FILED

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

May 13, 2008

THOMAS K. KAHN

CLERK

 Honorable Walter K. Stapleton, United States Circuit Judge for the Third Circuit Court *

of Appeals, sitting by designation.

[PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 07-11228

________________________

D. C. Docket No. 05-00546-CR-T-26MSS

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

versus 

ALFREDO EDUARDO POLO PADRON, 

a.k.a. Alberto Padron, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

_________________________

(May 13, 2008)

Before BARKETT, FAY and STAPLETON, Circuit Judges. *

BARKETT, Circuit Judge:
 Caruso pled guilty to the counts in this indictment on June 7, 2006. 1

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Alfredo Eduardo Polo Padron appeals from his conviction and 24-month

sentence on one count of conspiracy to commit mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C.

§§ 371 and 1341, and four counts of mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341. 

A jury convicted Padron of the mail fraud based on his involvement with a

personal injury clinic which obtained money from insurance companies by

submitting false claims via United States mail. On appeal, Padron argues that the

Government’s conduct in investigating him amounted to entrapment. He also

challenges three evidentiary rulings the district court made during his trial. 

Finally, he appeals from his sentence on grounds that the district court erred in the

loss calculation and that the district court lacked statutory authority to impose a

forfeiture money judgment against him. After careful review and consideration of

the briefs and oral argument of counsel, we affirm Padron’s conviction and

sentence.

I. FACTS

Padron was working as a janitor for the Tampa Housing Authority when he

met co-defendant, and later girlfriend, Elizabeth Caruso in 1996. Caruso met 1

Michael Sperounes, a government informant in this case, while she was working in

a personal injury clinic. Caruso testified at trial that she suspected that patients
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were being paid and that false insurance claims were being filed at both of the

personal injury clinics where she worked in the late 1990s. Sperounes was an

attorney who represented clients from one of the clinics in pursuing their personal

injury claims, and he was involved in many aspects of the insurance fraud industry. 

In December 1998, the FBI launched an investigation of insurance fraud

involving staged and nonexistent accidents called operation “Misplaced Trust”. 

Sperounes became a cooperating witness in 1998 after he received a grand jury

subpoena for records from his law practice. With his help, the FBI created Trident

Venture Group in November 1999 to infiltrate the staged accident insurance fraud

network. Trident was an undercover business which posed as an advance funding

company, a company which would advance money to individuals who expect to

receive insurance settlements on bodily injury claims in exchange for the right to

collect a greater amount of money upon settlement. Sperounes and FBI Special

Agent Gricel Sass were responsible for running Trident, and they were responsible

for initiating contact with people in the personal injury clinic business.

Caruso decided to open her own personal injury clinic in December 1999 or

January 2000, and she discussed her plan with Padron. Caruso and Padron each

invested $10,000 to open the new clinic, called the Tampa Bay Personal Injury

Clinic (“TBPIC”). Caruso was TBPIC’s president, and Padron served as its
 The FBI did not initially tell clinic owners that their business was illegal, though they 2

usually disclosed this within the first few meetings.

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treasurer and secretary. 

In March 2000, Sperounes and Special Agent Sass met with Caruso and told

her about Trident’s advance funding business, but they did not tell her that it was

illegal at that time. Caruso subsequently told Padron about Trident and suggested 2

that they work together. Sperounes and Sass began visiting TBPIC on a regular

basis and developed strong personal relationships with Caruso and Padron. 

Through a series of meetings in April 2000, Trident provided advance funding for

Cathy Castillo, a woman that Caruso and Padron retained to act as a staged

accident victim. Trident advanced Castillo $500, Padron instructed her where to

tell the insurance investigator she was sitting at the time of the accident, and

TBPIC later billed Castillo’s insurance company for her treatment.

In early June 2001, co-defendant Emmanuel Mellon visited TBPIC and told

Caruso and Padron that he had been referred to them by Trident, and that he

wanted to send “patients” to TBPIC. Sperounes met with Caruso and Padron to

vouch for Mellon and confirmed that Trident had funded staged accidents for

Mellon before. Caruso and Padron then agreed to work with Mellon, and Mellon

eventually referred the patients who participated in the June 7 and 12, 2001
 The patients from the June 7 and June 12, 2001, accidents all initially sought treatment 3

at TBPIC, though the ones from the June 7 accident later sought treatment at another clinic as

well. 

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accidents that are the basis of Padron’s indictment. 

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In October 2001, the FBI ended the undercover investigation. Later that

year, Caruso and Padron parted ways because of personal and business problems,

and Padron bought Caruso’s interest in TBPIC. 

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Padron was indicted for mail fraud and went to trial with three codefendants. He raised an entrapment defense and twice moved for a judgment of

acquittal based on the argument that the Government had engaged in outrageous

conduct and failed to present evidence of predisposition. The district court denied

both motions, but did give the jury an entrapment instruction. The jury found

Padron guilty of all counts.

After the trial, the district court entered a preliminary order of forfeiture

which contained a money judgment in the amount of $89,120.19. Padron filed a

renewed motion for a judgment of acquittal based on entrapment, and filed for a

new trial based on several allegedly erroneous evidentiary rulings. The court

denied both motions and sentenced Padron to twenty-four months in prison on

each count, to be served concurrently. The court also ordered Padron to pay
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$88,241.97 in restitution, and included the $89,120.19 forfeiture money judgment

in the sentence. This appeal followed. 

III. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

Several standards of review apply to this appeal. First, “[w]hen an

entrapment defense is rejected by the jury, [our] review is limited to . . . whether

the evidence was sufficient for a reasonable jury to conclude that the defendant

was predisposed to take part in the illicit transaction.” United States v. Brown, 43

F.3d 618, 622 (11th Cir. 1995). “[The] jury’s verdict cannot be overturned if any

reasonable construction of the evidence would allow the jury to find the defendant

guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. Accordingly, “we must view all facts and

make all inferences in favor of the government.” Id. Second, we review

evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Gunn, 369 F.3d

1229, 1236 (11th Cir. 2004). Third, we review the district court’s finding

regarding the loss amount for clear error, United States v. Patti, 337 F.3d 1317,

1323 (11th Cir. 2003), and Padron’s sentence for reasonableness. Gall v. United

States, 552 U.S. ___, 128 S.Ct. 586, 597 (2007); United States v. Hunt, 459 F.3d

1180, 1182 (11th Cir. 2006). Finally, we review de novo the legality of the

forfeiture money judgment entered against Padron. United States v. Hasson, 333

F.3d 1264, 1275 (11th Cir. 2003).
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IV. DISCUSSION

Padron first argues that the district court erred in denying his motion for

judgment of acquittal based on his entrapment defense. “A successful entrapment

defense requires two elements: 1) government inducement of the crime, and 2) 

lack of predisposition on the part of the defendant.” Brown, 43 F.3d at 623. “The

defendant bears [the] initial burden of production to show government

inducement.” Id. The “mere suggestion of a crime or initiation of contact is not

enough.” Id. Rather, “inducement requires an element of persuasion or mild

coercion.” Id. Once the defendant has produced evidence of inducement, “the

burden shifts to the government to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the

defendant was predisposed to commit the crime.” Id. 

Our review of the record demonstrates that the district court did not err in

concluding that Padron did not meet his burden of providing sufficient evidence of

inducement to support a judgment of acquittal. Although Padron contends that he

was unfamiliar with, and unaware of, the practice of staging accidents and

submitting fraudulent insurance claims when he and Caruso began operating

TBPIC, Padron has provided no evidence that he experienced any degree of

coercion to commit the fraud, and as we have held, the “mere suggestion of a crime

or initiation of contact is not enough” to prove inducement. See id. 
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The Government, in contrast, has provided ample evidence supporting a jury

finding that Padron was predisposed to commit fraud. Caruso provided the most

damaging evidence by testifying at trial that she and Padron had “always

discussed” paying for patients before they even opened the clinic; they discussed

potential patients based on people she knew from the clinic where she worked

before opening TBPIC and people he knew from the Tampa Housing Authority;

they staged their first accident before they met with anyone from Trident; they had

intended to engage in unlawful activity prior to meeting Sperounes and Agent

Sass; and that they were “trying not to get caught.” This testimony is more than

sufficient evidence to support a reasonable jury’s finding that Padron was

predisposed to commit insurance fraud. Therefore, the district court did not err in

denying Padron’s motion for a judgment of acquittal. 

Padron next argues that the district court erred by admitting 1) evidence

concerning Castillo’s uncharged staged accident on April 7, 2000; 2) demand

letters from attorneys concerning bodily injury claims submitted to insurance

companies on behalf of Padron’s patients; and 3) police reports concerning the

charged staged accidents on June 7 and 12, 2001. Each of Padron’s arguments fail. 

First, the evidence related to Castillo’s staged accident on April 7, 2000, was

properly admitted under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) to show motive, plan,
 Padron argues that the Government did not prove that Padron or any of his co- 4

conspirators had actually hired the attorneys who wrote the demand letters. The Government

argues that they were relevant to show that Padron was aware that lawyers were used to settle

fraudulent bodily injury claims and that the intended loss included bodily injury claims

submitted by the lawyers. We agree with Padron that the attorney letters were not relevant to the

mail fraud charge and should have been excluded. However, we find that any error was

harmless. Moreover, we reject Padron’s argument that the admission of the attorney letters

violates his Sixth Amendment rights under Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) because

the letters are not testimonial evidence. See United States v. Brown, 441 F.3d 1330, 1359 (11th

Cir. 2006) (“The Crawford rule applies only to testimonial evidence.”).

 Trident would not advance funding to bodily injury claimants unless a copy of the 5

police report of the incident was submitted to them. Thus, Mellon submitted the police reports

regarding the June 7 and June 12, 2001 accidents to Trident.

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and intent. Though there was a minor error on the 404(b) notice which listed the

accident as occurring on April 4 rather than April 7, Padron was provided with the

necessary pretrial discovery and had sufficient notice that the Government intended

to use this evidence at trial. Moreover, any prejudicial effect of admitting evidence

related to the April 7 accident was cured by the district court’s limiting

instructions. Second, though we agree with Padron that the attorney letters were

wrongly admitted, Padron has not demonstrated that he was prejudiced by this

error. Padron’s conclusory statement that this evidence indicated to the jury that 4

any purported conspiracy was larger and more complicated than necessary is

insufficient to show prejudice. Third, the district court did not err in admitting the

police reports that Mellon submitted to Trident to secure the advance funding for

the accidents on June 7 and 12, 2001. The police reports were not hearsay

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because they were admitted to demonstrate that a co-conspirator was seeking to
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secure advance funding, not for the truth of the matter asserted within the police

reports. The district court committed no reversible error in admitting the three

challenged categories of evidence.

Padron also contends that this case should be remanded for resentencing

because the district court improperly calculated the loss amount. In the case of

jointly undertaken criminal activity, a defendant is held accountable for all criminal

acts which are: (a) “in furtherance of the jointly undertaken criminal activity;” and

(b) reasonably foreseeable in connection with that criminal activity. U.S.S.G.

§ 1B1.3(a)(1); see also id., cmt. 2. In sentencing Padron, we cannot say that the

district court clearly erred in holding him accountable for the full intended loss

amount because it was reasonably foreseeable that, as a result of the staged

accidents underlying his conspiracy charge, the “patients” would seek treatment at

other clinics and demand letters would be submitted by personal injury attorneys. 

We also find no error in the district court’s conclusion that Padron should be held

liable for the full amount TBPIC billed to the insurance companies, irrespective of

deductibles and policy limits. See United States v. Grant, 431 F.3d 760, 765 n.6 

(11th Cir. 2005) (where a defendant attempts to cash a stolen check, the district

court may calculate the intended loss as the full value of the check, regardless of

the fact that the account contained less than the check’s full value).
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Finally, Padron argues that the district court lacked statutory authority to

enter a forfeiture money judgment in this case. This Circuit has not yet considered

whether 28 U.S.C. § 2461(c) authorizes criminal forfeiture of specified property in

general mail fraud cases, but numerous other courts, including several of our sister

circuits, have held that it does. See, e.g., United States v. Misla-Aldarondo, 478

F.3d 52 (1st Cir. 2007); United States v. Vampire Nation, 451 F.3d 189 (3d Cir.

2006); and United States v. Baker, 227 F.3d 955 (7th Cir. 2000). We agree.

Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 2461(c), effective August 23, 2000, to make

criminal forfeiture available in every case that the criminal forfeiture statute does

not reach but for which civil forfeiture is legally authorized. United States v.

Edelkind, 467 F.3d 791, 798–800 (1st Cir. 2006). The civil forfeiture statute

applicable in this case is 18 U.S.C. § 981 which permits the government to seek

civil forfeiture of “[a]ny property, real or personal, which constitutes or is derived

from proceeds traceable to a violation of . . . any offense constituting ‘specified

unlawful activity’ (as defined in section 1956(c)(7) of this title).” 18 U.S.C.

§ 981(a)(1)(C). General mail fraud is included in § 1956(c)(7)’s definition of

“specified unlawful activity.” 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(7). Thus, since civil forfeiture

is legally authorized by 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C), 28 U.S.C. § 2461(c) makes
 Padron also argues that because civil forfeiture procedures are against specific property

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in rem, money judgments are not available in the civil forfeiture context. This argument misses

the point because 28 U.S.C. § 2461(c) makes criminal remedies available in the civil context,

and Padron concedes that criminal forfeiture proceedings are in personam. See United States v.

Conner, 752 F.2d 566, 576 (11th Cir. 1985) (upholding forfeiture money judgment in the RICO

context on the ground that because criminal forfeitures are in personam, the government need

not trace the forfeited property to the underlying offense). 

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criminal forfeiture available for general mail fraud as well. 

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Padron argues that because the forfeiture statutes applicable in this case do

not contain provisions expressly authorizing the entry of forfeiture of

money judgments, the district court exceeded his statutory authority. It is clear,

however, that 28 U.S.C. § 2461(c) authorizes the government to seek forfeiture of

specified property “in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure” and it 

is equally clear that the federal rules explicitly contemplate the entry of money

judgments in criminal forfeiture cases. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2. Therefore, the

district court did not err in entering a forfeiture money judgment against Padron.

AFFIRMED.