COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Chief Judge Moon, Judge Annunziata 

 and Senior Judge Hodges 

Argued at Richmond, Virginia 

CESAR HERNANDEZ BLAKE, JR. 

v. Record No. 1172-94-2 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

 JUDGE WILLIAM H. HODGES 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA AUGUST 1, 1995 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF LOUISA COUNTY 

F. Ward Harkrader, Jr., Judge 

 Darwyn H. Lesh for appellant. 

 Thomas C. Daniel, Assistant Attorney General (James S. 

Gilmore, III, Attorney General, on brief), for 

appellee. 

 Upon his plea of guilty, appellant, Cesar Hernandez Blake, 

was convicted of conspiracy to distribute more than five pounds 

of marijuana. On appeal, he contends that the evidence presented 

by the Commonwealth was insufficient to constitute an offense 

under existing Virginia law. We affirm the conviction. 

 On November 8, 1993, appellant pled guilty to the charge of 

conspiracy to distribute more than five pounds of marijuana. The 

trial judge extensively and thoroughly questioned appellant to 

ensure that his plea was being entered freely and knowingly. The 

trial judge accepted appellant's guilty plea and the Commonwealth 

presented evidence concerning the conspiracy charge. Appellant 

agreed, "that would be the Commonwealth's evidence if it were 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
 2 

presented." 

 Appellant now argues that the Commonwealth's evidence "not 

only does not support the plea of guilty, but has the opposite 

effect by indicating that in fact no conspiracy . . . as charged 

in the indictment, ever existed." 

 The Supreme Court of Virginia has held that the Commonwealth 

is not required to present evidence to support a guilty plea. 

 [T]he introduction of evidence to sustain a 

conviction upon a guilty plea is 

. . . unnecessary in any criminal case. In 

Crutchfield v. Commonwealth, 187 Va. 291, 

296, 46 S.E.2d 340, 342 (1948), we said that 

a "plea of guilty, accepted and entered by 

the court, is a conviction or the equivalent 

of a conviction of the offense to which it is 

directed." And in Peyton v. King, 210 Va. 

194, 196, 169 S.E.2d 569, 571 (1969), we held 

that "a voluntary and intelligent plea of 

guilty by an accused is, in reality, a 

self-supplied conviction authorizing 

imposition of the punishment fixed by law. 

It is a waiver of all defenses other than 

those jurisdictional." 

 If, as Crutchfield and King teach us, a 

plea of guilty is a self-supplied conviction 

of the offense to which it is directed, the 

law would engage in superfluities to impose a 

requirement that evidence is necessary to 

sustain that which sustains itself. And if, 

as King holds, a plea of guilty is a waiver 

of all defenses save those jurisdictional, 

included in the waiver is the potential 

defense of lack of evidence or of 

insufficiency of evidence. 

 In accepting a plea of guilty, any 

Virginia trial judge is, of course, free to 

hear the evidence he deems necessary to an 

understanding of the case and to the fixing 

of an appropriate sentence. This does not 

mean, however, that evidence must be heard 

upon a plea of guilty. 
 3 

Kibert v. Commonwealth, 216 Va. 660, 664, 222 S.E.2d 790, 792 

(1976). Accordingly, the appellant's plea of guilty was 

sufficient to sustain the trial court's finding of guilt. The 

Commonwealth was not required to present evidence to support 

appellant's guilty plea. 

 Appellant's second and third issues are rendered moot by 

virtue of this Court's ruling on the first issue. 

 For the reasons stated, the judgment of the trial court is 

affirmed. 

 Affirmed.