IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS 

EASTERN DIVISION 

RICHARD PANDOLFI and ) 

STACEY PANDOLFI, ) 

 Plaintiffs, ) 

 ) 

 vs. ) Case No. 12 C 2328 

 ) 

CITY OF CHICAGO, LISA EITEL, DAVID ) 

SYFCZAK, MICHAEL CHEVALIER, JUSTIN ) 

STANAKER, and ROBERT STANAKER, ) 

 ) 

 Defendants. ) 

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

MATTHEW F. KENNELLY, District Judge: 

 Richard and Stacey Pandolfi sued the City of Chicago, Chicago police officers 

Lisa Eitel, David Syfczak, and Michael Chevalier, and private citizens Justin and Robert 

Stanaker under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law. The Pandolfis alleged that on or about 

April 2, 2010, the officers, along with the Stanakers, illegally broke into their residence 

without a warrant or consent. After the Pandolfis called 911 to report this, they alleged, 

the officers retaliated by arresting Richard Pandolfi without probable cause. After the 

arrest, the Stanakers alleged entered the residence under the officers’ supervision and 

ransacked it. Richard Pandolfi was ultimately convicted of aggravated battery based on 

what the Pandolfis contend was fabricated testimony. His conviction is currently on 

appeal. 

 The Pandolfis’ complaint, which they filed on March 29, 2012, included claims 

under section 1983 for unlawful search and seizure (Count 1), false arrest (Count 2), 

arrest in retaliation for exercise of free speech rights (Count 3), and state law claims for 

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intentional infliction of emotional distress (Counts 4 and 5) and property damage (Count 

6), as well as a claim against the City under 745 ILCS 10/9-102 seeking indemnification 

of any liability of the two officers (Count 7). 

 The case was disposed of before any discovery was done, indeed before the 

Court even set a discovery schedule. The City and the police officer defendants made 

an offer of judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68, in the amount of 

$5,001 in favor of Richard Pandolfi and $10,001 in favor of Stacey Pandolfi, plus 

reasonable attorney’s fees and costs through May 29, 2012 to be determined by the 

Court. Upon acceptance of the offer, the Pandolfis voluntarily dismissed their claims 

against the Stanakers without prejudice. On June 12, 2012, the Court entered judgment 

based on the Pandolfis’ acceptance of the offer of judgment. 

 The Pandolfis have filed a petition for attorney’s fees for three lawyers with the 

firm of Ekl, Williams & Provenzale, seeking a total of $30,899. The breakdown of the 

attorneys’ claimed time is as follows: 

 Terry Ekl: 21 hours @ $425 per hour = $8,925.00 

 Patrick Provenzale: 5.75 hours @ $350 per hour = 2,012.50 

 Tracy Stanker: 82.10 hours @ $250 per hour = 20,525.00 

The City defendants object on the ground that the amount claimed is excessive. 

 The starting point for determination of a reasonable attorney’s fee in a section 

1983 case is the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation, multiplied by a 

reasonable hourly rate. See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1984). The fee 

applicant bears the burden of showing the reasonableness of the time requested as well 

as the hourly rates. Id. at 437. If, however, “a plaintiff has achieved only partial or 

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limited success, the product of hours reasonably expended on the litigation as a whole 

times a reasonable hourly rate may be an excessive amount.” Id. at 436. See also, 

e.g., Spegon v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 175 F.3d 544, 558 (7th Cir. 1999). 

 The amount of damages plaintiffs recovered via their acceptance of the offer of 

judgment was undeniably modest. Their initial settlement demand made on May 15, 

2012, was $250,000. Defendants responded two weeks later, on Mary 29, 2012, with 

the $15,002 offer of judgment. Plaintiffs accepted the offer even though their attorney 

initially responded that the offer was “not realistic or reasonable.” Defs.’ Resp. to Pls.’ 

Pet. for Award of Fees, Ex. B. 

 It is also noteworthy that even though, from an objective standpoint, the degree 

of harm experienced by Richard Pandolfi (who was arrested, jailed for a brief period, 

and prosecuted) was greater than that experienced by Stacey Pandolfi, she recovered a 

greater amount. This is best explained by the fact that because Richard Pandolfi was 

found guilty of aggravated battery, his claims arising from his arrest and prosecution 

likely were barred by Heck v Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), because his conviction 

had not been vacated or reversed on appeal. 

 Plaintiffs acknowledge in their fee petition their limited degree of success in the 

litigation itself. Specifically, they state that the $15,002 they received “in no way 

compensated Plaintiffs for the injuries that they suffered at the hands of the Chicago 

Police Department . . . .” Pls. Pet. for Award of Fees at 3. They say, however, that they 

accepted the award because they believe the judgment will benefit Richard Pandolfi in 

the appeal from his criminal conviction. See id.; see also Pls.’ Reply at 4. It is 

speculative whether plaintiffs will obtain this collateral benefit; they cite no authority 

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supporting the proposition that the judgment will have a legal or other effect in the 

criminal appeal. One way or another, however, plaintiffs essentially traded off success 

in this litigation for a potential collateral benefit. Part of the price for this is that their 

concededly limited success in the case is an appropriate consideration in determining 

the reasonableness of the fees requested. 

 Defendants challenge the hourly rates proposed for the three attorneys involved. 

The reasonable hourly rate for an attorney is the market rate for his or her services, and 

the attorney’s actual billing rate for comparable work is presumptively appropriate to use 

as the market rate. See People Who Care v. Rockford Bd. of Educ., Sch. Dist. No. 205,

90 F.3d 1307, 1310 (7th Cir. 1996). As is typical for section 1983 litigation, however, 

the Pandolfis’ attorneys do not typically charge clients an hourly rate for their work on 

such cases, so the next best evidence of their market rate is the rate charged by 

lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience, and reputation in the relevant 

community. Id.; see Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 892, 825 n.11 (1984). 

 Based on the evidence provided, primarily a fee award by Judge Amy St. Eve in 

a section 1983 case in which Ekl and Provenzale were counsel for the plaintiff, that their 

appropriate hourly rates are $400 and $300 respectively, not the higher rates they seek 

here, which they do not support by any evidence regarding rates awarded to other 

attorneys of similar skill and experience in this type of litigation. (Ekl and Provenzale 

have billed higher rates for commercial and other types of litigation, but under People 

Who Care and the cases upon which it relies, the relevant field is litigation comparable 

to this case.) For Stanker, the Court approves a rate of $175, which the evidence 

reflects is commensurate with her more modest degree of experience. 

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 The Court is persuaded based on defendants’ objections that the amount of time 

spent preparing the complaint – 37.5 hours of Stanker’s time – is unreasonably high. 

The complaint is, to be sure, admirably detailed, but plaintiffs have not adequately 

justified this amount of time for drafting the complaint in a factually and legally 

straightforward case like this one. (The Court also notes that some amount of this time 

was necessarily spent drafting state law claims that were almost certainly time-barred, 

as well as the false arrest claims by Richard Pandolfi, which as noted earlier likely were 

barred by Heck v. Humphrey.) The Court reduces the time spent on this task to 20 

hours. As for the remainder of defendants’ challenges to particular time entries, the 

Court is unpersuaded. The remainder of the time spent was reasonable. 

 The resulting hours-times-hourly rate figures are as follows: 

 Ekl: 21 hours @ $400 per hour = $8,200.00 

 Provenzale: 5.75 hours @ $300 per hour = 1,725.00 

 Stanker: 62.10 hours @ $175 per hour = 10,867.50 

 Total: $20,792.50 

The Court further reduces this amount by twenty percent to account for plaintiffs’ limited 

success in this case, a point discussed in greater detail earlier in this decision. The 

resulting amount is $16,634. 

 The Court has considered the remainder of defendants’ arguments and 

determines them to be lacking in merit. 

Conclusion

 For the reasons stated above, the Court grants plaintiffs’ petition for award of 

attorney’s fees in part [dkt. no. 31] and awards plaintiffs attorney’s fees in the amount of 

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$16,634. The Court also awards plaintiffs their requested costs (just the civil case filing 

fee) of $350. 

 s/ Matthew F. Kennelly 

 MATTHEW F. KENNELLY 

 United States District Judge 

Date: September 4, 2012 

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