pacific Missile Range Facility in 2012. We are requesting $1.3 billion for THAAD in fiscal year 2011. We plan to deliver 

the second THAAD battery (we plan to procure 6 batteries by 2015), add a second 

launcher platoon to each battery to double the firepower to 48 interceptors, procure 

67 interceptors (we plan to procure a total of 431 interceptors by 2015), and complete hardware and software upgrades to the communications suite to enable 

THAAD to use fused data from all BMDS sensors. 

We are requesting $455 million for sensors in fiscal year 2011. We plan to upgrade the AN/TPY–2 radar software to facilitate its use as a surveillance radar or 

as a THAAD battery fire-control radar, optimize the radar’s ability to leverage assistance by external sensors, and support the contingency operations of AN/TPY–2 

radars deployed in Japan and Israel. We will continue to develop a Concurrent Test, 

Training and Operations capability to provide operational BMDS sensors (including 

the UEWRs, Cobra Dane and Sea-Based X-band radars) the capability to conduct 

training and testing while continuing to provide on-line missile defense, upgrade 

AN/TPY–2 and Sea-Based X-band radar discrimination and dense track management software, and conduct ground and flight testing to support accreditation of 

sensor models and simulations. 

We are requesting $343 million for Command and Control, Battle Management 

and Communications (C2BMC) in fiscal year 2011. We plan to provide automated 

planners to aid a Combatant Command’s deployment of BMD assets according to 

its concept of operations and conduct ballistic missile defense battles according to 

its tactics, techniques, and procedures. Furthermore, we will develop and deploy an 

upgraded version of our C2BMC hardware and software to provide new battle management functions that enable shoot-look-shoot tactics between layers of U.S. and 

international partners’ missile defense assets, control multiple BMDS radars, correlate and combine sensor data from multiple sensors tracking the same threat into 

one system track, provide real-time awareness of the battle as it develops in accordance with a Combatant Command’s concept of operations, and enable engagement 

coordination among BMDS elements in accordance with regional Area Air Defense 

Plans. Additionally, C2BMC will participate in and analyze results of ground and 

flight tests to support accreditation of models and simulations and support war 

games and exercises. 

MDA played a significant role in the conduct of the Ballistic Missile Defense Review. The agency provided technical analysis and data as required by the leaders 

of the review to support their effort to answer the questions posed by Congress. Preliminary analytical results were then presented to the departmental leaders, including the Secretary and Chairman, who then made recommendations to the President. 

Although MDA provided these architecture assessments, it is important to recognize 

the decision to deploy the recommended European PAA architecture was not based 

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solely on detailed performance predictions. Rather, the decision to deploy an Aegis 

SM–3-based architecture to Europe was based on the need for a flexible defense 

against an evolving threat from the Middle East. First, the previously proposed European missile defense architecture lacked a sufficient number of interceptors to defend against the current and emerging numbers of medium-range ballistic missiles 

(MRBMs) being fielded by Iran. Simply put, with a notional 2 interceptor shot doctrine, the 10 GBI interceptors proposed for Poland would easily be overwhelmed by 

a raid size of 6 threat missiles launched towards European targets. Second, with 

the European PAA, we can deploy a missile defense capability to Europe earlier 

than the previous Program of Record, with GBIs in Poland and an X–Band Radar 

in the Czech Republic. NATO Europe is threatened by a short-range and mediumrange ballistic missile threat now, so this was an important variable in the decision. 

Upon the completion of testing in 2011, we could begin the deployment of proven 

capabilities to defend against the MRBM threat. Third, by creating a re-locatable, 

land-based version of our most capable regional missile defense system, the Aegis 

Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) system, Combatant Commanders could have the capability to adjust their missile defense architectures to address the uncertainty of 

future missile threats without the need to develop a new missile defense system. 

These systems can be deployed in any theater in a reasonably short period of time. 

Fourth, the increased defended areas and larger raid size capacity resulting from 

planned enhancements to the Aegis BMD system are expected to increase the costeffectiveness of a European missile defense against the growing missile threat over 

this decade. Finally, while we currently have a limited defense system against potential Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) threats originating in the Middle 

East or Northeast Asia, there is no technical reason to indicate that this system 

would not be further enhanced by the deployments envisioned in Phase 4 of the 

PAA. It is important to note that the missile defense capability needs identified in 

the BMDR are consistent with capability needs listed in the recently approved, independently developed, classified STRATCOM missile defense Prioritized Capability 

List. 

PROVING THE BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM WORKS

A key tenet of the BMDR is to sufficiently test the capabilities and limitations 

of a missile defense system before we begin procurement, or we will ‘‘fly before we 

buy.’’ As such, missile defense projects are subject to production decisions by 

USD(AT&L). Additionally, we use the Services’ standard material release and operational certification processes that also rely on developmental and operational test 

data prior to formally fielding initial capability. Both THAAD and AN/TPY–2 have 

production decisions by USD(AT&L) and Army Material Review Boards planned for 

this year. We are requesting $1.1 billion in fiscal year 2011 to provide targets and 

support to missile defense projects to test new capabilities under developmental and 

operational conditions, including the use of actual threat missiles, to support accrediting our models and simulations and production decisions by USD(AT&L). In collaboration with the Services’ Operational Test Agencies, STRATCOM, and the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, we submitted a comprehensive Integrated 

Master Test Plan (IMTP) in March that describes our plan through fiscal year 2015 

to conduct over 150 test events to obtain specific data necessary to accredit our models and simulations and support operational assessments. The IMTP also describes 

our testing to support European PAA deployment decisions. To support a Phase 1 

decision in 2011, we have completed 10 Aegis BMD intercept tests of short range 

targets. We will conduct an Aegis BMD test against an intermediate-range ballistic 

missile target prior to the Phase 1 deployment. Likewise, there are system level 

ground tests, exercises, and simulations to test system effectiveness and interoperability. The IMTP also describes our testing of the two-stage GBI and several GMD 

intercept tests against long-range targets. I concur with the January 2010 DOT&E 

January assessment that ‘‘if MDA can execute the IMTP as planned, successful 

VV&A of BMDS models and simulations should result, enabling quantitative and 

objective rather than subjective assessments of the BMDS capability in the future.’’ 

I further agree with the DOT&E conclusion that ‘‘objective assessments of the 

BMDS capability are still a number of years in the future.’’ 

Our recent flight test results have been mixed. From October 2008 through today 

MDA achieved 5 of 7 successful hit-to-kill intercepts and a number of ‘‘firsts’’ in 

BMDS testing. In December 2008, the GMD system engaged an IRBM target 

launched from Kodiak Island, AK, using a GBI launched from VAFB in the most 

operationally realistic test to date that demonstrated our ability to fuse sensor data 

from five on-line sensors. Unfortunately, the target in that flight test failed to release countermeasures. In March 2009, with soldiers operating the system using 

939 

tactics, techniques, and procedures developed by the U.S. Army, we conducted 

THAAD’s first dual salvo endo-atmospheric engagement of a threat-representative 

separating ballistic target. The Navy conducted an intercept using an Aegis SM–2 

Block IV (terminal defense) in February 2009, and we conducted an SM–3 IA intercept in July 2009. In October 2009, we supported Japan’s intercept test of an SRBM 

using the Japanese destroyer JS MYOKO. 

Although we have had three intercepts out of three previous attempts using the 

GMD system, our newest variant of the kill vehicle, relying on data from the SeaBased X-band (SBX) radar, failed to intercept a target in January 2010 during a 

flight test to measure GMD’s performance at its maximum operational intercept 

range. The GBI launched successfully from VAFB and the newly designed LV–2 

long-range target successfully flew for the first time out of the Reagan Test Site in 

the Kwajalein Atoll 7,500 km away. It was a very valuable test because we collected 

extensive data on the performance of the SBX and GBI, the advanced exo-atmospheric kill vehicle (EKV), and the target. We discovered new failure modes for the 

SBX, the EKV flew more than twice the distance it had flown in previous tests, and 

we collected significant new data on the EKV’s ability to acquire, track, and discriminate the target. The failure investigation is expected to continue for several 

more months before root-cause is determined and verified. It is my intent to immediately correct any deficiency and repeat the test as soon as feasible. In contrast, 

the most recent attempt to conduct a THAAD test last December was of no value 

because of a target missile failure. The THAAD interceptor was not launched and 

the system was not exercised. Despite the cost of more than $40 million for that 

test and subsequent program delays, we gained no new information on the performance of the THAAD system. 

The two largest challenges to executing the U.S. missile defense program is acquiring a cost effective set of reliable targets and improving quality control. Over 

the past year we have initiated steps to acquire a new set of targets of all ranges, 

including Foreign Material Acquisitions, to verify the performance of the BMDS. 

Our new target acquisition strategy, initiated in fiscal year 2009, procures targets 

in production lots to increase competition, quality control, reduce costs, and ensures 

the availability of backup targets starting in 2012. For the next 3 years, we must 

continue to rely on an intensive inspection and oversight process to motivate mission assurance. 

Due to the precise nature of the operation of missile defense systems, very high 

standards of quality control and an enduring culture of disciplined mission assurance by the industry workforce is essential. We have had many successes in improving our prime contractor and supplier quality assurance. In each case, companies 

have been willing to identify shortfalls, invest in new capital assets and attain experienced leadership in changing cultures to establish the enduring discipline required 

to consistently deliver precision missile defense products. However, not all companies have sufficiently improved. Until we complete planned competitions, including 

the greater use of firm fixed price contracts, we will have to motivate greater attention by senior industry management through intensive government inspections, low 

award fees, the issuance of cure notices, stopping the funding of new contract scope, 

and documenting inadequate quality control performance to influence future contract awards by DOD. 

HEDGING AGAINST THREAT UNCERTAINTY

Missile defense technologies must be developed to adapt and upgrade our systems 

to counter future changing threats. In accordance with the PCL, we are focusing our 

future technologies in four areas: (1) developing more accurate and faster tracking 

sensors on platforms to enable early fire control solutions and intercepts; (2) developing enhanced command and control networks to link and rapidly fuse sensor data 

to handle large raid sizes of missile threats; (3) developing a faster, more agile 

version of our SM–3 interceptor to destroy long-range missiles early in flight; and 

(4) developing discrimination techniques to rapidly resolve Reentry Vehicles from 

other nearby objects. Additionally, we continue to research technologies for destroying boosting missiles with directed energy. We are developing more mature technologies for mid-term deployment decisions around 2015 and conducting science and 

technology experiments for far-term (around 2020) advanced capability deployment 

decisions. 

One of the highest priority capabilities requested by the warfighter community is 

a persistent and precise missile tracking capability. We are requesting $113 million 

in fiscal year 2011 for the Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS) and Near 

Field Infra-Red Experiment satellite operations. This space operations work will 

demonstrate the utility of remote missile tracking from space and reduce the risk 

940 

of integrating the remote tracking data of future satellites into missile defense fire 

control systems. MDA launched two STSS demonstration satellites on 25 September 

2009. We continue testing and operating the two demonstration satellites, including 

cooperative tests with other BMDS elements, and demonstrating these satellites 

against targets of opportunity and scheduled tests involving targets. We are also requesting $67 million in fiscal year 2011 for a new program start, the Precision 

Tracking Space System (PTSS), comprised of a network of remote tracking satellites, communications, and ground stations. Key attributes of the PTSS are its limited mission, uncomplicated design, lower costs, use of mature technologies, and integration with legacy data management and control systems to provide a persistent 

remote missile tracking capability of the areas of the earth that are of most concern 

for missile defense. Lessons learned from the two STSS demonstration satellites currently on orbit will inform decisions on the development of a prototype PTSS capability by the end of 2014. After validating the prototype design in ground testing 

in 2014, we plan to fly the first prototypes while we have industry teams compete 

to produce the remaining satellite constellation for initial constellation operations 

by 2018. 

We are also requesting $112 million for fiscal year 2011 for the development and 

testing of a remotely piloted vehicle (RPV) based missile tracking sensor system, or 

Airborne Infrared (ABIR) sensor system, to track large raids of ballistic missiles 

early in flight. We are completing an analysis of the optimum RPV platform and 

sensors to integrate into an effective early missile tracking system. 

For fiscal year 2011, we are requesting $52 million for C2BMC enhancements to 

develop a net-centric, Service-oriented architecture, to rapidly fuse sensor data and 

provide data to distributed fire control systems to intercept enemy reentry vehicles 

early, optimize shoot-look-shoot opportunities, and economize the number of interceptors required to defeat a raid of threat missiles. We are pursuing enhanced 

C2BMC capabilities and experiments to integrate interceptor fire control systems 

with ABIR, STSS, and other new sensor technologies. We work closely with 

STRATCOM and the COCOMs to develop and deliver the optimum C2BMC architectures in their regions. 

We are requesting $41 million in fiscal year 2011 to develop components that increase the speed of our SM–3 family of interceptors with advanced divert capability, 

faster boosters, and lighter kill vehicles. We are studying the use of a derivative 

SM–3 IB kill vehicle and derivatives of the first and second stages of the SM–3 IIA 

interceptor as part of the development of the SM–3 IIB long-range missile interceptor. 

We are requesting $99 million for fiscal year 2011 to conduct continued research 

on high energy lasers. This past year we saw the significant accomplishments of the 

Airborne Laser Test Bed (ALTB) as it completed preparatory tests which ultimately 

led to two successful and historic experimental shoot-downs of a solid rocket on February 3, 2010, and a boosting, liquid-fueled, Foreign Material Acquisition (FMA) target on February 11, 2010. We are preparing for another test against an FMA, at 

nearly twice the distance, later this spring. We will continue to investigate multiple 

high energy laser technologies to characterize their performance while validating 

the modeling and simulation of long range directed energy beam propagation and 

beam control. Additionally, we are currently supporting the USD(AT&L)/Director for 

Development, Research, and Engineering (DDR&E) comprehensive review of all 

DOD high energy laser programs to establish a department wide program for developing and applying high energy laser capabilities. We anticipate this review will define the ALTB’s role in the future development of high energy lasers. 

DEVELOP NEW, FISCALLY SUSTAINABLE CAPABILITIES OVER THE LONG TERM

MDA’s preferred approach to developing new missile defense capabilities is to 

evolve and upgrade existing capabilities to leverage the cost-effectiveness of utilizing 

existing Service training, personnel and logistics infrastructures. The fiscal sustainability of missile defense systems is largely determined by the cost of operations and 

sustainment. Therefore, MDA executes ‘‘hybrid management’’ of projects with the 

designated lead Services by embedding ‘‘Service cells’’ in MDA joint project offices 

to make design and development decisions associated with Doctrine, Organization, 

Training, Leadership, Personnel, and Facilities to assure MDA products efficiently 

align with Service processes and operational concepts. 

MDA has established six baselines (cost, schedule, technical, test, contract, and 

operational baselines) to plan and manage the execution of missile defense projects. 

I approve the baselines of technology programs, but jointly approve with lead Service Acquisition Executives the baselines of MDA projects in product development. 

These baselines not only assist in our cost-effective management of MDA projects, 

941 

but also provide visibility to the MDEB and Congress on the progress of our execution. The baselines of all of our projects are established in spring and will be submitted to Congress in a Baseline Acquisition Report (BAR) in June. Finally, these 

baselines will form the basis for USD(AT&L) production decisions. 

EXPAND INTERNATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE COOPERATION

As stated in the BMDR and Quadrennial Defense Review, a key strategic goal is 

to develop the missile defense capacity of our international partners. We are currently engaged in missile defense projects, studies and analysis with over 20 countries. Our largest international partnership is with Japan. We are co-developing the 

SM–3 IIA missile, studying future architectures, and supporting their SM–3 IA 

flight test program. In Europe, we are participating in the NATO Active Layer Theater Ballistic Missile Defense command and control program and war games, continuing technology research projects with the Czech Republic, and planning for the 

European PAA deployments, which include the installation of Aegis Ashore sites, 

one each in Romania and Poland. Collaboration with Israel has grown to involve the 

development and deployment of the Arrow Weapon System, which is interoperable 

with the U.S. missile defense system. MDA has completed and the United States 

is now in the final negotiation of an Upper Tier Project Agreement with Israel for 

cooperative development of an exo-atmospheric interceptor and amending the U.S.- 

Israel Arrow Weapon System Improvement Program agreement to extend the system’s battle space and enhance its ability to defeat long-range ballistic missiles and 

countermeasures. MDA and Israel are also jointly developing the David’s Sling 

Weapon System to defend against shorter-range threats, to include some ranges 

that the PAC–3 system cannot engage. Additionally, MDA is active in supporting 

the Combatant Commands through international symposiums, bilateral and multilateral dialogs, planning, and analysis with Allies and international partners to help 

them understand the benefits of integrated missile defense in their regions. 

CONCLUSION

Missile defense is a key part of our national security strategy described in the 

BMDR to counter the growing threat of ballistic missile proliferation. The New 

START treaty has no constraints on current and future components of the BMDS 

development or deployment. Article V, Section 3 of the treaty prohibits the conversion of ICBM or Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) launchers to missile 

defense launchers, and vice versa, while ‘‘grandfathering’’ the five former ICBM silos 

at Vandenberg AFB already converted for Ground Based Interceptors. MDA never 

had a plan to convert additional ICBM silos at Vandenberg and intends to hedge 

against increased BMDS requirements by completing construction of Missile Field 

2 at Fort Greely. Moreover, we determined that if more interceptors were to be 

added at Vandenberg AFB, it would be less expensive to build a new GBI missile 

field (which is not prohibited by the treaty). Regarding SLBM launchers, some time 

ago we examined the concept of launching missile defense interceptors from submarines and found it an unattractive and extremely expensive option. As the committee knows, we have a very good and significantly growing capability for seabased missile defense on Aegis-capable ships. 

Relative to the recently expired START Treaty, the New START treaty actually 

reduces constraints on the development of the missile defense program. Unless they 

have New-START accountable first stages (which we do not plan to use), our targets 

will no longer be subject to START constraints, which limited our use of air-to-surface and waterborne launches of targets which are essential for the cost-effective 

testing of missile defense interceptors against MRBM and IRBM targets in the Pacific area. In addition, under New START, we will no longer be limited to five space 

launch facilities for target launches. 

MDA is working with the combatant commanders, Services, other DOD agencies, 

academia, industry and international partners to address the challenges and difficulties of managing, developing, testing and fielding new military capabilities to 

deter use of ballistic missiles and effectively destroy them once launched. Implementing these warfighter priorities takes time, since the production time for a missile and radar is over 2 years and establishing and training a unit to create and 

deploy a military capability takes an additional year. Our fiscal year 2011 budget 

funds the warfighters’ near-term priorities while building the foundation of a layered defense system with our partners and friends that can provide an adaptive, 

cost-effective strategy to counter ballistic missile proliferation in the future. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to answering your questions. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, General. 

942 

Admiral Macy. 

STATEMENT OF RADM ARCHER M. MACY, JR., USN, DIRECTOR, 

JOINT INTEGRATED AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE ORGANIZATION, AND DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR FORCE PROTECTION, J– 

8, THE JOINT STAFF 

Admiral MACY. Thank you, Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, 

distinguished members of this committee. I appreciate the opportunity to discuss missile defense and the roles and functions of the 

JIAMDO with you. I have submitted written testimony for the committee and I would like to take a few minutes to summarize the 

key points. 

The JIAMDO is a small group of military and government civilian personnel that supports the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff (CJCS), the Joint Staff, and the combatant commanders. Our 

mission is to identify and coordinate joint requirements for air defense, cruise missile defense, and BMD to support development of 

solutions for the warfighter. 

Key tasks for my organization include: advocating for the 

warfighter’s desired air and missile defense capabilities; providing 

air and missile defense subject matter expertise and advice to the 

CJCS, and to the Commander of STRATCOM; facilitating combatant command and service collaborative efforts to identify and develop operational concepts, joint requirements, system interoperability, and operational architectures; developing and maintaining 

an air and missile defense road map; and finally, assessing and 

validating integrated air and missile defense capabilities. 

Our manning is tailored to provide current operational expertise 

in air and missile defense and is drawn from across the services. 

Our staff officers include Air Force E–3 AWACS air battle management specialists, Army Patriot surface-to-air missile officers, Navy 

Aegis surface warfare officers, and Marine Corps fighter pilots. The 

background and experience of these military personnel provide 

them operational credibility and standing when discussing requirements with the warfighter and enables them to translate operational needs into requirements documents, analysis and study activities, and demonstrations. It also provides a pool of experts to 

support the CJCS in the development of policies and programs for 

the warfighter. 

JIAMDO provides the CJCS with direct input and assessment on 

combatant command air and missile defense needs and options on 

how to meet those needs. JIAMDO is very focused on ensuring 

DOD is delivering capabilities that support combatant command 

operational plans and that address their air and missile defense 

gaps. We are an important conduit for the combatant commanders 

to get their air and missile defense needs into DOD. We have liaison personnel at Central Command, European Command, 

STRATCOM, Joint Forces Command, Pacific Command, Northern 

Command, NORAD, U.S. Forces Korea, and U.S. Forces Japan, and 

we support the STRATCOM in their role as the air and missile defense integrating authority. 

JIAMDO applies its extensive air and missile defense expertise, 

operational analysis capabilities, and Pentagon process knowledge 

943 

to serve as a link between the combatant commands and the joint 

and Service staffs. 

JIAMDO has been positioned by the CJCS to be at the intersection of the requirements processes for air defense and BMD and to 

act as an integration mechanism for harmonizing both common and 

differing needs across multiple services, platforms, and systems. 

Some recent and upcoming activities highlight this. During the 

BMDR, I was one of the three directors of the review and two of 

my senior officers served as co-chairs of the programmatic, process, 

and execution working groups, and requirements teams. 

JIAMDO also recently completed a BMD inventory analysis, the 

Joint Capability Mix (JCM) Study, as alluded to by the chairman. 

This was a STRATCOM requested study to determine the 

warfighter’s requirement for upper tier interceptors. Working with 

the combatant commands, the Services, and MDA, JIAMDO was 

able to quantify how many interceptors were needed and the effect 

those numbers had on warfighting capability. It is important to emphasize that this was not a unilateral effort by JIAMDO and in 

fact would not have been possible without the support, input, and 

participation of the MDA and the combatant commands. 

With the advent of the PAA for missile defense, we are embarking on a new round of analysis to understand the implications of 

that decision on our needs for sensors, weapons, and systems. The 

PAA concept will affect each combatant commander differently and 

each will have their own requirements for accomplishing their 

BMD responsibilities. In order to integrate these needs, we are undertaking a new round of analysis, the JCM–3 study. This is in its 

initial stages and we are targeting completion for about this time 

next year. 

Finally, as the Director of JIAMDO, I am the U.S. representative 

to the NATO Air Defense Committee and am responsible for addressing air and missile defense-related issues in NATO and for 

drafting and coordinating U.S. positions. In this role I recently had 

the privilege of working with the NATO staff and member countries to discuss the application of the PAA in Europe and the potential for regional missile defense capability in the NATO context. 

I should also note that I had the opportunity to observe yesterday when the North Atlantic Council was briefed on the PAA in 

Europe by the Vice CJCS, General Cartwright. 

In conclusion, developing the right capability for the warfighter 

is a challenging task. JIAMDO is a unique organization positioned 

and manned to meet this challenge and to support joint and coalition air and missile defense. 

Thank you for your time and I look forward to answering your 

questions. 

[The prepared statement of Admiral Macy follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY RADM ARCHER M. MACY, USN 

Thank you, Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, and distinguished members of the 

committee. I appreciate the opportunity to testify. It is an honor and pleasure to 

join Dr. Miller, Mr. Gilmore, and Lieutenant General O’Reilly to discuss missile defense and the roles and functions of the Joint Integrated Air and Missile Defense 

Organization. 

The Joint Integrated Air and Missile Defense Organization is a small group of 30 

military and government civilian personnel with support staff that supports the 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Joint Staff, and the combatant comVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:37 May 06, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00949 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\62155.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
944 

manders. Our mission is to identify and coordinate joint requirements to support efforts to develop air defense, cruise missile defense, and ballistic missile defense solutions for the warfighter. Key tasks for the organization are: 

Advocating for warfighter’s desired air and missile defense capabilities within the 

requirements and budgeting processes. 

Providing air and missile defense subject matter expertise and advice to the 

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff and Commander U.S. Strategic Command 

(STRATCOM). 

Facilitating combatant command and Service collaborative efforts to identify and 

develop operational concepts, joint requirements, system interoperability, and operational architectures. 

Developing and maintaining an air and missile defense roadmap to correlate capabilities to weapons systems and track progress towards delivering those capabilities 

to the warfighter. 

Assessing and validating integrated air and missile defense capabilities by means 

of simulations, technology demonstrations, and wargames. 

JOINT INTEGRATED AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE ORGANIZATION

These are challenging activities that will be discussed in more detail, but I want 

to provide some background on how Joint Integrated Air and Missile Defense Organization (JIAMDO) is structured. We are a Chairman Controlled Activity that functions within the Joint Staff. Chairman Controlled Activities are specialized organizations designed to address unique, overarching areas that are of joint interest. 

JIAMDO’s manning is tailored to provide current operational expertise in air and 

missile defense and is drawn from across the Services, and in our case is primarily 

from air and missile defense specialties. Some, examples are: Air Force E–3 AWACS 

air battle management specialist, Army Patriot surface-to-air missile officers, Navy 

Aegis Surface Warfare Officers, Marine Corps F/A–18 fighter pilot. The background 

and experience of these military experts allows them to relate at an operational 

level with the warfighter and enables them to translate operational needs into requirements documents, analysis and study activities, and demonstrations. It also 

provides an unequaled pool of experts to support the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff 

in the development of policies and programs for the warfighter. JIAMDO reports to 

the Chairman through the Joint Staff Director for Force Structure, Resources, and 

Assessment (Joint Staff J–8). 

Originally the organization was focused on addressing air and missile defense 

within a single theater of operations. However, the theater ballistic missile threat 

is evolving and one of its principal characteristics is increasing range, which enables 

a threat country to attack targets thousands of miles away. This attack could be 

crossing through one or more combatant commanders’ area of operations or Theaters, which has made the term ‘‘Theater’’ missile defense obsolete. Because of this, 

the decision was made to change the name of the organization to the Joint ‘‘Integrated’’ Air and Missile Defense Organization. This reflected several factors. First, 

was the Department’s overall shift to address the emergence of longer range ballistic missile threats. Second, it recognized the desire to more closely integrate air 

defense capabilities with ballistic missile defense capabilities. Third, it helped align 

the organization to support STRATCOM, which as a result of the changing air and 

missile defense environment had been assigned the task to synchronize planning for 

global missile defense. 

JOINT INTEGRATED AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE

Before continuing, I want to take a moment to provide a brief summary of what 

we mean by the air and missile defense concept that we support. Joint Integrated 

Air and Missile Defense is defined as the integration of capabilities and overlapping 

operations to defend the Homeland and U.S. national interests, protect the Joint 

Force, and enable freedom of action by negating an adversary’s ability to achieve 

adverse effects from their air and missile capabilities. This capability provides full 

spectrum dominance against aerial threats—space-based, and ballistic missile reentry vehicles; intercontinental through short-range ballistic missiles; cruise missiles; manned and unmanned aircraft; rockets, artillery, and mortars (RAM). The 

Protection extends from the Homeland, through friendly nations and coalition partners in a region, and within areas of military operations. 

The key enabling factors for integrated air and missile defense include the abilities to provide a battle space picture in which the commander is confident of it’s 

accuracy and completeness; that key intercept systems and shooters have the same 

high quality picture; that we can defend a broader area through mutually supporting, joint, interoperable forces; that we can increase the commander’s confidence 

945 

of successful engagement; and, that the commander has the flexibility to rapidly 

shift resources to best focus their effects on the adversary. 

JIAMDO AS PART OF THE JOINT STAFF

JIAMDO is the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff cadre of experts on air and missile 

defense. One of the duties of the Director, JIAMDO is to serve as the Deputy Director for Force Protection on the Joint Staff. In this function, the Director is responsible for overseeing the full scope of force protection activities in the capabilities development processes including those for air and missile defense. JIAMDO provides 

the Chairman direct input and assessments on combatant command air and missile 

defense needs that are put forward in their Integrated Priority Lists. Options on 

how to address those needs are developed in conjunction with the Services, and 

JIAMDO tracks the recommended courses of action from approval through the budgeting process to fielding. 

Weapon system fielding is another area where JIAMDO works critical issues in 

support of the Chairman. The fielding plan for new missile defense systems developed by MDA identified a need for the department to develop a process to transition 

and transfer those systems from MDA to the Services. JIAMDO worked closely with 

Service staffs and MDA to develop business rules and processes to handle this, and 

was the lead to take the new process to the JROC for approval. 

The most recent example of support to the Chairman was during the Ballistic 

Missile Defense Review (BMDR). JIAMDO had four key roles in the BMDR. The Director, JIAMDO, was one of the directors of the review; other JIAMDO personnel 

served as co-chair of the Programmatic Process & Execution Working Group, led the 

Requirements issue team, and served in the directorate of activities. In short, 

JIAMDO played a central role in the development of the BMDR. 

THE AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE INTEGRATING AUTHORITY

In July 2008, STRATCOM was designated the Air and Missile Defense Integrating Authority (AMD IA) and directed to serve as the combatant commands’ representative for air and missile defense. This was an outgrowth of STRATCOM’s ballistic missile defense role where they are the warfighter voice to MDA. JIAMDO’s 

role was also expanded at this time to include support to STRATCOM in the AMD 

IA capacity. This is a natural synergy where JIAMDO is able to apply its more extensive air and missile defense expertise and capabilities process knowledge to support the AMD IA. In addition to serving as a link between STRATCOM and the 

Joint and Service staffs, and facilitating meetings, document staffing, and briefings, 

JIAMDO also provides operational expertise and analytic support. This will be critical as the Department evolves the Prioritized Capabilities List, currently how ballistic missile requirements are documented for MDA, to encompass the full scope of 

air and missile defense. The expanded Prioritized Capability List will provide transparency and insight for developers in the Services for air defense, and in MDA for 

missile defense. It will also provide a common requirements view for senior decision 

makers. 

JIAMDO AND THE COMBATANT COMMANDS

A key part of our contribution is advocacy for combatant commands. JIAMDO is 

very focused on ensuring the Department is delivering capabilities that support 

combatant command Operational Plans and that address their air and missile defense gaps. The principal avenues used to coordinate the warfighters needs are the 

capability gap assessments and through a liaison program. 

The capability gap assessment is an annual Department process to address the 

combatant commands’ critical warfighting capability gaps in their Integrated Priority Lists or IPLs that identify risk in accomplishing their specific Unified Command Plan missions. Integration and assessment of air and missile defense inputs 

from the IPLs are the responsibility of JIAMDO. Through direct action officer level 

discussions with combatant command staffs we coalesce similar inputs from multiple combatant commands into what we call synthesized gaps. At this point 

JIAMDO begins a detailed cross-walk of gaps to current and planned programs, assesses the ongoing efforts to close or mitigate those gaps, and provides a balanced 

approach to recommend programmatic and/or non-programmatic solutions to close 

or mitigate remaining gaps against available resources. 

Again, through discussions with combatant command staffs we query them as to 

whether the plan fully meets their needs, partially satisfies it, or does not meet it 

at all, and carry that position forward in Department discussions and reviews. We 

also use our relationship with the combatant commands to gain insight into how to 

quantify the risk for those gaps that are not fully satisfied. JIAMDO then prepares 

946 

a formal briefing for the JROC that addresses how the gaps are being met, or recommendations on how to address them, which in some cases means accepting risk. 

As is true throughout this process, JIAMDO coordinates directly with the combatant 

command staffs on all recommendations. 

From this point forward the coordination becomes more formal. The Director of 

JIAMDO will accompany members of the Joint Staff, Services, and OSD on several 

trips to the combatant command headquarters. The first trip occurs after the JROC 

is briefed to ensure combatant commands understand and agree with the plan to 

address their gaps. For this trip JIAMDO will brief the consolidated gaps and recommended mitigation for the combatant command’s gaps from the synthesized 

group and specifically match it to planned actions. On a follow-on trip, the Vice 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Director of JIAMDO will go to individual Combatant Commanders and provide a forum to more closely examine plans 

to mitigate that command’s gaps and provide an opportunity to address other pressing concerns. This close coordination and contact from the action office level up to 

the Flag level is the way we meet our advocacy responsibilities and in my opinion 

the key to successful capabilities development. This direct and repeated contact with 

the combatant commands enables the Department to understand the full impact of 

its decisions on the warfighter. 

In addition to JIAMDO’s role in the joint staff capabilities processes, we have liaison personnel at CENTCOM, EUCOM, STRATCOM, JFCOM, PACOM, 

NORTHCOM, NORAD, USFK, and USFJ. The liaison provides a direct link between JIAMDO and the combatant commands. The liaisons are located within the 

combatant command headquarters staffs, and work air and missile defense day-today issues for both the hosting command and JIAMDO. In many cases they serve 

as both liaison and as the command’s expert on joint air and missile defense. The 

ability to leverage direct combatant command input on key issues, as well as analysis and wargaming inputs, enables all of our activities to maintain a warfighting 

focus. This relationship has served both the combatant commands and JIAMDO 

well, and provides a responsive and accurate avenue to gain answers to immediate 

inquiries within the Department of Defense. 

JIAMDO IN THE REQUIREMENTS PROCESS

With that background, I would like to move on to discussing what JIAMDO’s role 

is in the Department requirements processes. Meeting the challenges of countering 

air and missile threats is inherently a joint activity that requires not just the participation of assets from all our Services, but coherently integrated employment of 

those assets. Similarly, the proper development of requirements and weapon systems depends on the participation of all our Services, combatant commanders, and 

key Agencies. JIAMDO serves at the intersection of the requirements processes for 

air defense and for ballistic missile defense, and acts to integrate and harmonize 

both their common and differing needs across multiple services, platforms, and systems. 

The Joint Capabilities Integrated Development System (JCIDS) is the Department process used for air defense requirements and JIAMDO is at the hub of this 

process. I chair the first level of formal review and approval in JCIDS, and my deputy runs the joint working group that directs and vets analysis and requirements. 

As I mentioned earlier, JIAMDO also supports STRATCOM as AMD IA in their development of the Prioritized Capability List, which is MDA’s equivalent of JCIDS. 

JIAMDO’s alignment with the AMD IA positions us to fully examine employment 

and development interdependencies between ballistic missile defense and air defense, and explore the potential for innovative cross-utilization of technologies. In 

effect, JIAMDO serves as a bridge between the Department’s capabilities development process and the PCL process and enables the warfighter’s needs to remain as 

the focus of both those activities 

This is why JIAMDO is manned with air and missile defense operational personnel and positioned within the joint staff. These unique attributes, and the growing linkage between JCIDS and the PCL allows us to understand what is needed 

for the joint fight, and recognize opportunities to leverage capabilities across the air 

and missile defense mission area. 

THE INTEGRATED AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE ROADMAP AND OPERATIONAL

ARCHITECTURE

One of the techniques central to achieving the vision of integrated air and missile 

defense (IAMD), in the practical landscape of budgets, technology and time, is the 

Integrated Air and Missile Defense Roadmap, which supports the IAMD Operational 

Architecture. JIAMDO works with STRATCOM, the Combatant Commands, and the 

947 

Services, to develop the roadmap as a culmination activity where the hardware 

needed to meet operational concepts, architectures, and requirements is brought together to provide a moving snapshot of progress toward meeting warfighter needs. 

Getting to this point requires significant effort in many areas. It begins by bringing 

the Services and combatant commands to agreement at the macro level on what the 

air and missile defense problems are, now and in the future, and what the desired 

end state is. An Operational Concept does that. Through a process of joint meetings 

and discussions, and iterative written drafts, a document is developed that describes 

the end state of joint air and missile defense employment and shortfalls that must 

be overcome to reach it. That concept forms the basis for developing an operational 

architecture which in essence is a hierarchical listing of mission tasks that must be 

accomplished to execute air and missile defense. The Operational Architecture provides a common lexicon and conceptual structure that can be used across the Services to delineate what tasks a specific weapon systems must be capable of based on 

its role in the air and missile defense mission. The architecture does not specify 

what equipment should be used to conduct a task, only what tasks must be completed to enable joint employment. It is a necessary first step in order to develop 

the systems architecture which does specify the hardware and software that will be 

used for each task. This assortment of documents provides the necessary framework 

and structure the Services need to be able to build joint systems that enable the 

warfighter to have a plug and fight capability across the Services. 

The following example may help explain this process. Today’s surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) have very long fly-out ranges. In order to engage a target the SAM 

needs a radar to detect and track that target and provide tracking information to 

the missile. Historically, SAMs have their own organic radar positioned side by side 

with it, like the Patriot and Aegis weapon systems. Unfortunately, that means that 

in many cases, and especially for low altitude targets, the SAM’s fly-out range is 

well beyond where its organic radar can see. To regain that lost range, another 

radar that is closer to the target can be used as a surrogate for the SAM’s organic 

radar. The closer radar, which can be airborne and from another Service, digitally 

replaces the SAM’s organic radar track. The SAM is now able to fly-out to its maximum range. One of the desired end states in the current operational concept is to 

be able to have an Army radar provide the target tracking data to a Navy SAM to 

engage low altitude cruise missiles beyond the Navy radar’s line of sight. However, 

before that happens there must be agreement that there is a need (Requirement) 

for this capability against low altitude threats; the idea of jointly engaging needs 

to be described in operational terms (Operational Concept); a list of tasks to be executed must be determined and documented (Operational Architecture); and identification of what hardware and software is needed must be compiled (Systems Architecture). The lynchpin in the process is developing it all jointly so that regardless 

of which Service the SAM or radar is from the capability is there to complete the 

engagement. 

We have found that using a roadmap is the best method to bring these disparate 

but related pieces of information together. In close coordination with the Services 

and combatant commands, we have built an IAMD Roadmap which identifies a way 

forward for developing, and ultimately fielding, joint capabilities described in the 

operational concept/architecture. The purpose of IAMD Roadmaps is to enhance senior leader abilities to make better-informed and timely decisions. The Roadmap examines capabilities of the Service’s individual systems within a Family-of-Systems 

context and projects how these systems will contribute to achieving desired Joint 

capabilities. Specifically, the JROC-approved IAMD Roadmap Version 3 defined Air 

and Cruise Missile Defense (ACMD) capabilities that will enable the warfighter to 

employ Service specific and Joint IAMD capabilities within an integrated Joint Engagement Zone. Additionally, Version 3 addresses the Wide Area Air Surveillance 

(WAAS) challenges for the defense of the Homeland against air and cruise missile 

threats and includes a Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Appendix. Further, IAMD 

Roadmap Version 3 made recommendations which influenced Program Review (PR)– 

11 studies and will inform Program Objective Memorandum (POM)–12 budget planning. The JROC accepted the Roadmap recommendations for action and requested 

that JIAMDO return to the JROC to provide an update on the status of those recommendations, an assessment of kill chains that cross Service lines, and Service implementation of IAMD Roadmap in POM–12. Future IAMD Roadmaps will be developed in time to support budget decisions and influence guidance for developing the 

force. 

The Department has documented the operational needs for air defense in Joint 

Capability Documents and in the Prioritized Capabilities List for ballistic missile 

defense, and JIAMDO has published the Operational Concept and Operational ArVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:37 May 06, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00953 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\62155.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
948 

chitecture. A System Architecture as well as the next version of the Integrated Air 

and Missile Defense Roadmap is in development. 

ASSESSING OPERATIONAL ARCHITECTURES AND OPERATING CONCEPTS

A concurrent responsibility for the Joint Integrated Air and Missile Defense Organization is assessing and validating operational concepts and architectures, and 

helping combatant commands and Services define and refine requirements. This is 

performed primarily through studies and analyses and modeling and simulation. 

Study activities vary from inventory analysis to examinations of surveillance coverage and options for various mixes of surveillance sensors. A ballistic missile defense study is illustrative of this area. JIAMDO recently completed an inventory 

analysis, Joint Capability Mix (JCM) Study, in support of STRATCOM. They had 

requested a study to determine what the warfighter requirement was for upper tier 

interceptors for ballistic missile defense. The information was needed to support production and budget decisions. Working with the combatant commands, the Services, 

and the Missile Defense Agency (MDA), JIAMDO was able to quantify how many 

interceptors were needed and the affect on warfighter capability. The results were 

used to support recent programming decisions on missile defense. It is important 

to emphasize that this was not a unilateral effort by JIAMDO, and in fact would 

not have been possible without the support, input, and participation of the MDA 

and all the combatant commands. 

With the advent of the Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA) for missile defense, we 

are embarking on a new round of analysis to understand the implications of that 

decision on our needs for sensors, weapons and systems. The PAA concept will be 

applied in the different areas of responsibility of the combatant commanders, and 

each will have their own needs for how to accomplish their ballistic missile defense 

responsibilities. In order to integrate these needs across the Department, we are the 

initial stages of conducting the next round of analysis in this area with JCM–3, 

which we are targeting for completion about this time next year. I have included 

a graphic on the Senior Review Group of the study to illustrate the inclusive approach we use for our analysis. 

Modeling, simulation, and wargames are also used for analysis. A centerpiece of 

JIAMDO’s analysis is the Nimble Fire modeling and simulation activity. Nimble 

Fire is a U.S. classified operator-in-the-loop simulation where Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, and Army operational personnel come together to execute joint air and 

missile defense missions. The events are structured to allow operational personnel 

to employ as they deem appropriate and the data we obtain is used to define and 

refine capability gaps, requirements, concepts, and in some instances employment 

techniques. It is a fully functional joint architecture capable of executing current 

and future concepts with operationally representative positions for Aegis, Patriot, 

AWACS, E–2, F/A–18, F–15, F–22, and JLENS among others. The simulation can 

conduct distributed operations to U.S. and overseas military locations and annually 

executes a combined air, cruise missile, ballistic missile defense event in conjunction 

with MDA’s Missile Defense Integrated Operations Center simulation at Colorado 

Springs. Analysis events are based on combatant command war plans and routinely 

have participants from the commands in the operational positions. Results are outbriefed to the combatant command as well as the Services and agencies. Nimble 

Fire is a one of a kind capability that has proven to be invaluable in analyzing concepts and requirements. 

Two of the premier ballistic missile defense wargames, Nimble Titan, and the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) Wargame, are not conducted by JIAMDO, but 

JIAMDO provides analytical support and coordinates combatant command participation and input. Nimble Titan is sponsored by STRATCOM and led by the Joint 

Force Component Command, Integrated Missile Defense (JFCC IMD). It is a policy 

and military wargame designed to assess and evaluate coalition and allied participation in missile defense. U.S. and international missile defense experts from both 

ministries of foreign affairs and ministries of defense take part in the events. Eight 

nations currently participate with more countries to be added in 2012. Insights from 

these wargames allow the U.S. and its partners to identify potential policy and military issues such as command and control, information sharing, and coalition decision making. 

The BMDS Wargame, sponsored by the MDA, is a U.S. only classified tactical 

level simulation that brings together warfighters and developers to work collaboratively to examine how to fight the future ballistic missile defense system. This 

wargame explores areas such as shot doctrine, sensor control, interceptor inventory 

management, and force employment. JIAMDO provides development, planning, execution, and analytic support for these wargames. We also leverage findings from 

949 

these events to support other analyses, and used the shot doctrine developed during 

the BMDS wargame in the models for the JCM studies. 

JIAMDO AND THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION (NATO)

Closely associated with combatant command relationships are the NATO responsibilities of JIAMDO. The Director, JIAMDO is the U.S. Representative to the 

NATO Air Defense Committee. In this role the Director is responsible for addressing 

air and missile defense related issues in NATO. The Director drafts U.S. positions 

for NATO, and coordinates them with other U.S. stakeholders. The Director’s 

unique position allows insight into policy and military issues from both a U.S. and 

coalition point of view, and enables JIAMDO to understand and address tactical 

level integration of coalition partners in analysis and studies, and during the development of employment concepts. In this regard I have had the privilege of working 

with the NATO staff and appearing before the North Atlantic Council to discuss the 

application of the Phased Adaptive Approach in Europe and the potential for regional missile defense capability in a NATO context. 

CONCLUSION

In my opinion JIAMDO is uniquely and correctly positioned and manned to provide the kind of support the Department needs to meet the President’s air and missile defense objectives. The Department has recognized that air and missile defense 

is a complex mission area and has committed to joint warfighting. JIAMDO is part 

of that commitment and we are working hard to ensure that warfighter needs are 

met. Thank you for your time, and I look forward to answering your questions. 

Chairman LEVIN. Admiral, thank you very much. 

Let’s have an 8-minute first round for questioning. 

Secretary Miller, you outlined the four phases over the next decade for the PAA, so I’m not going to go into that in more detail. 

But I am going to be asking you, General O’Reilly, to go through 

some of the reasons why the military uniformly supported it. I’m 

going to just tell you what I understand the advantages of the new 

system are and then see if you agree. You outlined some of them, 

but I don’t think it was as comprehensive as it could be, so let me 

go through them. 

First, does the new plan, the PAA, provide protection 5 years 

sooner than the old plan? In other words, the old plan would have 

been deployed around 2017, I understand, while the new system 

will be deployed starting in 2011. Is that true? 

Dr. MILLER. Yes, Senator. We would estimate 5 to 6 years earlier. 

Chairman LEVIN. Okay, doctor, you can chime in. If either of you 

have a different answer on this let me know. 

Second, the new plan protects the most vulnerable areas first. 

The old system would not have provided any protection for Southeastern NATO Europe, the portions that are currently within range 

of Iranian missiles. The new plan starts by protecting the areas 

that are currently within range of existing Iranian missiles. Is that 

true? 

Dr. MILLER. That’s correct. 

Chairman LEVIN. Third, the new plan protects all of NATO Europe by 2018, and will provide additional protection to the United 

States with phase four in the 2020 timeframe, unlike the old system, which never would have covered more than 70 to 75 percent 

of NATO Europe. Is that true? 

Dr. MILLER. That’s right. 

Chairman LEVIN. General? 

General O’REILLY. Yes, sir. 

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Chairman LEVIN. Fourth, the old plan, with 10 interceptors in 

Poland, could have been overwhelmed with just 5 Iranian missiles 

or more. The new system, with many SM–3 interceptors at sea and 

on land and the potential for adding more with a naval surge, could 

handle many more Iranian missiles of all ranges. 

Dr. MILLER. Yes, sir, that’s correct. 

Chairman LEVIN. General? 

General O’REILLY. Yes, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. Next, the old system only defended against 

longer-range Iranian missile threats, which Iran does not yet have. 

The new system starts with capability against existing threats, but 

then adds capability against future threats. Is that true, doctor? 

Dr. MILLER. Yes, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. General? 

General O’REILLY. Sir, the old system could be used to defend 

against medium-range ballistic missiles, and that was part of our 

concern. It was a mismatch of our capability versus that mediumrange threat. 

Dr. MILLER. Excuse me, just to amplify on the General’s statement. The old system would not have covered the shorter-range 

systems of 500 kilometers or 1,000 kilometers or under. 

General O’REILLY. Yes. 

Chairman LEVIN. The PAA is a plus in that regard as well? 

General O’REILLY. Yes, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. Dr. Miller, do you agree? You’re shaking your 

head. 

Dr. MILLER. Yes, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. Finally, the old system was a fixed-site system 

that could not be moved to adapt to a changing threat. The new 

system is inherently flexible and adaptable. The Aegis BMD ships 

can move quickly. The land-based SM–3 sites can be relocated 

within about 4 months if a changed threat warranted it. Is that 

correct? 

General O’REILLY. Yes, sir. 

Dr. MILLER. Yes, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. Now, the baselines. General, you talked about 

I think six baselines for acquisition, including cost, schedule, performance, testing. One of the issues here, which Senator McCain 

raised, has to do with some of the problems that we have because 

of the cost-plus contracts that have been given in this area and 

some of the losses that we’ve suffered as a result of not being able 

to go after a contractor for defects. He listed one of the major defects which has recently been clear. You mentioned, General, that you used the figure $37 billion. 

You’re looking through that number of potential contract awards to 

see where competition can be used more often. That, of course, is 

one way to keep costs down. But we’re going to need to have some 

kind of warranties against defects, it seems to me. Right now, 

we’ve lost tens of millions of dollars, more than that, hundreds of 

millions of dollars, based on small defects, which means that systems were presented to us that did not do the job that they were 

supposed to do. 

I’m just wondering whether or not, in addition to looking for 

greater opportunities for competition to reduce the cost, you’re also 

951 

going to be looking for a system which is not as much based on 

cost-plus, but is based on warranties and defects that would have 

to be paid for by the contractors? 

General O’REILLY. Yes, sir. As I review the acquisition strategy for the value of $37 billion of contracts in the next 2 years, that 

is one of the criteria that I review for, is where can we apply both 

fixed-price contracts, which puts the penalty of not delivering a 

fully operational, functional end item on the producer, not only 

that, but also look for defect clauses. 

The problem that I have right now is with a lot of these contracts 

on the developmental side. There was an intent for the government 

and industry to share risk, but that risk we were talking about was 

a developmental risk and risk of technology and new manufacturing processes. Unfortunately, that cost-plus coverage to handle 

those risks limits our ability to enforce the fact when defects occur 

and the contractor is still not liable for those defects because of the 

way the contracts were constructed. 

So yes, sir, we are reviewing the actual construct of each one of 

those contracts. 

Chairman LEVIN. That’s very important to us. We just had the 

reform acquisition law which this committee initiated and promoted, and it was signed by the President. I understand sharing 

risks in the developmental stage. That is clear. You’re not going to 

get too many contractors who are going to be willing to take the 

risk of a new system which is under development. 

That’s very different, however, from producing something with a 

defect in it which is not supposed to be there. It’s a manufacturing 

defect. Something is left out which is supposed to be there. Something is put in the wrong place. That’s not supposed to be a shared 

risk. That’s a failure of manufacturing. 

I’m glad, and I know that Senator McCain raised this point very 

strongly and feels very strongly, and I think all the members of 

this committee do because we’ve been so actively involved in the reform effort here in terms of acquisition. Your determination in this 

area is very important to us. 

Dr. Gilmore, you have some skin in that game as well, and I’m 

sure that this effort that has been described and was part of your 

testimony is also good news for you as well. Is that accurate? 

Dr. GILMORE. That’s correct. The pace of testing now is largely 

limited by the availability of targets. So the sooner that we can get 

reliable targets, the more testing can be done. 

Chairman LEVIN. Dr. Miller, do you want to add anything to that 

issue in terms of cost-plus versus fixed price and getting guarantees, warranties against defective manufacturing? 

Dr. MILLER. Senator, I’ll just say that I agree with the statements of both General O’Reilly and Dr. Gilmore. 

Chairman LEVIN. All right, thank you. 

My time is up. Senator Inhofe is next. 

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I’m going to cover three things pretty quick here. First of all, the 

chairman spent a long time talking about the old system, the new 

system. We’re talking about the third site in Poland, which is one 

that I very strongly supported during that time. Do you agree that 

initially we were talking about having that capability of knocking 

952 

down an ICBM from Iran in the third site originally by 2013? That 

slipped probably to about 2015. Am I generally right there? Actually, originally I think it was 2012, but then it started slipping. 

General O’REILLY. Yes, sir. Then the requirements for ratification of the treaties before we could begin work—to build the missile 

field is 51⁄2 years, another year and a half to integrate it and complete the operational certification by the combatant command in 

Europe. So it was 2017 we reached the point before we could have 

the first operational site. 

Senator INHOFE. Okay. Now, I disagree with that, and I will submit for the record evidence that it would have been 2015. It’s not 

that big a deal, but that’s an opinion that I’m expressing. 

[The information referred to, submitted by Senator Inhofe, follows:] 

The 2007 report by the Department of Defense and the Department of State, Proposed U.S. Missile Defense Assets in Europe, stated that, the proposed European 

interceptor site would include ‘‘up to 10 silo-based long-range interceptors located 

in central Europe (2011–2013).’’ 

[The information referred to, submitted by the Department of Defense, follows:] 

Missile field construction was estimated at 51⁄2 years plus 1 year operational integration. The starting date slipped due to Ballistic Missile Defense Agreement ratification requirements, which moved the operational capability from 2014 to 2017. 

Senator INHOFE. The second thing I want to get out is how this 

treaty affects our ability to protect America, our national missile 

defense system. Dr. Miller, I looked in your written testimony after 

you made a statement and I couldn’t find it, but you said something to the effect that there is no restriction by Russia in terms 

of our ability for a national missile defense system. 

I did find, however, in General O’Reilly’s statement it says that 

‘‘the New START has no constraints on current and future components of the BMD’s development or deployment.’’ Let me just suggest to you that there are a lot of people who disagree with that. 

How do you respond, very briefly, and just take one of you—perhaps, General O’Reilly, you’d be the right one—when you have the 

Russian Defense Minister, Sergei Lavrov, who stated that linkage 

to missile defense is clearly spelled out in the accord and legally 

binding and the Russians will have the right to exit the accord if 

the U.S. is building up a missile defense strategy. 

I also have actually from the unilateral statement by Russia 

where they say the same thing, that yes, they do have that restriction on the United States and it is legally binding. 

Any response to that? 

General O’REILLY. Sir, the DOD General Counsel, the State Department General Counsel, and the National Security Council General Counsel have all advised me that it is not legally binding. 

Senator INHOFE. So that’s us. We’re saying it’s not legally binding, although the Russians say it is legally binding. Does that bother you? 

General O’REILLY. No, sir. 

Senator INHOFE. It bothers me. 

Dr. MILLER. Sir, it’s clear that the Russian unilateral statement 

is not unilaterally binding. But it’s also clear that they have the 

right to withdraw from New START, once ratified and impleVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:37 May 06, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00958 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\62155.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
953 

mented, should they see it in their national security interests. We 

don’t expect that to be the case. 

I would also note that the Russians made a similar statement 

with respect to New START I and concerns about BMD development. 

Senator INHOFE. Yes, I know that. 

Dr. MILLER. The United States then withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. The Russians stayed in START I at that time. 

We can expect them to make decisions that are based on their national interest. 

Senator INHOFE. The third thing that I want to get into the 

record—and there’s not going to be a lot of time to do all this— 

would be the issue that comes out as to when Iran is going to have 

the capability, and we spent a long time looking at this. We know 

that we have GBIs in California. We know we have them in Alaska. We’ve seen the map showing the footprint. Yes, it does reach 

the east coast of the United States barely, and a lot of people have 

said, well, that’s assuming we’re lucky with one shot, and then 

there’s a percentage that’s attached to that. 

I think the previous administration, in talking about the third 

site, felt the same as I do. That that is not a comfort level that I 

feel that I’m enjoying. 

Would anyone like to volunteer as to when you think that the 

Iranians are going to have the capability of sending an ICBM to 

the continental United States? 

Dr. MILLER. Sir, that’s an inherently uncertain question. The 

current estimates, as included in a recent unclassified report submitted by DOD, say that it could potentially be as soon as 2015. 

Senator INHOFE. Okay. I agree with that, and that’s the first 

thing we agree on. 

That being 2015 and the capability as I look at this—and we’ve 

been talking about the old system and the new system. I’m familiar 

with the SM–3 Block I–A, what its capabilities are. That’s 2010, 

that’s now. The Block 1–B, 2015; Block II–Alpha, that would be 

2018, but really to have the capability of a ground-based system 

that would have been in this case in Poland—at one time we were 

talking about doing that in Florida and decided that we wanted to 

have something that would also be defensive for Western Europe, 

and I agreed with that at the time. 

But to get to that you have to have an SM–3 Block II–B, Bravo. 

Does anyone want to venture a guess as to when that II–Bravo 

would be effective, deployable? 

Dr. MILLER. Sir, we estimate that for 2020. If I could briefly add, 

the current planned deployment for the PAA includes the placement of a forward-based radar in Europe in the 2011 timeframe. 

That radar will not only help the defense of Europe. It will also 

help the defense of the United States, and it was indeed the most 

important contribution of the previous architecture. That’s a common element from the past architecture. We moved it forward from 

what we estimated to be 2017 deployment to a 2011 deployment to 

provide that capability for improved national missile defenses earlier. 

Senator INHOFE. It’s my understanding that this 2020 date on 

the phase four is one—do you all stand behind that date? Because 

954 

I don’t. I’ve read a lot of things to the contrary, that there’s not any 

level of certainty to that. Does anyone feel very confident? 

General O’REILLY. Yes, sir. I’ve developed four missile systems. 

This is very feasible. We used very conservative timelines. We’ve 

looked at the technology. I’ve had two independent estimates. I’ve 

asked the Defense Science Board and the Secretary of Defense has 

supported me in an independent assessment of that this year to 

verify—— 

Senator INHOFE. I want you to send me something that is convincing that we would have that by 2020. Now, even if that’s true— 

and I would question that; I do want to see what you have and I 

want to give you the benefit of that doubt, General. But even if 

that’s true, we still have that timeframe between 2015 and 2020 

that is very disturbing to me. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

The 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR) established the goals and 

timelines for the Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA) in Europe. The PAA will build 

on already fielded Ballistic Missile Defense System assets to deploy capability in 

four phases, delivering missile defenses earlier than prior plans for defense of Europe, and will complement the North Atlantic Treaty Organization missile defense 

activities. The BMDR states that, ‘‘under this approach, in Phase 4 (2020 timeframe), an additional capability against a potential ICBM launched from the Middle 

East against the United States will be available. This phase will take advantage of 

an upgrade to the Standard Missile-3 (SM–3), the Block IIB.’’ 

The Missile Defense Agency’s (MDA) program and budget documentation supports 

and reflects a 2020 deployment of Phase 4. For example, MDA’s fiscal year 2011 

budget justification documentation states that, ‘‘in the 2020 timeframe, we intend 

to field in Phase 4 more advanced land-based capabilities in Europe using a more 

capable SM–3 Block IIB missile and space sensors to handle large raid sizes.’’ MDA 

requested $40 million in fiscal year 2011 to initiate this effort. 

Additionally, MDA has base-lined the schedule, technical, resource, and contract 

plans that will lead up to a 2020 deployment of the SM-3 Block IIB missile and 

other Phase 4 activities. These plans will be included in the congressionally-mandated Ballistic Missile Defense Accountability Report, which will be completed and 

delivered to the Congressional Defense Committees in June 2010. 

Senator INHOFE. This whole idea on the estimates that we have 

had in the past is a great deal of concern. You’ve heard me say this 

before, because I was there in 1998, in August 1998, when we 

asked the question, when will North Korea have the multiple-stage 

capability. At that time the intelligence estimate, and it came out 

of the White House also, somewhere between 5 and 10 years. That 

was August 24, 1998. Seven days later, August 31, they fired one. 

I’d rather be conservative in our estimates. I have to at least express the opinion of one member of this panel who’s very much disturbed over what could happen to the United States with this 

change in policy. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Inhofe. 

Senator Lieberman. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. 

Let me first thank all of you for the extraordinary work that 

you’ve done. I’ve said this before in previous years, but it’s not so 

long ago that there were a lot of people around here and elsewhere 

who thought that the whole idea of a BMD was really pie in the 

sky, no pun intended, I mean that it just was a ridiculous waste 

of money. I remember people saying, how are you ever going to 

have a bullet that could hit another bullet? Well, you have done it. 

955 

It’s a remarkable technological and management breakthrough, 

and I just don’t think we can thank you enough for it, because it 

has direct relevance to the security of the American people. 

My God, you’ve actually even done a successful test of the Airborne Laser, General O’Reilly. That was thought to be the biggest 

mind trip and waste of money, and yet it holds tremendous potential for giving us a number of capabilities, including hitting missiles in the launch phase, which is probably the best time we’d 

want to hit them. 

So the first thing I wanted to do is thank you for the work you’re 

doing. 

Second, last year in this committee we had a really vigorous debate in light of what many of us thought were excessive cuts in the 

MDA’s budget. I’m really glad that the President has proposed in 

the budget for the coming fiscal year restoring well over $500 million in funding to the MDA. I think that’s a very constructive step 

forward. 

I want to get into some of the discussion that both Senator Levin 

and Senator Inhofe had about the PAA and the two-stage GBI. If 

it’s possible, I find myself agreeing with what Chairman Levin has 

argued are the positive results of the PAA in terms of the defense 

of Europe and the Middle East, our NATO allies, and our allies in 

the Middle East in terms of short- and medium-range missiles 

which Iran has now. 

But I also agree with Senator Inhofe and I share his concerns 

about what we lost when we stopped the change from so-called 

‘‘old’’ to the new approach in terms of the GBI. Last week, General 

Burgess, the head of the Defense Intelligence Agency, was before 

this committee and echoing or paralleling what you said, Dr. Miller. He told us that their estimate was that Iran could have an 

ICBM that could hit the United States by 2015 with foreign assistance. 

When we pressed him on that, he said he was thinking about 

North Korea, and of course it’s quite plausible that North Korea 

would sell Iran such foreign assistance. The problem here is that 

the two-stage GBI was supposed to be done by 2015, maybe 2017, 

as time went on. It’s pretty clear in the exchange between Senator 

Inhofe and yourself that the SM–3 Phase II–B that will be capable 

of hitting a missile fired from Iran to the United States won’t be 

ready until 2020 at best. 

There is a gap there. It’s not a total vulnerability because of 

course we have the missiles in California and Alaska if, God forbid, 

the Iranian missile came over. General O’Reilly, I was pleased that 

the BMDR describes the administration’s commitment to ‘‘continued development and assessment of the two-stage GBI’’ as a hedge 

against the risks that either a threat to the American Homeland 

will develop sooner than expected or the SM–3 program will run 

into currently unanticipated technical challenges. 

I think that’s a very important statement to make because I 

think, as you would I guess agree, the two-stage GBI was a very 

good program, moving in the right direction. 

But here’s my concern. In your testimony you highlighted the upcoming two tests for the two-stage GBI as laid out in MDA’s IMTP. 

But if I’m reading things correctly, I’m concerned that, although 

956 

that pair of tests is scheduled through 2012, no other tests are 

planned until 2016. So quite directly, I’m asking how can the twostage GBI serve as an adequate hedge in the way that I described 

for defense of the Homeland, shoot, look, shoot—shoot from Europe, 

if we miss look, California, Alaska, pick it up? How can the twostage GBI serve as an adequate hedge if it will not be sufficiently 

tested until later in the decade? 

General O’REILLY. Sir, first of all, the two-stage GBI has the 

same components as the three-stage, except the third stage is removed and we have an adapter in there. The actual appearance of 

them, the length, everything, is identical. 

We will test the two-stage GBI in June and that will verify any 

differences between the two-stage and the three-stage GBI. The important part of this interceptor is the kill vehicle itself, and the kill 

vehicle is identical between the two- and three-stage GBI. So our 

choice of when we were testing the two-stage GBI was basically 

driven on what type of environments we wanted to test the kill vehicle in, because we believe after this test in June we will have satisfied any differences between the two and three-stage and literally 

at that point on the performance of a two-stage is directly correlated and identical to the performance of a three-stage, because 

the front end after the first few minutes of flight is identical between the two. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. So you’re saying that the program to develop the SM–3 systems will also facilitate or bring about the realization of the two-stage GBI as a hedge? 

General O’REILLY. The two-stage GBI, as we said, in June we believe will verify any distinctive differences. At that point it’ll be a 

very mature missile, because of the part that’s so key. The development of the SM–3 II–B is a separate, independent activity. If we 

did have a problem with that, another way of achieving a hedge 

against a launch from either North Korea or Iran is to have another shot opportunity from our current missile fields, and that’s 

what a two-stage GBI would provide you. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Current missile fields in Alaska. 

General O’REILLY. Yes, in Alaska. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Yes, I wanted to get to that. 

Let me just come back to the strategy of this. I assume that you 

would agree that the sooner we can have the capability to shoot, 

look, and shoot—that is, shoot at an Iranian or North Korean missile, Iranian particularly, from Europe and then look and see if we 

hit it, and if we don’t, shoot again from California and Alaska—the 

sooner we have that capability, the better? 

General O’REILLY. Yes, sir. 

Dr. MILLER. May I briefly—— 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Yes, go ahead, Dr. Miller. I’d invite you into 

the conversation. 

Dr. MILLER. Thank you very much. I just want to add that if we 

were 100 percent sure that a GBI interceptor would work effectively against this Iranian threat, we wouldn’t have been talking 

about the possibility of a third site. So you’re right that the idea 

of multiple shots is an important element. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. Right. 

957 

Dr. MILLER. What the SM–3 II–B provides is a different phenomenology, because it would have an ascent phase intercept. If 

there’s a problem with the sensor of the GBI, which is common to 

both the two-stage and three-stage, the SM–3 II–B will provide a 

different way to get after that future threat that’s independent and 

in our view a much greater contribution to the overall defense of 

the United States against that threat. 

Senator LIEBERMAN. I think you’re going to increasingly be asked 

about the potential gap here between when Iran has an ICBM and 

when we have the shoot, look, the two opportunities here. So I urge 

you to please be as direct as you need to be with us about what 

you need financially to really develop the two-stage GBI as a 

hedge, including, as you said, General O’Reilly, the potential for 

basing some of those two-stage GBIs in the United States for defense of our Homeland. 

I thank you. My time is up. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Lieberman. 

Senator Thune. 

Senator THUNE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, gentlemen, for your service and for all of your work 

on these important subjects. 

I want to come back, if I can, briefly to some questions that Senator Inhofe had asked with regard to New START. I’m concerned 

that the administration may not fully implement its Phased Adaptive plans for missile defense in Europe or that it may seek to slow 

down that implementation to avoid Russian withdrawal from the 

New START. What types of missile defense activities will the administration avoid to diminish the chances that the Russians will 

withdraw from the New START? 

Dr. MILLER. Senator Thune, this administration has attempted 

to make as clear as possible in the Missile Defense Review and in 

other statements that it will do everything necessary to defend the 

U.S. Homeland, our troops overseas, and to work with our allies 

and partners to defend them as well—full stop. 

Senator THUNE. I know your argument has been that these unilateral agreements, either side can walk away from this thing. But 

there’s certainly an implication that the Russians I think believe 

that there is more to this than what we’re being led to believe. I 

think it’s an important element as we look at this treaty, because 

missile defense plays so heavily in the defense not only of the 

United States, but our allies. 

So that’s something my guess is we’ll continue to pursue. 

Dr. MILLER. Sir, could I add just a brief note on the mathematics 

here? Currently we have 30 GBIs, by the end of this fiscal year, 

that will be deployed. Even with the potential growth in that, consider the difference in that scale relative to the 1550 warheads that 

are allowed under the New START. Whatever the concerns that 

the Russian Federation may have about the future of U.S. missile 

defense, the scale of the defensive capabilities that we have is nowhere near the potential of affecting the stability of the strategic 

deterrence relationship. 

958 

Senator THUNE. I appreciate that. I think sometimes too, though, 

that it gives them an out, a convenient out, an excuse at some 

point in the future. 

But let me ask you, Secretary Miller, if I might. In 2007, I should 

say, the Director of National Assessment—I want to quote for you 

what they said here: ‘‘The individual Russian entities continue to 

provide assistance to Iran’s ballistic missile programs. We judge 

that Russian entity assistance, along with assistance from entities 

in China and North Korea, has helped Iran move towards self-sufficiency in the production of ballistic missiles. The Russian Government has taken steps to improve controls on ballistic missile technology and its record of enforcement, though still mixed, has improved over the decade.’’ 

What level of assistance do you see from Russia today in helping 

Iran develop its ballistic missile capabilities or capacities? 

Dr. MILLER. Sir, I believe that the 2000 assessment still stands, 

but I’d like to take that question for the record and provide a detailed response if I could. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

Moscow is not providing state-to-state assistance to Tehran to further its ballistic 

missile and space launch vehicle research and development efforts. However, Russia’s advanced ballistic missile production infrastructure has technologies that could 

further current and future Iranian goals. Russian-based Iranian defense officials 

and intermediaries have access to Russian academics, companies, and research organizations, and some of these individuals and entities likely assist Iran with technologies that could assist in its ballistic missile programs. Iran is likely attempting 

to obtain Russian expertise in missile guidance systems to improve accuracy, composite structural materials to save weight and increase range, high temperature materials for reentry vehicles, and possibly with more energetic propellants. 

Senator THUNE. This is a follow-up to that one, so I don’t know 

if you want to maybe take this one for the record, too. On Thursday, April 15, there was a Washington Times newspaper article 

that reported that the Central Intelligence Agency’s Weapons Intelligence Nonproliferation Arms Control Center this year linked Chinese companies to missile programs in Iran. Do your missile defense plans take into account longstanding and possible present 

day cooperation and support by Russia and China for Iran’s ballistic missile program? 

Dr. MILLER. Sir, yes, they do, and I will provide more details 

with respect to the Chinese side of that equation as well for the 

record. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

Beijing is not providing state-to-state assistance to Tehran to further its ballistic 

missile and space launch vehicle research and development efforts, but Chinese individuals and entities provide Iran with controlled and dual-use technologies needed 

to advance in these areas. China-based Iranian defense officials and intermediaries 

have access to Chinese academics, companies, and research organizations, some of 

which continue to provide support despite being sanctioned. Iran is receiving materiel and technological assistance with missile guidance systems, raw materials, production machinery, and propellants. 

Senator THUNE. Thank you. 

This I would direct to you, Secretary Miller, as well as to General 

O’Reilly. As part of the PAA to European missile defense, my understanding is the administration is now seeking to establish a 

ground-based SM–3 missile defense site in Romania by 2015. What 

countries do you envision will be protected by that site? How do 

959 

you envision that the command and control process will work? 

What policies and procedures would likely be at work in the event 

that a launch would be detected? 

Dr. MILLER. The capabilities of the PAA in terms of coverage of 

Europe will grow over time. By the time of phase three, which is 

2018, it will have complete coverage of Europe, and that will be a 

combined contribution of the site in Romania, the site in Poland, 

and any additional sea-based sites as well. 

With respect to command and control, this is a conversation that 

we are having now with our NATO allies and we expect that the 

command and control for the PAA, which is intended to be the U.S. 

contribution to NATO missile defense, would be through the European Command, and then we are having discussions with our European allies with respect to NATO command and control arrangements. 

There’s an important program there called Active-Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defense (ALT–BMD), a NATO program that’s 

currently funded for study and that provides the command and 

control architecture to integrate countries’ contributions to missile 

defense as well. I think General O’Reilly will probably want to add 

something, perhaps Admiral Macy as well. 

General O’REILLY. Sir, the ALT–BMD program is focused on a 

lower tier and, as we’ve said, the most effective missile defense has 

both an upper and a lower tier. So you have multiple shot opportunities using different systems. They are reviewing, going through 

studies, as we speak in order to determine what their contribution 

would be from a lower tier and then how to integrate it with our 

systems that we’re proposing. 

This obviously will need the decision made at the Lisbon summit 

later this year with NATO to determine whether or not territorial 

defense in Europe is going to be a policy and a priority for them. 

If it is, the ALT–BMD system then would readily be available to 

integrate with the PAA. 

Senator THUNE. I want to ask one question that Senator 

Lieberman alluded to earlier. On February 11 of this year, MDA 

completed a successful destruction of a threat-representative missile in its boost phase using the high-energy laser beam from the 

Airborne Laser aircraft, which I think is a pretty remarkable accomplishment and in my view could lead to a revolution in military 

affairs. 

I’m interested in knowing what your views are regarding the successful test of the Airborne Laser program. Do you think it marks 

the beginning of sort of a revolution, and what are your views 

about this program as we move forward and how should we be 

leveraging the new technology that it represents? 

Dr. MILLER. I’ll speak very briefly, then ask my colleagues to 

come in. 

The test represented an important milestone in showing that directed energy technologies can play an important role in the future 

in missile defense. As the Secretary of Defense had noted in the decision to terminate the program just about a year ago, the concern 

was not about the technological capabilities of the system, but 

about the operational concept for applying it and the reality that 

there would have to be large numbers of aircraft relatively close to 

960 

the threats and there are serious concerns about the survivability 

of that platform and the lack of a concept of operations that would 

make it effective in an actual theater warfighting scenario. 

General O’REILLY. Sir, that intercept and destruction of the missile a few seconds after liftoff on 11 February demonstrated many 

scientific breakthroughs. There was a hierarchy of first-time accomplishments, and it went a long way with moving us from theory to 

empirical data that we’re collecting on these systems. 

That design was largely designed during the 90s that you saw on 

that platform. The platform demonstrated the beam control and the 

ability to propagate in the earth’s atmosphere. Since then, we have 

also been developing other technologies which produce more power 

in smaller packages, and our budget requests continue development of those so that we are readily available, or we have a platform readily available, in order to take these newer technologies 

and gain the standoff distances that we’ve been referring to that 

make them very operationally capable. 

Senator THUNE. I appreciate the doubts that have been expressed by some about the concept of operations in an actual conflict. But there are others who I think have great confidence in the 

aircraft. It seems to me at least that these directed energy type 

weapons have great potential to transform our future deterrence 

capability. So I hope that we can continue dialogue about how to 

use those technologies as we go forward. 

General O’REILLY. Yes, sir. 

Senator THUNE. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Thune. 

Senator Ben Nelson. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Let me thank you, gentlemen, for your service as well. I want to 

go a little more into the PAA. In his testimony before this committee last month, General Chilton, the Commander in Chief at 

STRATCOM, talked about STRATCOM being the ‘‘lead combatant 

command for missile defense advocacy’’ and indicated he was working to shape missile defense investments that ‘‘provide more effective capabilities for our geographic combatant commanders.’’ 

This goes to you, Admiral Macy. Have geographic combatant 

commanders requested increased regional missile defense capabilities? 

Admiral MACY. Yes, sir, they have, if by ‘‘increased’’ you mean 

additional assets. Following the generation of the PAA and the concept of having different abilities which could be tailored to regional 

needs, all of the combatant commanders with current significant 

issues in missile defense have been looking specifically at the PAA 

and how to adapt it to their region. 

I should take the opportunity to say that the PAA is not a system, but a concept of how you provide a regional missile defense. 

The systems, if you will, are the toolkit provided by General 

O’Reilly, which includes your interceptors, sensor packages, and 

command and control. There are differences in the regions between 

the Pacific, the Central region, and the European region, of politics, 

of threat, of geography, both technical and operational issues. So 

each of the combatant commanders are looking at that, and have 

961 

come forward with their initial estimates, and we are in the process now within the Joint Staff and with STRATCOM of looking at 

how to balance those assets and to meet their needs in the different regions. 

Senator BEN NELSON. There are obviously going to be different 

needs depending on the location of the combatant commander. So 

you’re requesting their input to determine how best to meet those 

needs, because there may be multiple needs and there may be some 

overlay of needs depending on the geographic location? 

Admiral MACY. Yes, sir. We have two primary means in which 

we can ascertain and address the COCOMs’ needs. The first is, if 

you will, through their systemic and technical capabilities desires, 

which are expressed in the prioritized capabilities list for missile 

defense, which has inputs from all of the COCOMs and is collated 

and signed forward by General Chilton to General O’Reilly as what 

he sees as the need for General O’Reilly to provide. 

Separately, on the operational end we have, as we do for all our 

forces, a global force management process with a series of steps 

and boards that meet to figure out how to divvy up, if you will, all 

of our assets around the globe. We have, over the last 6 months, 

been engaged in an effort to understand how to put the missile defense issues into that same process, because the process works. The 

trick here, if you will, is getting the business rules for missile defense to provide to the global force managers. That is coming to a 

conclusion here in the next few months, and incorporates those 

things such as I mentioned that the combatant commanders have 

been looking at: What would be the laydown for PAA in their area? 

Senator BEN NELSON. Different warheads, different delivery systems, different capabilities, different needs, but coordination of 

them and the integration of that total arsenal; is that what we’re 

attempting to do here? 

Admiral MACY. Yes, sir, exactly that, if you will, the toolkit of 

interceptors is fixed with the different types as sensors, and how 

do you apply those in the different regions. The other is recognizing 

that right now we don’t have enough, so how do you prioritize and 

how do you manage the risk between regions, which is what we do 

on a daily basis with all of our forces, whether it’s armor or ships 

or bombers or whatever. But the same thing applies to missile defense, yes, sir. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Thank you. 

Secretary Miller, do you support the PAA for missile defense in 

Europe, and is this a template for a regional missile defense in, 

let’s say, the Middle East or Asia as well? 

Dr. MILLER. Yes, sir, I do, and it is. As Admiral Macy noted, its 

instantiation will be different in each region, and we are working 

with our partners and allies to define those various architectures 

at this time, and also to do our own internal analysis of what 

makes most sense. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Secretary Miller, you heard the questions 

regarding the unique unilateral statements regarding the implications of our missile defense programs on the New START agreement. Is this a ’tis and ’taint situation, where they’re saying one 

thing and we’re saying another thing? Because unilateral statements that are contradictory are problematic in and of themselves. 

962 

The question is what’s the impact of the differences in understanding or different agreement about what the treaty says? 

If Russia decides to get out in the future at some point, is that 

a problem? Will we have achieved sufficient results being in the 

treaty for having gotten into the treaty in the first place? In other 

words, what is the impact if we end up in the situation where we 

part ways on the treaty, either we decide it’s not in our national 

interests or they decide it’s not in their national interests? What 

are the implications, positive and negative? 

Dr. MILLER. Senator Nelson, let me say at the outset that I do 

not expect that that is a likely outcome at all. This treaty is in the 

national security interests of both the United States and the Russian Federation, and that is true taking account of the verification 

provisions in the treaty, of the reduction of delivery vehicles and 

warheads, and of the data exchanges and other steps that will take 

place to make it so that both sides have a better understanding of 

each other’s capabilities. 

Senator BEN NELSON. So that’s the essence of the treaty from the 

standpoint of Russia and from the standpoint of the United States. 

Are they just stating for their own political purposes back home 

about the missile defense system or do they truly believe that they 

have some control or some limitation on what we do with missile 

defense, recognizing the consequences if they get out, if they disagree? 

Dr. MILLER. Senator Nelson, I think that the history of our discussions and of the choices of this administration and of past administrations make it clear that we will continue to invest in missile defenses and deploy missile defenses in order to protect the 

Homeland and to protect our forces overseas and our allies and 

partners. 

We’ve also made clear in the Missile Defense Review, and in the 

BMDR, that it is not our intention to change the strategic balance 

with respect to Russia, and the relatively small numbers of interceptors that we have today and the relatively small numbers we 

would have even if we increased that, compared to the 1,550 accountable strategic nuclear warheads under the New START, make 

it clear to me at least that we are a very long distance away from 

our defenses having any impact on strategic stability. 

We would like to continue discussions with Russia on missile defense cooperation. As Senator Levin noted, we believe we have a 

common interest in that area and would like to go forward from the 

current work on a common threat assessment to looking to include 

their radar, one at Armavir, and potentially other elements, to help 

improve our PAA in Europe. We think we have a lot of common 

interests, both in moving forward in missile defense and in reducing our nuclear weapons. 

Senator BEN NELSON. I agree with you, and this afternoon I’ll be 

discussing that area of cooperation between Russia and the United 

States with Senator Margelov, who is the chairman of the Russian 

Federation Council’s equivalent of their Foreign Relations Committee. There are areas where I think cooperation is possible. It appears that both sides are posturing to keep their own position open 

with respect to national defense and it’s not necessarily the threat 

963 

of a divorce before the prenuptual agreement is entered into. Is 

that fair? 

Dr. MILLER. Yes, sir. I’d go further to say I expect throughout the 

duration of the treaty—it’s a 7-year implementation period and it 

would be a 10-year period of implementation, with the possibility 

of a 5-year extension. Within that period, and I believe further, it’s 

in the interest of the United States and Russia to continue to reduce our nuclear weapons and to exchange information and to conduct the type of verification that we will under the New START. 

Senator BEN NELSON. So even if one side or the other side decides to get out, there’s still value in getting into the agreement? 

Dr. MILLER. Yes, sir. As I said, I don’t expect that that would be 

an outcome. 

Senator BEN NELSON. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Nelson. 

Senator Wicker. 

Senator WICKER. Thank you very much. 

Admiral Macy, let me begin with you and ask you to explore with 

us the effect that this PAA will have on Aegis shipbuilding and deployment. Perhaps others will want to contribute to this discussion. 

There are worries that valuable Aegis ships might be locked into 

the BMD mission. These ships carry out a wide range of other 

warfighting tasks and are very much in high demand. Was there 

collaboration between the Navy and the other agencies represented 

at the table on the creation of this plan, and does the Navy’s shipbuilding plan take into account the increased need for BMD-capable ships under this approach? 

Admiral MACY. Senator, thank you. To answer a couple of different pieces here: Yes, we had participation during the discussions 

last year and this year as part of the BMDR, which engendered the 

concept of the PAA as part of our analysis, with the other Services 

and with the COCOMs. 

We are certainly conscious of the impact of that on Aegis shipbuilding and ship tasking. I can’t tell you right now that there’s a 

plan to increase the shipbuilding as a result strictly of this tasking, 

because partly for the reason that you noted, that these are multimission ships, and they will be doing very many different missions 

at different times. 

As I mentioned earlier in my discussion with Senator Nelson, 

that is part of the global force management process, which is where 

you send ships and what you use them for. We do not anticipate 

at this time, nor have we to date, taken a ship and permanently 

assigned it to doing nothing but missile defense, whether it was 

part of the efforts that we have in the Seventh Fleet with potential 

risks from North Korea or in other parts of the world. 

I will note that in an earlier time in my life I served on a Tomahawk-capable ship and we performed a number of different missions. From time to time, depending on the needs of that combatant commander, we would be assigned to be the Tomahawk shooter, in which case we were geographically constrained within a certain area to be prepared to launch on a moment’s notice. That certainly could be a possibility in the future, depending on a BMD 

risk. 

964 

But that doesn’t mean that that is all that ship would ever do. 

Part of what you do in global force management on an annual 

basis, what you do in operational management, command and control on a day-to-day and a week-to-week basis, is to move your assets around. 

Now, we do need more Aegis BMD-capability, which is not necessarily the same thing as more Aegis BMD ships, because we are 

looking to convert certain numbers of our current Aegis ships to 

BMD capability. 

Senator WICKER. How many? 

Admiral MACY. I believe it’s a total of 38 across the Future Years 

Defense Program. I’d have to defer to General O’Reilly for the specific number. 

General O’REILLY. Yes, it will be 38 by 2015. 

Senator WICKER. How long ago was that decision made? Did that 

decision predate the decision to move toward this phased approach? 

Admiral MACY. I would say it was done in consonance with it 

and the discussions over the last year to 2 years as we developed 

this idea. The PAA did not spring full-blown on a day, and there 

were a lot of discussions looking at that. The chairman alluded earlier to the Joint Capabilities Mix Study. 

Senator WICKER. I hate to interject, but when was the PAA announced? 

Admiral MACY. The PAA was announced on September 17 of last 

year. 

Senator WICKER. Of 2009? 

Admiral MACY. Yes, sir. 

Senator WICKER. The decision with regard to the number of ships 

predated that? 

General O’REILLY. Sir, last year’s budget request was for 27 

ships by the end of this time, and we have increased that, working 

with the Navy, 11 more since the PAA has been decided and announced. 

Senator WICKER. Largely as a result of the PAA? 

General O’REILLY. Yes—well—— 

Admiral MACY. No, sir. A combination. The original—— 

Senator WICKER. General O’Reilly says yes and Admiral Macy 

says no. 

Admiral MACY. I would submit, sir, that the original increase up 

to 27 was as a result partly of the studies we had done saying that 

we need more. Then when the PAA came into being, the General 

was asked what more will it take, and that resulted in a further 

increase in the number of ships. 

Senator WICKER. For the two of you at that end of the table, are 

you telling the Senate that under the present plan we’re going to 

have enough Aegis ships to carry out this new PAA and all the 

other missions that are going to be required? Are you comfortable 

with that number? 

Admiral MACY. Based on the information we have now, we think 

that is a good number. It is a step in the right direction. Whether 

it is the total number will be part of the analysis I alluded to earlier, that will be conducted over the next year, the JCM–3 study. 

The last study just looked at interceptors. This new study will look 

at interceptors, launch systems, and sensors. 

965 

Dr. MILLER. Senator, could I very briefly? Prior to the PAA decision, the plan was for 27 Aegis-capable ships. After the decision, 

the plan was changed to 38 Aegis-capable ships, and we will continue to look at that question, I’m sure not just with the current 

study but over the years, as we see how the threat changes and 

how our capabilities develop. That’s a fundamental element of the 

adaptive part of that PAA. 

Senator WICKER. Let me move on to one other thing. Dr. Gilmore, in your testimony you talk about the ripple effects of a test 

failure, such as the recent GMD flight test FTG–06, and say that 

the ripple effect can be significant. I think our chairman and ranking member alluded to this in their statements. Can you give us, 

in a nutshell, why we had this failure? 

Dr. GILMORE. General O’Reilly can talk about it as well as I can 

and perhaps better. But the failure investigation is under way. I’m 

not sure exactly what we can say about the failure. 

Senator WICKER. Is it classified or is it just premature to answer 

that? 

General O’REILLY. It’s classified, sir. But I can say, sir, that 

there were two failure modes. The first was the sea-based X-band 

radar stopped transmitting at a certain point in time, and we understand why now. Second of all, we had a new version of the GMD 

kill vehicle. It was the first time being flown, the longest any kill 

vehicle’s been flown. We also encountered a problem that we’ve 

been able to identify on that design, and our intent is to make 

those corrections and test again this year. 

Senator WICKER. Dr. Gilmore, I guess my question is, according 

to your testimony the testing is very complex and fraught with potential for other failures. Can technology realistically meet the 

goals of this PAA? What are we to draw from your testimony that 

says an Aegis BMD test failure in the next year could impact the 

full implementation and assessment of phase one in the PAA for 

the defense of Europe? 

The test that you spoke of in your testimony, what did it do to 

our timeline, and what effect might one of these very possible failures have on the timeline? 

Dr. GILMORE. When there is a test failure, there is less knowledge gained and it will take longer to gain the amount of knowledge that we wanted to gain. So in the case of the failure of FTG– 

06, I think that General O’Reilly is still assessing what changes 

will have to be implemented in the IMTP, and that will be something that you would decide within the next 6 months or so, I 

think. 

But there’s a potential for tests to get bumped down the road in 

order to collect in the next test the information that would have 

been collected in this test. So the implication is that there would 

be less knowledge known in any given point in time. 

With regard to the PAA and whether it’s technologically feasible, 

yes, in my view it’s certainly technologically feasible. It will take 

time to test it, just like it takes time to test all of these complex 

systems. These are particularly complex systems, but all defense 

systems are complex, and we have a history of learning as we go 

along and some of the programs taking longer to test and pan out 

than we had originally hoped. 

966 

But I have no reason to expect that testing of the PAA through 

the various versions of the SM–3 interceptor will be particularly 

unique in the testing history of this program or other programs. 

Senator WICKER. Thank you. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Wicker. 

Senator Bill Nelson, with thanks to Senator Hagan. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Secretary Miller, with the Czech Republic 

we’re going to have some form of shared missile launch information. You mentioned this in your prepared statement. You indicate 

it’s a near-term effort. Do we need to provide for some funds or authority to conduct such information-sharing? 

Dr. MILLER. Senator, we’ve begun discussions with the Czech Republic on shared early warning. The required funds are relatively 

quite small. We are currently assessing whether the MDA and/or 

the Army have the authority to expend those funds. Sir, if we are 

unable to resolve that in the very near term, we may come back 

and ask for specific legislative authority. This would be in the single digits of millions of dollars. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Let me ask Dr. Gilmore. In your prepared 

testimony, you stated, talking about the Airborne Laser: ‘‘The engagement was not an operational test conducted under operationally realistic conditions.’’ Then why don’t you give us more detail 

why this was not an operationally realistic test and why it’s not a 

basis for using this aircraft as an operational weapons system. 

Dr. GILMORE. I’d be happy to do that. I can summarize some of 

those reasons immediately and then I can also refer you to the report on the Airborne Laser that I submitted to Congress this past 

January, which will spell out in greater detail, a lot greater detail, 

what I’m about to say. 

The range at which the intercept was conducted is not operationally realistic because modern air defenses would preclude the aircraft from penetrating into the air space of any country, even a 

small country like North Korea, to a position such that the range 

at which this particular foreign military asset was engaged was realistic. So you would have to demonstrate the capability to engage 

threats successfully at several times the range that was recently 

demonstrated. 

The next test will be at about twice the range of the initial test, 

but even that would not be an operationally realistic range for an 

engagement. In the case of larger countries like Korea, unless the 

power of the laser was substantially larger than the laser power in 

the current system or even the objective power that was originally 

sought, which was I think about three times the amount of power 

that’s in the current system, even with a much larger power laser. 

In a larger country like Iran there would probably always be locations from which a launch could occur that an airborne laser that 

had to stand off outside the Iranian borders could engage. 

In addition, there are other things that some people may regard 

as more mundane, but which are very important for a system to 

be operationally effective in combat. For example, you have to have 

a logistics system that will support the operations of the aircraft 

when it’s deployed. We don’t have that for this aircraft. It could be 

gotten, but we don’t have it currently. 

967 

There would have to be a relatively large fleet of aircraft. You 

would probably need one or two orbits of aircraft even to defend 

launches against a country like North Korea. Each orbit would 

have to have two aircraft in it to assure that one aircraft at any 

given time could engage. If you want two aircraft up, and they 

would have to be up continuously because you can’t give the enemy 

an opportunity to shoot when the aircraft land, then you would 

have to have another three to five aircraft to support those two up 

continuously. That’s a fleet of 10 or more aircraft would be needed 

in order to have an operationally effective system. 

Those are the highlights, and there are more details in the report 

I submitted. 

Senator BILL NELSON. What about the difference between chemical lasers and solid state? 

Dr. GILMORE. As General O’Reilly can discuss probably in greater 

detail than I can, there are concepts, some of which are being 

worked on at some of the national laboratories, for solid state lasers which would have higher power than the current sort of hybrid solid state-chemical lasers, but in a much smaller package. 

That means that you could put it on an aircraft that’s smaller than 

the large 747 on which the COIL, which stands for Chemical Oxygen Iodine Laser, is emplaced. 

MDA is pursuing those kinds of technologies, so they do offer 

promise. General O’Reilly could probably say more about that. 

Senator BILL NELSON. Mr. Chairman, I want the record to reflect 

that several predecessors ago of General O’Reilly, General Kadish 

testified to this committee—and this is years ago—that the chemical Airborne Laser by the time that he testified was going to be 

ready within 10 months. Of course, we’ve heard the testimony 

today that it’s nowhere near it. I thought that strange at the time 

and have made some remarks since about that kind of information 

coming to this committee, which was wildly optimistic, indeed a 

fantasy, is not the kind of testimony that this committee should be 

receiving. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you for the recollection. You have the 

memory here, institutional memory on this subject, but a lot of 

other subjects as well, which is invaluable to us. 

Senator LeMieux. 

Senator LEMIEUX. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to thank all of you for your service and for the important 

work that you’re doing on missile defense. It’s really essential for 

the emerging threats we have in the world that we’re facing. 

I want to go back to something, Dr. Miller, that you talked about 

and see if everybody’s in agreement with this. I believe that you 

testified that you believe that Iran could possibly have an ICBM 

by 2015? 

Dr. MILLER. That’s correct. As was noted, that would assume foreign assistance. 

Senator LEMIEUX. Is that everyone on the panel’s opinion as 

well? Any differing opinion? 

General O’REILLY. Sir, I don’t have a differing opinion. 

Senator LEMIEUX. We heard from General Cartwright, I believe 

it was, a couple of hearings ago in terms of development of a nuVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:37 May 06, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00973 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\62155.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
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clear weapon by Iran, that he thought that that would be, at its 

earliest, maybe a 3- to 5-year period, which would also bring us to 

about 2015. Is that your understanding as well? 

Dr. MILLER. Sir, there’s a tremendous amount of uncertainty associated with both of those estimates. With respect to a nuclear 

weapon, I think one can have confidence that it’s well beyond a 

year and it is more likely in that 3-plus time, timeframe. 

Senator LEMIEUX. I want to focus you on a topic, if I can, in another potential area of threat that’s not talked about a lot, but it’s 

being talked about more and more in this committee. The chairman 

and ranking member and myself have raised this issue when we’ve 

talked to our friends from SOUTHCOM. I want to set the table for 

you on this topic because I think it has an impact on missile defense. 

More and more we’re seeing Venezuela as an emerging threat, I 

believe, to the United States. We have evidence from a Spanish 

judge that Venezuela was collaborating with a group in Spain to 

potentially assassinate President Uribe. I had the opportunity this 

past weekend to go to our joint interagency task force in Key West, 

which does tremendous work on interdicting narcoterrorism, and 

we know that Venezuela is allowing for airplanes to fly over its 

space to bring drugs and other contraband up Central America towards Mexico to the United States, and that they’re a willing collaborator with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia. 

We know that Hezbollah and Hamas now have a presence in 

Latin America, and we know that Tehran and Venezuela through 

Chavez and Caracas have more and more connections. 

I want to pose to you and put on your radar screen for thought 

and contemplation that we should not be just concerned about a 

threat from Iran from the east, but we should be concerned about 

a threat from Iran from the south. I’m worried that in the next 10 

years we’re going to be talking about Venezuela trying to obtain a 

nuclear weapon. With this dangerous alliance that’s growing between Iraq and Venezuela, I want to pose to you the question of 

whether or not our missile defense system would be capable of 

intercepting a weapon that was launched from South America? 

General O’REILLY. Sir, the PAA that we’re using for missile defense applies, of course, to other areas other than Europe, especially in the United States. The PAA applied here to our territory 

would provide that defense. 

Senator LEMIEUX. Would that be through Aegis ships or what 

would be the mechanism for that defense? 

General O’REILLY. For the type of ranges you’re referring to, you 

would need to use Aegis, either Aegis Ashore or Aegis on ships, 

which we can surge into the area. 

Senator LEMIEUX. Right now am I correct, Admiral, that there 

are two Aegis ships that are on the east coast of the United States, 

or BMD-capable ships? 

Admiral MACY. At any given moment, it could be anywhere from 

two to five, and there are more as time goes on, because we are 

increasing the number of East Coast Aegis ships with BMD capability, not necessarily for that reason, even though, as the General 

pointed out, you would apply it in that direction should you feel the 

threat develop, but as a matter of, if you will, just practical fleet 

969 

management. It’s closer to the Mediterranean and parts of the Middle East from Norfolk than it is from San Diego. So the Navy is 

looking to more evenly distribute the number of BMD ships they 

have, if you will, in the two major fleets, Atlantic and Pacific. 

Senator LEMIEUX. In terms of the Atlantic, that would obviously 

provide for those ships to be in the south around Florida and the 

Gulf of Mexico? 

General O’REILLY. Yes, sir. Again, as you adapt in phases to 

what you believe Venezuela may be doing, it would be exactly that, 

and do you have ships, would there be Aegis Ashore sites placed 

in various locations, and then you would build up the architecture 

appropriate to that region. 

Senator LEMIEUX. In terms of a missile, you would not, I assume, need an ICBM to launch from South America to hit the 

United States? It would be a mid-range missile, is that correct? 

General O’REILLY. Mid-range to intermediate-range, and then we 

can talk about who thinks how many thousand kilometers is which. 

But yes, sir. 

Dr. MILLER. Sir, if I could interject very briefly, I just want to 

clarify that we have no plans to deploy Aegis Ashore within the 

United States. One of the advantages of the PAA is that that option would always be available in the future. But as was suggested, 

should the threat you posited arise, a sea-based capability should 

be able to cope with it. 

Senator LEMIEUX. Does Iran now possess medium-range missiles 

or short-range missiles? 

Dr. MILLER. Sir, the answer is yes to both of those questions. 

Senator LEMIEUX. I ask that you, as I have asked our leaders in 

CENTCOM and SOUTHCOM and others, to put this in your analysis if you’ve not already done so, going forward, because I believe 

that there is a gathering storm in this alliance between Iraq and 

Venezuela. I was also concerned to see that China has decided to 

give billions of dollars in aid to Venezuela. I ask that you focus on 

this topic because I think it’s something that we’re going to be dealing with in the years to come. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator LeMieux. 

Senator Hagan. 

Senator HAGAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thanks for your testimony today. I do support the administration’s PAA to BMD because it incorporates the relevant technologies in an accelerated time fashion to respond to the evolving 

threats that are out there. This approach augments our current 

technologies in place to protect the U.S. Homeland against longrange and ICBM threats. It also provides an enhanced capability 

to defend against short- and medium-range ballistic missile threats 

to our personnel that are deployed in the regional forward operating bases and headquarters, and obviously as well our allies in 

Europe, the Middle East, and Southwest Asia. 

The Navy’s mission of protecting Europe from ballistic missile attacks has widespread implications for the surface fleet, potential 

deployment schedules, crewing arrangements, and command and 

control procedures for cruisers and destroyers. Admiral Macy, what 

will be the command and control procedures regarding the use of 

970 

sea-based SM–3s for the purpose of intercepting ballistic missiles 

fired toward Europe from Iran or some other rogue country in the 

Middle East or Southwest Asia, and will the authority to fire the 

missile rest with the regional combatant commanders? 

Admiral MACY. To answer the last one first, yes, ma’am. 

Senator HAGAN. Okay. 

Admiral MACY. If I may take a moment, in BMD command and 

control can be thought of as encompassing two areas of effort: the 

command area, which is where you do your planning, you determine your preplanned responses, your rules of engagement, those 

assets you’re most particularly going to focus on protecting, and so 

forth. You can think of the control area as being the execution part. 

Once the missiles are flying, the timelines are such that the 

interaction and control is very limited, and you find that in order 

to be successful the operational commanders down to the level of 

the commanding officer of that destroyer needs to have the authority to carry out the plan that was developed earlier in order to succeed in the intercept. 

So we talk about the arrangements in the control area. It would 

follow if we were conducting this in a U.S. context, it would be in 

a line of command that comes down from European Command, 

through an area air defense commander, notionally possibly down 

to a regional defense commander, to the commanding officer of that 

ship, but who would be carrying out the plans he was given until 

told to stop, because that’s where command interaction in BMD 

most often comes in, is to tell you to stop, not to go. 

We like to tell people that to be effective the first phone call 

you’re going to get from that young commander is not what he 

wants to do, but what he just did. So the issue is on the command 

side. That’s where your planning and your decisionmaking occurs. 

In a U.S. context, that would be under, in the case of Europe, the 

command of European Command, Admiral Stavrides in his U.S. 

hat. General Brady is the U.S. Air Force Europe Commander, and 

would also have the responsibility for missile defense efforts under 

Admiral Stavrides. So that would be that organization. 

As I mentioned in my opening comments, I did have the opportunity yesterday to participate with the Vice Chairman on briefing 

the North Atlantic Council and that was a part of the discussion 

in a NATO context. It is our belief that should NATO take this as 

a mission we would then develop the missile defense command and 

control within a NATO context, in which you would have a missile 

defense adaptation of the military procedures that we follow now. 

NATO would be involved in the command part developing the 

plans, understanding what the rules of engagement would be, 

under what circumstances you would start to commence active missile defense launching interceptors. The NATO command and control, once they had the capability, the physical capability to participate, through adaptation of the ALT–BMD system or others—we 

believe the ALT–BMD system is the proper approach to take that 

up to an upper tier and to a territorial capability—would have 

more and more hands-on involvement in the command of it and it 

would fall under the NATO military procedures, where the Supreme Allied Command Europe (SACEUR) and Admiral Stavrides 

971 

in his role as SACEUR, with Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers 

Europe underneath him. 

As it happens, the U.S. air defense command focus is at 

Ramstein and that is also where the NATO air defense command 

focus, the buildings, are located. So it would be done in that context. 

Senator HAGAN. Thank you. 

Admiral MACY. Yes, ma’am. 

Senator HAGAN. As you’ve indicated, the administration’s PAA 

for BMD involves building two land-based Aegis BMD systems in 

Europe. Some observers suggest that the establishment of two 

Aegis Ashore sites would allow a reduction in the number of BMDcapable Aegis ships needed for European BMD operations. General 

O’Reilly, what modifications are needed to make the SM–3 suitable 

for use as a land-based missile and what are the technical risks associated with these modifications? 

General O’REILLY. Senator, one of the advantages of the landbased SM–3 is that we would not change the missile configuration 

used at sea or at land. It gives the Navy and the combatant commanders a greater pool of missiles to manage from, more operational flexibility. Each site can maintain between 80 to 120 missiles, so there’s a tremendous amount of firepower at each location. 

We literally are taking the Aegis system so that it is duplicated 

on the land. We have no special logistics requirements or training 

requirements or manning or command and control. So that in fact 

it is very adaptable to the Navy. Again, it can be moved within 4 

months, if we see the threat has diminished in one location or 

moved to another. It is very readily adaptable to remote sites or 

large protection. 

We don’t plan on making any unique changes of the Aegis system 

to be adapted to the land. 

Senator HAGAN. Thank you. 

I know, General O’Reilly, when you were in my office recently I 

was asking you the question on where you get the highly capable, 

trained individuals who do the technology, the individuals, the scientists. I do want to thank you for recruiting also at the universities and schools within North Carolina, because I know we have 

a lot of very capable individuals in our State, too. 

Following the official signing of the New START, the Russian 

Government announced that it reserves the right to withdraw from 

the treaty if its national interests are threatened. The Russian 

Government also announced that New START will only be effective 

if there’s no buildup in capabilities to the U.S. missile defense system. 

Dr. Miller, how is the administration reconciling Russia’s caveats 

under the New START treaty with Central Europe’s demands for 

a role in U.S. missile defense plans? 

Dr. MILLER. Senator, the United States made a unilateral statement as well with respect to New START, and I’ll just give you the 

relevant element of it. I had asked earlier that it be submitted for 

the record. That is that the statement says very directly that ‘‘The 

United States intends to continue improving and deploying its missile defense systems in order to defend itself against limited attack 

972 

and as part of our collaborative approach to strengthening stability 

in key regions.’’ 

What that means is that, both with respect to any necessary improvements for our Homeland defense and for the PAA in Europe 

and in other regions, we intend to make what improvements are 

necessary to continue to protect our Homeland, our forces deployed 

overseas, and our partners and allies. 

Senator HAGAN. Thank you. 

My time is up. Thank you. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Hagan. 

Senator Sessions. 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General O’Reilly, I’m concerned about whether or not we’re going 

to adequately continue to complete the deployment of our missile 

defense system, the GMD system that we spent decades perfecting, 

and it’s really exceeded most people’s, almost everybody’s expectations in technology, its proven effectiveness, and that sort of thing. 

There are some that have opposed it and as a result it seems this 

administration to me is penny wise, pound foolish, in the sense 

that once we have done all this let’s complete it. I’m concerned 

about whether or not we are deploying enough of these missiles, 

number one, and number two, whether we have enough to maintain the kind of testing that we need. 

The GMD program manager and the executive director briefed 

staff that the MDA, your agency, plans to acquire only 52 GBIs. 

Thirty will be deployed and put in the ground, while the remaining 

22 will be used for testing. By fiscal year 2019, based on the plans 

that are ongoing, MDA assumes that the initial developmental testing will be complete, but that will leave only three GBIs for stockpile reliability testing through 2032. 

So from 2019 to 2032 we have only three missiles, according to 

our present plans, 12 years, to do testing. By contrast, the Air 

Force conducts three flight tests each year on the Minuteman III 

ICBM and the Navy conducts four on the Trident SubmarineLaunched Ballistic Missile (SLBM). 

So is this enough? Don’t we need to, while the assembly process 

is still available to us, produce enough of these missiles so that we 

can maintain testing in the years to come? 

General O’REILLY. Sir, working with the test community, represented by Dr. Gilmore and the operational test communities, we 

did work together and determine that by 2019 if the tests are successful, we do believe that we will have the data necessary to confirm the performance of the GMD system in all anticipated flight 

regimes. 

We also have designed a missile which has an incredible capability of maintaining its health and status. Not only do we constantly maintain the health and status of these missiles, we also 

run periodic checks thoroughly to verify its performance and the 

proper functioning of all of the systems. We will conduct 4.3 million 

checks of these 30 missiles over a 20-year period, plus 600 other 

tests where we remove the missiles, remove components from 

them, test those components, and refurbish the missiles with brand 

new components. 

973 

Senator SESSIONS. I think this idea came from on high somewhere, to cut the number back. But are you confident that enough 

analysis has been done to conclude that through that 12 years 

there’s going to be enough missiles to do actual testing? Will you 

let us know if you conclude there’s a problem? Don’t we need to do 

it soon; otherwise we’ll have to restart an entire assembly process? 

General O’REILLY. Sir, we do today have to restart an entire assembly process. I’m faced with that right now. What we currently 

are building will take us through 2016 with the full production 

line. But yes, sir, I do have monitoring responsibilities to ensure 

that we have a production base that will take our refurbishments 

all the way to 2026, and we do need an industrial base to do that. 

So yes, sir, and I will report back if I determine that we need 

more missiles based on our estimation. 

Senator SESSIONS. I firmly believe that we’re cutting the number 

too close and I hope that it’s not too late to reevaluate that now. 

It would be a lot less costly. 

General O’Reilly and Dr. Gilmore, the industrial base supporting 

the production of solid rocket motors necessary for the ICBMs, 

SLBMs, and evolved expendable launch vehicles (EELVs) is under 

strain. The recent decision to cancel NASA’s Constellation program 

will likely reduce the customer base for solid rocket motors substantially, raising costs and perhaps leading to a loss of industry 

proficiency. It’s estimated that costs for solid rocket motors programs could rise as much as 150 to 200 percent for DOD. 

This is because, as I understand it, NASA has been consuming 

about 70 percent of these solid rocket motors and keeping the system moving forward. General O’Reilly, I understand that you or 

DOD were not consulted about the NASA decision on cancelling the 

Constellation program. This is our manned spaceflight plan for the 

future. What impact does that decision have on MDA? 

General O’REILLY. Sir, for GMD we were not consulted. Our solid 

rocket motor usage for large solid rocket motors was about 8 percent of the total production done in the United States every year. 

So we had a very small part to play. As you said, it was dominated 

by NASA’s use of the solid rocket motors. 

We have an increase in the small solid rocket motors based on 

the proposed budget that we have submitted to Congress, where we 

will consume over 550 tons of solid rocket motors in the next 5 

years. So we actually have the reverse process or challenge of having that production capability for small solid rocket motors. Yet at 

the same time, as you said, we have had a severe reduction in the 

industrial capacity to produce the large solid rocket motors. 

We are procuring five additional booster sets for our GBIs. One 

reason is they are economical to buy now to use them at a later 

date if we need to for testing or other purposes. 

Senator SESSIONS. I’m worried about it. 

Dr. Gilmore, is the Secretary of Defense concerned about the 

shrinking solid rocket motor industrial base and the issues that 

General O’Reilly mentioned? 

Dr. GILMORE. Senator, with all due respect, I think that General 

O’Reilly tracks the industrial base issues more than I do. I focus 

on the testing issues, not on the industrial base issues. So he would 

be the best one to answer that question. 

974 

Dr. MILLER. Senator, if I could interject very quickly, I do know 

that the Under Secretary for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, Dr. Carter, is currently undertaking a study of the industrial 

base for solid rocket motors. 

Senator SESSIONS. The President has already indicated that he’s 

rethinking some of the NASA issues, which I appreciate him doing, 

and I really think that he should do that, because I strongly believe 

we don’t need to abandon our leadership in space; and second, 

there may be ways in which we can recognize this symbiotic relationship between NASA and DOD that could be a basis for being 

able to continue that program. 

Mr. Chairman, I would just say I won’t ask the question at this 

point, but I may submit for the record my concern over the fact 

that we were ready to test the two-stage GBI, which was going to 

be deployed in Europe and will be deployed in the United States, 

and it’s ready to go forward. But our plan to create an interceptor 

in Europe capable of knocking down an ICBM that would hit the 

United States, appears to be delayed as late as 2020. I think that’s 

a mistake and we’ll want to pursue that as we go forward. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Sessions. If that’s submitted for the record, the answer will be forthcoming promptly, we 

hope. 

Senator Reed. 

Senator REED. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, gentlemen. General O’Reilly, in your opening comments you made the point that missile fields in Alaska were positioned to engage both Korea and Iran. Just a point of clarification. 

Does that affect the launchers or the radars and the launchers? 

Can the radar as it was configured in Alaska pick up a target coming from Iran? 

General O’REILLY. From a polar projection, the closest point to 

the United States from Iran is actually Alaska, and the same with 

North Korea. For our radars, we have the Fylingdales radar in 

England and coming on line next month will be the Thule radar 

in Greenland. They provide our northern observation and tracking 

of missiles launched from that part of the globe. 

Senator REED. So that both in terms of acquisition of the target 

and launching to intercept, Alaska is well positioned vis-a-vis Iran 

and North Korea? 

General O’REILLY. Yes, sir. As Secretary Miller said earlier, the 

contribution of a forward-based radar in Southern Europe adds tremendously to that capability also because we could track even 

sooner. 

Senator REED. One other aspect of this is not only the forwardbased radar, but also space satellite observation and integration. 

Does that enhance our ability to acquire the target and engage it? 

General O’REILLY. Yes, sir. We currently have a satellite system 

that tracks booster launches. But we have put into space last year 

two demonstrator satellites that not only demonstrate tracking a 

missile in launch, but the entire flight of the missile. Yes, sir, we 

have a proposal for the Precision Tracking Space System (PTSS), 

which then would be established by the middle of this decade, that 

would also track hundreds of missiles being launched over their enVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:37 May 06, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00980 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\62155.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
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tire flight and would provide information to both GMD and the 

Aegis system for intercepting. 

Senator REED. The plan now would be—or I’ll ask you the question. I don’t presume the answer. The Aegis would engage first, 

and then the ground-based missile would engage later in the flight? 

General O’REILLY. In the 2020 time, sir, in the timeline, we believe it’s very feasible to have a high acceleration interceptor in an 

Aegis system; yes, sir, the plan would be to have an early intercept 

soon after boost and destroy the missiles early in flight; and if not, 

then we have the GMD system for the second attempt. 

Senator REED. Relatively speaking, the reconfiguration of the 

system, has that advanced our ability to engage Iranian targets or 

delayed it? 

General O’REILLY. Sir, it has greatly advanced it, because we 

now have the capability to utilize sensors, not only on ships, for example, but they also have the ability to use sensors at any location, 

of any frequency, of any bandwidth. That significantly helps us 

launch interceptors sooner, so we don’t have to wait for the missile 

to get close enough to a ship in order to launch. The ship actually 

uses all sensors available to it. 

Senator REED. Let me ask another question about Aegis, and 

that is the shore sites. You talked to Senator Hagan about this, but 

one of the constraints, obviously, is vessels at sea and operational. 

The shore-based Aegis will, in fact, relieve some of that pressure. 

Admiral Macy, do you want to respond? 

General O’REILLY. Sir, I’ll just say yes, sir. That was the discussion last year and it was highly discussed with the Joint Staff and 

the Navy, and I’ll defer to Admiral Macy. 

Admiral MACY. One other point, sir. I’m in violent agreement 

with the General. It is also attractive financially. In simplistic 

terms, we’re taking the top third of the destroyer and putting it on 

a concrete pad. Therefore I don’t have to buy or operate the bottom 

two-thirds. This is not going to redo the U.S. budget, but we do expect to see some savings from being able to station the capability 

that way without all the attendant things that come with the ship. 

Senator REED. Are you planning just for the contingency to scale 

up, to have multiple further sites? 

Admiral MACY. As the need, yes, sir, that would be the point. 

Right now the plan is for two. As I mentioned earlier, I believe in 

my conversation with Senator Hagan, the other combatant commanders are also looking at it. None has as yet expressed the need, 

but they are certainly looking at it. In a number of ways it’s just 

as attractive to that commander because he also has to buy fuel 

and take care of that ship when it’s in his area of responsibility. 

So one of the big things about this is we could put one in other 

areas, including the SOUTHCOM region, though, as Dr. Miller 

said, right now we don’t have a plan. 

But yes, sir, we could buy more and do that. 

Senator REED. The launching system is relocatable, so you could 

move these. You wouldn’t have to buy another set. You could, if the 

need arose, just move it to another location. 

Admiral MACY. Yes, sir, that is our concept for how this would 

go. We have asked the MDA to include as part of their engineering 

assessment the ability to move this in 4 months as a starting point, 

976 

and then we’ll understand from them the costs and difficulties of 

doing it. But definitely we would like to be able to pick it up and 

move it somewhere else. 

Senator REED. Let me just ask the question and someone can decide who should answer it. That is that we’ve cancelled the cruiser 

CGX and we’re going to essentially replace that with the Flight 3 

DDG–51s. The radar on the Flight 3 is a scaled-down version of the 

AMDR which was going to go on the cruiser. Are you losing anything in that scaling down, any capabilities? What are the implications, essentially, of cancelling CGX to the BMD program? 

Admiral MACY. We believe that within the BMD program the implications can be handled by a different architecture. Though you 

have notionally a scaled-down radar—and I want to be careful how 

I say that. As I’m sure you’re aware, sir, if we get too much farther 

into that discussion we’ll have to have it in a separate room. 

But the other thing I want to go back to is what the General 

brought up. We are looking to the future to create an architecture 

which takes advantage of all of the sensors that are available in 

the particular battle space, such that you are not limited to the instrumented range of a SPY–1 or a THAAD or any other sensor, 

that by using what we call the engage-on-remote technique you will 

have one launching system launching one or more interceptors, 

which are being guided by data coming from separate sensors, not 

necessarily part of their generic system, and quite likely controlled 

by a battle management system in a third area and a third capability, to get beyond the limitations of such things as the curvature 

of the earth that just gets in the way of your radar. So we’d like 

to get beyond that. 

So the goal here is to not be focusing on an architecture which 

is a closed system fire control system, but an expanded engage-onremote capability. 

Senator REED. Thank you. 

One final quick question, Dr. Miller. New START has been discussed and one of the conditions is that we would not, except for 

grandfathered silos, convert silos to be BMD capable. My understanding is that we have no intention to do that, that it’s actually 

cheaper to build new silos. 

Dr. MILLER. Senator Reed, that’s absolutely correct. The existing 

silos at Vandenberg were grandfathered by the treaty and we have 

no plans to do additional conversions. As I believe General 

O’Reilly’s statement included, in fact, if we were to go forward with 

additional silos it would be cheaper to build new ones than to convert. 

Senator REED. So if that was a key negotiating point, we gave 

something away that we weren’t going to use anyway. That would 

be my comment, not yours. Thank you. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Reed. 

Senator Udall. 

Senator UDALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Good morning, gentlemen. I want to thank the chairman too for 

his patience and for staying here and giving me an opportunity to 

ask some questions as well this morning. 

Dr. Miller, thank you for your commonsense explanations of New 

START. There are certainly voices that I think have in some cases, 

977 

whether intentionally or not, muddied the waters. I for one look 

forward to the treaty coming to the floor of the Senate. I can’t 

imagine we wouldn’t find the votes to ratify it, in part because of 

your incisive and helpful explanations of what is included. 

If I might, I’d like to follow on and talk a little bit about NATOizing European missile defense. I know that there have been some 

positive statements issued on the PAA, but there has been no collective endorsement by the NATO heads. I understand the administration is hoping to secure such an endorsement at the Lisbon summit later. 

Can you discuss any progress that’s been made within the alliance on this subject? 

Dr. MILLER. Senator Udall, we began conversations with our 

NATO allies about the PAA as we were conducting the BMDR, so 

they were not surprised as we went forward with this approach, 

and in fact very shortly thereafter issued a statement of support 

as an alliance for PAA for Europe. 

Since then we’ve continued discussions as we’ve moved forward 

with first agreement by Poland to host a land-based site, then 

agreement by Romania to do the same. As we discussed earlier, 

we’re moving forward with the Czech Republic in developing a 

shared early warning capability as well. 

With respect to command and control, we will continue to work 

within a NATO context. We see the PAA as being the U.S. contribution to a NATO territorial missile defense. Sir, you’re correct, 

we hope that at Lisbon the alliance will in fact approve that as a 

NATO mission. 

Senator UDALL. Doctor, I understand part of the focus is on protecting civilian populations, not that military assets should not be 

protected as well, but there is a focus on civilian populations, is 

there not? 

Dr. MILLER. As the system develops through its phases, by phase 

three we have the capability for territorial defense of NATO Europe, which would include defense of populations. 

Senator UDALL. Thank you. 

Dr. MILLER. Earlier phases would, of course, have the same capability, but just not over the same breadth of geographic area. 

Senator UDALL. Thank you for that. 

General O’Reilly, good to see you. We’re proud, in Colorado, to 

host the Missile Defense Integration and Operations Center at 

Schriever. I always look forward to going down there and at least 

understanding a bit of what’s going on down there, because we 

have such smart people there on the ground. 

I understand you’ve created a new program this year, the PTSS 

and it would enhance the effectiveness of all missile defense systems and reduce reliance on land- and sea-based sensors. Given the 

ongoing challenges in space acquisition, which we have talked 

about in other ways this morning, can you assure the committee 

that this program can be delivered in a timely way, at a reasonable 

cost? As a follow-on, can you explain why the MDA is planning on 

acquiring a satellite capability when the Air Force has primary expertise for space systems? 

General O’REILLY. Sir, the PTSS, the strategy to develop it was 

based on many studies in the past of what were the challenges and 

978 

problems with previous satellite development programs. Two of 

them were the requirements being quite large on a small package; 

and second was to use technology that wasn’t mature at the time 

the program started. 

So the PTSS was designed to be a very simple satellite system, 

and that’s a key hallmark of it, is the size of it. It is designed to 

stare at certain parts of the Earth and do just that and transmit 

down what it sees for fusing with our battle management control 

systems on the ground. So we believe the strategy that was laid out 

and the cost estimates—we’ve had several independent cost estimates and we’ve been very conservative to ensure that this can be 

developed on the timeline stated and in fact endure setbacks and 

still be developed on the timeline stated, and the costs are very 

conservative for this. The approach is very simple and we did that 

intentionally in order to ensure we don’t have problems in executing this. 

The MDA actually will not manage the satellite aspect of this 

program. It is a system, though, that involves the command and 

control, the whole fire control system, the information transmitting 

and so forth. So the entire network needs to be integrated into our 

Aegis system especially and our GMD system. That’s the expertise 

and the integration that MDA brings. 

We are utilizing the Navy research lab and Johns Hopkins University, which have a history of successful launches of these size 

of satellites, in order for us to verify we understand the requirements, again going back, looking at the history of satellite programs and where they’ve had trouble. We want to assure we know 

what we’re going to ask industry to build. 

At that point we will compete the satellite system for development. Ultimately, sir, you’re correct, the Air Force will be managing this and therefore they have an Air Force cell that’s embedded in our team, so that we ensure that everything we’re developing follows their data management and their ground control systems out at Schriever, which will be operating the system. 

We believe we’ve built a team together, capitalizing on the core 

competencies, and then the MDA has to be the one that is ultimately responsible of delivering a missile defense capability with 

all our fire control systems and utilizing the benefits of those 

space-based sensors. 

Senator UDALL. Thank you for walking me through that process 

and that construct. 

Dr. Miller, Admiral Macy, let me turn to East Asia and the Middle East, the BMDR. Incidentally, I think the SECDEF put together a very comprehensive and helpful approach to missile defense in general. But according to the BMDR, the administration 

plans to tailor the PAA to East Asia and the Middle East. I understand that these regional missile defense architecture plans are 

still in development, so the inventory and resources requirements 

for Aegis and SM–3 and Patriots and THAAD are not certain. 

The BMDR says the Joint Staff and STRATCOM are developing 

a comprehensive force management process, recognizing that the 

regional demand for U.S. BMD assets is likely to exceed supply for 

some years to come. The new PAA to missile defense is likely to 

have significant force structure implications. Have these requireVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:37 May 06, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00984 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\62155.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
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ments been quantified yet and, given the fact that regional demand 

is likely to exceed supply for years to come, when do you think the 

comprehensive force management process will be completed to allocate what seemingly are scarce resources? Admiral Macy, let’s start 

with you. 

Admiral MACY. Senator, we are close to finishing up the initial 

estimate on the global force management issues and processes. 

We’ve been doing a study since last fall when it became apparent 

that this was going to be an issue when you apply a PAA to all 

three major regions with the current missile defense issues. That 

effort has been led by STRATCOM and by my organization, 

JIAMDO, on the Joint Staff. We are bringing that to a close in the 

next few months and we’ll be briefing it up to the Secretary, hopefully by June, if not before, to address the current near-term needs 

of allocating the available ships, interceptors, THAAD units, et 

cetera. 

In the longer term, we will be shortly starting the Joint Capability Mix-3 (JCM–3) study. This is a follow-on from JCM–2 that 

was done a couple of years ago, looking at the sufficiency of interceptors. This one will be, if you will, a repeat where we look at scenarios across the three regions, compare them against the 

COCOMs’ warfighting plans, and understand the implications. We 

don’t expect to be fighting in all three places at one time, but how 

much overlap do you assess or believe? Then this JCM–3 study, as 

it’s going to be called, will be starting soon, and expects to finish 

about this time next year. 

The big difference between it and the previous study is it will 

look not only at interceptors, but it will also look at launch systems, such as ships and THAAD batteries, and it will look at independent sensors such as airborne sensors, TPY–2 radars, and so 

forth. 

Senator UDALL. Thank you. 

Dr. Miller? 

Dr. MILLER. Senator Udall, I’d just add very briefly that DOD 

has an existing global force management process and over the last 

year we’ve worked to integrate missile defense assets into that 

process. I expect that, even with the accelerated purchases of missile defense assets, including THAAD missiles and including SM– 

3 capabilities, that we’ll continue to have to manage that process 

for some years to come. 

Senator UDALL. I see my time has expired, but, Dr. Miller, I assume that in the process of developing these plans we’re also working with the nations in those various theaters that are inclined to 

be supportive of our efforts and would like to be a part of the process of developing further missile defense capabilities? 

Dr. MILLER. Yes, sir, we are. 

Senator UDALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Udall. 

Let me just summarize some of the points that have been made 

on the Phased Adaptive System. There has been a reference made 

to a gap and the reference is to the following: that if, in fact, Iran 

gets foreign assistance, they could have a long-range missile by 

2015 or 2017. Our second missile defense system that would be 

able to defend against a long-range Iranian missile would not be 

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deployed until about 2020. That is characterized as a gap of 3 years 

or so, having one system instead of two. 

Now let’s look at the other side of the equation, where the 

Phased Adaptive System will have far superior radars. They will 

be able to use sensors from many sources, including satellite sensors and airborne sensors. So on the sensor side and the radar side, 

the Phased Adaptive System will be far more capable. 

On the interceptor side, the third site or the old system would 

be limited to ten missiles, which means you could maybe deal with 

five Iranian missiles, and the new system will have many, many 

more interceptors that will be available to it. 

You really have a double gap with the old system. You have a 

radar gap, the old system having far less capable radars, and you 

have a numerical missile or interceptor gap as well with the old 

system. 

Would you agree with that, Dr. Miller? 

Dr. MILLER. Senator, yes, I would agree. I would add that the 

PAA, because we place the forward-based radar in Europe in 2011, 

that will improve our national missile defense capabilities significantly. So, if you will, that’s an implicit gap that was closed by the 

change in approach. We’ll have greater capability, sooner than we 

would have, for the defense of the United States. 

Chairman LEVIN. Greater capability for the ground-based system? 

Dr. MILLER. That’s right. It will tie into the ground-based system. 

Chairman LEVIN. So we’ll have a greater, more capable system 

than we have now in Alaska and California? 

Dr. MILLER. It will augment that system and improve its capabilities. 

Chairman LEVIN. The first defense will be more capable, the second defense will be far more capable than the third site would have 

been, although it will not be available for perhaps 3 to 5 years later 

if Iran gets foreign assistance and comes up with an ICBM. So 

from my perspective, you have at least a double gap if you go to 

the old system compared to at best a very short-term, or at worst, 

a very short-term 3-year gap in having a second system in place. 

General, do you agree with that? Since you’re a General, will you 

generally agree with me on that? 

General O’REILLY. Yes, sir, I would. On top of that, there was 

some discussion about the ability of the GMD system to intercept 

one time. When we have the forward-based sensors, that also gives 

us the ability for GMD itself to intercept more than once, have 

more than one opportunity in the defense from a launch from the 

Middle East. 

Chairman LEVIN. In addition, the more capable radars on the 

new system are moveable; is that correct? 

General O’REILLY. Yes, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. The old radar was fixed at the third site. So 

there are other advantages as well. But I think if people want to 

talk about a gap, the number of gaps are much greater with the 

old system than with the new, at least a double gap with the old 

system, maybe a triple gap, compared to that very short-term soVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:37 May 06, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00986 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\62155.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
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called gap where you just have one system in place, even though 

it’s more capable than having two systems. 

Senator Udall, do you want to ask anything else? 

Senator UDALL. No, thank you. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you all. It’s been a very, very useful 

morning. We appreciate your being here. We’ll stand adjourned. 

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR CARL LEVIN

ADVANTAGES OF PHASED ADAPTIVE APPROACH

1. Senator LEVIN. Secretary Miller, General O’Reilly, and Admiral Macy, please 

list and explain all of the advantages and benefits, as well as the drawbacks, if any, 

of the Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA) for missile defense in Europe, compared to 

the previously proposed third Site missile defense system in Europe. 

Secretary MILLER. A key factor in any comparison between the European PAA 

and the former ‘‘Third Site’’ plan is the updated U.S. ballistic missile threat assessment. The threat from short- and medium-range missiles has developed very quickly. In the face of the growing regional threat, protection for U.S. forces, allies, and 

partners is provided sooner under the PAA than the previous plan. The PAA will 

allow us to field capabilities in the 2011 timeframe; the former Third Site plan 

would have added capabilities in 2017 or 2018. 

The European PAA provides coverage to the area that is most threatened first, 

and expands to cover all of our European North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

(NATO) Allies in the 2018 timeframe. Under the former approach, we did not provide full protection of our NATO Allies, and the areas left unprotected were those 

that were closest to the threat. 

With the PAA, we are able to deploy systems that are capable against larger numbers of missiles than the previous plan. With a ‘‘shot doctrine’’ of two shots per missile, only five threat missiles would be needed to overwhelm the previous architecture. 

The European PAA will improve the capabilities for defense of the United States 

in 2011 with the forward-based radar; which will increase the capabilities of the 

Ground-Based Interceptors (GBI) based in the United States. This improvement in 

defense of the Homeland will be available 6 to 7 years earlier than the previous architecture. 

The new approach is also more cost-effective. We expect requirements to increase 

as the threat grows; thus, it is more cost-effective to use the PAA’s Standard Missile-3 (SM–3), which is less than one-fifth the price of one GBI. 

The new approach also allows for greater cooperation with our allies. NATO’s 

views of missile defense have evolved in recent years. We are seeking a NATO decision to take on territorial defense as a NATO mission. We see positive indicators 

that NATO is interested in doing so, including the unanimous Foreign Ministerial 

statement in December 2009 that the Alliance welcomes the U.S. European PAA. 

The European PAA is also much more flexible than the Third Site approach: The 

SM–3 and other PAA systems are mobile, while the Third Site would have required 

large missiles at fixed locations. 

General O’REILLY. The PAA offers several advantages over the previous approach: 

increased number of interceptors, lower cost, increased coverage, earlier availability, 

increased adaptability, reduced deployment time and wider applicability. 

The previously proposed European missile defense architecture lacked a sufficient 

number of sensors and interceptors to defend against the current and emerging ballistic missile threat from by Iran. Simply put, with a notional two interceptor shot 

doctrine, the 10 GBI interceptors proposed for Poland would easily be overwhelmed 

by a raid size of 6 long-range threat missiles launched towards European targets. 

Furthermore, the GBIs would have been unable to defend against shorter-range ballistic missiles that threaten U.S. deployed forces and allies in the region. 

The Department of Defense (DOD) now plans to deploy missile defenses in Europe 

through a PAA that will combine stronger sensor networks with an Aegis SM–3- 

based architecture to provide a flexible defense against an uncertain and growing 

missile threat. Each of the four phases that comprise the European PAA (EPAA) 

will leverage more capable variants of the SM–3 missiles as they become available. 

The SM–3 is more affordable than GBIs and increases the cost-effectiveness of a European missile defense (you can buy four to seven production variants of the SM– 

3s (IA or IB) for the cost of one GBI). 

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The previous program did not cover most of Southeastern Europe, which today is 

exposed to Medium-Range Ballistic Missile (MRBM) threats. The previous program 

would not have been available until 2017 and was not adaptable to changes in future threats to Europe. Under the EPAA, however, we will begin deployment of missile defense capabilities in 2011 (Phase I). Additionally, by fielding mobile capabilities in phases, combatant commanders can adapt their missile defense architectures 

to address the uncertainty of future missile threats. These systems can be deployed 

in any theater in a reasonably short period of time. 

Finally, efforts over the next several years to develop, test, and procure the sensor, command and control, and interceptor upgrades for deployment of the EPAA architecture have application in theaters other than Europe. 

Admiral MACY. The PAA offers several advantages over the previous approach: increased number of interceptors, lower cost, increased coverage, earlier availability, 

increased adaptability, reduced deployment time and wider applicability. 

The previously proposed European missile defense architecture lacked a sufficient 

number of sensors and interceptors to defend against the current and emerging ballistic missile threat from by Iran. Simply put, with a notional 2 interceptor shot doctrine, the 10 GBI interceptors proposed for Poland would easily be overwhelmed by 

a raid size of 6 long-range threat missiles launched towards European targets. Furthermore, the GBIs would have been unable to defend against shorter-range ballistic 

missiles that threaten U.S. deployed forces and allies in the region. 

DOD now plans to deploy missile defenses in Europe through a PAA that will 

combine stronger sensor networks with an Aegis SM–3-based architecture to provide 

a flexible defense against an uncertain and growing missile threat. Each of the four 

phases that comprise the European PAA (EPAA) will leverage more capable 

variants of the SM–3 missiles as they become available. The SM–3 is more affordable than GBIs and increases the cost-effectiveness of a European missile defense 

(you can buy four to seven production variants of the SM–3s (IA or IB) for the cost 

of one GBI). 

The previous program did not cover most of Southeastern Europe, which today is 

exposed to MRBM threats. The previous program would not have been available 

until 2017 and was not adaptable to changes in future threats to Europe. Under the 

EPAA, however, we will begin deployment of missile defense capabilities in 2011 

(Phase I). Additionally, by fielding mobile capabilities in phases, combatant commanders can adapt their missile defense architectures to address the uncertainty of 

future missile threats. These systems can be deployed in any theater in a reasonably short period of time. 

Finally, efforts over the next several years to develop, test, and procure the sensor, command and control, and interceptor upgrades for deployment of the EPAA architecture have application in theaters other than Europe. 

2. Senator LEVIN. Secretary Miller, General O’Reilly, and Admiral Macy, Phase 

4 of the PAA to missile defense in Europe is planned to have the capability, using 

the SM–3, Block IIB variant interceptor, to defeat potential future long-range Iranian missiles in the 2020 timeframe. There has been a suggestion that, since Iran 

might, with sufficient foreign assistance, be able to develop a long-range missile by 

2015, there is a 5-year gap between our missile defense capability and Iran’s potential for an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capability. Please provide your 

views on whether such a gap would exist. 

Secretary MILLER. No, there would not be a gap in our capability. The United 

States is currently protected against any attacks from North Korea or Iran if they 

were able to develop an effective ICBM capability today. This protection is a result 

of investments made over the past decade in a system based on ground-based midcourse defense (GMD). Because of continuing improvements in the GMD system and 

the number of GBIs now deployed compared to potential North Korean and Iranian 

long-range ballistic missile capabilities, the United States possesses a capability to 

counter the projected threat from North Korea and Iran for the foreseeable future. 

Given uncertainty about the future ICBM threat, including the rate at which it 

will mature, it is important that the United States maintain this advantageous position. In order to maintain this position we will: continue to develop existing capabilities for our GMD system, complete the second field of 14 silos at Fort Greely, deploy 

new sensors in Europe to improve cueing for missiles launched at the United States, 

invest in further development of the SM–3 for future land-based deployment in Europe, increase investments in sensors and early intercept kill systems to help defeat 

missile defense countermeasures, and advance other hedging strategies including 

continued development and assessment of a two-stage GBI and directed energy technologies. 

983 

General O’REILLY. There is no ‘‘gap’’ in which the United States would be unprotected from potential Iranian long-range ballistic missile threats. The United States 

is already protected against limited long-range ballistic missile attacks, including 

against current and projected future threats from Iran. As part of the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS), the GMD element, with missile fields at Fort Greely, 

AK, and Vandenberg Air Force Base, CA, provides continuous operational capability 

to protect the Homeland against ICBMs. Given the uncertainties of future ICBM 

threats, including the rate at which they will mature, we plan to preserve our position of advantage by maintaining and enhancing our current midcourse defense capabilities. 

To that end, we will continue development of technologies to enhance SM–3 

variants to defeat longer-range ballistic missiles. With deployments of the SM–3 IIA 

(2018) and SM–3 IIB (2020) in Europe, we will augment Homeland defenses by 

intercepting long-range ballistic missiles earlier in their flight. 

Admiral MACY. There is no ‘‘gap’’ in which the United States would be unprotected from potential Iranian long-range ballistic missile threats. The United States 

is already protected against limited long-range ballistic missile attacks, including 

against current and projected future threats from Iran. As part of the BMDS, the 

GMD element, with missile fields at Fort Greely, AK, and Vandenberg Air Force 

Base, CA, provides continuous operational capability to protect the Homeland 

against ICBMs. Given the uncertainties of future ICBM threats, including the rate 

at which they will mature, we plan to preserve our position of advantage by maintaining and enhancing our current midcourse defense capabilities. 

To that end, we will continue development of technologies to enhance SM–3 

variants to defeat longer-range ballistic missiles. With deployments of the SM–3 IIA 

(2018) and SM–3 IIB (2020) in Europe, we will augment Homeland defenses by 

intercepting long-range ballistic missiles earlier in their flight. 

3. Senator LEVIN. Secretary Miller, General O’Reilly, and Admiral Macy, isn’t it 

true that the currently deployed GMD system has the ability to defend the United 

States from a potential future Iranian long-range missile threat? 

Secretary MILLER. Yes, the current GMD system is designed to protect the United 

States against limited ICBM attacks. This capability is a result of investments made 

over the past decade. Because of continuing improvements in the GMD system and 

the number of GBIs now deployed compared to potential North Korean and Iranian 

long-range ballistic missile capabilities, the United States possesses a capability to 

counter the projected threat from North Korea and Iran for the foreseeable future. 

General O’REILLY. Yes. The United States is already protected against limited 

long-range ballistic missile attacks, including projected future threats from Iran. By 

the end of fiscal year 2010, 30 GBIs will be deployed as part of the BMDS. This 

capability will defend the Homeland for the foreseeable future from the potential 

ballistic missile threats from Iran. 

Admiral MACY. Yes. The United States is already protected against limited longrange ballistic missile attacks, including projected future threats from Iran. By the 

end of fiscal year 2010, 30 GBIs will be deployed as part of the BMDS. This capability will defend the Homeland for the foreseeable future from the potential ballistic missile threats from Iran. 

4. Senator LEVIN. Secretary Miller, General O’Reilly, and Admiral Macy, please 

describe the capability of our current GMD system and the capability planned with 

future GMD upgrades. 

Secretary MILLER. By the end of fiscal year 2010, a total of 30 GBIs will be deployed as part of the BMDS. Given the continuing improvements planned for the 

GMD element, 30 operational GBIs will defend the Homeland for the foreseeable future against the projected threat from North Korea and Iran. Eight additional 

empty silos, and storage of test and spare GBIs, will provide a hedge against any 

unanticipated ICBM threat growth. We will conduct stockpile surveillance of GBIs 

by testing all limited life components as GBIs are refurbished through 2032. Data 

collected from future GMD flight tests, results from the age surveillance program, 

and future intelligence estimates regarding the pace of ICBM growth will inform decisions on the need to procure additional GBIs. We continue to upgrade GMD to increase reliability and survivability and expand the ability to leverage new BMDS 

sensors as well as test GMD to accredit our simulations. 

The President’s fiscal year 2011 budget request provides a substantial investment 

in the GMD element, a total of $5.9 billion across the Future Years Defense Plan 

(FYDP) intended to ensure the GMD element remains viable over the long term. We 

are requesting $1.3 billion in fiscal year 2011 for GMD to continue our GBI refurbishment and reliability sustainment programs to: help sustain the fleet to 2032 and 

984 

support a service life extension decision around 2027; procure an additional 5 GBIs; 

complete Missile Field 2 in a 14-silo configuration to accommodate a contingency deployment of eight additional GBIs; upgrade GMD Fire Control ground system software to ensure GMD leverages BMDS increased discrimination and tracking capability as sensor, data fusion, and battle management network matures; and complete the installation of a second GMD command and control node at Fort Greely, 

AK. Additionally, we will continue operations and sustainment of the Sea-Based Xband radar (SBX) platform to prepare for transfer of the SBX operations to the U.S. 

Navy in 2012. 

General O’REILLY. The GMD system forms the foundation of our Homeland missile defense against limited ICBM attack today. By the end of fiscal year 2010, a 

total of 30 GBIs will be deployed as part of the BMDS with 26 at Fort Greely, AK 

and 4 at Vandenberg Air Force Base, CA. Given the continuing improvements 

planned for the GMD element, 30 operational GBIs will defend the Homeland for 

the foreseeable future against the projected threat from North Korea and Iran. 

Eight additional empty silos and storage of test and spare GBIs will provide a hedge 

against unanticipated ICBM threat growth. We will conduct stockpile surveillance 

of GBIs by testing all limited life components as GBIs are refurbished through 2032. 

Data collected from future GMD flight tests, results from the aging and surveillance 

program, and future intelligence estimates regarding the pace of ICBM growth will 

inform decisions on the need to procure additional GBIs. 

We continue to upgrade GMD to increase reliability and survivability, expand the 

ability to leverage new BMDS sensors, and test GMD to accredit our models and 

simulations. Since the beginning of fiscal year 2009, MDA has delivered five new 

GBIs, upgraded Fire Control and Command Launch Equipment software, completed 

construction of a second GBI missile field at Fort Greely, AK, and delivered a new 

silo and an additional In-Flight Interceptor Communication System Data Terminal 

at Vandenberg Air Force Base, CA. Additionally, we are completing the missile defense upgrades to the Upgraded Early Warning Radar (UEWR) in Thule, Greenland, 

and we have transferred operation of the Cobra Dane Early Warning Radar and the 

Beale and Fylingdales UEWRs to the Air Force. We are continuing planning and 

design work to upgrade the Clear, AK Early Warning Radar. 

The President’s fiscal year 2011 budget request provides a substantial investment 

in the GMD element, a total of $5.9 billion across the FYDP ensuring the GMD element remains effective and viable over the long term by funding element and system improvements. We are requesting $1.3 billion in fiscal year 2011 for GMD to 

continue our GBI refurbishment and reliability sustainment programs to help sustain the fleet to 2032 and support a service life extension decision around 2027; procure an additional 5 GBIs; complete Missile Field 2 in a 14-silo configuration to accommodate a contingency deployment of 8 additional GBIs; upgrade GMD Fire Control ground system software to ensure GMD leverages BMDS increased discrimination and tracking capability as sensor, data fusion and battle management network 

matures; and complete the installation of a second GMD command and control node 

at Fort Greely, AK. Additionally, we will continue operations and sustainment of the 

SBX radar platform to prepare for transfer of the SBX operations to the U.S. Navy 

in 2012. 

Admiral MACY. The GMD system forms the foundation of our Homeland missile 

defense against limited ICBM attack today. By the end of fiscal year 2010, a total 

of 30 GBIs will be deployed as part of the BMDS with 26 at Fort Greely, AK, and 

4 at Vandenberg Air Force Base, CA. Given the continuing improvements planned 

for the GMD element, 30 operational GBIs will defend the Homeland for the foreseeable future against the projected threat from North Korea and Iran. Eight additional empty silos and storage of test and spare GBIs will provide a hedge against 

unanticipated ICBM threat growth. We will conduct stockpile surveillance of GBIs 

by testing all limited life components as GBIs are refurbished through 2032. Data 

collected from future GMD flight tests, results from the aging and surveillance program, and future intelligence estimates regarding the pace of ICBM growth will inform decisions on the need to procure additional GBIs. 

We continue to upgrade GMD to increase reliability and survivability, expand the 

ability to leverage new BMDS sensors, and test GMD to accredit our models and 

simulations. Since the beginning of fiscal year 2009, MDA has delivered five new 

GBIs, upgraded Fire Control and Command Launch Equipment software, completed 

construction of a second GBI missile field at Fort Greely, AK, and delivered a new 

silo and an additional In-Flight Interceptor Communication System Data Terminal 

at Vandenberg Air Force Base, CA. Additionally, we are completing the missile defense upgrades to the UEWR in Thule, Greenland, and we have transferred operation of the Cobra Dane Early Warning Radar and the Beale and Fylingdales 

985 

UEWRs to the Air Force. We are continuing planning and design work to upgrade 

the Clear, AK Early Warning Radar. 

The President’s fiscal year 2011 budget request provides a substantial investment in the GMD element, a total of $5.9 billion across the FYDP ensuring the GMD element remains effective and viable over the long term by funding element and system improvements. We are requesting $1.3 billion in fiscal year 2011 for GMD to 

continue our GBI refurbishment and reliability sustainment programs to help sustain the fleet to 2032 and support a service life extension decision around 2027; procure an additional 5 GBIs; complete Missile Field 2 in a 14-silo configuration to accommodate a contingency deployment of 8 additional GBIs; upgrade GMD Fire Control ground system software to ensure GMD leverages BMDS increased discrimination and tracking capability as sensor, data fusion and battle management network 

matures; and complete the installation of a second GMD command and control node 

at Fort Greely, AK. Additionally, we will continue operations and sustainment of the 

SBX radar platform to prepare for transfer of the SBX operations to the U.S. Navy 

in 2012. 

GMD ENHANCEMENT

5. Senator LEVIN. General O’Reilly, Phase 1 of the European PAA includes the 

planned deployment in the 2011 timeframe of a forward-deployed AN/TPY–2 radar 

in southeastern Europe. You have indicated that this deployment will enhance the 

capability of the GMD system to defend against a potential future threat from Iran. 

Please describe the GMD capability enhancement that will come from such a deployment. For example, will the deployment of the AN/TPY–2 allow a more efficient use 

of GBIs against a potential future Iranian ICBM threat, or even permit a ‘‘shootlook-shoot’’ firing doctrine? 

General O’REILLY. The United States plans to deploy missile defenses to counter 

more immediate regional ballistic missile threats to our forward-deployed troops and 

to our Allies in Europe. These plans involve a forward-deployed radar in Europe 

that will improve Homeland defense by detecting and tracking threat missiles 

launched out of the Middle East much earlier in the threat trajectory and provide 

high quality tracking information to the GMD element. This will increase the U.S. 

defended area performance and provide increased shoot-look-shoot capability across 

a greater portion of the United States. 

COMMITMENT TO FLY-BEFORE-YOU-BUY

6. Senator LEVIN. Secretary Miller, one of the key points of the Ballistic Missile 

Defense Review (BMDR) is the policy that missile defense systems must be tested 

realistically and successfully to permit deployment. According to the BMDR, ‘‘Before 

new capabilities are deployed, they must undergo testing that enables assessment 

under realistic operational conditions.’’ Are DOD and the administration fully committed to operationally realistic testing and demonstrating capability before deploying new missile defense capabilities? 

Secretary MILLER. The administration is committed to deploying capabilities that 

have been proven under extensive testing and assessment and are affordable over 

the long term. To strengthen the testing program, a number of steps are being 

taken. Working in close partnership with the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation, as requested by Congress, the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) announced a 

new approach to testing in June 2009. 

This program projects necessary test activities over the full course of each system’s development, not just 2 years into the future as under the former program. 

These activities include a comprehensive set of ground and flight tests designed to 

demonstrate operational performance and validate models used to support an evaluation of system effectiveness. The new master plan is to be reviewed and updated 

semiannually. This new approach will be evaluated after 1 year of experience (June 

2010), and any necessary adjustments will be made at that time. 

7. Senator LEVIN. Dr. Gilmore, General O’Reilly, and Admiral Macy, do you agree 

that this fly-before-you-buy approach is the right approach to take? 

Dr. GILMORE. Senator Levin’s opening statement noted DOD has adopted a policy 

of requiring realistic and operational testing to demonstrate that our missile defense 

systems work before we deploy them. I agree that this ‘‘fly-before-you-buy’’ approach 

is correct. The MDA’s Integrated Master Test Plan (IMTP), if successfully executed, 

should put into practice this approach and, over time, provide the data needed to 

evaluate quantitatively levels of confidence in the system’s performance. My office 

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will continue to work closely with the MDA, the BMDS Operational Test Agency, 

and the Combatant Commands to assure that system capabilities are adequately 

demonstrated by realistic testing prior to transitioning those systems to the acquiring services. 

General O’REILLY. A key tenet of the BMDR is to sufficiently test the capabilities 

and limitations of a missile defense system before we begin procurement, or ‘‘fly before we buy.’’ As such, missile defense projects are subject to production decisions 

by USD(AT&L). Additionally, we use the Services’ standard material release and 

operational certification processes that also rely on developmental and operational 

test data prior to formally fielding initial capability. 

Admiral MACY. Absolutely. Testing new systems under operationally realistic conditions before committing to full-scale procurement is a key factor in ensuring the 

reliability of fielded assets. 

OPERATIONAL TESTING NOW PLANNED

8. Senator LEVIN. Dr. Gilmore, for years I have been asking if the missile defense 

test plan included dedicated operational tests, and the answer has always been: No. 

This has been a disappointment, especially since some of the systems were deployed 

operationally. Does the current IMTP include plans for dedicated operational tests? 

If so, how soon would they begin? 

Dr. GILMORE. The current IMTP does include plans for dedicated operational testing. Operational testing, both ground and flight testing, is planned for each phase 

of the PAA. In fiscal year 2012 (post Phase 1), the MDA intends to conduct a system-level operational test, FTO–1, featuring three ballistic missile targets to be 

intercepted by Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (Aegis BMD) (version 3.6.1), Terminal 

High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), and Patriot. FTO–2 is planned for fiscal year 

2015 (Phase 2) and is a BMDS operational system-level flight test against five ballistic missile targets to be intercepted by GMD, Aegis BMD, THAAD, Aegis Ashore, 

and Patriot. FTO–3 is planned for fiscal year 2018 (Phase 3) and is a BMDS operational system-level flight test against five ballistic missile targets employing the 

same elements as FTO–2 but in their upgraded configurations. The IMTP does not 

currently address Phase 4 testing that would be conducted in fiscal year 2020. 

Additionally, Aegis BMD will conduct flight test FTM–15 in third quarter fiscal 

year 2011 and THAAD will conduct flight test FTT–13 in second quarter fiscal year 

2011. Both of these operationally realistic flight tests are planned to demonstrate 

capability against intermediate and medium range ballistic missiles, respectively, 

and to support my assessment of the PAA Phase 1 capability prior to the planned 

fiscal year 2011 deployments of these systems to the European theater. The MDA 

also plans to conduct ground testing of the command, control, battle management, 

and communications system in fiscal year 2011 to support the Phase 1 implementation. 

9. Senator LEVIN. Dr. Gilmore, has your organization reviewed and approved the 

plans for any such operational tests? 

Dr. GILMORE. My staff, along with the MDA, the combatant commands, and the 

BMDS Operational Test Agency participated in the development of the IMTP. Director, Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) has been involved in the evaluationbased strategy underpinning the IMTP since General O’Reilly initiated its development in December 2008. In addition to detailed and day-to-day staff involvement in 

the formulation of the IMTP, I personally participated in a number of executivelevel reviews and provided comments and guidance to the MDA. I approved the 

IMTP, which includes plans for operational testing. I expect that as the IMTP is 

executed, I will continue to review and approve the detailed operational test plans 

that support all significant BMDS operational testing, and that the realism of the 

testing conducted will increase over time. 

NO ICBM TESTS YET

10. Senator LEVIN. Dr. Gilmore, in your prepared testimony, you note that the 

GMD system ‘‘has not yet attempted an intercept of an ICBM target.’’ Since the purpose of the GMD system is to defend the United States against ICBMs, and it has 

not demonstrated such a capability, does this fact affect your assessment of the 

operational capability of GMD to defeat ICBM threats? 

Dr. GILMORE. As discussed in my February 2010 report to Congress assessing ballistic missile defense, GMD Flight tests FTG–02, FTG–03a, and FTG–05 demonstrated that the GMD has a limited capability to intercept a simple ballistic misVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:37 May 06, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00992 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\62155.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
987 

sile threat. Although the MDA used target missiles for these flight tests that did 

not duplicate the ranges that define ICBMs, re-entry vehicles that exhibited characteristics of ICBM re-entry vehicles were used. These tests provided data for a small 

portion of the substantial GMD performance envelope. The MDA is developing an 

ICBM class target. The current IMTP includes six GMD flight tests using these 

ICBM targets beginning in the third quarter of fiscal year 2015. Data obtained from 

these flight tests will inform future assessments. 

11. Senator LEVIN. Dr. Gilmore, if the GMD system demonstrates a capability to 

intercept ICBM targets, will that increase your confidence in the capability of the 

system? 

Dr. GILMORE. Test data from intercepts of ICBM targets are only some of the data 

I will need to determine a quantitative assessment of confidence in the capability 

provided by GMD. I will also need verified, validated, and accredited models and 

simulations that accurately replicate GMD performance. All the GMD flight tests 

and ground tests will be used to accomplish this task. These accredited models and 

simulations would then allow evaluation in the areas of the GMD performance envelope that are necessary for assessment but may be impossible to test due to safety 

or environmental reasons. The newly revised IMTP lays out a plan to obtain the 

data needed to rigorously accredit these models. 

NO OBJECTIVE BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM ASSESSMENT POSSIBLE YET

12. Senator LEVIN. Dr. Gilmore, in your prepared testimony, you state that ‘‘the 

ability to conduct comprehensive and objective assessments of BMDS capability is 

still a number of years away,’’ and that ‘‘it will take as many as 5 to 7 years’’ to 

collect the test data needed to validate models for missile defense capability. Does 

that mean that the ‘‘comprehensive and objective assessments’’ of our missile defense capability are at least 5 to 7 years away? 

Dr. GILMORE. Based upon the testing described in the most recent IMTP, my assessment is that it will take 5 to 7 years to collect the data needed to support rigorous, comprehensive, quantitative assessments of BMDS performance. During this 

time, however, there will be opportunities to complete limited verification, validation, and accreditation (VV&A) of some models and simulations. This should allow 

for some similarly limited quantitative assessments of the performance of selected 

BMDS elements. 

13. Senator LEVIN. Dr. Gilmore, since you note that there has been a history of 

missile defense test failures and delays, what affect would such delays in the future 

have on the schedule for collecting the necessary data and conducting the ‘‘comprehensive and objective assessments’’ you mentioned? 

Dr. GILMORE. In the IMTP, each test is designed to collect data for VV&A of the 

models and simulations. These data elements are defined as either Critical Engagement Conditions (CECs) or Empirical Measurement Events (EMEs). The IMTP is 

revised every 6 months. When a test failure occurs, preventing collection of planned 

CECs/EMEs, the IMTP revision process, in which my office participates, reviews the 

current test program for opportunities to collect the CECs/EMEs using other tests 

or to add new tests, as necessary. This is the case with the recent failure during 

FTG–06. FTG–06a is being planned and will be incorporated in a revised IMTP. 

No test plan as complex as the IMTP has ever been executed exactly as planned. 

There are always unforeseen system responses and failures that occur and require 

adjustments to the test plan. If such problems do not arise, it likely means that the 

testing being conducted is not robust. The delays in collecting data caused by test 

failures could vary from several months to more than 1 year depending upon many 

details including the BMDS element involved in the test and the targets used in 

the test. 

14. Senator LEVIN. General O’Reilly, do you agree with Dr. Gilmore that only subjective assessments of the missile defense system capability are possible to date, and 

not objective assessments, because of the lack of test data? 

General O’REILLY. I concur with the January 2010 DOT&E assessment that ‘‘if 

MDA can execute the IMTP as planned, successful VV&A of BMDS models and simulations should result, enabling quantitative and objective rather than subjective assessments of the BMDS capability in the future.’’ I further agree with the DOT&E 

conclusion that ‘‘objective assessments of the BMDS capability are still a number 

of years in the future.’’ 

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FTG–06 FLIGHT TEST PROBLEM

15. Senator LEVIN. General O’Reilly, what went wrong with the most recent GMD 

flight test at the end of January, FTG–06? 

General O’REILLY. Although we have had three intercepts out of three previous 

attempts (FTG–02, FTG–03a, FTG–05) using the GMD system, our newest variant 

of the kill vehicle, relying on data from the Sea-Based X-band (SBX) radar, failed 

to intercept a target in January 2010 during FTG–06, a flight test to measure 

GMD’s performance closer to its maximum operational intercept range. The GBI 

launched successfully from Vandenberg Air Force Base (VAFB) and the newly designed LV–2 long-range target successfully flew for the first time out of the Reagan 

Test Site in the Kwajalein Atoll 7,500 km away. 

The target complex was acquired and initially tracked by the SBX in the Pacific 

and track data was provided to GMD Fire Control (GFC). A Weapons Task Plan was 

generated and transmitted to the Command Launch Equipment located at VAFB. 

A GBI was then launched from an operationally-configured GMD silo, at VAFB. 

After the GBI launched, the SBX ceased providing data to the GFC earlier than 

planned. 

Even without target position updates from the SBX, the Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle (EKV) transitioned to target acquisition mode, but, due to an on-board failure, 

the EKV was unable to intercept the target. The SBX and EKV failures are under 

investigation by the FTG–06 Failure Investigation Team. 

Despite the failure to intercept, we collected extensive system and component performance data on the SBX, the GBI, the EKV, and the target. We discovered new 

failure modes for the SBX, the EKV flew more than twice the distance it had flown 

in previous tests, and we collected significant new data on its ability to acquire and 

track the target. 

During FTG–06, we obtained model validation data on CECs related to long interceptor time-of-flight. We collected EME data on EKV performance against a complex 

ballistic missile threat scene and a medium closing velocity intercept. As a result, 

current deployed systems will benefit from FTG–06 because it advanced simulation 

development and confirmed BMDS performance metrics. 

16. Senator LEVIN. General O’Reilly, when do you expect the Failure Review 

Board to complete its assessment? 

General O’REILLY. A Failure Investigation Team was chartered on February 4, 

2010 to investigate and determine the precise root cause of failure. The failure investigation is expected to continue for several more months before root-cause is determined and verified. The expected date for completion of a final report including 

an assessment of the failure is August 2010. 

17. Senator LEVIN. General O’Reilly, what do you plan to do about fixing the problems? 

General O’REILLY. I intend to implement corrective actions once the root cause of 

the failure is confirmed. 

18. Senator LEVIN. General O’Reilly, will you repeat the test after you think you 

have fixed the problem? 

General O’REILLY. Yes, I intend to repeat the test as soon as feasible after the 

root cause of the failure is confirmed and we have implemented corrective actions. 

19. Senator LEVIN. General O’Reilly, what implications are there, if any, for currently deployed systems? 

General O’REILLY. After a final report and assessment of the failure is provided, 

we will examine any implications to the deployed BMDS. 

NEW START AND MISSILE DEFENSE

20. Senator LEVIN. Secretary Miller, General O’Reilly, and Admiral Macy, there 

have been some concerns expressed by critics that the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) constrains our BMD program. Does the treaty constrain U.S. 

missile defense capabilities or programs? 

Secretary MILLER. The New START treaty does not constrain the United States 

from deploying the most effective missile defenses possible, nor does the New 

START treaty add any additional cost or inconvenience to our missile defense plans. 

As the BMDR, our budget submission and projections, and the U.S. unilateral statement made in connection with the New START treaty all make clear, the United 

States will continue to improve its missile defenses throughout the next decade. 

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The New START treaty touches on missile defense in three parts: in the Preamble, in Article V, and in the unilateral statements made by both Russia and the 

United States. 

The Preamble of the Treaty contains a statement acknowledging the interrelationship of strategic offensive and strategic defensive arms. President Obama and President Medvedev recognized in their Joint Understanding of July 2009 that this relationship will become more important as strategic offensive arms are reduced; they 

note current strategic defensive forces do not threaten to undermine the effectiveness of the Parties’ strategic offensive arms. 

Regarding the treaty’s ban in Article V, paragraph 3, on the conversion of ICBM 

or SLBM launchers to missile defense interceptor launchers and vice versa, MDA 

Director Lieutenant General O’Reilly has made clear that this ban does not constrain MDA’s plans. Should additional missile defense launchers be needed, we 

would build the smaller, much less expensive, tailor-made GBI silos rather than 

convert costly ICBM silos. Moreover, use of SLBM launchers for missile defense 

interceptors is an unattractive option and would be unreasonably expensive. 

Russia’s unilateral statement made in connection with the treaty raises the possibility of Russian withdrawal from the treaty if qualitative and quantitative improvements in U.S. missile defense were to threaten the viability of the Russian strategic 

nuclear deterrent. In fact, both sides have the right to withdraw from the treaty 

under Article XIV if they deem it necessary due to extraordinary developments 

which threaten supreme national interests. Such withdrawal clauses are common in 

treaties, especially in the case of arms control agreements. The U.S. unilateral 

statement takes note of the Russian statement but makes clear that U.S. missile 

defense systems do not threaten Russia and that the United States intends to continue to deploy improved missile defense systems to defend the U.S. Homeland from 

limited attacks and to defend collaboratively its deployed forces, allies, and partners 

against regional threats. 

General O’REILLY. The New START treaty does not impede the development and 

fielding of U.S. missile defenses, and it eliminates START constraints on development and testing. The New START treaty does not contain limitations that impact 

the U.S. plan to develop and field missile interceptor systems. 

Specifically, missile defense targets will no longer be subject to START constraints 

which limited and complicated MDA use of air-launched and waterborne launches 

of target missiles. Use of these targets is essential for the cost-effective testing of 

missile defense interceptors against medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles in the Pacific region. 

Admiral MACY. The New START treaty does not place constraints on missile defense testing programs as did START, which banned production, testing, or deployment of ballistic missiles or their launchers on waterborne vehicles other than submarines. This same ban also applied to air-to-surface ballistic missiles. New START 

has done away with these prohibitions and provides MDA with more flexibility in 

its testing capabilities. New START also has no constraints on MDA to conduct missile launches from any number of space launch facilities as the previous START had 

limited. 

21. Senator LEVIN. General O’Reilly, there were suggestions that, rather than negotiating a New START, we should simply extend the previous START I agreement. 

You have expressed the view that the previous START constrained our missile defense testing options. If we had extended the previous START I agreement, would 

that have perpetuated the constraints on our missile defense testing options? 

General O’REILLY. Yes. MDA’s intermediate-range LV–2 target missile system, 

used in key tests to demonstrate Homeland defense capabilities and the first phase 

of the new PAA to missile defense, was accountable under the START because it 

employs the first stage of the now-retired long-range Trident I SLBM. Due to the 

LV–2’s accountability under START it was subject to START movement reporting, 

launch location restrictions and telemetry collection and sharing requirements. 

These constraints limited the value the of LV–2 target system in BMDS testing by, 

among other things, restricting the number of locations from which the LV–2 could 

be launched. 

22. Senator LEVIN. General O’Reilly, from your perspective, is the New START 

better than the old START from a missile defense testing and development standpoint? 

General O’REILLY. The New START treaty does not impede the development and 

fielding of U.S. missile defenses, and it eliminates START constraints on development and testing. The New START treaty does not contain limitations that impact 

the U.S. plan to develop and field missile interceptor systems. 

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Specifically, because the Trident I is not included in the New START treaty the 

LV–2 is no longer subject to START constraints. This will allow MDA to examine 

alternative LV–2 target launch sites for more efficient test architectures and geometries by exploring other ways to make use of this target that is now free from 

START constraints. The result is that MDA will be able to improve BMDS performance for defense of the Homeland and examine efficiencies and enhancements to the 

BMDS testing program by taking advantage of new flexibilities, as well as opportunities to reduce cost. 

MISSILE DEFENSE COOPERATION WITH RUSSIA

23. Senator LEVIN. Secretary Miller, in your prepared testimony, you state that 

‘‘the administration has given special emphasis to renewing cooperation with Russia 

on missile defense,’’ and that ‘‘we are making a concerted effort to identify areas 

where the United States and Russia can pursue meaningful cooperation’’ on missile 

defense. You then describe a number of options being considered, including ‘‘sharing 

data gathered by existing U.S. and Russian radar installations; conducting collaborative missile defense flight tests; and undertaking experiments that would combine 

data from U.S. ground- and space-based sensors with data from Russian sensors 

such as the radars at Qabala, Azerbaijan and at Armavir, in southern Russia.’’ Do 

you agree that such cooperation with Russia would send a powerful signal to Iran 

that we are united against their threatening policies and programs? 

Secretary MILLER. Yes. Cooperation with Russia on missile defense would send a 

powerful signal to Iran that Russia and the United States are working together to 

counter the threat posed by Iran’s proliferating of ballistic missiles and pursuit of 

nuclear capability. 

24. Senator LEVIN. General O’Reilly and Admiral Macy, do you believe such cooperation, particularly sharing radar data on missile launches, and cooperative 

flight tests, would be beneficial to our missile defense capabilities? 

General O’REILLY. Yes, we continue to support expert dialogue on cooperative efforts with the Russian Federation, whose surveillance radars would enhance our 

ability to monitor ballistic missile development and flight testing in Southwest Asia. 

There are opportunities for us to cooperate in sharing our sensor data, our future 

research and development, and our command and control activities and exercises in 

order to build confidence between both sides that we’re not threatening each other, 

but we are building ourselves a defense against the proliferation of these missiles. 

Admiral MACY. Yes, we continue to support expert dialogue on cooperative efforts 

with the Russian Federation, whose surveillance radars would enhance our ability 

to monitor ballistic missile development and flight testing in Southwest Asia. There 

are opportunities for us to cooperate in the areas of shared sensor data, research 

and development, and command and control activities and exercises in order to 

build confidence between both sides that we’re not threatening each other, but we 

are building ourselves a defense against the proliferation of these missiles. 

25. Senator LEVIN. Admiral Macy and General O’Reilly, do you think it is technically possible that the PAA to missile defense could provide defensive coverage of 

parts of western Russia against Iranian missiles? 

Admiral MACY. Yes, it is technically possible. 

General O’REILLY. Yes, it is technically possible. 

CONTRACTOR PERFORMANCE

26. Senator LEVIN. General O’Reilly, you have expressed disappointment with the 

poor quality of some contractors’ performance, including the failure of an airlaunched target in an important THAAD flight test. Please describe your quality 

concerns, using specific examples. 

General O’REILLY. After the failure of a target missile in a THAAD test last December we convened a Failure Review Board. This board determined that a contractor had unacceptably low standards of engineering rigor, quality control and 

mission assurance which led to the root cause failure. Subsequently, we suspended 

the use of air-launched targets and prohibited the use of ballistic targets contracted 

or subcontracted from that contractor. MDA is awaiting evidence of improvement at 

the contractor before we continue funding. 

991 

27. Senator LEVIN. General O’Reilly, what steps are you taking to rectify the poor 

performance of the contractors and to ensure sustained quality improvements in the 

future? 

General O’REILLY. The precision of missile defense systems requires stringent 

manufacturing standards and quality control of all products. We have had many 

successes in improving our prime contractor and supplier quality assurance. In each 

case, companies were willing to identify shortfalls, invest in new capital assets and 

attain experienced leadership in changing cultures to establish the enduring discipline required to consistently deliver precision missile defense products. However, 

not all companies have sufficiently improved. 

Until we complete planned competitions with updated contract incentive types appropriate for the particular phase of development (e.g., firm fixed price, cost plus 

award fee, etc.) and defect clauses, we will continue to motivate senior industry 

management to improve through intensive inspections, low award fees, issuance of 

cure notices, stopping the funding of new contract scope, and documentation of inadequate quality control performance to influence future contract awards. We are increasing emphasis on competition at all phases of a program’s acquisition life cycle 

to ensure the highest performance and quality standards are sustained throughout 

development. 

Additionally, over the past year, we have initiated a new target acquisition strategy to increase competition, improve quality control, and reduce costs. 

AEGIS ASHORE TEST FACILITY AUTHORIZATION

28. Senator LEVIN. General O’Reilly, last year Congress appropriated $68.5 million for construction of an Aegis Ashore Test Facility at the Pacific Missile Range 

Facility in Hawaii to permit testing of the planned land-based SM–3 interceptor system for Europe. However, the request came after the Defense Authorization process 

was complete, and there was not enough information available for us to authorize 

the project separately. Senator McCain and I filed a separate bill to authorize the 

project as soon as the project information was complete, but we understand that 

DOD is seeking to have Congress authorize the project, as an amendment to the 

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010. Is it correct that DOD 

needs this Aegis Ashore Test Facility authorized now, in order to permit the testing 

that is needed to maintain the President’s schedule for Phase II of the PAA to missile defense in Europe in the 2015 timeframe? 

General O’REILLY. Yes, authorization of the $68.5 million of fiscal year 2010 Military Construction (MILCON) funding for the Aegis Ashore Missile Defense Test 

Complex (AAMDTC) at the Pacific Missile Range Facility in Hawaii is needed before 

we can carry out the project. The funds must be placed on contract in the first half 

of fiscal year 2011 to meet Aegis Ashore development and test schedules. 

In Phase II of the PAA, the first operational Aegis Ashore system will be installed 

in Romania in fiscal year 2015. The AAMDTC provides an operationally realistic environment to prove the effectiveness and suitability of Aegis Ashore prior to deployment in a host nation and is consistent with the Department’s fly-before-you-buy approach. 

If the Department does not receive authorization of the $68.5 million of MILCON 

in fiscal year 2011, the availability of the land-based SM–3 Block IB to be fielded 

in Phase II will be delayed a year, to the end of 2016. Therefore, fiscal year 2011 

authorization of the fiscal year 2010 MILCON funding of $68.5 million for the 

AAMDTC is crucial. 

29. Senator LEVIN. Secretary Miller, is DOD still planning to meet the President’s 

2015 schedule for Phase II? 

Secretary MILLER. Yes. 

ACQUISITION OVERSIGHT PROCESS

30. Senator LEVIN. General O’Reilly, the MDA has a unique high-level acquisition 

oversight process through an organization called the Missile Defense Executive 

Board (MDEB). The BMDR stated that this process is adequate, and there is no 

need to place MDA under the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) process. Can you 

explain why you and DOD believe the MDEB process is sufficiently rigorous, and 

why you believe it is a better mechanism than the DAB would be? 

General O’REILLY. The characteristics of the MDEB acquisition oversight process 

are uniquely suited to managing the BMDS. For example: 

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- MDEB meets more frequently on the BMDS than similar boards (e.g., Defense Acquisition Board) that govern a broader mission area across the 

DOD. 

- The MDEB leadership and decisionmakers (USD(AT&L) and VCJCS) 

have more BMDS-specific information available to them concerning the focused BMD mission area. 

- The MDEB as well as the Deputy Secretary of Defense-directed Life Cycle 

Management Process, enables collaboration between the acquisition and requirements decision authorities. 

The Government Accountability Office (GAO) recently reported (GAO 10–311) on 

the MDA acquisition process stating ‘‘importantly, the Director has begun new initiatives and in accordance with guiding principles of DOD’s acquisition policies, 

which already embrace knowledge-based practices and sound management controls.’’ 

ESTABLISHING ACQUISITION BASELINES

31. Senator LEVIN. General O’Reilly, you have stated your plan to establish acquisition baselines for a number of components of your program, including cost, schedule, performance, and testing. This is something that GAO has been recommending 

for many years, and something this committee has encouraged also. Previous MDA 

directors have said they would establish such baselines, but it did not happen. Specifically what baselines are you planning to establish, and how will they be used 

to help manage and evaluate your acquisition programs? 

General O’REILLY. MDA has established six baselines (resource, schedule, technical, test, contract, and operational baselines) to plan and manage the execution 

of missile defense projects. I approve the baselines of technology development programs, and jointly sign with lead Service Acquisition Executives the baselines of 

MDA projects in product development. These six baselines not only assist in our 

cost-effective management of MDA projects, but also provide transparency and accountability to the MDEB and Congress on the progress of our execution. The cost 

(resource), schedule, performance (technical), and test baselines being established 

this spring will be submitted to Congress in a BMDS Accountability Report in June. 

We will update the baselines, as required, through the MDA Program Change Board 

process. Finally, the baselines for the Product Development projects will form the 

basis for USD(AT&L) production decisions. 

32. Senator LEVIN. General O’Reilly, are you committed to establishing these 

baselines and providing them to Congress, as well as to the MDEB and to GAO? 

General O’REILLY. Yes. The baselines will provide the basis for our annual report 

to Congress (BMDS Accountability Report), which is also provided to USD(AT&L) 

and GAO. 

PATRIOT DEPLOYMENTS TO POLAND

33. Senator LEVIN. Secretary Miller, your prepared testimony indicates that Poland has ratified the supplemental Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) with the 

United States, which covers the stationing of U.S. military personnel in Poland in 

association with missile defense. I understood that at some point after that ratification, the United States would begin rotational deployments of a U.S. Army Patriot 

battery for training purposes in Poland. Is that rotational deployment of a Patriot 

training battery still on track, and if so, when will it begin? 

Secretary MILLER. The rotational deployment of a Patriot training battery is still 

on track. The Polish ratification of the Status of Forces Supplemental Agreement 

took place on February 26, 2010, and the deployment will begin within 90 days of 

Poland’s ratification. 

34. Senator LEVIN. Admiral Macy, does this rotational deployment to Poland have 

an impact on our planning and force management for possible contingency deployment of Patriot capabilities elsewhere? 

Admiral MACY. There is an impact but it is manageable. Planning and force management for possible contingencies elsewhere is a normal part of all deployments 

and operations. When any unit is engaged in a mission for a finite amount of time— 

such as a 30-day rotational deployment to Poland—the combatant command will assess how it will meet directed contingency missions elsewhere and plan accordingly. 

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR CLAIRE MCCASKILL

NATO AND THE PHASED ADAPTIVE APPROACH

35. Senator MCCASKILL. Secretary Miller, I think everyone in NATO can agree 

that Iran is a clear and dangerous threat. But I know our allies have many questions about the new European PAA. France, for example, has publicly expressed 

concerns. Like me, they want to know about cost, implementation, and effectiveness 

of this program. In particular, in these economically strained times, I am wondering 

how NATO allies are looking to the future on funding this program. You have 

Greece in financial crisis and our smaller allies, such as the Baltic States, really 

straining to contribute to missions in Afghanistan, address their important economic 

needs, and keep their publics in support of broader NATO missions. Please explain 

what kind of cost implication the new PAA strategy has for NATO allies and whether they are enthusiastic about participating or not. 

Secretary MILLER. At the NATO Foreign Ministerial in December 2009, Allies 

unanimously stated, ‘‘We welcome the new PAA of the United States to missile 

defence, which further reinforces NATO’s central role in missile defence in Europe.’’ 

In addition, Romania and Poland have agreed to host land-based sites in of the European PAA in 2015 and 2018 respectively. Thus, even amidst financial challenges, 

NATO members have embraced the collective importance of missile defense in recognition of the evolving threat. 

The United States will fund the European PAA. This U.S.-funded European PAA 

will be the U.S. contribution to NATO’s missile defense efforts. NATO and Allies 

including the French, Germans, Dutch, Greeks, Italians, and Spanish have focused 

their missile defense efforts in recent years on missile defense systems to protect 

deployed forces from shorter-range ballistic missile threats. These NATO countries 

already possess, or are acquiring, missile defense capabilities. 

NATO is also developing a command and control network called the Active Layered Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (ALTBMD) program that will allow Allies to 

link their missile defense assets together. ALTBMD could allow current and future 

NATO national systems-including those of the United States-to be able to ‘‘plug-andplay’’ with the overall NATO effort and the PAA assets. 

NATO is currently funding the component of ALTBMD that will provide command 

and control for defense of deployed forces only. Allies’ costs for territorial missile defense in Europe would come from the potential expansion of ALTBMD, including 

command and control linkages for Allies’ territorial missile defense efforts. NATO 

has funded a study to examine the implications and costs of expanding ALTBMD’s 

mission to include command and control (C2) for defense of territory. 

36. Senator MCCASKILL. Secretary Miller, if the United States is going to burden 

the lion’s share of the cost, which I expect it will, how are those costs factored into 

the new cost of the system? 

Secretary MILLER. The President’s budget request for fiscal year 2011 includes 

$2.7 billion for regional missile defense. If appropriated, this will begin funding the 

conversion of additional Aegis ships to be BMD capable, and the purchase of additional SM–3 interceptors, THAAD batteries, and AN/TPY–2 radars, along with covering other costs associated with the PAA for Europe. The FYDP will also reflect 

the longer-term cost associated with European PAA. 

NEW START

37. Senator MCCASKILL. Secretary Miller, I applaud you all for your efforts in getting New START signed. That is a great step with Russia and an important step 

related to nuclear arms reductions. But in my experience, there is usually a tradeoff 

for most advances with the Russians. Where are you in dissuading Russia from delivering to Iran the S–300 anti-aircraft system? 

Secretary MILLER. We have continued to make clear to the Russian government 

that we oppose the delivery of the S–300 and believe it would be a destabilizing and 

counterproductive step given Iran’s refusal to live up to its international obligations 

and that Russia and the United States are currently discussing possible new U.N. 

sanctions on Iran. We are pleased that, to date, Russia has not delivered the system. However, to date Russia has declined to cancel the sale. 

38. Senator MCCASKILL. Secretary Miller, if Iran were to get the system, would 

it be a setback to our missile defense deterrent, as Iran has recently boasted? 

Secretary MILLER. If Iran were to acquire the S–300 air defense system, it would 

not affect the deterrent and defensive value of our missile defenses. However, we 

994 

have continued to make clear to the Russian Government that we oppose the delivery of the S–300 and believe it would be a destabilizing and counterproductive step 

given Iran’s refusal to live up to its international obligations. 

ISRAELI MISSILE DEFENSE

39. Senator MCCASKILL. Secretary Miller, when Under Secretary Flournoy discussed missile defense before this committee last September, she said that Israel 

had not explicitly consulted on the new PAA but that the system would be compatible with Israel’s ongoing missile defense programs. Are you confident that our new 

PAA is able to be integrated with Israel’s missile defense system? 

Secretary MILLER. Israel was not explicitly consulted about our change in missile 

defense approach for Europe. However, the United States and Israel coordinate extensively on missile defense issues. We have a long history of cooperative research 

and development, which has borne fruit in the deployment of Israel’s Arrow missile 

defense system. Arrow is interoperable with U.S. systems. The United States and 

Israel also cooperate on missile defense operational issues through a program of 

joint exercises. The PAA—particularly its emphasis on advanced mobile BMD systems—is an advantageous framework when applied to ballistic missile defense cooperation with Israel. The applicability of this approach was successfully examined 

at recent exercises, such as the U.S.-Israel Juniper Cobra exercise. 

40. Senator MCCASKILL. Secretary Miller, please explain what value added Israel 

will get from the new PAA in terms of protection and strategic advantage. Is Israel 

more protected by the new system? 

Secretary MILLER. The increase in investments in regional missile defense assets 

and flexible capabilities associated with a PAA to regional missile defense, which 

can surge into the region in times of a political-military crisis, would benefit Israel. 

Our missile defense cooperation with Israel is already advanced and will continue. 

In addition to conducting major missile defense exercises with Israel, the most recent of which occurred in November 2009, the United States and Israel continue to 

meet regularly and coordinate extensively on a wide range of missile defense plans 

and operations. Moreover, our extensive support for Israel includes deployment of 

a US forward based AN/TPY–2 X-band radar to Israel, and support for Israeli missile defense programs such as the existing Arrow Weapons System, Arrow-2 production, Arrow-3 development, and the development of a new program, David’s Sling, 

for defeating short-range ballistic missiles. 

41. Senator MCCASKILL. Secretary Miller, how will the new PAA approach provide 

added protection to our friends in the Gulf? 

Secretary MILLER. The United States will pursue a PAA within each region that 

is tailored to the threats unique to that region, including their scale, the scope and 

pace of their development, and the capabilities available and most suited for deployment. 

In the Persian Gulf, the United States has a continuous missile defense presence 

and seeks to build on the Bilateral Air Defense Initiative to strengthen cooperation. 

The United States is also working with a number of partners in the region on purchases of missile defense capabilities under the auspices of the foreign military sales 

program. 

42. Senator MCCASKILL. Secretary Miller, is this system integrated with our efforts in Israel? 

Secretary MILLER. Israel’s missile defense assets are designed to be interoperable 

with U.S. systems. 

PAKISTAN AND INDIA

43. Senator MCCASKILL. Secretary Miller, I’d like to push more on how the new 

PAA approach affects countries to the north and east of Iran, which the Pentagon 

has not addressed much. Can you explain how, if at all, Pakistan (which borders 

Iran) fits into the new PAA calculus? 

Secretary MILLER. While Pakistan is an important security partner, we are not 

engaged in missile defense cooperation activities at this time. 

44. Senator MCCASKILL. Secretary Miller, what missile defense protection do the 

Pakistanis currently receive from U.S. assets in the region? 

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Secretary MILLER. While Pakistan is an important security partner, we are not 

engaged in missile defense cooperation activities with Pakistan at this time. 

45. Senator MCCASKILL. Secretary Miller, will the Aegis ship approach provide 

them with any additional protection? 

Secretary MILLER. While Pakistan is an important security partner, we are not 

engaged in missile defense cooperation activities with Pakistan at this time. 

46. Senator MCCASKILL. Secretary Miller, I know India has recently done testing 

for its own missile defense systems, including its interceptors. Where are we in 

terms of integrating our own missile defense strategy with India, and how is Iran 

factored into our mutual calculus, if at all? 

Secretary MILLER. In the 2005 ‘‘New Framework for the U.S.-India Defense Relationship,’’ the governments of the United States and India agreed to expand collaboration relating to missile defense. This resulted in three successful U.S.-India missile defense table-top exercises and a bilateral meeting in 2008 to discuss ideas for 

further cooperation. We look forward to continued cooperation with India. 

47. Senator MCCASKILL. Secretary Miller, how will the new PAA (and sea-based 

approach) help India, if at all? 

Secretary MILLER. India is an important security partner, but we do not have 

operational missile defense cooperation activities with India at this time. 

MISSILE DEFENSE CAPABILITY

48. Senator MCCASKILL. Admiral Macy and General O’Reilly, section 125 of the 

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 requires the Secretary of 

the Navy to submit a joint review with the head of the MDA to set forth requirements for investment in Aegis BMD-capable cruisers and destroyers. Please provide 

the status of where this review is headed with respect to determining the final number of Aegis ships that will be equipped with missile defense capabilities. 

Admiral MACY and General O’REILLY. Navy and the MDA completed the requested report and forwarded to Congress on April 19, 2010. The conclusions of the 

report state: 

‘‘Navy and MDA have jointly concluded that the plan for 38 funded surface combatants with Aegis BMD (by fiscal year 2015) contained in PB11 reflects an achievable balance of capacity and capability, while sustaining the requisite number of 

multi-mission Aegis cruisers and destroyers deployed worldwide to meet concurrent 

surface combatant requirements. The plan is consistent with QDR force-sizing guidance. Further increases to BMD capacity through additional new construction Aegis 

ships beyond those contained in Navy’s 30-Year Shipbuilding Plan are not considered necessary.’’ 

49. Senator MCCASKILL. Admiral Macy, what percentage of your future cruisers 

and destroyers (not the current fleet) are planned to be missile-defense capable? 

Admiral MACY. Under the program of record, 33 of the Navy’s 88 Aegis ships will 

be BMD capable by the end of the FYDP (2015), for a total of 43 percent. Under 

the current modernization plan, this percentage is expected to increase to 75 percent 

by 2025 and approach 100 percent by 2030. 

50. Senator MCCASKILL. Secretary Miller, I recently returned from a trip to Afghanistan that also included time at NATO headquarters in Brussels, where I received briefings on missile defense and met with key NATO allies on the implications of the new PAA to missile defense. Many of the allies I spoke with were interested in how we plan to resource and distribute our missile defense—capable Aegis 

assets and how they will be included in that calculus. Where are U.S. European 

Command (EUCOM) and U.S. Central Command in the planning process for testing 

of Aegis systems in the EUCOM area of responsibility (AOR)? 

Secretary MILLER. The Department will rely on the Global Force Management 

(GFM) process to assist in decisions on the allocation of missile defense forces 

among the geographical combatant commands. 

The GFM process is designed to adjudicate competing requirements from the various combatant commands. This approach underscores the value of developing capabilities that are flexible and adaptive and also relocatable, so that they can be 

surged into regions, as necessary. 

The United States will test PAA assets including Aegis systems prior to their deployment. Most of our operational testing takes place in the Pacific using our test 

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range and the missile defense test monitoring equipment there. Our missile defense 

assets are or will be tested before they are deployed to the combatant commanders’ 

AORs. 

51. Senator MCCASKILL. Secretary Miller, are we on track for tests to begin in 

2011? 

Secretary MILLER. Our missile defense assets are or will be tested before they are 

deployed to the Combatant Commanders’ areas of responsibility. For example, those 

Aegis BMD ships that are currently deployed have already been tested and are fully 

operational. 

52. Senator MCCASKILL. Secretary Miller, which allies will be included in that 

process and to what extent? 

Secretary MILLER. As part of our Phase 1 architecture, we plan to deploy a forward-based radar in Southeastern Europe. The other assets that are to be deployed 

as part of Phase 1 of the European PAA are sea-based and will not require any formal bilateral cooperation other than that which already exists for such activities as 

port calls, refueling, etc. 

In addition, the United States will continue its cooperative efforts with NATO Allies. The PAA aligns U.S. missile defense plans in Europe more closely with Allies’ 

existing missile defense efforts. NATO missile defense efforts in recent years have 

focused on missile defense systems to protect deployed forces from shorter range ballistic missile threats. Several NATO countries already possess or are acquiring missile defense capabilities. For example, several have PATRIOT systems (Netherlands, 

Germany, and Greece). Italy, Germany, and the United States are cooperatively developing the Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS). Others have expressed interest in acquiring systems like Patriot and the SM–3. NATO is also developing a command and control network that will allow Allies to link their missile 

defense assets together, called the ALTBMD program. ALTBMD could allow current 

and future national systems—including those of the United States—to ‘‘plug-andplay’’ with the overall NATO effort and the PAA assets. 

53. Senator MCCASKILL. Secretary Miller, I know that some allies have a greater 

comfort level than others with Russian involvement in building the missile defense 

‘‘roof,’’ so to speak, over Europe. Are you considering including Russia in any Aegisrelated exercises or activities, either bilaterally or through the NATO forum? 

Secretary MILLER. We are continuing bilateral discussions with Russia on missile 

defense cooperation focusing on a broad agenda that includes shared early warning 

of missile launches, possible technical cooperation, and even eventual operational cooperation with Russia. We believe we share common interests in missile defense cooperation, and are undertaking a common threat assessment as an initial cooperative step. 

We are also exploring NATO-Russia missile defense cooperation. As Secretary 

Clinton said in April 2010, ‘‘Following the restart of the NATO-Russia Council last 

December and the recent signing of the New START treaty, there is considerable 

momentum within the alliance for moving ahead with Russia on areas of common 

concern and shared responsibility. We are exploring how best to work within the 

NATO-Russia Council itself and we are committed to obtaining greater transparency and practical cooperation on issues like missile defense.’’ 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MARK UDALL

PRECISION TRACKING SPACE SYSTEM

54. Senator UDALL. General O’Reilly, I’d like to follow up on my questions about 

MDA’s acquisition of the Precision Tracking Space System (PTSS) program. As I understand this program, it will grow on the lessons learned in the Space Tracking 

Space System (STSS) program, eventually fielding 9 to 12 satellites and associated 

ground stations. You indicated that the PTSS program is being managed by Johns 

Hopkins University and the Naval Research Lab (NRL), as they have a proven track 

record for launching satellites of this size. It is my understanding that these organizations have a history of providing experimental satellites, but I am not aware that 

they have experience with the acquisition of an operational satellite constellation. 

What operational space programs has the NRL or Johns Hopkins fielded? 

General O’REILLY. The Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory 

(APL) and the NRL have a long history of developing prototype space systems and 

transitioning them to Government operational elements with industry suppliers. 

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The PTSS plan is for APL and NRL, in collaboration with laboratory partners such 

as Sandia National Labs, Massachusetts Institute of Technology Lincoln Labs, and 

Utah State University’s Space Dynamics Lab, to conduct a prototyping effort for 

PTSS and transition the production effort to industry. MDA does not intend for APL 

or NRL to field the operational PTSS. 

MDA is implementing Service Cells within the PTSS project office—a lesson 

learned from the experience transferring Cobra Dane Upgrade from MDA to the Air 

Force in early 2009. Specifically, Service representatives embedded in BMDS program offices during development improve MDA-Service interaction, transparency 

and program efficiency. 

In April and May 2010, the Air Force and MDA conducted discussions for an Air 

Force Space Command cell in the PTSS project office in anticipation that the Air 

Force will be designated as Lead Service of PTSS. The final arrangements are being 

worked with the envisioned objective for the Air Force to have overall authorities 

for PTSS doctrine, organization, training, leadership and education, personnel and 

facilities. In June 2010 the Navy and MDA will discuss a similar, embedded cell arrangement for the Navy to leverage PTSS capability from an overall architecture 

aspect in support of missile defense with the next generation radar suite aboard 

Navy surface combatants. 

55. Senator UDALL. General O’Reilly, what operational space programs of this 

scale has MDA fielded? 

General O’REILLY. None. However, MDA fielded several space programs of similar 

scale as the PTSS prototype program. On September 25, 2009, MDA launched the 

STSS. While PTSS will be less complex than STSS, we are similarly pursuing the 

simultaneous development, test, and launch of two spacecraft. Another example includes the successful Near Field Infrared Experiment, launched in April 2007. 

A more complex space program undertaken by MDA is the Mid-Course Space Experiment launched in April 1996. Although not a dual spacecraft manifest, this system compares similarly to PTSS in several areas, most notably in the optical telescope and multi-band tracking payload. 

MDA has not fielded a constellation of operational spacecraft of the scale proposed 

for the PTSS. 

56. Senator UDALL. General O’Reilly, you also mentioned an Air Force cell within 

MDA working on the PTSS program. Please respond with their roles, responsibilities, and authorities. 

General O’REILLY. In anticipation of Air Force’s designation as Lead Service for 

PTSS, MDA and the Air Force have begun preliminary discussions on an Air Force 

cell in the PTSS Project Office. We envision the Air Force will have overall authorities for PTSS doctrine, organization, training, leadership and education, personnel, 

and facilities. Final roles, responsibilities, and authorities are still pending. 

57. Senator UDALL. General O’Reilly, please discuss the planned interoperability 

of this satellite system with other Air Force systems. 

General O’REILLY. PTSS will be an element within the BMDS and interface within the broader U.S. National Security Space enterprise. We plan for PTSS to connect 

with the Air Force Satellite Control Network and other U.S. communication system 

assets, and the system will interface with Air Force and government overhead persistent infrared systems (OPIR). That interface will provide real time coordinated 

tasking between the PTSS, the BMDS, and the external OPIR systems as well as 

real time data dissemination of OPIR data necessary to develop state vector cues 

to the PTSS. The MDA is working with the joint OPIR community to develop a plan 

for posting PTSS data to the real time data service to make it accessible to other 

mission areas such as missile warning, technical intelligence, and space situational 

awareness. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN

NEW START AND MISSILE DEFENSE RESTRICTIONS

58. Senator MCCAIN. Dr. Miller, I appreciate the administration’s persistence 

against the numerous attempts by Russia to link missile defense to START. Nonetheless, in a recent interview, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev stated that he 

would consider withdrawing from the New START should the U.S. missile defense 

program in Europe create an imbalance. How do you perceive what the Russians 

mean by imbalance? 

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Dr. MILLER. We view Russia’s concern about imbalance as a hypothetical situation 

where our missile defense capabilities might be able to undermine the credibility of 

Russia’s strategic deterrent. 

Various American interlocutors repeatedly told their Russian counterparts that 

the PAA in Europe will not pose a threat to Russia because the United States does 

not view Russia as an adversary and the capabilities to be deployed during each 

phase will not pose a threat to Russian offensive missile forces. 

The missile defense interceptors we are planning to deploy as part of the European PAA will not have the speed necessary to intercept Russian ICBMs heading 

to the United States. 

In addition, the relatively small numbers of GBIs deployed at Fort Greely, AK, 

and Vandenberg Air Force Base, CA, designed to defeat first generation North Korean and Iranian ICBMs will not have significant capability against Russia’s strategic deterrent, which, under the New START treaty will include well over 1,000 

warheads deployed on several hundreds of advanced ICBMs and SLBMs. 

For these reasons, we do not believe that U.S. missile defenses will threaten Russia’s strategic deterrent, nor that Russia will have a legitimate missile defense-related reason to withdraw from the New START treaty. 

59. Senator MCCAIN. Dr. Miller, can you assure me that Russia will not have veto 

power within this administration going forward on the design, development, and deployment of our missile defenses? 

Dr. MILLER. Yes. During the course of the New START treaty negotiations, U.S. 

officials, including President Obama, repeatedly told their Russian counterparts 

that the United States would not accept any constraints on its ability to develop and 

deploy ballistic missile defenses to protect the U.S. Homeland and to defend our deployed forces, allies, and partners from regional missile threats. And, true to our 

declarations, we did not agree to any provision under New START that would constrain our missile defense programs. 

As the U.S. unilateral statement regarding missile defense, the BMDR, and our 

budgetary plans all make clear, the United States will continue to improve our missile defenses, as needed, to defend the U.S. Homeland, our deployed forces, and our 

allies and partners. 

60. Senator MCCAIN. Dr. Miller, are DOD and the administration fully committed 

to the development and procurement of the SM–3 block IIA and block IIB, irrespective of Russian concerns? 

Dr. MILLER. DOD and administration are committed to developing and deploying 

the missile defense assets needed to protect ourselves and our allies from the threat 

of ballistic missiles from defiant states, such as Iran and North Korea. Our plans 

include the SM–3 Block IIA and the IIB. 

The United States will continue to address stated Russian concerns over our future BMD capabilities, and we plan to continue to engage Russia on a broad range 

of cooperative initiatives, as well as on transparency and confidence-building measures. However, this will not limit the U.S. ability to develop and procure the capabilities we need. 

61. Senator MCCAIN. Dr. Miller, given this administration’s eagerness towards 

pursuing arms control, why should we not believe the Russians will hold future missile defense endeavors hostage by threatening to back out of New START? 

Dr. MILLER. The United States made clear to Russia that it would reject any restraints on our ability to provide protection from ballistic missile threats to the U.S. 

Homeland, our deployed forces, allies, and partners. As the U.S. unilateral statement regarding missile defense, the BMDR, and our budgetary plans all make clear, 

the United States will continue to improve our missile defenses, as needed, to defend the U.S. Homeland, our deployed forces, and our allies and partners. 

NORTH KOREAN AND IRANIAN THREAT

62. Senator MCCAIN. Dr. Miller and General O’Reilly, according to an unclassified 

DOD report on Iran sent to Congress on April 19, 2010, Iran with ‘‘sufficient foreign 

assistance . . . could probably develop and test an ICBM capable of reaching the 

United States by 2015.’’ If the Iranian or North Korean threat were to evolve faster 

than predicted, is the MDA ready and poised to expedite development, testing, and 

fielding of the PAA? 

Dr. MILLER. The United States is currently protected against the attacks that 

North Korea or Iran would be able to launch if they were able to develop an ICBM 

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capability. This protection is a result of investments made over the past decade in 

a system based on GMD. Continuing improvements in the GMD system and the 

number of GBIs now deployed gives us confidence that we can meet a potential 

North Korean and Iranian long-range ballistic missile threat. 

In addition to improving the GMD system, the United States is also pursuing several other hedging strategies for defense of the Homeland against a ballistic missile 

attack. For example, the United States will continue development and assessment 

of a two-stage GBI. We will also pursue multiple paths to develop and deploy ballistic missile sensors, including both airborne and space-based detection and tracking systems. 

The Department also plans to complete the construction of Missile Field 2 in Fort 

Greely, AK, by emplacing the full 14 GBI silos and making those silos operationally 

ready. This will both replace older, inadequate silos from Missile Field 1 and provide a Reserve capability to deploy rapidly up to eight additional GBIs from the pool 

of interceptors currently designated for testing. Although the Department does not 

currently foresee a need for more than 30 deployed GBIs, these extra operational 

silos will provide an additional hedge against future threat uncertainty. 

General O’REILLY. The United States is already protected against limited longrange ballistic missile attacks, including projected future threats from Iran. As part 

of the BMDS, the GMD element provides continuous operational capability to protect the Homeland against ICBMs. 

By the end of fiscal year 2010, 30 operational GBIs will be deployed as part of 

the BMDS. We plan to preserve our position of advantage by maintaining and enhancing our current midcourse defense capabilities and given continuing improvements planned for the GMD element, 30 operational GBIs will defend the Homeland 

for the foreseeable future against the projected threat from North Korea and Iran. 

Eight additional empty silos and storage of test and spare GBIs will provide a hedge 

against unanticipated ICBM threat growth. 

The United States plans to deploy missile defenses to counter more immediate regional ballistic missile threats to our forward deployed troops and to our Allies in 

Europe. These plans involve a forward-deployed radar in Europe that will provide 

data earlier in the engagement and augment Homeland defense capabilities already 

in place at Fort Greely, AK, and Vandenberg Air Force Base, CA. 

Additionally, we will continue development of technologies to enhance SM–3 

variants to add additional protection to our Homeland in the future. Deployments 

of the SM–3 IIB (2020) in Europe will augment the GMD system with a capability 

to intercept Iranian long-range ballistic missiles early in flight in the regions from 

which they were launched. 

The BMDS IMTP, Version 10.1, lays out the current plan for testing the PAA capabilities. We review and update the IMTP semi-annually to ensure our test program is consistent with MDA priorities, capability development schedules, and funding. 

63. Senator MCCAIN. Dr. Miller and General O’Reilly, what about the testing and 

fielding of the two-stage GBIs? 

Dr. MILLER. The fiscal year 2011 budget request funds continued development 

and testing of the two-stage GBI. The two-stage GBI is scheduled for one booster 

verification flight test in fiscal year 2010 and two intercept flight tests, the first in 

fiscal year 2012 and the second in fiscal year 2016. Any potential operational use 

of the two-stage GBI is yet to be determined. 

General O’REILLY. The schedule for testing the two-stage GBI is part of our overall IMTP objective to collect the data needed to anchor our models and simulation. 

The two-stage GBI test dates are driven by the types of engagements in which we 

need to test the GBI kill vehicle. We will test the two-stage GBI for the first time 

in June 2010 to verify differences between the performance of two-stage and the 

three-stage GBIs. After this test and the subsequent intercept events we believe we 

will have characterized differences between the two and will be able to evaluate the 

performance of a two-stage GBI using data collected from three-stage testing. 

This is possible because the two-stage GBI builds upon the success of the threestage GBI and has many of the same components, except the third stage is removed. 

The two-stage reuses existing flight-qualified components from its three-stage counterpart. Key common components are the Exo-atmospheric Kill Vehicle, BAM electronics, stage 2/3 interstage, and first and second stage motors. As part of the threestage development effort, these common components have undergone ground, flight, 

and qualification testing. Changes from the three-stage GBI are limited to the removal of the third stage motor, relocation of the BAM, and minor modifications to 

navigation and guidance software for the two-stage flight. 

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1DIA, Unclassified Report on the Military Power of Iran, April 2010. 

The most specialized and critical technology in a GBI is the kill vehicle itself and 

the kill vehicle for both the two- and three-stage interceptors is identical. 

NORTH KOREAN AND IRANIAN MISSILE DEVELOPMENT

64. Senator MCCAIN. General O’Reilly, the notion of collaboration between North 

Korea and Iran is not new. Earlier this month, press reports cited that Iran is building a new short-range missile launch site from an existing complex and appears to 

be working with North Korea. Do you currently see any evidence of technology 

transfer between Iran and North Korea? 

General O’REILLY. [Deleted.] 

65. Senator MCCAIN. General O’Reilly, do you agree that estimates on Iran’s 

timeline for ICBM development should take into account North Korean space launch 

and ICBM development? 

General O’REILLY. MDA relies on the Intelligence Community assessments of Iranian long-range missile developments, and defers to the IC. The current DIA assessment is that Iran could develop and test an ICBM capable of reaching the United 

States by 2015 with sufficient, continued foreign support.1

QUALITY CONTROL

66. Senator MCCAIN. General O’Reilly, as I mentioned earlier, contractor performance and a lack of contractor quality control is unacceptable and the description of 

the failed test in December is indicative of the significant impact just one contractor 

can have. While you have ceased to conduct any business with L–3/Coleman, the 

company responsible for the target in that test, I get the impression that L–3/Coleman is just the most recent example, certainly not the only one. During the press 

conference for the fiscal year 2011 budget release, the MDA Executive Director was 

quoted with the following statement: ‘‘I’m not going to name names today, but I’m 

going to tell you we continue to be disappointed in the quality that we are receiving 

from our prime contractors and their subs—very, very disappointed; quality-design 

issues, but more in quality of products delivered, which then results in rework and 

which reserved—because most of these contracts are cost contracts, it costs the taxpayer more.’’ Given the cost-plus nature of many of these contracts and the allegation that reckless failures by contractors are resulting in unnecessary cost increases, 

how do you intend to address these concerns, both proactively within MDA and 

across the DOD? 

General O’REILLY. MDA is committed to improving missile defense acquisition to 

overcome significant flight test delays, target and interceptor failures, cost growth, 

quality control, and program delays we have encountered in the past. 

Moving forward, MDA is implementing the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform 

Act of 2009, including provisions related to contract competition, and it is our intent 

to use greater firm fixed price contracts and defect clauses as we complete planned 

competitions. We are increasing emphasis on competition at all phases of a program’s acquisition life cycle to ensure the highest performance and quality standards are sustained throughout development. 

However, until we complete planned competitions we will have to motivate some 

senior industry management through intensive inspections, low award fees, issuing 

cure notices, consideration of pending quality concerns during funding decisions for 

new contract scope, and documenting inadequate quality control performance to influence future contract awards by DOD. 

67. Senator MCCAIN. General O’Reilly, what steps can be taken to ensure that 

contractors are held responsible to provide quality products without unnecessary increases in cost? 

General O’REILLY. As the Acquisition Executive Agent responsible for Missile Defense, I continue to pursue knowledge-based program performance practices and 

sound management controls in accordance with guiding principles of DOD’s acquisition policies, to include competition-based acquisition. Historical experience has 

demonstrated that competition-based acquisition results in contractors delivering reliable, high-quality products that meet performance specification thresholds within 

the cost and schedule parameters. 

The use of competition-based acquisition is an effective strategy to ensure quality 

control and contain costs for programs. As contracted activities come up for renewal 

1001 

or to adjust the scope of work, vigorous competition is pursued and knowledge 

points are established within contracts so progress can be assessed and alternatives 

evaluated. Competition ensures we have viable, multiple sources to motivate high 

reliability and quality at the lowest cost. Industry reacts to incentives from competition and is motivated to sustain and gain business by providing quality products on 

time and within cost. Vendors whose cost controls or products do not meet required 

metrics are faced with lost business opportunities. Companies must deliver cost-effective, high-quality, reliable products and services to be awarded contracts and win 

competitions, as well as retain contract performance history. Contract performance 

histories re-enforce this approach by informing future contract awards from MDA. 

68. Senator MCCAIN. General O’Reilly, what incentives does a cost-plus contract 

have to have to prevent unnecessary increases in cost resulting from carelessness? 

General O’REILLY. In order to prevent increases in cost, a cost-plus contract must 

have quality and mission assurance incentives. MDA development and sustainment 

cost-plus contracts have incentives that address, at a minimum, a mission success 

performance element. These incentives measure the timeliness and effectiveness of 

contractor performance on events that are key to successful BMDS performance. 

This ensures contractor focus on quality and mission assurance in addition to strict 

adherence of their corporate best practices. In order to prevent or minimize unnecessary cost increases and ensure quality products, cost-plus contracts reward a contractor for achieving performance at or below the set limit of the contract cost. A 

fee structure is also included that appropriately rewards a contractor for delivering 

required products that demonstrate performance. 

Should a contractor fail to achieve cost control and/or performance, award fees are 

appropriately reduced. Consistently poor work or a significant failure may result in 

the contract and/or work scope being restructured or the contract terminated, impacting the current work and award level of the contractor and opening the door 

for competitors to complete remaining work. The contractor’s performance assessment ratings may also be negatively affected, reducing the contractor’s ability to secure future contracts from MDA. FAR Part 46—Quality Assurance requires that 

clause 52.246–3 Inspection of Supplies—Cost Reimbursement be included in cost reimbursement contracts to ensure that no additional fee will be paid to the contractor 

for the correction of defects. 

MDA takes full advantage of cost-plus incentive contracts within a competitionbased acquisition strategy to ensure quality control and contain costs. As contracted 

activities come up for renewal or to adjust the scope of work, vigorous competition 

is pursued and knowledge points are established within the contracts so progress 

can be assessed and alternatives evaluated. Competition ensures we have viable, 

multiple sources to motivate high reliability and quality at the lowest cost. Industry 

reacts to incentives from competition and is motivated to sustain and gain business 

by providing quality products on time and within cost. Vendors whose cost controls 

or products do not meet required metrics are faced with lost business opportunities. 

Companies must deliver cost-effective, high-quality, reliable products and services to 

be awarded contracts and win competitions, as well as retain contract performance 

history. Contract performance histories re-enforce this approach by informing future 

contract awards from MDA. 

SCHEDULE DELAYS

69. Senator MCCAIN. General O’Reilly, in GAO’s recently released Assessment of 

Major Weapons Programs, they boldly asserted that ‘‘the Aegis BMD program is 

putting the SM–3 Block 1B at risk for cost growth and schedule delays by planning 

to begin manufacturing in 2010 before its critical technologies have been demonstrated in a realistic environment.’’ Is it true that technologies will not be fully 

mature until after the decision to produce the first 18 SM–3 Block 1Bs? 

General O’REILLY. The MDA disagrees with the GAO’s assertion that the program 

is putting the SM–3 Block IB missile at risk for cost growth and schedule delays 

by beginning manufacturing in 2010 before its critical technologies have been demonstrated in a realistic environment. 

For the SM–3 Block IB technologies to be fully mature, they must function properly during a flight test in the expected environment. These 18 SM–3 Block IB Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) rounds are being built to support flight testing that will demonstrate the maturity of the critical technologies and 

to prove-out manufacturing processes. 

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70. Senator MCCAIN. General O’Reilly, as concluded by GAO, do you agree that 

such an approach increases the risk of costly design changes in the event unexpected issues arise during testing? 

General O’REILLY. The MDA disagrees with the GAO’s assertion that the program 

is putting the SM–3 Block IB missile at risk for cost growth and schedule delays 

by beginning manufacturing in 2010 before its critical technologies have been demonstrated in a realistic environment. The procurement that is mentioned by the 

GAO in their report is for SM–3 Block 1B developmental test rounds to conduct 

flight testing of the second generation Aegis BMD/SM–3 weapon system. These 

rounds will also be used to validate production line processes. During fiscal year’s 

2010 and 2011, all critical technologies will have completed developmental testing, 

a successful flight test will have been conducted and the manufacturing readiness 

review would have been concluded. Only after the successful testing of these 

RDT&E missiles will an initial production decision be made by the USD(AT&L). 

71. Senator MCCAIN. General O’Reilly, given the key role the SM–3 Block 1B and 

future variants will play within our global missile defense architecture, are you concerned cost growth and schedule delay could greatly impede our ability to field the 

1Bs on schedule and in the quantities budgeted? 

General O’REILLY. The SM–3 Block IB RDT&E rounds purchased in fiscal year 

2010 are necessary to conduct flight test for the second generation Aegis BMD/SM– 

3 weapon system. In addition to providing assets to support test, these rounds will 

also be used to validate production line processes prior to a full rate production decision in 2012. 

MEDIUM EXTENDED AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM

72. Senator MCCAIN. Dr. Miller and General O’Reilly, in their most recent assessment of the Patriot follow-on, MEADS program, GAO assessed that while critical 

technologies are finally becoming mature, the program will likely face an 18-month 

delay and require at least an additional $1 billion to address issues that arose during the program’s preliminary design review (PDR) in 2008. GAO cites progress; 

however, I remain concerned especially in light of recent press reports stating the 

Army ‘‘MEADS is taking too long to develop and has become too expensive.’’ The 

Army is rumored to be in preliminary program transfer discussions with MDA; is 

this true? 

Dr. MILLER. The Department of the Army currently has program support and 

budgetary responsibility for the MEADS program. Discussions regarding a possible 

transfer to the MDA have occurred; however, no decision has been made to date. 

We will consult with Congress regarding any plans to realign this important program. 

General O’REILLY. The Army currently has program support and budgetary responsibility for the MEADS program. Discussions regarding a possible transfer to 

the MDA have occurred; however, no decision has been made to date. 

73. Senator MCCAIN. Dr. Miller and General O’Reilly, is it true that the program 

will need an additional $1 billion and are any additional increases expected? 

Dr. MILLER. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD(AT&L)), along with the Department of the Army, has responsibility for 

this program. According to AT&L, cost, schedule, and performance issues emerged 

during the MEADS PDR, which led to a tri-national Independent Review Team 

(IRT) assessment. The IRT review found that radar development had been delayed 

(leading to cost overruns), the program development and testing were high-risk due 

to tight schedules and engineering concurrency leading to the Critical Design Review (CDR), and the overall management and governance of the program were inefficient and needed to be improved. The IRT determined that the planned MEADS 

Design & Development (D&D) Program of Record (POR) would likely not produce 

the required performance within the original cost and schedule and estimated approximately $1 billion cost growth and a 12–24 months schedule slip in order to correct the identified deficiencies and reduce program risk going forward. 

In late 2008, the National Armaments Directors of the MEADS partner nations 

agreed in principle to proceed with the program to CDR, and agreed to delay the 

CDR by 1 year until August 2010 to mitigate program risks. Concurrently, the partner nations began work on an amendment to the program Memorandum of Understanding to revise the D&D POR and to re-evaluate the expected cost and schedule 

based on the IRT findings. The DOD Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation Office is in the final stages of updating an independent cost estimate that will be 

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available in time to inform the System Program Review, following the CDR later 

this year. At that time, the partner nations will have a full understanding of the 

cost, schedule, and technical maturity of the MEADS program. 

General O’REILLY. The Army currently has program support and budgetary responsibility for the MEADS program. I defer to the Army’s senior leadership on 

questions pertaining to the program’s cost. 

74. Senator MCCAIN. Dr. Miller and General O’Reilly, is 18 months the full extent 

of the schedule delay? 

Dr. MILLER. Please see response to Question #73. 

General O’REILLY. The Army currently has program support and budgetary responsibility for the MEADS program. I defer to the Army’s senior leadership on 

questions pertaining to the program’s schedule. 

75. Senator MCCAIN. Dr. Miller and General O’Reilly, given the international collaboration associated with MEADS, is it true that this program is exempt from traditional DOD acquisition regulations? If so, was or is MEADS in risk of breaching 

Nunn-McCurdy? 

Dr. MILLER. The MEADS program, under co-development in a partnership among 

the United States, Germany, and Italy, is the only active missile defense development program the United States currently has with NATO partners. We believe 

that honoring the U.S. commitments to cooperative program partners is critical. 

According to the USD(AT&L), who along with the Department of the Army has 

responsibility for this program; the MEADS program was designed to adopt many 

of the DOD 5000-series procedures and program documentation standards, but the 

MEADS program is managed by a NATO-chartered Agency. The NATO MEADS 

Management Agency administers the MEADS prime contract and is overseen by a 

tri-national Board of Directors who report to their respective acquisition authorities. 

DOD evaluates program performance in accordance with traditional acquisition 

practices and standards. Although an independent review of MEADS did identify 

significant cost and schedule growth, it is our understanding that MEADS has not 

breached the Nunn-McCurdy thresholds. The DOD Cost Assessment and Program 

Evaluation office is in the final stages of updating an independent cost estimate, 

and the NATO MEADS Management Agency is awaiting a restructure proposal 

from industry that will better define the actual magnitude of cost and schedule 

growth. 

General O’REILLY. The Army currently has program support and budgetary responsibility for the MEADS program. I defer to the Army’s senior leadership and 

the USD(AT&L) on whether the program is at risk for breaching Nunn-McCurdy restrictions. 

76. Senator MCCAIN. Dr. Miller and General O’Reilly, what steps are being taken 

to ensure that the program stays within budget and schedule? 

Dr. MILLER. According to the USD(AT&L), who along with the Department of the 

Army has responsibility for this program, the National Armaments Directors of the 

MEADS partner nations agreed in principle in late 2008 to proceed with the program to Critical Design Review (CDR), but agreed to delay the CDR by 1 year until 

August 2010 to allow time to correct technical issues and mitigate program risks. 

The partner nations agreed to revise the government oversight construct for 

MEADS and approved structural changes proposed within industry systems engineering and management. The NATO MEADS Management Agency and industry 

implemented a number of management and technical recommendations provided by 

an Independent Review Team of the MEADS program. 

The partner nations are working on an amendment to the program Memorandum 

of Understanding to revise further the remainder of the Design and Development 

program to reduce overall risk. The NATO MEADS Management Agency and the 

partner nations involved are re-evaluating the expected cost, schedule, and technical 

maturity of the program through the run-up to the CDR. The DOD Cost Assessment 

and Program Evaluation office is in the final stages of updating an independent cost 

estimate. The Army and OSD are jointly conducting a comprehensive U.S. System 

Program Review, which will be complete following the CDR later this year. At that 

time, each partner nation will have a full understanding of the cost, schedule, and 

technical maturity of the MEADS program. 

General O’REILLY. The Army currently has program support and budgetary responsibility for the MEADS program. I defer to the Army’s senior leadership on actions being taken to ensure the program stays within its budget and remains on 

schedule. 

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77. Senator MCCAIN. Dr. Miller and General O’Reilly, is the Army, the Office of 

the Secretary of Defense (OSD), or MDA looking at any alternatives to a Patriot follow-on system in the event it is determined that MEADS technologies will not materialize on time and within budget? 

Dr. MILLER. The MEADS program, under co-development in a partnership among 

the United States, Germany, and Italy, is the only active missile defense development program the United States currently has with NATO partners. 

Although there have been numerous schedule delays and cost growth in the 

MEADS program, the program is being restructured so that it can better meet its 

cost, schedule, and performance goals. 

When ready, MEADS will offer a replacement for the Patriot system that is more 

capable, more easily sustained, and more mobile. It could be an important part of 

a NATO missile defense effort. At this time, we are not considering alternatives to 

MEADS. 

General O’REILLY. The MDA has not been directed to examine alternatives to the 

MEADS program. MDA is also not aware of any Army or OSD initiatives pertaining 

to a Patriot follow-on system should MEADS not be available. 

78. Senator MCCAIN. Dr. Miller and General O’Reilly, how concerned is DOD with 

the affordability of this program? 

Dr. MILLER. Although there have been numerous schedule delays and cost growth 

in the MEADS program, the program is being restructured so that it can better 

meet its cost, schedule, and performance goals. 

General O’REILLY. Army currently has program support and budgetary responsibility for the MEADS programs. I defer to the Army’s senior leadership and the 

USD(AT&L) on questions pertaining to the affordability of the program. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JEFF SESSIONS

PHASED ADAPTIVE APPROACH

79. Senator SESSIONS. General O’Reilly, the central difference between the previous plan for missile defense in Europe and the PAA is the substitution of SM– 

3 missiles in Romania and Poland for the 10 long-range GBIs intended for Poland. 

Current, if somewhat vague, plans call for land-based SM–3 Block IB missiles in 

Romania by 2015 to address the medium range threat from Iran, and then landbased SM–3 Block IIA missiles in Poland by 2018 to address the intermediate range 

threat. By 2020, phase IV of the PAA is supposed to deliver the new SM–3 Block 

IIB missile, which will be capable against ICBM-class Iranian missiles, providing 

the United States an additional layer of protection. There are scant details, even 

in the BMDR, about the PAA. How many ships, interceptors, and radars are required for each phase of the PAA and how much this will cost? 

General O’REILLY. The PAA is not a defined system or capability, but rather a 

policy approach that guides the fielding of ballistic missile defense architectures tailored to an individual region. The interceptors, sensors, and command and control 

system are part of the tool kit MDA provides to the COCOMs to deploy the right 

mix of BMD capabilities in their Areas of Responsibility. For the European region, 

the Joint Staff and U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) must consider force 

structure requirements and allocate missile defenses to meet EUCOM’s needs. 

There is a GFM process to figure out how to allocate assets around the globe. At 

this point in time, a determination of how many ships, interceptors, and sensors are 

required for each phase of the PAA has not been made, but will be determined 

through the GFM process. While the exact force structure and inventory numbers 

for each of the Phases are still being determined, Phase I will leverage existing and 

maturing systems to counter the short- and medium-range ballistic missile (S/ 

MRBM) threat from the Middle East, while improving Homeland defense. Phase II 

will build upon Phase I by using existing and new capabilities to enhance our defense against the SRBM/MRBM threat from the Middle East. Phases III and IV will 

employ follow-on variants of the interceptors used in Phases I and II to expand defensive coverage of Europe against longer-range ballistic missile threats. 

80. Senator SESSIONS. General O’Reilly, does your testing and procurement plan 

support your fielding goals that I just laid out? 

General O’REILLY. Yes, MDA has developed and documented the test and procurement plans required to field the PAA. In February 2010, we finalized version 10.1 

of our IMTP that outlines the first three phases of the PAA test program and have 

provided it to the four congressional defense committees. The IMTP is a collaboVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:37 May 06, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 01010 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\62155.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
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rative effort in which we partnered with the DOT&E, STRATCOM, and the Service’s Operational Test Agencies to define the test data required to support both procurement and fielding decisions. The PAA procurement plan for the first three 

phases is outlined in the Ballistic Missile Defense congressional oversight documents (R-docs, P-docs) and the details of the phase IV procurement are still in development. 

TWO-STAGE GBI DEVELOPMENT AND FLIGHT TESTING

81. Senator SESSIONS. General O’Reilly, according to the February 2010 BMDR, 

the United States ‘‘will continue development and assessment of a two-stage GBI’’ 

as a hedging strategy for defense of the Homeland. Yet the testing schedule for the 

two-stage GBI is such that it may not be available in time should the SM–3 Block 

II missile encounter technical difficulties. Under the current schedule, which appears to be slipping, the SM–3 Block IIA may be available for deployment in 2018, 

while the IIB missile might be available no earlier than 2020. First flight test (nonintercept) of the two-stage GBI is scheduled for fiscal year 2010; first intercept is 

scheduled for end of fiscal year 2012; the next intercept test might occur in fiscal 

year 2016. What will be the role of the two-stage GBI in the BMD arsenal? 

General O’REILLY. DOD is investing in new missile defense capacity and capabilities to hedge against future uncertainties in both the ballistic missile threat and the 

technical risk inherent to our own development plans. One such hedge effort is the 

development and testing of a two-stage GBI. While there are no plans to field this 

interceptor at this time, maintaining a two-stage GBI development and testing program preserves national policy options to field missile defenses in a timely and effective manner. Accordingly, we will be flight testing the two-stage GBI for the first 

time in June. 

A two-stage interceptor has less burn time than the three-stage version, which allows it to operate within a shorter engagement timeline. Deployment of two-stage 

GBIs at Fort Greely, Alaska would provide additional time and additional opportunities to defend the United States from threat missiles launched from locations such 

as Iran. MDA has conducted studies to support two-stage GBI basing options for 

both the United States and Europe. At this time, however, there is currently no request from the combatant commanders to deploy a two-stage GBI. 

82. Senator SESSIONS. General O’Reilly, is the current development and testing 

schedule adequate to preserve the two-stage GBI option? 

General O’REILLY. Yes. The schedule for testing the two-stage GBI is part of our 

overall IMTP objective to collect the data needed to anchor our models and simulation. The two-stage GBI test dates are driven by the types of engagements in which 

we need to test the GBI kill vehicle. We will test the two-stage GBI for the first 

time in June 2010 to verify differences between the performance of two-stage and 

the three-stage GBIs. After this test and the subsequent intercept events we believe 

we will have characterized differences between the two and will be able to evaluate 

the performance of a two-stage GBI using data collected from three-stage testing. 

This is possible because the two-stage GBI builds upon the success of the threestage GBI and has many of the same components, except the third stage is removed. 

The two-stage reuses existing flight-qualified components from its three-stage counterpart. Key common components are the Exo-atmospheric Kill Vehicle, Booster Avionics Module (BAM) electronics, stage 2/3 interstage, and 1st and 2nd stage motors. 

As part of the three-stage development effort, these common components have undergone ground, flight, and qualification testing. Changes from the three-stage GBI 

are limited to the removal of the 3rd stage motor, relocation of the BAM, and minor 

modifications to navigation and guidance software for the two-stage flight. 

The most specialized and critical technology in a GBI is the kill vehicle itself and 

the kill vehicle for both the 2- and 3- stage interceptors is identical. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR SAXBY CHAMBLISS

AEGIS BMD

83. Senator CHAMBLISS. Secretary Miller, while I’m confident that the Aegis/SM– 

3 system may succeed, I’m concerned about future policy-related and programmatic 

challenges. What additional funding and assets might DOD need to implement the 

PAA, particularly as it relates to additional SM–3 interceptors and Aegis ships? 

Secretary MILLER. The President’s fiscal year 2011 budget request includes $2.7 

billion for regional missile defense. This investment will be used to convert addiVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:37 May 06, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 01011 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\62155.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
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tional Aegis ships to BMD-capable, adding 8 Aegis BMD ships between fiscal year 

2010–2012 and a total of 292 SM–3 interceptors by fiscal year 2015, field additional 

THAAD batteries and launchers for a total of 6 batteries and 281 Terminal HighAltitude Area Defense (THAAD) interceptors by fiscal year 2015, and to field additional AN/TPY–2 radars for a total of 14 by fiscal year 2015. 

Continued investments in regional missile defense will be necessary to meet these 

production goals, and to field the necessary capabilities to protect deployed U.S. 

forces, allies, and partners from regional ballistic missile threats. 

84. Senator CHAMBLISS. Secretary Miller, with regards to the proposed AegisAshore BMD site in Romania that was announced in February, have there been any 

offers of assistance from NATO or our other European friends in the form of financial support for this effort? 

Secretary MILLER. The land-based SM–3 site in Romania will be deployed based 

on a bilateral agreement. Our NATO Allies are not directly involved in funding that 

or other elements of the European PAA. The United States will fund the European 

PAA, and the European PAA will represent the U.S. contribution to NATO’s missile 

defense efforts. 

Regarding NATO and Allied efforts, NATO is also developing a command and control network called the ALTBMD program that will allow Allies to link their missile 

defense assets together, creating a more efficient architecture. In addition, NATO 

countries already possess or are acquiring national missile defense capabilities. Several countries have Patriot systems (Netherlands, Germany, Greece). Italy, Germany, and the United States are cooperatively developing the MEADS. Others have 

expressed interest in acquiring systems like Patriot and SM–3. ALTBMD could 

allow current and future NATO systems—including those of the United States—to 

be able to ‘‘plug-and-play’’ with the overall NATO effort and the Europan PAA assets. 

Currently NATO is funding the component of ALTBMD that will provide command and control for defense of deployed forces only, rather than territorial missile 

defense. The United States strongly supports continued funding for ALTBMD and 

its expansion because it will allow Allies’ missile defense systems to be interoperable 

and more efficient. 

85. Senator CHAMBLISS. Secretary Miller, will the Aegis-Ashore system in Romania be able to defend against Iran’s Shahab-3 missile? 

Secretary MILLER. Yes. The SM–3 interceptors and planned follow-on versions are 

designed to intercept MRBMs, including the Shahab-3. 

86. Senator CHAMBLISS. Secretary Miller and General O’Reilly, DOD’s BMDR discusses the expansion of countermeasures other nations are using to confuse and 

overwhelm BMDs. What can you tell me about how the U.S. BMD program is or 

is not responsive to these developments in countermeasures? 

Secretary MILLER. We see an increased desire on the part of potential adversaries 

to increase the numbers of ballistic missile systems and their operational performance. Some states aim to defeat missile defenses through operational countermeasures, such as large raid sizes and salvo launches, and technical countermeasures to enable penetration of missile defenses. The MDA has completed several 

external ‘‘red team’’ studies to provide insight into the possible future changes of 

the threat in these areas. 

Significant technical countermeasures are not expected to be deployed by potential 

adversaries within the near to midterm. However, adversary countermeasure capabilities may mature and deploy more rapidly than predicted. Ballistic missile defense capabilities and development must be agile so as to adjust to unexpected evolutions of the threat. 

MDA’s budget includes a portfolio of investments in capabilities to hedge against 

the possibility of more rapid than projected developments of the threat, including 

the use of countermeasures. These hedge capabilities include improvements in sensors to support our ability to intercept missiles before they can completely deploy 

countermeasures and to counter larger raid sizes. The Aegis BMD SM–3 Block IB 

system, available in the midterm, will have improved on-board discrimination and 

greater area coverage. The PAA provides an inherent hedge against threat uncertainties by deploying scalable, relocatable missile defenses. Moveable assets enable 

more rapid increases in capability against larger threat sizes. Scalable systems 

allow flexible integration of new technologies into the existing architecture to deal 

with uncertainty in the performance of threat systems. These approaches provide 

the United States with flexible responses to new threats and capabilities as they 

materialize. 

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General O’REILLY. We see an increased desire on the part of threat states to increase the numbers of ballistic missile systems and their operational performance. 

Some states aim to defeat missile defenses through operational countermeasures, 

such as large raids and salvo launches, and technical countermeasures to enable 

penetration of missile defenses. MDA has completed several external red team studies to provide insight into the possible future changes of the threat in these areas. 

Capabilities in the area of technical countermeasures are not expected to be deployed by adversaries of concern within the near to midterm. However, adversary 

countermeasure capabilities may mature and deploy more rapidly than predicted. 

Ballistic Missile Defense capabilities and development must be agile so as to adjust 

to unexpected evolutions of the threat. 

MDA’s budget includes a portfolio of investments in capabilities to hedge against 

the possibility of more rapid than projected qualitative developments of the threat, 

including their use of countermeasures. These hedge capabilities include improvements in sensors to support our ability to intercept threat missiles before they can 

completely deploy countermeasures and to counter larger raid sizes. The Aegis BMD 

SM–3 Block IB system, available in the midterm, will have improved on-board discrimination and greater area coverage. Research into the utility of directed energy 

systems for missile defenses is being funded by MDA. The PAA provides an inherent 

hedge against threat uncertainties by deploying scalable, relocatable missile defenses. Moveable assets enable more rapid increases in capability against larger 

threat sizes. Scalable systems allow flexible integration of new technologies into the 

existing architecture to deal with uncertainty in the performance of threat systems. 

These approaches provide the United States with flexible responses to new threats 

and capabilities as they materialize. 

87. Senator CHAMBLISS. Admiral Macy, I have some general concerns about the 

ability of the Navy to accommodate what appears to be a significant amount of 

growth over the next few years in the realm of missile defense. Given the multimission role of our Aegis-equipped ships, are you confident that the Navy can both 

refit their cruiser-destroyer force with Aegis technology while simultaneously meeting the maritime demands of our regional combatant commanders, all the while operating with a total of 88 cruisers and destroyers? 

Admiral MACY. The anticipated force requirements, as informed by the decision 

on the PAA, were taken into consideration in the Navy’s scheduling decisions on 

Aegis BMD refits. The GFM process is completely capable of managing our available 

forces to balance combatant commander requirements and U.S. commitments. 

88. Senator CHAMBLISS. Admiral Macy, as far as equipment and technology, what 

modifications are required for the sea-based Aegis system to be converted to the 

land-based Aegis Ashore system? 

Admiral MACY. With regard to the Aegis weapons system itself, little to no 

changes are required to convert it to Aegis Ashore. Certain mechanical, electrical, 

and structural modifications will be required to house the weapons system in the 

shore based structures. These details will be worked out during MDA’s system development efforts. 

89. Senator CHAMBLISS. Admiral Macy, do you foresee any challenges to meeting 

the fiscal year 2015-fiscal year 2018 timeline? 

Admiral MACY. While any technology development effort entails a certain amount 

of risk, I foresee no significant challenges to meeting the fiscal year 2015-fiscal year 

2018 timeline. The challenges normally found in a new program are being mitigated 

through the use of the same Aegis BMD configuration and functionality found on 

Aegis BMD ships, as well as the existing Navy infrastructure to meet training and 

personnel requirements. 

90. Senator CHAMBLISS. Admiral Macy, considering that a significant amount of 

the Navy’s resources will be dedicated to refitting its ships with Aegis BMD capabilities, how will we train, man, and equip the two planned Aegis Ashore sites (Romania and Poland) in this timeframe? 

Admiral MACY. Many of the manning requirements for the Aegis Ashore sites in 

Romania and Poland will be determined as we negotiate the basing agreements with 

the host-nations, including manning for site security, support facilities, etc. With respect to the manning required specifically to operate the weapons system, it will be 

significantly less than that of a ship. This is estimated to be 1/4 to 1/3 or less of 

an equivalent ship’s complement. As part of the duties of lead service, the Navy will 

assess the manning requirements for these systems and incorporate them into the 

Navy’s overall manning plan. The training requirements for Aegis Ashore will be 

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common to that for Aegis operators afloat, as will the majority of the system parts 

support. Parts support for Aegis Ashore specific components will be addressed during system development, but will leverage existing Navy logistics and logistics infrastructures. 

91. Senator CHAMBLISS. Secretary Miller and General O’Reilly, regarding the 

issue of testing, the administration’s policy emphasizes the need for operationally 

relevant testing and a fly-before-you-buy approach to BMD development and fielding. In my view, BMD testing is qualitatively different from testing for other types 

of weapon systems. If 99 percent of the time an airplane took off it was able to land 

successfully, but 1 percent of the time it crashed, that would be unacceptable and 

we would never tolerate it. However, if 99 percent of the time we launched a ballistic missile interceptor it hit its target, but 1 percent of the time it missed, in my 

view that is a great track record and is infinitely better than having no missile defense system at all. I am in favor of operationally realistic testing and flying before 

we buy, but I do not think we should demand the same level of reliability as we 

do for other systems. We need effective systems, but we shouldn’t require perfect 

systems. What are your comments on this issue? 

Secretary MILLER. We agree that it is important to balance reliability against 

availability regarding our missile defense systems. 

A key tenet of the BMDR is to test sufficiently the capabilities and limitations 

of a missile defense system before we begin procurement. Missile defense systems 

are subject to production decisions by USD(AT&L). Additionally, we use the military 

departments’ standard material release and operational certification processes that 

also rely on developmental and operational test data prior to formally fielding, initial capability. 

A related effort is the execution of the IMTP. In collaboration with the military 

departments Operational Test Agencies, STRATCOM, and the DOT&E, the MDA 

submitted a comprehensive IMTP in March 2010 that describes the test program 

through fiscal year 2015 to conduct more than 150 test events to obtain specific data 

necessary to accredit our models and simulations and support operational assessments. 

General O’REILLY. MDA is enforcing rigorous developmental testing to mitigate 

risk prior to operational assessments, consistent with the Acquisition Reform Act of 

2009 which directs enhanced focus on solid developmental testing. There is a clear 

benefit of early operational input to the development of missile defense systems. 

However, premature entry into operational development and testing (i.e., before the 

design and configuration has been stabilized and basic technical concepts have been 

validated) risks expensive repetition of non-recurring engineering and operational 

development. 

A key tenet of the BMDR is to sufficiently test the capabilities and limitations 

of a missile defense system before we begin procurement, or ‘‘fly before we buy.’’ As 

such, missile defense projects are subject to production decisions by USD(AT&L). 

Additionally, we use the Services’ standard material release and operational certification processes that also rely on developmental and operational test data prior to 

formally fielding initial capability. 

Another critical Department effort is the execution of the IMTP. In collaboration 

with the Services’ Operational Test Agencies, STRATCOM, and the DOT&E, MDA 

submitted a comprehensive IMTP in March that describes our plan through fiscal 

year 2015 to conduct over 150 test events to obtain specific data necessary to accredit our models and simulations and support operational assessments. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOHN THUNE

RUSSIAN AND CHINESE SUPPORT FOR IRAN

92. Senator THUNE. Secretary Miller, in 2007, the Director of National Intelligence assessed that ‘‘individual Russian entities continue to provide assistance to 

Iran’s ballistic missile programs. We judge that Russian-entity assistance, along 

with assistance from entities in China and North Korea, has helped Iran move toward self-sufficiency in the production of ballistic missiles. The Russian Government 

has taken steps to improve controls on ballistic-missile technology, and its record 

of enforcement—though still mixed—has improved over the last decade.’’ What level 

of assistance do you see from Russia today, in helping Iran develop its ballistic missile capabilities or capacities? 

Secretary MILLER. Moscow is not providing state-to-state assistance to Tehran to 

further its ballistic missile and space launch vehicle research and development efVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:37 May 06, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 01014 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\62155.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
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forts. However, Russia’s advanced ballistic missile production infrastructure has 

technologies that could further current and future Iranian goals. Russian-based Iranian defense officials and intermediaries have access to Russian academics, companies, and research organizations, and some of these individuals and entities likely 

assist Iran with technologies that could assist in its ballistic missile programs. Iran 

is likely attempting to obtain Russian expertise in missile guidance systems to improve accuracy, composite structural materials to save weight and increase range, 

in high temperature materials for reentry vehicles, and possibly in more energetic 

propellants. 

93. Senator THUNE. Secretary Miller, a Thursday, April 15, 2010, Washington 

Times newspaper article reported that CIA’s Weapons Intelligence, Nonproliferation 

and Arms Control Center this year linked Chinese companies to missile programs 

in Iran. Do your missile defense plans take into account longstanding and possibly 

present day cooperation and support by Russia and China for Iran’s ballistic missile 

program? 

Secretary MILLER. Beijing is not providing state-to-state assistance to Tehran to 

further its ballistic missile and space launch vehicle research and development efforts, but Chinese individuals and entities provide Iran with controlled and dualuse technologies needed to advance in these areas. China-based Iranian defense officials and intermediaries have access to Chinese academics, companies, and research 

organizations, some of which continue to provide support despite being sanctioned. 

Iran is receiving materiel and technological assistance with missile guidance systems, raw materials, production machinery, and propellants. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR DAVID VITTER

LONG-RANGE THREATS

94. Senator VITTER. Secretary Miller, Dr. Gilmore, General O’Reilly, and Admiral 

Macy, do you think that an additional missile field on the U.S. east coast would provide more protection from long-range threats to address a coverage gap? 

Secretary MILLER. [Deleted.] 

Dr. GILMORE. The additional area of defense provided by a missile field on the 

East Coast of the United States would depend upon the types of interceptors emplaced, as well as the radars and other sensors available. Whether such a field is 

needed is a question that should be answered by those in the Department responsible for determining military requirements. 

General O’REILLY. [Deleted.] 

Admiral MACY. An additional missile field on the U.S. east coast would provide 

some redundant coverage against long-range threats, but would provide no additional coverage. The west coast missile fields already provide coverage for 100 percent of the Homeland. 

95. Senator VITTER. Secretary Miller, Dr. Gilmore, General O’Reilly, and Admiral 

Macy, do you think such a site would be beneficial to further hedge against longrange threats? 

Secretary MILLER. Given continuing improvements in the GMD system and the 

number of GBIs currently deployed, the United States possesses a capacity to 

counter the projected threats of North Korea and Iran. Therefore, based on current 

threat projections, deployment of interceptors at an east coast site is not warranted. 

Dr. GILMORE. The additional area of defense provided by a missile field on the 

east coast of the United States would depend upon the types of interceptors emplaced, as well as the radars and other sensors available. Whether such a field is 

needed is a question that should be answered by those in the Department responsible for determining military requirements. 

General O’REILLY. [Deleted.] 

Admiral MACY. In the current budget climate, the redundancy afforded by a U.S. 

east coast missile field would provide less additional capability than would be lost 

as a result of the budget restructuring required to establish the new field. 

96. Senator VITTER. Secretary Miller, Dr. Gilmore, General O’Reilly, and Admiral 

Macy, how quickly could the United States have an operational east coast missile 

field? 

Secretary MILLER. Establishing a fully operational east coast missile field would 

require a minimum of 5 years from receiving funding and authority to proceed. This 

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estimate factors in considerations such as site selection, environmental survey/approval, site clearing and construction, and equipment production. 

Dr. GILMORE. I believe the answer to this question is best left to the MDA and 

the operational user. If a decision is made to deploy a missile field to the U.S. East 

Coast, I will ensure that appropriate operational testing is accomplished in a timely 

fashion. 

General O’REILLY. From authority to proceed and assuming funding is provided, 

fielding of a fully operational East Coast Missile Field (MF) would require a minimum 5 years of construction and check out plus a year for operational integration 

based on the following assumptions: 

(1) Located on a military base and within a single contiguous area similar to the 

GMD Missile Defense Complex (MDC) located at Fort Greely, AK. 

(2) Consisting of a 10-Silo configuration 

(3) Support facilities and equipment would include: 

a. Controlled entry point/force protection, security boundary/fencing, roads, 

local power and associated facilities support structure 

b. Missile Field - Mechanical Electrical Building (MEB) 

c. Command Launch Equipment/Readiness and Control Building 

d. Two In-Flight Interceptor Communication System Data Terminals 

e. Missile Assembly Building (MAB) 

f. Satellite Communications 

g. Self Sustaining Power Source 

(4) Approximately 2 years required for site selection, preconstruction and design, 

approval and environmental survey/approval. 

(5) Minimum of 3 years required for construction (initial site clearing to facilities 

with system equipment installed). 

(6) Minimum of 1 year for establishing initial operations and deployment, training, exercises, and verification of integration into GMD operational baseline. 

The time required to field a fully operational east coast MF could increase if the 

requirements for the site and capability exceeded these basic assumptions. 

Admiral MACY. Establishing a fully operational east coast missile field would require a minimum of 5 years from receiving funding and authority to proceed. This 

estimate factors in considerations such as site selection, environmental survey/approval, site clearing and construction, and equipment production. 

MISSILE DEFENSE AND NEW START

97. Senator VITTER. Secretary Miller, there seems to be conflicting reports and 

conflicting interpretation on limitations on missile defense in the START follow-on 

agreement. I find this troubling because it seems that Russia is adamant that this 

concession was provided in the negotiations, despite promises from the administration that such a concession would not be made. Was any promise made by the 

United States to Russia regarding missile defense during the negotiations or in the 

treaty? 

Secretary MILLER. No ‘‘promise’’ to or ‘‘side deal’’ with Russia has been made regarding missile defenses. The legally-binding documents connected to the New 

START treaty represent the only U.S. obligations. 

Specifically, Article V, section 3 of the treaty prohibits the conversion of ICBM 

or SLBM launchers to missile defense launchers and vice versa; that is, the conversion of missile defense launchers to launch ICBMs or SLBMs. This section also 

‘‘grandfathers’’ the five former ICBM silos at Vandenberg AFB that were converted 

for the placement of GBIs within them over the past several years. If more interceptors were to be added at Vandenberg AFB, it would be less expensive to build a new 

field of GBI silos, which is not prohibited by the treaty, than to convert additional 

ICBM test launchers. Regarding SLBM launchers, the MDA examined the concept 

of launching missile defense interceptors from submarines and found it an unattractive and unreasonably expensive option. 

The Preamble of the Treaty contains a statement acknowledging the interrelationship of strategic offensive and strategic defensive arms and recognizing that this relationship will become more important as strategic offensive arms are reduced. This 

statement also notes that current strategic defensive forces do not threaten to undermine the effectiveness of either Parties’ strategic offensive arms. The Preamble 

does not limit the United States. 

Both the United States and the Russian Federation made unilateral statements 

concerning ballistic missile defense just prior to signing the New START treaty. 

1011 

Russia asserted in its unilateral statement that any build-up in U.S. missile defenses that would ‘‘give rise to a threat to the strategic nuclear force potential of 

the Russian Federation’’ would justify Russia’s withdrawal from the treaty. This 

statement is not legally binding and does not constrain U.S. missile defense programs. In fact, both sides have the right to withdraw from the treaty under Article 

XIV, if they deem it necessary due to a threat to their supreme national interests. 

Such withdrawal clauses are common to treaties, especially in the case of arms control agreements. 

The United States also issued a unilateral statement concerning missile defense 

in connection with the New START treaty, stating that ‘‘the United States intends 

to continue improving and deploying its missile defense systems in order to defend 

against limited attack and as part of our collaborative approach to strengthening 

stability in key regions.’’ The statement takes note of Russia’s views expressed in 

its unilateral statement and makes clear that U.S. missile defenses ‘‘are not intended to affect the strategic balance with Russia,’’ but instead are intended to defend the United States against limited missile launches and to protect U.S. deployed 

forces, our allies and partners from regional threats. 

As the U.S. unilateral statement, the BMDR, and our budgetary plans all make 

clear, the United States will continue to improve our missile defenses as needed to 

defend the U.S. Homeland, our deployed forces, and our allies and partners. Nothing 

in the New START treaty, or in any other statements, limits our ability to do this. 

[Whereupon, at 12:02 p.m., the committee adjourned.] 

(1013) 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION 

FOR APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 

2011 

TUESDAY, DECEMBER 14, 2010 

U.S. SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, 

Washington, DC. 

LITTORAL COMBAT SHIP ACQUISITION 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:32 p.m. in room SD– 

G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin (chairman) presiding. 

Committee members present: Senators Levin, Reed, Bill Nelson, 

Hagan, Coons, McCain, Sessions, LeMieux, Brown, and Collins. 

Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk. 

Majority staff members present: Creighton Greene, professional 

staff member; and Michael J. Noblet, professional staff member. 

Minority staff members present: Joseph W. Bowab, Republican 

staff director; Pablo E. Carrillo, minority investigative counsel; and 

Christopher J. Paul, professional staff member. 

Staff assistants present: Christine G. Lang, Brian F. Sebold, and 

Breon N. Wells. 

Committee members’ assistants present: Carolyn Chuhta, assistant to Senator Reed; Neal Higgins, assistant to Senator Bill Nelson; Gordon I. Peterson, assistant to Senator Webb; Roger Pena, 

assistant to Senator Hagan; Lindsay Kavanaugh, assistant to Senator Begich; Joanne McLaughlin, assistant to Senator Manchin; 

Lenwood Landrum and Sandra Luff, assistants to Senator Sessions; Jason Van Beek, assistant to Senator Thune; Erskine Wells 

III, assistant to Senator Wicker; Brian Walsh, assistant to Senator 

LeMieux; and Scott Schrage, assistant to Senator Brown. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN 

Chairman LEVIN. Good afternoon, everybody. I want to welcome 

our witnesses today: from the Navy, Secretary Mabus, Secretary 

Stackley, Admiral Roughead, and Rear Admiral Pandolfe; from the 

Government Accountability Office (GAO), Paul Francis; from the 

Congressional Budget Office (CBO), Dr. Eric Labs; and from the 

Congressional Research Service (CRS), Ron O’Rourke. 

The Navy continues to be faced with a number of critical issues 

as it tries to balance its modernization needs and procurement 

needs against the costs of current operations. The shipbuilding 

1014 

budget remains at a level where it will be difficult at best to field 

the Navy that we must have. Therefore, we need to be looking for 

ways to make the shipbuilding program more affordable. 

The original Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) acquisition plan would 

have had the Navy buying both types of LCS vehicles for some time 

while the Navy evaluated the capabilities of each vessel. At some 

time in the future, the Navy would have had the option to downselect to building one type of vessel, but in any case the Navy 

would have been operating some number of each type of LCS vessels in the fleet, which means that the Navy would have been dealing with two shipyards, two supply chains, two training pipelines, 

et cetera. 

Last year, the Navy decided upon a winner-take-all acquisition 

strategy to procure the fiscal year 2010 vessels under a fixed-price 

contract, with fixed-price options for two ships per year for the next 

4 years. This revised strategy included obtaining the data rights for 

the winning ship design and competing for a second source for the 

winning design among other shipyards, starting in fiscal year 2012. 

The Navy did this after determining that the original acquisition 

strategy, an approach of buying at least one ship from each shipyard in fiscal year 2010 under a noncompetitive solicitation, was 

unaffordable. Earlier this year, the Navy released the solicitation 

under the revised strategy and has been in discussions with the 

two contractor teams and evaluating those proposals since that 

time. 

The Navy has decided, upon reviewing the bids from the two contractor teams, to modify its strategy for the following reasons: 

First, both teams have made offers that are much more attractive 

than had been expected and both are priced well below the original 

noncompetitive offers; and second, continuing the winner-take-all 

down-select would save roughly $1.9 billion compared with what 

had been budgeted for the LCS program in the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP). 

But the Navy has also determined that accepting the offers from 

both LCS contractor teams, rather than down-selecting to one design and starting a second source building the winning design, 

would save $2.9 billion, or $1 billion more than the program of 

record, and would allow the Navy to purchase an additional LCS 

vessel during this same period of the FYDP, 20 ships rather than 

19 ships. 

The Navy has also determined that, using net present value calculations, additional operation and support costs for maintaining 

two separate designs in the fleet for their service life over 40 to 50 

years would be much less than the additional savings that could 

be achieved through buying both the ships during the FYDP period. 

The Navy first conveyed to Congress its interest in modifying the 

LCS acquisition strategy in early November and said that they 

needed to act before the bid prices were set to expire on December 

14, 2010. Since then, the Navy has requested and the contractors 

have agreed that the LCS teams extend these bid prices until the 

end of this month. 

1015 

I understand that the Navy has been briefing members and 

staffs in the Senate and House of Representatives since announcing 

its revised plan. 

From a broad policy perspective, I believe the Navy approach of 

a competitive dual-source alternative could help ensure maximum 

competition throughout the life cycle of the program, meeting the 

spirit and intent of the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act 

(WSARA) of 2009. Specifically, it calls for two shipbuilders in continuous competition to build the ships for the life of the program. 

The Navy plans to build a total of 55 of these ships, so that competition would be going on for a number of years. 

The Navy has been prevented from sharing specific bid information that would violate the competitive source selection process by 

revealing proprietary information about the two contractors’ bids. 

This has led some to ask whether these bids can be independently 

verified. We should hear in detail from the Navy witnesses today 

about that issue and also why they believe that these bids are realistic bids. 

In that regard, I take some comfort from knowing that these bids 

are for fixed-price contracts and not for cost-type contracts, where 

a contractor has little to lose from underbidding a contract. 

As far as the capability of the two vessels, we will hear from Admiral Roughead today on whether each of the two vessels would 

meet the Navy’s requirements for the LCS program and why he favors the modified approach. 

Reports by CRS and other individuals have raised a number of 

questions about the strategy change. This hearing, that was called 

at the request of Senator McCain, by the way, will give us an opportunity to get answers about the Navy’s proposal. 

The CBO analysis also estimates that continuing competition between the two teams, as envisioned by the revised Navy strategy, 

would cost more than going ahead with the winner-take-all option. 

CBO, however, was unable to factor into their analysis the actual 

fixed-price bid data to which the contractors are willing to agree, 

because of the information-sharing constraints surrounding an ongoing competition. 

The GAO has raised concerns about potential cost growth from 

design changes, additional operation and support costs, and mission package development. We will need to hear from the Navy witnesses whether design changes are a significant threat to realizing 

the price reductions and why the Navy has confidence in its estimate that the operating and support cost increases are far less 

than the expected acquisition savings. 

As far as the progress in development of the mission packages 

is concerned, I believe the Navy’s fundamental architecture of the 

LCS program divorces changes in the mission package from 

changes that perturb the ship design and ship construction. In the 

past when there were problems with developing the right combat 

capability on a ship, this almost inevitably caused problems in the 

construction program. In the case of the LCS, I understand that 

the combat capability largely resides in the mission packages that 

connect to either LCS vessel through defined interfaces. Now, what 

that means, I believe, is that changes inside the mission packages 

should not translate into changes during the ship construction 

1016 

schedule, that they’re interchangeable, and whatever is happening 

in the mission package development program would apparently 

apply equally to either the down-select strategy or the dual-source 

strategy. We’ll need to hear from Navy witnesses today to describe 

that relationship in greater detail. 

In terms of the proposal’s effects on the industrial base and 

therefore on the future of competition, I would think that there 

would be a net positive. The Navy would have the opportunity to 

compete throughout the life of the program and any erosion in contractor performance could be corrected by competitive pressures. 

For the industrial base, there would be more stability in the shipbuilding program, and a number of Navy witnesses have previously 

testified that one of the important things that we could do for the 

Navy is to help the shipbuilders achieve stability in our shipbuilding programs. 

To me, the Navy’s proposal seems to promote that goal while effectively continuing competition throughout the program and at the 

same time reducing acquisition costs and buying an additional ship 

over the FYDP. 

Senator McCain. 

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN MCCAIN 

Senator MCCAIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank you 

for holding this hearing. This is a very important issue that is upon 

us in the final days of a lame duck session. 

I want to thank GAO, CRS, and CBO for raising important questions that should have answers before I believe we should consider 

approving this proposal. 

Mr. Chairman, we can’t consider this LCS in a vacuum. The 

story of this ship is one that makes me ashamed and embarrassed 

as a former Navy person and as a person who’s responsible to the 

taxpayers of my State. I’d like to just review with you a little background and one of the reasons why I remain incredibly skeptical 

about this latest rush proposal that we have to approve in a lame 

duck session. 

The background is that in November 2001, the LCS program was 

started. In 2004, the Navy awarded contracts to two teams led by 

Lockheed Martin and General Dynamics. The initial contract price 

was $188 million per ship. 

In the 2006 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), Congress set a cost cap of $220 million per ship. In the 2008 NDAA, 

Congress increased the cost cap to $460 million per ship. In the 

2009 NDAA, Congress amended the cost cap again by deferring its 

implementation by 2 years, as the Navy requested. In the 2010 

NDAA, Congress increased the cost cap to $480 million per ship. 

In 2007, the LCS unit procurement cost tripled to over $700 million. Later, outside the congressional budget review process, the 

Navy proposed to substantially restructure the LCS program. So 6 

years later, after expenditure of roughly $8 billion, the Navy decided to restructure the program. 

Then, of course, we went through the strategy of the down-select 

and the competition of 10 LCSs, that one contractor would build 10 

LCSs over a 5-year period, and the Navy decided to make a downselect decision and award the contract to build the 10 LCSs some 

1017 

time this summer. It delayed its decision twice. The award decision 

would not be made in December 2010. Then in November they 

came up with a great idea. 

I’d remind the witnesses and the taxpayers, the cost of the LCS 

from 2005 to 2010 has been $8 billion of the taxpayers’ dollars. 

What do we have to show for it? The first LCS was funded in 2005 

and it was commissioned in November 2008 at a cost of $637 million. The second LCS, funded in 2006, was commissioned in January 2010 at a cost of $704 million. 

Then numbers 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 funded and cancelled by the 

Navy; the third one, funded in 2006, cancelled in 2007; the fourth 

one, funded in 2006, canceled in 2007. The list goes on. 

Then we get to the eighth LCS, funded in 2009, christened in 

2010, and now is about 80 percent complete. The ninth LCS, funded in 2009, is under construction and is about 40 percent complete. 

So we’ve spent $8 billion. We have two ships commissioned, another one 80 percent complete and the other 40 percent complete. 

If my figures are wrong, which we got from the Navy, I will be glad 

to stand corrected. 

So here we are now with a brand-new idea as to how we should 

apportion the funding for the LCSs. Somehow, miraculously, a 

month or so ago the two shipbuilders came in with very low estimates. Now, we are told by the Navy those are very low estimates, 

but we don’t know what those numbers are because it’s proprietary 

information. 

I have to tell you, Mr. Chairman, I have never in the 20-some 

years that I’ve been a member of this committee approved of a program that I don’t know what the cost is. At least I owe it to the 

taxpayers of Arizona to know what the cost is. But with a record 

like this of $8 billion for four ships and an estimated cost of about 

$11 billion from 2010 to 2015, I’m supposed to say: Hey, this is a 

good deal. 

GAO has said they have concerns that decisionmakers need more 

information, cost savings are uncertain, future performance is an 

open question, the Navy’s assessment of design stability may be too 

optimistic, and the proposal is fundamentally inconsistent with an 

important GAO recommendation. 

CRS’s concerns are: How the proposal was presented raises 

issues; potential relative costs and risks of the two strategies is unclear; the proposal could hinder competition; the industrial base 

implications are uncertain; how the mission packages would be procured is unclear; and CBO’s concerns about costs and savings remain unclear, certainly, and the cost of operating and maintaining 

the LCS are probably more than the Navy’s estimate. 

The Navy may have overstated the costs of the current plan, and 

using two different combat systems for each LCS version may drive 

costs up. If you build two different ships, then you have two different supply lines, you have two different training regimens for 

the crew, and you have, obviously, dramatically increased costs, 

plus a problem with cross-training and safety concerns. 

Mr. Chairman, I understand that the two very generous offers 

have now been extended to December 30. I see no reason why those 

offers could not be extended to January or February or March, so 

1018 

that this committee could at least address the concerns that GAO, 

CBO, and CRS have raised. They’re important questions. 

When you look at the history of this ship, and now we’re supposed to buy an additional 15 ships based on costs we haven’t been 

told, with the incredible and disgraceful waste of the taxpayers’ 

money that has characterized this whole program, Mr. Chairman, 

I have greater responsibilities to the taxpayers of my State. 

I thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you so much, Senator McCain. 

Let me start with Secretary Mabus. 

STATEMENT OF HON. RAYMOND E. MABUS, JR., SECRETARY 

OF THE NAVY 

Mr. MABUS. Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain, distinguished members of this committee: Thank you for this opportunity to appear 

before you to discuss the LCS program. Following my comments, 

Admiral Roughead will have a short opening statement. Our Assistant Secretary for Research, Development, and Acquisition, Sean 

Stackley, is also here and is prepared, with your permission, to 

briefly offer some more specifics on the numbers involved in this 

proposal. 

The LCS brings critically needed capabilities and numbers to our 

Nation’s fleet which are necessary to give the Navy the force structure to meet the missions we’ve been given. For the future strength 

of our Navy, it’s vitally important that we succeed in delivering 

this 55-ship class affordably, effectively, and quickly, while at the 

same time exercising sound judgment and solid oversight. 

As Secretary, I take this process extraordinarily seriously and I 

would not have made this recommendation if I did not firmly believe that giving us the authority to move forward with a dual 

award of 10 ships to each of 2 shipbuilders, as we are requesting, 

is in the best interests of the taxpayers, our Navy, and our Nation. 

This authority, which I emphasize requires no additional funding, will enable us to purchase more high-quality ships for less 

money and get them into service in less time. It will help preserve 

jobs in our industrial shipbuilding base and will create new employment opportunities in an economic sector that is critical to our 

Nation’s military and economic security. 

We recognize that this proposal comes outside the normal budget 

process. However, a key focus of this Department for the last 2 

years has been to build as many ships for the Navy as possible, as 

affordably as we can. As a result, I believe it was my duty to 

present Congress with this opportunity. 

The timing of this request is the result of a very thorough analysis. Once we received the bids, we conducted two rounds of discussion with industry to assure ourselves that the bids were realistic 

and sustainable. That examination demonstrated that we achieved 

our goal, one we share with this committee, of driving down the 

cost of these ships. 

We next needed to examine the proposal from the standpoint of 

naval operations, which was done by the Chief of Naval Operations 

(CNO) and the Navy staff. As the CNO will explain in a moment, 

they concluded that a dual award created important operational 

1019 

flexibility. Finally, we met with Pentagon leadership for their review and concurrence with this proposal. 

This process took some time, but I believe it was critical to ensuring that we were making an operationally sound and fiscally responsible proposal that meets congressional guidelines, as well as 

the intent and the spirit of the WSARA of 2009. 

As you’re aware, both the lead LCSs fully meet performance requirements. Both the lead ships of each variant are currently in 

service and already performing well, while also conducting a comprehensive test and evaluation program. LCS–1, the Freedom, demonstrated some of the things we can expect during her maiden deployment earlier this year, a deployment done 2 years ahead of 

schedule. In less than 3 weeks of counternarcotics operation in the 

Caribbean, she made three major drug seizures and recovered more 

than three tons of cocaine. It was because of her capabilities that 

she was able to run down fast drug boats that otherwise would 

have escaped. 

I recognize that this program has historically had problems. The 

program’s early shortfalls and initially unrealistic cost expectations, stretching back nearly a decade, have been pointed out by 

members of this committee and oversight organizations. It was precisely because of this poor performance record that last year, with 

the concurrence of Congress, we made very significant changes to 

our LCS procurement strategy. The message from this committee 

and Congress was unmistakably clear: The Navy needs more ships, 

but they have to be more affordable. We heard that message and 

established and enforced a strict policy to limit design changes and 

their debilitating impact on cost and schedule. We worked with industry to ensure the lessons learned building the lead ships were 

put in place for efficient construction of successive ships. We put 

a talented, highly capable team in charge of this process. 

In 2009, when bids for follow-on ships of both variants came in 

unacceptably high, we made the two industry teams compete 

against each other to get costs down. In this, we structured a highly competitive, fixed-price procurement strategy to award 10 ships 

of a single design over 5 years to a single builder, with an additional 5 ships to be built by a second builder after another round 

of competition, with the Navy owning the technical data package 

for construction of all ships. 

In response to this down-select, industry competitors restructured their respective teaming agreements to eliminate excess overhead and unnecessary costs. They leveraged the 10-ship plan to 

drive down material costs with their vendors and they used the 

long-term nature of the contract to plan facility improvements to 

further reduce labor costs. 

These bids and the cost reductions we have seen demonstrated 

on LCS–3 and –4 will save the taxpayer approximately $1.9 billion 

in fiscal years 2011 through 2016. More importantly, the fact that 

prices were so dramatically reduced presented an opportunity to 

save an additional $1 billion, for a total of $2.9 billion, through a 

dual award of a 10-ship contract to each bidder. 

Each of the variants included in the two contracts will fall significantly below the cost cap established by Congress in 2010. If 

our request is approved, it would also enable purchase of an addiVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:37 May 06, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 01025 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\62155.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
1020 

tional ship through the realized savings. In short, we’ll get 20 ships 

for the price of 19. 

It’s important to note that these will be block buys and not 

multi-year contracts. We will not be contractually required to buy 

any ships after the first year and there are no termination or cancellation costs. Therefore, both Congress and the Navy will have 

continuing supervision and the ability to ensure this program stays 

on track. 

Senator Levin, Senator McCain, members of this committee: You 

have worked for years on behalf of our service men and women to 

provide them with what they need to protect our Nation, while also 

ensuring proper oversight to protect the interests of taxpayers. The 

LCS proposal you have before you is the fruit of those efforts. It 

delivers better value to the taxpayer and greater capability to our 

fleet. 

I believe we have arrived at an opportunity to realize significant 

real savings within our shipbuilding program, and we have done so 

by following congressional guidance. This is good for the Navy, 

good for the taxpayers, good for industry, good for workers, and 

good for our Nation. 

Thank you. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Secretary Mabus. 

Now, I believe you wished our CNO, Admiral Roughead, to follow? Okay, Admiral Roughead. 

STATEMENT OF ADM GARY ROUGHEAD, USN, CHIEF OF NAVAL 

OPERATIONS 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Thank you, sir. Chairman Levin, Senator 

McCain, distinguished members of the committee: Thank you for 

the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the LCS and 

the dual-award proposal that I believe is good for the Navy, for our 

critical shipbuilding base, and for the taxpayer. The LCS will bring 

new and needed capabilities to our fleet. It fills critical current and 

future warfighting needs in anti-submarine warfare, mine warfare, 

and surface warfare, close to shore, in areas of strategic interest, 

areas where we need shallow draft, speed, onboard capacity, and 

the flexibility to reconfigure our ships to optimize those missions. 

These same characteristics also allow the LCS to take part in blue 

water operations. Having commanded the Atlantic and Pacific 

Fleets, I know the value of such a ship. 

Accordingly, getting LCS into the fleet quickly, affordably, and in 

sufficient numbers became one of my highest priorities as CNO. 

The first step to get there, ironically and as was mentioned by Senator McCain, was to cancel LCSs we had planned for in 2007 because of unacceptable costs. What followed was extraordinary cooperation among my staff, the acquisition community, and the 

fleet. With the support of Congress, an acquisition strategy was developed and executed with discipline that gave us the opportunity 

to acquire LCSs at great savings. 

We have taken firm control of the program. Requirements have 

been controlled and we have held the line on changes to LCSs 

under construction today. I deployed the LCS earlier than any 

other ship class to assure we were on the right path operationally. 

It is clear to me that we are. 

1021 

The dual award will bring important stability to the industrial 

base and is a major step in getting to the floor of 313 ships in our 

fleet. It enables more rapid production by involving two shipyards 

with two designs that fulfill LCS mission requirements and that 

have complementary features. It allows us to take advantage of the 

solid progress and infrastructure investments made by both builders. It will sustain competition. 

The dual award also allows us to reduce costs by further locking 

in a price for 20 ships, enabling us to acquire the LCS at significant savings to American taxpayers and permitting the use of shipbuilding funds for other shipbuilding programs. 

What we have proposed is outside the normal process, but it is 

an opportunity that, when it became apparent, was one that was 

to be seized. While it locks the price in, it does not lock out control 

by Navy or Congress, as it is not a multi-year procurement. Our 

ship construction budget, of which these ships are a part, will be 

authorized annually. 

These are good ships. The LCS concept is a sound systems approach and we have brought the program under control. 

I respectfully request your support of the Navy’s LCS dual-award 

proposal. It is good for the Navy, for the Nation’s industrial base, 

and for our taxpayers. I look forward to your questions. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Admiral. 

Secretary Stackley, you will be next, and then we’ll call on Admiral Pandolfe if he has testimony. 

STATEMENT OF HON. SEAN J. STACKLEY, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY FOR RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, AND 

ACQUISITION 

Mr. STACKLEY. Yes, sir. Senator Levin, Senator McCain, members of the committee: I’d like to provide amplifying information regarding cost numbers to better inform the committee members 

where we are today and why we believe that the numbers that 

we’re looking at inside the bids are both credible and are very affordable. 

To provide baseline information, as Senator McCain pointed out, 

the lead ships’ construction costs to the taxpayer, the Navy, and 

the government are between $600 million and $700 million each. 

Those numbers reflect the shipbuilders’ costs as well as government-furnished equipment and any changes that were brought to 

bear on those ships. We will refer to that as the baseline cost when 

we talk about cost cap information. 

The follow ships, which are currently under construction at both 

Marinette and Austal, were negotiated ships inside of fixed-price 

contracts. Those are negotiated at target prices of about $500 million each, which includes the shipbuilder’s cost plus governmentfurnished equipment. Now, we also have budgeted above those targets change orders at 5 percent, as well as a share line that runs 

to a ceiling on the contract. So inside of the fixed-price construct, 

we’re sitting at targets for ship construction of about $500 million, 

with a range that could go as high as about $585 million for those 

ships if they don’t perform in accordance with the contract. 

1022 

Today, LCS–3, which launched at Marinette at about 81 percent 

complete, is on schedule and on budget. So she is hitting her numbers in accordance with the target on the contract. 

When we look at change order activity, which crippled the lead 

ships, the change order activity on LCS–3 is below 3 percent. So 

at 80 percent complete, change orders are performing at below 3 

percent, which is also well below the 5 percent budgeted. So we see 

construction and performance to a contract that is demonstrating 

stability and capturing lessons learned from the lead ship. 

For LCS–4 at Austal, she is 9 to 12 months behind LCS–3 by the 

natural progression of the contracts, she’s about 42 percent complete and on track for her launch at about 80 percent complete. 

While it’s still early in that ship’s overall construction, she is performing in accordance with her target. Also, change orders on that 

ship are minimal, less than 1 percent thus far. So we’re seeing 

demonstrated performance on the first follow ship, lessons learned 

and change order activity throttled to the extent necessary to ensure these ships hit their cost and schedule targets. 

Now we move to the solicitation that was cancelled in the summer of 2009. In 2009 we went out for bids for the 2010 ships. Proposals that came in were going in the wrong direction. So where 

we saw progression from the first to the second ship targets, we 

were seeing a reversal of that trend in these proposals, which reflected to a great extent the introduction of new shipyards inside 

the teaming agreements held by industry, and also risk that they 

viewed since they were very early on in construction of the follow 

ships at the time and had not demonstrated the learning that we 

are in fact seeing today. 

We cancelled that solicitation, as you’re well aware, and went out 

with the down-select, the solicitation for 10 ships, 2 ships per year 

over a 5-year period. So inside of the fiscal year 2010 through fiscal 

year 2015 period, where we have a total of 19 LCSs programmed, 

10 of those ships were to be down-selected and the remaining ships 

were to be opened up for competition for a second source, and then 

between the first and second source they would be competed in 

2015. So there’s 19 ships in fiscal years 2010 through 2015, 10 bid 

in the down-select. 

At the same time, as Senator McCain pointed out, the cost cap 

was established at $480 million, with an escalation provided for the 

cost cap. So over those ships the cost cap is averaged to about $538 

million. So we have a cost cap of $538 million and then we get bids 

in hand. We evaluate the bids and, while we can’t provide specific 

details on individual bids or individual ships to avoid violating the 

competition sensitivity, I’m going to provide averages per the 20- 

ship bid numbers. 

For 20 ships from the 2 competitors, average, including the shipbuilder’s cost for construction plus the government 5 percent budget for change orders, plus a margin for potential cost growth for unknowns or other performance considerations, the Navy is holding 

in its budget of $440 million per ship—that’s inside of a fixed-price 

contract—bid numbers, our government-furnished equipment, our 

budget for change orders, plus a management reserve budget for 

any cost performance or other issues that would impinge on the 

contract. 

1023 

In the worst case, which we do not anticipate and have no cause 

to believe, but within the fixed-price contract at ceiling, plus government-furnished equipment, plus the budget for change orders, 

the price to the government is on the order of $460 million average 

over the 20 ships. So under all circumstances, the pricing for these 

ships fall well below the cost cap and well below the budgeted 

amount, which is how we derive the savings that we’ve calculated. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. 

Admiral Pandolfe. 

STATEMENT OF RADM FRANK C. PANDOLFE, USN, DIRECTOR, 

SURFACE WARFARE DIVISION OPNAV N86 

Admiral PANDOLFE. Sir, very briefly, this program was founded 

in validated requirements arising from growing threats in the 

littorals from submarines, mines, and surface crafts, that we have 

to counter. In response to our request, both builders have produced 

highly capable ships that exemplify speed and maneuverability and 

adaptability. 

As mentioned, due to competition we now have favorable pricing, 

which allows us, with your permission, sir, to move forward with 

this program. 

Senator, we need these ships and we ask for your support. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Admiral. 

I think, Dr. Labs, you’re next on our list, so we’ll start with you. 

Thank you all for being here, by the way. I think I mentioned 

that at the beginning, but this is very short notice. We very much 

appreciate your all being here. 

Dr. Labs. 

STATEMENT OF ERIC J. LABS, PH.D., SENIOR ANALYST FOR 

NAVAL FORCES AND WEAPONS, CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET 

OFFICE 

Dr. LABS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, Senator 

McCain, members of the committee, I appreciate the opportunity to 

discuss the Navy’s LCS program with you today. 

Director Elmendorf sent a letter to Senator McCain on Friday in 

response to his request that CBO conduct an evaluation of the cost 

implications of the Navy’s proposal to change its LCS acquisition 

strategy. I ask that the full text of the CBO’s letter to Senator 

McCain be entered into the record. 

Chairman LEVIN. It will be. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

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Dr. LABS. CBO’s analysis suggests the following five conclusions: 

First, under either plan, costs for the first 19 ships are likely to be 

less than the amounts included in the Navy’s 2011 budget and 

FYDP; 

Second, CBO’s estimates show per-ship construction costs that 

are about the same for the two plans, but those estimates do not 

take into account the bids the Navy received; 


d14ful11.eps
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Third, adopting the dual-award plan might yield savings in construction costs, both from the possibility that the bids are lower 

than they would be in a subsequent competition when the economic 

environment could be different and from avoiding the need for a 

new contract to develop the infrastructure and expertise to build a 

new kind of ship; 

Fourth, operating and maintaining two types of ships would 

probably be more expensive than operating just one; and 

Fifth, if the Navy later decides to use a common combat system 

for all LCSs, the cost for developing, procuring, and installing that 

system could be significant. 

Let me first address the Navy’s estimates. In the 2011 FYDP, the Navy proposed spending almost $12 billion in current dollars to 

procure 19 LCSs under the down-select plan. The Navy now estimates the cost for that plan to be $10.4 billion, or about $1.5 billion 

less than its earlier estimate. Now, with the 2 bids in hand, the 

Navy proposes to purchase 20 ships, 10 from each contractor, for 

about $9.8 billion through 2015, or $600 million less than it currently estimates for the down-select plan and $2.1 billion less than 

its 2011 FYDP. 

The Navy briefed CBO on those estimates, but did not provide 

the detailed contractor data or the Navy’s detailed analysis of those 

data. If the contractors’ proposals for the 10-ship award are robust 

and do not change, the Navy’s estimates would be plausible. In 

fact, in today’s dollars and on a per-ton basis the cost of the LCSs 

under each strategy align well with the historical costs of the Oliver Perry-class frigate, the ship in the Navy’s inventory that is 

most similar to the LCS. But CBO has no independent data to 

verify the Navy’s savings estimate and total costs could grow by 

several hundred million dollars if the shipbuilders experience overruns. 

In contrast, CBO’s own estimates of costs are higher and indicate 

little difference in the per-ship cost of the two plans. But CBO’s estimates do not incorporate any benefits of competition that may 

have arisen as a result of the Navy’s existing down-select strategy. 

The Navy argues that benefits would be locked in by the fixed-price 

plus incentive contracts. CBO estimates that the down-select plan 

would cost the Navy about $583 million per ship, compared with 

an estimated cost of $591 million per ship under the dual-award 

plan. Given the uncertainties that surround such estimate, that difference, less than 2 percent, is not significant. 

Overall, CBO’s estimates of the costs for the down-select and the 

dual-award strategies are higher than the Navy’s by $680 million 

and $2 billion, respectively. However, in light of the contract bids, 

it is not clear that CBO’s cost estimating model is a better predictor of LCS costs through 2015 than the Navy’s estimates. Still, 

changes in design to address technical problems, changes in the 

number of ships purchased, inflation, or other escalation clauses 

could add to costs. 

The Navy decision to buy both types of ships through 2015 would 

have cost implications after 2015, but whether those costs will be 

higher or lower depends on at least three aspects of the Navy’s decision: First, which of the two ship designs the Navy would have 

selected under its original down-select plan; second, whether the 

1032 

Navy will buy one or both types of ship after 2015; and third, 

whether the Navy decides to develop a common combat system for 

both LCSs or keep the two separate combat systems under the 

dual-award approach. 

CBO cannot estimate those costs beyond 2015 because it does not 

know what the Navy is likely to decide in those areas. However, 

I would like to highlight the issue of the common combat system 

for the LCS. If the Navy were to decide that it wanted all LCSs 

to share the same system, it would be considerably more expensive 

to backfit the 12 LCSs under the dual-award strategy than the 2 

orphan LCSs under the down-select strategy. The combat system of an LCS today costs about $70 million. 

Thus, if future Navy leaders decided that a common combat system 

were desirable, developing, purchasing, and installing new combat 

systems in 12 LCSs would cost more than the savings that the 

Navy is asserting that the dual award offers over the next 5 years. 

Thank you and I’m happy to answer any questions you might 

have. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Dr. Labs. 

Mr. O’Rourke. 

STATEMENT OF RONALD O’ROURKE, SPECIALIST IN NAVAL 

AFFAIRS, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE 

Mr. O’ROURKE. Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, distinguished 

members of the committee: Thank you for the opportunity to testify 

today. With your permission, I’d like to submit my written statement for the record and summarize it here briefly. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you. They will all be made part of the 

record. 

Mr. O’ROURKE. The Navy’s proposed dual-award strategy is the 

third time in the history of the LCS program that the Navy has 

presented Congress with an important choice about the future of 

the LCS program late in the congressional budget review cycle, 

after Congress has completed its spring budget review hearings 

and some of its committee markups. The first instance was in mid2002 when the Navy submitted an amended request to Congress 

for fiscal year 2003 funding to get the LCS program started using 

a rapid acquisition strategy. The second instance was in September 

2009 when the Navy announced its proposed down-select strategy. 

The timing of the Navy’s new proposal for using a dual-award 

strategy provides relatively little time for Congress to collect cost 

or other information from the Navy, to solicit cost and other information from independent sources such as CBO and GAO, for CBO 

and GAO to develop such information and provide it to Congress, 

and for Congress to then evaluate all this information. 

This situation raises a potential issue for Congress concerning 

the possible implications for the LCS program and for congressional oversight of defense acquisition programs in general of proceeding with the LCS program in part on the basis of policies originally presented to Congress late in the congressional budget review 

cycle. 

There are a number of issues to consider in evaluating the relative merits of the down-select and dual-award strategies, including their potential relative costs, and on this key question the 

1033 

available information is fragmentary and not well vetted. Although 

the Navy’s statements in recent weeks about the cost implications 

of the dual-award strategy have tended to focus on ship acquisition 

costs, this is only one of at least three significant cost elements 

that can be examined in comparing potential costs of the down-select and dual-award strategies. 

Regarding ship procurement costs, there’s a notable difference 

between the Navy’s estimate and CBO’s estimate. The Navy estimates that, compared to the down-select strategy, the dual-award 

strategy would reduce ship procurement costs by $1 billion through 

fiscal year 2016. CBO in contrast estimates that, compared to the 

down-select strategy, the dual-award strategy would increase ship 

procurement costs by $740 million through fiscal year 2015. That’s 

quite a difference in estimates. 

The second cost element to factor in are potential additional costs 

under the dual-award strategy for possibly developing, procuring, 

and installing a common combat system for LCSs. Depending on 

what the Navy now or years from now decides to do regarding LCS 

combat system commonality, these additional costs can either be 

negligible or significant. Neither the Navy nor CBO has released 

estimates of these costs as of yesterday, but at the potential high 

end they could be enough to cancel out or even exceed any savings 

in ship procurement costs that might be realized through the dualaward strategy. The Navy’s intentions regarding LCS combat systems are not clear. 

The third cost element to factor in are the potential additional 

costs under the dual-award strategy for operating and supporting 

significant numbers of two LCS designs over their live cycles. GAO 

has reported a Navy estimate of $295 million in net present value 

terms for this additional cost, but this figure does not appear to 

have been vetted yet by an independent entity outside DOD. Both 

CBO and GAO have highlighted uncertainties regarding estimates 

of relative life cycle operation and support (O&S) costs under the 

down-select and dual-award strategies. 

When I put together the information on these three cost elements 

that was available as of yesterday, I get a range of possibilities. At 

one end of the range, the dual-award strategy might cost about 

$700 million less than the down-select strategy. Toward the other 

end of the range, the dual-award strategy might cost hundreds of 

millions dollars more than the down-select strategy. The wide degree of uncertainty from one end of the range to the other can be 

viewed as an expression of how imperfectly understood the potential relative costs of the down-select and dual-award strategies are 

at this point. 

Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the committee, this 

concludes my testimony. Thank you again for the opportunity to 

testify and I’ll be pleased to respond to any questions you might 

have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. O’Rourke follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY RONALD O’ROURKE

Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, distinguished members of the committee, 

thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss acquisition 

strategies for the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program. 

1034 

1 Anthony Capaccio, ‘‘Lockheed, Austal Extend Prices on Littoral Ship Bids,’’ Bloomberg.com, 

December 13, 2010; Christopher P. Cavas, ‘‘Deadline Looms For U.S. Navy’s LCS,’’ Defense 

News, December 13, 2010: 1. 2 H.R. 3082 was originally the fiscal year 2010 military construction, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and related agencies appropriations bill. 

INTRODUCTION

Down-Select Strategy Proposed In September 2009 

On September 16, 2009, the Navy announced a proposed LCS acquisition strategy 

under which the Navy would hold a competition to pick a single design to which 

all LCSs procured in fiscal year 2010 and subsequent years would be built. (The 

process of selecting the single design for all future production is called a down select.) The winner of the down select would be awarded a contract to build 10 LCSs 

over the 5-year period fiscal years 2010–2014, at a rate of two ships per year. The 

Navy would then hold a second competition—open to all bidders other than the 

shipyard building the 10 LCSs in fiscal years 2010–2014—to select a second shipyard to build up to five additional LCSs to the same design in fiscal years 2012– 

2014 (one ship in fiscal year 2012, and two ships per year in fiscal year 2013–2014). 

These two shipyards would then compete for contracts to build LCSs procured in 

fiscal year 2015 and subsequent years. 

Section 121 (a) and (b) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 

2010 (H.R. 2647/P.L. 111–84 of October 28, 2009) grant the Navy contracting and 

other authority needed to implement this LCS acquisition strategy. 

The Navy had planned to make the down-select decision and award the contract 

to build the 10 LCSs sometime this past summer, but the decision was delayed to 

as late as December 14. (The final bids submitted by the two LCS contractors were 

submitted on about September 15, and were valid for another 90 days, or until December 14.) 

DUAL-AWARD STRATEGY PROPOSED IN NOVEMBER 2010

On November 3, 2010, the Navy notified congressional offices that it was prepared 

to implement an alternative LCS acquisition strategy that would involve awarding 

10-ship contracts to both LCS bidders. The Navy would need additional legislative 

authority from Congress to implement this dual-award strategy. The Navy stated 

on November 3 that if the additional authority were not granted by December 14, 

the Navy would proceed to announce its down-select decision under the acquisition 

strategy announced on September 16, 2009. On December 13, it was reported that 

the two LCS bidders, at the Navy’s request, had extended the prices in their bids 

to December 30.1

The Navy’s proposed dual-award strategy poses a near-term issue for Congress of 

whether this strategy would be preferable to the down-select strategy, and whether 

Congress should grant the Navy, by December 30, the additional legislative authority the Navy would need to implement the dual-award strategy. 

On December 8, 2010, the House passed H.R. 3082, a full-year continuing appropriations bill for fiscal year 2011.2 Section 2314 of H.R. 3082 would provide the legislative authority the Navy needs to implement its proposed dual-award acquisition 

strategy for the LCS program. 

OBSERVATIONS REGARDING INFORMATION ON POTENTIAL COMPARATIVE COSTS

The potential comparative costs of the down-select and dual-award strategies are 

not clear. Observations that might be made about these costs as of December 13 include but are not limited to the following: 

• There is a significant difference between the Navy and the Congressional 

Budget Office (CBO) regarding relative LCS procurement costs under the 

down-select and dual-award strategies. The Navy estimates that, compared 

to the down-select strategy, the dual-award strategy could reduce LCS procurement costs by $1 billion through fiscal year 2016. CBO, in contrast, estimates that compared to the down-select strategy, the dual-award strategy 

could increase LCS procurement costs by $740 million through fiscal year 

2015. 

• As of December 13, there were no available estimates from the Navy or 

CBO regarding potential additional costs under the dual-award strategy for 

developing and installing a common combat system on some or all of the 

1035 

3The LCS combat system referred to in this discussion is the ship’s built-in collection of sensors, weapons, displays, and software, and not the LCS mission modules that can be placed on 

or taken off the ship. 4Government Accountability Office, Navy’s Proposed Dual Award Acquisition Strategy for the 

Littoral Combat Ship Program, GAO–11–249R, December 8, 2010, 14 pp. 5 Congressional Budget Office, letter report to Senator John McCain on LCS acquisition strategies dated December 10, 2010, 7 pp. 6This section is adapted from the December 13 update of CRS Report RL33741, Navy Littoral 

Combat Ship (LCS) Program: Background, Issues, and Options for Congress, by Ronald 

O’Rourke. 7Source: Navy point paper on proposed alternative LCS acquisition strategy dated November 

4, 2010. 

first 24 LCSs.3 Depending on what the Navy decides to do regarding LCS 

combat systems, these additional costs could be negligible or significant. 

The Navy’s intentions regarding the LCS combat systems are not clear. 

• According to the Government Accountability Office (GAO), the Navy estimates that, compared to the down-select strategy, the dual-award strategy 

would increase LCS life-cycle operating and support (O&S) costs by $295 

million (net present value). Both GAO’s December 8 report on the LCS program 4 and CBO’s December 10 letter report on the LCS program 5 express 

uncertainty regarding estimates of relative life-cycle O&S costs under the 

down-select and dual-award strategies. 

• CBO’s letter report included several cautionary statements about its estimates relating to limits on the information available to CBO in developing 

its estimates. 

GENERAL DISCUSSION 6

November 4 Navy Point Paper on Dual-Award Strategy 

A November 4, 2010, Navy point paper on the dual-award strategy stated the following (this is the full text of the point paper): 7

Littoral Combat Ship Proposed Revised Acquisition—Dual 10 Ship Awards 

• In summer 2009 Navy received bids for three fiscal year 2010 ships from 

Lockheed Martin/Marinette Marine/Bollinger and General Dynamics Bath 

Iron Works/Austal USA industry teams. These bids did not reflect competitive pricing and well exceeded the Congressional Cost Cap. In order to reverse cost trends on the program, the acquisition strategy was revised to 

the current down-select strategy. 

• The Navy’s Littoral Combat Ship acquisition strategy to down select to 

a single design has resulted in a highly effective competition between the 

industry bidders. Navy is on the path to down select in accordance with the 

terms of the current solicitation. 

• The industry response to the competitive acquisition strategy has resulted in reduction in cost for the LCSs relative to the previous bids. These 

competitive bids, coupled with Navy’s desires to increase ship procurement 

rates to support operational requirements, has created an opportunity to 

award each bidder a fixed-price 10-ship block buy—a total of 20 ships from 

fiscal year 2010 to fiscal year 2015. A comparison between the two strategies of which ships are included in a down select/second source versus dual 

10 ship block buy appears in the table below. 

• The current National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) anguage permits the Navy to procure up to 10 ships in a block buy. In order to execute 

a dual 10 ship award, Navy believes congressional authorization is required. 

• If congressional support for this approach is granted, Navy will work with 

industry to revise the ship procurement schedules within current proposal 

pricing (fiscals year 2010–2015 vice fiscal years 2010–2014). 

• Navy is continuing on the path to down select and absent authorization, 

we will proceed to down select by mid-December 2010. 

• There are numerous benefits to this approach including stabilizing the 

LCS program and the industrial base with award of 20 ships; increasing 

ship procurement rate to support operational requirements; sustaining competition through the program; and enhancing Foreign Military Sales opportunities. 

• The Navy intends to procure the Technical Data Package for both designs 

and if necessary a second source for either or both designs could be brought 

into the program. 

1036 

8 A December 6, 2010, press report states: ‘‘Lockheed officials have indicated that they could 

extend the pricing in their proposal for a short while beyond December 14, to allow time for 

Congress to approve the change. Lockheed Chief Financial Officer Bruce Tanner told an investment conference last week that Lockheed could extend the prices it offered for a day or 2, but 

not indefinitely . . . . Analysts said they expected both companies to show some flexibility on the 

expiration of their pricing, given that each firm stood to win a contract valued at around $5 

billion.’’ (Andrea Shalal-Esa, ‘‘U.S. Navy Hopeful Congress Will Approve Ship Buys,’’ Reuters.com, December 6, 2010.) Another December 6, 2010, press report that was posted online 

on December 3, 2010, stated: ‘‘Theoretically, Lockheed Martin and Austal could likely agree to 

extend the price deadline, but the Navy has not asked them to do so yet, [Navy spokeswoman 

• Either approach will ensure the Navy procures affordably priced ships. 

Some General Observations About the Dual-Award Strategy 

General observations that can be made on the Navy’s proposed dual-award strategy include but are not limited to the following: 

• The dual-award strategy would avoid, at least for now, the possibility of 

a contract protest being filed against a Navy down-select decision. 

• Although the dual-award strategy includes the possibility of the Navy at 

some point bringing a second source into the program for either or both 

LCS designs, the dual-award strategy does not include the guaranteed opportunity present in the down-select strategy for shipyards not currently involved in building LCSs to compete for the right to become the second LCS 

builder. 

• The Navy’s November 4, 2010, point paper on the dual-award strategy 

does not outline the Navy’s intentions regarding the currently different 

combat systems on the two LCS designs. 

• The dual-award strategy would require each LCS contractor to build 10 

ships over a period of 6 years (fiscal years 2010–2015) rather than 5 years 

(fiscal years 2010–2014), but at the same price that was bid for the 5-year 

schedule. In addition, LCSs built under the dual-award strategy would incorporate combat systems that would be built by combat system manufacturers in smaller annual quantities than would be the case under the downselect strategy, possibly increasing the costs of these combat systems. Factors such as these could, at the margin, alter the profitability for each contractor of building its respective group of 10 ships. 

Potential Oversight Questions for Congress 

Potential oversight questions for Congress in assessing whether the proposed 

dual-award strategy would be preferable to the down-select strategy announced by 

the Navy on September 16, 2009, and whether to grant the Navy, by December 30, 

the additional legislative authority the Navy would need to implement the dualaward strategy, include but are not limited to the following: 

• Does the timing of the Navy’s proposal provide Congress with enough 

time to adequately assess the relative merits of the down-select strategy 

and the dual-award strategy? Given that the contractors submitted their 

bids by about September 15, could the Navy have notified Congress of the 

proposed dual-award strategy sooner than November 3, giving Congress 

more time to seek information on and evaluate the proposal? Should the 

Navy ask the contractors to extend their bid prices for another, say, 30 or 

60 or 90 days beyond the original December 14 expiration date, so as to 

provide more time for congressional review of the Navy’s proposal? 8 (As 


d14ful1.eps
1037 

Captain Cate] Mueller said.’’ (Cid Standifer, ‘‘Stand-Alone Bill May Be Needed To Approve LCS 

Dual Block Buy Plan,’’ Inside the Navy, December 6, 2010.) 9For more on the KC–X program, see CRS Report RL34398, Air Force KC–X Tanker Aircraft 

Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Jeremiah Gertler. 10 Christopher P. Cavas, ‘‘Deadline Looms For U.S. Navy’s LCS,’’ Defense News, December 13, 

2010: 1. 11The Navy’s original fiscal year 2003 budget request, submitted to Congress in February 

2002, contained no apparent funding for development of the LCS. In addition, the Navy in early 

2002 had not yet announced that it intended to employ a rapid acquisition strategy for the LCS 

program. As a result, in the early months of 2002, there may have been little reason within 

Congress to view the LCS program as a significant fiscal year 2003 budget-review issue. In the 

Continued 

mentioned earlier, on December 13, it was reported that the two LCS bidders, at the Navy’s request, had extended the prices in their bids for 16 

days, to December 30.) 

• What role, if any, did a desire by the Navy to avoid a potential contract 

protest against the Navy’s down-select decision play in the Navy’s decision 

to propose the alternate dual-award strategy? For example, how concerned, 

if at all, was the Navy that the announcement of an LCS down-select decision might lead to a contract protest and controversy somewhat like what 

has been experienced in the Air Force’s KC–X aerial refueling tanker acquisition program? 9 A December 13, 2010, press report on the LCS program 

stated: ‘‘One high-level Navy source recently said that without the dualship approach, ‘there is 100 percent chance of a protest.’ ’’ 10

• What are the potential relative costs of the down-select and dual-award 

acquisition strategies, including development costs, procurement costs, and 

life-cycle operation and support (O&S) costs? Has the Navy fully and accurately estimated these costs—including potential costs for developing, procuring, and installing a common combat system for both LCS designs—and 

reported all these potential costs to Congress? 

• What are the potential relative risks of the down-select and dual-award 

acquisition strategies, including development risks, production cost risks, 

production schedule risks, and life-cycle O&S risks? Has the Navy fully and 

accurately estimated these risks, and reported all these potential risks to 

Congress? 

• What are the Navy’s intentions, under the proposed dual-award acquisition strategy, regarding the currently different combat systems on the two 

LCS designs? Does the Navy intend to leave them unchanged, adopt one 

of the combat systems as the common system for both designs, or develop 

a new combat system for both designs? If the Navy intends to pursue the 

second or third of these paths, what is the Navy’s plan (including schedule) 

for doing so? If the Navy does not have a definite plan regarding the combat systems for the ships, how well can the potential costs and risks of the 

dual-award strategy be estimated and compared to those of the down-select 

strategy? 

• What are the potential industrial-base impacts of the dual-award strategy, including impacts on the two LCS contractors, on shipyards that could, 

under the down-select strategy, bid for the right to become the second LCS 

builder, and on combat system manufacturers? 

• What impact, if any, might the Navy’s proposal to shift from its downselect strategy to the dual-award strategy have on the ability of the Department of Defense (DOD) to implement down-select strategies for other acquisition programs? For example, will the Navy’s proposal to shift to the dualaward strategy cause contractors bidding for other acquisition programs to 

treat with increased skepticism stated DOD intentions to carry out down 

selects? If so, could that reduce the benefits of competition that DOD might 

hope to achieve through the use of down-select strategies? 

Enough Time for Adequate Congressional Review of Navy Proposal? 

Regarding whether the timing of the Navy’s proposal provides Congress with 

enough time to adequately assess the relative merits of the down-select strategy and 

the dual-award strategy, it can be noted that this is the third time in the history 

of the LCS program that the Navy has presented Congress with an important choice 

about the future of the LCS program late in the congressional budget-review cycle, 

after Congress had completed its spring budget-review hearings and some of its 

committee markups. The first instance was in mid-2002, when the Navy submitted 

an amended request to Congress for fiscal year 2003 funding to get the LCS program started using a rapid acquisition strategy.11 The second was in September 

1038 

middle of 2002, the Navy submitted an amended request asking for $33 million in fiscal year 

2003 development funding for the LCS program. Navy officials explained that they did not decide until the middle of 2002 that they wanted to pursue a rapid acquisition strategy for the 

LCS program, and consequently did not realize until then that there was a need to request $33 

million in fiscal year 2003 funding for the program. By the middle of 2002, however, the House 

and Senate Armed Services committees had already held their spring fiscal year 2003 budgetreview hearings and marked up their respective versions of the fiscal year 2003 defense authorization bill. These two committees thus did not have an opportunity to use the spring 2002 

budget-review season to review in detail the Navy’s accelerated acquisition plan for the LCS program or the supporting request for $33 million in funding. 12Source: DOD letter to GAO dated December 6, 2010, p. 2, as reprinted in Government Accountability Office, Navy’s Proposed Dual Award Acquisition Strategy for the Littoral Combat 

Ship Program, GAO–11–249R, December 8, 2010, p. 12. The GAO report states on page 2: ‘‘According to the Navy, $1.9 billion in savings resulted from the competition between the two 

offerors and is common to both strategies. However, the Navy estimates that approximately $1.0 

billion in additional cost savings would be realized under the proposed dual award strategy because of the avoidance of higher start-up costs and risks associated with the second source 

planned for fiscal year 2012, among other factors. According to the Navy, these additional savings would be offset, in part, by increased total ownership costs.’’ 

2009, when the Navy announced its proposed down-select strategy for the LCS program. 

In light of the third instance—the Navy’s proposal of November 3, 2010, for using 

a dual-award strategy rather than a down-select strategy—a potential issue for Congress are the implications for the LCS program and congressional oversight of defense acquisition programs in general of proceeding with the LCS program in part 

on the basis of policies originally presented as proposals to Congress late in the congressional budget-review cycle, after Congress had completed its spring budget-review hearings and some of its committee markups. The Navy’s November 3, 2010, 

notification to Congress of the proposed dual-award strategy, combined with a request by the Navy that Congress act on that proposal by December 30, provides relatively little time for Congress to collect cost and other information from the Navy 

(including information that Navy might not offer in initial briefings to individual 

congressional offices), for Congress to solicit cost and other information from independent sources such as the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) and GAO, for CBO 

and GAO to develop such information and provide it to Congress, for Congress to 

hold hearings at which all this information might be discussed in a group setting, 

with multiple parties present, and for congressional offices to then form their evaluations of the Navy’s proposal. 

Potential Relative Ship Procurement Costs 

Regarding potential relative costs of the down-select and dual-award acquisition 

strategies, the Navy has stated that it estimates that procuring LCSs under the 

dual-award strategy would cost $1 billion less through fiscal year 2016 than procuring them under the down-select strategy.12 According to CBO, the Navy’s estimated savings through fiscal year 2015—the final year covered in the table shown 

in the Navy’s November 4 point paper—is $600 million. 

CBO in its December 10 letter report provided its own estimate of the relative 

ship procurement costs of the down-select and dual-award strategies through fiscal 

year 2015. As shown in Table 1, CBO estimates that the dual-award strategy would 

cost $740 million more in ship procurement costs than the down-select strategy 

through fiscal year 2015. 

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13Source: Telephone conversation with CBO, December 10, 2010. 14 Congressional Budget Office, letter report to Senator John McCain on LCS acquisition strategies dated December 10, 2010, p. 3. 

CBO’s letter report included several cautionary statements about its estimates relating to limits on the information available to CBO in developing its estimates. 

Under the down-select strategy, shipyards competing to become the second LCS 

builder could include yards that currently build other ships for the Navy, such as, 

possibly, General Dynamics’ Bath Iron Works (GD/BIW) of Bath, ME, Northrop 

Grumman’s Ingalls shipyard of Pascagoula, MS, or General Dynamics’ National 

Steel and Shipbuilding Company (NASSCO) of San Diego, CA. If such a yard were 

to be selected under the down-select strategy to become the second LCS builder, it 

could reduce the cost of other Navy ships being built at that yard by more fully 

spreading the fixed overhead costs of that yard. It is not clear whether the Navy 

estimate in Table 1 accounts for a possible reduction in the cost of other Navy ships 

that might be realized under the down-select strategy through more full spreading 

of shipyard fixed overhead costs. The CBO estimate does not account for this possible reduction.13

Potential Combat System-Related Investment Costs 

Any savings the dual-award strategy might realize relative to the down-select 

strategy in terms of costs for procuring LCSs could be offset by potential additional 

costs under the dual-award strategy for developing, procuring, and installing a common combat system for the two LCS designs. Developing a new common combat system for the two LCS designs might cost tens of millions of dollars. Procuring replacement combat systems for LCSs could cost tens of millions or dollars per ship. 

Removing an LCS’s existing combat system and installing a replacement system 

could cost several millions of dollars per ship. CBO’s letter report states that ‘‘if the 

Navy later decided to use a common combat system for all LCSs (rather than the 

different ones that would initially be installed on the two different types of vessels), 

the costs for developing, procuring, and installing that system could be significant.’’ 14

If, for example, the Navy decided to develop a new common combat system for 

both LCS designs, developed that new system at a one-time cost of, say, $30 million, 

procured 24 copies of that system at a recurring cost of, say, $50 million per copy, 

and installed them on the first 24 LCSs (i.e., LCSs 1 through 4, plus the 20 ships 

to be awarded under the dual-award strategy’s two 10-ship block-buy contracts) at 

a recurring installation cost of, say, $5 million per ship, the total cost would be 

$1,350 million. 

If, as another example, the Navy decided to adopt one of the two existing LCS 

combat systems as the common combat system for both designs, adapted that existing system for the other LCS design at a one-time cost of, say, $10 million, procured 

12 copies of that system at a recurring cost of, say, $50 million per copy, and installed them on 12 of the first 24 LCSs (i.e., the LCSs originally built or to be built 


d14ful2.eps
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15 Congressional Budget Office, letter report to Senator John McCain on LCS acquisition strategies dated December 10, 2010, p. 7. 16 Andrew Burt, ‘‘Navy Open To Combining Combat Systems On Both Littoral Combat Ships,’’ 

Inside the Navy, November 29, 2010. Material in brackets as in original. The Austal USA 

version of the LCS is the version developed by the General Dynamics-led LCS industry team. 

with the other combat system ) at a recurring installation cost of, say, $5 million 

per ship, the total cost would be $670 million. 

CBO’s December 10 letter report states that the existing combat systems on the two LCS designs cost about $70 million per ship.15 Using this figure (instead of $50 

million) as the basis for estimating the cost of a replacement combat system, the 

estimates of $1,350 million and $670 million in the preceding two paragraphs would 

become $1,830 million and $910 million, respectively. 

Regarding the Navy’s intentions for the combat systems on the two LCS designs, 

a November 29, 2010, press report states that ‘‘the Navy intends to keep separate 

the combat systems of the Lockheed and Austal USA versions of the Littoral Combat Ships for its dual buy strategy, but will ‘procure the tech data package to allow 

for consideration of [a] common combat system in the future,’ according to Navy 

spokeswoman Capt. Cate Mueller.’’ The report also quoted an industry official as 

saying that the Navy is likely ‘‘still strategizing as to how they’re going to single 

up on a combat system.’’ 16 A December 13, 2010, press report described as an ‘‘analysis’’ article stated: 

To speed development [of the LCS], each [LCS industry] design team was 

allowed to develop its own system. [For the Lockheed team’s LCS design,] 

Lockheed came up with COMBATSS–21, in some ways a lightweight derivative of the Aegis combat system built by the company and fielded on nearly 80 U.S. Navy cruisers and destroyers. General Dynamics’ Advanced Information Systems (AIS) developed an entirely new system for [the General 

Dynamics team’s LCS] design, a system the company claims more closely 

embodies the open architecture concept espoused by the Navy for virtually 

all its new computer systems. 

Each combat system requires its own support pipeline: maintenance and 

parts chains, training programs, operational characteristics. Even if the 

Navy had simply picked one, it would still have been unique in a fleet that 

has striven for homogeneity and relative simplicity. 

Navy officials downplay the impact of fielding separate systems, and 

claim competition will hold prices in check. But sooner or later, whether today’s management team supports both combat systems or not, an official 

will come into office who sees the dual-system setup as wasteful and 

unsupportable. When that happens, the ships with one of the systems will 

likely be taken out of service—years before they’re used up—and probably 

made available for foreign military sales. 

The Navy reportedly has a plan to deal with the dual combat systems, 

but it’s not saying what it is, possibly because officials lack the authority 

to discuss details of a dual-ship buy. While a number of congressional staffers and analysts have been briefed on the plan, they’ve been sworn to secrecy. Even among those who have been briefed, there are concerns that 

this is an issue the Navy needs to address publicly before the buybothdesigns plan can be approved. 

What’s the Plan? 

So what is the Navy’s plan for the combat systems? Sean Stackley, the 

service’s top weapons buyer, gave some clues in September 2009 when he 

announced the service would have a competition to buy only one of the designs. As a key factor in the strategy to keep a lid on cost growth and perhaps drive prices down, the Navy would compete multiple elements of each 

LCS design, including the combat systems, weapons and engines. Eventually, the service wants to purchase the technical package both for the design and for the combat system, thus allowing other companies to bid for 

construction. 

After sailors have a chance to put each LCS combat system through its 

paces, the service will begin to pick and choose among the various elements 

of each system. Those elements will be incorporated into what would become, in essence, a third combat system. Another competition would then 

be held for that, allowing companies such as Northrop Grumman, Raytheon 

or even Saab to bid as the combat system integrator. 

Under this scenario, a third system might be developed in time to begin 

incorporating the new, one-size-fits-both combat system into the later ships 

of each company’s 10-ship buy. Even if the new system isn’t ready by then, 

1041 

17 Christopher P. Cavas, ‘‘Two LCS Designs, One Big Dilemma,’’ Defense News, December 13, 

2010: 22. 18Government Accountability Office, Navy’s Proposed Dual Award Acquisition Strategy for the 

Littoral Combat Ship 19Government Accountability Office, Navy’s Proposed Dual Award Acquisition Strategy for the 

Littoral Combat Ship Program, GAO–11–249R, December 8, 2010, p. 6. 20 Congressional Budget Office, letter report to Senator John McCain on LCS acquisition strategies dated December 10, 2010, p. 3. 

it could become a key element in follow-on LCSs, beginning with the 25th 

LCS in 2016. 

What would become of the earlier ships featuring individual combat systems is 

not yet clear.17

Potential Relative Life-Cycle Operation and Support (O&S) Costs 

Any savings the dual-award strategy might realize relative to the down-select 

strategy in terms of costs for procuring LCSs could also be offset by potential additional life-cycle operation and support (O&S) costs of operating significant numbers 

of two different LCS designs. GAO’s December 8 report states: ‘‘According to the 

Navy, [estimated savings in LCS procurement costs under the dual-award strategy] 

would be offset, in part, by an additional $842 million in total ownership costs, 

which the Navy equates to a net present value of $295 million.’’ 18 The GAO report 

also states: 

Navy officials expressed confidence that their cost estimate supporting 

the dual award provides details on the costs to operate and support both 

designs. However, since little actual LCS operating and support data are 

available to date, the Navy’s estimates for these costs are currently based 

on data from other ships and could change as actual cost data become more 

available. These estimates are also based on new operational concepts for 

personnel, training, and maintenance that have not been fully developed, 

tested, and implemented. For example, the Navy has not yet implemented 

a comprehensive training plan, and it is possible that the plan could cost 

more or less than the training costs currently accounted for by the Navy.19

CBO’s December 10 letter report stated: 

Operating and maintaining two types of ships would probably be more expensive, however. The Navy has stated that the differences in costs are 

small (and more than offset by procurement savings), but there is considerable uncertainty about how to estimate those differences because the Navy 

does not yet have much experience in operating such ships.20

Potential Resulting Relative Net Costs 

Using information available as of December 13, potential relative costs of the 

down-select and dual-award strategies might be bounded as follows: 

On the one hand, compared to the down-select strategy, the dual award 

strategy might cost a net total of $705 million less. This net figure includes 

$1 billion in Navy-estimated ship procurement cost savings through fiscal 

year 2016, no additional combat system-related investment costs (i.e., the 

Navy decides not to pursue a common combat system for the two LCS designs), and $295 million in additional life-cycle O&S costs (net present 

value) for operating significant numbers of both LCS designs. 

On the other hand, compared to the down-select strategy, the dual award 

strategy might cost a net total of as much as $2,865 million more. This net 

figure includes $740 million in CBO-estimated higher ship procurement 

costs through fiscal year 2015, as much as $1,830 million in additional combat system related costs (i.e., the Navy decides to develop, procure, and install on 24 LCSs a new common combat system with a procurement cost 

of as much as $70 million per ship), and $295 million in additional life-cycle 

O&S costs (net present value) for operating significant numbers of both 

LCS designs. 

POTENTIAL RELATIVE RISKS

Regarding the potential relative risks of the down-select and dual-award acquisition strategies, the GAO report states that ‘‘a second ship design and source provided under the dual award strategy could provide the Navy an additional hedge 

1042 

21Government Accountability Office, Navy’s Proposed Dual Award Acquisition Strategy for the 

Littoral Combat Ship Program, GAO–11–249R, December 8, 2010, p. 4. 22Limits on Navy SUPSHIP capacities may have been a factor in the delayed discovery by 

the Navy of construction quality problems on Navy San Antonio (LPD–17) class amphibious 

ships. For a discussion of LPD–17 class construction quality problems, CRS Report RL34476, 

Navy LPD–17 Amphibious Ship Procurement: Background, Issues, and Options for Congress, by 

Ronald O’Rourke. 

against risk, should one design prove problematic.’’ 21 A converse argument might 

be that managing the construction of two very different LCS designs could place increased demands on overall Navy program management capacities and on the Program, GAO–11–249R, December 8, 2010, Table 1 on page 3. 

Navy’s Supervisor of Shipbuilding (SUPSHIP) capabilities for on-site monitoring 

of the construction of Navy ships—factors that might increase the chances of program-management challenges in the LCS program or of the Navy not detecting in 

a timely manner construction-quality problems that might occur in one or both LCS 

designs.22

Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the committee, this concludes my testimony. Thank you again for the opportunity to appear before you to discuss these 

issues. I will be pleased to respond to any questions you might have. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Mr. O’Rourke. 

Mr. Francis. 

STATEMENT OF PAUL L. FRANCIS, MANAGING DIRECTOR, ACQUISITION AND SOURCING MANAGEMENT, GOVERNMENT 

ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 

Mr. FRANCIS. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain, 

and members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to 

talk about the LCS today. 

We’ve been involved in the program on or off for about the past 

5 years and I would say I think the Navy’s done quite a bit of 

work, particularly in the last year, to get the program on track, but 

in our view the program is not out of the woods yet. We see risks 

in three areas. 

First would be the seaframes. The third and fourth seaframes 

are undergoing construction right now. There are design changes. 

Some design changes are being postponed to post delivery. I believe 

the Navy feels that they have adequately provided for these 

changes financially and managerially, but time will tell whether 

that’s sufficient. 

The second area is the mission equipment packages. The mission 

equipment packages have had difficulty in development and testing 

over the years. To illustrate, in 2007 the Navy had anticipated having delivered 16 mission equipment packages through fiscal year 

2012. Right now the estimate is at about eight and those mission 

equipment packages will be less capable than envisioned. 

The third area is integrated testing, that is bringing the mission 

equipment packages and the seaframes together. At this point, no 

operational testing of either the seaframes or the mission equipment packages has been done yet. Right now I believe the schedule 

is the first operational testing of the seaframes and two mission 

equipment packages, will be finished on the third quarter of fiscal 

year 2013. The third mission equipment package will be operationally tested in fiscal year 2015. There’s potential for discovery there 

when those systems are brought together and operationally tested. 

In August 2010, we raised the concern that the ships and the 

seaframes may be proceeding too quickly before the operational 

testing was done, and we made a recommendation to the Navy that 

1043 

1The decision to select a single ship design is referred to as the ‘‘downselect.’’ 

2 In response to the Navy’s September 2009 LCS acquisition strategy change, General Dynamics and Austal USA revoked their teaming arrangement for future seaframes, in turn allowing 

the General Dynamics Bath Iron Works shipyard to compete for selection as the planned potential second source of the winning design. Austal USA and Lockheed Martin are the prime contractors competing for the current 10-ship program. 3See GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Navy’s Ability to Overcome Challenges Facing the Littoral 

Combat Ship Will Determine Eventual Capabilities, GAO–10–523 (Washington, DC: Aug. 31, 

2010). 4See GAO, Navy’s Proposed Dual Award Acquisition Strategy for the Littoral Combat Ship 

Program, GAO–11–249R (Washington, DC: Dec. 8, 2010). 

they reconsider sequencing the mission equipment packages and 

the seaframes so that one didn’t get ahead of the other. The Navy 

and the Department of Defense (DOD) agreed with that recommendation, but we haven’t seen that followed up in the new 

dual strategy proposal. 

In closing, I’d say the risks that I cite in the programs are not 

materially different in either strategy. So for example, if the dual 

strategy were not followed and the existing down-select to 10 ships 

were followed, we’d have many of the same risks. I think by the 

Navy saying they’re willing to back 20 ships it does signal that the 

Navy is more confident in the ships and could create some expectations on the part of industry downstream. On the other hand, I 

think that having a second source could provide an additional 

hedge against risk should one seaframe develop some problems. 

Mr. Chairman, that concludes my statement and I’d be glad to 

answer any questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Francis follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT BY PAUL L. FRANCIS

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee: I am pleased to be here today to 

discuss the Department of the Navy’s proposed dual ship acquisition strategy for the 

Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program. LCS is envisioned as a vessel able to be reconfigured to meet three different mission areas: mine countermeasures, surface warfare, and antisubmarine warfare. Its design concept consists of two distinct parts— 

the ship itself (seaframe) and the mission package it carries and deploys. The Navy 

is procuring the first four ships in two different designs from shipbuilding teams 

led by Lockheed Martin and General Dynamics, which currently build their designs 

at Marinette Marine and Austal USA shipyards, respectively. 

The Navy’s strategy for procuring LCS has evolved over the years. Prior to September 2009, the Navy planned to continue building the class using both ship designs. This strategy changed following unsuccessful contract negotiations that same 

year for fiscal year 2010 funded seaframes—an outcome attributable to industry 

proposals priced significantly above Navy expectations. In September 2009, the 

Navy announced that in an effort to improve affordability, it was revising the LCS 

program’s acquisition strategy and would select one seaframe design before awarding contracts for any additional ships.1 Following approval of this strategy in January 2010, the Navy issued a new solicitation—intended to lead to a downselect— 

for fiscal year 2010 seaframes. In support of this strategy, Congress authorized the 

Navy to procure up to 10 seaframes and 15 LCS control and weapon systems. The 

Navy planned to have a second competition in 2012 and provide five of the ship control and weapon systems to the winning contractor, who would construct up to 5 

ships of the same design and install the systems. However, in November 2010, following receipt of new industry proposals for the fiscal year 2010 seaframes, the 

Navy proposed to change its acquisition strategy back to awarding new construction 

contracts to both industry teams.2

In August 2010, we issued a report evaluating LCS planning and implementation 

efforts that identified technical, design, and construction challenges that could impact the Navy’s ability to deliver promised LCS capabilities.3 This statement highlights findings from that report and a subsequent report issued on December 8, 

2010, which assessed risks that could affect the Navy’s ability to execute the LCS 

program.4 As detailed in our most recent report, we found that regardless of the 

1044 

strategy selected, the Navy continues to face design and construction risks in executing the LCS program, given its stage of maturity and its unique mission, design, 

and operational concept. These risks threaten the Navy’s ability to achieve the cost 

savings it estimates under either of its acquisition strategies. 

In preparing this testimony, we relied primarily on work supporting our most recent LCS report. That report contains a detailed overview of our scope and methodology. All of our work for this report was performed in accordance with generally 

accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and 

perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable 

basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions 

based on our audit objectives. 

SUMMARY

Successful business cases for shipbuilding programs require balance between the 

concept selected to satisfy warfighter needs and the resources—technologies, design 

knowledge, funding, time, and management capacity—needed to transform that concept into a product. Without a sound business case, program execution will be hampered, regardless of the contracting strategy. The LCS, given its stage of maturity 

and its unique mission, design, and operational concept, still faces design and construction risks. Most of these risks appear to be inherent to the program, regardless 

of which acquisition strategy is followed. Navy officials believe that experience to 

date on the program, coupled with fixed-price contracts and a sufficient budget for 

ship changes, mitigates this risk. However, much work and demonstration remains 

for LCS, and other shipbuilding programs have had difficulty at this stage. On the 

other hand, a second ship design and source provided under the dual award strategy 

could provide the Navy an additional hedge against risk, should one design prove 

problematic. Mission equipment packages are common to both ships and would pose 

the same execution risks, apart from integration. 

KEY FEATURES OF THE DOWNSELECT AND THE DUAL-AWARD STRATEGIES

The Navy estimates that both its existing and proposed acquisition strategies will 

generate significant cost savings to the government. According to the Navy, $1.9 billion in savings resulted from the competition between the two offerors and is common to both strategies. However, the Navy estimates that approximately $1.0 billion 

in additional cost savings would be realized under the proposed dual award strategy 

because of the avoidance of higher start-up costs and risks associated with the second source planned for fiscal year 2012, among other factors. According to the Navy, 

these additional savings would be offset, in part, by increased total ownership costs. 

The Navy plans to use some of the remaining savings, if realized, to fund construction of an additional LCS seaframe in fiscal year 2012. Table 1 compares the key 

tenets of each strategy. 

1045 

The quantities planned under both of the Navy’s strategies are similar through 

fiscal year 2015. These similarities are outlined in table 2, which details the Navy’s 

procurement plans for seaframes under both the existing downselect strategy and 

the proposed dual award strategy. 

Under the dual award strategy, the government will be authorized to contract for 

up to 20 ships. In contrast, the existing downselect strategy limits this authorization 

to up to 10 ships until fiscal year 2012, when the Navy planned to solicit a second 

source for additional ships. 

DESIGN CHANGES COULD INCREASE NEAR-TERM COSTS ABOVE CURRENT ESTIMATES

Under both the existing downselect strategy and the proposed dual award strategy, the Navy plans to award fixed-price incentive contracts for new seaframes. This 

type of contract provides for adjusting profit and establishing the final contract price 

by application of a formula based on the relationship of total final negotiated cost 

to total target cost. The final price is subject to a price ceiling, negotiated at the 

outset. In the case of LCS, the solicitation stated that the government would share 

50 percent of costs above the target cost, up to the price ceiling. Navy officials also 

stated that they have budgeted management reserve funds to accommodate potential impacts to cost performance during program execution. In other programs, the 

Navy has returned to Congress to request funding for costs exceeding the target 

costs. In the near term, cost increases are likely but it is unknown whether increases will exceed what the Navy has budgeted for fiscal years 2010 and beyond. 

The likely source of these cost increases is design changes, which result in out-ofsequence work, potentially limiting the shipbuilders’ ability to achieve the benefits 


d14ful3.eps d14ful4.eps
1046 

5GAO–10–523. 

6 According to Navy officials, the most recent progress related to LCS launch, handling, and 

recovery systems consists of: (1) successful operation and movement of an embarked 11-meter 

rigid-hull inflatable boat onboard LCS–1 in March 2010; (2) synthetic lift lines on LCS–2 successfully completing a 200 percent lift test; and (3) routine usage of a straddle carrier to move 

an 11-meter rigid-hull inflatable boat (with stowage cradle) and berthing modules around the 

LCS–2 mission bay. In addition, Navy officials state that LCS–1’s system is scheduled to begin 

testing with the mine countermeasures mission package in fiscal year 2011 and testing of LCS– 

2’s twin-boom extensible crane is progressing. 7See GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Guidance Needed on Navy’s Use of Investment Incentives 

at Private Shipyards, GAO–10–686 (Washington, DC: July 26, 2010) and GAO–10–523. 

they anticipate from construction process improvements and shipyard capital investments. 

Our August 2010 report on LCS discussed issues with the performance of particular ship systems at the time of lead ship deliveries and as a result of subsequent 

operating experience.5 In an effort to address technical issues on the first two ships, 

the Navy has implemented design changes for the third and fourth LCS seaframes 

(LCS–3 and LCS–4), several of which are not yet complete. These changes are significant and have affected the configuration of several major ship systems including 

propulsion, communications, electrical, and navigation. In addition, launch, handling, and recovery systems for both designs are still being refined, although the 

Navy reports recent progress related to each of these systems.6 To the extent that 

these design changes necessitate modifications in the ship specifications on which 

the contractors based their proposals for future ships, contract modifications will 

need to be negotiated and priced. According to the Navy, it estimates funding requirements for these change orders to total 5 percent for all future follow-on ships 

produced, regardless of whether it proceeds with a downselect strategy or the proposed dual award strategy. In addition, Navy officials stated that the seaframe solicitation includes a provision that agreed to design changes are ‘‘not to exceed’’ $12 

million—a feature that Navy officials state will bound government cost risk due to 

design changes. Pending full identification and resolution of deficiencies affecting 

the lead ships, the Navy’s ability to stay within its budgeted limits remains to be 

seen. 

As we reported earlier this year, the LCS shipbuilding teams have implemented 

process and capacity improvements based on lessons learned from constructing lead 

ships and have made capital investments in their yards in an effort to increase efficiency.7 Fully realizing these improvements may be challenging given the design 

changes still occurring in the program. To the extent that addressing technical 

issues disrupts the optimal construction sequence for follow-on ships, additional 

labor hours could be required beyond current forecasts. Introducing such inefficiencies could offset initial benefits obtained from the process improvements and new 

facilities the shipbuilders have put into place, increasing the risk of out-of-sequence 

work and rework. Some level of design changes can be reasonably expected given 

the testing that remains. To date, however, Navy officials report that LCS–3 and 

LCS–4 changes are being managed efficiently—citing improved cost and schedule 

performance by both shipbuilders. The Navy also believes that the LCS seaframe 

may be less affected by mission equipment changes than other ships given the 

equipment’s modular design. Maintaining a high level of performance will depend 

on avoiding significant design changes to seaframes under construction. 

OPERATIONS AND SUPPORT COSTS DIFFICULT TO ESTIMATE

Navy officials expressed confidence that their cost estimate supporting the dual 

award provides details on the costs to operate and support both designs. However, 

since little actual LCS operating and support data are available to date, the Navy’s 

estimates for these costs are currently based on data from other ships and could 

change as actual cost data become more available. These estimates are also based 

on new operational concepts for personnel, training, and maintenance that have not 

been fully developed, tested, and implemented. For example, the Navy has not yet 

implemented a comprehensive training plan, and it is possible that the plan could 

cost more or less than the training costs currently accounted for by the Navy. 

In addition, the Navy has not studied—within the context of the downselect strategy—the potential savings associated with early retirement of the two nonselected 

design ships. As such, decision makers do not have a complete picture of the various 

options available to them related to choosing between the downselect and dual 

award strategies. Under the existing downselect strategy, the Navy’s intention is to 

keep in service—at least initially—the other two ships of the design not selected for 

long-term production. The Navy acknowledged that operating and supporting two 

1047 

8See GAO, Littoral Combat Ship: Actions Needed to Improve Operating Cost Estimates and 

Mitigate Risks in Implementing New Concepts, GAO–10–257 (Washington, DC: Feb. 2, 2010). 9 According to Navy officials, the AN/AQS–20A sonar and Airborne Laser Mine Detection System recently completed developmental testing in August and October 2010, respectively. Alternatively, the Remote Minehunting System—produced since 2005—continues to struggle with reliability shortfalls. This has prompted the Navy to implement a series of design changes to the 

vehicle component and evaluate reducing the system’s performance requirements. 10Development of the Non-Line-of-Sight Launch System—an anticipated key system within 

the surface warfare package—was canceled in 2010 following test failures and higher than expected cost estimates. The Navy continues to evaluate alternatives to replace this capability onboard LCS. 11 According to Navy officials, the planned fiscal year 2012 operational test will employ the 

first LCS (LCS–1) seaframe and a (partial) surface warfare mission package. This date represents a recent update to the program’s testing plan as the Navy’s fiscal year 2011 budget estimates showed this event occurring in the third quarter of fiscal year 2013. 12GAO–10–523. 

different designs carries increased costs as compared to the costs of employing only 

one design. As we previously reported, these costs include separate training facilities because each design has unique equipment and therefore different operating 

and maintenance requirements.8 In February 2010, we recommended that the Navy 

conduct a cost-benefit analysis of options for these two ships, including the possibility of retiring them from service—a recommendation with which the Department 

of Defense agreed. As we point out in the February report, it is important that estimates of long-term operating and support costs are available to assess alternatives 

before a decision is made, particularly since these costs constitute over 70 percent 

of a system’s life cycle costs. However, in discussions with Navy officials in November 2010, they told us that their latest assessment of the long-term costs of maintaining two ship designs does not consider the option of retiring the two nonselected 

ships. 

MISSION PACKAGE UNCERTAINTIES AND DELAYS

The Navy’s request to double its current 10-ship authorization to 20 ships—at a 

time when the mine countermeasures, surface warfare, and antisubmarine warfare 

mission packages continue to face significant developmental challenges—highlights 

the Navy’s risk of investing in a fleet of ships that has not yet demonstrated its 

promised capability. Absent significant capability within its mission packages, 

seaframe functionality is largely constrained to self-defense as opposed to missionrelated tasks. 

Navy officials acknowledged that mission package systems have taken significantly longer to develop and field than anticipated. Underscoring this situation is 

the fact that development efforts for most of these systems predate the LCS program—in some cases by 10 years or more. However, Navy officials expressed confidence that their latest testing and production plans for mission package systems 

are executable. 

Recent testing of mission package systems has yielded mixed results. The Navy 

reports that two systems within the mine countermeasures mission package recently 

completed developmental testing, but another system is undergoing reliability improvements following production of several units that did not meet performance requirements.9 Further, test failures contributed to the cancellation of a key surface 

warfare mission package system, and the future composition of the package remains 

undetermined.10

Developmental challenges facing individual systems have led to procurement 

delays for all three mission packages and have disrupted program test schedules. 

Most notably, the Navy reports the first operational testing event involving a 

seaframe and partial mission package is now scheduled for late second quarter of 

fiscal year 2012, and the Navy expects individual mission package systems to remain in development through 2017.11

To safeguard against excess quantities of ships and mission packages being purchased before their combined capabilities are demonstrated, we recommended in our 

August 2010 report that the Secretary of Defense update the LCS acquisition strategy to account for operational testing delays in the program and resequence planned 

purchases of ships and mission packages, as appropriate.12 The Department of Defense agreed with this recommendation, stating that an updated schedule was under 

development to better align seaframe and mission module production milestones. 

However, it is unclear how the department’s concurrence with our recommendation 

can be reconciled against the Navy’s current request to increase the planned 

seaframe commitment, particularly since no operational testing involving mission 

packages—or any of their individual systems—has since taken place. Until mission 

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package and operational testing progresses—and key mine countermeasures, surface 

warfare, and antisubmarine warfare systems are proven effective and suitable onboard seaframes—the Navy cannot be certain that the LCS will deliver the full capability desired. This risk would increase with a commitment to higher quantities. 

The Navy believes this increased commitment is appropriately balanced against 

competing risks in the program. 

Mr. Chairman, that concludes my statement. I would be pleased to answer any 

questions. 

CONTACT AND STAFF ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

For future questions about this statement, please contact me at (202) 512–4841 

or francisp@gao.gov. Individuals making key contributions to this report were Belva 

Martin, Acting Director; Diana Moldafsky, assistant Director; Christopher R. Durbin; Jeremy Hawk; Kristine Hassinger; Simon Hirschfeld; and Karen Zuckerstein. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Francis. 

Let’s try a first round of 8 minutes. 

First let me ask you, Secretary Stackley. You’ve heard now the 

testimony of CBO, GAO, and CRS. Do you want to comment or 

react to any of the testimony that you’ve heard, before I ask specific questions? 

Mr. STACKLEY. Let me make a few comments. First, I believe Dr. 

Labs pointed out in his assessment that he basically estimated 

what the ships would cost in accordance with his cost model, but 

his information is uninformed by the bids. What we are bringing 

to the table is information inside of the bids that would take CBO’s 

cost estimates, which are within I would say 5 percent of the 

Navy’s budget and the Navy’s estimate of a year plus ago, and then 

bring against that demonstrated performance in the course of the 

past year on the first follow ships and fixed-price proposals inside 

the bids we have. 

So his estimate balanced against the fixed-price bids that we 

have are consistent in terms of the determination of the savings 

that we have here. I believe that CBO’s estimate and the Navy’s 

estimate and the Navy’s proposal for a dual award to provide savings are all consistent. 

Chairman LEVIN. The reason that they’re uninformed is that he 

did not have that information available to him, for proprietary reasons, is that correct? 

Mr. STACKLEY. Yes, sir. 

Chairman LEVIN. Nonetheless, looking at ranges, is that what 

you’re saying, they are consistent with your estimates? 

Mr. STACKLEY. His estimate is within a few percent of the Navy’s 

estimate and the Navy’s budget in 2011. When you bring the bids 

against that and you factor in, as I have described, the fixed price 

and the margins that we’re including for both change and any cost 

excursions, then we have a solid number to go against an estimate, 

and the difference is the savings that we’re bringing to the table. 

The second comment has to deal with, there’s a common theme 

between CBO, CRS, and GAO regarding risk; it’s risk and unknowns. I will describe that this program, as I mentioned in my 

opening remarks on the numbers has done a complete turn-around 

in terms of stabilizing design, stabilizing production processes, and 

driving lessons learned on the part of industry into their processes. 

So what that has resulted in is performance far improved, not 

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1049 

tracts. The key indicators I would tell you are what we’re seeing 

in terms of cost performance on the first ships, the first follow 

ships, and control of changes on the first follow ships, and then 

what we’re seeing in terms of remaining risk on the test program. 

So we have very much controlled change, controlled the risk that 

the program is staring at in the future. Then the mission package 

discussion has isolated any risk associated with the mission packages from the seaframes themselves. So we have a different view 

on risk, that yes, there is risk, but it is very well-controlled and 

contained within the estimates that we have on the program, which 

supports our assessment of the savings that we’re bringing to the 

table. 

Chairman LEVIN. Let me pick up where you just left off. 

Admiral Roughead, one ship of each design has been delivered. 

They’ve gained some operating experience. Do both of these vessels 

in their current configuration meet the Navy’s requirements? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Yes, Senator, both ships do. 

Chairman LEVIN. The CRS report lists some cost risks of pursuing a down-source strategy. As we’ve heard, the largest of these 

appears to be related to replacing the ship’s combat systems. If we 

were to do that as part of the plan, it would seem to eliminate 

some of the additional savings of the dual-source strategy. 

But I would note that the CRS report says that we might want 

to replace the combat system on all LCSs bought to date with a 

new common combat system. Admiral Roughead or Admiral 

Pandolfe, is the current combat system on each type of vessel adequate to meet your requirements? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Yes, sir, they are. 

Chairman LEVIN. If the combat systems fail in the future to meet 

requirements, then we would have to replace or upgrade those. But 

would that not be a decision unrelated to current acquisition strategy? Secretary Stackley, let me ask you that question. 

Mr. STACKLEY. Yes, sir. The current acquisition strategy does not 

call for the changeout of the combat system. 

Let me describe some characteristics of the combat system. As it 

was mentioned earlier, the total cost for the combat system is on 

the order of about $70 million. When we think of the combat system, we break it down into a couple key components, weapons, sensors, and command and control system. We have, in fact, on the 

weapons side of the combat system, commonality. Both ships have 

57-millimeter Bofors guns, both ships we’re looking at Counter 

Rocket, Artillery, and Mortor (CRAM) weapons systems. So the 

weapon system is already common both between them and also 

with other ships in the inventory. 

On the sensor side, we have contemplated moving towards a 

common sensor, and inside of this solicitation the Navy asked for 

priced bids for a new sensor to consider for the future. In total, the 

cost for bringing a new sensor—that’s both common for LCS and 

with the rest of the fleet—is about $20 million nonrecurring and 

about $2 million a ship difference. 

So weapons are common. If the Navy chose to go to a common 

system for performance reasons, the cost impact would be about 

$20 million nonrecurring and a couple million dollars a ship. 

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Then on the C and D side, which is largely the software system 

and displays and processors, the Navy does not have a drive right 

now to go towards common C and D for this class either in the 

down-select or dual-award. It is something that we could consider 

in the future. 

Chairman LEVIN. Another concern which has been raised by Mr. 

Francis is that if the Navy has to make changes in the mission 

package that would result in cost growth. As I understand the LCS 

architecture specifying how the mission packages plug into and operate on the ship through defined interfaces, the LCS program divorces mission package changes from the ship construction program and ship construction changes from the mission package program. 

Let me ask you, Secretary Stackley: Do I have that right so far 

or am I off, and if so, correct me? 

Mr. STACKLEY. No, sir, you have that correct. There is a strict 

interface control document that serves both the seaframe and the 

mission packages. So the seaframe is designed in accordance with 

the interface control document, the mission packages are designed 

in accordance with the interface control document, so that when 

you bring them together, form, fit, function, space, weight, power, 

and cooling support the mission packages as well as the seaframe 

design. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you. 

Senator McCain. 

Senator MCCAIN. I want to thank the witnesses. 

Dr. Labs, we’ve seen this movie before, haven’t we? Isn’t this the 

third time that the Navy has come in late in the game with proposals for a LCS? 

Dr. LABS. This has not been the first time where the Navy has 

come in, as you say, to change a major aspect of the program in 

a very short period of time. Mr. O’Rourke’s report certainly goes 

into that history in some detail. 

Senator MCCAIN. The third time after the NDAA was done, the 

Navy has come in and said, ‘‘Gee, we have it solved now and we 

need significant changes.’’ Obviously, I read off the results of those 

significant changes twice before. 

Mr. O’Rourke, you’ve been following this kind of business for 

about 30 years, is that right? 

Mr. O’ROURKE. Twenty-seven years in January. 

Senator MCCAIN. Have you ever seen one quite like this? 

Mr. O’ROURKE. I cannot think of another shipbuilding program 

that has had this many changes proposed over the years within 

that program at such a late stage in the congressional review process. 

Senator MCCAIN. Mr. Francis, did you have a chance to look at 

one of the concerns that’s been raised about the combat systems, 

the different combat systems in the different ships? 

Mr. FRANCIS. Senator McCain, we have not had a chance to look 

at the issue of the combat systems. I have read what Dr. Labs and 

Mr. O’Rourke have written, but we have not covered that ourselves. 

1051 

Senator MCCAIN. Dr. Labs, do you agree with Secretary 

Stackley’s remarks about the relative ease on the whole issue of 

combat systems on the different ships? 

Dr. LABS. Senator McCain, I honestly do not have enough information to comment intelligently on what Secretary Stackley offered 

up in response to those comments. 

Senator MCCAIN. Do you agree with Mr. O’Rourke’s statement that the costs of this new proposal could be $700 million less and 

in some cases could also be as much as over $2 billion more? 

Dr. LABS. I would say that, since a large part of the $2 billion 

more is being driven by the CBO estimate of what the dual-award 

strategy would be, it would depend very much on detailed examination of the contract bids, because the CBO model is just that, it’s 

a model. It takes what the Navy has been paying for the ship so 

far, it runs it down a learning curve, it applies rate factors and 

things like that. 

It did not take into consideration any benefits of competition, 

what the actual contract bids might be. If I were to have more access to that kind of data in a detailed way, it’s possible that the 

CBO estimate could change in response to that. 

There is certainly a potential range here because there’s still potential for cost growth within the context of those contracts. There 

is potential for cost growth even outside of those contracts if other 

decisions are made to address technical problems that arise on the 

ship, as Mr. Francis has stated. So there is certainly a possible 

range there, but without knowing more detailed information I can’t 

comment on whether I think the high end of the range is more likely than the lower end of the range or vice versa. 

Senator MCCAIN. But you agree there is a range? 

Dr. LABS. There is a range, yes, sir. 

Senator MCCAIN. Mr. Francis, do you agree that Mr. O’Rourke 

states on the one hand, compared with the down-select strategy, 

the dual-award might cost a net total of $705 million less. On the 

other hand, compared to the down-select strategy, the dual-award 

strategy might cost a net total of as much as $2.8 billion more? 

Mr. FRANCIS. Senator McCain, I would agree that there is a 

range. I’m not sure what the numbers are. As Dr. Labs explained, 

his numbers are not based on the current bid proposals. But we do 

think there is potential for risk. The Navy could be exactly right 

on what it’s estimating, but we will have to see whether they’ve 

adequately provided for that risk. 

Senator MCCAIN. But the three witnesses, Dr. Labs, Mr. 

O’Rourke, and Mr. Francis, are operating at a certain disadvantage 

because you don’t, as I don’t, know the exact cost that’s bid; is that 

correct? 

Mr. O’ROURKE. That’s correct. 

Dr. LABS. Yes, sir. 

Mr. O’ROURKE. There’s one more factor I think that needs to be 

considered, which is the unknown of what the bid prices would be 

under the second-stage competition that would be held under the 

down-select strategy. The Navy is saying in essence that they were 

pleasantly surprised by the bid prices they received on this solicitation, but might not they be also pleasantly surprised by the bid 

prices that would be submitted under the second-stage competition 

1052 

that would be held under the down-select strategy? What are the 

Navy’s assumptions regarding the kind of bid prices they might receive under that second-stage competition and are they as optimistic or as pleasantly surprising as what they have realized here? 

It’s also possible that if you were to implement the down-select 

strategy and hold the second-stage competition, the bid prices in 

that second-stage competition could be even better than the bid 

prices under this first one, because the number of bidders involved 

and the various talents they would bring to bear in putting their 

bids together could be as great or greater than what was available 

among the universe of bidders in this solicitation. 

So when the Navy says that they think they will get a billion dollars savings more under dual-award than under down-select, they 

are comparing known bid prices for this down-select to an unknown 

bid price for a down-select that would take place 2 or 3 years from 

now and one which might also be pleasantly surprising to the 

Navy. That is one dimension of how we cannot be all that certain 

about what the comparative prices are if we were to move forward 

with the down-select versus dual-award strategies. 

Dr. LABS. That’s a point, Senator McCain, that I raise in my report as well. 

Senator MCCAIN. Obviously, you would agree with the obvious. 

It takes a lot of training and a lot of skill to man one of these ships 

efficiently, with the latest technology and equipment. Yet now we 

are asking the men and women in the Navy to be trained in two 

separate ships, two separate systems, two separate supply chains, 

two separate maintenance regimens, and we have obviously a very 

large number of questions that remain unresolved, not because you 

three aren’t doing your job. You just don’t have the information, 

and those questions are the difference in costs, deficiencies affecting the lead ships have not been identified and fully resolved. Has 

the combined capability of the LCS seaframes with their mission 

modules been sufficiently demonstrated, so that increasing the 

Navy’s commitment to seaframes at this time would be appropriate? Why would operating and maintaining two different combat 

systems, that is sensors, weapons, and software, that are unique to 

each LCS version not offset the Navy’s savings estimates or ultimately prove to be wasteful and unsupportable; and how consistent 

is the Navy’s plan with GAO’s recommendations for the program? 

What is the down side to delaying this decision? The bidders 

have already agreed to one extension to December 30. What’s the 

down side to waiting, say 2 months, while we can get the complete 

information and for the people that Congress relies on for objective 

opinions and views and information, to give you a couple of extra 

months to look at and get the specifics that you don’t have now in 

order to make the kind of informed judgment and recommendations 

to Congress which, frankly, are your duties? 

Could I ask, maybe beginning with you, Dr. Labs? In other 

words, what’s the rush? 

Dr. LABS. It seems to me that the down side that I can imagine 

to this would depend very much on the type of negotiations the 

Navy has been having with the contractors and the process by 

which those contractors are involved in building LCS–3 and –4. If, 

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tract under the down-select strategy, by a few months leads to layoffs at the shipyard, if it leads to a loss of learning because there 

isn’t work for people to do because they were expecting the fiscal 

year 2010 ships, which have not even been awarded yet. That could 

lead to increased costs for that down-select strategy compared to 

what the Navy is presenting today. 

I have no idea as to what the range of that potential increased 

cost could be. It could be very small. It could be something significant. But that seems to me what would be the potential down side 

to it. 

On the positive side of the equation are many of the things that 

you’ve mentioned, that we’d have much more time to look at the 

details of the proposals and the details of the operating cost issues, 

which we have very little information to go on, and to make a more 

informed decision. That to me are the two sides of the equation as 

I see it. 

Senator MCCAIN. Mr. O’Rourke. 

Mr. O’ROURKE. I think the premise of your question included if 

the bids could be extended by another month or 2 or 3, and I don’t 

know whether that’s possible. But if the bids could be extended, it 

would provide more time to get at questions of, for example, the potential investment costs of moving toward commonality on the combat systems. That’s not something you would do because of any inadequacy of the current combat systems. It’s because you’re trying 

to streamline the number of combat systems that the Navy would 

be supporting across its surface fleet at any one time. 

So it would provide more time for that. It would provide more 

time to vet the number on life cycle operation and support costs 

and what the interaction between that number is, and also the 

interaction between that number and investments that you make 

in combat system commonality, because the more common you 

make the combat system, it could actually bring down whatever the 

premium is for life cycle O&S costs. 

In general, it’s better to get ships under contract sooner rather 

than later. I think as a general practice people in most cases would 

prefer to get the ships under contract. But if we were to wait more 

time and not have these ships under contract for 1 or 2 or 3 more 

months, it would not be the only shipbuilding program that has experienced that kind of a delay while we were waiting for issues to 

be sorted out. The contract award on the DDG–1000 destroyers was 

held, on the second and third ships in the program, in abeyance all 

through this year while we put the DDG–1000 back through the 

Nunn-McCurdy recertification process. The Navy had to do that. 

More generally, those two ships, the second and third ship in the 

DDG–1000 program, have not been awarded, even though the second ship was funded in the 2007–2008 timeframe and the third 

ship was funded in the 2009 timeframe. 

So there are other examples of ships that have waited for some 

time after they were funded until the contracts were awarded. It’s 

not a preferable practice, but if you can get value out of it in terms 

of developing firmer information on which to base a decision, then 

observers might judge that value to be worth it. 

Mr. FRANCIS. Senator McCain, if the bid prices can be extended 

I think a down side would potentially be work in the yard, particuVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:37 May 06, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 01059 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\62155.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
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larly for LCS–3, which was recently launched and is 80 percent 

complete. There’d be fabrication shops and so forth earlier in the 

process that might be looking for work. 

But apart from that, I think there are up sides programmatically 

to have more time to go through and analyze what we’re getting 

ourselves into and what the downstream effects are. I’ll give you 

one example. In the current estimate, the net present value of O&S 

costs to operate a second ship is put at $295 million. But last year 

when the strategy was changed to a down-select strategy the Navy 

cited substantial O&S cost savings by going down to one design. So 

a good analytical question would be, how does that $295 million 

cost in this strategy compare with what savings were estimated in 

the last strategy? 

Senator MCCAIN. I thank you. I thank the witnesses. 

I thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think it’s obvious that this is a 

rush to judgment on a program that has been plagued with billions 

and billions of cost overruns and waste of taxpayers’ dollars. I obviously am deeply concerned about that from the taxpayers’ standpoint. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator McCain. 

Senator Reed. 

Senator REED. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I believe Senator McCain has asked the right question and I 

think the Navy should respond. So, Secretary Mabus, Secretary 

Stackley, and Admiral Roughead, can you respond? What is lost or 

what do you gain by waiting? 

Mr. STACKLEY. Yes, sir. Let me start with the time line that 

we’ve been on. This is a 2010 solicitation for the 2010 ships. We, 

in fact, received the bids back in May. The competing industry 

teams who put together these fixed-price bids have gone out 

through their vendor base to secure long-term vendor agreements, 

looking for 10-ship buys with their vendors over a 5-year period. So 

they have agreements with their vendor base for that piece of their 

proposals to lock in those fixed prices. 

The other key components of their bids are their own labor learning and the overhead rates that come with that. Those were in the 

proposals received in May. We went through the evaluation, two 

series of discussions, and that brought us to the fall. The pricing 

was extended to expire in mid-December, and we have pushed that 

back to the end of the month. 

When we have discussions with industry about the impacts of 

further delay to the award, that’s where their proposals start to 

come apart. We have both hiring freezes and layoffs in effect at the 

competing shipyards, and we have vendor agreements that have 

been extended far beyond what was anticipated when they went 

out with their first go-arounds with the vendors. 

So their comeback to the Navy has been: We are at the point 

where we have to press on. The workforce is leaving, hiring freezes 

are in effect, and vendors are stressed in terms of their ability to 

keep faith with the fixed-price proposals that they have put in 

place. They will need to go back with any further delay and reprice 

their proposals. 

1055 

Today we have very affordable fixed-price proposals in hand, 

which is why we are here, and we do not propose to give those up 

for further delay. 

Senator REED. If I can follow up with just one question in this 

area. In order to make a decision, you would have to at least implicitly assume the additional cost to the Navy for the 2- or 3- 

month delay, given what the vendors and the contractors are saying. I would assume in your comments you assume it would be a 

significant increase, not something that could be acceptable to the 

Navy; is that correct? 

Mr. STACKLEY. I think that they have gotten very hard commitments from their vendors. This program has been very troubled. It 

started, stopped, started, and stopped. With this solicitation we are 

looking for stability. That has been the forcing function, to get costs 

under control and to get the competitive pressure that we’ve 

brought to bear. 

If we have another start-stop with the vendors, I just don’t have 

confidence that we’d be seeing the same type of pricing coming 

back in a repricing drill. 

Senator REED. Let me ask you another question. You’ve talked 

about average cost of ships, but we don’t do things on the average. 

We do things year-by-year, ship-by-ship. Can you plot out the 

graph of the year-by-year, ship-by-ship? Is it going to start off at 

a point and go up, up, up, and then peak? 

Mr. STACKLEY. No, sir. This is the stability issue and industry responding to the issues that we have driven in terms of performance. We are looking at going from ship 1 to ship 2, in terms of 

production labor, which is a big component of your cost. We’re seeing on average about a one-third reduction in labor hours between 

the first and second ship, which is phenomenal. This is rooting out 

the issues that plagued us on the lead ships. 

Then inside of the proposals across the 5 years, what we are seeing is very steady, aggressive learning proposed based on what 

we’re seeing for demonstrated performance to date, what they have 

locked in in terms of fixed prices with their vendors, a reasonable 

expectation of control of overhead rates based on this business 

base. 

So we continue down a learning curve nominally in the mid-80s, 

which is very good but not unreasonable in terms of comparison 

with other shipbuilding programs. The 51 program, for example, 

experienced learning in the 85 to 90 percent range. We’re seeing 

the Virginia-class in about the 90 percent range. 

They’ve made a significant drop in their costs from the first to 

the second ship and then they’re extending continued good learning 

throughout the period of this contract, and then backing it up with, 

as I described, locking in the material costs. Then you have escalation effects. In fact, the learning that we’re seeing dominates over 

any escalation effects in the period of this contract. 

Senator REED. Let me turn to another subject that’s been discussed. That is life cycle costs. Points have been raised by the oversight organizations that suggest that one of the motivating elements for a single contract was saving on life cycle costs, the points 

that Senator McCain made so eloquently about crew training and 

standardization. Now we have two ships and the life cycle costs are 

1056 

very vague, to say the least. They’re influenced by systems—antisubmarine systems, anti-mine systems—that are still being developed. 

Can you give us a notion of how you’re estimating life cycle costs, 

and how confident you are of that estimate? 

Mr. STACKLEY. Yes, sir. Let me start with the elements of the life 

cycle, the total ownership cost. We have what’s referred to as a program life cycle cost estimate, which was completed in the June-July 

timeframe. Independent of the design, whether it’s design A or design B, the program life cycle cost estimate is on the order of $83 

billion. The two different designs are pretty much on top of each 

other in that estimate. 

When we look at a dual design versus a single design in the life 

cycle, what we focus on are those elements of the life cycle cost that 

are affected by the design characteristics. So when it comes to 

manpower, for example, manpower is equal for the two because 

they’re both 40-man crews, and so you can remove that as a determinant in O&S costs. When you look at repair parts, whether it’s 

a diesel on the Austal version of the ship or the diesel on the LCS 

version of the ship, the repair part is about the same. So repair 

part costs get pushed off to the side in the assessment. 

Then you have maintenance and fuel costs. Those are pulled off 

to the side in the dual versus single design. The determining characteristics in placing the premium on dual design have to do with 

things like configuration management, in-service engineering support, software maintenance, and then nonrecurring associated with 

modernization. Then there’s the piece associated with training for 

the crew that Senator McCain highlighted. When you look at that 

portion of the life cycle and you estimate what the premium is for 

dual design versus single design, and take into account the fact 

that we have already paid for a lot of the nonrecurring cost, so by 

delivering two ships we have already absorbed those costs, and we 

also are going to continue to support the two ships that we have 

for either of the non-selected class in a down-select mode, that’s 

where you arrive at a fairly manageable premium associated with 

O&S for dual design, which in net present value is about $300 million. 

That’s the estimate. Today we went back to the 2006 business 

case analysis that was done at that point in time, because this 

same question was being viewed, and on a percent basis it is consistent with the 2006 assessment, it’s consistent with the program 

life cycle cost estimate done this year and then when we looked at 

it again in the fall. 

Senator REED. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. 

My time has expired, but I think these questions should be 

posed, and I will follow up, either in writing or if I get back for a 

second round, to the oversight, because this is a critical issue. I 

think it’s such a highly complex and technical nature that it deserves a discussion from both perspectives. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. Thank you, gentlemen. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Reed. 

Senator Sessions. 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for 

having this hearing. I think it’s good to air these questions. I apVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:37 May 06, 2011 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 01062 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6602 Y:\BORAWSKI\DOCS\62155.TXT JUNE PsN: JUNEB
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preciate Senator McCain’s commitment to containing costs and I 

think some of his criticisms early on of this program have been exactly correct. I think all of us recognize the program had an inauspicious beginning. 

I would just ask Admiral Roughead and Admiral Pandolfe, how 

many years do you two have working with building ships? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. I’ve been involved with ships for going on 38 

years now, Senator. I’ve had the opportunity to put the second ship 

of a class in commission, and I understand what the challenges are 

associated with that. As I said in my statement, these ships are 

needed, but what we’re seeing as we get on to building the second 

ship of the class or the second ship of each design is some pretty 

remarkable improvements that in my experience not only are encouraging, but they give me the confidence to go forward. 

Senator SESSIONS. The drop in price as the new ships come on, 

does that exceed what you have seen normally in your previous history? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Mr. Stackley can talk more about the pricing of ships, but what I have seen in the way of the learning curve 

as we go forward on these ships I think is really quite good. 

Senator SESSIONS. Admiral Pandolfe, how many years have you 

had? 

Admiral PANDOLFE. Sir, I’ve just gone over 30 years of operating 

and maintaining war ships. To the CNO’s point, I think the team 

has worked extraordinarily hard over the last year to bring this 

program to where it needs to be, to put rigor into the requirements 

and to work with our shipbuilders, and to get some affordable pricing that can lead to program stability. That’s what this program 

needs, sir. 

Senator SESSIONS. Secretary Stackley, how many years have you 

been working in this area? 

Mr. STACKLEY. About 30 years, sir. 

Senator SESSIONS. I think you have almost 100 years here of experience. You’ve been living with this a lot closer than any of us 

in the Senate have been living with it. The House has approved 

this plan that you’ve asked them to approve, and I’m inclined to 

agree, based on what I know. 

I think we ought to examine it, but I think we should have an 

open mind. Mr. Stackley, regarding to additional delays, you’ve 

mentioned a number of points. One of our reviewers in analyzing 

this talked about uncertainty in programs. We’ve already had a lot 

of uncertainty and a lot of delays in this program. Could this cause 

a bad reputation for DOD, in general, to a bidder thinking, no matter what I do, it’s going to be put off and delayed and costs are 

going to run up? Is that a concern we should have? 

Mr. STACKLEY. Sir, I think one of the most critical aspects of cost 

control on any major defense program is stability; stability of requirements, stability of design, stability in budgeting, stability in 

scheduling and contracting. Delaying the program tends to destabilize what we’re trying to accomplish here. 

Senator SESSIONS. Admiral Roughead, you’ve heard from CBO, 

GAO, and CRS. But the Navy has its own plan. It’s your ship, it’s 

your money that’s getting spent. Do you believe that your analysis 

of these bids and the decision you’ve reached is based on intense 

1058 

evaluation that is more in depth than the three that have been proposed here? Not that they’re not valuable, not that a fresh look at 

this isn’t very valuable. But tell me how you evaluate your own 

plan? It’s not as if you haven’t analyzed these factors yourself. 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Yes, sir. I think as the other witnesses mentioned, they’re working from models and from estimates. We’re 

working from known figures. We can get into why it is that way. 

I think even a delay may not even solve that problem, simply because of the restrictions that we have on making that information 

available. 

So a delay doesn’t get us any farther down the road. But we’re 

working from known figures; they’re at the disadvantage of not 

having those figures. 

The other point that I would make and one of the reasons why 

I have confidence in the ships is that we’ve had these to sea. There 

is no other ship class that I’m aware of that 2 years ahead of 

schedule I directed Admiral Pandolfe and his team to deploy the 

ship within a matter of months and the ship deployed, not only to 

the Caribbean in real operations, but then we pushed it out to Hawaii, where it participated in the largest maritime exercise in the 

world with other countries and with our high-end capabilities, an 

aircraft carrier. The ship has performed well. 

The mission modules are plug-and-play, so the complexity of the 

mission capabilities of the ship allows us to change those as we go 

along. I think there are so many attributes to this. I’m confident 

with the way we’ve seen both designs work at sea, and I’m comfortable with where we are. 

Senator SESSIONS. Secretary Mabus, I know that when you came 

on board there was a lot of criticism of this program. It seems to 

me I have to say you’ve done what Congress asked. You’ve confronted the cost. My criticism to you and Mr. Stackley was you emphasized cost so much that maybe you weren’t evaluating which 

ship had the greatest capabilities. But we had a cost problem. Congress told you to deal with the cost problem. 

I’m actually quite surprised and pleased that you’ve brought this 

under the cost cap and to a point where you can, as I understand 

it, add an additional ship and still have money left over, according 

to your estimates. 

Would you comment on that? 

Mr. MABUS. Yes, sir. Thank you. I sat in this room at my confirmation hearings, listened to the concerns raised, particularly on 

acquisition, on cost control of certain programs. I watched as this 

committee passed the WSARA of 2009 almost immediately after I 

was confirmed. In this we set about to use that Act as almost a 

checklist to go down, to put competition in the programs, to do firm 

fixed-price contracts whenever possible, to demand improvement as 

programs went along, to demand a learning curve, and that prices, 

time, and schedule should improve as programs mature, to make 

sure that designs did not change to any significant degree during 

construction, that designs be mature, and that technology be mature. 

To the CNO’s point, because these are modular ships, because 

you can remove and replace weapons systems, you have a very stable hull, a very stable platform for these weapons systems, so that 

1059 

you don’t have to redesign an entire ship as technology improves 

or as weapons systems change. 

I think, as I said in my statement, that this is a great example 

of the WSARA of 2009 working, that we have taken a program that 

had problems, particularly in cost, but also in stability, and have 

stabilized the program, have driven costs down by using the intent, 

the spirit, and the specifications of that Act. 

Senator SESSIONS. Mr. Stackley, I believe one of our witnesses 

testified that the follow-on contract bid if we use the original proposal, the single source proposal, could be lower than you’ve estimated as you evaluated the viability of this dual award. Isn’t it 

possible that they could also be higher than you presently estimate? 

Mr. STACKLEY. I read CBO’s report and understand the information that’s in their table and the differences in terms of the way 

the Naval Sea Systems Command and CBO estimate. In terms of 

the baseline for the down-select, we are within 5 percent of each 

other relative to the estimate. But again, CBO does not have the 

insight into the specific bid information that we have that gives us 

far greater confidence in terms of the numbers that we’re bringing 

forward. 

Senator SESSIONS. You’re getting a fixed-price contract and I believe it’s CBO’s numbers using inflation of 1.0 in 2011, edging up 

to 2.3 in 2015. If it goes above that, are the bidders required to eat 

that cost? 

Mr. STACKLEY. The proposals that we received are what’s referred to as forward-priced, which means that they have included 

escalation inside of their bids. 

Senator SESSIONS. So if it goes higher than that, they eat that 

cost? 

Mr. STACKLEY. It’s all in accordance with the terms and conditions of that fixed-price contract, yes, sir. 

Senator SESSIONS. Even though it’s a fixed-price contract, you’re 

not contractually obligated to even buy them. If Congress decides 

not to fund the ship in the future, there will be no penalty if the 

government fails to purchase another ship? 

Mr. STACKLEY. Yes, sir. When we award these contracts, we’re 

funding the first ships on the contract, but the ships that are in 

the out-years are subject to the annual appropriations. So if either 

the Navy or Congress determine not to fund the out-year ships, 

there is no termination liability or cancellation ceiling. 

Senator SESSIONS. I think it’s a pretty tough negotiation, Mr. 

Chairman. I think they’ve done a pretty good job. 

Chairman LEVIN. It’s the first bit of daylight in this program, actually. 

Senator LeMieux. 

Senator LEMIEUX. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Before I start on my questions, I wanted to take a moment of 

personal privilege. I think this will be my last Senate Armed Services Committee meeting. I’m not sure, but I think so. 

Chairman LEVIN. You never know around here. 

Senator LEMIEUX. You never know. There could be one tomorrow. 

Chairman LEVIN. It’s been our privilege to have you be with us. 

1060 

Senator LEMIEUX. Thank you for the good work that you’ve done, 

thank you to Senator McCain, it is especially important work as 

we’re fighting two wars. So I just wanted to make a note of that. 

Admiral Roughead, in listening to this it occurs to me that we’ve 

had a competition here with two ships and we’re in the situation 

now where the proposal is on the table to not pick one or the other, 

but to pick both. Why is it in the best interest of the Navy and why 

does it serve the requirements of the Navy to have both of these 

ships, as opposed to just have one? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Thank you, Senator. I think there are a couple of reasons. One, it is clearly going to allow us to begin introduction of the ships at a more rapid rate, simply because we’ll have 

two shipyards building, so we’ll have two production lines moving. 

There is no question that both of these designs meet the LCS requirement. That said, there are attributes in each design that I believe in the future will prove to be operationally advantageous. Operating the ships in tandem, a particular ship with another collection of ships, I think will give us capabilities that we would not 

have had before. 

Then coupled with that are the savings that are realized by going 

down this path. So from what I would call the speed to the fleet, 

the flexibility that we get, and then the advantage to the taxpayer 

in the cost of the program, I think those are the advantages that 

are apparent to me. 

Senator LEMIEUX. Operationally, would you potentially deploy 

one ship or the other depending upon the mission based upon the 

unique capabilities of those ships if you had both in your arsenal? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. I think that each ship has some attributes 

that favor one over the other. What is the mission, what is the environment, what are the other ships that are in company? I think 

all those are factors that will allow us to put together better mixes 

of capability simply because of the attributes of each design. 

They both fit the bill, and I think it’s going to give our Navy increased flexibility. 

Senator LEMIEUX. I don’t have a problem with that and that’s a 

compelling argument to me. I want the Navy to have all of the 

tools it needs to be able to accomplish whatever mission there is. 

If they both fit the bill but there’s one that has a unique advantage 

in a specific situation, I think that makes a lot of sense, for you 

to have that. 

I am concerned, however, with the point that Senator McCain 

brought up, is that it’s hard for us to do our oversight function if 

we’re not able to rely upon CBO to look inside the numbers. I trust 

you, but I adhere to the old Reagan expression, ‘‘trust, but verify.’’ 

Our job is to know. 

Maybe the chairman and the ranking member have been privy 

to this information. We don’t have the privy of this information. On 

its face, the idea that we have two ships, we had a competition and 

we’re supposed to get to one, and now we’re going to take both and 

that’s going to save us money, doesn’t make intuitive sense. It 

doesn’t make sense to have two ships which require two maintenance programs, which require two training regimens, which are 

going to require different attributes for the Navy to be able to deal 

with these two ships over time. That doesn’t make intuitive sense. 

1061 

If it is true that you can save $600 million, or even $1 billion, 

which is another number I heard, as opposed to the number that 

our friends at GAO, CBO, and CRS suggest, which will cost more, 

that’s fine. But we need to have that information. 

Mr. Chairman, this may not be something that happens when 

I’m here, but it seems to me that in the future we need to make 

sure that the folks who do this evaluation for us have this information and then we, whether it’s in executive session or not, can have 

that information. We can’t do our job without it. 

I feel a little bit hamstrung without knowing exactly what the 

numbers are and what the attributes of the particular ship are. If 

we could have a candid conversation about why you like this ship 

better than that one, I think we could do a better job. 

It’s hard for me to come to a final conclusion. I am appreciative 

of your comments and I certainly want you to have all the tools you 

need, but I also have to look out for the taxpayer, and it’s hard for 

me to make that evaluation. 

I appreciate what you’ve done. I appreciate Secretary Mabus’ 

work on this, because I know cost-cutting, as my colleague from 

Alabama said, has been something that you’ve been focused on. So 

I appreciate that. 

I don’t have any additional questions, Mr. Chairman, because I 

feel at a loss if we don’t have that information. I hope going forward that this committee will have the ability to be able to truly 

evaluate the pros and the cons with the information before it. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. There’s no doubt that there’s a disadvantage in 

that regard in terms of oversight. I don’t know myself how to get 

around the proprietary protection. 

By the way, we don’t have that information, either. We’re relying 

on the Navy and then our oversight folks to the extent they’re able 

to do it, and they tell us what they can do and what they can’t do, 

and give us the range of their limitations. It is a disadvantage, it 

seems to me, and we will look into how we can possibly in the future deal with that. I’m not sure that they’ve solved that in the 

past that we can, but it’s an important point. 

Senator LEMIEUX. If I could just suggest, in the procurement 

process going forward, I know that these companies have proprietary information. There’s going to have to be some ability to have 

a limited waiver of that, because we can’t do our job under the 

Constitution if we can’t know what the information is. 

Chairman LEVIN. Yes, it definitely is a problem for us, and we 

have to weigh the limitations in our judgment as to what we’re operating under. 

In terms of the attributes, though, I don’t know that that is privileged information. The CNO has given us the statement that each 

ship has certain attributes. I think that part of it probably is available to us. Is that right? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Yes, sir, I would say it is. A lot of it is simply in the configurations of the ship, the volume that is available 

in one, boat-handling capability that’s available in another. The 

first time I walked aboard the LCS was back in 2007 as the first 

two were being built, I was struck at the potential that was in the 

1062 

ship, the volume, the aviation capability, the ability to move boats 

on and off. 

Each one is different, as a fleet commander both in the Atlantic 

and Pacific and having operated globally, I could envision each one 

of those ships bringing great versatility, agility, and capability to 

our Navy. One thing our commanders will do is they’ll mix and 

match this capability for the mission, for the environment, to get 

the best effect. I think it really gives us some incredible capability, 

not just in what we’ve been talking about, in cost and stability to 

program and to the industrial base, but I think it gives us great 

operational flexibility. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator LeMieux, and thank you 

for your great service to this committee and to our State and to our 

country. We really appreciate your being with us. You’ve been a 

very, very active participant in the work of this committee and we 

deeply appreciate it. 

Senator LEMIEUX. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate it. 

Senator SESSIONS. Mr. Chairman, I’d like to join you in that. 

Senator LeMieux’s been a great member of the Senate and this 

committee. Thank you. 

Chairman LEVIN. Senator Collins. 

Senator COLLINS. Mr. Chairman, before Senator LeMieux leaves, 

I just want to point out to my colleagues that, who knows, he may 

be back on this committee some day. 

Chairman LEVIN. I can’t say exactly with a straight face that I 

would look forward to that, as much as I look forward to the service that you’ve given to us. [Laughter.] 

But I think Senator LeMieux understands I’m an honest person 

and you put me in a very difficult position. 

Senator COLLINS. I apologize, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. That’s all right. 

Senator COLLINS. I just couldn’t quite resist the opportunity 

there. 

Chairman LEVIN. I do repeat my strong feeling that you’ve been 

a major contributor to this committee. That is sincere and I would 

want to keep that sincerity in my response in reaction to Senator 

Collins’ comment. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

On a more serious note—though that was a serious note—I want 

to thank the chairman and the ranking member for holding this 

hearing today on what is a very important issue. I must say that 

the Navy’s latest decision on this program took me by surprise. I’ve 

had a very helpful opportunity to talk to some of the members of 

this panel as well as to other experts. But, like many of my colleagues, I’ve not yet reached a final decision on the Navy’s proposal. 

Since that decision is upon us, since language is included in the 

omnibus, I very much welcome this opportunity today to better understand the Navy’s rationale for this change in its strategy. Both 

the Secretary and Admiral Roughead have said that this plan is 

good for our shipbuilding industrial base. As all the members of 

this panel as well as my colleagues on this committee know, preserving the industrial base is a major concern of mine and a major 

concern of the Navy’s. 

1063 

Let me start by first exploring that issue with you, and I’ll start 

with you, Admiral Roughead. When the Navy announced last year 

that it was going to hold an LCS down-select competition and cease 

to build the two different designs, it stated that the winning shipbuilder would build 10 ships in the near term and then there would 

be a second competition that would be held by the Navy to introduce the second source shipbuilder. 

A number of Navy shipbuilders, including Bath Iron Works 

(BIW) in my home State, relied on the Navy’s announced plan and 

thought that they might well end up competing to be that second 

source for the ship that was produced as a result of the down-select. The reason that this is important to our shipbuilders is many 

of them, including BIW, are looking out and seeing gaps in their 

workload, and the potential of being able to build some of the LCSs 

would help fill in some of those gaps. 

Under the Navy’s new proposal, however, the Navy will continue 

to build both designs with the two current shipbuilders and there’s 

no longer a definitive plan or commitment by the Navy to introduce 

competition by other shipbuilders in fiscal year 2012, which had 

been the original plan. 

I understand the case that you’re making for the new plan and 

I understand the advantages that it could have, including certain 

cost advantages. But I’m concerned that you’re removing an opportunity for more volume to help fill in those gaps for other shipbuilders that had hoped to build LCSs in the future and now are 

unlikely to have the opportunity to do so. 

I realize that’s a long introduction to my concern. But given your 

new proposed strategies, what specific actions will the Navy’s leaders take to preserve shipbuilding volume and stability at critical 

shipyards like BIW if it now appears that they’re not going to be 

involved in building the LCS? I ask this in particular because of 

my concern that we still don’t have the DDG–1000, the second and 

third ship, under construction contracts, even though they’ve been 

fully authorized and appropriated, and in view of my concern about 

the low level of procurement on the DDG–51, a concern that I know 

you share. 

Admiral, if you could address that concern on how you plan to 

preserve shipbuilding volume and stability necessary for our shipyards if you go this new route. 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Yes, Senator. Thank you for the question. In 

fact, even if we go with the 20-ship option that we’re talking about 

here, that’s only about half the ship class. So our commitment is 

to continue to build the LCS, to get to the target of 55 that we 

need. So there is more shipbuilding that will go on as a result of 

the LCS. 

This is not an operational factor for me, but I also believe that 

the designs of the ships, the flexibility in the ships, and also the 

cost of these ships open up potential for foreign military sales that 

would otherwise not be there. Then on top of that, is the savings 

that we derive, because we look at our shipbuilding account in its 

entirety. These savings also enable us to look at how we can shift 

around other procurements that we may need because we’ve realized these savings. 

1064 

Senator COLLINS. I guess my concern is if you have the two current shipbuilders each building 10 ships—and I understand the advantage if you can get 20 ships for the cost of 19, that that is powerful—but it seems very unlikely to me that other shipbuilders are 

going to be able to come in at that point. That’s very different from 

a down-select that produced 1 ship design, the first shipbuilder 

would build 10, and then it’s a tossup or an open competition. It’s 

very different if you’re going with 20 ships, 10 at each shipyard, 

and it seems to me that does make it unlikely for others to bid in 

the future. 

Let me go to your second point about cost and ask the Secretary 

and you both this question. The Navy has asserted that the dualaward strategy not only adds stability to the LCS program, but will 

produce savings that could benefit shipbuilding programs as a 

whole. Earlier this year, as you’re all aware, both the Senate 

Armed Services Committee and the House Armed Services Committee expressed concern in our committee reports that the procurement rate for destroyers is insufficient. 

If the Navy’s large surface combatants continue their historical 

average service lives of 25 to 30 years, we are never going to reach 

the Navy’s goal of 88 large surface combatants. Furthermore, if you 

look at the independent Perry and Hadley panel which reviewed 

the Quadrennial Defense Review, that panel recommended a fleet 

of 346 Navy ships. Admiral Roughead, every time we’ve talked 

you’ve always been careful to say 313 is the floor, and so I suspect 

that higher number is not really a surprise to you. These are actual 

requirements. This isn’t pie in the sky. These are to meet our military presence requirements. 

Secretary Mabus, we’ll start with you: Do you believe that the 

change that you’re proposing for the LCS program will make it 

easier for you to address the budget shortfalls facing the shipbuilding budget? 

Mr. MABUS. Thank you, Senator. Yes, as Secretary Stackley said 

earlier, we would propose taking the savings that we get from the 

proposed dual buy and keeping it in shipbuilding, so that we can 

procure more ships, for the same amount of money over the next 

5 years. 

Admiral Roughead and I share your concern that we keep these 

critical skills in our shipyards, because shipbuilding skills tend to 

be unique and if you lose those skills they are very hard, if not impossible, to regain. Second, as this committee has authorized, the 

DDG–51 line has been restarted, because it is one of our crucial 

platforms. It’s one of the most flexible platforms that we have, and 

that’s particularly true since the President has given the Navy the 

mission of being the first antiballistic missile defense in the Phased 

Adaptive Approach. We’re the first phase, the Aegis system that 

goes on the DDG–51. 

So it would certainly be our hope and our recommendation that 

any savings we get from the LCS program go back into building 

more of other classes of ships. 

Senator COLLINS. Admiral Roughead, do you want to add to that 

or give me a similar commitment that the savings would be not diverted for other purposes, but help meet the shortfall that is so 

clear in the shipbuilding budget? 

1065 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Yes, Senator. I am committed to the force 

structure. I think I’ve been consistent with that during my time as 

CNO. I’m also very focused on the need for recapitalizing the combatant fleet when we get to the 20s. That is an issue that I would 

submit is bigger than the Navy, because it is about our ability to 

field that type of force as part of our national interest. It’s also significantly important to our industrial base and what we will be 

doing as the ships that we built in numbers in the 80s age out. Key 

to that, one of those large number-drivers, are our combatants, the 

DDG–51s, and so that is the strategy that we as a Navy and we 

as a Nation have to take forward into the 2020s. 

Senator COLLINS. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you, Senator Collins. 

Starting round two, I just have really one additional question. 

There’s been the question of the additional O&S costs of operating 

two different ships here. I think you told us, Secretary Stackley, 

that we’re going to be operating ships in each class in any event 

since we will have at least two in each class. So the question is how 

confident are you that you have adequately estimated the marginal 

costs of operating a larger number of the ship class that might 

have only included two ships? 

Mr. STACKLEY. Yes, sir. We have broken down the different categories of costs and to the extent that we can at this stage in what 

will be about a 40-year life cycle for the program, have tried to discretely cost out the research and development (R&D), the procurement, and the operations and maintenance (O&M) bills associated 

with the dual design. We start on the R&D side on the upfront. We 

have a good understanding today of things like training systems required for the two different ship types, and in fact we have training 

systems that we’ve already procured for the two different ship 

types, so we have high fidelity in the remaining costs in that category. 

We’re sustaining two different design efforts today inside of the 

procurement. We look at the premium associated in plans and engineering in a down select versus the dual-award inside of the budget, and then we are able to extrapolate that outside of the FYDP 

carrying that on into the life cycle for the class. So we believe we 

have good fidelity there. 

When you get into software maintenance and modernization, 

that’s subjective and it’s subjective by way of there are future decisions that we’re going to make on the class that will impact that. 

So while we have what I’ll call a plug number in there in our estimate, throughout the life cycle we’re going to be continually reevaluating what modernization at what cycle, what point in the 

program, do we insert new capabilities or do baseline upgrades. 

That’s a little bit more subjective. It doesn’t have the fidelity as 

compared to the other categories that I’ve described. 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you. 

Senator Sessions. 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you. 

I appreciate all of you. I know that the Navy has worked hard 

to bring this program under control. I think earlier when our independent evaluators were criticizing the program I think the Navy’s 

1066 

defense was not so good. But I do believe you’ve gotten this program under control and I thank you for that. I think that criticism 

and objective view helped get us to the position we are today. 

But ultimately it is the Navy who handles this weapons system, 

who’s working with it daily, who’s had people in the shipyards 

monitoring every step of the construction. I value your opinion and 

you’ve seen both the ships and you say both would be helpful to 

you. I think that’s something that we should consider. 

It does seem to me, Admiral Roughead, that if a decade from now 

a new anti-mine warfare system, a new surveillance system, a new 

weapons system, came about and you decided to put it on 15, 20, 

or 30 of the ships, might not one of those ships be better able to 

handle it, and could that be an advantage from having ships with 

slightly different capabilities? 

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Yes, sir, I think the two different types give 

us a certain amount of flexibility and versatility, as I talked earlier 

about this ability to mix the capabilities of a force that we put in 

there. 

The other thing I would say that the LCS gives us that other 

ships do not is that if we are upgrading a mine warfare capability 

in the LCS that seaframe can be off doing something in anti-submarine warfare. Today, if we want to take it in and upgrade a capability, that ship comes off line. In the case of the LCS, we can 

upgrade the mine countermeasure package while the ship is doing 

anti-submarine warfare or surface warfare. 

The ability to increase capability on these ships on both designs 

is really quite extraordinary. That’s why the system that we’re putting together is for more than a ship. It really is a capability that 

we’ve not had before. 

Senator SESSIONS. I think you could argue that there could be a 

minor extra cost because one ship is presumably slightly less expensive than the other, but apparently they’re pretty close, from 

what I understand from your testimony. So I think that the additional advantage is helpful. 

One thing about our industrial capacity, Secretary Mabus. We 

often sell ships to our allies and it’s both good for our shipbuilding 

capacity and for those countries. 

Having two ships, might that be somewhat of an advantage for 

our ability to export weapons systems to our allies? 

Mr. MABUS. I think it would, Senator. I think, like operationally, 

in terms of foreign military sales, having both versions gives us 

more flexibility. Some countries may want one version for specific 

reasons. Others may want the other. I think it gives us a better 

opportunity to make those sales and make more of them than with 

one version. 

Senator SESSIONS. I just don’t think there’s any doubt, Mr. 

Chairman. If these shipyards are preparing to go forward, they’re 

at a point where the delays do impact them. I see one Navy source 

in a recent article said there’s a 100 percent chance of a contest 

or a protest. I don’t know whether that’s accurate or not. But certainly we would be in a position to move forward with a lot less 

potential delays in this recommendation of the Navy. I’m inclined 

to think it’s well thought out. 

Thank you for having this hearing. 

1067 

Chairman LEVIN. Thank you very much, Senator Sessions. 

I’ll just close with one request and then one comment. The request is that the agencies that help us to oversee these kind of 

issues—we’ve run into this proprietary issue before. It’s not the 

first time. So we would ask you to give some thought as to how we 

can in the future address that issue. You have the same issue. 

You’re unable to be more specific because you don’t have the information. It’s proprietary and these contractors are not going to disclose it. 

We have the Navy, on the other hand, that has seen it, and has 

given us the assurances. These are fixed-price contracts. If these 

weren’t fixed-price contracts, let me tell you, I’d have plenty of 

problems with these contracts. They’re fixed-price contracts, so we 

have a pretty fair handle on that. But still, if we can solve that proprietary information issue in the future, I think it would be helpful 

to you and it would be helpful to us as well. 

In terms of my comment, this has been a troubled program, obviously. The Senate has been deeply involved in trying to get this 

back on track. It seems like it is on track. This is the first daylight 

in this program that I think we’ve seen, and it’s very welcome. We 

are grateful that all of you would come here today again on short 

notice; it was important that you be available to answer these 

questions. I think you’ve done a very, very good job of doing that. 

Thank you all. With that very positive comment, we now stand 

adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:36 p.m., the committee adjourned.] 

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