14-2274 

Ding v. Lynch 

BIA 

Hom, IJ 

A201 120 232 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED 

ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE 

PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT 

FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE 

(WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY 

OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for 

2 the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States 

3 Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 

15th 4 day of December, two thousand fifteen. 

5 

6 PRESENT: 

7 PETER W. HALL,

8 DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON, 

9 GERARD E. LYNCH,

10 Circuit Judges. 

11 _____________________________________ 

12 

13 YINDI DING, 

14 Petitioner, 

15 

16 v. 14-2274 

17 NAC 

18 

19 LORETTA E. LYNCH, UNITED STATES 

20 ATTORNEY GENERAL, 

21 Respondent. 

22 _____________________________________ 

23 

24 FOR PETITIONER: John W. Reinhardt, Huntington, New 

25 York. 

26 

27 FOR RESPONDENT: Benjamin C. Mizer, Principal Deputy 

28 Assistant Attorney General; Blair T. 
2 

1 O’Connor, Assistant Director; Scott 

2 M. Marconda, Trial Attorney, Office 

3 of Immigration Litigation, United 

4 States Department of Justice, 

5 Washington, D.C. 

6 

7 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a 

8 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby 

9 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review is 

10 DISMISSED in part and DENIED in part. 

11 Petitioner Yindi Ding, a native and citizen of the People’s 

12 Republic of China, seeks review of a May 30, 2014, decision of 

13 the BIA affirming a March 1, 2013, decision of an Immigration 

14 Judge (“IJ”) denying Ding’s application for asylum, withholding 

15 of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture 

16 (“CAT”). In re Yindi Ding, No. A201 120 232 (B.I.A. May 30, 

17 2014), aff’g No. A201 120 232 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Mar. 1, 

18 2013). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying 

19 facts and procedural history in this case. 

20 As an initial matter, we lack jurisdiction to review the 

21 agency’s decision insofar as it pretermitted Ding’s untimely 

22 asylum application. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(3). Accordingly, 

23 to the extent Ding seeks review of that determination, her 

24 petition is dismissed. However, we may review Ding’s challenge 

25 to the agency’s denial of withholding of removal and CAT relief. 
3 

1 Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed the 

2 IJ’s decision as modified by the BIA, i.e., minus the basis for 

3 denying relief that the BIA declined to consider (the denial 

4 of CAT relief unrelated to credibility). See Xue Hong Yang v. 

5 U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 426 F.3d 520, 522 (2d Cir. 2005). The 

6 applicable standards of review are well established. See

7 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); see also Su Chun Hu v. Holder, 579 

8 F.3d 155, 158 (2d Cir. 2009). 

9 The agency may, “[c]onsidering the totality of the 

10 circumstances, . . . base a credibility determination on the 

11 demeanor, candor, or responsiveness of the applicant . . ., the 

12 inherent plausibility of the applicant’s . . . account, the 

13 consistency between the applicant’s . . . written and oral 

14 statements (whenever made and whether or not under oath and 

15 considering the circumstances under which the statements were 

16 made), . . . without regard to whether an inconsistency . . . 

17 goes to the heart of the applicant’s claim.” 8 U.S.C. 

18 § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 

19 163-64 (2d Cir. 2008). 

20 Ding sought asylum and related relief based on her alleged 

21 forced sterilization under China’s family planning policy in 

22 1980 and her conversion to Christianity in the United States. 
4 

1 In finding her not credible, the IJ reasonably relied on Ding’s 

2 demeanor, noting that she failed to respond directly to 

3 questions throughout her testimony. See 8 U.S.C. 

4 § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); see also Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 

5 81 n.1 (2d Cir. 2005). That finding is supported by the record. 

6 The IJ’s demeanor finding and the overall credibility 

7 determination are bolstered by record inconsistencies 

8 regarding Ding’s medical records from China. See Li Hua Lin 

9 v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 453 F.3d 99, 109 (2d Cir. 2006); see 

10 also Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 165-67. Ding did not provide 

11 compelling explanations for these inconsistencies. See 

12 Majidi, 430 F.3d at 80. 

13 The agency also reasonably relied on Ding’s inability to 

14 testify credibly about her religion. Although the agency may 

15 err in basing a credibility determination on an applicant’s lack 

16 of doctrinal knowledge, there are “instances in which the nature 

17 of an individual applicant’s account would render h[er] lack 

18 of a certain degree of doctrinal knowledge suspect and could 

19 therefore provide substantial evidence in support of an adverse 

20 credibility finding.” Rizal v. Gonzales, 442 F.3d 84, 90 (2d 

21 Cir. 2006). Because Ding testified that she had been reading 

22 the Bible every day for six years and attending church regularly 
5 

1 during that time, the agency did not err in questioning her 

2 credibility based on her lack of basic doctrinal knowledge. 

3 See id. 

4 The agency also found an inconsistency in Ding’s testimony 

5 “that she had received a [U.S.] doctor’s letter in 2011,” 

6 whereas the undated letter indicates that it was printed on 

7 December 15, 2010. CAR at 56. This discrepancy, if there was 

8 any, does not amount to an inconsistency. Ding at first 

9 explained that she did not remember the exact date, but 

10 responded that “it’s around 2011” after the government asked 

11 “when [she] got [the letter], approximately” and whether she 

12 could “estimate the year.” Id. at 112-14. Thus, Ding’s 

13 testimony was all that it purported to be: a reasonable 

14 approximation. We would be reluctant to leave undisturbed the 

15 IJ’s credibility determination if it rested substantially on 

16 this supposed inconsistency. But we conclude that remand is 

17 futile and therefore not required because “(1) substantial 

18 evidence in the record relied on by the IJ, considered in the 

19 aggregate, supports the IJ’s finding that petitioner lacked 

20 credibility, and (2) disregarding those aspects of the IJ's 

21 reasoning that are tainted by error, we can state with 

22 confidence that the IJ would adhere to his decision were the 
6 

1 petition remanded.” Siewe v. Gonzales, 480 F.3d 160, 167 (2d 

2 Cir.2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

3 Having found that Ding’s testimony was not credible, the 

4 agency reasonably relied further on her failure to rehabilitate 

5 her testimony with reliable evidence corroborating or 

6 independently supporting her claims of past harm and fear of 

7 future harm. See Biao Yang v. Gonzales, 496 F.3d 268, 273 (2d 

8 Cir. 2007). Ding did not submit evidence of her pregnancy or 

9 other medical records from China and admitted that she made no 

10 effort to obtain such evidence. The agency reasonably declined 

11 to credit an unsworn letter from Ding’s daughter. See Y.C. v. 

12 Holder, 741 F.3d 324, 332 (2d Cir. 2013). It likewise 

13 reasonably gave little evidentiary weight to the U.S. doctor’s 

14 letter because it was an undated email copy that provided only 

15 “inferential evidence” for Ding’s claim and did not include the 

16 reports on which it claimed to rely, and because the doctor was 

17 not available for cross-examination. CAR at 57. 

18 Ultimately, the agency’s adverse credibility 

19 determination is supported by substantial evidence. See

20 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). That finding is dispositive of 

21 withholding of removal and CAT relief. See Paul v. Gonzales, 

22 444 F.3d 148, 156-57 (2d Cir. 2006). 
7 

1 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is 

2 DISMISSED in part and DENIED in part. 

3 FOR THE COURT: 

4 Catherine O=Hagan Wolfe, Clerk