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i

iii

Strategic Studies Institute

and

U.S. Army War College Press

RUSSIAN BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE:

RHETORIC AND REALITY

Keir Giles

June 2015

The views expressed in this report are those of the author and 

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copyrighted.
iv

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with this monograph.

ISBN 1-58487-689-1

vii

FOREWORD

The focus on Russian intervention in Ukraine in 

2014-15 has obscured other areas of contention which 

previously were prominent and problematic in relations between the United States and Russia. One such 

area is the strenuous Russian objection to U.S. plans 

for ballistic missile defense, most recently in the form 

of the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA). 

At some point in the near future, the issue of missile defense will once more be on the table with Russia; whether as a result of a relaxation of tensions allowing renewed bilateral discussion of security issues, 

or indeed because of an immediate threat of Russian 

escalatory action in response to the United States rolling out missile defense capabilities. In either case, U.S. 

policymakers and negotiators need to be prepared 

and fully acquainted with the wide range of issues 

at stake. 

In this respect, both the current monograph and 

its predecessor, European Missile Defense and Russia, 

provide an essential grounding in the Russian approach to missile defense, and crucially, to specific inconsistencies in Russian objections to U.S. plans. The 

Strategic Studies Institute therefore recommends both 

monographs to those both engaged with studying and 

managing Russia, and mitigating the adverse consequences of Russia’s distinctive world view. 

 

 DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

 Director

 Strategic Studies Institute and

 U.S. Army War College Press

ix

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

KEIR GILES is the director of the Conflict Studies Research Centre (CSRC), a group of deep subject matter 

experts on Eurasian security formerly attached to the 

United Kingdom (UK) Ministry of Defence. Now operating in the private sector, CSRC provides in-depth 

analysis on a wide range of security issues affecting 

Russia and its relations with overseas partners. After beginning his career working with paramilitary 

aviation in Russia and Ukraine immediately following the fall of the Soviet Union, Mr. Giles joined the 

BBC Monitoring Service (BBCM) to report on political 

and military affairs in the former Soviet space. While 

still working for the BBCM, Mr. Giles also worked for 

CSRC at the UK Defence Academy where he wrote 

and briefed for UK and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) government agencies on a wide range 

of Russian defense and security issues.

He is the only double Associate Fellow of the Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House) 

in London, UK, as well as a regular contributor to research projects on Russian security issues in both the 

UK and Europe. Mr. Giles’s work has appeared in

a wide range of academic and military publications 

across Europe and in the United States.

xi

SUMMARY

Russia has made air and space defense, including 

ballistic missile defense (BMD), a top priority, while 

at the same time protesting vehemently against the 

deployment of U.S. missile defense technology in Europe, which Moscow claims upsets strategic stability 

and increases the danger of war. Russian declaratory 

policy provides U.S. policymakers with significant 

material to develop an approach intended to mitigate 

Russian obstructionism over European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) and U.S. plans for BMD more 

broadly. Put simply, Russian complaints at the dangerous irresponsibility of the United States introducing new anti-missile capabilities ring hollow, when 

Russia is forging ahead with its own program to do 

precisely the same. 

U.S. officials have repeatedly attempted to allay 

Russian concerns over the potential for EPAA and its 

predecessor systems to compromise Russian strategic 

deterrence. These attempts have foundered on Russian concerns, some of which appear disingenuous, 

but others of which are genuinely rooted in an entirely different Russian approach to the purpose and 

status of nuclear weapons. Despite the current hiatus in relations, opportunities for meaningful dialog 

with Russia on missile defense will arise again in the 

future. At that point, U.S. representatives should be 

fully informed on the scope and ambition of Russia’s 

own missile defense programs. This will allow them 

not only to rebut some of the more facile Russian accusations, but also to counter some persistent Russian 

arguments relating to strategic balance. 

In brief, discussion of Russian capabilities should 

be an integral part of future conversations with Rus-
xii

sia on the deployment of U.S. and allied BMD assets. 

This monograph provides the necessary overview of 

Russian plans for missile defenses, and the rhetoric 

surrounding them. 
1

RUSSIAN BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE:

RHETORIC AND REALITY

INTRODUCTION 

While this monograph was being researched 

and written, Russian actions in Crimea and eastern 

Ukraine had brought U.S.-Russian relations to a new 

low in the post-Cold War era. Normal relations and 

conversations between the United States and Russia 

were apparently on hold during an unprecedented, and apparently intractable, crisis of European 

security. 

But the longer view of relations between the two 

former superpowers shows precedents that suggest 

relations stand a strong chance of early recovery, despite Russia’s hard line and unpalatable actions.1

 With 

or without this recovery, some persistent challenges 

to the relationship will remain; the state of relations 

will affect how these challenges are presented, rather 

than the underlying contradictions themselves. One 

of these challenges is ballistic missile defense (BMD), 

and its implications for nuclear deterrence. 

For the past 7 years, plans for BMD capability in 

Europe have been a consistent sticking point in relations between the United States and Russia. In brief, 

Russia’s strenuous opposition to these plans is based 

on claims, not all of them disingenuous, that this capability is intended to compromise Russia’s nuclear 

deterrent capability.2

Yet, all discussion of the subject highlights the 

current and proposed U.S. deployments and entirely 

ignores Russia’s own missile interception systems, 

which are claimed to have comparable capability. 

While Moscow continues to strengthen its armed forc-
2

es and seeks to reduce its capability gap with the United States, the perception of vulnerability leads Russia 

to invest heavily in strategic weapons and aerospace 

defense, including defense against both nuclear missiles and precision guided munitions.

Russia protests that U.S. SM-3 missiles pose a potential threat to strategic stability, and has made belligerent threats of direct military action to prevent 

their deployment. But no mention at all is made of 

the strategic implications of Russia’s own S-400 and 

S-500 systems, despite the fact that if the performance 

and capabilities claimed for them by Russian sources 

are accurate, they pose at least as great a threat to 

deterrence as do SM-3s. 

This monograph therefore aims to describe Russia’s claims for its missile defense systems and, where 

possible, to assess the likelihood that these claims are 

true. This will form a basis for considering whether 

discussion of Russian capabilities should be an integral part of future conversations with Russia on the 

deployment of U.S. and allied BMD assets. 

An assessment of this kind requires an essential 

caveat. Research for this monograph has been conducted from open sources in Russian and English, 

and unclassified discussion with knowledgeable individuals on both sides of the debate. As such, it has 

obvious limitations, especially in a field where the fine 

detail of capabilities and deployments is highly classified. In addition, the proliferation of designations 

used by Russia for systems still in development, and 

the confused and contradictory reporting of them in 

open source media, adds a further layer of obfuscation. In the words of one assessment—entitled, tellingly, “Experts Baffled by Profusion of Russian Missile 

Projects”—the resulting “linguistic labyrinth has been 
3

further confused, perhaps deliberately, by a proliferation of new names in Russian reports.”3

The descriptions of specific Russian projects in this 

monograph are therefore a synthesis of public declarations by Russia as carried in open sources, rather 

than an authoritative and verified systems handbook. 

Nonetheless their value is important, since responses 

to Russian claims for their missile defense systems 

must necessarily rely on public pronouncements. 

RUSSIAN PRIORITIES 

Missile defense is an illusion—no matter how much 

money you invest in it.

Dmitri Rogozin, Russian Deputy Prime Minister 

responsible for the military-industrial complex4

This first public pronouncement reflects a widespread view, both in Russia and elsewhere, that successful missile defense is both immensely expensive 

and technically not feasible. This reflects a long legacy 

of costly and mostly fruitless efforts by American and 

Soviet arms designers in the field.5 But the view is at 

odds with current Russian defense policy, which is 

devoting considerable resources to aerospace defense 

as part of the current Russian rearmament program.6

The program to develop and deploy means of air 

and space defense is one of the largest components of 

the widely-reported State Armaments Program for the 

period up to 2020, and will receive approximately 20 

percent of the program’s total budget, which in absolute terms means around 3.4 trillion rubles (more than 

$100 billion).7 Under the approved plan, space- and 

land-based missile attack early warning systems will 

be modernized and provided with new components; 
4

a whole series of entirely new anti-aircraft and antimissile weapon systems will be introduced; Moscow’s 

ballistic missile defenses will be thoroughly overhauled; several new antimissile production plants will 

be built to handle huge procurement contracts; and a 

new integrated air and space defense command-andcontrol information system will be established.8

The irony lies in the fact that Moscow has made 

air and space defense, including BMD, a top priority, 

while at the same time protesting vehemently against 

the deployment of U.S. missile defense technology in 

Europe, which allegedly upsets strategic stability and 

increases the danger of war. In his 2012 pre-election 

treatise on defense policy and national security, Russian President Vladimir Putin ranked aerospace defense second in importance to Russia after the nuclear 

deterrent.9 A year later, Chief of the General Staff 

(CGS) of the Russian Armed Forces Valery Gerasimov 

confirmed that priority in the development of Russia’s armed forces through 2020 would continue to be 

given to the strategic nuclear forces and the air and 

space defense system.10

Although brought to the fore by Russia’s new financial capabilities and emphasis on military regeneration, emphasis on missile defense is, in fact, not a 

novelty in the evolving Russian military doctrine. As 

a former high-ranking official in the Ronald Reagan 

administration put it: “The Kremlin, going back to Soviet days, has always believed missile defenses were 

not simply legitimate but necessary.” Furthermore, 

the Russian military pursued the development and 

deployment of such weaponry without interruption 

“including and notwithstanding its obligations under 

the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.”11
5

The following sections discuss the organization 

of aerospace defense in Russia, Russia’s current and 

planned BMD systems, the state of their manufacturers, and finally the rhetoric surrounding the development of missile defenses. 

Russian Aerospace Defense Forces—

Current and Future Shape. 

The Russian Aerospace Defense Forces (VKO) 

were created in 2011 by a decree of former President 

Dmitry Medvedev12 and ever since have been the subject of controversy. The birth pangs of the new organization perfectly reflect the circumstances surrounding the radical military reform launched by former 

Defense Minister Anatoliy Serdyukov and the former 

CGS General Nikolay Makarov in 2008. 

According to a number of informed observers, the 

most striking feature of the overall reform effort has 

been the absence of a coherent definition of the precise 

purpose of Russia’s military and threats it is supposed 

to counter.13 In the course of the changes, which strove 

to reduce the number and size of various command 

structures and abolish unnecessary tiers of command, 

the air force lost the bureaucratic tussle for control 

over the VKO, which thus gained space to develop on 

its own. The decree establishing the VKO was issued 

at the end of 2011. But even at that time next to nothing was known about its content, the remit of the new 

armed service, or even the date of signature. It appears 

that senior Russian officers, even those who had given 

media interviews with confident predictions about the 

future shape of the VKO and who were later put in 

charge of a very different organization from the one 

they had described, were in all probability kept in the 
6

dark until the final political decision had been made.14

In late-2012, senior officers were explaining that the 

process of integration of VKO into Russia’s command 

and control system was still ongoing, and while the 

new command was scheduled to take on its full duties 

in 2015, integration would continue through 2020.15

The Russian Ministry of Defense has now declared 

the main outlines of the new armed service. The core of 

the VKO consists of Air Force’s surface-to-air missile 

(SAM) brigades in the Moscow region and the space 

forces. The latter, overseen by the Space Command, 

have seen very few changes in their organization. 

They include the Main Missile Attack Early Warning 

Center (SPRN) in Solnechnogorsk, the Main Space 

Surveillance Center (SKKP) in Noginsk, and the Main 

Trial Centre for Testing and Control of Space Assets.16

However, the VKO’s air and missile defense component, under the umbrella of the Air and Missile Defense Command, looks curiously weak. The VKO took 

over SAM systems but not air defense aircraft, which 

are still assigned to the Military Districts and to the 

air force. The three air defense brigades assigned to 

Air and Missile Defense Command are supposed to 

protect Moscow and 26 administrative regions around 

the capital (the so called Central Industrial Region) 

which is home to 30 percent of Russia’s population 

and lists 140 separate high-priority facilities.17 This 

was a daunting task even for the predecessor of Air 

and Missile Defense Command, the Special Purpose 

Command, which had Su-27, MiG-29, and MiG-31 air 

defense regiments at its disposal. It is therefore difficult to perceive how VKO can fulfill its stated role as 

a stand-alone command. In an ideal scenario air force, 

missile defense, the SRPN and SKPP systems should 

cooperate (they even share a common catalog of tar-
7

gets with single designations), but, as one Russian defense analyst put it, “in practice such integration will 

be difficult to pull off.”18

Meanwhile, the complexity of the VKO structure 

has been openly criticized, with growing calls for reorganization. Liberal military analysts Alexei Arbatov 

and General Vladimir Dvorkin decried their lack of 

“logical command structure and a unified information system” and, most importantly, the fact that their 

existence is not compatible with Russian “economic 

or military-technical capabilities.”19 Aleksandr Tarnayev, a member of the Russian State Duma Defense 

Committee, complained that due to insufficient funds, 

the VKO command could not fulfill its tasks. The 

General Staff, Tarnayev asserted, lacks the means to 

constantly monitor Russian airspace, since re-equipping the VKO with modern high technology assets is 

progressing too slowly. Furthermore, the former unified system of air defense in the country had broken 

into five parts: four air defense Military Districts and 

the VKO.20 As part of his review of reform decisions 

made by his predecessor, in 2012 incoming CGS Gerasimov asked for “clarification” of the development of 

the VKO, including the manner of its creation and the 

number of mistakes and corrections needed.21

Protecting the important military and government infrastructure in the industrial heart of the 

country is not the only mission the VKO forces have 

been officially assigned. The Ministry of Defense lists 

other tasks:

• Providing command authorities with highly 

accurate information on detection of ballistic missile launches and prevention of missile 

attacks;
8

• Destruction of the ballistic missile warheads of 

the potential enemy in case of crucial governmental facilities being attacked;

• Defense of the major command control stations 

and governmental facilities, armed formations, 

the most important industrial and economic 

centers, and other installations against the enemy’s joint air- and space-based strike weapons 

(SVKN) in the zone of probable damage;

• Monitoring space objects and identification of 

potential threats to the Russian Federation in 

space and from space and prevention of attacks 

as needed;

• Carrying out spacecraft launches and placing 

into orbit and controlling satellite systems, including integrated ones (intended to be used for 

both military and civilian purposes), in flight, 

and using specific ones to provide the Russian Federation Armed Forces with necessary 

data; and,

• Maintaining both military and integrated satellite systems with launching installations and 

assets of control in working order; and “a number of other tasks.”22

These are clearly far beyond the current VKO capabilities. But objections to the VKO’s current structure 

and purpose do not take into account the fact the extended process of integration into Russia’s command 

and control system, which itself has undergone a 

significant overhaul over recent years.23

A clearer picture of the future shape and mission 

of the VKO was provided by Deputy Defense Minister 

Yuri Borisov and Major General Sergei Yagolnikov, 

Director of the Second Scientific and Research Insti-
9

tute of the Defense Ministry (responsible for air and 

space defense), in the spring of 2014. The VKO will 

be “modernized” over the next 6 years, they said, and 

its structure overhauled in 2015. Under the approved 

plan, the VKO will comprise four subdivisions. These 

will include a space- and ground-based intelligencegathering and ballistic missile early warning system, 

an air and space defense command, a command-andcontrol structure, as well as a logistics support branch. 

Thus, the ministry plans to integrate the activities of 

all units responsible for conducting Russia’s air and 

space defense into one branch. According to Borisov, 

investments in new arms systems and other military hardware for the new command should reach 2 

trillion rubles ($55 billion) by 2020.24

The overhauled structure would be intended to 

integrate Russia’s response to potential attacks into 

a single system of air and space defense. Emphasis 

would be put on enhancing the role played by radar 

in detecting airborne threats. The Defense Ministry is 

working on about 100 research and development projects for new VKO weapon systems, to be financed out 

of the 2 trillion rubles.25

Yagolnikov presented the principal philosophy 

behind the planned reform in a speech at the annual 

session of the influential Non-departmental Expert 

Council on VKO Problems on February 28, 2014, 

which was later republished by the authoritative military publication Voyenno-promyshlennyy Kuryer (VPK). 

Yagolnikov identified two possible approaches to 

the reorganization of Russian air and space defense. 

The first scenario assumed continuation of the buildup of the VKO with a unified command-and-control 

structure and an exclusive area of responsibility. The 

second scenario assumed merging the VKO and the 
10

Air Force into a single armed service, and dividing operational and administrative functions between a new 

Air and Space Command and individual Military Districts. In order to assess the two options, Yagolnikov 

outlined three basic tasks of the VKO:

1. Contribution to strategic nuclear deterrence 

through early warning against decapitating and disarming nuclear attacks and through defending strategic command-and-control systems and strategic forces 

against such attacks; 

2. Protection of Russian state boundaries in airspace, control over airspace, and cessation of attempts 

at its misuse; control over outer space; and,

3. Air and space defense of forces and installations 

in regional military conflicts.26

Reviewing the tasks individually by use of mathematical modeling, the Ministry of Defense came to 

the conclusion that the first option, a gradual build-up 

of the VKO, is best suited for their fulfillment. 

The problems and challenges facing the VKO are 

complex and not limited to modernizing its structures and re-equipping its units with state-of-the-art 

systems such as the much vaunted S-500 air defense 

system. The challenges are also organizational and 

systemic, and extend to a lack of qualified personnel.27

The timeframe and the outline of reorganization have 

been set. The eventual effectiveness of the new structure can be assessed after its results emerge. 

Almaz-Antey.

The chaos and unpredictability surrounding the 

establishment of the VKO is mirrored in developments 

around the main airspace defense technology manu-
11

facturers. The company now known as Almaz-Antey 

originated in the merger of two prestigious defense 

manufacturers: Almaz, which produced long range air 

defense systems, and Antey, which dealt with short 

range and troop air defense. After a complex and controversial combining of the two entities, “Joint-Stock 

Company Almaz-Antey Aerospace Defense Concern” 

(OAO Kontsern PVO Almaz-Antey) was established by 

President Vladimir Putin in 2002 uniting no fewer than 

46 enterprises, including factories, research and production organizations, design bureau, and research 

and development institutes involved in the development and manufacture of short-, medium-, and longrange air defense missile systems, radar surveillance 

systems, and automated control systems. This was 

part of a broader push to unite splintered pieces of 

the sprawling military-industrial complex, and other 

industries ravaged by underinvestment and lack of direction during the chaotic 1990s. In 2007, the company 

was enlarged and now includes around 50 enterprises 

in 17 Russian regions, employing over 94,000 people. 

The Russian state is the sole shareholder.28

 Along with other “national champions” created 

by the Kremlin with the purpose of monopolizing the 

domestic market and attaining a competitive edge 

over global rivals, Almaz-Antey has performed extremely well. The group produces the whole range of 

Russian top-line anti-aircraft and anti-missile systems, 

including S-300PMU2 Favorit, S-300VM Antey 2500, 

S-400 Triumf, S-300 Rif-M (ship-based), 9K37 Buk, and 

9K330 Tor. Approximately 90 percent of its revenues 

come from the defense sector, with half of the total 

made up by exports. In 2012, the company managed 

to increase its defense revenues by an impressive 62 

percent to $5.7 billion, which placed it among the top 

15 arms manufacturers worldwide.29
12

Yet not even a company the size of Almaz-Antey 

is able to produce advanced anti-aircraft systems on 

its own, and has to purchase hardware from various 

state-owned and private enterprises. This is especially 

the case for radar, communications, electronic warfare 

and electronic countermeasures technology. As part 

of his primary concern with airspace defense, President Putin has long sought to establish a horizontally 

integrated holding company, which would serve the 

interests of the VKO. One of the proposed solutions involved integrating Almaz-Antey into Rostec, a bloated conglomerate of more than 600 entities overseen by 

Sergey Chemezov, which includes radar manufacturer 

Vega and JSC Sozvezdiye, responsible for developing 

and producing electronic warfare and radio communications technology. The second proposal envisaged 

selling Almaz-Antey to the RTI group, which specializes in producing early warning radars (Voronezh 

for instance), space communications technology and 

control systems for anti-aircraft weaponry. In the end, 

Putin was content with neither solution. First, Rostec 

was considered cumbersome and ungovernable even 

by Russian standards; and, second, Almaz-Antey was 

regarded as too strategically important to pass to private hands, as RTI is majority-owned by AFK Sistema, 

a holding controlled by magnate Vladimir Yevtushenkov. A compromise was therefore found under which 

Almaz-Antey is to become the core of the VKO industry. It should absorb several independent subcontractors (mainly satellite manufacturer Kometa) and appoint Sergei Chemezov head of its supervisory board 

in order to ensure harmonized relations with Rostec.30

On July 16, 2014, the U.S. Department of Treasury 

placed Almaz-Antey on the Sectoral Sanctions Identification List, cutting it off from the American financial 
13

system and potential American subcontractors or clients.31 The EU imposed a similar set of sanctions on 

Almaz-Antey 2 weeks later, noting that the company 

makes missiles that have been used by pro-Russian 

groups to shoot down aircraft over eastern Ukraine.32

According to the General Director of Almaz-Antey 

Yan Novikov, the sanctions will have no tangible 

impact on the company.33

New Hardware—Radars.

Commenting on the state of the Russian militaryindustrial complex, Igor Ashurbeyli, former chief designer of Almaz-Antey, used a medical metaphor, saying that the patient is “more alive than dead.”34 In each 

sector of the Russian defense industry, where export 

revenues were available, they allowed capacity and 

manpower to be retained during the long period of 

underfunding following the end of the Soviet Union. 

In the case of aerospace technology, which makes up 

by far the biggest share of Russia’s arms exports, the 

patient is doing relatively well. 

New hardware has recently been added in all 

important branches of aerospace defense. The earlywarning systems for detecting incoming ballistic missiles or threats from space (SPRN and SKKP) consist 

of satellites and ground-based radar and observation 

sites. Since March 2012, four new satellites of the Oko

system have provided Russia with practically permanent coverage of the continental United States, but 

they are unable to detect launches from other areas.35

The ground-based early-warning radar chain is being modernized and relocated to Russia. The most 

important additions include three Voronezh-type radars, which became operational after long delays in 
14

Lekhtusi (east of St. Petersburg) in 2012 and Armavir 

in 2013. As of June 2014, two additional radars of this 

class had begun initial operations: one in Mishelevka 

(near Irkutsk), one in Kaliningrad; and four others 

were under construction (Vorkuta, Barnaul, Orsk, 

and Yeniseysk).36 Voronezh-class radars have an operational range of 6,000 kilometers (km) (3,728 miles). 

Compared to previous generation stations, they can be 

more quickly established and require a smaller crew 

to operate.37 In keeping with the usual tenor of Russian claims for new systems, Deputy Defense Minister 

Yuriy Borisov said “no one else can match these stations.”38 It was the Voronezh radar in Armavir, which 

in 2013 detected a launch of two ballistic missiles in 

the Mediterranean Sea, which later turned out to be 

part of Israel’s test of its missile defense shield.39

Russia has also begun testing a new radar designed 

to detect highly maneuverable aerial targets, including cruise missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles, at 

a range of up to 3,000-km (over 1,800 miles), allowing it to cover most of Europe. The new-generation 

over-the-horizon radar, dubbed Container, was put 

on trial duty near the town of Kovylkino southeast 

of Moscow in December 2013. According to Defense 

Minister Sergei Shoigu, Container will allow Russia to 

expand its monitoring range and control over the situation “to the west” and should be fully operational by 

the end of 2015.40 According to Russian CGS Valery 

Gerasimov, the completed airspace defense system 

will ensure guaranteed detection of enemy ballistic 

and long-range cruise missiles at launch.41
15

Table 1. New Hardware - Missile Systems.

S-400 Triumf. 

The most significant upgrade of the VKO air and 

space defense component currently under way is the 

introduction into service of S-400 systems produced by 

Almaz-Antey. The S-400 Triumf (North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO] designation SA-21 Growler) 

is in fact the most recent operational upgrade of the 

extensive S-300 SAM family. The antiballistic missile 

capabilities of the older versions were comparable to 

those of the American PAC-1 and PAC-2 Patriot series.42 In the case of the S-400, however, analysts largely agree that the system “in many respects is more 

capable than the U.S. Patriot series and offers mobility 

and performance and thus survivability much better 

than that of Patriot.”43 The main distinctions between 

the S-400 and its predecessors lie in the refinements to 

the radar, software (thanks to Russia’s post-Cold War 

large-scale access to Western technology markets, and 

Western computational technology) and several new 

Russian Designation NATO Designation

S-300P/PT SA-10A Grumble A

S-300PS SA-10B Grumble B

S-300PM/PMU SA-10C Grumble C

S-300V SA-12A/B Gladiator / Giant 

S-300PMU1 SA-20 Gargoyle A

S-300PMU2 Favorit SA-20 Gargoyle B

S-300VM/Antey-2500 SA-23A/B Gladiator / Giant

S-400 Triumf SA-21 Growler A

S-500 Triumfator
16

missile types. As a result, the S-400 can be armed with 

flexible mixes of missiles designed to counter a range 

of different targets, providing a truly multilayered 

defense capability. 

The S-400 is equipped with sophisticated electronic warfare systems. Hence, jamming of the S-400s 

acquisition and engagement radars will prove challenging, because they employ countermeasures such 

as rapid frequency-hopping and agile beam-steering. 

The S-400 also employs new methods that reportedly 

have shown some ability to detect stealth aircraft. 

Among the most potent is the use of new radar systems such as the Nebo-M, which employ a combination of sophisticated radar systems designed to track 

and engage stealth aircraft at tactically meaningful 

distances.44

Like the Patriot SAM system, the S-400 has been 

designed to counter a wide range of airborne and airspace targets, not only ballistic missiles, and until now 

the main concerns over its potency have been focused 

on manned aircraft.45 For the interception of ballistic 

targets, it uses the 48N6 and 9M96 families of longand medium-range missiles with a maximum range 

of up to 250-km.46 That is comparable to the U.S. Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system, 

designed solely for missile defense. THAAD is intended to shoot down short-, medium- and intermediaterange ballistic missiles, although owing to a different 

design philosophy, the maximum THAAD operating 

altitude (around 150-km) is significantly higher than 

that of its Russian rival.47 The 48N6 missile is reportedly suited for destroying medium-range ballistic 

missiles with a maximum range of 3,500-km flying at 

4,800 meters per second, at a distance of 5 to 60 km and 

an altitude of 2 to 27 km. The warhead is able not only 
17

to deflect the incoming ballistic missile but also effectively destroy it.48 In the case of the better-known and 

extremely maneuverable 9M96 missile, the producer 

claims an 80 percent hit probability against a ballistic 

missile and a 70 percent kill probability against a particular part of a ballistic missile (i.e., warhead).49

Very few details, except for vague declarations 

by military officials, are known about the ultra-longrange 40N6 missile, which is supposed to have a range 

of up to 400-km.50 It is not known whether a one-stage 

or a two-stage rocket will carry its warhead, and there 

are some doubts about its maneuverability due to its 

size.51 Some estimates52 allege a maximum speed of 

4,800 meters per second, which would slightly overmatch the performance of the U.S. SM-3 Block IIA 

missile, to be rolled out in 2018 at earliest in Phase 3 of 

the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA).53

The 40N6 missile supposedly passed all trials in July 

2012, and according to Major General Andrei Dyomin, the Chief of Staff of the Air and Missile Defense 

Command, was supposed to enter service “soon” afterwards.54 Military analysts are less optimistic and 

estimate the 40N6 will not be deployed before 2015.55

The sole supplier of missiles for the S-400 system is 

Moscow-based manufacturer MMZ Avangard, which 

is part of Almaz-Antey. In its latest available annual 

report for 2012, the company stated that it was finishing work on starting serial production of the 40N6 

missile.56 No information on its performance or commissioning has been released since. The situation 

was pointedly summarized in June 2014 by Russian 

defense expert Aleksandr Stepanov: 

Although official sources have repeatedly stated that 

the testing of new long-range missiles is completed 
18

and that it will be adopted in the near future, on the 

sidelines they are saying the opposite.57

The VKO forces around Moscow have command 

of three S-400 regiments (in Elektrostal, Dimitrov, and 

Zvenigorod), which means six battalions in total, with 

eight launchers per battalion.58 Furthermore, one additional regiment should be put under the VKO command by the end of 2014, concluding the first phase 

of the VKO rearmament.59 Not all S-400 deployments, 

however, have ended up in VKO hands. During the 

2009–12 time frame, most new deliveries went far 

away from the capital, apparently under the influence of the air force.60 Priority was given to potential 

areas of vulnerability in the vicinity of Russian borders. As early as 2009, one battalion was reportedly 

deployed in the Far East near Nakhodka to counter 

the potential threat posed by North Korea’s missile 

tests.61 A whole regiment was permanently stationed 

there in August 2012.62 More surprisingly, the Pacific 

Fleet should receive an unspecified number of additional S-400 units “for the protection of Kamchatka” 

by the end of 2014.63 The second border destination of 

Russia’s most advanced anti-aircraft and anti-missile 

system was Kaliningrad where the first battalion under the aegis of the Baltic Fleet was commissioned in 

April 2012.64 Finally, one S-400 regiment was stationed 

in the Southern Military District near Novorossiysk 

at the end of 2012, this time with the Air Force.65 All 

in all, out of seven regiments received by the armed 

forces by the end of 2013, only three have been given 

to the VKO, with one additional regiment promised 

by the end of 2014.

According to the 2020 State Armament Program, 

plans are to produce and deploy a total of 56 S-400 

battalions, which translates into approximately 450 
19

launchers.66 This will be a demanding task for the defense industry. In order to accomplish it, 21 additional 

regiments will have to be produced in the course of 

the next 7 years, meaning three regiments per year. 

Representatives of the S-400 manufacturer, AlmazAntey, assessed the current production capacities at 

two to three regiments a year.67

In the past, Almaz has experienced difficulty completing the state defense order for supply of S-400 systems. This, at least according to the official version, was 

what led to the surprise firing of Almaz chief designer 

Igor Ashurbeyli in February 2011.68 Lately, the company has been investing in new facilities. In May 2014, 

production started at a new building for S-300/S-400 

assembly at Almaz-Antey’s North-Western Regional 

Centre in St. Petersburg, with first batches planned to 

roll out by the end of 2014.69 But at the moment, it is 

safe to assume, as Almaz-Antey’s then-General Director Vladislav Menshchikov confirmed in 2012, that the 

State Arms Program 2011–20 exceeds the company’s 

existing capacity.70

Export to China.

In March 2014, the usually well-informed daily 

Kommersant reported that President Vladimir Putin 

had agreed “in principle” to the sale of S-400 systems 

to China. Talks are now being held on the number 

of systems and their cost, but even if specific agreements are reached, the Chinese armed forces will not 

be able to receive the complexes “earlier than 2016.”71

Given the apparently stretched production capacities 

of Almaz-Antey, this still seems to be an optimistic 

estimate.

China’s desire to acquire an unnamed number of 

S-400 battalions was reported unofficially for the first 
20

time in 2011. However, the Russian military predictably asserted that first they have to receive a sufficient 

number of the S-400 systems in their own inventory 

before the complex would be exported. Another objection was raised by Russia’s security services, which 

feared (quite justifiably) that the Chinese intended to 

copy the necessary technical elements of the system to 

create their own air defense weaponry on this basis. 

Supposedly, these problems have been resolved. 

An agreement between Russia and China on intellectual property rights in the arms trade has entered 

in force. According to Kommersant information, the 

delivery to China of two to four Triumf battalions is 

now being discussed, and the client’s main desire is to 

obtain complete information on the specifications and 

performance characteristics of the new complex.72

Defense experts are skeptical about the deal coming 

through until the requirements of the VKO and the air 

force are met. Even if the sale eventually takes place, 

it will certainly not include the newest long-range interceptors.73 The last Chinese-Russian contract involving advanced air defense systems was sealed in 2007. 

Under the terms of that contract, the Chinese armed 

forces received 15 S-300PMU2 battalions, which were 

supplied to protect the largest cities such as Beijing 

and Shanghai. The development of the S-300PMU2 

Favorit (NATO designation SA-20B Gargoyle), which 

was the last of the S-300P variants to carry the S-300P 

designation, was completed in 1997.74

The uncertain timeframe of the S-400 sale was 

confirmed by Sergey Ivanov, the Chief of Staff of the 

Russian Presidential Administration, and until 2007 

Russia’s first civilian defense minister. In July 2014, 

he remarked that if a contract were to be signed for 

China to buy the system, it would still take a number 
21

of years for the deal to be completed. Several other 

countries including Egypt, Kazakhstan, Belarus, Vietnam, Armenia, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Serbia have 

also expressed interest in purchasing the system.75

S-500 Triumfator M.

When the first reliable news about the development 

of the fifth-generation air defense system surfaced in 

2009, the S-500 Triumfator M (sometimes also designated as Prometheus) was supposed to be introduced 

in 2012.76 The latest projections by the Russian military and Almaz-Antey experts presume that system 

development will be completed in 2015, with the first 

battalion to be deployed a year later.77 This still seems 

to be a very optimistic estimate, given the fact that the 

S-400 experienced a 7-year delay in development.78

In contrast to the S-400, whose primary purpose 

was air defense, the S-500 is intended to be a fullfledged anti-ballistic missile (ABM) system.79 Rather 

than succeeding the S-400, it is intended to work in 

conjunction with it. While the S-400 is designed to defend against short- and medium-range missiles, the 

S-500 is designed to combat intercontinental ballistic 

missiles (ICBMs).80 In 2012, the system had completed 

the technical design phase and the estimated timeframe for its deployment was reported to be 2015–18.81

The exact specifications of the new airspace defense system remain classified, and the most detailed 

comment to date on the design philosophy and implementation have been observations made by Russian 

defense and industry officials in interviews. According to them, the S-500 is derived from the existing 

S-400 Triumf, but reduced in dimensions and more 

power-efficient. The choice of vehicles intended to 
22

carry the S-500 launchers, radars, command posts, 

and other electronic equipment suggests a highly mobile and survivable system, built for “hide, shoot and 

scoot” operations.82

Designed to intercept ballistic missiles at a height 

of up to 200 kilometers and a maximum range of 600 

kilometers, the system is expected to be able to shoot 

down up to ten incoming ballistic missiles simultaneously. It also has an extended radar range compared 

to the S-400.83 Russia’s Air Force Commander-in-Chief 

Lieutenant General Viktor Bondarev claimed that the 

S-500 will also have a response time of about three to 

four seconds, which is considerably shorter than the 

S-400, which is rated at nine to ten seconds.84

New S-500 Missiles.

What remains a source of speculation, however, 

is the kind of interception the S-500 missiles will 

use. One option is a nuclear blast because it can destroy “the entire cloud of incoming warheads with 

no need to determine true threats from dummies.”85

Most of the missiles in the S-300 and S-400 systems 

use high-explosive fragmentation warheads. Russia, however, is working on two new missiles that 

have been designed for the S-500 (and the S-400): the 

77N6-N and the 77N6-N1. They will be the first Russian missiles with inert warheads, which can destroy 

nuclear warheads by hitting them with precision at 

hypersonic speed (7-km per second).86 This would far 

outmatch even the American SM-3 block IIA missile, 

which is also currently under development and is to 

be deployed from 2018 onwards. The Block II has a 

projected maximum speed of roughly 4.5-km per 

second and enhanced capability to address interme-
23

diate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) and a limited 

capability to address ICBMs.87 However, it is not clear 

when the 77N6-N and the 77N6-N1 may enter service, 

given that facilities for their production are still in 

construction.88

Initially, two large factories in Kirov and Nizhniy Novgorod, the cost of which was estimated at 81 

billion rubles, were supposed to start production of 

77N6N and 77N6-N1 missiles “at the beginning of 

2014.”89 Latest reports suggest that the Kirov facility should begin production at the end of 2015, with 

full capacity utilization available in 2017.90 The Nizhniy Novgorod facility should be finished in 2016 and 

employ 3,500 people.91 Given these time frames, it is 

doubtful that the new generation hypersonic missiles 

will enter service any time soon. 

The absence of more advanced missiles in general is one of the major obstacles to fully equipping 

the VKO with modern systems. The missile shortage 

worsened after the production of the old S-300 was 

stopped completely, even for exports.92 This has also 

reflected workforce aging and the low replacement 

rates of production equipment. In 2008, Almaz-Antey 

agreed with the Defense Ministry on a plan for the 

company’s modernization, but, due to the financial 

crisis, those intentions never materialized. It took an 

intensive campaign calling for overhaul and refurbishment to induce the presidential administration to 

act. In February 2012, President Putin signed a Federal 

Targeted Program for the development of the defense 

industry to 2020, under which three trillion rubles 

were promised to the military-industrial complex for 

the modernization of its production facilities.93

Bottlenecks in missile production could cause further delay in the introduction of the S-500. The S-400 is 

already in operation and, therefore, any further delays 
24

in 40N6 missile production will set upgrades back still 

further. Unlike the S-400, the S-500 cannot employ 

missiles used in the S-300 family, which means that the 

range of the missiles suitable for the system is severely 

limited.94 There are already signs that additional delays are to be expected. At first, the State Armament 

Program 2011-20 projected purchases of 10 battalions 

of the S-500.95 At the end of 2013, the Commander of 

the VKO expected five batteries to be delivered by 

2020, with first batches arriving in “several years.”96

The results of throwing more money at the defense industry remain to be seen. As defense analyst 

Aleksandr Konovalov put it: 

The country’s leadership looks at the defense sector 

like a Coke machine. Put money in and get a bottle. 

Nothing is that simple with the domestic military-industrial complex, and investing a lot of money doesn’t 

guarantee getting production precisely on time. And 

the discussion about the S-500 is questionable; it’s possible it doesn’t even exist in drawings.97

Whether or not the system really exists and regardless of what its real capabilities are if it does, Russian 

senior officers are publicly confident about its performance, especially vis-à-vis American competitors. 

Thus, the former Commander of the VKO, Colonel 

General Oleg Ostapenko, claimed in 2012 that “the 

S-500 will be better than any similar U.S. system. The 

Americans have so far only hyped them up in the 

electronic media, but we already in effect have a real 

missile.” Declining to give the specifications and performance characteristics of the missile for the S-500, he 

said “until it flies, we do not talk about these things.”98
25

Missile (Russian) System (Russian) System (NATO) Missile Max Speed (m/s) Altitude (min) (m) Altitude (max) (m) Range (min) (km) Range (max) (km) Missile weight (kg) Warhead weight (kg) IOC

5V55K S-300PT SA-10A 2000 47 1480-1500 1335V55R S-300PS/PMU SA-10B 2000 25 25000 75 1665 196 19859M82 S-300V SA-12B 1800 30000 100 5800 150 19889M83 S-300V SA-12A 1800 75 5800 150 198848N6 S-300PM/PMU1 SA-20A 150 1800-1900 14348N6E S-300PM/PMU1 SA-20A 2100 150 199048N6E2 S-300PMU2 SA-20B 2100 200 1835 180 199948N6E3/DM S-400 SA-21 2100 250 1835 180 20099M82M S-300VM SA-23B 2600 30000 200 5800 150 20119M83M S-300VM SA-23A 1700 75 20119M96E S-400 SA-21 5 20000 1 409M96E2 S-400 SA-21 - 5 30000 1 120 2011-201240N6E S-400 SA-21 TBD 450 2011-201255R6M S-500

Table 2. Area Defense SAM Parameters.

Note: The data have been collated from a range of open sources and should therefore be treated as indicative of Russian claims rather than definitively accurate.
26

At Sea.

Russia is also working on naval versions of the 

S-400 and S-500, but their deployment seems also to 

be unlikely in the near future. According to a source 

from the military-industrial complex, the S-400F, the 

naval version of the S-400, was “practically ready” 

in 2012, but no information about its commissioning 

has yet appeared in open sources.99 The carriers of the 

systems were supposed to be the three mothballed nuclear-powered Kirov-class missile cruisers (the Admiral Nakhimov, Admiral Lazarev, and Admiral Ushakov), 

with 2020 given as the year of their reintroduction into 

service.100

After years of delays, the refit of the Admiral Nakhimov finally began at the beginning of 2014. The cruiser 

will be equipped with P-800 Oniks (SS-N-26) supersonic anti-ship cruise missiles, and the S-400 Triumf, 

along with other weapon systems designed to shoot 

down missiles and aircraft approaching the ship. The 

refit should be completed in 2018.101 The other missile 

cruisers, including the Pyotr Velikiy, the only Kirovclass ship active in service, are expected to be modernized as well, but no timeframes have been announced. 

In March 2013, the Navy reportedly decided to 

heavily modernize antisubmarine ships of the Project 1155 Fregat (NATO codename Udaloy) class and 

equip them with the Redut air defense system with 

interceptors from the S-400. A representative from the 

Northern Shipyards design bureau, which built the 

Project 1155 vessels and is among the front runners 

in the competition for modernization of Project 1155, 

said that: 

the first modernized big antisubmarine ship will appear not earlier than in 2016: development of the lead 
27

project will take about 18 months. After that the technical project of modernization will be retrofitted for 2 

to 4 years more.102

In February 2013, the Russian Navy approved a 

preliminary design for the largest naval ship to be 

built since 1989. According to the newspaper, Izvestia, 

the new ship will be armed with anti-ship missiles, 

cruise missiles, air defense and ballistic defense systems, including the S-500. However, no final decision 

about its construction has been made, and it will take 

2 to 3 years just to prepare technical documentation.103

Finally, the official designation for the naval version of 

the S-500 does not appear to have been made known 

publicly.

Moscow Defense System. 

Meanwhile, the A-135 Moscow missile defense system, which is also part of the VKO and became operational in 1989, is being modernized under the SamoletM program. Originally, the A-135 was deployed with 

two types of missiles capable of countering ballistic 

targets: the shorter-range 53T6 (NATO designation 

Gazelle) endo-atmospheric interceptor and the giant 51T6 (Gorgon) exo-atmospheric interceptor with 

a 350-km range.104 Both were silo-launched and used 

10 kiloton nuclear warheads to destroy their targets. 

Between 2005 and 2007, the 51T6 missiles were decommissioned. Among the probable reasons were the 

drawbacks of nuclear interception and the approaching end of the interceptors’ service life. This has left 

the remaining 68 53T6 missiles as the sole operational 

interceptors of the A-135 system.105 In 2007, financing 

for the project increased sharply. According to some 

sources, the missiles have had their nuclear warheads 
28

replaced with conventional explosives.106 Gazelles 

are regularly tested to prolong their permitted service lives, with the last known launch taking place in 

2012.107 In 2013, the command center and the powerful 

radar assigned to the A-135 system underwent software upgrades.108

Gazelle has a maximum range of 60-km and is capable of intercepting targets at an altitude between 

10 and 40-km. It can reach a speed of 5-km per second.109 VKO officers have enthusiastically praised the 

supposed high effectiveness of the A-135. According 

to Major General Andrei Dyomin, the Chief of Staff 

of the Air and Missile Defense Command, ballistic 

and air defense systems around the capital “can destroy 90% of targets in the event of a potential massive aerospace attack. This figure stands at 60% for the 

Central Industrial Region.”110 However, Dyomin did 

not elaborate on what a “massive aerospace attack” 

means and which part of it the A-135 is supposed to 

counter. Former Chief of the Strategic Missile Troops 

Main Staff Colonel General Viktor Yesin, noted since 

retirement for his off-message commentary, offered a 

more reserved estimate. According to him, the Moscow system, “once it has been made fully ready, can at 

best destroy several dozen intercontinental warheads 

targeting its coverage area.”111 Critics point to a lack of 

combat readiness, as the 53T6 nuclear warheads are 

believed to be stored separately from their delivDesignation 

(Russian)

Designation 

(NATO)

Missile Max 

Speed (m/s)

Apogee (km) Missile weight 

(kg)

Warhead 

51T6 SH-11 Gorgon 350 33,000 Nuclear

53T6 SH-08 Gazelle 5500 80 9693 HE (previously 

nuclear)

Table 3. Silo-Based Missiles.
29

ery vehicles. Reportedly, the warheads are mounted 

together only during the time of “serious military 

threat.”112 This “scandalous revelation, which according to some accounts bordered on treason,” was first 

made by none other than former General Director of 

Almaz-Antey Igor Ashurbeyli.113 As one Russian defense analyst put it, “even back in Soviet times, the 

system’s capability was so limited as to be unsuitable 

for defending against any serious strikes. At best it 

could cope with a few single ballistic missiles.”114

It remains to be seen what additional capabilities the A-235 Samolet-M modernization program 

will bring. According to latest available reports, the 

A-235, just like its predecessor, was designed and developed by the Novator company in Yekaterinburg. 

It is intended to be a fixed land-based ballistic missile 

defense system and its new interceptors, upgraded 

53T6 missiles with conventional as well as nuclear 

warheads, will probably utilize the presently mothballed 51T6 (Gorgon) silos. It should have a range 

of up to 100-km and an altitude of up to 30-km and 

should be able to counter “the fastest ICBMs currently 

in service.”115 The system will feature Russia’s first 

anti-missile to employ hit-to-kill technology, which 

will in all probability be its biggest limiting factor. 

Reservations about the high-precision, high-altitude 

kinetic intercept were expressed most prominently by 

Aleksandr Konovalov, the President of the Institute 

of Strategic Estimates, who stated that “it is doubtful 

that the designers of Novator have achieved such a 

remarkable result in the stratosphere.”116 That may 

well be true. Russia began work on the A-235 in 1997, 

and in 2011 the first test launches were conducted. The 

system should by now have become operational, but 

there appears to have been no mention of it in open 

sources since 2012. 
30

Prioritizing Missile Defense. 

Despite doubts over the delivery of actual capability, it is clear that Russia devotes significant attention 

and considerable resources to ballistic missile defense. 

Both the General Staff and the Kremlin consider capabilities in this branch indispensable for countering 

current and future threats. CGS Gerasimov stated in 

2013 that the center of gravity of combat operations is 

shifting from the spheres of land and sea to the aerospace and information spheres, and that it is impossible to safeguard national security without a reliable 

defense shield.117

Regional threats are important. Despite public 

rhetoric, Russia is well aware of, and worried about, 

the growing number of deployed ballistic missiles and 

nations operating them, all of them dangerously close 

to Russian borders. The most important proliferators include China and North Korea, with Pakistan, 

India, and Iran also possessing significant arsenals of 

theater-range ballistic missiles. Iran and North Korea 

are actively developing ballistic missiles with strategic 

reach. Due to its massive size, much of Russia’s territory is well within the reach of IRBMs and ICBMs 

launched from Iran, North Korea, and especially China.118 While Russia is not antagonistic toward any of 

these countries, it could be painfully vulnerable in any 

contingency. Sergey Ivanov touched upon the issue in 

May 2013: 

We are surrounded by a raging sea of threats and 

problems. These are Muslim fundamentalism, North 

Korea’s nuclear device, for sure, and also we have Iran 

that is developing its missile technology. I am not saying that they are our enemies, but we must take this all 

into consideration.119
31

He then pointed out a key difference in American and 

Russian threat perceptions regarding IRBMs: “They 

cannot reach America, but they can very well reach 

us.”120

 Another important factor contributing to Russia’s 

emphasis on BMD derives from the militarized nature 

of the Russian economy and society as a whole. Over 

the course of history, the country has developed an 

image of great-power status and prestige, which rests 

largely on its defense capabilities. The military-industrial complex is supposed to be both a source of pride 

and, notionally, an engine of progress, as described by 

President Putin in his pre-election treatise on national 

security: 

Sometimes they say the revival of the defense industry 

is a yoke for the economy, an extremely heavy burden 

that ruined the Soviet Union. I am convinced that is 

a profound mistake. . . . The renewal of the militaryindustrial complex will become a locomotive that will 

pull the development of various industries: metallurgy, mechanical engineering, the chemical and radioelectronic industries, the entire [information technology] and telecommunications range. . . . The task is 

to multiply Russia’s economic power, create an army 

and military-industrial complex that will secure Russia’s sovereignty, the respect of our foreign partners 

and lasting peace.121

In addition, arms manufacturing is one of the few 

industries in which Russia continues to demonstrate 

a level of success far surpassing its civilian industrial 

and technological achievements, and is able to compete in foreign markets. Russia has managed to maintain its position as the number two exporter of arms to 

the world. According to Centre for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies (CAST), the most successful 
32

businesses in the sector are aerospace and air defense 

companies.122 As the story with the Russian contract 

to deliver five battalions of the S-300 to Iran among 

others shows, arms exports in Russia’s case represent 

a powerful instrument of foreign policy. 

In terms of national pride, it is remarkable how 

regularly Russian officials present new weapon systems as the most sophisticated and capable in the 

world, and how particular comparisons are drawn 

with American rivals. Thus, Igor Ashurbeyli, the designer of Russia’s most advanced air defense weapons, describes their potential as if the arms race had 

never ended: “We are not overtaking someone, we 

are not lagging behind, and on the contrary, they [the 

United States] are attempting to overtake us.”123 The 

tone becomes patronizing when comparing the S-400 

and S-300 family with the Patriot systems: “Yes, they 

have followed our path, but let’s put it this way, they 

haven’t got so far.”124

In common with the almost mythic status of Russia’s nuclear deterrent,125 the importance of Russia’s 

air defense arsenal has over time become psychological.126 In order to retain its self-perceived great-power 

status, Russia needs capabilities, which can be portrayed as state-of-the-art, which in missile defense 

translates into the most sophisticated systems capable 

of destroying both IRBMs and ICBMs. 

This explains why recent Russian efforts in improving missile defense capabilities have only partly 

depended on developments and progress in similar 

U.S. efforts. Thus, in 2011, the heyday of the RussoAmerican reset, Russia’s Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin stated that Russia will build its national 

missile defense system “irrespective of what its Western partners will be doing in this field.” He conceded 
33

that Russia was “somewhat behind the U.S. in missile defense,” but added that serious efforts had been 

made in recent years to restore Russia’s parity in this 

area.127

Parity with the United States brings us to the most 

serious threat Russian missile defense is supposed to 

counter, other than irrelevance in the international 

arena; this is vulnerability to U.S. offensive potential. 

Russia views specific actions by the United States and 

NATO as threats to its security, and the establishment 

of a missile defense shield in Europe is at the top of the 

list. The Russian position was expressed by Vladimir 

Kozin, a member of an interagency working group attached to the Russian presidential administration discussing missile defense issues with NATO, and a leading researcher with the Russian Institute of Strategic 

Studies: “The only purpose of the U.S. missile defense 

equipment deployed in Europe is to destroy Russian 

intercontinental ballistic missiles.”128

Also, the Russian military has sometimes described 

the expansion of the VKO capabilities as a response to 

U.S. and NATO plans to establish missile defense infrastructure in Eastern Europe. Hence the oblique reference of Lieutenant General Oleg Ostapenko, former 

Commander-in-Chief of the VKO, who said the new 

Voronezh early warning radars represent “elements 

of the nuclear deterrence system. It is only natural 

that each new radar put into duty is an additional reason for the concerned parties [the U.S. and NATO] to 

think about their actions.”129

In the context of the limited plans for deployment 

of U.S. anti-missile systems, there have been doubts 

as to whether Russia’s senior leaders really view U.S. 

missile defense plans with such deep anxiety. But the 

official rhetoric has been consistent. President Putin 
34

openly described the annexation of Crimea as a preemptive step to foil NATO plans for missile defense in 

the Black Sea.

I’ll use this opportunity to say a few words about 

our talks on missile defense. This issue is no less, and 

probably even more important, than NATO’s eastward expansion. Incidentally, our decision on Crimea 

was partially prompted by this.

Needless to say, first and foremost we wanted to support the residents of Crimea, but we also followed 

certain logic: If we don’t do anything, Ukraine will be 

drawn into NATO sometime in the future. We’ll be 

told: ‘This doesn’t concern you,’ and NATO ships will 

dock in Sevastopol, the city of Russia’s naval glory.

But it isn’t even the emotional side of the issue. The 

point is that Crimea protrudes into the Black Sea, being in its center, as it were. However, in military terms, 

it doesn’t have the importance it used to have in the 

18th and 19th centuries—I’m referring to modern 

strike forces, including coastal ones.

But if NATO troops walk in, they will immediately 

deploy these forces there. Such a move would be geopolitically sensitive for us because, in this case, Russia 

would be practically ousted from the Black Sea area. 

We’d be left with just a small coastline of 450 or 600 

kilometers, and that’s it!130

Needless to say, the NATO ships in Sevastopol 

would include those equipped with SM-3 missiles and 

the ground forces would be “immediately” deployed 

with other pieces of missile defense infrastructure, 

including powerful radars. Russia believes the U.S. 

missile defense shield is “not a defensive system, but 

part of the offensive potential deployed far away from 
35

home.”131 The development of Russia’s missile defense capabilities is aimed at countering this offensive 

potential, if nothing else, by dissuading the adversary 

from believing a massive surprise attack could be 

successful. 

In assessing security threats, Russia has always 

placed greater emphasis on capabilities than on intentions. Thus, any country possessing capabilities that the 

Russian military cannot counter represents an alarming threat. In addition, Russian officials themselves 

ascribe this line of reasoning to their American counterparts. State Duma Deputy and Defense Committee 

Member Aleksandr Tarnayev, who also happens to 

be a former communications officer and KGB military 

counterintelligence operative, wrote for bimonthly 

defense-industrial journal Vozdushno-Kosmicheskaya 

Oborona: 

In politics agreements are observed as long as they 

are favorable to the strong side. There is no other such 

country in the world except Russia with the potential of ensuring guaranteed destruction of the United 

States. That is why the Americans are preparing to 

fight specifically against us. They have clearly written 

in corresponding documents that we are their Enemy 

No 1, and not partners, friends, or comrades.132

Devising weapon systems capable of countering 

the American threat, therefore, is only natural as the 

Russian side always expects the worst from other 

countries. The fact that the expansion of the VKO is 

to a large extent aimed at countering the U.S. offensive potential was confirmed by the Russian president himself. When visiting one of the facilities for 

manufacturing air defense missiles in June 2013, he 

observed: “Effective airspace defense is the guarantee 
36

of strategic nuclear deterrent forces’ survivability and 

our country’s protection against attacks by the airspace systems.”133 The reference to the United States is 

clear: only the United States is capable of threatening 

the survivability of Russia’s strategic nuclear forces 

and no other country possesses offensive airspace 

systems.

But a closer examination of Russian declarations on strategic deterrence reveals additional complexities. In his 2012 pre-election campaign article, 

President Putin wrote: 

We can guarantee against upsetting the global balance 

of power either by creating our own very expensive 

and as yet not very effective missile defense system, 

or, much more productively, by ensuring our capability to penetrate any missile defense system and protect 

Russia’s retaliation potential.134

This statement is worth dissecting in greater detail. It appears to be a recognition that it is cheaper 

and more efficient to attempt to maintain what Russia 

sees as strategic balance by designing missiles capable 

of penetrating the U.S. missile defense shield, than 

by committing trillions of rubles to projects aimed 

at reliably protecting millions of square kilometers 

and hundreds of locations from massive missile attacks. But Russia appears to be following both logics 

simultaneously. 

From its earliest days, critics of U.S. missile defense systems have noted that Russia—and other 

adversaries—would be prompted to invest in inexpensive (in relative terms) countermeasures to defeat 

missile interceptors.135 This is precisely what Russia 

has proceeded to do. Russian Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin recently described Russia’s test 
37

of an advanced road-mobile ICBM, called the RS-26 

Rubezh, as a “missile defense killer.”136 According to 

Russian news reports, the missile flight test involved 

three dummy warheads designed to defeat defenses. 

But if building Russian missile defenses is “expensive” and “not very effective” against U.S. nuclear 

ballistic missiles, which have always been considered 

the greatest threat to Russian strategic retaliation capability, why is Russia pushing ahead with investment in anti-missile systems? Leading defense analyst Alexei Arbatov thinks the main task for Russian 

airspace defense is to protect the country’s strategic 

nuclear forces from U.S. offensive systems of a different kind, namely long-range conventional precisionguided weapons.137 Russian defense commentators 

suggest that this threat consists currently of subsonic 

sea-launched and air-launched cruise missiles, which 

the S-400 can neutralize effectively. But the situation 

will change with the introduction of more advanced 

systems currently in development under the umbrella 

of the Prompt Global Strike (PGS) program. 

The U.S. PGS program seeks to develop hypersonic 

and other conventional and nuclear weapons capable 

of attacking any location on earth within an hour. Elements of the U.S. system are supposed to be fielded 

in the next 10 to 15 years. They include boost-glide 

systems with hypersonic re-entry vehicles, which can 

follow an unpredictable trajectory and could be extremely hard to detect sufficiently in advance—that is, 

early enough to launch a retaliatory strike.138

According to Arbatov, “Russian authorities now 

consider these weapons, and not the U.S. missile defense systems, to be the main high-tech threat,” since 

in this area “Russia has the biggest technology gap to 

close.”139 Indeed, senior Russian officers consistently 
38

highlight the danger of a massive and paralyzing 

instantaneous air and missile strike,140 and exercise 

scenarios are beginning to practice against this eventuality.141 According to former chief of the Russian General Staff’s Main Operations Directorate LieutenantGeneral Andrey Tretyak: 

VKO is a response to the possibility of all campaigns 

being in air and space and not reaching the ground 

operations stage. . . . [they could assure] victory 

through supremacy in the air, space, and information 

domains—so VKO is a deterrent. If an opponent is 

more technologically advanced, he must risk suffering 

unacceptable damage to prevent aggression.142

This concern emphasizes still further the Russian preoccupation with preventing threats to deterrent potential: in this context, “the declining role of 

nuclear deterrence, to which Russian authorities give 

such a prominent part, must look like an alarming 

prospect.”143 It should not therefore be a surprise that 

Vladimir Kozin, in his role as member of an interagency working group attached to the Russian presidential 

administration discussing missile defense issues with 

NATO, complains that the:

Americans completely exclude from the negotiations 

such important non-nuclear weapons as anti-missile 

systems, anti-satellite weapons and high-precision capabilities that could perform lightning strikes in any 

part of the world.144

At the February 28, 2014, annual session of the 

Non-departmental Expert Council on VKO Problems, 

Igor Ashurbeyli declared with his characteristic outspokenness, “We stand idle, bound by international 
39

treaties about a ‘peaceful space’ which no one observes, except for us. The militarization of space is inevitable. What’s more, it is vitally needed.”145 The start 

of tests of hypersonic missiles by China as well will 

only make the Russian headache worse.

146

From this perspective, building up missile defense 

systems as well as enhancing the survivability of offensive missiles could appear to be a prudent insurance 

policy. This was confirmed by two senior officers from 

the Russian General Staff Academy in 2012. Speaking at NATO Defense College in Rome, they told the 

audience that Russian missile defense is a “military 

response to a new threat for the medium- and longterm forecasts over decades—all possibilities. The task 

is not to allow the worst case scenario to develop.”147

CONCLUSION 

Over the last 8 years, Russia has significantly modernized its air defense systems, expanding them geographically and making them more versatile, mobile, 

and effective. The interceptors introduced in this period, mainly on the S-400 platform, give Russia the capability to counter a wide range of missile threats up 

to and including IRBMs in some of the most important 

and/or vulnerable parts of its territory. 

Further improvement and geographical expansion 

of air defense capabilities will depend on the ability of 

arms manufacturers to deal with increased demands of 

the State Armament Program. One of the main bottlenecks—the design, production, and troubleshooting 

of the newest long-range interceptors—significantly 

restricts the operational range of the S-400 by denying it the intended long-range interceptors, and will 

in all probability cause still further substantial delays 
40

in introducing the S-500. The commissioning of this 

system before 2020 is unlikely.

If published figures are to be believed, the S-400 

represents the apex of current air defense capabilities, 

and is in many respects more capable than the U.S. 

Patriot series. However, comparisons with THAAD 

and SM-3 missiles could be misleading, as these systems were developed solely for the purpose of missile 

defense and their design follows an entirely different 

philosophy. Russia’s goal is to protect its territory 

from within its borders, using a multilayered shield 

of several complementary systems, including, but not 

limited to, the S-400 and the S-500. The United States 

is focusing heavily on countering ballistic missiles in 

various stages of their flight, which requires a missile 

defense shield of global reach and presence. 

According to open sources and statements by Russian officials, Russian ultra-long-range interceptors, 

which are still in development, should offer better 

performance than their American rivals and should 

be able to counter ICBMs. However, many experts 

doubt their stated ability to neutralize nuclear warheads at high altitudes using high-precision hit-to-kill 

technology. 

Nevertheless, entirely predictably, Russian officials and servicemen portray their air defense systems, whether commissioned or still in development, 

as being the best in the world. This derives from the 

fact that assertions of this kind significantly contribute to Russia’s much vaunted great-power status, 

competitiveness on the global arms market, and, in 

Russian eyes, the flourishing of the Russian economy. 

This, together with the increasing threat of ballistic 

missile proliferation along the long perimeter of Russia’s southern borders, is one of the reasons why the 
41

enhancement of Russia’s air defense capabilities is 

not a direct and symmetrical response to U.S. missile 

defense deployments in Europe. 

The capabilities of the new VKO, built around 

the S-400 and other systems, can hardly protect Russian retaliatory capability, let alone the entire strategic forces, as nearly half of the S-400 regiments are 

currently stationed near Moscow where no strategic 

forces are based. The Russian missile defense shield 

is “expensive” and “not very effective” at best and a 

“myth” at worst. Its main raison d’être is to serve as 

a deterrent against a single more technologically advanced rival, who seeks the capability to destroy any 

target anywhere in the world within an hour. 

Within the Russian understanding of strategic stability, future planned VKO assets could be considered 

a stabilizing factor, since they could eventually make 

a first disarming strike impractical. But the Russian 

narrative has not developed to include reasonable 

explanations such as this. Instead, superficial arguments (for example, that the VKO system is less immoral than U.S. BMD because it is built within Russia 

and does not approach toward U.S. borders) are being 

repeated as mantras.148

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 

The military implications of Russia devoting huge 

investment specifically to countering U.S. plans for 

strike capabilities are obvious, and it is to be hoped 

that the intended results are already the subject of intensive study by the U.S. intelligence community. But 

in addition to the purely technical realm of capability, Russian missile defense developments provide a 

political opportunity for the United States to mitigate 
42

some of the transactional costs of Russian opposition 

to the U.S. deployment of anti-missile systems. 

Russian plans for the introduction of enhanced 

ABM capabilities have a much more nebulous timescale than the declared schedule for EPAA. Prior 

experience of development setbacks for the S-500 

program—including the original flight test date passing by before construction of the production facilities 

had even started—together with known overloading 

of Almaz-Antey’s production capacity suggest that 

it will be some time before the long-promised S-500 

actually appears in the flesh. 

But regardless of the actual state of real-life capabilities, Russian declaratory policy provides U.S. policymakers with significant material to develop an approach intended to mitigate Russian obstructionism 

over EPAA and U.S. plans for BMD more broadly. Put 

simply, Russian complaints at the dangerous U.S. irresponsibility of introducing new anti-missile capabilities ring hollow when Russia is forging ahead with its 

own program to do precisely the same. If the performance and capabilities claimed for new Russian systems are accurate, they pose at least as great a threat to 

deterrence as do SM-3s. 

The paradox was pointed out by Roberto Zadra, 

Head of the BMD Section of NATO’s Defense Investment Division, at the Royal United Services Institute 

(RUSI) Missile Defense Conference in June 2013. Zadra 

reversed the Russian argument of missile defense being a dangerous threat to strategic stability, and asked 

rhetorically why there was no NATO discussion of 

planned S-500 systems as a similar threat. By applying 

the same logic, he asked, how could the S-500 be anything other than destabilizing—all the more so since 

its proposed capabilities are so highly classified?149
43

U.S. officials have repeatedly attempted to allay 

Russian concerns over the potential for EPAA and its 

predecessor systems to compromise Russian strategic 

deterrence. These attempts have foundered on Russian concerns, some of which appear disingenuous, 

but others of which are genuinely rooted in an entirely different Russian approach to the purpose and 

status of nuclear weapons.150 Despite the current hiatus in relations, opportunities for meaningful dialog 

with Russia on missile defense will arise again in the 

future. At that point, U.S. representatives should be 

fully informed on the scope and ambition of Russia’s 

own missile defense programs. This will allow them 

not only to rebut some of the more facile Russian accusations, but also to counter some persistent Russian 

arguments relating to strategic balance. 

In brief, discussion of Russian capabilities should 

be an integral part of future conversations with Russia 

on the deployment of U.S. and allied BMD assets. 

ENDNOTES

1. A theme explored in detail in Keir Giles, “The State of the 

NATO-Russia Reset,” Shrivenham, UK: Conflict Studies Research 

Centre, September 2011.

2. For full details, see Keir Giles, European Missile Defense and 

Russia, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War 

College, July 2014.

3. “Experts Baffled by Profusion of Russian Missile Projects,” 

BBC Monitoring, January 24, 2014.

4. “Russia Offers Pyramid Radar for Missile Defense,” RIA 

Novosti, May 4, 2012.

5. A good account of the history of missile defense can be 

found in Bertel Heurlin and Sten Rynning, eds., Missile De-
44

fence: International, Regional and National Implications, New York: 

Routledge, 2005.

6. For more on this, see Keir Giles, Russian Military Transformation: Goal in Sight? Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. 

Army War College, June 2014.

7. Alexei Arbatov, “Strategic Dialogue: A Change of Priorities,” Moscow, Russia: Carnegie Moscow Center, December 10, 

2013, available from carnegie.ru/2013/12/10/strategic-dialoguechange-of-priorities. 

8. Alexander Khramchikhin, “Vozdushno-Kosmicheskaya Oborona kak Vozmozhnost” (“Air-Space Defense as an Opportunity”), 

Nezavisimoe Voyennoe Obozrenie, No. 11, March 4, 2013, p. 3, available from nvo.ng.ru/concepts/2011-03-04/1_oborona.html.

9. Alexander Stukalin, “Russian Air and Space Defense 

Troops: Gaping Holes,” Moscow Defense Brief, May 2012.

10. “New Russian Air Defense System to Detect Missiles at 

Blastoff,” RIA Novosti, July 10, 2013.

11. Cited in Bill Gertz, “Putin’s Power Play: Russia Builds Up 

Missile Systems, Seeks to Limit U.S. Defenses,” The Washington 

Free Beacon, May 16, 2013, available from www.washingtontimes.

com/news/2013/may/16/putins-power-play-russia-building-missilesystems-/. See also Giles, European Missile Defense. 

12. “Russia’s Aerospace Defense Forces Go on Duty to Stave 

Off Threats,” RIA Novosti, December 1, 2011.

13. Keir Giles, Russian Military Transformation—Goal in Sight, 

Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 

May 2014, p. 13.

14. Alexander Stukalin, “Russian Air and Space Defense 

Troops: Gaping Holes,” Moscow Defense Brief, May 2012. 

15. Private conversations with author, November 2012. 
45

16. “Structure,” Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, available from eng.mil.ru/en/structure/forces/cosmic/

structure.htm.

17. Alexander Stukalin, “Russian Air and Space Defense Troops: Gaping Holes,” Moscow Defense Brief, May 2012; 

“Structure,” Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation.

18. Stukalin, “Russian Air and Space Defense Troops: 

Gaping Holes.” 

19. Alexei Arbatov and Vladimir Dvorkin, “Voyennaya 

reforma Rossii: sostoyaniye i perspektivy” (Russia’s Military Reform: Status and Prospects), Moscow, Russia: Carnegie Centre, 

2013, p. 71. 

20. Aleksandr Tarnayev, “Kto zashchitit nashe nebo” (“Who 

Will Protect Our Sky”), Voyenno-promyshlennyy kuryer, August 21, 

2013, available from www.vpk-news.ru/articles/17139. 

21. Lieutenant General Andrey Tretyak, speaking at NATO 

Defense College, Rome, Italy, November 27, 2012.

22. “Aerospace Defence Forces,” Moscow, Russia: Ministry of 

Defense of the Russian Federation.

23. Keir Giles and Andrew Monaghan, Russian Military Transformation—Goal in Sight, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 

U.S. Army War College, May 2014, p. 22.

24. Jaroslaw Adamowski, “Russia to Boost Aerospace Forces, 

Overhaul Structure,” Defense News, May 25, 2014, available from 

www.defensenews.com/article/20140525/DEFREG01/305250015/

Russia-Boost-Aerospace-Forces-Overhaul-Structure. 

25. Ibid.

26. Sergey Yagolnikov, “Stroit VKO poetapno” (“VKO Should 

be Built Gradually”), Voyenno-promyshlennyy kuryer, March 12, 

2014, available from www.vpk-news.ru/articles/19444. 
46

27. Roger N. McDermott, “Russia’s Aerospace Defense 

Forces: Organizational Chaos—Analysis,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, 

September 3, 2013, available from www.jamestown.org/single/?no_

cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=41304&tx_ttnews[backPid]=7&cHash=

7bf9a5fdb49ccb849dc4af22643c7a6d#.U-4G52ND2lb. 

28. Information from company website, available from www.

almaz-antey.ru/en/about/.

29. “Defense News Top 100 for 2013,” Defense News, July 

22, 2013, available from special.defensenews.com/top-100/charts/

rank_2013.php, accessed on August 6, 2014.

30. Elena Kiseleva and Ivan Safronov, “PVO i PRO usilivayut tyazhelovesom” (“Anti-Missile and Anti-Aircraft Defense Is 

Strengthened by a Heavyweight”), Kommersant, June 24, 2014, 

available from www.kommersant.ru/doc/2497923, accessed on 

September 1, 2014.

31. “Sectoral Sanctions Identifications List,” Washington, DC: 

U.S. Department of Treasury, July 29, 2014, available from www.

treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/SDN-List/Pages/ssi_list.aspx.

32. Matthew Dalton, “EU Places Sanctions on Russian Oligarchs,” The Wall Street Journal, July 30, 2014, available from online.

wsj.com/articles/eu-places-sanctions-on-russian-oligarchs-1406749975.

33. “U.S. Sanctions Not to Impact Almaz-Antei Concern 

Operations,” Interfax-AVN, July 17, 2014.

34. “Interviyu s izvestnym oboronschikom i uchyonnym Igorem 

Ashurbeili” (“Interview with Well-Known Arms Designer and Scientist Igor Ashurbeyli”), RBK, September 9, 2013, available from 

presscentr.rbc.ru/interview/2013/09/09/1238/. 

35. Märta Carlsson, Johan Norberg, and Frederik Westerlund, 

“Military Capability of Russia’s Armed Forces in 2013,” Russian 

Military Capability in a Ten-Year Perspective—2013, Stockholm, 

Sweden: FOI, December 2013, p. 31. 

36. “Early warning,” Pavel Podvig, ed., Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, January 30, 2004, available from russianforces.org/sprn/. 
47

37. “Russia Begins Construction of New Anti-Missile Radar,” 

RIA Novosti, August 13, 2013. 

38. “Russia Has Best Missile Defense Radars—Senior 

Official,” RIA Novosti, August 2, 2013.

39. Pavel Podvig, “Unexpected dangers,” Russian Strategic 

Nuclear Forces, October 7, 2013, available from russianforces.org/

podvig/2013/10/unexpected_dangers.shtml. 

40. “Russia Activates Aerospace Defense Radar Aimed at 

Europe,” RIA Novosti, December 9, 2013.

41. “New Russian Air Defense System to Detect Missiles at 

Blastoff,” RIA Novosti, July 10, 2013.

42. Carlo Kopp, “Almaz S-300P/PT/PS/PMU1/PMU2/

Almaz-Antey S-400 Triumf/SA-10/20/21 Grumble/Gargoyle. 

Technical Report APA-TR-2006-1201,” Air Power Australia, 

April 2012, available from www.ausairpower.net/APA-GrumbleGargoyle.html. 

43. Ibid.

44. Carlo Kopp, “Evolving Technological Strategy in Advanced Air Defense Systems,” Joint Force Quarterly, Vol. 57, 

2010, p. 91.

45. Carlo Kopp, “Almaz-Antey S-500 Triumfator M. Self Propelled Air/Missile Defence System/SA-X-NN. Technical Report 

APA-TR-2011-0602,” Air Power Australia, April 2012, available 

from www.ausairpower.net/APA-S-500-Triumfator-M.html.

46. “S-400. Self-Propelled Surface-To-Air Missiles, Russian 

Federation,” Jane’s Land-Based Air Defence, December 21, 2012. 

47. “THAAD,” Encyclopedia Astronautica, available from webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:BLQsfe2L43wJ:www.

astronautix.com/lvs/thaad.htm.

48. Adrian Ochsenbein, “Das Boden-Luft Lenkwaffensystem 

SA-21 GROWLER” (“The Surface-to-Air-Missile System SA-21 
48

Growler”), Washington, DC: Defense Threat Informations Group, 

January 2014, available from www.dtig.org/docs/SA-21.pdf.

49. Ibid.

50. Raketu dalnego radiusa deystviya dlya S-400 sozdadut v 2012 

godu (Long-Range Missile for S-400 Will be Built in 2012), Voyennoye 

obozreniye, February 13, 2012, available from topwar.ru/11220-

raketu-dalnego-radiusa-deystviya-dlya-s-400-sozdadut-v-2012-

godu.html.

51. “Krepost/Redut-K/Redut-Poliment (9M96/9M100),” 

Jane’s Weapon Systems: Naval, December 17, 2012. 

52. Ochsenbein, “Das Boden-Luft Lenkwaffensystem SA-21 

GROWLER.”

53. “The European Phased Adaptive Approach at a Glance,” 

Washington, DC: Arms Control Association, May 2013, available 

from https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Phasedadaptiveapproach.

54. “New S-400 Long-Range Missile Ready For Service—

Official,” RIA Novosti, June 28, 2012.

55. “Military Magazine Looks at Ukraine’s Anti-aircraft 

Missile Weapons,” BBC Monitoring, July 10, 2012. 

56. “Godovoy otchyot OAO MMZ Avangard za 2012 god” (“OAO 

MMZ Avangard Annual Report 2012”), June 17, 2013, available 

from www.disclosure.ru/issuer/7743065177/.

57. “Zvyozdnye Voyny: Voyska VKO lish chastichno gotovi obespechit bezopasnost Rossii” (“Star Wars: Aerospace Defense Troops 

Only Partially Ready to Ensure Russia’s Security”), Nasha Versiya, 

June 9, 2014, available from versia.ru/articles/2014/jun/09/zvezdnye_

voynye.

58. “Rossiyskie voyska nachnut poluchat po tri polka S-400 v god” 

(“Russian Forces Will Get Three S-400 Regiments a Year”), Voyennyy informator, September 14, 2013, available from www.militaryinformant.com/index.php/army/3636-1.html; “Russia deploys S-400 

air defense regiment near Moscow,” Xinhua, March 17, 2014. 
49

59. “Voyska VKO poluchat novye kompleksy” (“VKO Forces 

Will Get New S-400 Systems”), Voyennoe Obozrenie, March 26, 

2014, available from topwar.ru/42382-voyska-vko-poluchat-novyekompleksy.html. 

60. Stukalin, “Russian Air and Space Defense Troops: 

Gaping Holes.” 

61. “Russia deploys S-400 air defense system in Far East,” RIA 

Novosti, August 28, 2009.

62. “Chetvertyy polk S-400 zastupit na boevoe dezhurstvo v Nakhodke” (“Fourth S-400 Regiment Will Be Commissioned in Nakhodka”), RIA Novosti, August 15, 2012. 

63. “Tikhookeanskyy flot nachal letnyy period obuchenia” (“The 

Pacific Fleet Began the Summer Exercise Period”), Moscow, Russia: The Russian Ministry of Defense, June 2, 2014, available from 

flot.com/news/navy/index.php?ELEMENT_ID=166522.

64. “Baltic Fleet Receives S-400 Air Defense Missile Systems,” 

rusnavy.com, April 9, 2012, available from rusnavy.com/news/navy/

index.php?ELEMENT_ID=14816.

65. “Zenitno-raketnyy polk YUVO VVS Rossii poluchil na vooruzhenie kompleks S-400 Triumf” (“Anti-Aircraft Regiment of the Russian Air Force in the Southern Military District Received S-400 

Triumf in Its Arsenal”), TV Zvezda, December 22, 2012, available 

from tvzvezda.ru/news/forces/content/201212221329-i9ct.htm. 

66. “Minoborony raskakazalo o planach zakupki zenitnych kompleksov S-500” (“Defense Ministry Talks about Plans to Buy S-500 

Missile Systems”), Lenta.ru, February 24, 2011, available from 

lenta.ru/news/2011/02/24/s500/. 

67. “Rossiyskie voyska nachnut poluchat po tri polka S-400 v god” 

(“Russian Forces Will Get Three S-400 Regiments a Year”), Voyennyy informator, September 14, 2013, available from www.militaryinformant.com/index.php/army/3636-1.html. 

68. Sergey Konovalov, “Vozdushno-Kosmicheskaya Paradigma” (“Aerospace Paradigm”), Nazavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie, 
50

January 30, 2012, available from nvo.ng.ru/wars/2012-01-30/2_

paradigma.html.

69. “Russia: Vityaz SAM in Production 2015; New S-300/400 

SAM Production Site,” Interfax-AVN, May 14, 2014. 

70. Aleksey Nikolskiy, “Rakety izgotovleny, zhdyom vykhoda 

v more” (“Missiles Have Been Manufactured, We Are Waiting to 

Go to Sea”), Vedomosti, May 2012, available from www.vedomosti.

ru/newspaper/article/280533/rakety_izgotovleny_zhdem_vyhoda_v_

more_vladislav_menschikov.

71. Ivan Safronov, “Moskva podelitsya Triumfom s Pekinom. 

Kitai mozhet stat pervym pokupatelem rossiyskikh komplexov S-400” 

(“China May Be First Buyer of Russian S-400 Complexes: Moscow 

Will Share Triumf with Beijing”),” Kommersant, March 28, 2014, 

available from www.kommersant.ru/doc/2439430.

72. Ibid.

73. Interviews with members of the Czech defense 

community.

74. Kopp, “Almaz-Antey S-300PMU2 Favorite Self Propelled 

Air Defence System/SA-20 Gargoyle, Technical Report APATR-2009-0502.” 

75. “China may be first buyer of Russian S-400 missile defense 

system,” Want China Times, July 14, 2014, available from www.

wantchinatimes.com/news-subclass-cnt.aspx?id=20140714000069&c

id=1101. 

76. “Russia to revamp air-space defenses by 2020 - Air Force 

chief,” RIA Novosti, August 11, 2009. 

77. “Russian Armed Forces Will Start Deploying S-500 New 

Long-Range Air Defense Missile System in 2016,” Army Recognition, August 10, 2014, available from www.armyrecognition.

com/august_2014_global_defense_security_news_uk/russian_armed_

forces_will_start_deploying_s-500_new_long-range_air_defense_

missile_system_in_2016_10.html.
51

78. Ochsenbein, “Das Boden-Luft Lenkwaffensystem SA-21 

GROWLER.”

79. “Pervye S-500 mogut postupit v rossiyskie voyska v 2013 

godu” (“The First S-500 systems May Be Supplied to the Russian 

Troops in 2013”), Vzglyad, June 27, 2012, available from vz.ru/

news/2012/6/27/585719.html.

80. “S-400,” Jane’s Land/Based Air Defense, December 21, 

2012, section Self-Propelled Surface-To-Air-Missiles; “S-500 

Prometheus,” Missile Threat, April 26, 2013, available from

missilethreat.com/defense-systems/s-500/; Mark B. Schneider and 

Peter Huessy, “Russian Deployment of Missile Defenses. Hidden in Plain Sight,” New York: Gatestone Institute, February 18, 

2013, available from www.gatestoneinstitute.org/3590/russia-missiledefense.

81. Robert Wall, “Russia Ramps Up For Fielding S-500 Defense System,” Aerospace Daily & Defense Report, Vol. 242, No. 10: 

1, April 2012.

82. Kopp, “Almaz-Antey S-500 Triumfator M. Self Propelled 

Air/Missile Defence System/SA-X-NN. Technical Report APATR-2011-0602.”

83. “Russian Armed Forces Will Start Deploying S-500 New 

Long-Range Air Defense Missile System in 2016.”

84. “Russia to Put First S-500s in Service in 2013,” Xinhua General News Service, June 27, 2012; “Pervye S-500 mogut postupit v rossiyskie voyska v 2013 godu”.

85. Pavel Felgenhauer, “Moscow’s BMD Cooperation Demands Do Not Seem Serious,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, Vol. 8, No. 

111, June 9, 2011, available from www.jamestown.org/single/?no_

cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=38030.

86. Andrei Kislyakov, “Russia to Roll Out New Hypersonic Missiles,” Russia & India Report, December 18, 2012, available from in.rbth.com/articles/2012/12/18/russia_to_roll_out_new_

hypersonic_missiles_21107.html.
52

87. “The European Phased Adaptive Approach at a Glance.” 

88. Aleksey Mikhaylov, “Plants to Manufacture Hypersonic 

Missiles to Cost R81 Billion. Defense Ministry Will Construct Two 

Major Plants to Supply Projectiles for Surface-to-Air Missile Complexes—One in Kirov and One in Nizhniy Novgorod,” Izvestia, 

BBC Worldwide Monitoring, November 28, 2012.

89. Ibid.

90. “Raketnyy zavod koncerna PVO Almaz-Antey v Kirove 

sdadut v ekspluatatsyu do konca 2015 goda” (“Almaz-Antey Concern’s Missile Factory Will Start Producing by the End of 2015”), 

Lenta novostey N. Novgorod, available from www.kommersant.ru/

doc/2484131. 

91. “Stoimost stroitelstva novovo zavoda koncerna PVO AlmazAntey v Nizhnem Novgorode sostavit 45 miliard rubley” (“The New 

Almaz-Antey Concern’s Factory in Nizhny Novgorod Will Cost 

45 Billion Rubles”), NIA N. Novgorod, August 6, 2014, available 

from www.niann.ru/?id=458048. 

92. Kislyakov, “Russia to Roll Out New Hypersonic Missiles.” 

93. Vasiliy Sychev, “Bolshe polnomochyy” (“More Authority”), Lenta.ru, November 29, 2012, available from lenta.ru/

articles/2012/11/29/vpk/.

94. Mikhaylov; “Pervye S-500 mogut postupit v rossiyskie voyska 

v 2013 godu.” 

95. Valeriy Ivanov, “Valeriy Ivanov on VKO, S-500, S-400,” 

Russian Defense Policy, July 24, 2011.

96. “Komanduuschyy voyskami VKO: osobennye nadezhdy vozlagaem na sistemu S-500” (“Commander of the VKO Forces: We Pin 

Big Hopes on the S-500”), RIA Novosti, November 28, 2013. 

97. Cited in “Those Air Defense Missile Factories,” Russian 

Defense Policy, December 1, 2012, available from russiandefpolicy.

wordpress.com/2012/12/01/those-air-defense-missile-factories/. 
53

98. “S-500 system on schedule, better than U.S. ones—Russian Aerospace Defence Chief,” Interfax-AVN, BBC Monitoring 

Former Soviet Union, September 5, 2012.

99. “Pervye S-500 mogut postupit v rossiyskie voyska v 2013 godu.” 

100. Ilya Kramnik, “Starye kreysera prevratyat v atomnykh ubiyts” (“Old Cruisers Will Be Turned into Nuclear Killers”), Izvestia, 

September 20, 2011, available from izvestia.ru/news/501209.

101. “Russia Begins Nuclear-Powered Missile Cruiser Overhaul,” RIA Novosti, January 24, 2014. 

102. Denis Telmanov and Aleksei Mikhailov, “Rossiya moderniziruyet stariy antipiratskiy flot” (“Russia Will Modernize Its 

Old Anti-Pirate Fleet”), Izvestia, March 20, 2013, available from

izvestia.ru/news/546972.

103. Aleksei Mikhailov and Dmitri Balburov, “Rossiya sozdaet 

samiy krupniy posle 1989 goda korabl” (“Russia Will Build Its Biggest Ship Since 1989”), Izvestia, February 13, 2013, available from 

izvestia.ru/news/544787.

104. “A30 (SH08 ’Gazelle’),” Jane’s Strategic Weapons Systems, January 22, 2012.

105. Ruslan Pukhov, “Joint Missile Defense Is Limited to Data 

Sharing,” The Moscow Times, May 3, 2012, available from www.

themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/joint-missile-defense-is-limited-todata-sharing/457902.html. 

106. Sean O’Connor, “Russian/Soviet Anti/Ballistic Missile 

Systems. Technical Report APA-TR-2009-1203,” Air Power Australia, April 2012, available from www.ausairpower.net/APA-RusABM-Systems.html. 

107. “Russia Tests Short-Range Interceptor Missile,” RIA Novosti, October 12, 2012.

108. “Early Warning,” Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces, available from russianforces.org/sprn/.
54

109. Andrey Mikhailov, “Mnogokanalnyy strelbovyy kompleks 

Amur-P” (“Multichannel Missile System Amur-P”), VozdushnoKosmicheskaya Oborona, May 28, 2011, available from www.vko.ru/

vuzy-i-poligony/mnogokanalnyy-strelbovyy-kompleks-amur-p.

110. “New Missile Defense Technologies Could Appear in 

Russia—Deputy Defense Minister,” Russia & CIS Defense Industry 

Weekly, Space and Rocket Building edition, December 11, 2012.

111. “Russian Aerospace Defense Not up to Its Task—Senior 

General,” Interfax-AVN, November 28, 2012.

112. Ruslan Pukhov, “Joint Missile Defense Is Limited to 

Data Sharing.”

113. Sergey Smirnov, “Moskva bezzaschitnaya” (“Moscow Is 

Defenseless”), Gazeta.ru, August 15, 2011, available from www.

gazeta.ru/politics/2011/08/15_a_3733805.shtml. Ashurbeili noted the 

A-135 system is essentially useless in its current state. 

114. Stukalin, “Russian Air and Space Defense Troops: 

Gaping Holes.” 

115. Aleksei Mikhailov, “Protivoraketnyj schit Moskvy ukrepitsya Gazelyami” (“Moscow’s Anti-missile Shield Will Be Reinforced with Gazelles”), Izvestia, December 12, 2012, available from 

izvestia.ru/news/541289.

116. Ibid.

117. Yuriy Gavrilov, “Genshtab ocenil ugrozy. Voennye podgotovili plan oborony Rossii do 2020 goda” “(The General Staff Has Assessed Threats. The Military Have Prepared a Plan for Russia’s 

Defense Through 2020”), Rossiyskaya Gazeta, February 14, 2013, 

available from www.rg.ru/2013/02/14/oborona-site.html. 

118. Kopp, “Almaz-Antey S-500 Triumfator M. Self Propelled 

Air/Missile Defence System/SA-X-NN. Technical Report APATR-2011-0602.” 
55

119. “Slim Hope for Missile Defense Agreement with US—

Top Kremlin Official,” Russia Today, March 5, 2013, available from 

rt.com/politics/slim-hope-for-missile-defense-agreement-with-us-topkremlin-official-832/.

120. Ibid.

121. Vladimir Putin, “Byt silnymi: garantii nacionalnoy bezopasnosti dlya Rossii” (“Being Strong: National Security Guarantees for 

Russia”), Rossiyskaya Gazeta, February 2012, 2012, available from 

www.rg.ru/2012/02/20/putin-armiya.html. 

122. Konstantin Makienko, “Successful Year for Aerospace 

Manufacturers,” Russia & CIS Observer, July 24, 2008, available 

from cast.ru/eng/?id=319.

123. Ibid.

124. Viktor Baranets, “Kosmicheskiy schit nam ne zatreschit?” 

(“Will Our Space Shield Crack?”), Komsomolskaya Pravda, December 29, 2011, available from www.kp.ru/daily/25813.3/2791248/. Interestingly, Ashurbeyli, who considers himself a “father” of the 

S-500, described Mercedes S-500 as his inspiration for the name 

of the new weapon system, saying “we need to catch up with the 

Germans.” 

125. Giles, European Missile Defense and Russia.

126. Jana Honkova, Current Developments in Russia’s Ballistic 

Missile Defense, Arlington, VA: George C. Marshall Institute, April 

16, 2013, p. 8. 

127. “‘NATO Will Never Get Access to Russia’s Big Red Button’,” Russia Today, July 1, 2011, available from rt.com/politics/

rogozin-nato-control-button/.

128. Vladimir Kozin, “U.S.-NATO Missile System: First-Strike 

Potential Aimed at Russia,” Global Research, March 2, 2013, available from www.globalresearch.ca/u-s-nato-missile-system-first-strikepotential-aimed-at-russia/5324913.
56

129. Viktor Litovkin, “Russia Installs New Radars as a Deterrent,” Russia Beyond the Headlines, June 8, 2012, available 

from rbth.com/articles/2012/06/08/russia_installs_new_radars_as_a_

deterrent_15834.html. 

130. “Direct Line with Vladimir Putin,” President of Russia, 

April 17, 2014, available from eng.kremlin.ru/transcripts/7034.

131. Ibid.

132. Aleksandr Tarnayev, “There Is No Reliable Russian 

Aerospace Defense System: Unified Leadership and Unified Responsibility for Organizing and Waging Armed Warfare Against 

Offensive Aerospace Enemy Forces and Assets Have Not Been 

Defined at the Strategic Level,” Vozdushno-Kosmicheskaya Oborona, 

April 14, 2014.

133. Vladimir Putin, “Rossiya budet narashchivat vozhmoyhnosti VKO” (“Russia Will Develop Its Airspace Defense Capabilities”), Natsionalnaya Oborona, No. 7, July 2013, p. 22.

134. Putin, “Byt silnymi: garantii nacionalnoy bezopasnosti 

dlya Rossii.” 

135. See, for instance, George Lewis, Lisbeth Gronlund, 

and David Wright, “National Missile Defense: An Indefensible 

System,” Foreign Policy, Winter 1999-2000, pp. 120-132. 

136. Bill Gertz, “China Conducts First Test of New Ultra-High 

Speed Missile Vehicle. Test is Part of a New Arms Race For Super Fast Weaponry,” The Washington Free Beacon, January 13, 2014, 

available from freebeacon.com/national-security/china-conducts-firsttest-of-new-ultra-high-speed-missile-vehicle/.

137 . Arbatov, “Strategic Dialogue: A Change of Priorities.” 

138. Ibid.

139. Ibid.

140. Private conversations with author, 2007-14. 
57

141. “Экипажи ВВС и расчеты ПВО Восточного военного

округа успешно отразили массированный ракетно-авиационный удар в рамках СКШУ ‘Восток-2014’” (“Air Force Crews 

and Air Defence Detachments of the Eastern Military District 

Successfully Repel Mass Air and Missile Strike within the Framework of the VOSTOK-2014 joint Command and Staff Exercise”), 

Moscow, Russia: Russian Ministry of Defense website, September 

21, 2014, available from function.mil.ru/news_page/country/more.

htm?id=11987755.

142. Speaking during visit of Russian General Staff Academy 

to NATO Defense College, November 27, 2012.

143. Arbatov, “Strategic Dialogue: A Change of Priorities.” 

144. Kozin, “U.S.-NATO Missile System: First-Strike Potential 

Aimed at Russia.” 

145. Sergey Kiselev, “Uchonye i konstruktory govoryat o neizbezhnosti militarizatsiy kosmosa” (“Scientists and Constructors 

Talk about the Inevitability of the Militarization of Space”), Nezavisimaya Gazeta, March 3, 2014, available from www.ng.ru/

armies/2014-03-03/100_vesvko.html?id_user=Y.

146. Gertz.

147. Cited in Keir Giles and Andrew Monaghan, Russian Military Transformation—Goal in Sight, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies 

Institute, U.S. Army War College, May 2014, pp. 22-23.

148. Arbatov, “Strategic Dialogue: A Change of Priorities.” 

149. Speaking at RUSI Missile Defence Conference, London, 

UK, June 12-13, 2013.

150. Giles, European Missile Defense and Russia.
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General William E. Rapp

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

and

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE PRESS

Director

Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Director of Research

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Author

Mr. Keir Giles

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Publications Assistant

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

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Composition

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