Defense Science Board 

Task Force 

on

The Role and Status

of 

DoD Red Teaming Activities

September 2003

Office of the Under Secretary of Defense

For Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics

Washington, D.C. 20301-3140
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i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. Introduction........................................................................................1

II. What Are Red Teams And Red Teaming?.....................................2

III. What Makes an Effective Red Team? .............................................5

IV. Observations About Current Red Team Activities.......................7

V. Red Teams At The Strategic Level ................................................13

VI. Conclusions ......................................................................................15

VII. Recommendations ...........................................................................16

Appendix 1. Terms of Reference..............................................................19

Appendix 2. Task Force Members ...........................................................21

Appendix 3. Contrasts Between Product/Project and Enterprise Red 

Teams.....................................................................................23

Appendix 4. Historical Examples of “Red Team” Activities...............31

Appendix 5. Draft Memo From The Secretary of Defense ...................37

Appendix 6. Glossary.................................................................................39
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I. INTRODUCTION

The Task Force was charged to examine the use of red teams in the 

Department of Defense and recommend ways that such teams could be of

greater value to the department. Our Terms of Reference and task force 

membership are provided in Appendices 1 and 2. 

Our usage of the term red team includes not only "playing" adversaries 

or competitors, but also serving as devil's advocates, offering alternative 

interpretations (team B) and otherwise challenging established thinking 

within an enterprise. 

We argue that red teaming is especially important now for the DoD. 

Current adversaries are tougher targets for intelligence than was the United 

State's major cold war foe. Red teaming deepens understanding of options 

available to adaptive adversaries and both complements and informs 

intelligence collection and analysis. Aggressive red teams are needed to 

challenge emerging operational concepts in order to discover weaknesses 

before real adversaries do. In addition, in the wake of recent military 

operations, use of red teams can temper the complacency that often follows 

success.

Chapter II elaborates on what we mean by red teams and red teaming. 

The attributes of effective red teams are discussed in Chapter III. A 

summary of some current red team activities in DoD is provided in Chapter 

IV. Chapter V and Appendix 3 discuss a special case of the use of red teams 

where the red team addresses issues fundamental to the existence of the 

enterprise and not just particular plans or programs. Conclusions and 

recommendations are offered in Chapters VI and VII. A draft Secretary of 

Defense memorandum implementing our recommendations is provided in 

Appendix 5. Appendix 4 contains historical examples of red team activities, 

and finally, there is a glossary provided in Appendix 6.
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II. WHAT ARE RED TEAMS AND RED TEAMING?

Red teams and red teaming processes have long been used as tools by the 

management of both government and commercial enterprises. Their 

purpose is to reduce an enterprise’s risks and increase its opportunities. 

Red teams come in many varieties and there are different views about 

what constitutes a red team. We take an expanded view and include a 

diversity of activities that, while differing in some ways, share a 

fundamental feature. 

Red teams are established by an enterprise to challenge aspects of that 

very enterprise’s plans, programs, assumptions, etc. It is this aspect of 

deliberate challenge that distinguishes red teaming from other management 

tools although the boundary is not a sharp one. (There are many tools used 

by management for a variety of related purposes: to promulgate visions, 

foster innovation, promote efficiencies.)

Red teaming can be used at multiple levels within the enterprise; for 

example, at the

n Strategic level to challenge assumptions and visions, 

n Operational level to challenge force postures, a commander’s war 

plan and acquisition portfolios, 

n Tactical level to challenge military units in training or programs in 

development.

In general, red team challenges can help hedge against surprise, 

particularly catastrophic surprises. It does this by providing a

n Wider and deeper understanding of potential adversary options and 

behavior that can expose potential vulnerabilities in our strategies, 

postures, plans, programs, and concepts. This role (to explore 

technically feasible and responsive threats) has become increasingly 

important as a complement to the more traditional intelligence-based 

threat projections (capabilities-based versus threat-based planning).
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n Hedge against the social comfort of “the accepted assumptions and 

the accepted solutions”. This includes hedge against bias and 

conflict of interest.

n Hedge against inexperience (a not uncommon situation in DoD and 

other Government Agencies where leadership tenures tend to be 

short).

Areas where red teams can and do play an important role within DoD 

include:

n Training

n Concept development and experimentation (not just an OPFOR for 

the experiment but continuous challenge by red teams throughout 

the concept development process) 

n Security of complex networks and systems

n Activities where there is not much opportunity to try things out (for 

example, nuclear weapons stockpile issues)

A red team is comprised of individuals selected for their special subject 

matter expertise, perspective (professional, cultural), imagination or 

penchant for critical analysis. Members of the team could be from within or 

outside the organization, their assignment to the team could be temporary 

or extended and the team itself can be of short-term duration or standing. In 

some rare cases, the culture of the enterprise fosters challenge to the degree 

that it acts as its own red team.

The red team itself is only one element in a red teaming process. The 

process can be explicit or ad hoc. Elements of the process include the 

following: who the red team reports to; how it interacts with the 

management of the enterprise and with “blue” (the owner of the activity it is 

challenging), and how the enterprise considers and uses its products. 

We identify three types of red teams. Our expanded notion of red teams 

includes teams established to serve as:

n Surrogate adversaries and competitors of the enterprise, 

n Devil’s advocates,
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n Sources of judgment independent of the enterprise’s “normal” 

processes (often from team members with experience from positions 

at higher levels in industry or government).

Surrogate adversaries and competitors: This category itself includes a 

wide range of activities. The purpose of these red teams is to sharpen skills, 

expose vulnerabilities that adversaries might exploit and in general increase 

understanding of the options and responses available to adversaries and 

competitors. 

In some, the team tries to emulate an adversary or competitor. The

setting could be a military training, experimentation or gaming environment 

where the red team plays the “Opposing Force”, using the adversary’s 

presumed tactics and equipage (actual or virtual). Examples in the training 

arena are the Army’s OPFOR at the NTC and the JRTC, the Air Force’s at 

Nellis AFB and the Navy’s at Fallon and Key West. 

The setting could also be red team attacks to compromise an information 

or computer system. The setting for the surrogate adversary could be future 

acquisition – where a red team might – under conditions similar to those 

available to the adversary—invent counters to US military systems. 

In some cases the red team is not explicitly constrained to think and 

behave as an adversary might, but is given wider latitudes to discover 

technological counters to US systems. A successful example of this type of 

red team (and one of the longest established red team processes in DoD) is 

the Navy’s Subsurface Ballistic Nuclear (SSBN) Security Program.

Devil’s advocate: These red teams offer critiques of, and in some cases 

alternatives to, the enterprise’s assumptions, strategies, plans, concepts, 

programs, projects and processes. At the program level the objective of this 

type of red team is to provide critical analysis in order to anticipate 

problems and avoid surprises. The red team’s subject, either explicit or 

implicit, can also be process, how an organization conducts its business. An 

example of such a team was the Ballistic Missile Threat Committee that 

Secretary Rumsfeld chaired in 1998. It examined the same data available to 

the intelligence community but identified alternative paths adversaries 

might take and came to different conclusions about the threat.
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General Advisory Boards and other sources of independent judgment:

The objective is often to be a sounding board and “kitchen cabinet” for the 

sponsor.

III. WHAT MAKES AN EFFECTIVE RED TEAM?

Red teaming is important but it is not easy nor often done very well. The 

Task Force looked at red team experiences within and outside of DoD and 

concluded that there are formidable challenges to establishing and 

sustaining effective red teams and associated red teaming processes. 

Meeting these challenges involves to a large part managing the tradeoff 

between independence and interaction. Typical causes of red team failure 

include the following.

The red team:

n Does not take its assignment seriously (Task force members 

commented that in their own experience serving on red teams they 

rarely were provided with a clear statement of objective).

n Could lose its independence and be “captured” by the bureaucracy 

(or could be self inflicted by the red team trying to figure out what 

the sponsor really wants).

n Could be too removed from the decision making process and thus 

become marginalized. 

n Could have inadequate interaction with “blue” (i.e., the program or 

activity it is challenging) and be viewed as just another sideline critic. 

(DoD doesn’t need to pay for these; there are plenty out there).

n Could destroy the integrity of the process and lose the confidence of 

decision makers by “leaking” its finding to outsiders. 

 There are additional challenges for red teaming that provide surrogate 

adversaries including: 

n Not capturing the culture of the adversary/competitor (but instead 

mirror images).
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n Quality of red team insufficient to provide interesting challenges to 

“blue” (perhaps because of resource constraints on red).

ATTRIBUTES OF EFFECTIVE RED TEAMING

With the challenges of the previous section in mind we offer the 

following as basic ingredients of successful red teaming.

The culture of the enterprise: This may be the most important 

contributor to effective red teaming. Red teaming can thrive in an 

environment that not only tolerates, but values internal criticism and 

challenge. Unfortunately, it is often the case that those organizations in need 

of red teaming have a culture inimical to its use.

Top Cover: A red team needs a scope, charter and reporting relationship 

that fit the management structure. A red team should be expected to raise 

issues that might not be welcome throughout the enterprise; it needs the 

support, sometimes from the very top levels of the enterprise. Top cover is 

needed to ensure that the red team’s products not only have the requisite 

degree of independence, but are seriously considered as well (this does not 

imply acceptance). Two related attributes are:

1. Independence with accountability: The independence to avoid 

becoming subordinate to the programs it is challenging, 

accountability to make it relevant and timely and to maintain the 

integrity and confidentiality of the process.

2. A process in which the output of the red team is seriously 

considered and can be acted upon in a timely manner: Without such 

a process, red teams become marginalized or merely another sideline 

critic. 

Robust interaction between the red and “blue” teams: It is not a win or 

lose game. The objective is to establish a win-win environment in which 

blue learns from the process and comes out with sharper skills or more 

robust solutions and / or greater appreciation for the issues that their 

superior must deal with. When the red team is charted to offer alternative 
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solutions it is important to incentivize them to challenge basic assumptions 

and get to the root issues.

Unusually careful selection of staff: Success of any activity depends on 

proper staffing. Staffing red teams present special challenges. Many very 

talented individuals are not necessarily suited, temperamentally or 

motivationally to be effective red team members. Furthermore, resource 

constraints normally imposed on red teams necessitate judicious selection of 

the right mix of talents and perspectives. Imagination is a particularly 

desirable attribute. Most members of the team will not be permanent red 

teamers and selection can also be based on the potential for professional 

development. Red team members often regard the experience as the best 

training they have had.

A deft touch in the use of red teams: Too often, red teams will be called 

for only after major problems have arisen or after too many resources have 

been expended when an earlier use of red teams could have anticipated the 

problems and changing directions been less painful. However, if used too 

early, with too heavy a hand, promising ideas may be prejudged as failures. 

IV. OBSERVATIONS ABOUT CURRENT RED TEAM

ACTIVITIES

US Navy’s SSBN Security Program: This red team activity has had an 

extraordinary long life. The program was established in the early 1970s to 

identify potential vulnerabilities that the Soviet Union might exploit to put 

US SSBNs at risk. This program, by identifying potential vulnerabilities in 

the SSBN force, also had a “shadow” customer in the Navy’s own 

antisubmarine warfare programs. 

Originally established to look at the vulnerabilities of the US SSBNs, the 

focus of the program shifted in the mid 1980's to evaluate and assess 

findings from the intelligence community. Recent work has involved SSBN 

protection vulnerabilities, terrorist threats, and security in port. The 

perspective on SSBN survivability changed as well over time with the 
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8 _________________________________________________________________________

collapse of the Soviet Union and the advent of new asymmetric threats. In 

the 1970's and 1980's, the objective for SSBN survivability was hours 

(sufficient to deter a nuclear exchange). After the cold war ended, the 

survivability came to be viewed in terms of days or months. 

Though the scope and focus of the SSBN Security Program has changed 

over the decades, its guiding principles have remained largely unchanged 

and have been a major factor in the Navy’s ability to sustain an effective 

program for so long. These principles include:

n Strong and widely acknowledged national purpose 

n Stable and adequate funding

n Highly competent people

n Access to the details of the target program (vital for this effort, in 

general the level of access can be a control variable in red teaming)

n Independence to criticize

n Direct accountability to senior official (outside of the SSBN program 

management line) empowered to take corrective action

n A strong, but not subordinate, relationship with the Intelligence 

community 

The SSBN Security Program assesses threats and vulnerabilities based on 

physical principles and thus represents one form of red teaming. These 

assessments are determined by technological feasibility and operational 

realities, not on cultural differences or other geopolitical considerations. 

Missile Defense Agency - Red Teaming Experience: For almost two 

decades the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) and its two predecessor 

organizations, the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization and the Ballistic 

Missile Defense Organization, have employed a variety of red team 

techniques. The purpose of these activities has been to identify, 

characterize, understand and mitigate the risk associated with the 

development and deployment of a missile defense system. 

They have used several types of red teams. In one (sometimes 

characterized as threat-based) the main purpose is to understand responsive 

countermeasures. These red teams typically do not interact much at all with 
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blue. The products of this kind of red team are typically descriptions of 

suites of penetration aids that an adversary might design and deploy (in the 

near, mid or far-term) in response to a US missile defense system. These 

products are generally reflected in “evaluate-to” threats which tend to have 

little programmatic impact compared to the intelligence-based “design-to“ 

threats. 

In contrast to this “threat based” approach is a second type of red 

teaming effort (“capability based”). The primary emphasis of these red 

teams is to understand the capabilities and susceptibilities of the blue 

missile defense system in order to exploit inherent weaknesses in the blue 

system. The red team is typically as interested in blue assumptions about 

the threat as it is in actual blue capability. This form of red teaming requires 

a continuous and detailed exchange of information between the red and 

blue teams. It is our impression that in spite of good intentions, this type of 

red teaming has been difficult to achieve and sustain. The current MDA 

director has attempted to facilitate an intimate red and blue interaction by 

focusing the red team effort on certain critical issues and by using a high 

profile white team to foster significant interchange between the red and blue 

teams. 

Red team membership has been drawn from a variety of sources over the 

years including Federally Funded Research and Development Centers, 

intelligence agencies, National Laboratories, defense contractors as well as 

small numbers of people from the missile defense organizations themselves. 

US citizenship has typically been a requirement for membership. However, 

MDA currently has a red team composed solely of UK citizens whose 

purpose is to understand as much as they can about the US missile defense 

system from unclassified US sources as well as all foreign sources but 

without having direct contact with US blue components.

Individuals on red teams usually have had a strong technical 

background. For one long-running red team, however, membership 

specifically was limited to individuals without special technical expertise or 

knowledge about missile defense countermeasures. This activity -- the 

Countermeasures Hands-On Program (CHOP) -- was established by SDIO 

over ten years ago in response to a 1992 Defense Science Board Task Force 

on SDI Countermeasures. The Task Force’s concern was the possibility that
REDTEAM REPORT_____________________________________________________________

10 _________________________________________________________________________

relatively unsophisticated countermeasures were not being adequately 

addressed. 

Since CHOP was established at Kirtland Air Force Base in Albuquerque 

NM, over a dozen “skunk work” missions have been completed. Typically 

the participants (different for each mission) are about half a dozen young 

military officers and government civilians (with recent engineering degrees). 

They are not given any classified information about the blue system. In each 

mission they are given a countermeasure related problem and are then 

asked to identify, design and often, actually build, countermeasures to US 

defense systems. They exploit commercial computer programs, standard 

machine tools and commercial electronics. In several cases the 

countermeasures they built, some subscale, have been demonstrated in 

actual flight tests. In spite of these successful experiments, it is not clear to 

this Task Force whether the program has had much impact on the missile 

defense program. 

Given the highly public and controversial nature of the subject, the 

missile defense organizations have received much “free red teaming” from 

non-government and government sources. MIT Professor T. Postol’s 

analysis of photographic and other evidence on Patriot intercepts during the 

1991 Gulf War and April 2000 Union of Concerned Scientists report, 

"Countermeasures: A Technical Evaluation of the Operational Effectiveness 

of the Planned US National Missile Defense System" are examples of the 

first. 

Perhaps the external red team effort that has had the greatest effect on 

the management of the missile defense program was the 1998 report of the 

“Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States”. 

This effort was created by congressional legislation in the Fiscal Year 1997 

National Defense Appropriations Act and chaired by Mr. D. Rumsfeld (then 

a former secretary of defense). This study helped to foster the 

organizational acceptance of subsequent red team analyses, liberating it 

from the bonds of standard intelligence assessments, which are typically 

based on relatively straightforward and limited extrapolations of what had 

actually been seen. 

Air Force Red Team Program: The Air Force Directorate of Electronics 

and Special Programs is home to the Air Force Red Team program 
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___________________________________________________________________________11

(SAF/AQLR). The Air Force Red Team provides assessments of concepts 

and technology (as opposed to serving as a surrogate adversary). The Red 

Team’s scope spans the entire Air Force and it has the funding and authority 

to conduct analyses and design and perform field tests. Their process 

involves making judgments (in part based on open literature) about 

capabilities and knowledge of future adversaries. They also involve the 

Intel community in the process, to get input from this community and also 

to provide feedback to help inform intelligence collection and analysis about 

what to look for if an adversary attempts to achieve a new capability. 

Their process involves red/blue interaction in order to evaluate and 

recommend blue system improvements. They argue their approach: 

n Provides disciplined approach to guide decision making in 

technology development

n Allows warning regarding vulnerability of fielded capabilities

n Gives insight into defining what sensitive information to protect 

A measure of red team success is when their data has altered a 

development plan or an acquisition program (e.g., initial production was 

limited; subsequent upgrade produced a better product). 

From their experience, attributes of an effective red team include 

independence from the project offices, experienced personnel, constructive 

environment (i.e., recommend blue force improvements as counter 

countermeasures), and a capability to evaluate the art of the possible (i.e., 

looking at risk based on technical possibilities, not just known capabilities). 

The US Army’s Red Franchise Organization: The US Army in 1999

established a Red Franchise organization within its Training and Doctrine 

Command (TRADOC) to guide Army training, concept and force 

development, experimentation, and transformation.. The Red Franchise 

organization is responsible for defining the Operational Environment for the 

next two decades, which is defined in Joint Publication 1.02 as “the 

composite of all conditions, circumstances and influences which affect the 

employment of military forces and bear on the decisions of the unit 

commander.” The Operational Environment is the intellectual foundation 

for transforming the Army from a threat-based force to the capabilities-
REDTEAM REPORT_____________________________________________________________

12 _________________________________________________________________________

based Objective Force. The Operational Environment is more useful than 

specific threats to guide force development and support spiral development.

The Red Franchise organization (reporting to TRADOC DCSINT) has a 

great deal of independence from its customers in TRADOC and in the joint 

and interagency communities. Its products, including the Joint Operational 

Environment (written in partnership with U.S. Joint Forces Command –

USJFCOM) and threat portrayals, are used to support wargames and 

experiments concept development. The Red Franchise provides its products 

to other Services, and Joint and interagency customers as well. The Red 

Franchise also have produced an “instruction manual” for the Opposing 

Forces (OPFOR) at the Joint National Training Center (JNTC), the JRTC and 

the CMTC in which they provide guidance on the composition and behavior 

of opposing forces. The Red Franchise makes heavy use of outside experts 

to develop their products. 

TRADOC has more recently stood up the Devils Advocate organization

separate from but able to support the Red Franchise as necessary or 

appropriate with the mission to support Army and DoD/Joint 

transformation by conducting and coordinating studies, reviews, and 

analysis of concepts, requirements documents, and training products. The 

Devil’s Advocate places particular attention to the Army’s Objective force, 

the Future Combat System, and related initiatives. 

USJFCOM Red Teams for joint concept development and 

experimentation: JFCOM has been using red teams for joint concept 

development (including Rapid Decisive and Effects-Based Operations) and 

experimentation (including Unified Vision ‘01, Millennium Challenge ‘02 

(MC02) and Unified Quest ‘03). 

JFCOM representatives to our task force stated a continuing need to get 

red teams engaged earlier in the concept development and experiment 

design process before large amounts of money (and therefore egos / careers) 

are committed to a concept. They cited a need for standards for establishing 

and using red teams for joint concept development and experimentation 

and organizational self-confidence to accept and act on criticism. 

Understanding the difference between an experiment and an exercise is 

important. Concepts can fail; experiments fail only if nothing is learned. 
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The challenge of using red teams effectively in experiments was 

highlighted by concerns expressed by the person that played the OPFOR 

commander in MC02. MC02 was billed as an experiment that would allow 

the OPFOR a measure of free play (and we understand would also 

document when and why red team play was constrained and the lessons 

learned and follow-up analysis needed). Instead MC02 was more 

demonstration than experiment, involving an orchestration of events that 

precluded free play. 

OSD’s Defense Adaptive Red Team (DART) Activity: The DART was 

established by the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Advanced Systems 

and Concepts) in June 2001. Its mission is to support the development of 

new joint operational concepts by providing red teaming services to JFCOM, 

the combatant commands, Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration

(ACTD), Joint Staff, and OSD. The services run the gamut of red team types. 

They include serving as surrogate adversaries for wargames and 

experiments; conducting vulnerability/failure analysis for concepts (e.g., 

ONA and RDO); doing Team B development of competing concepts;

providing an independent assessment of experiments (UV01 and MC02);

and providing a framework for concept development and evaluation for the 

joint staff. It also is identifying best practices in red teaming.

Based on their experience, DART emphasized several lessons about 

necessary conditions for effective red teaming:

n Support from the top, which is a combatant commander for most of 

their customers, 

n Support and active involvement from people in the organization that 

can make things happen, and 

n Trust at all levels, and appropriate confidentiality since the red team 

is raising fundamental issues about how organizations conduct their 

business.

V. RED TEAMS AT THE STRATEGIC LEVEL

A special case of red teaming occurs when the entire enterprise is 

challenged (rather than a project or product). A more detailed discussion of 
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14 _________________________________________________________________________

the differences between the two cases is provided in Appendix 3. The role of 

a strong red team can be especially important when the enterprise’s CEO or 

Senior Executive or Officer faces the following:

n Change is urgent, but what to do is unclear; e.g., regulatory change

n CEO can’t order the change due to lack of credibility; e.g., nontechnical executive in a scientific, medical, or craft organization

n Change required is so abrupt that buy-in by a majority of the power 

‘barons’ is required; e.g., in a University, Military, Religion.

n Resistance is strong/immediate or long-lasting/subversive; 

e.g..discriminatory practices, labor problems.

n CEO has a short tenure due to age or practice.

n Pervasive change is required in decision-making, financial control, 

career paths, and organizational power/turf, which cut across 

existing organizational boundaries.

When these conditions exist, the CEO needs to find a good solution that 

can be implemented, is hard to reverse, and will continue whether or not he

/ she is in charge.

The role of the red team in such a situation is to:

1. Clarify the degree of urgency of the threat/required change. Provide 

factual, balanced analysis, objective if possible, to their peers for 

debate and discussion (important that team members be credible).

2. Create alternatives backed by data, feasibility, likely outcome, 

difficulty of implementation, resources required, likely resistance, 

communication needs. Compare to existing, or momentum, 

approach. Challenge assumptions, myths, turf, beliefs.

3. Gather opposing views, and ensure they are communicated clearly. 

(Important since many people are reluctant to voice valid concerns.)

4. Lead discussions toward choice of an acceptable solution. 

”Acceptable” is defined by need, not political preference. Balancing 

what is needed versus what is feasible versus what is political takes 
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some skill. CEOs don’t always take well solutions they don’t like. The 

red team may or may not have a preferred solution.

5. Plan implementation, gathering views on difficult problems, 

identifying resources necessary, organizing communication and 

feedback

6. Project manage the onetime activities of the transition until the 

organization is able to do so. This could take several months.

7. Disband.

Significant change requires scores or hundreds of mini-projects in a large 

organization. At the beginning, few managers have the perspective on what 

is needed or what is possible. Most executives undertake a change of major 

magnitude only once in their careers at the top of the organization. A red 

team, reporting to the CEO, or perhaps the Executive Committee, can make 

a tremendous difference in how well change is accomplished. They often are 

the articulate advocates for change.

VI. CONCLUSIONS

Red teaming has long been a valuable, if underutilized, tool for the 

Department of Defense. The use of red teams has become especially critical 

now and we recommend that their role be expanded. There are two reasons:

1. To deepen understanding of the adversaries the US now faces in 

the war on terrorism and in particular their capabilities and 

potential responses to US initiatives. Red teaming to help identify 

the range of options available to potential adversaries (state and substate) using accessible technology and asymmetric means is an 

important complement to evidentiary based threat assessment from 

intelligence and other sources. Intelligence collection is also informed 

by red teaming and the insights it offers into possible threat actions 

and responses. We believe this complementary role has grown in 

importance because these adversaries present much more difficult 

targets to collect against than our cold war adversary, the USSR. 
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16 _________________________________________________________________________

2. To guard against complacency. The US military is attempting to 

transform itself – the force that triumphed in Operation Iraqi 

Freedom fought quite differently than the force that prevailed in 

Desert Storm 12 years ago. Perhaps the most difficult environment to 

transform an enterprise is during a time of great success. It will 

however be necessary to continue transforming our armed forces to 

deal with committed and adaptive adversaries (perhaps much more 

so than faced in the recent operations). Aggressive and pervasive red 

teaming throughout DoD and particularly in OSD, can help avoid 

complacency and even more self-defeating attributes that too often 

are part of a victor’s baggage.

The use of red teaming is expanding within DoD and the intelligence 

community, largely because of the first reason above – to help understand 

the new threats 

However, the task force is concerned that because of the historical 

difficulties of creating and sustaining effective red team processes, many 

new initiatives to establish red teams will not provide the expected value. 

Attention from the highest levels in the DoD will be necessary to 

establish and sustain quality red teams and red teaming processes. 

Effective red teaming will be much more influenced by a change in the 

culture of the enterprise than by attempts to institutionalize red teaming or 

putting someone in charge. Cultural change within DoD is a formidable, 

but feasible, task. It is underway, for example with respect to jointness as 

evidenced by the way US forces operated in Operation Iraqi Freedom.

VII. RECOMMENDATIONS

We have two. The SecDef should 

1. Take steps to inculcate effective red team use throughout the 

department

2. Establish a few red teams in critical areas. 
_____________________________________________________________ REDTEAM REPORT

___________________________________________________________________________17

1. The SecDef should take the following steps to inculcate effective red 

teaming throughout DoD:

n Issue a memorandum (draft provided in Appendix 5) that offers 

general guidance to the Department on the value of red teaming 

and directs specific actions to promulgate its more effective use. 

(This is a way to reach executives/leaders that he might not 

touch / influence directly). 

n Task the USD (AT&L) to outline the procedures to be used in the 

several forms of red teams and to develop a current best practice 

guideline for how to do red teams well. Make them widely 

available in the Department.

n Make red teaming the subject of continuing intellectual activity 

at the PME and other relevant institutions. Teach it, research 

ways to do it better, keep abreast of red team activities 

(government and commercial, US and foreign). Idenfity 

successful red teamers to be the instructors in Professional 

Military Education (PME) courses. The PME courses themselves 

should be crafted around important Service, Joint, or OSD red 

team projects. Task the CJCS and the USD (AT&L) to be coleads in making this happen.

2. The SecDef should establish red teams in a few critical areas

We believe most important is to establish a substantial red team effort to 

help understand the military lessons that others will garner from OEF, OIF 

and other recent US military operations. The focus should be on potential 

adversaries and suppliers of adversaries. The number of actors of interest 

can be quite large. We recommend starting with perhaps a half dozen or so 

subject nations (or sub national entities) spanning a range of motivations 

and capabilities. For each entity of interest we suggest that two teams be 

established: one to address strategic/operational responses, the other 

operational/tactical. 

We recommend that the USD (P), USD (AT&L), USD (I) and the CJCS be 

assigned responsibilities for establishing and conducting these red team 

efforts. The intelligence community should participate strongly in this 

exercise but intelligence is but one input to understanding threat options.
REDTEAM REPORT_____________________________________________________________

18 _________________________________________________________________________

Other candidates for more aggressive red team activity include:

n The nuclear weapons program and associated stockpile stewardship 

because of the inability to test the weapons 

n Elusive targets (can learn from recent campaigns)

n Force projection process and its collaborating contributors including 

Regional Combatant Commands, TRANSCOM, JFCOM, DLA, etc (to 

improve capabilities in terms of agility, speed, reduced footprint)

Red teams could help enhance the way DoD approaches the 

development and fielding of networked capabilities and related systems-of 

systems (becoming more the norm). Red teams could also be used to more 

aggressively challenge evolving joint concept and prototypes. These are 

both opportunities to create multi-Service red teams within a joint context.
_____________________________________________________________________APPENDIX 1

___________________________________________________________________________19

APPENDIX 1. TERMS OF REFERENCE
APPENDIX 1 ____________________________________________________________________

20 _________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________APPENDIX 2

___________________________________________________________________________ 21

APPENDIX 2. TASK FORCE MEMBERS

Task Force Co Chairman:

Dr. Theodore Gold Dr. Robert Hermann

Task Force Members:

Dr Joseph Braddock Mr. William Delaney

Mr Bran Ferren Dr. Craig Fields

Dr. John Foster, Jr. Dr. Ronald Kerber

Dr. Joseph Markowitz Mr. John Stewart

Mr. Jack Welch, Jr. Maj Gen Jasper Welch, USAF (Ret)

Executive Secretary:

Mr. Chuck Sieber, OSD Land Warfare

DSB Secretariat Representative:

LTC Carla Kendrick, USA, USD(AT&L)/DSB

LTC Scott Dolgoff, USA, USD(AT&L)/DSB

Government Advisors:

Dr. Theodore Barna, DUSD/AS&C

Mr. Shane Deichman, USJFCOM
APPENDIX 2 ____________________________________________________________________

22 _________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________APPENDIX 3

___________________________________________________________________________23

APPENDIX 3. CONTRASTS BETWEEN PRODUCT/PROJECT 

AND ENTERPRISE RED TEAMS 

Chapter V of the report refers to the special case of red teaming that 

occurs when the entire enterprise is challenged and not merely a project or 

product. The distinction among the types of red teams is significant in 

terms of the difficulties encountered in establishing and conducting effective 

red teams. When the focus of the red team is a process (instead of a project 

or product), the team attributes can be those of an enterprise red team. It 

would depend on how deeply and broadly the process is embedded in the

the enterprise.

Specific attributes that help define the type of red team include: 

ß significance 

ß scope

ß success/cost of failure

ß executive sponsor

ß assumptions

ß tradeoffs 

ß mental framework 

ß team leader

ß team composition, and project plan.

The table highlights differences in these attributes between 

program/project and enterprise red teams. It is followed by a description of 

some of the challenges to achieving these attributes in an enterprise red 

team.
APPENDIX 3 ____________________________________________________________________

24 _________________________________________________________________________

Table 1. Characteristics of Product / Project and Enterprise Red Teams

ATTRIBUTE PRODUCT/PROJECT TEAM ENTERPRISE TEAM

SIGNIFICANCE Important, urgent, not terminal 

to organization

Existence as a major player 

in jeopardy, perhaps over 

several years

SCOPE 1 program; less than 50% of 

enterprise

Affects >75% of enterprise; 

its place in larger world, what 

it is known for in the past

SUCCESS/COST OF 

FAILURE

Lower cost or time; better 

function or quality; may miss 

opportunity 

Unknown for years; unclear; 

end of the enterprise is the 

risk

EXECUTIVE SPONSOR Operating executive, program 

manager

CEO, Secretary, Board

ASSUMPTIONS About design rules, cost, time, 

quality and their importance

Values; capacity to change; 

available leadership, will, 

skill, external trends

TRADEOFFS Cost vs. Time vs. Function vs. 

Quality

Politics, power, history, risk 

of error, investment, people, 

current vs. future

MENTAL FRAMEWORK Mission, objective, tradeoffs External trends of 

economics, funding, 

competition, technology: 

internal values 

TEAM LEADER Good engineer, leader, 

manager

Strategic thinker, organizer, 

critical thinker

TEAM COMPOSITION Engineers, finance, contracts, 

manufacturing, support

Executive, Planner, CFO, 

Political, Behavior, 

Technology trends (+same 

as project)

PROJECT PLAN Specific, scheduled, followed Unclear; blind alleys; 

exploratory

EXAMPLES ß Reduce cost/time in radar 

company.

ß Ramp up production of Army 

helicopter.

ß Build manufacturing facility in 

50% of time.

ß Increase ship building 

capacity from 5 to 6 per year.

ß Start generic drug company.

ß Increase hospital operating 

room capacity by 20% with 

no cost investment.

ß Avoid $60M investment in 

power generation.

ß Reduce drug lead time by 

50%. 

ß Catch semiconductor 

industry leader within 2 

generations.

ß Accelerate automobile 

development from 6 to 3 

years.

ß Size steel industry (up or 

down)

ß Merge or not defense 

electronics company

ß Post Challenger upgrade 

manufacturing
_____________________________________________________________________APPENDIX 3

___________________________________________________________________________25

Significance: Generally, an enterprise team is faced with either a major 

problem or a major opportunity, which will significantly alter the 

organization. The consequences are large but not necessarily immediate, 

which tends to delay addressing the situation. 

Consequences for commercial companies can include a major loss of 

market share, missing a generation of technology, being 4th or 5th into a 

technology, being bought against its will, or bankruptcy. Consequences for 

government organizations can include major press embarrassment followed 

by house cleaning and damage to reputations of executives, loss of 

institutional influence, or program elimination. For some, the result is 

unfavorable combination with incompatible organizations.

Early recognition of significant consequences is an essential skill. But 

often, even those who see looming consequences fail to address the problem 

aggressively, such that they are managed by circumstances rather than 

manage circumstance. There are many commercial world examples: 

including in electronics, shipbuilding, steel, pharmaceuticals, electrical 

equipment, and automobiles.

Scope of Red Team: The scope of an enterprise red team is usually quite 

broad. It can encompass what is happening politically and economically 

around the world, how the organization’s position is changing among its 

peers, how it is governed, and how the basic processes of management 

should change. New courses of action tend to be disruptive, advantaging 

some parts of the organization and disadvantaging others. Not 

infrequently, the senior leadership is the problem and must either change 

behavior or change jobs. Such outcomes pose a delicate communication 

challenge for the red team; senior executives vary widely in their response 

sometimes “killing the messenger” aka red team leader.

Success/Cost of Failure: Enterprise red teams tend to develop 

“solutions” or “roadmaps” which cannot be conclusively proved before the 

fact. Therefore, arguments can ensue and factions vie for a more convincing 

position. The red team leader and executive sponsor must clarify the cost of 

failure even if they cannot precisely define success (often it is easier to do 

the former). For example: “failure to develop the next generation 
APPENDIX 3 ____________________________________________________________________

26 _________________________________________________________________________

technology by X will result in our losing the entire Y market, even though 

we are not sure that the next generation of technology will be profitable”; or 

“unless test scores of students improve, we will lose control of the schools”; 

or “we don’t know what success in anti-terrorism looks like, but we sure 

know what failure looks like.” The role of the executive sponsor is far more 

extensive on these enterprise problems than on product/project problems.

Executive Sponsor: The executive sponsor for an enterprise red team has 

a tough task. The terms of reference to the team must be sufficiently broad, 

yet not so broad that it is impossible. He should not prejudice the team’s 

thinking, but if he does, he must encourage disagreement (more about this 

below). He must pick a team matched to a task he has never done before. It 

is unlikely that he recognizes all the major issues or constraints. He is 

starting a process not defining an end product. Often there is opposition to 

starting the team.

Once started, the executive must strike balance after balance. He must 

encourage progress, but discourage superficial analysis; require new and 

useful facts but rein in analytical anarchy; challenge myths but preserve 

their truths; break down turf fences but tactfully; trample on other 

executives prerogatives but not with self-interest; question values but not 

their importance; sponsor ideas for change without demeaning past 

progress. It is not easy.

Throughout, informed dissent must be encouraged. This too can be

easy. Junior people are uneasy disagreeing with senior people in groups 

larger than two (and sometimes one). Dissent sounds like criticism, and feels 

like criticism to some. A team member from engineering has trouble 

challenging the Chief Engineer, for whom he has worked (two levels down) 

and will once again work (more than two levels down). The sponsoring 

executive must encourage, goad, challenge, brow-beat other senior 

managers to do something that does not come naturally in hierarchies –

allow and encourage dissent from the red team members and others. 

In addition, the executive sponsor provides intellectual quality control 

and relevance to the team, although he is learning as they do, or even with a 

few weeks lag. Not easy. And it is not easy to recognize an answer. It is 

only possible to recognize the best available answer and judge whether it is 

sufficient. That is judgment of a high order.
_____________________________________________________________________APPENDIX 3

___________________________________________________________________________27

Assumptions: This is a major stumbling block in enterprise red team 

activity. Wrong early assumptions cause failure. Assumptions must be 

sharply challenged, and challenged again. Statements such as “that is not 

feasible, it is outside our mandate, they won’t stand for it, you can’t be 

serious, or that will never happen” depress active challenge.

Less tangible, but still critical, assumptions are more difficult to 

challenge than tangible ones, and thus may not be routinely questioned. For 

example, “our product is better than their product” can be clearly 

challenged through reverse engineering and discussions with customers. 

“Their new product introduction process is giving them a real advantage 

over us” is less easy to prove. Yet, it was crucial in pharmaceuticals, autos, 

and mobile telephones with major adverse consequences to very good 

companies which awakened far too late.

Assumptions about human behavior particularly need challenge. “The 

union won’t buy that, the Congress won’t do that, our customers are too 

loyal to do that” need close examination since the most frequently repeated 

truisms are often only partially correct, and one can drive a truck through 

partially. It is more often true that “X will occur if new conditions A, B, C 

are created which are feasible though difficult.” When creating an 

enterprise red team, this aspect deserves attention by the best minds 

available.

Within DoD, assumptions about cultural obstacles - “ change will be too 

hard” or “take too long”-particularly need to be challenged. What is often 

characterized as a deep-seated cultural problem can turn out to be largely 

due to an absence of leadership and lack of widely perceived need.

Tradeoffs: Everyone knows how to make tradeoffs. Sometimes the 

specifics are hard but the process is well known in engineering and 

economics. However, enterprise red teams are usually unskilled at making 

the trade-offs that they face. For example, “alienating half of our customers 

to gain a new set of more desirable customers” is not typically a tradeoff 

taught in business school. “Risking leadership in the industry if we fail at 

risky venture X” faces few executives in their working career. Or for the 

British Cabinet, “shall we choose 1 billion pound sterling adverse trade 

balance, or 500 million pounds sterling operating loss, or lay off 50,000 
APPENDIX 3 ____________________________________________________________________

28 _________________________________________________________________________

Welsh steel makers two years before election?” is not part of the curriculum

taught at Oxford or Cambridge

Unfamiliar tradeoffs require clarity of presentation in order to generate 

debate. Yet the temptation is to ‘fuzz the issue’ when it is uncomfortable, 

embarrassing to senior people or hard to clarify. The CEOs who keep 

pressing for clarity even when they are part of the problem will get better 

results for the organization and actually enhance their leadership and 

esteem.

Mental Framework: The mental framework for solving enterprise 

problems parallels the problems themselves. External information is 

preponderant. Outside trends in technology, economics, politics, finance, 

and competition are important. Internal value shifts, capacity and speed to 

change, current economic strength and weakness, awareness of people 

about the outside world, all affect how quickly major change can be 

accomplished. Forecasting is unfortunately necessary because medium and 

large organizations change very slowly and major change requires half a 

decade. However, finding red team members who are accustomed to 

thinking about half-decade change programs is not easy. R&D professionals 

are no better than others with the exception that they are usually very good 

at assessing technology rates of change. 

Team Composition: As can be deduced from above, ideal team 

members are most likely nonexistant. The art is to mix quite different skills. 

Technology is often an issue; should an engineer, scientist, specialist, 

systems type, or futurist be the team member? And where do you find 

finance people who will be constructive, not obstructive when ideas 

obviously require lots of capital or losses or risk? Can behavior types stop 

facilitating the red team long enough to be analytically perceptive about 

trends in internal and external populations? And politics is about here and 

now, not two years from now no matter how important trends are. In other 

words, selecting individuals with skills can’t be delegated. It is high-order 

handicraft.

Project Plan: The enterprise red team of course needs a plan, but 

flexibility must be an intrinsic part of the plan. Enterprise teams are 

somewhat like R&D – initial exploration of many avenues, triage of 

approaches and possibilities, digging deeper into a few and finally 
_____________________________________________________________________APPENDIX 3

___________________________________________________________________________29

concentrating on the very few that offer major opportunity. For example, in 

a UK steel example, balance of trade data did not exist in useful form, 

apparent pricing was quite different than real pricing (though strictly 

forbidden by policy), productivity data was not comparable and was, in fact, 

wrong, and competitors all assumed that they would increase market share 

of world steel to justify expansion plans even though everyone agreed on 

limited market size. A precise plan would have been useless almost as soon 

as it was written. 

Perspective data, not financial accuracy is important initially. Teams 

cannot ask financial or IT departments for a particular analysis and wait for 

a result. The time required is too long, the accuracy specious, and 

perspective lacking. 
APPENDIX 3 ____________________________________________________________________

30 _________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________APPENDIX 4

___________________________________________________________________________31

APPENDIX 4. HISTORICAL EXAMPLES OF “RED TEAM”

ACTIVITIES

The term “red teaming” as it is currently used is relatively new, but 

military organizations have utilized the types of activities encompassed by 

the phrase for quite some time. In particular, they have used war games 

with adaptive simulated enemies to test war plans, as well as emerging 

concepts. At a more rudimentary level, simply having a person (or group of 

people) look for vulnerabilities in plans, or offer alternative takes on 

scenarios, has proven of considerable value. Examining some historical case 

studies of such war games might be useful to see how games might best be 

used in the current environment, as well as to examine the misuses of red 

teaming methodologies.

EXAMPLES OF SUCCESSFUL RED TEAMS

German development of armored warfare in the Interwar Period. As a 

result of the Treaty of Versailles, Germany was unable to buy or build any 

kind of armored vehicles (other than police vehicles). But, the Germans were 

able to learn from the exercises being conducted by the British, who were at 

the forefront of tank development. Most importantly, they initiated a series 

of studies to look critically at the lessons of World War I in order to apply 

those lessons to emerging doctrine. As a part of that careful examination, the 

German military was able to conceptualize how armored forces might be 

utilized, as well as “how a potential opponent might utilize armor against 

German forces.”1 The insights developed by this series of studies was 

pivotal in the German conduct of the blitzkrieg.

US carrier aviation in the Interwar Period. The U.S. Naval War College 

conducted a series of war games that helped extrapolate technological 

trends in the strategic environment. While the contemporary level of 

technology at the time did not allow for the exploration of some questions, a 

series of war games conducted between 1923 and 1935 demonstrated the 

potential of aircraft carriers to act independently, which in turn affected 

 

1

 Murray, Williamson. “Armored Warfare: The British, French and German Experiences” in Military Innovation in 

the Interwar Period. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996. p.39.
APPENDIX 4 ____________________________________________________________________

32 _________________________________________________________________________

decision-making about procurement. That level of insight eventually paid 

off for the U.S., because after Pearl Harbor, America possessed a carrier fleet 

to allow it to recover from the loss of its battleships. In fact, the raid at Pearl 

Harbor may have been the catalyst that the United States needed to force it 

to abandon the age-old “Battleship Paradigm” that placed primacy on the 

big gun and relegated the aircraft carrier to a supporting role.

Operation Post Mortem (June/July 1945). During the course of the war, 

the British had great difficulty in assessing the effectiveness of their ECM 

systems. In 1945, though, they captured intact the German air defense 

command in Denmark. In late June and early July the British decided to run 

full-scale, mock raid against the system to test the effectiveness of their ECM 

systems. The operation inherently had some artificiality. For example, there 

was no German fighter coverage employed; and, because the air defense 

system in Denmark had not been attacked during the war, it consisted 

mostly of inexperienced operators. Nevertheless, the British were able to 

gain valuable insights into the effectiveness of their systems.2

Cuban Missile Crisis (1962). On the first day of the crisis, October 16, 

President Kennedy organized the “Ex Comm” (the Executive Committee of 

the National Security Council) to help advise him on the situation, and U.S. 

responses to the unfolding crisis. His choice of those in the Ex Comm 

(especially his brother and the Attorney General, Robert Kennedy) was a 

deliberate move to provide alternatives for courses of action and act as a 

counterbalance for the strong military response, originally being advocated. 

Another example of Kennedy’s use of dissenting views to produce 

alternative courses of actions occurred on October 27. Early in the day, a 

letter had been received from Khrushchev. It was more formal than 

previous communications, and the tone indicated that someone might have 

written it other than Khrushchev. The State Department drafted a response 

that tried to answer some of the concerns raised, but there was dissent as to 

whether that was the correct way to go. Robert Kennedy and others 

(including Ted Sorenson, the Presidential Counsel) suggested ignoring that 

letter and answering the proposal made in the previous letter. Debate over 

the subject was heated, and in response, President Kennedy ordered Robert 

 

2

 Rosen, Stephen Peter. Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military. Ithaca: Cornell University 

Press, 1991. p. 198.
_____________________________________________________________________APPENDIX 4

___________________________________________________________________________33

Kennedy and Sorenson to go into another room to draft a counter-proposal. 

That allowed the President to look at the two choices and thus make a 

decision. In the end, the Kennedy/Sorenson draft was the letter the 

President signed and sent to Khrushchev.

EXAMPLES OF UNSUCCESSFUL RED TEAMS

Pearl Harbor (1941). In one respect, the war gaming surrounding the 

attack at Pearl Harbor was a success for the Japanese. As intended, the 

attack sank or disabled the majority of the U.S. Battleship fleet. And while 

there was disappointment that the U.S. carrier fleet was not present, and 

thus escaped unscathed, Japanese planning had focused on American 

battleships, not aircraft carriers.

On the other hand, Japanese planning for Pearl Harbor did not consider 

certain aspects that a thorough red team might have suggested. First of all, it 

never considered the impact that aircraft carriers would have on the course 

of the war. Even though the Pearl Harbor attack eventually led the demise 

of the “Battleship Paradigm”, the Japanese still based their assumptions 

about the course of the war on the theory that surface warfare consisted of 

battle fleets engaging enemy battle fleets and relegated aircraft carriers to a 

support role.

Misdirected objectives of the raid are another issue not addressed by war 

gaming. If the Japanese had concentrated on attacking the military 

infrastructure (such as the harbor installation, workshops, dry docks, and oil 

storage facilities) instead of on the warships, the raid would have been more 

effective at delaying the American response. The Japanese did disable part 

of the U.S. fleet, but the infrastructure remained largely intact. Thus, the U.S. 

Navy was able to make a fast recovery. The harbor was still serviceable (and 

thus able to receive American aircraft carriers and prepare them for 

offensive operations), and equipment was mobilized to salvage and repair 

many of the ships sunk during the raid (making them available for offensive 

operations later in the war). Attacking the harbor infrastructure would have 

forced the American fleet to operate from West Coast bases. Even attacking 

the oil depots in Hawaii would have resulted in the laborious process of 

restocking fleet trains that would have required months to organize.3 For all 

 

3

 U.K. Ministry of Defense. War With Japan, Vol. II: Defensive Phase. London: HMSO, 1995. p. 25.
APPENDIX 4 ____________________________________________________________________

34 _________________________________________________________________________

of 1942 the U.S. military would have had to use its West Coast bases rather 

than Hawaii for its military operations in the Pacific.

Japanese war plans also flawed in the strategic approach that the Pearl 

Harbor raid took, which was contrary to Japan’s overall strategy. The goal of 

the attack was to destroy U.S. morale and force a compromise that accepted 

the situation in the Pacific. As one Japanese planner pointed out, “while a 

war which began with an attack in the south might be ended in a 

compromise, an attack on Pearl Harbor would destroy any hope of a 

compromise settlement.”4 The conception of the raid rested on the 

assumption that the U.S. fleet posed a threat to the Japanese flank in the 

event of a southward attack. But Japanese intelligence at the time knew that 

the U.S. fleet did not have the tankers or supply ships to support a flank 

attack. 

Midway (1942). On May 1, 1942, the Japanese Combined Fleet 

Headquarters conducted a four-day series of war games to test the 

operations planned for Midway and beyond. The scope of the plans amazed 

some critical officers who noted that the formidable program “seemed to 

have been dreamed up with a great deal more imagination than regard for 

reality.”5 In hindsight, we know the Midway operation was a dismal failure. 

Looking at the details of the war game reveals flaws in the approach and 

philosophy that should be highlighted for the war planner of today.

First, even considering the scope and complexity of the operations, the 

war game rested on the assumption that the Imperial Navy could execute all 

operations without difficulty. In no small measure, this was due to the 

arbitrary interference of the officer presiding over the war game, Rear 

Admiral Ugaki, who set aside the ruling of the umpires when they 

adversely affected the Japanese side. 

Second, the lack of familiarity with the plans by the operational 

commands responsible for the conduct of the war game resulted in those 

commands following the lead of the staff of the Combined Fleet 

Headquarters. In a telling example, a question arose as to how the First 

Carrier Striking Force (under Vice Admiral Nagumo) would react to an 

 

4

 Weinberg, Gerhard. A Word At Arms. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994. p. 259.

5

 Fuchida, Mitsuo and Masatake Okumiya. Midway: The Battle That Doomed Japan. Annapolis: Naval Institute 

Press, 1955. p.96.
_____________________________________________________________________APPENDIX 4

___________________________________________________________________________35

enemy carrier task force appearing on its flank. The vague reply suggested 

no response plan existed. Nothing was done to prepare for such an 

eventuality. In fact, this was just the eventuality that occurred at Midway.

Third, the war games ended with many of the officers in the operational 

forces dissatisfied over various aspects of the plan, in particular the 

underestimation of enemy capabilities. Because they failed to voice such 

reservations, the plan marched on while planners failed to address the 

various problems and underlying assumptions.6

 

6

Ibid ., p.94-99.
APPENDIX 4 ____________________________________________________________________

36 _________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________APPENDIX 5

___________________________________________________________________________37

APPENDIX 5. DRAFT MEMO FROM THE SECRETARY OF 

DEFENSE 

A DoD culture that is more conducive to taking risks needs to be 

more attentive to understanding these risks. Red teams can be a major

contributor, not only by “playing” the adversary, but also by challenging 

our assumptions, plans and programs. I look to red teaming as a disciplined 

way to deepen our understanding of options available to adversaries, to 

make our assumptions, plans and programs more robust and to avoid the 

complacency that often follows success. 

I want more effective use of red teams in DoD. As a first step, I am 

creating several red teams to help identify the lessons that potential 

adversaries (nations and other) could be learning from recent US military 

campaigns. The USD (I), working with the USD (AT&L), USD (P) and the 

VCJCS will establish the teams and report back to me in 60 days.

In addition, to strengthen our use of red teams, I have directed:

− USD (AT&L) to develop, distribute and continually update, a best 

practices guide for red teaming

− CJCS, USD (AT&L) and the Service Chiefs to establish red teaming as 

a subject to be researched and taught at institutions of PME

− Department and Agency Heads to report back to me on their plans 

for enhancing the role of red teams in their own organizations 

Red teams are not an oversight function. Embedding the use of red 

teams in DoD’s culture will increase our understanding of the risks as we 

make major changes and transform our military capabilities.
APPENDIX 5 ____________________________________________________________________

38 _________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________APPENDIX 6

___________________________________________________________________________39

APPENDIX 6. GLOSSARY

ACTD Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration

AFB Air Force Base

SAF/AQLR Secretary of the Air Force / Acquisition Special 

Programs Red Team

AT&L Acquisition Technology and Logistics

CEO Chief Executive Officer

CHOP Countermeasures Hands-On Program

CJCS Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

CMTC Combat Maneuver Training Center

DART Defense Adaptive Red Team

DCSINT Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence

DLA Defense Logistics Agency

DoD Department of Defense

DSB Defense Science Board

Intell Intelligence

JFCOM Joint Forces Command

JRTC Joint Readiness Training Center

MC02 Millennium Challenge ‘02

MDA Missile Defense Agency

MIT Massachusetts Institute of Technology

NTC National Training Center

OEF Operation Enduring Freedom

OIF Operation Iraqi Freedom
APPENDIX 6 ____________________________________________________________________

40 _________________________________________________________________________

ONA Operational Net Assessment

OPFOR Opposing Force(s)

OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense

P Policy

PME Professional Military Education

RDO Rapid Decisive Operations

SAF Secretary of the Airforce

SDI Strategic Defense Initiative 

SDIO Strategic Defense Initiative Organization

SecDef Secretary of Defense

SSBN Subsurface Ballistic Nuclear

TF Task Force

TRADOC Training and Doctrine Command

TRANSCOM Transportation Command

UK United Kingdom

US United States

USD Office of the Under Secretary of Defense

UV01 Unified Vision ‘01