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S. HRG. 114–77 

U.S. POLICY IN UKRAINE: 

COUNTERING RUSSIA 

AND DRIVING REFORM 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

MARCH 10, 2015 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/ 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

BOB CORKER, TENNESSEE, Chairman

JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho 

MARCO RUBIO, Florida 

RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

CORY GARDNER, Colorado 

DAVID PERDUE, Georgia 

JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia 

RAND PAUL, Kentucky 

JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming 

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey 

BARBARA BOXER, California 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire 

CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware 

TOM UDALL, New Mexico 

CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut 

TIM KAINE, Virginia 

EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts 

LESTER E. MUNSON III, Staff Director

JODI B. HERMAN, Democratic Staff Director

(II)

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Corker, Hon. Bob, U.S. Senator from Tennessee, opening statement ................. 1 

Hon. John Herbst, former United States Ambassador to Ukraine; director, 

Dinu Patriciu Eurasia Center, the Atlantic Council, Washington, DC ........... 51 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 54 

Response of John Herbst to question submitted by Senator Bob Corker .... 67 

Hon. John C. Kornblum, former Assistant Secretary of State for European 

Affairs, and former United States Ambassador to Germany, Berlin, Germany ...................................................................................................................... 47 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 50 

Responses of John C. Kornblum to questions submitted by Senator Bob 

Corker ............................................................................................................ 67 

Mckeon, Hon. Brian P., Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for 

Policy, U.S. Department of Defense, Washington, DC ...................................... 11 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 13 

Responses of Brian P. McKeon to questions submitted by Senator Bob 

Corker ............................................................................................................ 66 

Responses of Brian P. McKeon to questions submitted by Senator James 

E. Risch .......................................................................................................... 69 

Menendez, Hon. Robert, U.S. Senator from New Jersey ...................................... 3 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 5 

Nuland, Hon. Victoria, Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs, U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC .............................. 6 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 9 

Responses of Victoria Nuland to questions submitted by Senator Bob 

Corker ............................................................................................................ 65 

Response of Victoria Nuland to question submitted by Senator James 

E. Risch .......................................................................................................... 68 

Toloui, Hon. Ramin, Assistant Secretary for International Finance, Department of the Treasury, Washington, DC ............................................................. 15 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 17 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

Prepared statement of Olexander Motsyk, Ambassador of Ukraine ................... 63 

(III)

(1) 

U.S. POLICY IN UKRAINE: COUNTERING 

RUSSIA AND DRIVING REFORM 

TUESDAY, MARCH 10, 2015 

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:03 a.m., in room 

SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Bob Corker (chairman of the committee) presiding. 

Present: Senators Corker, Risch, Rubio, Johnson, Flake, Gardner, 

Perdue, Isakson, Paul, Barrasso, Menendez, Cardin, Shaheen, Murphy, and Kaine. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BOB CORKER, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM TENNESSEE 

The CHAIRMAN. This meeting of the Senate Foreign Relations 

Committee will come to order. 

I want to begin this hearing by expressing my condolences to the 

family of Boris Nemtsov and the people of Russia. The murder of 

Russian opposition leader, Boris Nemtsov, just outside the Kremlin 

appears to be an attempt to silence those in Russia who want to 

see their country move away from the authoritarianism, corruption, 

and lawlessness of today’s Russia. Boris Nemtsov sought a better 

future for his people, and we must remain committed to his vision 

for a democratic Russia at peace with itself and its neighbors. He 

was especially critical of Putin’s aggression in Ukraine where, for 

over a year now, Russia has continued its occupation of Crimea and 

the destabilization of the country’s eastern regions. 

Our country made a commitment in 1994 to defend Ukraine’s 

sovereignty and its territorial integrity, which has been under a 

near constant assault by Russia for more than a year. More recently, we lured Ukraine West by supporting their desire for closer 

association with Europe. 

Now with Ukraine’s future in the balance, the refusal of the administration to step up with more robust support for Ukraine and 

further pressure on Russia is a blight on U.S. policy and 70 years 

of defending a Europe that is whole, democratic, and free. 

The conflict in eastern Ukraine, started by Russian-backed mercenaries, now directly involves thousands of Russian military personnel and has resulted in over 6,000 deaths and generated 1.5 

million refugees and internally displaced persons. 

For roughly 2 weeks after the second Minsk cease-fire agreement 

was signed on February 12, the Russian-backed rebels continued 

their offensive activities, ultimately acquiring the strategic railway 

2 

hub, Debaltseve. The determination of the rebels to secure 

Debaltseve, despite the fact that the Minsk cease-fire agreement 

required them to withdraw to a demarcation line established last 

September, shows that Putin has no intention of honoring the 

cease-fire. 

While the violence has subsided since the rebels achieved their 

short-term objective and acquired Debaltseve, the Minsk cease-fire 

is far from being a success. 

In addition to the ambiguous constitutional electoral conditions 

required of Ukraine to regain control of its borders, the second 

Minsk agreement is burdened by the failure of the first Minsk 

agreement as it stands. In fact, administration officials have repeatedly referred to the recent Minsk accord as an implementation 

agreement of the first Minsk accord. 

But jumping from cease-fire to cease-fire in hope of convincing 

Russian-backed rebels to fulfill the same commitments they continually renege on is not a strategy and certainly not a strategy for 

success. 

In my view, any strategy will not be effective unless the United 

States begins to provide Ukraine with the ability to inflict serious 

military cost using defensive weapons on the thousands of Russian 

troops operating in its eastern regions. 

The Ukraine Freedom Support Act, which originated in this committee, passed unanimously by Congress, and signed into law by 

the President, authorizes $350 million in lethal military assistance 

to Ukraine. But yesterday we heard Germany’s Ambassador to the 

United States say that President Obama privately pledged to 

Chancellor Merkel in February that the United States will not deliver lethal military assistance to Ukraine despite the fact that he 

and other administration officials continue to tell the American 

public that they are seriously considering this policy. 

Deputy Secretary of State Tony Blinken argued last week in Berlin that no amount of lethal military assistance for Ukraine will be 

sufficient to defeat the rebels and their Russian sponsors. 

But our objective is not to provide Ukraine with enough weapons 

to overwhelm the Russian military in a direct confrontation. Rather, the provision of lethal assistance aims to increase Ukraine’s defense capabilities in a way that will give Kyiv the ability to produce 

conditions on the ground favorable to a genuine peace process. 

By equipping Ukraine with the means to impose a greater military cost on Russia, the United States will be contributing to a 

quicker, fairer, and more stable settlement of the conflict. 

But our support for Ukraine must go beyond simply imposing 

cost on Russia. Ukraine’s foreign currency reserves have diminished to a month’s worth of imports. The Ukrainian currency has 

lost 80 percent of its value since April 2014, and its economy continues to teeter on the brink of collapse. 

At the same time, while I believe the government in Kyiv is 

genuinely committed to reform, more needs to be done by the 

Ukrainian authorities to move forward with these reforms, especially in the energy sector where corruption siphons billions of dollars away from the budget each year. 

Even if the United States does more to help Ukraine and Kyiv 

defeats the Russian-backed rebels, but the Ukrainian economy imVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:22 Oct 08, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\FULL COMMITTEE\HEARING FILES\114FIRST\2015 ISSUE HEARINGS GONE TO PRES
3 

plodes in the process, we have failed and Putin has succeeded. As 

a matter of fact, he has had an even greater success if that occurs. 

This is why the United States must have a comprehensive strategy that will both counter Russian aggression but also drive political, economic, and anticorruption reforms in Ukraine. 

During this hearing, I hope to have a detailed discussion that explores the situation in eastern Ukraine since the Minsk cease-fire 

agreement was signed, examines why the United States has failed 

to provide Ukraine with lethal military assistance, and considers 

additional ways to support Ukraine with its ongoing economic challenges. 

I look forward to your testimony. I thank you for being here. 

And now I will turn it over to our distinguished ranking member 

for his opening comments. 

STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT MENENDEZ, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY 

Senator MENENDEZ. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding 

what is an extraordinarily important and timely hearing on countering Russia in the Ukraine. And I appreciate our witnesses being 

here. 

Let me join you in very heartfelt condolences to someone who 

was a courageous opposition leader, and sometimes true patriots 

pay a price. Boris Nemtsov led efforts in which he passionately believed in in a different Russia. And I find it pretty outrageous to 

see the latest narrative that is being portrayed that an Islamist 

plot is the reason why he was assassinated. But to his family, his 

friends, and his followers, we have our heartfelt thoughts and condolences. 

Now, as it relates to today’s hearing, there are many experts who 

would contend that the complexity of the geopolitics that led to the 

U.S. retreat from Europe created an opening for Putin in the 

Ukraine. Clearly, we must closely coordinate with our European 

friends for the sanctions against Russia to work. 

But I think, without any doubt, we can all agree on one point, 

and that is that the United States must take the lead. I believe the 

administration should fully implement measures in the Ukraine 

Freedom Support Act, which the President signed into law on December 18. The legislation passed with unanimous consent in both 

Houses of Congress. It authorizes the President to provide muchneeded military and humanitarian aid to Ukraine, and it imposes 

additional sanctions against Russia. This legislation was necessary 

in December, and it is certainly necessary today. 

Now, we all want a diplomatic solution, but I believe this can 

only come about when Putin believes that the cost of continuing to 

ravage Ukraine is simply too high. Providing nonlethal equipment 

like night vision goggles is all well and good, but giving the 

Ukrainians the ability to see Russians coming but not the weapons 

to stop them is not the answer. The night vision goggles are one 

thing, but providing antitank and antiarmor weapons, tactical 

troop-operated surveillance drones, secure command and communications equipment would be far better. 

And frankly, I am disappointed that the administration, required 

to report to Congress on its plan for increasing military assistance 

4 

to Ukraine on February 15, has yet to send us that report. I was 

glad to join with Senator Corker in sending a letter to the President yesterday on the importance of providing defensive weapons 

and that we need to see this overdue report. 

In my view, it is time to impose additional targeted sanctions on 

the Russian energy sector to add to existing sanctions that are already costing the Russian economy about $140 billion per year, or 

about 7 percent of its economy. The administration should tighten 

restrictions on the development of shale deposits or to drilling and 

offshore drilling. I think the last thing we want to do is use American technology to create a Russian shale revolution that could only 

extend its reach into Europe and beyond. 

The Ukraine Freedom Support Act called for the administration 

to impose sanctions on other defense industry targets as well as on 

special Russian crude oil projects by January 31, and I am still 

waiting for the administration’s response. 

At the end of the day, the most effective sanction is an economically viable and stable Ukraine. The United States may provide an 

additional $1 billion in loan guarantees toward the end of this year, 

on top of the $2 billion in guarantees already provided. In my view, 

this is a worthy investment, and it needs to be matched by continued reforms by the Ukrainians. 

Finally, I think we need to reinforce the transatlantic agenda. 

We must take a more strategic approach in facing this resurgent 

Russia. First, we need to reinvigorate the institutions that have for 

so long contributed to the transatlantic relationship and peace and 

stability. We need to sharpen our arsenal of response options, and 

that means NATO and EU integration and adapting them to today’s realities. 

In my view, the attention on Europe’s east in confronting the 

threat from Russia has been necessary, but we also need to focus 

on the south, also vulnerable to undue Russian influence. We need 

to strengthen secure and economic relationships in the Balkans, especially in Serbia, Montenegro, Bulgaria, and Bosnia. 

Second, our intelligence community also needs to reprioritize the 

Russian threat not only by addressing the immediate security 

threat in Ukraine, but across the board in Europe. 

And third is communications. I understand the administration is 

working with the Broadcasting Board of Governors to commit a little over $23 million to Russian language programming, which is a 

49-percent increase over fiscal year 2014. I think that and other 

public diplomacy funds are incredibly important to counter Russian 

propaganda which, when I traveled to the region last year and 

have listened to those who have visited us from the region, they 

said they are overwhelmed by Russian propaganda. 

There is one key point, and at the end of the day, that is that 

strong American leadership is what will matter. 

Mr. Chairman, I would ask that the totality of my statement be 

included in the record, and I thank you for the opportunity. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Menendez follows:] 

5 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR ROBERT MENENDEZ

AMERICAN LEADERSHIP

There are many experts who would contend that the complexity of the geopolitics 

that led to the U.S.’s retreat from Europe created an opening for Putin in Ukraine 

. . . Clearly, we must work in close coordination with our European friends in order 

for the sanctions against Russia to work. . . . But, I think—without any doubt— 

we can all agree on one key point: The United States must take the lead. 

The administration should fully implement measures in the Ukraine Freedom 

Support Act, which the President signed into law on December 18. The legislation 

passed—with unanimous consent—in both Houses of Congress. It authorizes the 

President to provide much-needed military and humanitarian aid to Ukraine. And 

it imposes additional sanctions against Russia. This legislation was necessary in 

December, and is even more necessary today. 

SECURITY ASSISTANCE IN UKRAINE

The simple fact is—we all want a diplomatic solution, but I believe that this can 

only come about when Putin believes that the cost of continuing to ravage Ukraine 

is simply too high. We have a responsibility to increase that cost. 

Providing nonlethal equipment like night vision goggles is all-well-and-good, but 

giving Ukrainians the ability to see the Russians coming, but not the weapons to 

respond, is not the answer. Night vision goggles are one thing, but providing antitank and antiarmor weapons, tactical troop-operated surveillance drones, and secure 

command-and-communications equipment would be better. Frankly, I’m disappointed that the administration—required to report to Congress on its plan for 

increasing military assistance to Ukraine on February 15—has yet to send us that 

report. 

SANCTIONS

In the meantime, Putin has used his military power to impose his will in Ukraine, 

but he is also using every economic tool at his disposal and we must do the same. 

In my view, it’s time to impose additional targeted sanctions on the Russian 

energy sector to add to existing sanctions that are already costing the Russian economy about $140 billion per year—or about 7 percent of its economy. The administration should tighten restrictions on the development of shale deposits, Arctic drilling, 

and offshore drilling. 

The Ukraine Freedom Support Act called for the administration to impose sanctions on other defense industry targets as well as on special Russian crude oil 

projects by January 31. And I am still waiting on the administration’s response. 

These sanctions are necessary, but, at the end of the day, the most effective sanction 

is an economically viable and stable Ukraine. The U.S. may provide an additional 

$1 billion in loan guarantees toward the end of this year, on top of the $2 billion 

in guarantees already provided. In my view, this is a worthy investment and it 

needs to be matched by continued reforms by the Ukrainians. 

As I said—all of us can agree on one key point: at the end of the day, strong 

American leadership is what will matter most. 

With that, I thank the Chairman for calling this hearing, and I thank our witnesses for taking time to be here. 

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, absolutely. We want to thank 

you for the comments. 

And we will turn to the witnesses. On our first panel, our first 

witness is Victoria Nuland, Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs. Our second witness today is Brian 

McKeon, Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. 

A big title. Thank you. Our third witness is Ramin Toloui, Assistant Secretary of Treasury for International Finance. Our fourth 

and final witness on the first panel is Vice Adm. Frank Pandolfe, 

Director for Strategic Plans and Policy at the Joint Staff. We thank 

you all for being here, sharing your thoughts and viewpoints. 

I will remind you that your full statement will be entered into 

the record, without objection. And so if you would please summaVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:22 Oct 08, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 S:\FULL COMMITTEE\HEARING FILES\114FIRST\2015 ISSUE HEARINGS GONE TO PRES
6 

rize your statement, about 5 minutes or so, and we look forward 

to our questions. Again, thank you all very much for being here. 

STATEMENT OF HON. VICTORIA NULAND, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EUROPEAN AND EURASIAN AFFAIRS, 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC 

Ms. NULAND. Thank you, Chairman Corker, Ranking Member 

Menendez, members of this committee. Thank you for the opportunity to join you today to talk about the situation in Ukraine and 

for the personal investment that so many of you have made in that 

country’s future. 

Today Ukraine is central to our 25-year transatlantic quest for 

a Europe whole, free, and at peace. My interagency colleagues and 

I are pleased to update you on United States efforts to support 

Ukraine as it works to liberate the country from its corrupt, oligarchic past, and chart a more democratic European future and to 

bring an end to the Russian and separatist aggression. 

In my remarks, I will focus on two areas today: first, the work 

that Ukraine is doing with U.S. and international support to reform the country, to tackle corruption, and to strengthen democratic institutions. Second, I will give an update on our efforts to 

support the implementation of the February and September Minsk 

agreements, including our readiness to impose further costs on 

Russia if the commitments Moscow made are further violated. 

Ukraine’s leaders in the executive branch and the Parliament 

know that they are in a race against time and external pressure 

to clean up the country and enact the difficult and socially painful 

reforms required to kick-start the economy and to meet their commitments to their own people, to the IMF, and to international 

community. 

The package of reforms already put forward by the government 

and enacted by the Rada is impressive in its scope and in its political courage. Just last week, the Ukrainians passed budget reform, 

which is expected to slash the deficit significantly this year and to 

give more fiscal control to local communities and spur economic 

and political decentralization. 

They have made tough choices in just the last few days to reduce 

and cap pension benefits and to phase in a higher retirement age, 

as requested by the IMF. 

They have created new banking provisions to stiffen penalties for 

stripping assets from the banks at the public’s expense, a common 

practice among oligarchs. 

And they have passed laws cutting wasteful gas subsidies and 

closing the space for corrupt middlemen who buy low, sell high, 

and rip off the Ukrainian people. 

Ukraine will use the $400 million in increased revenue from 

these measures to care for the 1.7 million people who have been 

driven from their homes by the conflict. 

With United States support, with your support on this committee, and in this Congress, including a $1 billion loan guarantee 

last year and $355 million in foreign assistance and technical advisors, the Ukrainian Government is improving energy efficiency in 

homes and factories with metering, consumer incentives, and infrastructure improvements, building e-governance platforms to make 

7 

procurement more transparent and basic government services 

cleaner and more publicly accessible. 

They are putting a newly trained force of beat cops on the streets 

in Kyiv who will protect not shake down the citizens, a prototype 

of what they hope to do nationwide. 

They are reforming the Prosecutor General’s Office, supported by 

U.S. law enforcement and criminal justice advisors to help energize 

law enforcement and increase prosecutions. 

With the help of USAID experts, they are deregulating the agriculture sector and allowing family farmers to sell more of their 

produce in local and regional and wholesale markets. 

And they are helping those who were forced to flee Donetsk and 

Luhansk with new jobs and skills training in places like Kharkiv. 

And there is more support on the way. The President’s fiscal year 2016 budget request includes $513.5 million to build on these efforts. 

And as you said, Mr. Ranking Member and Mr. Chairman, 

Ukraine’s hard work must continue. Between now and the summer, 

we must see continued budget discipline and tax collection enforced 

across the country, notably including on some of Ukraine’s richest 

citizens who have enjoyed tax impunity for far too long. We need 

to see continued reforms at Naftogaz and across the energy sector. 

We need to see final passage of agricultural legislation, full and impartial implementation of anticorruption measures, including a 

commitment to break the oligarchic, kleptocratic culture that has 

ripped off the country for too long. 

As you both said in your opening statements, the best antidote 

to Russian aggression and malign influence is for Ukraine to succeed as a democratic, free market state. For this to happen, we 

have to help ensure that the Ukrainian Government lives up to its 

promises to its own people and keeps the trust of the international 

financial community. But at the same time, the United States and 

Europe and the international community must keep faith with 

Ukraine and help ensure that Russia’s aggression and meddling 

cannot crash Ukraine’s spirit, its will, or its economy before reforms take hold. 

That brings me to my second point. Even as Ukraine is building 

a more peaceful, democratic, independent nation across 93 percent 

of its territory, Crimea and parts of eastern Ukraine have suffered 

a reign of terror. In eastern Ukraine, Russia and its separatist puppets have unleashed unspeakable violence and pillage. This is a 

manufactured conflict, controlled by the Kremlin, fueled by Russian 

tanks and heavy weapons, and financed at Russian taxpayers’ expense. It has cost the lives of more than 6,000 Ukrainians, and 

hundreds of young Russians have also lost their lives in eastern 

Ukraine, sent there to fight and die by the Kremlin. And when 

they come home in zinc coffins, ‘‘Cargo 200’’ which is the Russian 

euphemism for war dead, their mothers and their wives and their 

children are told not to ask too many questions or raise a fuss if 

they ever want to see death benefits. 

Throughout this conflict, the United States and the EU have 

worked in lockstep to impose successive rounds of tough sanctions, 

including sectoral sanctions, on Russia and its separatist cronies as 

the cost for their actions. Our unity with Europe remains the corVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:22 Oct 08, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 S:\FULL COMMITTEE\HEARING FILES\114FIRST\2015 ISSUE HEARINGS GONE TO PRES
8 

nerstone of our policy toward this crisis and a fundamental source 

of our strength. 

It is in that spirit that we salute the efforts of German Chancellor Merkel and French President Hollande in Minsk on February 

12 to try again to end the fighting in eastern Ukraine. The Minsk 

package of agreements, the September 5th and 19th agreements 

and the February 12th implementing agreement, offer a real opportunity for peace, disarmament, political normalization and decentralization in Ukraine, and the return of Ukrainian state sovereignty in the east and border control. 

For some eastern Ukrainians, conditions have already begun to 

improve. The OSCE reports that the cease-fire is holding on many 

parts of the line of contact. There have been significant withdrawals already of Government of Ukraine heavy weapons, and 

some separatist heavy weapons have also been withdrawn, although that process is incomplete, as is OSCE access. And the little 

village in southeast Donetsk of Komintermove demining has already begun under OSCE auspices. 

But the picture is very mixed. Just yesterday, shelling continued 

in Shyrokyne, a key village on the way to Mariupol, and outside 

Donetsk over the weekend. As I said, access for OSCE monitors, 

particularly in separatist-controlled areas, remains spotty. And just 

in the last few days, we can confirm new transfers of Russian 

tanks, armored vehicles, heavy artillery, and rocket equipment over 

the border to the separatists in eastern Ukraine. 

So in the coming days—days, not weeks—here is what we need 

to see: a complete cease-fire in all parts of eastern Ukraine; full, 

unfettered access to the whole conflict zone; a pull-back of all heavy 

weapons; and an end to uninspected convoys of cargo over the 

Ukrainian border. 

If fully implemented, this will bring greater peace and security 

in eastern Ukraine for the first time in almost a year. 

As the President has said, we will judge Russia by its actions not 

by its words. And the United States will, with our international 

partners, start rolling back sanctions on Russia but only when the 

Minsk agreements are fully implemented. 

The reverse is also true. If these are not implemented, there will 

be more sanctions, and we have already begun consultations with 

our European partners on further sanctions pressure, should Russia continue fueling the fire in the east or in other parts of 

Ukraine, fail to implement Minsk, or grab more land, as we saw 

in Debaltseve after the agreements were signed. 

Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member, members of this committee, America’s investment in Ukraine is about far more than 

protecting the choice of a single European country. It is about protecting the rules-based system across Europe and globally. It is 

about saying no to borders changed by force, to big countries intimidating their neighbors or demanding a sphere of influence. 

We thank this committee for its bipartisan support and commitment to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine and to 

a Europe whole, free, and at peace. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Nuland follows:] 

9 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF VICTORIA NULAND

Chairman Corker, Ranking Member Menendez and members of this committee— 

thank you for the opportunity to speak to you today on the situation in Ukraine and 

for your personal investment in that country’s future. As many of you know from 

your travels, your meetings, and the establishment of the bipartisan Senate Ukraine 

Caucus last month, Ukrainians deeply appreciate this committee’s support for their 

country’s security, democracy, sovereignty, and future prosperity. 

Today Ukraine is central to our 25-year Transatlantic quest for a ‘‘Europe whole, 

free, and at peace.’’ My interagency colleagues and I are pleased to update you today 

on U.S. efforts to support Ukraine as it works to liberate the country from its 

corrupt, oligarchic past, chart a more democratic, European future, and bring an 

end to Russian-fueled violence. In my remarks, I’ll focus on two areas: first, the 

work Ukraine is doing—with U.S. and international support—to reform the country, 

tackle corruption, and strengthen democratic institutions; second, I will give an update on our efforts to support implementation of the February and September Minsk 

Agreements, including our readiness to impose further costs on Russia if the commitments Moscow made are further violated. My colleagues from DOD—Principal 

Deputy Under Secretary McKeon and Vice Admiral Pandolfe—will address our security relationship in greater detail. A/S Toloui will speak more to our macroeconomic 

assistance in coordination with our international partners. 

First—a quick reminder of why we’re here. Sixteen months ago, the Kyiv Maidan 

and towns across Ukraine erupted in peaceful protest by ordinary Ukrainians fed 

up with a sleazy, corrupt regime bent on cheating the people of their sovereign 

choice to associate with Europe. They braved frigid temperatures, brutal beatings, 

and sniper bullets. The leader of that rotten regime fled the country, and he was 

voted out by the Parliament—including most members of his own party. Then, 

Ukraine began to forge a new nation on its own terms—signing an Association 

Agreement with the European Union; holding free and fair elections—twice—even 

as fighting raged in the east; and undertaking deep and comprehensive economic 

and political reforms. 

Against the backdrop of Russia’s aggression, the situation in the country remains 

precarious. Ukraine’s leaders, in the executive branch and the Parliament, know 

they are in a race against time to clean up the country and enact the difficult and 

socially painful reforms required to kick start the economy, and meet their commitments to their people, the IMF and the international community. The package of 

reforms already put forward by the government, and enacted by the Rada, is 

impressive in its scope and political courage. 

Just last week: 

• They passed budget reform expected to slash the deficit this year, and strengthen decentralization by giving more fiscal control to local communities; 

• They made tough choices to reduce and cap pension benefits, increase work 

requirements, and phase in a higher retirement age; 

• They created a new banking provision to stiffen penalties for financiers for 

stripping assets from banks at the public’s expense, a common practice among 

oligarchs; 

• And, they passed laws cutting wasteful gas subsidies and closing the space for 

corrupt middlemen that buy low, sell high, and rip off the Ukrainian people. 

These laws will also enhance corporate efficiency, incentivize domestic production, and use $400 million in increased revenue from state-owned gas companies 

to help care for the poor including some of the 1.7 million people driven from 

their homes by the conflict. 

With U.S. support—including a $1 billion loan guarantee last year and $355 million in foreign assistance and technical advisors—the Ukrainian Government is: 

• Helping insulate vulnerable Ukrainians from the impact of necessary economic 

reforms; 

• Improving energy efficiency in homes and factories with metering, consumer 

incentives, and infrastructure improvement; 

• Building e-governance platforms to make procurement transparent and basic 

government services cleaner and publicly accessible; 

• Putting a newly trained force of beat cops on the streets of Kyiv who will protect, not shake down, the citizens; 

• Reforming the Prosecutor General’s Office (PGO)—supported by U.S. law 

enforcement and criminal justice advisors—and helping energize law enforcement and just prosecutions; 

• Moving to bring economic activity out of the shadows; 

10 

• Supporting new agriculture laws—with the help of USAID experts—to deregulate the sector and allow family farms to sell their produce in local, regional 

and wholesale markets, and; 

• Helping those forced to flee Donetsk and Luhansk with USAID jobs and skills 

training programs in places like Kharkiv. 

And there’s more support on the way. The President’s budget includes an FY16 

request of $513.5 million—almost six times more than our FY14 request—to build 

on these efforts. 

To turn the page, Ukraine’s hard work must continue. Between now and the summer, we must see budget discipline maintained and tax collection enforced across 

the country—notably including on some of Ukraine’s richest citizens who have 

enjoyed impunity for too long. We need to see continued reforms at Naftogaz and 

across the energy sector; final passage of agriculture legislation; full and impartial 

implementation of anticorruption measures, including a commitment to break the 

oligarchic, kleptocratic culture have has decimated the country. 

As I said in my last appearance before this committee, the most lasting antidote 

to Russian aggression and malign influence in the medium term is for Ukraine to 

succeed as a democratic, free market state and to beat back the corruption, dependence, and external pressure that have thwarted Ukrainians’ aspirations for decades. 

For this to happen, we must ensure that the government lives up to its promises 

to the Ukrainian people, and keeps the trust of the international financial community. And, at the same time, the United States, Europe, and the international community must keep faith with Ukraine, and help insure that Russia’s aggression and 

meddling can’t crash Ukraine’s spirit, its will, or its economy before reforms take 

hold. 

Which brings me to my second point—even as Ukraine is building a peaceful, 

democratic, independent nation across 93 percent of its territory, Crimea and parts 

of eastern Ukraine are suffering a reign of terror. Today Crimea remains under illegal occupation and human rights abuses are the norm, not the exception, for many 

at-risk groups there—Crimean Tatars, Ukrainians who won’t surrender their passports, journalists, LGBT citizens and others. 

In eastern Ukraine, Russia and its separatist puppets unleashed unspeakable violence and pillage. This manufactured conflict—controlled by the Kremlin; fueled by 

Russian tanks and heavy weapons; financed at Russian taxpayers’ expense—has 

cost the lives of more than 6,000 Ukrainians, but also of hundreds of young Russians sent to fight and die there by the Kremlin, in a war their government denies. 

When they come home in zinc coffins—‘‘Cargo 200,’’ the Russian euphemism for war 

dead—their mothers, wives, and children are told not to ask too many questions or 

raise a fuss if they want to see any death benefits. 

Throughout this conflict, the United States and the EU have worked in lock-step 

to impose successive rounds of tough sanctions—including sectoral sanctions—on 

Russia and its separatist cronies as the costs for their actions. In Crimea, we have 

shown through our investment sanctions that if you bite off a piece of another country, it will dry up in your mouth. Our unity with Europe remains the cornerstone 

of our policy toward this crisis. 

And it is in that spirit that we salute the efforts of German Chancellor Merkel 

and French President Hollande in Minsk on February 12 to try again to end the 

fighting in Ukraine’s East. The Minsk Package of Agreements—September 5, September 19, and the February 12 implementing agreement—offer a real opportunity 

for peace, disarmament, political normalization and decentralization in eastern 

Ukraine, and the return of Ukrainian state sovereignty and control of its territory 

and borders. Russia agreed to it; Ukraine agreed to it; the separatists agreed to it. 

And the international community stands behind it. 

For some eastern Ukrainians, conditions have begun to improve. Along long areas 

of the line of contact, particularly in Luhansk Oblast, the cease-fire has taken hold; 

the guns have quieted in some towns and villages; some weapons have been withdrawn; some hostages have been released. 

But the picture is very mixed. Since the February 15 cease-fire, the OSCE Special 

Monitoring Mission has recorded hundreds of violations. Debaltseve, a key rail hub 

beyond the cease-fire lines, fell to the separatists and Russian forces 6 days after 

Minsk was signed and 3 days after the cease-fire was to come into effect. In 

Shchastya, in villages near the Donetsk Airport, in Shyrokyne and other towns 

around Mariupol the shelling continues, as verified by OSCE Special Monitor 

Authority. 

In the coming days, not weeks or months—here is what we need to see: 

• A complete cease-fire in all parts of eastern Ukraine. 

11 

• Full, unfettered access to the whole conflict zone including all separatist-held 

territory, for OSCE monitors, and; • A full pull-back of all heavy weapons—Ukrainian, Russian, and separatist—as 

stipulated in the agreements, under OSCE monitoring and verification. 

If fully implemented, this will bring greater peace and security in eastern Ukraine 

for the first time in almost a year. And with it, Ukraine will once again have unfettered access to its own people in the East, and the opportunity for dialogue and 

political normalization with them. That’s what Minsk promises. Peace, then political 

normalization, then a return of the border. But first, there must be peace. 

Russia’s commitments under the Minsk agreements are crystal clear and again 

the choice is Russia’s. As the President has said, we’ll judge Russia by its actions, 

not its words. The United States will start rolling back sanctions on Russia only 

when the Minsk agreements are fully implemented. 

But the reverse is also true. We have already begun consultations with our European partners on further sanctions pressure should Russia continue fueling the fire 

in the east or other parts of Ukraine, fail to implement Minsk or grab more land 

as we saw in Debaltseve. 

Mr. Chairman, members of this committee, America’s investment in Ukraine is 

about far more than protecting the choice of a single European country. It’s about 

protecting the rules-based system across Europe and globally. It’s about saying ‘‘no’’ 

to borders changed by force, and to big countries intimidating their neighbors or 

demanding spheres of influence. It’s about protecting our 25 year American investment in the prospect of a Europe whole, free, and at peace and the example that 

sets for nations and people around the world who want more democratic, prosperous 

futures. 

I thank this committee for its bipartisan support and commitment. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. McKeon. 

STATEMENT OF HON. BRIAN P. MCKEON, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY 

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, WASHINGTON, DC 

Mr. MCKEON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and Senator 

Menendez. I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today. 

Having spent nearly half of my professional life on the staff of 

this committee under then-Senator Biden, it feels good to be back 

in this room, although a little daunting to be on this side of the 

witness table. 

The statement I have submitted to the committee, which I will 

now summarize, is on behalf of myself and Admiral Pandolfe. So 

we will save a little time on the back end. 

I will not repeat the state of play on the Minsk agreement, which 

Assistant Secretary Nuland has just summarized. 

Since the beginning of this crisis, the United States has vigorously pursued a multipronged approach in response to Russia’s aggression in Ukraine. We have raised the cost to Russia for its actions, reassured allies of our unwavering support to their security, 

and provided tangible support to Ukraine to help it through the crisis. 

Working closely with Europe and other partners and allies, the 

administration has imposed real costs on Russia for its aggressive 

actions. The Department of Defense has halted defense and military cooperation with Russia. The administration has also prohibited exports of sensitive technologies that could be used in Russia’s 

military modernization, has imposed blocking sanctions on 18 Russian defense technology firms. 

Second, we are taking visible, concrete measures to reassure our 

allies and partners in Europe, and to deter further Russian aggression. Thanks to Congress, the European Reassurance Initiative, or 

12 

ERI, is helping the Department to increase and sustain an enhanced United States air, sea, and ground presence in Europe and 

to improve facilities needed to reinforce allies along the border with 

Russia. Additionally, ERI funds will be used to bolster our assistance to Ukraine and to the Baltic partners. 

As part of our reassurance measures, we have maintained a persistent presence of U.S. military forces in each of the Baltic States, 

Poland, and the Black Sea since April of last year. We have also 

had a near persistent presence in Romania and Bulgaria. We have 

tripled the number of United States aircraft taking part in our Baltic air policing rotation, provided refueling aircraft for NATO Airborne Warning and Control System missions, deployed U.S. Navy 

ships to the Black and Baltic Seas 14 times, and increased training 

flights in Poland. 

In the coming year, using ERI funds, we will increase our reassurance and deterrence efforts with additional measures, which are 

detailed in my prepared statement. 

Similarly, NATO has taken concrete steps to reassure the allies 

and to deter Russia. These measures are defensive, proportionate, 

and fully in line with our obligations under the North Atlantic 

Treaty to provide for collective defense of the alliance. 

Allies have also agreed to measures as part of NATO’s readiness 

action plan that will improve the alliance’s long-term military posture and capabilities and ensure it is ready to respond swiftly and 

firmly to new security challenges. Last month, NATO Defense Ministers decided to enhance the NATO response force by creating a 

spearhead force, known as a very high readiness joint task force, 

which will be able to deploy on very short notice. The task force 

consists of a land component of around 5,000 troops with an appropriate mix of air, maritime, and special operations forces units. It 

aims to strengthen the alliance’s collective defense and ensure that 

NATO has the right forces in the right place at the right time. 

Third, we are providing substantial support to Ukraine as it 

deals with simultaneous economic and military crises. Ukraine has 

been a strong partner of the United States and NATO since independence, and our security cooperation with Ukraine dates back to 

1992. During this period, the United States provided Ukraine with 

military training, professional education, communications equipment, and support for border control and counter-proliferation efforts. Unfortunately, the corruption of the Yanukovych regime 

starved Ukraine’s Armed Forces of resources. The neglect of the 

armed forces by the regime did not, however, strip the military of 

its professionalism or its determination to fight. 

Since the beginning of the crisis, the United States has increased 

its security assistance to Ukraine. We have committed, as you 

know, $118 million in material and training assistance to the military, the national guard, and the border guard service. Under ERI 

in the coming year, we will dedicate at least another $120 million, 

including $45 million for State Department security assistance programs. Our assistance has been consistent with identified Ukrainian needs and priorities and it is vetted by our country team in 

Kyiv and a flag-level United States-Ukraine joint commission that 

continues to assess how to maximize the effect and impact of our 

assistance. Key areas of assistance include sustainment items, 

13 

medical support, personal protective gear, secure communications, 

and perimeter security. We have also provided countermortar radar 

capabilities, which the Ukrainians tell us they have used to good 

effect. 

Similarly, we are also continuing to conduct longstanding exercises such as Rapid Trident to increase interoperability among 

Ukraine, the United States, NATO, and Partnership for Peace 

member nations. The most recent iteration of Rapid Trident last 

September included a multinational field training exercise and saw 

the participation of 15 countries and approximately 1,300 personnel. 

Other measures remain under active consideration in the administration, including the provision of additional security assistance. 

As the President has said most recently this weekend, we are looking at all our options, including the possibility of lethal defensive 

weapons. At the same time, we have made clear we do not believe 

there is a military solution to the conflict in Ukraine, and we are 

working actively to support the diplomatic track, as Assistant Secretary Nuland outlined. 

In conclusion, Russia’s aggressive actions in Ukraine are a threat 

to the bipartisan objective of American policy since the end of the 

cold war of seeking a Europe whole, free, and at peace. The United 

States will continue to work closely with our Ukrainian and European partners to counter these actions and provide reassurance 

and support to our partners and NATO allies. 

Thank you for the opportunity to be here. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. McKeon follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF BRIAN P. MCKEON

Chairman Corker, Senator Menendez, members of the committee, I appreciate the 

opportunity to appear before you today. 

The crisis in Ukraine continues. After more than a year of aggressive Russian 

action, the situation in Ukraine remains unstable. As the committee is aware, last 

year Russia occupied the Crimean Peninsula and subsequently has attempted to 

annex it. Today, Russia continues its participation and active support to separatists 

engaged in violence in eastern Ukraine. As Assistant Secretary Nuland informed 

you, the cease-fire under the terms of the Minsk Implementation Plan may be holding in many areas of eastern Ukraine, and we have seen some progress on withdrawals of weapons. However, cease-fire violations continue, almost all of them on 

the Russian and separatist side; this is not an ‘‘immediate and comprehensive ceasefire’’ as called for by the plan. We remain concerned that this may be a period of 

strategic pause—a stalling tactic as a precursor to more violence as occurred before 

the most recent Russian and separatist assault in January. We call on Russia to 

stop ‘‘moving the goalposts,’’ to uphold the cease-fire, and to allow Ukraine the freedom to choose its own path. 

As you heard from Assistant Secretary Nuland, since the beginning of the crisis 

the United States has vigorously pursued a multipronged approach in response to 

Russia’s aggression in Ukraine. We have raised the costs to Russia for its actions, 

reassured allies of our unwavering support to their security, and provided tangible 

support to Ukraine to help it through the crisis. I wish to highlight the measures 

taken in each of these three areas, including actions taken by the Department of 

Defense. 

RAISING COSTS TO RUSSIA

First, working closely with Europe and other partners and allies, the administration has imposed real costs on Russia for its aggressive actions. We have worked 

diligently to isolate Russia at the United Nations Security Council, we and our partners have suspended Russia’s participation in the G–8. The Department of Defense 

halted defense and military cooperation with Russia. The administration has also 

prohibited exports of sensitive technologies that could be used in Russia’s military 

14 

modernization and has imposed blocking sanctions on 18 Russian defense technology firms. Most important, the United States and its European allies have 

imposed a series of sanctions to raise the costs for Russia and Ukrainian separatists 

for their aggressive actions, including targeted sectoral sanctions in the Russian 

finance, energy, and defense sectors, which have had a substantial impact on Russia’s economy. 

REASSURING ALLIES

Second, we are taking visible, concrete measures to reassure our allies and partners in Europe and to deter further Russian aggression. Thanks to Congress, the 

European Reassurance Initiative, or ERI, is helping the Department to increase and 

sustain an enhanced U.S. air, sea, and ground presence in Europe and to improve 

facilities needed to reinforce allies along the border with Russia. Additionally, ERI 

funds will be used to bolster our assistance to Ukraine and to the Baltic allies. 

As part of our reassurance measures, we have maintained a persistent presence 

of U.S. military forces in each of the Baltic States, Poland, and the Black Sea since 

April 2014. We tripled the number of U.S. aircraft taking part in our Baltic Air 

Policing rotation, provided refueling aircraft for NATO Airborne Warning and Control System missions, deployed U.S. Navy ships to the Black and Baltic Seas 14 

times, and increased training flights in Poland. 

In 2015, using ERI funds, the United States will increase its reassurance and 

deterrence efforts with additional measures, including: 

• Rotating an armored brigade to Europe for several months; 

• Prepositioning in Europe a second battalion-sized set of tanks and Bradley 

fighting vehicles; 

• Conducting additional bilateral and multilateral exercises and training with 

allies and partners; 

• Deploying a squadron of U.S. Air Force A–10s to Europe for nearly 6 months; 

• Making infrastructure improvements to eight airfields; 

• Prepositioning fuel and ammunition; and, 

• Building the capacity of close partners such as Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine 

to enhance interoperability to work alongside U.S. and NATO forces, as well as 

to provide for their own defense. 

Similarly, NATO has taken concrete steps to reassure allies and deter Russia. 

These measures are defensive, proportionate, and fully in line with the obligations 

under the North Atlantic Treaty to provide for allied defense. NATO’s deterrence 

measures have included: 

• Increasing the number of aircraft on air-policing patrols over the Baltics and 

the number of bases used for Baltic Air Policing; 

• Deploying aircraft to Bulgaria, Poland, and Romania for training and exercises; 

• Commencing AWACS surveillance flights over the territory of our eastern allies; 

• Sending more ships to patrol the Baltic Sea, the Black Sea, and the Mediterranean; 

• Deploying ground troops to the eastern parts of the alliance for training and 

exercises, on a rotational basis; and, 

• Conducting over 200 NATO and national exercises in Europe in 2014. 

Allies have also agreed to measures as part of NATO’s Readiness Action Plan that 

will improve the alliance’s long-term military posture and capabilities, and ensure 

it is ready to respond swiftly and firmly to new security challenges. NATO Defense 

Ministers in February decided to enhance the NATO Response Force by creating a 

‘‘spearhead force,’’ known as a Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF), that 

will be able to deploy at very short notice. The VJTF consists of a land component 

of around 5,000 troops with an appropriate mix air, maritime, and SOF units. It 

aims to strengthen the alliance’s collective defense and ensure that NATO has the 

right forces in the right place at the right time. 

EFFORTS TO SUPPORT UKRAINE

Third, we are providing substantial support to Ukraine as it deals with simultaneous economic and military crises. Ukraine has been a strong partner to the 

United States and NATO since its independence, and our security cooperation with 

Ukraine dates back to 1992. Such cooperation over the past two decades has paid 

dividends, as Ukraine has been a steadfast coalition partner in Afghanistan, Iraq, 

Kosovo, and Bosnia, as well as in counter-piracy operations off the Horn of Africa. 

During this time, the United States provided Ukraine with military training, professional education, communications equipment, and support for border control and 

counterproliferation efforts. Unfortunately, the corruption of the Yanukovych regime 

15 

starved Ukraine’s Armed Forces of resources. But the neglect of the Armed Forces 

by the regime did not strip the military of its professionalism or its determination 

to fight. 

Since the start of the crisis the United States has increased its security-related 

assistance to Ukraine. We have committed $118 million in material and training 

assistance to Ukraine’s military, National Guard, and Border Guard service. Under 

ERI, in FY 2015 we will dedicate at least another $120 million including $45 million 

for State Department security assistance programs. Our assistance has been consistent with identified Ukrainian needs and priorities, and it is vetted by our country team in Ukraine and by a flag-level U.S.-Ukraine Joint Commission that continuously assesses how to maximize the effect and impact of our security assistance. 

Key areas of material assistance include sustainment items, medical support, personal protective gear, secure communications, and perimeter security. We have also 

provided countermortar radar capabilities, which the Ukrainians tell us they have 

used to good effect. 

Similarly, we also continue to conduct longstanding exercises such as Rapid Trident to increase interoperability among Ukraine, U.S., NATO, and Partnership for 

Peace member nations. The most recent Rapid Trident iteration in September 2014 

included a multinational field training exercise and saw the participation of 15 

countries and approximately 1,300 personnel. 

Other measures remain under active consideration in the administration, including the provision of additional security assistance. As the President has said, we are 

looking at all our options, including the possibility of lethal defensive weapons. At 

the same time, we have made clear that we do not believe there is a military solution to the conflict in Ukraine, and are working actively to support the diplomatic 

track. 

CONCLUSION

Russia’s aggressive actions in Ukraine are a threat to a bipartisan objective of 

American policy since the end of the cold war of seeking a Europe whole, free, and 

at peace. The United States will continue to work closely with our Ukrainian and 

European partners to counter these actions and to provide reassurance and support 

to our partners and NATO allies. 

Thank you for the opportunity to be here today, and look forward to your questions. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Toloui. 

STATEMENT OF HON. RAMIN TOLOUI, ASSISTANT SECRETARY 

FOR INTERNATIONAL FINANCE, DEPARTMENT OF THE 

TREASURY, WASHINGTON, DC 

Mr. TOLOUI. Chairman Corker, Ranking Member Menendez, and 

members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify 

today on the U.S. Government’s actions to support Ukraine’s economy. 

The objective of the United States and international economic assistance strategy toward Ukraine has been to support the efforts of 

President Poroshenko’s government to stabilize, revitalize, and restructure Ukraine’s economy. My remarks today will elaborate 

upon the strategy and its evolution over the past year in response 

to the conflict in eastern Ukraine. I would note that our efforts to 

mobilize the international effort to support Ukraine financially 

have been complemented by the work of others at the Treasury Department to impose costs on Russia for its aggressive actions in 

Crimea and eastern Ukraine that have exacerbated the challenges 

facing Ukraine’s economy. 

Last spring, the United States, together with international partners, supported an international assistance package totaling $27 

billion. This assistance centered on a 2-year $17 billion IMF proVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:22 Oct 08, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00019 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 S:\FULL COMMITTEE\HEARING FILES\114FIRST\2015 ISSUE HEARINGS GONE TO PRES
16 

gram and also included a $1 billion U.S. loan guarantee and $2.2 

billion from the European Union. 

The IMF and other donors agree that Ukraine has lived up to its 

economic reform commitments made in exchange for the support. 

Over the last year, the Ukrainian Government has initiated steps 

to reduce the deficit and distortionary natural gas subsidies, improve targeting of social assistance, strengthen the rule of law and 

reduced corruption, increase transparency within the inefficient 

state-owned energy company, and initiate financial sector repair. 

This is very much the comprehensive approach to reform, Chairman Corker, that you referred to. In support of these efforts Treasury advisors are providing the Ukrainian Government with technical assistance. 

This was always going to be a challenging program of reform and 

adjustment. Unfortunately, the intensification of Russian aggression has created significant additional pressure on Ukraine’s economy and necessitated further international support to bolster the 

government’s reform efforts. As such, during the past few months, 

we have mobilized the international community to increase 

Ukraine’s support package by at least $10 billion. Further, the IMF 

now plans to support Ukraine through the end of 2018 with a larger gross financing package allowing more time for the economy to 

adjust and for economic reforms to bear fruit. 

As part of that international effort, the United States intends to 

provide a new $1 billion loan guarantee in the first half of 2015, 

provided Ukraine remains on track with the reform program it has 

agreed with the IMF. If Ukraine continues making concrete 

progress on its economic reform agenda and conditions warrant, 

the U.S. administration will also be willing, working with Congress, to consider providing an additional up to $1 billion loan 

guarantee in late 2015. 

The next step in further driving this augmented international assistance effort is to secure IMF board approval on March 11, tomorrow, for the new IMF program. To meet its reform requirements in 

advance of the IMF board meeting, the Ukrainian Government has 

passed meaningful reform measures to improve public financing 

and reduce inefficient energy subsidies. Provided that the authorities adhere to the reform program and the security situation does 

not deteriorate further, the IMF projects that Ukraine’s economy 

will expand in 2016 and foreign exchange reserves will rise substantially. 

In view of the inherent uncertainties in the security situation, 

there continue to be risks. This year’s intensification of the conflict 

has imposed severe damage on an already fragile economy. Currency depreciation and deposit flight have put a strain on the 

banking sector, and significant structural damage has occurred 

within Ukraine’s economy. 

Amid these challenges, Ukraine’s ambitious reform agenda deserves our continued support. Core United States and global security interests are at stake in Ukraine, and providing economic support to the Ukrainian Government is an essential part of our strategy to respond to Russian aggression. As long as Ukraine’s Government continues to undertake difficult reforms, the international 

17 

community must do all it can to help Ukraine succeed and be prepared to adapt its assistance strategy as required. 

At the same time, the international community must continue to 

ensure that as long as Russia disregards its commitments and fuels 

violence and instability in Ukraine, the costs for Russia will continue to rise. 

Chairman Corker, Ranking Member Menendez, and members of 

the committee, as with all emerging market crises, our assistance 

strategy is not without risk, and the path to success is not without 

obstacles, particularly amid the current security backdrop. However, critical elements needed for success, an ambitious reform program, a government and country committed to change, and a sizable international support package, are currently in place. To that 

end, we will continue to work closely with our international partners to provide Ukraine the support it needs. The strong backing 

of Congress has been a critical foundation to these efforts to support Ukraine, and we look forward to working closely together in 

the months ahead. 

And I look forward to answering your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Toloui follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF RAMIN TOLOUI

Chairman Corker, Ranking Member Menendez, and members of the committee, 

thank you for the opportunity to testify today on the U.S. Government’s actions to 

support Ukraine’s economy. 

The objective of the United States and international economic assistance strategy 

toward Ukraine has been to support the efforts of President Poroshenko’s government to stabilize, revitalize, and restructure Ukraine’s economy. My remarks today 

will elaborate upon this economic and financial strategy, and its evolution over the 

past year in response to the conflict in eastern Ukraine. I would note at the outset 

that our efforts to mobilize the international effort to support Ukraine financially 

have been complemented by the work of others at the Treasury Department to 

impose costs on Russia for its aggressive actions in Crimea and eastern Ukraine 

that have exacerbated the challenges facing Ukraine’s economy. 

ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE STRATEGY

Last spring, the United States, together with international partners, supported an international assistance package totaling $27 billion. This assistance centered on a 

2-year $17 billion International Monetary Fund (IMF) program, and also included 

a $1 billion U.S. loan guarantee and $2.2 billion from the European Union. In 

exchange for this support, the Ukrainian authorities committed to an ambitious 

economic reform agenda to reduce vulnerabilities and increase economic growth 

potential. 

The IMF and other donors agree that Ukraine has lived up to its economic reform 

commitments. Over the last year, the Ukrainian Government has initiated difficult 

and urgently needed steps to: reduce the general government deficit; reduce 

distortionary natural gas subsidies; improve targeting of social assistance to protect 

the most vulnerable; strengthen the rule of law and reduce corruption; increase 

transparency within the inefficient state-owned energy company; and initiate financial sector repair. In support of these efforts, Treasury technical advisors are providing the Ukrainian Government with expert assistance in the areas of bank supervision and bank resolution, and government debt and liability management. 

This was always going to be a challenging program of reform and adjustment. 

Unfortunately, the intensification of Russian aggression has created significant additional pressure on Ukraine’s economy and necessitated further international support to bolster the government’s reform efforts. The fragile security situation has 

eroded confidence, increased capital outflows, weakened the currency, and depleted 

foreign exchange reserves. The destruction of economic capacity in eastern Ukraine 

has driven a deeper and longer economic recession than previously estimated. As 

such, during the past few months, we have mobilized the international community 

to increase Ukraine’s support package by at least $10 billion. As part of the international effort, the United States intends to provide a new $1 billion loan guarantee 

18 

in the first half of 2015, provided Ukraine remains on-track with the reform program it has agreed with the IMF. If Ukraine continues making concrete progress 

on its economic reform agenda and conditions warrant, the U.S. administration will 

also be willing, working with Congress, to consider providing an additional up to 

$1 billion loan guarantee in late 2015. As part of this up-sized economic assistance 

package, the IMF now plans to support Ukraine through end-2018 with a larger 

gross financing package, allowing more time for the economy to adjust and for economic reforms to bear fruit. Also as part of this package, Ukraine has indicated that 

it will seek to work with creditors to adjust the profile of its debt to provide additional financial breathing room. 

The next step in further driving this augmented international assistance effort is 

to secure IMF Board approval on March 11 for the new IMF program, which will 

unlock a large disbursement of IMF financing. Based on international support 

pledged to date, Ukraine’s foreign exchange reserves are set to increase significantly 

over the next few weeks, which will bolster confidence and provide the authorities 

with space to further execute their ambitious reform agenda. To meet its reform 

requirements in advance of the IMF Board meeting, the Ukrainian Government 

passed meaningful and difficult reform measures to improve public finances and 

reduce inefficient energy subsidies. Since these measures were taken, Ukraine’s currency and capital markets have rebounded significantly. Provided that the authorities adhere to the reform program and the security situation does not deteriorate 

further, the IMF projects that Ukraine’s economy will expand next year and foreign 

exchange reserves will rise substantially. 

In view of the inherent uncertainties in the security situation, there continue to 

be risks. This year’s intensification of the conflict has imposed severe damage on 

an already fragile economy—particularly the export-oriented regions of eastern 

Ukraine. Currency depreciation and deposit flight have put a strain on the banking 

sector, and significant structural damage has occurred within the Ukrainian economy. Overcoming these impacts and restoring market confidence will be challenging. 

Amid these challenges, the Ukrainian Government continues to demonstrate a 

strong commitment to an ambitious reform agenda, and deserves our continued support. Core U.S. and global security interests are at stake in Ukraine, and providing 

economic support to the Ukrainian Government is an essential part of our strategy 

to respond to Russian aggression. As long as Ukraine’s Government continues to undertake the difficult reforms required to restore economic and financial stability, the 

international community must do all it can to help Ukraine succeed and be prepared 

to adapt its assistance strategy as required. And at the same time, the international 

community must continue to ensure that as long as Russia disregards its commitments and fuels violence and instability in Ukraine, the costs for Russia will continue to rise. 

CONCLUSION

Chairman Corker, Ranking Member Menendez, and members of the committee, 

as with all emerging market crises, our assistance strategy is not without risk and 

the path to success is not without obstacles, particularly amid the current security 

backdrop. However, critical elements needed for success—an ambitious reform plan, 

a government and country committed to change, and a sizable international support 

package—are currently in place. To that end, we will continue to work closely with 

the international financial institutions and our partners around the world to provide 

Ukraine the support it needs and enable Ukraine’s people to achieve their economic 

aspirations. The strong backing of Congress has been a critical foundation to these 

efforts to support Ukraine, and we look forward to working closely together in the 

months ahead. I look forward to answering your questions. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. We thank each of you for your testimony and Admiral Pandolfe for being here to answer questions. 

I will begin with you, Secretary Nuland. I know in the past you 

have characterized what Russia has done in Ukraine as an invasion. Does that description still stand with you? 

Ms. NULAND. We have used that term in the past. 

The CHAIRMAN. And are you using that again today? 

Ms. NULAND. I am comfortable with that word. 

The CHAIRMAN. And just for the record, since Russia does not acknowledge the deaths of their soldiers, if you will, publicly, how 

19 

many Russian soldiers do you think have been killed in Ukraine 

as part of this conflict? 

Ms. NULAND. Well, Mr. Chairman, as you can imagine, it is pretty difficult to have a completely accurate assessment, given Russia’s efforts to mask its dead, but we estimate it is—— 

The CHAIRMAN. What does our intelligence tell us? 

Ms. NULAND [continuing]. In the hundreds and hundreds. 

The CHAIRMAN. Hundreds and hundreds? The numbers I thought 

were substantially higher than that. So under 1,000? 

Ms. NULAND. Chairman, I cannot speak to more than 400 or 500 

at the moment, but if we have a better number for you in the future, we will come back to you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Okay, good. 

I know that you have been a strong advocate publicly for support 

in Ukraine and have been a good person for us to talk to both by 

phone and here as a witness. 

What is the administration’s position right now on the 

Debaltseve as far as what are our demands regarding Russia’s, the 

rebels’ withdrawal—from that area and by what timeline? 

Ms. NULAND. Well, Mr. Chairman, as you know—and I think it 

is in my longer statement—we were extremely concerned to see the 

flattening of Debaltseve after the signing of the Minsk agreement. 

Debaltseve is outside of the special status territory. So it is territory that the Government of Ukraine did have control of. Under the 

Minsk agreements, there is supposed to be a complete withdrawal 

to the lines agreed on September 19. So that would include the 

vacating of Debaltseve by the separatists. 

The CHAIRMAN. So we are demanding that they leave. Is that the 

U.S. position and by what date? 

Ms. NULAND. That is the position that Minsk calls for and we 

support Minsk, yes. 

The CHAIRMAN. And what is that date? What is the timeline by 

which they have to step back away from Debaltseve? 

Ms. NULAND. Well, the implementation agreement of February 

12 calls for the full pullback of heavy weapons and military equipment within some 16 days. We are already beyond that, but they 

are working on it. 

With regard to when the—— 

The CHAIRMAN. They actually are working on it. Russia is working on that? 

Ms. NULAND. As I said in my testimony, we have seen incomplete 

compliance in terms of OSCE access, including in Debaltseve, incomplete compliance in terms of OSCE being able to verify the 

pullback of separatist heavy weapons. But when you get to the political phase of Minsk, which is to follow this, the political jurisdiction of the special status zone does not include the town of 

Debaltseve. If the separatists comply, they should be not insisting 

on having political control of that area by spring. 

The CHAIRMAN. Secretary McKeon, we appreciate you coming 

here today and sitting on that side. 

Secretary Carter and Joint Chief Dempsey have both talked 

about the fact that they would like to see defensive weaponry supported. Secretary Nuland, I know, has advocated for that. We have 

passed that unanimously out of both Houses, at least passed it 

20 

unanimously out of the Senate. It came out of the House. There 

seems to be some debate within the administration, and obviously, 

the German Ambassador thinks the President has made quiet commitments that we are not going to do that. 

What is the status of this debate within the administration 

where we are all getting mixed signals and very confused by the 

stance the administration is taking? 

Mr. MCKEON. Senator Corker, I cannot speak to what happened 

in the bilateral meeting between the President and Chancellor 

Merkel. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, can you speak to where we are in this debate? 

Mr. MCKEON. I can. It probably will not be a very satisfying answer, sir. We are still working in the interagency on reviewing a 

number of options, including lethal defensive weapons, but I cannot 

give you a timetable on when we might have a decision on additional assistance. 

The CHAIRMAN. You said $118 million and other kinds of assistance. But it is my understanding we have committed $118 million 

or $120 million. We have only delivered half of that. Is that correct? 

Mr. MCKEON. About half. That is correct. 

The CHAIRMAN. So just for what it is worth, this feels just like 

3 years ago the Syrian opposition where basically we were going 

to help. There were all these things we were going to do. We were 

going to deliver trucks. They got there way beyond their usefulness. 

What is happening? I mean, we have Secretary Nuland come in. 

She speaks strongly. We see her in Munich. She speaks strongly. 

We thank her for that. And yet, the administration does not do 

even what it said it would do. I mean, what is going on with the 

administration? It is incredibly frustrating for all of us to think the 

administration truly supports Ukraine; and yet, it feels like they 

are playing footsy with Russia. There is something else that is happening. They are not really committed to this. And I am wondering 

if you could speak clearly to what is happening. 

Mr. MCKEON. Senator Corker, what I could say is we share your 

frustration about the speed of delivery of our commitments, and 

the new Secretary has pressed us on this. In fact, in one of my first 

meetings with him, he said to us let us start a new policy. Let us 

not promise assistance unless we can deliver it quickly. 

The CHAIRMAN. And what would keep us from being able to deliver $118 million worth of nonlethal assistance? 

Mr. MCKEON. It is a range of things, sir. Some, it is a case of 

finding it in the stocks of the United States military. In the case 

of some equipment, we are purchasing it off the production line. I 

can tell you that the head of our Defense Security Cooperation 

Agency has made this a high priority, and we are pushing him all 

the time. And the case of the countermortar radars is a good example. We got approval for those in late October, and we got them delivered, trained, and fielded within 2 months. So we are able to 

move quickly in some instances. In other instances, it is unacceptably slow. But I can assure you we are making it a top priority. 

21 

I just cannot explain why in some circumstances it goes slower 

than we would like. 

The CHAIRMAN. And we know this is not your decision. We appreciate you being the messenger. But as Secretary Nuland has 

said, Russia has invaded Ukraine. We agreed to protect their territorial sovereignty in 1994. They gave up 1,240 nuclear weapons, 

and we agreed to protect them. And now, as Russia has invaded, 

we are still not willing to give defensive weapons. 

I would just go to Secretary Nuland. Why do you think that is 

the case? I mean, why would we be so feckless—feckless—in agreeing to something back in 1994 and yet be unwilling to give them 

the kind of defensive weaponry that they can utilize, not more than 

they can utilize? Why would we not be doing that? What would be 

your impression of our inability to make that happen? 

Ms. NULAND. Well, Chairman, as Under Secretary McKeon has 

said, we have provided some significant defensive systems, including the counterfire-mortar radars which have saved lives in 

Ukraine. We have not answered the entire shopping list from the 

Ukrainians. There are a lot of factors that go into that. And we are 

continuing to look at the situation on the ground and the needs 

and the implementation of Minsk as we evaluate this going forward. 

The CHAIRMAN. It is my understanding that we have also 

dropped back from training the Ukrainian National Guard and put 

that on hold. Can you just briefly tell me why that is the case, Secretary McKeon? 

Mr. MCKEON. Senator Corker, as you know, we had notified your 

committee I believe several months ago about a program of training for the National Guard. We have not had a decision—never had 

a decision on the final timing and scope of it. We had talked about 

doing it this month, but it is still under consideration as to when 

we would do that training. 

The CHAIRMAN. It is pretty evident that we are really not going 

to do much. It is pretty evident that the strong statements that we 

have made are statements. 

And I will close. I know my time is up. 

But I will just say to Mr. Toloui thank you for your presentation. 

I do hope that we—and our partners—are committed to providing 

the financial assistance that is going to be necessary to keep 

Ukraine afloat. I think the greatest victory for Putin—other than 

certainly making us look really weak to the world right now and 

certainly not following through on our commitments—I think his 

greatest victory would be for Ukraine to fall and him not to have 

to break it—but for it to break by economic conditions there on the 

ground. And I hope that we are committed. I know others may ask 

you questions about how much we are committed to provide them. 

But thank you all for your testimony. I realize each of you are 

messengers and not making these decisions. 

Secretary Menendez. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Well, thanks for the promotion, Mr. Chairman. [Laughter.] 

Let me say I am not quite sure why we cannot move ahead. 

Former National Security Advisor, Dr. Brzezinski, former Secretary 

of State, Madeleine Albright, both testified before the Senate 

22 

Armed Services Committee that the United States should provide 

defensive weapons to Ukraine. When asked about providing such 

weapons to Ukraine, Ash Carter said during his confirmation hearing, I very much am inclined in that direction because I think we 

need to support the Ukrainians in defending themselves. U.S. 

Army Europe Commander LTG Ben Hodges recently stated his 

support for providing weapons to Ukraine in order to provide the 

necessary muscle for a diplomatic solution. The Chairman of the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff has suggested the same. 

So I have a question. Are Dr. Brzezinski, Secretary Albright, Secretary Carter, General Hodges, General Dempsey, and a unanimous Congress all wrong? 

Ms. NULAND. I take it that is a question to me, Ranking Member 

Menendez? 

Senator MENENDEZ. Well, either you, Madam Secretary, or the 

Secretary of the Defense Department, whoever wants to take it. 

But I mean, you have an overwhelming view from a wide spectrum, 

and I do not get it. So maybe you can elucidate. Are they all 

wrong? And if so, why are they wrong? 

Ms. NULAND. I think as the interagency discussion on this subject has taught us, there are factors on both sides, and we are continuing to evaluate. I think from where we sit at the State Department, if we can see these Minsk agreements implemented, if we 

can see peace in eastern Ukraine, that offers the best hope for the 

Ukrainian people. But we will continue to evaluate the situation as 

we go forward. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Let us stop there. Minsk I, nothing, a disaster. Minsk II only went ahead and largely incorporated more territory that the rebels had taken since Minsk I and made the 

boundary lines to assure between Ukraine and Russia less capable 

of actually being pursued because it was all dependent upon some 

votes on decentralization of the government. There have been, Admiral Pandolfe, about 1,000 violations of the cease-fire. Is that a 

fair estimate? 

Admiral PANDOLFE. I cannot give you a precise figure, but there 

have been a number. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Okay. That is a commonly referred to number, 1,000 violations of the cease-fire. 

And so we keep working on this aspirational basis while Russia 

works effectively to take more and more Ukrainian land. And there 

is not enough money in the world to be able to help the Ukrainians 

sustain themselves if they continue to bleed because of the conflict 

that Russia has created and still stokes in eastern Ukraine. 

So I do not get it. Unless you change the calculus for Putin, this 

is going to continue. He will get his land bridge to Crimea, and so 

much for our statements about we are not willing to forgive the 

fact that Crimea is gone. I do not get it. 

So I do not know how much the interagency process is going to 

continue to wait. I guess when all of this is solidified, then it will 

be too late. 

Let me ask you. According to the law, the administration is supposed to report on its plan for increasing military assistance to the 

Government of Ukraine. It was supposed to have done that by FebVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:22 Oct 08, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00026 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 S:\FULL COMMITTEE\HEARING FILES\114FIRST\2015 ISSUE HEARINGS GONE TO PRES
23 

ruary the 15th. It has not. What day can we expect this report to 

be submitted? 

Ms. NULAND. Senator Menendez, we very much regret that these 

reports are not yet ready. We are continuing to work on some of 

the programmatic issues that we want to reflect in these reports, 

including those that flow from our 2015 budget, and speaking for 

us, we have only just had our pass-back. So we are hoping to have 

them up to you in coming weeks if not in coming days. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Secretary McKeon, welcome back to the committee. You did a lot of distinguished work here while you were 

here. 

On December 10, you testified before the Armed Services Subcommittee that the United States was considering a variety of military responses to Russia’s violation of the INF Treaty. Among the 

responses you outlined was the placement of U.S. ground-launched 

cruise missiles in Europe, which I assume would have nuclear capability. Can you further elaborate on the military responses the 

administration is considering to Russia’s INF violation and how 

NATO allies have reacted to the suggestion of the introduction of 

U.S. GLCM’s? 

Mr. MCKEON. Senator Menendez, on the last issue, when I 

talked about that in the hearing, it was in the hypothetical sense. 

Introducing a GLCM into Europe would not be in compliance with 

the treaty. So we would have, in the first instance, to withdraw 

from the treaty or declare it null and void based on Russia’s actions. I had put that out there as just something we obviously could 

do if we chose to come out of the treaty. 

What we are looking at in terms of options, countermeasures, 

some of which are compliant with the treaty, some of which would 

not be—I can describe a range of things in different buckets. One 

would be defenses of NATO sites or U.S. sites in Europe. Second 

would be counterforce capabilities to prevent attacks, and third 

would be countervailing strike capabilities to go after other Russian targets. So we are looking at a range of things. 

We are still, in the first instance, trying to persuade Russia to 

come back into compliance with the treaty and remember why they 

signed it in the first instance. But if that does not succeed, our objective is to ensure they have no significant military advantage 

from their violation of the treaty. 

Senator MENENDEZ. And so far, we have not succeeded at getting 

them back into compliance. 

Mr. MCKEON. That is correct. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Now let me ask you Secretary Toloui. At the 

height of the Maidan protests in December 2013, Russia extended 

a $3 billion bond in an attempt to keep President Yanukovych in 

power. He fled the country with unknown millions, but Ukraine 

and its citizens retained the debt. Given the exorbitant terms of the 

bond, Russia can demand immediate repayment in full, and if 

Ukraine refuses to pay, it would trigger default on all Ukrainian 

debt. In my estimation, that is clearly an economic weapon. 

Now there is precedent for shielding countries from this type of 

coercion. In 2003, the United States and the EU, among others, 

adopted in their legal systems U.N. Security Council Resolution 

1483, which made Iraqi oil and gas assets immune to seizure by 

24 

private creditors. The U.K. Parliament could similarly enact legislation to deny enforcement of the bond since it is governed under 

English law. 

If Russia refuses to reschedule payments on the bond or reclassify it as a government-to-government debt under the auspices of 

the Paris Club, has the administration engaged with the British 

Government on the possibility of denying enforcement of the bond 

under British law? 

Mr. TOLOUI. Ranking Member Menendez, thank you for that 

question. I think you touched on a few points, so let me touch on 

a few aspects that are relevant. 

First of all, Russia has not asked for, has not demanded, socalled acceleration of this payment. 

In addition, the Ukrainian Government, in the context of its IMF 

program, has indicated that it intends to discuss with creditors, 

which would include Russia, the rescheduling of obligations falling 

due, primarily within the scope of the IMF program. That would 

include this Russian $3 billion. And those discussions are only beginning with what we anticipate will be the approval of the IMF 

program tomorrow. 

Second, let me also mention that Treasury, specifically our 

FinCEN, is cooperating with the Ukrainian authorities on the 

other issue that you mentioned which is the recovery of assets that 

went missing with the departure of the previous regime. 

So we are certainly willing to look at the issue that you mentioned, should that eventuality arise, but right now, as I said, Russia has not accelerated this claim, and also this claim is going to 

be subject to the discussions between the Ukrainian Government 

and its creditors. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Well, one final point. I hope we do not wait 

until Russia pulls such a trigger. I hope they do not. But then if 

it is all too late and the process of doing what is necessary to create 

the appropriate protection under international law, as it relates to 

the U.N. Security Council resolutions, may be too late. So it seems 

to me there is no harm in having a discussion to be poised for that 

possibility so that we are not on the back end of trying to play 

catchup ball. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator. 

Senator Gardner. 

Senator GARDNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this hearing 

today, and thank you to the witnesses for testifying today. 

I am going to start with Secretary Nuland and just talk briefly 

about some of the comments that were made last week at a hearing 

the committee held, including witnesses, Gary Kasparov, as well as 

President Saakashvili. When I asked the President about his role 

with Ukraine and to talk about the promises that he believes have 

been made by the United States to Ukraine and whether or not we 

had met those promises, I think the answer was clearly he did not 

feel that we had lived up to all that we had promised. And the bargain that the United States had entered into—excuse me—the 

agreement—the benefits of the bargain they had not yet received 

in terms of promises of our commitment to them. 

25 

In your testimony, you stated that the United States must keep 

faith with Ukraine. How do you mesh his belief through his representation of Ukraine and your statement that we have kept faith 

with the people of Ukraine? 

Ms. NULAND. Well, I cannot speak to how former Georgian President Saakashvili comes to his conclusion, but I would simply say 

that I think this Congress has been enormously generous and responsive to the administration’s request, including going above and 

beyond in some cases the requests that we have made, including 

in the category of the European Reassurance Initiative where we 

have more money for Ukraine than we asked for. 

What we have been trying to do, both through the loan guarantee program and through the bilateral assistance that I outlined 

in some detail, is to try to support the implementation of these 

very, very tough reforms that the Ukrainians are making, and we 

will continue to do that. 

We have also fielded a huge number of technical advisors into 

the ministries to help them both with the drafting of legislation 

and with the implementation. 

And on the security assistance side, the numbers are significant 

as compared to previous support for Ukraine, but as Under Secretary McKeon said, we want to see it move faster. 

Senator GARDNER. And thank you. 

And I believe this question is probably more appropriate to Mr. 

McKeon, as you discussed in your comments to the chairman, according to an Associated Press article, the German Ambassador 

claimed that President Obama agreed not to send arms to Ukraine. 

What is the administration’s current posture on lethal assistance 

to Ukraine? 

Mr. MCKEON. Senator, we are still reviewing it. It is still an option. 

Senator GARDNER. And when do you believe this review will be 

completed? 

Mr. MCKEON. I hope soon but I cannot put a timetable on it. 

Senator GARDNER. Soon. Is that days, weeks, months? 

Mr. MCKEON. I hesitate to predict, sir. 

Senator GARDNER. What has your conversation been with the 

Ukraine leadership regarding this assistance? 

Mr. MCKEON. There are conversations going all the time in the 

field with Ambassador Pyatt but also my former boss, the Vice 

President, has put President Poroshenko and the Prime Minister 

on speed dial. He talks to them at least once a week it seems. I 

do not know the latest of what he has said to them on this issue. 

I think in general they are getting the same information that I am 

giving you, that it is under consideration. 

Senator GARDNER. So they would say the same thing to you as 

well, that they have not heard. They do not know when this assistance—— 

Mr. MCKEON. That is correct. And they have made their requests 

and interests known. There is no doubt about that. 

Senator GARDNER. When we are talking about the cease-fire and 

the Russia-backed offensive, do you think—in your intelligence, 

your reports that you have seen, how much time do we have before 

Putin renews his push into Ukraine? Mr. McKeon? 

26 

Mr. MCKEON. Sir, getting inside President Putin’s head and predicting his next move is an ongoing challenge for the intelligence 

community, as well as the policy community. I can tell you some 

reporting today that I can give you on an unclassified basis, some 

of which Assistant Secretary Nuland gave briefly in her testimony. 

The Russians continue to operate in eastern Ukraine where they 

are providing command and control support, operating air defense 

systems, and fighting alongside the separatists. As she said, they 

are moving military equipment, and there are still battalion tactical groups across the border of some significant number. But 

when they may make another move I do not think anybody can 

say. 

Senator GARDNER. In terms of sanctions, you mentioned sanctions, Secretary Nuland. What are we doing right now in terms of 

the European Union governments such as Hungary, Greece, Cyprus, those nations who have been opposed to traditional sanctions 

on Russia—what have we been doing to talk to them about the 

steps needed and necessary for additional sanctions? 

Ms. NULAND. Well, despite some publicly stated concerns, those 

countries that you mentioned have supported sanctions in the 

council when the leaders come together. We continue to talk to 

them bilaterally about these issues. I will make another trip out to 

some of those countries in the coming days and weeks. 

But we are also working with the commission itself to continue 

to design sanctions that if we need to use them, if they need to be 

applied either in deterrent or actual, have more of an effect on Russia than they do on the European economy or our own economy. So 

that is part of the conversation that we have. 

Senator GARDNER. In that consideration of design of sanctions, 

does the administration support and what have the conversations 

been expelling Russia from the SWIFT financial system? 

Mr. TOLOUI. I think it would be better not to get into the details 

of potential actions that we could take. The framework that we 

evaluate all potential actions is basically the impact that they 

would have on Russia and the Russian economy against the spillover or blowback that would occur both to the United States and 

our partners in Europe. So without commenting on specific actions, 

that would be the prism through which we would be evaluating 

something like that. 

Senator GARDNER. But you have discussed the SWIFT financial 

system option with European counterparts? 

Mr. TOLOUI. We have discussed a whole range of options for further sanctions. 

Senator GARDNER. Mr. McKeon, last week we also talked about 

the length of time it would take for NATO to train a capable 

Ukrainian military that can successfully defend its territory. What 

time length do you think it would take? How much time do you 

think it would take to train Ukrainian military forces? 

Mr. MCKEON. Well, Senator, it depends on the type of training 

and the scope of training, how many units we were talking about. 

The training that the chairman asked me about that was on the 

books is being looked at for the National Guard Forces was going 

to be over the course of 6 months, and I think it was five or six 

27 

companies or battalions. But, Frank, do you know the details on 

that? 

Admiral PANDOLFE. Four. 

Mr. MCKEON. So if we were to train all of their military—you are 

talking over 100,000 people—that would take a much longer period 

of time, sir. 

Senator GARDNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Secretary Shaheen? I am having trouble with all 

these Secretaries, and you all could serve extremely well in those 

positions. I apologize for the demotion. [Laughter.] 

Senator SHAHEEN. Well, thank you, Senator Corker. I appreciate 

that. 

And thank you to all of our witnesses for being here today. 

I want to begin by just sharing the frustration that we have 

heard from other members of this committee about the slowness 

with which we are providing assistance to Ukraine on the weapons 

side, not just about the decision, which seems to be taking a very 

long time on providing assistance, but the other forms of assistance 

that would be helpful to the Ukrainian military that is in the field. 

I had an opportunity to meet last week with some representatives from Ukraine, a member of Parliament and some others. And 

one of the things they talked about was—and I got into a back and 

forth with them about the reservations that have been expressed 

by this administration and by Chancellor Merkel and other Europeans about providing weapons and the extent to which that might 

escalate the conflict. And they said a couple of things that really 

resonated with me. 

One was that they were not sure that the conflict could be escalated to much worse than they expect it to be, in fact, under the 

current circumstances, and that there was a real symbolic impact 

should we provide defensive weapons that would have a real morale boost on both the military and on the people of Ukraine. 

So in our analysis of the pros and cons of providing defensive assistance, do we disagree with that assessment, that there would be 

a real symbolic impact to providing that help? I guess this is directed at either you, Secretary Nuland, or Brian McKeon. 

Mr. MCKEON. Senator, all of our assistance to the Ukrainians is 

providing not just symbolic but real assistance to support their government across the board, both economic and the security assistance. So I am not going to deny that any assistance we provide 

would be of importance to the Ukrainians. 

What I would say, though, about what we have already provided 

and what we have committed is it is meeting real Ukrainian military needs. The armed forces were somewhat stripped bare by the 

corruption of the last regime, and so while I realize a lot of it 

seems rather basic in terms of—— 

Senator SHAHEEN. No, I appreciate that, and I am not disagreeing with that at all. I am expressing my frustration, as others 

have, with the timeliness of providing that assistance, as well as 

a decision about whether we are going to, in fact, provide defensive 

weapons. 

And I guess I would ask this of you, Secretary Nuland. Do we 

think there is a point at which Chancellor Merkel would feel like 

the second Minsk agreement has failed and that an effort to find 

28 

a peaceful resolution to the conflict has failed and therefore we 

may need to think about other steps? 

Ms. NULAND. Senator, we are in an intense conversation with our 

allies about a common standard for measuring implementation 

with Minsk and ensuring that the OSCE gives us all, whether it 

is Chancellor Merkel, President Obama, or anybody else, a clear 

picture of where the cease-fire is holding, where it is not, where 

OSCE has access, where it does not, where weapons are being 

pulled back so that we can measure. 

We have talked with our European allies, including Germany, 

about two things, not only seeing those things implemented but 

also about the danger of any future land grab, which is why I 

shouted out this village of Shyrokyne which is on the road to 

Mariupol. 

But there is now this third concern that I also mentioned in my 

opening, which is the continued resupply over the border which is 

not compatible with either the spirit or the letter of Minsk. So we 

need to watch all of those things together. As I said, sanctions are 

going to have to increase. Pressure is going to have to increase if 

Minsk is not implemented. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Well, as I know you all know, there was a European Subcommittee hearing last week on Ukraine, and one of the 

concerns that was expressed was about the economic assistance because if the economy of Ukraine fails, then a resolution to the conflict probably is moot. 

But one concern that we discussed was the ability of the Ukrainian people to continue to support the reforms that are being enacted. And I wonder if you could speak to that, Secretary Nuland. 

Ms. NULAND. Well, thank you, Senator. This is a real concern for 

Ukraine’s leaders, whether they are in the executive or they are in 

the Rada. As I outlined in my opening, the kinds of intensive 

changes to the structure of the economy are going to have impacts 

in people’s pocketbooks and in people’s lives, including the raising 

of the pension age, increased energy prices. So this is why we are 

working so hard with the IMF and our international partners that 

as Ukraine takes these tough measures, that the support comes in 

quickly so that the economy can stabilize, so investment can come 

back, so that the people can see a light at the end of the tunnel. 

We have to get Ukraine growing again. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. 

One of the other things that was mentioned at last week’s hearing—and I guess this question is probably for you, Admiral 

Pandolfe—and that is the concern that Putin might try to test the 

Article 5 commitment of NATO countries. And can you talk about 

what steps we are taking to try and deter Putin from thinking that 

he should test that? 

Admiral PANDOLFE. Well, yes, ma’am. 

First of all, our commitment to Article 5 is ironclad, as is all the 

allies, and that needs to be understood—and we believe that is understood—to emphasize that NATO has enacted some reassurance 

measures, which include increasing air, ground, and sea forces in 

the eastern parts of Europe. They are also adapting their force 

structure with a very high readiness joint task force and standing 

up what is called NATO force integration units to facilitate the 

29 

flow of reinforcements, should that be needed, into eastern Europe. 

These all come out of the Wales Conference. So it is a head of 

state-level commitment, and NATO is moving forward with that. 

And on the United States side, the ERI monies that were authorized by the Congress are most appreciated and are very much helping in that as well. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Perdue, please. 

Senator PERDUE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I just want to echo the frustration that you are hearing this 

morning. Because of the intransigence of this administration, it 

seems to me that all of a sudden we are in an era where our allies 

do not trust us and our enemies do not fear us. You know, as it 

was mentioned earlier, Ukraine unilaterally gave up over 1,000 nuclear weapons on the assurance that their national security would 

be protected. NATO and the United States was behind that. 

Last September, with President Poroshenko by his side, President Obama promised to help Ukraine build up an effective security force to defend themselves from aggression. And yet, here we 

are today talking about more delays in terms of getting that support. 

Kurt Volcker, a former U.S. Ambassador to NATO, has written 

that this new cease-fire amounts to, ‘‘an institutionalization of a 

frozen conflict inside Ukraine along the lines of Abkhazia and 

South Ossetia in Georgia and Transnistria and Moldova. This is exactly what the Kremlin wants.’’ 

Admiral, I have just got a couple questions. Do you think that 

Putin’s objective is to create a frozen conflict like the ones in Georgia and Moldova? And if so, what would be our response to that? 

Admiral PANDOLFE. Senator, I think his objective is to keep 

Ukraine destabilized so it does not effectively join the West. He is 

threatened by progressive democracies on his borders in my opinion, and he is trying everything he can to prevent that from happening. 

In their previous responses, Secretary Nuland and Secretary 

McKeon have pointed out that we have implemented a wide array 

of initiatives focused on generating pressure, economic, diplomatic, 

and military, to try to force the Russians to stop this behavior and 

respect the territorial integrity of Ukraine. 

Senator PERDUE. Thank you. 

And from a strategic perspective, in recent months Russia has 

kidnapped an Estonian intelligence officer on Estonian soil, warned 

Latvia of unfortunate consequences for its alleged mistreatment of 

ethnic Russians, forced Sweden to reroute a civilian airliner recently to prevent a collision with a Russian military jet, and flown 

strategic bombers over the English Channel actually, and sent unannounced formations of military aircraft into European airspace. 

I would like to follow up on Senator Shaheen’s question about 

Article 5. But do you believe Putin’s strategic objective is to undermine the credibility of NATO’s guarantee to secure all its member 

states? 

Admiral PANDOLFE. I do. I think President Putin would like very 

much to undermine the NATO alliance, and we are working very 

30 

hard to communicate to him the solidarity of that alliance and taking steps to emphasize and illustrate that solidarity. 

Senator PERDUE. Can you talk specifically about what is being 

done by NATO in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania in regard to that? 

Admiral PANDOLFE. Well, as mentioned a moment ago, the reassurance measures being taken by NATO do include—and the 

United States is part of this obviously—rotating forces through the 

Baltic States, engaging those states in terms of exercises and training and assistance, as well as facilitating additional aircraft being 

stationed into those countries. NATO AWACS are flying over eastern Europe to a greater extent. Ships are in the Baltic and the 

Black Seas to a greater extent. All of this holistically is designed 

to bolster and underline the Article 5 commitments. 

Senator PERDUE. Thank you. 

And one last question, Secretary Toloui. All four of you have said 

in different ways that the solution here is diplomatic, economic, 

and military. My question is on the sanctions. You know, Russia 

does not have a consumer economy. They have got an energy economy. Their banking sector can be hit and also their military arms 

manufacturing sector. 

Can you speak in a nonclassified way about what needs to be 

done from the sanctions perspective that can actually get his attention at this point? 

Mr. TOLOUI. Senator Perdue, thank you for that question. 

The sectors that you mentioned actually have been targeted 

through the sanctions. Both the defense sector and the financial 

sector have been subject not only to what we call sectoral sanctions, which restricts the ability of companies in that sector to borrow money, to tap the capital markets, which are needed for them 

to develop their businesses, but also in particular in the defense 

sector, there have been individual companies listed and subject to 

asset freezes. 

So those sectors are very important. They are part of the reason 

why the sanctions have had the effect that they have had on the 

Russian economy with the currency depreciating by more than 40 

percent, the economy expected to contract this year, inflation rising 

to over 17 percent. So those sectors are very important. They have 

been part of our tailored sanctions program, and these are the effects that we have seen. 

Senator PERDUE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Murphy. 

Senator MURPHY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you to the panel for being here today. I would just note 

to the chairman and ranking member, Senator McCain was in Connecticut yesterday, and we held a townhall meeting with Connecticut’s Ukrainian American population. We had an overflow crowd at 

the Ukrainian National Home in Hartford, probably around 300– 

400 people. And they raised some of the similar concerns that were 

raised here today, but they also expressed real and heartfelt appreciation for the fact that if it were not for the leadership of the 

United States rallying the international community to the economic 

assistance that is allowed for the Ukrainian Government to still 

stand, if it was not for our leadership on rallying the international 

community towards a policy of sanctions, this story would have 

31 

played out in a very different way. This is a dire situation in eastern Ukraine today, but I think many of the people that I represent, 

though they want us to go further, understand what we have done 

thus far and its importance to the ability of Ukraine to continue 

to defend itself to the degree that it can. 

I have one specific question, and then I wanted to talk a little 

bit about some of the concerns that many of us have about a policy 

of providing defensive arms, though I support it. 

First is the question of what the Budapest Memorandum obligates the United States to do. Already today I have heard some of 

my colleagues talk about the Budapest Memorandum as obligating 

the United States to defend or obligating NATO to defend Ukraine 

from a territorial attack. I think it is important for us to know exactly what we are obligated to do when we sign these international 

agreements, notwithstanding our unanimity in our belief that we 

think we should provide defensive weapons to the Ukrainians. 

So maybe I will pose this question to you, Secretary Nuland. It 

is my understanding the Budapest Memorandum obligates each 

country individually to respect the territorial integrity of Ukraine 

but, significantly, is not a mutual defense treaty, does not obligate 

any of those countries to then defend Ukraine. It is not comparable 

to Article 5. I just think it is important for us to understand if that 

is actually the case. 

Ms. NULAND. First of all, Senator, as a native Connecticut girl, 

I am glad to see that Connecticut Ukrainian Americans are active 

and supportive of Ukraine. 

I was part of the negotiating team that worked on the Budapest 

Memorandum, so I know it well. You are accurate. It was a political agreement among the four signatories, notably the United 

States, the United Kingdom, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine, 

to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine, not 

to attack her. But it was a political agreement. It did not have legally binding treaty force or legally binding national defense obligations. 

That said, it is Russia that has violated the spirit and the letter 

of that agreement. 

Senator MURPHY. Agreed. 

Mr. McKeon, I want to just talk a little bit about how circumstances on the ground would play out in the event that we decided to give substantial defensive weapons to the Ukrainians. The 

supposition is that Putin is not paying a big enough price simply 

with economic sanctions, and that the price that he would pay perhaps in greater numbers of lives lost that he would not be able to 

cloak in secrecy due to increased U.S. assistance would change his 

calculus. I think that is a chance worth taking. That is why I have 

joined with my colleagues in supporting providing defensive weapons. But I understand that it is a chance and that there is also a 

significant chance that that is not how things will go, that he will 

just continue his march straight through the lines that we have 

fortified. 

I do not know if you are to this point in terms of your thinking 

or the proposals that you have been making to the President, to the 

Secretary, but what would we do in the event that we provided a 

certain level of defensive weaponry, Putin amassed additional 

32 

forces, moved straight through the lines that we have then supplied? Would we be in the position of then having to send additional supplies, additional weapons? How does this play out in the 

case that it does not go the way that we hope it goes whereby Putin 

pays a bigger price than he is paying today, stops his aggression, 

or comes to the table? What happens if that does not work? 

Mr. MCKEON. Senator Murphy, without getting into all the specifics of the internal debate in the administration, in some respects 

you have put your finger on the conundrum. From the beginning 

of this crisis, we have looked at ways to increase the costs on President Putin, to deter further aggression, and to change his calculus. 

And so that is certainly part of the thinking that goes into weighing whether additional weapons, including lethal defensive weapons, would achieve that and then on the opposite side what you 

said about does this raise the ante. I do not want to say does this 

provoke him because he does not need any provoking. Then what 

would Ukraine feel that the United States owes them in terms of 

additional assistance? So it is trying to see to the second, third, and 

fourth move on this chessboard that is part of the conversation. 

Senator MURPHY. Yes, I agree with you. I do not buy this argument that us supplying the Ukrainians with defensive weapons is 

going to provoke Putin. He has got a plan here that he is going to 

carry out regardless. We are already in for a pretty significant commitment as it is. I just want to make sure—and I think you are 

suggesting that you are having these conversations—that we are 

playing this out not just to step one, but to step two and three and 

four. I think very often we supply you with advice that does not 

necessarily contemplate the follow-on actions of our initial commitment. 

A very final question. I will try to make it quick. Back to you, 

Secretary Nuland. Just speak to us about the greater challenge 

here. We are seeing the tip of the iceberg when it comes to the 

tools that Russia is using, and frankly you and our Government, 

writ large, is vastly underresourced to try to prevent the next 

Ukraine from occurring. And as I have been saying a number of 

times in a number of different forums, at the same time that we 

are debating the assistance that we should be giving to Ukraine, 

we really need to be having a discussion about how we resource 

State and Defense to help all these other countries that we are 

talking about, whether it be the Baltics, the Balkans, Moldova, 

Georgia, to try to make sure that this is the last crisis of this proportion that we face in the region. 

Ms. NULAND. Thank you, Senator, and thank you for your attention to some of the underresourced parts of Europe, in particular 

the Balkans and Central Europe. 

Well, as you said, in addition to the security challenges and not 

only the security challenges in Ukraine and the other key periphery states like Moldova and Georgia, but also to the alliance itself 

as Under Secretary McKeon and Admiral Pandolfe have spoken to, 

there are all kinds of asymmetric challenges posed by this conflict, 

whether you are talking about the use of energy as a weapon, 

which requires us to work much more intensively with the EU and 

with our European allies and partners on energy diversification, 

the work that we have been doing on reverse flow gas to Ukraine, 

33 

more LNG terminals in the Baltics, now looking at the energy dependence of some of our allies in southern Europe. We would like 

to be able to do more to help Bulgaria, Hungary, Croatia, and other 

countries like that, although we are doing a lot together with the 

EU. 

Things like use of corruption as a tool of malign influence to undermine sovereignty, whether you are talking about directly paying 

political candidates or whether you are talking about just ensuring 

that there is enough dirty money in the system to undercut democratic institutions or to make individual political actors vulnerable 

to outside pressure. So we are working with countries to expose 

that and also to close the space for corruption in their system particularly focused on central Europe and the Balkans. 

The propaganda, which is not simply what you see in terms of 

news, but it is also under-the-table efforts to support what looked 

like legitimate NGOs but are actually agents of influence in countries that change the debate on things that we are working on, 

whether it is about TTIP or whether it is about Ukraine or other 

things. So there is a lot to focus on, particularly in the Balkans, 

where they are not, most of them, cemented into the alliance, and 

many of them not cemented into the EU, so they are more at risk, 

but also in allied territory. 

Senator MURPHY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Before turning to Senator Johnson, I do want to 

say that countries watching the last exchange—Madam Secretary, 

from a person who helped write the Budapest agreement, apparently it was a superficial agreement, only a political agreement. I 

would say that countries watching that last exchange would be 

pretty reticent to come to any agreement with the United States 

for sure, the U.K., and Russia regarding nuclear arms. My guess 

is that last exchange would be a pretty major setback to anyone 

who thought we were ever serious about an agreement relative to 

nuclear proliferation. 

But with that, I will turn it over to Senator Johnson. 

Senator JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Yes, that answer 

to that question certainly does not reassure the allies, which I 

think was one of the phrases I heard in the testimony. 

Senator Gardner and Senator Shaheen mentioned the hearing 

we had last week in our European subcommittee. I called that 

hearing to try to lay out and describe reality, to really tell the story 

of what Russia has become under Vladimir Putin. I would refer 

people to my written opening remarks where we laid out a pretty 

revealing timeline that included 29 political assassinations. And of 

course, the day after we called the hearing, we saw the assassination of Boris Nemtsov. Pretty stark. 

I want to talk about the strategy here. We have talked about the 

objectives of Vladimir Putin. I want to talk about the strategy. 

During that hearing, Gary Kasparov, who has been a leading voice 

of the opposition, said that Putin rebuilt a police state in Russia 

in full view of the outside world, and now he is confident enough 

in his power to attempt to export that police state abroad to Georgia, to Ukraine, to Moldova. Where next? 

Former Georgia President Saakashvili told our subcommittee 

that only the swift and immediate action of the U.S. Government 

34 

to train and equip the Ukrainians can stop Putin’s strategy to 

deconstruct the transatlantic architecture, to deconstruct the postcold-war order. 

Secretary Nuland, do you agree that that is by and large what 

Vladimir Putin is trying to do? And if you do not agree, what is 

his strategy? What is his overall motivation? What is his overall 

goal? 

Ms. NULAND. Well, I certainly agree with the way Admiral 

Pandolfe characterized his motives earlier in this hearing. He is 

looking to keep countries in the former Soviet space under his political and economic control. He is looking to roll back the gains of 

a Europe whole, free, and at peace, which is why all of the things 

that we are talking about here, whether it is allied reassurance 

and making sure that where we do have treaty commitments, 

which is to our NATO allies, that every millimeter of space is defended, but also to help strengthen and provide more resilience, political security and economic to all the countries in the periphery. 

Senator JOHNSON. Earlier in Vladimir Putin’s aggression against 

Ukraine, I heard a number of administration officials saying that 

we were trying to offer an off-ramp to Vladimir Putin. Does anybody on the panel here believe that Vladimir Putin is looking for 

an off-ramp? By my evaluation, he is just simply looking for onramps, strategically pausing, and looking for that next on-ramp. 

Anybody want to dispute that? 

Mr. MCKEON. I do not know that I would call it an off-ramp, Senator. I think there was a point earlier in the crisis where he arguably was. I think, as Admiral Pandolfe said, he is trying to keep 

Ukraine out of the West and keep it in a destabilized situation. 

Whether he seeks to go further in Ukraine, I cannot say. 

Senator JOHNSON. Certainly from my standpoint, he is really not 

looking for off-ramps. He is looking for opportunities. 

Dr. Stephen Blank testified. I want to see if this is pretty much 

the administration’s evaluation of really what Russia is doing. According to the IHS consultancy firm, Ukrainian authorities, and 

the Potomac Institute, there are currently 14,400 Russian troops on 

Ukrainian territory backing up the 29,300 illegally armed formations of separatists in eastern Ukraine. These units are well 

equipped with the latest main battle tanks, armored personnel carriers, and infantry fighting vehicles plus hundreds of pieces of tube 

and rocket artillery. There are also 29,400 Russian troops in Crimea and 55,800 amassed along the border with eastern Ukraine. 

Is that pretty much this administration’s assessment of really 

what the Russian troop strength is in Crimea and in Ukraine? 

Whoever is the most qualified. 

Mr. MCKEON. Senator Johnson, without going into the specifics 

of the intelligence on the number of Russians in eastern Ukraine, 

I cannot comment on—it changes from week to week. It is somewhat fluid. Suffice it to say there are many Russian soldiers in 

eastern Ukraine, and there is no doubt they have transferred hundreds of pieces of equipment. 

Senator JOHNSON. You are certainly not saying this assessment 

is inaccurate. There is a real possibility this is accurate. 

Mr. MCKEON. I cannot say that the number is exactly right in 

terms of 14,000. In terms of the numbers on the border, as I menVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:22 Oct 08, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00038 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 S:\FULL COMMITTEE\HEARING FILES\114FIRST\2015 ISSUE HEARINGS GONE TO PRES
35 

tioned earlier, the latest information we have on the border, there 

are 11 Russian battalion tactical groups on the Rostov area off of 

eastern Ukraine. 

Senator JOHNSON. Senator Shaheen was talking about meeting 

with some of the Ukrainian parliamentarians, and I did the same 

thing. They were certainly concerned about a potential spring offensive by Russia. And, Secretary Nuland, you talked about they 

are amassing, moving additional heavy equipment into Ukraine. Is 

that not a big concern? 

Ms. NULAND. Senator, that is exactly why we are seeking the 

greatest degree of fidelity on whether this Minsk agreement is 

being implemented and strengthening the OSCE so it can give us 

an accurate picture. But it is also why we are publicly here calling 

out some of the specific concerns we have, whether it is about the 

rearming that we have seen in the last couple of days, whether it 

is about the continued firing in the strategically important villages 

of Shyrokyne, et cetera. So, again, if Minsk is implemented before 

spring and things pull back, then that will allow space for politics 

to begin in eastern Ukraine, but if not, we have to be prepared to 

have more sanctions pressure on Russia, and that is what we are 

preparing. 

Senator JOHNSON. That is a big ‘‘if.’’ I would argue sanctions 

have not worked particularly well. In one of my meetings with 

some of our European allies, the comment was made that as Russia 

becomes weaker economically, they become more dangerous. I kind 

of agree with that assessment which is again why I believe we 

have to provide a military response, lethal defensive weaponry. 

Let me just close with a quote by Georgian President Saakashvili 

or certainly his assessment—there are a couple quotes in here— 

about changing Putin’s calculus. As Senator Menendez mentioned, 

he was there on the front lines when Russia invaded Georgia. In 

a resolute action on the part of the Bush administration, sending 

in supplies without Russia really knowing what was on those cargo 

airplanes, that was certainly one of the factors causing Russia to 

stop further expansion, aggression into Georgia. 

Saakashvili basically said that deployments from Russia’s far 

east are proof that the Kremlin is sensitive to the rising ‘‘costs for 

Putin’s invasion of eastern Ukraine’’ because Russians have ‘‘a very 

thin layer of tolerance for human casualties.’’ So again, that was 

Saakashvili’s assessment, that if we would show some strength, 

some resolve, in other words, respond to President Poroshenko’s 

plea that, yes, they will provide the courage, they will provide the 

boots on the ground to fight Vladimir Putin’s aggression, but they 

cannot do it with blankets. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Cardin. 

Senator CARDIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and 

thank you for holding this very important hearing, and I thank all 

of our witnesses. 

There is no question there is strong consensus on this committee, 

I think in the United States Senate, that the United States needs 

to do more to help the Ukrainians defend themselves. So I just 

want to make that clear from the beginning. The Ukrainians need 

defensive support so they can defend themselves as far as weapons 

36 

are concerned. And this committee has spoken and many of us 

have voiced this, and the hearing, I think, has been pretty clear 

about our position in that regard. 

It is also clear that we need to take stronger action against Russia. The tragic assassination of Boris Nemtsov really points out just 

how extreme the Putin regime has gotten. I think what we could 

do, Madam Secretary—and I would just urge you to look at—the 

individuals Mr. Nemtsov exposed who were committing gross violations of Russian rights. It would be appropriate for us to review 

whether we should be imposing the Magnitsky type sanctions 

against those individuals that he worked on within Russia. 

And let us not forget Nadiya Savchenko who is unlawfully imprisoned in Russia today, who was taken from Ukraine by Russia. 

This Senate has spoken on Ms. Savchenko through passage of a 

resolution. 

So there is just continued effort, and Russia’s violations of its 

agreements, including the Minsk II cease-fire. I am pleased to see 

you are looking at additional sanctions. 

Understand that it is going to take U.S. leadership. If we wait 

for Europe to act, it is not going to be effective. We have to be out 

there with our European partners, but it is going to require U.S. 

leadership. 

I want to change gears for one moment, if I might. I think we 

have had a lot of questioning on the defensive issues. I want to get 

to the economic front for one moment because my assessment from 

visiting Kyiv was that what happened in the protests there were 

as much about basic rights and economic rights as it was about political issues. So as we look to Ukraine being able to defend its borders and being able to control its territory, we also, at the same 

time, have to make sure that they have an effective government 

with the institutions that protect the rights of all of its citizens to 

express their views and to be treated fairly, free from corruption, 

as well as economic opportunities that that country should be able 

to provide for its citizens. 

So I know the IMF originally made a commitment in 2014. I 

think it was $17 billion, $4.5 billion was released. They now have 

a new commitment that they entered into in February this year 

that looks like it takes this up to maybe $22 billion. I know the 

United States has provided some direct assistance. 

But can you tell us how confident you are that the Ukrainian 

Government is moving toward the development of the institutions 

critical for democracy to flourish and how successful we are on 

their path for economic reform? 

Mr. TOLOUI. Senator Cardin, thank you very much for that question. 

I could not agree more that what we saw in the Maidan and 

what we have seen since reflects the desire of the Ukrainian people 

for a better life, including a better economic life. And I think that 

one reason that we have been successful in mobilizing such large 

international financial assistance for Ukraine is because the actions that the Ukrainian Government has taken reflect a decisive 

break from the past. Their willingness to address subsidies and inefficiencies and corruption in their government spending and their 

state-owned enterprises, establishing an anticorruption bureau, 

37 

and addressing issues related to insider influence within financial 

institutions, all of these are actions that the Ukrainian Government has put forward, not that the international financial institutions have imposed on Ukraine. And when Secretary Lew or Under 

Secretary Nathan Sheets or myself have visited Ukraine in the last 

couple of months, the departure from the past practices of Ukrainian governments could not be more evident. 

So our responsibility is to ensure that the international community, and the United States as part of the international community, 

is doing everything it can to support this reform agenda that the 

Ukrainian Government has embraced and has been embraced by 

huge legislative majorities in the recently elected Ukrainian parliament. 

Senator CARDIN. Is there more that the United States should be 

doing? Are we satisfied with the IMF package? Are other countries 

coming forward with appropriate aid also? 

Mr. TOLOUI. We think that we have the right package right now. 

We are satisfied with the IMF package. As you know, the United 

States had provided a $1 billion loan guarantee for Ukraine last 

year. We intend to provide another one in the first half of this year 

and are working with Congress to consider another $1 billion loan 

guarantee at the end of this year. So we appreciate congressional 

support for that. 

In terms of other countries, we have had Europe and other bilateral donors increase their assistance to Ukraine in recent months. 

That is something that the senior officials within the Treasury, as 

well as the State Department, have worked on and we are going 

to continue to work on. We think that this government merits continued support not only from the United States but from other 

countries and international financial institutions. 

Senator CARDIN. And I support the packages. I think we are 

doing the right thing. 

But I just urge us—our support for Ukraine must include accountability and progress being made in regards to governance 

issues and human rights issues, and we have to make that very 

clear. We will be patient, but we will not have indefinite patience. 

They must demonstrate their ability to carry out their verbal commitments to their people, and we have to be tough about that. 

I would ask one last question, if I might, and that is an assessment of the OSCE mission. As you know, one of the hats I wear 

is the ranking Democrat on the Helsinki Commission. Can someone 

give me an assessment as to how effective the OSCE has been in 

Ukraine? 

Ms. NULAND. Senator, well, first, thank you for the work that 

you do with the OSCE. I think this is a tool of foreign policy and 

of European policy that was underutilized until the Ukraine crisis. 

Without the eyes and ears of the OSCE, I would not have been able 

to give the rundown that I gave of where things are going well and 

where things are going poorly in Ukraine at the beginning of this 

hearing. 

That said, as you know, they are an unarmed force. They can 

only operate in a permissive environment. So that has been one of 

the challenges that they have had, whether it was getting into secure the crash site after Malaysian Air Line 17 or whether it has 

38 

been now working, particularly in separatist-held areas, to get the 

kind of access that they need. So that is what we have to continue 

to work on. 

We are trying to work now with European partners to make sure 

that every OSCE nation carries its weight in terms of fielding monitors, in terms of paying the budget increases that this requires, 

but also in terms of the specialized skills. We now need OSCE 

monitors who know the difference between an X kind of artillery 

piece and a Smerch rocket and that kind of thing. So we are working on all that. 

Senator CARDIN. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Isakson. 

Senator ISAKSON. Thank you, Chairman Corker. 

The chairman and I were in a private meeting this morning. So 

I cannot quote by name the individual but it is a very well respected journalist and commentator in America who was asked the 

question about what is the greatest threat to the United States security. Ironically, although acknowledging ISIL and obviously what 

we all know is going on in the Middle East, he directly cited the 

threat of Putin to disrupt NATO and destroy NATO as the biggest 

threat to the United States and the world, as he saw it, in the outlying years. 

So, Secretary McKeon and Admiral Pandolfe, I would like your 

opinion on that statement. 

Mr. MCKEON. Senator Isakson, I would, in some respects, defer 

to the IC and its judgment of current threats to United States security. In terms of the terrorist threat, ISIL is certainly a threat. 

AQAP and core al-Qaeda is still a threat to the United States, as 

are other branches of al-Qaeda and ISIL. 

We are certainly worried about the negative trend of Russia and 

what it is doing not just in Ukraine but along Europe’s borders, 

and it is the core of the reason we have taken a lot of reassurance 

measures that we have and thinking hard about making sure that 

the alliance commitment can be met not just through the United 

States but through all of our NATO partners. 

Senator ISAKSON. Admiral. 

Admiral PANDOLFE. Senator, traditionally degree of threat is defined as capability and intent. In terms of capability, you know, the 

Russians are a world-class state with a world-class military. In 

terms of intent, that makes it even more important that we do the 

kinds of initiatives we have talked about this morning to try to 

shape the intent to minimize the risk. 

Senator ISAKSON. Well, thank you for those answers. 

You know, one good benefit of older age, which I am enjoying, is 

you have a long memory of experiences you went through in your 

life. One of the ones I went through is the Cuban missile crisis in 

the 1960s, and there are some—I am not drawing a total comparison, but some comparison to what Khrushchev did in trying to put 

missiles in Cuba and what Kennedy did in response and the potential of what is going on in the Ukraine because finally President 

Kennedy put a blockade around Cuba and called Khrushchev’s 

bluff. And when he did, Khrushchev pulled his missiles out and 

went home. 

39 

I do not think we are at that place yet by any stretch of the 

imagination, but you all spend a lot of your careers looking into the 

future and saying ‘‘what if.’’ And so I think it is a lot of what Senator Johnson was saying. What if things get worse? We need to be 

prepared to be able to have the same type of response to match the 

threat with the force necessary to thwart that threat. 

Am I right or wrong on that? 

Mr. MCKEON. Senator, in the Department of Defense, we are always worrying about the threats right in front of us but also the 

threats in the future, and we do a lot of planning to look out ahead. 

And the military modernization of Russia and its activities in central Europe have, no doubt, got the mind focus on looking ahead 

at various permutations of what Russia might do. So it is definitely 

an area of concern that we are giving a lot of thought and attention 

to in the Department. 

Senator ISAKSON. Well, I know you have to be careful in your answer. And I will get to you, Admiral. And I respect that an understand that. But I think it is a fair enough comparison to underscore 

the needs. I think this committee feels in its entirety for us to look 

down at possible calculations down the line and be prepared to confront power with power and threat with threat. 

Admiral. 

Admiral PANDOLFE. I would just like to underline what Mr. 

McKeon said and to your point, Senator. I mean, readiness is absolutely key to deterrence. It is fundamental to what we do, and it 

is coupled to, as Assistant Secretary Nuland has said, Alliance solidarity. Those elements together are the best way to buy down risk 

and ensure stability and security. 

Senator ISAKSON. Secretary Nuland, I want to ask you a question 

for my own edification. Would you consider Russia’s use of its infinite supply of natural gas and oil soft power? 

Ms. NULAND. Certainly its use of energy as a weapon. I do not 

know if I would call it soft, but it is certainly a tool of its influence. 

Senator ISAKSON. My question—I do not know the answer to this. 

This is not a loaded question. It is one that is going to show my 

ignorance probably. But had their been a counterbalance to the 

supply of petroleum and gas that Russia could supply in that part 

of the world, could that have thwarted what Russia has done in the 

Ukraine and Crimea? 

Ms. NULAND. Well, I think their interest in controlling supplies 

of energy to Europe is a factor. There were many other factors at 

play in Russia’s decisions that it made in Ukraine. 

Senator ISAKSON. But an alternative supply available to the 

Ukraine would have made possibly a difference in how far Russia 

went early on? And I am not trying to bait you. I am just trying 

to understand your—— 

Ms. NULAND. Yes. I mean, I think if Ukraine had been able to 

be more energy independent earlier in its period since independence from the Soviet Union, it would have had more resilience, and 

it would have had more ability to resist. And that is one of the reasons why we are putting so much effort now in the bilateral program into energy diversification, energy security for Ukraine, as 

well as for the rest of Europe. 

40 

Senator ISAKSON. And the reason I asked the question is it is important for us to understand the national defense interest of developing all the petroleum resources we can in the United States so 

we have control to kind of balance what the Russians are able to 

do in Russia. 

Thank you all for your time and your interest. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Senator Kaine. 

Senator KAINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thanks to the 

witnesses. 

I want to pick up on where Senator Isakson left off, and then I 

have some questions about the economy and energy issues. 

I have been a strong supporter of the economic sanctions against 

Russia, and I understand there have been earlier questions about 

the possibility of more sanctions in the energy sector. It does seem 

this is the economic tool that Russia uses most. So whether it is 

sanctions in the energy sector or helping nations that over-rely on 

Russia to have alternate sources of energy or to develop their own 

sources of energy, these are all strategies that I strongly support. 

But Senator Johnson made a comment repeating some comments 

from a hearing last week, and I am just interested in your theories 

about it. To the extent that we are more successful in economic 

sanctions, to the extent that an extended period of low oil prices, 

for example, puts economic pressure on Russia, there was some testimony in the hearing last week that that makes Russia more dangerous militarily. And I would be curious as to your thoughts on 

that. I am a supporter of sanctions and energy pressure, but does 

that raise the risk of unpredictable military behavior? 

Mr. MCKEON. Senator Kaine, I do not know that it raises the 

risks or makes Russia more dangerous. It is hard to understate the 

provocations and dangers of the actions President Putin has already taken. He is going to face some hard economic choices if oil 

prices stay down and capital flight continues and the ruble continues in the direction it is going. He has got a big investment in 

his military modernization. It is a big part of his budget. And as 

I say, if the oil prices stay down, he is going to have to make some 

hard choices. If he continues to sustain those investments, there 

are going to be some other costs I suspect in the social safety net 

in Russia. So he is going to have to weigh that in terms of his internal politics. I know it is not exactly a democracy, but he does 

have to pay attention to what is going on in the country and public 

attitudes. 

Senator KAINE. Any different positions? 

[No response.] 

Senator KAINE. So this is not something we should be overly concerned about if we decide to do more sanctions in the energy sector 

or take steps to help Ukraine and other nations diversify their energy portfolio? 

Then let me follow up and ask about this issue of the internal 

Russian dynamic. There has been a lot of question of how much are 

the sanctions having an effect, how much are low oil prices having 

an effect. Clearly we have seen statistics about capital outflow, reduction in foreign direct investment, devaluation of the ruble, other 

economic effects. What is the best that you can tell me now in an 

41 

unclassified setting about the combined effects of either sanctions 

or oil prices on the internal political dynamic in Russia today? 

Ms. NULAND. Well, I think Assistant Secretary Toloui has given 

you some of the facts and figures that this policy has wrought, not 

only Russia’s vulnerability to low oil prices because of their lack of 

economic diversification over the last 15 years, but also as a result 

of sanctions. I think we have yet to see what the political impacts 

will be, but we clearly can see from some of the statistics that Russian kitchen tables are being hit now by these policy choices that 

the Kremlin are making. When you hear Assistant Secretary Toloui 

talk about inflation at 15 to 17 percent, when we have statistics 

of skyrocketing food prices across the Russian space, 20 to 40 percent in some places, when we know that average Russians are having difficulty paying for loans for apartments, for cars, when we see 

imports way down, it is affecting lifestyles. Now, that simply goes 

to the point that the Kremlin has prioritized their international adventure over the quality of life for their own people, and at what 

point that has a political effect, I think we have yet to see. 

Senator KAINE. The question about where will oil prices be in a 

year is something of which we should be wary with respect to speculating, but there are people who have to make that speculation. 

Folks who buy fuel for major airlines, et cetera have to do projections all the time, and some of their projections are that oil prices 

would stay in this low range for some extended period of time. 

If we are a year from now and oil prices have stayed in basically 

this historically low level, talk a little bit about what you would 

predict that you would see in terms of the internal Russian economic dynamic, and then we can draw the line between that and 

likely political feelings. 

Mr. TOLOUI. Senator Kaine, thank you for that. 

I think it is important to recognize that the economic outcomes 

that we have seen in Russia have really been an interaction between what we have seen in oil and the impact of economic sanctions. Higher oil prices would definitely be a positive for the Russian economy. 

But I think it is relevant to look at what both Moody’s and S&P 

have done to Russia’s credit rating. Russia has been downgraded 

to junk for the first time since 2003–2004. Now, the responsibility 

of agencies like Moody’s and S&P is not to react to what the oil 

price is today but to think about how Russia’s economy is being 

managed, what the impact of sanctions is, and how that affects the 

Russian Government’s ability to meet its obligations not only to foreign creditors but to its people. 

And so I think that if we saw higher oil prices—and I am not 

going to speculate on oil prices like you mentioned. But I think 

that even if we see oil prices rise, the combination of economic mismanagement and the impact of sanctions has cast the shadow on 

Russian economic prospects that is expected to persist. And one 

manifestation of that is the decision of the rating agencies to designate Russian debt as junk. 

Senator KAINE. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I do not have other questions. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Rubio. 

Senator RUBIO. Thank you. Thank you all for being here. 

42 

Secretary Nuland, in your statement, you outline our goal as 

threefold. First, we want peace, then political normalization, and 

then ultimately the return to borders, which I imagine includes 

Crimea as well. The question that I have is how realistic—and the 

hope is that Minsk would offer that promise with peace coming 

first as the precondition for all these things to be possible. 

The question that I have is how realistic is that goal, given the 

goals that Putin has himself. I think the goal, unless any of you 

dispute this—I think the goal Putin has here is to basically—it is 

not just about Ukraine. It is about completely reorganizing the 

post-cold-war, post-Soviet-era order in Europe. And it is not just 

about Ukraine. 

And in that context, that is why he wants to weaken and divide 

and perhaps even force NATO to fall apart. In fact, he has questioned why we even need a NATO anymore since there is no more 

Soviet Union. As part of furthering that goal, he has openly said 

that they believe they need to establish a sphere of influence and 

not just throughout the former Soviet space but also in former 

Warsaw Pact type countries. 

This whole talk about protecting Russian speakers—this is just 

an excuse that he puts out there as a justification before the international community for moving forward. But ultimately their goal, 

their ultimate goal, here is to carve out, to reorder the post-Soviet 

order in the region and to carve out for Russia a strategic space, 

for themselves, of influence. 

And so in light of that, why should we have any hope that these 

cease-fires are actually going to hold, given we know what his ultimate goal is? Now, he may agree to a temporary cease-fire as a tactical move maybe hopefully to split us off from the Europeans, in 

essence hoping for us to act. And maybe that is why there have 

been arguments that we should not go on sanctions alone because 

it could cause friction with the European Union and split us from 

them in that regard. But at the end of the day, he may agree to 

a cease-fire temporarily either to consolidate gains they have already made or to perhaps try to create a point of friction between— 

hoping that we will jump out ahead of the Europeans and create 

that as a division. But ultimately his goal unquestionably is to 

completely rearrange the order in this area and carve out for Russia a sphere of influence. 

So how is it even realistic, knowing that about him, to think that 

he is ever going to allow stabilization to return to Ukraine and that 

he is ever going to return back to their borders, given we know 

what their goal is. I mean, he is a criminal and a thug, but he is 

also a very determined one who has shown the willingness to act 

out in furtherance of a strategic goal. So why should I feel optimistic that there is any chance of that happening, given the goal 

he has now, unless the cost/benefit analysis changes for him? 

Ms. NULAND. Senator, I am not going to dispute any of your 

analysis. I am simply going to say that Minsk is a test for Russia. 

Russia signed it. The separatists signed it. It is also a choice for 

Russia. If fully implemented, it would bring back sovereignty and 

territorial integrity in the east. It does not, obviously, address Crimea. 

43 

So now we have to test. And as I said at the beginning, the 

record is already mixed today, and we have to be ready both for 

the opportunity for success but also to impose more costs, significant costs, on Russia, with our European partners, if Minsk is violated either because the agreement is not implemented or because 

there is a further land grab or because the separatists are further 

armed. And that is what we are watching. 

Senator RUBIO. So in furtherance of that question, if in fact this 

is a test, what is wrong with now laying out clearly exactly what 

we are going to do if that test has failed. In essence, if this test 

fails, we are going to arm the Ukrainians with—by the way, as a 

sovereign country, Ukraine has a right to defend itself not just 

against Russian aggression or separatist aggression but any aggression. If in fact we are trying to strengthen the writ of that government, part of that is allowing them to provide for their own defense. So we should be doing that anyway. 

But is it the position of the administration that we are going to 

lay out a clear picture, hopefully with your European partners, of 

what the specific sanctions will be and what specific military aid 

we will provide if Russia fails the Minsk test? 

Ms. NULAND. Senator, I think in my opening I made clear that 

we are working now with the Europeans to lay out concrete sanctions costs if Minsk is not implemented or further violated. We generally do not signal those in advance, but we make it clear that we 

are prepared, and that is what we are working on. With regard to 

security assistance, we are continuing to evaluate that based on 

the situation on the ground, and implementation of Minsk will very 

much be part of that. 

Senator RUBIO. Can you comment on whether denying Russia access to the SWIFT system is something that has been discussed? 

Mr. TOLOUI. We actually generally do not discuss in a public 

forum any specific measures, but we discuss a whole range of 

things. As we are evaluating it, we look at both the impact that it 

would have on Russia, as well as the spillovers that it would have 

on the global economy, the United States, and our European partners. But I do not want to comment on any specific action. 

Senator RUBIO. My last question, I guess, is just more of a— 

maybe I do not expect you to comment on this. But irrespective of 

whether Russia adheres to Minsk or not, if in fact we want to stabilize Ukraine, is not part of that stabilization to give them the 

ability to defend themselves in the future from any other aggression that may exist? In essence, there are other countries that have 

not been invaded who we provide military assistance to and defensive systems to because we understand that the absence of it invites aggression in the future. I just want to know why is it a bad 

idea to provide them defensive systems irrespective—and I know 

that is being reviewed. But is there an argument to be made 

against providing defensive weapons to a country irrespective of 

how the cease-fire turns out since we are trying to help them stabilize their government and as part of that, it has to be the ability 

to provide for their national defense? 

Mr. MCKEON. Senator Rubio, as you know, we have provided a 

range of security assistance in the nonlethal categories which have 

met real Ukrainian security requirements because the armed forces 

44 

were not fully stripped bare, but they were left rather lacking by 

the corruption of the last regime. And I expect long past this crisis, 

we will have a defense partnership with the Government of 

Ukraine, but at the present time, as Assistant Secretary Nuland 

said, defensive lethal weapons are being reviewed but it is not 

something on offer at the present time. 

Senator RUBIO. And my last question is—I have heard some commentary that even among Putin’s critics within Russia there are 

those who do not support giving defensive weapons to Ukraine because ultimately that would lead to the death of Russians, and they 

cannot support that. I read that yesterday. I think The Washington 

Post reported or had some commentary from some of Putin’s opponents. 

So here is my question. If Putin says there are no Russian troops 

in Ukraine, therefore, if we provided—if that is true, he has nothing to worry about. Right? 

Ms. NULAND. As I made clear in my opening, not only do we believe that there are Russian forces in Ukraine, we believe that they 

are responsible for command and control, arming, financing, directing of this conflict. We also believe that there are many hundreds 

of Russians dead in Ukraine and that it does pose a vulnerability 

for the Kremlin politically at home because they are denying they 

are even active there. 

Senator RUBIO. Sorry. Just one quick point. I read in your statement—maybe you did not say this publicly because you had to 

shorten your statement. Is it not accurate that as these coffins are 

returning and these bodies are returning to Russia, Russian families of the dead soldiers are being told not to comment on it or they 

will be denied death benefits? 

Ms. NULAND. Yes, and I did say that publicly here. 

Senator RUBIO. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

I know Senator Menendez had a closing question for this panel. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank 

you all for your testimony. 

Madam Secretary, the Budapest Memorandum was basically a 

way to entice the Ukrainians to give up their nuclear weapons. Is 

that a fair statement? 

Ms. NULAND. Ranking Member Menendez, at the time the primary intent was to get Russia to assure Ukraine that it would not 

seek to take advantage of Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity if it gave up its weapons. So Ukraine sought that political 

guarantee primarily from Russia, and it is that guarantee that 

Russia has violated. There was never an intent to have treaty obligations—— 

Senator MENENDEZ. No. I gather that from your answer to Senator Murphy. You said it was a political agreement. Right? Yes? 

Ms. NULAND. Yes. 

Senator MENENDEZ. All right. So we also, however, signed that 

political agreement, and so while you say the concern for Ukraine 

was Russia not seeking to attack it or to interfere with its territorial integrity if it did what? If it gave up its nuclear weapons. 

Right? That is the essence of what was induced from the Ukrainians. Is that not fair to say? Whether it was that they wanted a 

45 

guarantee from Russia and we just joined with Great Britain and 

others to sort of like give them further comfort in this political 

agreement, it was to give up their nuclear arms because otherwise 

there is no reason for such an agreement. 

Ms. NULAND. Senator, they also sought assurance from the other 

two nuclear powers, the United States and Great Britain, that we 

would not seek to exploit Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial integrity. And we obviously have not done that. So that was the 

structure of the agreement. 

Senator MENENDEZ. But the whole purpose of it was to guarantee territorial integrity and not to face the threat from any of 

these powers if it did what? Give up its nuclear weapons. Is that 

correct? 

Ms. NULAND. Of course. 

Senator MENENDEZ. I do not know why we are dancing around. 

Ms. NULAND. No. Of course. 

Senator MENENDEZ. It is about giving up their nuclear weapons. 

Ms. NULAND. Of course, and they did that. 

Senator MENENDEZ. So how is this political agreement different 

than the one we are trying to strike with Iran? Is basically the 

agreement we are trying to strike with Iran not a political agreement because it is not a treaty obligation the administration has 

said? 

Ms. NULAND. I am not, as you know, qualified to get into the intricacies of the deal that we are trying to strike with Iran. I think 

I will leave that to the folks in the administration who work on 

Iran. 

Senator MENENDEZ. I am not asking you about the intricacies of 

the agreement. That is for another time with another panel. 

The question is it seems to me that what we have heard from 

the administration, as it relates to Iran, is to say that it is not 

going to be a treaty, therefore the Congress has no need to have 

a say. It is going to be basically a political agreement. And if that 

is the case, then we need to know the nature of what that means. 

As I see it unfolding here in the Budapest Memorandum, which 

was a political agreement ultimately to entice the Ukrainians to 

give up their nuclear weapons, which they did with an understanding that all of these powers were not going to affect its territorial integrity, which in the case of Russia has been violated. So 

I do not see the difference, and I do think it is very much on point. 

So it raises concerns for me as to where we are going in that regard. But you tell me you are not capable of answering that question. 

Ms. NULAND. Well, let me just say that with regard to the Budapest political commitment, the United States of America lived up 

to its commitments under Budapest. So if the concern is whether 

the United States honors political commitments as it honors treaties, I think one can be reassured by our behavior vis-a-vis Budapest. I cannot speak to other nations. 

Senator MENENDEZ. We have certainly, nor did we ever have any 

intention of interfering with Ukraine’s territorial integrity. The 

reason that we joined is to give comfort, support, and I think the 

Ukrainians would think that in fact that political agreement with 

these three powers—because I doubt that the Ukrainians ever 

46 

thought that we were going to somehow invade their territory—was 

in fact that we would be supportive of their security and their territorial integrity. But at this point, while we certainly have not done 

anything to interfere with its integrity, I think the Ukrainians 

would feel far short of what that agreement meant in terms of its 

actual implementation. And so at the end of the day, it is a political agreement that can be interpreted as those who signed it wish 

to interpret it. And that is, I think, a challenging proposition. 

The CHAIRMAN. I very much appreciate the line of questioning 

the ranking member just put forth. 

I have to say this has been a very good hearing. We thank all 

of you for your testimony. 

It has been very unsatisfying to me. I would ask the Secretary 

who does meet with people constantly around the world. Surely on 

the heels of us never doing the things we said we would do with 

the Free Syrian Army rebels and now the world being very aware 

of this Budapest Memorandum and knowing that this is another 

decision memo that sits on the President’s desk undecided. 

This has to have affected our credibility with others around the 

world. I would love to have your sense of that and how damaging 

our lack of ability make simple decisions—they certainly have complex outcomes, but the decisions themselves are relatively simple, 

certainly highly supported by Congress. So we are all in this together should a decision be made. 

But I would just like to get your sense of how badly, on the heels 

again of what we never did in Syria, on the heels of a redline that 

was never adhered to, and this particular issue which is so important to world stability—I would love to get your sense of how this 

is affecting us with others. 

Ms. NULAND. Well, Chairman, I would say with regard to my 

patch, Europeans do see these strong bipartisan, bicameral support 

for Ukraine, whether it is on the economic side or on the security 

side—and frankly per capita, we have done—well, I do not want to 

say ‘‘per capita,’’ but we have done far more than most nations in 

the transatlantic space to support Ukraine. And I do think that our 

leadership in this is recognized. As spirited a debate as is ongoing 

inside the administration on some of these security support questions, there is also a transatlantic debate. So that question gets 

asked also in our diplomacy. But the Europeans come at it from 

both sides depending upon where they sit. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, we are going to have the record open for 

questions and move into a second panel. 

I would just say that I have very much enjoyed our conversations. You have been very forward with your statements regarding 

Ukraine and the things that need to be done, and that has been 

appreciated very much by most of us. 

I would have, at this point, significant difficulty coming to work 

each day with these decisions lingering in the way that they have 

and us, again, not taking the steps that many people within the administration, as I understand it, feel need to be taken. And yet, we 

continue for some reason not to do those things that we have acted 

as if we might do. 

So I have a number of other questions that I will send in writing, 

and I thank each of you for being here. I realize that in all cases 

47 

you all are messengers and not the ones that have these decision 

memos sitting on your desk unheralded. But we thank you for your 

service to our country and appreciate your candid testimony. 

With that, we will move to the second panel. 

Our first witness is former Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs and former U.S. Ambassador to Germany, John 

Kornblum. Our second and final witness on this panel is former 

U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine and Director of the Eurasia Center at 

The Atlantic Council, John Herbst. 

And as you all are getting seated and comfortable, we will begin 

with Ambassador Kornblum. 

Ambassador Kornblum, I do want to thank you for being here in 

particular. I know you are a resident of Nashville, TN, and we are 

always glad to have really bright people from Nashville, TN, here 

testifying. With that, if you would begin, we would appreciate it. 

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN C. KORNBLUM, FORMER ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EUROPEAN AFFAIRS, AND 

FORMER UNITED STATES AMBASSADOR TO GERMANY, BERLIN, GERMANY 

Ambassador KORNBLUM. Thank you very much. You might even 

be more pleased to learn I have very direct contact with another 

city you know, Chattanooga, TN. And Mr. Mayor Berke is going to 

be at a meeting that I am organizing in Berlin in 3 weeks to talk 

about the tremendous success that Chattanooga has had in revitalizing the city and supporting entrepreneurship there. And I think 

you had a little bit to do with that. I have heard that anyway from 

history. 

And so I am very pleased to be here both because of my ties to 

Tennessee and also because these are issues that I worked upon a 

lot in the 1990s. I was the Assistant Secretary during this whole 

period involved in all these memorandum and these agreements 

and participated in the negotiation of most of them, not the Budapest paper but most of the others. And so to you and also to Ranking Member Menendez, I am very pleased to be here. 

I have a very special point to make. You have heard in extremely 

good detail if not always satisfying detail about how our Government sees things. But I think there is one thing that we need to 

think about which Senator Rubio in particular talked about, and 

that is the direction of this conflict and the definition of this conflict. 

My own view is—and I have been living in Germany for a long 

time now after I stopped being Ambassador. And I think that I can 

say with a certain amount of accuracy that whatever we are doing 

in Ukraine and with Russia, we are losing the public affairs battle 

on this crisis, the narrative as we say in the journalistic world. 

The narrative that is most prevalent, in the United States to a 

considerable extent but more so even in Europe, is that this is a 

Russia which is reacting angrily because it was cheated, ill-used, 

misused by the West after 1990. And I think it is important that 

we focus on this fact because many of the decisions—and let me 

say a couple points about that—which are going to be taken in the 

future will depend considerably on whether the Russians believe 

that they have the upper hand on this aspect of the crisis and 

48 

whether we, in fact, can maintain a strong situation and a strong 

direction. 

The fact is that after 1990, we dealt with the Russian leadership 

which saw the collapse of the Soviet Union as a liberation and not 

as a Western attack on Russia. And they knew exactly what our 

plans were. We talked to them in great detail about it. We did not 

talk to them about the details of NATO enlargement or EU enlargement, but we certainly told them that our goal for them and 

for Europe was to establish democracy, establish free market systems, and to allow Russia to join the Western world. And on many 

of the discussions I had, Ambassador Herbst was along, and I think 

he can attest to this. We worked very hard to make this point not 

only clear but to establish things to make it real. 

And now, 20–25 years later, for me the narrative of this crisis 

is not whether Russia somehow is now a wounded power, but the 

fact that the United States, three administrations in connection 

also working with the Congress, have established between the Baltic States and now, hopefully, Ukraine also, and the south, a community of nearly a billion persons, which is democratic, which is 

secure, which is oriented toward free markets, and which wants to 

be part of the Western and the Atlantic world. 

Now, I say this so precisely because we have to remember what 

the situation was 25 years ago. Twenty-five years ago, we had the 

western part of the continent democratized. The eastern part was, 

to put it mildly, a mess. When we first came in to establish relations with the new governments in Poland and Czechoslovakia, 

Hungary, we found that they had hardly any of the basic conditions 

for modern industrial Western society. And so the cooperation within NATO, with the strong leadership of these countries, has in fact 

succeeded. 

And many of the reasons that we have this conflict with Russia 

right now is not because Ukraine violated orders or not because 

Russia has somehow felt threatened by the West. It is because the 

leadership in Russia, after the beginning of this century, has covered its own misdeeds, its own poor performance with an increase 

in the authoritarian system, and they are finding that the countries on their periphery, but also until recently, much of their population wanted to join the West and not to maintain an eastern orientation. 

This is the basic point, and it leads to strategy, however. It suggests, for example, that entering into negotiations with the Russians over how to conclude this crisis are not very relevant at the 

moment. There is not any new security system which we can offer 

the Russians which would not include giving them a sphere of influence in these very countries we are trying to protect. There is 

not any military arrangement which we can enter with the Russians which would not somehow limit our ability to defend these 

countries to the east who we have helped become democratic. There 

is not any new political forum which we can think up which would 

change the fact that the real reason that Putin and his cohorts in 

Russia in general feel threatened at the moment. It is not because 

of anything we have done and not because of NATO sanctions even, 

although I favor them, but because of things such as—it has all 

been discussed here today—the oil price, Russia’s lack of investVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:22 Oct 08, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00052 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 S:\FULL COMMITTEE\HEARING FILES\114FIRST\2015 ISSUE HEARINGS GONE TO PRES
49 

ment in the high-tech sector, Russia’s inability to build the infrastructure necessary for a modern industrial economy, et cetera, et 

cetera. 

It also, I think, has to do with the fact that Russia—Mr. Herbst 

is more of an expert on this than I am—has, in fact, also failed to 

have the political leadership since 2000 which helped its population 

come out of the shock of the end of the cold war and to understand 

how closely its interests are involved with being part of the West. 

So we have a situation now which is important for all the reasons that our Government officials mentioned to you today. They 

gave, I thought, a very comprehensive view of what is going on. 

But we are, in effect, facing an even larger challenge, a challenge 

which is not only a challenge to Europe but a challenge actually 

across the entire world, and that is that Russia, whether consciously or by accident, is taking account of a growing unease 

around the world at the dislocations caused by what is called 

‘‘globalization,’’ what is the modern information technology world, 

what is happening with the dislocation of industries, et cetera, et 

cetera, and that the Russians have been able to harness this dissatisfaction in their own country. 

But I can tell you with, shall I say, a lot of experience—I have 

been living in Berlin now for 17 years and I am still very politically 

active there—that these arguments are also having an effect in 

Western Europe, and they are also having an effect, as you know, 

in other parts of the world. 

Add to that—one of the Senators mentioned it—Russia is financing, with very large efforts, movements in Western Europe who are 

antidemocratic, who are trying to undermine the Western system. 

And Russia is also continuing to threaten in one way or the other 

the weakest points of our system such as the Baltic States, such 

as the Republic of Georgia, where I worked quite diligently in recent years. And so we are facing not just the question—and it is 

a very important question. 

I might add that I will mention to Senator Murphy that my wife 

grew up in the Ukrainian community in Hartford, CT. And so she 

is very oriented toward Ukraine, has been an election observer 

there twice already. So we are very committed to Ukraine. 

But the real challenge of this crisis is that Russia, after immense 

efforts on the part of the West—and I must say really immense efforts—has broken out of the channel of unity and cooperation 

among the countries of Europe and is now adapting an anti-Western—but ultimately that means anti-globalization and anti-American approach. 

And to understand the importance of this, there was an extremely good article in The Washington Post this week talking 

about the rhetoric that is being used inside China about the West. 

And it turns out to be almost word for word the same rhetoric that 

Russia is using. The same rhetoric is heard in the Middle East. 

And even in India, which we consider to be a very important partner, Putin has been visiting, and the Indian leadership more or less 

agreed with many of the things he was saying. 

So we are talking here not just about a problem with Russia, 

which is an important one. We are talking, in fact—and that is 

why I mentioned Senator Rubio—about a wearing away at the 

50 

foundations of the Western community in Europe but, even more 

so, a wearing away of the ability that the West is going to have 

to influence, control if you will, the content of the new globalized 

world which is coming up. And so that is the main consequence 

that I see in this conflict. 

And my final point would be I am very appreciative of your personal efforts to increase our information budgets, to have Radio 

Liberty and Radio Free Europe be more active. And I think that 

winning back the narrative and using tools such as the ones that 

you are financing is almost as important as considering military 

support for Ukraine, which I support very strongly. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Kornblum follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JOHN C. KORNBLUM

Senator Corker, members of the committee, I am honored to have been invited 

to join your hearing on the crisis in Ukraine. I was a frequent guest of this committee and its members during the 1990s in my role as Assistant Secretary of State 

and Special Envoy to the Balkans. I look forward to our discussion of ways in which 

Russian strategy can be countered. 

In those years, we cooperated to establish conditions for a peaceful, democratic 

transition for nations of the former Warsaw Pact. Congressional support for economic and humanitarian aid to Russia, the economic support funds extended to 

Eastern Europe and the tireless efforts of Senators Nunn, Lugar, and many others 

to reduce the threat of nuclear weapons in the former Soviet Union, including in 

Ukraine, were essential to our success. 

In the London Summit Declaration of July 6, 1990, NATO promised to ‘‘reach out 

to the countries of the East which were our adversaries in the cold war and extend 

to them the hand of friendship.’’ The London document also presented ideas for an 

important strengthening of the OSCE, which were agreed at the Helsinki summit 

2 years later. 

First assessments of conditions in the former Warsaw Pact in 1990 were pessimistic to say the least. These countries had been stripped of their talent and identity and left with few of the structures of modern political or economic life. 

But Western assistance and the dedication of their own peoples worked a near 

miracle. One by one the nations of Central Europe departed intensive care. Today, 

we can be proud of the secure and prosperous democratic community of nearly 1 

billion inhabitants which stretches from the east of Europe to the tip of Alaska. 

Membership of both NATO and the European Union gave these countries the stability and the technical assistance necessary to succeed. It was in no way aimed at 

isolating Russia. 

Many of the Russian leaders with whom we dealt in those years welcomed these 

efforts. They viewed the collapse of the Soviet Union as liberation rather than defeat. They embraced hopes for Western democracy as the best path to both security 

and freedom for their country. 

I repeat this history, because it so contradicts the version of post-cold-war events 

we now often hear. Today it is our economic and political success which threatens 

Russia’s authoritarians rulers, not our soldiers. Those who find logic in Russian criticism of Western behavior 20 years ago have perhaps not asked residents of Estonia 

or Slovakia how they feel about NATO expansion. 

This is why the Russian counterattack, military and digital, has been so vicious. 

Current Russia leaders appear to view the growing encroachment of the Western 

way of life as an existential challenge. 

I am one who favors military assistance to help Ukraine regain its footing. But 

I believe that a substantially expanded public presentation of the facts could be 

equally as important. 

Why? Because at the moment, Putin’s ability to control public perceptions is 

severely hindering efforts to stop the fighting and restore order in Ukraine. And, 

for the moment at least, the West is losing the rhetorical battle. 

Russia has invested immense resources into applying the tools of globalization to 

a massive program of disinformation. It has combined nationalism within Russia, 

with the legend of a proud nation humbled by the evil West and added an extra 

dose of old fashioned anti-Americanism to shoot an unbroken stream of invective 

around the world. 

51 

Putin is also using the same methods to influence the self-styled Western ‘‘realists’’ who seem not to understand that Russia’s anger has little to do with NATO 

or European security structures. Bowing to Putin’s imperial pretensions will do 

nothing to redress the falling oil price, Russia’s failure to invest in new technology 

or the flow of talented scientists and technicians to the West. 

In other words, the Russian attack on Ukraine has already expanded into what 

is probably the world’s first digitally managed diplomatic confrontation. Normal people, rich and poor are increasingly worried that they are losing control of their destinies to something called globalization. Putin has been able to harness these fears 

in a desperate effort to return the narrative to issues of the past. 

He wants us to believe that the crisis is really about the way in which the West 

suppresses countries like Russia which don’t follow the American lead. However farfetched it may seem, this image of Western betrayal is attractive to many non-European and even some European countries who also feel put upon by the West. The 

echo has helped Putin justify his unbroken flow of troops and materiel into Ukraine. 

At the same time, Russian aggression has provided Ukraine one thing which was 

so far lacking—national purpose. 

Unless the United States and its allies wrest the rhetorical high ground from Russia, Mr. Putin is likely to become more arrogant and thus more dangerous. His 

sense of media control could ultimately make him overconfident and prone to disastrous mistakes. Senator Corker I congratulate you for your efforts to strengthen our 

information activities in the region. 

Championing the need to ensure a democratic operating system for digital society 

is today the equivalent of our support for political democracy during the cold war. 

The radical integration of the world through high speed information networks and 

modern logistics is redrawing the global geostrategic map before our very eyes. 

Everyone, including Russia, will profit if we ensure that the principles of Western 

democracy are firmly established as the basis for global integration. If, however, we 

allow the debate to lend credence to those who reject the openness of Western values, it won’t stop at Russia or Ukraine, or even in Europe. China is already mounting a counterattack. We could see the digital world rapidly deconstructing into competing cultural fiefdoms. 

Above all this crisis demonstrates that in a networked world, there are no longer 

any unimportant far away countries. Every place on earth can become central to our 

concerns if the factors line up correctly. One of the main jobs of a new generation 

of digital diplomats will be to learn how to judge the factors which influence such 

network behavior better than we have done so far. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Ambassador. 

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN HERBST, FORMER UNITED STATES 

AMBASSADOR TO UKRAINE; DIRECTOR, DINU PATRICIU 

EURASIA CENTER, THE ATLANTIC COUNCIL, WASHINGTON, 

DC 

Ambassador HERBST. Chairman Corker, Ranking Member 

Menendez, thank you very much for this chance to testify. It is an 

honor to be here. 

I have been asked to talk about Kremlin aggression in Ukraine 

and how to counter it. But in order to take this subject on properly, 

we need a wider lens. The reason for this is simple. There are influential people in the United States and especially in Europe who 

do not understand the gravity of this crisis. They do not understand it because they think the crisis is simply about Ukraine and 

Moscow’s aggression there. With that narrow understanding, they 

oppose the strong measures necessary to counter Kremlin aggression and to secure vital—and I mean vital—American interests, not 

simply important interests. 

The crisis that we face is, as I think almost every Senator today 

said, a crisis of Kremlin revisionism. Mr. Putin does want to overturn the post-cold-war order established in Europe and Eurasia. 

This order has been the foundation of the unprecedented peace and 

52 

prosperity that not just Europe but the entire world has enjoyed 

over the past 25 years. Mr. Putin has stated that he must have a 

sphere of influence in the post-Soviet space, not just the post-Russian world; his concerns extend into the Warsaw Pact countries 

and he has the right to protect ethnic Russians and Russian speakers wherever they reside. 

Mr. Putin has major resources to pursue aggression. He possesses the world’s sixth-largest economy, one of the world’s two 

largest nuclear arsenals, and far and away the strongest military 

in Europe. 

And we all know Mr. Putin has committed multiple acts of aggression in Georgia in 2008, in Crimea early last year, and since 

April of last year, he has been conducting an increasingly overt, 

covert war in Ukraine’s east. 

In this covert war in Ukraine’s east, he has escalated his intervention multiple times. He has agreed to two cease-fires, Minsk I 

and Minsk II, and violated each one of them. His goal in Ukraine 

is what the Admiral said earlier today, to destabilize the country. 

But to achieve that—and this is not clearly understood—he cannot 

settle for a frozen conflict. He needs to be regularly on the offensive, albeit with tactical pauses. 

He has made clear by his statements and his actions that if he 

succeeds in Ukraine, there will be future targets. The targets may 

include NATO allies, specifically Estonia and Latvia, where ethnic 

Russians and Russia speakers comprise 25 percent of the population. 

Recent Kremlin provocations include the kidnapping of an Estonia intelligence official from Estonia. And that happened on the 

day that the NATO summit ended last September. They have also 

included the seizure of a Lithuanian ship from international waters 

of the Baltic Sea. He is telling the Baltic States and all the states 

in his neighborhood that they are not secure even as members of 

NATO. 

We have a vital interest—again I use that word ‘‘vital’’—in stopping Moscow’s revanchist policies before they move to other countries, especially to the Baltic States. 

I think it was Senator Isakson who said that the Kremlin menace is the most important national security danger we face today. 

I endorse that wholeheartedly. ISIL is a ragtag bunch of terrorists, 

a serious danger to individual Americans, not an existential threat 

to the United States. A revanchist Moscow is an existential threat 

to the United States. Even Iran with its nuclear program is not the 

same order of threat as Mr. Putin’s Russia, one of the world’s two 

largest nuclear powers and on the prowl. If Western leaders clearly 

understood this danger, they would devote substantially more resources to deal with it and they would draw a bright redline in 

Ukraine, stop Putin in Ukraine before he moves elsewhere. 

To date, Western policy has been slow, reactive, and all too concerned about giving Mr. Putin a graceful way out of the crisis—and 

not sufficiently focused on imposing costs that would make it too 

expensive for him to continue his aggression. We had a very distinguished panel in the first 2 hours of this session, but they were all 

too reflective of a slow, reactive approach. 

53 

To persuade Mr. Putin to put aside his revisionist dreams, we 

need to do things that play on his weaknesses. Strong sanctions are 

part of this. We have to deal with Mr. Putin’s economy. We must 

persuade Mr. Putin by announcing the strong additional sanctions 

for aggression to come. I think it was Senator Rubio who asked 

why we cannot tell Mr. Putin now what sanctions we will impose 

if he moves beyond the current cease-fire line. He asked a very 

good question. We need to have sanctions in place now if he moves 

again. Such proactive measures may deter aggression; but if he 

moves, they will impose costs for the aggression by weakening his 

economy, weakening his political support at home, and depriving 

him of resources for his next aggression. I give the Obama administration pretty good marks for dealing with sanctions because they 

are trying to pull along a somewhat reluctant Europe. 

The other area we need to work on is on the security side. Mr. 

Putin has a serious vulnerability. The Russian people do not want 

Russian troops fighting in Ukraine. That is why he is lying to 

them. That is why the Russian dead that come back are buried in 

secret. That is why the families of the Russian dead are told that 

if they tell the neighbors that their sons fought and died in 

Ukraine, they will not get death benefits from the government. 

If we provide defensive lethal equipment to Ukraine, that means 

that either Mr. Putin will be deterred from going further into 

Ukraine because he does not want to risk the casualties, and the 

political fallout of the casualties; or if he goes further into Ukraine, 

he suffers those casualties, and his support at home will weaken. 

This is a compelling reason to give weapons to Ukraine. 

Some people who argue against supplying weapons say that if we 

do that, Mr. Putin will simply escalate. Perhaps. But if he escalates, again he suffers more casualties, he weakens his support, 

and he has fewer resources with which to pursue aggression beyond Ukraine. 

I was one of a group of eight former officials who produced a re- port on this. We suggest giving Ukraine $1 billion a year for each 

of the next 3 years, $3 billion of weapons total. The report provides 

the details. I want to mention to this committee just two elements 

of that. 

One, we should be providing antiarmor equipment because the 

Russians have used mass tanks in order to commit their aggression 

in Ukraine. We should also be providing counterbattery radar for 

missiles because Ukrainians have suffered 70 percent of their casualties from Russian missiles. We are giving them counterbattery 

radar for mortars. They need it for missiles. 

We also need to keep in place the sanctions for the seizure of Crimea. And I should add the Atlantic Council just released a report 

on substantial systematic Russian human rights violations in Crimea. 

I would like to briefly mention two other essential elements of 

our policy. We need to do more in NATO to bolster the deterrence 

to Russian aggression against the Baltic States. The administration 

and NATO have taken some good steps forward. The Wales summit 

talked about creating this rapid reaction force and deploying a company of soldiers to the Baltic States. That is a nice first step but 

it is very small. We should put a battalion into Estonia and the 

54 

other Baltic States, properly armed as a serious trip wire against 

further Russian aggression. We need to make sure that NATO has 

a contingency plan dealing for a possible Russia hybrid war in the 

Baltic States. Especially vulnerable is Narva in Estonia, which is 

a Russian-speaking enclave. 

Finally, we need to do the right thing in the information war 

against Russia. John already mentioned that. I know that this committee supports additional funding for Radio Free Europe and 

Radio Liberty. This is important to offsetting the massive Russian 

propaganda campaign. 

These four steps, enhanced sanctions, military supplies to 

Ukraine, a much stronger military posture in NATO’s east, and a 

ramped-up information effort, will give us a good, good start in 

stopping Mr. Putin in Ukraine, making sure he does not go beyond 

Ukraine. Again, this is a vital American interest. 

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Herbst follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JOHN E. HERBST

Chairman Corker, Ranking Member Menendez, members of the committee, thank 

you for the invitation to speak this morning. It is an honor. 

I have been asked to speak about the Kremlin’s aggression in Ukraine and how 

the United States should counter this. In order to take on this subject properly, we 

need a wider focus. I will try to provide that wider focus here. 

Over 1 year has passed since Moscow began its invasion of Ukraine, introducing 

to the world a new term: ‘‘little green men.’’ Using these troops over 11 months ago, 

the Kremlin began its hybrid war in Ukraine’s east. The political class in Washington, policymakers, and influence wielders are slowly coming to understand what 

is going on. In the most powerful capitals in Europe, the process is even slower. 

Only in the eastern reaches of Europe—Poland, the Baltic States, Romania, 

Moldova, Georgia—is the crisis in Ukraine properly understood. That is no surprise. 

Proper understanding of the crisis and an adequate response is essential for the 

very survival of these states. 

Ukraine, the states of the former Soviet Union, NATO, and the EU face the problem of Kremlin revisionism. President Putin has stated on numerous occasions his 

dissatisfaction with the peace in Europe and Eurasia established at the end of the 

cold war. He has at his disposal substantial means for acting on his dissatisfaction 

and most important of all, he has used those means. It is time policymakers in 

major capitals understood this. 

THE POST-COLD-WAR ORDER

What is the post-cold-war order that Mr. Putin finds so objectionable? It is the 

peace that emerged just before and after the dissolution of the Soviet Union with 

the following traits: 

• The countries that were subservient to Moscow in the Warsaw Pact pursued 

independent internal and foreign policies; 

• Due to an agreement accepted by the leaders of Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and 

Kazakhstan, the Soviet Union dissolved and its constituent republics became 

independent states. (It is important to note that this decision was taken exclusively by Russian and other leaders in the Soviet Union. The West played no 

part in this and then President George H.W. Bush even advised against it.); 

• It was understood that disputes in Europe would be resolved only by negotiations and other peaceful means; 

• The tensions and geopolitical competition that characterized 20th century 

Europe and made it history’s bloodiest were a thing of the past; 

• To reduce political tensions and to promote prosperity, European integration 

would continue, including the countries of the former Soviet bloc; and 

• Russia and the West were now partners, and ever closer relations were in 

prospect. 

55 

THE PUTIN DOCTRINE

Mr. Putin, senior Russian officials, and commentators have made their views of 

the post-cold-war order clear. In numerous statements Mr. Putin and other senior 

Russia officials have: 

• Called for a Russian sphere of influence in the former Soviet space; • Described Georgia, Ukraine, and now Kazakhstan as failed or artificial states; • Asserted Moscow’s right and even duty to protect not just ethnic Russians, but 

Russian speakers wherever they happen to reside. (Russian speakers make up 

25 percent of the population of Kazakhstan; as well as our NATO allies Estonia 

and Latvia. There are also significant Russian populations in countries that 

used to be part of the Soviet Union.); and • Called for new rules for the post-cold-war order, or ‘‘there will be no rules.’’ 

THE KREMLIN TOOL BOX FOR UNDERMINING THE PEACE OF EUROPE AND EURASIA

To understand the challenges posed by a country, it is necessary to understand 

not only its intention, but also its potential. To his credit, Mr. Putin has overseen 

the rebirth of a strong Russia. He has accomplished this by establishing some stability in the political system; instituting sound fiscal policies; permitting, within certain limits, entrepreneurs to make business decisions; and inviting Western investors. He was also a major beneficiary of the rise of gas and oil prices. 

Mr. Putin presides over the world’s sixth-largest economy. He controls one of the 

world’s two-largest nuclear arsenals, the strongest conventional military in Europe, 

and the worlds’ second-largest arms industry. In short, Mr. Putin’s revisionist intentions are supported by a substantial economy—albeit one under pressure due to falling hydrocarbon prices—and one of the world’s three most powerful militaries. 

Were Moscow’s attack on the post-cold-war order purely rhetorical, it would be 

problematic, but manageable. Unfortunately, this assault has been comprehensive. 

It involves Russia’s information apparatus, intelligence services, criminal networks, 

business community, and military. 

The heavily subsidized Russian media has been conducting a virulent anti-Western and particularly anti-American campaign for years. Mr. Putin’s media have 

fanned xenophobia and intolerance throughout Russia. This campaign has been part 

of Mr. Putin’s effort to (1) reduce the chance that the Russian people are attracted 

to democratic ideas, and (2) mobilize the Russian people to support his aggression 

in neighboring countries. 

Russian intelligence services and connected criminal networks play an important 

part in Mr. Putin’s efforts to undermine the post-cold-war order. First, we should 

note that the very organization of Moscow’s intelligence agencies provides a clue to 

its intentions. The Soviet Union’s intelligence service (the KGB) was split in half. 

The FSB was given responsibility for domestic security. The SVR was given responsibility for foreign intelligence. The fact that the independent states of the former 

Soviet Union were the responsibility of the FSB tells us what Moscow thinks of 

their independence. 

A main purpose of the FSB—and the GRU, Russian military intelligence—is to 

penetrate the security organs of the neighboring states to ensure that they will promote Russian interests as defined by the Kremlin. That includes, as we have seen 

in Ukraine, making sure that the military, police, and intelligence will not mobilize 

against Russian-led insurrection or invasion. 

Corruption, a major feature of Mr. Putin’s Russia, is an important tool for the 

Kremlin in promoting its influence in the Near Abroad. The Kremlin understands 

that corrupt foreign officials are more pliant. Cooperation between Russian intelligence services and criminal organizations figures here. For instance, the siphoning 

off of vast resources from the gas sector into private hands has created a huge scandal in Russia and Ukraine. Shadowy companies—Eural Trans Gas, RosUkrEnergo— 

were set up as operators in a scheme put together by Semion Mogilevich, a major 

Russian crime boss. 

As he consolidated power in Moscow, Mr. Putin established that Russian companies were subject to Kremlin control to promote objectives abroad. Gas and oil production is the heart of Russia’s economy. Mr. Putin has used these assets to promote 

his foreign policy in a number of ways. He has built gas pipelines to Western 

Europe around Ukraine and even ally Belarus so that he can use gas as a weapon 

against these countries, while maintaining access to his wealthy customers in the 

West. He has hired shameless senior European officials to work as front men in his 

companies. 

Gazprom has established business practices regarding the carrying of Central 

Asian gas in its pipelines and the delivery of gas to European customers that violate 

EU energy policy and maximizes Russian leverage in dealing with individual counVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:22 Oct 08, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00059 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\FULL COMMITTEE\HEARING FILES\114FIRST\2015 ISSUE HEARINGS GONE TO PRES
56 

tries. For instance, Gazprom practices have made it harder for European countries 

to supply gas to Ukraine. This is done so that the Kremlin can punish Kyiv by cutting off the supply of gas. Lucrative arrangements with specific companies in select 

EU countries also build constituencies that will support Kremlin foreign policies. 

As a last resort, of course, Mr. Putin has modernized and rebuilt the Russian military; and he has not hesitated to use it in pursuit of his revisionist objectives in 

Georgia and Ukraine. 

THE KREMLIN RECORD BEFORE THE UKRAINE CRISIS

The crisis in Ukraine originated not in Ukraine, but in the minds of Mr. Putin 

and the Russian security elite that find the post-cold-war order unacceptable. While 

the broad extent of today’s crisis is Mr. Putin’s responsibility, its roots go back to 

imperialist thinking in Russian security circles since the dissolution of the Soviet 

Union. 

In this respect, I commend to the committee Serhii Plokhy’s excellent work, ‘‘The 

Last Empire: The Final Days of the Soviet Union.’’ Dr. Plokhy describes how even 

Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin objected to Ukraine’s 1991 referendum, in 

which 91 percent of the Ukrainians , including 54 percent in Crimea, voted for independence from the Soviet Union (and Russia). It is worth noting, too, that when the 

results of the Ukrainian referendum became clear, these two relatively liberal Russian politicians began to assert Moscow’s right to protect Russians in Ukraine—the 

same ‘‘principle’’ that Mr. Putin has been using to justify his aggression. 

From the very first days of the post-Soviet world, Moscow’s security services developed the ‘‘frozen conflict’’ tactic to limit the sovereignty of its neighbors. It supported Armenian separatists in the Azerbaijan region of Nagorno-Karabakh in order 

to exert pressure on Azeris, South Ossetians, Ajarians, and the Abkhaz in Georgia 

to pressure Tbilisi, and the Slavs in Transnistria to keep Chisinau in check. For 

those who mistakenly blame current tensions with Moscow on the West, it is worth 

noting that Moscow had its frozen conflicts policy in place before discussions of 

NATO enlargement. 

Russian activity in the Near Abroad in the 1990s was just a prelude to Mr. 

Putin’s policies. He unleashed a massive cyber attack on Estonia in 2007 to express 

his unhappiness with a decision to take down a memorial to the Red Army in 

Tallinn. This attack took full advantage of the security service-criminal nexus in 

Russia described above. (Due to corruption, Russia, a nation rich in mathematicians, 

has not produced a world-class cyber company, but it does have the world’s best 

hackers.). While it was clear that the attack in Estonia originated in Moscow, the 

West chose not to state this clearly or to make it an issue in its relationship with 

Mr. Putin. 

In 2008, Moscow provoked a conflict with Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili 

and used its army to defeat the Georgian military. In that same year, Moscow recognized Georgia’s breakaway regions as independent. Moscow’s aggression was condemned in the West, albeit to varying degrees. It is both amusing and sad to note 

in retrospect that then-French President Nicolas Sarkozy agreed to sell Moscow 

the Mistral aircraft carrier as a reward for observing the cease-fire that he had 

negotiated. 

This episode revealed a weakness of Western diplomacy toward Russia that Mr. 

Putin has been exploiting regularly in the current Ukrainian crisis. Mr. Putin commits an act of aggression, threatens further aggression, and then graciously accepts 

Western gifts in exchange for not escalating the violence. While the American 

response to Mr. Putin’s aggression was not craven, President Obama launched his 

naive reset with Mr. Putin only a year after the Georgian war. 

MR. PUTIN’S UKRAINE ADVENTURE AND THE WEST’S REACTION

Mr. Putin’s adventure in Ukraine began when he decided at some point in 2013 

that it would be unacceptable for Ukraine to sign a trade agreement with the EU. 

This prospect had not disturbed him in the past. When I served as Ambassador in 

Ukraine, it was clear that Moscow strongly opposed NATO membership for Ukraine, 

but it had not taken a position against EU membership for the country. And of 

course, the prospective trade agreement was a good deal short of membership. It 

is important to remember this when reading the arguments of those who claim that 

this crisis is actually due to NATO enlargement. 

Most Ukrainians, including then President Yanukovych, who was often described 

as pro-Kremlin (a simplification), wanted the EU deal. Partly due to Kremlin pressure—Moscow had been banning Ukrainian exports—Mr. Yanukovych backed away 

from the trade deal in late November 2013. The next day, there were tens of thousands of demonstrators on the streets of Kyiv protesting this decision. When Mr. 

57 

Yanukovych tried to clear the streets with strong-arm policing, he roused hundreds 

of thousands of demonstrators, tired of his corrupt and increasingly authoritarian 

rule. Mr. Putin’s offers of lower gas prices and a loan of $15 billion did not satisfy 

the demonstrators. For 2 months Mr. Yanukovych alternated between police methods and inadequate concessions to persuade the protestors to go home. He failed. 

Sergei Glaziyev, Mr. Putin’s principal adviser on Ukraine, was publicly urging Mr. 

Yanukovych to use force to deal with the protesters. 

Finally in late February 2014, Mr. Yanukovych either permitted or ordered the 

use of sniper fire to terrorize the protesters into leaving the streets. A hundred people died as a result. But the demonstrators did not leave the streets; they were 

enraged and Mr. Yanukovych’s political support collapsed. He fled the country a few 

days later for Russia. 

In response, the Kremlin launched its invasion of Crimea with ‘‘little green men,’’ 

who looked like and were equipped like Russian soldiers, but without the insignias 

and flags of the Russian military. The United States and Europe placed some mild 

economic sanctions on Russia in response. They were also making every effort in 

private diplomacy and public statements to offer Mr. Putin an ‘‘off ramp’’ for the 

crisis. That the West had such a tender regard for Mr. Putin’s dignity was not unnoticed in the Kremlin and certainly made Mr. Putin’s decision to launch his hybrid 

war in the Donbass easier. The Sarkozy model was holding and has yet to be 

broken. 

Since Mr. Putin launched his decreasingly covert war in Ukraine’s East, he has 

escalated his intervention several times. It began last April with Russian leadership, arms, and money. When Ukraine launched its counteroffensive under newly 

elected President Poroshenko last June, the Kremlin sent in increasingly sophisticated weapons (including the missile system that shot down the Malaysian airliner 

in July), more mercenaries (including the Vostok Battalion of Chechens), and finally 

the Russian Army itself in August. Only the use of regular Russian forces stopped 

the Ukrainian counteroffensive. Throughout this period, the West was slow and 

weak in confronting the Kremlin. For instance, the G–7 leaders had warned Mr. 

Putin in early June that if he did not cease his intervention in Ukraine by the end 

of the month, Russia would face sectoral sanctions. Yet by the end of June, despite 

the introduction of major Russian weapons systems into Ukraine, there was no more 

talk of sectoral sanctions. Only the downing of the Malaysian passenger jet in July 

and the invasion by Russian troops persuaded the Europeans to put those sanctions 

in place. 

After the regular Russian forces defeated the Ukrainian Army in early September, 

Germany and France helped negotiate the Minsk I cease-fire. However, Russia 

repeatedly violated its agreement by introducing more military equipment and supplies into Ukraine and taking an additional 500 square kilometers of Ukrainian territory. This escalated aggression did not lead to any additional sanctions last year. 

Despite the Russian offensive that greeted the New Year, EU foreign policy chief 

Mogherini was floating the idea of easing sanctions. As the violence increased, Ms. 

Mogherini dropped the subject. But in February, Germany and France helped negotiate a new cease-fire, Minsk II, with terms far worse for Ukraine. Mr. Putin certainly enjoyed this process. The Sarkozy pattern was unbroken. For violating Minsk 

I, Mr. Putin received a much more favorable cease-fire, which he promptly violated 

by seizing the strategic town of Debaltseve. And why not? While Western leaders 

huff and puff at each new Kremlin aggression, they hope out loud that this is the 

last one. And then, occasionally they levy additional sanctions on Russia. 

WHAT THE WEST SHOULD EXPECT NEXT FROM THE KREMLIN

Nowhere has Mr. Putin stated clearly what he needs to stop his war against 

Ukraine. Western leaders have fallen all over themselves offering solutions publicly 

and privately to assuage the Russian strongman, but to no avail. There is a simple 

reason for this. Mr. Putin’s objective in Ukraine is, at a maximum, to establish a 

compliant regime in Kyiv. This is something that he cannot achieve, because a large 

majority of Ukrainian citizens despise him for the bloody war that he unleashed. 

His minimum objective is to destabilize the country, so that it cannot effectively 

reform itself and orient its policy toward Europe. 

Mr. Putin has not stated these objectives formally, because they are things he 

cannot admit in polite society. But destabilizing Ukraine means that he cannot sit 

still in the territories that have already been conquered by his proxies. He has to 

continually stir the pot by military action and/or terrorism/subversion. A good example of terror was the bombs set off in Kharkiv that killed demonstrators at last 

month’s rally honoring those killed by snipers on Kyiv’s Maidan Square. 

58 

Leaders in Washington, London, Berlin, and Paris need to understand what their 

counterparts in Warsaw, Riga, Tallinn, and Vilnius understand: that Kremlin ambitions go beyond Ukraine. If the West does not stop Mr. Putin now, they will find 

him revising the post-cold-war order elsewhere. It is time to break the Sarkozy 

pattern. 

Mr. Putin is not hiding his ambitions. While we do not know precisely where he 

may move next, we know the candidates. The Kremlin has proclaimed its right to 

a sphere of influence throughout the post-Soviet space, as well as its right to protect 

ethnic Russians and Russian-speakers wherever they reside. This just happens to 

include the entire post-Soviet space, including some countries that were never part 

of the Soviet Union, but were members of the Warsaw Pact. Kazakhstan’s Russianspeaking Slavic community is 25 percent of its population. The same is true in Estonia and Latvia. 

Last August, Mr. Putin called Kazakhstan an artificial country created by the 

genius of President Nazarbayev. Mr. Putin noted that Russians in Kazakhstan faced 

no ill treatment under President Nazarbayev, but speculated that problems could 

arise once he passes the scene. Kazakhstan’s Slavs are located along the border with 

Russia, in areas that contain a good percentage of the country’s oil resources. Just 

as the West’s weak reaction to Moscow’s Georgian invasion emboldened Mr. Putin 

to strike in Ukraine, so too will a Western-tolerated Kremlin victory in Ukraine 

endanger the former states of the Soviet Union. Is that an acceptable outcome for 

Western statesmen? 

The danger goes beyond the grey zone, to states that enjoy membership in the 

EU and NATO. While never recognized by the United States, Estonia, Latvia, and 

Lithuania were incorporated into the Soviet Union; and two of those states have 

large Slavic communities. A good number of serious thinkers and statesmen say 

that Mr. Putin’s reach will not extend to the Baltic States, because they are members of NATO and have Article 5 protection under the NATO Charter. That is, of 

course, a critical deterrent, but does Mr. Putin understand this? 

Mr. Putin has wondered publicly, as have other senior Russian officials, why 

NATO is still in existence. After all, they opine, it was created to stop the Soviet 

Union, which dissolved 25 years ago. It is no secret that the Kremlin would like 

to weaken the alliance. Mr. Putin has been playing games in the Baltics to probe 

for weaknesses and to challenge the applicability of Article 5. The list is not small. 

In 2007, he unleashed the devastating cyber attack on Estonia. Last September, on 

the day that the NATO summit ended (2 days after the visit of President Obama 

to Tallinn), the Kremlin seized an Estonian counterintelligence officer from Estonia. 

A few weeks later, Russia seized a Lithuanian ship from international waters in the 

Baltic Sea. 

WHAT THE UNITED STATES AND THE WEST MUST DO

First, Western leaders need to understand the nature of Mr. Putin’s threat. In 

charge of one of the world’s most formidable militaries and a large economy, he is 

intent on upsetting the post-cold-war order. He represents a threat to global order 

far larger than ISIL, and notably larger than a radical-Mullah-run Iran seeking 

nuclear weapons. NATO statesmen who labeled ISIL and not Russia an existential 

threat to the alliance will be figures of fun for future historians. 

Recognizing this means that we will cease to take seriously the argument that 

we must let Mr. Putin violate the sovereignty of multiple neighbors in order to get 

his help with Iran and ISIL. It would also mean that we would spend more 

resources dealing with the Kremlin menace than we devote to ISIL. 

This last point is especially important in the intelligence area. The intelligence 

resources that we devote to an aggressive nuclear superpower is significantly less 

than what we use to monitor a rag tag bunch of terrorists numbering no more than 

20,000. It also matters when looking at financial and military support for Ukraine, 

as we will discuss below. 

If we understand that Mr. Putin’s ambitions extend to the entire post-Soviet 

space, including perhaps our Baltic NATO allies, we recognize that we have significant interest in stopping Mr. Putin’s aggression in Ukraine. We do not want Mr. 

Putin’s grasping hand extending to additional countries, and we have a vital interest in stopping him if he moves against Estonia, Latvia, or Lithuania. It is very 

much in our interest to make his life so uncomfortable in Ukraine that the Kremlin 

thinks twice about additional aggression. 

First, on Ukraine. 

59 

SANCTIONS

In Ukraine, our short- and middle-term objectives should be to prevent further 

Russian aggression, which will allow President Poroshenko to reform and develop 

Ukraine in peace. That is not easy to do, since Mr. Putin’s plan is precisely the opposite, to keep the pot boiling. Our policy should not be to refrain from taking any 

‘‘provocative’’ action, in the hopes that this time the Kremlin will actually observe 

the Minsk II cease-fire. This approach has failed multiple times for over a year. It 

guarantees that the crisis will escalate, because the only world leader who believes 

that there is a military solution to the Ukraine crisis has an office in Red Square. 

To increase the odds that Mr. Putin does not move beyond the current cease-fire 

line, we must address his vulnerabilities. He has at least two. First of all, his implicit deal with the Russian people is that he delivers prosperity and they let him 

rule the country. The Russian economy is under serious pressure today because of 

the sectoral sanctions levied last summer by the United States and EU, in addition 

to the sharp fall of hydrocarbon prices. The sanctions will bite harder with time, 

especially if oil prices remain low. 

The last serious sanctions were put in place lasts September. Since then, Moscow 

has taken over 500 square kilometers of additional Ukrainian territory and violated 

both the Minsk I and II cease-fires. For that, both the United States and the EU 

should either level additional sectoral sanctions or extend last year’s sectoral sanctions. In response to the latest Kremlin aggression, the EU renewed some sanctions 

imposed last spring early. That was not enough. Besides additional major sanctions 

for the substantial aggression over the past 6 months, it is time for the United 

States and Europe to take the initiative. Specifically, they should reach agreement 

on new sanctions that will be imposed if the Kremlin’s proxies seize Mariupol or 

any additional territory in Ukraine. This might serve as a deterrent for the 

Kremlin. 

Part of this deterrent could include a public discussion of removing Russia from 

the SWIFT system of financial payments. Actually barring Russia from SWIFT 

would have a devastating impact on Moscow’s economy; it would also be controversial globally. But an effort by the United States to put it on the agenda would create 

substantial pressure on Moscow and encourage the Europeans to be less cautious 

in applying additional sectoral sanctions. 

It is important to note here that the Obama administration has done a good job 

in regards to sanctions. It understands that the key to success is to make sure that 

both the United States and the EU sanction Russia. I fully understand that there 

is reluctance in corners of the EU to do so. The administration has worked hard, 

and largely with success, to impose sanctions in tandem with Europe. But as 

described above, the process has been too slow. 

MILITARY ASSISTANCE

Mr. Putin’s second vulnerability concerns the use of his army in Ukraine. While 

his media have spread a sea of vitriol among the people of Russia, it has not been 

able to persuade them that Russian troops should be used in Ukraine. Since last 

summer, numerous polls by Moscow’s Levada Center have shown that a large majority of the Russian people oppose using troops in Ukraine. Since his people do not 

want Russian troops in Ukraine, he is telling them that no troops are there. He is 

lying to his people. Thousands of regular Russian troops were used in August and 

September to stop Ukraine’s counteroffensive. Our intelligence now estimates that 

there are anywhere from 250 to 1,000 Russian officers in Ukraine. Ukrainian intelligence claims that there are as many as 9,000 or 10,000 Russian troops in Ukraine. 

I am not endorsing the higher figures. I do believe, however, that since we are not 

devoting enough intelligence assets to the Russia menace, our numbers are far from 

certain; and if they err, it is likely on the low side. 

In any case, Russian casualties are a vulnerability for Mr. Putin. He is burying 

his dead in secret. More casualties make this harder to do. What this amounts to, 

is that we should give Ukraine defensive, lethal aid, so that is may defend itself. 

I was one of a group of eight former U.S. officials who issued a report urging the 

Obama administration to provide $1 billion in defensive arms, including lethal 

equipment, to Ukraine for the next 3 years. For a major national security priority, 

$1 billion a year is not a great deal of money. In the first 6 months of Operation 

Inherent Resolve against ISIL, the United States spent $1.5 billion. 

The purpose is to deter further aggression—and to stabilize the situation in the 

rest of Ukraine. Opponents of this idea argue that this would not deter the Mr. 

Putin, because the Kremlin has escalation advantage, and Ukraine is more important to Russia than the United States. It may be true that Ukraine is more important to Moscow than Washington, but it is not more important to Moscow than to 

60 

Kyiv. Kyiv and the Ukrainian people will continue to fight the aggressors. Why do 

we want to disadvantage the victim of aggression by denying them arms? 

Some opponents of providing weapons argue that Kremlin military strength 

means that it can defeat any weapons system we provide. And if that happens, it 

would be geopolitical defeat for the United States. This is simply false. We can pursue a policy of weapons supply without taking responsibility for securing Moscow’s 

defeat. We can provide weapons while making clear that we have no intention of 

using American troops. This was the successful rationale behind the Reagan Doctrine, which challenged Soviet overreach in Third World conflicts around the globe 

by providing weapons. 

The last point is this. If we understand that Mr. Putin’s aim of revising the postcold-war order may mean aggression in countries beyond Ukraine, it is very much 

in our interest to make his experience in Ukraine as painful as possible. That will 

make him more vulnerable at home and will leave him with fewer resources for mischief elsewhere. 

The Obama administration is reviewing its position on weapons for Ukraine. 

Many senior figures in the administration support this. It is time for the White 

House to make the decision to send weapons to Ukraine. Chancellor Merkel made 

clear during her visit to Washington last month, that while she opposes the supply 

of weapons to Ukraine, she would work to ensure that such a decision by the United 

States did not undermine transatlantic unity. 

Such military equipment must include light antiarmor weapons—the massing of 

Russian tanks was critical as Moscow’s proxies seized Debaltseve in violation of 

Minsk II—and counterbattery radar for long range missiles. Seventy percent of 

Ukrainian casualties come from missile and artillery fire. The report also recommends sending armored Humvees, secure communications equipment, equipment to 

jam Russian unmanned aerial vehicles, and medical supplies. 

Within the U.S. Government, Congress has taken the lead on the supply of weapons for Ukraine, when it passed the Ukraine Freedom Support Act. That bill authorized the expenditure of USD 340M for weapons. Congress may need to act once 

again. But this time it is essential to pass legislation that both authorizes and 

appropriates USD 3B over 3 years. This is the most pressing national security danger at the moment. Congress needs to appropriate resources. 

There is also a critical economic element in the Ukraine crisis. This involves both 

comprehensive reform in Ukraine and Western assistance to help Ukraine pay its 

short-term international debt. I have not dwelt on this here because this testimony 

focusses on the broader Kremlin danger. But it is important to note that the West 

needs strongly encourage the Poroshenko/Yatsenyuk team to implement reform and 

provide the necessary financing on the debt problem. 

In addition, while focusing on stabilizing the security situation in Ukraine’s East, 

the West must not recognize in any way Moscow’s annexation of Crimea. The 

United States and Europe can support the people of Crimea by: 

• Maintaining the sanctions already passed in response to the Kremlin’s taking 

of Crimea; 

• Refusing to confer legitimacy on Moscow’s control of Crimea, just as the United 

States refused accept the to recognize the Soviet Union’s ‘‘incorporation’’ of the 

Baltic States after the signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact; 

• Passing legislation forbidding its citizens and companies from conducting business with Russian authorities and companies in Crimea, except when the Government of Ukraine agrees; 

• Making sure that their courts are open to suits by the government, companies, 

and citizens of Ukraine for the use of Crimean assets and resources by the Russian Government and others not authorized by the government of Ukraine. 

COUNTERING REVISIONISM BEYOND UKRAINE

The United States must act in two different geopolitical areas beyond Ukraine to 

deal with Moscow’s revanchist tendencies. Most importantly, we must act decisively 

to strengthen NATO and deterrence in the new members of the alliance, especially 

the Baltic States. Since the Kremlin offensive in Ukraine’s East began last spring, 

NATO has taken a number of positive steps in this direction. Last April, the Pentagon deployed infantry units of 150 troops to Poland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. This is a ‘‘persistent,’’ but rotating deployment. Washington is also planning 

on deploying 150 Abrams tanks and Bradley fighting vehicles to Poland. Air patrols 

in the Baltic States have tripled in the past year. And more NATO ships are entering the Black Sea than in the past. 

These are all good measures. So too was the decision at the Wales summit to create a rapid response force that could deploy 5,000 soldiers within 48 hours; and the 

61 

decision by NATO Defense Ministers last month to place some headquarters’ functions in Bulgaria, Romania, Poland, and the Baltic States. 

Still, two more steps are needed in the short term. First the deployment thus far 

is too small. During the cold war, our ‘‘trip wire’’ force in Germany was 200,000 

troops. We should put forward in the Baltics at least a fully equipped battalion. Of 

even more importance, we need a quickly but carefully worked contingency plan for 

the appearance of Kremlin provocateurs among the Slavic population of Estonia or 

Latvia. This plan should include elements for small provocations, such as the kidnapping of the Estonian intelligence official. We should also work within the alliance to achieve agreement to formally review the NATO–Russia Founding Act if 

Moscow’s proxies seize significant territory in Ukraine. 

The second area that requires a new policy is that grey zone in Eastern Europe, 

the Caucasus, and Central Asia where Moscow claims a sphere of influence. Do 

Western policymakers believe that Moscow has a right to order things in this area 

as it chooses—never mind the preferences of the other states? If not, the United 

States, NATO, and the EU need to consider measures that will strengthen these 

countries. Some are relatively simple. Countries interested in a stronger United 

States and/or NATO security connection would certainly welcome more American or 

NATO military visits. For Georgia that might mean more port visits by a more 

proactive NATO presence in the Black Sea. In Central Asia, that might mean more 

CENTCOM visits for Uzbekistan. We might enhance cooperation with all interested 

Central Asian states in offsetting the potential destabilizing impact of our withdrawal from Afghanistan. While this may seem counterintuitive, this last initiative 

need not exclude the Kremlin. Indeed we can also help strengthen some nations on 

Russia’s periphery by projects that include the Kremlin. This would also demonstrate that our policies are designed not just to discourage Kremlin aggression, 

but also to seek cooperation on matters of mutual interest. 

Policy in the grey zone should also focus on state weaknesses that Moscow 

exploits in order to exert its control. As discussed above, the Kremlin uses its intelligence services to recruit agents in the power ministries of the post-Soviet states; 

and its uses its firms to acquire key sectors’ of these countries’ economies and to 

buy political influence. With interested countries, the United States and NATO 

should offer programs to help vet the security services and military in order to 

establish that they are under the full control of the political leaders in these states. 

At the same time, the United States and the EU offer programs to uncover corruption in the financial and other sectors’ of these countries’ economies. 

A FINAL POLICY RECOMMENDATION

There is one more element of Mr. Putin’s aggressive policy that needs to be 

addressed: the weaponization of information. An admitted admirer of Nazi propagandist Joseph Goebbels, Mr. Putin has gained nearly complete control over the 

Russian media and turned it into an instrument promoting extreme nationalism. Its 

disinformation has been successful especially at home, but also in neighboring countries. The budget for broadcasts by Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty in Russian 

and other languages of the former Soviet Empire was sharply curtailed after the 

dissolution of the Soviet Union. At the time, that made sense. It no longer does. 

In response to the crisis in Ukraine, the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG) 

in FY15 increased its budget for Russian-language programming by 49 percent to 

USD 23.2M. It will be asking for an additional USD 15.4M for FY 2016. I would 

certainly endorse this request for additional funds, but would also suggest that Congress reach out to the BBG to see if, in fact, more resources are not required. 

A KREMLIN PROBLEM, NOT A RUSSIA PROBLEM

The challenge that we face is rooted in Mr. Putin’s style of leadership, a style 

which privileges the security services, with their neoimperial policy preferences, 

criminal connections, and disdain for civil society and democracy. None of the policies recommended in this paper are directed against the people of Russia. The 

assassination of Boris Nemtsov last month is a reminder of a truth uttered by the 

great Russian historian, Vasiliy Klyuchevskiy, in his lectures on Russian history. He 

observed that the expansion of the Russian state abroad is inversely proportional 

to the development of freedom for the Russian people. In other words, expansion 

abroad means repression at home. That is certainly the pattern that Mr. Putin has 

established. Opposing Mr. Putin’s aggressive policies is not only vital to our national 

security, but a service for the Russian people as well. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you both for outstanding testimony. 

62 

And I am going to defer questions at this moment to Senator 

Menendez. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank 

you both for your service to our country at different times. 

It is always a pleasure to welcome another Tennessean here to 

the hearing room. You have a great Tennessean here as the chairman, and you should all be very proud of him. 

Ambassador Herbst, let me just ask you. I think you laid out a 

pretty compelling case and probably did it better than I have been 

successful in trying to do in terms of the importance of it. You 

spent time in Kyiv as our Ambassador. You had a lot of opportunities to observe President Putin’s behavior toward its neighbors. If 

I were to ask you to—and you have largely, I think, already referred to his intentions, but would you expect, for example, if unchecked, Russian forces to move into Mariupol? 

Ambassador HERBST. Mr. Putin cannot accept a frozen conflict. 

A frozen conflict is a bad outcome. But with a frozen conflict, 

Ukraine could develop as a democratic, prosperous state, and that 

is what Mr. Putin is against. So he has to move beyond the area 

he currently controls. 

Mariupol is the most likely target but not the only one. He could 

move further into the northern parts of the Donbass. The Russians 

have been conducting a terror campaign in Kharkiv. Kharkiv is arguably the second largest city in the whole country, but the Russians have been unable to establish a clear presence there. But 

they will continue to probe there. They will move wherever they 

can with the least casualties to themselves and the least uproar in 

Europe. We need to provide Ukraine the means to stop that from 

happening. Otherwise, Mr. Putin will continue to go forward. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Let me ask you to answer two questions that 

are also often poised in a contrary view to mine, that providing defensive lethal weapons to Ukraine would create serious problems 

with Europe or that providing such weapons would just lead Russia 

to further escalate. What would you say in response to those questions? 

Ambassador HERBST. I will start with the second because the answer is quicker. Mr. Putin has escalated half a dozen times precisely because he has not had any pushback. If we push back, I am 

not going to say Mr. Putin will not escalate. We do not know what 

he will do. But the chances of him escalating go down. That is the 

second question. 

As for the first question, I watched very carefully Chancellor 

Merkel’s visit to Washington in February. She said ‘‘that she opposes sending weapons to Ukraine.’’ She also said that if the 

United States were to do that, she would work hard to make sure 

that there is no transatlantic disharmony. That is an amber light, 

a light which we can go through because she understands the 

United States may ultimately make the intelligent decision to provide Ukraine the weapons needed to defend itself. I do not have 

any doubt that we can manage the alliance on this issue. What you 

need is strong leadership, which unfortunately we have not seen, 

strong leadership from Washington in Europe, in NATO. With that, 

this is manageable. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

63 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, gentlemen, I apologize for not having questions at this moment. I have got to get to a meeting at 12:45. This 

has been a very long, but a very informative meeting. I want to 

thank you both for your testimony, and if you would, we will have 

some written questions we would like for you to respond to. 

I do think the strategy that you have laid out, Ambassador, is 

very clear, very helpful. I think, Ambassador Kornblum, the insights into what is driving Russia were also very helpful. We appreciate both of you for your service to our country, for being here 

as an asset to us as we try to serve our country. 

And with that, the record for this hearing will be open until 

March the 12th. So if people have questions, they can send those 

in and hopefully you will respond promptly to those. 

We thank you again for being here. 

The meeting is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:38 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

PREPARED STATEMENT OF OLEXANDER MOTSYK, AMBASSADOR OF UKRAINE

Distinguished Senators, ladies and gentlemen, let me start with expression of 

gratitude for your continued support of Ukraine in this difficult time of its young 

history. Last year was a period of unprecedented challenges to global order and 

international law, which Russian aggression against my country brought about. But 

it was also a time of strong unity of the civilized world in the face of fundamental 

threat to democracy and peace. 

This threat has emerged as a response to aspirations of the Ukrainian nation to 

return to its European roots. The Revolution of Dignity on Kyiv’s Maidan has 

evoked admiration around the globe as an unbreakable ambition to break with the 

past and strive for prosperous future. At the same time, it was perceived as an existential threat by the Russian leadership which deems liberty and democracy as 

obstacles on a path to realization of its goals. 

A year of Russian aggression has undeniably revealed the true intentions of Moscow’s actions. Its persistence in spite of Western sanctions and international isolation shows that Russia will use any means necessary to forestall democratic development of Ukraine. The primary goal is to prevent Ukraine’s European integration, 

keep it in Russia’s orbit, or dismember it altogether. 

The Kremlin uses any means to fulfill this task, including the attempted illegal 

annexation of our sovereign territory of Crimea, manufacturing conflict, based on 

false pretext, in eastern Ukraine and directly participating in it by flooding the 

region with weapons, military equipment, mercenaries, Russian armed forces and 

resorting to vicious propaganda campaign. 

The character of Russia’s geopolitical calculation show that despite the central 

role of Ukraine, it is only one of the key elements in the implementation of its strategic objective—restoration of new form of the Soviet Union by creating a circle of 

instability in the region. In the 21st century, when progress is achieved through 

cooperation and measured by well-being, Russia resorts to force, coercion, intimidation, and violation of international law as the means of imposing its will on the 

global arena. Chances are high that this line of action will not be limited to Ukraine 

and will reach other countries such as Moldova, Georgia, and Kazakhstan, and even 

NATO allies, primarily the Baltic States. 

In defense of their land, Ukrainians demonstrated an unswerving will to protect 

their country. This fight, however, is not only about us. By countering the forces 

of oppression and authoritarianism, Ukraine serves as a powerful line of defense of 

freedom and democracy. Our success in this struggle today is the guarantee that 

the full-scale war will not come knocking on the doors of the West tomorrow. 

We highly appreciate great support of the United States, both the administration 

and U.S. Congress, provided so far. Without it, the situation for our independence 

would be much more difficult. A number of declarative and legislative actions by 

Congress have created a formidable framework of cooperation between our countries 

in general, and in countering the Russian aggression in particular. Combined with 

strong stand and decisive action by the administration, they established the leading 

64 

role of the United States in this process and reinforced the unity with Europe as 

a major factor in its success. 

Despite the strong counteraction, Russia’s calculus remains unchanged and the 

efforts to restore the vision of Europe whole, free, and at peace must be enhanced. 

In this context, we want to hope for full implementation of Freedom Support Act, 

passed by the U.S. Congress last year, which envisages a number of provisions, fulfillment of which would significantly impact the situation. 

Ukraine shares the view of its Western partners that the diplomatic settlement 

is the only way forward in terms of resolving the conflict. But we also believe that 

a decision in favor of providing Ukraine with means to defend itself would considerably contribute to this process. The concerns associated with such a step are legitimate, but there can be no doubt that defensive weapons in possession of Ukraine 

would substantially raise the cost of Russian aggression. They would incline Moscow 

to negotiate or at least waive any remaining doubts about its strategic intentions. 

Ukraine will not use arms to escalate the conflict. Our goal is to bring peace to 

our people. That is why last month at the Minsk summit, Ukraine negotiated an 

agreement with Russia, with the participation of Germany and France. Although 

extremely fragile, the deal can lay a reliable foundation for a peaceful settlement 

of the conflict. Our major concern in this regard is the inclination of the Russian 

side and the separatists it supports to comply with their obligations. 

The seizure of Debaltsevo, the increasing threat of attack on Mariupol and the 

continued flooding of Ukraine’s territory with Russian weapons and military personnel raise doubts about Moscow’s inclination to implement the Minsk Agreement. 

If these activities continue, the response of the West has to be robust with all 

options on the table. These can include traditional means of raising the cost for 

aggression, such as new round of economic sanction, but also new measures—exclusion of Russia from international organizations and SWIFT banking system, and 

deprivation of the right to host the 2018 FIFA World Cup. 

Moscow has to be put before a simple choice: either it will comply with international law or suffer difficult consequences. In order for good relations to be 

restored, Russian forces, mercenraries, and arms must leave Ukraine’s territory and 

the Kremlin must stop its interference in our internal affairs. Restoration of territorial integrity of Ukraine must be seen as a logical step in the context of Budapest 

Memorandum, of which Russia is the side. 

This also concerns the Ukrainian region of Crimea, which has become the victim 

of the initial stage of Russian aggression. Since the unlawful annexation of peninsula it has turned into a territory of brutal violations of human rights and abuses 

of individual freedoms. The indegeneous population of Crimean Tatars is constantly 

harassed by the puppet authorities, while the mere of expression of support for 

Ukraine is treated as a crime. We believe that this situation can be resolved only 

through return of Crimea to Ukraine and we will not rest until this goal is achieved. 

Although preservation of territorial integrity dominates on Ukraine’s agenda, 

other challenges are of critical implication as well. We are determined to use the 

chance of truce presented by the Minsk Agreement to make progress with muchneeded reforms in our country. As of today, Ukrainian Government and Verkhovna 

Rada took significant steps directed at comprehensive overhaul of the state budget, 

judicial system, prosecutor’s office, pension system, anticorruption legislation, 

energy-efficiency, governmental transparency. This incomplete list will be expanded 

as the Ukrainians are committed to transforming their country into a modern European state. 

Progress in this area would not have been possible without strong financial support of our Western partners led by the United States. We hope that this support 

will be expanded into a comprehensive program similar to the Marshall Plan, which 

once helped Europe to recover from the consequences of a devastating war. 

For all the tragedy of recent developments in Ukraine, they have demonstrated 

that in face of enormous challenges, the Ukrainians have chosen not to give in but 

to stand up for their rights and freedoms, and to unite to preserve their country’s 

sovereignty. What can be observed today is the reemergence of a new civilized European nation, determined to build its future on the everlasting principles of accountable government, respect for human rights, dynamic civil society, free media and 

protected national security. It is my strong conviction that sooner rather than later 

this development will lead us to become an equal and effective member of the European family of nations. 

Such an outcome would be in the interests of not only the Ukrainian people, but 

also of Europe as a whole, including Russia. This task can be fulfilled through 

strong and decisive actions of the democratic world aimed at assisting Ukraine, 

restoring the stability of international system and negating the prospects of another 

65 

global conflict. We are looking forward to the continued U.S. leadership in this 

process. 

RESPONSES OF VICTORIA NULAND TO QUESTIONS

SUBMITTED BY SENATOR BOB CORKER

Question. Although the terms of Minsk II cease-fire agreement indicate that 

Debaltseve should remain part of Ukrainian-held territory, the Russian-backed 

rebels launched an offensive to acquire the town after they signed the cease-fire 

agreement and now control Debaltseve. 

♦ What does this indicate about the commitment of the rebels to the Minsk agreement and its implementation? Is it the position of the administration that the 

rebels will have to withdraw from Debaltseve? What is the deadline for this 

withdrawal? 

Answer. Combined Russian-separatist forces launched the offensive on Debaltseve 

before the negotiations in Minsk on the February 12, 2015, Minsk implementation 

plan—also called ‘‘Minsk II’’ by some—and extended the offensive through the negotiations, leading to the Ukrainians’ withdrawal of their forces from Debaltseve on 

February 18. The September 2014 Minsk agreements have the line of contact running clearly east of Debaltseve, leaving that city firmly in the Ukrainian Government’s hands. The February 12 Minsk implementation plan links back to those 

agreements. We support Ukraine’s claim that Debaltseve lies outside the Special 

Status Area, and that the separatists must vacate it as part of the fulfillment of 

the Minsk agreements. 

The commitments contained within the Minsk agreements are supposed to be fulfilled by the end of 2015, but this will require political will on the part of Ukraine, 

Russia, and the Russia-backed separatists, all of whom signed the agreements. We 

stand ready to assist in their fulfillment, as we believe the Minsk agreements are 

the best chance for a durable, diplomatic resolution of the crisis. We will judge the 

separatists and their Russian backers by their actions. 

Question. What distinguishes the second Minsk cease-fire agreement from the 

first? Why would this cease-fire agreement hold when the first cease-fire agreement 

collapsed? 

Answer. The main distinguishing feature to date has been the overall reduction 

of violence along the cease-fire line since the February 15 cease-fire went into effect. 

That said, attacks across the cease-fire line persist, and their numbers have 

recently increased. The OSCE’s Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) has been inhibited by access restrictions placed on it mainly by the Russia-backed separatists, 

making it difficult for the SMM to report on cease-fire violations and the status of 

heavy weapons withdrawal. We have seen frequent attacks usually initiated by the 

separatists against Ukrainian positions to the west and north of the cease-fire line. 

A true cease-fire would require full and unfettered access by the OSCE SMM to 

the entire length of the cease-fire line and separatist-held territory, and constant 

vigilance by the U.S., our European allies and partners, and like-minded countries. 

We must be prepared to increase the costs on Russia and the separatists if we 

see continued stalling on fulfillment of the Minsk commitments, or renewed land 

grabs by combined Russian-separatist forces. 

Question. The Minsk II agreement states that Ukraine will not be able to assume 

control of its internationally recognized border with Russia until Kyiv changes its 

constitution to include decentralization. Is decentralization clearly defined in the 

agreement? 

Answer. Decentralization is defined sufficiently in the Minsk agreements—including the February 12 Minsk implementation plan, or ‘‘Minsk II’’—that it should be 

achievable to a standard that is agreeable to all concerned. It will be complicated, 

however, as the process of decentralization applies to the entire country of Ukraine, 

and therefore will require the agreement of the Ukrainian Parliament (Rada) on its 

features, not only for the area currently held by the separatists, but for all of 

Ukraine. We are confident the Ukrainian Government and Rada can find a solution 

that will work and have the desired effect. 

66 

RESPONSES OF BRIAN P. MCKEON TO QUESTIONS

SUBMITTED BY SENATOR BOB CORKER

TRAINING THE UKRAINIAN NATIONAL GUARD

Question. Why have plans to train Ukrainian National Guard troops not been 

implemented? 

Answer. DOD and the Department of State notified Congress last summer of the 

administration’s intent to transfer a total of $19 million of available fiscal year (FY) 

2014 funds to the Global Security Contingency Fund for the purpose of providing 

training and additional nonlethal equipment to units of the Ukrainian National 

Guard as early as the second quarter of FY 2015. The equipment will begin arriving 

in early April and the training is scheduled to begin the week of 20 April. 

DELAYS IN NONLETHAL MILITARY ASSISTANCE

Question. Approximately $120 million in nonlethal military assistance has been 

committed to Ukraine by the United States but equipment worth only half of this 

amount has been delivered to Ukraine. What explain this delay? 

Answer. Ukraine is a top priority and we are working to further expedite the provision of assistance. When implementing government-to-government security assistance programs, however, we must operate through technology, security, and foreign 

disclosure reviews; contracting processes; and then arrange for transportation and 

delivery. We are constantly working to speed up these timelines and have been successful in some instances, such as countermortar radars, which we were able to 

deliver these in less than 2 months after the decision was made to provide them. 

We will continue to expedite the provision of assistance whenever possible. Once the 

GSCF training program starts in late April for the Ukrainian National Guard, we 

will have delivered well over half of the $120 million in assistance. 

ASSESSMENT OF UKRAINIAN CAPACITY, CAPABILITIES AND GAPS

Question. Has the U.S. military conducted an assessment of the Ukrainian Armed 

Forces to gain an understanding of their current capacity, capabilities, and gaps? 

What were the findings and how is the United States prepared to assist in filling 

the training and arming gaps? 

Answer. Yes, through the U.S.-Ukraine Joint Commission, led by the U.S. European Command and senior Ukrainian Ministry of Defense officials, the United 

States engages in regular, senior-level discussions with Ukraine to identify gaps in 

Ukraine’s military capacity and capability. Over the past year, the Joint Commission conducted comprehensive assessments of Ukrainian military functional areas. 

These assessments resulted in prioritized lists of requirements that have informed 

current security assistance, mid- and long-term cooperative and institutional reform 

efforts, and training and professionalization of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. The 

assessment teams have made recommendations for improvements and growth in the 

following areas: medical, logistics, institution building, special operations, communications, information, and border security. The assessment and review process, 

through the commission, is an ongoing process 

NECESSARY EQUIPMENT FOR THE UKRAINIAN MILITARY

Question. Does the Ukrainian military possess the necessary equipment, including 

lethal weapons systems, to effectively respond to attacks from the Russian-backed 

rebels and Russian forces operating in eastern Ukraine or neighboring Russian 

regions? What U.S. weapons systems and equipment, if provided, would pay the biggest return on investment—lethal and nonlethal? What is the status of providing 

such equipment? 

Answer. We do not believe a military resolution of this conflict is possible. The 

President is regularly reviewing options to support Ukraine, including whether the 

United States should provide defensive lethal assistance. We have thus far provided 

assistance that helps to address key Ukrainian capability gaps, such as in communications, mobility, and countermortar radars. We continue to provide assistance to 

Ukraine and expect deliveries to continue for at least the next 18 months as funds 

are allocated, contracts signed, and equipment delivered. We are also processing $75 

million in additional assistance authorized as part of the European Reassurance 

Initiative (ERI). 

67 

RESPONSES OF JOHN C. KORNBLUM TO QUESTIONS

SUBMITTED BY SENATOR BOB CORKER

Question. What exactly is at stake for the United States in Ukraine? What are 

the consequences of our failure and Putin’s success? 

Answer. Russian action against Ukraine came almost exactly 20 years after Russia, together with the U.S., U.K. and France had guaranteed the sovereignty and 

territorial integrity of Ukraine as part of Ukraine’s relinquishment of nuclear weapons it had inherited from the Soviet Union. Ukraine’s independence and security 

were thus tied to the overall ‘‘settlement’’ of issues resulting from the collapse of 

the USSR. For the United States to acquiesce in Russia’s unilateral moves against 

Ukraine, would mean that we had accepted the end of rule of law in relations with 

Russia. The complex European project, which the United States led for nearly 50 

years would be put in question. We would be faced with a rogue power (Russia) 

playing as desired among several weak and insecure countries such as the Baltics, 

Georgia, or Moldova. America’s own security would be threatened. The freedom of 

movement of our diplomacy would be severely limited by the instability throughout 

the region. 

This freedom of movement will be especially important to protect in the new international conditions which are emerging in the 21st century. Coming years will be 

characterized by the emergence of new powers, by new and untested crisis situations and by the rapid spread of high-speed information technology. Maintaining a 

coherent foreign policy will become many times more difficult. The United States 

will succeed only if it is able to build a sense of cohesion among new powers and 

old. To do this, we must maintain the leading role of Western values and methods 

in the new information networks. Losing the advantage to Russia would undercut 

this interest severely. We would find ourselves on the defensive. We would be 

unable to take initiatives to maintain our technological advantage. This is one reason why Russia is spending so much on propaganda and information technology. It 

wants to steal the narrative and has succeeded already to a considerable extent. 

Question. Is Germany a mediator in the Ukraine conflict or a genuine supporter 

of Ukraine’s desire to join Europe? 

Answer. Germany rejects the idea that it is mediating in this crisis. Chancellor 

Merkel has taken the lead, because she has the best contacts with Putin and 

because Germany has serious interests in Russia. But as her quick trip to Washington in February demonstrated, Chancellor Merkel conducts her diplomacy with 

the closest consultation with the United States and the European allies. From the 

first days of post-Soviet Ukrainian independence, Germany has been among the 

strongest supporters of Ukraine’s sovereignty and economic stability. It supported 

Ukraine’s desire to move closer to Europe, because it believed this was the best way 

to ensure both the security and economic independence of Ukraine. 

Question. Can U.S. leadership in Ukraine be supplanted by German leadership? 

If so, is this desirable or conducive to the advancement of American national interests? 

Answer. No, Germany cannot take over leadership from the United States in 

Ukraine or elsewhere in Europe. The Germans are the first to state that without 

American support, there could be no European defense or diplomacy with Russia. 

As I mentioned during my testimony, I believe that the United States has put too 

much burden on Germany during this crisis. Chancellor Merkel is a brilliant, dedicated leader, but neither she nor her country have the background or the resources 

to be the major Russian interlocutor with the West. Germany would be in a better 

position if there were a more active American role. Not taking over the negotiations, 

but participating in both words and deeds. It is at this moment not clear whether 

Putin believes he can push through his goals with the Europeans, while the United 

States stands by. Testing his intentions is too big a risk to take. it is important that 

he be clear that the United States will react if he pushes further forward than he 

already has. 

RESPONSE OF JOHN HERBST TO QUESTION

SUBMITTED BY SENATOR BOB CORKER

Question. Given the magnitude of the threat and challenges posed by Russian 

aggression in Ukraine, has the United States devoted sufficient attention and 

resources to this issue? What more can and should be done? 

Answer. A revisionist Kremlin bent on overturning the post-cold-war settlement 

in Eurasia is the greatest threat to global stability and American interests at this 

68 

moment. The American response to this suggests that the White House does not 

understand this danger. That response has been reactive, piecemeal and, overall, 

ineffective. 

This danger is currently manifest in Ukraine. What we face today is not a 

Ukraine crisis, but a crisis of Kremlin aggression which appeared earlier in Georgia 

and today in Ukraine. To address this challenge, we need a comprehensive policy 

with at least six elements. 

First we need to accurately and publicly define the challenge. Nowhere has the 

White House laid out the challenge to Eurasian and global stability posed by Mr. 

Putin’s revanchist policies. 

If the administration correctly defines the problem, it will be clear that the United 

States must take the lead in resolving it—the second element of a sound policy. We 

cannot subcontract leadership on this issue to Berlin or any other capital because 

our vital interests are involved. So, for instance we would insist that the United 

States must be part of the negotiating process that produced the cease-fires. 

We would also develop strong and proactive policies imposing major costs on the 

Kremlin for its aggression. This leads us to the third and fourth elements of our 

policy. 

The third is to impose economic costs on Moscow for its aggression by economic 

sanctions. Washington has done a pretty good job on this front in pulling an, at 

times, reluctant Europe to levy sanctions. 

But the fourth element relates to the military. Ukrainian forces have done a commendable job fighting the strongest military in Europe. We should openly and 

unapologetically be providing Ukraine substantial military equipment, including 

defensive lethal weapons, to deter further Russian aggression in Ukraine or, if 

deterrence fails, to impose a higher cost on Russian forces. This cost might help ultimately stop Kremlin aggression in Ukraine; but even if it does not achieve that, it 

will leave Moscow with fewer military resources to carry out aggression elsewhere. 

At a minimum, our policy should be designed to make the war in Ukraine so 

unpleasant for Moscow that it decides it is too expensive to unleash war beyond that 

country. 

Fifth, we need to exert our leadership in NATO and push for the deployment of 

far more substantial forces and equipment to the Baltic countries and perhaps other 

eastern members of the alliance. The purpose is to deter possible Kremlin provocations there. 

Finally, we need to provide even more additional resources to Radio Free Europe 

and Radio Libert to increase its Russian language programming to help offset the 

massive Kremlin propaganda program. 

These six elements will secure our vital interests against the rogue policies of Mr. 

Putin. 

One last point. The administration is not devoting sufficient intelligence resources 

to the Russian war in Ukraine and the broader Kremlin danger. This flows naturally, but unfortunately, from the failure to understand the gravity of the danger. 

This needs to change. 

RESPONSE OF VICTORIA NULAND TO QUESTION

SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JAMES E. RISCH

Question. A few months after the Russian invasion of Georgia, President Obama 

was unwilling to provide defensive military equipment to the Georgian Government; 

this opposition also led to European allies refusing to provide any level of military 

equipment to Georgia. While President Obama has refused to provide defensive 

lethal arms to Ukraine, does the U.S. position support other nations offering military assistance to Ukraine, or will the administration seek to block those provisions 

as well? 

Answer. The administration has not taken a position on other nations providing 

security assistance to Ukraine. In fact, we have worked closely with a number of 

allies and partners to encourage them to contribute greater security assistance to 

Ukraine. Solidarity among allies is essential to our response to Russian aggression. 

Russia’s aggression in Ukraine makes clear that European security and the international rules and norms against territorial aggression cannot be taken for granted. 

Together with Europe, we are supporting the Ukrainian people as they choose their 

own future and develop their democracy and economy. 

While we continue to believe that there is no military resolution to this crisis, 

Ukraine has the right to defend itself. We have committed significant nonlethal 

security assistance to help Ukraine sustain its defense and internal security 

operations. 

69 

The interagency is conducting an ongoing review of our elements of security 

assistance to Ukraine to ensure they are responsive, appropriate, and calibrated to 

achieve our objectives. We continue to monitor the situation closely and remain in 

constant contact with our Ukrainian counterparts, as well as our NATO allies and 

partners, to explore opportunities for defense cooperation. 

RESPONSES OF BRIAN P. MCKEON TO QUESTIONS

SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JAMES E. RISCH

EUROPEAN REASSURANCE INITIATIVE

Question. In your testimony you mentioned the European Reassurance Initiative 

and the success of the ERI among our eastern European allies. Unfortunately, ERI 

was not placed in the Defense Department’s base budget; and as a result has created some concern among European allies about an enduring U.S. commitment to 

the initiative. 

♦ Will you ensure the ERI is included in the base FY17 budget? 

Answer. The European Reassurance Initiative (ERI) is an important tool for U.S. 

efforts to reassure our allies and partners, and it is critical that these efforts continue for as long as necessary. The Department’s FY 2016 Overseas Contingency 

Operations (OCO) request includes $789.3 million in ERI funding to sustain the 

efforts started in FY 2015 and reflects our continued commitment to the initiative. 

The source of the funds will be considered against competing global priorities, legal 

requirements, and the constraints imposed by the Budget Control Act before a final 

decision is made for the FY 2017 budget. 

Question. In your testimony you mentioned the European Reassurance Initiative 

and the success of the ERI among our eastern European allies. Unfortunately, ERI 

was not placed in the Defense Department’s base budget; and as a result has created some concern among European allies about an enduring U.S. commitment to 

the initiative. 

♦ What additional steps can the United States take to increase the level reassurance? 

Answer. The United States is committed to the security of our Central and Eastern European allies in promoting regional security. We will continue our reassurance measures through a persistent presence of air, land, and sea forces in the 

region. The Department’s request of $789.3 million for the European Reassurance 

Initiative (ERI) fiscal year 2016 reflects this commitment. Additionally, we plan to 

increase the capability, readiness, and responsiveness of allies and partners by continuing to increase the number of exercises and training events, improve infrastructure, build partner capacity, and enhance prepositioned U.S. equipment in the 

region. In support of NATO’s Readiness Action Plan (RAP), the United States will 

also participate in NATO’s new Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF); 

increase the number of servicemembers we have assigned to Multinational Corps 

Northeast in Poland; and assign staff officers to the six new NATO Force Integration Units that NATO Defense Ministers agreed to establish at their February 2015 

meeting. 

Through both a fully funded FY 2016 ERI appropriation and the U.S. commitment 

to NATO’s RAP/VJTF, our Eastern European allies will see results regardless of 

whether funding is appropriated in the base budget or the Overseas Contingency 

Operations (OCO) budget. 

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