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i

iii

Strategic Studies Institute

and

U.S. Army War College Press

IRAQ’S SHIA WARLORDS AND 

THEIR MILITIAS: 

POLITICAL AND SECURITY CHALLENGES 

AND OPTIONS

Norman Cigar

June 2015

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iv

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ISBN 1-58487-685-9
v

FOREWORD

The phenomenon of Iraq’s Shia warlords and the 

militias they lead has significant implications for the 

conduct of the war against Islamic State in Iraq and 

Syria (ISIS), including for U.S. policy interests and for 

U.S. Landpower forces deployed in-country. 

In this monograph, Dr. Norman Cigar analyzes the 

rapid resurgence of the Shia militias and the warlords 

thanks to a mass popular mobilization in response 

to the severe ISIS threat to the country in 2014. The 

militias have played a key role in helping to stabilize 

the situation on the ground, while the Iraqi Army has 

been rebuilding with the help of the international Coalition. At the same time, the warlords have become 

significant political players who have an impact on issues of interest to the United States, such as sectarian 

reconciliation and the formation of a National Guard 

in Sunni areas, which have implications for the future 

of Iraq’s security and stability. 

Dr. Cigar focuses on the interests, policies, operations, and capabilities of the warlords and the militias 

they command, and highlights that they are embedded in operations with the Iraqi Army and national 

police. Knowing as much as possible about these militias takes on added importance, given the significant 

U.S. military contribution to the fight against ISIS in 

the form of air support, training, planning assistance, 

intelligence sharing, and logistics—including a key 

landpower element—operating with the presence of 

the Shia militias on the same battlefield. The militias 

are significant, in particular, for force protection and 

operational security issues in relation to the deployed 

U.S. forces. 
A key conclusion of this monograph is that, because of the continuing need for their participation in 

the fight against ISIS as the Iraqi Army is rebuilt, and 

the warlords’ growing political power as well as the 

popularity they have gained from their victories, the 

warlords and the militias are likely to remain a significant factor for the foreseeable future. In addition, 

the ascendancy of the Shia warlords and militias are 

likely to provide Iran with greater access and influence in Iraq. At the operational level, the monograph 

points to the need for deconfliction to avoid friendlyfire incidents that could escalate, given the militias’ 

traditional hostility and suspicion of U.S. motives, as 

well as continuing attention to operational security 

and force protection. 

The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this monograph as part of its continuing effort 

to inform discussions on dealing with the ongoing 

ISIS threat and security issues in Iraq. This analysis 

should be useful to help strategic leaders, planners, 

intelligence professionals, and commanders to better understand the challenges of the contemporary 

strategic landscape in the Middle East and to craft 

effective responses.

 

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

Director

 Strategic Studies Institute and

 U.S. Army War College Press

vi
vii

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

NORMAN CIGAR is a Research Fellow at the Marine 

Corps University, Quantico, VA, from which he retired 

recently as Director of Regional Studies and the Minerva Research Chair. Previously, he had also taught 

at the Marine Corps Command and Staff College and 

at the Marine Corps School of Advanced Warfighting. 

In an earlier assignment, he spent 7 years as a senior 

political-military analyst in the Pentagon, where he 

was responsible for the Middle East in the Office of 

the Army’s Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, and 

supported the Secretary of the Army, the Chief of Staff 

of the Army, and Congress with intelligence. He also 

represented the Army on national-level intelligence issues in the interagency intelligence community. During the Gulf War, he was the Army’s senior politicalmilitary intelligence staff officer on the Desert Shield/

Desert Storm Task Force. Dr. Cigar is the author of numerous works on politics and security issues dealing 

with the Middle East and the Balkans, and has been 

a consultant at the International Criminal Tribunal 

for the former Yugoslavia at the Hague. He has also 

taught at the National Intelligence University and was 

a Visiting Fellow at the Institute for Conflict Analysis & Resolution, George Mason University. Among 

his writings are Al-Qa’ida’s Doctrine for Insurgency and 

Al-Qaida, the Tribes, and the Government. Lessons and 

Prospects for Iraq’s Unstable Triangle. Dr. Cigar holds a 

Certificate from the Middle East Institute, Columbia 

University; an M.S.S.I. from the National Intelligence 

University; an M.I.A. from the School of International 

and Public Affairs, Columbia University; and a D.Phil. 

from Oxford (St. Antony’s College) in Middle East history and Arabic. He has studied and traveled widely 

in the Middle East.

ix

SUMMARY

As America’s de facto co-belligerents who often 

share the same battlespace in the fight against Islamic 

State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), the presence and activity 

of Iraq’s Shia warlords and their militias have an impact on U.S. interests and policies at both the strategic 

and operational levels. The practical objective of this 

monograph is to provide a better understanding of the 

Shia militia phenomenon and to highlight the factors 

with which U.S. policymakers and U.S. Army planners and commanders will have to deal with respect 

to operations in Iraq. 

The appearance and rapid advance in 2014 of ISIS, 

or the Islamic State as it calls itself, and the security 

crisis that resulted in Iraq also engendered a mushrooming in the size and role of the Shia militias in Iraq 

and has resulted in the unprecedented importance 

and status of the warlords who lead them. With the reenergizing of the pre-existing militias and the creation 

of new ones as part of a mass mobilization, this force 

has played a significant role in most of the campaigns, 

helping to stem and then turn the ISIS tide, thanks to 

its religious commitment, Iranian support, and previous experience gained by some fighters in Syria. 

The militias are embedded in mainstream society, 

and the warlords who lead them are also political and 

often religious leaders and have emerged as powerbrokers in the country’s political system in their own 

right. Not only have the militias had an impact on the 

battlefield, but the warlords have also shaped policies 

on such issues as the formation of a National Guard in 

the Sunni areas, whether to target ISIS in urban areas, 

whether to rehabilitate the Baathists, and whether to 

establish détente with the Gulf States; they have also 
hindered reconciliation with the Sunni community, 

which is needed in order to weaken ISIS’s appeal in 

that community. 

As the U.S. Landpower footprint increases, planners and commanders must remain sensitive to the integrated position the warlords and the militias have in 

Iraq’s security system and the fact that the militias are 

embedded in military operations with the Army and 

police. As such, their presence and influence must be 

considered in U.S. decisionmaking, and the appropriate conditions and limits on operational cooperation, 

intelligence sharing, and logistic support to the Iraqi 

forces must be determined. In particular, the warlords have often displayed hostility to U.S. interests 

and could represent a potential force protection concern to any U.S. ground presence. Given the militias’ 

links with Iran, Iranian hostility to U.S. policies or a 

degradation in U.S.-Iranian relations could increase 

the risk to deployed personnel. Iraqis perceive a continuing need for the militias in the effort against ISIS 

for some time to come, given the requirement to rebuild the Army after its earlier poor showing against 

ISIS and its history of corruption, politicization, and 

neglect. Combined with this need, the recent rise in 

the warlords’ popularity and legitimacy is likely to 

ensure an ongoing role for them in Iraq’s security and 

political life for the foreseeable future.

x
1

IRAQ’S SHIA WARLORDS AND 

THEIR MILITIAS: 

POLITICAL AND SECURITY CHALLENGES 

AND OPTIONS

INTRODUCTION 

The appearance and rapid advance of the Islamic 

State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), or the Islamic State, as it 

calls itself, in 2014 and the security crisis that resulted 

in Iraq also engendered a mushrooming in the size 

and role of the Shia militias in Iraq and has resulted 

in the unprecedented importance and status of the 

warlords who lead them. As such, these militias have 

become a significant part of the country’s security and 

political landscape that one cannot ignore, and they 

are likely to remain a factor to contend with for some 

time to come. Moreover, if not allies, the Shia militias 

have become for Washington at least co-belligerents 

in what one can justly term the ISIS War. 

Unavoidably, in Iraq’s dynamic political and security situation, details about the militias will evolve 

rapidly, and, at most, one can only portray a snapshot 

of the situation. However, what one can do is identify 

and analyze the factors and trends as of this writing—

February 2015—that one can expect to persist and to 

draw conclusions on that basis. Ultimately, the practical objective of this monograph is to provide a better 

understanding of the Shia militia phenomenon and 

highlight the factors with which U.S. policymakers 

and U.S. Army planners and commanders will have 

to deal. Given the already significant U.S. ground 

presence in Iraq, Americans will have to interact with 

the Shia militias both strategically at the political level 

and operationally on the battlefield. As such, it is im-
2

portant to understand the militias’ identity, objectives, 

strategic and operational impact, and the implications 

for U.S. Landpower forces and political decisionmakers involved in Iraqi affairs. 

What to call these Shia military formations is, in itself, a controversial issue in Iraq. The militias and their 

supporters label themselves generically as “Al-Hashd 

Al-Shabi” (the Popular Mobilization or Levée en Masse), 

“the Islamic Resistance” (al-muqawama al-islamiya), 

“the Volunteers” (al-mutatawwiun), or the mujahidin. 

Detractors refer to them as “militias” (milishiyat), 

which, in Iraq, has a pejorative connotation equivalent 

to “gangs.” Here the general term, “militias,” will be 

used in the English-language sense as a descriptive of 

such organizations without any negative implication, 

equivalent to the generic “Al-Hashd Al-Shabi” or just 

“Al-Hashd” in the Iraqi texts.

The Militias’ Early Years. 

Shia militias have been a political-military factor in 

Iraq ever since the overthrow of the Saddam regime in 

2003 and were often at odds with the U.S. presence in 

the country, many times resulting in clashes with the 

U.S. armed forces, as well as with the Sunni community and the local government. Although the U.S.-led 

Coalition had managed to control such militias, often 

after hard-fought campaigns in which the militias 

many times took heavy casualties, the latter continued 

to exist, even if only in a reduced form. 

With a diminishing of the jihadist Sunni threat after 2008 and the imminent departure of U.S. forces, 

militia force structures were reduced. During the 

succeeding “quiet years,” some militias, such as the 

Mahdi Army (Jaysh Al-Mahdi) led by Muqtada Al-
3

Sadr, reverted largely to a reserve status, while in the 

case of the Badr militia, many of its personnel were 

integrated into the country’s security forces. Other militias continued to operate more actively, as was true 

of the Units of the Righteous People (Asa’ib Ahl AlHaqq), the latter, with the tacit blessing of and often 

in close coordination with the security forces in Sunni 

areas where they were accused of a pattern of crimes 

against civilians, contributing a significant grievance against Al-Maliki’s Shia-majority government 

and armed forces and feeding Sunni resistance and a 

willingness to cooperate with ISIS.1 Some of the Iraqi 

militias’ cadres were also receiving further training in 

Iran or Lebanon during this operational lull. Some of 

the militias, such as Badr and Ahl Al-Haqq, continued 

to operate in Al-Anbar province at Prime Minister AlMaliki’s request as part of the campaign against Sunni 

dissidents.2

The Syrian Interlude.

After the outbreak of the Arab Spring in neighboring Syria in 2011 and the rise of Al-Qaida activity 

there, many of the Iraqi militias revived their activity 

as they deployed personnel to fight on behalf of the 

Asad regime. Rather than being motivated by any devotion to the secular Baathist Asad regime, it was the 

possibility of victory by Sunni Islamist forces that was 

seen as a threat to Shia shrines in Syria and to Shia 

interests in general that provided the impetus. It was 

reportedly the commander of the Quds Division, the 

unit of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) 

responsible for foreign operations, Major General Qasim Sulaymani, who had ordered the Asa’ib Ahl AlHaqq and other Iraqi militia elements loyal to Iran to 
4

deploy to Syria. According to the media, these units 

were armed and trained in Iraq and Iran under Quds 

supervision, and subsequently crossed Iraq to Syria, 

with the Iranian embassy in Baghdad coordinating the 

effort. Almost 5,000 fighters were said to have gone to 

Syria, with most of the existing militias represented.3

Iraqi Shia clerics encouraged such volunteers, and the 

Iraqi government under Prime Minister Nuri Al-Maliki tacitly endorsed and supported such deployments, 

while government officials attended public memorial 

services for those who fell in Syria.4 Transit was no 

doubt facilitated by the fact that Hadi Al-Amiri, head 

of the Badr Force militia and a long-time Iranian ally, 

at the time was Iraq’s Minister of Transportation.

5

The intensity of the combat operations against the 

Al-Qaida-backed Jabhat Al-Nusra and ISIS in Syria is 

suggested by the fact that one militia, Asa’ib Ahl AlHaqq, acknowledged having lost 300 fighters in just 

one engagement extending over several days in the 

Damascus area.6 Iraqi militia leaders often established 

their credibility in the Syrian theater, as was the case 

with Falih Al-Khazali, then a leader in the Iraqi Hizb 

Allah (who subsequently broke away to establish the 

Kata’ib Sayyid Al-Shuhada’ militia as a separate organization), who lost an eye in the fighting in Syria.

Responding to the ISIS War: The Militias 

Are Re-energized.

The current resurgence of the militias can be traced 

to the ascent in 2013-14 of the local Al-Qaida branch —

originally The Islamic State in Iraq, later renamed The 

Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) or the Islamic State 

in the Levant (ISIL), and renamed once again as the Islamic State in June 2014 when it broke with Al-Qaida. 
5

Thanks to the experience and arms gained from fighting against the Asad regime in Syria and the political 

alliances it contracted with dissident Sunni elements 

(tribes, Saddam-era Baathists, military officers, and 

non-Al-Qaida jihadists) seething against what they 

termed a repressive Shia-dominated Baghdad government, ISIS was able to make rapid territorial advances 

in Iraq in 2014, which was facilitated by the collapse 

of Iraq’s security forces. This expansion was accompanied by massacres and expulsions of Shia military personnel and civilians, as well as the destruction of Shia 

shrines and religious institutions in the areas that ISIS 

seized, creating a national crisis that marked a turning point in both the country’s history and in the fortunes of the militias. In effect, the country’s majority 

Shia community, which was at greatest risk from ISIS, 

saw it had few, if any, other options for its survival in 

the face of a disintegrating Iraqi Army patently unable to stop ISIS. Likewise, the Iraqi government, then 

still led by Prime Minister Nuri Al-Maliki, could find 

no other immediate expedient to try to stem the ISIS 

onslaught than the existing Shia militias. When two 

combat-hardened militia units returned from Syria to 

Iraq in June 2014, the beleaguered government immediately deployed them to the front lines.7

Significantly, it was the country’s most senior 

Shia religious figure, Ali Al-Sistani, known as the Authority (Al-Marja, or his office as Al-Marjaiya), who 

provided the mechanism for an enormous and rapid 

expansion of the militias. Reacting to the vehemently 

anti-Shia acts by ISIS in the recently conquered areas 

and its stated intent to march to the Shia holy cities 

of Karbala and Najaf, on June 13, 2014, Al-Sistani 

promulgated a fatwa, or religious opinion, declaring 

a jihad incumbent on the community as a whole (ji-
6

had kifa’i). This call triggered a levée en masse within 

the Shia community, what came to be known as 

Al-Hashd Al-Shabi. 

DEVELOPING THE MILITIAS

Thanks to the flood of new recruits generated by 

Al-Sistani’s call-up, existing militias were vastly increased, while new militia units were also formed. 

Raising, financing, and training the new recruits 

marked a cooperative effort among the existing militias, the Iraqi government, the Shia religious establishment, and the Shia tribes. For example, in the Basra 

area, recruits—often by tribal contingent—reported to 

the police stations, while it was the Basra local government that provided money to outfit the volunteers. 

Mobilization. 

At first, there was no real mechanism in place to 

process the volunteers. Ten times more volunteers 

came forward than the government had anticipated 

or wanted. Of the million-plus who stepped forward, 

Prime Minister Al-Ibadi (sometimes spelled Al-Abadi), who replaced Al-Maliki after the latter’s ouster in 

September 2014, later confirmed that “Only a small 

number of them were used, since it was not possible 

to use all of them.”8 Most initial volunteers probably 

were deemed unfit for duty, have ended up in home 

guard duties, or may well have returned home after 

the initial outburst of zeal. Actual numbers on the 

ground are hard to determine. According to one local official, there were over 17,000 volunteers committed on various fronts by September 2014, while Hay’at 

Al-Hashd Al-Shabi reported 60,000 in the field in late-
7

2014.9 A hostile senior Iraqi political figure reported 

in January 2015 that the militias had 250,000 men in 

its force structure (perhaps considering active and reserve/home guard personnel), with plans to double 

that force structure within 6 months.10 A Badr commander, for his part, claimed by the end of 2014 that 

there were 100,000 militia fighters.11 Tallies may depend on how one counts committed and supporting 

forces, including militia reservists, home guards, and 

part-time personnel. Determining the total strength is 

even more difficult, with few militias providing end 

strength figures, such as the Saraya Ashura’, which 

claimed to have 50,000 personnel, and the Al-Abbas 

Division that claimed 5,000 fighters, with at least 

3,000 more in its reserve component.12 What is significant is the impact that the infusion of so many new 

volunteers was to have on the battlefield.

In particular, volunteers who joined new units—

such as the Abbas Division sponsored by the central Shia religious shrine, Al-Ataba Al-Husayniya, in 

Karbala—often came from specific areas, in the latter 

case, from Karbala and the Basra area.13 Shia tribes 

served as significant manpower pools and provided 

a recruitment mechanism, as in Babil province, where 

tribes set up volunteer recruitment centers, with entire tribal contingents volunteering and tribal shaykhs 

sometimes leading the volunteers.

14 For example, in 

Al-Muthanna province, the tribes had supplied some 

1,200 volunteers initially and sent more subsequently.15 The Muntafida tribes, for their part, contributed 

5,000 volunteers.16 The raising and deployment of militia units has been a continuing process, and in late 

October 2014, one militia warlord, Ammar Al-Hakim, 

called for the formation of additional militia units to 

guard the shrines in Karbala and Najaf.17 In January 
8

2015, Dhi Qar province sent 750 fighters as reinforcements to the militias operating in Diyala.18 As mixed 

areas were retaken from ISIS, more local Shia were 

said to have joined the militias, as in Salah Al-Din 

province, where hundreds were reported to have volunteered, according to an Iraqi government minister, 

and 3,000 after the town of Al-Muqdadiya in Diyala 

was retaken.19 In early-2015, in fact, the militias organized by the senior Shia religious establishment, the 

Ataba, announced the opening of new recruitment 

centers throughout the country.20

Training and Readiness.

Since 2014, the militias have developed as a threetiered force. First, there was the experienced nucleus, 

which had existed before the call-up; second, there 

were the recent volunteers who lacked any real training or combat experience; and, third, there was a reserve component, part of which also served as a local 

home guard. As one could expect, pre-existing militias, thanks to their experienced cadres and personnel 

and standing organizational structure, were able to 

take greatest advantage of the mobilization and have 

been the most prominent on the battlefield ever since. 

According to Hadi Al-Amiri (as commander of 

Badr), the initial influx of volunteers brought in many 

with no training, who could not be sent immediately 

to the front. The Badr Force dealt with the influx of 

volunteers by sorting them by level of experience and 

provided training to the neophytes.21 As Al-Amiri 

reports, Iranian teams participated in their training, 

and he claims the Iranians trained 60 percent of the 

volunteers.22
9

At times, the training was rudimentary, such as 

the 2-week course for a newly raised unit, Al-Hakim’s

Fawj Al-Imam Al-Baqir, itself part of the larger Saraya 

Ashura’ unit, composed mostly of tribesmen and refugees.23 The initial training for the new volunteers in 

Karbala’, on the other hand, took place at the provincial Police Academy.24 Likewise, a unit that the Shia 

charitable foundation (Waqf) raised was trained at the 

Najaf provincial Police Academy.25 The Saraya Ashura’

militia was trained and armed by the national police.26 At times, individual militias provided training 

for their own volunteers, as in the case of the Saraya 

Al-Salam, although in some cases, the latter provided 

recruits with only a single day of training.27 The Badr

militia, with its advantage of combat experience, also 

provided cadres for other newly formed militia units, 

which contributed a particular focus on military operations in urban terrain (MOUT).28 In general, new 

fighters were probably expected to learn on the job, 

operating alongside more experienced veterans. More 

recently, at least some volunteers have gone through 

longer training courses, such as the 3,200 graduates of 

a 3-months course they completed in January 2015.29

As suggested already, most personnel may be serving as home guards. A militia unit in its entirety could 

have the permanent role of a home guard, or an individual committed militia could have its own reserve 

component, as in Najaf, where some 3,000 fighters 

were mobilized for the specific mission of defending 

the city, or for temporary guard duty, as when the Abbas Division called up 3,000 of its reserves to provide 

security for the upcoming Ashura religious festival in 

Karbala.30 Some reservists were expected to be able to 

respond quickly, as was the case when Muqtada AlSadr ordered the Saraya Al-Salam reserves in Al-Muth-
10

anna province to be ready with a 48-hour notice.31

Indicative of the gravity of the ISIS threat in the early 

period, the Supreme Islamic Council had even provided arms handling training to women volunteers 

in Najaf.32 In January 2015, plans were also reported 

for a women’s contingent to support the militias with 

food preparation and medical care for the upcoming 

operation to liberate Mosul.33

Equipping and Maintaining the Militias.

Often, the financial and other support the government promised has fallen short of the militias’ expectations, creating recurring problems. The central government has provided the bulk of the militias’ funding 

since the call-up of 2014, and had already spent $1 

billion on the militias by late-2014, although when 

the Finance Minister (a Kurd) revealed the expense, 

it aroused a storm of protest from militia supporters, 

who accused him of seeking to sabotage the project 

with his revelations.34 However, the actual payment 

of salaries and benefits to the intended beneficiaries 

has proven to be a major problem, with fighters often 

complaining of not receiving any pay for months at a 

time, if at all. 

Grumbling soon also arose about shortages of food, 

drinking water, equipment, and ammunition.35 As one 

Army source acknowledged, militias often were said 

to have a more reliable logistics system than did the 

Army, which often neglected to provide even food 

to the militias.36 To be sure, even the Army often suffers from such negligence, as in one typical case when 

the Army, as well as the militias, was receiving food 

unfit for human consumption as a result of government corruption dating from Al-Maliki’s time, and the 
11

Army itself was often buying food from the private 

sector.37 The established militias already had equipment, at least for their core members and, aside from 

personal arms, their arsenals included crew-served 

weapons, ranging to heavy machine guns, mortars, 

and rocket launchers, with four-wheel-drive vehicles 

as the preferred mode of transport. Thanks to subsequent acquisitions through government transfers and 

capture from ISIS, their arsenals now include artillery, 

self-propelled air defense guns, High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HUMVEES), and other armor, including even tanks. New militias complained 

of the limited supply of arms and munitions that the 

government provided, obliging some fighters to buy 

their own weapons on the open market.38 Eventually, 

some militia units were able to seize arms from ISIS, in 

some cases, arms of U.S. origin that ISIS had originally 

seized from the Army and paraded that fact, no doubt 

embarrassing the latter.39

In addition, operations with the Army often also 

gave rise to militia discontent. Some volunteers were 

said to have returned home after seeing the unprofessional Iraqi Army with which they were expected 

to operate, including exercising “poorly thought-out 

plans.”40 The militias also blamed the Army with providing shoddy medical support and poor covering 

fire, while accusing Sunni officers of hedging their 

bets with ISIS.41

This lack of support has often resulted in degraded 

morale and protests by individual fighters. Already in 

July 2014, hundreds of volunteers blocked the main 

road between two provinces and pelted the local 

Member of Parliament’s convoy with rocks in protest 

for not receiving any pay, while other angry volunteers refused to go into battle. Demonstrations on a 
12

large scale over the same issue were repeated in Diyala province in September 2014.42 Some volunteers returned home, even abandoning positions on the front 

lines, for that reason.43 Others, such as 200 personnel 

from one militia unit, continued to drain away over 

time, citing the lack of pay and family benefits.44 Moreover, some fighters complained that certain categories 

in the militias, such as individuals who are simultaneously government employees or politicians’ security 

guards or those who belong to the warlords’ political 

parties, were more likely to get paid than were ordinary volunteers.45 The hardship caused by sporadic 

or no pay was heightened by the fact that members 

from poor families, many of whose youth had been 

unemployed and in need of salaries, constituted the 

majority of the new volunteers, as was argued by 

a delegation from Babil province to the Baghdad 

government.46

The government repeatedly recognized its responsibility to pay the militia fighters, as when it reaffirmed publicly in November 2014 its commitment 

to grant the families of militiamen killed in action 

the same benefits as military personnel. Prime Minister Al-Ibadi reportedly had to intervene personally 

with the bureaucracy to begin to get arrears paid.47

In part, embezzlement by senior officials—especially 

during the Al-Maliki era—within the agency tasked 

with supporting the militias was to blame for the 

problems, with funds diverted for private purposes.48

According to some Members of Parliament, political 

favoritism also plays a role, with some militia units 

receiving their full pay while others do not, depending on the individual warlord’s clout.49 Even the commander of the Iraqi Hizb Allah militia complained 

that salaries and benefits were paid erratically and 
13

were influenced by how much political clout a militia 

could exert.50 The country’s chronic bureaucratic mismanagement no doubt is also to blame for shortfalls 

in support. 

The militias’ backers in political and religious 

circles have often had to resort to lobbying on the 

militias’ behalf. For example, the Shia religious establishment—including at the highest levels—repeatedly

has exerted pressure on the government to support 

the volunteers with pay, food, weapons, and equipment, which has also been the case with local governments and other prominent religious leaders.51 Local 

governments, the parent militia organizations, and 

Shia foundations frequently have filled the shortfall 

in support given to the fighters for those militias they 

sponsored or who came from their areas. For example, 

the provincial government of Basra provided 40b Dinars ($3.4 million) to equip the volunteers initially.52

The Shia Waqf, for its part, sent food to both the Army 

and the militias in the field at Samarra, and set up field 

bakeries and a water-treatment facility for them.53

Organization.

In terms of organization, Prime Minister AlMaliki (who at the time was also Minister of the Interior) placed the old and new militias initially in a 

newly-created structure, the Popular Hashd Agency 

(Hay’at Al-Hashd Al-Shabi), within the Ministry of the 

Interior. However, the agency was faced with managing a coalition of individual jealously autonomist 

militias, and its function has been mainly in terms of 

funding and benefits, as well as serving as a coordinating mechanism for policy with other government 

and security agencies, while the Army was tasked to 
14

provide logistics and other combat support. As any 

bureaucratic organization would, the Hay’a has lobbied frequently for a larger budget on behalf of its 

constituency.54 The Director of the Hay’a agency is 

Falih Al-Fayyad, who is also the country’s National 

Security Adviser (and an Al-Maliki holdover), while 

Abu Al-Mahdi Al-Muhandis, the Deputy Director, 

is also the number-two man in the Badr organization 

and, as of February 2015, another Badr commander, 

was made the Hay’a’s spokesman. In the new government led by Prime Minister Al-Ibadi following Al-Maliki’s ouster in September 2014, ultimate responsibility 

for this agency went to Muhammad Al-Ghabban, the 

new Minister of the Interior, who is a leading figure in 

the Badr militia. According to the Minister of the Interior, militias operated under the command and control of his Ministry, but enjoyed delegated authority in 

liberated areas.55

Who Are the Militias and the Warlords?

There may be over 50 Shia militias by now, varying 

in size, regional affiliation, political orientation, objectives, and importance. At times, there can be intense 

rivalry between militias and, in the past, these differences often led to armed clashes between competing 

warlords. There are indications that Iran can and at 

times has intervened with some militias to deal with 

leadership issues which, along with control of turf, 

are more significant than ideological ones.56 The following are among the most significant militias—some 

old, some new. 
15

The Militias.

Leadership competition, rather than ideology or 

strategy, divides the pro-Iranian militias, over most of 

which Iran has influence rather than control. Tehran 

may see advantages in this, as it is easier to deal with 

several smaller competing dependent militias than 

with a single large one.

Militias Allied to Iran.

Quwwat Badr (Badr Force). Originally established 

in Iran and used against Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War, 

it was the military wing of the Supreme Council of 

the Islamic Revolution of Iraq (renamed the Supreme 

Islamic Council in 2007). The Badr Force, under Hadi 

Al-Amiri, broke off from the Council in 2012 following 

leadership disputes. It is reported to be close to Iran’s 

Quds Division and the latter’s commander, General 

Sulaymani.

Asa’ib Ahl Al-Haqq (Units of the Righteous People). 

Its leader, cleric Qays Al-Khazali, broke from Muqtada Al-Sadr’s Jaysh Al-Mahdi militia in 2007 when the 

latter stood down, taking 3,000 personnel with him to 

form the new militia. 

Iraqi Hizb Allah. It is closely linked to Lebanese 

Hizb Allah and Iran. 

Katai’b Sayyid Al-Shuhada’ (The Greatest Martyr 

Battalions). Broke off from Iraqi Hizb Allah in 2013, led 

by cleric Shaykh Abu Mustafa Al-Shibani and by Falih 

Al-Khazali. It is a close ally of Iran and of the Quds Division, and its website features prominently an image 

of Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamene’i.

Kata’ib Al-Tayyar Al-Risali (The Missionary Movement Battalions). Emerged from Al-Sadr’s Jaysh 
16

Al-Mahdi, and is led by cleric Shaykh Adnan Al-Shamhani. It is a close ally of Iran and of the Quds Division, 

and its website includes an image of Iran’s former 

leader, Ayatollah Rouhallah Khomeini.

Kata’ib Al-Imam Ali (The Imam Ali Battalions). Led 

by Shibl Al-Zaydi, a former follower of Al-Sadr. AlZaydi has a close personal relationship with General 

Sulaymani. It prides itself on special forces operations.

Jaysh Al-Mukhtar (Al-Mukhtar’s Army). Established in 2013 by the former head of the Iraqi Hizb 

Allah, cleric Wathiq Al-Battat (killed in action in 

December 2014). 

Militias Sympathetic or Not Hostile to, but Independent 

from, Iran.

Other militias, while willing to cooperate with 

Tehran, see themselves as having their own sources of religious legitimacy and emphasize their 

independence.

Saraya Al-Salam (The Peace Companies). Its leader, 

cleric Hujjat al-islam (a lesser degree of Shia cleric 

than an ayatollah) Muqtada Al-Sadr, set up Saraya 

Al-Salam in 2014, amalgamating some personnel from 

his other militia units and incorporating new recruits, 

while also retaining his pre-existing Liwa’ Al-Yawm 

Al-Mawud (The Judgment Day Brigade). In February 

2015, Al-Sadr “froze” his militias’ operations temporarily, but that may have been a political maneuver on 

his part. 

Saraya Ashura’ (The Ashura’ Companies). The Supreme Islamic Council, led by cleric Ammar Al-Hakim, formed this militia in 2014, although some cadres 

were available from earlier units. 
17

The two Ataba-s, that is, the two central Shia religious establishments in the holy cities of Karbala 

and Najaf, raised their own militia units in 2014, such 

as Karbala’s Firqat Al-Abbas Al-Qitaliya (Al-Abbas 

Combat Division), which remained directly subordinate to the Shia clerics and which they supported 

with logistics.57

Some militia units are composed largely of refugees, such as the Liwa’ Al-Imam Al-Husayn (Imam 

Al-Husayn Brigade), composed of the Shia refugees 

who had fled the ISIS seizure of Tell Afar in Naynawa 

province, a 300-man unit of Christian refugees attached to the Kata’ib Al-Imam Ali, and another unit of 

Shabak refugees.58 In early-2015, 1,500 more Shia refugees were being trained in militia camps to join the 

6,000 that had preceded them in preparation for the 

anticipated campaign to retake Mosul.59

Other militia units have had the character of home 

guards for local defense, as was the case of Sariyat 

Al-Taff Al-Qitaliya (Al-Taff Combat Company), raised 

specifically “to defend the city of Karbala and its holy 

shrines.”60 The Shia Waqf also raised a 4,000-man force 

whose mission was primarily to protect the holy sites 

in Najaf and Kufa and to provide local security for the 

annual religious festivals. This unit cooperated operationally with the Badr Force and coordinated with the 

Najaf police.61 Yet another militia unit in Karbala was 

trained by the Army for a “limited mission,” that of 

uprooting “ISIS gangs” and sleeper cells.62

Marginal Militias.

Outside the mainstream, there are also smaller, 

more extreme militias—often with a millenarian 

worldview—who have not participated in the war 

against ISIS. Although limited in size, these militias 
18

are, nevertheless, a fanatical and unpredictable element, especially at the local level, and are potentially disruptive because of their apocalyptic outlook. 

Such militias include the Jund Al-Sama’ (The Army of 

Heaven) and the Ansar Al-Mahdi (The Mahdi’s Partisans), both of whom seek to overthrow the existing Shia religious hierarchy and replace it with their 

own prophetic movements. Of late, another similar 

militia, Jaysh Al-Husayn (Husayn’s Army)—led by 

Mahmud Al-Sarkhi, a self-proclaimed grand ayatollah with a millenarian outlook, who has hinted that 

he is the expected Mahdi and the rightful leader of 

the Shia—has been particularly troublesome, sparking confrontations with the former Al-Maliki government. Al-Sarkhi is vehemently opposed both to Iraq’s 

Shia religious establishment and to Iran, as well as to 

the United States, and rejected Al-Sistani’s 2014 mobilization call. The Al-Maliki government cracked 

down violently on Al-Sarkhi in clashes in July 2014, 

but his followers are still on the ground.63 He controls 

perhaps 25,000-30,000 followers, and his stronghold is 

in Nasiriya.64

The Militia Warlords.

The militias are not marginalized armed gangs. 

Rather, the militias and those who control them—

warlords for all intents and purposes—are embedded 

in mainstream society. No matter how radical their 

positions and actions may seem to outside observers, 

there is considerable truth in the claim by the country’s Minister of the Interior that the militias are “an 

inseparable element of Iraq’s fabric.”65 Although not 

all the militia leaders actually command field operations or have equal power, they are nevertheless treated with deference by Army and police commanders, 
19

even if a sense of competition and resentment may 

also be present. Warlords have regular policy discussions with government officials at the highest levels 

on issues that are not limited to just militia affairs. 

Moreover, far from being ostracized by senior religious authorities, warlords often meet with and are 

welcomed by the latter. Indicative of the established 

position the militias have in Iraq’s socio-political system is the fact that any criticism results in figures from 

all public sectors leaping to their defense. Opponents 

of the militias also have to face the militias’ supporters 

in Parliament, who accuse such critics of being “unIraqi” and of “lacking any sense of patriotism.”66

The militia warlords not only have a role in military affairs but have also emerged as powerbrokers 

in the country’s political system in their own right, 

thanks to an interlocking and reinforcing system of 

functions they perform. In a very real sense, the militia warlords are the government, through the political 

parties they control and the Members of Parliament 

and government officials at both the national and local 

levels who are affiliated to those parties or who even 

themselves belong to the parties’ military wing; and 

this control is, moreover, quite apart from the direct 

role in political life that the warlords play personally. 

Warlords often can count on networks of loyalists at 

the national and local levels who may themselves be 

influential political figures, government officials, military and police officers, or clerics. In fact, warlords can 

be especially powerful at the local level, where they 

may well be dominant, or at least have a significant 

presence in a particular city’s administration, police, 

religious infrastructure, and economy. 

At the national level, for example, members of 

Badr include the Ministers of Municipalities, Human 
20

Rights, Interior, and Communications, as well as the 

Deputy Director of the Al-Hashd Al-Shabi Agency. 

The Ministers of Transportation, Oil, and Youth on 

the other hand, are from the Supreme Islamic Council. The country’s Deputy Prime Minister, Baha’ AlAraji, is a member of Al-Sadr’s party, as are three 

Ministers. Officials from militia-linked parties are 

also embedded throughout the national government 

in other positions of influence. Thus, a Member of 

Parliament who belongs to Al-Sadr’s party is also a 

member on the Finance Committee in Parliament and 

has been influential in shaping the country’s budget. 

Shaykh Humam Al-Hammudi, the number-two man 

in the Supreme Islamic Council, is also the chairman 

of the Foreign Policy Committee in Parliament and is 

Parliament’s Deputy Speaker. 

Highlighting the interpenetration of institutions, 

government officials who belong to political parties that sponsor the militias have themselves often 

operated in the field with the militias. 

While the case of Al-Amiri may have been the 

most striking, others have done so as well. For example, the Minister of Municipalities, Abd Al-Karim 

Yunis Al-Ansari, who is also the Assistant Secretary 

General of the Badr Party, supported the militias not 

only by visiting fielded units and providing them with 

equipment, supplies, and water, but he also participated in operations.67 Falih Al-Khazali, a leader of the 

Kata’ib Sayyid Al-Shuhada’ militia, is also a Member of 

Parliament and periodically dons his militia uniform 

to inspect his fighters at the front. Likewise, Badr 

Party sitting Members of Parliament have served as 

militia field commanders, while others—such as the 

leader of Badr’s parliamentary caucus—also made a 

show of appearing at the front in uniform.68 The Secretary-General of the Kata’ib Al-Tayyar Al-Risali militia, 
21

Shaykh Adnan Al-Shamhani, who is also a Member 

of Parliament, has likewise gone in uniform to inspect 

his fighters, as is displayed prominently on his organization’s website. Before his appointment, Muhammad Al-Ghabban, as a top Badr figure and Member of 

Parliament, had himself joined the Badr militia in field 

operations during the summer of 2014 and, even after 

being appointed as the new Minister of the Interior in 

the Al-Ibadi government and assuming control of the 

agency responsible for the militias, was said to still be 

leading in the field at times, as in the campaign for Jurf 

Al-Sakhr.69

As such, warlords can operate in several dimensions with reinforcing linkages, often functioning as 

leaders not only in military operations, but also in 

political activity. Since some warlords are also significant Shia clerics and heads of a religious party or of 

a religious foundation, they may also be influential 

in the religious domain. To be sure, some warlords 

are primarily political and religious figures, leaving 

combat operations to subordinate commanders. Even 

those warlords who are not field commanders, such 

as cleric Ammar Al-Hakim, the head of the Supreme 

Islamic Council, or Muqtada Al-Sadr, are anxious to 

be seen in uniform in the field among their militia 

fighters. Other warlords, however, are themselves actual field commanders, as is the case with cleric Ayatollah Qays Al-Khazali, who leads his Asa’ib Ahl AlHaqq fighters from the front, and as was true of cleric 

Wathiq Al-Battat (killed in December 2014), who led 

the Jaysh Al-Mukhtar from the front. In fact, often it is 

not possible to distinguish which hat a warlord may 

be wearing—whether speaking as a military commander, politician, or religious figure—although that 

may not matter, except to underline the overlapping 

identities and sources of power of such warlords.
22

Warlords wheel and deal as equals with the government leadership, senior military commanders, 

tribal leaders, and foreign representatives, and AlHakim, for example, (and perhaps others) meets with 

the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq.70 Many of the militias, 

in fact, can be considered as the armed wing of the 

political party to which they are attached and provide 

muscle for the latter. For example, Hadi Al-Amiri, the 

charismatic leader of the Badr Force, is also the head 

of the Badr Party organization, served as Minister of 

Transportation under Prime Minister Nuri Al-Maliki, 

and is currently still a Member of Parliament. He has 

participated in major operations, and was prominent 

in the relief of the besieged town of Amirli (the first 

significant defeat for ISIS) and in the Jurf Al-Sakhr 

campaign, playing a key role in drafting plans as part 

of a joint force with the Army and the police. He deals 

as an equal player with Army and police commanders, tribal leaders, and national and local officials, 

and has visited and met with political, religious, and 

military figures in Iran. 

Indicative of such power even in local politics, the 

Badr Force appointed one of its own as governor of 

Al-Azhim district after helping to expel ISIS from the 

area, while the militias are also reputed to run their 

own prisons.71 Al-Sadr’s supporters and the Supreme 

Islamic Council were said to be expanding their control over the local administration in central and southern Iraq.72 Given the perception that it was the militias 

who were the decisive element in stopping ISIS, it is 

not surprising that militia warlords are also popular, 

at least among the Shia. In a man of the year contest 

for political figures at the end of 2014, for example, 

Qays Al-Khazali (as leader of the Ahl Al-Haqq) was the 

winner, with Badr’s Al-Amiri coming in second.73
23

The Militias and the Iranian Connection.

Support for the militias has become a key component of Tehran’s policy in Iraq, which is facilitated by 

the fact that most—although not all—of Iraq’s Shia 

militias have had a long-standing organizational and 

ideological relationship with Iran and, in the case of 

some of the warlords, an even longer personal tie. AlAmiri, for example, was a commander of the Badr unit 

that fought on Tehran’s side in the Iran-Iraq War of 

the 1980s, while most other prominent Badr figures 

only returned to Iraq from Iran after the demise of 

Saddam Husayn in 2003. As noted already, over the 

years, Iran has provided arms and training to many of 

these militias through its Quds Division and, according to one Lebanese press source, in recent years some 

20,000 Iraqis have been trained by the Quds division.74

In the more recent period, Iran has played an even 

more direct role for the Shia militias in Iraq. According 

to a Lebanese Hizb Allah report, General Sulaymani, 

the veteran commander of the Quds Division, accompanied by Iranian and Lebanese advisers, had landed 

at Baghdad’s airport just hours after the fall of Mosul 

to ISIS in June 2014, where he was greeted by many 

of the Iraqi militia warlords.75 Iran has stressed that 

its role is restricted to providing training and advice 

in Iraq.76 Lebanese Hizb Allah, which has strong ties to 

Tehran, also deployed MOUT and sniper experts who 

were used as trainers for volunteers in Iraq, helped 

with planning, and provided combat advice and expertise in areas such as defusing explosives.77 Iran has 

also provided intelligence support, arms, munitions, 

and other equipment, and medical care in Tehran, as 

well as occasional air support both to the Iraqi government and to some of the militias directly. Signifi-
24

cantly, one of the militias’ priorities had been to secure 

the main road between Diyala and the Iranian border 

because “That road is very important,” according to 

the province’s Chief of Police.78

In many ways, this support has been decisive, as the 

number-two man in Badr, Abu Mahdi Al-Muhandis, 

claimed that “the only arms and equipment we received were from Iran [as opposed to the Coalition]” 

and “had it not been for those arms and support we 

would not have won those victories.”79 What is more, 

during the war against ISIS, General Sulaymani and 

his staff of advisers were said to have played a key 

role in planning and leading operations involving the 

Iraqi militias in all major campaigns. In January 2015, 

according to Al-Muhandis, there were “hundreds” of 

Iranian advisers.80 According to Badr’s official newspaper, Jaridat Badr, just in Diyala province, there were 

over 200 Iranian military advisers and fighters operating with the Kurdish Peshmerga—and no doubt also 

with the Shia militias deployed in the same area—and 

they were said to be especially active in helping to 

draft campaign plans.81 Indeed, Al-Hakim complained 

that Iran was not included in the Coalition, insisting 

that Iran was needed for victory.82

In fact, as Al-Amiri put it, all victories by the militias had been “coordinated” with Sulaymani and 

members of IRGC.83 A Lebanese Hizb Allah source 

noted that General Sulaymani “was present at all the 

major battles side-by-side with the fighters and was 

in radio contact with them, refining their plans and 

directing their movements, giving his orders to advance toward the enemy lines.”84 Other senior Iranian 

officers have also operated in Iraq, with at least three 

flag-rank officers killed in action—General Hamid 

Taqavi of the IRGC in December 2014, General Mahdi 
25

Nawruzi from the paramilitary Basij militia (subordinate to the IRGC) in January 2015, and General 

Reza Hosseini Moghaddam of the IRGC in February 

2015—indicating that senior Iranian personnel have 

operated at the front with the militias. While Al-Amiri 

has been careful to deny the presence of any Iranian 

combat troops in Iraq, he did acknowledge that Iran 

provided unspecified fire support.85 The Iranian advisory role, as the spokesman for the Hay’at Al-Hashd AlShabi acknowledged, was continuing undiminished 

into 2015.86

Most Iraqi warlords have visited Iran recently and 

met with senior government and religious figures. 

Iraqi warlords have recognized and applauded Tehran’s support. For example, Ammar Al-Hakim, while 

on a visit to Iran, praised Iran for its help and for “the 

significant role” it played in the fight against ISIS in 

terms of providing “key advice,” logistics support, 

and planning and organizational help. In fact, he calculated that, without this help, ISIS would have occupied Arbil in Kurdistan.87 Indeed, underlining the 

militias’ view of the importance of Iran’s role, at General Taqavi’s memorial service in Tehran, Al-Amiri 

concluded that “Had it not been for Iran and Major 

General Sulaymani, Haydar Al-Ibadi’s government 

would now be a government-in-exile.”88

In functional terms, one can view some of the 

Iraqi militias as extensions of the Iranian security 

apparatus, while the close interaction with the militias also provides Tehran with a potent political tool 

with which to exert its influence in Iraq. In fact, Iraq’s 

Vice-President Ayad Allawi has claimed that Iran has 

pressured the Iraqi government to expand the militias 

even more.89 Although Iran does not directly control 

the militias, nevertheless, the shared experience and 
26

dependence on Iranian support, within a context of 

often congruent interests, has engendered a genuine 

symbiosis over time. What is equally significant, as 

one can expect, Iraqi warlords and their staffs, as individuals, have often formed close personal ties with 

their Iranian counterparts. 

Many militias are eager to highlight their ties to 

Iran as a means of solidifying their legitimacy. For 

example, Badr claimed to have had authority for its 

military activity from Khamene’i even before Al-Sistani’s fatwa.90 In fact, several warlords—including the 

leaders of Ahl Al-Haqq, Iraqi Hizb Allah, Kata’ib Sayyid 

Al-Shuhada’, and Kata’ib Al-Tayyar Al-Risali—openly 

recognize Iran’s Ayatollah Khamene’i as God’s representative on earth (wali al-faqih), providing a potent 

religious element of allegiance. Khamene’i also appears frequently in Badr’s imagery, including on the 

death posters for its fallen fighters. For Iraqi Hizb Allah, there is an additional reinforcing link through the 

parent Lebanese Hizb Allah (indeed, both Iraqi and 

Lebanese Hizb Allah use the same yellow flag). For 

its part, the central Iraqi Shia establishment around 

Ayatollah Al-Sistani—and, by extension, the militias 

it has fielded—also has a warm relationship with Iran 

while retaining its own autonomy. On the other hand, 

Al-Sadr, though not openly hostile, is stand-offish toward Tehran, viewing his own family religious pedigree as sufficient legitimacy. Only the eccentric AlSayyid Al-Sarkhi Al-Hasani and his Jaysh Al-Husayn

militia are vociferously anti-Iranian, and he called reliance on Iran “betting on . . . a losing horse,” since he 

claimed the latter is so weak, it would collapse in any

confrontation.91
27

THE MILITIAS’ OPERATIONAL LEVEL 

SIGNIFICANCE—STEMMING THE DISASTER

Not surprisingly, the militias’ performance on the 

battlefield has been key to their image and to the warlords’ standing in the country’s socio-political system. 

At the time of the levée en masse, the security situation in the fight against ISIS looked grave, if not fatal. 

The Army and police seemed to realize they needed 

the militias, even if only reluctantly, especially in the 

early days when ISIS seemed unstoppable. 

With the Iraqi Army reeling and the very real threat 

to Baghdad and other parts of Iraq of an ISIS takeover 

in 2014, the response by the Shia militias probably 

“saved the day,” and in many instances since then, 

the militias continued to make the difference between 

victory and defeat. In the first Iraqi counteroffensive, 

a joint force of security forces and militias (along with 

Iranian advisers) was able to relieve the besieged town 

of Amirli—the first victory after a series of humiliating defeats by ISIS. After Amirli, even ISIS recognized 

that they were now fighting a new war because of the 

mobilized militias, and one ISIS analyst remarked that 

even senior militia commanders had not held back, 

unlike the Iraqi Army commanders in the previous 

fighting elsewhere.92

That the militias played the central part in the 

Amirli operation is clear. Hadi Al-Amiri—then still 

the country’s Minister of Transportation—was wearing his hat of Commander of the Badr Force when he 

deployed 2,000 Badr fighters to the Amirli area.93 Once 

there, he took an active role, setting up a council as 

the coordinating mechanism between the Army and 

all the militias, and he himself served on the front 

lines.94 It was he and his staff (supported by General 
28

Sulaymani and his staff) who apparently drafted the 

overall operational plan for the relief of the town. A 

police spokesman at Amirli noted that Al-Amiri was 

in charge (bi-qiyadat) of the operation and that “AlAmiri’s forces” also had “an obvious impact on liberating the nearby Al-Azhim area.”95 In fact, it appears 

that Al-Amiri also supervised the subsequent clearing 

operation in northern Diyala province, where he was 

in charge not only of the militia units but also of the 

Army and police, and for which Badr claimed to have 

deployed 5,000 of its own fighters.96 Again, the militias were said to have been key in the retaking of the 

town of Al-Muqdadiya, also in Diyala province. 97

The militias also made the decisive difference in 

other victories over ISIS, as in the campaign to retake 

Jurf Al-Sakhr south of Baghdad from August-October 

2014, which was described as the single biggest Iraqi 

operation since 2003. This is a key area whose control 

could have split Baghdad from the south as well as 

threatened the capital itself. The Islamic State, abetted 

by local Sunni communities, appeared to be succeeding in methodically encircling and cutting off Baghdad 

and, as of mid-2014, the Iraqi Army and police were 

finding it difficult to stop effectively the adversary in 

that area, and five Army commanders in charge of the 

operation had been relieved in a span of 2 months.98

Al-Amiri (and the Iranian advisers) again played a

key role in planning the campaign.99 The militias’ willingness to slog it out in the swamps, rugged terrain, 

vegetation, and water barriers—all filled with improvised explosive devices (IEDs)—in that region, as well 

as to fight in the well-fortified built-up areas, where 

the Army’s mechanized units could not operate effectively, was noticeable, as well as that militia personnel 

often led the way.100 The veteran militia fighters with 
29

experience against ISIS in Syria were especially effective in small-unit actions where initiative and leadership were key. 

The militias also provided a reserve element for 

the defense of Baghdad, preparing to resist ISIS—including with suicide operations—if the Army failed 

to hold the city’s defensive belt. As one local Saraya 

Al-Salam commander noted, his fighters, in fact, had 

had more experience in MOUT than in mobile warfare in any event.101 Hizb Allah apparently used its earlier experience preparing for the city’s defense, using 

engineers to erect berms covered with fires south of 

Baghdad with the intent of cutting ISIS’s logistics and 

taking away the latter’s mobility, noting this would 

provide time to react.102

Since then, the militias have continued to be prominent in virtually all the campaigns against ISIS, and 

the Iraqi media and government sources have always 

been careful to recognize the militias’ role alongside 

the Army and police in the official accounts. As one 

Iraqi military expert put it in October 2014, the “Islamic resistance” had “changed the course of the war 

and achieved outstanding victories;” and, he added, 

“If the resistance withdraws from the battlefield . . . 

the results in the situation do not bear thinking.”103

Initially, Iraqi Army officers had been dismissive 

and hostile to the new militia volunteers, claiming 

that many were over age, out of shape, and untrained, 

an attitude perhaps also fueled in part by professional pride and resentment of any competition.104

Later, however, as the militias showed their worth, 

the Army was “amazed . . . by the ferocity with which 

we fought,” according to a commander in the Badr 

Force, and there were reports that the Army was full 

of praise for the militias.105 As a police officer in Di-
30

yala province told a reporter, “We can’t hide the fact 

that, without the Shi’ite Asa’ib [Ahl Al-Haqq] militia’s 

help, Islamic State flags would be flying on top of the 

Baquba government headquarters now.”106 The Iraqi 

media widely recognized the Shia volunteers as having been the decisive factor in defeating ISIS at Amirli 

and elsewhere.107 Even a provincial Kurdish official 

in Diyala joined in the recognition, concluding that 

“Were it not for the militias, we would not be exercising government and politics in Baquba.”108 Significantly, Prime Minister Al-Ibadi, in a meeting with 

militia commanders, praised the “major role” that the 

militias had played in the fighting, labelled their contribution “priceless,” and called them “the backbone 

of the security forces.”109

To be sure, as a Member of Parliament noted, it is 

difficult for militia units to operate effectively without the Army’s fire support and air power.110 Iraqi 

Hizb Allah notes that there is intensive coordination 

with the Army and police, including in the sharing of 

intelligence, while the militias have provided intelligence for and helped coordinate Iraqi air strikes in 

most of the operations.111 Al-Amiri has portrayed the 

Army and police in a supporting role to the militias, 

although that may well be an exaggeration.112

The militias not only coordinate operations with 

the Army, but in many cases are embedded in the 

planning process in joint operations rooms so that, in 

the case of Al-Amiri, the latter was aware of all future 

plans. These joint operations rooms with the Army 

have continued into 2015.113 The militias also set up 

joint operations rooms with the Kurds.114 For the January 2015 Diyala campaign, Ahl Al-Haqq, for example, 

was still coordinating closely with the army, police, 

and central and local governments.115 Moreover, it was 
31

made clear that the Army and militias often share the 

same headquarters, as when a Shia religious official 

visited a single location to inspect and to hear both the 

troops’ and the militia fighters’ complaints.116 In January 2015, when a convoy conveying the Army’s Commander of the Tigris Operations and Al-Amiri was 

attacked and the two narrowly missed being struck 

by an IED, they were carrying out a joint inspection 

tour of the Army and militia units.117 The degree of 

coordination between the Army and police, however, 

has varied by theater and by individual militia, and 

at Samarra, there were separate Army and militia 

headquarters.118

In many ways, the militias have provided a valuable complement to the Army’s conventional capabilities. As noted, at least some of the fighters and cadres 

had had training and intensive recent combat experience against ISIS in Syria, and some brought to the 

battlefield their own crew-served weapons such as artillery and rocket launchers as well as personal arms. 

On one occasion, Hizb Allah claimed to have rescued 

an Army unit by providing covering fire so it could 

withdraw after what the unit claimed was an errant 

Coalition air strike that had mistakenly hit near the 

Army unit’s position instead of the ISIS position, causing the Army unit to become demoralized and withdraw in a disorganized manner, which ISIS had then 

sought to exploit.119

In contrast to recent Army experience, militia leadership was proactive, with commanders leading from 

the front and willing to take casualties, and militia at 

times outperformed the Army and police tactically, as 

the Army and police were often static, showed limited 

initiative, and lacked MOUT training.120 It was militia fighters who often took the initiative, for example, 
32

discovering ISIS tunnels and arms caches in the combat zones, dismantling some 600 IEDs in the town of 

Al-Muqdadiya, or developing actionable local intelligence.121 It was Saraya Al-Salam fighters who foiled an 

attack against the port of Basra when they discovered 

rocket launchers poised to be fired.122

Significantly, militia fighters, motivated by religious zeal or a desire for revenge, displayed a willingness to undergo hardships and to stand and fight, 

as well as a high degree of cohesion, a characteristic 

reinforced in many instances where recruitment had 

followed along tribal lines or in a particular locale.123

The strong backing of the Shia religious establishment, 

often reinforced by the fact that some of the warlords 

are themselves clerics, provides an additional source 

of cohesion, as well as legitimacy. Not only did AlSistani’s original fatwa provide religious sanction, but 

senior Shia clerics have continued to go frequently to 

the front to visit the militias in order to provide spiritual support and assess their logistics needs.124

Local loyalties, of course, can also pose difficulties, 

and, at one point when ISIS seemed dominant and 

when an immediate threat loomed over the town of 

Karbala, local officials in the latter pressured recentlyvolunteered fighters to return home to defend their 

city.125 Muthanna province, too, wanted its fighters 

back, as it felt unprotected.126 In fact, the local government in Karbala, as was true of other local authorities, 

requested more resources from the central government to train and equip its local fighters. It also campaigned to transfer authority over to, and channel the 

requested resources for these local fighters through 

the provincial government. This is a reflection of the 

perennial contest for power between the central government and centrifugal forces at the local level.127
33

The additional numbers of militia fighters were 

also a major help in consolidating victories over ISIS, 

as that was often a problem for the overextended 

Army and police. The security forces, in fact, have usually been unable to replace militia forces once ISIS has 

been defeated, as Badr’s spokesman pointed out when 

he offered to turn over Diyala province to the security 

forces, provided the latter could ensure control.128 According to a leader in Al-Sadr’s movement, despite his 

militia’s offers to relinquish control of retaken areas 

in order to avoid sectarian problems, the Army and 

police often decline, arguing that they lack the manpower.129 In this security vacuum, the militias have 

provided a stopgap expedient, often having to engage 

in additional combat in secured areas. For example, 

the Khuddam Al-Sayyida Zaynab (Servants of Our Lady 

Zaynab), deployed to the supposedly cleared Tikrit 

area, were forced to launch a spoiling attack against 

ISIS units preparing to attack militia field headquarters.130 When operating in Sunni-only areas, however, 

these militias may be less effective; for example, in AlAnbar, militia commanders complained that the local 

population did not cooperate with them or provide 

intelligence against ISIS.131

The militias have also relieved the hard-pressed 

Army and police by providing general security in 

the south after the Army had deployed into combat. 

Militia units that remained in their home areas were 

especially useful in patrolling familiar terrain continuously, enabling them, for example, to identify and detain would-be ISIS infiltrators, and obviating the need 

for the commitment of Army forces.132 Militias also 

provided security for specific events such as Shia religious festivals, as was the case with the 18,000 militia 

personnel deployed in Najaf on occasion of the 40th 
34

Day of Husayn’s Martyrdom celebration, but they 

have also undertaken more mundane tasks, such as 

cleaning Najaf before a religious holiday.133

The militias’ role in the area of crime, however, 

has been somewhat problematic. With the departure 

of Army and police units to the front, in many areas a 

security vacuum developed that criminal elements exploited, engaging in kidnappings, extortion, and robberies. Often, the perpetrators were gangs claiming 

to belong to one of the militias. However, Al-Khazali 

acknowledged that some criminals had also joined the 

militias for personal gain and as a cover for their illegal 

activities.134 In Baghdad in November 2014, the Minister of the Interior appealed to the militias to crack 

down on such rogue elements, while also including 

measures to regularize the militias’ presence, such as 

obligating the latter to register their vehicles, leading 

to many arrests of such rogue elements.135

The number of militia casualties is hard to determine since the Iraqi media ordinarily does not disaggregate militia and security forces casualties in reporting. For the campaign in Diyala province through 

January 2015, however, the militias lost some 500 

dead and over 1,000 wounded.136 While most casualties seem to result from small-scale engagements, occasionally there are also major events in which militia 

losses have been significant, such as a suicide attack 

during the Jurf Al-Sakhr campaign that left 25 militia dead in October 2014, while a tanker truck bomb 

in the Samarra area caused more than 50 casualties in 

February 2015.

137 Casualties may be underreported in 

official tallies, as in one engagement in Diyala in January 2015, off-the-record local medical sources reported some 101 militia and 7 Iranian casualties.138 Given 

the disproportionate recruitment from the poorer 

segments of society out of economic need, casual-
35

ties have also been felt most severely in that sector, 

at times causing resentment. As one father who had 

lost a son complained, the sons of the politicians and 

government officials did not join and fight in the militias.139 Aware of the sensitivity and in order to lessen 

the impact of casualties, in some cases, the authorities 

scheduled individual burials at different times of the 

day and in different places.140

THE MILITIAS’ STRATEGIC AND POLITICAL 

IMPACT 

The militias and the warlords have also had a significant impact at the political level. Despite their stabilizing role from one perspective in helping to turn 

the tide against ISIS, the militia warlords at the same 

time have also weighed in on, have influenced, or have 

triggered a number of political-military issues, some 

of which threaten to spark domestic conflict and could 

have a serious effect on Iraq’s long-term security and 

stability. More precisely, the warlords’ input extends 

to concrete policies, which they may introduce, derail, 

shape, or delay, depending on the specific circumstances. Many of these issues affect policies—most 

often in negative terms—in which the United States 

has a direct interest. While the warlords have an influence on most policies, several stand out as especially 

significant.

Targeting Urban Areas.

In the fight against ISIS, the Sunnis have complained of indiscriminate government air strikes and 

shelling against urban areas which, although aimed at 

ISIS, have also caused civilian casualties, and which 
36

the Sunnis have often seen as an intentional way to 

punish all Sunnis. While the government under Prime 

Minister Al-Ibadi in 2014 committed itself to end 

strikes against urban areas, in practice this has been 

difficult to achieve, not least because of pressure on 

the government by the militias. The latter and their 

constituents have argued that restraint in bombing 

and shelling would only help ISIS. For example, a Badr

Member of Parliament (who is also a militia field commander) complained that the government’s moratorium on such operations was hampering the defeat of 

ISIS.141 There is widespread support within the broader 

Shia community for the militias’ stand and, typically, 

a leading cleric in Basra demanded the government 

resume air strikes against cities as part of the fight 

against ISIS.142 Sunni organizations in Iraq—some of 

which have cooperated with ISIS—on the other hand 

have pressured the United States not to target urban 

areas.143 In practice, such operations have continued, 

generating continued Sunni discontent. 

Creating a National Guard.

The United States has promoted the creation of a 

National Guard, with medium and heavy weapons 

and maneuver units focused on the Sunni areas as a 

mechanism to provide security and as reassurance to 

the country’s Sunni community. Sunni leaders have 

supported the concept of a National Guard strongly, 

viewing it as a Sunni Army and as a basic guarantee 

for their community. 

However, the project was slow in getting off the 

ground, not least because of obstruction by the warlords, who no doubt saw this force as a competitor 

and as a threat to the authority of the central govern-
37

ment in which they had a stake, not to speak of the 

sectarian aspect. The process was not made easier 

by the fact that, for many Sunnis—including Sunni 

Members of Parliament—the mission of the planned 

National Guard was to be not only against ISIS but 

also “to get rid of the [Shia] militias” from the Sunni 

provinces.144 Shia warlords raised a number of objections intended to delay, if not derail, the establishment of the National Guard. Al-Amiri, for example, 

expressed his reservations about forming the National 

Guard, calling the plan “hasty.”145 Hizb Allah claimed 

the National Guard would partition the country.146

One Badr Member of Parliament, for his part, opposed 

the National Guard’s having heavy weapons, at least 

in the immediate future.147 In their opposition, the militias were able to rely on a broad-based Shia hostility 

to such a force. Even the senior Shia clerics expressed 

their reluctance for a basically Sunni National Guard, 

arguing that it was better not to rely on sectarian and 

ethnic structures although, given the same clerics’ 

involvement with the Shia militias, that stance may 

appear hypocritical.148

More broadly, the warlords and their spokesmen 

often demanded that volunteers from all communities be allowed to join, thereby likely ensuring a Shia 

majority, with Al-Sadr insisting specifically that militia units also be incorporated into any such new 

force.149 Some warlords and Shia politicians stated 

they would accept the National Guard, provided 

it was organized on a nationwide basis and with its 

own government ministry, whereby they presumably 

could exercise their own influence in the new force 

and compete with the military.150 One Member of Parliament even proposed that the Shia militias should 

be the nucleus for any National Guard.151 Sensitive to 
38

this entrenched opposition, the Prime Minister’s office 

felt it prudent to coordinate the establishment of the 

National Guard with the militias and even to suggest 

that the latter could constitute “the nucleus” for the 

National Guard.152

Rehabilitating the Baathists.

Closely related to the National Guard issue was 

whether to rescind the punitive laws against Baathists 

and Saddam-era officers and to reintegrate them into 

society, as the Sunnis have requested. Specifically, the 

Sunnis assumed that the leadership for the National 

Guard was to be provided by recruiting former officers in Saddam’s Army (who would ordinarily have 

joined the Baath Party and had had Sunni tribal links), 

and the local media reported that a visiting U.S. delegation had actually met with veteran officers for 

that purpose.153 On the contrary, according to a Badr

leader, the new Badr Minister of the Interior was intent on purging “all Baathist officers and anyone with 

Baathist sympathies.”154 Jaysh Al-Mukhtar even vowed 

to exterminate the Baathists if the latter were rehabilitated.155 In any event, the Shia refused to disband the 

Accountability and Justice Committee, which investigated Baathists, as the Sunnis had hoped, as part of a 

deal to establish the National Guard.

Détente with the Gulf States.

As Prime Minister, Al-Ibadi has pursued a policy 

of détente with Iraq’s neighbors and, in particular, 

with the Gulf States, but the militia warlords have often complicated the effort, displaying particular hostility toward Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab 
39

Emirates (UAE). There had already been a stormy 

history between some of the militias and these states, 

which was often fueled by religious friction. For example, Abu Al-Mahdi Al-Muhandis, the number-two 

man in Badr and in the Hay’at Al-Hashd Al-Shabi, had 

been sentenced to death in absentia by Kuwait in connection with an alleged attempt on the latter country’s ruler in 1983. Likewise, in 2013, the Ahl Al-Haqq

had shelled a Saudi border post in protest to what it 

claimed was Saudi interference in Iraq. 

More recently, such irritants as the arrest and trial 

of prominent Shia clerics in Saudi Arabia and Bahrein, 

accusations of the Gulf States’ funding and arming ISIS 

and the Sunni community, and the UAE’s call in November 2014 to place a number of the Iraqi militias on 

the international terrorist list have raised the militias’ 

ire, as has the Saudi media’s promotion of the outsider 

warlord, Al-Sarkhi. Militia warlords have also viewed 

Saudi Arabia’s willingness to support lower oil prices and its decision to maintain production levels as 

targeting Iraqi interests. Al-Amiri has portrayed the 

Gulf States as ingrates, arguing that it was Iraq’s militias and Al-Sistani’s fatwa that had saved them from 

ISIS.156 To a certain extent, Prime Minister Al-Ibadi 

has had to accommodate such views, as he explained 

his opposition to Arab air strikes in Iraq as part of the 

Coalition in terms of suspecting that Saudi Arabia 

would also target the militias.157 Indicative of the implied disruptive power that the militias can wield, the 

Iraqi media reported that Prime Minister Al-Ibadi had 

made sure to check with the political parties that have 

militias (as well as with Iran) to obtain their assurance 

that they would not oppose the reopening of the Saudi 

embassy in Baghdad.158
40

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES

Sharing a Battlefield.

Unavoidably, the presence and activity of the Shia 

militias also have an impact on U.S. interests and policy at both the strategic and operational levels. Clearly, 

many of the issues noted previously intersect with 

U.S. policy considerations, some more directly than 

others. Some of the militias have a history of violent 

confrontation with U.S. forces dating back to the postSaddam period. More recently, most militias have displayed a more muted but still hostile attitude toward 

the United States, although such hostility has been 

modulated for those militias loyal to Iran, as the latter 

has engaged in its own rapprochement with Washington, the centerpiece of which has been the negotiating 

process surrounding Iran’s nuclear program. 

Even so, there is skepticism and hostility in militia 

circles toward the United States which cannot be discounted. In January 2015, Al-Sadr’s party even tried 

to have Parliament abrogate the existing U.S.-Iraqi 

Security Agreement.159 Should bilateral U.S.-Iranian 

relations deteriorate, that could mean a sharpening of 

militia hostility in Iraq as well. As it is, for example, 

Iraqi Hizb Allah has stated that it would deal with foreign troops as with occupiers, which Iran—perhaps as 

a subtle warning of its own—was eager to report in its 

own media, adding that one of the options the United 

States was considering was using “the pretext of fighting ISIS” to introduce ground troops.160

Shia warlords express negative views of U.S. policy either directly or through the political parties they 

lead or the media they control. Since many of the militias have their own websites, newspapers, radio and 
41

TV stations, and well-developed social media skills, 

they can get their message out effectively. The Shia 

warlords, and Shia opinion in general, see any U.S. 

policy against a backdrop of a greater alleged strategy of Washington’s expansion in the region. Badr, 

for example, has claimed that U.S. policy in Iraq was 

part of “a secret plan to remake the Middle East.”161 A 

common theme is that the U.S. fight against ISIS is not 

genuine and merely a pretext to re-occupy Iraq; that 

its intent is to weaken Iraq in order to increase Israel’s 

security; that the United States created ISIS; and, as a 

Sadrist Member of Parliament claimed, that the U.S. 

intent was to break up Iraq.162 The official Badr newspaper, in fact, accused the United States of wanting 

to reestablish its influence in the Middle East through 

the fight against ISIS, characterizing the policy as “soft 

colonialist power.”163

There is already a general resentment in militia 

circles of the U.S. personnel, stemming from an unease with the growing number of U.S. advisers, as was 

the case after an increase in November 2014, when a 

Sadrist Member of Parliament, while praising the militias, warned of “interference in Iraq’s affairs” and 

of a stealth return of American influence, while Ahl 

Al-Haqq complained that Parliament should have discussed the issue before increasing the number of trainers.164 In that overall political atmosphere, even the appearance of cooperating with the Americans is to be 

avoided, as, for example, militiamen left Al-Asad base 

in Al-Anbar after U.S. trainers arrived in November 

2014.165 Such concern over even implying cooperation with Americans is legitimated by support within 

Shia clerical circles at the highest levels, as Ayatollah 

Al-Sistani has warned Iraqi leaders that foreign help 

should not be “an entrée to trample the independence 
42

of political and military decisionmaking” for Iraq, 

while Al-Sistani’s representative warned the Coalition not to prepare for “a permanent war” in Iraq and 

stressed the need to respect Iraq’s sovereignty and 

independence.166

Although most militias grudgingly accept Iraq’s 

current need for U.S. air and training support, some 

warlords, such as Hadi Al-Amiri, have dismissed altogether—at least for show—the need for Coalition 

support, especially once the situation had stabilized, 

arguing that the Army and militias could liberate 

Iraq.167 Moreover, the militias’ media frequently provides a message to the effect that the Coalition has not 

been doing enough, and is not effective, against ISIS. 

Militias have spread rumors that the United States did 

not really want to target ISIS effectively since, as one 

Badr Member of Parliament put it, the U.S. intent was 

only to use ISIS’s presence to divide Iraq and get at its 

oil resources.168 As a corollary, a consensus among the 

warlords developed—and a position echoed by Iran—

that the Coalition was not committed and that it would 

fail in uprooting ISIS terrorism, with Al-Amiri calling 

reliance on the Coalition “a mirage.”169 At the same 

time, the militias have also criticized repeatedly what 

they saw as U.S. delays in fulfilling stalled arms agreements and interpreted that as part of a hostile policy 

designed to help ISIS.170 To a great extent, such militia 

views are often reinforced by other prominent figures 

in the Shia community. Al-Sistani’s representative, for 

example, has also claimed that the West wants to divide Iraq.171 Militia priorities may differ from those of 

the United States in terms of phasing the liberation of 

territory, with the militias in early-2015 favoring Salah 

Al-Din province first as opposed to U.S. preferences 

for a Mosul-first effort.172
43

The U.S. military has already been operating in 

the same battlespace as the militias, whether with air 

operations, training missions, or even providing unwilling support, as in arming the militias, even if only 

indirectly. For example, according to unnamed U.S. senior officials, arms that the United States had supplied 

to the Iraqi government for use by the country’s military have been transferred to the militias.173 In a sense, 

the U. S. military has already de facto collaborated in 

“combined” operations with some militias, which operate alongside regular Iraqi Army units, by providing air support to some campaigns. Conversely, the 

militias have had to acknowledge the reality of a U.S. 

presence in the fight against ISIS, if only because of the 

need to avoid being struck in error from the air which, 

given the fluid situation on the ground and often poor 

air-ground deconfliction, takes on added importance. 

Recognizing this factor, militia operations at times, as 

in the fight for the town of Bayji, have had to proceed 

more slowly out of concern for possible misplaced 

air strikes.174

The militias have used U.S. operations to fuel resentment with claims intended to reflect America’s 

alleged hostile intentions. For example, militias have 

claimed that U.S. air strikes had struck their forces deliberately, as was the case with both Muqtada Al-Sadr 

and Hizb Allah.

175 Even more intense was the recurring propaganda campaign, echoed by Iran, that the 

United States was air-dropping arms and supplies to 

ISIS. Al-Hakim’s political spokesmen, for example, 

explained that the reason for such alleged U.S. help to 

ISIS was that Washington wanted to prolong the war 

and thereby attrit Iraq’s manpower.176 While errant 

air-drops may well have landed in ISIS-controlled 
44

areas on the fluid battlefield, the militias portrayed 

this as a willful policy intended to help ISIS in support 

of U.S. interests. 

The close proximity of militia and U.S. forces, combined with militia hostility, carries the risk of potential 

confrontations. In February 2015, Hizb Allah claimed 

to have fired on a U.S. helicopter on the ground, which 

it asserted had airlifted ISIS fighters, prompting Parliament’s Security and Defense Committee to authorize shooting down any aircraft on such a mission.177

The militia factor will be even more relevant for 

any ground presence of U.S. Army personnel—including those engaged in a training mission—as well as for 

other U.S. and allied military and civilian government 

personnel, or contractors.178 Moreover, the media has 

reported on some U.S., British, and Canadian Special 

Forces engaged in combat, which could heighten the 

potential for contact and friction.179

In practical terms, the militias—in particular those 

that have close ties to Iran and the Lebanese Hizb Allah—will likely collect intelligence on U.S. systems, 

organization, and techniques; engage in hostile propaganda; and may constitute an operational security 

and force protection risk, due to their long history 

of hostility toward the United States and clashing 

interests with the latter; any information they collect likely would be passed on to the Iranians. Such 

militia attitudes place limits on U.S. policy options 

and at some point could also engender friction on the 

ground, leading to anti-American violence by members of some militias even if no U.S. ground combat 

elements are introduced, given the multiplicity of 

militias and the challenges of command and control.
45

Pre-empting the Option of Coalition 

Ground Forces.

Although the deployment of ground combat forces 

into Iraq has perhaps not been a serious policy consideration from the American side, this has been a major issue for Iraqis, who have seen the possibility as 

either something to be encouraged or to be opposed, 

usually depending on their communal identity and 

interests. As one might expect, Sunni leaders, as was 

the case with Sahwa leader, Ahmad Abu Risha, have 

been vocal proponents of a U.S. ground intervention 

against ISIS, in great part to forestall a presence of the 

Shia militias and the Iraqi Army (which they view as 

largely Shia) in their areas.180 A Member of Parliament 

representing Al-Anbar, from the Sunni Ittihad Al-Quwa Al-Wataniya party, in fact, argued openly that the 

Coalition represents Sunni interests and expressed his 

strong support for a foreign ground presence.181 Some 

Al-Anbar officials even threatened to stop fighting 

against ISIS unless the Iraqi government made a commitment to approve a U.S. ground presence.182

Conversely, all the Shia warlords have adamantly 

rejected any such ground combat presence, based 

both on ideological and power interest motives. For 

example, Al-Hakim opposed either regional or Coalition ground forces in Iraq and when he met General 

(Ret.) John Allen, Special Presidential Envoy for the 

Global Coalition against ISIS, in October 2014, he reportedly told the latter outright that the Iraqis opposed 

ground forces and just wanted U.S. weapons.183 Sadr 

Al-Din Al-Qubanchi, the main imam in Najaf and a 

leading figure in the Supreme Islamic Council, not 

only opposed a Coalition ground presence but even 

urged that the Coalition provide weapons and money 
46

for the militias instead.184 Iraqi Hizb Allah, for its part, 

warned that U.S. ground forces would be a step in the 

United States’ “plan to re-occupy Iraq” and concluded that “we will not permit America’s return in any 

form,” expressing its displeasure already by what it 

claimed were U.S. officers directing operations.185 Ahl 

Al-Haqq’s leader, Qays Al-Khazali, likewise, opposed 

U.S. ground forces, stating that “we will not accept 

any foreign troops in Iraq,” and preferred that Washington just arm Iraq, while voicing his suspicion that 

Washington would introduce ground forces in order 

to partition the country as a way to enhance Israel’s 

security.186

Several of the militias have hinted what their reaction would be if there were a foreign ground intervention, perhaps seeking to forestall such an option. 

For example, Badr’s leader Al-Amiri warned that his 

militia’s personnel would “refuse outright to fight 

under an American umbrella.”187 Highlighting the 

difficulty often in distinguishing intersecting roles of 

militia figures, the Minister of Municipalities, who is 

also the Assistant Secretary General of the Badr Party, 

likewise spoke with his party/militia hat on in opposing the presence of foreign ground troops.188 For their 

part, Hizb Allah and the Kata’ib Sayyid Al-Shuhada’ also 

stated their refusal to cooperate with the United States 

and threatened to leave their positions if U.S. ground 

forces were deployed.189 In late October 2014, in fact, 

Al-Sadr ordered the Saraya Al-Salam to begin a phased 

withdrawal from areas in which they had been operating, ostensibly irked that some in the government had 

urged a U.S. ground presence.190

Some militias even threatened to oppose any U.S. 

ground combat forces actively and, for example, Ahl 

Al-Haqq warned that it would fight against any such 
47

presence.191 Al-Sadr, too, threatened that if the United 

States deployed ground forces, his militia not only 

would withdraw from the front immediately but, he 

added, “If you return, we will return . . . we will make 

you taste the woes of your decision, which you will 

regret.”192 A Member of Parliament from Al-Sadr’s 

party added that “If they [i.e., the Americans] are 

thinking of returning, that will mean digging their 

own graves.”193 There were reports that Iran in September 2014 had sent guidance to those militias loyal 

to Tehran to pressure Prime Minister Al-Ibadi not to 

allow U.S. ground combat forces, threatening to stop 

their own operations otherwise.194

Such skepticism of and opposition to a U.S. ground 

presence is shared and supported by broad segments 

of Shia public opinion in the country. Recognizing 

that a large and visible U.S. ground presence would 

be unpopular within the Shia community in general, 

Prime Minister Al-Ibadi and other senior officials have 

gone out of their way to reassure their power base that 

they, too, are opposed to that. Reflecting both the direct impact of warlords within the government and 

the perceived need even within pro-Western circles to 

accommodate such domestic fears, Al-Ibadi came out 

repeatedly against any foreign ground troop presence 

in Al-Anbar, stressing the need for only international 

air support, armaments, and efforts to cut off funding to ISIS.195 In a meeting with Al-Sistani in October 

2014, Prime Minister Al-Ibadi reportedly was careful to reassure the latter that no U.S. ground troops 

would come.196
48

THE MILITIAS, SECTARIANISM, 

AND NATIONAL RECONCILIATION

Ultimately, national reconciliation among Iraq’s 

sectarian and ethnic components will be essential to 

bring about genuine stability and security. However, 

communal relations in the country remain tense, in no 

small part because of the militias’ activity, although 

the Sunni and the Kurdish communities also bear a 

share of responsibility for the situation.

The Militias and the Sunnis.

The increased prominence of the Shia militias has 

exacerbated in many ways the Sunni community’s 

long-standing grievances and fears of a hostile or indifferent Shia-dominated government and represents 

a major obstacle in achieving national reconciliation. 

Both Ayatollah Al-Sistani and several of the top warlords have stressed publicly that they fight for Iraq as 

a whole and that they oppose sectarianism (al-ta’ifiya). 

Al-Sadr at one point even ordered the Saraya Al-Salam

to replace the Al-Sadr insignias on their uniforms with 

the map of Iraq in order not to give the impression that 

this was a sectarian war.197 However, Al-Sadr has also 

equated the enemy in sectarian terms as “the killers 

of Husayn,” a damning image as persecutors of one 

of the holiest figures in Shia doctrine.198 The religious 

coloring of the Shia militias is inescapable. Not only 

are they in many cases created and led by Shia clerics, but the names of the militia units, the mottos they 

use, the banners they fly in addition to the Iraqi flag, 

and the posters they display are clearly from the Shia 

tradition. Typically, the Firqat Al-Abbas Al-Qitaliya’s

inaugural parade in Karbala had culminated at the 
49

central Husayn shrine.199 In October 2014, militiamen 

renewed their oath in Shia shrines. Shia clerics serve 

as chaplains with the deployed militia units or go to 

the field to raise morale, preach on religion, and explain geo-political issues, focusing especially on “why 

we fight.”200 Even Prime Minister Al-Ibadi, while condemning sectarianism, has sometimes also played to 

Shia sentiments to encourage cohesion, calling the 

population to follow the “lesson from Imam Husayn’s 

path in order to defeat the Umma’s enemies.”201

Many in the Sunni community see the Shia militia 

as a threat, and the militias’ actions continue to fuel 

deeply felt grievances that will delay or even prevent 

the detachment of the Sunni community from ISIS, as 

well as provide tinder for future conflict. Militia operations in Sunni areas have long been controversial, 

especially in Al-Anbar province, the hotbed of Sunni 

protest against the former Al-Maliki government and 

a source of local support for ISIS. Typically, when Ahl 

Al-Haqq deployed a unit of 300 to Al-Anbar in November 2014, the local tribes complained that they did not 

want the militias but arms, equipment, and logistic 

support instead.202

Reflecting a widespread Sunni perception, a Member of Parliament stressed that military operations 

often have an anti-Sunni character irrespective of the 

Sunnis’ ideology.203 Many Sunnis, in fact, argue that 

the Baghdad government and the Shia militias lump 

all Sunnis together as terrorists, and that all Sunnis are 

victims of a systematic policy of revenge.204 A cleric 

in Fallujah even accused the Baghdad government of 

conducting operations intended to “exterminate the 

Sunnis.”205

Iraq’s Sunni media and religious circles specifically address the issue of militia crimes constantly (al-
50

ways using the term, milishiya, in its pejorative Iraqi 

sense), and this issue has been a major source of Sunni 

alienation. Sunni politicians have been outspoken in 

their recriminations against the warlords, with one 

Sunni Member of Parliament, for example, calling the 

leader of the Ahl Al-Haqq a “Shia criminal,” and using 

the pejorative term “Safavid” for Shia.206 In Al-Anbar, 

Sunni politicians accused militias such as the Saraya 

Al-Salam of committing atrocities under the pretext of 

liberating the province and argued that it was better to 

arm the local Sunnis instead.207

Sunnis accuse the Shia militias of committing 

crimes against the Sunni population in a systematic 

manner—whether from political motivation, religious 

animosity, personal gain, or revenge—including killing civilians, kidnapping, torching houses, extorting businesses, looting, destroying palm groves, and 

ethnic cleansing; international observers have confirmed many of these accusations.208 Militias—and 

the Army—are sometimes accused of conducting 

scorched-earth operations and, in Diyala province, 

militias were said to engage in collective punishment, 

retaliating for IEDs planted by ISIS by shooting local 

Sunni residents.209 Ethnic cleansing at times appears to 

be methodical and part of policy, as local Sunni critics 

have charged that the militias were preventing Sunni 

refugees from returning to Diyala province in areas 

along the border with Iran, evidently a point of concern for the latter as well as for those Iraqis intent on 

securing land access to Iran.210

In fact, a Sunni coalition mounted a campaign, 

which included sending a petition to the White 

House, asking that the Shia militias be included on the 

international list of terrorist organizations, although 

the Iraqi government blocked a local satellite channel 
51

promoting the petition.211 Deputy Prime Minister Salih Al-Mutlag, a Sunni, for his part, wanted the Coalition to target the Shia militias as well as ISIS with its 

air strikes.212 In Diyala province, Sunnis formed their 

own units specifically to defend against “the terrorist militias” and asked for government support.213

Frustrated tribes and Members of Parliament from AlAnbar complained that the government, for political 

reasons, was willing to arm the Shia militias, but not 

the Sunni tribes. Militia sources countered that seeking arms for the tribes was just a vehicle for arming 

the jihadis, accusing some tribes of selling weapons 

to ISIS.214

On occasion, Army officers have confronted illdisciplined militiamen and exchanged fire over the 

latter’s actions, such as torching Sunni homes.215 However, overall, Sunni sources argue that government 

forces do nothing to restrain the militias. Sunnis also 

complain that the legal route does not provide redress, 

as they say that courts support the militias.216 In addition, Iraq’s Sunnis—even those hostile to ISIS—have 

been exasperated that the Coalition, in their view, was 

ignoring their treatment at the hands of the Shia militias.217 Such perceptions may well affect the Sunnis’ relationship with the government, and some may even 

see ISIS as providing a shield against the Shia. As one 

Sunni Member of Parliament noted, “They [i.e., the 

Shia militias] arrest people, and nobody knows where 

they are taken. . . . This makes so many people want 

to volunteer with [the] Islamic State to fight the militias.”218 In support of that conclusion, Sunnis in the 

area south of Baghdad were said to often favor ISIS 

specifically as protection against the Shia militias.219

As a result of the military operations and, no doubt 

of militia policies, there was an increase in Sunni refu-
52

gees who, according to the Chief of Police of Diyala, 

had become a willing pool of recruits for ISIS, with 

only women, children, and the old remaining in some 

refugee camps.220

Militias have routinely denied any wrongdoing 

against the Sunnis or have contended any such occurrences were only isolated cases. Often, their supporters in the government have backed them up. Thus, 

Iraq’s Ministry for Human Rights (headed by a member of the Badr Party, Muhammad Al-Bayati) rejected 

outright the accusations by Amnesty International of 

sectarian massacres, arguing that the militias are part 

of the Iraqi military and that the allegations could not 

be proven.221 Only occasionally have militia warlords 

acknowledged, even if only in general terms, violations of human rights, and some warlords at least 

have verbally condemned such conduct. For example, 

Al-Sadr disavowed those members of his own militia 

who had been involved in executing prisoners and 

nearby Sunni villagers after the relief of Amirli, condemning retaliation and calling for “an end of hate.”222

Al-Hakim also met with his militiamen and stressed 

the need to follow orders and to maintain discipline.223

The top Shia religious authority, Al-Sistani, also acknowledged a problem. Aware of violations in the 

field, he censured the “few undisciplined elements 

who, by their actions, give a bad name to the volunteers,” and reminded fighters that it was forbidden 

to attack any innocent civilians but, at the same time, 

cautioned politicians not to generalize the behavior of 

what he said was a minority of wrongdoers to the majority of militia fighters, and cautioned that it was necessary to continue supporting the fighters to achieve 

victory.224 Again, in late January 2015 as Diyala was 

being cleared, both Al-Sistani and Al-Amiri reiterated 
53

the need to protect private property, although AlAmiri also equated critics to ISIS fellow travelers. 

However, whether such verbal reproaches will 

translate into effective measures on the ground is questionable, as command and control at the local level 

may be weak and discipline hard to enforce, especially 

given the emotions that may play a role. Significantly, 

as Diyala was being cleared, even Sunni tribes allied 

to the government against ISIS complained of attacks 

by the Army and militias against homes, mosques, 

and individuals.225 The fact that in January 2015 AlAmiri became head of the committee charged with the 

return of refugees to Diyala or that a hardline Sadrist 

Member of Parliament, Hakim Al-Zamili, is head of 

a committee tasked with investigating a massacre of 

Sunni civilians, may not help matters. What is more, 

senior government officials, including the Minister of 

the Interior and the Minister of Defense, have often 

either cast doubt on or dismissed outright accusations 

of wrongdoing by the militias. Even Prime Miniser AlIbadi, perhaps motivated by expediency and a sense 

of a continuing need for the militias, refused to accuse the latter of war crimes, claiming that the alleged 

crimes had not been committed by either the Army or 

the militias; or he attributed such accusations to “politics” and equated their critics to a fifth column.226

Barring effective measures by the Baghdad government to address the issue of the militias’ mistreatment 

of Sunni civilians, the Sunnis’ negative perceptions 

are likely to fester and to hamper operations against 

ISIS. To be sure, the Sunni community itself is fragmented, and some tribes have become disillusioned by 

the lack of government support in their fight against 

ISIS. They resent what they claim is the government’s 

reluctance to arm and pay them while supporting the 
54

militias lavishly. For example, the Al Bu Nimr tribe, 

which had been battered by ISIS and feeling that the 

government had abandoned it, felt it had no choice 

but to arrive at an understanding with Al-Sadr, who 

promised to provide arms and training and, eventually, sent 2,000 personnel from the Saraya Al-Salam to 

Al-Anbar in November 2014. However, most Sunni 

tribes in Al-Anbar have developed a deep distrust of 

the Shia militias and, according to one Sunni leader, 

“there is fear of the militias’ arrival . . . and of a repetition of what occurred in Diyala, Jurf Al-Sakhr, and AlWafa’ south of Al-Ramadi, when the militias torched 

civilians’ houses, looted their property, and killed 

them by the dozen after liberating the areas,” while 

a tribal chief asked “Why do we need the militias? 

We are beginning to have doubts about the militias’ 

entering Al-Ramadi.”227

In this charged atmosphere, any incident can escalate quickly, as was the case when the militias allegedly interrogated and then executed two residents 

of Al-Ramadi in February 2015. The killings sparked 

rage within Al-Anbar, prompting tribal chiefs to demand the militias leave the province, and obliging 

Prime Minister Al-Ibadi to intervene personally to 

investigate the matter.228 However, members of both 

communities have been guilty of sectarian massacres, 

which provide ongoing flashpoints and make it difficult to quell passions. Significantly, the Ahl Al-Haqq

code-named its campaign in Salah Al-Din province 

“Revenge for the Speicher Martyrs,” referring to the 

Shia cadets massacred by ISIS, allegedly aided by 

local Sunni tribes.229
55

The Militias and the Kurds.

Although muted at present, there is also the potential for friction between the Shia militias and the 

Kurdish community, centering on control of territory, 

oil revenues, and the concept of decentralization or 

central control. To be sure, the Kurdish Peshmerga 

and the militias (as well as the Army) have cooperated in military operations against ISIS as the common 

enemy. Despite the current cooperation, there have 

also been indications that this relationship could fray 

in the future as control over liberated areas that are 

mixed comes into question. 

Many Iraqis (Shia and Sunni) resent what they see 

as the Kurds having taken advantage of the weakness 

of the Iraqi government and military to seize the contested oil-rich Kirkuk area and other parts of Diyala. 

They fear further Kurdish expansion as additional 

ISIS-held territory is liberated, especially in light of 

the Kurdistan Regional Government’s open statement 

after the liberation of the Sanjar area in December 

2014 that it would annex the latter to Kurdistan. Badr

was critical of the landmark agreement Baghdad had 

worked out with Kurdistan on revenue sharing. 

A Kurdish Member of Parliament accused the central government of conducting a sectarian policy by 

stationing the militias in the liberated areas in Diyala 

province and using them to carry out an Arabization 

policy to the detriment of Kurdish interests.230 The 

Kurds, for their part, have also been accused of carrying out ethnic cleansing and refused to allow militia 

units to be raised in the disputed Kirkuk and Mosul 

areas. This is critical in that the Baghdad government 

had proposed $3 billion to buy arms for the militias 

to garrison those two areas.231 In fact, the Peshmerga 
56

have repeatedly demanded—unsuccessfully—that 

the militias relinquish to them control of the areas 

that the latter liberated in that province.232 Al-Hakim, 

among others, has gone out of his way to remind the 

Kurds that Kurdistan is still part of Iraq, while Badr

has accused the Kurds of exploiting the militias’ victories for their own benefit.233 Shortly after the siege 

of Amirli was lifted in a joint effort, the Badr Force 

seized several key checkpoints and offices in the town 

from the Kurdish Peshmerga, while in January 2015, 

the Kurds detained a dozen militiamen following a 

dispute and ensuing firefight.234 In February 2015, 

Kurdish officials warned that any attempt by the militias to enter Kirkuk—a continuing ethnic flashpoint—

would be met by force.235 On one occasion, General 

Sulaymani, highlighting the influence he has with the 

militias, reportedly hurried to the scene in the mixed 

Diyala province in order to defuse friction between 

the militias and the Peshmerga over accusations by 

the latter that the militias were ethnically cleansing 

local Kurds.236 Such friction adds a complication to 

the campaign to retake Mosul and could involve the 

militias in further confrontations.

LOOKING TOWARD THE FUTURE: 

REALITIES AND IMPLICATIONS

The warlords no doubt keep an eye down the 

road, on the post-ISIS period as well as on the present, and are laying the foundations for a reshaped 

national power balance in which they and their parties would gain greater influence. A number of factors 

are likely to affect the developing situation and could 

have significant implications for Iraq’s future and for 

U.S. interests.
57

A Continuing Need for the Militias.

Barring a significant foreign ground combat presence, Iraqis will perceive a continuing need for the militias in the effort against ISIS for some time to come. 

Rebuilding the Iraqi Army—which had been hobbled 

by corruption, poor leadership, absentee soldiers, insufficient training, ineffective logistics, and shaky morale during the Al-Maliki era—into an effective force 

will not happen quickly. Both Lieutenant General 

James Terry, the commander leading the U.S. military 

mission in Iraq, and Prime Minister Al-Ibadi acknowledged in January 2015 that this process could take 3 

years.237 The militias complain of problems in joint 

operations with the Army, due to ineffective Army officers, and report that some Army officers ran away 

or withdrew their units, leaving the militia volunteers 

behind, and that government air support often arrived 

late.238 According to an Iraqi military analyst, even into 

2015, the Army still was poor at coordinating among 

its own units, lacked a national operations center, only 

maneuvered in large units, lacked sufficient MOUT 

skills, and was slow and visible, leaving it vulnerable to the more agile ISIS’s small unit tactics.239 Even 

Prime Minister Al-Ibadi told militia commanders in 

February 2015 that their militias were “the key pillar 

of our system,” since the Army “is not structured for 

anti-guerrilla operations.”240

The Iraqi Army has also lacked a sufficient manpower base to meet its multiple demands. This shortcoming is linked to the problem of Iraq’s “ghost” 

soldiers (fada’iyun, literally “empty-space men,” or 

wahmiyun, literally “imaginary men”)—personnel 

existing only on paper, with officials and officers syphoning off the imaginary soldiers’ salaries, allowing 
58

troops to go home for a share of their pay, or having 

them work in the officers’ private companies. According to one Iraqi source, as of November 2014, there 

were said to be more than 200,000 such ghost soldiers 

in the military, although others placed the number at 

50,000.241 Despite Al-Ibadi’s vigorous efforts to end 

this practice, reform will take time, as the problem 

was entrenched at the highest levels of the political 

and military systems and is endemic in the police, 

most government ministries, and economic and social 

institutions—including 60,000 ghost security guards 

for the Members of Parliament—so that many entrenched interests who stand to lose will likely drag 

their feet on reform.242 Even in January 2015, according to a Member of Parliament from Al-Anbar, only 25 

percent of the Army personnel on the roster for duty 

in the province were actually available for combat.243

Moreover, Kurdish forces also may only provide 

limited support as further campaigns unfold against 

ISIS, depending on Kurdish interests. As Nechirvan 

Barzani—the provincial Prime-Minister of Kurdistan—stressed in January 2015, the Kurds would fight 

for “areas that rightfully belonged to the Kurdish region and would avoid using peshmerga fighters to 

drive Islamic State fighters from Sunni areas or retake 

Mosul.”244

Thinking and Debating Reorganization.

Given the likelihood of the militias’ continued 

significance, it is not surprising that there has been a 

trend to institutionalize the Hay’at Al-Hashd Al-Shabi

(Popular Hashd Agency) administration as a new center of power. By December 2014, responsibility for the 

Hay’a had been transferred from the Ministry of the 
59

Interior to the Cabinet, suggesting an intent to centralize and establish a more permanent stand-alone 

structure. Indications in early-2015 pointed to the development of a more professional organization for the 

Hay’a with its own administrative directorates, intelligence, security, and coordination capabilities.245

The country has seen the establishment in many 

ways of a parallel army and, perhaps, the militia force 

may develop into an equivalent of the IRGC or the 

Basij in Iran, with additional equipment and professionalization, in tandem with the regular army. Some 

in the Hay’a administration have proposed an expansion of the existing Hay’a by creating new units and 

staffing them with the current militia fighters as individuals without their present militia units’ names and 

flags and placing the expanded force directly under 

the Hay’a’s command, essentially creating a parallel 

force similar to the IRGC.246 It is unclear how the individual militia warlords might react to such proposals. 

At the time, only Al-Sadr, often a maverick, appeared 

to agree to an end of the militias by full integration 

into the Army.247

However, the coalition nature of individual competitive militias and warlords jealous of their autonomy may well preclude such an amalgamation. For 

example, while the militias graduated a better-trained 

Special Forces unit by January 2015, indicating a trend 

toward professionalization, even the new contingent 

was then incorporated into the Badr Force.248 In practice, each militia operates according to its own interests. Al-Amiri was fully aware that the militias are far 

from united and rued that they thus did not achieve 

their full operational potential because of their autonomy.249 For now at least, the government, Army, and 

police have only tenuous operational control over the 
60

militias. For example, municipal authorities can appeal directly to militia leaders and bypass the government chain of command, as was the case for the embattled town of Duluiya, which asked for Al-Amiri’s 

help in repulsing ISIS attacks.250

Although the National Guard project eventually 

passed by a narrow margin within the Cabinet in February 2015, it looked as if it would face further hurdles 

before the full Parliament because of unresolved issues, including its relationship to the militias. Iran was 

said to be promoting the transformation of the militias 

into the National Guard and, in fact, the spokesman 

of the Hay’a proposed changing the latter’s name to 

the National Guard, in essence making the militias 

the core of the new organization, which would defeat 

the original intent of the National Guard and alienate the Sunnis.251 As it was, in order to make the National Guard acceptable to the Shia, the punitive laws 

against the Baathists remained in force, complicating 

efforts to recruit Saddam-era officers.

Translating Prestige into Power.

Success on the battlefield against ISIS has provided 

the militias with popularity, as well as military muscle, 

that can be translated into political power. The warlords’ present-day operations and political activity are 

intertwined, and the warlords will work to shape the 

situation so that they can institutionalize a greater role 

for themselves in the future. Nuri Al-Maliki, still a political player even after his ouster as Prime Minister, 

for example, was critical of Badr, accusing the latter of 

using military operations for “electoral propaganda” 

and to increase its leader’s popularity for the next 

election cycle.252 If the warlords’ prestige grows, they 

could establish a greater presence within the govern-
61

ment, which would also provide greater entrée into 

Iraq by Tehran, with which several warlords have 

close ties. 

Even if it remains only an administrative umbrella 

organization, the Hay’a is a lucrative prize because of 

the cash that flows through it and the political clout 

that this financial lever could represent over individual militias. Thus, not surprisingly, various players 

have sought to gain control over it. The Minister of the 

Interior (a leading Badr figure), for example, preferred 

to absorb the militias directly into his own ministry.253

Al-Sistani allegedly had released an edict supporting 

placing the militias under the Ministry of Defense, although his office maintained that there had been no 

such edict and that this document was a forgery.254

In early-2015, Nuri Al-Maliki launched a concerted 

behind-the-scenes lobbying and public relations effort 

to garner the allegiance of some warlords in his bid to 

become the head of the Hay’a, whose current director and its spokesman are from Al-Maliki’s political 

grouping. Hyping his own role in the original mass 

mobilization at the expense of Al-Sistani and forcefully defending the militias against domestic critics, 

Al-Maliki also highlighted the key role he had played 

as Prime Minister in supporting the Asad regime, no 

doubt seeking to garner Iran’s backing for his candidacy.255 Al-Maliki, still a political player and an inveterate schemer despite his ouster as Prime Minister, 

appeared to view the Hay’a as a vehicle for his political comeback. Although he has denied any ambition 

to become Prime Minister again, he has also left the 

possibility open, saying that he would do so “only if 

the people demand that.”256

However, Al-Maliki’s bid for power could generate discontent among some warlords and politicians. 
62

One Member of Parliament, for example, argued 

that the corruption that had characterized the former 

Prime Minister’s time in office would now reemerge 

with Al-Maliki’s return; and Al-Sadr, for his part, vehemently rejected Al-Maliki, reminding his audience 

that the latter had been responsible for the Army’s 

collapse and warning that none of Al-Sadr’s followers 

would participate in the Hay’a under the latter, while 

suggesting that Al-Sistani select a leader instead.257 

Al-Sistani and Al-Ammar’s Supreme Islamic Council 

have also opposed Al-Maliki, while there have been 

contradictory reports on Iran’s stand. Al-Ibadi, who 

no doubt views Al-Maliki as a serious challenger to 

his own position, also opposed Al-Maliki’s candidacy, 

reminding the latter that “I am the commander of the 

Hashd . . . and no one else,” and reportedly threatened 

to cut off pay to the militias if the latter sided with 

Al-Maliki.258 Nevertheless political in-fighting around 

the Hay’a is likely to continue and Al-Maliki may yet 

strike a deal.

The Complexities of Demobilization.

Once the ISIS threat is eliminated or recedes, many 

in Iraq would like to see the recently expanded militias restructured, reduced in size, or, if possible, even 

closed. A Kurdish politician, for example, was adamant that the Shia militias “must not remain armed 

once terrorism is eliminated.”259 Although it may be 

a question to be faced some time down the road, demobilizing the armed and experienced fighters in the 

militias will be a difficult undertaking for any Iraqi 

government, even if it were willing to do so. 

As long as domestic power relations are not stabilized and a strong central government can affirm its 
63

authority, militias are not likely to disappear, especially given the present structure of the government, 

with the militia-linked political parties as constituent 

embedded elements within the political system. Government officials linked to the warlords, as one might 

expect, promote their own militias as, for example, 

was the case of Deputy Prime Minister Baha’ Al-Araji, 

who asserted that the victory achieved over ISIS in Jurf 

Al-Sakhr would not have been possible without the 

Saraya Al-Salam, his party’s militia.260 The government 

sought to appropriate money in the 2015 draft budget 

for the creation of 15,000 new jobs for militia fighters 

in the government sector, with another 20,000 personnel to be integrated into the Army as an inducement 

for an eventual demobilization.261 However, given the 

sharp fall in the country’s oil revenues, the proposal 

ran into legislative opposition, with some suggesting instead a parallel cheaper “reserve army.” Cutting funds for the militias may be difficult, not least 

because of the presence of their mother parties in the 

Parliament. For example, Al-Wafa’ li’l-Muqawama 

(the party of the Kata’ib Sayyid Al-Shuhada’) warned 

that any cuts would be a “red line” and pushed for 

even more money for 2015.262 One Member of Parliament even proposed shifting money from the Department of Defense to the militias, arguing that the latter 

deserved to be rewarded.263 As of January 2015, the 

budget proposal for 2015 year was to allot 1 trillion 

Dinars ($780 million) for the militias.264

The United States, no doubt concerned about 

many of the negative dynamics that have emerged, 

has reportedly sought to curb the militias. Some local 

news reports, in fact, claimed that the United States 

at one point asked Prime Minister Al-Ibadi to replace 

untrained and ideologically partisan militia forces in 
64

the Baghdad area—then representing roughly half the 

city’s force structure—with regular forces.265 However, while on a visit to the United States in October 

2014, Prime Minster Al-Ibadi noted that he had “made 

clear” to President Barack Obama what the militias’ 

role was and the need to support the latter, as they 

were “the backbone of the fight against ISIS.”266 That 

position had not changed in 2015, as Al-Ibadi reportedly had refused outright a visiting U.S. Senator’s 

request that the militias be disbanded.267

Significantly, rivalry among the warlords could 

increase sharply and lead to further violence once the 

ISIS threat recedes, particularly if there is a weak government or if the warlords are embedded in the government and seek greater control of the latter. In the 

past, some militias have clashed openly, as was the 

case between Al-Sadr’s followers and the Ahl Al-Haqq, 

itself an offshoot from Al-Sadr’s Jaysh Al-Mahdi parent 

organization, with the two militias competing for the 

same personnel. To be sure, an imminent ISIS threat 

induced greater cooperation among the Shia militias. 

For example, even Al-Sadr and Ahl Al-Haqq’s commander, Al-Khazali, announced they would be cooperating, despite their past enmity, which had included

armed clashes on Sadr’s home ground of Sadr City as 

late as 2013.268

Nevertheless, competition remains just below 

the surface, and small-scale incidents suggest ongoing tensions. For example, one unit sponsored by the 

Ataba in Najaf complained that, while it was operating in Samarra, the Badr unit there ordered that it 

subordinate itself to the latter, otherwise, it would get 

no pay and be forced to leave.269 In January 2015, an 

armed clash broke out in Baghdad between two small 

militias, probably over control of turf.270 Competition 
65

for lucrative assets could also pit rival warlords, as 

was the case between Badr and the Supreme Islamic 

Council for control of the Baghdad airport.271 Typically, Al-Sadr’s party accused the Minister of the Interior 

(a leading figure in Badr) of favoring his own party 

when he removed the chief of police in Basra and replaced the latter with a Badr member.272 Competition 

could become even more violent and destabilizing 

than in the past, especially since the militias’ acquisition of combat experience, additional recruits, and 

new weaponry as part of the ISIS War. 

Convincing militia forces to relinquish control 

in areas where they have operated may be difficult, 

and Qays Al-Khazali, leader of the Ahl Al-Haqq, flatly 

stated that his men would not leave the areas they 

liberated.273 The militias even seized some contested 

territory in Al-Anbar and annexed it to Karbala and 

Babil provinces, reversing the earlier reallocations of 

territory when Saddam had shifted provincial boundaries.274 Similarly, disarming the militias of personal 

weapons as part of demobilization would be unrealistic, given the country’s gun culture and continuing 

insecurity and, particularly as even heavy weapons 

now seem to have seeped down to the tribes.275

IMPLICATIONS FOR LANDPOWER 

AND RECOMMENDATIONS

While one cannot predict what Iraq will look like 

in the future, over the coming months, Iraqi forces in 

all their forms, and supported by the Coalition, will 

likely retake some of the territory lost to ISIS earlier 

and push back, if not eliminate, the ISIS threat. What 

is significant in terms of the warlords and their militias is that the ongoing ISIS War is affording them 
66

an unprecedented level of legitimacy within the Shia 

community. The warlords can now point not only to 

Al-Sistani’s original fatwa as a basic source of legitimacy, but also can rely on the widespread gratitude 

for their achievements from all sectors of Shia society 

and on the country’s continuing need for their services. In fact, Baghdad and Maysan province are already 

in the process of building memorials to fallen militia 

fighters. While the militias’ names or administrative 

and organizational structures may change, the militia 

phenomenon is not likely to disappear in the near future, and the warlords will remain players in both the 

security sphere and in politics. Moreover, as America’s de facto co-belligerents, the warlords and the militias have become a factor that can have a significant 

impact on U.S. interests and, therefore, represent a 

dimension that the United States must take into consideration both at the political and operational levels. 

Based on the preceding analysis, a number of recommendations for U.S. policy and Landpower interests emerge in relation to Iraq’s Shia warlords and 

their militias, with implications for decisonmakers 

and operators. Policymakers, planners, and operators 

must understand that the militias are not simply military forces, but that the warlords who lead the militias 

are also political and often religious leaders and that 

their power extends into Parliament as well as into the 

local administration. Prime Minister Al-Ibadi oversees 

a coalition government in which warlords and the 

parties and militias they control constitute a significant element, and the Prime Minister operates with 

limited maneuver space and may not always be able 

to achieve certain political goals or implement certain 

policies. If the warlords believe the United States is 

favoring other sectarian or ethnic communities at the 
67

expense of the Shia, this could be reflected in militia 

hostility toward U.S. personnel.

As the U.S. Landpower footprint increases, planners and commanders must remain sensitive to the 

integrated position the warlords and the militias have 

in Iraq’s security system, and understand that the militias are embedded in military operations with the 

Army and police. As such, their presence and influence must be considered in U.S. decisionmaking, and 

the appropriate conditions and limits on operational 

cooperation, intelligence sharing, and logistic support 

to the Iraqi forces must be determined. U.S. personnel must be vigilant to maintain operational security, 

a situation that will be complicated by the embedded 

nature of the militias within the Iraqi security forces, 

including in operations rooms, as leaks of future plans 

by militia sources have been common.276 Operators 

must be aware that, within the Iraqi military and police, there are likely to be militia veterans, as well as 

members or sympathizers of the political or religious 

organizations that sponsor the militias, or relatives, or 

fellow-tribesmen of fighters in the militias. 

Policymakers and operators must keep in mind the 

militias’ links with Iran and remember that Iranian hostility to U.S. policies or a degradation in U.S.-Iranian 

relations could increase the risk to deployed personnel, whether on a combat mission or in support, which 

could be exacerbated by a history of long-standing militia hostility toward U.S. forces from earlier clashes. 

In light of the militias’ Iranian connection and likely 

recruitment of key Iraqi militia individuals over the 

years, the militias are likely to collect intelligence on 

behalf of the Iranians—as well as for their own benefit—on U.S. operations, communications, combat 

systems, and intelligence methods and sources.
68

Operators must ensure that effective deconfliction 

with the militias is treated as a priority, even if only 

indirectly. The possibility of friendly fire involving 

the militias could have serious repercussions both 

in the field and in the political arena. In particular, if 

the number of U.S. forward air controllers remains 

limited, reliance on local sources—including militias 

or their supporters or enemies—for airpower targeting may not always be reliable, and care must be exercised in ensuring congruence with U.S. objectives. 

Insofar as possible, personnel should be prepared to 

deal with incidents and confrontations with militia 

personnel that could otherwise escalate quickly, given 

the background hostility, or be inflated and distorted 

for propaganda purposes. In addition, U.S. operators 

must be aware that elements favorable or hostile to 

the militias could seek to use information to influence U.S. targeting decisions, with potentially serious 

consequences. 

Planners should develop easy-to-use recognition 

guides to distinguish the prodigious array of militia 

logos, flags, and uniforms (which, in some cases, may 

resemble those worn by the Iraqi Army or police), and 

include images of the militias’ leadership. This will facilitate evaluating likely policies affecting U.S. operations and guard against potential threats. 

Landpower operators may have to plan for additional force protection measures for Coalition partners and contractors—including armed ones who 

often operate with little outside control—whose numbers are likely to increase and who may be in contact 

with militia elements. Even though this is not strictly 

a U.S. Government responsibility, nevertheless, the 

reality on the ground could present a policy and 

operational dilemma. 
69

Policymakers and operators must promote any 

rehabilitation of former Baathists—whether in the political realm or on the ground—carefully, understanding the sensitivity this issue represents for the militias 

and for the Shia community at large, as they or their 

families may have been victims of some of the same 

individuals seeking reintegration. 

The U.S. Government and Department of Defense 

should monitor the militias’ media, and operators 

should develop a robust information capability to 

counter that media’s negative anti-Coalition message 

which, if not neutralized, could shape public opinion and could affect operations and force protection 

for personnel on the ground. Personnel must keep in 

mind that most militias have well-developed media 

and religious networks that can spread libelous accusations quickly. The often factionalized local government cannot always provide such message security. 

Military personnel must be prepared to deal with the 

moral dilemmas they may well face if they witness the 

mistreatment of civilians or prisoners by the militias.

ENDNOTES

1. “Qiyadi Badr: 3 alaf muqatil min sarayana sa-yahsimun 

marakat Al-Falluja fi 48 saa bi-amr Al-Maliki” (“A Badr Commander: 3,000 of Our Troops will Decide the Battle for Falluja in 

48 Hours If Al-Maliki Orders It”), Baghdad, Iraq: Iraqi Women’s 

League, April 20, 2014, available from www.iraqiwomensleague.

com/mod.php?mod=news&modfile=item&itemid=25252.

2. Ibid.

3. “Bi-amr min Sulaymani Abu Dar wa-shaqiqah wa-Arkan 

Al-Hasnawi wa’l-asharat min Asa’ib Ahl Al-Haqq ila Suriya” (“By 

Sulaymani’s Order Abu Dar and His Two Brothers, Arkan Al-Hasnawi, and Dozens of the Asa’ib Ahl Al-Haqq to Syria”), Ahrar Al-
70

Iraq (Baghdad, Iraq), April 9, 2012, available from www.ahraraliraq.

com/print&id=5304; Vivian Aqiqi, “Ilaf yakshif asma’ wa-adad alfasa’il al-iraqiya al-muqatila fi Suriya” (“Ilaf Divulges the Names 

of the Iraqi Groups Fighting in Syria”), Ilaf (London, UK), January 

11, 2014, available from www.elaph.com/Web/news/2014/1/866489.

html?entry=arab; and Suadad Al-Salhy, “Iraqi Shi’ite Militants 

Fight for Syria’s Assad,” Reuters, October 16, 2012, available from 

www.reuters.com/assets/print?aid=USBRE95KORP20121016.

4. After his ouster, Al-Maliki boasted that he had provided 

weapons and other equipment, logistics support, medical aid, and 

transportation to the Iraqi militias deploying to Syria, “Badr AlAmiri wa-Asa’ib Al-Khazali wa’l-Kata’ib: Al-Maliki huwa zaim 

al-muqawama al-islamiya fi Al-Iraq” (“Al-Amiri’s Badr, Al-Khazali’s Asa’ib, and the Katai’ib [Hizb Allah]: Al-Maliki Is the Leader of 

the Islamic Resistance in Iraq”), Chakuch (Baghdad), January 29, 

2015, available from chakooch.com/news.php?action=view&id=6326. 

(Hereafter “Badr Al-Amiri wa-Asa’ib Al-Khazali.”)

5. Abd Al-Jabbar Al-Itabi, “Shia iraqiyun: La nudafi an AlAsad lakin an al-maraqid al-shiiya” (“Iraqi Shias: It Is Not AlAsad Who We Are Defending But the Shia Shrines”), Ilaf, July 5, 

2013, available from www.elaph.com.

6. “Asa’ib Ahl Al-Haqq mushayyida bi-mawqif Iran: Sa-najal Al-Iraq maqbara li-DAISH” (“The Asa’ib Ahl Al-Haqq Praise 

Iran’s Stance: We Will Make of Iraq a Grave for ISIS”), Shafaqna

(Najaf), November 18, 2014, available from iraq.Shafaqna.com/

today/item/46757. (Hereafter “Asa’ib Ahl Al-Haqq mushayyida 

bi-mawqif Iran.”)

7. “Wusul liwa’ay Abu Al-Fadl Al-Abbas wa-Dhu Al-Faqar ila 

matar Baghdad li’l-indimam fi musanadat al-jaysh bi-muqatalat 

DAISH” (“The Arrival of the Two Abu Al-Fadl and Dhu Al-Faqar

Brigades at the Baghdad Airport and Their Deployment in Support to the Army in the Fight against ISIS”), Al-Ghad Press (Basra), 

June 12, 2014, available from alghadpress.com.

8. “Al-Ibadi: Tahrir al-mudun min DAISH qirar Iraq wa-laysa amriki” (“Al-Ibadi: Liberating the Cities from ISIS Is an Iraqi, 

Not an American, Decision”), Al-Rafidayn (Baghdad), November 3, 2014, available from www.alrafidayn.com/arabic/index.php/

responsive/2469-2014-11-04-13-53-06.
71

9. Quoted in “Al-Amiri yakhud maarik dariya fi Diyala takallalat bi-tahrir 18 qariya wa-maqtal 150 irhabiyan” (“Al-Amiri Enters Fierce Battles in Diyala Which Are Crowned with the Liberation of 18 Villages and the Death of 150 Terrorists”), Jaridat Badr

(Baghdad), September 27, 2014, available from www.badrpress.

com/badr/feeds_print.php?lang=ar&id=26730; and “Al-Sadr yansah 

al-hukuma bi-tasallum al-manatiq al-muharrara min Al-Hashd 

Al-Shabi tajannuban li’l-intihakat” (“Al-Sadr Advises the Government to Accept Control of the Liberated Areas in Order to 

Prevent Abuses”), Al-Mada, November 30, 2014, available from 

almadapaper.net/ar/printnews.aspx?NewsID=475851. (Hereafter “AlSadr yansah al-hukuma.”)

10. Vice President Ayad Allawi quoted in “Rub milyun musallah shii fi Al-Iraq ya’tamarun bi-awamir Al-Haras Al-Thawri” 

(“A Quarter of a Million Shia Armed Men in Iraq Who Take Orders from the Revolutionary Guard”), Al-Siyasa (Kuwait), January 4, 2015, available from alseyassah.com. (Hereafter “Rub milyun 

musallah shii.”)

11. “Qiyadi fi Badr: Balad tumaththil al-khatt al-awwal li’lmuwajaha ma DAISH” (“A Badr Commander: Balad Represents 

the Front Line in the Confrontation with ISIS”), Al-Mada Press

(Baghdad), December 16, 2014, available from www.almadapress.

com.ar/NewsDetails.aspx?NewsID=41150.

12. “Al-Majlis Al-Ala: Shakkalna Saraya Ashura’ bi-50 alf 

muqatil li-muharabat DAISH” (“The Supreme Council: We Set 

Up the Saraya Ashura’ with 50,000 Fighters for the Fight against 

ISIS”), Wikalat Khabar li’l-Anba’ (Baghdad), June 15, 2014, available from khabaar.net/index.php/permalink/22536.html (Hereafter 

“Al-Majlis Al-Ala: Shakkalna Saraya Ashura’”); and “Kushifat an 

dawat 3 alaf mutatawwi ihtiyat li-ta’min al-madina fi ashura’” 

(“The Call-up of 3,000 Volunteers as a Reserve for the City’s Security during Ashura’ Was Revealed”), Al-Alam Al-Jadid (Baghdad), 

October 21, 2014, available from al-aalem.com. (Hereafter “Kushifat an dawat 3 alaf mutatawwi.”)

13. Ibid.

14. “Tazhahura fi Al-Najaf ta’yidan li-fatwa al-marjaiya” 

(“Show of Support in Najaf for the Marja’s Fatwa”), Al-Sabah
72

(Baghdad), June 16, 2014, available from www.alsabaah.iq/ArticlePrint.aspx?ID=72861, (Hereafter “Tazhahura fi Al-Najaf”); and 

“Asha’ir Kab fi Al-Basra tulin tatawwuha li’l-difa an al-watan 

wa’l-muqaddasat” (“The Kab Tribes in Basra Announce They 

Are Volunteering to Defend the Nation and the Holy Places”), 

Al-Sabah Al-Jadid (Baghdad), June 17, 2014, available from www.

newsabah.com/wp/newspaper/9017. 

15. “Ashira fi Al-Muthanna tuqaddim 35 shahidan wa’l-Rumaytha tursil al-mi’at li’l-qital” (“A Tribe in Al-Muthanna Has 

Given up 35 Martyrs and Al-Rumaytha Sends Hundreds to the 

Fight”), Al-Mada Press, November 17, 2014, available from almadapaper.net/ar/printnews.aspx?NewsID=475000. (Hereafter “Ashira fi 

Al-Muthanna.”)

16. “Tashkil majlis asha’ir Muntafidha min khamsat alaf 

muqatil li-tahrir manatiq yusaytir alayha DAISH” (“The Formation the Mutafidha Tribal Council Consisting of 5000 Fighters for 

the Liberation of the Territories Held by ISIS”), Al-Sumarriya TV

(Baghdad), August 29, 2014, available from www.alsumaria.tv/

news/109347.

17. “Al-Hakim yadu ila tashkil arba firaq askariya min almutatawwiin al-mustaqillin li-himayat al-atabat al-muqaddasa” 

(“Al-Hakim Calls for the Formation of Four Independent Volunteer Military Units for the Defense of the Holy Atabas”), Nun 

News Agency (Baghdad), October 21, 2014, available from www.

non14.net/55288.

18. “Dhi Qar tursil dufa jadida min muqatili Al-Hashd AlShabi tadumm 750 muqatilan li-muharabat DAISH” (“Dhi Qar 

Sends a New Contingent of Al-Hashd Al-Shabi Fighters Consisting of 750 Fighters to Battle ISIS”), Al-Nasiriya News Agency (AlNasiriya), January 22, 2015, available from www.nasiriyah.org/ara/

post/56811.

19. “Al-Juburi yulin indimam al-mi’at min abna’ Salah AlDin li’l-Hashd Al-Shabi wa-yu’akkid: Tahrir al-muhafazha bat 

qariban” (“Al-Juburi Announces That Hundreds of Sons of Salah 

Al-Din Have Joined Al-Hashd Al-Shabi and Stresses: The Province’s Liberation Is Near”), Al-Mada Press, November 21, 2014, 

available from www.almadapress.com/ar/news/39960; and “Amni-
73

yat Diyala: 3000 mutatawwi min abna’ Al-Muqdadiya indammu 

li-quwwat Al-Hashd Al-Shabi” (“The Security Agency in Diyala: 

3,000 Volunteers from Al-Muqdadiya Joined Al-Hashd Al-Shabi’s 

Forces”), Al-Masdar News (Iraq), January 24, 2015, available from 

l-news.net/index.php/policy/69350.html.

20. “Firqat Al-Abbas Al-Qitaliya tulin an fath bab al-tatawwu 

fi jami muhafazhat Al-Iraq” (“Firqat Al-Abbas Al-Qitaliya Announces That the Volunteer Process Has Opened in All of Iraq’s 

Provinces”), Shabatak Al-Kafil Al-Alamiya (Karbala), February 4, 

2015, available from alkafeel.net/ar-news/index.php?id=2491. 

21. Hasan Al-Samawi, “Fawj Jafar Al-Tayyar al-qism althalith yaltahiq bi-rakb al-mujahidin” (“Fawj Jafar Al-Tayyar, the 

Third Section, Joins the Mujahidin Mission”), Jaridat Badr, September 21, 2014, available from www.badrpress.com/badr/feeds.

php?lang=ar&page_name=politic&id=26503.

22. “Al-Amiri: Kull najahatna marhuna li-tadhiyat al-shabab 

al-shia al-iraqiyin wa-bi-tansiq ma Haras Al-Thawra al-irani wamajami al-muqawama al-shiiya” (“Al-Amiri: All Our Successes 

Have Been Built on the Sacrifices of the Iraqi Shia Youth in Coordination with the IRGC and the Shia Resistance Groups”), Kayhan

(Tehran), December 6, 2014, kayhan.ir/ar/print/11421. (Hereafter 

“Al-Amiri: Kull najahatna marhuna li-tadhiyat al-shabab.”)

23. Haydar Al-Rimahi, “Fawj Al-Imam Al-Baqir min mutatawwii Al-Najaf yunhi tadribatih al-askariya” (“Fawj Al-Imam Al-Baqir That Is Composed of Volunteers from Najaf Completes Its Military Training”), Shaykh Al-Qubanchi website (part of Supreme 

Islamic Council), September 28, 2014, available from alqubanchi.

com/news/1286.

24. “Karbala’iyun mutatawwiun yantaqidun ‘adam istiqbalhim’ fi markaz al-tadrib wa-majlis al-muhafazha yu’akkid: 

Adadhum kabira wa-sa-naftah markazan akhar” (“Volunteers 

from Karbala Criticize That They ‘Were Not Accepted’ in the 

Training Center But the Provincial Council Reassures Them: 

There Are So Many But We Will Open Another Center”), Al-Mada 

Press, June 14, 2014, available from www.almadapress.com/ar/NewDetails.aspx?NewsID=32548.
74

25. “Al-Najaf tashhad akbar istirad askari li-Fawj Al-Shahid 

Maytham Al-Tammar al-khass bi-himayat al-mazarat al-shiiya” 

(“Najaf Witnesses the Largest Military Parade by the Fawj AlShahid Maytham Al-Tammar, Whose Special Mission Is the Protection of the Shia Shrines”), Wikalat Al-Iraq Al-Markaziya li’l-Anba’

(Baghdad), September 4, 2014, available from www.iraqidev.org/

news/index.php/alnagef/51318.html. (Hereafter “Al-Najaf tashhad 

akbar istirad.”)

26. “Al-Majlis Al-Ala: Shakkalna Saraya Ashura’.”

27. “Mutatawwiun li’l-Alam: Marajina hadhdharuna min 

ikhafat al-tawa’if al-ukhra aw al-taaddi alayhim wa-amalna 

mu’aqqat” (“Volunteers Tell Al-Alam: Our Marjas Cautioned Us 

to Not Alarm or Attack Other Sects and Our Activity Is Temporary”), Al-Alam (Baghdad), June 17, 2014, available from www.

alaalem.com/index.php?news=.

28. “Al-Jinah al-askari li-munazhzhamat Badr: Lasna milishiyat wa-lan nusharik bi-hilf ma Amrika” (“Badr’s Military 

Wing: We Are Not Militias and We Are Not Part of an Alliance 

with America”), Jaridat Badr, September 18, 2014, available from 

www.badrpress.com/badr/feeds_print.php?lang=ar&id=26461. (Hereafter “Al-Jinah al-askari li-munazhzhamat Badr”); and “Tawajjuh 

600 mutatawwi Badr fi Wasit ila qati Diyala” (“600 Badr Volunteers Deploy from Wasit to Diyala”), Wikalat Al-Iraq Al-Markaziya li’l-Anba’, July 29, 2014, available from www.iraqidev.org/news/

index.php/amnea/50410.html.

29. “Takharruj 3200 muqatil min Al-Hashd Al-Shabi 

fi Dhi Qar” (“3200 Al-Hashd Al-Shabi Fighters in Dhi Qar 

Graduate”), Al-Sumarriya TV, January 8, 2015, available from 

www.alsumaria.tv.

30. Husayn Al-Asdi, “3000 muqatil li-himayat sur madinat Al-Najaf al-ashraf” (“3,000 Fighters for the Defense of the 

City of Najaf the Noble”), Wikalat Nun, June 22, 2014, available 

from www.non14.net/51749/3000-; and “Kushifat an dawat 3 alaf 

mutatawwi.”

31. “Saraya Al-Salam fi Al-Muthanna tastajib li-nida’ Al-Sadr 

wa-tulin istidadha li’l-taharruk ila Samarra’ fi ayy waqt” (“The 

Saraya Al-Salam in Al-Muthanna Responds to Al-Sadr’s Call and 
75

Proclaims Its Readiness to Deploy to Samarra”), Al-Mirbad Radio 

(Basra), December 12, 2014, available from almirbad.com.

32. Haydar Al-Ramahi, “Al-Sayyid Al-Qubanchi lada liqa’ih 

al-dawra al-tadribiya al-askariya li’l-nisa’ al-mutatawwiat fi AlNajaf al-ashraf” (“Sayyid Al-Qubanchi While Visiting the Military 

Training Course for the Women of Najaf the Noble”), Al-Qubanchi’s website, September 30, 2014, available from alqubanchi.com/

news/1287.

33. “DAISH yulawwih bi-idam al-mukhalifin li-waraqatih wa-tashkil muaskar nisa’i li-dam tahrir Naynawa” (“ISIS 

Indicates It Will Execute Anyone Who Refuses to Sign Its Document and the Creation of a Women’s Camp to Contribute to the 

Liberation of Naynawa”), Shafaq News (Baghdad), January 20, 

2015, available from www.shafaaq.com/sh2/index.php/news/iraqnews/89806--q-.html.

34. Yusuf Al-Saidi, “Zibari yuhawil ijhad intisarat Al-Hashd 

Al-Shabi” (“Zibari Tries to Abort Al-Hashd Al-Shabi’s Achievements”), Khabar (Baghdad), November 5, 2014, available from khabaarpaper.com.

35. Nawzad Mahdi, “Qiyadiyun fi Al-Hashd Al-Shabi: Mahammatna muharabat muntahiki hurmat al-balad la al-isa’a li’liraqiyin” (“Commanders in Al-Hashd Al-Shabi: Our Mission Is to 

Fight against Those Who Violate the Country’s Sovereignty, Not 

to Harm Iraqis”), Al-Alam, October 15, 2014, available from www.

alaalem.com/index.php?aa=new&id22=21271. (Hereafter “Qiyadiyun fi Al-Hashd Al-Shabi.”)

36. “Masdar askari yafdah al-qiyadat al-askariya wa-yumajjid 

bi’l-Asa’ib fi Al-Falluja” (“A Military Source Shames the Military 

Leadership and Praises the Asai’ib [Ahl Al-Haqq] in Falluja”), AlKashif (Baghdad), October 16, 2014, available from www.alkashif.

org/news.php?action=view&id=2550.

37. Uthman Al-Mukhtar, “Al-Iraq: Safqa fasida li’l-jaysh biqimat 90 miliyun dular” (“Iraq: Corrupt Deal for the Army Worth 

$90 Million”), Al-Arabi Al-Jadid (London, UK), December 15, 2014, 

available from www.alaraby.co.uk.
76

38. “Mi’at al-muqatilin yansahibun min khutut muharabat 

DAISH li-tarkihim 3 ashhur bila rawatib wa-adam tazwidhim 

bi-absat muaddat al-muwajaha” (“Hundreds of Fighters Leave 

The Front Lines of the Fight against ISIS Because They Were Left 

for Three Months without Pay and Even the Means to Fight”), 

Al-Alam Al-Jadid, October 12, 2014, available from al-aalem.com. 

(Hereafter “Mi’at al-muqatilin.”)

39. “Ahl Al-Haqq tunazhzhim istiradan fi Maysan bi-aliyat 

askariya istarjaatha min DAISH” (“Ahl Al-Haqq Organizes a Parade in Maysan with Military Equipment Which They Recovered 

from ISIS”), Al-Mada Press, November 6, 2014, available from 

www.almadapress.com; and Josh Rogin and Eli Lake, “Iran-Backed 

Militias Are Getting U.S. Weapons,” Bloomberg View (New York), 

January 8, 2015, available from www.bloombergview.com. (Hereafter Rogin and Lake, “Iran-Backed Militias.”)

40. Mustafa Muhammad, “Al-Irhab yatahassan bi’l-ard alwaira wa’l-hawiyat” (“Terrorists Take Cover in the Rough Terrain and Underground Shelters”), Al-Alam, August 8, 2014, available from www.alaalem.com. (Hereafter Muhammad, “Al-Irhab 

yatahassan.”)

41. “Ta’kidan li-ma nashara Al-Kashif: Jarha fasa’il al-muqawama yatimm ightiyalihim ala ayadi al-quwwat ‘al-mutakhadhila’” (“Confirming What Al-Kashif Reported: The Wounded 

from the Resistance Units Are Killed by Traitorous Forces”), AlKashif, September 27, 2014, available from www.alkashf.org/news.

php?action=view&id=2467.

42. “Al-Mutatawwiun fi Dhi Qar lam yatalaqqaw rawatibhum fa-intafadu muhtajjin qatiin li’l-tariq!” (“The Volunteers 

from Dhi Qar Did Not Receive Their Pay and Mutinied in Protest by Blocking the Road!”), Al-Madar, July 25, 2014, available 

from www.almadarnews.info/index.php?page=article&id=5546; and 

“Tazhahurat fi Diyala li’l-mutalaba bi-sarf rawatib Al-Hashd AlShabi” (“Demonstrations in Diyala Demanding the Payment of 

Al-Hashd Al-Shabi Salaries”), Shafaqna, September 24, 2014, available from www.shafaaq.com/sh2/index.php/news/iraq=news/83903-

2014-09-24-1l-53.html.
77

43. “Masadir li’l-Alam: La wujud li-DAISH . . . Al-Qaida wa’lsukkan yuqatilun al-jaysh fi Jurf Al-Sakhr” (“Al-Alam Sources: 

There Is No ISIS . . . It Is Al-Qaida and the Population Who Are 

Fighting against the Army in Jurf Al-Sakhr”), Al-Alam, August 7, 

2014, available from www.alaalem.com/index.php?news=; and “Rif 

Al-Latifiya baya Al-Dawla wa-rafa banadiqha bi-wajh al-jaysh” 

(“The Latifiya Countryside Gave the Baya to ISIS and Turned Its 

Rifles against the Army”), Al-Alam, September 14, 2014, available 

from www.alaalem.com/index.php?aa=news&id22=20600. (Hereafter 

“Rif Al-Latifiya.”)

44. “Mi’at al-muqatilin.”

45. Ala’ Hasan, “Al-Rawatib tufrigh bi’l-Iraq min mutatawwiih” (“The Issue of Salaries Empties Iraq of Its Volunteers”), 

Al-Jazira TV (Doha), January 28, 2015, available from www.

aljazeera.net.

46. “Majlis Babil yursil wafdan ila Baghdad li’l-isra bi-tasarruf 

rawatib Al-Hashd Al-Shabi” (“The Babil Council Sends a Delegation to Baghdad to Speed Up Payment of the Salaries to Al-Hashd 

Al-Shabi”), Al-Mada Press, January 14, 2015, available from www.

almadapress.com/ar/NewsDetails.aspx?NewsID=42591.

47. “Al-Hukuma tamnah qatla Al-Hashd Al-Shabi huquq 

wa-imtiyazat al-jaysh” (“The Government Grants Those Killed in 

Al-Hashd Al-Shabi the Same Rights and Benefits As the Army”), 

Shafaq News, November 11, 2014, available from www.shafaaq.

com; and “Itlaq rawatib Al-Hashd Al-Shabi” (“Salaries Paid to AlHashd Al-Shabi”), Al-Dustur (Baghdad), November 6, 2014, available from www.daraddustour.com.

48. “Masadir: Falih Al-Fayyad muttaham bi-sariqat amwal 

Al-Hashd Al-Shabi li-salih munazhzhamatih al-sirriya” (“Sources: Falih Al-Fayyad Is Accused of Stealing the Al-Hashd Al-Shabi’s Funds for the Benefit of His Secret Organization”), Wikalat 

Kunuz Media (Baghdad), October 27, 2014, available from www.

knoozmedia.net/?p=83002.

49. “Kutlat Al-Fadila al-niyabiya tadu mas’uli Al-Hashd AlShabi ila taqdim ‘bayanat maliya’ an sarfiha al-amwal al-mukhassasa li-anasir Al-Hashd” (“The Parliamentary Virtue Party Caucus 
78

Calls on Al-Hashd Al-Shabi Officials to Give ‘Financial Reports’ 

about How the Money Allocated for Al-Hashd Personnel Was 

Spent”), Awan (Baghdad), January 15, 2015, available from awaniq.

com/ar/news/15029.

50. “Al-Muhammadawi: Liqa’atna bi’l-marjaiyat al-diniya 

tadammanat bahth mawduay Al-Hashd Al-Shabi wa’l-muwazana” (“Al-Muhammadawi: Our Meeting with the Religious 

Marja Dealt with the Two Issues of Al-Hashd Al-Shabi and the 

Budget”), Al-Sumarriya TV, January 18, 2015, available from www.

alsumaria.tv.

51. “Al-Marjaiya tadu li-tawfir al-silah li’l-mutatawwiin watasmiyat waziray al-difa wa’l-dakhiliya ala uss ghayr ta’ifiya” 

(“The Marja Calls for the Arming of the Volunteers and for the 

Two Ministries of Defense and the Interior Not to Be on a Sectarian Basis”), Shafaqna, October 3, 2014, available from iraq.Shafaqna.

com/topnews/item/44636. (Hereafter “Al-Marjaiya tadu li-tawfir 

al-silah li’l-mutatawwiin”); “Maraji Al-Najaf yadun li-dam almujahidin al-mutatawwiin” (“Najaf’s Marjas Call for Supporting 

the Volunteer Mujahidin”), Al-Dustur, October 18, 2014, available 

from www.daraddustour.com; and “Al-Marjaiya al-diniya al-ulya 

tadu li-muwasalat dam al-muqatilin didd DAISH” (“The Senior 

Religious Marjas Call for Continued Support for Those Fighting 

against ISIS”), Al-Ghadir TV (Najaf), October 24, 2014, available 

from www.alghadeer.tv/news/detail/19764.

52. “Tazhahura fi Al-Najaf,” and “Majlis Dhi Qar yuwajjih 

bi-dam quwwat Al-Hashd Al-Shabi maddiyan wa-manawiyan” 

(“The Dhi Qar Council Provides Material and Moral Support 

to Al-Hashd Al-Shabi Forces”), Dhi Qar government website, 

n.d., available from www.nasiriyah.org/ara/post/53010; “Majlis 

Karbala’ yukhassis khamsa milyarat dinar li-dam Al-Hashd AlShabi fi al-atabatayn al-husayniya wa’l-abbasiya wa-200 milyun 

dinar li-Amirli” (“The Karbala Council Allocates Five Billion 

Dinars As Support for Al-Hashd Al-Shabi in the Two Husayni 

and Hasani Atabas and 200 Million Dinars for Amirli”), Al-Mada 

Press, September 15, 2014, available from www.almadapress.com/ar/

news/36857.

53. ”Al-Shaykh Al-Masudi yatafaqqad al-qitat al-askariya almurabita hunak min al-jaysh wa-quwwat Al-Hashd Al-Shabi” 
79

(“Shaykh Al-Masudi Inspects the Military Units of the Army and 

Al-Hashd Al-Shabi on Duty There”), Al-Sabah Al-Jadid, September 

19, 2014, available from www.newsabah.com/wp/newspaper/19518. 

(Hereafter ”Al-Shaykh Al-Masudi yatafaqqad.”)

54. “Al-Asadi: Al-Hashd Al-Shabi yasa li-ziyadat muwazanatih” (“Al-Asadi: Al-Hashd Al-Shabi Seeks to Increase Its 

Budget”), Shabakat Al-Ilam Al-Iraqi (Baghdad), January 2, 2015, 

available from center-imn.net. 

55. Muhammad Al-Ghabban quoted in “Akkad ann al-fasa’il 

al-jihadiya tamil taht itar al-dawla” (“He Confirmed That the Jihadi Units Are Operating under the Jurisdiction of the Government”), Jaridat Badr, November 23, 2014, available from www.

badrpress.com/badr/feeds_print.php?lang=ar&id27913.

56. For example, when the Kata’ib Sayyid Al-Shuhada’ split off 

from Iraqi Hizb Allah, “Inshiqaq amin amm Kata’ib Hizb Allah AlIraq wa-tashkil Kata’ib Sayyid Al-Shuhada’” (“The Departure of the 

General Secretary of the Kata’ib Hizb Allah of Iraq and the Formation of the Kata’ib Sayyid Al-Shuhada’”), Al-Masalla (Baghdad), 

April 14, 2013, available from almasalah.com/ar/PrintNewspage.

aspx?newsid=10285.

57. “Qa’id amaliyat Al-Furat Al-Awsat: Ma wajadnah fi Firqat 

Al-Abbas (alayhi al-salam) Al-Qitaliya kan fawq al-mutawaqqa 

min nahiyat al-indibat wa’l-ruh al-qitaliya al-aliya” (“The Chief 

of the Middle Euphrates Operations Command: What We Saw 

from the Firqat Al-Abbas Al-Qitaliya Was Above Our Expectations 

in Terms of Discipline and Superior Fighting Spirit”), Shabatak 

Al-Kafil Al-Alamiya, July 21, 2014, available from alkafeel.net/arnews/index.php?id=1938. 

58. “Bi-riayat al-ataba al-abbasiya al-muqaddasa: Ahali Tall 

Afar yahtafilun fi Karbala’ bi-takharruj al-dufa al-ula min Liwa’ 

Al-Imam Al-Husayn (alayh al-salam) li-tahrir madinathim” (“Under the Auspices of the Abbasi Ataba: The People of Tall Afar 

Celebrate in Karbala the Graduation of the First Class of the Liwa’ 

Al-Imam Al-Husayn for the Liberation of Their City”), Shabatak 

Al-Kafil Al-Alamiya, October 2, 2014, available from alkafeel.net/

ar-news/index.php?id=2091; “300 muqatil masihi fi Kata’ib Al-Imam 

Ali” (“300 Christian Fighters in the Kata’ib Al-Imam Ali”), Al-Mus-
80

taqbal Al-Iraqi (Baghdad), January 10, 2015, available from www.

almustakbalpaper.net/content.php?id=511; and “Al-Shabak yarfidun 

akthar min alf muqatil li’l-muqawama al-islamiya” (“The Shabak 

Contribute More Than 1,000 Fighters to the Islamic Resistance”), 

Iraqi Media Network (Baghdad), January 2, 2015, available from 

center-imn.net. The Shabak are a mostly-Shia Iranian-language 

community in Iraq.

59. “Al-Mawsil: 1500 mutatawwi fi Al-Hashd” (“Mosul: 1500 

Volunteers in Al-Hashd”), Al-Masalla, February 8, 2015, available 

from almasalah.com/ar/NewsDetails.aspx?NewsID=46913. 

60. “Qism Bayn Al-Haramayn Al-Sharifayn yushakkil quwwa askariya li-himayat maraqid Karbala’ al-muqaddasa” 

(“The Qism Bayn Al-Haramayn Al-Sharifayn Area Establishes 

an Armed Force to Protect Karbala’s Holy Mausolea”), Shabatak 

Al-Kafil Al-Alamiya, October 11, 2014, available from alkafeel.net/

ar-news/index.php?id=2122.

61. “Al-Najaf tashhad akbar istirad.”

62. “Yuwasilun tadribathum al-qitaliya istidadan li-mahammat khassa tuhaqqiq hadafha al-manshud bi’l-qada’ ala al-isabat 

al-takfiriya” (“They Are Continuing Their Military Training for 

Special Missions Whose Objective They Will Fulfill by Eliminating theTakfiri Gangs”), Al-Rawda Al-Husayniya Al-Muqaddasa Radio (Karbala), September 29, 2014, available from imamhussain-fm.

com/index.php.

63. “Hurub marja shii muarid li’l-Sistani bad qasfih bi’l-ta’irat” 

(“The Shia Marja Opposed to Al-Sistani Flees after Being Bombed 

by Aircraft”), Ilaf, July 11, 2014, available from www.elaph.com/Web/

News/2014/7/919413.html; “Al-Qawl al-fasl bi-Mahmud Al-Sarkhi: 

Man huwa? Nasabuh?” (“The Final Word on Mahmud Al-Sarkhi: 

Who Is He? What Is His Background?”), Shafaqna, July 2, 2014, 

available from iraq.Shafaqna.com; and “Al-Zamili yakshif tafasil 

al-hujum ala maqarr Al-Sarkhi bi-Karbala’” (“Al-Zamili Reveals 

Details of the Attack on Al-Sarkhi’s Headquarters in Karbala”), 

Al-Jazira TV, July 11, 2014, available from www.aljazeera.net; and 

Loveday Morris, “Clashes between Army, Supporters of Fringe 

Cleric Imperil Stability in Iraq’s Shiite South,” The Washington 

Post, July 8, 2014, available from www.washingtonpost.com.
81

64. “Man huwa Mahmud Al-Sarkhi qa’id Jaysh Al-Husayn bi’lIraq?” (“Who Is Mahmud Al-Sarkhi, Leader of Jaysh Al-Husayn in 

Iraq?”), Al-Arabiya TV (Abu Dhabi), July 7, 2014, available from 

www.alarabiya.net.

65. “Al-Ghabban yudmij quwwat Al-Hashd Al-Shabi bi’l-quwwat al-amniya” (“Al-Ghabban Incorporates the Al-Hashd AlShabi Forces into the Security Forces”), Al-Kashif, January 3, 2015, 

available from www.alkashf.org/news.php?action=view&id=2891. 

66. “Al-Sharifi: Al-Hashd Al-Shabi ja’ talbiyatan li-nida’ almarjaiya wa-man yarfudhu yurid tawassu ruqat al-irhab!” (“AlSharifi: Al-Hashd Al-Shabi Came about in Response to the Marja 

and Anyone Who Opposes It Wants the Expansion of Terrorism’s 

Sway”), Wikalat Sumer Al-Ikhbariya (Baghdad), November 12, 

2014, available from sumernews.3abbaer.com.

67. “Al-Ansari yuizu li’l-dawa’ir al-baladiya al-imkaniyat 

al-lazima li’l-muqatilin fi Jurf Al-Sakhr” (“Al-Ansari Explains to 

the Municipal Authorities What the Necessary Capabilities of the 

Fighters in Jurf Al-Sakhr Are”), Jaridat Badr, October 26, 2014, available from www.badrpress.com/badr/feeds.php?lang=ar&id=27351. 

68. “Al-Amn al-niyabiya wa’l-Hashd Al-Shabi: Taqaddum 

DAISH yaqtasir ala gharb al-asima wa’l-jaysh yataqaddam fi shimal wa-janub Baghdad” (“The Parliamentary Security Committee 

and Al-Hashd Al-Shabi: ISIS’s Advance Stops West of the Capital, 

While the Army Advances to the North and South of Baghdad”), 

Al-Mada, October 14, 2014, available from almadapaper.net/ar/printnews.aspx?NewsID=473047; “Qiyadiyun fi Al-Hashd Al-Shabi; 

and “Ra‘is kutlat Badr al-niyabiya: Amrika tunaffidh amaliyat 

al-ihtiwa’ li-DAISH wa-laysa al-qada’ alayh” (“The Head of the 

Badr Parliamentary Party: America Is Carrying Out Operations 

to Contain ISIS and Not to Eliminate It”), Jaridat Badr, November 2, 2014, available from www.badrpress.com/badr/feeds_print.

php?lang=ar&id=27567.

69. “Al-Ghabban wazir midan la karasi yudashshin mansibah 

fi sahat al-maarik” (“Al-Ghabban, a Field Minister Not a ChairBorne One, Inaugurates His Tenure in Office on the Battlefield”), 

Al-Masalla, October 24, 2014, available from almasalah.com/ar/

PrintNewspage.aspx?newsid=40349.
82

70. “Al-Sayyid Ammar Al-Hakim yabhath ma al-safir al-amriki abraz al-qadaya al-siyasiya wa’l-amniya wa-taziz al-alaqat 

bayn al-baladayn” (“Al-Sayyid Ammar Al-Hakim Discusses with 

the American Ambassador the Key Political and Security Issues 

and the Strengthening of Relations between the Two Countries”), 

Al-Furat News (Baghdad), November 5, 2014, available from 

wwww.alforatnews.com/modules/news/article.php?storyid=68584. 

71. “Milishiya Badr tuin ahad afradha mudiran li-nahiyat 

Al-Azhim” (“The Badr Militia Appoint One of Its Members as 

Governor of the District of Al-Azhim”), Al-Gharbiya News (Baghdad), September 29, 2014, available from www.algharbiyanews.

com/?p=37068; and Abd Al-Aziz Al-Ta’i, “Mutaqal sirri li-milishiya Al-Hashd Al-Shabi li’l-tadhib wa’l-ibtizaz” (“Al-Hashd 

Al-Shabi Militia’s Secret Prison for Torturing and Extortion”), AlArabi Al-Jadid , December 24, 2014, available from www.alaraby.

co.uk.

72. “Al-Sadriyun wa’l-Majlisiyun yataharrakun li’l-saytara 

ala al-hukumat al-mahalliya fi al-wasat wa’l-janub” (“The Sadris 

and Members of the Supreme Islamic Council Move to Take Control of the Local Governments in Central and Southern Iraq”), AlAlam, February 8, 2015, available from www.alaalem.com. 

73. “Nata’ij al-taswit: Al-Khazali shakhsiyat al-am fi Al-Iraq” 

(“The Results of the Voting: Al-Khazali Is the Person of the Year 

in Iraq”), Shafaq News, January 10, 2015, available from www.

shafaq.com/sh2/index.php/news/iraq-news/89295-01-10-16-10-33.html.

74. “Qa’id Al-Thawri Al-Irani: Ashrafna ala qital DAISH bi’lIraq” (“Commander of the IRGC: We Supervised the Fight against 

ISIS in Iraq”), Arabi 21 (Beirut), September 17, 2014, available from 

www.t.arabi21.com/News/Print/776123.

75. “Qasim Sulaymani fi Baghdad” (“Qasim Sulaymani in 

Baghdad”), Al-Manar TV (Beirut), November 27, 2014, available 

from www.almanar.com.lb/wapadetails.php?eid=1041104. (Hereafter 

“Qasim Sulaymani fi Baghdad.”)

76. “Madha yafal al-jinral Sulaymani fi Al-Iraq?” (“What Is 

General Sulaymani Doing in Iraq?”), Quds Online (Tehran), January 7, 2015, available from www.qudsonline.ir. This is a source close 

to the IRGC.
83

77. “Tafasil an Hizb Allah Al-Libnani wa-dawrih fi amaliyat 

Khaybar fi Al-Iraq” (“Details on the Lebanese Hizb Allah’s Role 

in the Khaybar Operation in Iraq”), Al-Kashif, November 9, 2014, 

available from www.alkashf.org/news.php?action=view&id=2633; 

and “Muqatilu Badr: Qannasu DAISH mushkilatna wa-mudarribun libnaniyun yushrifun ala qannasi Al-Hashd” (“Badr Fighters: 

ISIS Snipers Are Our Task and Lebanese Trainers Supervise AlHashd Snipers”), Al-Alam Al-Jadid, November 10, 2014, available 

from al-aalem.com. (Hereafter “Muqatilu Badr: Qannasu DAISH.”)

78. “Tahrir tariq yarbut Diyala bi-Iran min saytarat DAISH” 

(“The Liberation from ISIS Control of a Road Linking Diyala with 

Iran”), Al-Mada, November 19, 2014, available from almadapaper.

net/ar/printnews.aspx?NewsID=475227. (Hereafter “Tahrir tariq 

yarbut Diyala bi-Iran.”)

79. Interview with Abu Mahdi Al-Muhandis, “Mas’ul qiyadat 

Al-Hashd Al-Shabi al-iraqi li’l-Wifaq: DAISH tattajih ila al-uful” 

(“An Official in Al-Hashd Al-Shabi’s Leadership to Al-Wifaq: ISIS 

Is Heading for a Fall”), Al-Wifaq (Tehran), January 24, 2015, available from www.al-vefagh.com/News/67388.html. 

80. Ibid. 

81. “Masdar li-Badr: Akthar min 200 khabir irani wa-muqatil 

yusaidun Al-Peshmerga bi-adad min manatiq Diyala” (“A Source 

to Badr: More Than 200 Iranian Experts and Fighters Are Helping 

the Peshmerga in a Number of Areas in Diyala”), Jaridat Badr, October 12, 2014, available from www.badrpress.com/badr/feeds_print.

php?lang=ar&id=26972.

82. “Al-Sayyid Al-Hakim: Ala man yarfa shiar musaadat AlIraq li-muwajahat al-irhab an yuthbit hirsah alayhi” (“Al-Sayyid 

Al-Hakim: Those Who Voice the Slogan of Helping Iraq to Confront Terrorism Must Prove They Are Serious”), Al-Adala (Najaf), 

September 18, 2014, available from www.aladalanews.net/index.

php?show=news&action=article&id=120258. (Hereafter “Ala man 

yarfa.”)

83. “Al-Amiri: Kull najahatna marhuna li-tadhiyat al-shabab.”

84. “Qasim Sulaymani fi Baghdad.”
84

85. Interview with Hadi Al-Amiri by the Iranian media, “AlAmiri: DAISH talaqqa daman mutakamilan min 80 dawla bi’lamwal wa’l-silah wa’l-afrad” (“Al-Amiri: ISIS Received Complete 

Support from 80 Countries in Terms of Money, Arms, and Personnel”), Jaridat Badr, January 12, 2015, available from badrpress.com/

badr/feeds.php?lang=ar&page_name=activities&id=29068. (Hereafter 

“Al-Amiri: DAISH talaqqa daman.”)

86. “Al-Asadi: Iran tudaim Al-Hashd Al-Shabi istishariyan” 

(“Al-Asadi: Iran Supports Al-Hashd Al-Shabi with Advice”), 

Rudaw (Arbil), January 27, 2015, available from rudaw.net/arabic/

middleeast/iraq/2701201511.

87. “Lawla musaadat Iran la-ihtallat DAISH Arbil” (“Had 

It Not Been for Iran’s Help ISIS Would Have Occupied Arbil”), 

Tabnak (Tehran), January 7, 2015, available from www.tabnak.ir/ar/

news/25287.

88. “Al-Amiri yushayyid bi-dawr Iran wa’l-liwa’ Sulaymani fi 

al-nasr ala DAISH” (“Al-Amiri Praises Iran’s and Major General 

Sulaymani’s Role in the Victory over ISIS”), Jaridat Badr, January 

7, 2015, available from badrpress.com/badr/feeds.php?lang=ar&page_

name=talk&id=28975.

89. Quoted in “Rub milyun musallah shii.”

90. “Al-Jinah al-askari li-munazhzhamat Badr.”

91. “Al-Marja Al-Sarkhi: Ayy muwajaha sa-takun ma Iran satanhar Iran wa-tuhzam asra min inhiyar Al-Mawsil” (“Marja AlSarkhi: In Any Confrontation with Iran, the Latter’s Defeat Will 

Be Quicker Than Mosul’s Collapse”), Al-Sarkhi’s website, October 5, 2014, available from www.al-hasany.net.

92. Rabi Baghdad, “Hal kanat Amirli sijn li’l-rafida am nuqtat 

ruju lahum?” (“Was Amirli a Prison for the Shia or the Comeback 

Point for Them?”), Al-Minbar Al-Ilami Al-Jihadi, ISIS’s principal 

forum, September 1, 2014, available from alplatformmedia.com/vb/

showthread.php?t=62402. 

93. “Al-Amiri yasil ila Al-Tuz ala ra’s quwwa kabira li-fakk 

al-hisar an Amirli” (“Al-Amiri Arrives in Al-Tuz at the Head 
85

of a Large Force in Order to Relieve the Siege of Amirli”), AlSumarriya TV, August 22, 2014, available from www.alsumaria.tv/

news/108635.

94. Ali Al-Qaysi, “Al-Quwwat al-amniya tutahhir Al-Azhim 

bi-musharakat Al-Peshmerga wa’l-ahali wa-dam tayaran aljaysh” (“The Security Forces Clear Al-Azhim in Cooperation 

with the Peshmerga and the Local Population and the Military’s 

Air Support”), Al-Sabah Al-Jadid, August 13, 2014, available from 

www.newsabah.com/wp/newspaper/15117. (Hereafter “Al-Quwwat 

al-amniya tutahhir.”)

95. Muhammad Al-Zuhayri, “Mas’ulun: Al-Amiri yaqud 

mutatawwiin isnadan li’l-quwwat al-amniya” (“Officials: AlAmiri Leads Volunteers in Support of the Security Forces”), AlAlam, August 25, 2014, available from www.alaalem.com/index.

php?aa=news&id22=19968.

96. “Masdar: Amaliyat tathir nahiyat Al-Azhim fi Diyala tammat bi-ishraf min wazir al-naql Hadi Al-Amiri” (“A Source: The 

Clearing Operation of the Al-Azhim District Was Conducted under the Supervision of the Minister of Transportation Hadi AlAmiri”), Al-Sumarriya TV, June 23, 2014, available from www.

alsumaria.tv/news/103926; and “Al-Amiri: Manasibna sahat al-qital wa-lan natakhalla an wajibatna al-jihadiya min ajl al-karasi” 

(“Al-Amiri: Our Posts Are the Battlefield and We Will Not Relinquish Our Jihadist Duty Just for Posts”), Jaridat Badr, available 

from www.badrpress.com/badr/feeds_print.php?lang=ar&id=26490; 

and “Sulaymani fi Jalawla’ wa-muhafizh Diyala li’l-Zaman: AlMilishiyat mutallaqat al-aydi fi al-qatl wa’l-khatf” (“Sulaymani Is 

in Jalawla’ and the Governor of Diyala to Al-Zaman: The Militias 

Have a Free Hand to Kill and Kidnap”), Al-Zaman (Baghdad), November 27, 2014, available from www.azzaman.com/?p=89339.

97. For example, as in retaking the town of Al-Muqdadiya, 

see Liz Sly and Abigail Hauslohner, “Militia Retakes Town as 

Fighting Turns Openly Sectarian,” The Washington Post, June 15, 

2014, p. A10.

98. Muhammad, “Al-Irhab yatahassan.”
86

99. “Majlis Babil: Al-Amin al-amm li-munazhzhamat Badr

khattat li-amaliyat Jurf Al-Sakhr wa-hasamha fi sitt saat” (“The 

Babil Council: The Secretary General of Badr Drafted the Plan for 

the Jurf Al-Sakhr Operation and Was Decisive in Six Hours”), Jaridat Badr, October 26, 2014, available from www.badrpress.com/badr/

feeds.php?lang=ar&page_name=activities&id=27363.

100. Jamal Al-Khursan, “Quwwat Al-Jaysh wa’l-Hashd wajahat kama’in wa-qannasin wa-fakkakat 250 ubuwwa nasifa min 

asl 500” (“Army and Al-Hashd Forces Faced Ambushes and Snipers, and Defused 250 IEDs Out of an Original 500”), Al-Alam AlJadid, October 26, 2014, available from al-aalem.com.

101. “Qiyadi fi Jaysh Al-Mahdi: Fath bab tasjil asma’ almuqatilin al-mustaiddin li-amaliyat istishhadiya didd DAISH” 

(“A Comamnder in the Jaysh Al-Mahdi: The Registering of the 

Names of Those Who Are Ready to Undertake Martyr Operations 

against ISIS Has Begun”), Al-Wikala Al-Ikhbariya li’l-Anba’ (Baghdad), October 15, 2014, available from www.ikhnews.com/index.

php?page=article&id=130925.

102. “Khubara’ wa-qada: Qiyam Kata’ib Hizb Allah bi-insha’ 

al-sawatir” (“Experts and Commanders: Kata’ib Hizb Allah Begins 

the Construction of Berms”), Hizb Allah site, September 5, 2014, 

available from www.kataibhizbollah.com.

103. Interview by journalist Husayn Al-Kabi, “Khabir askari: 

Ta’irat al-tahaluf al-duwali ghita’ jawwi li-himayat DAISH min 

fasa’il al-muqawama” (“A Defense Expert: The Coalition’s Aircraft Provide Air Cover to Protect ISIS from the Resistance’s 

Units”), Hizb Allah site, October 3, 2014, available from www.

kataibhizbollah.com/ar/index.php.

104. “Dawawinha tatahawwal ila marakiz tatawwu ma ilan 

al-bara’a min al-muntamin li’l-tanzhim al-irhabi” (“Its Council 

Houses Are Transformed into Volunteer Centers after Proclaiming the Banning of Anyone Who Belongs to the Terrorist Organization”), Al-Sabah, June 24, 2014, available from www.alsabaah.iq/

ArticleShow.aspx?ID=73389.

105. “Muqatilu Badr: Qannasu DAISH.”
87

106. Ahmed Rasheed, “Iraqi Shi’ite Militias Use Hit Lists to 

Pick Off Foes: Police,” Reuters, July 31, 2014, available from www.

reuters.com/assets/print?aid=USKBN0G01ZV20140731.

107. “Al-Quwwat al-amniya tutahhir.”

108. Quoted in “Hashd Diyala yutalibun muntaqidihim bi’lqital maan aw al-samt wa’l-Kurd yu’akkidun: Lawla Al-Hashd 

Al-Shabi la-ma kanat hunak amaliya siyasiya fi al-muhafazha” 

(“The Diyala Al-Hashd Demand from Their Critics to Join Them 

in the Fight Or to Be Quiet, While the Kurds Confirm That Had It 

Not Been for Al-Hashd Al-Shabi There Would Not Be Any Political Activity in the Province”), Al-Mada Press, November 28, 2014, 

available from www.almadapress.com.

109. “Al-Ibadi yasif quwwat Al-Hashd Al-Shabi bi’l-amud alfaqri li’l-quwwat al-amniya fi muharabat DAISH wa-yu’akkid istidad al-hukuma li-talbiyat mutatallabathim” (“Al-Ibadi Calls the 

Al-Hashd Al-Shabi Forces the Backbone of the Security Forces in 

the War against ISIS and Confirms the Government Is Prepared to 

Meet Their Requests”), Al-Furat News, October 5, 2014, available 

from wwww.alforatnews.com/modules/news/print.php?storyid=65853; 

and “Al-Ibadi: Al-Hashd Al-Shabi lan yakun min al-shia wahdihim” (“Al-Ibadi: Al-Hashd Al-Shabi Will Not Be Made Up Only 

of Shia”), Ilaf, February 4, 2015, available from www.elaph.com. 

(Hereafter “Al-Ibadi: Al-Hashd Al-Shabi.”)

110. “Al-Bulani yadu ila taghtiyat quwwat Al-Hashd Al-Shabi 

barran wa-jawwan wa-adam tarkihim saidan sahla li’l-dawaish” 

(“Al-Bulani Calls for the Provision of Ground and Air Cover for 

the Al-Hashd Al-Shabi Forces and That They Not Be Left As Easy 

Prey for ISIS”), Al-Sumarriya TV, October 17, 2014, available from 

www.alsumaria.tv/news/113599.

111. “Malumat istikhbarat Kata’ib Hizb Allah tashum fi tadmir shawkat DAISH” (“Kata’ib Hizb Allah Intelligence Contributes to the Destruction of ISIS Lair”), Hizb Allah site, January 24, 

2015, available from www.kataibhizbollah.com; and Wa’il Nima, 

“DAISH wa’l-Hashd Al-Shabi yatasaraan ala jisr yarbut Al-Falluja bi-janub Baghdad” (“ISIS and Al-Hashd Al-Shabi Contest a 

Bridge Linking Falluja and the Area South of Baghdad”), Al-Mada, September 3, 2014, available from almadapaper.net/ar/printnews.
88

aspx?NewsID=471072 (hereafter “DAISH wa’l-Hashd Al-Shabi 

yatasaraan”); and “Al-Juhd al-istikhbari li-Kata’ib Al-Imam Ali

tasharak tayaran al-jaysh bi-qasf mawaqi DAISH” (“The Kata’ib 

Al-Imam Ali’s Intelligence Effort Contributed to the Military Aircraft’s Strike on ISIS Positions”), Kata’ib Al-Imam Ali site, December 18, 2014, available from www.kt-im-ali.com/news/158.

112. “Al-Amiri: DAISH talaqqa daman.”

113. “Al-Amiri: Qarub tanfidh amaliyat askariya kubra litahrir Salah Al-Din bi’l-kamil min saytarat DAISH” (“Al-Amiri: 

The Execution of a Major Military Operation to Liberate Salah 

Al-Din Completely from ISIS Control Soon”), Jaridat Badr, December 23, 2014, available from www.badrpress.com/badr/feeds.

php?lang=ar&page_name=activities&id=28601; and “Ahl Al-Haqq: 

Fasa’il al-muqawama al-islamiya tamil ala isnad al-jaysh biamaliyatih al-askariya” (“Ahl Al-Haqq: The Islamic Resistance 

Units Support the Army in the Military Operations”), Al-Ansar

website, January 8, 2015, available from www.al-ansaar.net/main/

pages/news.php?nid=34085. 

114. “Al-Amiri: DAISH talaqqa daman.”

115. “Ahl Al-Haqq tantaqid mutalabat bad asha’ir Al-Anbar 

Amrika bi-damha wa-tu’akkid: Hunak khutta jadida qariba litahrir Salah Al-Din” (“Ahl Al-Haqq Criticizes the Demands from 

Some of the Tribes in Al-Anbar for America to Support Them 

and Affirms: There Will Soon Be a New Plan for the Liberation 

of Salah Al-Din”), Awan, January 21, 2015, available from awaniq.

com.ar/news/15242.

116. ”Al-Shaykh Al-Masudi yatafaqqad.”

117. “Najat Al-Zaydi wa’l-Amiri min muhawalat ightiyal fi 

Diyala” (“Al-Zaydi and Al-Amiri Escape Attempt to Kill Them in 

Diyala”), Al-Gharbiya News, January 24, 2015, available from www.

algharbiyanews.com.

118. ”Al-Shaykh Al-Masudi yatafaqqad.”

119. “Kata’ib Hizb Allah tatadakhkhal fi al-waqt al-munasib 

li-inqadh quwwa iraqiya taarradat li-qasf al-tahaluf al-dawli al-
89

mazum bi-muhit mawaqiha” (‘The Kata’ib Hizb Allah Intervene at 

the Right Moment to Rescue an Iraqi Unit under Fire in Its Perimeter by the So-Called International Coalition”), Hizb Allah website, October 19, 2014, available from www.kataibhizbollah.com/ar/

index.php.

120. For example, in the campaign south of Baghdad, militia 

commanders sometimes complained about a lack of cooperation 

from the Army and accused the police of remaining in their barracks, leaving the fighting to the militias. “DAISH wa’l-Hashd AlShabi yatasaraan”; and Wa’il Ni’ma, “3 alaf musallah yahkumun 

qabdathum ala Al-Mawsil fi asra inhiyar li’l-jaysh” (“3,000 Fighters Succeed in Capturing Mosul in a Precipitous Collapse of the 

Army”), Al-Mada, June 10, 2014, available from almadapaper.net/ar/

printnews.aspx?NewsID=466155.

121. “Ta’kidan li-ahaqqiyatihim bi-wizarat al-dakhiliya Badr

Al-Amiri tufaddih ajhizat al-dawla al-amniya wa-ihmalha” (“Affirming Its Right to the Ministry of the Interior, Al-Amiri’s Badr

Embarrasses the State’s Security Organs and Their Neglect”), 

Al-Kashif, September 17, 2014, available from www.alkashf.org/

popup.php?action=printnews&id=2413; “Al-Hashd Al-Shabi yarfa 

600 ubuwwa nasifa fi Al-Muqdadiya” (“Al-Hashd Al-Shabi Removes 600 IEDs in Al-Muqdadiya”), Al-Baghdadiya News, February 3, 2015, available from albaghdadianews.com; and “Quwwat 

Al-Hashd Al-Shabi tathur ala makhba’ li’l-asliha wa-masna li’lmutafajjirat shimali Babil” (“Al-Hashd Al-Shabi Forces Discover 

an Arms Cache and an Explosives Factory North of Babil”), AlMasdar News, January 27, 2015, available from l-news.net/index.

php/safety/69458.html.

122. “Saraya Al-Salam tusaytir ala sawarikh muwajjaha liistihdaf mawani Al-Basra” (“The Saraya Al-Salam Seize Rockets 

Poised to Strike Basra”), Khabar, January 14, 2015, available from 

khabaarpaper.com.

123. For example, the Liwa’ Abtal Al-Marjaiya militia, sponsored by the senior Shia authorities, was raised in the Al-Rumaytha district in Al-Muthanna province. “Wusul Liwa’ Al-Marjaiya 

li-masharif Al-Naimiya wa-sadd hujum ala Al-Ramadi wa-maqtal 

161 daishiyan” (“The Liwa’ Al-Marjaiya Arrives in Al-Naimiya 

and an Attack on Al-Ramadi Is Repulsed and 161 Members of 
90

ISIS Are Killed”), Shafaqna, December 4, 2014, available from iraq.

Shafaqna.com/topnews/item/47434.

124. “Muntasibu al-ataba al-husayniya fi qaidat Balad li-taziz 

al-ruh al-manawiya wa’l-lujistiya li-abtal Liwa’ Ali Al-Akbar” 

(“Members of the Husayni Ataba Go to Al-Balad Base to Raise 

the Morale and Provide Logistics for the Heroes of the Liwa’ Ali 

Al-Akbar”), Al-Ataba Al-Husayniya website, November 18, 2104, 

available from www.imamhussain.org/news/2417vie.html.

125. “Tahassuban min iqtirab DAISH min hududha Karbala’ 

tastaidd li-insha’ satir yafsilha an Al-Anbar” (“As a Precaution against ISIS’s Approach to Its Borders Karbala Prepares 

to Build a Berm Separating It from Al-Anbar”), Al-Madar, October 20, 2014, available from www.almadarnews.info/index.

php?page=article&id=8137.

126. “Ashira fi Al-Muthanna.”

127. “Karbala’ al-muqaddasa tutalib bi-tahwil salahiyat AlHashd Al-Shabi wa-tadribih ala al-muhafazhat” (“Holy Karbala 

Requests That the Jurisdiction for and Training of Al-Hashd 

Al-Shabi Be Placed under the Province”), Jaridat Badr, October 13, 2014, available from www.badrpress.com/badr/feeds_print.

php?lang=ar&id=27006.

128. “Mutahaddith bi-ism Al-Amiri: Mustaiddun li’l-insihab 

min Diyala bi-shart” (“A Spokesman for Al-Amiri: We Are Ready 

to Withdraw from Diyala on Condition”), Shafaq News, December 

12, 2014, available from www.shafaaq.com/sh2/index.php/news/iraqnews/87864-2014-12-12-05-59-16.html. 

129. “Al-Sadri yansah al-hukuma.”

130. “Khuddam Al-Sayyida Zaynab yunaffidhun amaliya istibaqiya nawiya wa-yukabbidun al-dawaish khasa’ir bashariya 

kabira fi Qaryat Al-Bu Ajil al-tikritiya” (“The Khuddam Al-Sayyida Zaynab Carry Out a Spectacular Operation and Inflict Heavy 

Casualties on ISIS in Qariyat Al-Bu Ajil in Tikrit”), Wikalat Nun, 

November 10, 2014, available from www.non14.net/56166.
91

131. “Ansar al-marjaiya tuharrir Al-Asalat wa-maqtal waitiqal 23 daishiyan” (“The Marja’s Men Liberate Al-Asalat, Killing 

or Capturing 23 ISIS Members”), Shafaqna, February 2, 2015, available from iraq.Shafaqna.com/today/item/49872.

132. “Tafasil muthira an mukhattat DAISH fi harbih alilamiya” (“Disturbing Details of ISIS’s Media War Plan”), AlKashif, October 19, 2014, available from www.alkashf.org/news.

php?action=view&id=2562.

133. “Al-Najaf al-ashraf: Musharakat 18 alf muqatil min mujahidi Al-Hashd Al-Shabi fi ta’min ziyarat al-arbiin” (“Noble Najaf: The Participation of 18,000 Fighters from Al-Hashd Al-Shabi’s 

Mujahidin for Security for the Arbiin Pilgrimage”), Jaridat Badr, 

November 3, 2014, available from www.badrpress.com/badr/feeds_

print.php?lang=ar&id=28085; “Firqat Al-Imam Ali li-Himayat AlMuqaddasat tusharik fi ihya’ dhikra usbu al-mawadda bi-tanzhif 

shawari Al-Najaf” (“The Firqat Al-Imam Ali li-Himayat Al-Muqaddasat Participates in the Celebrations of the Week of Love by Cleaning Najaf’s Streets”), Shafaqna, January 6, 2015, available from iraq.

Shafaqna.com/most-important/item/48849; and “Samahat al-shaykh 

al-sayyid al-qa’id (aazzahu Allah) yusdir bayanan muhimman 

yashkur fih kull man labba nida’ al-istidad wa-yulin an istidadih li’l-tansiq ma al-hukuma al-iraqiya li-idkhal anasir mu’mina 

bi-hubb Al-Iraq wa’l-tadhiya min ajlih ila al-jaysh al-iraqi” (“His 

Excellency Shaykh Al-Sayyid Leader Issues an Important Communique in Which He Thanks All Who Responded to the Call to 

Be Prepared and Declares His Readiness to Coordinate with the 

Iraqi Government the Enlistment into the Army of Believers Who 

Love and Are Ready to Sacrifice Themselves for Iraq”), Muqtada 

Al-Sadr’s website, December 16, 2014, available from jawabna.com/

index.php/permalink/7647.html.

134. ”Qiyadi bariz fi Al-Asa’ib yakshif an ghadab Al-Khazali 

wa-khuttatuh fi tasfiyat Al-Tanzhim!” (“A Leading Commander 

in Al-Asa’ib Reveals Al-Khazali’s Anger and His Plan to Eliminate 

the (ISIS) Organization”), Al-Kashif, September 21, 2014, available 

from www.alkashf.org/new.php?actionb=view&id=2433. 

135. “Al-Dakhiliya tadu ‘al-fasa’il al-jihadiya’ ila musaadatha fi milaff al-amn bi-Baghdad wa-tu’akkid : Amaliyat al-khatf 

mu’amara li-tashwih sumat Al-Hashd Al-Shabi” (“The Ministry 
92

of the Interior Calls on the ‘Jihadi Units’ to Help It with Security 

in Baghdad and Affirms: The Kidnappings Are a Plot to Besmirch 

Al-Hashd Al-Shabi’s Reputation”), Al-Mada Press, November 

28, 2014, available from www.almadapress.com; and “Amaliyat 

Baghdad: Itaqalna kathiran min-ma yastaghillun ism Al-Hashd 

Al-Shabi wa’l-mutabaa mustamirra” (“The Baghdad Operations 

Command: We Detained Those Who Exploit the Name of AlHashd Al-Shabi and the Matter Continues to Be Pursued”), AlGhad Press, October 30, 2014, available from alghadpress.com/ar/

NewsDetails.aspx?NewsiD=22582; “Al-Iraq yulin itiqal ‘rajul al-din 

al-askari’ al-muthir li’l-jadl fi Baghdad” (“Iraq Announces the Arrest of a Controversial ‘Military Cleric’ in Baghdad”), Shafaq News, 

June 4, 2014, available from www.shafaaq.com/sh2/index.php/news/

iraq-news/78052--q-q-.html.

136. “1500 qatil wa-jarih min Al-Hashd Al-Shabi bi-amaliyat 

tahrir mudun Diyala” (“1,500 Dead and Wounded from Al-Hashd 

Al-Shabi in the Operation to Liberate the Towns in Diyala”), Shafaq News, February 1, 2015, available from www.shafaaq.com/sh2/

index.php/news/iraq-news/90407-1500---------.html. 

137. “Karbala’ tushayyi 25 shahidan saqatu al-yawm bitafjir intihari fi Jurf Al-Sakhr bi-hudur mumaththil al-marjaiya” 

(“Karbala, with the Participation of the Marja’s Representative, 

Buries 25 Martyrs Who Fell Today as a Result of a Suicide Bombing in Jurf Al-Sakhr”), Shafaqna, October 27, 2014, available from 

iraq.Shafaqna.com/topnews/item/45753; and “Hujum wasi aqb tafjir 

intihari istahdaf tajammuan li’l-Hashd Al-Shabi fi Sur Shanas biSamarra’” (“A Broad Attack Following a Suicide Bombing That 

Targeted a Concentration of Al-Hashd Al-Shabi in Sur Shanas in 

Samarra”), Iraq Press Agency (Baghdad), February 2, 2015, available from www.iraqpressagency.com.

138. “Suqut 108 min Al-Hashd Al-Shabi bayn qatil wa-jarih” 

(“108 Dead and Wounded from Al-Hashd Al-Shabi”), Iram News

(Abu Dhabi), January 23, 2015, available from www.eremnews.

com/?id=101174. 

139. “Al-Fuqara’ la yadkhulun al-janna” (“The Poor Do Not 

Go to Heaven”), Al-Alam Al-Jadid, November 26, 2014, available 

from al-aalem.com.
93

140. “Al-Basra tushayyi yawmiyan thalath dahaya min harb 

DAISH” (“Basra Buries Three Victims of the ISIS War Daily”), AlAlam Al-Jadid, October 23, 2014, available from al-aalem.com.

141. “Qa’id fi Al-Hashd Al-Shabi: Amrika la tuqatil 

‘adawatha’ ala ard al-waqi” (“A Commander in Al-Hashd AlShabi: America Will Not Fight against Its ‘Tools’ on the Ground”), 

Al-Alam, October 16, 2014, available from www.alaalem.com/index.php?aa=news&id22=20704. (Hereafter “Qa’id fi Al-Hashd 

Al-Shabi.”)

142. “Khatib juma bi’l-Basra yutalib bi-isti’naf al-darabat aljawwiya li-mawaqi DAISH” (“The Friday Preacher in Basra Demands the Resumption of Air Strikes against ISIS Positions”), 

Shafaqna, October 3, 2014, available from iraq.Shafaqna.com/today/

item/44650.

143. “Taarrafu ala al-sabab al-haqiqi wara’ ghadab al-amrikan 

min al-quwa al-sunniya fi Amman” (“Know the Real Reason behind the Americans’ Anger at the Sunni Forces in Amman”), AlKashif, September 30, 2014, available from www.alkashf.org/news.

php?action=view&id=2481.

144. “Qa’id fi Al-Hashd Al-Shabi.”

145. Muhammad Kazhim, “Ra’is kutlat Badr yantaqid izdiwajiyat al-siyasiyin fi wasfihim li-butulat abna’ Al-Hashd AlShabi” (“The Head of the Badr Party Criticizes the Politicians’ 

Double Standard in Describing the Heroics of the Al-Hashd AlShabi Boys”), Jaridat Badr, October 1, 2014, available from www.

badrpress.com/badr/feeds_print.php?lang=ar&id=26882.

146. “Kata’ib Hizb Allah: Mashru Al-Haras Al-Watani yuidd 

Sahwa li’l-amrikan wa-muqaddima li-taqsim Al-Iraq” (“The 

Kata’ib Hizb Allah: The National Guard Project Will Bring Back 

the Sahwa for the Americans and Is the Prelude to Iraq’s Partition”), Al-Ittijah TV (Iraq), January 13, 2015, available from aletejahtv.org/index.php/permalink/42609.html.

147. “Na’ib an Badr: Al-Haras Al-Watani quwwat ihtiyat wala yajuz taslihahu bi-asliha thaqila” (“A Badr Member of Parliament: The National Guard Is a Reserve Force and It Cannot Have 
94

Heavy Weapons”), Jaridat Badr, October 21, 2014, available from 

www.badrpress.com/badr/feeds_print.php?lang=ar&id=27233. (Hereafter “Na’ib an Badr: Al-Haras Al-Watani.”)

148. “Al-Marjaiya tadu li-tawfir al-silah li’l-mutatawwiin.”

149. “Na’ib an Badr: Al-Haras Al-Watani”; and “Al-Sadr yuwajjih Saraya Al-Salam bi’l-insihab min al-manatiq allati yatawajadun fiha” (“Al-Sadr Orders the Saraya Al-Salam to Withdraw 

from the Areas Where They Are Deployed”), Al-Masalla, October 

29, 2014, available from almasalah.com. (Hereafter “Al-Sadr yuwajjih Saraya Al-Salam.”)

150. “Mutatalabat siyasiya fi Al-Basra bi-tashkil wizara askariya radifa li-wizarat al-difa” (“Political Demands in Basra to Establish a Reserve Military Ministry for the Ministry of Defense”), 

Sumarriya TV, June 14, 2014, available from www.alsumaria.tv/

news/103162.

151. “Al-Tarfi: Al-Hashd Al-Shabi al-rakiza al-asasiya fi 

tashkil Al-Haras Al-Watani bi’l-muhafazhat kaffatan” (“AlTarfi: Al-Hashd Al-Shabi Is the Main Pillar for Forming the National Guard in All the Provinces”), Al-Furat News, October 20, 

2014, available from wwww.alforatnews.com/modules/news/article.

php?storyid=67073. 

152. “Maktab Al-Ibadi: Ijra’at tashkil Al-Haras Al-Watani 

tashuqq tariqha bi’l-tansiq ma al-difa wa’l-Hashd Al-Shabi” (“AlIbadi’s Office: The Measures for Setting Up the National Guard 

Entail Coordination between the Ministry of Defense and AlHashd Al-Shabi”), Sumarriya TV, November 19, 2014, available 

from www.alsumaria.tv/news/116662.

153. “Makatib mutatawwiin fi Samarra’ yudirha alwiya 

min al-jaysh al-sabiq” (“Volunteer Recruitment Bureaus in Samarra Run by Major Generals from the Former Army”), AlAlam, September 29, 2014, available from www.alaalem.com/index.

php?aa=news&id22=20999; and “Washintun tajtami ma dubbat 

al-jaysh al-sabiq li-tashkil Al-Haras Al-Watani” (“Washington 

Meets with Officers from the Former Army to Form the National 

Guard”), Al-Dustur, November 27, 2014, available from www.daraddustour.com/index.php/home-news/28107-2014-11-25-21-40-18.
95

154. “Qiyadi badri: Al-Dakhiliya yatazim tajmid wakilih AlAsadi wa-zar anasir al-munazhzhama dakhil al-wizara!” (“A 

Badri Leader: The Ministry of the Interior Intends to Neutralize 

Its Deputy Al-Asadi and to Pack the Ministry with Members of 

Badr”), Al-Kashif, November 18, 29014, available from www.alkashf.org/news.php?action=view&id=2677.

155. “Hizb Allah Al-Iraq yulin an ta’sis Jaysh Al-Mukhtar wayatawaad Al-Qaida” (“Iraqi Hizb Allah Announces the Creation of 

the Jaysh Al-Mukhtar and Threatens Al-Qaida”), Al-Sumarriya TV, 

February 4, 2013, available from www.alsumaria.tv/news/70898.

156. “Al-Amin al-amm li-munazhzhamat Badr: Lawla fatwa 

al-marjaiya wa’l-Hashd Al-Shabi la-tarabba al-irhab ala buldan 

Al-Khalij” (“The Secretary General of Badr: Had It Not Been for 

The Marja’s Fatwa and the Al-Hashd Al-Shabi, Terrorists Would 

Be in Control of the Gulf Countries”), Jaridat Badr, January 8, 2015, 

available from badrpress.com.

157. “Haydar Al-Ibadi: Al-Saudiya sa-tastaghill al-harb ala 

DAISH li-tanfidh hajamat ala mawaqi tanzhimat iraqiya” (“Haydar Al-Ibadi: Saudi Arabia Will Take Advantage of the War 

against ISIS to Carry Out Attacks against Iraqi Organizations”), 

Wikalat Al-Akhbar Al-Iraqiya (Baghdad), October 7, 2014, available from irq4all.com/ShowNews.php?id=99600.

158. “Al-Ibadi yahsal min Iran wa’l-milishiyat bi-adam altaarrud li’l-sifara al-saudiya” (“Al-Ibadi Gets Reassurances from 

Iran and the Militias That They Will Not Oppose the Saudi Embasssy”), Mawsuat Al-Rashid (Baghdad), January 12, 2015, available from www.alrashead.net/index.php?prevn&id=7576&typen=2.

159. “Hal tanjah Kutlat Al-Ahrar fi ilgha’ al-ittifaqiya al-amniya ma Washintun?” (“Will the Ahrar Bloc Succeed in Canceling the 

Security Agreement with Washington?”), Al-Alam (Tehran), January 5, 2015, available from www.alalam.ir/print/1663696?img=0.

160. “Ahl Al-Haqq: Sa-nataamal ma al-quwwat al-ajnabiya 

ka-quwwat muhtalla fi hal dukhulhim Al-Iraq” (“Ahl Al-Haqq: 

We Will Treat Foreign Forces as Occupation Forces If They Enter 

Iraq”), Al-Sumarriya TV, February 1, 2015, available from www.

alsumaria.tv; and “Asa’ib Al-Haqq bi’l-Iraq yuwajjuhun tahdhiran 
96

ghayr mubashir li’l-amrikan” (“The Asa’ib Al-Haqq in Iraq Send 

an Indirect Warning to the Americans”), Tasnim News Agency 

(Tehran), February 2, 2015, available from www.tasnimnews.com/

arabic/Home/Single/642328.

161. “Al-Tahaluf al-duwali: Sura ghamida wa-ahdaf mashkuk 

biha” (“The International Coalition: A Murky Picture and Suspicious Objectives”), Jaridat Badr, September 18, 2014, available from 

www.badrpress.com/badr/feeds_print.php?lang=ar&id=26436.

162. “Al-Ahrar tatahaddath an mukhattat amiriki li-taqsim 

Al-Iraq wa-ihtilalih bi-hujjat DAISH” (“The Ahrar Party Discuss 

an American Plan to Partition and Occupy Iraq under the Pretext 

of ISIS”), Ahrar Al-Iraq (Baghdad), October 9, 2014, available from 

www.ahraraliraq.com/index.php?page=article&id=36043.

163. “Al-Mashriq taht al-intidab al-amiriki” (“The East 

under an American Protectorate”), Jaridat Badr, September 

17, 2014, available from www.badrpress.com/badr/feeds_print.

php?lang=ar&id=26388.

164. “Siyasiyun: Akthar min 3000 mustashar fi Al-Iraq ‘tadakhkhul safir” (“Politicians: More Than 3,000 Advisers in Iraq Are 

a ‘Boldfaced Intervention’”), Al-Alam, November 11, 2014, available from www.alaalem.com/index.php?news=.

165. “Al-Hashd Al-Shabi tughadir qaidat Al-Asad wa-400 

muqatil min Al-Anbar yatalaqqawn tadribat amirikiya” (“AlHashd Al-Shabi Leaves Al-Asad Base as 400 Fighters from Al-Anbar Get American Training”), Iraq Press Agency, November 11, 

2014, available from www.iraqpressagency.com/ar/archives/104884.

166. Communique “Al-Marja Al-Sistani yuhdhir bi-an takun 

al-musaada al-kharijiya li-muharabat DAISH madkhalan li’lmasas bi-istiqlaliyat al-qirar al-siyasi wa’l-askari bi’l-Iraq” (“The 

Marja Al-Sistani Cautions That Foreign Help in the Fight against 

ISIS Not Be at the Expense of the Independence of Iraq’s Political and Military Decisionmaking”), Al-Sistani’s site, September 

19, 2014, available from www.sistani.org/arabic/in-news/24963; and 

“Al-Qubanchi yuhdhir min tawajjuh al-tahaluf al-duwali li-harb 

da’ima fi Al-Iraq” (“Al-Qubanchi Warns the International Coalition Not to Engage in a Permanent War in Iraq”), Al-Qirtas News 
97

(Baghdad), September 19, 2014, available from www.alqurtasnews.

com/news/50395.

167. Interview with Hadi Al-Amiri, “Hadi Al-Amiri: AlKhatar al-takfiri yuhaddid al-alam bi-rummatih wa-DAISH saniat Amrika wa’l-Gharb” (“Hadi Al-Amiri: The Takfiri Threat Endangers the Entire World and ISIS Is a Creation of America and 

the West”), Tasnim News Agency, January 7, 2015, available from 

www.tasnimnews.com/arabic/Home/Single/611899.

168. “Qa’id fi Al-Hashd Al-Shabi.” 

169. “Al-Amiri: Man yurid ibqa’ DAISH yatahajjam ala AlHashd Al-Shabi wa’l-itimad ala al-tahaluf al-duwali sarab wamu’tamarna al-qadim fi Al-Hawija” (“Al-Amiri: Those who Want 

ISIS to Remain Attack Al-Hashd Al-Shabi; and Reliance on the 

International Coalition Is a Mirage and Our Next Conference Will 

Be in Al-Hawija”), Al-Mada Press, February 8, 2015, available from 

www.alamadapress.com/ar/NewsDetails.aspx?NewsID=43828. 

170. “Ala man yarfa;” and “Al-Amin al-amm li-munazhzhamat Badr: Al-Munazhzhamat al-irhabiya hiya nitajat siyasat 

Washintun al-khati’a” (“The Badr Organization’s Secretary General: The Terrorist Organizations Are the Offspring of Washington’s Mistaken Policy”), Jaridat Badr, September 18, 2014, available 

from www.badrpress.com/badr/feeds_print.php?lang=ar&id=26450. 

(Hereafter “Al-Amin al-amm li-munazhzhamat Badr.”)

171. “Mumaththil al-marjaiya: Malamih al-mukhattat al-duwali li-taqsim Al-Iraq bada’at tatakashshaf” (“The Marja’s Representative: The Contours of the International Plan to Partition Iraq 

Have Begun to Be Clearer”), Shafaqna, October 1, 2014, available 

from iraq.Shafaqna.com/of-the-day/item/44530.html.

172. “Taharrukat Al-Hashd Al-Shabi tusabbib al-irbak liDAISH wast Al-Mawsil” (“Al-Hashd Al-Shabi’s Movements Are 

Causing a Dilemma for ISIS in the Middle of Mosul”), Wikalat AlYawm Al-Thamin (Baghdad), February 11, 2015, available from 

8th-day.com/?p=95619. 

173. Rogin and Lake, “Iran-Backed Militias.”
98

174. “Jaysh Al-Hashd Al-Shabi: Al-Khawf min ta’irat al-tahaluf abta’ harakatna nahw tahrir al-manatiq al-mujawira li-Bayji” 

(“Al-Hashd Al-Shabi Army: Fear of the Coalition Aircraft Slowed 

Our Advance toward Liberating the Areas Adjacent to Al-Bayji”), 

Al-Alam Al-Jadid, November 2, 2014, available from al-aalem.com.

175. “Al-Sadr yuwajjih Saraya Al-Salam”; and “Istikhbarat 

Kata’ib Hizb Allah: Al-Qasf al-amriki li-qitat al-jaysh wa’l-Hashd 

Al-Shabi amdan yakshif khabathat al-nawaya al-amrikiya” (“The 

Kata’ib Hizb Allah’s Intelligence: The Intentional American Bombing of an Army Unit and of Al-Hashd Al-Shabi Reveals the Malice 

of American Intentions”), Kata’ib Hizb Allah site, September 21, 

2014, available from www.kataibhizbollah.com/ar/index.php.

176. “Al-Musawi: Istimrar al-harb fi Al-Iraq ghayat Amrika” 

(“Al-Musawi: America’s Goal Is the Prolongation of the War in 

Iraq”), Al-Istiqama (Baghdad), January 8, 2015, available from alestiqama.com/?p=144365.

177. “Al-Amn al-barlamaniya tadu Al-Hashd Al-Shabi liistihdaf wa-isqat al-ta’irat allati tulqi al-musaadat” (“The Parliamentary Committee on Security Urges Al-Hashd Al-Shabi to 

Target Any Aircraft That Drops Aid”), Ayn Al-Iraq News (Baghdad), February 7, 2015, available from aynaliraqnews.com/index.

php?aa=news&id22=31133.

178. Perhaps in anticipation, by late-2014, at least one U.S. 

company was recruiting personnel to “conduct combat missions” in Iraq. See Ann Scott Tyson, “U.S. Firm Taps Ex Operators to Fight ISIS,” Warrior Scout (Seattle, WA), December 7, 2014, 

available from warrior-scout.com/story/1487723-u-s-firm-taps-exoperators-to-fight-isis.

179. Ford Sypher, “Are American Troops Already Fighting on 

the Front Lines in Iraq?” The Daily Beast (New York), September 

2, 2014, available from www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/09/02/

are-american-troops-already-fighting-on-the-front-lines-in-iraq.html#;

“SAS Quad Bike Squads Kill up to 8 Jihadis Each Day,” The Daily 

Mail (London), November 22, 2014, available from www.dailymail.

co.uk; and Ian Austen, “Canada: Troops Clash with ISIS in Iraq,” 

The New York Times, January 19, 2015, available from www.nytimes.com.
99

180. “Tahshidat askariya li’l-jaysh wa’l-Hashd Al-Shabi bi-hadaf tahrir Amirli” (“The Massing of the Army and Al-Hashd AlShabi with the Intent of Liberating Amirli”), Al-Sabah, August 26, 

2014, available from www.alsabaah.iq/ArticlePrint.aspx?ID=76600.

181. “Na’ib anbari: Muaskarat al-jaysh asbahat mustawdiat liDAISH wa-takhlis al-muhafazha minhum lan yatimma min dun 

quwwat barriya ajnabiya” (“A Member of Parliament from AlAnbar: The Army Bases Have Become Depots for ISIS and Their 

Elimination from the Provinces Will Not Happen without Foreign 

Ground Forces”), Al-Mada Press, October 10, 2014, available from 

www.almadapress.com/ar/news/37954.

182. “Sasa yastahjinun al-mutalaba bi-sahb al-jaysh min AlAnbar” (“Politicians Reject the Demands to Withdraw the Army 

from Al-Anbar”), Al-Mada Press, October 19, 2014, available from 

almadapaper.net/ar/printnews.aspx?NewsID=473406.

183. “Al-Hakim: Al-Dawaish lan yataqaddimu shibran nahw 

ard Baghdad wa-nahnu mawjudun” (“Al-Hakim: The Members 

of ISIS Will Not Advance a Single Inch toward Baghdad While 

We Exist”), Wikalat Sumer Al-Ikhbariya, October 16, 2014, available 

from sumernews.3abber.com/page/2; and “Al-Hakim yushaddid ala 

ihtiram siyadat Al-Iraq wa-dam al-quwwat al-amniya” (“Al-Hakim Insists on Respect for Iraq’s Sovereignty and on Support for 

the Security Forces”), Shafaqna, October 13, 2014, available from 

iraq.Shafaqna.com/of-the-day/item/44644.

184. “Al-Qubanchi: Mushkilatna laysat fi al-quwwat al-barriya wa-innama fi al-qudrat al-taslihiya” (“Al-Qubanchi: Our Problem Is Not with Ground Forces but Rather with Armaments”), 

Shafaqna, October 10, 2014, available from iraq.Shafaqna.com/

topnews/item/44942.

185. Hizb Allah communique, September 15, 2014, available 

from www.katabibhizbollah.com.

186. “Kalimat al-amin al-amm li’l-muqawama al-islamiya 

Asa’ib Ahl Al-Haqq al-shaykh Qays Al-Khazali hawl al-awda alsiyasiya al-amniya al-akhira” (“The Speech by the Secretary General of the Asa’ib Ahl Al-Haqq’s Islamic Resistance, Shaykh Qays 

Al-Khazali, on the Latest Political and Security Situation”), Ahl 
100

Al-Haqq website, September 16, 2014, available from www.ahlualhaq.com; and statement by Ahmad Rida Al-Mu’min, Ahl Al-Haqq’s 

Media Office, Ahl Al-Haqq website, n.d., ca. September 29, 2014, 

available from www.ahlulhaq.com. Al-Amiri expressed the same 

view in “Al-Amin al-amm li-munazhzhamat Badr.”

187. Ibid.

188. “Al-Ansari: Lasna bi-haja ila quwwat ajnabiya wa’-l-iraqiyun hum man harrar al-aradi” (“Al-Ansari: We Do Not Need Foreign Forces and It Was the Iraqis Who Liberated the Territories”), 

Jaridat Badr, November 3, 2014, available from www.badrpress.com/

badr/feeds_print.php?lang=ar&id=27594.

189. “Kata’ib Hizb Allah tuhaddid: Lan nakun ma Amirika fi 

makan wahid illa fi halat qital” (“Kata’ib Hizb Allah Threaten: We 

Will Not Remain in Any Place Where America Is Except to Fight the 

Latter”), Al-Rafidayn, September 15, 2014, available from www.alrafidayn.com/arabic/index.php/responsive/3099-2014-09-15-11-10-02; 

and “Kata’ib Sayyid Al-Shuhada’ tuhaddid bi’l-insihab min sahat 

al-qital fi hal tadakhkhul al-quwwat al-amrikiya” (“Kata’ib Sayyid 

Al-Shuhada’ Threaten to Withdraw from the Battlefield If American Forces Intervene”), Al-Sumarriya TV, December 12, 2014, 

available from www.alsumaria.tv.

190. “Al-Sadr yuwajjih Saraya Al-Salam.”

191. “Asa’ib Ahl Al-Haqq mushayyida bi-mawqif Iran.”

192. Communique, Al-Sadr website, September 15, 2014, 

available from jawabna.com/index.php/permalink/7574.html?print.

193. “Na’iba an at-tayyar al-sadri: Narfud awdat al-amrikan 

ila Al-Iraq bi-ayy shakl min al-ashkal” (“A Member of Parliament 

from the Sadri Movement: We Reject the Americans’ Return under Any Form”), Wikalat Nun Al-Ikhbariya, October 13, 2014, 

available from www.non14.net/55061.

194. “Masdar muttali li’l-Shahid News: Iran tuwajjih 4 milishiyat muwaliya laha bi-arqalat al-juhud al-dawliya li-muwajahat Al-Dawla Al-Islamiya” (“An Informed Source to Al-Shahid 

News: Iran Directs Four Militias Which Defer to It to Obstruct 
101

International Efforts to Fight the Islamic State”), Al-Shahid News

(Baghdad), September 17, 2014, available from alshahidnews.

com/?p=28788.

195. “Al-Ibadi bad liqa’ Al-Sistani: Muttafiqun ala rafd dukhul 

al-quwwat al-ajnabiya wa-nahnu bi-haja li’l-taslih wa’l-tadrib 

wa’l-isnad” (“Al-Ibadi Following His Meeting with Al-Sistani: 

We Are in Agreement in Rejecting the Entry of Foreign Forces 

and That What We Need Are Arms, Training, and Support”), 

Al-Wikala Al-Wataniya Al-Iraqiya li’l-Anba’ (Baghdad), October 20, 2014, available from www.ninanews.com/arabic/News_Print.

asp?ar95_VQ=HHHDML; and “Al-Hukuma tujaddid rafdaha irsal quwwat dawliya ila Al-Anbar” (“The Government Repeats 

Its Refusal about the Deployment of International Forces to AlAnbar”), Al-Mada Press, October 27, 2014, available from www.

almadapress.com/ar/NewsDetails.aspx?NewsID=38832.

196. “Al-Ibadi: Al-Sistani awsa bi-jaww amni mustaqirr wadam al-mutatawwiin wa-sa-nuhasib kull man takhallaf an alwajib” (“Al-Ibadi: Al-Sistani Called for a Stable Security Environment and for Support for the Volunteers and We Will Discipline 

Anyone Who Is Derelict in His Duty”), Al-Mada Press, October 20, 

2014, available from www.almadapress.com.

197. “Wusul alf muqatil min Saraya Al-Salam bi-qiyadat muhafizh Baghdad li-marqad Al-Imamayn Al-Askariyayn” (“The 

Arrival of 1,000 Fighters of the Saraya Al-Salam Led by the Mayor 

of Baghdad to the Shrine of the Two Imams”), July 1, 2014, AlSumarriya TV, available from www.alsumaria.tv/news/104486.

198. Al-Sadr’s reminder, in the form of a communique to fielded forces to “follow orders,” Al-Sadr’s website, September 4, 2014, 

available from jawabna.com/index.php/permalink/7555.html?print. 

199. “Istirad askari li’l-wajba al-ula min Firqat Al-Abbas (alayhi al-salam) Al-Qitaliya li’l-difa an Al-Iraq wa’l-atabat al-muqaddasa” (“A Military Parade by the First Contingent of the Firqat AlAbbas Al-Qitaliya for the Defense of Iraq and the Holy Atabas”), 

Shabatak Al-Kafil Al-Alamiya, June 26, 2014, available from alkafeel.net/ar-news/index.php?id=1883.
102

200. “Min ajl raf al-ruh al-manawiya li’l-muqatilin al-iraqiyin, 

qism al-shu’un al-diniya fi Al-Ataba Al-Abbasiya al-muqaddasa 

yaqum bi-ilqa’ muhadarat diniya wa-tathqifiya wa-tahshidiya” 

(“The Religious Affairs Sections of the Abbasiya Ataba Gives Religious, Cultural, and Inspirational Lectures in Order to Raise the 

Morale of the Iraqi Fighters”), Shabatak Al-Kafil Al-Alamiya, July 

27, 2014, available from alkafeel.net/ar-news/index.php?id=1952.

201. “Al-Ibadi yadu ila tawhid al-sufuf wa-istilham al-ibar 

min masirat al-imam Al-Husayn” (“Al-Ibadi Calls for the Unity of 

Ranks and for Inspiration from the Life of the Imam Al-Husayn”), 

Al-Iraqiya TV (Baghdad), October 24, 2014, available from www.

imn.iq/news/view.53013.

202. “Al-Kashf an wusul 300 unsur min Asa’ib Ahl Al-Haqq ila 

qaidat Ayn Al-Asad fi Al-Anbar” (“It Is Revealed That 300 Members of Asa’ib Ahl Al-Haqq Have Arrived at Ayn Al-Asad Base 

in Al-Anbar”), Ahrar Al-Iraq, November 10, 2014, available from 

www.ahraraliraq.com/print.php?id=37015.

203. “Barlamani iraqi: Al-Amaliyat al-askariya fi bad almanatiq tahdif li-idaf ahl al-sunna” (“Iraqi Member of Parliament: The Military Operations in Some Areas Are Intended to 

Weaken the Sunnis”), Al-Madar, October 2, 2014, available from 

www.almadarnews.info/index.php?page=article&id=7667.

204. Hayfa’ Zankana, “Anta daishi wa-in kunta tiflan!” (“You 

Are a Member of ISIS Even If You Are a Child!”), Wikalat Al-Akhbar Al-Iraqiya, October 21, 2014, available from iraq4all.com/PrintNews.php?id=99892. Some Shia voices openly imply this, as one 

journalist, asking rhetorically why the Sunnis did not respond to 

the mobilization, replied that: 

All terrorism sprang from the Sunni regions . . . and your 

(Sunni) brothers support it and are part of its force structure; 

how can you expect them to then participate in the popular 

mobilization (Al-Hashd Al-Shabi) while they are fighting 

against it?

Muhammad Abd Allah, “Li-madha la yujad sunni fi AlHashd Al-Shabi?” (“Why Are There No Sunnis in Al-Hashd AlShabi?”), Sawt Al-Iraq, September 1, 2014, available from www.

sotaliraq.com/mobile-item.php?id=167005.
103

205. “Khatib Al-Falluja yattahim hukumat Baghdad bi-ibadat 

ahl al-sunna fi Al-Anbar wa’l-Iraq wa-ihraq Al-Falluja” (“Falluja’s Friday Preacher Accuses the Baghdad Government of Exterminating the Sunnis in Al-Anbar and Elsewhere in Iraq and 

of Torching Falluja”), Al-Mada Press, October 17, 2014, available 

from www.almadapress.com/ar/news/38320.

206. “Abraz qiyadat Al-Quwa Al-Wataniya al-sunniya yasif 

Qays Al-Khazali bi’l-mujrim al-safawi’” (“The Most Prominent 

Leader of the Sunni Al-Quwa Al-Wataniya Characterizes Qays 

Al-Khazali as a Safavid Criminal”), Al-Kashif, October 16, 2014, 

available from www.alkashf.org/news.php?action=view&id=2549.

207. Wisam Al-Mulla, “Al-Mutlag: Ma taqum al-milishiyat 

ta’ifi istifzazi lan naskut alayh” (“Al-Mutlag: What the Militias 

Are Doing Is Sectarian Provocation about Which We Will Not Be 

Silent”), Khabar, November 12, 2014, available from khabaarpaper.

com/index/the-news/12733.

208. For example, Amnesty International (London), Absolute 

Impunity: Militia Rule in Iraq, London, UK: 2014, available from 

www.amnesty.org.uk/sites/default/files/absolute_impunity_iraq_report.pdf; Amnesty International, “Iraq: Evidence of War Crimes 

by Government-backed Shi’a Militias,” October 14, 2014, available from www.amnesty.org/en/news/iraq-evidence-war-crimes-government-backed-shi-militias-2014-10-14; and Tirana Hassan, “The 

Gangs of Iraq,” Human Rights Watch, Washington, DC, November 

4, 2014, available from www.hrw.org/news/2014/11/04/gangs-iraq. 

209. Ned Parker and Ahmed Rasheed, “Special Report: Inside Iraq’s ‘Killing Zones’,” Reuters, December 17, 2014, available 

from www.reuters.com/assets/print?aid=USKBNOJVI10J20141217; 

and “Muhafizh Diyala yushakkil Saraya Al-Difa Al-Watani li-rad 

al-milishiyat wa-yughliq mumaththiliyat Al-Umam Al-Muttahida” (“The Governor of Diyala Forms the Saraya Al-Difa Al-Watani

to Defend against the Militias and Closes the United Nations Representative’s Office”), Al-Madar, August 28, 2014, available from 

www.almadarnews.info/index.php?page=article&id=6537.

210. Usama Mahdi, “Baghdad: Damm alaf al-asha’iriyin li’ljaysh bi-muhafazha muhadhiya li-Iran” (“Baghdad: Thousands of 

Tribals Join the Army in a Province Adjoining Iran”), Ilaf, January 
104

7, 2015, available from www.elaph.com/Web/News/2015/1/971889.

html. (Hereafter Mahdi, “Baghdad: Damm alaf al-asha’iriyin.”)

211. “Nashitun wa-siyasiyun wa-wujaha’ yulinun ta’yidhim 

li’l-hamla al-iraqiya li-idraj al-milishiyat ala al-qa’ima al-dawliya 

li’l-munazhzhamat al-irhabiya dayin darurat dam al-hamla litahqiq ahdafha” (“Activists, Politicians, and Notables Proclaim 

Their Support for the Iraqi Campaign to Place the Militias on the 

International List of Terrorist Organizations and Claim That Supporting This Campaign Is Vital in Order for It to Achieve Its Objectives”), Wikalat Al-Akhbar Al-Iraqiya, October 25, 2014, available from irq4all.com/PrintNews.php?id=99950.

212. Nihad Jasim, “Salih Al-Mutlag: Gharat al-tahaluf yajib an 

tastahdif al-milishiyat aydan” (“Salih Al-Mutlag: The Coalition’s 

Raids Must Also Target the Militias”), Al-Alam, September 28, 2014, 

available from www.alaalem.com/index.php?aa=news&id22=20955.

213. “Muhafizh Diyala al-sabiq yadu ila tashkil saraya muqatila min al-sunna maduma hukumiyan aswa al-milishiyat” (“The 

Former Governor of Diyala Calls for the Formation of Government-Supported Sunni Combat Units Similar to the Militias”), AlMadar News, August 23, 2014, available from www.almadarnews.

info/index.php?page=article&id=6505.

214. “Al-Hashd Al-Shabi: Al-Ittihamat tahdif li-madd al-irhab 

bi’l-silah taht iba’at al-asha’ir” (“Al-Hashd Al-Shabi: The Accusations Are Intended to Supply the Terrorists with Arms under the 

Cover of the Tribes”), Al-Alam, November 10, 2014, available from 

www.alaalem.com/index.php?news=.

215. “Taraju li’l-muqatilin al-shia an khutut al-muwajaha 

li-tahdi’at makhawif al-sunna” (“Shia Fighters Are Withdrawn 

from the Front Lines in Order to Calm Sunni Fears”), Shafaq News, 

November 11, 2014, available from www.shafaaq.com.

216. “Nashitun iraqiyun yatlaqun hamla wasia li-muhakamat 

al-milishiyat al-ta’ifiya fi al-mahakim al-dawliya” (“Iraqi Activists Launch a Broad Campaign to Bring the Sectarian Militias to 

Justice in the International Courts”), Al-Gharbiya, September 11, 

2014, available from www.algharbiyanews.com/?p=36062.
105

217. “DAISH al-shia wa-dawaish al-sunna takhtalif al-tawa’if 

wa’l-irhab wahid” (“The Shia ISIS and the Sunni ISIS Differ in 

Sect But All Terrorism Is Similar”), Ahrar Al-Iraq, October 10, 2014, 

available from www.ahraraliraq.com/print.php?id=36022.

218. Loveday Morris, “On Outskirts of Baghdad, Islamic 

State’s Advances Raise Tensions,” The Washington Post, October 

17, 2014, available from available from www.washingtonpost.com.

219. “Rif Al-Latifiya.”

220. “Tahrir tariq yarbut Diyala bi-Iran.”

221. “Al-Iraq yarudd ala Al-Afw Al-Duwaliya: Al-Hashd 

Al-Shabi juz’ min al-manzhuma al-rasmiya wa-la yumkin nasab 

al-jara’im lahum” (“Iraq Responds to Amnesty International: AlHashd Al-Shabi Is a Component of the Official System and the 

Crimes Cannot Be Attributed to Them”), Khabar, October 16, 2014, 

available from khabaarpaper.com/index.php/the-news/11266.

222. “Muqtada Al-Sadr yatabarra’ min jarimat Saraya Al-Salam

fi dabh al-mutaqalin bi-Amirli” (“Muqtada Al-Sadr Disavows 

Responsibility for Crimes by the Saraya Al-Salam in the Killing 

of Prisoners in Amirli”), Al-Zaman, September 8, 2014, available 

from www.azzaman.com/archives/81818. 

223. “Daiyan iyyahum ila al-indibat wa’l-iltizam al-ali alsayyid Ammar Al-Hakim yushayyid bi’l-intisarat allati haqqaqtha 

al-quwwat al-amniya wa-quwwat Al-Hashd Al-Shabi” (“Calling 

Them to Be Disciplined and to Do One’s Duty, Al-Sayyid Ammar Al-Hakim Praises the Successes That the Security Forces and 

Al-Hashd Al-Shabi Have Achieved”), Supreme Islamic Council website, October 14, 2014, available from www.almejlis.org/

more/5579-1.

224. “Al-Marjaiya tuhdhir al-muwatinin min sha’iat alirhabiyin wa-tahithth asha’ir Al-Anbar li’l-intifad ala DAISH” 

(“The Marja Cautions against the Terrorists’ Rumors and Encourages the Tribes of Al-Anbar to Rise Up against ISIS”), Buratha 

News (Najaf), October 17, 2014, available from burathanews.com/

news/250361.html; and “Mumaththil Al-Sistani: Al-Tasarrufat 

ghayr al-maqbula li-bad al-muqatilin yajib an la takun wasila 
106

li’l-tamim ala al-akharin” (“Al-Sistani’s Representative: The Unacceptable Actions by Some Fighters Must Not Be a Pretext to 

Generalize about the Rest”), Al-Mada Press, November 28, 2014, 

available from www.almadapress.com.

225. “Al-Amiri yulin Diyala khaliya min DAISH wa-yuwassi 

Al-Hashd bi-himayat mumtalakat al-ahali” (“Al-Amiri Announces That Diyala Is Free of ISIS and Calls on Al-Hashd to Protect 

People’s Property”), Al-Mada, January 27, 2015, available from

almadapaper.net.

226. ”Al-Ibadi: Al-Hashd Al-Shabi.”

227. Hamid Al-Falluji, “Al-Anbar: Kabus Diyala hal yuakkir 

safw al-alaqa ma fasa’il Al-Hashd Al-Shabi?” (“Al-Anbar: Will 

the Nightmare of Diyala Disrupt the Good Relations with the AlHashd Al-Shabi Units”), Al-Alam Al-Jadid, January 28, 2015, available from al-aalem.com.

228. “Ashirat Albu Jabir bi’l-Anbar: Qatl ithnayn min al-ashira lam yunaffidhhu shakhs wahid wa-nutalib bi-sahb Al-Hashd” 

(“The Albu Jabir Tribe in Al-Anbar: The Killing of Two Members 

of Our Tribe Was Not Carried Out by Only a Single Individual 

and We Demand the Withdrawal of Al-Hashd”), Sumarriya TV, 

February 8, 2015, available from www.alsumaria.tv. 

229. “Intilaq amaliyat Al-Tha’r li-Shuhada’ Speicher fi Salah 

Al-Din” (“The Revenge for the Martyrs of Camp Speicher Campaign in Salah Al-Din Kicks Off”), Al-Istiqama, February 10, 2015, 

available from alestiqama.com/?p=151202.

230. “Na’ib kurdi yattahim Baghdad bi-ibqa’ man yasifhum 

bi-milishiyat fi Jalawla’ wa’l-Sadiya ‘al-kurdistaniyatayn’” (“A 

Kurdish Member of Parliament Accuses Baghdad of Keeping 

What He Calls Militias in ‘Kurdish’ Jalawla’ and Al-Sadiya”), AlAlam, November 27, 2014, available from www.alaalem.com/index.

php?aa=news&id22=22459.

231. “Al-Talibani li-Iraq Press: Kurdistan lan yasmah bitashkil Al-Hashd Al-Shabi bi’l-manatiq al-mutanaza alayha” 

(“Al-Talibani to the Iraqi Press Agency: Kurdistan will Not Allow the Formation of Al-Hashd Al-Shabi in the Disputed Ar-
107

eas”), Iraq Press Agency, January 27, 2015, available from 

www.iraqpressagency.com.

232. Nasir Al-Jammal, “Al-Hashd Al-Shabi yuharrir almanatiq wa-Arbil turid ikhrajhum” (“Al-Hashd Al-Shabi Liberates Territories and Arbil Wants to Force Them to Leave”), AlAlam, November 27, 2014, available from www.alaalem.com; and 

“Hal Karkuk muqbila ala tashkil kata’ib min Al-Hashd Al-Shabi?” (“Does Kirkuk Accept the Formation of Units of Al-Hashd 

Al-Shabi?”), Shafaq News, January 7, 2015, available from www.

shafaaq.com. (Hereafter “Hal Karkuk muqbila.“)

233. “Al-Sayyid Ammar Al-Hakim: Kurdistan juz’ asas waaziz min ard Al-Iraq” (“Al-Sayyid Ammar Al-Hakim: Kurdistan 

Is a Basic and Dear Part of Iraq”), Al-Furat TV (Najaf), October 

21, 2014, available from www1.alforattv.net/modules/news/print.

php?storyid=102493; and “Badr al-niyabiya: Nuwwab akrad sadaru juhud Al-Hashd Al-Shabi fi tahqiq al-intisarat” (“The Badr Parliamentary Party: The Kurdish Members of Parliament Usurped 

Al-Hashd Al-Shabi’s Efforts in Achieving Victories”), Al-Masdar News, January 14, 2015, available from l-news.net/index.php/

policy/68528.html.

234. “Al-Ashayish tuhdhir min nawaya Badr al-saytara ala 

mawaqi muhimma fi Tuzkhurmatu” (“Al-Ashayis Warns of Badr’s

Intentions to Control Important Positions in Tuzkhurmatu”), AlMadar, September 26, 2014, available from www.almadarnews.info/

index.php?page=article&id=7502; “Masdar muttali: Al-Peshmerga 

tataqil 12 unsuran min Saraya Al-Khurasani fi Diyala” (“A WellInformed Source: The Peshmerga Detain Twelve Members of 

the Saraya Al-Khurasani in Diyala”), Al-Alam Al-Jadid, January 14, 

2015, available from al-aalem.com.

235. Samir Muhammad, “Hizb Al-Barzani yuhaddid bi’l-tasaddi li’l-Hashd Al-Shabi idha dakhalat Karkuk” (“Al-Barzani’s Party Threatens to Confront Al-Hashd Al-Shabi If It Enters Kirkuk”), 

Al-Wikala Al-Ikhbariya li’l-Anba’, February 10, 2015, available 

from www.ikhnews.com/index.php?page=article&id=135307. 

236. Mahdi, “Baghdad: Damm alaf al-asha’iriyin.”
108

237. General Terry quoted in Nancy A. Youssef, “Pentagon 

Insider on New Plan to Fight ISIS: ‘Of Course It’s Not Enough’,” 

The Daily Beast, January 6, 2015, available from www.thedailybeast.

com; and Al-Ibadi quoted in “Iraq May Need Three Years to Restructure and Rebuild the Military: PM,” Reuters, January 11, 

2015, available from www.reuters.com/article/2015/01/12/us-iraqmilitary-idUSKBNOKLOOP20150112. On some of the challenges, 

see Loveday Morris, “The U.S. Military Is Back Training Troops 

in Iraq, But It’s a Little Different This Time,” The Washington Post, 

January 8, 2015, available from www.washingtonpost.com.

238. “Qiyadiyun fi Al-Hashd Al-Shabi.” 

239. Interview with Hisham Al-Hashimi by Diya’ Ibrahim 

Hassun, “Hal sa-tada al-istratijiyat al-amniya li’l-hukuma al-iraqiya haddan li-suqut al-dahaya?” (“Will the Iraqi Government’s 

Security Strategy Put an End to the String of Victims?”), Voice 

of Russia in Arabic, February 3, 2015, available from arabic.sputniknews.com/arabic/ruvr.ru/2015_02_03/282667205. 

240. “Al-Ibadi: Al-Hashd Al-Shabi lan yakun min al-shia 

fa-qat” (“Al-Ibadi: Al-Hashd Al-Shabi Will Not Be Composed 

Only of Shia”), Al-Ghad Press, February 3, 2015, available from 

aghadpress.com/ar/NewsDetails.aspx?NewsID=26559. 

241. “200 alf jundi wa-dhabit fada’i wahmi dakhil almu’assasa al-askariya” (“200,000 Imaginary Ghost Troops and 

Officers within the Military Establishment”), Al-Dustur, November 19, 2014, available from www.daraddustour.com/index.php/

home-news/27784-4605454505; and “Al-Wahmiyun wara’ suqut 

Al-Mawsil wa-maktab al-qa’id al-amm kan ra’s al-fasad” (“The 

Imaginary Soldiers Are Responsible for the Fall of Mosul and 

the Commander-in-Chief Was the Head of the Corruption”), AlDustur, December 7, 2014, available from www.daraddustour.com.

242. For example, fully one-half of the Basra province police 

force was said to be composed of ghost personnel, “Ala khalfiyat tathirih li-wizarat al-difa Al-Ibadi wa’l-Ghabban yubashiran 

bi-haykalat wizarat al-dakhiliya wa-tanzhifha min atba Al-Maliki!” (“Behind Al-Ibadi’s Purge of the Ministry of Defense, He 

and Al-Ghabban Control Directly the Structure of the Ministry 

of the Interior and the Purge of Al-Maliki’s Followers”), Al-Ka-
109

shif, November 18, 2014, available from www.alkashf.org/news.

orgphp?action=view&id=2679; and “Bad dam Al-Ibadi lahum AlNasrawi wa’l-Ghabban yaqdun ala zhahirat al-fada’iyin fi AlBasra” (“After Al-Ibadi Gives Them His Support, Al-Nasrawi 

and Al-Ghabban Crack Down on the Ghost Personnel Problem 

in Basra”), Al-Kashif, November 17, 2014, available from www.

alkashf.org/news.orgphp?action=view&id=2672.

243. “Na’ib: Qiyadat amaliyat Al-Anbar tuqatil bi-25% min 

junudha wa-yajib al-tahqiq bi-hadhihi al-qadiya” (“A Member of 

Parliament: The Commanders of the Al-Anbar Operations Command Are Fighting with 25 Per Cent of Their Troops and this Issue Must Be Investigated”), Al-Sumarriya TV, January 21, 2015, 

available from www.alsumaria.tv/news/122509.

244. Interview with Nechirvan Barzani by Samia Nakhoul, 

Ned Parker, and Isabel Coles, “Kurdish PM Says U.S.-led Coalition against Islamic State Faces Long War,” Reuters, January 

30, 2015, available from www.reuters.com/article/2015/01/30/iraqkurdistan-idUSKBN0L315S20150130.

245. “Hay’a rasmiya li’l-Hashd Al-Shabi fi Al-Iraq” (“An Offical Agency for Al-Hashd Al-Shabi in Iraq”), Al-Jazira TV, December 17, 2014, available from www.aljazeera.net.

246. “Al-Hashd Al-Shabi: Alwiya jadida min dun rayat” (“Al-Hashd Al-Shabi: Brigades without Banners”), AlAlam, January 21, 2015, available from www.alaalem.com/index.

php?aa=news&id22=24193. 

247. “Al-Sadr wa-wazir al-difa yu’akkidan ala darurat wujud 

al-milishiyat fi al-mu’assasa al-askariya” (“Al-Sadr and the Minister of Defense Stress the Need for Having Militias in the Military 

Establishment”), Awan, January 19, 2015, available from awaniq.

com/ar/news/15143.

248. “Takharruj fawj al-mahammat al-khassa fi Al-Hashd 

Al-Shabi bi-Diyala” (“The Special Missions Unit of Al-Hashd AlShabi Graduates in Diyala”), Buratha News Agency, January 13, 

2015, available from burathanews.com/news/257009.html; and “Badr

tukharrij Fawj Al-Hamza Sayyid Al-Shuhada’” (“Badr Graduates the 

Al-Hamza Sayyid Al-Shuhada’ Unit”), Jaridat Badr, January 13, 2015, 
110

available from www.badrpress.com/badr/feeds.php?lang=ar&page_

name=activities&id=29117.

249. “Al-Amiri: Kull najahatna marhuna li-tadhiyat alshabab.”

250. “Al-Amiri: Al-Hashd Al-Shabi wa’l-quwwat al-amniya 

qadira ala fakk al-hisar an Al-Duluiya” (“Al-Amiri: Al-Hashd AlShabi and the Security Forces Can Lift the Siege of Al-Duluiya”), 

Jaridat Badr, September 18, 2014, available from www.badrpress.

com/badr/feeds_print.php?lang=ar&id=26460.

251. Husam Al-Ahmad, “Ri’asat Al-Haras Al-Watani: Al-Ibadi yadam Al-Rabii wa-Tihran targhab bi’l-Maliki muqabil ziamat 

Al-Hakim li’l-Tahaluf Al-Watani” (“Command of the National 

Guard: Al-Ibadi Supports Al-Rabi While Tehran Wants Al-Maliki in Exchange for Al-Hakim’s Becoming Head of the National 

Bloc”), Al-Alam Al-Jadid, February 4, 2015, available from www.alaalem.com; and “Bad tara’’us ri’asat Al-Hashd Al-Shabi fi Al-Iraq 

Al-Maliki: 2015 Iraq khalin min DAISH” (“After Making Himself 

Head of Al-Hashd Al-Shabi, Al-Maliki: In 2015 an Iraq Free of 

ISIS”), Al-Kashif, February 1, 2015, available from www.alkashf.org/

news.php?action=view&id=3030.

252. “Al-Maliki yaftah al-nar ala Al-Amiri sakhiran min 

intisarat munazhzhamat Badr!” (“Al-Maliki Opens Fire on 

Al-Amiri, Mocking the Badr Organization’s Victories”), AlKashif, October 30, 2014, available from www.alkashf.org/news.

php?action=view&id=2611.

253. “Al-Ghabban: Quwwat Al-Hashd Al-Shabi bi’l-quwwat 

al-amniya” (“Al-Ghabban: Al-Hashd Al-Shabi’s Forces within the 

Security Forces”), Al-Kashif, January 3, 2015, available from www.

alkashf.org/news.php?action=view&id=2891. 

254. “Maktab al-sayyid Al-Sistani yanfi sudur bayan hawl qiyadat Al-Hashd Al-Shabi” (“Al-Sistani’s Office Denies It Issued 

a Communique about the Leadership of Al-Hashd Al-Shabi”), 

Shafaqna, February 6, 2015, available from iraq.Shafaqna.com/of-theday/item/49823.

255. “Badr Al-Amiri wa-Asa’ib Al-Khazali.”
111

256. “Al-Maliki yanfi sayahu li’l-ruju ila al-masrah al-siyasi 

min jadid wa-yu’akkid: Lan aud li-ri’asat al-wuzara’ illa idha talab al-shab dhalik” (“Al-Maliki Denies He Is Attempting a Comeback and Stresses: I Will Not Become Prime Minister Again, Unless the People Demand That”), Al-Mada Press, February 2, 2015, 

available from www.alamadapress.com.

257. Adil Kazhim, “Al-Ahrar tulqi ala Al-Sistani ikhtiyar qiyada li’l-Hashd Al-Shabi” (“The Al-Ahrar Party Want Al-Sistani 

to Choose the Leader of Al-Hashd Al-Shabi”), Al-Zaman, January 

31, 2015, available from www.azzaman.com; “Muqtada qata nisf altariq alayhi li-qiyadat Al-Hashd Al-Shabi” (“Muqtada Forestalled 

Him from Becoming Leader of Al-Hashd Al-Shabi”), Al-Abbasiya 

News (Baghdad), February 4, 2015, available from www.alabasianews.com; and “Ra’is kutlat Al-Dawa: Qiyadat Al-Maliki li’l-Hashd 

tani awdat al-kharab wa’l-fasad” (”The Leader of the Dawa Party (Iraq Organization): If Al-Maliki Is Leader of Al-Hashd That 

Means the Return of Devastation and Corruption”), Zagros TV

(Arbil), February 1, 2015, available from zagrostv.com/Default.asp

x?page=article&id=43603&1=2. 

258. “Al-Ibadi li’l-Maliki: Ana qa’idan li’l-Hashd Al-Shabi 

wa-laysa anta” (“Al-Ibadi to Al-Maliki: I Should Be Leader of AlHashd Al-Shabi and Not You”), Wikalat Al-Yawm Al-Thamin, 

February 4, 2015, available from 8th-day.com?p=94930; and “AlIbadi yuhaddid bi-qat rawatib Al-Hashd Al-Shabi fi hal irtibatih 

bi’l-Maliki” (“Al-Ibadi Threatens to Cut Off Al-Hashd Al-Shabi’s 

Pay If the Latter Supports Al-Maliki”), Sky Press (Iraq), February 

5, 2015, available from www.skypressiq.net/main/index.php/ct-menuitem-3/2235-2015-02-05-09-19-55. 

259. “Hal Karkuk muqbila.”

260. “Al-Araji: Intisar Jurf Al-Sakhr lam yatahaqqaq lawla 

Saraya Al-Salam” (“Al-Araji: The Victory at Jurf Al-Sakhr Would 

Not Have Happened Without the Saraya Al-Salam”), Aswat Al-Iraq

(Baghdad), October 29, 2014, available from ar.aswataliraq.info.

261. “Muwazanat 2015 khassasat 35 alf daraja wazhifiya lianasir Al-Hashd Al-Shabi” (“The 2015 Budget Allocated 35,000 

Jobs for the Members of Al-Hashd Al-Shabi”), Iraq Press Agency, 

January 13, 2015, available from www.iraqpressagency.com.
112

262. “Al-Wafa’ li’l-Muqawama tadu li-ziyadat takhsisat AlHashd Al-Shabi wa-tu’akkid: Manzhumat al-difa khatt ahmar” 

(“The Al-Wafa’ li’l-Muqawama Party Calls for an Increase in Allocations for Al-Hashd Al-Shabi and Stresses: The Defense Agencies Are a Red Line”), Al-Mada Press, January 22, 2015, available 

from www.almadapress.com/ar/NewsDetails.aspx?NewsID=42991.

263. “Na’iba an Al-Fadila tu’akkid darurat munaqalat juz’ 

min al-mabaligh al-mukhassasa li’l-difa ila Al-Hashd al-Shabi” 

(“A Member of Parliament from Al-Fadila Party Calls for a Reallocation of Part of the Funding from the Ministry of Defense to AlHashd Al-Shabi”), Al-Sumarriya TV, January 18, 2015, available 

from www.alsumaria.tv.

264. “Akthar min triliyun dinar takhsisat Al-Hashd Al-Shabi 

wa’l-nazihin fi muwazanat 2015” (“More Than Three Trillion Dinars Allocated to Al-Hashd Al-Shabi and the Refugees in the 2015 

Budget”), Al-Ghad Press, January 21, 2015, available from alghadpress.com/ar/NewsDetails.aspx?NewsID=25884.

265. “Washintun tutalib Al-Ibadi bi-istibdal quwwat AlHashd Al-Shabi hawl Baghdad li-annaha ta’ifiya wa-ghayr 

mudarraba wa-ajiza an himayat al-asima min-khatar DAISH” 

(“Washington Demands That Al-Ibadi Replace Al-Hashd 

Al-Shabi Forces around Baghdad Because They Are Sectarian and Untrained and Incapable of Defending the Capital from 

the ISIS Threat”), Al-Siyasa, October 19, 2014, available from 

al-seyassah.com.

266. “Al-Ibadi: Awdahna li’l-ra’is al-amriki dawr Al-Hashd 

Al-Shabi bi-muwajahat DAISH” (“Al-Ibadi: We Made It Clear to 

the American President What the Role of Al-Hashd Al-Shabi Is 

in the Fight against ISIS”), Al-Masalla, October 30, 2014, available 

from almasalah.com.

267. Al-Ibadi yubligh McCain rafdah ilgha’ Al-Hashd AlShabi fi Al-Iraq” (“Al-Ibadi Informs McCain of His Refusal to 

Disband Al-Hashd Al-Shabi in Iraq”), Al-Kashif, January 29, 2015, 

available from www.alkashf.org/news.php?action=view&id=3022. 

268. “Al-Sadr wa’l-Khazali yu’akkidan ala al-amal al-mushtarak wa-idhabat al-khilafat” (“Al-Sadr and Al-Khazali Confirm 
113

They Are Working Together and That Their Differences Were Resolved”), Al-Ghad Press, August 31, 2014, available from alghadpress.com. 

269. “Bi-Tawjih min Abu Mahdi Al-Muhandis turid Fawj 

Al-Ataba Al-Alawiya min Samarra’” (“The Fawj Al-Ataba AlAlawiya Was Forced Out of Samarra by Order of Abu Mahdi AlMuhandis”), Kitabat (Iraq), January 2, 2015, available from www.

kitabat.com/ar/print/41553.html.

270. “Saraya Al-Khurasani tuhawwil mintaqat Al-Karrada ila 

sahat qital” (“The Saraya Al-Khurasani Transforms the Karrada 

Quarter into a Battlefield”), Awan, January 31, 2015, available 

from awaniq.com/ar/news/15607.

271. Al-Amiri li-Sulagh: La tataarrad li-rijal Badr wa-illa 

aghlaqt lak matar Baghdad” (“Al-Amiri to Sulagh: Don’t Interfere with Badr Personnel Or I Will Close Down the Baghdad Airport”), Chakuch, January 31, 2015, available from chakooch.com/

news.php?action=view&id=6337.

272. “Al-Ahrar tantaqid Al-Ghabban li-taghyirih qa’id shurtat Al-Basra wa-tattahimuh bi-idarat al-dakhiliya li-salih hizbih” 

(“The Al-Ahrar Party Criticizes Al-Ghabban for Replacing the 

Head of the Basra Police and Accuses Him of Running the Ministry of the Interior for His Party’s Benefit”), Wikalat Al-Maluma

(Iraq), January 27, 2015, available from www.almaalomah.com.

273. Ahmad Rida Al-Mu’min, Ahl Al-Haqq’s Media Office, 

Ahl Al-Haqq websiste, n.d., ca. September 29, 2014, available from 

www.ahlulhaq.com.

274. “Milishiyat Al-Hashd Al-Shabi tahtall ajza’ wasia min 

janub Al-Anbar wa-tadummuha li-Karbala’ wa-Babil” (“The 

Al-Hashd Al-Shabi Militias Occupy Wide Areas of Southern 

Al-Anbar and Annex Them to Karbala and Babil”), Ahrar AlIraq, January 24, 2015, available from www.ahraraliraq.com/index.

php?page=article&id=39136.

275. In the eastern part of Baghdad, Al-Rusafa, more than 

1,000 were reportedly hit by stray gunfire from citizens celebrating 

a win by the country’s soccer team at the Asia Cup, and the con-
114

certed effort in 2015 by the government, the media, and religious 

and tribal authorities to stem such gunfire is not likely to succeed 

any more than in the past. “Akthar min 1000 isaba fi Al-Rusafa biintilaqat nariya ihtifalan bi-fawz Al-Iraq” (“More Than 1,000 Hit 

by Gunfire in Al-Rusafa in the Celebration of Iraq’s Victory”), Buratha News Agency, January 23, 2015, available from burathanews.

com/news/257748.html. During an inter-tribal fight in January 2015, 

the Army noticed that the tribes, too, now had heavy weapons, 

“Al-Niza al-asha’iri fi Al-Fadiliya kashaf an asliha thaqila sharqi 

Baghdad” (“The Tribal Dispute in Al-Fadiliya Revealed Heavy 

Weapons East of Baghdad”), Al-Masdar News, January 29, 2015, 

available from l-news.net/index.php/safety/69617.html.

276. As in the case of the plan for the envisioned campaign 

in Salah Al-Din province, leaked by the Ahl Al-Haqq. “Ahl AlHaqq tantaqid mutalabat asha’ir Al-Anbar Amrika bi-damha 

wa tu’akkid: Hunak khutta jadida qariba li-tahrir Salah Al-Din” 

(“The Ahl Al-Haqq Criticizes the Al-Anbar Tribes’ Request from 

America for Support and Declares: A Plan Will Be Ready Soon for 

the Liberation of Salah Al-Din”), Awan, January 21, 2015, available from awaniq.com.ar/news/15242; and by the Kata’ib Al-Imam 

Ali, “Al-Khutta al-askariya allati wadaha al-qada kull min al-hajj 

Muhammad Shakir wa’l-fariq al-rukn Ali Al-Friji” (“The Military 

Plan That the Leadership, Including Hajj Muhammad Shakir and 

Staff Lieutenant General Ali Al-Friji, Drafted”), Kata’ib Al-Imam 

Ali site, n.d., January 2015, available from www.kataabimamali.com.
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General William E. Rapp

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

and

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE PRESS

Director

Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Director of Research

Dr. Steven K. Metz

Author

Dr. Norman Cigar

Editor for Production

Dr. James G. Pierce

Publications Assistant

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

*****

Composition

Mrs. Jennifer E. Nevil