1 NOTI CE Decisi on fi led 06 /18/ 10. The textof this dec ision m ay be changed or
corrected prior to the filing of a Petit ion for Re hea ri ng o r th e dispos it ion of

the s ame. NO. 5-08-0641 IN T HE AP PEL LA TE C OU RT OF ILLIN OIS

FIF TH DIST RICT

________________________________________________________________________ In re LAN CE H., Alleged t o Be a Person ) Ap peal f rom the C ircuit Subject to Involunt ary

Admission ) C ou rt o f R an do lp h C ou nt y. ) (The P eople of th e State of Illinois, Petitioner- ) No. 08-MH-231 Ap pellee , v. Lan ce H ., Resp ond ent- ) App ellant). ) H ono rab le W illiam A. S chu we rk, Jr ., ) Judge, presi ding.

________________________________________________________________________ JUS TIC E W EX ST TE N d elivere d the o pinion of the cour t: The respondent , Lance H., was involunt arily committedto the Chest erM ental H ealth Center(Chester) on November 26, 2 008
. The respondent appeals, rais ing four points: (1) the State has neit

her the cons titutional a utho rity nor the s tatutory au thority to civ illy comm itan asymp toma tic indivi dual, (2) the State 's f ailure to pres ent cl ear andconvinci ng evidence of the stat utory elements for an in vo lu nt ar y co m m itm en t v io lat ed th e r es po nd en t's due process rights, (3) if the trial cou rt prop erly com mitted the res pon dent, then the trial court violated the respo nden t's constitutio nal righ t t o treat ment in t he least restrictive set

ting, and (4) nei ther the o rder nor

the pet iti on for continued involuntary admissi on complied wit h the M enta l He alth and D evelopm ental Disab ilities Code (the C ode) (405 ILCS 5/1-1 00 et seq. (West 2008)). For the fol lowing reas ons, we rever se. BACKGROUND The respondent

was born in 1961 and has a long his tory of mental illness and cr iminal conductdating ba ck to 1979. Since the n, he has s pent most of hi s li fe eithe r incarc erate d for various crimes or institutionali zed as a re sult of voluntaryand invo luntary co mm itmen ts. His latest involunt ary

commitment, the subj ectof this appeal, began on November 20, 2008, a fter2

Da vid Dunker file d a peti tion s eeking t o administ er involuntary treat ment to the respondent pursuant to section 3-813 of t

he Code (405 ILCS 5/3-813 (West 2008)). The petition all eged that the resp ond ent shoul d be subject to involuntary

treat ment based on t

he foll owing statements: "[The respondent ] was admitt ed to Cheste r *** on 2-29-08 a s an [i]nvoluntary admissi on *** upo n reac hing his pro jected paro le da te . H e signe d [v ]olun tary shortly after admission but then requested a discharge. He is chro nic ally mentally i ll and remains par ano id an d ag gre ssiv e[,] although he does foll ow his medicat ion regi men. He lacks insight

into hi s mental i llnes s and remains very argumentat ive. Ou tsi de a control ledenvironmen t he wou ld dec om pens ate[,] thu s bec om ing a d ange r to [him ]self or o ther s." The petition did not

include the names and addr esses of any relative or clos e frien ds, no r did i t exp la inwhynon e wer e l is te d as re qui re d by se ct io n 3- 601 (b )( 2) of t he Co de ( 405 ILCS 5/3 -60 1(b )(2) ( W est 2 008 )). Ins tead , "N /A" wa s w ritten in th at se ction of th e pe tition

. The petition was accompanied by two certi ficat es of

examinati on: one conduct ed on October28, 2008, by Kathryn Holt, a clinicalpsy chologi st, and the other conduct ed on October13, 2 008 , by A . Ge sm und o, M .D., a psych iatrist. In ad dition to the two certificat es,
a 30-day treat ment plan was al so fil ed with the petition. The t reatment plan indicated that the r esp ond ent m ainta ins fam ily con tact o n a r egu lar b asis. On No vem ber 2 6, 200 8, a co mm itmen t hearin g w as he ld. Tra cy M ott, a lic ens ed clini cal socialworker employ ed at Chest er, t esti fied that she s erved as t he respon dent' s primary therapi st for

a number of y ears; that the res pondent has had nine admissi ons since 199 7; that "[h]e' s curre ntly not dis play ing sy

mptoms of a mental illness, but he is taking medicati on for a m ental illness"; that he has a h istoryof psy chotic sympt oms as well as mood symptoms; that he becomes easi ly agitated at

times; that he has delus ions of persecution; t hat3

his diagn osis was sc hizoaffe ctive disorder, bipolar ty pe, para phili a not othe rwise spec ifie d, and antis ocialpersonal ity disorde r; t

hat in he r opini on, the respondent was asymptomatic at this time becaus e he is on m edica tion; tha t he w as last in restraint s in May of 2008; that he
wa s taking 2 m illigram s of risp eridon e, 1,00 0 m illigram s of D epak ote, an d 1 m illi gr am o f loraze pam twice a day; t hat she would not expect the resp ondent to c on tinue to take h is medicati on if

he we re re le as ed f

ro m a struc tured s etting; that she would expect

the respondent

to decompensat e and for some of hi s psy chotic sympt oms to recur if he were not takinghis medication; that in her opinion the respondentis a per son who should be subj ect to invo luntary ad missio n; that b ecau se of the res pon dent's m ental ill ness, she wo uld
reaso nably expecthim to i mpose seri ous phys icalharm to othe rs in t he near fut

ure; t hat the respondent

does not have a histor y of harm ing h imself but tha t she d id no t "believ e he w ould be able to ta ke care of hi s own basic needs "; that it was her recommendati on that t he
r espondentb e hos pitalized for a p eriod o f 18 0 days; tha t the resp ond ent w as vo luntarily takinghis medicationat the time of t he heari ng; andthat he has been making improvement in h is cu rren t settin g an d ho spita lizatio n. The respo nden t testified th at he felt that he did not nee d to be ins tit utional izedbecause he knew how to take his medi cati on and how to cook forhims elf an d bec ause he w anted to take care o f his dying fa ther. H e testified that if re leased he w ould live wit h his family, that he had fam ily that wo uld tak e care of h is basic physi cal needs , that he would cont inue to take his medication, and that he di d not feel he would be a dan ger to himself or to others. O n Novem ber 26, 2008, the court entere d an order finding that the res pondent was subject t o involun tary

admissi on, and the respondent was ordered t o be hospit aliz ed in a Departmentof

Human Se rv ic es men ta l h ea lt h or de ve lo pme nt al ce nt er , w h ich the court not ed was at that

time t he least restrictive envi ronment appropriate and av ai la bl e. On December 8, 200 8, the re spon dent filed his n otice o f app eal pro se . On De cem ber 9, 2008, the co urt4

appo inted c oun sel for the res pon dent. AN AL YS IS We begin our a nalysis by not ing that the underlyi ng case is moot. The order admitt ing the respond ent expired o n M ay 25, 2009; thus, w e canno t gra nt effecti ve reli ef to the responden t. Ord in arily we lac k juri sdict ion to cons ider moot i ssues, but we may consi der these appeals i f they

fallwithin a recognized ex cep tion to th e m oot nes s do ctrin e. In re Do nrell S. , 395 I ll. App. 3d 599, 602-03 ( 2009). Thi s is a que sti on of law, which we revi ew de novo

. In re Al

fred H. H. , 233 Ill. 2d 345 , 350 (20 09)

. The respondent contends that both the public-interestexcepti on and the capable- ofrepetition- yet -evading- review exception to the mootness d o ctrine apply . Because we find that the publi c-int er est e xcepti on applie s, we decline to consi der whether t he capable- ofrepetiti on-yet- evading-review exception applies. "The public[ -]i nter est exce pt ion allows a court to consider an otherwise moot case when (1) the questi on present ed is of a publ ic nat ure; (2) there is a need f or an authoritative determi nationfor the future guid ance of p ublic officers; and (3) there is a likelihood o f future
recurr ence of

the question." In re Al fred H. H. , 233 I ll. 2d at 3 55. "T he 'pub lic interes t' excepti on is ' narrowly

constr ued and requi res a cl ear sho wing of each criterion. ' " In re Alfred H. H. , 233 Il l. 2d at 355-56 (quoti ng In re Marriag e of P eters-F arrell , 216 Il l. 2d 287, 292 (20 05)). The respo n dent a sserts the follow ing rea sons that the "pub lic interes t" exce ption is met: (1) the appeal r aises consti tuti onal is sues and statutory issues th at are m atters of a pub lic nature, i.e

. , the constit utional iss u e of

whether a court can i nvoluntarily commit an asymp toma tic indivi dual andthe statutory issu es of wh ether th e ord er, wh ich fa ils to state findings of fact, and the pet iti on, which fai ls t o lis t the r espondent' s fri ends and fami ly,
com ply with the C ode, (2) " [a] publis hed opinion by this [c]ourt

would not only

aid the5

parti es to simil ar act ions, but it would also pr ovide guid ance to the c ircuits of the distric t in determi ning the is sues pres ented i n this appeal, " and (3) "because this app eal raise s both consti tuti onal and s tatutory issu es, it is high ly likely that a d ecision in this ap peal w ould impact fut

ure li tigation." We find that a ll t hree criteri a are satisfi ed in thi s case. "First, the proce dures which must be foll owed and the proofs t hat must be made before a cou rt may au thorize invo luntary trea tmen t to recipie nts of me ntal health services are matters of a p ublic nature and of substantialpublic concern." In re Mary An n P. , 202 Il l. 2d 393, 402 (2002). Here, the re are que sti ons invol ving the procedures and statutoryguidelines to be follow ed; these are matter s of consi derable public c oncern. See In re James S. , 388 I ll. App. 3d 1102, 1105 (2009) (applying the pu blic-inte rest ex ceptio n to the mootness doctrine whe re the circ uit cou rt's order d id no t conta in any find ings o f fac t); In re Phi llip E. , 385 Ill. App. 3d 278, 282 (200 8) ("T he statu tory guide lines an d req uirem ents for a certain le vel of proof are not mer ely

goals but

are in pl ace i n order t o provide t he respondent

with due process" ). Second, we note t hat the re have been at

least four recent

cases fr om Ran dolp h Co unty that this court has rever sed for a fai lure t o comply wit h the Code. See In re Jose ph M. , 398 Ill. App . 3d 10 86 (2 010 ); In re Donrell S. , 395 I ll. App . 3d 59 9 (20 09); In re Michael H. , 392 Ill . App. 3d965 (200 9); In re Phi llip E. , 3 85 I ll . A pp. 3d 2 78 ( 200 8) . T hus , w e belie ve there i s a need for an a uthori tative deter

minati on for futur e guidance. Third, given the short durati on of an order for an involuntary

admissi on, we find there is a like lihood of the future recurr ence of

compliance i ssues wit

hout the oppor

tunit y for appell ate re view. See, e.g. , In re Mary An n P. , 202 I ll. 2d at 4 02-0 3; In re Mic hae l H. , 392 Ill . App. 3dat 970 ; In
re Philli p E. , 385 Il l. App. 3d at 282. This is espe cial ly true gi ven the hi story of the
res po nd en t's mental i llnes s. See I n re J os ep h M. , 39 8 I ll. A pp . 3d at 1 08 7 ( "re sp on de nt 's historyof mental i llnes s virt ually guarante es that

he will be the subj ectof petitions for the invol unt ary administ

rati on of psy chotropi c medicati on in the f uture" ). I n fact, the res pondent6

was a party

to a compli ance iss ue in In re Donrell S. , 3 95 I ll . A pp. 3d 5 99 ( 200 9) . T hus , w e findthat t

he issue s in thi s case r elat ed to the procedu res that must be followe d in involun tary treat ment cases satis fy t

he "publi c inte rest " excepti on to the moot ness doctrine, and w e w ill
now consider

the res pondent' s arguments that are rel ated t o the poli cies t hatmust be adhere d to in inv olu ntar y com mitm ent c ase s. "Involuntary commitment affec ts ver y i mpo rtant liberty

interest s, and thus those seeking t o keep an indi vidual s o confined must stri ctly comply wit

h proceduralsafeguards include d within the [Code]." In re Phi llip E. , 385 Il l. App. 3d at 284 ; In re Robin C. , 385 I ll. App. 3d 523 , 527 (20 08)

. "These safeguards are i ncluded within the Code t o ensure t hat the mental health system d oes n ot bec om e an o ppre ssive to ol r athe r than a means to ser ve the society in which we live." In re Phi llip E. , 385 Il l. App. 3d at 284. " The Code's pr ocedural safeguards are not mere technicalit ies." In re Rob er t D. , 345 Ill. App. 3d 76 9, 771 (20 04). "Rather, th ey a re es se nt ial to ol s to sa fe gu ar d t he lib er ty i nterest s of responde nts i n mental health cases." In re Rob er t D. , 345 Il l. App. 3d at 771. The respond ent conten ds that the trial court's order mu st be reversed because , contrary to stat ute, neithe r it

nor the r eco rd c ont ains a sta tem ent o f the cou rt's fin din gs o f fa ct. The State concedes this point and notes t hat it requi res a revers al. Section 3- 816(a) of t he Code provides in part

as foll ows: "Every

finalorde r entere d by the c ourt u nder this A ct shall b e in writi ng and shallbe accompanied by a stat ement on the record of t he court' s findi ngs of fact and conclusi ons of law." 405 ILCS 5/3-816(a) (West 2008). In In re James S. , we re cently
revers ed the ci rcuit

court on t

his exact issue, no t ing that

"in mentalhealth cases, stri ct compliance with the C ode is com pelling beca use libe rtyinterest s are involved." 388 Ill . App. 3d at 1107 (ci ting In re Fra nces K. , 322 Il l. App. 3d 203, 208 (2001)). Thus, as i n In re James S. , because the ci rcuit court fa iled to make writt en findings of fact and conc lusi ons of law on the re cord as i t was requi red to do under the Code, we rever se.7

The respondent

next aver s that

the petition for involuntary admissi on was defecti ve because, contrar

y t o stat ute, it fa iled

to include the names and addr esses of family or fri ends. The State coun ters that the failure of the p etition to name re latives or friends do es not requ ire
a reversal because petit ions for involunt ary

admissi on should be r ead in their entiret y and that, in this case, the required certificates attached to the p etition both aver tha t the exam iners informedthe res pondent of the purpose of the ex amin ation a nd in form ed him of h is right to speakto a relative, friend, or att orney before the examinati on but the respondent dec lined t hat opportuni ty . We find the St ate' s argument unper suasive

. Section 3-601(b) of the Code provides in relevant part as foll ows: "(b) The petiti on shallinclude all of the fol lowing:
*** 2. Th e na me and add ress of th e sp ous e, par ent, guar dian, su bstitute decisi on maker, if any, and close relative, or if none, the name and addre ss of anykno wn friend of t

he respondent

whom the petitioner has reason t o belie ve may know o r have any of the other names a nd addr esses. If the pe titioner is unab le to suppl y any

such names and addre sses, the pet iti onershall state that dili gentinqu ir y was made to l earn thi s infor mation and spe cify

the st eps taken." 405 ILCS 5/3-601(b )(2) (West 2 008). "The primary

rule of statutory co nstruc tion is to ascert ain and gi ve effect to the intent of the legisl ature." In re Mary Ann P. , 202 Ill . 2d at 405. "The most r elia

ble indi cator of

the leg isl atu re 's intent

is the language us ed in the s tatute, w hic h must be given its pl ain and ord inar y mea nin g. In re Mar y Ann P. , 202 I ll. 2d at 4 05. "W here th e statuto ry langua ge is clear and unambiguous, it wil l be give n effectwithout r esort to other aids of con struc tion ." In re Mary An n P. , 202 Il l. 2d at 405. Here, the st atute is cl earand unambiguous, stat ing that the pet iti on shall include the8

names of any r elat ives or

known friends or, i f none can be found, the pet iti on " shall stat e that dili gentinquiry was mad e to learn thi s information and specify t he steps taken." (Em phas is add ed.) 405 ILCS 5/3-601(b)(2) (West 2008). The st atute does not pr ovide any excepti ons to this requir ement, and t he stat ute employ s the word "s hall, " which the s upreme court "has constr ued as a cle ar expres sion o f legisla ti ve in tent t o im pos e a m and ator y oblig ation ." People v. O '

Brien , 197 Ill. 2d 88, 9 3 (2 001 ); see , e.g. , Villag e of Winfield v. Illin ois Sta te Labor Relations Board , 17 6 Ill . 2d 54, 64 (199 7); People v. Thomas , 171 Il l. 2d 207, 222 (1996); In re James S. , 388 I ll. App . 3d at 1 107 ; In re William s , 305 Il l. App . 3d 506, 510 (1999). Thus, there is n o question th at the abbrev iation "N/A " did not m eet the statutory requirements, and the res pondent' s procedur al ri ghts were vi olate d. See In re Wiess ing , 229 Ill. App. 3d 737, 739 (1992) (" According to t he report , al though res pondenthas li ttl e contact with his fam ily, there is no excu se fo r failure to con tact a clo se relativ e as req uir ed by the sta tute
. The issue as to compli ance with se ction 3- 601(b)(2) is not whether the re was substantial compliance. The petition fai ls t o show any compli ance. To say t his pet iti on was adequate would r ender meaningl ess the provisi ons of secti on 3-601(b)( 2) and eliminate an important

protection to perso ns sim ilarly situated to respo nden t"). " 'Non com plianc e w ith statutoryprovisi ons of the Code rende rs a j udgment enter ed under such circumstance s
erroneous and of no effect.' " In re James S. , 388 Ill . App. 3d at 1107 (quoting In re Frances K. , 322 Ill . App. 3d at 208); se e al so In re Mic hae l D. , 306 Il l. App. 3d 25, 27 (1999) ("[S]i nce the le gisl ature i s presumed t o know that the remedy f or viol ating the proce dural rules of the M ental H ealth Code is rever sal of an involuntar y commitment order [citations], if it had de sire d a di ffere nt rem edy for th e partic ular pr oced ural ru le at issue here, it co uld have provided for

it in the s tatute. It

did not. Accordingly , the error of the court was not har mle ss an d re ver sal is wa rran ted" ). Fo r this reas on a lso, a rev ersa l is req uire d. We ackn ow ledge that w hen faced with this issue , other d istricts of th is cou rt have9

ruledthat a re versa l may no t be req uired w hen th e resp ond ent su ffers no p rejudic e as a re sult of the p roc edu ral d evia tion

. In re Robin C. , 385 Il l. App. 3d at 5 27-2 8; In re To mmy B. , 372 Ill. App. 3d 677, 684 -85 (2 007 ); In re Deni se C. , 348 Il l. App. 3d 889, 892-93 (200 4); In re Robinson , 287 Ill. App . 3d 10 88, 19 04 (1 997 ); In re Ada ms , 239 Il l. App. 3d 880, 884-85 (1993). Contra In re Mic hae l D. , 306 Il l. App. 3d at 28 (finding that where the section of the Code is man datory an d disp ositive, th ere is no requir ement of prej udice). In doing so, these
cour ts have rel ied pri marily on the supr eme court' s decis ion in In re Nau , 153 Il l. 2d 406, 419 (1992), or the p roge ny resulting theref rom , wh ere the cour t held that proceduraldeviat ions from the Code do not require a reve rsalof a commitment or der if t he defects could have and shou ld have been objec ted to im med iately, or cou ld hav e bee n eas ily cured if objec ted to im m ed iat ely, and in the end made no differe nce anyway. I n that case , the court hel d that stri ctcompliance wi th the n otice re quirem ent of section 3-61 1 of

the C ode ( Ill. Rev . Stat. 1989, ch. 911⁄2, par. 3-611 (now 405 ILCS 5/3-611 (West 2008))), req uiri ng that t he respond entrecei ve notic e of the t ime and place of the hearing, was not requir ed whe n th e purpose beh ind the s tatut e w as sa tisfie d, i.e

. , the r esp ond ent k new abo ut th e he arin g. In re Nau , 153 Ill . 2d at

419. Simil arly , the court found t hata revers al was not r equired f or the failure to comply

with the requirement

under section 3-813 of t he Code (Ill . Rev. St at. 1989, ch. 911⁄2, par. 3-813 (now see 4 05 ILCS 5/3-813 (West 2008))) t hata peti tion be f

iled prior to the expirati on of the initialorder when the purpose behindthe st atute was not frust rated bythe o ne- day d elay in filin g. In re Nau , 153 I ll. 2d at 422 -23. Here, the purpos e behind secti on 3-601(b)( 2) was not sat isfi ed by t he abbrevi ation " N/A." Nor was the purpose behi nd the stat ute met by

the inclus ion of the requir ed cert ific ates attach ed to th e petition . In fac t, reading the petition and its a ttachm ents in th eir entire ty leads us to the o ppo site conclusi on: that prov iding a li st of the petitioner' s family and frie nds was appli cable. Indeed, t he treat ment plan attached t o the pe tition ind icated that the respo nden t main tained fam ily10

contact on a regu lar bas is, a nd at the hearing, the res pondent te sti fied that he no l onger wanted to be institutionalized so that he co uld take care of his dying father, t hat if relea sed he would live wit

h his family, and that

his family would t ake care of his basi c phys icalneeds. There was n o excu se for not fo llowing the statutoryrequir ement in t his cas e. See In re Ellis , 284 Ill . App. 3d 691, 694 (1996) (f inding no exc use for t

he State 's f

ailure to comply

with the requ ireme nts of secti on 3-601(b)( 2) where the St ate admit ted that the respondent

had been prev iously hospit aliz ed on approximat ely 20 occasions and w here the res pondent' s mother maintai ned contact

with the ment al heal th cen ter); In re Ada ms , 239 Il l. App. 3d 880, 885 (1993) ("Where the outcome of the commitment hearing may

have been pr ejudi ced by t he St ate 's fail ure to s tri ctly comply wit

h the Code, r eversalof

the pe tition is pro per "). T hus , a
rev ersa l is req uire d on this is sue as w ell. Be caus e we f

in d tha t t he tria l c our

t' s o rd er an d the pe titi on w er e f at al ly fl awe d, we need not address the respondent's addi tional contenti ons. We do, however, feelcompelled (as we have done in the pa st on this exact issue) to bri efly address the res pondent' s argument that even if t

he tri al court

properl y committed the respondent , the tri al court vi olat ed the
re sp on de nt 's cons titutional rig ht to trea tmen t in the le ast restr ictive setting. Sec tion 3- 811 of the Code mandates t

hat "[t ]he court

shallorder t

he least restrictive alte rnat ive for treat ment which is appr opriat e." 405 I LCS 5/3-811 (West 2008). Here, there was abso lutely
no proof pre sented t

hat cont inued hospi tali zati on in Chester was the lea st re stri ctive alte rnati ve availa ble to the res pondent. Without any evidence, we have no idea why t he tri al court made this determi nation. Thus, the tri al court 's order als o violates the res pondent' s due process right s, and t

he judgment coul d be revers ed on this ground as well . See In re P hillip E. , 385 Ill. A pp. 3 d at 2 86. "Procedu r al defici encies and mistakes in mental -healt h cases ' suggest a

lack of atte ntionto process' [citation], and w e reiterate the need for greater a ttent ion t o deta il in11

complying with the statut ory requir ements in these cases." In re Robin C. , 385 Ill . App. 3d at 528. As th e Illinois Supreme Court rec ently stat ed in In re Andrew B. , No . 1074 98, slip op. at 11 (F ebru ary 19, 20 10), w e "rem ind o ur co urts to b e eve r vigilan t to pr otect against abuses of power and preser ve the fundam ental l iberty interes ts of in dividu als sub jected to inv olu ntar y-adm issio n pr oce edin gs." CONCLUS ION For th e fo re goi ng r eas ons , t he j udg ment

of t he Randolph Coun ty circuit cou rt is
revers ed.

Reversed.

CH AP MA N an d ST EW AR T, JJ., concur.NO. 5-08-0641 IN T HE AP PEL LA TE C OU RT OF ILLIN OIS

FIF TH DIST RICT

___________________________________________________________________________________ In re LAN CE H., Alleged t o Be a Person ) Ap peal f rom the C ircuit Subject to Involunt ary

Admission ) C ou rt o f R an do lp h C ou nt y. ) (The P eople of th e State of Illinois, Petitioner- ) No. 08-MH-231 Ap pellee , v. Lan ce H ., Resp ond ent- ) App ellant). ) H ono rab le W illiam A. S chu we rk, Jr ., ) Judge, presi ding.

___________________________________________________________________________________ Opinion Filed : June 18, 2010

___________________________________________________________________________________ Justice s : Ho nor able Jam es M . W exs tten, J .,

Honorable Meliss a A. Chapman, J., and Ho nor able Bru ce D . Ste wa rt, J., Concur

___________________________________________________________________________________ Atto rneys Ve ron iqu e B ake r, D irect or, B arb ara A . Go ebe n, L aur el S pah n, P atti W ern er, for Staff Att orney s, LegalAdvocacy Servi ce, Guardi anship & Advocacy Commissi on, Appell ant 4500 College Avenue, Sui te 100, Alton, I L 62002

___________________________________________________________________________________ Atto rneys Ho n. R and all R ode wa ld, S tate's A ttorn ey, Ra ndo lph Co unt y Co urth ous e, C hes ter, for IL 622 33; Patrick D elfino, Director, Step hen E . Norris, Dep uty Director, Ken dra Appellee S. Peterson, S taff Attorne y, Office of the S tate's Attorneys Appe llate Prosecutor,

Fif th Di stri ctOffi ce, 730 E. Il li noi s Hig hway15, P.O. Box 224 9, Mt . Ver non, IL 62864

___________________________________________________________________________________