PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

_____________

No. 19-3961

_____________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Appellant

v.

ROBERT DEAN CAESAR

_____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

(District Court No.: 2:18-cr-00525-001)

District Judge: Honorable Gerald J. Pappert

_____________________________________

Argued February 11, 2021

(Filed June 23, 2021)

Before: CHAGARES, SCIRICA, and RENDELL, Circuit 

Judges.

William M. McSwain

Seth M. Schlessinger

Jennifer A. Williams (Argued)

Robert A. Zauzmer

Office of United States Attorney

615 Chestnut Street

Suite 1250

Philadelphia, PA 19106

Counsel for Appellant
2

Stephen P. Patrizio

Two Penn Center Plaza

1500 John F. Kennedy Boulevard

Suite 1205

Philadelphia, PA 19102

David E. Robbins (Argued)

8 Erika Lane

Broomall, PA 19008

Counsel for Appellee

_________

O P I N I O N

_________

RENDELL, Circuit Judge.

Facing federal child pornography charges, defendantappellee Robert Caesar moved to suppress evidence seized 

pursuant to search warrants executed by the Pennsylvania State 

Police. The District Court granted the motion in part, 

suppressing thousands of images of child pornography and 

photographs of Caesar’s sexual abuse victims. The 

Government now appeals.

The initial warrant application contained information 

that Caesar had sexually abused two children in his home and, 

on multiple occasions, took to the Internet seeking out used 

children’s undergarments and photos and videos of partially 

clothed children. Although the supporting affidavit included 

no express allegations that Caesar possessed child 

pornography, it stated that child abusers “routinely keep” such 

images. App. 49. The magistrate judge issued a warrant 

authorizing officers to search Caesar’s home for child 

pornography and other sexually explicit images of minors, 

among other things, and several items of electronic equipment, 

later found to contain child pornography, were seized. 

Charged under federal law with producing, receiving, and 

possessing child pornography, Caesar moved to suppress the 

images. The District Court excluded the images, determining

that the statements linking child molestation with child 
3

pornography failed to establish probable cause. It further 

concluded that the affidavit was so deficient that the good faith 

exception to the exclusionary rule did not apply. Because we 

conclude that the officers relied on the initial warrant in good 

faith, we will reverse that part of the District Court order

suppressing the images and remand for further proceedings.

I. BACKGROUND

The evidence at issue was gathered by State Police

officers pursuant to three search warrants while investigating

Caesar for various sexual offenses involving minors. Because 

our Fourth Amendment inquiry turns on the sufficiency of the 

affidavits of probable cause presented to the issuing magistrate, 

the facts are largely drawn from those affidavits. See United 

States v. Zimmerman, 277 F.3d 426, 430 n.3 (3d Cir. 2002).

A. The Initial Tip and Caesar’s eBay Activity

In July 2017, the State Police received a tip from the 

National Center for Missing and Exploited Children 

(“NCMEC”) about suspicious online activity by an eBay user. 

Officers investigated the tip and discovered several outgoing 

messages from the user’s account, horses357, seeking to buy 

children’s used underwear and swimsuits. In one message, the 

user asked for a photo of the inside of the clothing item and for 

information about the age and weight of the child who 

previously wore it. In another message, the user, posing as a

parent buying swimwear for his son, asked, “who wore this and 

at what age?” App. 49. In a third message, the user posed as 

a child looking for photos or videos of other children in their 

undergarments: 

Hi, [i]t’s JJ again. I won these, yeah! But I spent 

more than dad said I could. He might not be to 

[sic] happy. Can your son David do another 

video in these or the white ones before you send 

them? Or some pics please? I didn’t win the 

black and blue ones my brother wanted. 

Someone out bid [sic] me . . . after the sale was 

over. Can you ask your son if he would like to 

exchange email addresses please? . . . Ok, thanks 

again. JJ.
4

App. 50.

The State Police learned that horses357 was registered 

to “Robert Caesar . . . of 906 Street Rd., Oxford, PA.” App. 

49. Several other pieces of information corroborated Caesar’s 

connection to the eBay account. The account listed Caesar’s 

work email address and phone number, and the Internet 

Protocol (“IP”) address associated with the account was tied to 

a home address in Oxford. Driver’s license records also

showed that Caesar’s home address was 906 Street Road. State 

Police Trooper Stefano Gallina interviewed the owner of the 

residence, who stated that Caesar had rented the house for four 

years. The landlord also told Gallina that Caesar had never 

been married and had no children. 

B. Subsequent Investigation into Sexual Abuse 

of the Two Brothers

While the initial investigation was ongoing, in January 

2018 Gallina received a referral from Children and Youth 

Services alleging that Caesar had sexually abused two 

adolescent brothers. On January 17, 2018, Gallina interviewed 

the brothers—ages sixteen and fourteen—and their mother,

separately. The older brother told Gallina that, a few years 

prior, Caesar began paying the boys to do occasional chores 

around his house. “[S]ome time” later, Caesar started

supplying him (then fourteen years old) and his brother (then 

twelve years old) with alcohol. App. 50. Around June 2015, 

Caesar began sexually abusing the boys. Caesar would provide 

the older brother alcohol and then take him to Caesar’s

bedroom, where Caesar performed oral sex on him and forced 

the boy to masturbate him. The sexual abuse took place 

“several times” and “always” occurred in Caesar’s bed. App. 

50. On multiple occasions, Caesar asked the older brother to 

engage in other sexual acts with him, but the boy refused. The 

boy agreed, however, to let Caesar keep a few articles of his 

underwear. 

The younger brother advanced similar allegations in his 

interview with Gallina. He also stated that Caesar supplied him 

with alcohol and brought him to the bedroom, where Caesar 

sexually abused him. Both boys claimed that the sexual 
5

conduct continued until late December 2017, at which point 

their parents prohibited them from returning to Caesar’s house. 

In her interview with Gallina, the boys’ mother stated only that 

the younger brother returned home from Caesar’s house one 

evening in late December 2017 smelling like alcohol. She did 

not share any information about the alleged sexual abuse. 

The day after these interviews, Gallina applied for two 

warrants to search for evidence of aggravated indecent assault 

of a minor, in violation of 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3125(a)(8). The 

warrant applications sought authority for the following:

• In the first warrant, a search of Caesar’s home for 

two categories of evidence: (1) physical evidence of 

the alleged sexual abuse, consisting of “[s]emen and 

bodily fluid belonging to the victims, children’s 

underwear and swimwear,” and (2) “images of child 

pornography, child erotica or nudity and/or any 

images of the victims in any form (hard copy 

photographs, VHS tapes, DVD’s, CD’s, or stored on 

personal electronic devices).” App. 47. This second 

category of evidence is at issue on appeal.

• In the second warrant, a collection of a sample of 

Caesar’s DNA. 

The affidavits of probable cause supporting the first and second 

warrants each consisted of four single-spaced pages that set

forth a detailed description of Caesar’s eBay messages and the 

sexual abuse allegations against him.

In addition, the affidavits provided an extensive 

accounting of Gallina’s experience and training as a State 

Police trooper and ex-Federal Air Marshal. At the time of the 

investigation, Gallina had been a trooper for approximately six 

years and “ha[d] investigated several thousand criminal 

incidents.” App. 48. Many of these criminal investigations

“included the search and investigation of electronic 

communication devices, electronic records and data.” App. 48.

He had also taken courses on general investigation techniques, 

investigation methods for drug crimes and violent crimes, and 

criminal behavior assessment, among other subjects. None of 

Gallina’s training addressed sex crimes specifically.
6

Based on his training and experience, Gallina made

several statements about the tendency of child abusers to 

possess child pornography and other sexually explicit images. 

He alleged that he

kn[ew] that those involved in the sexual abuse of 

children and juveniles routinely keep and 

maintain . . . [digital or physical copies of] 

photographs of nude children and of children 

posed in various states of undress . . . [and]

videos of nude children and of children posed in 

various states of undress performing sexual acts

. . . .

App. 49. At other points in the affidavit, Gallina repeated 

similar allegations that child abusers “routinely and commonly 

store, share, and maintain” sexually explicit images and videos

of children. App. 51. He also averred that individuals who 

sexually abuse children often browse the internet for child 

pornography and used articles of children’s clothing on 

websites such as Craigslist, eBay, and Facebook Marketplace. 

A Chester County magistrate judge issued the two 

warrants and the State Police searched Caesar’s home the same 

day. During the search, officers seized stained bedsheets, 

pillowcases, and articles of stained children’s underwear. 

They also discovered several pieces of electronic equipment, 

including a cell phone, digital camera, various VHS cassettes 

and compact discs, two computers, and multiple external hard 

drives. One of the hard drives was found wedged between the 

mattress and box spring in Caesar’s bedroom. The officers did 

not search the devices immediately upon seizing them. 

Later that day, following the search, Gallina arrested 

Caesar and brought him to the police station for questioning. 

After Gallina read Caesar his Miranda1rights, Caesar agreed 

to be interviewed. The interview proceeded for about an hour 

until Caesar told Gallina that he did not want to answer more 

questions. Notwithstanding Caesar’s multiple invocations of 

his right to remain silent, Gallina continued to question him. 

Caesar went on to admit that he sexually abused the two 

1 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
7

brothers, used the underwear and swimsuits that he bought on 

eBay as a means for sexual gratification, and viewed child 

pornography on some of the seized devices. Before the District 

Court, the Government conceded that all these post-invocation 

admissions should be suppressed. The parties do not contest 

this issue on appeal.

Although the initial warrant permitted a search for

images “in any form . . . [including those] stored on personal 

electronic devices,” App. 47, Gallina later secured an 

additional warrant specifically authorizing a search of the 

seized devices’ contents. At oral argument, counsel for the 

Government noted that law enforcement officers often seek an 

additional standalone warrant to search computer devices as a

“belt-and-suspenders” approach to conducting investigations. 

Oral Arg. at 12:20–13:45. The third warrant application 

included nearly all the information in the first affidavit, in 

addition to a summary of the items seized in the search of 

Caesar’s residence and Caesar’s post-invocation admissions 

from his interrogation. Equipped with both the initial warrant

and third warrant, the State Police found over 70,000 images 

and videos of child pornography on the seized devices. These 

images included several sexually explicit photos of the 

younger brother. 

C. Caesar’s Criminal Proceedings and 

Suppression Motion

Caesar was indicted in federal court and charged with

production of child pornography under 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a)

and (e), receipt of child pornography under 18 U.S.C. 

§ 2252(a)(2), and possession of child pornography under 18 

U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B).

2 He then moved to suppress all the 

2

In addition, the Chester County district attorney charged 

Caesar with various state child sexual assault and child 

pornography offenses. While the district attorney’s office 

dropped the state child pornography charges in favor of the 

federal prosecution, it pursued the sexual assault charges 

involving the two brothers, and a jury convicted Caesar in 

August 2020. In that case, the Chester County Court of 

Common Pleas suppressed Caesar’s post-invocation 
8

evidence seized in the search of his home. The District Court 

denied the motion as to the DNA sample and physical evidence 

of sexual abuse but granted it with respect to the “images of 

child pornography, child erotica or nudity and any images of 

the victims” 3 discovered on the electronic devices. United

States v. Caesar, No. 18-525, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 206763,

at *26 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 26, 2019). This timely appeal followed. 

If affirmed, the District Court’s suppression order would 

effectively terminate Caesar’s federal prosecution, which 

involves only the child pornography charges. 

II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3231. We exercise jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal 

under 18 U.S.C. § 3731. In reviewing the District Court’s 

suppression order, we review its factual findings for clear error 

and exercise de novo review over its legal conclusions. See 

United States v. Werdene, 883 F.3d 204, 209 (3d Cir. 2018).

III. DISCUSSION

The Fourth Amendment forbids “unreasonable searches 

and seizures” and mandates that “no Warrants shall issue, but 

upon probable cause.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. The violation 

of an individual’s Fourth Amendment rights, however, does 

not always guarantee suppression of evidence derived from an 

illegal search. See United States v. Katzin, 769 F.3d 163, 170 

(3d Cir. 2014) (en banc). That is because “the exclusionary 

rule is not an individual right,” but a prudential remedy meant 

to deter law enforcement officials from engaging in 

unreasonable searches and seizures. Herring v. United

States, 555 U.S. 135, 141 (2009); see also Stone v. Powell, 428 

U.S. 465, 482 (1976) (describing the exclusionary rule as “a 

statements, but not any physical evidence obtained in the 

searches. 

3 Although courts have distinguished child pornography and 

“child erotica,” for convenience we will refer to the “images of 

child pornography, child erotica or nudity” identified in the 

first and third warrants collectively as “child pornography.” 

See, e.g., United States v. Vosburgh, 602 F.3d 512, 520 n.7 (3d 

Cir. 2010).
9

judicially created means of effectuating the rights secured by 

the Fourth Amendment”); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 

206, 217 (1960) (“The [exclusionary] rule is calculated to 

prevent, not to repair.”).

Because the suppression remedy is an “extreme 

sanction” that carries significant costs, United States v. Leon, 

468 U.S. 897, 926 (1984), however, it “has always been our 

last resort, not our first impulse,” Hudson v. Michigan, 547 

U.S. 586, 591 (2006). Given these costs, the Supreme Court in 

Leon established the “good faith” exception to the exclusionary 

rule, which prohibits suppression of “evidence obtained in 

objectively reasonable reliance” on a warrant later invalidated 

for lack of probable cause. 468 U.S. at 922.

A. The District Court Opinion

The District Court concluded that the officers lacked 

probable cause to search for the images and that the good faith 

exception did not apply. In so holding, the District Court 

primarily relied on our opinion in United States v. Zimmerman,

a Fourth Amendment case that, as here, involved a warrant 

application that alleged the supposed tendency of child 

molesters to possess child pornography. The District Court 

determined that, under Zimmerman, Gallina’s statements about 

the molestation-pornography link were merely “boilerplate”

and that, without more factual support, these statements failed

to establish probable cause to search for evidence of child 

pornography. Caesar, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 206763, at *18, 

20. Despite the detailed averments about Caesar’s eBay 

messages and prolonged sexual abuse of the brothers, the

District Court held that the first affidavit “lacked any facts

tying Caesar’s home to child pornography or to images of the 

victims.” Id. at *18. Absent such facts, the court reasoned, the 

affidavit failed to state probable cause to search for the images. 

Citing Zimmerman and our opinion in Virgin Islands v. John, 

654 F.3d 412 (3d Cir. 2011), the District Court further held that

the weaknesses of the first affidavit were so glaring that it was 

“entirely unreasonable” and, “at a minimum, grossly 

negligent” for Gallina to rely on the constitutionally infirm 

warrant. Id. at *20. Thus, the good faith exception to the 

exclusionary rule did not apply. 
10

The District Court concluded that the third warrant also 

did not render the images admissible. Although the third 

warrant provided additional authorization to search the 

electronic devices—separate from the initial warrant—the 

District Court held that the images were nonetheless tainted by 

the unlawful search of Caesar’s house because Gallina 

leveraged the fruits of that search to elicit Caesar’s confession

during the interrogation.

4

 Pointing to what it considered to be

Gallina’s “grossly negligent” reliance on the first warrant and 

his willful violation of Caesar’s right to remain silent during 

the later interrogation, the District Court also held that Gallina 

did not rely on the third warrant in good faith. Id. at *22 n.6,

23 n.8. The court therefore concluded that the images should 

be suppressed.

On appeal, the Government urges that the District Court 

erred in two ways. First, it argues that the searches of Caesar’s 

home and electronic devices were supported by probable cause 

and therefore did not violate the Fourth Amendment’s 

prohibition against unreasonable searches and 

seizures. Second, it argues that in any event, the State Police 

reasonably relied on the magistrate judge’s probable cause 

determinations such that the good faith exception should

4 The District Court declined to decide whether Gallina’s 

violation of Caesar’s right to remain silent alone required 

suppression of the images. As the District Court noted, the 

“fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine does not apply to 

nontestimonial, physical evidence derived from a suspect’s 

voluntary statements made before officers inform him of his 

Miranda rights. See United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 

636 (2004) (“The Self-Incrimination Clause . . . is not 

implicated by the admission into evidence of the physical fruit 

of a voluntary statement.”); United States v. DeSumma, 272 

F.3d 176, 180–81 (3d Cir. 2001). But we have not opined 

whether that same principle applies to physical evidence 

derived from a suspect’s statements elicited in violation of 

Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981), where the suspect 

invokes his right to an attorney or right to remain silent, yet 

officials continue the interrogation. We need not address that

question here.
11

apply.

5

 

We need only address the Government’s second 

argument to resolve this appeal. Because we conclude that the 

good faith exception applies, we need not determine whether 

probable cause supported the searches in the first place. See, 

e.g., United States v. Ninety-Two Thousand Four Hundred

Twenty-Two Dollars & Fifty-Seven Cents, 307 F.3d 137, 145 

(3d Cir. 2002) (“turn[ing] ‘immediately to a consideration of 

the officers’ good faith’” rather than first analyzing probable 

cause (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 925)); see also Katzin, 769 

F.3d at 170. 

B. The Exclusionary Rule and Good Faith 

Exception

As required by Leon and its progeny, we apply the 

exclusionary rule only in those “unusual cases” where it may 

achieve its “remedial objectives”: to appreciably deter 

unreasonable searches and seizures by law enforcement

officers. Leon, 468 U.S. at 908, 918. The rule is designed to 

eliminate any incentive for officers to violate suspects’ Fourth 

Amendment rights by prohibiting the admission of illegally 

seized evidence at trial. Herring, 555 U.S. at 139–40. By

doing so, suppression “compel[s] respect for the [Fourth 

Amendment’s] constitutional guaranty in the only effectively 

available way.” Elkins, 364 U.S. at 217.

In determining whether to suppress the fruits of an 

unconstitutional search, we must undertake a “rigorous” costbenefit analysis, weighing the “deterrence benefits of 

exclusion” against its “substantial social costs.” Davis v. 

United States, 564 U.S. 229, 237–38 (2011); accord Herring, 

555 U.S. at 141. Those costs include interfering with courts’ 

truth-seeking function, and more specifically, concealing 

“reliable, trustworthy evidence bearing on guilt or innocence” 

and, in some instances, “set[ting] the criminal loose in the 

community without punishment.” Davis, 564 U.S. at 237. 

5 The parties do not contest the part of the District Court’s order 

denying Caesar’s motion to suppress the bedsheets, 

pillowcases, underwear, and DNA sample. Accordingly, that 

part of the District Court order will be affirmed.
12

Exclusion is a “bitter pill,” id., swallowed only where it would 

result in a “substantial deterrent effect” that outweighs its 

resulting costs, Leon, 468 U.S. at 907 n.6. 

The Leon good faith exception to the exclusionary rule 

effectuates this balance by forbidding suppression where 

officers act in “good faith” or “objectively reasonable reliance” 

on a search warrant later held to be defective. 468 U.S. at 922; 

see also Katzin, 769 F.3d at 171. Under these circumstances, 

where an officer acted illegally but did so “in the objectively 

reasonable belief that [his] conduct did not violate the Fourth 

Amendment,” it is unlikely the threat of suppression would

deter any future constitutional violations. Leon, 468 U.S. at 

918. We do not exclude the fruits of unconstitutional searches

in such cases because any marginal deterrent benefit is 

outweighed by its costs.

Since Leon, the Supreme Court has further refined the 

good faith exception, placing the culpability of the officer’s 

misconduct at the center of the deterrence analysis. See 

Herring, 555 U.S. at 143; Davis, 564 U.S. at 238. It could be 

said that these more recent pronouncements in Herring and 

Davis have expanded the reach of the good faith exception and 

further narrowed the scope of the exclusionary rule. See Davis, 

564 U.S. at 258–59 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Since the deterrent 

effect of exclusion “varies with the culpability of the law 

enforcement conduct” at issue, the exclusionary rule applies 

only where the official conduct is “sufficiently deliberate that 

exclusion can meaningfully deter it, and sufficiently culpable 

that such deterrence is worth the price paid by the justice 

system.” Herring, 555 U.S. at 143–44. To trigger the 

exclusionary rule, law enforcement conduct must be 

“deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent,” or involve 

“recurring or systemic negligence.” Id. at 144. “[S]imple, 

‘isolated’ negligence,” in turn, does not warrant suppression. 

Davis, 564 U.S. at 238. 

Thus, “[t]he test for whether the good faith exception 

applies is ‘whether a reasonably well trained officer would 

have known that the search was illegal despite the magistrate’s 

authorization.’” United States v. Loy, 191 F.3d 360, 367 (3d 

Cir. 1999) (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 922 n.23). Guided by

Herring and Davis, we examine the totality of the 
13

circumstances, “consider[ing] not only any defects in the 

warrant but also the officer’s conduct in obtaining and 

executing the warrant and what the officer knew or should have 

known.” United States v. Franz, 772 F.3d 134, 147 (3d Cir. 

2014). In doing so, we bear in mind that police officers are not

trained attorneys and generally cannot be expected to secondguess a magistrate’s probable cause determination. See

Messerschmidt v. Millender, 565 U.S. 535, 547 (2012). 

Accordingly, “[t]he mere existence of a warrant typically 

suffices to prove that an officer conducted a search in good 

faith,” United States v. Hodge, 246 F.3d 301, 307–08 (3d Cir. 

2001), and “will obviate the need for any deep inquiry into

[the] reasonableness” of the officer’s reliance on the warrant,

United States v. Stearn, 597 F.3d 540, 561 (3d Cir. 2010)

(internal quotation marks omitted).

In “rare circumstances,” id., however, a warrant may be

so flawed that “the officer will have no reasonable grounds for 

believing that [it] was properly issued,” Leon, 468 U.S. at 923

(footnote omitted). We have identified four such situations in 

which the good faith exception does not apply:

(1) where the magistrate judge issued the 

warrant in reliance on a deliberately or 

recklessly false affidavit;

(2) where the magistrate judge abandoned his 

or her judicial role and failed to perform 

his or her neutral and detached function;

(3) where the warrant was based on an 

affidavit so lacking in indicia of probable 

cause as to render official belief in its 

existence entirely unreasonable; or

(4) where the warrant was so facially 

deficient that it failed to particularize the 

place to be searched or the things to be 

seized.

United States v. Tracey, 597 F.3d 140, 151 (3d Cir. 2010); see 

also Leon, 468 U.S. at 923. According to Caesar and the 

District Court, this case presents the third exception to the good

faith exception above. Tracey, 597 F.3d at 151.
14

Leon provided early guidance as to how the good faith 

exception can apply notwithstanding a warrant affidavit that 

lacks facts sufficient to establish probable cause. There, police 

officers initiated an investigation based on a confidential 

informant’s tip that the defendants were selling drugs and later 

secured a facially valid warrant to search the defendants’ 

homes and automobiles. Leon, 468 U.S. at 901–02. The court 

of appeals suppressed the evidence seized because the warrant 

application contained no information regarding the informant’s 

reliability or the basis of his statements and accordingly failed 

to satisfy probable cause. Id. at 905. While declining to review

the lower court’s probable cause determination, the Supreme 

Court noted that the affidavit nevertheless relayed the details 

of the officers’ “extensive investigation” and provided “much 

more than a ‘bare bones’ affidavit.” Id. at 926. And as 

demonstrated by the divided panel opinions of the lower court, 

the affidavit “provided evidence sufficient to create 

disagreement among thoughtful and competent judges as to the 

existence of probable cause.” Id. Accordingly, the Court held 

that the officers’ reliance on the magistrate’s probable cause 

determination was objectively reasonable, and that suppression 

would not advance the remedial purposes of the exclusionary 

rule. Id.

Although we decline to rule on probable cause, “the 

probable cause inquiry remains highly relevant” to our good 

faith analysis. Stearn, 597 F.3d at 562. In determining whether 

the good faith exception should apply, we examine whether an 

officer could reasonably believe that probable cause existed by 

assessing the facts in light of the relevant legal standards and 

pronouncements in applicable precedent. Under that 

precedent, probable cause is a “fluid concept,” turning on “the 

factual and practical considerations of everyday life,” which 

requires only a “fair probability that contraband or evidence of 

a crime will be found in a particular place.” Illinois v. Gates, 

462 U.S. 213, 231–32, 238 (1983). As we explain below, the 

existence of probable cause here is a close question under our 

Fourth Amendment caselaw, but that does not preclude the 

determination that the officers acted in good faith.

C. The Officers Seized the Images from Caesar’s 

Home in Good Faith Reliance on the Initial 

Warrant
15

The question before us is whether the facts set forth in 

the initial affidavit of probable cause were so deficient that the 

officers’ reliance on the accompanying warrant to search 

Caesar’s home and electronic devices was entirely 

unreasonable.6 Like the District Court, we are mindful of our

opinions in Zimmerman and John. Both those cases address 

the extent to which police officers can reasonably rely on 

warrants supported, in part, by police officers’ statements

about the tendency of child sexual abusers to possess child 

pornography. In both cases, divided panels concluded that the 

good faith exception did not apply. However, Zimmerman and 

John are distinguishable on their facts, and they do not

persuade us that the first affidavit was so obviously defective

that no reasonable officer would have believed there was 

probable cause to search for child pornography and images of

Caesar’s sexual abuse victims. Moreover, given the Supreme 

Court opinions in Herring and Davis, both of which were 

controlling when the warrant was issued, we cannot conclude 

that the officers’ conduct in seizing and searching the devices

was sufficiently flagrant to justify suppression of the images. 

1.

Because the District Court’s reasoning relied almost 

entirely on our precedent in Zimmerman and John, we will 

discuss those opinions in some detail. 

In Zimmerman, the police secured a warrant to search 

the home of the defendant, a high school teacher and coach, for 

evidence of sexual abuse of minors, including adult 

pornography and child pornography. 277 F.3d at 429–30. The 

affidavit of probable cause included three categories of 

information. First, some of Zimmerman’s students alleged that 

he had sexually abused them at school and on athletics road

trips. Id. at 430–31. Second, some current students and one 

former student stated that Zimmerman had shown them adult 

pornography at Zimmerman’s home six and ten months before 

the warrant application. Id. at 430, 434. Third, the affidavit 

related a postal inspector’s opinion that “persons with a sexual 

interest in children may possess child pornography and keep it 

in their homes for extended periods of time.” Id. at 431. 

6 We address the third warrant in Part III.C.3, infra.
16

During the search of Zimmerman’s home, police seized several 

images of child pornography, among other items. Id.

We held that the affidavit failed to set forth probable 

cause to search for child pornography and that the good faith 

exception did not apply. Id. at 429. As to probable cause, we 

noted that the warrant application “contained no information 

that Zimmerman had ever purchased or possessed child 

pornography,” and that “there was absolutely no information 

in the affidavit . . . indicating that child pornography was—or 

ever had been located [in his home].” Id. at 432–33. Because 

the Government conceded that the police lacked probable 

cause, we declined to determine how much weight, if any, to 

attribute to the postal inspector’s statement about the 

molestation-child pornography connection. Id. at 433 n.4. We 

noted, however, that “there [was] nothing” in the postal 

inspector’s statement about Zimmerman, the facts of his case, 

or the results of the investigation. Id. at 434. And without 

additional factual support, such “[r]ambling boilerplate 

recitations [regarding a molestation-pornography link] . . . may

have added fat to the affidavit, but certainly no muscle” in the 

probable cause calculus. Id. at 433 n.4 (internal quotation 

marks and citation omitted). 

The good faith exception did not apply because the

affidavit was “clearly insufficient” and “it was ‘entirely 

unreasonable’ for an official to believe to the contrary.” Id. at 

437. We reached that conclusion because—having already 

rejected the postal inspector’s statements—the only 

information linking pornography of any kind to Zimmerman’s 

residence was a single stale allegation that Zimmerman had 

stored a video of adult pornography on his home computer. Id. 

Then-Judge Alito, who would later write the majority 

opinion for the Supreme Court in Davis, dissented. He 

reasoned that, even if the warrant did not state “fresh probable 

cause” to search for child pornography, the majority 

improperly refused to apply the good faith exception. Id. at 

438 (Alito, J., dissenting). Pointing to Zimmerman’s 

“allegedly extended course of conduct with the students and 

his use of [adult] sexual materials in carrying out that course of 

conduct,” the dissent concluded that the affidavit provided 

some evidence that Zimmerman would possess “similar 
17

materials” in his home at the time of the search. Id. at 440. 

Unlike the majority, the dissent declined to opine whether the 

affidavit “provided fresh probable cause.” Id. But because 

“there is no bright line between fresh and stale probable cause,” 

the dissent concluded that this case did not present one of the 

“rare circumstances in which, although a neutral magistrate has 

found that there is probable cause, a lay officer executing the 

warrant could not reasonably believe that the magistrate was 

correct.” Id.

Unlike Zimmerman, John involved a warrant 

application that lacked any express statement about the link 

between molestation and pornography but nonetheless relied 

on an unsupported inference that child abusers often collect 

child pornography. There, the officer applied for a warrant to 

search the home of John, a teacher, after some of his sixthgrade students reported that he had sexually assaulted them in 

his classroom. John, 654 F.3d at 414. The students claimed

that John maintained two notebooks where he kept 

“inappropriate” notes about his female students, which he 

brought to and from school each day. Id. The warrant sought

permission to collect the notebooks and child pornography. Id.

We held that the affidavit was “wholly lacking in 

probable cause[] because [e]ven a cursory reading of [the] 

affidavit reveals that there is not a single assertion that John 

was in any way associated with child pornography.” Id. at 419

(second alteration in original) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). The allegations that John had committed sex crimes 

on school property and that “he kept two particular pieces of 

evidence of those crimes in his home” were inadequate “to

establish—or even to hint at—probable cause as to the wholly 

separate crime of possessing child pornography.” Id. 

Accordingly, the affidavit needed to allege the existence of an 

“assault-pornography correlation” explicitly and state the basis 

for the allegation. Id. Such a statement might be supported by 

“studies . . . show[ing] that a correlation exists between one

crime and the other,” or “perhaps extensive investigatory 

experience.” Id. at 420. But because the affidavit did not 

include either, we would not permit the officer to infer a 

connection between two distinct crimes to support a showing 

of probable cause or a good faith determination. Id. 
18

Judge Fuentes dissented. Underscoring the Supreme 

Court’s then-recent opinions in Herring and Davis, he 

concluded that the officer’s conduct was not sufficiently 

culpable to warrant the suppression remedy. Id. at 423 

(Fuentes, J., dissenting). He reasoned that, given the shortage 

of circuit court opinions addressing analogous fact patterns at 

the time of the search, a reasonably well-trained police officer 

would have acted just as the officer did: “[S]he would submit

a request to a judge asking whether there is probable cause for

a warrant. And, lacking legal training herself, she would then

rely on that judicial determination to do her job.” Id. at 425. 

The dissent observed that even subsequent court of appeals

opinions addressing the question presented—whether probable

cause to believe someone has molested a child “automatically”

supplies probable cause to believe that person possesses child

pornography—“provide[d] conflicting guidance.” Id.

(citing United States v. Hodson, 543 F.3d 286, 292–93 (6th Cir. 

2008); United States v. Falso, 544 F.3d 110, 122, 125 (2d Cir. 

2008); and United States v. Colbert, 605 F.3d 573, 578–79 (8th 

Cir. 2010)). And if “even judges, steeped in law and acting in 

the utmost good faith, can have different opinions on the issue 

. . . it was not objectively unreasonable—let alone, entirely 

unreasonable—for [the officer] to take one side of the 

controversy over the other, even if we now disagree with that 

decision.” Id. According to the dissent, suppression would not 

adequately deter officers from making such a mistake, and the 

good faith exception should therefore apply. Id.

2.

With these precedents in mind, we turn to the facts of 

this case. Here, the District Court faulted Gallina’s initial 

warrant application for many of the same deficiencies of the

Zimmerman and John warrants, even concluding that, as in 

those cases, “nothing in the first affidavit hinted that Caesar

ever had child pornography or images of the victims in his 

home.” Caesar, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 206763, at *16. The 

court further held that the only “conceivable bases” for 

probable cause to search for child pornography “were the 

‘unexamined biases and stereotypes’ Gallina briefly mentioned 

in the affidavit.” Id. at *20 (quoting John, 654 F.3d at 421). 

We are not so sure. 
19

Setting aside Gallina’s statements about the link 

between molestation and pornography for now, we conclude 

that the initial affidavit provided more than the “bare bones” or 

“paltry” affidavits that preclude good faith reliance. United 

States v. Pavulak, 700 F.3d 651, 664 (3d Cir. 2012); 

Zimmerman, 277 F.3d at 438. Asin Leon, the affidavit detailed 

the origin of Gallina’s investigation and the multiple steps

officers took leading to the issuance of the initial warrant: the

receipt of the NCMEC tip, review of the eBay messages and 

associated IP address, verification of Caesar’s driver’s license

records, and four interviews with Caesar’s landlord, the 

victims, and victims’ mother. See 468 U.S. at 901. By relying 

on interviews that were conducted only days before the search,

the affidavit supplied more than a solitary piece of stale 

evidence. See Zimmerman, 277 F.3d at 437. Moreover, the 

affidavit was not merely based upon a single uncorroborated 

anonymous tip, see United States v. Williams, 3 F.3d 69, 73–

74 (3d Cir. 1993), or an officer’s conclusory statement that he 

believed probable cause existed, see Pavulak, 700 F.3d at 664.

Indeed, the existence of probable cause to search for 

sexually explicit images presents a closer question here than in 

Zimmerman and John, where we concluded with little trouble 

that probable cause was absent. The initial affidavit stated a 

stronger basis than the warrant applications in both those 

cases—namely because it included detailed allegations that 

Caesar sexually abused the two brothers not in school, but in 

his home for over two years, and because Caesar used eBay to 

seek out images of children in various stages of undress. 

Taking these facts together, the affidavit contained some basis 

for believing Caesar had sexually explicit images of children

in his house. The third exception to the good faith exception,

for affidavits “so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to 

render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable,” is 

therefore of questionable applicability. Tracey, 597 F.3d at 

151.

The District Court’s primary criticism of the affidavit 

was that it failed to formally accuse Caesar of violating

Pennsylvania’s child pornography statute7and identified no

7 See 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 6312(c), (d), (g) (prohibiting the 

dissemination, viewing, and possession of child pornography).
20

direct evidence that Caesar took photos of his victims or kept

child pornography in his home—the two categories of images 

identified in the warrant application. But therein lies the rub. 

“[D]irect evidence linking the place to be searched to the crime

is not required” to establish probable cause. Hodge, 246 F.3d 

at 305 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). Rather, probable cause to search for an item “can be, 

and often is, inferred by ‘considering the type of crime, the 

nature of the items sought, the suspect’s opportunity for 

concealment and normal inferences about where a criminal 

might hide’” the fruits of his crime. United States v. Jones, 994 

F.2d 1051, 1056 (3d Cir. 1993) (citation omitted); see also 

United States v. Price, 558 F.3d 270, 282 (3d Cir. 2009). 

Whether or not they were enough to satisfy probable cause, the 

allegations about Caesar’s prolonged sexual abuse of the two 

brothers and his interest in photos of children in various stages 

of undress supported the reasonableness of the officers’ belief 

that probable cause existed.

First, Gallina’s affidavit set forth a connection between 

Caesar’s sexual interest in children and the site of the search

where the electronic equipment was located. In Zimmerman 

and John, nearly all the alleged sexual abuse occurred at the 

schools where the defendants worked. In contrast, the alleged 

sexual abuse here occurred exclusively in the defendant’s 

home, in his bedroom, several times over two years, ending

only weeks before the search. As the District Court noted, the 

affidavit did not claim that Caesar photographed the brothers 

or used child pornography in aid of his sexual abuse. The

brothers’ allegations could nevertheless lead a reasonable 

officer to believe there was a critical link between the 

defendant’s pursuit of sexual gratification via children and 

possession of equipment containing explicit images of children

in his home. That link was certainly closer than in Zimmerman

and John.

The strong allegations tying child molestation to 

Caesar’s home are particularly significant as they relate to the

search for images of Caesar’s victims. As described in the 

warrant application, such images would have constituted

evidence of the allegations of child molestation. Significantly, 

Caesar concedes on appeal that the affidavit set forth probable 

cause to search for physical evidence of sexual abuse in his 
21

home. While not necessarily sufficient to establish probable 

cause, the facts supporting that search would tend to support a 

further search, in the same location, for related evidence of the 

same crime—including photographs of the crime victims. The 

fact that Caesar allegedly abused the brothers in his home and 

kept their used underwear also provided a basis for believing 

that he would have kept other mementos of the boys in his 

house. 

Second, and arguably more importantly, the affidavit 

recounted Caesar’s interest in images of partially dressed 

minors and the steps he took to secure such images. Gallina 

averred that Caesar, a single man with no children, bid on used 

children’s underwear and swimwear and, in at least two 

instances, requested videos or photos of children modeling the 

posted clothing items. The District Court summarily dismissed 

these communications and any images Caesar might have 

received8as stale because they were at least six months old as 

of the search in January 2018. Again, we are not so sure.

Although the “[a]ge of the information supporting a warrant 

application is a factor in determining probable cause . . . , [a]ge 

alone . . . does not determine staleness.” United States v. 

Harvey, 2 F.3d 1318, 1322 (3d Cir. 1993) (citations omitted). 

Rather than simply count the “months between the facts relied 

on and the issuance of the warrant,” id. (citation omitted), we 

must also consider “a number of variables, such as the nature 

of the crime, of the criminal, of the thing to be seized, and of 

the place to be searched,” United States v. Williams, 124 F.3d 

411, 420 (3d Cir. 1997) (quoting United States v. Tehfe, 722 

F.2d 1114, 1119 (3d Cir. 1998)).

Gallina could reasonably have downplayed the sixmonth gap in time between the NCMEC tip and warrant 

application because “pedophiles rarely, if ever, dispose of child 

pornography.” Zimmerman, 277 F.3d at 434. Such evidence 

is therefore less likely to grow stale. See United States v. 

Vosburgh, 602 F.3d 512, 529 (3d Cir. 2010) (“[I]nformation 

8 Although the District Court referred to the “eBay images,” 

we note that the initial affidavit failed to clearly state whether 

Caesar received any images from other eBay users in response 

to his solicitations. See Caesar, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

206763, at *19, n.5. 
22

concerning [child pornography] crimes has a relatively long 

shelf life.”); United States v. Shields, 458 F.3d 269, 279 n.7 (3d 

Cir. 2006) (nine-month-old evidence that defendant 

participated in online groups sharing child pornography was 

not stale). While Gallina did not specifically allege that 

Caesar’s eBay messages contained child pornography, the

child-focused sexual nature of the messages was obvious based 

on the other information in the affidavit. In one of its most 

graphic portions, the affidavit stated that after receiving a

message from Caesar soliciting children’s undergarments, 

another eBay user replied, “If you buy it I will lube it and cum 

into [it] for you in skype real show and you can watch this.” 

App. 49. Clearly, the NCMEC, Gallina, and magistrate judge 

were not alone in detecting Caesar’s infatuation with children

and the sexual intentions behind his eBay messages. The role

these communications played in Caesar’s sexual pursuits could 

reasonably suggest that he would not quickly discard them.

That Caesar sought out the images of partially dressed 

children by using a computer further counsels that the 

messages might not have been stale at the time of the officers’ 

search. We have observed that images and files stored on 

computers are “not the type of evidence that rapidly dissipates 

or degrades.” Vosburgh, 602 F.3d at 529. Electronic files can

remain indefinitely on computer devices, and digital forensic 

investigators often recover such evidence long after it is 

deleted. Id.; see also United States v. Gourde, 440 F.3d 1065, 

1071 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (noting the “long memory of 

computers”). It is therefore, at minimum, a close question 

whether this evidence was stale at the time of the search. See

Zimmerman, 277 F.3d at 440 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“[T]here is 

no bright line between fresh and stale probable cause.”). 

We view these averments as something more than the 

“nothing” that the District Court concluded. Caesar, 2019 U.S. 

Dist. LEXIS 206763, at *16. Instead, Caesar’s eBay activity, 

taken together with the detailed allegations of ongoing and 

contemporaneous sexual abuse in his house, could indicate his

interest in pursuing visual sexual stimulation online. It was not 

entirely unreasonable to believe that Caesar, an individual who 

had sought to obtain photos of partially dressed children,

would likely possess such photos—or perhaps more explicit 

photos—in the place where he pursued his physical sexual 
23

interests with the two brothers. Evaluating these facts in 

totality, as required, we disagree with the District Court’s 

assessment. See D.C. v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 588 (2018) 

(“Our precedents recognize that the whole is often greater than 

the sum of its parts—especially when the parts are viewed in 

isolation.”). 

The District Court was also critical of Gallina’s 

statements, from his purported experience, about the link 

between molestation and possession of child pornography. In

both John and Zimmerman we expressed skepticism about the 

existence of an “intuitive relationship” between child sexual 

abuse and child pornography. John, 654 F.3d at 422; 

Zimmerman, 277 F.3d at 433 n.4. Even in his dissent in John, 

Judge Fuentes acknowledged that the evidence of a correlation 

between the two offenses is “mixed.” John, 654 F.3d at 423 

n.2 (Fuentes, J., dissenting). But in assessing whether Gallina 

acted in good faith, we cannot ignore the volume of social 

science research and legal authority discussing the tendency of 

child sexual abusers to possess child pornography. The 

legislature has also weighed in on this question. In support of 

the Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, Congress 

issued findings that “child pornography is often used by 

pedophiles and child sexual abusers to stimulate and whet their 

own sexual appetites, and as a model for sexual acting out with 

children.” Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 121, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996); 

see also S. Rep. No. 104-358, at 12–13 (1996) (“Law 

enforcement investigations have verified that pedophiles 

almost always collect child pornography or child erotica.”). 

More recently, the United States Sentencing Commission has 

commented on the frequency of “criminal sexually dangerous

behavior”

9

among child pornography offenders. U.S. Sent’g 

Comm’n, Federal Child Pornography Offenses 169 (2012) 

(“Sentencing Commission Report”). According to the 

Commission, social scientists have reached “varying 

conclusions” on this issue, but a consensus has identified 

“some correlation between viewing child pornography and sex 

9 As defined in the Sentencing Commission Report, “criminal 

sexually dangerous behavior” consists of “contact” sex 

offenses, “non-contact” sex offenses, and certain prior nonproduction child pornography offenses. Sent’g Comm’n Rep. 

at 174.
24

offending.” Id. at 102, 169; see also id. at 171–74 (canvassing 

the scholarship).

Several of our sister circuits have favorably cited these 

findings in other contexts,

10 and some have even called the 

molestation-pornography nexus “common sense,” United

States v. Byrd, 31 F.3d 1329, 1339 (5th Cir. 1994), or 

“intuitive,” Colbert, 605 F.3d at 578. Guided by our opinion 

in John, we do not go that far. We nevertheless credit the 

weight of these authorities in concluding it was not entirely 

unreasonable for an officer to believe the initial affidavit set 

forth probable cause to search for the images.

As we explained in John, the existence of a molestationpornography correlation is a factual question. And in John we

noted that officers who rely on this correlation must offer a 

factual basis for the magistrate judge to evaluate

independently. See 654 F.3d at 419–20. Gallina did just that,

or attempted to do so. He explicitly relied on his experience 

and training to conclude that child sexual abusers tend to 

possess child pornography. The District Court rejected these 

statements about the molestation-pornography connection as 

insufficient “boilerplate” that was not “tailor[ed]” to the facts 

of this case. Caesar, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 206763, at *18. 

But Gallina clearly attempted to support his belief in the 

molestation-pornography nexus by reciting his lengthy

experience conducting criminal investigations and the 

10 See United States v. Lebovitz, 401 F.3d 1263, 1271 (11th Cir. 

2005) (citing Congress’s factual findings in affirming the 

defendant’s sentence under the Sentencing Guidelines); United

States v. Brand, 467 F.3d 179, 198 (2d Cir. 2006) (citing 

congressional findings in holding that evidence of child 

pornography was admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 

404(b), in part because “child pornography shares a strong 

nexus with pedophilia”); see also Byrd, 31 F.3d at 1339 

(rejecting defendant’s entrapment argument because “common 

sense would indicate that a person who is sexually interested 

in children is likely to also be inclined, i.e., predisposed, to 

order and receive child pornography”); Colbert, 605 F.3d at 

578 (“Child pornography is in many cases simply an electronic 

record of child molestation.”). 
25

extensive list11 of investigative training courses he had 

completed. By providing this exhaustive summary, Gallina at 

the very least tried to comply with John’s requirements, further 

supporting our conclusion that he searched for the images in 

good faith.

Even if it was questionable whether there existed 

probable cause to search for the images, Gallina’s reliance on 

the initial warrant and his conduct securing the warrant did not 

approach the standard of gross negligence required to trigger 

the exclusionary rule. See Franz, 772 F.3d at 147. We have 

described gross negligence generally “as the want of even scant 

care and the failure to exercise even that care which a careless 

person would use.” United States v. Wright, 777 F.3d 635, 640 

(3d Cir. 2015) (quoting Fialkowski v. Greenwich Home for

Children, Inc., 921 F.2d 459, 462 (3d Cir.1990)).

11 The full list of courses included the following: Criminal 

Behavior Assessment; Basic Narcotics Investigator; 

Identifying Deceptive Behavior; First Contact (“detailing 

behaviors and tendencies of suspects during interdictions of a 

traffic stop”); Current Drug Trends; Commercial Vehicle 

Interdiction; Passenger Vehicle Interdiction; Conducting 

Complete Traffic Stops; Operation Safe Highways Initiative 

for Effective Law Enforcement Detection; Background 

Investigator; Wiretap ‘A’ Certification; Cell Phone Use in 

Drug Investigations; Interview and Interrogation; Statement 

Analysis (“detailing techniques and methods at identifying and 

analyzing truthful and deceptive written and verbal 

statements”); Ritual Homicide Investigation; and Violent 

Crime Behavioral Analysis (“utilizing behavioral analysis in 

identifying, analyzing, and investigating homicides, child 

abductions, and kidnappings”). App. 48.

While Gallina lacked experience investigating sex

offenses such as the ones in this case, the summary of his

background analyzing criminal behavior in other contexts and 

his generally applicable training satisfied John’s basic 

requirements. Coupled with his obvious familiarity and 

personal connection with the facts of this case, contra

Zimmerman, 277 F.3d at 433 n.4, Gallina’s statements linking 

child molestation to child pornography were adequately 

tailored to support a good faith determination.
26

Based on the record, we cannot say that Gallina acted 

without “even scant care” in the execution of the first warrant. 

Id. As required, he submitted a warrant application that set 

forth several facts tending to show that child pornography and

images of sexual abuse victims might be found in Caesar’s

house. “[T]hose facts presented the magistrate with the

judgmental task of evaluating their cumulative significance

and testing it against the legal standard of probable cause.” 

Williams, 3 F.3d at 74. Where, as here, probable cause presents

a close judgment call, we conclude that suppression would not

meaningfully deter future Fourth Amendment violations. 

Once the magistrate judge makes the call in such cases, officers

are entitled to rely on it and execute the authorized search

without sanction.

12

 

3.

Caesar urges that the images must nonetheless be 

suppressed because they were recovered from his electronic 

devices only after execution of the third warrant. As discussed 

above, that warrant’s affidavit of probable cause was based in 

12 Caesar argues that reversing the District Court would 

“open[] the door to assume that every person accused of child

molestation is automatically under investigation for child 

pornography.” Appellee’s Br. 31. These concerns are 

misplaced. Our good faith determination does not disturb a key 

principle of our holdings in Zimmerman and John: that 

probable cause to believe a defendant engaged in child 

molestation, alone, cannot establish probable cause to search 

for evidence of the separate crime of possessing child 

pornography. See Falso, 544 F.3d at 122, 128 (holding that the 

affidavit failed to state probable cause because it relied on a 

“fallacious inference” linking child sexual abuse to child 

pornography, but applying the good faith exception because 

“[probable cause] is certainly an issue upon which reasonable 

minds can differ”); cf. United States v. Edwards, 813 F.3d 953, 

966, 972 (10th Cir. 2015) (concluding that probable cause was 

lacking because the affidavit relied on a “logically fallacious” 

link between possession of child pornography and other 

“pedophilic tendencies,” but applying the good faith exception 

because the link “[was] not so obviously unsound that it 

rendered reliance on the warrant objectively unreasonable”).
27

part on a summary of the items seized in the search of Caesar’s 

home and Caesar’s post-invocation admissions that he viewed 

child pornography on some of the electronic devices. Caesar 

argues that the third warrant was therefore tainted by the 

unlawful seizure of the devices and illegally obtained 

confession and that it failed to independently supply probable 

cause to search the devices themselves. This argument ignores 

the fact that the initial warrant expressly permitted a search for 

the digital images themselves. See App. 47 (authorizing a 

search for the specified images “in any form . . . [including 

those] stored on personal electronic devices” (emphasis 

added)); see also United States v. Gregoire, 638 F.3d 962, 

967–68 (8th Cir. 2011) (“A search warrant which specifically 

authorized the seizure of a computer and a search for financial 

records clearly contemplates at least a limited search of the 

computer’s contents without the need of a second warrant.”

(internal quotation marks omitted)).

Even if a warrant lacks such express authorization, 

courts have routinely upheld subsequent searches of legally 

seized electronic equipment. Multiple circuit courts have 

recognized that “a second warrant to search a properly seized 

computer is not necessary where the evidence obtained in the 

search did not exceed the probable cause articulated in the 

original warrant.” United States v. Evers, 669 F.3d 645, 652 

(6th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also 

United States v. Upham, 168 F.3d 532, 536 (1st Cir. 1999) 

(“The extraction of unlawful images from within the computer 

and diskettes was . . . contemplated by the warrant” where 

“[t]he warrant explicitly authorized the seizure of both the 

computer plus diskettes and the unlawful images” and “[t]he 

images . . . were ‘inside’ the computer or diskettes.”).13

Accordingly, we do not believe a distinction between the 

devices and images is warranted for purposes of our good faith 

inquiry. Because the initial warrant permitted both the seizure 

and search of the electronic devices and supported the officers’

13 Those holdings accord with Federal Rule of Criminal 

Procedure 41, which provides that, unless otherwise specified, 

a warrant authorizing the seizure of electronic storage media

also “authorizes a later review of the media or information 

consistent with the warrant.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(e)(2)(B).
28

good faith reliance, the third warrant was unnecessary to 

review the contents of the devices. 

In reaching this conclusion, we recognize Gallina’s 

egregious conduct during his interrogation of Caesar. Caesar 

invoked his right to remain silent at least six times, but Gallina 

continued to question him about the sexual abuse allegations 

and electronic devices seized during the search of his home. 

Caesar urges that this misconduct reflects Gallina’s “overly 

aggressive and illegal” approach to the investigation as a whole

and that such conduct was sufficiently culpable to warrant 

suppression of the images. Appellee’s Br. 43. But Gallina’s

misconduct following the seizure of the devices does not alter 

our conclusion that he and the other officers relied on the initial 

warrant in good faith. Cf. United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 

463, 475 (1980) (“The exclusionary rule enjoins the 

Government from benefiting from evidence it has unlawfully 

obtained; it does not reach backward to taint information that 

was in official hands prior to any illegality.”). Once the 

officers seized the devices, they were also entitled to search the 

devices, as explicitly authorized by the magistrate judge.14 

14 Because we conclude that the third warrant was superfluous, 

we need not decide whether Caesar’s ill-gotten confession or 

any of the evidence seized under the first warrant might have

tainted the third warrant such that it could not support an 

officer’s good faith reliance. That question—whether the good 

faith exception may apply to a warrant issued on the basis of

evidence derived from an earlier constitutional violation—is 

not one that we have squarely addressed. We note, however, 

that several of our sister circuits have held that the good faith 

exception may, under certain circumstances, overcome the 

taint of earlier unconstitutional conduct. See United States v.

Massi, 761 F.3d 512, 525–28 (5th Cir. 2014); United States v.

McClain, 444 F.3d 556, 564–566 (6th Cir. 2005); United

States v. Fletcher, 91 F.3d 48, 51–52 (8th Cir. 1996); United

States v. Thomas, 757 F.2d 1359, 1368 (2d Cir. 1985). But see

United States v. McGough, 412 F.3d 1232, 1239–40 (11th Cir. 

2005) (holding that the good faith exception did not apply 

where the officer presented tainted evidence in support of a 

warrant application); United States v. Vasey, 834 F.2d 782, 

789–90 (9th Cir. 1987) (same).
29

We will not punish the Government because Gallina 

took the extra step of securing an unnecessary warrant but then 

committed serious errors in doing so. Given our conclusion 

that an officer could rely on the first warrant in good faith, 

suppressing the images based on the third warrant’s flaws 

would put the Government in a worse position than if the 

officers had simply searched the devices immediately upon 

seizing them. Cf. Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 443–44 (1984) 

(holding that the benefits and costs of the exclusionary rule

“are properly balanced by putting the police in the same, not a 

worse, position that they would have been in if no police error 

or misconduct had occurred”). Excluding the images under 

these circumstances would not meaningfully deter future 

Fourth Amendment violations. On the contrary, suppression 

might discourage police officers from seeking judicial 

authorization for follow-up searches in cases where, unlike 

here, an additional warrant is actually needed. We therefore

conclude that the images should not be suppressed.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse that part of 

the District Court’s order suppressing the images of child 

pornography and images of sexual abuse victims seized from 

Caesar’s electronic devices. The District Court’s order will be

affirmed in all other respects. The case will be remanded to 

the District Court for further proceedings consistent with this 

opinion.