Rel: July 26, 2024

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. 

Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, 

Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections 

may be made before the opinion is published in Southern Reporter.

ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS

SPECIAL TERM, 2024

_________________________

CL-2023-0382

_________________________

Catherine S. Cauthen 

v.

Carey Lee Cauthen, Jr. 

_________________________

CL-2023-0408

_________________________

Carey Lee Cauthen, Jr.

v. 

Catherine S. Cauthen

Appeals from Baldwin Circuit Court

(DR-19-901487)
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2

FRIDY, Judge.

Catherine S. Cauthen ("the wife") appeals from a judgment of the 

Baldwin Circuit Court ("the trial court") divorcing her from Carey Lee 

Cauthen, Jr. ("the husband"), and, among other things, dividing the 

marital assets, calculating child support, and finding her in contempt for 

violating a status quo order. The husband filed a cross-appeal, 

challenging the trial court's computation of his share of the value of a 

pickup truck, its failure to hold the wife in contempt for failing to pay a 

certain bill and for causing him to incur living expenses because of her 

violation of a status quo order, and its failure to award him an attorney 

fee. For the reasons set forth herein, we affirm the judgment in part, 

reverse it in part, and remand the cause to the trial court.

Background

The parties married in July 2013 and had one child ("the child"), 

who was born in 2016. On December 11, 2019, the wife filed a divorce 

action against the husband alleging incompatibility of temperament. On 

December 12, 2019, the trial court entered an order directing the parties 

to maintain the status quo as it existed during the marriage to the extent 

possible ("the status quo order"). To assist in the achievement of that 
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3

goal, the order directed the parties to pay debts and recurring monthly 

financial obligations such as rent, utilities, groceries, and the like "in the 

same manner and from the same sources as they have customarily been 

paid during the marriage." The status quo order also directed the parties 

to preserve assets, providing:

"Apart from reasonable and necessary expenditures of funds 

in order to pay the regular recurring expenses of the parties, 

without PRIOR permission of the Court, the parties SHALL 

NOT: (1) dissipate, encumber, sell, transfer, conceal, destroy, 

or dispose of assets presently in their control, nor shall they 

permit the same to occur; (2) make withdrawals from or 

liquidate any account with a financial institution including 

but not limited to checking, savings, money markets, or CDs; 

(3) incur any debt; (4) withdraw from, borrow against, alter or 

change the beneficiary designation of or reduce in any way 

any retirement type account including but not limited to 

profit-sharing, pension, IRA, or Keogh; (5) alter or change any 

insurance policy (medical, life, property, etc.) including 

making changes to the ownership, beneficiary designation, 

term, or amount, and further shall not allow any policy to 

lapse or the coverage to be otherwise adversely affected; (6) 

terminate or adversely affect any utility service, including 

water, gas, electric, cable, internet, telephone or other 

services, or withdraw deposits therefrom; (7) expend any 

funds for vacations or luxury items; (8) sign or endorse the 

other party's name to or negotiate any negotiable instrument 

or legal document (such as tax returns, tax refunds, insurance 

payments, loans, credit card applications); (9) terminate or 

limit credit cards unless in that party's sole name; (10) open 

or divert mail addressed to the other party; (11) destroy or 

alter any records of any kind, including electronic data files."

(Capitalization in original.)
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4

On March 31, 2020, the husband answered the wife's complaint 

with a general denial. Through different counsel, the husband filed an 

amended answer and a counterclaim for divorce on April 29, 2020. That 

same day, he filed a motion requesting custody of the child and exclusive 

possession of the marital residence. In that motion, he alleged that the 

wife had "become increasingly unstable, erratic, and violent" toward him 

and that her behavior had "spiraled out of control," including, he said, 

drinking alcohol to excess. The husband further alleged that the wife had 

threatened to kill him and others, had threatened to commit suicide, and 

had access to firearms. The trial court scheduled a hearing on the 

husband's motion for May 4, 2020.

On May 4, 2020, shortly before the scheduled hearing, the wife filed 

a response to the husband's motion alleging that, although they were 

then living in separate rooms of the marital residence, the husband 

"caused her to suffer inappropriate touching almost every morning" and 

that he had raped her on at least two occasions. In her response, she 

claimed she had not disclosed the alleged rapes earlier because, she said, 

she was a "private person and simply did not [want] anyone to know 

about the situation in her home." The wife denied the behavior that the 
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5

husband had attributed to her, stated that he drank alcohol to excess, 

and claimed that he was "actually very lazy and is telling mistruths in 

an effort to obtain money from [her] family as he refused to properly and 

adequately provide for [the] wife and child." She asked that the husband 

be required to vacate the marital residence and that she be allowed to 

retain custody of the child.

The trial court held the hearing on May 4 as scheduled. On that 

date, the trial court entered an order requiring that, because of the 

allegations of domestic violence, guns in the marital residence, and 

excessive use of alcohol by both parties, the Baldwin County Department 

of Human Resources ("DHR") was to conduct a home study and report its 

findings to the court.

The trial court held the trial over three days on August 2 and 6, 

2021, and November 23, 2021. The wife and the husband both testified 

that when they married in 2013, her father gave them a choice between 

having a large wedding or having a smaller wedding and receiving a gift 

of $40,000. They chose to take the money, and the ceremony was held 

before immediate family only. The wife's father, however, testified that 

he did not give them any money at the time of the wedding but, instead, 
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6

had merely lent them the $40,000 to help them get started in life; he had 

nothing to document that the payment was a loan. 

When they first married, the husband and the wife lived in 

Montgomery. After about four months, they moved to Dalhart, Texas. In 

Dalhart, the husband worked in the cattle industry; the wife worked for 

veterinarians making "farm calls" before going to work in a research 

program in a diagnostic laboratory. The husband testified that, at that 

time, his annual income was between $40,000 and $45,000 and the wife 

earned between $50,000 and $55,000. The wife testified that her parents 

had lent them the money to purchase their first house. Because that 

house was built over a sewer line, the wife said, they were forced to sell 

it without a profit. She said she repaid her parents, who then gave her a 

second loan to purchase the second home that she and the husband had 

in Dalhart. The wife said that she and the husband bought the second 

house for approximately $161,000 and that she paid her father $500 each 

month. The wife testified that the second house needed numerous 

repairs, most of which she made herself, and that she paid a handyman 

to do the work that she could not handle. 
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The child was born in September 2016. The wife said that, when 

the parties lived in Texas, the husband paid for half of the child's daycare 

expenses but that, at that time, she provided health insurance for the 

family. She also said that, when she and the husband lived in Texas, he 

"was never really around" because, she said, he was "roping," drinking 

with his friends, or "hanging out with other women." She said that he 

came home "enough to make it look good." 

The husband and the wife sold the second house in December 2017 

for $165,718.18. The wife said that she could not remember how much of 

that amount she gave to her father but that she knew she paid him back 

with interest. After selling the second house, the parties remained in 

Texas for a few months before they returned to Alabama. The wife 

testified that she wanted to live closer to her family in Alabama because 

her grandfather was ill and because she wanted to divorce the husband. 

She also said that her parents were eager for the wife, the husband, and 

the child to return to Alabama. The husband testified that he and the 

wife wanted to return to Alabama to start a cattle business on her 

family's land. The wife and the husband testified that the wife's mother 
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had said that she would keep the child and pay for daycare while the 

mother worked. 

The wife said that the husband left Texas in February 2018 but that 

she and the child stayed until the end of March so that she could receive 

a bonus at work. The husband returned to Montgomery, where he worked 

at a stockyard for a man he had known for a long time and with whom he 

had discussed "running some cattle" on the wife's family's land. The wife 

said that the husband and she had hoped to run cattle on her 

grandparents' property when she inherited that property until, she said, 

she saw the husband's business plan. She did not elaborate on that 

comment. 

In March 2018, the wife and the child moved to Fairhope from 

Texas and lived in a house ("the Fairhope house") her parents had 

purchased. The wife said that her father offered to let them live in the 

house rent free. Her parents also initially paid the utilities at the 

Fairhope house, the wife said. 

The wife testified that she did not know why the husband went to 

Montgomery rather than Fairhope, where she and the child were living, 

other than to say that he was supposed to obtain a job that provided 
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9

family health-insurance coverage. The wife testified that the husband's 

job at the stockyard did not provide health insurance, but, she 

acknowledged, the husband did begin providing the wife and the child 

with insurance within a few months of starting work there. 

The husband testified that, while he worked in Montgomery, he 

traveled to Fairhope once or twice a week and almost every weekend that 

he did not have to work. Other weekends, he said, the wife and the child 

would come to Montgomery. The wife corroborated his testimony. 

The husband testified that the wife and he had had a happy 

marriage and that, while they were living apart, they called each other 

daily. He submitted text messages in which they used numerous terms 

of endearment for each other. The texts tended to show that they had 

what the husband said was a loving relationship in which they shared 

their lives, including purchasing furniture together, looking at property 

together, and doing routine things like buying groceries for the family. 

The wife acknowledged that, when she and the husband returned to 

Alabama, they would text each other about looking forward to spending 

weekends together and about how much they loved each other. The 

husband joined the wife in Fairhope in December 2018.
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The wife testified that, throughout the marriage, she and the 

husband maintained separate financial identities. She said that they 

never had a joint financial account. She said that she had a checking 

account ("the checking account") that she opened before the parties 

married and a money-market savings account ("the savings account"). 

When the wife left Texas after receiving her bonus and after repaying the 

loan from her parents they had used to purchase the second house in 

Texas, the checking account and the savings account had a combined 

balance of $101,666.06. The record does not disclose the original source 

or sources of the money in those accounts. 

A review of transactions involving the checking account indicated 

that the husband transferred money into that account but that he did not 

deposit his entire paycheck into that account. The husband testified that 

he considered his income during the marriage to be "marital funds." He 

testified that, in 2018, he transferred $12,845.23 into the checking and 

savings accounts in the wife's name. In 2019, he said, he transferred only 

$5,561.99 into the wife's accounts but, that year, he said, he was also 

paying more than $800 per month for health insurance for the wife and 
CL-2023-0382 and CL-2023-0408

11

the child. Additionally, he said, he purchased groceries and paid expenses 

incurred for the care and feeding of the wife's horses. 

The wife said that she had full access to the husband's bank account 

and that she would transfer money from the husband's bank account into 

the checking account to pay the household bills. She said that she also 

set up an automatic payment from his bank account to pay credit-card 

debt. At times, the wife said, she would send the husband a text message 

with the amount of money she needed for the bills, and, she said, he 

would transfer that amount to the checking account "after [she] produced 

a list of documentation of what he was paying, cent for cent." 

The wife referred to the husband's transfers of money into the 

checking account as "reimbursements" for his share of the expenses and 

said that he never put money into the account other than for those 

"reimbursements." She said that she divided the household expenses the 

"same as I did with all my roommates in college." For example, she said 

that the husband provided money for his share of the utilities and, she 

said, "[i]f he wanted TV, he had to pay for it because I thought it was a 

waste of money." 
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A review of the savings account indicated that the wife deposited 

the bonus she received before leaving Texas into that account. She said 

that she would transfer money from the savings account into the 

checking account to pay for things.

In November or December of 2018, the wife said, she met John 

Ikner and in early 2019, the two began to communicate by phone 

regularly. She began working for his company, John Ikner Homes, Inc., 

at that time, and she admitted that the two began a sexual relationship 

before she filed her divorce complaint in December 2019. At the time of 

the trial, she continued to work as an independent contractor for Ikner's 

construction company. 

After the husband moved to Fairhope in December 2018, the wife 

testified, there were "many, many nights" that she failed to come home. 

The husband said that the first night she did not come home was 

December 23, 2018. She returned to the Fairhope house the evening of 

December 24, 2018. She acknowledged that the husband was home with 

the child the nights she did not come home. She also admitted that she 

had come home one morning with a bumper hanging off her truck and, 

on another occasion, she had come home with vomit on the side of her 
CL-2023-0382 and CL-2023-0408

13

vehicle. The wife said that one night, she left the house by climbing out 

of the bedroom window.

The husband testified that there were several nights when the wife 

came home "highly intoxicated," to the extent that the child recognized 

that something was wrong. Some nights, he said, the wife left the house 

with guns from their gun safe. When asked whether she had taken a gun 

from the gun safe, waved it around, and left the marital residence on 

many occasions, the wife replied, "Not on many occasions, no." She said 

that she had a pistol, three shotguns, and multiple rifles. She testified 

that she had threatened to kill herself if the husband would not let her 

out of the marriage. The husband corroborated the wife's testimony, 

adding that, sometimes when the wife had been drinking, she had 

threatened to kill other people. The husband said that, at his request, he 

and the wife sought counseling but that it did not work. 

The husband testified that he told the wife's mother that he was 

concerned about the wife's drinking. He also said that he had talked to 

the wife's mother several times about her possibly coming to the Fairhope 

house to stay with the child on days that he had to go to work early and

the wife had not come home from the night before. He said that the wife's 
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14

mother told him that she was worried about the wife, as well, and that 

she believed that the wife needed help because of her drinking. To 

corroborate his testimony regarding his conversations with the wife's 

mother, the husband submitted a text message she had sent to him 

informing him that the wife had been drinking again and was leaving the 

house. 

The wife testified that the husband had had unwanted sexual 

contact with her in early 2019, then said it occurred in early 2020, after 

she had filed the divorce complaint. We note that, in her testimony, the 

wife never said that the husband had raped her, as she had alleged in 

her response to the husband's motion for custody and for exclusive 

possession of the marital residence. 

The husband disputed the wife's characterization of his conduct. He 

related an incident that occurred one Friday night in April 2019, when 

he had planned to take the wife out to dinner and arranged for the wife's 

mother to stay with the child. The wife did not come home until after 

nine, the husband said, and told him that she did not want to go out to 

eat. He said that he could tell that she had been drinking. The wife told 

the husband that she wanted a divorce, and they talked for "quite some 
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15

time." He said he told the wife that he was willing to do anything he 

could, adding that he was trying to save their marriage. Eventually, the 

husband and the wife went to sleep, and, he said, he began touching her 

to try to make up with her. He said that, in doing so, he may have touched 

her crotch but that they did not engage in sexual relations. The wife 

jumped up, he said, and he got the keys to her truck because he believed 

that she was leaving. He said that the wife demanded the keys, and,

when he did not give them to her, she hit him and then went to the guest 

room, opened the gun safe, and began removing guns and putting them 

on the bed. The husband said that he pleaded with her to stay and told 

her that he would sleep on the couch. He said that she told him that if he 

did not give her the keys, she would call the police and report that he was 

threatening her with the guns. He said he gave her the keys, and she left. 

Telephone records that the husband submitted into evidence indicate 

that, when the wife left the house, she called John Ikner. The records 

indicate that, in April 2019, the month in which the described incident 

occurred, the wife spoke with Ikner 118 times. 

In April 2020, after the wife had filed the divorce complaint, she 

called the husband to tell him that she needed to get money out of their 
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16

gun safe, where they also kept cash, to pay a worker $800. However, she 

said, she took two envelopes of cash containing a total of approximately 

$15,000 and left $600 for the husband. The husband confirmed the wife's 

testimony, adding that she also removed several guns from the safe. 

The wife's father testified that he was surprised to learn that the 

wife had started a divorce action and was also surprised about some of 

the wife's behavior that the husband related to him. He said that he had 

a conversation with the wife and then told the husband that if they could 

not get along, the husband should move out of the marital residence. 

As mentioned, on May 4, 2020, the trial court heard the parties' 

competing motions for possession of their house in Fairhope and 

temporary custody of the child. At the hearing, the trial court ordered 

DHR to investigate the parties before it ruled on the motions. The next 

day, May 5, 2020, the husband and the wife were served with an eviction 

notice. According to the notice, the wife's parents had decided to sell the 

Fairhope house "to reallocate funds that [were] needed elsewhere" and a 

long-term rental of the Fairhope house was "contrary to the best use of 

the property by the owner." The notice indicated that the husband and 

the wife were to vacate the house no later than June 4, 2020. 
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17

The wife testified that, upon receiving the eviction notice, the 

husband looked for storage units where the parties could move their 

personal property, including their home furnishings, and notified the 

wife of the cost of those units. The wife said that, although she did not 

remember specifically saying so, she probably told the husband that if he 

moved anything out of the house, she would have him arrested for theft. 

On June 4, 2020, the wife's parents issued a second notice permitting a 

two-week extension of the lease "for personal property only." The notice 

expressly provided that the wife's parents did not intend to allow the 

husband to continue to live in the Fairhope house. The wife's father 

testified that he and the wife's mother believed that the husband needed 

to be out of the house. 

The wife did not move from the Fairhope house, and she 

acknowledged that by not allowing the husband to remove anything from 

the Fairhope house while she continued to live there, she retained all the 

marital property. Meanwhile, the husband had to find a new place to live 

and furnish that residence. He testified that he rented a house in 

Fairhope. He could not get any furniture or other items from the marital 
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18

residence, he said, and he even had to buy socks and a toothbrush the 

day he left that house to be able to go to work the next day.

On July 1, 2020, the wife signed a new lease agreement with her 

parents allowing her to live in the Fairhope house until June 1, 2021. The 

rent was to be $2,300 per month, and the wife had to pay a security 

deposit of $2,300. In addition, the wife was required to pay back rent from 

May 2018, and on July 1, 2020, the wife wrote a check to her parents for 

$85,100. The wife's father testified that he was not aware, until the wife 

filed for a divorce, that the husband and the wife had not been paying 

rent for the Fairhope house, but he acknowledged that he had never 

discussed rent with the husband. He said that he did not like taking 

$85,100 for back rent but said that he felt like that the husband and the 

wife needed to pay it. The wife also paid her parents an additional $360 

to store her personal property in the Fairhope house from June through 

December 2020, even though she was living in the house at that time. 

She said she paid that amount out of the checking account. 

The wife testified that her mother signed the contracts for the 

child's daycare and paid the child's daycare expenses of $185 per week 

from May 2018 until June 29, 2020, for a total of $14,696. The wife 
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testified that, after she filed the divorce complaint, she repaid her mother 

the $14,696 for the daycare expenses with money from the checking 

account. The wife also used money from the checking account to 

"reimburse" her parents $4,398 for power and water bills that they had 

paid while the husband and the wife lived in the Fairhope house. The 

husband testified that, in all, the wife "depleted" a total of $144,545 from 

what he said should be marital funds by paying "reimbursements" to her 

parents.

Other than the two houses they purchased in Texas, the wife said, 

the parties did not jointly purchase any other real estate during the 

marriage. At the time of the trial, the wife said, she owned forty acres of 

land ("the Higbee farm property") that had been a gift to her from her 

grandfather, Dick Higbee, in 2006 or 2008, before the parties had 

married. She testified that her grandfather had allowed another man to 

farm the Higbee farm property and that that man was still farming that 

property at the time of the trial. Before the marriage, the wife also 

inherited a half-interest in a condominium in Auburn, which she sold 

during the marriage. The wife said that her grandparents had also 
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20

"gifted" her a quarter-interest in a beach condominium, which was sold 

in 2020, after she had filed the divorce action. 

The husband testified that, other than the real property that the 

wife had been gifted, the parties did not own any real property. However, 

he said, the wife paid the taxes on the condominiums and the Higbee 

farm property, as well as other fees and purchases associated with those 

properties, from the account from which the household bills were paid 

and to which he contributed money. 

The husband testified about a dispute regarding the payment of the 

parties' bill for cellular telephone service through Verizon ("the Verizon 

account") that arose while the divorce was pending. He said that, in 

addition to his telephone line and the wife's line, the wife had added lines 

for her mother and her grandmother, and the total bill was paid 

automatically through one of the wife's credit cards. In April 2020, the 

husband said, he was notified that three lines had been removed from 

the Verizon account, so that his was the only line remaining, and that 

the automatic payment through the wife's credit card had been deleted. 

As a result, he said, he linked his credit card to the Verizon account. 

About a month later, he said, he was notified that the three lines had 
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21

been re-added to the Verizon account. The husband said that the wife's 

cancellation of the payment method for the Verizon account, leaving him 

to pay the monthly bill, constituted a violation of the status quo order. At 

trial and in his postjudgment motion, the husband argued that the trial 

court should have required the wife to reimburse him for an equitable 

portion of the Verizon bill.

The wife testified that in April 2020, again while the divorce was 

pending, she purchased two lots in Magnolia Springs ("the Magnolia 

Springs property"). The wife said that the transaction was "in the works" 

before she filed for the divorce in December 2019 and that she did not ask 

the court for permission to purchase real property even though the status 

quo order was in place when the closing occurred. To buy the Magnolia 

Springs property, the wife said, she obtained a $130,000 loan from her 

father, who also gave her an option to receive an additional $20,000 to 

make improvements to the Magnolia Springs property. One of the lots 

had a structure on it, which Ikner's company removed. The security and 

collateral for the loan was the Magnolia Springs property; the wife's 

father also obtained an interest in a 2019 model Chevrolet 2500 pickup 

truck that was in the wife's name ("the wife's pickup truck") as additional 
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22

collateral. The wife's pickup truck had been purchased during the 

marriage, and the husband testified that had often driven it during the 

marriage. 

The wife's father testified that, by the time of the trial, no payments 

had been made toward the $130,000 loan and that he had taken 

ownership of the wife's pickup truck. The title and the insurance to that 

truck were both in his name, he said. The husband testified, however,

that, after the wife's father's testimony, the husband paid to have a title 

search performed on the truck, and it was still in the wife's name. The 

wife's father also testified that he believed that the title to the Magnolia 

Springs property reverted to him because of the wife's failure to repay 

the loan. The wife's father said that he believed that the Magnolia 

Springs property was worth between $130,000 and $140,000, but, even 

though the property was worth at least as much as the loan, he still was 

entitled to take ownership of the wife's pickup truck because, he said, 

there had been some demolition expenses when the structure on one of 

the lots was removed. He then admitted that the wife had paid those 

expenses. 
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When the wife received the $130,000 loan from her father, she 

signed a promissory note and received a payment schedule. She testified 

that she had not made any payments toward the loan and that she had 

not exercised her option for money with which to make improvements. 

The wife admitted that taking out the loan and creating an encumbrance 

on her pickup truck appeared to be violations of the status quo order. 

Evidence was presented indicating that, in January 2020, the month 

after the wife received the loan from her father, a payment of $10,000 

was made toward the wife's pickup truck from the checking account and 

the savings account, but the wife said that she did not recall making that 

payment. The wife said that paying $10,000 toward her pickup truck was 

not part of her usual monthly recurring expenses, but, she said, she did 

like to pay off vehicles early. At the time of the trial, no debt remained on 

the wife's pickup truck. 

In December 2020, the wife received a semiannual $10,500 lease 

payment from TMPA, Inc., for a cell tower on the Higbee farm property. 

She deposited that money into the checking account. The husband 

testified that the lease agreement for the cell tower was signed in 

November 2019 and was for a term of forty-five years. 
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On January 3, 2021, again while the divorce was pending, the wife 

purchased a 2017 Lexus automobile with a $5,000 down payment taken 

from the checking account. She said that the month before, she 

transferred $4,000 from the savings account to the checking account 

because, she said, she needed it. In March 2021, while the divorce was 

pending, the wife opened what she called the Higbee Farms checking 

account ("the Higbee Farms account"), which had approximately $20,000 

in it at the time of the trial. The wife said she made an initial deposit of 

$20,000 into the Higbee Farms account using money from the checking 

account. 

The wife testified that she lived in the Fairhope house for a full year 

before moving in with her parents. She said she stayed with them for a 

few weeks before moving into a house on Higbee Road ("the Higbee Road 

house"), which her grandmother owned but that was empty. In 2021, the 

wife wrote a series of checks from the checking account to pay for repairs 

to the Higbee Road house, for cleaning the furniture she took to that 

house, for an interior designer, and, after a hurricane, for repairs to the 

fence around a pasture on her parents' property, where she kept her 

horses. The checks totaled $35,235.76. 
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The husband testified that, at the time of the trial, he worked for 

an engineering firm and, through November 2021, had earned $57,418 

for the year. He paid $856.54 per month for health and dental insurance 

for the wife and the child; his employer paid for his health and dental 

insurance. The wife testified that the husband had paid health insurance 

for the child and her but that, at the time of the trial, she provided her 

own health insurance because, she said, she did not want to be on his 

policy. The wife did not indicate whether she paid for the child's 

insurance coverage, and she did not provide evidence of the cost of the 

insurance coverage that she claimed she had obtained for herself. The 

husband also testified that he had reviewed the wife's bank records and 

determined from her deposits that her annual income from various 

sources in 2019 had been $53,022.20. 

The husband presented evidence indicating that, since the filing of 

the divorce complaint and the entry of the status quo order, the wife had 

spent $39,387 on renovations to the Higbee Road house. Additionally, he 

submitted documentary evidence indicating that the wife transferred 

$16,000 from the child's savings account to the wife's checking account 

and an additional $7,000 from the Higbee Farms account to the checking 
CL-2023-0382 and CL-2023-0408

26

account. In all, the husband submitted documentary evidence indicating 

that, since filing the divorce complaint, the wife had made what he called 

"suspect transactions" totaling $62,000 that he said should have 

remained in the checking and savings accounts in light of the status quo 

order. 

On December 29, 2021, the trial court entered an order divorcing 

the parties but retaining jurisdiction over "post-nuptial" issues including 

the division of marital property and child custody. On January 6, 2023, 

the trial court entered the final judgment of divorce. In that judgment 

the trial court awarded the parties joint legal and physical custody of the 

child and ordered the wife to pay the husband $142 per month in child 

support, retroactive to January 2022. The retroactivity of the childsupport award created an arrearage of $1,846, which the trial court 

ordered the wife to pay the husband immediately. The trial court also 

made the following factual findings and awards:

"Testimony was provided by the wife and other 

witnesses related to funds, transfers and property transfers 

that was not only less than credible but appeared to be 

actually fabricated for this litigation for the express purpose 

of moving those assets out of the wife's or the marital estate. 

Specifically, the Court finds that the lease payments on the 

parties' home, the reimbursement for a wedding gift, loan 

repayments, payment after the fact for childcare, auto 
CL-2023-0382 and CL-2023-0408

27

transfers, and charging the parties to store their furniture 

were all transactions that were manipulated to circumvent 

this Court's ability to rule on pending matters related to 

possession of the home and on final matters related to 

property division. The wife's choice to dispose of marital 

assets violates the status quo order and for that, the Court 

finds the mother in contempt of Court. She is herein ordered 

to compensate the husband for the value of those payments 

and marital assets, as is addressed in the Court's award, towit: 

"a. [The husband] is to receive 50% of the 

value of the truck [the wife] pledged as collateral 

and lied about transferring to her dad. A judgment 

for $10,210.62 is entered in favor of [the husband]

and against [the wife]. The Court arrived at this 

number by averaging the highest value estimates 

given by the parties (to-wit: $60,000 and $26,000), 

and subtracting the payoff figure given at trial (towit: $22,578.77) and dividing that by two. This was 

the only evidence presented to the Court from 

which the Court could make an award. Although 

the [wife] or her father may have paid off the 

remainder of the truck balance, that would have 

been after the parties' separation and the court 

does not factor that into this calculation.

"b. [The husband] is to receive 50% of what 

[the wife] paid to her mother for day care. A 

judgment for $7,348.00 is entered in favor of [the 

husband] and against [the wife]. 

"c. [The husband] is to receive 50% of what 

[the wife] was [sic] paid for the power and the 

water. A judgment for $2,194.85 is entered in favor 

of [the husband] and against [the wife].
CL-2023-0382 and CL-2023-0408

28

"d. [The husband] is to receive 50% of the 

storage fee paid to [the wife]. A judgment for 

$180.00 is entered in favor of [the husband] and 

against [the wife].

"e. [The husband] is to receive 50% of what 

[the wife] was [sic] paid for rent. A judgment for 

$42,550.00 is entered in favor of [the husband] and 

against [the wife].

"f. [The husband] is to receive 50% of the 

Lexus down payment made during the pendency of 

this case. A judgment for $2,500.00 is entered in 

favor of [the husband] and against [the wife].

"g. [The husband] is to receive 50% of the 

wedding gift that was misrepresented to the court 

as a loan. A judgment for $20,000.00 is entered in 

favor of [the husband] and against [the wife]. 

"h. [The husband] is to receive 50% of what 

[the wife] paid for renovations to the Higbee Road 

house and her parents' fence. A judgment for 

$17,617.88 is entered in favor of [the husband] and 

against [the wife].

"i. [The husband] is to receive 50% of what 

was in the safe less what he got. A judgment for 

$7,020.00 is entered in favor of [the husband] and 

against [the wife].

"j. [The husband] is to receive his horse, and 

pay to [the wife] a reasonable feed cost and farrier 

bill since separation (less any feed he purchased). 

"k. [The wife] is to receive the Magnolia 

Springs/Pecan Grove property and 100% of her 

grandmother's property and all liability.
CL-2023-0382 and CL-2023-0408

29

"l. [The wife] is to receive her Lexus and all 

liability. [The husband] is to receive his 

automobile and all liability."

The trial court also divided the parties' firearms and directed that, 

if the parties could not otherwise agree, the remainder of their personal 

property was to be divided by taking turns choosing items from a list until 

all the property was divided. In addition, the trial court awarded the 

husband control of all the 529 college funds and savings accounts 

established to benefit the child and ordered the wife to reimburse any 

money she had removed from those accounts during the pendency of the 

divorce. The trial court made each party responsible for their individual 

debts and for their own attorney fees.

On February 2 and February 3, 2023, the wife and the husband filed 

respective motions to alter, amend, or vacate the judgment. On May 5, 

2023, the trial court entered an order purporting to address those 

motions; however, the wife's motion had been denied by operation of law 

on Wednesday, May 3, and the husband's had been denied by operation 

of law on Thursday, May 4, 2023. See Rule 59.1, Ala. R. Civ. P. Thus, the 

May 5, 2023, order was a nullity. See Moragne v. Moragne, 888 So. 2d 

1280, 1282 (Ala. Civ. App. 2004); Ex parte Miller, 335 So. 3d 1151, 1153 
CL-2023-0382 and CL-2023-0408

30

(Ala. 2021). On June 1, 2023, the wife filed a notice of appeal to this court; 

on June 8, 2023, the husband filed a cross-appeal. 

Standard of Review

When this court reviews a divorce judgment entered after the 

presentation of ore tenus evidence, we presume that the trial court's 

factual findings are correct, and we will reverse a judgment based on 

those findings only if the evidence does not support the judgment so as to 

render it plainly and palpably wrong. Clements v. Clements, 990 So. 2d 

383, 389 (Ala. Civ. App. 2007). Furthermore, "the ore tenus standard of 

review has no application to a trial court's conclusions of law or its 

application of law to the facts; a trial court's ruling on a question of law 

carries no presumption of correctness on appeal." Ex parte J.E., 1 So. 3d 

1002, 1008 (Ala. 2008) (citing Ex parte Perkins, 646 So. 2d 46, 47 (Ala. 

1994)).

Analysis

The Wife's Appeal -- CL-2023-0382

The wife contends that, in dividing the marital property, the trial 

court erred by impermissibly considering what she says is her separate 

estate. In Nichols v. Nichols, 824 So. 2d 797, 802 (Ala. Civ. App. 2001), 
CL-2023-0382 and CL-2023-0408

31

this court explained that, in a divorce proceeding, a spouse's "separate 

estate" is the real or personal property over which that spouse exercises 

exclusive control and from which the other spouse derives no benefit 

because of the marital relationship. A spouse's separate estate includes 

property that person owned prior to the marriage and property received 

by gift or inheritance during the marriage. § 30-2-51(a), Ala. Code 1975. 

Marital property, on the other hand, includes property the parties 

purchased or otherwise accumulated during their marriage. In addition,

property that would otherwise qualify as one's separate estate may be 

considered marital property if it was regularly used, or income from it 

was used, for the common benefit of the parties during their marriage. 

See § 30-2-51(a), Ala. Code 1975. The trial judge has broad discretion to 

determine whether such property is to be considered marital property. 

Nichols, 824 So. 2d at 802.

The wife argues that the trial court impermissibly considered her 

ownership interest in three properties that she had been gifted before the 

marriage (which, although she does not specifically identify those 

properties, appear to be the Higbee farm property, the half-interest in 

the condominium in Auburn, and the quarter-interest in the beach 
CL-2023-0382 and CL-2023-0408

32

condominium) when it divided the marital property because, she says, 

those properties were part of her separate estate. The judgment simply 

does not support the wife's contention, however, because the trial court

did not award any of those properties its property division; thus, we find 

no merit to this contention.

The wife also argues that the trial court impermissibly considered 

her share of the proceeds that she received when the Auburn 

condominium and the beach condominium were sold. She placed those 

proceeds in her checking account. She also says that she placed in the 

checking account the income that she received from the lease of the

Higbee farm property for the use of a cellular-telephone tower. 

The wife makes the conclusory assertion that the checking account 

was not a joint account and, therefore, she says, the money she deposited 

into that account, including the proceeds from the sale of the gifted 

property, was not marital property. She further claims that she and the 

husband "were each responsible for their own expenses and debts" and, 

as she did at the trial, characterizes the husband's contributions to the 

checking account or to the payment of bills or household purchases as 

merely "reimbursements" for the expenses he incurred during the 
CL-2023-0382 and CL-2023-0408

33

marriage. In other words, the wife essentially characterizes all the 

income and property the parties acquired during the marriage as each 

spouse's separate property that would not have been subject to division 

and, although she does not explicitly say so, she appears to assert that 

the parties actually had no marital property. 

The wife contends that she used what she called the "separate nonmarital funds" from the checking account to "repay her parents for their 

generous loans she received while she was unemployed." Therefore, she 

says, the trial court could not properly award the husband a portion of 

that money because, she said, it was not used for the common benefit of 

the marriage and was not subject to division. 

The underlying premise of the wife's argument, that is, that each 

party retained his or her separate estate, including bank accounts and

vehicles purchased during the marriage, and that the husband merely 

"reimbursed" her for what she said was his share of the expenses incurred 

during the marriage, ignores the evidence showing that the wife's bank 

accounts contained funds that came from both parties, that those funds 

were comingled, and that those comingled funds were used to pay the 

common bills and debts of the parties. Therefore, the trial court 
CL-2023-0382 and CL-2023-0408

34

reasonably could have believed that the funds in the bank accounts were 

marital property subject to division. Additionally, the trial court was free 

to reject the wife's disputed testimony that the parties' funds and bills 

were divided during the marriage such that each party paid for only the 

portion of each bill attributable to him or her, and only from money 

received from his or her separate labor. See Morgan v. Morgan, 183 So. 

3d 945, 967 (Ala. Civ. App. 2014) (holding that a trial court is not required

to believe the testimony of a party, especially when it has found portions 

of that testimony not to be credible).

Based on the evidence presented, we find no basis for concluding 

that the trial court erred in determining that the checking account and 

the savings account were marital property, that the husband was entitled 

to a share of the money that was in those accounts, and that the wife 

depleted those accounts after filing the complaint for divorce. 

The wife also argues that the trial court improperly considered her 

pickup truck when it divided the marital property. In its judgment, the 

trial court awarded the husband half of its value. Evidence indicated that 

the wife's pickup truck was purchased during the marriage and that the 

husband had often driven it during the marriage. Like the bank accounts, 
CL-2023-0382 and CL-2023-0408

35

the trial court reasonably could have believed from the evidence that the 

wife's pickup truck was also marital property subject to division, and we 

find no basis for reversing that determination.

In a closely related argument, the wife contends that the trial court 

erred in holding her in contempt for spending what she says were her 

separate funds. As mentioned, in its judgment, the trial court found that 

the wife violated the status quo order when she engaged in certain 

transactions that the trial court said were designed to move assets out of 

the wife's or the marital estate to prevent those assets from being subject 

to division as marital property. 

In its judgment, the trial court did not specify whether it was 

holding the wife in civil contempt or in criminal contempt. In finding the 

wife in contempt, however, the trial court ordered her to pay the husband 

50% of the value of several items of personal property to compensate the 

husband for the value of what it had found had been "manipulated to 

circumvent" the court's "ability to rule on pending matters related to 

possession of the home and on final matters related to property division." 

Rule 70A, Ala. R. Civ. P., provides that, in civil proceedings, "'[c]ivil 

contempt' means willful, continuing failure or refusal of any person to 
CL-2023-0382 and CL-2023-0408

36

comply with a court's lawful writ, subpoena, process, order, rule, or 

command that by its nature is still capable of being complied with."1

Moreover, "'[t]he failure to perform an act required by the court for the 

benefit of an opposing party constitutes civil contempt.'" J.K.L.B. Farms, 

LLC v. Phillips, 975 So. 2d 1001, 1012 (Ala. Civ. App. 2007) (quoting 

Carter v. State ex rel. Bullock Cnty., 393 So. 2d 1368, 1370 (Ala. 1981)). 

"The purpose of a civil contempt proceeding is to effectuate compliance 

with court orders and not to punish the contemnor." Watts v. Watts, 706 

So. 2d 749, 751 (Ala. Civ. App. 1997). Because the trial court's purpose in 

having the wife repay the husband for depleted accounts or the value of 

certain items was to compensate him rather than to punish the wife, we 

conclude that the trial court intended to hold the wife in civil contempt. 

The determination of whether a party is in contempt is within the 

discretion of the trial court, and, unless the record reveals an "'abuse of 

that discretion or unless the judgment of the trial court is unsupported 

by the evidence so as to be plainly and palpably wrong, this court will 

1In contrast to civil contempt, the dominant purpose of a finding of 

criminal contempt in those situations where a party has disobeyed a 

court order is to punish the contemnor rather than to coerce his or her 

compliance with the order. See Rule 70A(a)(2)(C) and (D), Ala. R. Civ. P.
CL-2023-0382 and CL-2023-0408

37

affirm.'" Nave v. Nave, 942 So. 2d 372, 377 (Ala. Civ. App. 2005) (quoting 

Stack v. Stack, 646 So. 2d 51, 56 (Ala. Civ. App. 1994)).

Aside from paying for their regularly recurring expenses, the status 

quo order forbade the parties from, among other things, transferring 

assets, making withdrawals from or liquidating "any account with a 

financial institution including but not limited to checking, savings, 

money markets, or CDs"; incurring any debt; terminating or adversely 

affecting any utility service, including telephone services; or expending

any money for luxury items. The plain language of the status-quo order 

does not differentiate between marital accounts or individual accounts. 

As mentioned, whether certain property is marital property is left to the 

discretion of the trial court; it is not up to the parties individually to make 

that decision. See Nichols, 824 So. 2d at 802.

Here, the trial court found that the wife's transfer of money and 

property from her accounts "appeared to be actually fabricated for this 

litigation for the express purpose of moving those assets out of the wife's 

or the marital estate." The evidence is undisputed that, during the 

pendency of the divorce action, the wife depleted the checking and 

savings accounts when her parents "decided" that she needed to 
CL-2023-0382 and CL-2023-0408

38

reimburse them for back rent and child-care expenses for which they had 

never charged her, as well as reimbursing them for "storage fees," the 

utilities incurred while the parties lived in the Fairhope house, and the 

$40,000 the wife's father had given to the parties when they married. 

Additionally, during the pendency of the divorce, the wife purchased real 

property in Magnolia Springs with a loan from her father and for which 

she used her pickup truck as collateral. She did not make any repayments 

on that loan and said that she allowed the father to take her pickup truck, 

which the parties had purchased during the marriage, and put it in his 

name. However, the husband presented evidence indicating that, at the 

time of the trial, that truck remained in the wife's name. After the entry 

of the status quo order, the wife also used money from the bank accounts 

to repair a fence at her parents' residence, to renovate the Higbee farm 

property, and to purchase a Lexus automobile. 

The evidence clearly supports the trial court's determination that 

the wife's depletion of the checking and savings accounts for the various 

payments to her parents, the transfer of the wife's pickup truck to her 

father, the purchase of a Lexus automobile, and the payments for repairs 

to her parents' fence and her grandparents' property were violations of 
CL-2023-0382 and CL-2023-0408

39

the plain language of the status quo order. Therefore, the trial court's 

judgment finding the wife in contempt for those transactions is due to be 

affirmed. 

The wife next contends that the trial court incorrectly calculated 

the parties' incomes and their health-insurance payments for purposes of 

determining child support. However, in her motion to alter, amend, or 

vacate the judgment, the wife challenged only that portion of the childsupport calculation regarding the credit that the husband was to be given 

for his payment of health-care insurance for the child. The wife did not 

raise the issue of the correctness of its calculation of her monthly adjusted 

gross income for purposes of determining her child-support obligation. 

Therefore, we will not consider the wife's contention that the trial court 

incorrectly calculated her monthly income when determining child 

support. Andrews v. Merritt Oil Co., 612 So. 2d 409, 410 (Ala. 1992) ("This 

Court cannot consider arguments raised for the first time on appeal; 

rather, our review is restricted to the evidence and arguments considered 

by the trial court.")

Regarding the propriety of the amount the trial court credited to 

the husband for his payment of health-care coverage, on the Form CS-42 
CL-2023-0382 and CL-2023-0408

40

"Child Support Guidelines" that the trial court completed to calculate the 

parties' respective child-support obligation, the trial court gave the 

husband a credit of $842.15. The wife argues that the $842.15 was the 

full amount that he paid for family health-insurance coverage and that, 

for child-support purposes, the husband should receive credit for only the 

amount he paid toward the cost of the child's health-care coverage. In 

support of her contention, the mother cites Rule 32(B)(7)(e), Ala. R. Jud. 

Admin., which provides that health-care-coverage costs 

"shall be the pro rata portion of the health-care-coverage cost 

attributable to the child or children who are the subject of the 

support order, which shall be calculated by dividing the total 

health-care-coverage cost actually paid by, or on behalf of, the 

parent ordered to provide the coverage by the total number of 

persons (adult and/or children) covered and then multiplying 

the result by the number of children who are the subject of the 

support order."

We agree with the wife that, under Rule 32(B)(7)(e), the trial court 

improperly credited the husband with the entire amount that he paid for 

health-insurance coverage rather than the portion of that amount that 

was attributable to the child's share of the health-insurance coverage. 

Therefore, we must reverse the judgment insofar as the wife's childsupport obligation was based on an incorrect calculation of the amount of 

credit the father should have received for his payment of the cost of the 
CL-2023-0382 and CL-2023-0408

41

child's health-care-coverage. On remand, the trial court should 

recalculate the mother's child-support obligation using in its calculations 

the proper amount the father was due to be credited for the cost of healthcare coverage for the child under Rule 32(B)(7)(e).

The wife next contends that the trial court erred in awarding the 

husband retroactive child support. In its March 2023 judgment, the trial 

court made the wife's child-support obligation retroactive to January 1, 

2022, and found that the wife owed the husband $1,846 in child support 

from January 2022 through January 2023. The mother also contends 

that, by her calculation, the husband owes her $5,085 in child support for 

the 30-month period before the trial court entered the judgment. 

The wife did not raise any arguments concerning the trial court's 

determination that she owed the father a child-support arrearage during 

the trial or in her postjudgment motion. Therefore, we will not entertain 

them on appeal. See Andrews, 612 So. 2d at 410. However, because we 

have already determined that the trial court must recalculate the 

mother's child-support obligation, we also reverse the judgment insofar 

as it calculated the amount of the arrearage the mother owed to the 

father, and, on remand, the trial court should calculate the arrearage 
CL-2023-0382 and CL-2023-0408

42

based on the new amount of child support the mother must pay the father 

after determining the proper amount of credit he is to receive for the 

payment of health-care-coverage costs attributable to the child.

The Husband's Appeal -- CL-2023-0408

The husband contends that, when the trial court awarded him half 

the value of the wife's pickup truck, it improperly computed the value of 

the wife's pickup truck based on the evidence presented. In its judgment, 

the trial court awarded the husband $10,210.62, which it had calculated 

was half the value of the wife's pickup truck. The trial court explained 

that it had determined that value by "averaging the highest value 

estimates given by the parties (to-wit: $60,000 and $26,000) and 

subtracting the payoff figure given at trial (to-wit: $22,578.77) and 

dividing that by two." The husband argues that the trial court mistakenly 

used the estimations to which he testified regarding the value of the 

wife's pickup truck, which was between $55,000 and $60,000, and the 

value of his own pickup truck, a 2016 Chevrolet 1500 ("the husband's 

pickup truck"), which was between $25,000 and $26,000. He said that he 

still owed $23,000 on his pickup truck. He says that the wife did not 

testify as to the value of her pickup truck, and our review of the record 
CL-2023-0382 and CL-2023-0408

43

does not reveal that the wife offered any evidence regarding the value of 

her pickup truck. Indeed, in her reply brief, the wife does not dispute the 

figures that the husband sets forth in his argument. Instead, she argues 

that the husband should not be permitted to recover more than the 

$10,210.62 the trial court awarded him for his share of the value of her 

pickup truck because, she says, the husband did not contribute any 

payments toward the truck or its maintenance. She makes no argument 

regarding the factual mistake upon which the husband bases his 

argument as to this issue.

Based on our review of the record, we agree with the husband that 

the evidence indicates that the trial court mistakenly calculated the 

value of the wife's pickup truck based on a range of values the record does 

not support. The only evidence regarding the value of the wife's pickup 

truck is the range of between $55,000 and $60,000 to which the husband 

testified. Additionally, the evidence was undisputed that there was no 

debt on the wife's pickup truck at the time of the trial. Because the trial 

court's calculation of 50% of the value of the wife's pickup truck was based 

on a factual mistake, we reverse the judgment as to the award of 

$10,210.62 to the husband for his share of the value of that vehicle, and 
CL-2023-0382 and CL-2023-0408

44

we remand the cause for the trial court to recalculate its award based on 

the evidence discussed herein. 

The husband next contends that the trial court erred by failing to 

award him an attorney fee. Specifically, he argues that he should have 

been awarded an attorney fee because of the wife's conduct, including her 

admitted adultery and the fabrication of evidence regarding the depletion 

of money from the bank accounts the wife claimed were hers alone but 

which the trial court concluded was marital property. The latter conduct 

was a basis for the trial court's decision to hold the wife in contempt. 

Section 30-2-54, Ala. Code 1975, provides that a trial court, in its 

discretion, may award an attorney fee in a divorce case upon a finding of 

civil contempt. Rhodes v. Rhodes, 317 So. 3d 37, 46 (Ala. Civ. App. 2020). 

The trial court awarded the husband half of the amount it found that the 

wife had depleted the bank accounts at issue "to compensate" the 

husband. The trial court was not required to award the husband an 

attorney fee on top of that compensation, and, given the evidence before 

it, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in 

refusing to do so.
CL-2023-0382 and CL-2023-0408

45

Regarding the wife's adultery, we note that, in the judgment, the 

trial court did not state the basis on which it divorced the parties. A trial 

court is granted broad discretion regarding whether to award an attorney 

fee in domestic-relations cases. See Turney v. Turney, 381 So. 3d 429, 443 

(Ala. Civ. App. 2022). "Factors to be considered by the trial court when 

awarding such fees include the financial circumstances of the parties, the 

parties' conduct, the results of the litigation, and, where appropriate, the 

trial court's knowledge and experience as to the value of the services 

performed by the attorney." Figures v. Figures, 624 So. 2d 188, 191 (Ala. 

Civ. App. 1993). "This court will not reverse the trial court's discretionary 

decisions unless we are convinced that it '"'committed a clear or palpable 

error, without the correction of which manifest injustice will be done.'"'" 

Turney, 381 So. 3d at 443 (citations omitted). The evidence indicated

that, at the time of the trial, the incomes of the husband and the wife 

were essentially equal, with both earning between $50,000 and $60,000 

annually. The trial court's division of marital property was also 

essentially equal. We cannot say that the trial court's decision not to 

award the husband an attorney fee results in a manifest injustice under 
CL-2023-0382 and CL-2023-0408

46

the circumstances. Therefore, the judgment is due to be affirmed as to 

this issue.

The husband next contends that the trial court erred by failing to 

hold the wife in contempt for her refusal to pay the Verizon cellulartelephone bill. Specifically, he argues that, after the trial court entered 

the status quo order, the wife removed her line, her mother's line, and 

her grandmother's line from the Verizon account and stopped paying the 

Verizon bill by means of automatic payments to her credit card. Then, 

after the husband began paying the Verizon bill by means of automatic 

payments from his credit card, she restored those lines to the Verizon 

account, causing him to have to pay for those lines. The wife's conduct, 

he argues, caused him to incur $3,487.11 in expenses that he was not 

paying before the entry of the status quo order. In support of his 

contention, the husband cites Reed v. Dyas, 28 So. 3d 6 (Ala. Civ. App. 

2009), in which this court reversed a judgment denying a wife's motion 

for contempt that she filed when the husband stopped making payments 

on vehicles after being ordered to do so in the parties' divorce judgment. 

In Reed, we quoted J.K.L.B. Farms, LLC v. Phillips, 975 So. 2d 1001, 

1012 (Ala. Civ. App. 2007), for the proposition that " '"[t]he failure to 
CL-2023-0382 and CL-2023-0408

47

perform an act required by the court for the benefit of an opposing party 

constitutes civil contempt." Carter v. State ex rel. Bullock County, 393 

So. 2d 1368, 1370 (Ala. 1981).'" Reed, 28 So. 3d at 8. 

As previously noted, whether to hold a party in contempt is left to 

the trial court's discretion, and this court will not reverse a trial court's 

decision regarding whether a party is in contempt unless it is so 

unsupported by the evidence as to be plainly and palpably wrong. Nave, 

942 So. 2d at 377. Here, the status quo order directed the parties to pay 

debts and recurring monthly financial obligations such as rent, utilities, 

groceries, and the like "in the same manner and from the same sources 

as they have customarily been paid during the marriage." It is 

undisputed that the wife's actions changed the source of the payment of 

the Verizon bill. The trial court held the wife in contempt for other 

violations of the status quo order, and our review of the record reveals no 

justification for excluding this particular violation from the ones for 

which the wife was ordered to compensate the husband. We conclude that 

the evidence does not support the trial court's decision not to hold the 

wife in contempt for what can only be viewed as the intentional shifting 

of the responsibility for payment of the Verizon bill to the husband after 
CL-2023-0382 and CL-2023-0408

48

the entry of the status quo order. See Reed, 28 So. 3d at 8. Therefore, the 

judgment is reversed as to this issue, and on remand, the trial court is 

directed to enter a judgment consistent with this opinion. 

The husband next contends that the wife caused him to incur living 

expenses higher than those he had had before the entry of the status quo 

order when, he says, she wrongfully evicted him and locked him out of 

the marital residence. He seeks $32,210.65 or some portion thereof as 

compensation for the financial loss he claims he sustained because of the 

wife's conduct. 

The wife's parents owned the marital residence, and they took steps 

to evict the parties from that house, albeit in a manner that appeared to 

be contrived between them and the wife, particularly since the wife was 

never required to leave the residence. The husband does not argue that 

the wife's parents' conduct violated a lease agreement, and he does not 

assert that they had no legal basis for evicting him. The status quo order 

did not prohibit the wife's parents, who were not parties to the divorce 

action, from determining who they would permit to live on their property, 

and the trial court properly could have concluded that their action in 
CL-2023-0382 and CL-2023-0408

49

evicting the husband did not constitute a violation of the status quo order 

by the wife. Thus, we find no merit in the husband's contention.

Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, we reverse the judgment insofar as, 

in determining the wife's child-support obligation, it credited the 

husband with more health-care-coverage costs than is permissible under 

Rule 32(7)(e), Ala. R. Jud. Admin.; it incorrectly determined the value of 

the wife's pickup truck; and it failed to hold the wife in contempt for 

changing the source of payment for the Verizon bill in violation of the 

status quo order. In all other respects, we affirm the judgment. We 

remand the cause to the trial court for it to enter a new judgment 

consistent with this opinion. 

The husband's request for an attorney fee on appeal is denied.

CL-2023-0382 -- AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; 

AND REMANDED.

CL-2023-0408 -- AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; 

AND REMANDED.

Edwards and Hanson, JJ., concur.

Moore, P.J., and Lewis, J., concur in the result, without opinions.