Filed 5/13/24 Wiedner v. Stevenson CA2/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions 

not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion 

has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

PATTY WIEDNER,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

CHARLYNE STEVENSON,

as Trustee, etc.,

Defendant and Appellant.

B323760

Los Angeles County

Super. Ct. No. 19STPB11853

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles 

County, Ana Maria Luna, Judge. Affirmed in part, reversed 

in part, and remanded.

John A. Bunnett for Defendant and Appellant.

John Alan Cohan for Plaintiff and Respondent.

_________________________
2

Before her death, Roberta Louise Davis established

a special needs trust—within her own inter vivos trust—to

benefit her gravely disabled adult son Daniel L. Black during 

his lifetime. Daniel was under a Lanterman-Petris-Short (LPS) 

conservatorship. One of Roberta’s sisters, appellant Charlyne

Stevenson, was the successor trustee of Roberta’s trust, trustee 

of Daniel’s special needs trust, and a contingent, remainder 

beneficiary of Roberta’s trust upon Daniel’s death. Another 

sister, respondent Patty Wiedner, was excluded from the trust. 

She became involved in Daniel’s care after Roberta’s death in 

June 2016 and, in April 2019, succeeded the public guardian 

as Daniel’s conservator.

1 At the heart of this appeal is a dispute 

between these sisters over payments Patty asked Charlyne to

make to her from the trust. In the end, the probate court ordered 

Charlyne pay Patty from the trust: her conservator fees, costs 

she had advanced and incurred for Daniel’s benefit, and her

court-appointed attorney’s fees and costs.

Charlyne appeals from that order, and the court’s order 

awarding $1,750 in sanctions against Charlyne and her counsel 

after it denied Charlyne’s motions for new trial and to set aside 

the judgment. Charlyne asserts several errors. She contends 

Patty had no standing or legal basis to demand her conservator 

fees and attorney fees be paid from the trust; substantial 

evidence did not support the expenses, fees, and attorney fees 

the court ordered to be paid; the sanctions were not justified 

1 We refer to Roberta, Daniel, Charlyne, and Patty by 

their first names for ease of reference. We intend no disrespect 

in doing so.
3

or authorized by law; and irregularity in the proceedings and 

the exclusion of relevant evidence resulted in a miscarriage 

of justice requiring a new trial. 

We conclude Patty had standing. We also conclude

the terms of the special needs trust allowed reimbursement 

for some, but not all, of the expenditures Patty claimed and 

for her conservator fees, and substantial evidence supported 

the court’s findings as to those expenditures. We reverse the 

court’s order in part, however, to the extent it orders Patty 

be reimbursed for certain expenditures she incurred before 

her conservator appointment and for her attorney fees. We also

reverse the court’s sanctions award. We find no miscarriage 

of justice occurred. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

1. The trust and conservatorship

Roberta created her living trust in September 2002. 

She amended and restated it in March 2010, naming her sister 

Charlyne as the successor trustee. The main asset of the trust 

was a single-family residence. Roberta died on June 30, 2016. 

As successor trustee, Charlyne sold the property, which netted 

$335,847 to the trust on August 29, 2016.

Roberta’s trust included—as a sub-trust—a “special 

needs trust”

2 for the benefit of her adult son Daniel, who had

2 A special needs trust is a trust that is intended to allow 

the beneficiary to continue to maintain eligibility for certain 

needs-based government benefits. (Balian v. Balian (2009) 

179 Cal.App.4th 1505, 1512.) Daniel’s needs-based government 

benefits were his monthly supplemental security income (SSI) 

and Medi-Cal benefits.
4

schizophrenia and developmental disabilities. The sub-trust 

was known as the “Daniel L. Black Special Needs Trust” (SNT). 

Charlyne is also the trustee for the SNT. 

Around April 2009, before Roberta died, Daniel was placed 

under an LPS conservatorship.

3 His schizophrenia “made him 

‘clinically unstable’ such that he was in and out of hospitals when 

he was not housed in a facility.” He had behavioral problems, 

such as “hitting himself, punching walls, disrobing in public, 

impulsivity and outbursts.” The public defender represented 

Daniel in the LPS conservatorship proceedings. The mental 

health court appointed the public guardian (Ernest Baiden)

as the conservator of Daniel’s person and estate.4

Daniel received monthly social security and SSI; this

constituted his “estate.” From these funds, the public guardian

paid for Daniel’s clothing, room and board, and extra spending 

money (known as PNI) for personal items, “like soda and other 

treats.” The public guardian paid Daniel’s board and care facility

about $1,050 a month and deposited $130 a month in PNI to 

3 The LPS Act (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 5000 et seq.) provides 

for the appointment of a conservator of the person, the estate, 

or both, “for a person who is gravely disabled as a result of a 

mental health disorder or impairment by chronic alcoholism.” 

(Id., § 5350.)

4 Baiden was a deputy public conservator with the office 

of the public guardian. The public guardian must serve as 

conservator of any person found to be gravely disabled under the 

LPS Act for whom the court has recommended a conservatorship 

“if the court finds that no other person or entity is willing and 

able to serve as conservator.” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 5354.5.)
5

Daniel’s account with the facility (or $35 a month if he were 

in a skilled nursing facility). The public guardian also was 

responsible for making payments for Daniel’s medical and dental 

care.

Daniel’s conservatorship was renewed each year until 

his death in 2020. (See Welf. & Inst. Code, § 5361, subds. (a) & 

(b) [an LPS conservatorship automatically terminates one year 

after the appointment of the conservator unless the conservator, 

after determining the conservatorship is still required, petitions 

for reappointment for a succeeding one-year period].) The public 

guardian served as Daniel’s conservator until April 2019 when 

Patty succeeded Baiden. 

According to Roberta’s trust, on her death, the remaining 

trust property was to be held in the SNT “to provide a 

supplemental and emergency fund to supplement any public 

benefits available to [Daniel] during his lifetime.” On Daniel’s

death, the trustee (Charlyne) was to distribute any remaining 

trust property “outright” to herself, her daughter (Roberta’s 

niece), and Roberta’s great nephew (presumably, the niece’s son).

Under the terms of the SNT, 

“No part of the income or principal of the trust 

shall be used to replace or supplant public 

benefits of any county or any state, federal, 

or other governmental agency that has a legal 

responsibility to serve persons with disabilities 

or conditions that are the same as or similar to 

those of [Daniel]. For purposes of determining 

[Daniel’s] eligibility for public benefits, no part 

of the principal or undistributed income of 

the trust estate shall be considered available 
6

to him, and he shall have no right to compel 

the trustee to release principal or income to 

him or for his benefit or otherwise have any 

access to any of the trust assets.”5

The SNT also directs that, if the trustee were asked to 

release trust funds to or on behalf of Daniel to pay for needs that 

public benefits “would be authorized to provide” in the absence 

of the SNT, 

“the trustee shall deny the request and take 

whatever administrative or judicial steps 

may be necessary to continue the eligibility 

of [Daniel] for all available public benefits, 

including obtaining a determination or 

declaration from a court of competent 

jurisdiction that the trust principal is 

not available to [Daniel] for purposes of 

determining his eligibility for any public 

benefits. Any expenses of the trustee in this 

regard, including reasonable attorneys’ fees, 

shall be a proper charge to the trust estate.”

The SNT mandates that, during Daniel’s lifetime, “the 

trustee shall pay to or apply for the benefit of [Daniel] as much 

of the net income and as much of the principal of the trust as the 

trustee, in the trustee’s sole discretion, from time to time deems 

necessary or advisable for the satisfaction of his special needs,” 

5 The SNT defines “public benefits” as including, but not 

limited to, SSI, Medi-Cal or other state medical assistance 

program authorized under Medicaid, and federal social security 

disability insurance.
7

meaning, “the requisites for maintaining the good health, 

comfort, safety, and welfare of [Daniel] when, in the discretion 

of the trustee, those requisites are not being provided for” by 

any public benefit program or person legally obligated to support 

Daniel. The SNT requires the trustee to “consult with any 

guardian, conservator, custodian, or other person who cares 

for [Daniel] regarding his special needs.”

2. Patty’s involvement and appointment as conservator

Patty, also Daniel’s aunt, was not a named beneficiary

or successor trustee of Roberta’s trust. Patty had not visited 

Daniel in the seven years before Roberta’s death, except maybe 

once in 2012 or 2013. After Roberta’s death in June 2016, Patty 

began to visit Daniel regularly. She made various expenditures 

on his behalf, including paying for haircuts, sundries, and 

clothes; taking him to lunch; and depositing cash in his 

“account” with the facility where he lived to pay for extra treats. 

In January 2017, Patty asked John Bunnett, as the trustee’s

counsel, to reimburse her from the SNT for the money she had 

spent from July to December 2016. Bunnett refused. He told 

Patty’s then-counsel that Patty was not authorized to make 

expenditures, or perform duties, on behalf of the SNT, and the

listed expenses “were never communicated to or authorized by” 

Charlyne, as trustee.

At some point, Daniel developed extensive problems 

with his teeth. He had difficulty eating and pain, which he 

complained about to Patty. She began taking him to dental 

providers in December 2016. She obtained estimates for different 

treatment plans from various providers. In January 2017, a

specialist at UCLA provided a $25,925 estimate for extractions, 

bone grafts, and dental implants. Patty apparently appeared 
8

before the mental health court in January 2017 to ask about 

getting Daniel’s teeth fixed. In July, she wrote the judge in the 

LPS conservatorship proceeding to ask about having Daniel’s 

teeth fixed, and included the estimate.6

There was a difference of opinion as to the best course 

of treatment for Daniel. In her July 2017 letter, Patty wrote 

she did not believe Daniel was a “good candidate” for partial 

dentures, as he likely would lose or break them. Baiden, on the 

other hand, wrote in a January 2018 memorandum, “Any attempt 

to have all of Mr. Black’s teeth extracted for dental implants will 

be too invasive and not serve Conservatee’s best interest.”

In August 2017, Baiden responded to the mental health 

court’s inquiry as to whether a family member could be appointed 

as successor conservator for Daniel. He did not recommend 

Patty. Baiden described Charlyne and Patty as having an

“intense sibling-rivalry.” He was concerned Daniel “could 

possibly become a ‘pawn’ between his two Aunts.” He noted

Charlyne’s appointment as Roberta’s successor trustee “ha[d] 

bothered” Patty “a lot,” and stated Patty was “doing everything 

possible to even have [sic] an invasive procedure to have [Daniel] 

go through an unnecessary and invasive dental procedure 

so the Trust will be drained.” He believed Daniel’s interests 

would best be served by the public guardian continuing as his 

conservator.

6 In April 2017, Patty apparently filed a petition in the 

Riverside County superior court asking it to monitor the SNT. 

After Charlyne (through Bunnett) filed a demurrer based on 

Patty’s lack of standing, Patty withdrew her petition. Patty’s

petition is not part of the appellate record.
9

In January 2018, Baiden provided an update on 

recommendations he had received about Daniel’s dental needs. 

Lumina Dental had identified 14 of Daniel’s teeth that should be 

extracted and recommended upper and lower partial dentures.

7

Baiden also noted Daniel was “clinically unstable, going in 

and out of hospitals” due to behavioral problems. He “need[ed] 

to remain in a locked setting at th[at] time due to his ongoing 

behavioral problems.”

In November 2018, Patty asked the public guardian 

to reimburse her for clothing and other items she had bought 

for Daniel. Baiden made clear, as he had told her previously, 

that “[a]ny purchases made for Danny by anyone, without 

prior authorization from [the] [p]ublic [g]uardian cannot be 

reimbursed,” as the public guardian had to make those purchases

directly. Baiden asked Patty to let him know if Daniel told her 

about specific items he needed.

On April 10, 2019—on Daniel’s motion—the mental health 

court relieved the public guardian as conservator and appointed 

Patty as Daniel’s LPS conservator of the person. Because Patty 

did not have an attorney, the court appointed one for her 

(Kelli Stanford). The court noted, “If there are needs that 

Mr. Black has—that need to be paid out of the special need[s] 

trust, I would expect that you would make a request for that. 

7 Lumina Dental, however, prepared an estimate that 

focused on removing only the four worst teeth. The public 

guardian paid for that treatment in advance—about $3,600—

from Daniel’s monthly benefits. Daniel was unable to have 

the procedure at that time due to his instability. By the time 

he was able, the public guardian no longer was conservator.
10

But if you’re making extravagant request[s], then I’m going 

to be looking at the conservatorship.”

On December 6, 2019, the mental health court relieved 

Stanford as Patty’s counsel. The court appointed John Cohan 

to represent Patty, as Daniel’s conservator, “for all purposes” 

under section 5370.1 of the Welfare and Institutions Code and 

ordered “[a]ttorney fees to be paid by Los Angeles County.”

3. Dispute over dental treatment leading to petitions

In November 2019, Patty obtained estimates from Western 

Dental, but they did not involve implants. Patty wanted Daniel 

to have implants. Charlyne and attorney Bunnett did not 

believe Daniel would handle the procedure well, partly because 

it required anesthesia and he had apnea. In December 2019, 

Patty, through attorney Cohan, sent a demand that the SNT 

pay for proposed dental implant treatment, at first estimated 

to cost $21,850 and then increased to $50,465. Patty sought

an order in the LPS conservatorship case authorizing her, 

as Daniel’s conservator, to consent to dental treatment on 

his behalf. The court entered an order on January 8, 2020, 

authorizing Patty to consent on Daniel’s behalf to dental 

implants or dentures, tooth extractions, bone grafts, other 

procedures, and anesthesia “as needed for the procedures.”

Meanwhile, on December 20, 2019, Charlyne, as trustee, 

filed a petition under Probate Code8 section 17200 et seq., 

amended on February 25, 2020, to bring the internal affairs 

of Roberta’s trust and the SNT under the probate court’s 

8 Statutory references are to the Probate Code, unless 

otherwise stated.
11

jurisdiction.

9 The petition sought, among other things, an order 

that she had “sole discretion to determine what expenditures” 

to make from the SNT and to deny expenditures she deemed 

inappropriate; a determination of the dental treatment Daniel 

required; instructions as to whether she had discretion to deny 

spending the requested funds on the dental treatment if she 

determined it was not in Daniel’s best interest; and an order 

that she was not required to reimburse Patty for any expenses 

she “purportedly made on behalf of Daniel” that Charlyne did 

not authorize in advance. The petition made various factual 

allegations, including that Patty was trying to drain the trust 

because she felt “spurned that she had been cut out of” the trust, 

and essentially had prevented Charlyne from seeing Daniel.

Patty filed a response with objections to Charlyne’s 

amended petition, raising issues of Charlyne’s breach of her 

trustee and fiduciary duties, alleging ethical violations by her

counsel, and asking for sanctions and damages. Patty alleged 

Daniel was in poor health, “exacerbated by long-standing and 

serious dental problems” that Charlyne had failed to pay for 

from the SNT. Patty alleged Charlyne had refused to pay for 

anything Daniel “need[ed] or . . . requested” and had “abrogated 

her duties by delegating day-to-day trust[ ] administration and 

decision-making” to Bunnett. Patty asked the court to order 

Charlyne to pay for Daniel’s dental procedures out of the SNT. 

The response also included a letter from prosthodontist 

9 Patty filed a notice of related case, which Charlyne 

opposed. Because the LPS conservatorship case and the 

new probate case both fell within the probate division rules,

Department 1 did not relate them.
12

Dr. Alfredo Paredes, who saw Daniel in May 2020. He 

recommended a full mouth reconstruction with dental implants 

under general anesthesia. The estimated cost was $65,000.

At a hearing on Charlyne’s petition on July 31, 2020, 

after Dr. Paredes testified about Daniel’s teeth and that he was 

suffering from infection that could not be managed long-term 

with antibiotics, the court ordered Charlyne to release $30,000 

from the SNT to Patty by August 10, 2020, to begin Daniel’s 

dental work. The court understood Daniel’s treatment “would 

have to proceed in phases, including multiple stages to extract 

teeth and then place [the] implants, and that Daniel would 

have to be sedated with anesthesia.” The court directed Patty 

to submit receipts for the use of the $30,000 to Bunnett, 

and appointed a guardian ad litem (GAL) for Daniel.

Bunnett filed an ex parte application asking the court to 

reconsider and/or stay its order directing Charlyne to release 

the funds to Patty. He argued the health department recently 

had expanded Medi-Cal dental benefits to include most of the 

treatment outlined by Paredes.10 He contended the terms of 

the trust thus prevented Charlyne from releasing the funds to 

pay for the covered treatment. Patty opposed the application. 

Cohan declared he had contacted several Medi-Cal dental 

offices: they either did not provide the treatment Daniel 

needed or said they never had been able to get Medi-Cal to 

pay for dental implants. The court denied the application.

10 The Medi-Cal Dental Provider Handbook required 

pre-authorization for dental implants and documentation 

of “exceptional medical circumstances.”
13

Sadly, on August 27, 2020, Daniel had his first dental 

procedure with Dr. Paredes and died.

On September 30, 2020, Charlyne filed her first and final

account and report of trustee seeking reimbursement of costs, 

for her trustee’s and her attorney’s compensation, and for

distribution of the trust estate. Ultimately, Charlyne sought

$15,345.41 in trustee fees at $40 per hour; reimbursement 

of $1,284.47 in out-of-pocket expenditures for Daniel; and 

attorney fees for Bunnett totaling $47,318.15. Charlyne 

does not challenge the court’s final order concerning these 

fees and costs.

On October 8, 2020, the court convened a hearing 

on Charlyne’s first amended petition. The court assumed 

jurisdiction over Roberta’s trust and the SNT and confirmed 

Charlyne as acting trustee of the trusts. The court ordered 

“that all proceedings involving the Trust and all proceedings 

arising under . . . § 17200, et seq. be commenced in the 

Los Angeles Superior Court, Central District.” The court 

denied Charlyne’s other requests or found them moot. The court

also gave “an OK to set any petition that should be considered 

in conjunction with the [trustee’s] accounting for 2/18/2021.”11

The petition was to be filed and served by December 15, 2020.

In accordance with the court’s order, on December 10, 2020, 

Patty filed a petition for the allowance of conservator’s fees,

reimbursement of costs advanced, and payment of costs incurred, 

11 At the hearing, the court stated that, if Patty planned to 

seek reimbursement for any expenses, “that should be something 

that is brought before the court.”
14

and allowance of conservator’s attorney’s fees and costs, all 

to be paid from the SNT. Patty and Cohan asserted standing

to bring the petition under sections 2640, 2641, and 2642. 

The petition alleged there was no conservatorship estate.

Patty asked for reimbursement of out-of-pocket costs

totaling $33,228.36 that she made for Daniel’s benefit from

July 2016 through July 25, 2020; $56,500 for transportation costs 

from July 2016 to July 15, 2020; and $8,000 in conservator fees 

as compensation for performing her duties as conservator under 

section 2641. Cohan asked for attorney fees from August 5, 2020 

to the present. At $250 per hour they totaled $20,350, but had 

increased to $38,007.26 by the end of trial. He also asked for 

$1,082.26 in costs.

On May 3, 2021, the court set an evidentiary hearing

for October 20, 2021, on the petition for conservator’s fees and 

on the trustee’s accounting. The minute order notes that all 

counsel/parties appeared by LACourtConnect.

The court heard testimony over three days on October 20, 

2021, November 3, 2021, and January 31, 2022. Patty, her 

husband, Charlyne, Baiden, and Cohan testified. Bunnett 

requested a statement of decision. The court filed its proposed 

statement of decision on April 25, 2022. The court established 

equitable liens against the trust assets for reimbursement of 

monies to Patty and her conservatorship fees, and as to attorney 

fees payable to Cohan (and to Daniel’s GAL). The court ordered 

Patty be reimbursed from the trust $32,198.36 in out-of-pocket 

expenses, $56,500 in transportation costs, and $8,000 in 

conservatorship fees; and Cohan be reimbursed $28,947.26 in 

attorney fees and costs. As to Charlyne’s accounting, the court 

ordered her to pay from the trust $30,155.65 in attorney fees and 
15

$1,231.32 in costs to Bunnett, pay herself $5,760 in trustee fees,

reimburse herself $1,284.47 in out-of-pocket costs, and pay the 

GAL $11,141.88.

Charlyne objected to the proposed statement of decision. 

The court overruled the objections on May 25, 2022, declared 

its statement of decision final, and entered its order on Patty’s 

petition on June 24, 2022 and on Charlyne’s accounting on July 1, 

2022.

On July 15, 2022, Charlyne filed notices of intention 

to move for a new trial and to set aside the judgment and enter 

a different judgment under section 663 of the Code of Civil 

Procedure. She argued the court abused its discretion in 

not conducting the trial in open court and excluding evidence 

relevant to her case, and awarded excessive “damages.” Charlyne 

argued the judgment should be set aside because it was based 

on an error of law, namely, that no legal basis existed to compel

the SNT to reimburse Patty for the expenses she claimed or 

to pay her conservator or attorney fees. She also argued the 

trial evidence was insufficient to support the court’s order.

The court denied the motions on September 2, 2022. 

On Cohan’s request for sanctions in his joint opposition to the 

motions, the court also ordered Charlyne and Bunnett to pay, 

jointly and severally, sanctions of $1,750.

Charlyne appealed from the “judgment” on Patty’s petition 

for conservator fees, reimbursement of costs, and attorney fees;

from the “judgment” on trustee’s first and final account—but only 

to the extent it ordered Charlyne, as trustee, to pay the amounts 

granted in Patty’s petition; from the court’s orders denying 

Charlyne’s motions for new trial and to vacate the judgment 
16

and enter a new judgment; and from the court’s order imposing 

sanctions.

DISCUSSION

Charlyne contends: (1) the probate court abused its 

discretion in directing Charlyne, as trustee, to pay from the trust

Patty’s conservator fees and costs allegedly expended for Daniel’s 

benefit and her attorney fees allegedly incurred for Daniel’s or 

the trust’s benefit;12 (2) irregularity in the proceedings and the 

court’s exclusion of evidence resulted in a miscarriage of justice 

requiring a new trial; (3) substantial evidence does not support

the court’s awards on Patty’s petition, in any event; and (4) the 

court abused its discretion in imposing $1,750 in sanctions 

against Charlyne and Bunnett.

1. Standards of review

As this appeal primarily is from a judgment based on 

a statement of decision after a bench trial, “we review the 

trial court’s conclusions of law de novo and its findings of fact 

for substantial evidence.” (McPherson v. EF Intercultural 

Foundation, Inc. (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 243, 257.) We resolve 

“ ‘any conflict in the evidence or reasonable inferences to be 

drawn from the facts . . . in support of the determination of the 

trial court[’s] decision.’ ” (Estate of Young (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th

62, 75–76.) “We may not reweigh the evidence and are bound 

by the trial court’s credibility determinations.” (Id. at p. 76.)

12 More specifically, Charlyne contends the court erred in 

“imposing an equitable lien against the vested interest of the 

[trust’s] contingent beneficiaries in contravention to the express 

intentions of the settlor of [Roberta’s trust].”
17

Where the trial court’s orders are based on the exercise 

of its discretion—such as the award of conservator fees, expenses, 

and attorney fees here—we apply the abuse of discretion 

standard of review. (See, e.g., Conservatorship of Levitt (2001) 

93 Cal.App.4th 544, 549 [determination of what constitutes 

reasonable attorney fees is committed to the discretion of the 

trial court]; § 2640, subd. (c) [court determines if compensation 

requested by conservator is “just and reasonable”]; cf. In re 

Fraysher’s Estate (1956) 47 Cal.2d 131, 136 [“In passing upon 

the reasonableness and necessity of expenditures during

[estate] administration, the court below is vested ‘with a broad 

discretion,’ which will not be disturbed on appeal except when 

abused.”].) A court abuses its discretion if it exceeded the bounds 

of reason or contravened the uncontradicted evidence, failed to

follow proper procedure in reaching its decision, or applied the

wrong legal standard to the determination. (Dunlap v. Mayer

(2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 419, 424.) 

To the extent the court’s orders depend on its 

interpretation of statutes or of the trust instruments at issue, 

however, our review is de novo. (Pena v. Dey (2019) 39 

Cal.App.5th 546, 551, disapproved on other grounds by 

Haggerty v. Thornton (2024) 15 Cal.5th 729 [de novo standard 

of review applies to questions of statutory interpretation and 

to interpretation of trust instrument where interpretation does 

not depend on extrinsic evidence]; see also Conservatorship of 

Whitley (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1206, 1213 [on review of an award 

of attorney fees after trial, normal standard of review is abuse 

of discretion; however, de novo review of such a trial court order 

is warranted where the determination of whether the criteria for 
18

an award of attorney fees and costs have been satisfied amounts 

to statutory construction and a question of law].)

We review the propriety of the trial court’s ruling, not its 

reasoning, and “may uphold the ruling ‘on any basis presented 

by the record whether or not relied upon by the trial court.’ ” 

(Alamo v. Practice Management Information Corp. (2013) 

219 Cal.App.4th 466, 481, fn. 5.)

2. Standing

Charlyne, as she did below, first contends Patty lacked 

standing to bring her petition because Patty was neither a 

trustee nor a beneficiary of the trust. “The probate court has 

general power and duty to supervise the administration of 

trusts.” (Schwartz v. Labow (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 417, 427 

(Schwartz).) Section 17200 authorizes a trustee or beneficiary 

to petition the probate court “concerning the internal affairs

of the trust,” including to “[s]ettle the accounts and pass[ ] upon 

the acts of the trustee, including the exercise of discretionary 

powers.” (§ 17200, subds. (a), (b)(5); Schwartz, at p. 427 

[“[p]roceedings in the probate court ‘concerning the internal 

affairs of the trust’ are commenced with the filing of a petition”].) 

Under section 17206, the probate court “in its discretion may 

make any orders and take any other action necessary or proper 

to dispose of the matters presented by the petition.”

Here, Charlyne’s section 17200 petition raised the issue 

of her discretionary powers under the trust to decide when to 

expend SNT funds for Daniel’s needs. She specifically asked 

the court for an order that she was “not required to reimburse 

Patty . . . for any of the expenses purportedly made on behalf 

of Daniel . . . not authorized by the Trustee beforehand, and if 

Patty . . . wishes to duplicate or supplement efforts of the Trustee 
19

in providing for the needs of Daniel . . . , such expenses are 

of her own choosing and not reimbursable by the [SNT].” She 

also asked the court to order “any and all matters concerning 

the internal affairs of the trust be brought in the Probate 

Department of the Los Angeles Superior Court.” The court 

so ordered after assuming jurisdiction over the trusts.

Whether Charlyne abused her discretion as trustee of 

the SNT in denying reimbursement of expenditures made on 

Daniel’s behalf concerned the propriety of “the acts of the trustee”

and was “a matter presented by the petition.” Having raised

the issue in her own petition, Charlyne cannot now claim Patty 

had no standing to ask the court—as part of the action Charlyne 

commenced—for reimbursement from the SNT of her expenses 

incurred for Daniel’s benefit. 

Relatedly, Charlyne contends the court had no authority 

to issue an equitable lien against the trust because the trust 

assets vested in the remainder beneficiaries on Daniel’s death.

The court’s broad powers under section 17200 enabled the court 

to consider the acts of the trustee, including the propriety of the 

trustee having withheld her discretion to release trust funds for 

Daniel’s benefit—despite his untimely death. Having found the 

trustee was in breach of trust, we conclude the court could impose 

an equitable lien to remedy that breach in light of the unique 

circumstances before it. (See Farmers Ins. Exchange v. Zerin

(1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 445, 453 [equitable liens may arise out

of general considerations of right and justice as applied to the 

relations of the parties and the circumstances of their dealings;

they frequently are based on the equitable maxim that “equity 

will deem as done that which ought to be done”].) “To preserve 

[a] trust and to respond to perceived breaches of trust, the 
20

probate court has wide, express powers to ‘make any orders 

and take any other action necessary or proper to dispose of the 

matters presented’ by [a] section 17200 petition.” (Schwartz, 

supra, 164 Cal.App.4th at p. 427.)

Moreover, Charlyne also filed a first and final account 

and report of trustee, asking the court to disburse trust funds 

to Charlyne and her attorney, and distribute the balance of the 

trust estate to the three remaining beneficiaries. Charlyne’s 

request to settle her account—which arose from the filing of 

her section 17200 petition—“activated the probate court’s duty 

and authority to scrutinize the appellant’s account.” (Schwartz, 

supra, 164 Cal.App.4th at p. 427 [“Presented with a section 17200

petition to settle an account, ‘the probate court has a duty 

imposed by law to inquire into the prudence of the trustee’s 

administration.’ ”].) The court could not do so without also 

considering any claims for reimbursement raised by Patty. 

The court had the “ ‘inherent power to decide all incidental 

issues necessary to carry out its express powers to supervise 

the administration of the trust.’ ” (Ibid.) In any event, the court 

specifically told Patty—if she planned to seek reimbursement 

for any expenses—“that should be something that is brought 

before the court.” The court’s minute order indicated it had

given “an OK to set any petition that should be considered 

in conjunction with the [trustee’s] accounting for 2/18/2021.”

Finally, we agree with Patty that, as Daniel’s conservator,13

she had standing to bring her petition under sections 2641 and 

13 Charlyne contends Patty did not file her petition in her 

capacity as Daniel’s conservator. By the time Patty filed her 

petition, Daniel’s conservatorship had terminated due to his 
21

2642. As we discuss in detail below, those sections expressly 

authorize a conservator and her attorney to petition the court

for conservator and attorney fees. (Whether those sections 

authorized the court to direct the trust to pay conservator fees 

and appointed counsel’s fees versus whether the court could hear 

Patty’s petition at all is a different question that we address 

below.) And, as the court noted in denying Charlyne’s motion 

to set aside the judgment, section 2623 authorizes a conservator

to seek “[t]he amount of the reasonable expenses incurred in the 

exercise of the powers and the performance of the duties of the 

death. (§ 1860, subd. (a).) Section 2630 allows the court to retain 

jurisdiction of the conservatorship proceeding in the event of the 

conservatee’s death for the purpose of settling the accounts of the 

conservator “or for any other purpose incident to the enforcement 

of the judgments and orders of the court.” As Charlyne notes, the 

probate court did not have jurisdiction over the conservatorship 

case; the mental health court did. Nevertheless, as Patty would 

have been able to file her petition as Daniel’s conservator had 

he not died, she did not lose standing to ask the probate court 

for reimbursement from the trust in connection with Charlyne’s 

petition that brought the trust under the court’s jurisdiction. 

Again, Patty’s request relates to the court’s consideration 

of Charlyne’s exercise of her discretionary powers and her 

accounting as trustee. Moreover, the first paragraph of Patty’s 

petition states she was appointed conservator of the person of

Daniel, the “deceased beneficiary of the [SNT] subject to this 

proceeding,” and Cohan identifies himself as the “court-appointed 

counsel for Patty Wiedner, Conservator of Daniel Lee Black, 

Conservatee.” Accordingly, Patty was bringing her petition 

in her capacity as Daniel’s conservator up until his death.
22

. . . conservator.” (§ 2623, subd. (a)(1).) Accordingly, we conclude 

Patty had standing to file her petition.

3. The SNT was not part of Daniel’s “estate”

Patty brought her petition for conservator fees, 

reimbursement of expenses, and attorney fees under sections 

2640,14 2641, and 2642. Section 2641 allows a conservator of 

the person to petition the court (in a conservatorship proceeding) 

for “an order fixing and allowing compensation for services in 

the best interest of the . . . conservatee rendered to that time.” 

(§ 2641, subd. (a).) “The compensation allowed shall thereupon 

be charged against the estate.” (Id., subd. (b).) Section 2642, 

in turn, permits an attorney who has rendered legal services 

to a conservator to petition the court for “an order fixing and 

allowing compensation” for those legal services. (§ 2642, 

subd. (a).) Again, any compensation allowed “shall . . . be 

charged against the estate.” (Id., subd. (b).) Finally, section 

2646 provides: “In proceedings under this chapter [governing 

compensation of guardian, conservator, and attorney], the court 

shall only determine fees that are payable from the estate of the 

. . . conservatee and not limit fees payable from other sources.”

Patty had argued—as she does on appeal—that the SNT

was part of the conservatee’s (Daniel’s) estate and thus reachable

to pay her conservator and attorney fees under these statutes. 

Charlyne contended—as she does on appeal—the SNT was not 

part of the conservatee’s estate and thus there was no authority 

14 Section 2640 governs petitions to the court by conservators 

of the estate for an “order fixing and allowing compensation.” 

(§ 2640, subd. (a).) Patty was appointed conservator of the 

person only.
23

to direct the trust to pay Patty’s conservator and attorney fees. 

We agree with Charlyne that the SNT is not part of Daniel’s 

“estate.”

Patty relies on both section 2586 and 2400. Section 2586 

states, the “ ‘estate plan of the conservatee’ includes, but is not 

limited to, . . . any trust of which the conservatee is the settlor 

or beneficiary.” (§ 2586, subd. (a).) But sections 2641, 2642, 

and 2646 refer to the conservatee’s “estate,” not “estate plan.” 

Thus, section 2586 is not relevant to our analysis. Section 2400

defines “ ‘[e]state’ ” as “all of the conservatee’s personal property, 

wherever located, and real property located in this state.”

(§ 2400, subd. (b).) Section 2640.1, which also is inapplicable to 

the situation before us, provides, “[i]f a conservator of the estate 

is not appointed, but a conservator of the person is appointed, 

the compensation and costs allowed [to the individual who was 

not appointed conservator] shall be ordered by the court to be 

paid from property belonging to the conservatee, whether held 

outright, in trust, or otherwise.” (§ 2640.1, subd.(c).)

Patty argues the SNT was part of Daniel’s estate because, 

“[a]t the time [it] was established, Daniel acquired a vested

property interest in the trust, to be disbursed according to 

criteria set forth in the instrument.” She cites Anderson v. 

Superior Court (1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 112 (Anderson) for the 

proposition that, “ ‘the beneficiaries [of a trust] are the real 

owners of the property.’ ” (Quoting, id. at p. 117, alteration 

in respondent’s brief.)

The trust in Anderson was nothing like the trust here.

The trust there was created to sell real property and distribute 

the proceeds of the sale to the beneficiaries. The trustee had no 

other power over the property. (Anderson, supra, 142 Cal.App.3d 
24

at p. 116.) The quotation that Patty altered from the case stated: 

“Thus, the trust is a naked, dry trust, and the beneficiaries are 

the real owners of the property.” (Id. at p. 117.) Although that 

may have been the case in Anderson, that is not the case with 

respect to a third-party special needs trust like the one at issue 

here.

Daniel was not the owner of any of the assets in the SNT. 

He was the beneficiary of what is known as a “third-party”

special needs trust. A third-party special needs trust—in 

contrast to a “first-party” special needs trust—“is established 

by one person (usually a parent) using his or her own funds 

for the benefit of another, the person with a disability. It 

does not involve any assets of the person with a disability.” 

(See Fay Blix, The World of Special Needs Trusts (Nov. 2008)

50 Orange County Lawyer 10, *11 (Blix); see also Hook & Kefalas 

Dudek, Special Needs Trust Handbook (Dec. 2023) § 5.01[B]

(Hook) [a third-party special needs trust preserves “public 

benefits for the trust beneficiary while supplementing the 

beneficiary’s lifestyle with private funds” and “protect[s] the 

private third-party funds from the state”].) 

“The purpose of a special needs trust is ‘to enhance the 

beneficiary’s quality of life through the purchase of additional 

goods and services that are not covered or adequately provided 

by SSI . . . and Medicaid.’ ” (Gonzalez v. City National Bank 

(2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 734, 743–744 (Gonzalez).)

On Daniel’s death, any funds remaining in the SNT would 

go to the named remainder beneficiaries. More importantly, 

although the purpose of the SNT was “to supplement any public 

benefits available to [Daniel] during his lifetime,” he had “no 

right to compel the trustee to release principal or income to him 
25

or for his benefit or otherwise to have any access to any of the 

trust assets.” Accordingly, the trust funds were not available 

to him and thus not part of his estate.

A first-party or self-settled special needs trust, on the 

other hand, is funded by the disabled person’s own assets. (Blix, 

supra, at *11.) Those assets are not considered in determining 

the beneficiary’s eligibility for needs-based benefits like SSI 

and Medi-Cal. (Ibid.) After the beneficiary dies, however, 

the government provider of the benefits, such as Medi-Cal, is 

entitled to reimbursement from any funds left in the first-party 

special needs trust. (See Gonzalez, supra, 36 Cal.App.5th

at p. 744 [“so long as the state will recover for the Medicaid 

services provided to the special needs trust beneficiary during 

her lifetime, the beneficiary remains eligible for such services, 

even if the amount in the trust otherwise would disqualify 

the beneficiary from receiving such benefits”]; id. at p. 745

[“California regulations also provide that for a qualifying special 

needs trust to be considered ‘not available’ when determining 

Medi-Cal eligibility, the trust must be set up so that ‘[t]he State 

receives all remaining funds in the trust, or respective portion 

of the trust, upon the death of the individual . . . up to an 

amount equal to the total medical assistance paid on behalf 

of that individual by the Medi-Cal program’ ”]; 42 U.S.C.

§ 1396p(d)(4)(A) [trust containing assets of a disabled individual 

under age 65 established for the individual’s benefit is not 

considered in determining individual’s eligibility for state

Medicaid benefits if the state “will receive all amounts 

remaining in the trust upon the death of such individual 

up to an amount equal to the total” benefits paid].)
26

A third-party special needs trust, however—because it is 

not funded by the beneficiary’s assets—need not include such a 

“payback provision.” (Loring & Rounds, A Trustee’s Handbook—

Rounds and Rounds (2024) § 9.3, p. 1482 & fn. 25; Special Needs 

Alliance, Administering a Special Needs Trust: A Handbook for 

Trustees (2024) p. 5 <https://www.specialneedsalliance.org/wpcontent/uploads/2024/01/SNA-2024-Handbook.pdf> [as of May 10, 

2024], archived at <https://perma.cc/3GVZ-EWUL> (Handbook)

[self-settled special needs trusts, unlike third-party trusts, “must 

include a provision directing the trustee, if the trust contains any 

funds upon the death of the beneficiary, to pay back anything the 

state Medicaid program has paid for the beneficiary”]; id. at p. 6 

[third-party special needs trust is established by someone other 

than the person with disabilities “with assets that never belonged 

to the beneficiary” and are not required to include a “ ‘payback’ 

provision for Medicaid benefits upon the beneficiary’s death”].)

The California cases on which Patty relies to argue the 

SNT was part of Daniel’s estate do not involve third-party special 

needs trusts. Rather, in all of them, the trusts were funded with 

assets belonging to the settlor.

In Riverside County Public Guardian v. Snukst (2022) 

73 Cal.App.5th 753, the reviewing court found assets of the 

revocable inter vivos trust of a deceased settlor, who also was 

a conservatee and Medi-Cal recipient, constituted his estate 

for purpose of Medi-Cal reimbursement. (Id. at pp. 756–757.) 

Thus, the trial court should have reimbursed the state from 

the trust for the Medi-Cal benefits it had provided to the 

conservatee/settlor during his lifetime before distributing the 

assets to the trust’s beneficiary. (Ibid.) Similarly, in Belshé v. 

Hope (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 161, 163–165, 175, the court held 
27

real property a Medi-Cal recipient had passed to beneficiaries 

to her inter vivos trust on her death was part of the benefit 

recipient’s estate—despite its transfer—from which the state 

could seek reimbursement of Medi-Cal benefits it had provided 

her. Under this reasoning, perhaps if Patty had been Roberta’s 

conservator, Roberta’s estate would have included the assets 

in the trust that were to be distributed to the remainder 

beneficiaries. Belshé thus reinforces Charlyne’s point that 

the assets in the SNT were part of Roberta’s—not Daniel’s—

estate.

Finally, Patty cites Gonzalez, supra, 36 Cal.App.5th 734, 

for its statement, “ ‘[u]pon the death of the beneficiary of a special 

needs trust, any remaining assets in the trust are treated as part 

of the beneficiary’s estate.’ ” (Id. at p. 751, quoting Shewry v.

Arnold (2004) 125 Cal.App.4th 186, 197.) Patty, however, omits 

the important qualifier: “ ‘for purposes of Medi-Cal 

reimbursement.’ ” (Gonzalez, at p. 751, italics added, quoting 

Shewry, at p. 197.) Moreover, the court in Gonzalez was 

describing Shewry’s discussion of section 3605, which “applies 

only to a special needs trust established under Section 3604.” 

(§ 3605, subd. (a).) Section 3604 governs the establishment of 

a special needs trust when the court has ordered that “money 

of a minor or person with a disability be paid to a special needs 

trust”—in other words, a first-party trust. (§ 3604, subd. (a)(1).)

In Gonzalez, the plaintiffs’ daughter was severely disabled 

due to complications during her birth. After the daughter 

received a multi-million-dollar settlement in a medical 

malpractice lawsuit, a court placed the settlement proceeds 

in a special needs trust with the daughter as the beneficiary. 

(Gonzalez, supra, 36 Cal.App.5th at pp. 739–740.) On the 
28

daughter’s death, her parents argued the remainder of the trust 

should be distributed to them. The court, however, found the

state was entitled to reimbursement for the Medi-Cal benefits 

it had provided the daughter from the funds remaining in the 

trust after her death. (Id. at pp. 739, 741–742.) The trust 

included the required “ ‘payback’ provision” that—under the 

applicable federal statute—on termination of the trust, the 

residual shall be payable to any state or state agency that 

has provided state medical benefits to the beneficiary. (Id.

at p. 763.)

Again, unlike the assets used to fund the SNT here, assets 

placed in a special needs trust established under section 3604 

belong to the beneficiary. Those assets—e.g., funds from an 

injury settlement—otherwise would have been paid directly to

the beneficiary. Thus, absent the creation of the special needs 

trust in Gonzalez, the assets would have been considered in 

determining the daughter’s eligibility for public benefits and she 

likely would have lost those benefits. Roberta, however, placed 

her own assets—not Daniel’s assets—in the SNT created for him.

Nor is there any similar “payback” provision in the SNT, nor was

one required. 

As Charlyne notes, the Law Revision Commission 

Comments to section 3605 state, “On the death of the special 

needs trust beneficiary or on termination of the trust, trust 

property may become subject to reimbursement claims under 

federal or state law. [Citations.] For this purpose and only 

this purpose, the trust property is treated as the beneficiary’s 

property or as property of the beneficiary’s estate.” Logically, 

if trust property belonging to the beneficiary of a special needs 

trust is treated as the beneficiary’s estate only for purposes of 
29

government benefits reimbursement, then property placed in 

Daniel’s SNT, which never was his to begin with, and cannot 

be reached for reimbursement of benefits paid to him on his 

death, cannot constitute his estate for purposes of reimbursing 

conservator fees and attorney fees under the Probate Code.

Accordingly, we do not agree that the conservatee’s estate 

included the SNT—which was funded entirely by Roberta’s 

property, not monies or property owned by Daniel.15 

4. Nevertheless, the terms of the trust allowed 

reimbursement for some of the expenditures Patty

made on behalf of Daniel and for her conservator fees

Although we cannot construe the SNT as Daniel’s estate, 

the probate court’s order directing the trustee to reimburse Patty 

from the trust for her expenditures and costs incurred on Daniel’s 

behalf was based on the terms of the SNT itself. “The primary 

duty of a court in construing a trust is to give effect to the 

settlor’s intentions.” (Barefoot v. Jennings (2020) 8 Cal.5th 822, 

15 In its order denying Charlyne’s motion to set aside 

the judgment, the court found section 2640.1 provided that 

“the conservatorship fees and attorney’s fees may be paid from 

the Living Trust as the Probate Code broadly defines ‘estate’ 

as a conservatee’s ‘personal property, wherever located, and 

real property located in this state.’ ” (Quoting § 2400.) It’s 

unclear why the court relied on section 2640.1. That section 

authorizes a person who petitioned for appointment as 

conservator, but who was not appointed in lieu of a different 

conservator, to petition the court for compensation for “his or 

her services rendered in connection with and to facilitate the 

appointment of a conservator, and costs incurred in connection 

therewith.” (§ 2640.1, subds. (a) & (c).)
30

826.) Here, the settlor (Roberta) stated her intention clearly.

As the court noted, the terms of the trust “clearly show[ed] 

that the primary use” of the trust’s assets—the proceeds from 

the sale of Roberta’s house—“was to provide a supplemental 

and emergency fund for Daniel” during his lifetime to augment 

any public benefits available to him.

Under the express terms of the trust, the trustee 

(Charlyne) was to use the trust income and principal to satisfy 

Daniel’s “special needs”—the “requisites” for maintaining his 

“good health, comfort, safety, and welfare”—as the trustee in her 

“sole discretion . . . deem[ed] necessary or advisable.” The terms 

of the SNT expressly stated Daniel’s special needs “shall include, 

but not be limited to” his medical and dental care, travel needs, 

and recreation—among other delineated items—to the extent

not provided for or reimbursed by public benefits. Thus, in the 

court’s view, “In a perfect world, Daniel would have lived a much 

longer life and died spending the last penny of the trust doing 

something that brought him joy.” As the trial court put it, the 

terms of the SNT “allow[ed] for payment of those ‘extras’ for 

Daniel that public benefits did not cover.”16 We agree with 

the trial court’s assessment of the trust instrument.

16 Indeed, an SNT can make disbursements for many services 

and items not covered by public benefits without affecting the 

beneficiary’s eligibility for Medicaid and SSI—the need-based 

public benefits Daniel received—such as: entertainment; 

recreation; vacations; caregiving; cell phone, cable, or internet 

services; electronics; clothing; hair care; hobby supplies; 

magazine and newspaper subscriptions; nonfood grocery items; 

over the counter medications; and many others. (See Cal. CEB,

Special Needs Trusts: Planning, Drafting, and Administration 
31

The court found, “Patty clearly expended monies to 

afford Daniel a better quality of life both before and after being 

appointed as his conservator for which reimbursement is now 

properly claimed.” Except for a few categories of expenses 

that we discuss below, we agree.

Patty prepared a summary of her expenditures she had 

made for Daniel—both before and after she was appointed his 

conservator—and gave the court receipts for some, but not all, 

of them. They included items for Daniel’s direct benefit, such as 

clothing (including underwear), toiletries, dental care, a radio 

and batteries, grooming services, entertainment, and meals out—

(2023) §14.67.5 [list of “generally permissible distributions”] 

(CEB, Special Needs Trusts). Disbursements for food and 

shelter, however, are considered income that could reduce 

the amount of SSI the beneficiary receives. (Social Security 

Administration, Program Operations Manual System—

Supplemental Security Income (May 2024) SI 01120.200.E.1.b. 

<https://secure.ssa.gov/apps10/poms.nsf/lnx/0501120200> [as of

May 10, 2024], archived at <https://perma.cc/ME6Q-GECJ>

(SSA POMS) [“[f]ood or shelter received by the trust beneficiary 

as a result of disbursements from the trust to a third party 

is income in the form of in-kind support and maintenance”]; 

Hook, supra, § 9.01[D][2] [“[a]ll distributions should be made to 

third parties on behalf of the beneficiary and should be limited, 

to the extent possible, to items that cannot be considered food 

or shelter, or converted to use for food or shelter,” which are 

considered income, citing SSA POMS, supra, SI 01120.200.E.1.a

& 01120.200.E.1.b]; see also Handbook, supra, pp. 10–12 

[similar].) The occasional meal out “may be characterized 

as entertainment” rather than food, however. (CEB, Special 

Needs Trusts, supra, § 14.53.)
32

items and services that no public benefit program provided for

Daniel, would not affect Daniel’s eligibility for benefits, and were 

for Daniel’s “good health,” “comfort,” or “welfare,” in accordance 

with the trust’s terms.

Patty also testified about her contact with Daniel and the

expenditures she made on his behalf, which the court accurately 

summarized in its statement of decision. The court noted Patty 

was concerned Daniel “would end up in a psychiatric hospital.” 

Patty thus maintained regular contact with him after his mother 

died—after a several year lapse in contact—“so that Daniel 

had some quality of life that kept him happy and less agitated.” 

She put money on Daniel’s account at his facility for extra treats, 

like “snacks and beverages.” The court also noted Patty testified 

she maintained a journal of the expenses she incurred between 

July 2016 and July 2020, and had receipts for most of her 

expenses. And, before the evidentiary hearing, the court noted 

it had “looked through” the summary of Patty’s out-of-pocket 

costs, as well as the receipts. The court thus had evaluated the 

documentary evidence supporting the expenses Patty claimed 

she had incurred on Daniel’s behalf, as well as Patty’s testimony, 

to determine Patty legitimately incurred them and they were 

expended to satisfy Daniel’s special needs. Those records and

Patty’s testimony provide sufficient evidence to support the 

court’s finding that Patty’s claimed out-of-pocket expenditures 

(or, at least, most of them) were appropriate expenditures under 

the terms of the trust.

Nevertheless, the trust terms gave Charlyne the sole 

discretion to determine what was “necessary or advisable” to pay 

from the SNT for Daniel’s needs. Daniel himself had no right

to compel Charlyne to release funds, nor did he have any access 
33

to the trust assets. In exercising her sole discretion as trustee,

however, Charlyne was required to “act in accordance with 

fiduciary principles” and could not “act in bad faith or in 

disregard of the purposes of the trust.” (§ 16081, subd. (a);

see also Rest.3d Trusts, § 50, subd. (1) [“A discretionary power 

conferred upon the trustee to determine the benefits of a 

trust beneficiary is subject to judicial control only to prevent 

misinterpretation or abuse of the discretion by the trustee.”]; 

Estate of Giraldin (2012) 55 Cal.4th 1058, 1072 [“California 

courts have considered the Restatement of Trusts in interpreting

California trust law.”].) To determine whether evidence is 

sufficient to support a trial court’s finding that the trustee has 

“been guilty of an abuse of discretion requires an inquiry into 

the intentions of the settlor . . . , and an examination of the 

conduct of the trustee[ ] in the administration of the trust.” 

(In re Ferrall’s Estate (1953) 41 Cal.2d 166, 174.) We conclude

substantial evidence supports the court’s finding that Charlyne 

abused her discretion in declining to reimburse (or objecting after 

Daniel’s death to reimbursement of) Patty’s expenditures for 

Daniel’s benefit—that were permissible disbursements under 

the trust—by disregarding the purpose of the SNT.17

17 In considering what amount of trustee fees to award 

Charlyne, the court also found she “breached her duties as 

trustee not only as described in the trust document itself but 

also within the meaning of [§] 16004,” which deals with conflicts 

of interest. The court found “Charlyne had a very high duty to 

make sure that her decision making and actions did not result 

in deprivation of trust assets for Daniel’s use which would 

necessarily result in a larger amount being distributed to her

upon his death.”
34

Charlyne testified Patty shouldn’t be reimbursed “[for] a 

thing” she purchased because Charlyne—or the public guardian 

when he was the conservator—already had provided Daniel with

the same things. Essentially, Charlyne’s position was that Patty 

was making unnecessary, duplicative expenditures without

prior authorization.

In her declaration filed in support of her accounting and 

request for trustee fees, Charlyne averred that, as part of her 

trustee duties, she had provided Daniel with necessary clothing, 

cable T.V. to watch sports, money for activities, and whatever

else he needed that could be funded from the trust without 

jeopardizing the public benefits he received. Charlyne’s 

summary of disbursements from the SNT for Daniel’s benefit 

from September 2016 to July 2020 shows payments for Daniel’s

cable and cellular service, clothing and supplies, shoes, medical 

care, and “Cash for Daniel Black” (presumably paid to his 

housing facility for the activities and other needs Charlyne

mentioned in her declaration).

From Patty’s receipts, it appears she did buy Daniel 

several apparently duplicative clothing items at times. The 

court, however, credited Patty’s testimony, finding it “credible, 

thoughtful and unflappable even on cross-examination.” The 

court specifically noted Patty’s testimony that she bought extra 

clothing for Daniel, as he “complained about items going missing 

in the facility.” Patty also testified about having to buy Daniel 

a new radio because he had broken the two Charlyne had bought.

Thus, we can infer the court rejected Charlyne’s position that

paying for these duplicate items Patty provided was wasteful

or unnecessary.
35

Substantial evidence also supports the court’s finding that 

Charlyne failed to fulfill her duty under Article 5.4(e) of the trust 

to “consult with any guardian, conservator, custodian, or other 

person who cares for [Daniel] regarding his special needs”; and 

under Article 5.4(b) to “regularly consult with [Daniel] and any 

persons or entities providing care or assistance to [him] for the 

purpose of determining [his] needs and resources.” As the court 

noted in its statement of decision, Charlyne admitted she did not 

confer with or reach out to Patty—even after she was appointed 

conservator—about “any of Daniel’s needs.”

Rather, Charlyne testified she “just reached out to the 

board and care homes” where Daniel lived. She had Patty 

contact Bunnett.

18 The reason, according to Charlyne, was Patty 

called her at all hours of the night, leading Charlyne to change 

her phone number.19 As a result, Charlyne gave Daniel the 

number to her cell phone but, because no voicemail had been

18 The court also reasonably could find Charlyne’s delegation 

to Bunnett was not effective. Patty’s former court-appointed 

attorney Stanford told the court, at the July 31, 2020 hearing, 

that she had written to Bunnett in July 2019 about arranging 

for any court-approved dental treatment for Daniel and to 

establish a budget out of the SNT for Daniel’s recreational 

and entertainment needs. Bunnett apparently responded with 

a letter “that was basically a treatise on special needs trusts, 

and from that point,” he never responded to Stanford’s emails 

or voicemails.

19 When the court directly asked Charlyne, “Why didn’t you 

reach out to your sister as was your responsibility as trustee?” 

Charlyne replied, “Because Danny kept telling me she didn’t 

like him.”
36

set up on that phone, he could not leave her a message. Charlyne

testified that, if she saw she had missed a call from Daniel, 

she would call him back.

The court thus could find that Charlyne, having failed to 

consult Patty regularly about Daniel’s needs, at least when she 

was conservator—and arguably beforehand as a “person[ ] . . . 

providing care or assistance to [Daniel]”—could not reasonably 

have refused to exercise her discretion to make payments from 

the SNT to satisfy those needs, as she could not have known what 

those needs were without consulting Patty. Charlyne apparently 

did not know Daniel required replacement clothing or other items

despite having conferred with his housing facilities. And, Patty 

testified Daniel could not reach Charlyne by phone. We can infer 

the court credited this testimony. The court thus could have

concluded Charlyne was not regularly asking Daniel about his 

needs, either.

Accordingly, except for a few categories of costs we discuss

below, we conclude the trial court did not err in ordering Patty 

be reimbursed from the trust for her out-of-pocket expenditures 

made on Daniel’s behalf.

a. Out-of-pocket attorney fees

As part of her out-of-pocket costs, Patty asked for

reimbursement of attorney fees (and costs) she incurred in 

2016 and 2017 with Raxter Law, apparently in connection with 

or related to the petition she filed in Riverside County that she 

voluntarily dismissed due to her lack of standing. The record 

does not demonstrate that Patty’s filing of the dismissed 

petition benefited Daniel in any way. Similarly, she asked for

reimbursement of attorney fees incurred in 2017 with Conover 

& Grebe relating to proceedings in the LPS conservatorship 
37

including a hearing on the appointment of the conservator 

in September 2017. The record does not demonstrate how 

these attorney fees Patty incurred benefited Daniel either. 

Accordingly, the court erred in directing the trustee to reimburse 

Patty from the trust for those out-of-pocket attorney fees.

b. Cash deposits made before and after appointment 

as conservator

Patty’s request for reimbursement also included relatively 

small cash deposits she made on Daniel’s account at his 

housing facility for his “snacks and beverages.” Technically, 

a disbursement from the SNT for Daniel’s food could affect 

his receipt of SSI, as food received by a beneficiary as a result 

of a disbursement made to a third party is “income in the form 

of in-kind support and maintenance.” (SSA POMS, supra,

SI 01120.200.E.1.b.)20 But Charlyne reimbursed herself from 

the SNT for cash deposits she had made on Daniel’s account 

for his entertainment and other needs. We thus can infer the 

court found it would be an abuse of Charlyne’s discretion not 

to reimburse Patty as well for those same sorts of expenditures 

given they were for Daniel’s comfort. 

On the other hand, Bunnett asked Patty about an ATM 

withdrawal she had made on November 4, 2019, while she 

20 Similarly, Patty asked for reimbursement for food she 

purchased for Daniel at grocery stores, such as cereal or juice. 

We can infer the court concluded either these extra treats were 

more along the lines of entertainment than food—as Daniel’s 

housing facility provided his food—or the value of any snacks or 

beverages purchased would have been too small to make a real 

difference in Daniel’s receipt of SSI had he lived.
38

was Daniel’s conservator, for $136 that she claimed for 

reimbursement. Patty testified she had taken that money 

out of her personal bank account and put it on Daniel’s account 

at his residential care facility for his PNI money.

Patty testified that, “a few times,” Daniel’s monthly public 

benefit payments—his social security and SSI—came to her and 

she put the funds “in the checking account.” Patty testified about 

these funds as Baiden had—that Daniel’s monthly social security

went to pay for his care at his facility, and his monthly SSI—

at either $35 or $136 a month, depending on the type of facility—

was put on Daniel’s account as his PNI money to pay for “sodas or 

chips from vending machines or whatever.” There was no money 

left over after making those payments.

As Daniel’s monthly SSI either was going to Patty or 

directly to his facility, there would be no need for Patty to be 

reimbursed for the $136 she paid for Daniel’s PNI. To the extent 

Patty, as Daniel’s conservator, was the named recipient of his 

SSI, any SSI payments she received, but did not pay to Daniel’s 

account, should be credited back to the trust.

c. Mileage and transportation costs

Patty’s summary of expenditures for her out-of-pocket 

costs also included mileage expenses for driving to visit Daniel. 

Patty’s claimed $56,500 in transportation costs—which the court 

awarded her—represented the cost attributed to the time Patty’s 

husband took to drive Patty to visit Daniel or take Daniel to 

appointments. Patty’s mileage and transportation costs included 

trips she made to visit Daniel before and after she became his 

conservator.

Patty’s husband Earl drove her because she did not drive 

long distances. For a time, Patty did not live close to Daniel’s 
39

facilities. According to her records, which the court credited, 

she drove 110 to 168 miles roundtrip to see Daniel. Earl testified 

it was five hours roundtrip from their residence in Lake Elsinore 

to the locations of Daniel’s residence and health appointments, 

which until fall 2019, were in places like Sylmar, Santa Monica, 

Downey, and Los Angeles. Earl “charged” $400 per roundtrip 

to these places.

21 He based that figure on the $400 Charlyne 

paid a third party, who also cut Daniel’s hair, to drive her to 

visit Daniel. She paid her daughter $300 to drive her. (Charlyne 

was about 79 years old.) Earl testified he also helped Patty with 

Daniel during her visits—for example, supervising him in public 

restrooms. Baiden agreed it was necessary to have more than 

one person transport Daniel anywhere due to his behavior. The 

court found Patty’s husband’s and Baiden’s testimony credible.

As Daniel’s conservator, Patty had a duty to visit him

and attend to and assess his needs. Had Daniel had an estate, 

she would have been entitled to recover “reasonable expenses 

incurred in the exercise of the powers and the performance of the 

duties of . . . conservator.” (§ 2623, subd. (a)(1).) This evidence 

supports the trial court’s finding that Patty’s transportation 

costs—once she became Daniel’s conservator—were reasonable.22 

21 Patty did not actually pay her husband for driving her.

22 As she does on appeal, Charlyne argued “travel and 

mileage by a conservator is generally not reimbursable” under 

rule 4.43 of the Los Angeles Superior Court Local Rules. That 

rule does not allow a personal representative to claim “[l]ocal 

travel and mileage” as costs, but does allow claimed costs for 

long distance travel. (Rule 4.43(a)(5) & (b)(3).)
40

Moreover, Patty’s performance of her duties as conservator 

were for Daniel’s direct benefit. Because she had to drive a long 

distance to see Daniel, and could not transport him in the car

alone,23 she could not have performed those duties without Earl’s 

services. Accordingly, the court reasonably could find it would 

be an abuse of discretion for the trustee not to reimburse Patty 

for these expenses incurred in the course of performing her 

conservator duties for Daniel.24

Before she was appointed Daniel’s conservator, however,

Patty—and her husband—sat in the position of an aunt and 

uncle visiting their disabled nephew. And, unlike the items Patty 

purchased for Daniel or entertainment she provided for him, 

Patty’s mileage and transportation costs did not directly benefit 

23 Patty testified she had to sit in the backseat with Daniel 

to prevent him from bolting from the car.

24 Nevertheless, the record does not support requiring the 

SNT to pay Patty her requested “auto allowance” (mileage) at 

$.55 per mile for trips where she also claimed transportation fees 

for Earl’s driving “services.” Earl testified he and Patty thought 

a $400 flat rate was reasonable as Charlyne paid that amount 

for Michelle Higgens (a “beauty operator”) to drive her. (Earl

“charged” $100 after Daniel moved to a facility in their own 

county.) Charlyne did not also reimburse herself—or her drivers

—for separate mileage fees, however. As Earl based his fees for 

driving Patty on what Charlyne had paid, his $400 (and $100) 

trip rates also presumably accounted for mileage. At oral 

argument, Cohan could not say what the fees included.

Accordingly, any mileage expenses Patty claimed during 

her tenure as conservator for trips where she also claimed 

a transportation fee should be excluded as duplicative.
41

Daniel. We thus cannot conclude Charlyne can be deemed to 

have abused her discretion by not reimbursing, or objecting 

to reimbursing, Patty for her mileage or transportation costs 

in making those voluntary, though thoughtful, visits. Paying for 

Patty’s mileage and husband-driver was not necessary to Daniel’s 

comfort or welfare, as was—say—buying him clothing to replace 

what had “gone missing.” Thus, the court had no basis to order 

the trust to pay for those expenses.

d. Other pre-conservator personal expenses

We also do not agree the SNT required Charlyne to 

reimburse Patty for her other personal expenses—such as her 

own (and Earl’s) meals and entertainment costs—incurred during 

visits to Daniel before Patty became his conservator. Patty was 

Daniel’s aunt. We cannot conclude Daniel’s mother intended the 

SNT to be used to pay for her sister’s meals and entertainment 

simply because she incurred those costs while visiting her 

nephew. (In re Greenleaf’s Estate (1951) 101 Cal.App.2d 658, 

661–662 [“the basic inquiry, whenever the exercise of a trustee’s 

discretion, absolute or otherwise, is challenged, is always 

whether the trustee acted in the state of mind contemplated by 

the trustor”].) As with her pre-conservator transportation costs, 

Patty’s or Earl’s own food purchases, movie tickets, and the like 

did not “supplement” Daniel’s public benefits—the SNT’s stated 

purpose—unlike the items, services, and entertainment Patty 

purchased for Daniel. Once Patty replaced the public guardian 

as Daniel’s conservator, however, the county no longer provided 

Daniel with conservator services. Accordingly, reasonable 

expenses Patty incurred in discharging the duties she owed 

Daniel as his court-appointed conservator—as with her 
42

conservator fees discussed below—necessarily were for Daniel’s 

welfare.

25

e. Conservator fees

The court found Patty’s claimed conservator fees of $8,000

—billed at an hourly rate less than what Charlyne billed for her 

trustee fees—was “more than reasonable and should be allowed.” 

The trust allows payment of trustee fees but is silent as to 

the payment of conservator fees. The court reasonably could 

conclude that was the case because the public guardian was 

Daniel’s conservator when Roberta executed the restated trust, 

which included the SNT. As the public guardian remained

Daniel’s conservator, there would have been no reason for 

Roberta to amend her trust to add a provision specifically 

allowing for the payment of conservator fees. In any event, 

Patty’s performance of her duties as Daniel’s court-appointed 

conservator necessarily were required for Daniel’s welfare. 

Accordingly, the court did not err in directing the trust to pay 

Patty’s conservator fees.

5. Attorney fees

Finally, the court awarded Cohan his requested costs of

$1,097.26 from the trust, finding he incurred them “while seeking 

relief that was to benefit Daniel [and] for which the trust should 

be obligated to pay.” The court also found Cohan’s “attorney fees 

25 Patty notes section 2641 authorizes the court to include 

in an order of conservator fees compensation for a conservator’s 

services “rendered before the date of the order appointing the 

. . . conservator.” (§ 2641, subd. (b).) As we discussed, such 

compensation must be charged against the conservatee’s estate, 

and the SNT is not part of Daniel’s estate.
43

were generated in response to the litigation tactics of Charlyne 

and her counsel,” including having to respond to Bunnett/

Charlyne’s opposition to releasing the funds for Daniel’s dental 

work, responding to Bunnett’s lengthy discovery requests, and 

apparently attending a six-hour deposition of Patty. The court, 

however, was “not persuaded” that all of the $36,925 in fees 

Cohan requested “went to benefit Daniel and/or the trust.” 

The court found $27,850 was a reasonable amount of attorney 

fees the trust should pay Cohan.

The mental health court appointed Cohan as Patty’s 

counsel under section 5370.1 of the Welfare and Institutions 

Code—part of the LPS Act—entitled “[a]ppointment of counsel 

for private conservator with insufficient funds.” That section 

provides the court “may appoint . . . a private attorney to 

represent a private conservator in all proceedings connected 

with the conservatorship, if it appears that the conservator has 

insufficient funds to obtain the services of a private attorney.” 

(Welf. & Inst. Code, § 5370.1, italics added.) We presume 

the court found Patty had insufficient funds to pay for counsel 

as it ordered the county was to pay attorney fees.

Cohan represented he was appointed to represent the 

conservator for all purposes—that would include representing

Patty in the probate proceeding. The probate matter 

undisputedly was connected with the conservatorship matter. 

The mental health court ordered that the reasonableness of 

the dental treatment for Daniel, including its cost, should be 

determined by the probate court where the section 17200 petition 

was pending. Patty’s efforts in the probate court to obtain the 

trust funds for Daniel’s dental work were in performance of 

her duties as his conservator. Accordingly, it seems the mental 
44

health court’s order applies to Patty’s attorney fees incurred in 

the probate court to secure the $30,000 disbursement for Daniel’s

dental treatment. In other words, as the mental health court 

ordered, the county should pay for that portion of Patty’s 

attorney fees.

In a supplemental filing, Cohan stated he had not filed his 

fee request with the mental health court for his representation 

of Patty in the probate court because the presiding judge there

told him those “services . . . related to counsel’s appointment 

in the non-LPS probate case . . . and therefore the fee request 

should not be presented to the mental health court.”26 As 

Cohan’s only court appointment comes from the mental health 

court’s order, the terms of that order would seem to apply in 

the probate court as well. We remand the matter for the probate 

court to determine whether the county, in accordance with the 

mental health court order, should pay for that portion of Patty’s 

attorney fees incurred in obtaining the funding for Daniel’s 

dental treatment in the probate court.

However, we do not agree that the fees Cohan generated 

representing Patty in her petition for reimbursement of her costs

and fees from the trust were for Daniel’s benefit. Accordingly, 

we do not see a basis for the court ordering the trust to pay 

those fees.

Just as the trust is silent as to the payment of conservator 

fees, it also is silent as to the payment of attorney fees for anyone 

other than the trustee. Again, the public guardian was Daniel’s 

conservator when Roberta executed the SNT and at her death. 

26 Cohan also said he had been paid for work he had done

representing Patty in the mental health court.
45

The public guardian would not have been entitled to attorney fees 

from the SNT. Patty argues Article 5.4(c) “specifically provides 

. . . ‘reasonable attorneys’ fees’ ‘shall be a proper charge to the 

trust estate’ in the event of litigation.” That section, however, 

refers only to the trustee’s attorney fees. The terms of the trust 

required the trustee to deny any request to release funds to pay 

for needs that public benefits would be authorized to provide, 

and to “take whatever administrative or judicial steps may be 

necessary to continue the eligibility of [Daniel] for all available 

public benefits.” The paragraph ends, “Any expenses of the 

trustee in this regard, including reasonable attorneys’ fees, 

shall be a proper charge to the estate.” (Italics added.) It is 

disingenuous for Patty to imply this provision of the trust 

authorizes the conservator’s attorney fees.

As there is no express provision authorizing payment of

Daniel’s conservator’s attorney fees, we cannot find Charlyne’s 

objection to payment of those attorney fees incurred to 

recover funds for Patty is an abuse of the trustee’s discretion. 

Accordingly, on remand, the court should determine what portion 

of Cohan’s attorney fees were incurred in prosecuting Patty’s 

petition to recover her conservator fees, expenses, and attorney 

fees from the trust and exclude them.

6. There was no irregularity in the proceedings 

resulting in a miscarriage of justice

Charlyne argues the irregularity in the proceedings 

caused a miscarriage of justice. Charlyne’s chief complaint, as 

it was in her motion for new trial, is that the trial court abused 

its discretion in not conducting the bench trial in open court. 

Charlyne and her counsel appeared in person on the first day of 

the evidentiary hearing on October 20, 2021, but Patty, Cohan, 
46

and the GAL appeared remotely through Court Connect. (Patty 

appeared by phone only.) Bunnett asked for a continuance, 

arguing his presentation of the evidence would be hampered as

he had been prepared to question the witnesses using exhibits 

in an exhibit book. The court denied the continuance, noting the 

court allows parties to appear in person or remotely, depending 

on their comfort level with what then was an ongoing pandemic. 

Although the minute order setting the October 20, 2021 hearing 

date does not mention remote appearances, the court’s order 

denying the new trial motion stated, “During the Court’s trial 

setting conference, the Court authorized the parties to either 

appear remotely or in person for the upcoming trial.”

Charlyne argues the court failed to give proper notice of 

the remote appearance under section 367.75 of the Code of Civil 

Procedure and rule 3.672 of the California Rules of Court. Even 

if we assume there was no notice, Charlyne has failed to show 

how she was prejudiced. The court began the hearing with

Patty’s petition. On a break, Bunnett was able to send his

exhibits to the parties and counsel through a DropBox link, and 

they were able to open the exhibits and answer his questions 

about them. There was no miscarriage of justice.

Charlyne contends a miscarriage of justice occurred based 

on several other grounds, including that the court prejudged

the evidence; attempted to coerce Bunnett to stipulate to Patty’s 

claimed costs; did not allow Bunnett to develop a defense to 

Patty’s and her counsel’s accusations that Charlyne did nothing 

for Daniel’s dental work; excluded exhibits Bunnett had prepared

to reorganize and categorize the receipts Patty submitted; and 

there were purported inaccuracies in the statement of decision. 
47

We find none of Charlyne’s contentions has merit, nor has she 

demonstrated how any of them led to an unfair trial.

There is no evidence the court engaged in any misconduct. 

The parties submitted written argument and evidence in advance 

of the bench trial. The court did not prejudge the evidence. The 

court gave the parties its tentative ruling on some of the fees and 

costs claimed—after reviewing the parties’ submissions—and

noted it was inclined to grant Patty’s request for reimbursement 

of about $33,200 but probably would “need some further 

testimony or elaboration” on the $56,500 she claimed in 

transportation costs. The court did not state it was inclined to 

exclude those expenses or ask Bunnett to stipulate to the $56,500

as Charlyne asserts. As to the $33,200 in costs, the court merely

asked Bunnett if he wanted to submit on that figure. After 

Bunnett argued about certain items, the court noted it would be 

a “long slog” to go line-by-line, and the court would take that into 

account “in terms of any fees I make for anybody.” We read the 

court’s comments as trying to streamline the presentation of 

evidence and letting counsel know the court would not be inclined 

to find counsel’s time reasonably spent for purposes of recovering 

fees if they were to go through each expenditure, line by line

over several pages. In any event, neither Bunnett nor Cohan

was awarded all the fees they requested.

As for the evidence, the court acted within its discretion 

to exclude Bunnett’s duplicative exhibits of Patty’s costs. (See 

Evid. Code, § 352.) And, based on our review of the record, 

Charlyne was able sufficiently to develop her case. Moreover, 

some of the evidence, or lack thereof, about which she complains

is more relevant to the court’s orders awarding her trustee fees 
48

and attorney fees, which she does not challenge on this appeal. 

We find no prejudicial error.

7. The court’s sanction award

In denying Charlyne’s motion for new trial, the court

awarded sanctions of $1,750 against Charlyne and her attorney, 

jointly and severally, to be paid out of her share of the trust 

directly to Cohan (for having to prepare his opposition). The 

court’s September 2, 2022 minute order does not state the basis 

for the sanctions.

In his joint opposition to Charlyne’s motions, Cohan invited

the court to issue an order to show cause as to why Bunnett had 

not violated Code of Civil Procedure section 128.7 in filing his

motions. Under section 128.7, subd. (c)(2), the court may, on its 

own motion, issue an order to show cause as to why an attorney 

should not be sanctioned for presenting a pleading or motion 

for an improper purpose, or without basis in law or fact. There is 

no such order to show cause in the appellate record. Accordingly, 

we presume the court did not issue sanctions under that statute.

Appellant’s opening brief argues “[t]he fact the motion 

lacks merit is not enough by itself to justify an award of Code 

of Civil Procedure § 128.5 sanctions.” (Respondent’s brief 

provides no legal citation regarding sanctions.) Under Code of 

Civil Procedure section 128.5, a trial court may order a party and 

the party’s attorney to pay “the reasonable expenses, including 

attorney’s fees, incurred by another party as a result of actions 

or tactics, made in bad faith, that are frivolous or solely intended 

to cause unnecessary delay.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 128.5, subd. (a).) 

“ ‘Frivolous’ means totally and completely without merit or for 

the sole purpose of harassing an opposing party.’ ” (Id., subd. 

(b)(2).)
49

At the hearing on Charlyne’s motion, the court found the 

remote appearance issue discussed above was not “a meritorious 

basis” for bringing a motion for new trial under section 657 of 

the Code of Civil Procedure for a trial irregularity. Based on our 

discussion above, and the court’s comments at the motion hearing 

and in its minute order, we conclude the court found the new trial 

motion frivolous. We agree. Nevertheless, to award sanctions 

under section 128.5, the court had to find the motion was 

frivolous and in bad faith. (See, e.g., Shelton v. Rancho Mortgage 

& Investment Corp. (2002) 94 Cal.App.4th 1337, 1346.) The court 

did not make such a finding. We thus reverse the sanctions 

order.

DISPOSITION

The court’s September 2, 2022 order awarding $1,750 

in sanctions against appellant and her counsel is reversed. 

The court’s June 24, 2022 “order re petition for allowance of 

conservator fees, reimbursement of costs advanced and incurred 

and conservator’s attorney’s fees and costs” is affirmed in part 

and reversed in part. The matter is remanded for the court 

to conduct further proceedings consistent with this opinion, 

as follows. 

The court shall recalculate the amounts ordered to be 

reimbursed to Patty Wiedner from the SNT (1) to reduce the 

$32,198.36 reimbursement by (a) any cash deposits Patty made 

to Daniel’s facilities for his PNI to the extent those amounts were 

covered by Daniel’s monthly SSI payments that Patty received 

but did not pay to Daniel’s facilities; (b) “auto allowance” 

(mileage) costs claimed for dates before April 10, 2019; (c) “auto 

allowance” (mileage) costs for dates on or after April 10, 2019, 

on which Patty also asked to be reimbursed for transportation 
50

costs; (d) any out-of-pocket costs incurred before April 10, 2019 

to pay for the meals or food, entertainment expenses, items, 

services, etc. of anyone other than Daniel Black; and (e) attorney 

fees (and any related costs) paid to Raxter Law in 2016 and 2017 

and to Conover & Grebe in 2017; and (2) to reduce the $56,500 

transportation costs reimbursement by the amount claimed 

for dates before April 10, 2019. The $8,000 conservator fee 

reimbursement is affirmed.

With respect to the $28,947.26 in attorney fees and 

costs ordered to be reimbursed from the SNT to Patty’s courtappointed attorney John Cohan: (1) the court shall determine 

whether Los Angeles County should pay—under the terms 

of the mental health court’s December 6, 2019 order—Patty’s 

attorney fees incurred to obtain funding from the SNT for 

Daniel’s dental work, and if so, order the County, rather than 

the SNT, to reimburse Cohan for those fees; and (2) if the court 

determines the County is not responsible to reimburse Cohan, 

the court shall reduce the $28,947.26 reimbursement from 

the SNT by the amount of attorney fees incurred to prosecute

Patty’s petition to recover her conservator fees, expenses, 

and attorney fees from the SNT.
51

The court also shall amend paragraph (2)(a) on page two 

of its July 1, 2022 order to direct the Trustee to pay the amounts 

as recalculated on remand.

The parties are to bear their own costs on appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

EGERTON, J.

We concur:

LAVIN, Acting P. J.

ADAMS, J.