United States Court of Appeals 

For the First Circuit 

No. 14-1962 

THOMAS R. MASON, 

Plaintiff, Appellant, 

v. 

TELEFUNKEN SEMICONDUCTORS AMERICA, LLC, 

Defendant, Appellee. 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE 

[Hon. Joseph N. Laplante, U.S. District Judge] 

Before 

Howard, Chief Judge, 

Selya and Lynch, Circuit Judges. 

Kenneth J. Barnes, with whom Law Office of Kenneth J. Barnes, 

Anne M. Rice, and Rice Law Office PLLC were on brief, for 

appellant. 

Irvin D. Gordon, with whom Sulloway & Hollis, P.L.L.C. was on 

brief, for appellee. 

July 29, 2015 
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SELYA, Circuit Judge. This case involves a series of 

shifting employment arrangements. Plaintiff-appellant Thomas R. 

Mason asserts that defendant-appellee TSI Semiconductors America, 

LLC (TSA), formerly known as Telefunken Semiconductors America, 

LLC, abridged his contractual rights with respect to no fewer than 

three of these arrangements. At the summary judgment stage, the 

district court concluded that Mason had failed to make out a 

genuine issue of material fact sufficient to sustain any of his 

claims. After careful consideration, we reverse in part, affirm 

in part, and remand for further proceedings. 

I. BACKGROUND 

 In 2009, Mason began work in a senior engineering 

position for Tejas Silicon, Inc. (Tejas), a California-based 

corporation with an office in New Hampshire. The terms of Mason's 

employment were delineated in a written agreement (the Agreement) 

that took effect on April 1, 2009. The Agreement contained a 

section entitled "Consequences of Termination of Employment." 

Part of this section permitted Tejas to terminate Mason's 

employment without cause upon 60 days' written notice, in which 

event Mason would be entitled to continued salary payments and 

benefits for one year. If, however, the termination was "due to 
- 3 - 

the acquisition, merger, or buyout by another entity," then Mason's 

severance pay and benefits would continue for two years.2 

 The Agreement stipulated that Mason's employment was for 

a fixed term (one year), which would renew automatically on each 

anniversary of the Agreement's effective date unless either party 

elected not to renew. An election not to renew could be made by 

providing written notice no fewer than 30 days prior to the 

anniversary date. 

 Mason's employment with Tejas continued uneventfully for 

two years, and the Agreement renewed automatically on April 1, 

2010 and April 1, 2011. The landscape changed, though, in December 

of 2011 when Mason learned of an impending corporate 

restructuring.3 As Mason understood it, Tejas would terminate his 

employment and TSA would offer him new employment. Soon 

thereafter, TSA wrote to Mason and offered him employment in his 

then-current position at his then-current salary, beginning 

January 1, 2012 (the Offer Letter). 

 2 The Agreement entitled Mason, in certain circumstances, to 

immediate vesting of stock options as part of a severance package. 

Because this appeal is not concerned with the quantum of damages 

(if any) to which Mason may be entitled, we make no further 

reference to the stock option provisions. 

3 The parties dispute the nature of the corporate event that 

ultimately transpired. TSA maintains that Tejas continues to exist 

as a separate and independent entity; Mason maintains that Tejas 

was merged into TSA. Our disposition of this appeal does not 

require us to resolve this dispute, and we shall refer to this 

event neutrally as the "2011 reorganization." 
- 4 - 

 Mason decided to accept employment with TSA and, in 

December of 2011, signed four documents: a document entitled 

"Amendment to Employment Agreement" (the Amendment); the Offer 

Letter; a document entitled "Employment, Confidential Information 

and Invention Assignment Agreement" (the New Agreement); and a 

document entitled "Employee Transfer Agreement and General 

Release" (the Release). By its terms, the Amendment was to take 

effect on January 1, 2012. Mason, Tejas, and TSA all signed it, 

thus memorializing their mutual intent to amend the Agreement. 

 The Amendment went on to state that, "effective as of 

January 1, 2012," each reference to Tejas in the Agreement would 

be replaced by a reference to TSA; that Tejas would "transfer and 

assign to [TSA] the Agreement and all of its rights, duties and 

obligations thereunder"; and that TSA would assume those rights, 

duties, and obligations. It also provided that "the Agreement 

shall continue under [Mason's] employment relationship with 

[TSA]." 

 The Offer Letter, though, provided that Mason's 

employment with TSA would be "for no specified period of time" and 

would be "an at-will employment relationship," under which either 

Mason or TSA could "terminate the relationship at any time, for 

any reason, with or without cause." Apparently in response to 

this language, Mason wrote (in the signature block of the Offer 
- 5 - 

Letter) the words "As Amended (Attached)" and annexed a copy of 

the Amendment. 

 The New Agreement contained, in capital letters, Mason's 

acknowledgment "that, except as set forth in any other written 

agreement between me and the company, my employment with the 

company constitutes 'at-will' employment." Mason executed this 

document without any qualification. 

 To complete the picture, the Release provided that, in 

exchange for $1000 and the offer of new employment by TSA, Mason 

would "ABSOLUTELY AND IRREVOCABLY AND UNCONDITIONALLY" release TSA 

from "any and all claims" against TSA or its "[r]elated [p]arties," 

including claims arising "as a result of [his] employment with and 

separation from employment" as of December 31, 2011. Here again, 

Mason added a holographic coda, stating cryptically "EXCEPT AS 

AMENDED IN 'AMENDMENT TO EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT.'" 

 In January of 2012, Mason began toiling for TSA. Two 

months later — on February 29 — TSA sent him an e-mail announcing 

that the Agreement "will not be extended for an additional oneyear period and will automatically expire April 1, 2012." The email proposed that, should the parties "agree to continue the 

employment relationship on and after April 1, 2012, then the 

employment relationship shall be in accordance with" the Offer 

Letter and the New Agreement. 
- 6 - 

 Mason sought to clarify whether his employment with TSA 

was being terminated as of April 1. In an e-mail sent on March 

31, TSA responded that it was not terminating Mason's employment 

but, rather, was simply declining to renew the Agreement. It went 

on to state that Mason's subsequent employment would be governed 

by the documents signed in December of 2011 (including specifically 

the Offer Letter and the New Agreement). Mason continued to work 

for TSA until May 17, 2012, when TSA furloughed him as part of a 

company-wide reduction in force. 

 Mason did not go quietly into this bleak night. He 

repaired to a California state court and sued TSA for breach of 

contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair 

dealing, and violation of section 203 of the California Labor Code. 

Citing diversity of citizenship and the existence of a controversy 

in the requisite amount, TSA removed the case to federal district 

court. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(a), 1441. It thereafter successfully 

moved to transfer venue to the District of New Hampshire. See id. 

§ 1404(a). 

 After the close of discovery, the parties cross-moved 

for summary judgment. Mason resisted summary judgment on his 

breach of contract claims, asserting that there were genuine issues 

of material fact as to whether any of three separate events — the 

December 2011 reorganization, the February 2012 non-renewal, and 

the May 2012 layoff — constituted a termination without cause that 
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triggered the duty to pay severance. The district court entered 

summary judgment in favor of TSA upon concluding that on a plain 

reading of the relevant contractual provisions, none of these 

events constituted a termination under the Agreement. See Mason 

v. Telefunken Semiconductors Am., LLC, No. 12-507, 2014 WL 3962470, 

at *8 (D.N.H. Aug. 13, 2014). This timely appeal followed. 

II. ANALYSIS 

 We review a decision to grant or deny summary judgment 

de novo. See Bisbano v. Strine Printing Co., 737 F.3d 104, 107 

(1st Cir. 2013); Avery v. Hughes, 661 F.3d 690, 693 (1st Cir. 

2011). In this instance, Mason appeals only the district court's 

entry of summary judgment in favor of TSA, not the court's denial 

of his own motion for summary judgment. Hence, we take the facts 

and the reasonable inferences extractable therefrom in the light 

most favorable to Mason. See Torres Vargas v. Santiago Cummings, 

149 F.3d 29, 30 (1st Cir. 1998). We will affirm only if we are 

satisfied that there is no genuine issue of material fact and TSA 

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Vineberg v. 

Bissonnette, 548 F.3d 50, 55 (1st Cir. 2008). Such an affirmance 

may rest on any ground made manifest by the record. See Houlton 

Citizens' Coal. v. Town of Houlton, 175 F.3d 178, 184 (1st Cir. 

1999). 

 Since this is a diversity case, we look to federal law 

for the summary judgment framework and to state law for the 
- 8 - 

substantive rules of decision. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 

473 (1965); Artuso v. Vertex Pharm., Inc., 637 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 

2011). The parties have stipulated that California is the 

wellspring of the relevant state law, and that stipulation jibes 

with the choice-of-law provisions contained in the Agreement and 

the Amendment. Consequently, we accept this stipulation at face 

value without performing a full-blown choice-of-law analysis. See 

Butler v. Balolia, 736 F.3d 609, 612 (1st Cir. 2013); Artuso, 637 

F.3d at 5. 

 This appeal necessarily rises or falls with the breach 

of contract claims. In contract disputes, the court may construe 

clear and unambiguous contract terms as a matter of law. See 

Torres Vargas, 149 F.3d at 33. If, however, ambiguity lurks, an 

examination of extrinsic evidence "becomes essential." Id. 

 California follows the familiar rule that an ambiguity 

arises if, when viewed in context, a contract term is equally 

susceptible to more than one reasonable meaning. See Dore v. 

Arnold Worldwide, Inc., 139 P.3d 56, 60 (Cal. 2006); Transamerica 

Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d 259, 264 (Cal. Ct. 

App. 1994). Whether a contract term is ambiguous is itself a 

question of law. See Blackie v. Maine, 75 F.3d 716, 721 (1st Cir. 

1996); Allen v. Adage, Inc., 967 F.2d 695, 698 (1st Cir. 1992). 

 Against this backdrop, a series of questions must be 

asked concerning each of Mason's breach of contract claims. To 
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begin, an inquiring court must ask whether the dispositive contract 

language is susceptible to more than one reasonable 

interpretation. See Torres Vargas, 149 F.3d at 33. If not, the 

court may proceed to construe the language and dispose of the 

summary judgment motion accordingly. See Newport Plaza Assocs. v. 

Durfee Attleboro Bank (In re Newport Plaza Assocs.), 985 F.2d 640, 

644 (1st Cir. 1993). But if there is more than one reasonable 

interpretation, the court must then ask whether the extrinsic 

evidence reveals a genuine issue of material fact regarding the 

meaning of the ambiguous language. See Allen, 967 F.2d at 698. 

If the extrinsic evidence is "so one-sided that no reasonable 

person could decide the contrary," the meaning of the language 

becomes evident and the erstwhile ambiguity will not preclude 

summary judgment. Bos. Five Cents Sav. Bank v. Sec'y of Dep't of 

HUD, 768 F.2d 5, 8 (1st Cir. 1985). But if the extrinsic evidence 

bearing on the meaning of the relevant language is "contested or 

contradictory," summary judgment will not lie. Allen, 967 F.2d at 

698 n.3. 

 With this framework in place, we turn to Mason's breach 

of contract claims. We address the purported termination events 

sequentially. 

A. The December 2011 Reorganization.

 Mason's flagship claim is that the district court erred 

in granting summary judgment on his breach of contract claim 
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arising out of the 2011 reorganization and the concomitant 

cessation of his employment with Tejas. He argues that the 

relevant contractual provisions are ambiguous and that a genuine 

issue of material fact exists regarding the contracting parties' 

understanding of the Agreement's termination clause. 

 Termination is not defined in the Agreement, and the 

drafters obviously used the word in more than one sense. At 

various places, the termination clause refers to termination "of 

employment" generally, termination of "[the employee's] 

employment" specifically, and termination of "employment with the 

Company." Mason insists that one reasonable interpretation of the 

Agreement is that the parties intended for termination to have the 

relatively narrow meaning of termination of employment with Tejas. 

He suggests that construing a termination clause to require 

severance payments regardless of new employment comports with the 

norm for companies in Tejas's industry and with other surrounding 

language in the Agreement. 

 TSA demurs. It argues that the plain meaning of 

"terminate" is to "discontinue" or "sever," and that Mason's 

employment was neither discontinued nor severed but, rather, 

transferred seamlessly from Tejas to TSA. Thus, Mason's employment 

could not have "terminated" because he was never without a job.4

 4 There is some inherent tension in TSA's position. On the 

one hand, it argues that it is not a successor entity to Tejas and 
- 11 - 

 "[W]ords are like chameleons; they frequently have 

different shades of meaning depending upon the circumstances." 

United States v. Romain, 393 F.3d 63, 74 (1st Cir. 2004). This 

adage is relevant because the termination clause in the Agreement 

is imprecise and, as such, is susceptible to either of the 

competing interpretations urged by the litigants. After all, the 

Agreement uses the word "termination" loosely, in reference to 

"termination of employment," termination of "[the employee's] 

employment," and termination of employment "with the Company." 

Then, too, with respect to the continuation of benefits, the 

contracting parties appear to have contemplated the possibility of 

new employment following termination, yet they did not make clear 

how that new employment would relate to severance benefits. 

Finally, the Agreement contemplates the possibility of termination 

due to "acquisition, merger, or buyout" but does not expressly 

preclude severance payments even in the event of employment by the 

successor entity. 

 In our estimation, TSA's invocation of dictionary 

definitions does not assist its cause. Even if we assume that 

 

the language of the Release (which TSA drafted) indicates that it 

sought to hire Tejas employees free and clear of obligations owed 

by Tejas. On the other hand, TSA argues that Mason's employment 

with Tejas transferred seamlessly from Tejas to TSA without any 

termination of Mason's employment. "Having one's cake and eating 

it, too, is not in fashion in this circuit," United States v. 

Tierney, 760 F.2d 382, 388 (1st Cir. 1985), and we are skeptical 

that TSA can have it both ways. 
- 12 - 

"terminate" means "discontinue" or "sever," as TSA insists, 

Mason's employment with Tejas could reasonably be found to have 

been discontinued or severed regardless of any "transfer" to TSA. 

Moreover, our doubts about the meaning of "terminate" must be 

weighed in light of a legal regime prescribing that "unemployment 

is not a prerequisite to the right to separation pay." Chapin v. 

Fairchild Camera & Instrum. Corp., 107 Cal. Rptr. 111, 115 (Cal. 

Ct. App. 1973). Rather, such a right "may, and frequently does, 

exist where there is no interruption whatever in the continuity of 

employment." Id. 

 The upshot is that the Agreement fails to make clear 

whether the contracting parties intended that a termination 

sufficient to trigger the payment of severance benefits could occur 

even in the event of immediate reemployment by another entity as 

part of a company-to-company transaction. Consequently, the 

termination clause is ambiguous as a matter of law. 

 The question, then, reduces to whether the extrinsic 

evidence relating to the meaning of the clause is so conclusive 

that it dispels the ambiguity. See Torres Vargas, 149 F.3d at 33; 

Bos. Five Cents, 768 F.2d at 8. In ascertaining the meaning of a 

contract term, evidence of the contracting parties' intent at the 

time of contract formation is most significant. See People ex 

rel. Lockyer v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 132 Cal. Rptr. 2d 151, 

158 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003). This principle applies even where, as 
- 13 - 

here, one of the litigants was not a signatory to the Agreement: 

under California law, a successor in interest to a contract who 

has not renegotiated the terms of the contract is bound by the 

meaning assigned to its terms by the original parties. See Applera 

Corp. v. MP Biomeds., LLC, 93 Cal. Rptr. 3d 178, 196 (Cal. Ct. 

App. 2009); Spector v. Nat'l Pictures Corp., 20 Cal. Rptr. 307, 

312 (Cal. Ct. App. 1962). TSA is therefore bound by the shared 

intent of the contracting parties to the Agreement (Mason and 

Tejas).5 See Spector, 20 Cal. Rptr. at 312. Of course, postformation, pre-dispute conduct also may bear on the meaning of a 

contract's terms. Under California law, evidence of such conduct 

may be relevant in ascertaining the contracting parties' shared 

understanding of a contract's original meaning. See Oceanside 84, 

Ltd. v. Fid. Fed. Bank, 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d 487, 492-93 (Cal. Ct. 

App. 1997). 

 Here the record is largely devoid of any extrinsic 

evidence showing a shared understanding between Mason and Tejas 

about the meaning of "termination" as that term is used in the 

Agreement. What extrinsic evidence exists is not so one-sided as 

to cure the ambiguity and compel a finding against Mason. For 

 5 We note that the Amendment did not alter any of the 

substantive terms of the Agreement. It merely memorialized the 

parties' understanding that TSA would assume Tejas's rights and 

duties under the Agreement and effectuated that assumption by 

substituting TSA for Tejas in the Agreement's text. 
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example, there is conflicting evidence anent the nature of the 

2011 reorganization and whether the contracting parties thought at 

the time of the reorganization that Mason's employment with Tejas 

was being terminated without cause. 

 The post-formation evidence on which TSA relies 

(principally, Mason's failure to seek severance payments during 

the first two months of his employment with TSA) is subject to 

varying interpretations. Furthermore, one of Mason's sworn 

statements avers that he and Tejas's president (who signed the 

Agreement on Tejas's behalf) understood the 2011 reorganization to 

constitute a termination under the Agreement, regardless of 

whether Mason decided to cast his lot with the successor firm.6 

 As post-formation, pre-dispute evidence, the Amendment 

itself (although signed by Mason, Tejas, and TSA) tells us very 

little. Its preamble states that "as part of [a] corporate 

consolidation and reorganization, Tejas will be merged into and 

with [TSA] or will be dissolved as a corporate entity after January 

1, 2012, and [Mason] will become employed by [TSA] as of January 

1, 2012." Withal, the Amendment is totally silent as to the 

 6 We note that Mason also relies upon the sworn statement of 

the former Tejas president as evidence that Tejas terminated 

Mason's employment within the meaning of the Agreement. As the 

admissibility of this affidavit was controverted in the court 

below, we give it no weight in our analysis. Similarly, we leave 

open the relevance of a document composed by TSA as part of the 

2011 reorganization (colloquially known as "Exhibit A"). 
- 15 - 

mechanics of how Mason would cease to work for Tejas and start to 

work for TSA. It is equally silent as to the implications of those 

actions, including whether Mason was entitled to severance 

benefits as a result. 

 The short of it is that ascertaining the meaning of the 

termination clause in the context of the 2011 reorganization hinges 

largely on the credibility of Mason's claims as to the contracting 

parties' shared intent and the inferences to be drawn from the 

circumstances surrounding the signing of the Amendment and the 

parties' conduct. Such matters are open to reasonable dispute 

and, therefore, are not the stuff of summary judgment. Rather, 

they are squarely within the province of the factfinder. See, 

e.g., Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986); 

Mandel v. Bos. Phoenix, Inc., 456 F.3d 198, 206 (1st Cir. 2006). 

 TSA has a fallback position. It argues that even if 

Mason's employment with Tejas was terminated in December of 2011, 

the Release operated to absolve TSA of any liability for severance 

benefits owed to Mason. This argument lacks force. 

 By its terms, the Release discharged TSA from "any and 

all claims" that Mason may have had, including any claims resulting 

from his separation from employment effective December 31, 2011. 

TSA posits that this instrument extinguished any claim that Mason 

may have had against TSA for severance benefits as a result of the 

termination of his Tejas employment. Although this argument has 
- 16 - 

a certain superficial appeal, it fails to take into account Mason's 

handwritten coda to the Release, which stated "EXCEPT AS AMENDED 

IN 'AMENDMENT TO EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT.'" According to one of 

Mason's sworn statements, this coda was intended to exempt from 

the Release any severance obligations Tejas owed to him under the 

Agreement — and its wording is reasonably susceptible to that 

interpretation. And if those obligations were exempted from the 

Release — a matter on which we take no view — TSA might have 

assumed them by operation of the Amendment. 

 To sum up, the handwritten coda, though not compelling 

Mason's construction, renders the Release susceptible to more than 

one reasonable interpretation. Extrinsic evidence in the record 

does not relieve this uncertainty. It follows that the Release 

does not, as a matter of law, bar Mason's claim for severance 

benefits arising out of the 2011 reorganization. See Torres 

Vargas, 149 F.3d at 33; Allen, 967 F.2d at 698 n.3. 

 That ends this aspect of the matter. Because genuine 

issues of material fact permeate the record, the district court 

should not have granted TSA's motion for summary judgment on 

Mason's claim for severance benefits arising out of the 2011 

reorganization. 

B. The February 2012 Non-Renewal.

 Mason next claims that TSA terminated his employment 

without cause when it notified him in February of 2012 that it 
- 17 - 

would not renew the Agreement but would let it expire on March 31, 

2012. The district court rejected this claim, granting summary 

judgment in favor of TSA on the basis that non-renewal was not 

tantamount to termination. See Mason, 2014 WL 3962470, at *8. 

 As said, the effective date of the Agreement was April 

1, 2009. Its non-renewal clause explains that Tejas (and by 

substitution, TSA) agreed to employ Mason "for a period commencing 

on the Effective Date and ending on the first anniversary of the 

Effective Date (the 'Term')." The "Term" would be extended for 

additional one-year periods unless either party gave written 

notice of its exercise of the non-renewal option "at least thirty 

(30) days prior to the applicable anniversary of the Effective 

Date." 

 Mason first asserts that the non-renewal clause is 

ambiguous as to whether the exercise of the right of non-renewal 

had the effect of ending his employment with TSA or simply ending 

the protections provided by the Agreement. In his view, employment 

under the Agreement was not merely "labor for wage" but, rather, 

"a specific relationship with a specific employer . . . for 

particular and agreed upon terms and conditions." When employment 

under those terms and conditions ended, his thesis runs, the 

employment itself was necessarily terminated and the duty to pay 

severance benefits was kindled. 
- 18 - 

 Words are not infinitely malleable, see, e.g., 

Levinsky's, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 127 F.3d 122, 129 (1st 

Cir. 1997), and a contract term is not ambiguous simply because an 

imaginative party conjures up an alternate interpretation, see 

F.D.I.C. v. Singh, 977 F.2d 18, 22 (1st Cir. 1992); Lockyer, 132 

Cal. Rptr. 2d at 158. Read naturally, the non-renewal clause is 

not susceptible to Mason's proffered interpretation. After all, 

a contract term should not be construed in isolation; rather, it 

should be construed in light of the contract as a whole. See, 

e.g., Powerine Oil Co. v. Superior Court, 118 P.3d 589, 598 (Cal. 

2005). By the same token, a court should construe a contract to 

give effect to each material term and not to render any term 

meaningless. See Lueras v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP, 163 Cal. 

Rptr. 3d 804, 823 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013). These tenets help to 

explain why Mason's claim fails. 

 "Non-renewal" and "termination" are distinct terms 

having different meanings.7 Here, moreover, the structure of the 

 7 "Termination" is typically defined as the "act of bringing 

to an end or concluding," Webster's Third New International 

Dictionary 2359 (2002), or a "conclusion or discontinuance," 

Black's Law Dictionary 1700 (10th ed. 2014). By contrast, 

"nonrenewal" means "a failure to renew," see id. at 1220, where 

"renew" typically means to "make or do again," Webster's Third New 

International Dictionary 1922 (2002), or to "restor[e] or 

reestablish[]," Black's Law Dictionary 1488 (10th ed. 2014). This 

difference in meaning is all the more clear where, as here, the 

words refer to different objects: as to termination, the Agreement 

speaks to various kinds of termination of employment, but as to 
- 19 - 

Agreement makes it nose-on-the-face plain that the contracting 

parties never intended to use those distinct terms synonymously. 

First, the non-renewal clause appears in section two of the 

Agreement under the heading "Term," whereas the termination clause 

appears in section six under the heading "Consequences of 

Termination of Employment." See, e.g., Alameda Cnty. Flood Control 

v. Dep't of Water Res., 152 Cal. Rptr. 3d 845, 862 (Cal. Ct. App. 

2013) (applying rule that "[w]here the same word or phrase might 

have been used . . . in different portions of a [contract] but a 

different word or phrase having different meaning is used instead, 

the construction employing that different meaning is to be favored" 

(internal quotation marks omitted)). Second, the contracting 

parties' intent to define different meanings is well-illustrated 

by comparing the 30-day notice requirement in the non-renewal 

clause with the 60-day notice requirement in the "without cause" 

portion of the termination clause. If the parties had intended 

non-renewal to constitute termination under the Agreement, there 

would have been no need for disparate notice periods. Indeed, 

such disparate periods would make no sense. 

 In an effort to blunt the force of this reasoning, Mason 

argues that the disparate notice periods do not foreclose the 

possibility that non-renewal is a form of termination. He suggests 

 

non-renewal, the Agreement speaks to non-renewal of the term of 

the contract. 
- 20 - 

that a jury reasonably could conclude that the contracting parties 

agreed to a shorter notice period for non-renewal because they 

anticipated the possibility that a decision not to renew might 

occur closer to the anniversary date. But common sense 

defenestrates this suggestion. For one thing, Mason's 

interpretation would hollow out the bargained-for 60-day notice 

requirement for termination without cause. For another thing, 

there is a common-sense explanation for the disparate notice 

periods: that termination would end employment with TSA altogether 

whereas non-renewal would only eliminate certain protections under 

the Agreement. Mason's suggested reading completely overlooks 

this explanation. 

 The marketplace rationale for such a common-sense 

reading is apparent. The severance provisions for termination 

without cause are generous (but perhaps more ephemeral than Mason 

would have liked), and the contracting parties may well have wanted 

to ensure that either side could revisit those provisions 

periodically. The non-renewal clause offered the parties just 

such a vehicle. 

 To say more about this claim would be supererogatory. 

We hold that the non-renewal clause is not ambiguous in the context 

of the Agreement as a whole. See Dore, 139 P.3d at 60. Giving 

the contract language its plain meaning, see id., TSA's exercise 

of the non-renewal option did not work a termination of employment 
- 21 - 

within the meaning of the Agreement and, thus, did not trigger an 

entitlement to severance payments. Accordingly, the district 

court did not err in granting summary judgment on this claim. 

C. The May 2012 Layoff. 

 In the court below, Mason contended that TSA's 

termination of his employment as part of a company-wide reduction 

in force on May 17, 2012 constituted termination without cause 

within the purview of the Agreement and, thus, triggered an 

entitlement to severance payments. Because Mason did not renew 

this contention in his opening brief on appeal, he waived it. See 

DeCaro v. Hasbro, Inc., 580 F.3d 55, 64 (1st Cir. 2009). And while 

Mason did attempt to resurrect this contention in his reply brief, 

that was too late. See Cipes v. Mikasa, Inc., 439 F.3d 52, 55 

(1st Cir. 2006); Sandstrom v. ChemLawn Corp., 904 F.2d 83, 87 (1st 

Cir. 1990). 

 We add that even if this contention had been preserved 

on appeal, it would fail in light of our holding that TSA's timely 

exercise of its right of non-renewal terminated the Agreement 

without terminating Mason's employment. See supra Part II.B. We 

explain briefly. 

 To begin, TSA validly exercised its right of non-renewal 

effective March 31, 2012. Consequently, Mason's subsequent 

employment was not covered by the Agreement but, instead, was for 

"no specified term." Cal. Lab. Code § 2922. Under California 
- 22 - 

law, employment without a fixed term is presumed to be at will. 

See id.; Guz v. Bechtel Nat'l, Inc., 8 P.3d 1089, 1100 (Cal. 2000). 

 Mason attempts to overcome this presumption. He 

suggests that since he continued to work for TSA after the 

expiration of the Agreement, performing the same tasks under the 

same job title for the same salary and benefits as he previously 

had received, an implied-in-fact contract arose between April 1 

and May 17. In his view, this implied contract amounted to a 

continuation of the Agreement, so that he enjoyed the same 

severance protections on May 17 as he had when the Agreement was 

in force. 

 This is little more than wishful thinking. Under 

California law, a court cannot imply a contract in fact containing 

terms that directly contradict terms of an express at-will 

agreement. See Tomlinson v. Qualcomm, Inc., 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d 

822, 830 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002); Halvorsen v. Aramark Unif. Servs., 

Inc., 77 Cal. Rptr. 2d 383, 385 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998). This is 

especially true where the written agreement was signed by the 

employee and expressly limits the manner in which the at-will 

provisions may be altered. See, e.g., Starzynski v. Capital Pub. 

Radio, Inc., 105 Cal. Rptr. 2d 525, 529 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001). 

Here, Mason signed two documents in December of 2011 — the Offer 

Letter and the New Agreement — which explicitly acknowledged that, 

absent the Agreement, his employment with TSA would be at will. 
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What is more, each document stipulated that the at-will provisions 

could not be altered except by a writing signed both by Mason and 

TSA's president. In the face of these unmodified documents, Mason 

cannot overcome the presumption that his employment on May 17 was 

at will. See id. Therefore, his layoff did not entitle him to 

the prophylaxis of the Agreement (which had by then expired). See 

Halvorsen, 77 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 385. 

 In an effort to change the trajectory of the debate, 

Mason argued below that even if his implied contract argument 

failed, the non-renewal of the Agreement did not take effect on 

April 1 because the Amendment (which had an effective date of 

January 1) by some mysterious alchemy caused the Agreement's 

effective date to migrate from April 1 to January 1. By this 

logic, the non-renewal could not have been effective before 

December 31, 2012 — and Mason would have still been covered by the 

Agreement (and its severance protections) when he was laid off in 

May. 

 This argument is jejune. The Amendment makes pellucid 

that the only aspect of the Agreement that it altered was to 

substitute TSA for Tejas. It provided that this substitution would 

take effect on January 1, 2012, but it did not provide that either 

the term of the Agreement or its effective date would in any way 

be revised. 
- 24 - 

 That is game, set, and match. We hold that Mason's claim 

for severance benefits stemming from his layoff on May 17, 2012 

has been waived; and that, in all events, summary judgment on that 

claim was appropriate. 

III. CONCLUSION 

 We need go no further.8 For the reasons elucidated 

above, we reverse the district court's summary judgment ruling in 

part, affirm that ruling in part, and remand for further 

proceedings consistent with this opinion. No costs shall be taxed 

on appeal. 

So Ordered. 

 8 Our decision today does not deal with Mason's claim for 

breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 

Even though the district court did not address this claim in any 

meaningful way, it granted judgment on the case as a whole, and 

Mason took pains to preserve this particular claim on appeal. 

Given this sequence of events, we deem it prudent to refrain from 

addressing the matter here and, instead, leave it open on remand. 

Cf. United States v. Ticchiarelli, 171 F.3d 24, 29 (1st Cir. 1999). 

In contrast, Mason did not preserve on appeal his claim for a 

violation of the California Labor Code. Thus, we deem that claim 

foreclosed on remand. See, e.g., United States v. Connell, 6 F.3d 

27, 30 (1st Cir. 1993).