IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 19-1494

Filed March 4, 2020

IN THE MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP AND CONSERVATORSHIP OF 

DIANE FLORENCE NORELIUS,

JULIANN ELIZABETH NELSON and KRISTINE BETH NORELIUS,

Appellants.

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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Crawford County, James S. 

Heckerman, Judge.

Appellants appeal an award of guardianship fees. AFFIRMED. 

Maura Sailer of Reimer, Lohman, Reitz, Sailer & Ullrich, Denison, for 

appellants.

Dean A. Fankhauser of Fankhauser, Farrens & Rachel, PLC, Sioux City, for 

appellee.

Considered by Bower, C.J., and Tabor and Mullins, JJ. Schumacher, J., 

takes no part.
2

MULLINS, Judge.

Following highly contested litigation, Marcia Losh was appointed as the 

ward’s guardian in May 2018. In June 2019, Losh filed a request for an award of 

fees. She stated she spent twenty hours working toward obtaining a guardianship 

prior to being appointed guardian and at least 171.75 hours on guardianship 

administration matters after her appointment. She requested fees at a rate of $40 

per hour, amounting to a total of $7670, to be paid by the ward’s conservatorship. 

The court entered an order approving the request and ordering the conservatorship 

to pay the amount requested. The appellants, Juliann Nelson and Kristine 

Norelius, daughters of the ward in interest, filed a motion to reconsider, enlarge, or 

amend pursuant to Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.904(2), requesting the court to 

vacate its order pending its receipt of an itemization of Losh’s services and set the 

matter for hearing. The court entered an order directing Losh to supply an 

itemization and setting the matter for hearing. Losh supplied her itemization, to 

which the appellants resisted. Following an unreported hearing in July, the court 

confirmed its fee award, concluding the fees were reasonable. This appeal 

followed. 

On appeal, the appellants challenge the fee award as erroneous.1 First, the 

appellants argue Losh failed to meet her burden to show the fees—both the time 

spent and the rate requested—were reasonable. But, because the hearing on the 

fee award went unreported, we have no way of knowing what evidence Losh 

 

1 Losh argues the appellants do not have standing to challenge the fee award. We 

have no record of that argument being either raised in or decided by the district 

court. We therefore do not consider the argument. See Meier v. Senecaut, 641 

N.W.2d 532, 537 (Iowa 2002). 
3

presented to show her fees and the rate were reasonable. As the challengers on 

appeal, it was the appellants’ “duty to provide a record on appeal affirmatively 

disclosing the alleged error relied upon.” In re F.W.S., 698 N.W.2d 134, 135 (Iowa 

2005). And it would be improvident of us to speculate on what occurred at the 

hearing, and we decline to do so. See id. at 135–36. The parties’ indications as 

to what occurred at the hearing are insufficient to fill the void. Cf. Smith v. Iowa 

Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 729 N.W.2d 822, 828 (Iowa 2007) (stating the “recitation” of 

what occurred in a lower proceeding “is not a substitute for the required appellate 

record”). 

Next the appellants argue Losh was not entitled to fees incurred before she 

was appointed guardian. Iowa Code section 633.673 (2019) provides, in relevant 

part, the following: “The ward or the ward’s estate shall be charged with the court 

costs of a ward’s guardianship, including the guardian’s fees and the fees of the 

attorney for the guardian.” Whether Losh was entitled to fees before she was 

appointed guardian is a question of statutory interpretation, which we review for 

legal error. Banilla Games, Inc. v. Iowa Dep’t of Inspections & Appeals, 919 

N.W.2d 6, 14 (Iowa 2018). The plain and unambiguous language of the statute 

entitles Losh to “court costs of [the] guardianship.” Iowa Code section 633.673. A 

related statute, section 633.551(5), provides: 

Except as otherwise provided in sections 633.672 and 633.673, in 

proceedings to establish a guardianship or conservatorship, the 

costs . . . shall be assessed against the respondent or the 

respondent’s estate unless the proceeding is dismissed either 

voluntarily or involuntarily, in which case fees and costs may be 

assessed against the petitioner for good cause shown.
4

Thus, section 633.551(5) denotes a legislative intent that a guardian’s fees for 

court costs, awardable by section that 633.673, also include those incurred “in 

proceedings to establish a guardianship.” Both statutes require that the costs be 

paid by the ward or ward’s estate. Section 633.673’s indigency exception is 

incorporated by reference into section 633.551(5). When read together, the 

statutes allow the guardian to be awarded fees for court costs incurred in 

proceedings to establish a guardianship. Thus, we find no legal error in the court’s 

award of fees incurred prior to Losh’s appointment as guardian. 

Finally, the appellants argue Losh should be estopped from claiming fees. 

While the appellants passively suggested in their resistance to Losh’s motion for 

fees, that “Losh has waived her right to fees under theories of equitable estoppel 

and estoppel by acquiescence,” there is nothing in the record indicating the court 

considered the argument, as it merely concluded “the fees are reasonable.” The 

argument was therefore not preserved for our review. See Meier, 641 N.W.2d at 

537; see also Stammeyer v. Div. of Narcotics Enforcement, 721 N.W.2d 541, 548 

(Iowa 2006) (finding an argument not preserved for appeal when there was 

“nothing indicating the court ruled upon or even considered” it). The proper 

procedure to preserve error was to file a motion raising the court’s failure to decide 

the issue. See Lamasters v. State, 821 N.W.2d 856, 863 (Iowa 2012). 

We affirm the award of guardian fees in favor of Losh.2 

AFFIRMED. 

 

2 While we do not normally consider issues raised for the first time in a reply brief, 

because the arguments made in the appellants’ reply brief are responsive to Losh’s 

brief, we have considered them, and we reject them. We deny the appellants’ 

request for attorney fees on appeal.