Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 10A01-1612-PL-2770 | September 5, 2017 Page 1 of 17

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Paul L. Jefferson

McNeely Stephenson

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE

CLAY DANIEL WALTON &

ADAMS, PLC

Theodore W. Walton

Clay, Daniel, Walton & Adams 

PLC

Louisville, Kentucky

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Baylor Intermodal, Inc.,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

Chris Hood, Clay Daniel Walton 

& Adams PLC, and Fast Trak 

Investment Company, Inc.,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

September 5, 2017

Court of Appeals Case No.

10A01-1612-PL-2770

Appeal from the Clark Circuit 

Court

The Honorable Bradley B. Jacobs, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

10C02-1606-PL-73

Mathias, Judge.

[1] Baylor Intermodal, Inc. (“Baylor”) appeals the Clark Circuit Court’s order 

dismissing this case for lack of personal jurisdiction over all named defendants. 
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[2] On appeal, Baylor challenges the trial court’s conclusion that the defendants’ 

contacts with Indiana were insufficient to establish the “minimum contacts” 

necessary for the court to exercise personal jurisdiction. Concluding that the 

trial court’s ruling is consistent with the requirements of personal jurisdiction as 

defined in Indiana Trial Rule 4.4(A) and the Constitutions of this state and the 

United States, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] Attorney Ted Walton (“Walton”) represented Hood in a federal wrongful 

termination action after Hood’s employer, Baylor, terminated him for refusing

to haul an overweight load. Hood’s termination occurred on May 12, 2011, in 

Joliet, Illinois. Baylor is an Indiana corporation with its principal office in 

Indiana. Its drivers haul freight through multiple states. 

[4] Hood was a resident of the Commonwealth of Kentucky and was referred to 

Walton’s firm, Clay, Daniel, Walton & Adams, PLC (“CDWA”), by the 

Louisville Bar Association. CDWA has its sole business office in Kentucky, and 

all of its fourteen attorneys are licensed in Kentucky. Walton and two other 

CDWA attorneys maintain Indiana bar licenses. Baylor retained an Indiana 

law firm after Walton filed a complaint on Hood’s behalf with the Occupational 

Safety and Health Administration (“OSHA”) in Chicago on August 8, 2011.

[5] On May 22, 2013, a federal Administrative Law Judge in Louisville, Kentucky, 

found that Baylor had inappropriately terminated Hood. Baylor sought review 
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of the ALJ’s findings by an Administrative Review Board in Washington, D.C. 

The Board upheld the ALJ’s determination on December 4, 2015.

[6] On January 29, 2016, Baylor filed a Petition for Review of the Board’s decision 

with the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Chicago. 

While the Seventh Circuit appeal was pending, Hood met with Baylor’s 

president, Mark Fessel (“Fessel”), on or about March 17, 2016, in 

Elizabethtown, Kentucky. At this point in the proceedings, mediation of the 

controversy had stalled, and Baylor was facing bankruptcy. Hood was also 

unemployed and in financial distress. Without attorneys for either side present, 

they entered into an agreement purporting to settle the entirety of the 

disagreements between them. Two more meetings between Fessel and Hood 

were held at Baylor’s offices in Indiana in March and April 2016. The writings 

produced in these meetings stated Baylor would not be a party to any attorney 

fee or lien disputes and that Hood would be responsible for the lien payments.

[7] On March 18, 2016, Walton learned that his client’s agreement with Baylor 

called for Baylor to make settlement payments directly to Hood, in 

contravention of the contingency fee contract Hood had with Walton. Walton 

notified Baylor that disbursement of payments to Hood would render Baylor 

liable for repayment of liens on the proceeds Hood received, which included 

Walton’s lien for attorney fees. Hood had also executed two additional liens, 
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one with the New Jersey loan-issuing corporation Fast Trak on June 29, 2015. 

Appellant’s App. Vol. 2, pp. 34–42.1

[8] On June 24, 2016, Baylor filed the declaratory action in Clark Circuit Court 

and named Hood, CDWA, and Fast Trak as defendants. Baylor sought the trial 

court’s determination of the parties’ rights under the settlement agreement 

between Baylor and Hood. The complaint specifically asked the court to 

determine that Baylor was authorized to pay Hood according to the terms of 

their settlement agreement and that Baylor was not obligated for repayment of 

liens to CDWA or Fast Trak. 

[9] On July 13, 2016, CDWA filed a motion to dismiss and a brief in support in 

which Walton argued the court should dismiss Baylor’s action pursuant to 

Indiana Trial Rule 12(B)(1)(2)(7), Indiana Trial Rule 4.4(A) and (D), Indiana 

Trial Rule 19, and, in the alternative, principles of comity and forum non 

conveniens. CDWA also cited the complaint it filed in Jefferson Circuit Court in 

Kentucky two days earlier, on July 11, 2016, which named all interested 

parties, including both known lienholders. CDWA argued the Clark Circuit 

Court should defer to the Kentucky proceedings and explained:

Indiana courts apply the “most intimate contacts” test to resolve 

any choice of law issues. Citing Standard Fusee Corp., 940 N.E.2d 

810, 815 (Ind. 2010) (citing W.H. Barber Co. v. Hughes, 223 Ind. 

 

1 While Fast Trak is named in Baylor’s complaint, it did not respond or appear. The final lien was between 

Hood and a family member, William Miller (“Miller”) of Kentucky. Miller is not named in Baylor’s 

complaint, and Baylor cites a release signed by Miller on March 31, 2016. Appellant’s App. Vol. 2, p. 160.
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570, 63 N.E.2d 417, 423 (Ind. 1945)).... The engagement 

agreement between CDWA and Hood was a contract between 

Kentucky residents, negotiated in Kentucky, signed in Kentucky, 

and performed in Kentucky. The purported settlement agreement 

between Baylor and Hood was negotiated and signed at a 

Cracker Barrel in Elizabethtown, Kentucky. It is clear Kentucky 

law applies.

Appellant’s App. Vol. 2, pp. 53–54. 

[10] On September 16, 2016, Baylor responded to CDWA’s motion to dismiss with 

a motion for default or summary judgment. Baylor argued that the court should 

deny CDWA’s motion to dismiss because personal jurisdiction over CDWA 

was established by Walton’s minimum contacts with the state. Appellant’s App. 

Vol. 3, p. 3. Those contacts included Walton’s correspondence with Baylor’s 

counsel, his membership with the Indiana bar, and “purposeful acts” Walton 

directed toward an Indiana entity. Appellant’s App. Vol. 3, pp. 5–6. Baylor 

argued the present controversy arose from its settlement agreement with Hood, 

and not from the initial OSHA complaint and proceedings. Baylor believed its 

settlement agreement with Hood resolved the federal controversy and was

therefore the proper basis for jurisdictional analysis. That settlement agreement 

“is between Hood, a Kentucky resident, and Baylor, an Indiana corporation. 

[The] agreement was primarily negotiated in Indiana.” Baylor came to the 

opposite conclusion regarding CDWA’s forum non conveniens argument and the 

application of Indiana’s “most intimate contacts” test:

The settlement agreement [with Hood] was performed by Baylor 

in Indiana. The subject matter of the settlement agreement is for 
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the payment by an Indiana corporation of funds to a Kentucky 

resident, making the Indiana party at a higher risk for 

enforcement actions.... [A]lthough the parties are split between 

Kentucky and Indiana, the rest of the factors weigh in favor of 

adjudicating this matter in Indiana. 

Appellant’s App. Vol. 3, p. 10. 

[11] On October 5, 2016, the trial court heard argument by Walton and counsel for 

Baylor. Hood appeared without counsel, and Fast Trak failed to appear or 

otherwise respond. On November 7, 2016, the trial court ruled in favor of 

CDWA, dismissing the matter in its entirety for lack of personal jurisdiction 

over all named defendants and denying Baylor’s motions for default or 

summary judgment. The trial court issued the following conclusions of law as 

to personal jurisdiction: (1) CDWA’s occasional legal presence in Indiana and 

the fact that several of the firm’s attorneys are licensed in Indiana do not 

constitute “continuous and systematic” contacts with the forum state; and (2) 

specific jurisdiction may not be conferred because Walton did not engage in 

“significant ‘suit-related’ conduct” putting him on notice that CDWA could be 

haled into Indiana courts, as due process requires. The trial court concluded 

that adjudicating the rights of co-defendants Hood and Fast Trak without a 

finding of personal jurisdiction over all parties would unfairly prejudice any 

rights of CDWA, and moreover would be void for lack of personal jurisdiction 

over CDWA.
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[12] Baylor now appeals the trial court’s judgment.2

Standard of Review

[13] The central issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in determining it 

lacked personal jurisdiction over CDWA. Personal jurisdiction is a question of 

law we review de novo. LinkAmerica Corp. v. Cox, 857 N.E.2d 961, 965 (Ind. 

2006). Indiana state trial courts are courts of general jurisdiction; therefore, 

jurisdiction is presumed. Everdry Mktg. and Mgmt., Inc. v. Carter, 885 N.E.2d 6, 

10 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). Unless the court’s lack of jurisdiction is apparent on 

the face of the complaint, the party contesting jurisdiction bears the burden of 

proving the lack of personal jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence. 

Wolf’s Marine, Inc. v. Brar, 3 N.E.3d 12, 15 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). The trial court’s 

legal conclusion as to whether personal jurisdiction exists is not entitled to 

deference on appellate review; however, to the extent personal jurisdiction turns 

on facts, the trial court’s findings of facts are reviewed only for clear error. 

LinkAmerica, 857 N.E.2d at 965. Here, the trial court made extensive findings of 

facts regarding the nature of the CDWA’s contacts with the state of Indiana. 

Reversal by this court will result only if the facts in the record do not directly or 

indirectly support the trial court’s findings. Fischer v. Heymann, 12 N.E. 3d 867, 

870 (Ind. 2014).

 

2 Only CDWA filed a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. Hood received Baylor’s complaint 

and appeared before the trial court without counsel. Fast Trak did not respond or appear. 
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Discussion and Decision

[14] Personal jurisdiction relates to the authority of an Indiana court to include a 

person in its adjudicative process and to subsequently issue a valid judgment 

over that person. Boyer v. Smith, 42 N.E.3d 505, 509 (Ind. 2015). A 

jurisdictional challenge by an out-of-state defendant requires a court to address 

the foundational question of its power to act. Perry v. Stitzer Buick GMC, Inc., 637 

N.E.2d 1282, 1286 (Ind. 1994). Indiana Trial Rule 4.4 is the equivalent of the 

state’s long-arm statute and lists activities that often support personal 

jurisdiction. However, Indiana courts may also “exercise jurisdiction on any 

basis not inconsistent with the Constitutions of this state or the United States.” 

T.R. 4.4(A). The Indiana Supreme Court has interpreted the “any basis” 

provision of the rule to mean that analysis of personal jurisdiction in this state 

mirrors federal “minimum contacts” analysis. Boyer, 42 N.E.3d at 509 (citing 

LinkAmerica, 857 N.E.2d at 967). Before an Indiana court may properly assert 

personal jurisdiction over a defendant, the Due Process Clause of the 

Fourteenth Amendment requires the defendant have “certain minimum contact

with the state such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional 

notions of fair play and substantial justice.” LinkAmerica, 857 N.E.2d at 967 

(citing International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 362 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)). Minimum 

contacts include acts defendants themselves initiate within or without the forum 

state that create a substantial connection with the forum state itself. Boyer, 42 

N.E.3d at 509 (Ind. 2015); see Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 

(1985). Due process requires that potential out-of-state defendants are able to 
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predict what conduct constitutes “minimum contacts” and will lead to their 

inclusion in the jurisdiction of Indiana courts. Boyer, 42 N.E.3d at 509 (citing 

Burger King, 471 U.S. at 472).

[15] Personal jurisdiction can be general or specific. Simek v. Nolan, 64 N.E.3d 1237, 

1242 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). “If the defendant’s contacts with the state are so 

‘continuous and systematic’ that the defendant should reasonably anticipate 

being haled into the courts of that state for any matter, then the defendant is 

subject to general jurisdiction, even in causes of action unrelated to the 

defendant’s contacts with the forum state.” LinkAmerica, 857 N.E.2d at 967 

(quoting Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 415 n. 9 

(1984)). If the defendant’s contacts with the state are not “continuous and 

systematic,” the defendant may be subject to specific jurisdiction “if the 

controversy is related to or arises out of the defendant’s contacts with the forum 

state.” Id. (citing Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414 & n. 8).

[16] In this case, the parties disagree on the existence of both general and specific 

personal jurisdiction.

A. General Personal Jurisdiction

[17] General personal jurisdiction refers to the ability to be sued for any claim in a 

state. Anthem Ins. Companies, Inc. v. Tenet Healthcare Corp., 730 N.E.2d 1227,

1234 (Ind. 2000). The contacts required for general personal jurisdiction are 

greater than those needed to establish specific personal jurisdiction. Helicopteros,

466 U.S. at 414–15. The defendant’s contacts in the forum state must be 
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substantial, continuous, extensive and systematic. Anthem Ins., 730 N.E.2d at

1235. If such contacts between an out-of-state defendant and the forum state 

exist, the defendant is “constructively present” in the state and no fundamental 

unfairness results from requiring the defendant to appear in a forum state court. 

Purdue Research Foundation v. Sanofi-Synthelabo, S.A., 338 F.3d 773, 787 (7th Cir. 

2003).

[18] Baylor argues Indiana’s general jurisdiction over CDWA is established by 

CDWA’s business operations in Indiana. Appellant’s Br. at 10. Indiana Trial 

Rule 4.4(A)(1) states “[a]ny person or organization that is a nonresident of this 

state...submits to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state as to any action 

arising from the following acts committed by him or her or his or her agent: 

doing any business in this state.”

[19] Walton’s affidavit in support of CDWA’s motion to dismiss estimated 98% of 

the firm’s legal matters arise in Kentucky. Appellant’s App. Vol. 2, p. 209. 

CDWA does not advertise nor maintain an office in Indiana. Id. It is a 

Kentucky Limited Liability Company and maintains one office in Louisville, 

Kentucky. Id. Baylor asks us to find from these facts that — however minimal

— CDWA “does business” in the state sufficient for the firm to be sued for any 

matter in Indiana courts. T.R.4.4(A)(1). 

[20] Such a mechanical approach to the minimum contacts test we have applied 

since International Shoe defeats the purpose of what the due process clause seeks 

to ensure — the “fair and orderly administration of law,” and the ability of out-
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of-state defendants to “reasonably anticipate being haled into the courts of [a] 

state for any matter.” Davis v. Simon, 963 N.E.2d 46, 51 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012)

(citing Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 415 n. 9, 104 S. Ct. 1868). CDWA’s minimal 

business presence in Indiana is insufficient to meet the “continuous and 

systematic” contacts standard required for general jurisdiction to be proper.

[21] Baylor frames the fact that three CDWA attorneys maintain Indiana bar 

licenses as a separate issue for jurisdictional consideration. The Indiana 

Supreme Court addressed a similar question of general jurisdiction over a 

Kentucky attorney in Boyer. In that case, an attorney was sued as an individual 

in an Indiana court for — among other charges — prior malicious prosecution 

of Indiana plaintiffs in a Kentucky state court. Boyer, 42 N.E. 3d at 507. 

Whether the attorney was licensed to practice in Indiana was a critical question 

in that case because it contributed to the determination of whether the business 

she conducted in Indiana made her “constructively present” in the state. Id. at 

508. The attorney did not have an Indiana bar license nor sufficient minimum 

contacts with Indiana, although her business dealings and representation of a 

nonresident client in a federal matter had taken her to Indiana. Id. The court 

concluded her presence doing business in the state was insufficient to convey 

general jurisdiction over her. Id.

[22] In the present controversy, a nonresident law firm is the named defendant 

contesting Indiana’s jurisdiction, as opposed to an individual attorney. 

Walton’s Indiana bar licensure and his ability to conduct business in Indiana 

are factors that distinguish him from the attorney in Boyer. This distinction 
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informs our analysis of whether CDWA’s business contacts with Indiana make 

the firm “constructively present” in the state. But Walton’s Indiana bar 

licensure is not controlling under Indiana Trial Rule 4.4(A)(1). Despite three 

CDWA attorneys being able to practice law in Indiana, CDWA’s business with 

Indiana is neither extensive nor substantial, and therefore, the firm does not 

have sufficient minimum contacts with Indiana that establish general 

jurisdiction here.

[23] Furthermore, the Indiana Supreme Court noted in Boyer that since International 

Shoe, general jurisdiction has played a reduced role, compared to specific 

personal jurisdiction, in modern jurisdictional analysis. Boyer, 42 N.E.3d at 508. 

(quoting Daimler AG v. Bauman – U.S. –, 134 S.Ct. 746, 755 (2014)). Because

Baylor also disputes the determination that Indiana cannot establish specific 

jurisdiction over CDWA, we now turn to an analysis of whether CDWA 

engaged in suit-related contacts with the state of Indiana, giving rise to the 

present controversy.

B. Specific Personal Jurisdiction

[24] A state may exercise specific jurisdiction when a defendant has purposefully 

availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state and 

the controversy relates to or arises out of those activities. LinkAmerica, 857 

N.E.2d at 967 (citing Burger King, 471 U.S. at 474–75). In other words, specific 

jurisdiction depends on a defendant taking some action or causing some injury 

within the state to establish a minimum contact or substantial connection there. 

Walden v. Fiore, 134 S.Ct. 1115, 1122 (2014). Analysis of minimum contacts 
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“focuses on the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the 

litigation.” Id. at 1121. In particular, analysis focuses on a defendant’s contacts 

within the state — and not simply with people who reside there. Id. When 

evaluating an out-of-state defendant’s contacts with the forum state, a court 

should consider the following:

(1) whether the plaintiff’s claim arises from the defendant’s forum 

contacts; (2) the overall contacts of the defendant or its agent 

with the forum state; (3) the foreseeability of being haled into 

court in that state; (4) who initiated the contacts; and (5) whether 

the defendant expected or encouraged contacts with the state.

Wolf’s Marine, Inc. v. Brar, 3 N.E.3d 12, 15 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). A single 

contact with the forum state may be sufficient to establish specific jurisdiction if 

it creates a “substantial connection” with the forum state and the controversy is 

related to that connection. Simek, 64 N.E.3d at 1242–43 (citing McGee v. Int’l. 

Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957)). “Random, fortuitous, or attenuated 

contacts or ... the unilateral activity of another party or of a third person” are 

not sufficient to establish specific jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant. Id. 

at 1243 (quoting Burger King, 471 U.S. at 476–77 (internal citation omitted)).

[25] Incorporating federal clarifications into Indiana law, personal jurisdiction over 

CDWA requires that the firm have minimum contacts and substantial 

connections within the state that create or contribute to the controversy at hand. 

Those contacts and connections must arise from CDWA’s own conduct within 

or directed into Indiana. We therefore consider whether CDWA’s suit-related 
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conduct established minimum contacts within Indiana and gave rise to Baylor’s 

claim.

[26] Jurisdictional analysis at the trial court level properly focused on CDWA’s 

contacts with Indiana during the underlying federal wrongful termination case. 

CDWA’s relationship with Baylor’s Indiana counsel began when Hood was 

referred to Walton by the Louisville Bar Association. On Hood’s behalf, 

Walton filed a wrongful termination complaint with the Occupational Safety 

and Health Administration in Chicago. Appellant’s App. Vol. 2, pp. 74–88. 

During the proceedings that followed, Walton corresponded by phone and 

email with Baylor’s Indiana counsel. In Boyer, the Indiana Supreme Court’s 

considered the jurisdictional effect of an out-of-state attorney’s correspondence 

with Indiana parties during underlying federal litigation:

Attorney Cassidy [the Kentucky attorney]’s contacts with 

Indiana are merely products of her relationship to plaintiffs... 

and are not products of her own intentional conduct. ...She 

corresponded with an Indiana attorney and served documents to 

an Indiana law office only because the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure required her to do so in order to adequately represent 

[her client] in the Kentucky lawsuit. ... Indeed, if we took away 

Cassidy’s relationship with [the opposing party and her client], 

she would have absolutely no relevant contacts within Indiana. 

Her “suit-related conduct” of representing [her client] in federal 

court in Kentucky created no contact or connection within 

Indiana other than the fact that a plaintiff resided here. Her 

connection to Indiana resulted from the actions of others – and as 

Walden emphasizes, plaintiffs’ or third parties’ actions cannot 

serve as the only link between a defendant and a forum state. 

Walden, 134 S.Ct. at 1121.
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Boyer, 42 N.E.3d at 511–12. Likewise, Walton’s suit-related contacts with 

Indiana were products of his relationship with Hood and counsel for Hood’s 

former employer, Baylor. The trial court was correct in determining that those 

contacts were part of Walton’s “zealous prosecution” of his Kentucky client’s 

federal matter and, alone, do not indicate CDWA intentionally availed itself of 

Indiana’s jurisdiction. 

[27] We also consider Walton’s contacts with Indiana when the wrongful 

termination case was on appeal before the United States Court of Appeals for 

the Seventh Circuit in Chicago. On March 18, 2016, counsel for Baylor notified 

Walton and the Seventh Circuit mediator that Baylor’s president, Mark Fessel, 

and Hood had met and “resolved this dispute to their satisfaction.”3 Appellant’s 

App. Vol. 2, p. 133. A settlement agreement and two clarifying addendums 

were signed by Fessel and Hood on March 17 in Elizabethtown, Kentucky, and 

on March 18 and April 4 at Baylor’s Indiana office, respectively. Id. at 31–33. 

Walton advised Baylor’s counsel on March 21 of his attorney lien on any 

payments Baylor had made or planned to make to Hood. Id. at 144. When 

Baylor’s counsel notified Walton of its client’s intention to pay Hood directly, 

Walton asserted his right to the attorney lien in an email dated March 23, 2016. 

Id. at 142.

 

3 The status of the Seventh Circuit federal appeal is unknown. The record indicates Baylor’s counsel notified 

the Seventh Circuit mediator of Baylor’s intention to move to dismiss the appeal, but whether that motion 

was filed is a fact not included in the record.
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[28] There is disagreement between the parties about the jurisdictional effect of 

Walton’s contacts with Baylor’s counsel after March 18, 2016, when Baylor 

believed the federal matter was settled. Appellant’s Br. at 14. Baylor argues that 

Walton’s Indiana bar license distinguishes him from the Kentucky attorney in 

Boyer and should lead the court to conclude Walton has overall contacts with 

Indiana sufficient to exercise specific jurisdiction over his firm. Id. It does not. 

[29] The fact that Walton and two other CDWA attorneys maintain Indiana bar 

licenses is unrelated to Walton’s representation of his Kentucky client in a 

federal wrongful termination matter. Being haled into an Indiana court for a 

controversy arising from the federal matter solely based on Walton’s Indiana 

bar license would not have been foreseeable to CDWA. Baylor argues what 

gave rise to the present controversy was Walton’s choice to “engage with a 

business and attorneys in Indiana after the underlying representation [of Hood] 

concluded.” Id. However, Walton’s post-settlement contacts with the forum 

state were initiated by the unilateral activity of other parties, in this case, 

Fessel’s and Hood’s decision to negotiate a settlement agreement without 

counsel. Specific jurisdiction cannot be established over an out-of-state 

defendant based on contacts prompted by the unilateral activity of third parties. 

Burger King, 471 U.S. at 476–77.

[30] We agree with CDWA that the present controversy fundamentally arises from 

an attorney contract and lien between a Kentucky resident and a Kentucky law 

firm. The fact that Walton corresponded with Baylor’s counsel and asserted his 

right to the attorney lien on Hood’s settlement proceeds was due to unilateral 
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activity by third parties. CDWA’s claim that the settlement agreement between 

Baylor and Hood was an attempt to avoid repayment of Walton’s attorney lien 

is more appropriately addressed by a Kentucky court. 

Conclusion

[31] For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the court’s order granting CDWA’s 

motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. 

[32] Affirmed.

Kirsch, J., and Altice, J., concur.