SIXTH D IVISI ON JUNE 4, 2010 No. 1-08- 3607 ELIZAB ETH GUTS TEIN, ) Appe al fro m the ) Ci rcu i t Cou rt of Plai ntif f-A ppelle e, ) Coo k C oun ty ) v. ) No. 05 L 002597 ) CIT Y OF E VANS TO N, a Mu nicipal Co rp or at ion, ) Ho no r ab le ) Edward

Wa sh i ngton II De f en da n t-A pp el l an t. ) Jud ge P re siding JU STI CERO BE RTE. G OR DO N del i v ered th e op i n i on of th e c our t: Plaint iff Elizabet h Gut st ein fil

ed s uit in the c ircu it co ur t of Co ok Co unt y against t he
m un i ci pal de f en da n t, the C i ty of Evansto n (C i ty ), a l l eg i n g th at sh e f el l an d suf f ered i n j uri es to he relb o w r es ult ing fr o m t he mun icip alit y’s ne glig en t maint en an ce o f an un impr o ve d a lley in ba ck of pl ai nti f f ’s hom e. A j ury retu rned a verd i ct i n f av or of pl ai nti f f i n th e a moun t of $201,829.00, less a 50% deduction for contributory n eglige nce, an d the trial court entered judgm ent on that verdict. The Ci ty appeals the trial

court ’s den

ia l of its tim el y f il ed postt rial mot ion. On ap pea l, t he Cit y arg ues t hat (1 ) p laintiff was no t an inte nded use r o f the alley and th usth e C i ty i s e n ti tl ed to a judgm

en t n.o.v. , ( 2) t he t rial co ur t abus ed it s discr et ion in dec iding th at p l ai n ti f f wa s a n i n ten de d u se r a s a matte r of l aw , a n d ( 3) th e C i

ty wa s e n ti tl ed to i m m un i ty from li abi li ty pursuan

t t o section 2-201 of the Local Governm

ental and Govern

me ntal Em ploye es Tort Im

m uni ty A ct (745 ILCS 10/2-201 (We st 2008 )).

BACK GROUND On Ju ly 10 , 20 04 , pla int iff pu lled a w ee d fr o m t he ba ck yar d g ar de n o f he rho me in Evansto n an

d deci ded to dispose of the unwa nted pla nt in the yard waste disposal

bi n provided for her use by the C ity. T wo unimpro ved a lleys abut plaint iff ’s pr op er t y. One alley runs no rt h-1-08-3607

1 A locally pop

ular hot dog st

and, Must ard’s Last Stand,

is located south of the e

ast-west alley and comm ercia l vehicles tra

vel alo ng the

alley to ma ke d elive ries t here.The prope

rty east of Mustard’s is

the locatio n of North western Univ ersity’ s football stadium. 2 so ut h along t he ea st er n edg e o f plaintiff’s pr op er t y and t he o t her ru ns ea st -w est along t he
sou the rn edgeof the prop erty. Pl

ai nti f f ’s yard wa ste bi n, al ong wi th d i sp osa l con tai ne rs f or recyc li ng an d trash, sit outside pl

ai ntif f’ s propert y a

long the e ast-west alley

(all ey ). A gated f en ce en ci rc l es pl ai n ti f f ’s b acky ard, s o pl ai n ti f f pr oce eded

dow n a p ath th rough h er b acky ard to the gate to enter the alle

y. W hen she reach ed the gate, plai

ntif f testif ie d that she scan

ned the area to ma ke sure there were no depressi ons or ot her i

mpe dim ents i n the al le y. Prior t o stepping out into t he alley, p laintiff heard an ice c re am tr uck dr iving along t he alley and t ur ned t o lo cat e t he vehicle. She t hen st epp ed o ut into t he alley and t ripp ed in a “so ftba ll-sized” dep re ssio n in the uni mproved al

le y, caus in g her to fall a

nd suf fer i nj uries to her el bow. Plaint iff ’s pa rt ner , P at ricia Bu t kus , t est ifi ed a t t rial t hat she ha d bee n co mplaining to t he Ci ty ab out the condi

tion of the eas

t-west all ey

for y ears. Ms. Butkus testif

ie d that she teleph

oned th e C i ty on n um erous occ as i on s a

n d l ef t v oi ce -m ai l mes sa ge s wi th th e pub l i c w ork s dep ar

tmen t. In Ma rc h 20 04 , M s. Bu

tku s ex ch an ge d e -m ai l cor re sp on den ce

wi th Ci ty A l derm an El iza b eth T isd ah l, in w hic h sh e c o mpla ine d t ha t co mmer cia l t r affic 1 was dam agi ng the al le y a nd creatin g a dangerous co ndi

tion in the vici ni ty of the gate t o Ms. But kus’s and plain tiff ’s proper ty. Ms. But kus t est ifi

ed t hat Alder man Tisda hl visi t ed t he alley sho rt ly ther eaft er and a gr eed t hat t he
ar ea a ro und t he ga t e wa s in po or co ndit ion. Alder man Tisda hl assur ed M s. B ut kus t hat she would pl ace the plai

ntif f’ s residence on the Ci

ty’s pri ority l is t for all ey repairs a nd i nstructed Ms. Butkus to t el ephone the Ci ty to foll ow up and conf

irm that t hi s was done.1-08-3607

3

The al l ey abuttin g pl ai ntif f ’sproperty

i s wh at the C i ty c al l s an “u ni m prove d al l ey,” meaning t hat it is unp aved . T her e wa s so me dispu t e at t rial as t o w hat mate rial co nst itu t ed t he surfac e of the al

le y a t t he tim e of plai ntif f’ s i nj ury. Plai

ntif f argued that the al

le y s urface
con siste d of l i meston e g

ra v el wh i l e th e C i ty mai n tai n ed th at th e a l l ey h ad b een re su rf ac ed wi th asp halt c hips. Bo t h par t ies ag re e t hat t he r avag es o f winte r c aus e significant damag e t o t he surfac e of an un

im proved all ey . In order t o address this problem , the City had i nsti tut ed a pro gram of ann

uall y regradin

g its uni mproved all

eys. Gle n Crabtree, a publi

c works supervi sor for the City, testifi ed for the plai

ntif f as an adverse wi

tness pursuan

t t o section 2-1102 of the Code of Ci vi l Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-1102 (West 2008) ). Mr. Crabtree’s dut ies i ncl uded t he care and mai

ntenance of the City ’s alley s, st re et s, a nd side walks . As a sup er visor , Mr . C ra bt re e r epo rt ed t o t he su per intend ent of st re et s and
sa n i tati on , w h o re por ted to th e d i re ctor of pu b l i c w ork s, wh

o i n tur n repor ted to th e c i ty
man ager. T he ci

ty man ager was respo nsi

ble for det ermi

ni ng the budget for p ublic works, i n cl udi n g th e c are a n d m ai n ten an ce of th e C i ty ’s un i m pr ov ed al l ey s. How ev er , the c i ty
man ag er ’s de t er minat io n st ill had t o be ap pr o ve d b y t he cit y co un cil. When ask ed a bou t t he go ver nmenta l str uct ur e o f the City, Mr. Cra bt re e st at ed t hat t he Ci ty has a hom

e rule f orm of governm

ent, in whi ch the m ay or and alde

rmen ma ke the poli

cy determi nations . The vari

ous city departments, i

ncl udin g the publ ic works department, then im plem ent and carry out those po li cies. Accordin g to Mr. Crabtree, the City did n ot ma in tain i ts uni mproved al

le ys for pedestrian traffi c; i t mai ntain ed the alle

ys only for veh ic ula r traffi c. Mr. Crabtree test if

ie d that as soon as
wea t her per mitt ed in t he sp ring, he wo uld r efit t he Cit y’s sno w r emova l equipment for gr ading1-08-3607

2 The City’ s web page describi ng garbage pic k-up polici es states: “ Garbage mus t be placed on the curb or alley line by 7 a.m.; it will not be collected from private property.” (Emphasis in the original.) 4 an d w o rk w it h labo rcr ew s t o r eg r ad e t he Cit y’s un impr o ve d a lleys
. He t es t ified t ha t it wa s his pr ac ti ce to m ake s ur e th at th e a l l ey ad j ac en t pl ai n ti f f ’s pr ope rty wa s reg ra de d e ach

yea r p rior to t he Cit y’s Fo ur t h of Ju ly parad e bec aus e o f increa sed ped est rian t ra ffi c in the ar ea fo r t he fest ivities. Ho weve r, Mr. Cra bt re e also t est ifi ed t hat he did no t kee p r eco rd s de monst ra t ing t he pr og re ss o f the annua l reg ra ding p ro gr am, no r d id he have any indepe ndent re co llectio n t hat t he al l ey had be en regraded pri or to Jul

y 10, 200 4. Wh en a ci ty re siden t cal l s to com plai n a bout the cond i tion of a n un i m prove d al l ey, Mr. Cra btreetes ti f

i ed tha t he woul d ty pical l y go out to th

e s i te of the com pl ai nt w i thi n 4 8 hours

of recei vi ng the cal l. After exam

in in g the si te, he would determi

ne wh ether or not the area needed
re pair and, if i

t did, wo uld p lace t he loc at ion o n his li st of p ending s pec ifi c r epa irs. Only after t he ci ty-w i de reg radi ng program

wascom pl ete woul

d Mr. Crabtree perf

orm s peci f i c repa i rs re que st ed by r eside nt s. M r. Cra bt re e t est ifi ed t hat he did no t have a ny reco rd or indepe ndent
re co llectio n of Ms . B ut kus ’s t elepho ne ca lls and vo ice-mail messag es c omp laining abou t t he
co nd it io n o f t he alle y. Pl ai n ti f f an d M s. Bu tku s p l ac ed

th ei r g ar b ag e c on tai n er s i n th e a l l ey , a s op pos ed to somepl ace on thei

r propert y, b ecause the contai ners h ad al ways been

in the alle y a nd that was where t he neighb or s placed t heir garbage co ntainers. I n addition, Ms. But kus t estified, “that ’s where the ci

ty trucks pic

k it up.” Mr. Crabtree conf irm ed that the City

would not pick up ref

use, yar d w as t e, o rr ec yclin g f r o m p r iva t e p r o pe r t y. 2 Pursuant to Ci ty ordin ance, resi dents m ust place their garb age contain

ers on the curb or all

ey li ne f or pick-up. If a resi

dent’s property abuts an1-08-3607

5

all ey, then t he resident must place his or her gar bage co ntainers in the alley. Only if a resident’s property does n ot abut an al l ey may the re siden

t pl ace garb age c ontai

ners on the street curb
. At trial , the City

attempted to argue that plai ntif f di d not have to keep her garbage
co nt ainers in the a lley, tha t she inst ead co uld have place d t he co nt ainers on a co ncr et e pa d next to her garage. However, i n order to do t hat pla

in tif f would have had to pick up the l arge contain ers and pl ace them over a fen

ce. That would hav

e been vi rtuall y i mpossi ble. Whe n pl ai n ti f f an d M s. Bu tku s pur ch

as ed th e p rop er

ty i n 20 00 , they

perf orm ed se v eral i m pr ov em en ts on t he pr op er t y, including c ons t ru ct ing a new t wo -c ar gar age , e re ct ing a fence ar ou nd t he backy ard, pouring a concrete pad outside the f ence n ext to t he garage, an

d in stall in g a wal kway from the kitchen door t o t he f

ence gate to t he al

le y. The Ci ty argued that had pl

ai ntif f pl aced her gar bage co nt ainers on t he co ncr et e pa d, she c ou ld have w alked t hro ugh he r ba ckyar d, into t he ga ra ge , a nd o ut a g ar ag e d o o r t o t he c o ncr et e p ad t hus avo iding t he a lley alt o ge t her . P laint iff testifi ed i n response that i

t was far m

ore conveni

ent for her to take a direct rout e down her back yard pat h t o t he ga t e and ou t into t he alley wher e t he ga rba ge c ont ainers wer e loc at ed a nd t ha t , if sh e w alk ed t hr o ug h he rga r ag e, sh e s t ill w o ul d h av e h ad t o wa lk in t he alle y. Af ter plai ntif f rested he

r case, the Ci

ty f il ed a m ot ion f or directed verdict arguing that (1) pl ai nti f f wa s n ot an i nte nd ed us er of the al l ey an d there f ore th e C i ty di d n ot owehe r a d uty of
or dinar y care pur sua nt t o s ect ion 3 -1 02 ( 745 ILC S 1 0/ 3- 102 (Wes t 200 8) ), (2 ) t he Cit y had no noti ceof the al l eg ed pothol e or d

ep res si on i n th e al l ey , an d (3 ) th e C i

ty wa s i m m une f rom liabil ity pu rsu ant t o s ect ion 2 -2 01 ( 745 ILC S 1 0/ 2- 201 (Wes t 200 8) ). The t rial co ur t denied t he City’s mo t ion o n all thr ee issu es. Sp eak ing spe cifically t o t he first issue r aised by defenda nt , t he tria l court stated: “I th

i nk th e pl ai ntif f i s an i nten ded u ser.”1-08-3607

6

Plai ntif f f il ed a m ot ion f or directed verdict after the City rested its case, argui

ng that (1) pla in tif f was an i ntended user of

the alle y, (2) the Ci

ty ha d notice of the c ondition of the al le y pri or to p l ai

n ti f f ’s i n j ur y , a n d ( 3) th e C i

ty f ai l ed to prov e d

i scre ti on ar

y i m m un i ty pu rsua n t to se cti on 2 -20 1 (7 45 I LC S 10/2- 201 (Wes t 200 8)) . W he n th e tri al cou rt ob j ec ted to the f orm of plai ntif f’s m ot ion, in struct in g that a directed verdict is di ff erent from decidi

ng an i ssue as a ma tt er of law, plai

ntif f am ended h er motion f

or directed verdict to cover only the notice i ssue, and mo ved t o s t rike t he Cit y’s affirmative d efense s t hat plaint iff was not an inte nded use r a nd that the Ci ty h ad discre tion ary i m m uni ty. Th e tri al court struck

the C i ty’ s discre

tion ary i m m uni ty d ef en se b eca use i t foun d the Ci ty’ s al l ey mai nten ance progr

am m i nisteri al . Howev

er, at that t im

e the trial court reserved the issue of wh ether plai ntif f was an i ntended user of

the alle y f or th e j ur y to de ci de , a n d den i ed pl ai n ti f f ’s moti on f or di re cte d verdi

ct. Later, when discussi

ng the l anguage to be used i

n the j ury i

nstructions, plai

ntif f’ s counsel
ar gue d t hat t he jur y shou ld no t dec ide t he issue of w het her plaint iff was an inte nded use r o f the alle y. Pl ai ntif f’ s counsel

argued that the issue

of i ntent was a compone

nt of the questi on whether the Ci ty owe d pl ai nti f f a d uty of ca re, wh i ch wa s a matte r of l aw an d n ot a q ue sti on of f ac t f or the jury. The trial

court agreed.

“ THE CO UR T: W e a re n ot goi ng to ha ve a d eterm i na ti on by the jur y whet her t his is intend ed, an inte nded use r. I ha ve determi ned that as a m

atter of law. DEFENSE COUNSEL: So as a matter of law she is an i nte nd ed us er d es pi te C rab tree sa y i ng wedon ’t m

ai nta i n th i s f or pedestr ians?1-08-3607

7 THE CO URT: W

e al ready ruled on that, y eah .” As n ot ed, the jury

returned a verdict in f

avor of plai

ntif f i n the am ount o f $201,879, whi ch i t reduced by

50% for plai

ntif f’ s contrib

uto ry n eglige nce. The j ury al

so answered two special in terro gator ie s, whi

ch f ound that t he Ci

ty did have notice of the

condi tion of the al

le y pri or to pl ai nti f f ’s i njury. The tri

al cou rt en tere d a j udg men t on th e verd i ct i n th e a moun t of $1 00 ,93 9.5 0. Th e C i

ty th en f i l ed a p ost trial moti on re qu esti n g th at th e tr i al cou rt gra n t th e C i ty ei th er a j udgm en t n.o.v. or a new t rial. T he t rial co ur t denied t he Cit y’s mot ion. AN AL YSIS Th e C it y ra ises t hr ee cha lleng es t o t he t ria l co ur t ’s d enia l o f its re qu es t fo r p o st t ria l re lief. First , t he Cit y arg ues t hat t he plaint iff was not an inte nded use r o f the municipal alley pur sua nt to section 3-102(a) (745 ILCS 10/3-102(a) (West 2008)) and that, therefore, the City is entitled to a j udgm

en t n.o.v. Se con

d, t h e C i ty argu es th at ev en i f th e tr i al cou rt di d n ot er r i n f ai l i n g to gr an t th e C i ty a j udgm en t n.o.v. , th e tri

al cou rt ab us ed i ts d i screti on i n d eterm i ni ng asa m atte r of l aw that plai

ntif f wasan i nten ded u ser of

the a l l ey . Fi na l l y , the C i ty a rgues that the tria l court im properly deni ed the Ci ty’s m ot ion f or a directed verdict, arguing that the Ci ty ha d discr et ionar y im

munity pu rsu ant t o s ect ion 2 -2 01 ( 745 ILC S 1 0/ 2- 201 (Wes t 200 8) ). All of the Ci ty’s a rgumen ts in volv e questions

of law, which we rev

ie w de novo
. Kouzoukas v. Retirement Board of the Policeman’s Annuity & Benefit Fund , 23 4 Ill. 2d 446 , 46 3 (2 009 ); Addison Ins. Co. v. Fay , 232 Il

l . 2d 446 , 451 (2 009).

1. Wa s p lain t iff a n in t en de d u se ro f t he alle y? The C i ty f i rs t ar gu es th at th e tr i al cou rt erre d b y f ai l i n g to g ra n t a j udgm en t n.o.v. i n i ts f av or b ec au se

pl ai n ti f f wa s n ot an i n ten de d u se r of th e a l l ey. A j udgm en t n.o.v. sho uld o nly be1-08-3607

8

gr ant ed w her e all of t he evide nce, when view ed in a light most favo ra ble to t he no nmoving par t y, so ove rw helmingly favo rs t he moving p ar t y that no c ont ra ry ver dict co uld eve r st and ba sed on tha t evi den ce. Pedrick v. Peor

ia & Eastern R.R. Co. , 3 7 I ll. 2d 4 94, 510 (1 967 ). We
ca nno t “u su r

p t he fun ct io n o f t he jur y and su bst it ut e it s ju dg men t o n q ue st io ns o f fac t fair ly subm itted, tried, and determi

ned f rom the evi

dence wh ic h di d not great ly

preponderate either way .” Maple v. Gustafson , 151 Il l . 2d 445 , 452-5 3 (199 2). “ The court ha s n

o rig ht to enter a j udgm en t n.o.v. if there is any evi dence, together with reasonab le in feren ces to be drawn the ref rom, demons

trati ng a sub sta nti al f ac tua l di spute , or w

he re th e a ss es sm en t of cre di bi l i ty of the wi tnes ses or the de term i na tion regar di ng c onf l i cti ng e vi den ce is de ci si

ve to the outcome.” Maple , 151 Ill . 2d at 454. In ord er to m ai n tai n a c au se of ac ti on f or n eg l i gen ce , pl

ai n ti f f m us t estab l i sh

th at th e C i ty owed a duty of ordin

ary ca re, breached that duty, an d an i nj ury was proxim ately caused by

that bre ach
. Curatola v. Village of Niles , 154, Ill . 2d 201, 207 (1993). Wh ether the Ci

ty owed plai ntif f a duty of c are is a q

ues tion of l aw f or the cour

t to deci de. Vaughn v. Cit y of West Frankfort , 16 6 Ill. 2d 155 , 15 8 (1 995 ); Marshal l v. City of Ce

ntralia , 143, Il

l . 2d 1, 6 ( 1991)
. The L oca l Gov er n men tal an d G ov er n men tal Em pl oy ee s T ort I m

m un i ty A ct (A ct) l i

m i ts the c omm on l aw du tie s of m uni ci pal i tie s. Marshall, 143 Ill. 2d a t 5 ; Curatola, 154 Ill . 2d at 208. Se cti on 3- 10 2( a) of

th e A ct prov i de s i n perti n en t pa rt: “[A ] l ocal pub l i c en tity ha s the duty to exerc i se ordi

na ry car e t o maint ain its p ro per t y in a reas ona bly safe co ndit ion fo r t he
us e i n th e ex ercise

of ordi n ar y ca reof pe opl e w h om th e en ti ty in tended and perm

itted to use the property in a m ann er in whi ch1-08-3607

9 and a t suc h t imes as it was re aso nably fore see able t hat it w ou ld be
use d ***.”

745 IL CS 10/3-102 (a) (W est 200 8). Thus, acco rding to t he statu te, a mun ici pali ty owes a dut y of ordin

ary care only

to those who are bot h i

ntended and permi

tt ed users of muni

cipal pro pert y. 745 ILCS 10/3- 102(a) ( West 20 08 )
. Be ca us e “ t he Ac t ‘is in d er o ga t io n o f t he co mmo n la w, ’ ” we mus t co nst rue it st r ict ly agai nst the m uni ci pal def endan t. Vaughn , 166 Ill . 2d at 158, quo ting Curatola, 154 Ill . 2d at 208.

“ [A ]n i nte nd ed us er of prop erty i s, b y de f i ni ti on, also a

pe rm i tted u ser; a p erm

i tted u ser of propert y, h

owever, is n

ot necess aril

y a n i ntended user.” Boub v. Township of Wayne , 183 Ill . 2d 520, 52 5 (199 8). “[T]he duty

of a m unici pality depends on wh

ether the use of the property was a perm itted
an d in t en de d u se . ** * W he t he ra p ar t icu lar us e o f pr o pe r t y wa s p er mit t ed an d in t en de d is determi ned b y l ooking to t he n

ature of the propert y i

tself .” Vaughn , 1 66 I ll. 2d a t 162 -6 3. “Int ent mus t be in ferred f rom the ci

rcumstances.” Sisk v. W

illiamso n County , 167 Ill . 2d 343, 351 (1 99 5) . B oth

pa rties ag re e th at p l ai n ti f f wa s a perm i tted us er of th e a l l y ; th e on l y i ss ue f or u s to deci de i s wh ethe r plai ntif f wasal so an

i nten ded u ser. Gene ral l y , “ an al l ey i s a road wa y de si gned f or veh i cul ar traf f i c, a nd the duty i m pos ed on a m uni ci pality under section 3-102(a) is the sa me as that im

posed for a street” ( Khali1 v. City of Chicago , 283 Il

l . Ap p. 3d 16 1, 163- 64 (19 96)), an d m uni ci pal i tie s do n ot owe a duty

of ordi na ry ca reto pe de str

i ans w al ki n g i n th e stre et ( Vaughn , 16 6 I l l . 2d at 1 61 ). H owev er , Il

l i n oi s c our ts have recognized narrow excepti ons to t hi s rule . One exc eption i s where a m unici pality has des i gna ted are as f

or street pa

rki ng. I n those ca ses , pede stri an s are i nten ded a nd p erm i tted users of the roadw ay

f or the n arrow pu rpose of en teri ng a nd e xi tin g the parke d ve

hi cle. Sisk , 16 7 I ll.1-08-3607

10

2d at 351 ; Torres v. City of Chicago , 218 Ill . App. 3d 89, 94 (1991) (fi ndi ng pl ai ntif f an in tended
use r o f the ro adw ay when he st epp ed ba ck fr om t he t ru nk o f a legally par ked vehicle: “u se o f the par king sp ace log ically

ent ails ped est rian u se o f the adjac ent ar eas in or der t o e nt er and e xit t he pa rke d v eh icle an d s uc h u se o f t he st r ee t is t he r efo r e a lso int en de d a nd pe rmit t ed an d r ea so na bly fore seeable”) ; Di Domen ico v. Vil lage of Romeoville , 171 Ill . App. 3d 293, 295-96 (1988) (f i n di n g p l ai n ti f f an i n ten de d u se r of th e road wa y wh en h e step pe d of f th e s i dewal

k i n ord er to access the trunk of h

is le gally parked veh

ic le : “It defi

es comm on sens e to co ncl

ude that such l oca l en ti ti es di d n ot co n tem pl ate an d i n ten d th at th e op erator

of th e v eh i cl e a l ong w i th pas seng er s wo uld u se t he st re et ar ea a ro und t he pa rk ed ve hicle for ingre ss and egr ess t o a nd from thei r vehicle”). This n

arro w exception extends only to those ped estrians who must necessaril y wal k in the ro adway i

n order t o access a legall

y parked vehi

cle; an unnecess ary use o f t he r o ad wa y wh er e a leg al a lt er na t ive ex ist s, su ch as a c r o ss wa lk, in o r de rt o ac ce ss a v eh icle does n ot quali f y f or thi s ex cepti on. Sisk , 167 Ill . 2d at 351-52 ( fi ndi ng that pla

in tif f was not an i nten ded u ser of

a coun try r oadway wi th no ma rked p arki

ng s pace s, wa l kway s, or cross

wal ks); Wojdyla v. City of Park Ridge , 148 Ill . 2d 417, 426 (1992) (fin din g that plai ntif f wh o cro ssed a si x-lane country

hi ghway out si de of a crosswal

k in order t o reach hi s parked car was n ot an i nten ded u ser of

the road way ). T hu s, I llino is c o ur t s ha ve es t ab lishe d t ha t so met hing mo r e t ha n me r e n ec es sit y is
r eq uir ed in o r de rfo ra p ed es t r ian t o be an int en de d u se rin a r o ad wa y; t he r e mu st be so me af fir mat ive ph ysic al ma nife st at io n o f t he munic ip alit y’s int en t t ha t a p ed es t r ian us e t he r o ad wa y. Boub , 1 83 I ll. 2d a t 528 (finding t hat a lack of sp ecial pa vement mark ings o r o t her signs in dic ating tha

t bicy cl es were i

ntended users of

a bridge precl

uded a fi ndi ng that pla

in tif f was an1-08-3607

11

intended user of t he bridge) ; Torres v. City of Chicago , 2 18 I ll. App. 3d 8 9, 94 ( 199 1) (finding t hat wher e a municipa lity per mits pa ra llel park ing o n a r oa dwa y, it int ends t hat dr ivers o f the vehicle will use t he r oa dwa y in ord er t o e nt er and e xit t he vehicle) . Whe re t her e ar e no af f i rm ati ve ph y si cal man i f es tations of a m un i ci pal i ty ’s i nte nt, ne ce ss i

ty ca nn ot appl y the duty of ordi na ry care f or a si dewa l k to a roadwa

y . Sisk , 1 67 I ll. 2d a t 352 . I n Sisk , th e p l ai nti f f ’s motor
v eh i cl e stru ck a c on crete

b ridg e cros si

n g a creek, a n d w h en pl ai n ti f f ex i ted h i s a uto to in vestigate the extent of the dam age, he f ell of f the roadway

and i nto t he creek. 167 Il

l. 2d at 346. On appeal , the court hel d that t he m

unici pal defen dant had n

o dut y to mai

ntain county roads f or pedes tria n traf f i c wi thout som

e af f i rm ati ve phy sical man i f estati on of i nten t. Sisk , 167 Ill . 2d at 352. As our suprem

e court explai

ned:

“ In con tra st, th ere a

ren o su ch man i f estati on s to i n di ca te th at W i l l i am son Cou n ty i n ten de d p edestrians to wal

k on i ts country roads, much

le ss the speci

fi c road and bridges compl ai ned of b y plai ntif f i n the ca se a

t bar. As the

appe l l ate court n

oted, there
ar e no walkw ays o r c ro sswa lks o n ru ra l cou nt ry ro ads suc h as t he
coun ty-l i ne road i n th i s ca se. F urthe r, m an y coun ty roads a re gr avel ro ads and o fte n have no sho ulder . We believe t hat t he in feren ce to be drawn f

rom these f

acts, if any , is that
m uni ci pal i tie s do n ot in tend that pe des tria

ns wal k on ru ral coun try roads . Al th oug h i t m ay b e n ec es sa ry at ti mes f or p edestrians to wal k on country roads, such use i s not a man

if estation of the l

ocal
m un i ci pal i ty ’s i nte nt th at p ed es tri an s w al

k on i ts c oun try roads or1-08-3607

12 an un dertaking b

y the mun ic ipa li ty to make country roads f ree from defec ts that mi ght in

jure pede strian s.” Sisk , 167 Ill . 2d at 351- 52. In th e c as e a

t b ar , w e do n ot h av

e p h y si ca l man i f estati on s of th e C i ty ’s i n ten t b ut th e C i ty h as estab l i sh ed a p oli cy re qui ri n g i ts res i den ts to pl ac e th ei r trash, re cy

cl i n g, a n d y ard w aste co nt ain er s in t he alle y, w hic h is mu nic ipa l pr o pe r t y. T he po licy e xp r es sly s t at es t ha t t he Cit y will not p ick up the refuse f

rom private pro pert y; residents must use t he Cit y pro per t y. We have pre vi ous l y he l d that a

pe rs on w ho v i ol ate s a m un i ci pal ordi na nc e re f err i ng to a p i ec e of
m uni ci pal property can not be an i nten ded u ser of

that prope

rty. Montano v. City of Chicago , 308 I ll. A pp . 3d 61 8, 62 4 ( 19 99 ) ( a d elive ry pe r so n w ho vio lat ed a c it y o r din an ce wh en st o pp ing his del i very truck i n a n a l l ey could not b e an

i nten ded u ser of

the a l l ey ). We h ave consi dered the is sue of wh

ether pedestrians can b e i

ntended users of

mun ic ipa l alleys in thre e pr eviou s ca ses a nd in eac h cas e, t he de t er minatio n was fact -sp ecific. I n Khalil, t he pl ai nti f f wa s w al ki ng dow n th e m i ddl e of an al l ey i n or de r to get f

rom a p ark i ng l ot to a restau ran t when h e tri pped i n a hole an d f el l
. Khalil, 2 83 I ll. App. 3d a t 162 . I n esse nce, t he plaint iff was using t he alley as a s idewa lk and t her e we re no a ffi rmat ive physical manifesta t ions t ha t t he de fe nd an t munic ip alit y int en de d f o rpe de st r ian s t o wa lk

do wn t he mid dl e o f t he alle y. Khalil, 28 3 Il

l . A pp. 3d a t 164 . A cc ordi

ngl y , we f oun d that p l ai nti f f wa s n ot an i nte nd ed us er of the al l ey an d th usthe m un i ci pal i ty ha d n o duty to mai nta i n th e al l ey i n a con di ti on s ui tab l e f or pede stri an s. Khalil, 283 Ill . App. 3d at 164. In Kavales v. City of Berw yn , t he plaint iff

’s de ced ent was walking a long a side walk a nd
en tered a n a l l ey wh ere the al

l ey i nters ected a

sidewa l k. Kavales v. City of Berw yn , 305 Ill . App.1-08-3607

13

3d 536, 539 (1999). When s he en tered t he al

le y, the pl ai ntif f’ s deceden

t was stil l wi thin the li nes of the si dewa l k on e i ther s i de of

the a l l ey . Kavales , 30 5 Il

l . A pp. 3d a t 539 . Sh e s teppe d i

nto a “depres sed , une

ven, a nd c racke d” portion of

the a l l ey and f el l
. Kavales , 305 Ill . App. 3d at 539. We de t er mined t ha t , ev en t ho ug h p laint iff’s de ce de nt wa s t ec hnic ally in a n a lley w he n sh e fe ll, the locati on was i

n ef fect a “ ‘si dewal k area.’ ” Kavales , 30 5 I ll. Ap p. 3d at 54 4. Ac co r di ng ly, we fo und t hat plaint iff

’s de ced ent was an inte nded use r o f the alley where it int er sec t ed t he sidewa l k, be caus e the

sidewa l k was use d f or pedes tria n traf f i c. Kavales , 305 Ill . App. 3d at 544. Th e fa ct s o f Thomas v. T

own of Cicero , 30 7 I ll. A pp . 3d 84 0 ( 19 99 ) , mo st clo se ly app ro ximate t hos e o f the insta nt cas e. In Thomas , t he plaint iff walke d t hro ugh he r ba ckyar d and
o ut int o t he alle y in o r de rt o dis po se o f a b ag o f t r as h in h er ga r ba ge ca n, wh ich wa s lo ca t ed in the a l l ey . Thomas , 307 Ill . App. 3d at 842. After she threw awa y h er trash, the plai

ntif f conti nued down the a l l ey i n orde r to vi si t a ne i ghbor. Thomas , 307 Ill . App. 3d at 842. After she h ad progressed several

feet down the al

le y f rom her garb age can, pl

ai ntif f tri pped and f

ell on a crack i n the al l ey . Thomas , 3 07 I ll. App. 3d a t 842 . I n Thomas , the defen dant mun ic ipa li ty adm itted that its alle

ys were “ ‘e asem

ents f or peo ple to get [t o] t hei

r garages, util

ities, el ectric, cabl

e, [and] garbage.’ ” Thomas , 30 7 I ll. A pp . 3d at 84 2. Ju st ice Wa rr en Wo lfso n, wr it ing fo rt his
co ur t , fo und t hat t he d efe nda nt munic ipa lity ha d c re at ed a “s afe har bo r” in whic h t he p laint iff was an i ntended user of

the alle y s o long as sh

e wal ked along the path to her garbage can, wh ic h i s the sec ond n arrow ex cepti on f ound b y Il l i noi s courts . Thomas , 307 Ill . App. 3d at 845. How ev er , on ce th e p l ai n ti f f de pa rte d f rom th at “ sa f e h ar b or”an d p roc ee de d down

th e a l l ey to vi si t her nei ghbor, she coul

d no longe

r be an i ntended user of

the alle y, m erely a permi tt ed one. Thomas , 307 Ill . App. 3d at 845. Because pl ai ntif f “ had thrown away

her garbage

and h ad1-08-3607

14

st epp ed a way fro m the p ro t ect ion o f her e ase ment w hen she t ripp ed a nd fell,” w e fo und t hat she
wasnot an

i nten ded u ser of

the a l l ey . Thomas , 307 Ill . App. 3d at 845. Justice Wol fs on’s saf

e harbor ana

ly si s shoul d appl y i n the i nstant case. SeeThomas , 307 Il l . Ap p. 3d a t 845. W hen the Ci

ty e nacted i ts ordi na nc e di recti ng p l ai ntif f to pla ce h er y ard
wa st e, t ra sh, and re cyc ling c o nt aine rs in t he a lley, it cr ea t ed a s afe har bo r in w hich p laint iff
co uld wa lk along t he alley in ord er t o r eac h t he co nt ainers . T he o rd inance p ro vides, in per t inent part , as foll

ows: “(A) Re si dences W ith A ccess To An

Al le y: A ll resi dences which abu t upo n an alley shall designa t e a c ollect ion sit e at t he edge of the proper

ty d i rectl y adj acent to such

al l ey . Wh ere pr ac t ica ble , t he sit e s ha ll no t be fen ce d o ro t he rwis e c lo se d o ff in
suc h a manner as t o imped e efficient co llectio n. Any ga t es lead ing t o t he co llectio n site fro m the a lley shall be unlo cke d. The coll ection si

te may be on the al l ey i tself , provi ded that contai

ners sh all n o t int er fe r e w it h t he fr ee mo ve men t o f ve hic les in t he alle y. (B) Residences W

ithout Alley A

ccess: 1. O ccupa nts of res i de nc eswh

ose prop erty doe s n ot abut an alley shall locat e ga rba ge c ont ainers along t he
cu rbi m medi ate l y ad j ac en t to the prop erty *** .” Eva

ns ton Ci ty C ode § 8-5 -10 (20 04). Plai ntif f com pli ed wi th the Ci ty’s ordi nan ce and garb age pi ck-up policy when she pl aced her
was te contai

ners i n the al l ey and thus shoul d f al l wi thi n a saf e harb or, whe

re ped estri an s are1-08-3607

15

in tended users o f the al

ley when they

walk i n the all ey onl y to access their waste co ntainers. The City argues t hat it was unnecessary for plai ntif f to enter the alley i

n order t o dispose of he r yar d wa st e, and t hus p laintiff was no t an inte nded use r o f the alley becau se she co uld have ke pt he rwa st e c o nt ain er s o n t he co nc r et e p ad ne xt t o he rga r ag e. We ar e n o t pe r su ad ed by t his argumen t. First, the concrete pad is part of pl ai ntif f’ s priv ate proper ty. The Ci

ty’s waste pick-up po licy cl ear ly stat es t hat t he Cit y will not pick u p wa st e fro m privat e pr op er t y. The re for e, t he Cit y’s s ug ge st io n is no t a via ble o pt io n, as it vio lat es t he w rit t en p o licy. S ec o nd, eve n if pla int iff was abl e to access her waste contain ers from the concrete pad, the City ’s argum ent is anal ogous t o s aying tha t t he dr iver o f a legally par ked vehicle sho uld climb over t he ge ar shift and exit t he vehicle fro m the p asse nger side d oo r in o rd er t o a void walking in t he r oa dwa y. We have pre vi ous l y f oun d that w he re a m un i ci pal i ty man i f es ts a n i nte nt th at p eop l e p ark

the i r v eh i cl eson the street, the mun

ic ipa li ty al so in tends that the occupants of those vehi cl es wal k in the roadway for the purpose of accessi ng the parked autos. See, e.g., Torres , 21 8 I ll. A pp . 3d at 94
. T ha t sa me anal ys is should appl

y h ere as wel l. In the in stant case, the Ci

ty, by passi ng an ordinan ce that resi dents m

ust place thei

r waste containers i

n the al le y, m anifes ted an i ntent that plai

ntif f pl ace her wa st e c o nt aine rs in t he a lley. T he lo gic al infe re nce is t hat t he C it y also int end ed t hat pla int iff be ab l e to acce ss h

er wa ste con

tai ners an d tha t me an s wa

l ki ng i n the al l ey i n orde r reach them . Fin ally, t he Cit y’s ar gu men t wo ul d h av e u s p en aliz e p lain t iff fo rimp r o vin g h er pr o pe r t y. T he Cit y’s ar gu men t implie s t ha t if pla int iff ha d n o t inst alle d t he co nc r et e p ad , t he n sh e w o uld h av e b een an i n ten de d u se r of th e a l l ey wh en sh e w al ke d i n th e a l l ey i n ord er to ac ce ss h er wa ste co nt ainers . P laintiff installed t he co ncr et e pa d aft er pur chas ing t he pr op er t y in 2000 . T he previous owners had kept thei r waste containers i

n the al le y a nd ha d no al ternative l ocation, such1-08-3607

16

asa c onc rete pa d, i n w hi ch to plac e them

so a s to a

voi d w al ki ng i n th e al l ey i n or de r to th row awa y their gar bage . As o ur sup re me co ur t has mad e clea r, we mus t loo k t o t he nat ur e o f the
m uni ci pal property to determ

i ne the m uni ci pal i ty’ s i nten t. Vaughn , 166 Ill . 2d at 162-63. The re for e we canno t loo k t o impr ove ments or chang es mad e t o p rivat e pr op er t y abut t ing t he Ci ty ’s pr operty to deter m i n e th e C i ty ’s i n ten t wi th re sp ect to i

ts o wn pr ope rty . B ut, th e C i

ty
ar gu es , o nc e p laint iff inst alle d t he co nc r et e p ad , t he Cit y no lo ng er int en de d fo rpla int iff t o wa lk i n th e a l l ey. A m un i ci pal i ty ’s i n ten t ca n n ot ch an ge b ec au se of an i n de pen den t act of a th i rd pa rty wit ho ut so me a ffir mat ive man ife st at io n o f t ha t ch an ge d i nt en t o n t he pa r t o f t he munic ip alit y. Boub , 183 Ill . 2d at 528. Th e C it y also ar gu es t hat t he t ria l co ur t abu se d it s d iscr et io n in d ec iding whe t her pla int iff
was an inte nded use r o f the alley as a mat t er of law , r at her t han allow ing t he jur y to dec ide t he i ss ue . W e do not f

i nd thi s a rgu men t pe rs ua si ve . “ Th e ‘ i

nte nd ed an d pe rm i tted’ de term

i na ti on in forms the duty issue, and the duty is sue i s a questi on of law.” Thomas , 307 Ill . App. 3d at 845, ci ting Khalil, 28 3 I ll. A pp . 3d at 16 2- 63
. T he t r ial c o ur t ac t ed we ll wit hin it s d isc r et io n w he n it determi ned that pl ai

ntif f was an i ntended user of

the alle y as a m atter of law. Accordin gly , we fi nd that pla

in tif f was an i ntended user of

the alle y a nd the Ci ty owed her a duty of c are pu

rsua nt to 745 IL CS 10/3-102(We st 2008 ). 2. Did t he Cit y ha ve di sc r et io na ry immu nit y? The Ci ty al so argues that it was i mm une f rom lia bi li ty pursuan

t t o section 2-201 (745 ILC S 1 0/ 2- 201 (Wes t 200 8) ). Go ver nmenta l entit ies bear t he bur den o f pro per ly raising and provi ng th at they are i m m une und er the Act in order to ba

r plai ntif f s’ recovery . Van Meter v. Darien Park Dis trict , 207 Il l . 2d 359 , 370 (2 003).1-08-3607

17

The Act grants imm

uni ty to mun ici pal def endants engaged in

certa in discretionary acts. 745 ILCS 10/ 2-201 ( West 2008). Section 2-20 1 pro vides as foll ows: “Exce pt as ot herwi se provi ded by Stat ute, a publi

c em ploy ee ser ving in a po sitio n involving t he de t er minatio n of p olicy or t he
ex er cis e o f dis cr et io n is n o t liable fo ran inju ry re su lt ing fr o m his act o r omissi

on in determi

ni ng policy wh

en acting i

n the exercise of such di scretion even though abused.” 745 ILCS 10/2- 201 (West 2008)
. Section 2-209 al

lows m unici palities to shel

ter under the im

mun ity granted to publ

ic em ploy ees co ve r ed by se ct io n 2
- 20 1. 74 5 I LC S 1 0/ 2- 10 9 ( We st 20 08 ) ( “A lo ca l pu blic e nt it y is no t liable f or an i njury res ul ti ng f rom an ac t or om

i ss i on of i ts em pl oyeewhere

the em pl oyeei s n ot l i ab l e”). Our sup re me co ur t has he ld t hat t he Act set s up , in ess ence , a t wo -p ar t t est t o d et er mine whi ch em ploy ees m ay be granted di scretionary

im mun ity under section 2-201. An em ploy ee may qualify for discretionary i

mm uni ty “i f h e holds either

a p osi ti on i nv ol vi ng the de term i na ti on o f p o licy or

a positi on in

volv in g the exercise of discretion.” Harinek v. 161 North Clark Street Ltd. Part nership , 181 I ll . 2d 335, 341 (199 8). Ho wever, an empl oyee who satisfi

es the fi rst pr ong of t he t est must also have e ngag ed in both t he de t er mina t io n o f p o licy and the exerc i se of dis cretion whe

n perf ormi ng the act or omis si on from whi ch the pl ai ntif f’ s i nj ury resul

ted. Harinek , 18 1 Il l . 2d at 3 41. W

he the r th e act or om

i ss i on i n q ue sti on i s d i screti ona ry or m i nisteri al m ust b e deter

m i ne d on a cas e-by-cas e b asis. Snyder , 16 7 Ill. 2d at 474 ; Anderson v. Alberto-Culver USA, Inc. , 317 Il l . Ap p. 3d 11 04, 111 3 (200 0).1-08-3607

18

The re for e, we mus t det er mine, first , w het her Cra bt re e wa s in a po sitio n involving t he determi nation of policy or an exerci se of discretion an d, second, whether he

both determi

ned policy and exercis ed di scretion wh en m ai ntain in g the alle y. See Harinek , 181 Ill . 2d at 341. Po licy dete rminat ions, as u sed in sect ion 2 -2 01, involve “ ‘t hos e de cisions which r equ ire t he
mun icip alit y t o ba lan ce co mpe t ing int er es t s a nd t o mak e a jud gme nt ca ll as t o wh at so lut io n w ill best serve e ach of those i

nterests.’ ” Harinek

, 181 Ill . 2d at 342, quo ting West v. Kirkham , 147 Ill . 2d 1, 11 (1992). “[D]i scretionary acts are those whi ch are un ique to a particul

ar publ ic off ic e, whi le mi ni sterial acts are those whi ch a person perf orms on a gi

ven state o f f acts in a prescri bed
mann er, in obedience to t he mandate o f l egal aut hority, and w ithout reference t o t he official ’s dis cretion as to the propr ie ty of the act.” Snyder

v. Curr an Tow nship , 167 Ill . 2d 446, 474 (1 995 ). “ ‘A municipal co rp or at ion ac t s judicially or e xer cises d iscre t ion whe n it se lect s and adopts a plan i

n the m aki ng of pub li

c i mprovem ents, but as soon as i

t begin s to carry out t hat pla n i t acts mi ni sterial ly and i s bound to see that the work is done i n a reasonably

saf e ***
ma nne r.’ ” Greene v. City of Chicago , 73 Ill . 2d 100, 108 (1978), quot in g Johnston v. City of East Moline , 40 5 Il

l . 46 0, 4 66 ( 195 0). Ou

r s upr em e c ourt f urth er exp l ored

the con tours of discr et ionar y versu s mini st er ial act s in In re Chicago Flood Litigation :

“ Of f i ci al ac ti on i s j udi ci al where i t i s th e re sul t of jud gme nt o rdis cr et io n. Offic ial d ut y is minis t er ial w he n it is ab sol ute , ce rtai n a nd i m pe rati ve , i nv ol vi ng mere l y the execution of
a se t t ask , a nd whe n t he law w hich impose s it, pr esc ribes a nd defi nes the ti me , mode and occasi

on of i ts performan

ce wi th such
cer t ainty, t hat not hing re mains for judg ment o r d iscre t ion.1-08-3607

19 [Citation.] A [m

unici pal ] corpo ration acts j udic ia ll y, or exercises di screti on, when i t se l ec ts a nd adoptsa p l an

i n th e m ak i ng of publ ic im provemen ts, such as constructin

g sewers or drains; b

ut as so o n a s it be gin s t o ca rry o ut [ t he ] pla n, it ac t s minis t er ially, an d is bound to see that t he work is done i n a reasonably

saf e and ski ll ful
ma nne r.’ ” In re Chicago Flood Litigation , 176 Ill . 2d 179, 194 (1997), quo ting City of Chicago v. Seben , 165 Ill . 371, 377-78 (1897 ). Two li nes of cases h ave em erged as Illi

nois court s hav

e considered the is sue of wh at co nst itu t es “d et er mini

ng po licy” and “exer cising discr et ion” fo r t he pu rp os es o f app lyi ng discr et ionar y im

munity. 7 45 I LCS 10/ 2- 201 (Wes t 200 8) . T he first line of cas es fo llows t he
re as o ning o f Greene

and maint ains t hat when a municipal employee is dec iding whet her and how t o implement a pr og ra m of mainte nance and impr ove ments , t hat employee is “det er mini ng pol i cy ” an d “ ex ercisi

ng d i scre tion ” as requi red b y section 2-201
. Greene , 73 Ill . 2d at 108; see, e.g., Chicago Flood Litigation , 176 Ill . 2d at 194; Hanley v. City of Chicago , 343 Ill . App. 3d 49, 57 ( 200 3) . B ut onc e t he emplo yee is car rying o ut t hat maintena nce o r impro vement pr og ra m, t he
em ploye e’s actions a re m i nisteri al and do not gi

ve ri se to di scre

tion ary i m m uni ty. Greene , 73 I ll. 2d at 10 8; s ee, e.g., Snyder , 16 7 Ill. 2d at 474 -75 ; Anderson , 317 Il l . Ap p. 3d a t 1117. The sec ond l i ne of c ase s se ems to fi

nd th at an y act tha t woul d resul

t in l i ab i l i ty f or a mun ic ipa li ty i s “determ

in in g policy ” and “ exerci si

ng di scretion.” Courson v. Danville School District No. 118 , 3 33 I ll. App. 3d 8 6, 91 ( 200 2) (finding t hat a sho p t eac her ’s de cision t o r emove the s af ety sh i eld f rom a saw i nv olv ed a d eterm i na tion of p oli cy an d an ex ercise of

di scre tion );1-08-3607

20

Wrobel v. City of Chicago , 3 18 I ll. App. 3d 3 90, 395 (2 000 ) ( finding tha t labor er s’ de cisions
conc ern i ng h ow to fi l l pothol es i

nv olv ed a d eterm i na tion of p oli cy and an ex ercise of

di scre tion ); Johnson v. Decatur Par

k District , 3 01 I ll. App. 3d 7 98, 809 (1 998 ) ( finding tha t a t umbling coach ’sdeci

sions n ot to en sure

adeq uate pl acemen t of sa f ety mats an d not to warn

of the dan

gers i nh ere nt i n u si ng a m i ni tram pol i ne i nv ol ve d de term i na ti ons of pol i cy an d e xe rci se s of di scre tion ). Our sup re me co ur t has o ffered so me guida nce o n det er mini ng wha t so rt s o f po sitio ns in volve “deter mi

ni ng policy” an

d “exerci sin

g discretion.” 745 ILCS 10 /2-201 ( West 2008). Most
re cent cas es g ra nt ing discr et ionar y im munity involve d ecisio ns t hat t oo k plac e at t he exe cut ive or poli cy -m aki ng l ev el
. Arteman v. Clinton Community School District No. 15 , 198 Ill . 2d 475, 487 (2002) (school di strict deci ded not to provide rolle r bladi ng saf ety equi pme nt for a hi gh sch ool ph y sical educ ati on cl

ass ), superseded on other grounds by statute as s tated in Murray v. Chicago Youth Center

, 22 4 Ill. 2d 213 (20 07) ; Harinek , 181 Ill . 2d at 342 (fire m arshal pla nne d and exec ut ed a fire d rill

in a dow nto wn high-rise) ; Chicago Flood Litigation , 176 Ill . 2d at 195 (Ci ty of Ch i cago retai

ne d di scre

tion to chan ge l ocati on of bri dge p i l i ngs). In Harinek

, the p l ai ntif f al l eged that sh e suf f ered i nj uri es re sul

tin g f rom th e f i re marsh al ’sne gli gen

t conduct duri

ng th e cours e of

a f i re dri l l
. Harinek

,1 81 I ll. 2d a t 338 . D ur ing t he fire d rill, t he mars hal dire ct ed a n ent ire floo r o f peo ple, including t he plaint iff , t o s t and in t he vi ci ni ty of a h eavy , win dowless door in a crowded elev

ator area, where m

ore people were pl aced than the a rea c oul d hol

d. Harinek

, 181 Ill . 2d at 338. When the door was suddenl y pus hed opened, i t struck a nd i nj ured th e pl ai ntif f ’she ad, ca

usi ng s erious i

nj ury . Hari

nek, 181 Ill . 2d at 338 . T he su pr eme co ur t affirmed t he t rial co ur t ’s dismissal o f the plaint iff ’s co mplaint o n t he1-08-3607

21

gr ou nds t hat t he fire mar shal wa s ent itled t o d iscre t ionar y im munity und er sec t ion 2 -2 01 o f the Act. Harinek

, 18 1 Il l . 2d at 3 43. Th e c ourt rea son ed tha t the f i re m ars ha l wa s i n a pos i ti on involving t he de t er minatio n of p olicy beca use he “bea rs s ole a nd final resp ons ibil ity for planning and executin

g fi re dril ls in bui ldi ngs throughout Chi cago” and that he both determi ned polic y and exercised

di scre tion i n the cours e of

the f i re dri l l at i ssue i n the com plai nt. Harinek

, 18 1 I ll. 2d at 343. Just ice Garman prop osed the following framework for explai nin g t he cou rt ’s
re aso ning in Harinek :

“Fir st , we sho uld as k: Whe r e d o es t he o fficia l wh o se ac t io n is ch alle ng ed st an d in t he r ele va nt hie r ar ch y o f de cis io nma ke r s? D id he be ar t he so le a nd fina l re sp o nsib ilit y fo rt he de cis io n in que st ion, or was his dec ision t o a ct as he did su bject t o r eview a nd app ro val by ot her s? The higher t he o ffi cial st oo d in t he r elevant ch ai n of com man d, t h e m orel i ke l y i t i s th at h e acte d w i

th dis cretion f

or t he purposes of se ction 2-201.” Van Meter v. Darien Park Distric t , 207 Ill . 2d 359, 392 (2003) (Gar ma n, J., dis senti

ng, j oin ed b y Fi tzgera l d, J.). In o ur analysis, w e must det er mine whet her or not Mr. Cra bt re e wa s “ser ving in a pos i ti on i nv ol vi ng the de term i na ti on of pol i cy an d/or the exerc i se of di screti on, ” a s req

ui red f or dis cretionary

im mun ity under section 2-201. See 745 ILCS 10/2-201 (West 2008). Mr. Crabtree
never testifi

ed that he m

ade determi

nations of poli cy . Instead, he testif

ie d that such determi nations cam e from the ma yor and al dermen of the Ci ty. Crabtree m

erely checked out resi dents’ com

pla in ts about t he condi

tion of spe ci fi

c alle ys and, f rom those compl

ai nts, made a1-08-3607

22

list o f l ocat ions whi

ch needed repairs. There is n o evidence i

n the recor d of this case that his l ist
wa s u se d a s th

e b as i s of repai rsth at w ere m

ade, an d oth er pe opl e i n th e c i ty also prov i de d l i sts f or repai r. In f act, Crabtree t estif

ie d that he had n

o recor d or indepen

dent recoll

ection of that al

le y du ri n g th e s pri n g of 20 04 . Si n ce th e C i ty h ad estab l i sh ed a p rogra m of an n ual l y re gr ad i n g al l i ts unimpro ved a lleys, car rying o ut t his reg ra ding p ro gr am app ear s t o be “abso lut e, cer t ain and im perative, i nvol vi ng m erely the execution of a set task.” Chicago Flood Litigation , 176 Ill . 2d at 1 94 . In addi ti on , ou r sup re me c our

t h as made c l ea

r that w h i l e th e dec i si on of wh eth er to implement a p ro gr am of r epa irs is bo t h a de t er minatio n of p olicy and a n exer cise o f discr et ion, carry i ng out that program

i s a m i nisteri al act. Greene , 73 Il

l . 2d at 10 8; s ee, e.g., Snyder , 16 7 I ll. 2d at 474 -75 ; Anderson , 31 7 I ll. A pp . 3d at 11 17
. T he inst an t ca se fit s s qu ar ely w it hin t his ge ne ral rul e a nd wese e n othi ng i n th e re cord to i nd i ca te that M r. C rab tree ’s ac ti ons or lac k of actions i n m ai ntain in g the alle y i s the sort o f conduct that would be im mun e from li abi li ty unde r th e A ct. De f en da nt p oi nts to Wrobel v. City of Chicago i n s upport of the proposi

tion that l ab orers wh o f i x p othol eshol d pos i ti ons req ui ri ng both the de term i na ti on of pol i cy an d the e xe rci se of dis cretion and thus

are eligi ble for di scretionary

im mun ity under section 2-201 (745 ILCS 10/2- 201 (W est 200 8)). Wrobel v. City of Chicago , 3 18 I ll. App. 3d 3 90, 395 (2 000 ). In Wrobel , t he plaint iff s allege d t hat t hey suffer ed injur ies re sult ing fro m the d efenda nt municipality’s neg ligent
re pair of a po t hole. 318 Ill. App . 3 d at 391 . T he r eco rd in Wrobel dis cl osed how the work was do ne. We affirmed t he t rial co ur t ’s gr ant of su mmary judgment in favor of t he de fendant on t he grounds that the defen

dant was enti

tled to discreti onary i

mm uni ty unde r section 2-201,1-08-3607

23

expl ai ni ng: “These workers ar e directed by [their f oreman] to remove ‘as m

uch’ loo se asp halt a nd exist ing moist ur e in a po t hole ‘ as p os sible’ befor e ap plying the col d m i xtur e. W h i l e th ey are ob l i ga

ted to un derta ke such mea su repu rsua n t to t he ex pr es s d ire ct ive o f t he ir fo r ema n, t he wo rke r s e njo y dis cr et io n in det er mini ng ho w much a spha lt and moist ur e sho uld be a ct ually extr act ed a nd whet her t hat amou nt is indeed ade qua t e t o e nsur e a d ur able pa t ch. The dec isions o f the wo rk er s in this r ega rd can a lso fair ly be characterized as poli

cy determi nations . When

confronted wi

th a particular st re t ch o f ro adw ay, t he wo rk er s must nece ssar ily be co ncer ned w ith t he efficiency in which they pr epa re any po t holes for re pair . S pec ifi cally, t he workers must allocate thei r tim e and resources am

ong the various pot hole s t ha t will be r ep air ed , an d t he y mus t en su r e t ha t no t t o o muc h t ime is dedi cated to pothol

e prep aration. The m

ore ti me an d res ources

the workers devo t e t o p re par ing po t holes for a pa t ch, t he less t ime and r eso ur ces t hey have avai la ble to r epai

r the ot her potholes ex

is ting throughout their dai

ly grid. For t he sam

e reasons discussed above, the extent o f the worker s’
rem ova l ef f orts r ep res en t both a d eterm i na ti on of pol i cy an d a n e xe rci se of dis cr et io n. T he de gr ee t o wh ich a p o t ho le s ho uld be pr ep ar ed , an d s pe cific ally ho w mu ch lo o se as pha lt and mo ist ur e w ill be r emo ved , is a ma t t er o f a
wo rk er ’s pe rso nal judgment , a nd enc omp asse d wit hin that judg ment a re t he policy considerations of ti

me and resource al

locati on durin

g a gi ven1-08-3607

24 workday.” Wrobel , 318 Ill . App. 3d at 395. In t he ca se a t bar , t her e is no t hing in the re co rd t o s how t hat any wo rk was do ne in the al l ey , ce rtai nl y not h ow i t wa s done . Every

ca se m us t be de ci de d on the ev i de nc e a nd f ac ts of that case. The burden

was on the ci

ty to pro ve h

ow and why

it i s enti tled to im mun ity and i t has f ail ed to sustai

n that bu rden
. Van Meter , 207 Ill . 2d at 370. We dist inguish Wrob el on it s fact s. I n Wrobel the question of

the defe ndan t’s negl ige nce fo cu se d o n t he minu t iae o f how m uni ci pal workers repai red a p arti cul

ar pothol e, b eca use there
was no d isput e t hat t he municipal de fendant had p at ched t he po t hole jus t days be for e t he plai ntif f s’ i nj ury . Wrobel , 31 8 Il

l . A pp. 3d a t 395 . Th i s i nq ui ry exam i ne d suc h f

ac tors as h

ow muc h water a worker removed f rom a pothole bef

ore patching i

t and what sort o f m

aterial was use d to form

the p atch
. Wrobel , 318 Ill App. 3d at 395. In the case at bar, the Ci ty ha d establ is hed a program to annua

ll y regrade i

ts uni mproved al

le ys . Glen Crabtree, a publ

ic works
su perv i sor f or th e C i ty , te sti f i ed th at h e u sual l y re gr aded th e a l l ey i n qu esti on pri or to th

e F our th of Jul y. Howeve

r, Mr. Crabtree t estif

ie d that he had n

o recor d that he had regraded the al le y prior to July

10, 2004, and that he had n o inde penden t recollection that he ha

d done so, or what had be en do ne. Thu s t he qu est ion fo r t he jur y was no t whet her t he Cit y pro per ly prep ar ed t he depre ss i on th

at tri ppe d pl ai nti f f , or w he the r th e C i ty uti l ize d the p rope

r m aterials. The

que sti on wasf ar m ore si m pl e: wa s the

al l ey repai red an d was i t repai red ad equa tel y ? W hen the j ury re tur n ed a v erdi ct i n f av or of pl ai n ti f f , tw o re as on ab l e i

n f eren ce s c an b e d ra wn : e i th er th e C i ty did no t re gr ade t he alley prio r t o J uly 10, 200 4, or , e ven if the City did r egr ade t he alley dur ing th at s pri n g, t h e reg ra di n g w as n eg l i gen tl y ca rri ed out. The C i

ty pr es en ted n o f ac ts a t tri al to sug ges t t hat t he r egr ading p ro ces s in the insta nt cas e involved t he so rt of c omp lex, lo cat ion-1-08-3607

25

spe cific det er minatio ns t hat wer e in que st ion in Wrobel . In the case at bar, Crabtree testif ie d that the ci ty m ade ann ual repairs, b ut t here i s no evi

dence of what they

did. Ou r s upr em e c ourt h asmad e c l ea

r th at w he the r a m un i ci pal i ty en gage s i n a prog ram of pu b l i c i m pr ov em en t i s a di scre ti on ar

y matte r b ut th e m an n er i n wh i ch th e m un i ci pal i ty i m pl em en ts the program

i s n ot. Snyder , 167 Ill . 2d at 474-75 ( “W e are al so mi

ndf ul ofthe longst an din g c o mmo n la w p r inc iple t ha t , alt ho ug h a go ve rnme nt al a ge nc y has dis cr et io n in deter m i n i n g w h eth er to pe rf orm a pub l i c w ork

or m ake a n i m pr ov em en t, on ce th e dec i si

on to perf orm th e work is m

ade, i t mu st be done wi th rea sona

bl e ca re an d i n a non ne gli gen t ma nn er”); see also Baran v. City of Chicago Heights , 43 Il

l . 2d 17 7, 1 80 -8 1 ( 19 69 ) (“

In h ol di n g a ci ty responsi ble for i nj uries thus caused the court is n ot reviewi ng the ci ty's dis cretion i

n sel ectin g a plan. It is not co nt ro lli

ng o r p assing u po n t he cit y’s est imate o f public need s. N or is it de ciding what t he ‘best’ ki

nd of i mprovemen

t may b e. It is si

mpl y say in g that when a ci

ty creates a hazardous co ndi

tion and someone is

in jured as a consequence it m ust resp ond in dam

ages, just
asothe rs are req ui red to do” ). Th

i s i nd i ca testha t di screti ona ry i m m un i ty sh oul d n ot ex ten d to a
mun icip alit y’s ac t io ns w he n c ar rying o ut a p r o gr am o f main t en an ce an d r ep air su ch as t he o ne in the c ase at ba r. In a ddit ion, 20 d ays befo re t he o pinion in Wrob el was publ is hed, we ex

pli ci tly stated t hat
we w ou ld no t gr ant discr et ionar y im munity t o e ver y act per for med by a pu blic employee. We cautioned agai

nst an overl

y e xpansi ve readi ng of s ection 2-201, expl

ai ni ng: “Every fai lure to mai

ntain propert y c ould be

descri bed as an
exer cise o f discr et ion u nder municipal defend ant s’ exp ansive approa ch to govern

men tal i m m un i ty . The l eg i sl atu re c oul d n ot1-08-3607

26 have i ntended such

a resul t; ot herwi se, it would n

ot have codif

ie d the com mon l aw duty to mai nta i n prope rty un de r s ec ti on 3 -10 2 of t he Ac t . T he Ac t mus t be st r ict ly co nst rue d a ga inst t he pu blic entity in volv ed.” Anderson , 317 Ill . App. 3d at 1117, citin g Aikens v. Morris , 145 Il

l . 2d 273 , 278 (1 991). No t wit hst anding t he findings in Wrobel , we will c o nt inu e t o co nst rue se ct io n 2
- 20 1 s t r ict ly agains t municipal

defendan ts. The C i ty argu es th at M r. Cra b tre e ex ercise s d

i scre ti on i n deter m i n i n g w h i ch al l ey s to regrade, when, an

d with wh at material

s. Wh il e this ma y b e true, Mr. Crabtr ee was n ot the fi nal arbi ter o f wh ether plai ntif f’ s alle y would be

regraded or o therwis e repai red in the spri ng of 2004. Ms. But kus t est ifi

ed t hat she ha d co mplained abo ut t he co ndit ion o f the alley vi a t elepho ne and e-mai l to Al derman Tisda hl . Alderman

Tisda hl had com e to inspect the condi

tion of the al

le y ne ar pl ai ntif f ’sf ence ga te and agre ed th at the c ondi tion waspoor and

i n n eed of repai r. Al derman Ti sdahl

then assured Ms. But kus that she would put t he alley on the City’s priority li

st for spo t re pair s. T hus, Alder man Tisda hl, no t Mr. Cra bt re e, exer cised discr et ion in det er mini ng that plai ntif f’ s alle y s hould b e repai

red. Once Al

derman Tisda hl ma de the deci sion that plaint iff ’s alley need ed r epa ir, M r. Cra bt re e no long er had d iscre t ion t o d et er mine whet her t he alle y n eeded attention. Hi s role b ecam e purely mi ni sterial : carryi

ng out t he m

ai ntenan ce re que st ed by t he alde rman. A gai n, the Ci ty poi nts to Wrobel

an d a r gu es t ha t Mr
. Cr ab t r ee ex er cis ed dis cr et io n in determi ni ng how to fi ll the depressi

ons i n the al le y b y pl ai ntif f’ s f ence gate. If the C ity

had pr ese nt ed e vidence at t rial t hat Mr. Cra bt re e had in fact re pair ed t he de pr essio ns by reg ra ding t he1-08-3607

27

al l ey the n we w oul

d b e p res en

ted wi th th e q ue sti on of whether M

r. C rab tree exerc i se d di

screti on in choosin g whi ch m aterial s to use in the regradi ng. However, no such e

vi dence was

presented at trial . Instead we onl

y h ave Mr. Crabtree’s assertion that he a tt em pts to regrade this

particular alley i n t ime for t he Fo ur t h of Ju ly parad e ea ch year and s o he must have r egr ade d t he alley by t ha t t ime in 2 00 4. T his is no t an iss ue o f wh et he rMr
. Cr ab t r ee us ed t he co rr ec t mat er ials in regradin g the alle y, b ut rat her whe

ther he regraded the al

le y a t all . There was no evi

dence pres en ted at tri al

that he di d. Once Alder man Tisda hl put plaint iff ’s alley on t he pr ior ity list fo r r epa irs, Mr. Cra bt re e no l ong er h ad di screti on to d ec i dewhether or

not to a l l oca te C i ty res ourc esf

or the re pai r of pla in tif f’ s alle y. Tha t decisi on had b een taken out of hi s han ds. Al l that was l

eft f or Mr. Crabtree
was t o c ar ry o ut t he r equ est ed maint enanc e, an ac t t hat we ha ve pr eviou sly found t o be minist er ial. The Ci ty argued at oral argum

ent that the tr ia

l c ourt prevented i

t from presen

ting a complete discretionary

im mun ity def ense pursuant t o sect ion 2-201. 745 I LCS 10/2-20 1 (West 2008). However, t he record does not suppo rt t hat assertion. Pl ai ntif f cal le d Mr. Crabtree as an adverse wi tnes s pur sua

nt to sec tion

2-110 2 (735 ILCS 5/2-11 02 (W est 200 8)). W

hi l e Mr. Crabtree was o n the stand, t he Ci ty cross exami

ned hi m i n great det ail

about hi s duties as a pu blic w o rk s s up er viso r a nd h is r o le in t he C it y’s a lley maint ena nce pr o gr am. Aft er pla int iff
r es t ed he rca se , t he Cit y mo ve d fo ra d ire ct ed ve r dic t be ca us e, amo ng o t he rar gu men t s, it clai med that it had discretionary i mm uni ty pursuant t o sect ion 2-201 (745 I LCS 10/2-20 1 (West 20 08 )). The tr

i al cou rt d en i ed th at m oti on . Th en th e C i ty re ca l l ed Mr . C ra b tre e a s a wi tn es s i n i ts cas e in chief and q ues t ioned him f ur t her abo ut his ro le in the p ublic wo rk s de par t ment. Afte r t he1-08-3607

28

Ci ty rested i ts case, plai

ntif f f il ed a m ot ion f or directed verdict clai

mi ng that the Ci

ty ha d fai le d t o s ufficiently pro ve disc re t ionar y im munity. T he t rial co ur t det er mined, a fte r he ar ing all of t he
ev i de nc e p res en

ted to the j ury , th at the C i

ty ha d f ai l ed to es tab l i sh

tha t i t qua l i f i ed f or discr et ionar y im

munity und er t he Act . 7 45 I LCS 10/ 2- 201 (Wes t 200 8) . T he Cit y was g iven the opportuni ty to pre sen

t itscas e; the tri

al court did not b ar the

Ci ty f rom a rgui ng d i scre tion ary imm unit y unt il after t he Cit y had pr ese nt ed a ll of its e vidence on t he issue . T he Cit y has t he burden of provin g that it quali

fi es f or discretionary

im mun ity and the Ci

ty f ai le d to me et that bur den
. Van Meter , 207 Ill . 2d at 370. Accordin gly , we fi nd that the trial

court correct ly

barred the Ci

ty f rom presenti

ng a di scre tion ary i m m uni ty d ef en se pursuan

t to secti on 2-2 01 (74 5 ILC S 10/2 -201 (W est 200 8)). CONCLUSION Fo rt he fo r eg o ing r ea so ns , we af fir m t he ju dg men t o f t he cir cu it co ur t o f Co o k C o un t y. Af fi rmed. J. GO RDON

and Mc BRID E, JJ., c oncu r.