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OVERSIGHT FAILURES BEHIND THE RADIOLOGICAL INCIDENT AT DOE’S WASTE ISOLATION PILOT PLANT 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND 

INVESTIGATIONS 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND 

COMMERCE 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

JUNE 12, 2015 

Serial No. 114–54 

( 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Energy and Commerce 

energycommerce.house.gov 

COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE 

FRED UPTON, Michigan 

Chairman 

JOE BARTON, Texas 

Chairman Emeritus 

ED WHITFIELD, Kentucky 

JOHN SHIMKUS, Illinois 

JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania 

GREG WALDEN, Oregon 

TIM MURPHY, Pennsylvania 

MICHAEL C. BURGESS, Texas 

MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee 

Vice Chairman 

STEVE SCALISE, Louisiana 

ROBERT E. LATTA, Ohio 

CATHY MCMORRIS RODGERS, Washington 

GREGG HARPER, Mississippi 

LEONARD LANCE, New Jersey 

BRETT GUTHRIE, Kentucky 

PETE OLSON, Texas 

DAVID B. MCKINLEY, West Virginia 

MIKE POMPEO, Kansas 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

H. MORGAN GRIFFITH, Virginia 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida 

BILL JOHNSON, Ohio 

BILLY LONG, Missouri 

RENEE L. ELLMERS, North Carolina 

LARRY BUCSHON, Indiana 

BILL FLORES, Texas 

SUSAN W. BROOKS, Indiana 

MARKWAYNE MULLIN, Oklahoma 

RICHARD HUDSON, North Carolina 

CHRIS COLLINS, New York 

KEVIN CRAMER, North Dakota 

FRANK PALLONE, JR., New Jersey 

Ranking Member 

BOBBY L. RUSH, Illinois 

ANNA G. ESHOO, California 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

GENE GREEN, Texas 

DIANA DEGETTE, Colorado 

LOIS CAPPS, California 

MICHAEL F. DOYLE, Pennsylvania 

JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois 

G.K. BUTTERFIELD, North Carolina 

DORIS O. MATSUI, California 

KATHY CASTOR, Florida 

JOHN P. SARBANES, Maryland 

JERRY MCNERNEY, California 

PETER WELCH, Vermont 

BEN RAY LUJA ́ N, New Mexico 

PAUL TONKO, New York 

JOHN A. YARMUTH, Kentucky 

YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York 

DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa 

KURT SCHRADER, Oregon 

JOSEPH P. KENNEDY, III, Massachusetts 

TONY CA ́ RDENAS, California 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS

TIM MURPHY, Pennsylvania 

Chairman 

DAVID B. MCKINLEY, West Virginia 

Vice Chairman 

MICHAEL C. BURGESS, Texas 

MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee 

H. MORGAN GRIFFITH, Virginia 

LARRY BUCSHON, Indiana 

BILL FLORES, Texas 

SUSAN W. BROOKS, Indiana 

MARKWAYNE MULLIN, Oklahoma 

RICHARD HUDSON, North Carolina 

CHRIS COLLINS, New York 

KEVIN CRAMER, North Dakota 

JOE BARTON, Texas 

FRED UPTON, Michigan (ex officio) 

DIANA DEGETTE, Colorado 

Ranking Member 

JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois 

KATHY CASTOR, Florida 

PAUL TONKO, New York 

JOHN A. YARMUTH, Kentucky 

YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York 

JOSEPH P. KENNEDY, III, Massachusetts 

GENE GREEN, Texas 

PETER WELCH, Vermont 

FRANK PALLONE, JR., New Jersey (ex 

officio) 

(II) 

(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Hon. Tim Murphy, a Representative in Congress from the Commonwealth 

of Pennsylvania, opening statement ................................................................... 1 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 3 

Hon. Diana DeGette, a Representative in Congress from the State of Colorado, opening statement ...................................................................................... 4 

Hon. Marsha Blackburn, a Representative in Congress from the State of 

Tennessee, opening statement ............................................................................ 6 

Hon. Frank Pallone, Jr., a Representative in Congress from the State of 

New Jersey, opening statement .......................................................................... 51 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 52 

WITNESSES

Madelyn Creedon, Principal Deputy Administrator, National Nuclear Security 

Administration, Department of Energy .............................................................. 8 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 10 

Additional information for the record ............................................................. 57 

Answers to submitted questions 1 ................................................................... 77 

Mark Whitney, Acting Assistant Secretary for Environmental Management, 

Department of Energy ......................................................................................... 15 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 17 

Additional information for the record ............................................................. 63 

Answers to submitted questions 1 ................................................................... 77 

Theodore A. Wyka, Chief Nuclear Safety Advisor for the Deputy Assistant 

Secretary for Safety, Security, and Quality Programs, Office of Environmental Management, Department of Energy, and Former Chairman, Accident Investigation Board, Department of Energy 2

Answers to submitted questions 1 ................................................................... 77 

Allison B. Bawden, Acting Director, Natural Resources and Environment, 

Government Accountability Office ...................................................................... 28 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 30 

Answers to submitted questions ...................................................................... 101 

SUBMITTED MATERIAL

Invitation of June 5, 2015, from Mr. Murphy to Ernest Moniz, Secretary, 

Department of Energy, submitted by Mr. Murphy ........................................... 73 

Invitation of June 5, 2015, from Mr. Murphy to Gene L. Dodaro, Comptroller 

General, Government Accountability Office, submitted by Mr. Murphy ......... 75 

Subcommittee exhibit binder 3

1The Department of Energy provided a joint response to questions submitted 

to Secretary Ernest Moniz. 2Mr. Wyka did not offer an oral or written statement for the record. 

3The information has been retained in committee files and also is available 

at http://docs.house.gov/Committee/Calendar/ 

ByEvent.aspx?EventID=103595. 

(1) 

OVERSIGHT FAILURES BEHIND THE RADIOLOGICAL INCIDENT AT DOE’S WASTE ISOLATION PILOT PLANT 

FRIDAY, JUNE 12, 2015 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS, 

COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, 

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:47 a.m., in Room 

2322, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Tim Murphy [chairman 

of the subcommittee] presiding. 

Members present: Representatives Murphy, Burgess, Blackburn, 

Bucshon, Brooks, Mullin, Collins, Upton (ex officio), DeGette, 

Green, Welch, and Pallone (ex officio). 

Also present: Representative Luja ́n. 

Staff present: Charles Ingebretson, Chief Counsel, Oversight and 

Investigations; John Ohly, Professional Staff Member, Oversight 

and Investigations; Chris Santini, Policy Coordinator, Oversight 

and Investigations; Dan Schneider, Press Secretary; Peter Spencer, 

Professional Staff Member, Oversight and Investigations; Jessica 

Wilkerson, Oversight Associate; Christine Brennan, Democratic 

Press Secretary; Jeff Carroll, Democratic Staff Director; Ryan 

Gottschall, Democratic GAO Detailee; Christopher Knauer, Democratic Oversight Staff Director; Elizabeth Letter, Democratic Professional Staff Member; and Timothy Robinson, Democratic Chief 

Counsel. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. TIM MURPHY, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA 

Mr. MURPHY. All right. Good morning. I apologize for the delay, 

but we are here now. This is the hearing on the ‘‘Oversight Failures Behind the Radiological Incident at DOE’s Waste Isolation 

Pilot Plant.’’ 

Today we will review a costly series of oversight failures at two 

important Department of Energy sites. These failures contributed 

to a radiological leak last year at one of the sites, the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, known as WIPP, which serves to dispose in mined 

salt caverns certain types of radiological waste from our Nation’s 

nuclear weapons programs. 

This leak, along with a separate truck fire the week before, exposed management and oversight shortcomings both at WIPP and 

at one of the Nation’s premier national laboratories, the Los AlaVerDate Mar 15 2010 14:42 Nov 20, 2015 Jkt 037690 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\114THCONGRESS\114X54XDOEXWIPPASKOK111915\114X54XDOEXWIPPXPDFMAD
2 

mos National Laboratory. Los Alamos, it turns out, was the source 

of the radiological material and the errors that caused a reaction 

in the material that burst a container in WIPP’s underground facility. 

Since the incident, WIPP has been shut down, and the Department has embarked on remediation, training, and rebuilding that 

will cost taxpayers an estimated $240 million just to restart limited 

operations next year. All told, it may ultimately cost more than 

$500 million before full operations are estimated to commence in 

2018, and there are reports of DOE fines or settlements of some 

$73 million. 

This was no small oversight failure, and the issues we will examine today raise broader questions about the state of the Department’s oversight framework for operations and its various cleanup 

at nuclear sites. 

The root cause of the radiological incident was established in a 

DOE report this past April. Basically, hundreds of containers were 

inappropriately packaged for WIPP disposal by workers at Los Alamos. They packaged waste mixtures with organic absorbants, 

which created reactive and ignitable waste forms. 

The specific culprit was off-the-shelf organic kitty litter, and the 

use of this organic material was traced to someone writing down 

‘‘organic’’ instead of ‘‘inorganic’’—a simple human error. But this is 

more than what happens when you don’t pay attention in high 

school chemistry and spelling classes. This failure to catch an error 

reflected a much larger systemic failure. 

Two years before the incident, Los Alamos actually stopped work 

that had been mixing waste with organics precisely because of the 

reactivity and ignition risks. The lab’s so-called Difficult Waste 

Team, along with Federal site officials, directed a safety process 

change that would use inorganics as absorbants. 

The problem was, over the next year and a half, no one in management or among Federal overseers made sure the new procedures were followed, so what they thought was fixed wasn’t. And 

no one in management or at the Federal level reviewed the process 

to determine why workers had been creating dangerous mixtures 

in the first place—a basic practice of an effective safety system. 

As the Los Alamos Lab’s own review noted, the fact that so many 

critical management, safety, and oversight mechanisms all failed 

simultaneously over an extended period of time are of significant 

concern. 

Also of significant concern are patterns of oversight failure found 

to have occurred at the WIPP site. For example, at WIPP, both the 

contractor and Feds failed to identify or fix shortcomings in equipment and degraded conditions in the mine over a period of years. 

These errors led to the environmental release and added tens of 

millions to the cost of recovery operations. 

The failures at these sites contribute to a long story of DOE 

struggles to conduct adequate oversight of its management and operating contractors, which are responsible for much of the core activities of the Department. 

Just over 2 years ago, DOE and National Nuclear Security Administration, NNSA, officials came before this committee to explain 

security failures at the Y–12 National Security Site in Tennessee. 

3 

The failures were notoriously exposed when several elderly peace 

activists penetrated the security perimeter of the most secure section of the site. 

What was clear from that incident sounds very familiar today: 

What the Feds thought was working wasn’t. Site officials trusted 

that contractors were doing what they were supposed to do without 

checking. Federal line oversight had failed. 

We were told then that the successful reliance on department 

contractors depends on strong and clear lines of accountability and 

on meaningful and consistent measurement of contractor performance. We were promised that actions would be taken to address the 

shortcomings. Yet we have again learned from GAO that the DOE 

and NNSA have yet to make significant progress to make the necessary reforms with regard to measurement of contractor performance, and this is not acceptable. 

Today we will hear from department officials and the GAO, all 

of whom can explain the costly oversight failures at WIPP and Los 

Alamos, what is being done, and what must be done to fix these 

problems at the sites and across the complex. I hope this hearing 

helps to identify what is necessary for DOE to develop an oversight 

system that can effectively identify, address safety issues and security issues before they become costly mistakes. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Murphy follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. TIM MURPHY

Today we will review a costly series of oversight failures at two important Department of Energy sites. These failures contributed to a radiological leak last year at 

one of the sites, the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, known as WIPP, which serves to 

dispose in mined salt caverns certain types of radiological waste from our nation’s 

nuclear weapons programs. 

This leak, along with a separate truck fire the week before, exposed management 

and oversight shortcomings both at WIPP and at one of the nation’s premier national laboratories—the Los Alamos National Laboratory. Los Alamos it turns out 

was the source of the radiological material and the errors that caused a reaction 

in the material that burst a container in WIPP’s underground facility. 

Since the incident, WIPP has been shut down and the Department has embarked 

on remediation, training, and rebuilding that will cost taxpayers an estimated $240 

million just to restart limited operations next year. All told, it may ultimately cost 

more than $500 million before full operations are estimated to commence in 2018. 

This was no small oversight failure. And the issues we will examine today raise 

broader questions about the state of the Department’s oversight framework for operations at its various cleanup and nuclear sites. 

The root cause of the radiological incident was established in a DOE report this 

past April. Basically, hundreds of containers were inappropriately packaged for 

WIPP disposal by workers at Los Alamos. They packaged waste mixtures with organic absorbents, which created reactive and ignitable waste forms. 

The specific culprit was off-the-shelf organic kitty litter. And the use of this organic material was traced to someone writing down ‘‘organic’’ instead of ‘‘inorganic’’—a simple human error. Yet the failure to catch this error reflected a much 

larger systemic failure. 

Two years before the incident, Los Alamos actually stopped work that had been 

mixing waste with organics precisely because of the reactivity and ignition risks. 

The lab’s so-called ‘‘difficult waste team’’ along with Federal site officials directed 

a safety process change that would use ‘‘inorganics’’ as absorbents. 

The problem was, over the next year and one-half, no one in management or 

among Federal overseers made sure the new procedures were followed. So what they 

thought was fixed wasn’t. And no one in management or at the Federal level reviewed the process to determine why workers had been creating dangerous mixtures 

in the first place—a basic practice of an effective safety system. 

4 

As the Los Alamos Lab’s own review noted ‘‘the fact that so many critical management, safety, and oversight mechanisms all failed simultaneously over an extended 

period of time.are of significant concern.’’ 

Also of significant concern are patterns of oversight failure found to have occurred 

at the WIPP site. For example, at WIPP, both the contractor and feds failed to identify or fix shortcomings in equipment, and degraded conditions in the mine—over 

a period of years. These errors led to the environmental release and added tens of 

millions to the cost of the recovery operations. 

The failures at these sites contribute to a long story of DOE’s struggles to conduct 

adequate oversight of its management and operating contractors, which are responsible for much of the core activities of the Department. 

Just over two years ago, DOE and National Nuclear Security Administration 

(NNSA) officials came before this committee to explain security failures at the Y– 

12 National Security Site in Tennessee. The failures were notoriously exposed when 

several elderly peace activists penetrated the security perimeter of the most secure 

section of the site. 

What was clear from that incident sounds very familiar today: what the Feds 

thought was working wasn’t. Site officials trusted the contractors were doing what 

they were supposed to do, without checking. Federal line oversight had failed. 

We were told then that the successful reliance on Department contractors depends 

on strong and clear lines of accountability and on meaningful and consistent measurement of contractor performance. We were promised that actions would be taken 

to address the shortcomings. 

Yet we have again learned from GAO that the DOE and NNSA have yet to make 

significant progress to make the necessary reforms with regard to measurement of 

contractor performance. This is not acceptable. 

Today, we’ll hear from Department officials and the GAO, all of whom can help 

explain the costly oversight failures at WIPP and Los Alamos, what is being done 

and what must be done to fix those problems, at the sites and across the complex. 

I hope this hearing helps to identify what is necessary for DOE to develop an 

oversight system that can effectively identify and address safety and security issues 

before they become costly mistakes. 

Mr. MURPHY. I now recognize the ranking member from Colorado, Ms. DeGette, for 5 minutes. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DIANA DEGETTE, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF COLORADO 

Ms. DEGETTE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

And, again, I want to thank you for your comity in holding the 

hearing till I got here. As you know, the President was briefing the 

Democratic caucus, and I felt like I owed him to listen to what he 

had to say. 

And I am particularly glad you waited for me because when I 

heard your opening statement it was deja vu all over again to me, 

because I have been on this O&I panel for most, if not all, of the 

incidents that you discussed. 

We have had over a dozen hearings since I have been here to examine oversight failures and contractor mismanagement at the 

DOE NNSA Nuclear Complex. A perusal of the GAO testimony 

today reveals a string of mishaps and management failures over 

the last decade involving these sites. And that is why, for years, 

DOE and NNSA have remained on the agency’s high-risk list for 

Federal programs highly susceptible to mismanagement and waste. 

The problems have been costly and disruptive. For example, in 

2004, which was over a decade ago, there were so many incidents 

at Los Alamos that the lab director shut down the entire facility 

for several weeks to address them. A few years later, at a hearing 

on lab security, our beloved chairman emeritus, John Dingell, observed, quote, ‘‘I feel a little bit like this is the movie ’Groundhog 

5 

Day.’ For some reason or another, DOE has proven itself incapable 

of managing this critical security and preventing recurring problems.’’ That was in 2007. 

Now, as you mentioned, in July 2012, the DOE NNSA complex 

was in the news again because these protestors with basic tools 

managed to cut the fence at Y–12 and gain access to the area surrounding a highly enriched uranium storage facility. This was supposed to be one of the most secure facilities in the country, but, as 

you said, a small group of aging activists, including an 82-year-old 

nun, were able to access the compound uninterrupted by security. 

And if you haven’t seen those videos, just watch them. It is chilling. 

As I said in a hearing about that incident, without good oversight, serious issues won’t be identified and fixed, and the results 

could be disastrous. I can’t think of any reason why we would want 

to decrease our oversight of these facilities, inhibit the ability of 

oversight to review site actions, or reduce accountability for those 

responsible for keeping the nuclear sites safe. That was in 2012. 

Now, we quickly learned that the Y–12 fiasco was not an isolated 

event. Last year, a waste drum packed by a Los Alamos contractor 

managed to burst open and contaminate the Nation’s only transuranic waste repository. Called the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, or 

WIPP, this facility is supposed to house most of the Nation’s lowlevel, cold-war-generated nuclear waste. This incident resulted in 

closing the facility perhaps for years. It will also cost the taxpayer 

millions of dollars to clean up. 

In the last several decades, we have seen the DOE use a range 

of strategies to oversee their contractors. And I do want to say I 

think the DOE has made some efforts. After concerns that handson oversight was burdensome and ineffective, DOE and NNSA 

adopted a less intrusive oversight strategy. The new model, which 

had reliance on contractor assurance systems, was supposed to let 

contractors assess performance and provide data for Federal oversight efforts. 

Nonetheless, since the implementation of this strategy 5 years 

ago, we continue to have incidents that make me question this approach. I mentioned the security incident at Y–12. Y–12 was one 

of the first facilities NNSA affirmed as having in place an effective 

and mature contractor assurance system capable of identifying 

risks and weaknesses. But this system failed, and the committee 

had several hearings to see what went wrong. We received assurances from the DOE that they had learned lessons from the past 

and were committed to implementing the new management and 

performance measures. Nonetheless, the more recent incidents involving WIPP suggest this oversight framework is not where it 

needs to be. 

So where are we now? I think it is safe to say this new oversight 

framework needs major retooling. Mr. Chairman, I don’t know if we 

are back to square one. I certainly hope we are not. But, at a minimum, we need to establish a clear path forward. I hope DOE and 

NNSA will share some ideas so they can actually make progress in 

implementing the new framework. If excessive transactional oversight is not the answer and reliance on a contractor assurance system is not the answer, then what is the answer? 

6 

And we need to figure this out pronto, Mr. Chairman, not just 

because of these two incidents but because the missions at NNSA 

sites are critical to our Nation’s security. 

In response to the GAO report, NNSA outlined plans for a new 

corporate policy that will form a comprehensive framework for a 

contractor assurance system. I don’t even know what that means, 

Mr. Chairman, but I hope we can get some answers today about 

how that new policy will result in significant and effective changes 

at the agency. 

We have been going in circles, and we have to stop doing that. 

So I hope we can see some changes come out of the WIPP accident 

investigations and GAO’s latest report. We are going to be vigilant, 

but I have to be honest, I am not overly optimistic. 

Thanks, and I yield back. 

Mr. MURPHY. The gentlelady yields back. 

I now recognize the gentlewoman from Tennessee and the vice 

chair of the full committee, Mrs. Blackburn, for 5 minutes. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MARSHA BLACKBURN, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF TENNESSEE 

Mrs. BLACKBURN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And I am not going to take 5 minutes, and I will yield the time 

to whomever would like it. But I am going to pick up right where 

Ms. DeGette left off, talking about Y–12. 

And as we conducted that hearing and the assurances that we 

were given that things were going to be more closely watched, and 

now we find ourselves, as Chairman Murphy said, looking at a 

hearing where someone either wasn’t paying attention in spelling 

class or science class or didn’t know the difference and went on to 

inappropriately use an organic kitty litter. 

The problem for us is, not only is this expensive—you are talking about $551 billion being the estimate to clean this up, to clean it 

up, and to get the facility operational—you also look at the impact 

that this has on nuclear-generated power and on storing that 

waste. 

And in Tennessee, where Y–12 is located—and I was up at Oak 

Ridge the week before last and over at TVA and out at the Watts 

Bar Plant. And the safe storage of that nuclear waste, as we bring 

the second Watts Bar reactor on line—it is about 95 percent complete right now—this is something of tremendous concern. 

So we are looking for answers. And I think, more than just answers, we are looking for responsible action and a way to solve this 

so that best practices and protocols are in place and we are not 

finding ourselves back at a hearing saying, well, we learned a lesson, but we really didn’t learn a lesson, and we took no actions 

from the lesson we were supposed to learn. 

With that, Mr. Chairman, I will yield to the gentleman from 

Texas. 

Mr. BURGESS. I thank the gentlelady for yielding. 

I have been on this subcommittee for over 10 years now. This has 

been a recurrent theme that comes up over and over again. So I 

want to echo what other members have said, that it is important 

to get this right and to get this solved. We are talking about the 

7 

Nation’s nuclear secrets. This should be the most closely guarded 

and where the greatest attention to detail should be placed to security issues, and we keep having to come here and discuss breaches. 

I do want to acknowledge the help of the Government Accountability Office and, in particular, Allison Bawden, who is one of our 

witnesses today, who has been enormously helpful to our staff 

through this and other issues. 

And, Mr. Chairman, I will yield back the balance of my time. 

Mr. MURPHY. The gentleman yields back. 

We are waiting for the ranking member, Mr. Pallone, to come in, 

but while we are waiting for him, I thought I would at least take 

the time to introduce the witnesses, unless anybody else on this 

side wants the rest of his time? I suspect not. 

All right. We will save some time here. 

Today’s panel is the Honorable Madelyn Creedon, the Principal 

Deputy Administrator for the National Nuclear Security Administration. 

Welcome. 

Mark Whitney, the Acting Assistant Secretary for the Office of 

Environmental Management at the Department of Energy. 

Mr. Whitney is also accompanied by Theodore Wyka—did I pronounce that correctly?—the Chairperson of the Accident Investigation Board and the Chief Nuclear Officer in DOE’s Office of Environmental Management. 

We also have Allison Bawden, the Acting Director of the Natural 

Resources and Environment team at the Government Accountability Office. 

Maybe I will just proceed, if that is OK with you, Ms. 

DeGette—— 

Ms. DEGETTE. Yes. 

Mr. MURPHY [continuing]. Just to go ahead and start with the 

swearing in? 

Ms. DEGETTE. Yes. 

Mr. MURPHY. All right. So let’s do that. 

So you are aware that the committee is holding an investigative 

hearing and, when doing so, has the practice of taking testimony 

under oath. Do any of you have an objection to testifying under 

oath? 

Everyone agrees to do that. 

The Chair then advises you that, under the rules of the House 

and rules of the committee, you are entitled to be advised by counsel. Do any of you desire to be advised by counsel today? 

All the witnesses say no. 

In that case, if you will please rise and raise your right hand, 

and I will swear you in. 

[Witnesses sworn.] 

Mr. MURPHY. The witnesses have answered ‘‘yes,’’ so you are now 

under oath and subject to the penalties set forth in Title 18, section 

1001 of the United States Code. 

I will let our first witness start a 5-minute summary. At any 

point, we may have the ranking member then give—so I will recognize you now, Ms. Creedon, for 5 minutes. 

If you want to turn on the mic, pull it close, and watch the lights 

in front of you. 

8 

Thank you. 

STATEMENTS OF MADELYN CREEDON, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY 

ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY; MARK WHITNEY, ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, ACCOMPANIED BY 

THEODORE A. WYKA, CHIEF NUCLEAR SAFETY ADVISOR FOR 

THE DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR SAFETY, SECURITY, AND QUALITY PROGRAMS, OFFICE OF ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, AND 

FORMER CHAIRMAN, ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION BOARD, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY; AND ALLISON B. BAWDEN, ACTING 

DIRECTOR, NATURAL RESOURCES AND ENVIRONMENT, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 

STATEMENT OF MADELYN CREEDON 

Ms. CREEDON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member 

DeGette, and members of the subcommittee. I want to thank you 

for the opportunity today to discuss the radiological release at the 

Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, or WIPP. 

I am pleased to be joined today by Mark Whitney, the Acting Assistant Secretary of Energy for Environmental Management. We 

have provided written testimony to the subcommittee and respectfully ask that it be submitted for the record. 

On February 14, 2014, a radiological release occurred in the 

Waste Isolation Pilot Plant in New Mexico when a drum, which 

had been shipped from Los Alamos National Laboratory, experienced an exothermic reaction that led to overpressurization and 

breach, causing a release of a portion of the drum’s contents. 

The specifics of this radiological release at WIPP and the subsequent restart activities will be addressed by Mr. Whitney. 

While the Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration, NNSA, holds the overall management and operating 

contract for the Los Alamos National Laboratory, the Department 

of Energy’s Office of Environmental Management is the program 

lead for legacy waste cleanup activities performed at LANL and for 

the operation of WIPP. NNSA is, however, responsible for the overall site operations. 

That said, I want to assure you all that all of us at DOE take 

this unintentional release of radioactive material very seriously, as 

we do all significant events. 

What is most troublesome about this event is that, as the accident investigation determined, it was preventable. It will also be 

costly to fix and has left us without a true waste repository for an 

indeterminate period of time. And this is simply unacceptable. 

Today I will focus on the actions that the NNSA has taken since 

the event and highlight a few ongoing initiatives we are pursuing 

to improve the governance and oversight at NNSA sites. 

NNSA and the Office of Environmental Management have taken 

corrective actions in response to the WIPP incident. This includes 

both long-term and short-term compensatory measures. These 

measures will address the underlying issues and problems that 

contributed to the errors in packaging the legacy waste. 

9 

NNSA and EM, working with the other components of the Department of Energy, have realigned the Federal program and oversight responsibility for legacy waste materials. The responsibility 

has been transferred from the local NNSA field office to a newly 

established environmental management field office. 

We have also held our management and operating contractor at 

the Los Alamos National Laboratory responsible and accountable 

for their part in allowing conditions to develop that led to this 

event. The M&O’s fee for operating the laboratory was reduced 

drastically. We did not grant a year of award term, and we took 

back a year of award term that had previously been awarded. 

Award term is a year of the contract. So we did not give them an 

additional year on the contract, and we took back a previously 

awarded additional year on their contract. We are also in the process of modifying this M&O contract to allow EM to have more direct control over their work at Los Alamos in the near term and 

then to modify their contracting strategy in the long term. 

NNSA is also working on several fronts to improve our overall 

approach to site governance. We have kicked off two specific initiatives. The first is to examine our contracting strategy to ensure 

that we incentivize the right behaviors while also holding our labs 

and sites accountable. The second initiative is to better define the 

NNSA site governance model, with specific attention to identifying 

clear expectations regarding contract management and oversight 

and clarifying the roles and responsibilities between the NNSA 

field and headquarters elements and, in the case of Los Alamos, 

the Office of Environmental Management as well. 

In conclusion, I want to assure you that the Department understands the seriousness of this event. We have taken numerous concrete and aggressive actions to address the specific events and are 

also looking at governance generally. These actions will help us ensure that we do not repeat the mistakes that gave rise to this incident and help improve operations across the entire NNSA enterprise. 

With that, I thank you, and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Creedon follows:] 

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Mr. MURPHY. Thank you. 

Mr. Whitney, we will have you go next. 

STATEMENT OF MARK WHITNEY 

Mr. WHITNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member 

DeGette, and distinguished members of the subcommittee. Thank 

you for the opportunity to share our commitment and vision on the 

Department of Energy’s ongoing recovery of the Waste Isolation 

Pilot Plant. 

Safe performance of work is our overriding priority, and the Department’s first responsibility is to protect the workers, the public, 

and the environment. Safety first is the clear expectation behind 

all of our decisions and our activities. The Secretary and I continue 

to set the expectation for the EM workforce that safety is integral 

to accomplishing the mission. 

WIPP’s primary mission is to safely and permanently dispose of 

the Nation’s defense-related transuranic waste, which is a byproduct of nuclear weapons research and production, facility dismantlement, and site cleanup. 

On February 5, 2014, a vehicle used to transport salt caught fire 

in the WIPP underground. Workers were safely evacuated, and the 

underground portion of WIPP was shut down, but the fire resulted 

in minor smoke inhalation to six workers. It did not adversely, 

however, impact the public or the environment. 

On February 14, 2014, a second unrelated event occurred when 

an air monitor measured airborne radioactivity close to the location 

where waste was being emplaced. No employees were underground 

at the time. The next day, low levels of airborne radioactive contamination were detected, the result of when a small amount of radioactivity leaked by the exhaust duct dampers through the 

unfiltered exhaust ducts and escaped aboveground. 

As a result of these events, the WIPP repository is shut down 

and is currently not accepting waste shipments. 

The Department established an Accident Investigation Board to 

fully investigate the event and understand the causes and factors 

that contributed to the radiological release. The AIB identified direct causes, root causes, and contributing causes to the radiological 

release. 

While the investigation focused on the activities that contributed 

to the breached drum in the WIPP underground, the conclusions 

and analyses represent an opportunity to assess and benchmark all 

of our operations and apply lessons learned across the EM complex. 

We have made considerable progress towards safely recovering 

WIPP over the last 16 months, including the immediate response 

to the incidents, our investigation to the incidents, the development 

of corrective action plans, and the issuance and implementation of 

the WIPP recovery plan. 

We are strengthening safety management programs such as nuclear safety, fire protection, emergency management, and radiological control, reestablishing a bounding safety envelope, and responding to all of our oversight organizations’ concerns. 

Underground entries were necessarily limited in the weeks following the incidents, but they are now safely performed daily. Restoration of the underground includes radiological surveys, radioVerDate Mar 15 2010 14:42 Nov 20, 2015 Jkt 037690 PO 00000 Frm 00019 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\114THCONGRESS\114X54XDOEXWIPPASKOK111915\114X54XDOEXWIPPXPDFMAD
16 

logical buffers in noncontaminated areas, ground control stability 

inspections, roof bolting, and equipment maintenance. 

Work is being performed also safely in contaminated areas. Adequate ventilation is required, however, for habitability of the underground, including dust removal during mining and removal of 

exhaust fumes during diesel engine operations. Increasing ventilation capacity is a principal requirement for the safe underground 

operations, and our plan is to increase ventilation over the next 

year to support resumption of operations and ultimately to increase 

the airflow back to pre-incident rates, although that will take several years. 

EM has worked diligently to improve oversight at the headquarters and field level. To ensure continued health and safety to 

the workers, the public, and the environment, the Department 

must provide effective, comprehensive oversight of work at every 

phase and level. EM is committed to strengthening Federal and 

contractor oversight competencies. Many of these actions have already been implemented. 

In summary, WIPP is an important national resource that we are 

working hard to recover. DOE will resume disposal operations at 

WIPP but only when it is safe to do so. The safety of workers, the 

public, and the environment is first and foremost. And we continue 

to keep the community and stakeholders, including Congress, informed of WIPP recovery in a transparent manner. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Whitney follows:] 

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Mr. MURPHY. Thank you. 

Mr. Wyka, we understand you are not testifying today but you 

are going to be available to answer questions. Thank you. 

Ms. Bawden, you are recognized for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF ALLISON B. BAWDEN 

Ms. BAWDEN. Chairman Murphy, Ranking Member DeGette, and 

members of the subcommittee, thank you for inviting me today to 

discuss GAO’s report on the framework established by the Department of Energy and its National Nuclear Security Administration 

for overseeing management and operating contractors. These M&O 

contractors are trusted by the Government to achieve some of its 

most sensitive national security missions. 

GAO has reported for decades on the management challenges 

DOE faces for contract administration and oversight. My testimony 

today highlights three findings from GAO’s recently completed 

work on NNSA’s framework for overseeing its M&O contractors, as 

well as preliminary observations from GAO’s ongoing work that includes examining oversight of WIPP. 

These findings from our work and the parallels drawn to oversight of WIPP are particularly important in light of two competing 

narratives about DOE oversight of M&O contractors. 

On the one hand, there are the series of safety and security incidents on which GAO and others have reported for years. Many of 

these incidents have indicated the need for better oversight, such 

as the 2012 security incident at Y–12, 2008 security performance 

issues at Livermore, and safety and security performance issues at 

Los Alamos in 2004 and 2006. 

On the other hand, there is discussion of Federal micromanagement of M&O contractors and excessive and burdensome requirements that affect productivity. 

DOE’s current oversight framework, which was established in 

2011 to bridge these two narratives, requires M&O contractors to 

develop assurance systems, or CAS, that provide data to help contractors drive continuous improvement in their operations and that 

can be leveraged, when appropriate, to improve the efficiency of 

Federal oversight by relying on the contractor-generated information from CAS. 

A 2011 NNSA policy elaborates on DOE’s framework by identifying assessments Federal overseers should conduct to determine 

when it is appropriate to leverage CAS for oversight. These are: the 

risk of an activity, the maturity of the contractor’s CAS or a way 

of thinking about the reliability of the information provided by the 

contractor systems, and the contractor’s past performance. 

NNSA’s policy describes balancing the oversight approaches that 

can result from these assessments. On one side is transactionbased oversight or direct oversight, such as inspections and performance testing, particularly for high-risk or high-hazard activities. And on the other side is system-based oversight, where NNSA 

can rely on contractor-generated information it receives from contractor systems. 

In our recently completed work regarding NNSA’s implementation of the framework for overseeing M&O contractors, we found 

the following: 

29 

First, NNSA has not fully established policy or guidance for implementing its framework to oversee M&O contractors. Specifically, 

at the headquarters level, NNSA does not have guidance to fully 

support conducting the three assessments required by its policy. 

While NNSA has some guidance for assessing risk, it has no policy 

or guidance for assessing the maturity of CAS or for evaluating 

past performance. We concluded that, without this policy or guidance, oversight approaches could over-rely or under-rely on information from CAS. 

Second, NNSA field offices have developed their own procedures 

for conducting assessments of risk, CAS maturity, and contractor 

past performance; however, these procedures are not complete and 

differ among field offices. We concluded that differences among 

these procedures affect NNSA’s understanding at the enterprise 

level of how oversight is conducted. For example, when field offices 

use different procedures for assessing CAS maturity, it is difficult 

to compare the maturity of these systems. 

Third, NNSA no longer uses the process it established in 2011 

policy to review the effectiveness of oversight approaches in place 

at each contractor site and field office, including how CAS is being 

used for oversight. This process was discontinued after the Y–12 

security incident and has not been replaced, in essence eliminating 

the one process NNSA had that would have allowed the agency to 

determine whether oversight approaches are consistently applied. 

Regarding WIPP, our preliminary observations on oversight of 

WIPP underscore the importance of having clear guidance on when 

and how to rely on contractor information for oversight. Notably, 

according to DOE’s Accident Investigation Board report, NNSA’s 

Los Alamos field office, responsible for overseeing waste packaging, 

was over-reliant on CAS for environmental compliance oversight 

and that this reliance was not consistent with an NNSA review 

that observed CAS was still maturing. 

Thank you again for having me today. I look forward to responding to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Bawden follows:] 

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Mr. MURPHY. Thank you. 

I now recognize the ranking member of the full committee, Mr. 

Pallone, for his opening statement of 5 minutes. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. FRANK PALLONE, JR., A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY 

Mr. PALLONE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for letting me, you 

know, go a little late here. 

Today’s hearing obviously focuses on oversight failures at the Department of Energy’s Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, or WIPP. And the 

incidents there raise broader questions about how to conduct effective oversight across the DOE and NNSA Nuclear Complex. 

On this committee, there has long been bipartisan support for 

congressional oversight to ensure that DOE is effectively managing 

its contractors and keeping the nuclear complex safe. And DOE 

and NNSA have shown repeatedly that our continued oversight is 

needed. 

For nearly two decades now, this committee, GAO, and DOE’s inspector general have identified a wide array of safety and security 

issues facing DOE at NNSA sites. I was going to mention them. 

Some of them, perhaps all of them, have already been mentioned, 

but I did want to mention again. 

In 2004, Los Alamos National Laboratory suspended operations 

after a student was partially blinded in a laser accident and classified information went missing. In 2006, a drug raid in a mobilehome park found a large number of classified documents that had 

been removed from an NNSA lab. In 2007, a GAO report revealed 

that NNSA weapons laboratory workers had faced nearly 60 serious accidents or near misses over the previous 7 years. In 2008, 

GAO found security and protection of weapons-grade nuclear material severely lacking at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory 

due in part to NNSA’s deficient oversight. And then, in 2012, three 

trespassers managed to gain access to a secure area directly adjacent to some of the Nation’s critically important weapon-related facilities at Y–12 National Security Complex in Oak Ridge, Tennessee. 

This committee has held a number of hearings on these topics to 

understand what went wrong and what DOE and NNSA were 

doing to ensure this didn’t happen again in the future. But now we 

find ourselves dealing with today’s topic, which has been mentioned 

already, in February 2014, when WIPP experienced both an underground truck fire and a radiological release from a nuclear waste 

drum within a 9-day period, and operations at WIPP were subsequently shut down. The facility obviously has not reopened, and it 

may cost over half a billion dollars to make it fully operational 

again. 

I just think it is an alarming record. The DOE and NNSA facilities guard some of the Nation’s most dangerous nuclear materials, 

and for too long the DOE and NNSA have allowed mismanagement 

and oversight failures to continue, and we need answers today 

about how that will change. 

Effective contractor oversight is a key component of those 

changes. DOE and NNSA rely heavily on contractors to carry out 

52 

their missions’ activities. In 2010, DOE changed its system for contractor oversight to be more hands off, and they planned to rely on 

the contractor assurance systems developed by the contractors 

themselves to catch problems and provide data for Federal oversight efforts. 

In our 2012 hearing on the Y–12 incident, the committee concluded that DOE and NNSA needed to do a better job of overseeing 

their contractors. Yet here we are today with recent documentation 

from GAO and DOE’s own accident investigation boards that contractor assurance systems across the DOE and NNSA complex may 

not be capable of identifying risks and weaknesses. 

Obviously, we have heard the GAO, and I hope to hear concrete 

plans from DOE and NNSA for amending their systems for contractor oversight. 

I just want to close by talking about how many billions of dollars 

we have spent to fix these repeated problems across the DOE. 

DOE’s Office of Environmental Management and NNSA have been 

on GAO’s high-risk list for a long time, largely due to their struggles to stay within cost and schedule estimates for most major 

projects. 

Regarding what happened at WIPP, NNSA’s written testimony 

today says, and I quote, ‘‘The release, which was subsequently determined to have been avoidable, will be costly to fix and has left 

us without a transuranic waste repository for an indeterminate period of time,’’ unquote. 

The bottom line here is that, when these projects go off the rails, 

taxpayer dollars are at risk, and so are important projects that national security depends on. We need to make sure taxpayers’ money 

is spent more wisely. 

And I want to thank our witnesses and this panel. 

You know, the committee spent decades doing oversight on these 

issues. Both of our chairmen and our Ranking Member DeGette 

have been involved in this for a long time, and we do intend to 

keep a close eye as we move forward. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Pallone follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. FRANK PALLONE, JR. 

Today’s hearing will focus on oversight failures at the Department of Energy’s 

Waste Isolation Pilot Plant—or WIPP. The incidents there raise broader questions 

about how to conduct effective oversight across the DOE–NNSA nuclear complex. 

On this committee, there has long been bipartisan support for congressional oversight to ensure that DOE is effectively managing its contractors and keeping the 

nuclear complex safe. And DOE and NNSA have shown repeatedly that our continued oversight is needed. 

For nearly two decades now, this committee, GAO, and DOE’s Inspector General 

have identified a wide array of safety and security issues facing DOE and NNSA 

sites. Let me walk through just a few of those. 

In 2004, Los Alamos National Laboratory suspended operations after a student 

was partially blinded in a laser accident and classified information went missing. 

In 2006, a drug raid in a mobile home park found a large number of classified 

documents that had been removed from an NNSA lab. 

In 2007, a GAO report revealed that NNSA weapons laboratory workers had faced 

nearly 60 serious accidents or near misses over the previous 7-year period. 

In 2008, GAO found security and protection of weapons-grade nuclear material severely lacking at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, due in part to NNSA’s 

deficient oversight. 

53 

In 2012, three trespassers managed to gain access to a secure area directly adjacent to some of the nation’s most critically important weapon-related facilities at Y– 

12 National Security Complex in Oak Ridge, Tennessee. 

This committee has held a number of hearings on these topics to understand what 

went wrong and what DOE and NNSA were doing to ensure this did not happen 

again in the future. 

But now we find ourselves dealing with today’s topic. 

In February 2014, WIPP experienced both an underground truck fire and a radiological release from a nuclear waste drum within a nine-day period. Operations at 

WIPP were subsequently shut down. The facility has still not reopened, and it may 

cost over half a billion dollars to make it fully operational again. 

This is an alarming record. The DOE and NNSA facilities guard some of the nation’s most dangerous nuclear materials. And for too long, the DOE and NNSA have 

allowed mismanagement and oversight failures to continue. We need answers today 

about how that will change. 

Effective contractor oversight is a key component of those changes. DOE and 

NNSA rely heavily on contractors to carry out their mission activities. In 2010, DOE 

changed its system for contractor oversight to be more hands-off. They planned to 

rely on the contractor assurance systems—developed by the contractors themselves—to catch problems and provide data for Federal oversight efforts. 

In our 2012 hearing on the Y–12 incident, the committee concluded that DOE and 

NNSA needed to do a better job of overseeing their contractors. Yet here we are 

today with recent documentation from GAO and DOE’s own accident investigation 

boards that contractor assurance systems across the DOE–NNSA complex may not 

be capable of identifying risks and weaknesses. 

I look forward to hearing GAO share their findings today, and I hope to hear concrete plans from DOE and NNSA for amending their systems for contractor oversight. 

I want to close by talking about how many billions of dollars we have spent to 

fix these repeated problems across DOE. DOE’s Office of Environmental Management and NNSA have been on GAO’s ‘‘high risk’’ list for a long time, largely due 

to their struggles to stay within cost and schedule estimates for most major projects. 

Regarding what happened at WIPP, NNSA’s written testimony today says, ‘‘The 

release, which was subsequently determined to have been avoidable, will be costly 

to fix, and has left us without a transuranic waste repository for an indeterminate 

period of time.’’ 

The bottom line here is that when these projects go off the rails, taxpayers’ dollars 

are at risk and so are important projects our national security depends on. We need 

to make sure taxpayers’ money is spent more wisely. 

I want to thank all of our witnesses for being here today. This committee has 

spent decades doing oversight on these issues, and I assure you we will keep a close 

eye moving forward. 

Thank you. 

Mr. PALLONE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MURPHY. Thank you. 

The gentleman yields back. 

I now recognize myself for 5 minutes of questions. 

First of all, Mr. Wyka, you ran the Accident Investigation Board 

and determined that the radiological incident was preventable. Am 

I correct? 

Mr. WYKA. Yes, sir. 

Mr. MURPHY. And you also determined the systemic root cause 

was that site offices, or the Feds, I think you said failed to ensure 

that Los Alamos adequately implemented hazard controls in waste 

packaging. Is that correct? 

Mr. WYKA. Close. It’s that they inadequately developed and implemented the repackaging and treatment procedures that incorporated suitable hazard controls and included a rigorous review 

and approval process. 

Mr. MURPHY. Thank you. 

And that contributing cause was failure of oversight from line officers at headquarters; is that correct? 

54 

Mr. WYKA. There were several contributing causes, or what I 

would call missed opportunities. And those included the characterization and certification program and process itself, the land safety 

procedures that they use, the hazard identification and control 

mechanisms and processes that they used at the lab, as well as the 

training and qualification of both the workers and the first-level 

supervisors, the contractor assurance system, and oversight at all 

levels, including the Federal office and headquarters. 

Mr. MURPHY. So multiple levels of failures of oversight. 

Mr. WYKA. Yes, sir. 

Mr. MURPHY. Thank you. 

Ms. Creedon and Mr. Whitney, if you could answer this, too. Do 

either of you have any disagreements with the Department’s Accident Investigation Board findings? 

Ms. CREEDON. No, sir. 

Mr. MURPHY. Mr. Whitney? 

Mr. WHITNEY. No, sir. 

Mr. MURPHY. So you agree that this incident was preventable if 

handled differently? 

Ms. CREEDON. Yes, sir. 

Mr. WHITNEY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. MURPHY. Thank you. 

Now, Ms. Creedon, you were confirmed for your position last July 

2014, but you actually have long experience with DOE and NNSA 

and are generally familiar with the Department’s oversight challenge. Is that a fair statement? 

Ms. CREEDON. That’s correct. 

Mr. MURPHY. Thank you. 

So testimony before this committee over the years has identified 

numerous security problems—you heard that stated by multiple 

members up here—but also safety process problems at Los Alamos 

which go back 15 years. And we heard a partial list in the GAO 

testimony this morning. 

To take another example, in testimony just 2 years ago, we 

learned that the Los Alamos site office—the Feds had closed half 

of 62 safety system corrective actions without adequate 

verifications. 

So is it truly any surprise to you that Los Alamos Feds did not 

know that workers spent a year and a half incorrectly mixing hundreds of barrels of radiological waste? 

Ms. CREEDON. Mr. Chairman, one of the fundamental problems 

with this particular failure is that—well, there are many, as the report indicated, but one of them is clearly the failure of the CAS approach and the CAS system at Los Alamos. So Los Alamos did not 

have a mature CAS system, and it had not picked up these issues. 

One of the primary weaknesses in the CAS system, as we have 

now gone back and looked at it, was it was inadequate with respect 

to overseeing subcontractors. And this is a fundamental problem. 

The other problem—and this is a problem that we have begun 

to address already—is that the lines of oversight at Los Alamos 

were not clear. So one of the Secretary’s initial actions and responses was to clarify these lines of authority and responsibility for 

oversight at Los Alamos. 

55 

And the first action that we took was to take the Environmental 

Management personnel who were imbedded in the NNSA field office and Mr. Whitney, at the direction of the Secretary, established 

a standalone EM field office. And then I will let him go into the 

details of that particular field office. 

But the other thing that we are doing is also changing the way 

that they oversee the contract itself so they will have more authority and responsibility so these lines will be clearer in the future. 

Mr. MURPHY. So, along those lines, let me probe a little bit deeper. So, from your experience, what is it that makes ensuring effective safety systems oversight so difficult to sustain at Los Alamos? 

Ms. CREEDON. So one of the things that I think we have to look 

at is ensuring that the contractors really do have in place for their 

own purposes an internal oversight capability. 

The Department historically and NNSA historically has focused 

on those very high-hazard activities of the criticality, safety, and 

those are the ones that have had the focus and attention. NNSA 

historically has had to balance some of its oversight responsibilities. So we have about 75 people in the Los Alamos and NNSA 

field office, and there are on the order of 12,000 contractor employees at Los Alamos. So, with that ratio, we have to make sure that 

our initial focus, our most intense focus is associated with those 

high-hazard activities. 

And these activities that were associated with the repackaging of 

this legacy waste in this overarching construct were considered to 

be low-hazard activities. So for that, we rely on the systematic approach at Los Alamos. 

Mr. MURPHY. So it being low—well, I see I am out of time. I will 

follow up with that later on. Thank you. 

Ms. DeGette, you are recognized for 5 minutes. 

Ms. DEGETTE. I want to thank all of our witnesses for coming 

today. And this is an issue that we have been grappling with for 

many years, as you heard in my opening statement. 

I wanted to ask you, Ms. Bawden—I understand that DOE contract management, specifically EM and NNSA, have been on the 

high-risk list for a long time. Is that correct? 

Ms. BAWDEN. Yes. 

Ms. DEGETTE. Now, that is a list that GAO places agencies and 

programs on that are at increased risk for waste and mismanagement; is that right? 

Ms. BAWDEN. That’s right. 

Ms. DEGETTE. Now, in 2010, the Department launched an effort 

to reform its approach to oversight. I know you are familiar with 

this memo, the 2010 memo from Deputy Secretary Poneman called 

‘‘Department of Energy Safety and Security Reform Plan’’; is that 

right? 

Ms. BAWDEN. Yes. 

Ms. DEGETTE. Now, in the safety reform section, it states that 

DOE will provide contractors with, quote, ‘‘the flexibility to tailor 

and implement safety programs in light of their situation without 

excessive Federal oversight or overly prescriptive departmental requirements.’’ 

Are you familiar with that section? 

Ms. BAWDEN. Yes. 

56 

Ms. DEGETTE. Now, it says the same thing for security reform. 

Is that right? 

Ms. BAWDEN. Yes. 

Ms. DEGETTE. Now, Ms. Bawden, under this new system, NNSA 

was supposed to be able to rely on information from contractor assurance systems put into place by the M&O contractors, correct? 

Ms. BAWDEN. Yes. 

Ms. DEGETTE. And the NNSA was supposed to affirm that the 

systems were mature and effective. Is that right? 

Ms. BAWDEN. That’s correct. 

Ms. DEGETTE. Now, one of the first NNSA sites to receive that 

affirmation was the Y–12 facility in Tennessee, correct? 

Ms. BAWDEN. Yes. 

Ms. DEGETTE. Now, after that facility was affirmed, that is when 

we had the security fiasco where the nun and the other people 

were able to penetrate the compound. Is that right? 

Ms. BAWDEN. Yes. 

Ms. DEGETTE. So I understand that after that failure they 

scrapped the affirmation process, correct? 

Ms. BAWDEN. Yes. 

Ms. DEGETTE. And so, really, they had no way of affirming the 

maturity or usefulness of these systems. 

Ms. BAWDEN. They do not have a current process in place. 

Ms. DEGETTE. All right. 

Now, let me talk to you for a minute about WIPP. I understand 

when the DOE conducted its accident investigation it found that 

the contractor assurance systems for the two M&O contractors affiliated with WIPP and Los Alamos failed to identify the risks associated with that disaster. Is that right? 

Ms. BAWDEN. Yes. 

Ms. DEGETTE. Now, your team just completed a comprehensive 

audit, and you found that the NNSA doesn’t have the capability to 

evaluate which sites have viable contractor assurance systems capable of giving the agency the data that it needs to oversee the contractors that run these critical facilities, correct? 

Ms. BAWDEN. They do not have policies in place. That’s correct. 

Ms. DEGETTE. OK. 

And the contractor systems at Y–12, Los Alamos, and WIPP all 

failed to prevent major security and safety incidents, correct? 

Ms. BAWDEN. Yes. 

Ms. DEGETTE. Now, you raised concerns about these contractor 

assurance systems across the entire NNSA complex, correct? 

Ms. BAWDEN. Yes. 

Ms. DEGETTE. So, at this point, what approach or system is 

NNSA using to conduct oversight at its sites, where literally billions of dollars are being spent? 

Ms. BAWDEN. Thank you for the question. 

NNSA is utilizing many different approaches at its sites across 

the spectrum of available transactional and systems-based options. 

What we found is that you really have to go to each individual site 

to figure out whatever site approaches they’re taking, and information about oversight broadly was not available at the headquarters 

level 

57 

Ms. DEGETTE. So it is really just sort of, now, catch as catch can, 

whatever people think at the different sites. Would that be a 

fair—— 

Ms. BAWDEN. The field offices are making their decisions at each 

site. 

Ms. DEGETTE. The field offices are making their decisions at 

each site. 

Ms. BAWDEN. Uh-huh. 

Ms. DEGETTE. So does that approach give you confidence the 

Federal Government is applying effective oversight over its M&O 

contractors? 

Ms. BAWDEN. I think the recommendations that we made that 

were aimed at improving policy, consistency, and fully fleshing out 

this framework would help give us that confidence. 

Ms. DEGETTE. Now, you know, Ms. Creedon, I know that you are 

all trying to grapple with this, and it has been a complex and difficult problem that people have been trying to grapple with, really, 

ever since I have been on this committee, which is 1997. 

But I have to say that, since 2002, DOE policies and orders have 

required that all these contractors have these systems. But you 

hear Ms. Bawden say that the compliance is sort of catch as catch 

can among the different agencies. 

What is your response to that? 

Ms. CREEDON. As Ms. Bawden said, when the Y–12 event occurred, the CAS system at Y–12 had been affirmed. And my understanding at the time was that NNSA then determined that, clearly, 

the approach that they had taken to affirming these contractor assurance systems was not working and they set it aside. 

Since I started at the Department of Energy—I was confirmed in 

July and started in August—one of my responsibilities is as the 

fee-determining official, and part of that is to look at how all of 

these contractors are performing. So, among other things, we at the 

Department have changed some of the methodologies with respect 

to the contractor and the contract and have changed some of the 

performance criteria. 

But what I have started to do, which in some respects is a compensatory measure for some of these differences, is I meet for an 

entire day with all of our field office managers every quarter, and 

we go through exactly what’s going on—— 

Ms. DEGETTE. OK. I don’t mean to stop you, but my time has expired, and I think it would be really helpful if you could supplement your answers to deal exactly with this problem that we have 

of now no cohesion. 

[The information follows:] 

Our oversight policies are implemented through Department of Energy 

(DOE) Directives that are issued at the department level, and followed by 

all offices of the DOE, as required. Where specific directive language includes contractor requirements, they are included in DOE contracts. These 

directives are consistent with statutes and regulations. 

Ms. DEGETTE. Thank you for your comity. 

Mr. MURPHY. We let you go because it was important questions 

you were asking. 

Dr. Burgess, you are recognized for 5 minutes. 

58 

Mr. BURGESS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Wyka, I have here, I think, three accident investigation reports from the Department of Energy Office of Environmental Management, and in each one there is a judgment-of-need list at the 

end of the report. And I haven’t added them up myself, but I am 

told by staff that there are 122 judgments of need in these three 

reports that the Department and the contractors will need to address. 

So let’s just ask the obvious question. This is 122 judgments of 

need. Is that a lot? 

Mr. WYKA. It’s a big number, but I actually don’t go for a quota 

for a number. I look at the issues and develop the conclusions and 

judgment of needs based on what we find until we sort or resolve 

the problems. 

A lot of those judgment of needs are more extensive than others. 

Some of them are extent of conditions rather than just looking at 

the event at Los Alamos. It’s going to require, you know, the Department to look at it from a programmatic perspective as well as 

enterprise-wide. 

Mr. BURGESS. But, say, going back over the last 10 years, many 

of these things seem to be recurrent themes. Am I wrong to make 

that assumption? 

Mr. WYKA. No, sir, you are correct. And that’s what the board 

concluded in all three investigations, that a lot of these issues were 

brought up in other reviews and assessments, both internally and 

externally, and they weren’t addressed as repeatable issues, which 

was another missed opportunity—— 

Mr. BURGESS. Well, why not? 

Mr. WYKA [continuing]. In several functional areas. 

Mr. BURGESS. Why not? I mean, again, I have been on this subcommittee for 10 years. We have been dealing with these problems 

every year that I have been on the subcommittee. The obvious 

question is why not, or what is it going to take to get these things 

brought up to standards where we won’t be reading these types of 

headlines and, quite honestly, putting our workers and contractors 

at risk? 

So do we have an answer for that? 

Please. 

Mr. WHITNEY. If you don’t mind, sir, I will answer that for the 

Office of Environmental Management. 

Yes, Ted was exactly right. Even with respect to the EM contractor at the WIPP site, there were assessments over the past 

years, corrective actions put in place, and they were not tracked accordingly. 

We are going to resolve that issue. Among many other things 

that we are doing with respect to oversight at headquarters, we 

have developed a more robust corrective action tracking system, a 

corrective action software hub, and we will assure the followthrough on all corrective actions. 

We are also increasing resources in the oversight area for headquarters for our Safety, Security, and Quality Programs office that 

really did not have the staffing to implement a robust headquarters 

oversight program. 

59 

We have done the same at the Carlsbad Field Office, increasing 

resources, but, just as importantly, we have reorganized the office 

there. The office previously had the production or the waste emplacement group, the folks that were responsible for the program, 

and the folks that were responsible for oversight in the same office. 

And, in fact, unfortunately, some folks wore two hats. They were 

responsible for emplacing the waste and for oversight of that activity, which is clearly not the right way to approach it. 

So we have reorganized it into an Office of Program Management 

and an Office of Oversight, to ensure that all the position descriptions accurately reflect the oversight responsibilities. And those are 

being pulled into performance plans of the Federal employee. 

We are doing this across the board at headquarters and revamping our oversight program in response to the AIB reports and part 

of our corrective action planning process to include really developing a more robust oversight arm. There will be a baseline program as well a program that looks at trends across the complex 

and ensures that when a trend develops—— 

Mr. BURGESS. Yes. If I can just interrupt you, because I am going 

to run out of time. This all sounds wonderful, and I have the transcript from the hearing we had after the Y–12 incident 2 1⁄2 years 

ago, and I think the same thing was said to us then. So, I mean, 

again, that is the question. 

And, I mean, is Secretary Moniz satisfied with this? Does he 

think this is acceptable from your department, from the Department of Energy? 

Mr. WHITNEY. Sir, I won’t speak on behalf of the Secretary, but 

I believe, as Madelyn and I both endorse the recommendations 

from the AIB report and realize things need to be corrected, we are 

taking an approach that I know the Secretary is supportive of, 

which is ensuring that the recommendations, and the findings from 

the Accident Investigation Board reports, we are sharing across the 

complex with the EM folks. 

We have worked directly—Ted has—with each site office to give 

individual briefings of the AIB findings, to talk about lessons 

learned, where there may be extent-of-condition issues at that site, 

as well. And then, later this month, we will have all of the field 

offices managers in to—— 

Mr. BURGESS. I don’t mean to be rude, but I am going to interrupt, because they are going to cut me off here in a moment. 

Acting Secretary Poneman, last time we had this discussion, over 

2 years ago, he said: Our management principles say that we will 

only succeed by continuous improvement. That was part of the 

process, so it wouldn’t just be mindlessly continuing to check the 

box, but it would be vigorous and aggressive. I am sorry. We 

missed the mark, and we need to do better. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. MURPHY. I thank the gentleman. 

I now recognize Mr. Pallone for 5 minutes. 

Mr. PALLONE. Thank you. 

Mr. Whitney and Administrator Creedon, since 2002, DOE policies and orders have required that each DOE M&O contractor have 

a contractor assurance system. 

60 

In 2011, DOE sought to increase its reliance on these systems for 

oversight purposes; is that correct? 

Ms. CREEDON. That’s correct. 

Mr. PALLONE. OK. 

Now, let me just read from the WIPP accident investigation report. It says, and I quote, ‘‘Nuclear Waste Partnership, the contractor that packed the drum, has not fully developed an integrated 

contractor assurance system that provided assurance that workers 

perform compliantly, risks are identified, and control systems are 

effective and efficient.’’ 

And then, I quote, ‘‘The Los Alamos National Security Contractor 

Assurance System was not effective in identifying weaknesses,’’ end 

of quote. 

So, again, to both of you, why were valid risk systems not in 

place, and aren’t they required to have them? 

Mr. WHITNEY. Yes, sir. Thank you for the question. 

One, just a correction. Nuclear Waste Partnership did not pack 

the drum. They operate the WIPP facility. 

Mr. PALLONE. OK. 

Mr. WHITNEY. But you’re exactly right, and we agree with the 

AIB findings, which stated they did not have an adequate contractor assurance system in place. 

Unfortunately—— 

Mr. PALLONE. And they were required to have them? 

Mr. WHITNEY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. PALLONE. OK. 

So let me ask Ms. Bawden, then, given these findings, the Accident Investigation Board made recommendations that M&O contractors, NNSA, and the Department put in place viable contractor 

assurance systems and improved field office and headquarters oversight of them. Your recent report, however, found that NNSA’s efforts to do this across the nuclear complex has not been adequate 

or complete. 

So if I could ask Ms. Bawden, weren’t these contractors already 

supposed to have the contractor assurance systems in place? 

Ms. BAWDEN. Yes. They were required. 

Mr. PALLONE. And what gives the GAO confidence that NNSA or 

EM, for that matter, can adopt the accident report recommendations on approved oversight, given the findings of your recent report? 

Ms. BAWDEN. Our findings, similar to what the Accident Investigation Board report found, were that revisions to policies, improvements in policies are needed. And the proof is really going to 

be in the implementation of those policies once they’re completed. 

And we will look at that as part of the followup on the recommendations that we’ve made. 

Mr. PALLONE. But what—you know, so, again, I will ask Administrator Creedon and Mr. Whitney. 

I mean, I guess you’ve, you know, been kind of answering this 

question already, but, you know, why should we have any confidence that, you know, things are going to change? 

Ms. CREEDON. You know, that is an extraordinarily difficult 

question. And it is certainly something that the Secretary is comVerDate Mar 15 2010 14:42 Nov 20, 2015 Jkt 037690 PO 00000 Frm 00064 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\114THCONGRESS\114X54XDOEXWIPPASKOK111915\114X54XDOEXWIPPXPDFMAD
61 

mitted to, the Administrator is committed to, I am committed to, 

is trying to get this right. 

It’s pretty clear that the processes that were in place when this 

event happened weren’t right. They didn’t catch the events. The 

contractor assurance system didn’t catch what was going on. We 

didn’t catch what was going on. 

And so now we’ve done a bit of a pause, and we are now in the 

process of once again trying to put in place these policies that will 

figure out how to ensure that this contractor assurance system is 

reliable. 

One of the measures, I think, going forward is to see if we begin 

to agree with them. So, even in the last year, it’s pretty clear that 

the contractor assurance systems at some sites are better than 

other sites. And it’s putting these processes in place, which we’ve 

embarked on doing again. We hope we get it right this time. 

Mr. PALLONE. All right. 

Let me just ask Mr. Whitney, you know, about the cost. I mentioned in my opening—there’s only a minute left here. 

How much is it going to cost to make WIPP fully operational 

again? And when do we expect that to happen? And what are we 

losing by shutting down WIPP for several years? How much is that 

going to cost the Department? 

Mr. WHITNEY. Yes, sir. 

We anticipate the cost to resume operations—which, initially, our 

target for that is by the end of March of 2016—will be approximately $242 million. 

To resume operations at the pre-incident pace will require additional ventilation, and that will require a capital construction 

project. And the rough order of magnitude of where we are in the 

planning process for that project is between $77 million and $310 

million. 

So I can’t say exactly how much it will cost to get to the point 

where we were pre-incident, but it will take several years to get 

to that point. 

Mr. PALLONE. All right. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MURPHY. Thank you. The gentleman yields back. 

Now I recognize Mr. Bucshon for 5 minutes. 

Mr. BUCSHON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Again, this is another instance, I think, that maybe a lot of good 

people are put in a bad spot. And I appreciate all your testimony 

and what you are trying to do to improve the situation. 

From your testimony, Ms. Bawden, it appears that the oversight 

framework shifts from one administration to the other. This is not 

a criticism of any administration in general. My concern is that 

come a new administration, whomever that may be, that somebody 

may want to develop a whole new approach to oversight. 

I fully understand that political appointees carry out policy 

issues of whatever administration is in place. However, it seems to 

me on critical issues like this that maybe there needs to be people 

in charge that span administrations, that don’t have the ability to 

change policy every time something changes. That doesn’t make 

any sense to me. 

62 

And the reason I say this, because across the Government what 

happens is agencies wait you out. If the agency itself, as a whole, 

doesn’t like what you are trying to do, they just wait you out until 

the next people come, and they sustain a problem that just keeps 

happening. 

You have heard from many of the members who have been on 

this subcommittee for years, maybe decades, that this is a recurring theme. It is going continue to recur. We are going to be here 

probably 2 or 3 years from now, and people in your positions, who 

are from the next administration, are going to be, unfortunately, 

put in front of us trying to explain what an agency has been doing, 

literally, for decades that you can’t change, and that is unfortunate. 

So, Ms. Bawden, do you think this is wise, this is a wise way to 

run something as critical as this? I mean, is this wise? 

Ms. BAWDEN. What we looked at in the course of our review was 

the policy that was in place and how it has been implemented. 

With respect to part of the question that you asked on sort of leadership and political leadership, the Mies-Augustine panel that was 

commissioned by Congress to review governance did look at that 

issue, but GAO has not. 

Mr. BUCSHON. Again, it is not a criticism of political appointees. 

This is a criticism of a system that may not be wise in certain critical areas of agencies. I get you are going to have a secretary of 

energy, I get you are going to have people appointed down the line, 

but certain areas, maybe, it is just not appropriate. 

I mean, Ms. Creedon, what do you think? First of all, you are a 

graduate of University of Evansville, which is in my hometown, so 

welcome. 

What do you think? 

Ms. CREEDON. So I think one of the issues now is the NNSA has 

been the subject of a number of investigations over the last several 

years—I mean, for decades actually, but a lot of them over the last 

several years—and they are all very critical. And one of the things 

that we have been seeing is we do, the Federal Government does 

an annual Federal Employees Viewpoint Survey, and by and large 

the workforce at NNSA is very good. The workforce at our labs 

are—— 

Mr. BUCSHON. And, again, I want to make it clear, I am not criticizing the workforce. It is the system, right? 

Ms. CREEDON. Exactly. They are very good. But part of the problem is, they are not very happy and they are not very happy with 

the state of affairs. So I am very hopeful this time that they want 

to get out of this hole. Everybody wants to get out of this hole. 

Mr. BUCSHON. And I am sure they do. 

Ms. CREEDON. So hopefully as we work towards it this time, we 

can get something in place that will be enduring and everybody 

gets out of this hole so that they are not continually the subject of 

very unflattering reports. 

Mr. BUCSHON. Understood. 

Mr. Whitney, do you have any comments on that? 

Mr. WHITNEY. Only that I am a career employee. 

Mr. BUCSHON. Then you have a very good view of this, which you 

probably can’t say here publicly, but I understand. 

63 

Mr. WHITNEY. I started this assignment in May of last year. My 

predecessor was also a career employee. We haven’t had a confirmed Assistant Secretary for several years. But we do have a very 

dedicated, strong workforce, as you pointed out, that is competent. 

Mr. BUCSHON. Yes. 

Mr. WHITNEY. And I completely agree, it is not the workforce. We 

have systemic issues that were brought out by the AIB report that 

we need to fix. 

Mr. BUCSHON. I think that is accurate. 

One of the other things that frustrates me is you can never put 

your finger on who actually is responsible at the end of the day, 

right? And we need to hold people more responsible, whether that 

is career or political appointees. 

Any time we try to ferret that out here in oversight hearings, at 

the end of the day, there is no one person that we can put our finger on, and that is very frustrating. Quickly, the cost, $70 million in contractor fines, half a billion 

dollars for the taxpayer potentially. I mean, is that a fair way to 

divvy that up? I mean, if we determine who is responsible, it seems 

to me if it is the agency responsible, then fine. If it is the contractor responsibility, then they should pay the whole thing. You 

can submit that answer for the record. 

[The information follows:] 

Fines are levied against the contractor in different ways, but the most common approach is through a mutual agreement of the parties. A bilateral 

agreement addressing the terms and conditions associated with the fine/ 

penalty is normally incorporated into the contract via modification. The bilateral agreement will outline the methodology for reaching the amount of 

the fine. Payment of the fine is normally a reduction to the available fee 

pool included in the existing contract. For example, because of the impact 

of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) incident National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) withheld $57.2M of fee in FY14, which included the entire award, at-risk fee, and fixed fee available to the contractor for work performed for the Department of Energy (DOE)/NNSA. Absent existing funds on the contract, the contractor will issue a check to the 

US Treasury to cover the fine. 

DOE and NNSA Management and Operating contracts are cost reimbursement, level of effort contracts. This means that although the contractor may 

lose the fee for unsatisfactory performance, generally, unless determined 

unallowable under the standards identified in the FAR, the costs for cleanup and repair are covered as they would be under any other cost reimbursement contract. 

Mr. BUCSHON. I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MURPHY. The gentleman yields back now. 

Now we recognize Mrs. Brooks for 5 minutes. 

Mrs. BROOKS. Thank you. 

Continuing a bit on that line of questioning, I am a former U.S. 

Attorney, and so I have led a Federal office where career prosecutors and career other staff, obviously, are there day in and day out 

through administrations, and different priorities come from different administrations and different leadership styles and so forth. 

But I think that because those of you who are the career, Mr. 

Whitney and Mr. Wyka, both career people, this is a bit of an opportunity for you to—and because I think other people of this 

panel—I am new to this committee, so I have not been here time 

and time again asking these questions like our chair and our rankVerDate Mar 15 2010 14:42 Nov 20, 2015 Jkt 037690 PO 00000 Frm 00067 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\114THCONGRESS\114X54XDOEXWIPPASKOK111915\114X54XDOEXWIPPXPDFMAD
64 

ing member have been. And I think this is a great opportunity for 

you to share with us what you would like to see happen in the 

best-case scenario, what are the improvements that you believe 

need to be made. 

For instance, looking at GAO’s report and seeing what their recommendations have been and seeing that we just cannot seem to 

get this right, site after site and different sites, and I appreciate, 

Ms. Creedon, that you are spending days at each site now each 

quarter, but, yet, when you leave someday, how will that be institutionalized? And so while you might be really moving it in the 

right direction, how will we get to it being so systematic and so institutionalized that the oversight of this most critical infrastructure 

in our country is not left to random changes in how the oversight 

is conducted? 

And so I would really like to hear from the career folks what you 

would like to see improved and what policies you would like to see 

in place with respect to the contractor oversight or whether or not 

there should be more direct oversight. And so I would like to get 

your thoughts in my now 2 1⁄2 minutes left from both of you what 

your—and not that I don’t appreciate what the others have to say, 

but this is an opportunity for career folks to tell us what needs to 

be fixed and how do we make sure these things don’t happen again. 

What is it? 

Mr. Whitney, start with you, and then Mr. Wyka. 

Mr. WHITNEY. Yes, ma’am. Thank you. 

I think, most importantly, for the EM program, we cannot treat 

this as an opportunity only to fix WIPP and the incident there. We 

have to use this as an opportunity to fix our oversight across the 

EM complex. 

Mrs. BROOKS. Agreed. 

Mr. WHITNEY. We very much are focusing in that area and making sure that not only are we sharing lessons learned, engaging directly with all our site managers, all our Senior Executive Service 

folks in the field to go over the lessons learned, and thankfully Mr. 

Wyka has agreed to work with us on that and to really engage and 

look at lessons learned, but also the oversight function. 

The contractor assurance system is one component of our overall 

oversight function. It is an important component. It is a contractor’s component. But we have to make sure that as we move forward and we build a more robust oversight element at headquarters, that we are doing that in the field too and not just at 

WIPP, but at each of our field sites. 

Mrs. BROOKS. Mr. Wyka. 

Thank you. 

Mr. WYKA. Thank you for the question. 

I think probably a key is to make sure that we have acceptance 

at all levels, not only at the senior level, but the mid-levels, as well 

as the worker level, that we have problems to fix, and to use this 

as an opportunity, as Mark mentioned, to almost look at ourselves 

in the rearview mirror and look at the analysis conclusions, the 

judgment of needs, the program processes, oversight breakdowns at 

all levels, look at our respective programs, no matter what they 

are, to sort of see if we are seeing those same type of precursortype activities. 

65 

Mrs. BROOKS. And how does that occur now when you need to 

do those evaluations at your sites? Is it just with the top level? Or 

how do those process improvements, self-examination exercises 

take place now? 

Mr. WYKA. I think one way is to look at the way we look at our 

CAS systems. Rather than to look at them in terms of an affirmation or are they in place, the way we did it with the Accident Investigation Board—we didn’t do a CAS assessment, we looked at the 

event—is to look at them in terms of the functional areas—Radcon, 

work controls, nuclear safety—and to look at the elements with respect to those functional areas, are they actually working effectively. 

Mrs. BROOKS. But then how is that shared with every single person in the facility? 

Mr. WYKA. There is a lessons-learned program, and through 

what we are doing now and through debriefings and bringing our 

field managers together and having them required to read the documents and then we will discuss what are our corporate next-step 

options as an enterprise. 

Mrs. BROOKS. Thank you. My time is up. 

I yield back. 

Mr. MURPHY. Thank you. 

Now I recognize Mr. Collins for 5 minutes. 

Mr. COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I am new to this committee and shocked, I guess would be a good 

word, from what I am hearing. I come from the private sector. I 

am an ISO guy. I am an ISO 13485, my biotech. I run a select 

agent operation. We deal with all the bioterrorism agents. I deal 

with anthrax. We inactivate it. We make sure it is inactivated. My 

folks wear spacesuits. We have double airlocks. We don’t make mistakes. 

Why don’t we make mistakes? Because we have people in charge 

who know what they are doing. Clearly, that can’t be said for your 

agency. 

Now, let me just state a fact: You can’t defend the indefensible. 

But would any of you like to try, or should we move on? 

So the next question is, who was fired over this, and how many 

people? 

Ms. CREEDON. The NNSA held responsible the contractors, the 

contractor operator. 

Mr. COLLINS. Were they fired? 

Ms. CREEDON. So we did two things—— 

Mr. COLLINS. Did you fire them? 

Ms. CREEDON. We did not fire them, but what we did is we took 

all their fee and we did not—— 

Mr. COLLINS. Did you sue them? 

Ms. CREEDON. Well, we took all of their fee, and we took back 

a year of contract award that had been previously given. 

Mr. COLLINS. Oh, my goodness. And you think that was good 

enough? 

Ms. CREEDON. It is all of their fee. 

Mr. COLLINS. That is not enough. The taxpayer is on the hook 

for $500 million. Did we sue them? 

66 

Ms. CREEDON. The laboratory director also relieved the seven 

senior managers who were responsible for the work that was done 

at Los Alamos. 

Mr. COLLINS. So he, obviously, wasn’t involved or responsible because we didn’t fire him? I am just saying, this is an example. I 

am somewhat surprised you are trying to defend this. You can’t defend the indefensible. 

In the private sector, you would probably be fired. The contractor would be relieved. The contractor would be sued for the $500 million. We would put him into bankruptcy, if that is what it took, because I think what you are hearing me saying is through his incompetence and the incompetence of the people who didn’t have 

the—this is procedures. 

Are you familiar with lockout-tagout? Well, when electricians, we 

would run the risk of them getting electrocuted if they are working 

on electrical equipment. It is fail-safe. You have keys. You have 

training. You can’t be working on a live box with these procedures 

in place. 

This is fundamental. I mean, I am new to this committee. I am 

just beyond any comprehension that this occurred, that anyone involved is still working there. And it rests with the person in 

charge, the Secretary, yourself and others, the contractor. In the 

private sector they would have been terminated, they would have 

been sued, two or three levels of people would have been fired, a 

fix would have been in place, an emergency SWAT team would 

have been put in. 

Industry operates, my business operates in areas of critical—I 

mean, we are growing bioterrorism agents. We have people wearing 

spacesuits. We have to know nothing can go wrong. I mean, nothing can go wrong. And when people say, ‘‘Why don’t you sleep well 

at night some nights?,’’ that is some of the reasons. 

But I hear this very nonchalant—we took away—I mean, do you 

realize how ludicrous it is that the organization in charge of this 

did what they did and cost the taxpayers $500 million and they are 

still there? And you think that taking away a year of their extension works? I just don’t know what world you guys live in other 

than the bureaucratic world the public gets so upset by. I just 

would not only expect more, but I am surprised you are still working there. 

I mean, do you see where I am coming from? The taxpayers deserve more. And is there a reason we haven’t sued the company to 

reclaim our $500 million? Our Government sure went after Toyota. 

We are going after GM for other things like that. Why aren’t we 

going after this contractor? 

Ms. CREEDON. So on the Los Alamos operating contractor, we did 

everything that we can do under our contract with them. We took 

all of their fee, and we took back a previously awarded—— 

Mr. COLLINS. So we have a contract that doesn’t state that they 

are responsible for something? When you breach a contract—and I 

would think this would be considered some breach of the contract— 

whatever the contract says is out the window. Taxpayers lost $500 

million. You are saying we have a contract that doesn’t allow us 

to recover that, or we can’t sue on another basis, of gross incompetence? I would think gross incompetence and negligence would 

67 

allow you to move forward on a suit. Maybe you lose the lawsuit, 

but I guess what I am hearing, we didn’t even bring it. Did we? 

Ms. CREEDON. No. 

Mr. COLLINS. No. 

I just find this whole thing unacceptable and would not only ask 

you to do better in the future, but somebody should be looking in 

mirrors and deciding, if they are not capable of doing the job, do 

us a favor and resign. If someone else is in charge and they are 

willing to put up with this level of incompetence within our own 

organization and the contractor, I think, again, they need to look 

in the mirror, and for the good of the Nation think about whether 

they should go to work tomorrow. 

Anyway, my time is over. I yield back. 

Mr. MURPHY. The gentleman yields back. 

Ms. Creedon, just to clarify, who was in charge at the time this 

last problem occurred? Who had your position as a Principal Deputy Administrator of NNSA? 

Ms. CREEDON. At the time that this event occurred, well, neither 

I nor the current Administrator were in place at that time. And I 

am trying to remember. I think at the time this was in place Tom 

D’Agostino was the Administrator and Neile Miller was the Principal Deputy Administrator. And they are, obviously, no longer in 

those positions. 

Mr. MURPHY. And, Mr. Whitney, who had your position at that 

time? 

Ms. CREEDON. Neile Miller. 

Mr. MURPHY. Oh, Neile Miller. 

Ms. CREEDON. Sorry. 

Mr. MURPHY. OK. 

Mr. Whitney, I just want to make sure I understand who was in 

charge. Because Mr. Collins is bringing up a question. I just want 

to know what was the chain of command at that time. 

Ms. CREEDON. I stand corrected. The previous Principal Deputy 

Administrator had already left at that point in time. And there was 

an Acting Administrator. Tom D’Agostino had also left at the time 

of this event. So at that point we had an Acting Administrator for 

NNSA, and there was no one in my position at the time of this 

event. 

Mr. MURPHY. And, Mr. Whitney, about your position? 

Mr. WHITNEY. Yes, sir. We did not have a confirmed Assistant 

Secretary at the time. I believe the most senior person was a senior 

advisor for environmental management at the time. 

Mr. MURPHY. It doesn’t sound like anybody was in charge at the 

time. 

Mr. Green, you are recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. GREEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I would like to talk about the effectiveness of DOE’s oversight 

across various sites of the nuclear security complex and the reliability of related contractor assurance programs. Is it safe to say 

that the WIPP accident investigations prove that the Federal oversight and the contractor assurance systems were ineffective at 

WIPP and at LANL? The Y–12 security breach also demonstrated 

the ineffectiveness of oversight and contractor assurance. 

68 

For both our DOE witnesses, what do you know about the contractor assurance systems at the other nuclear weapons research 

facilities and cleanup sites? Are there any that you can point to 

that we can rightly say are effective for DOE oversight purposes? 

Ms. CREEDON. At the NNSA sites we have contractor assurance 

systems in place. We are looking at those again. We have been 

looking at those. They are a tool, as we look at how we evaluate 

our contractors. Right now we believe that some of them are actually pretty good and others clearly need work, like the one at Los 

Alamos. 

Mr. WHITNEY. Yes, sir. For the environmental management program, we did conduct a review of the contractor assurance systems 

at our largest sites. This was prior to the WIPP incident. We 

looked at the elements, operational elements of the CAS system to 

see if they were there and to see if they were being implemented 

appropriately and if the field office is then providing that independent oversight. For those sites, we did find that they had effective systems in place, but now we are moving forward to reevaluate 

all of our sites’ CAS. 

Mr. GREEN. All of us would hope this would be an exception of 

the rule. So you are evaluating that now with your other sites to 

see if there has been any followup. I understand the GAO report, 

that NAP–21 established a process for NNSA headquarters to review the effectiveness of contractors’ implementation of assurance 

systems and field offices’ oversight approaches called affirmation. 

However, after the Y–12 security breach occurred at a facility 

whose contractor assurance system had been affirmed as effective, 

NNSA discontinued the process of affirmation reviews. Is that 

true? 

Ms. CREEDON. That is correct. 

Mr. GREEN. If you don’t like the answer, you don’t review it? 

Ms. CREEDON. No. What happened was the contractor assurance 

system at Y–12 had been affirmed, and then it was shortly after 

that contractor assurance system had been affirmed we had the incident at Y–12. So it was clear that there was a fault in that affirmation process, and we discontinued that process. 

Mr. GREEN. OK. GAO has also recommended that NNSA establish a process of reviewing the effectiveness of field offices’ oversight approaches, including the use of contractor assurance information. NNSA’s response letter to the GAO report states that the 

new corporate policy and guidance will outline an approach for 

validating the effectiveness of the oversight approaches by March 

of 2016. 

Administrator, does this mean that just the process will be established by March of 2016, not that the actual reviews will be conducted? 

Ms. CREEDON. So that is when the implementation guidance will 

be issued, and the process will actually be established sometime 

earlier. So we will have it implemented and up and running by 

then. 

Mr. GREEN. OK. So how long after that will it take to conduct 

and complete the actual effectiveness reviews? 

Ms. CREEDON. I don’t know, because we haven’t put those implementation processes in place yet. But even in this interim period, 

69 

we still continue to look at our contractor assurance systems. We 

work with our field office managers in other ways to ensure that 

we have got adequate oversight and that these are providing us 

with reliable information. 

Mr. GREEN. So you are actually looking at a range of facilities 

to make sure these effectiveness reviews are conducted hopefully as 

soon as possible. 

Ms. CREEDON. Yes. 

Mr. GREEN. And will that be before March 16? 

Ms. CREEDON. So a formal process has not yet been reestablished. But even in advance of the reestablishment of a formal 

process, we are looking at whether or not these contractor assurance systems are providing us accurate and timely information. 

Mr. GREEN. And this is systematic, I guess, of all the sites? 

Ms. CREEDON. On the NNSA sites, yes. And I will let Mr. Whitney speak to his sites. 

Mr. GREEN. OK. On EM’s effectiveness. 

Mr. WHITNEY. Yes, sir. We believe that it is a systemic issue, and 

that is why we are revamping our oversight program at headquarters with a strong focus on all the oversight elements, including the contractor assurance system at all our sites and our field 

offices’ oversight of those contractor assurance systems. 

Mr. GREEN. So in your testimony, it is a systemic and not just 

an exception. But you are working to fix it, I hope. 

Mr. WHITNEY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. GREEN. OK. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I know I am out of time. 

Mr. MURPHY. Thank you. 

Now we welcome and recognize Mr. Luja ́n for 5 minutes. 

Mr. LUJA ́ N. Mr. Chairman, thank you so very much. And I really 

appreciate, Mr. Chairman, you and the ranking member bringing 

us together for this important hearing pertaining to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant and Los Alamos National Laboratory EM, as well 

as the NNSA. 

Mr. Whitney, as we work on these issues, I think it is important 

to remember that in executing the mission of these projects, as well 

as to Ms. Creedon, that we also work with these local communities. 

And, Mr. Whitney, are you committed to engaging and involving 

the surrounding local community in the prioritization and procurement of environmental cleanup efforts at Los Alamos National Laboratory? 

Mr. WHITNEY. Yes, sir. I have had an opportunity actually to 

meet with the community on several occasions now. And now that 

we have formally stood up the EM field office, our senior manager 

there has also done that, and we are committed to continuing that 

relationship. 

Mr. LUJA ́ N. And as you increase Federal oversight positions at 

LANL, what are you doing to ensure that the funding for cleanup 

efforts does not adversely impact it? 

Mr. WHITNEY. As we move forward with EM, the transition from 

NNSA to EM, we are looking at the entire program. Of course you 

know the consent order with the State for the cleanup program was 

to be completed by the end of 2015, and that is not going to happen. So we are looking at the program, rebaselining the program, 

70 

and also we will be working very closely with the State over the 

next several months, and we will assure that we have resources requested to do the cleanup work at the site based on that. 

Mr. LUJA ́ N. And, Mr. Whitney, as conversations are had with 

various States around the country based on what we saw with the 

incident here, are we going to also take into consideration that the 

time lines that we are working with are going to ensure that the 

safest protocol associated with completing these projects is included? 

Mr. WHITNEY. Yes, sir. Safety is our overriding priority, and that 

is, as the Secretary has said, that is an integral part of accomplishing our mission. That comes first, and then the mission will 

follow. 

Mr. LUJA ́ N. I appreciate that very much. 

And, Ms. Creedon, what is your agency’s intent for CAS? Do you 

believe that CAS is still the right tool for the objective that we are 

talking about today? 

Ms. CREEDON. Yes, sir. Contractor assurance systems are an important element. They should provide the contractor, our M&O 

partners, with an opportunity to be able to have their own internal 

strong assessment program, which is an absolutely essential element of effective management. And it, hopefully, if it is effective, 

will provide the same information to us. 

Mr. LUJA ́ N. So in order to work with the contractors and with the 

leadership at the various laboratories in NNSA’s case, does NNSA 

have a responsibility to make sure that proper policies and guidance are given for the implementation of the CAS systems? 

Ms. CREEDON. Yes, sir. 

Mr. LUJA ́ N. And what is your response to GAO where one of the 

GAO reports includes that NNSA did not fully establish policies or 

guidance for using CAS information for oversight leading to inconsistency in oversight and GAO also stated that NNSA did not adequately monitor the effectiveness of the CAS process? 

Ms. CREEDON. So we agree with GAO. As we have discussed, the 

NAP–21 affirmation process was halted after the events at Y–12. 

And now that the Administrator, the new Administrator, Frank 

Klotz and I are both in place, we are taking a look at this again 

and trying to get all of us back on the right track. 

Mr. LUJA ́ N. Very good. I would just note as well that in a separate GAO report, April 15, 2015, ‘‘Observations on Management 

Challenges and Steps Taken to Address Them,’’ the report also, 

quote: ‘‘As noted in GAO’s 2015 high risk report, NNSA has a long 

history of identifying corrective actions and declaring them successfully resolved, only to follow with the identification of additional actions. As GAO has reported, this suggests that NNSA does not 

have a full understanding of the root causes of its contract and 

project management challenges.’’ 

So I think it is critically important, as we look over the series 

of these, that we have to get this right. Above all, we also not only 

have national security responsibilities to all the workers, to all the 

communities that are in this space, to ensure their safety, as Mr. 

Whitney has as well, and we have to get this right. 

And with that being said, Mr. Chairman, I know that several of 

our members today have spoken about or asked questions about 

71 

1The information has been retained in committee files and also is available at http:// 

docs.house.gov/Committee/Calendar/ByEvent.aspx?EventID=103595. 

governance structure as well, and I know my office is reaching out 

to the majority staff and minority staff so we can have those conversations based on the Mies-Augustine report, the Academy of 

Sciences, various amendments that have come through the House 

and Senate in this structure. And I think that there is an important responsibility that we have in the committee, but also for 

those that are interested, I would certainly appreciate getting a 

chance to work with them. 

And then also, as we noted, Mr. Chairman, as my time elapses, 

or has elapsed, with making sure that we are able to work with 

our Senate counterparts that through the process of making sure 

that we have the right people in the right jobs at the right time. 

As we saw, there was a lapse here with a lot of acting administrators and acting directors, acting secretaries in this space as well. 

I don’t think that is an excuse, though, Mr. Chairman, but every 

layer of oversight that we can work on to make more effective, I 

would certainly appreciate being able to work with anyone, and especially yourself and the ranking member on that. 

Thank you again for allowing me the time to speak today, sir. 

Mr. MURPHY. Thank you. And I want to offer my gratitude not 

only for your offer, but your continued help for this subcommittee. 

We recognize your concern about your district there, as is the other 

members from the other districts which this covers. 

And along those lines, Ms. DeGette, I would like to get on the 

record a request that we discussed as a sidebar, that this subcommittee continues to follow up. And we would ask the support 

of the Department of Energy not just in the hearing mode, but 

really we want to continue oversight and briefings with you and get 

some updates. We know your invoking a lot of changes, but we recognize these problems have gone on too long, too far. 

We appreciate your candor. I will tell you, nothing goes better 

than having a committee hearing where people come in here and 

say, ‘‘We have got a problem.’’ That is helpful. And we recognize 

your motivation in trying to fix this. We want to continue to work 

with you, so we would like to have further briefings in the future. 

Ms. DEGETTE. If I may, I also want to add our thanks to GAO, 

which has really been bulldogging this for many, many years now. 

Mr. MURPHY. Thank you. 

We do appreciate it. Let everybody know at GAO that we find 

your reports very valuable and pretty straightforward. So thank 

you. 

Ms. BAWDEN. Thank you. 

Mr. MURPHY. Along those lines, too, I also ask unanimous consent that the contents of the document binder be introduced into 

the record and to authorize staff to make any appropriate 

redactions. And without objection, the documents will be entered 

into the record with any redaction the staff determines are appropriate. 1

Mr. MURPHY. In conclusion, I want to thank all the witnesses. 

Thank you so much for your participation in today’s hearing. It has 

been very helpful. 

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And I remind members, they have 10 business days to submit 

questions for the record. And I ask all that the witnesses all agree 

to respond promptly to the questions. 

And with that, this hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:15 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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