J-S65016-17 

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: D.M.H., JR., 

A MINOR

APPEAL OF: D.H., FATHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 830 EDA 2017

Appeal from the Decree February 1, 2017

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County 

Family Court at No(s): CP-51-AP-0000750-2016, 

CP-51-DP-0002809-2014

IN THE INTEREST OF: M.N.E.H., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: D.H., FATHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 831 EDA 2017

Appeal from the Decree February 1, 2017

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County 

Family Court at No(s): CP-51-AP-0000751-2016, 

CP-51-DP-0002810-2014

IN THE INTEREST OF: M.M.H., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: D.H., FATHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 833 EDA 2017
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Appeal from the Decree February 1, 2017

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County 

Family Court at No(s): CP-51-AP-0000752-2016, 

CP-51-DP-0000897-2015

BEFORE: OLSON, J., OTT, J., and MUSMANNO, J.

MEMORANDUM BY OTT, J.: FILED OCTOBER 27, 2017

D.H. (“Father”) appeals from the decrees entered on February 1, 2017, 

in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, involuntarily terminating 

his parental rights to his sons, D.M.H., Jr., born in February of 2012, and 

M.N.E.H., born in January of 2014, and his daughter, M.M.H., born in February 

of 2015 (collectively, “Children”).1 Upon careful review, we affirm.

We summarize the factual and procedural history as follows. The 

Philadelphia Department of Human Services (“DHS”) became involved with 

this family in January of 2014, when Mother tested positive for illegal drugs 

at the time of M.N.E.H.’s birth. Involuntary Termination Petition, 8/22/16, at 

Exhibit A, ¶ a.2 DHS established a safety plan whereby Mother, along with 

M.N.E.H. and D.M.H., Jr., were to reside in the home of her parents (“maternal 

grandparents”), who would supervise Mother’s contact with her sons. Id. at 

¶ b. In September of 2014, DHS received a report alleging that Mother and 

____________________________________________

1 By decrees entered on February 1, 2017, the trial court also involuntarily 

terminated the parental rights of the Children’s mother, C.A.M. a/k/a C.M. 

(“Mother”). Mother did not file notices of appeal.

2 During the subject proceedings, Mother’s counsel stipulated to the statement 

of facts attached to DHS’s petition. N.T., 2/1/17, at 15.
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M.N.E.H. were not residing with the maternal grandparents, but with Father, 

who also used drugs. Id. at ¶ c. Upon investigation, DHS substantiated the 

report. Id. Further, DHS found Father’s home in disrepair and not 

appropriate for his sons. Id. at ¶ e. 

On January 26, 2015, the trial court adjudicated D.M.H., Jr., and 

M.N.E.H. dependent. Id. at ¶ g. When M.M.H. was born in February of 2015, 

she tested positive for benzodiazepines. Id. at ¶ i. The trial court adjudicated 

her dependent on April 20, 2015. Id. at ¶ p. 

The Children have special developmental and educational needs. N.T., 

2/1/17, at 25. As a result, they receive cognitive therapy. Id. at 25-26, 38. 

In addition, M.M.H. receives physical therapy as a result of spinal problems. 

Id. at 39-40. 

Father was assigned the following Single Case Plan (“SCP”) objectives: 

report to the Clinical Evaluation Unit (“CEU”) for three random drug tests and 

a drug screen assessment and diagnosis; participate in parenting classes; and 

participate in weekly supervised visits. N.T., 2/1/17, at 17-18. 

In April of 2015, Father was incarcerated for one month due to a 

violation of probation, which he was serving as a result of a conviction in 2011 

involving burglary. N.T., 2/1/17, at 62; DHS Exhibit 18. Thereafter, in June 

of 2015, Father was incarcerated for crimes committed after the placement of 

his sons involving robbery, unlawful restraint, and impersonating a public 

servant, to which he pleaded guilty. Id. at 63; DHS Exhibit 17. In February 
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of 2016, Father was sentenced to a term of incarceration of one to two years 

and five years of probation. Trial Court Opinion, 5/8/17, at 3; DHS Exhibit 

17. In addition, in April of 2016, Father was sentenced to a term of 

incarceration of 3 to 24 months related to the 2011 crime of burglary. Trial 

Court Opinion, 5/8/17, at 3.

On August 22, 2016, DHS filed petitions for the involuntary termination 

of Father’s parental rights to the Children pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), 

(2), (5), (8), and (b). A hearing occurred on February 1, 2017, during which 

DHS presented the testimony of Kiyana Grimes, a social worker and case 

manager at the Community Umbrella Agency (“CUA”), and Tysha Fletcher, a 

CUA outcome specialist.3 Father testified on his own behalf via telephone from 

State Correctional Institution (“SCI”) Coal Township, at which time the parole 

board had approved a “home plan” for Father, but had not yet provided him 

a release date. N.T., 2/1/17, at 23, 34. In addition, Father presented the 

testimony of N.M. (“maternal grandmother”), who, along with the maternal 

grandfather, had been the kinship care providers for approximately one year 

at the time of the subject proceedings.4 N.T., 2/1/17, at 114. The maternal 

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3

In addition, DHS presented the testimony of Richard F. Limoges, M.D., 

psychiatrist, with respect to the involuntary termination petitions against 

Mother only.

4 The maternal grandparents requested approval as kinship care providers at 

the time of the older children’s placement. Involuntary Termination Petition, 

8/22/16, at Exhibit A, at ¶ f. Although their request was not granted until 
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grandmother testified that Father occasionally telephones the Children from 

prison, and he sends them letters and pictures. Id. at 112-113. 

By decrees dated and entered on February 1, 2017, the trial court 

involuntarily terminated Father’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 

2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). Father timely filed notices of appeal and 

concise statements of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 

1925(a)(2)(i) and (b), which this Court consolidated sua sponte.

On appeal, Father presents the following issues for our review:

A. Whether the trial court committed reversible error when it 

involuntarily terminated [F]ather’s parental rights where such 

determination was not supported by clear and convincing evidence 

under . . . 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(5), and (a)(8) 

as [F]ather made progress towards working and meeting [his] 

[SCP] goals, namely staying drug free, working towards obtaining 

housing, working on parenting skills, and other goals, during the 

[C]hild[ren]’s placement?

B. Whether the trial court committed reversible error when it 

involuntarily terminated [F]ather’s parental rights without giving 

primary consideration to the effect that the termination would 

have on the developmental[,] physical[,] and emotional needs of 

the [C]hild[ren] as required by the Adoption Act[,] 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 

2511(b)?

Father’s brief at 4.

We consider Father’s issues according to the following standard.

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March of 2016, as best as we can discern from the certified record, the 

Children were placed with the maternal grandparents at the time of their 

adjudications “through a family arrangement . . . pending [their] kinship [care 

request].” N.T., 2/1/17, at 16, 25, 114; Involuntary Termination Petition, 

8/22/16, at Exhibit A, at ¶ l.
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The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases 

requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and 

credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported 

by the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate

courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law 

or abused its discretion. A decision may be reversed for an abuse 

of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest 

unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial 

court’s decision, however, should not be reversed merely because 

the record would support a different result. We have previously 

emphasized our deference to trial courts that often have first-hand 

observations of the parties spanning multiple hearings.

In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (citations and quotation marks 

omitted). 

Termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the 

Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S. § 2101-2938, which requires a bifurcated analysis. 

Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party 

seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing evidence 

that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory grounds for 

termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the court 

determines that the parent’s conduct warrants termination of his 

or her parental rights does the court engage in the second part of 

the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the 

needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests 

of the child. One major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis 

concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond between 

parent and child, with close attention paid to the effect on the child 

of permanently severing any such bond.

In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted).

We need only agree with the trial court as to any one subsection of

Section 2511(a), as well as Section 2511(b), in order to affirm. See In re 

B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc). In this case, we 
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conclude that the certified record supports the decrees pursuant to Section 

2511(a)(2) and (b), which provides as follows.5

(a) General Rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a child 

may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following 

grounds:

. . .

(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, 

neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child 

to be without essential parental care, control or 

subsistence necessary for his physical or mental wellbeing and the conditions and causes of the incapacity, 

abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be 

remedied by the parent.

. . .

(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights 

of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental, 

physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights 

of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of 

environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings, 

income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the 

control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant 

to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any 

efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein 

which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the 

filing of the petition.

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5 Based on this disposition, we need not consider Father’s issues with respect 

to Section 2511(a)(1), (5), and (8). However, we conclude that termination 

pursuant to Section 2511(a)(5) and (8) was not appropriate with respect to 

M.M.H. because she was never in Father’s care. Likewise, termination was 

not appropriate under these subsections with respect to D.M.H., Jr., because 

it is not clear in the certified record whether he was removed from Father’s 

care. See In re C.S., 761 A.2d 1197, 1200, n. 5 (Pa. Super. 2000) (en banc) 

(holding that, because Section 2511(a)(5) and (8) are predicated on removal 

of the child from the care of the parent, they were inapplicable where the 

record reflects that the child was never in the father’s care). 
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23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2), (b).

This Court has stated as follows. 

In order to terminate parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 

2511(a)(2), the following three elements must be met: (1) 

repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal; (2) 

such incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal has caused the child to 

be without essential parental care, control or subsistence 

necessary for his physical or mental well-being; and (3) the 

causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will 

not be remedied.

In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1272 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citation 

omitted)). 

Further, we have stated, “[t]he grounds for termination due to parental 

incapacity that cannot be remedied are not limited to affirmative misconduct. 

To the contrary, those grounds may include acts of refusal as well as 

incapacity to perform parental duties.” In re A.L.D., 797 A.2d 326, 337 (Pa. 

Super. 2002) (citations omitted). Nevertheless, parents are required to make 

diligent efforts towards the reasonably prompt assumption of full parental 

responsibilities. Id. at 340. A parent’s vow to cooperate, after a long period 

of uncooperativeness regarding the necessity or availability of services, may 

properly be rejected as untimely or disingenuous. Id. 

In In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817 (Pa. 2012), our Supreme Court 

addressed the relevance of incarceration in termination decisions under 

Section 2511(a)(2). The S.P. Court held that “incarceration is a factor, and 

indeed can be a determinative factor, in a court’s conclusion that grounds for 

termination exist under § 2511(a)(2) where the repeated and continued 
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incapacity of a parent due to incarceration has caused the child to be without 

essential parental care, control or subsistence and that the causes of the 

incapacity cannot or will not be remedied.” Id. at 828. 

With respect to Section 2511(b), this Court has stated that, 

“[i]ntangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability are involved in the 

inquiry into the needs and welfare of the child.” In re C.M.S., 884 A.2d 1284, 

1287 (Pa. Super. 2005) (citation omitted). Further, the trial court “must also 

discern the nature and status of the parent-child bond, with utmost attention 

to the effect on the child of permanently severing that bond.” Id. (citation 

omitted). However, “[i]n cases where there is no evidence of any bond 

between the parent and child, it is reasonable to infer that no bond exists. 

The extent of any bond analysis, therefore, necessarily depends on the 

circumstances of the particular case.” In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 762-763 

(Pa. Super. 2008) (citation omitted). 

On appeal, Father argues that the court abused its discretion in 

terminating his parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2) because he 

attempted to remain close to the Children and to complete his SCP objectives. 

Specifically, Father asserts he “completed a drug program and was awaiting 

to be released from prison.” Father’s brief at 9 (citations to record omitted).

The trial court found that Father’s conduct warranted termination under 

Section 2511(a)(2) as follows.

Father has failed to take affirmative steps to place himself in a 

position to parent the Children. The Children need permanency, 
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which Father cannot provide. Father is unable to take immediate, 

or even foreseeable, custody of the Children and ensure that they 

receive their therapy and special services.

Trial Court Opinion, 5/8/17, at 11. Upon review, we discern no abuse of 

discretion.

Father testified that, at the time of the two older children’s adjudication, 

he participated in a drug screen, which was positive for cocaine. N.T., 2/1/17, 

at 65. Kiyana Grimes, the CUA case manager for this family since February 

of 2015, testified that Father did not begin drug and alcohol services prior to 

his incarceration. Id. at 18. She testified that he completed a drug and 

alcohol program in prison in September of 2016. Id. at 20, 23. 

With respect to his parenting objective, Ms. Grimes testified that, prior 

to his incarceration, Father was referred to the Achieving Reunification Center 

(“ARC”) for parenting services, but he never attended. Id. at 49-50. Ms. 

Grimes testified that Father told her he was attending a parenting class at 

DHS, but he did not provide documentation to show he completed it. Id. at 

50. In fact, Father acknowledged on cross-examination that he did not 

complete the parenting program before being incarcerated. Id. at 59-60. 

Further, Ms. Grimes testified she never received documentation to show that 

Father completed a parenting program while in prison. Id. at 20-21.

Ms. Grimes testified Father was granted weekly supervised visits with 

the Children before his incarceration. Id. at 19. She testified, “Sporadically, 
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[Father] would come to the visits. Normally he would engage and interact 

with the kids[,] but he [would] leave early.” Id. 

Ms. Grimes explained that the “home plan” approved by the parole 

board involved Father returning to the home of his sister, where he was 

residing at the time of the Children’s placement. Id. at 34-35. Ms. Grimes 

testified on cross-examination that the home was not suitable for reunification 

purposes because it needed repairs and was too small to accommodate the 

Children.6 Id. 

Finally, Father testified during direct examination that he does not want 

his parental rights terminated “[b]ecause I want to be there. . . . I do have a 

relationship with my children. They do call me father. I want to be there. 

I’m willing to do whatever I have to do.” Id. at 55-56. To the extent the trial 

court rejected Father’s vow to cooperate as untimely or disingenuous, we 

discern no abuse of discretion. See In re A.L.D., 797 A.2d at 340. 

Indeed, prior to his incarceration, Father had not commenced drug and 

alcohol treatment. In addition, Father had not completed a parenting 

program, and he “sporadically” participated in supervised visits with the 

Children, from which “most of the time he would leave early.” N.T., 2/1/17, 

at 19, 24. Father was incarcerated in June of 2015, through the time of the 

____________________________________________

6 Ms. Grimes testified that the home of Father’s sister would not accommodate 

the Children because it has two bedrooms, and an unspecified number of 

children of Father’s sister reside there as well. N.T., 2/1/17, at 34. 
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subject proceedings, as a result of the crimes he committed after the 

placement of D.M.H., Jr. and M.N.E.H. Although the parole board had 

approved a “home plan” for Father, the home he would return to was not 

suitable for the Children. Moreover, Father would remain on probation for five 

years after his release, the date of which had not yet been determined at the 

time of the hearing.

Based on the foregoing, we discern no abuse of discretion by the trial 

court in terminating Father’s parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2). 

Father’s repeated and continued incapacity, neglect, or refusal to perform his 

parental duties has caused the Children to be without essential parental care, 

control or subsistence necessary for their physical or mental well-being. In 

addition, the causes of Father’s incapacity, neglect, or refusal cannot or will 

not be remedied. 

With respect to Section 2511(b), Father asserts that the Children “call 

him father and that he loves his children. . . .” Father’s brief at 11 (citing

N.T., 2/1/17, at 55-56). Therefore, Father argues DHS did not prove by clear 

and convincing evidence that a bond does not exist between him and the 

Children. 

It is well-established that a parent’s own feelings of love and affection 

for a child, alone, will not preclude termination of parental rights. See In re 

L.M., 923 A.2d at 512. Further, in considering the affection which a child may 

have for his or her natural parents, this Court has stated the following:
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Once clear and convincing evidence is produced 

demonstrating a parent has failed to cultivate a bond with 

her children, we cannot then overturn the termination of her 

parental rights on the basis that an agency did not produce 

enough evidence to prove the children do not feel strongly 

about the parent--a showing which is inherently negative in 

the first instance. A child’s feelings toward a parent are 

relevant to the section 2511(b) analysis. Nonetheless, 

concluding a child has a beneficial bond with a parent simply 

because the child harbors affection for the parent is not only 

dangerous, it is logically unsound. If a child’s feelings were 

the dispositive factor in the bonding analysis, the analysis 

would be reduced to an exercise in semantics as it is the 

rare child who, after being subject to neglect and abuse, is 

able to sift through the emotional wreckage and completely 

disavow a parent. . . . Nor are we of the opinion that the 

biological connection between [the parent] and the children 

is sufficient in of itself, or when considered in connection 

with a child’s feeling toward a parent, to establish a de facto

beneficial bond exists. The psychological aspect of 

parenthood is more important in terms of the development 

of the child and its mental and emotional health than the 

coincidence of biological or natural parenthood.

In re K.K.R.-S., 958 A.2d 529, 535 (Pa. Super. 2008) (internal citations and 

quotation marks omitted). 

In addition, our Supreme Court has stated that, “[c]ommon sense 

dictates that courts considering termination must also consider whether the 

children are in a pre-adoptive home and whether they have a bond with their 

foster parents.” T.S.M., supra at 268. The Court directed that, in weighing 

the bond considerations pursuant to Section 2511(b), “courts must keep the 

ticking clock of childhood ever in mind.” Id. at 269. The T.S.M. Court 

observed that, “[c]hildren are young for a scant number of years, and we have 
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an obligation to see to their healthy development quickly. When courts fail . 

. . the result, all too often, is catastrophically maladjusted children.” Id.

In this case, there is no record evidence that the Children have seen 

Father since his incarceration in June of 2015. However, the maternal 

grandmother testified that Father telephones the Children from prison 

occasionally. N.T., 2/1/17, at 112. She explained, “Sometimes he will call 

every day for about a month[,] and then I may not hear from him maybe for 

a couple of weeks.” Id. at 114. The maternal grandmother testified that 

D.M.H., Jr., and M.N.E.H. know who Father is. Id. at 112. With respect to 

M.M.H., she testified, “she knows daddy but I’m not sure that she could put a 

face to that. But she knows it’s daddy on the phone.” Id. at 113. The 

maternal grandmother testified that the Children “get very excited to speak 

with [Father] on the phone.” Id.

Nonetheless, Ms. Grimes, a social worker and the case manager who 

visits the Children in their kinship care home on a regular basis, testified that 

D.M.H., Jr., then nearly age five, and M.N.E.H., then age three, “have a lack 

of connection with” Father because they have not “had any consistent contact 

or communication with” him. N.T., 2/1/17, at 25, 27-28. With respect to 

M.M.H., then nearly age two, Ms. Grimes testified that she “was an infant 

when . . . [Father] . . . was incarcerated so she really doesn’t have any 

connection with him.” Id. at 28. Therefore, Ms. Grimes testified that the 

Children would not suffer irreparable harm if Father’s parental rights are 
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terminated. Id. at 29-30. Rather, Ms. Grimes testified that D.M.H., Jr., and 

M.N.E.H. are “well-bonded” to their maternal grandparents. Id. at 25. She 

testified that M.M.H. “is also attached” to the maternal grandmother. Id. 

Likewise, Tysha Fletcher, the CUA outcome specialist for this family since 

2016, testified that there is “a big bond” between the Children and the 

maternal grandmother.7 Id. at 107.

The maternal grandparents are a pre-adoptive resource for the Children. 

Id. 114. The maternal grandmother testified as follows on cross-examination 

by DHS:

Q. [I]f the court were to terminate [Father’s] rights, would you let 

him maintain contact or play any role in [the Children’s] lives?

A. Yes.

Id.

Finally, the maternal grandmother testified that D.M.H., Jr., and 

M.N.E.H. receive occupational therapy and special instruction in her home. 

Id. at 115. With respect to D.M.H., Jr., she testified, “He’s doing 

wonderfully[,] so he’s come a long way.” Id. at 115. In addition, the maternal 

grandmother testified that M.M.H. receives special instruction and physical 

____________________________________________

7 Ms. Fletcher testified that, while the maternal grandparents’ kinship request 

was pending, she supervised visits between the Children and the maternal 

grandmother. N.T., 2/1/17, at 104-105. In addition, Ms. Fletcher testified 

that she supervised visits between the Children and Mother, and that the 

maternal grandmother attended those visits as well. Id. at 104-105, 108-

109.
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therapy. Id. Further, she testified that M.M.H. will begin speech therapy the 

following day. Id. 

Based on the totality of the record evidence, which we have reviewed in 

light of the relevant statutory and case law, we discern no abuse of discretion 

by the trial court in concluding that there is no parental bond between the 

Children and Father; therefore, terminating Father’s parental rights would not 

destroy an existing beneficial relationship for the Children. See Trial Court 

Opinion, 5/8/17, at 16. The testimonial evidence supports the court’s 

conclusion that terminating Father’s parental rights will serve the Children’s 

developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare pursuant to Section 

2511(b). Accordingly, we affirm the decrees.

Decrees affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 10/27/2017