Filed 12/10/20 (unmodified opn. attached)

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

In re Edgerrin J., a Person Coming 

Under the Juvenile Court Law.

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

EDGERRIN J.,

Defendant and Appellant.

 

D076461

(Super. Ct. No. J239465)

ORDER MODIFYING OPINION

AND DENYING REHEARING

NO CHANGE IN JUDGMENT

In re Jamar D., a Person Coming Under 

the Juvenile Court Law.

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

JAMAR D.,

Defendant and Appellant.

 

D076462

(Super. Ct. No. J242137)
2

THE COURT:

It is ordered that the opinion filed on November 20, 2020 be modified to 

delete the image on page 11 of the opinion and replace it with the following 

redacted image:

Respondent’s petition for rehearing is denied.

There is no change in judgment.

HALLER, Acting P. J.

Copies to: All parties
Filed 11/20/20 (unmodified opinion with modified photo)

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

In re Edgerrin J., a Person Coming 

Under the Juvenile Court Law.

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

EDGERRIN J.,

Defendant and Appellant.

 

D076461

(Super. Ct. No. J239465)

In re Jamar D., a Person Coming Under 

the Juvenile Court Law.

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

JAMAR D.,

Defendant and Appellant.

 

D076462

(Super. Ct. No. J242137)

APPEAL from judgments of the Superior Court of San Diego County, 

Browder A. Willis, Judge. Reversed and remanded with directions.

Alex Coolman, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for 

Defendant and Appellant Edgerrin J.
2

Christine M. Aros, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for 

Defendant and Appellant Jamar D.

Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant 

Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Daniel 

Rogers, Christopher P. Beesley, Robin Urbanski, and Genevieve Herbert, 

Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

After receiving a citizen’s tip that Black males in a Mercedes were 

“acting shady,” four San Diego Police Department (SDPD) officers drove to 

the scene in two marked vehicles, activating emergency lights in one.

Parking behind the Mercedes, the officers positioned themselves beside each 

of its four doors and asked the three teenagers inside for their names and 

identification. A records check later indicated that the driver was on 

probation subject to a Fourth Amendment waiver. The officers searched the 

vehicle and recovered a loaded firearm and sneakers linking the minors to a 

recent robbery. 

The minors moved to suppress the evidence found in the car, claiming 

their initial detention was not supported by reasonable suspicion. Finding 

the encounter was consensual rather than a detention, the juvenile court 

denied the motions. Two of the minors pleaded guilty to a subset of the 

charges originally filed.

In this consolidated appeal,1 two of the minors—Edgerrin J. and Jamar 

D.—challenge the denial of their suppression motions. They argue the 

1 After both appeals were fully briefed, we consolidated on our own 

motion People v. Edgerrin J. (D076461) and People v. Jamar D. (D076462) for 

purposes of decision, as both appeals involve the same facts, challenge the 

same ruling, and raise similar issues. (See, e.g., People v. Lieng (2010) 190 
3

juvenile court erred in finding the encounter consensual and claim the 

citizen’s tip did not establish reasonable suspicion to detain them. We agree 

on both points. But there was conflicting evidence as to whether officers 

knew other facts that might furnish reasonable suspicion for the stop, or 

justify the detention and search pursuant to Edgerrin’s active Fourth 

Amendment waiver. Because the rationale for its ruling made it unnecessary 

for the juvenile court to address these other issues, we reverse and remand 

for a new hearing to permit it to assess witness credibility and reach factual 

findings in the first instance. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

1. Police contact and search

On March 13, 2019, SDPD officer Jerrad Schnautz was on patrol with 

his partner Willis Short in the Encanto neighborhood of southeast San Diego. 

At around 6:00 p.m., the two were parked on Madera Street along with fellow 

officers Kyle Williams and Samuel Euler. As the four officers dealt with an 

unrelated issue, a driver approaching southbound on Madera stopped her car 

in the middle of the street and stepped out. She said she lived nearby, 

provided her address, and reported there were Black males in a parked black 

Mercedes on her street who were “acting shady.” After receiving the tip, all 

four officers drove three blocks to the location in two separate police vehicles. 

When they arrived, the officers found a legally parked black Mercedes 

with three young Black males inside. Williams and Euler parked directly 

behind the Mercedes, activating their vehicle’s emergency lights; Schnautz 

and Short pulled up behind them but did not activate their lights. The four 

officers stepped out, walked over to the Mercedes, and positioned themselves 

at each door to prevent its three occupants from leaving. 

Cal.App.4th 1213, 1218.) Because only Edgerrin requested oral argument, 

consolidation did not affect the hearing. 
4

When the officers asked the vehicle occupants for their names and 

information, Edgerrin (sitting in the driver’s seat) initially gave a false name. 

Schnautz went back to his patrol vehicle to perform records checks on all 

three occupants. Upon learning Edgerrin’s identity and confirming that he

was on probation subject to a condition waiving his Fourth Amendment

rights (Fourth waiver), officers searched the Mercedes and recovered a loaded 

firearm underneath the driver’s seat, a pair of sneakers connected to a 

robbery, and a clear white canister containing marijuana. The minors were 

arrested. 

2. Charges and Motions to Suppress

The San Diego County District Attorney filed petitions under Welfare 

and Institutions Code section 602 accusing Edgerrin and Jamar of robbery 

(Pen. Code,2 § 211), receiving stolen property (§ 496, subd. (a)), and various 

weapons-related charges along with associated enhancements. Edgerrin was 

additionally charged with providing false information to a police officer 

(§ 148.9, subd. (a), count 8). Defendants moved to suppress evidence 

obtained from the Mercedes. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 700.1.)3 

The People opposed the suppression motions, arguing in their briefs 

that officers discovered Edgerrin’s Fourth waiver during “a consent [sic] 

encounter with the minors.” Although Officer Williams activated his 

emergency lights in parking behind the Mercedes, the prosecution claimed 

this was done to “warn on-coming traffic of officers on foot,” and all officers 

proceeded to the vehicle “on foot in a slow and calm walk.” Alternatively, the 

People claimed that the officers had reasonable suspicion to detain the 

2 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

3 Our record does not disclose the charges filed against the third minor, 

D.W., whose suppression motion was also considered at the same hearing.
5

minors based on the citizen’s tip. They argued that Encanto was a 

neighborhood where “[g]ang violence and violent crime [are] a fact of life” 

causing residents “to be hyper-vigilant of suspicious, or shady, activity,” and 

it was significant that the tipster “felt the conduct she saw rose to the level of 

needing to flag down and tell the police.” 

3. Hearing and Ruling

The suppression motions were heard by Judge Willis. The People 

examined SDPD gang detective Amalia Sidhu and Officer Schnautz, and the 

court reviewed footage from Schnautz’s bodyworn camera (BWC) depicting 

officers’ encounter with the minors and the subsequent search. The principal 

factual dispute between the parties centered on what Schnautz and the other 

officers knew about Edgerrin at the time they approached the Mercedes. The 

prosecution relied on testimony by Sidhu and Schnautz suggesting the 

officers knew by then that Edgerrin was a Lincoln Park gang member in rival 

gang territory, driving a black Mercedes, and on probation with a Fourth 

waiver. Defense counsel vigorously challenged this account, questioning why 

such information was omitted from police reports and conflicted with the 

officers’ behavior in the BWC footage.4

As noted, the prosecution identified two theories in its written 

opposition—either the encounter was consensual, or there was reasonable 

suspicion to detain based on the citizen tip. At the hearing, the prosecutor 

expanded on these theories. Relying on testimony that officers knew 

beforehand of Edgerrin’s active Fourth waiver, he suggested it was a 

straightforward “Fourth waiver probation search.” Alternatively, the 

prosecutor claimed there was reasonable suspicion to detain the minors based 

4 To avoid repetition, the parties’ competing accounts are detailed in the 

discussion.
6

on officers’ awareness that Edgerrin was a gang member in rival gang 

territory around a gang holiday—“this is reasonable suspicion, pure and 

simple, even without the Fourth waiver, knowing who he is, knowing when it 

was, knowing where he was.” “And then you layer into that, we have a 

civilian who lives in this neighborhood actively and affirmatively approaching 

gang unit officers . . . flagging them down, telling them that this is shady.” 

Edgerrin’s counsel responded that the prosecution was using the ends 

to justify the means. Despite Sidhu’s testimony about what she told patrol 

officers, neither of her reports disclosed what transpired before the stop, 

leaving the court with a “credibility issue.” And the citizen tip that people 

were “acting shady” was too vague to create reasonable suspicion that 

criminal activity was afoot. Although officers could have stopped to ask a few 

questions, they instead “drove up in two separate cars, lights already on, up 

behind a Mercedes [whose] license plate they didn’t check. They had no idea 

who was in that vehicle,” as the BWC video seemed to confirm. 

At that point, the juvenile court interjected, asking “Where was the 

stop? There was no stop in this circumstance.” The court rejected counsel’s 

assertion that a stop occurred when the officers pulled up, lights on, behind

the Mercedes. Instead, the judge described what transpired as a proper 

“consensual encounter” following a citizen tip. 

After hearing from remaining defense counsel, the court denied the 

suppression motions, finding that no detention had occurred. As it explained, 

the officers had a right to be at that location and check on the vehicle after 

receiving the citizen tip. The court reasoned that at each step, the officers’ 

actions were lawful—their initial investigation was justified by the tip, their 

encounter with the minors remained consensual, and once they confirmed 
7

that Edgerrin was subject to a Fourth waiver, they could legally search the 

vehicle.5 

4. Subsequent Proceedings

Jamar admitted to robbery (§ 211) and the associated gang and firearm 

enhancements charged in count 1, and all remaining charges were dismissed. 

He was adjudged a ward of the court and committed to Urban Camp, with his 

commitment stayed while he was placed on probation. Edgerrin admitted to 

assault with a firearm (§ 245, subd. (a)(2)) and the associated gang 

enhancement charged in count 2, and the charges remaining against him 

were likewise dismissed. The court committed Edgerrin to the Youthful 

Offender Unit Program, setting his maximum custody at 12 years, 4 months 

with a custodial program not exceeding 480 days. 

DISCUSSION

Challenging the suppression ruling, defendants argue the juvenile 

court erred in concluding the officers were engaged in a consensual encounter 

when they activated their lights, parked behind the Mercedes, and 

surrounded the vehicle. They claim this conduct instead amounted to a 

detention, for which the vague citizen tip did not provide reasonable 

suspicion. The People respond that the court could reasonably find that no 

detention occurred. And even otherwise, they suggest the officers had 

reasonable suspicion to detain the minors based on facts they knew at the 

time.

As we explain, there is no question a detention occurred. We further 

agree with defendants that the bare citizen tip of “shady” behavior in this 

5 As will be discussed, the judge focused on the fact that the officers 

made no excessive show of authority by drawing weapons or activating their 

sirens, and although they had activated their lights, officers acted as though 

the encounter was consensual. 
8

case does not, without more, furnish reasonable suspicion. Nevertheless, we 

must remand for further proceedings to permit the juvenile court to consider 

whether the detention and subsequent search could otherwise be justified by 

facts officers might have known about Edgerrin prior to the stop. 

Specifically, there were conflicting accounts at the suppression hearing as to 

whether officers knew at the time they approached the Mercedes that 

Edgerrin was inside with an active Fourth waiver, and/or that he was a gang 

member in rival gang territory. The evidence on these matters is heavily 

contested, and competing inferences could be drawn. Because the juvenile 

court erroneously focused on whether the encounter was consensual, it had 

no occasion to make a factual finding as to what facts the officers knew in 

making the detention. Remand is therefore appropriate for the court to make 

such findings in the first instance.

1. Standard of review

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects 

against unreasonable searches and seizures, including brief investigatory 

stops. (U.S. Const., 4th Amend.; People v. Souza (1994) 9 Cal.4th 224, 229 

(Souza).) The appeals before us turn on whether a detention occurred and, if 

it did, whether it was lawful. These questions present mixed issues of law 

and fact. (See People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 342.) In reviewing a 

suppression motion, the trial court is vested with the power to assess witness 

credibility, resolve evidentiary conflicts, weigh the evidence, and draw factual 

inferences; its findings are upheld on appeal so long as they are supported by 

substantial evidence. (People v. Woods (1999) 21 Cal.4th 668, 673−674.) 

However, we exercise our independent judgment in determining whether on 

these facts the challenged search or seizure complied with the Fourth 

Amendment. (People v. Brown (2015) 61 Cal.4th 968, 975 (Brown).)

2. The minors were detained.
9

“An officer may approach a person in a public place and ask if the 

person is willing to answer questions. If the person voluntarily answers, 

those responses, and the officer's observations, are admissible in a criminal 

prosecution.” (Brown, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 974.) “Such consensual 

encounters present no constitutional concerns and do not require 

justification.” (Ibid.) “However, ‘when the officer, by means of physical force 

or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen,’ the 

officer effects a seizure of that person, which must be justified under the 

Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.” (Ibid.; quoting Terry 

v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1, 19, fn. 16 (Terry).) When an individual submits to 

a show of authority, “ ‘a seizure occurs if “in view of all the circumstances 

surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed he was 

not free to leave,” [Citation].’ ” (Brendlin v. California (2007) 551 U.S. 249, 

255 (Brendlin); Brown, at p. 974.)

Here, we readily conclude the minors were detained. Two marked 

police vehicles pulled up behind the legally parked Mercedes. As Detective 

Sidhu explained, this practice is called “contact and cover” and is designed to 

let people know there is more than one police vehicle present. The first of the 

vehicles to park behind the Mercedes activated its lights. Though there is no 

bright-line rule that activating lights always constitutes a detention, the 

“Supreme Court has long recognized that activating sirens or flashing lights 

can amount to a show of authority.” (Brown, supra, 61 Cal.4th at pp. 978, 

980.) 

Even if a stop did not occur with the officers’ arrival on the scene, it

plainly occurred immediately thereafter when four officers stepped out of 

their vehicles after parking and walked to each door of the sedan for the 

admitted purpose of preventing its occupants from leaving. The minors were 
10

directed to roll down their windows, hand over proof of identification, and 

provide their names, addresses, and birthdays. When Edgerrin asked if he 

could call his father, Officer Williams ordered him, “Stay off this phone. 

I don’t want you to do any of that kind of stuff, okay?” Jamar spelled his 

name for officers and gave his date of birth, but when he could not provide 

proof of identification, Officer Short warned him, “don’t lie to me” and stated 

the officers were “not gonna leave here until we find out” his real name. 

Under these facts, no reasonable person in defendants’ position would feel 

free to leave. (Brendlin, supra, 551 U.S. at pp. 255, 257; see Brown, supra, 

61 Cal.4th at pp. 977−980 [defendant was detained when deputy stopped 

behind his parked car and activated his lights].) Instead, a reasonable person 

in the minors’ position “would have perceived [the officers’] actions as a show 

of authority, directed at [them] and requiring that [they] submit by 

remaining where [they] [were].” (Brown, at p. 978.)

The juvenile court found otherwise based on footage from Officer 

Schnautz’s bodyworn camera. Having requested transmission of that exhibit 

(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.224(d)) and reviewed the video, we reach the 

opposite conclusion. While the officers seemed calm, courteous, and used a 

conversational tone with the minors, there is no question a detention 

occurred. Overt displays of authority, such as drawing a gun or barking out 

peremptory commands, are not essential for police officers to establish control 

and curtail an individual’s ability to leave. 

Specifically, the video shows a police vehicle with activated lights 

parked behind the Mercedes on a quiet, two-way residential street. Williams 

and Euler step out and walk toward the two front doors of the Mercedes as 

Schnautz pulls in behind. Schnautz parks behind Williams’s vehicle, and he 

and Short immediately step out and walk toward the two rear doors of the 
11

Mercedes. Williams directs Edgerrin to roll down his windows and tells him 

they were there because people reported something shady was going on. By 

then, Schnautz and Short reach the rear doors, and all four officers engage 

with its occupants. This still frame from the video plainly reflects a show of 

authority and submission by the occupants inside:

Faced with this record, the People appropriately concede that the 

evidence supports “a reasonable conclusion that there was, in fact, a 

detention.” Indeed, that is the only reasonable conclusion. 

3. Uncontested evidence does not furnish lawful justification for the stop.

Because the encounter was not consensual, the officers required legal 

justification to detain the minors. In their opposition brief below, the People 

maintained that the citizen tip, standing alone, furnished reasonable 

suspicion for a detention. At the hearing the prosecutor shifted gears, 

arguing in closing that the tip furnished reasonable suspicion in combination 

with officers’ prior knowledge that Edgerrin was a gang member present in 

rival gang territory around a gang holiday. Separate and apart from these 

theories, the People argued for the first time at the suppression hearing that 

the officers knew beforehand that Edgerrin had an active Fourth waiver, 

making it “a straight-up Fourth waiver probation search.” 
12

On appeal defendants contend the citizen tip did not, standing alone, 

furnish reasonable suspicion. Nor, in their view, could the detention be 

justified on the basis of Edgerrin’s probation status, as “the record leaves 

considerable ambiguity regarding whether the officer in fact knew about this 

status prior to the stop.” The People respond that there was reasonable 

suspicion because the citizen report of “shady” activity by occupants of a 

black Mercedes amplified officers’ preexisting knowledge that Edgerrin was a 

gang member driving a black Mercedes in rival gang territory. Moreover, the 

People further claim that officers knew from Detective Sidhu that Edgerrin 

was on probation with an active Fourth waiver. 

Addressing these arguments in turn, we conclude the vague citizen tip 

of “shady” behavior did not, standing alone, furnish reasonable suspicion for 

a detention. As to whether there were additional facts known to the officers 

that could support the citizen tip—or whether officers knew of Edgerrin’s 

active Fourth waiver at the time they initiated contact—the facts are heavily 

contested, and no credibility finding was made by the juvenile court. 

Accordingly, on the present record the detention and subsequent search 

cannot be justified on this potential alternative ground. It will be for the 

juvenile court on remand to make the necessary factual findings and 

determine whether the officers in fact had enough additional information to

constitute reasonable suspicion.

a. Legal Principles

Although a brief investigatory detention need not be supported by 

probable cause, it must be based on reasonable suspicion that criminal 

activity is afoot—i.e., “specific articulable facts that, considered in light of the 

totality of the circumstances, provide some objective manifestation that the 

person detained may be involved in criminal activity.” (Souza, supra, 

9 Cal.4th at pp. 230−231; see Navarette v. California (2014) 572 U.S. 393, 396 
13

(Navarette); Terry, supra, 392 U.S. at p. 22.) The reasonable suspicion 

standard is objective in nature, “based on the facts and circumstances known 

to the officer but without regard to the officer’s subjective state of mind.” 

(People v. Flores (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 617, 626.) Mere rumor or hunch do 

not suffice. (See Brown, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 981; Navarette, at p. 397; 

Terry, at p. 22; In re Tony C. (1978) 21 Cal.3d 888, 893.) “[W]here a 

reasonable suspicion of criminal activity exists, ‘the public rightfully expects 

a police officer to inquire into such circumstances “in the proper exercise of 

the officer's duties.” ’ ” (People v. Wells (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1078, 1083.)

Reasonable suspicion is, of course, unnecessary here if the officers 

knew that Edgerrin was inside the black Mercedes and subject to an active 

Fourth waiver at the time they approached the vehicle. But such knowledge 

must exist at the time of the stop; after-acquired knowledge of a probation 

search condition cannot justify an otherwise unlawful detention or search. 

(See In re Jaime P. (2006) 40 Cal.4th 128, 133 (Jaime P.).)

b. The citizen tip, by itself, did not provide reasonable suspicion for a 

detention.

In its opposition papers and at the suppression hearing, the prosecution 

relied on the citizen tip to argue in whole or in part that there was reasonable 

suspicion to detain the minors. Defendants maintain that this tip, standing 

alone, did not suffice. We agree with defendants.

“The ‘reasonable suspicion’ necessary to justify a stop ‘is dependent 

upon both the content of information possessed by the police and its degree of 

reliability.’ ” (Navarette, supra, 572 U.S. at p. 397; Brown, supra, 61 Cal.4th 

at p. 981.) Where officers rely on a citizen’s tip, that tip must be “ ‘reliable in 

its assertion of illegality, not just in its tendency to identify a determinate 

person.’ ” (People v. Dolly (2007) 40 Cal.4th 458, 471 (Dolly).) “A tip’s 

reliability depends upon an assessment of ‘the totality of the circumstances in 
14

a given case.’ ” (Id. at p. 464.) “One simple rule will not cover every 

situation. Some tips, completely lacking in indicia of reliability, would either 

warrant no police response or require further investigation before a forcible 

stop of a suspect would be authorized.” (Adams v. Williams (1972) 407 U.S. 

143, 147.) Both quantity and quality matter: “if a tip has a relatively low 

degree of reliability, more information will be required to establish the 

requisite quantum of suspicion than would be required if the tip were more 

reliable.” (Alabama v. White (1990) 496 U.S. 325, 330 (White).)

Case law offers useful guideposts on the reliability requirement for 

citizen tips. In White, supra, 496 U.S. 325, an anonymous tip that a woman 

would drive from a particular apartment building to a particular motel in a 

station wagon with a broken right taillight, transporting cocaine, was 

sufficiently reliable to create reasonable suspicion once officers corroborated 

the innocent details. (Id. at pp. 331‒332.) A 911 caller’s tip that she had 

been run off the highway was likewise sufficiently reliable in Navarette 

where the caller identified the make and model of the vehicle, recited the 

license plate number, made a contemporaneous report, and used the 911 

emergency system. (Navarette, supra, 572 U.S. at pp. 399−400.) Similarly, in 

Brown, officers had reasonable suspicion for a detention based on a 911 call 

reporting a violent fight. (Brown, supra, 61 Cal.4th at pp. 982‒983.) “[The] 

caller’s eyewitness knowledge, contemporaneous reporting, use of the 911 

system, and confirmation of his address”—in addition to his overhearing one 

of the people in the fight claim to have a loaded gun—“all provided additional 

indicia of reliability.” (Id. at p. 982.) Finally in Dolly, supra, 40 Cal.4th 458, 

an anonymous tip by a 911 caller that “a light-skinned African-American 

male had ‘just pulled a gun’ on him and had mentioned a gang name” was 
15

sufficiently reliable because the caller provided key details about the 

perpetrator that could be corroborated by police. (Id. at p. 462.)

In contrast to these cases, there was no reasonable suspicion to detain 

and frisk a minor in Florida v. J.L. (2000) 529 U.S. 266 (J.L.), where police 

received an anonymous telephone tip claiming a young Black male in a plaid 

shirt standing at a bus stop was carrying a firearm. The tipster did not 

explain how he knew this information or suggest any particular familiarity 

with the suspect, and the tip itself included no predictions of future behavior 

that could be corroborated to assess his credibility. (Id. at pp. 271−272.) The 

court rejected the state’s contention that the tip was reliable because “there 

really was a young [B]lack male wearing a plaid shirt at the bus stop” as the 

tipster described—reasonable suspicion required “that a tip be reliable in its 

assertion of illegality, not just in its tendency to identify a determinate 

person.” (Ibid.)

Turning to our record, Officer Schnautz testified at the suppression 

hearing that he and his three colleagues were parked on the northbound side 

of Madera Street when, around 6:05 p.m., a female driver approaching them 

southbound stopped and flagged them down. The driver told officers that she 

lived on a street nearby, where a parked black Mercedes was occupied by 

Black males who were “acting shady.” Although the tipster “didn’t elaborate 

on what she meant” by “acting shady,” officers decided to make contact with 

occupants of the vehicle. The BWC footage supports this account; after 

receiving the tip, the officers immediately drove a few blocks to the specified 
16

street and approached the Mercedes.6 As we explain, this report of “shady” 

behavior lacked the requisite indicia of reliability—particularly as to the 

assertion of illegality—to be used as the sole justification for the detention.

“[P]rivate citizens who report criminal activity generally have no bias 

or motive other than good citizenship, and therefore tend to be reliable.” 

(Brown, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 982.) Tips are even more reliable where 

“officers had the opportunity to see the tipsters, observe them face-to-face and 

evaluate their credibility.” (People v. Coulombe (2000) 86 Cal.App.4th 52, 58 

(Coulombe).) The tipster in this case spoke to officers face-to-face and 

revealed her address, providing some means of tracking her down. (Brown, 

at p. 982.) Although not established by Schnautz’s testimony, it seems 

plausible that she was speaking from personal knowledge as someone who 

had just witnessed something she believed was “shady” behavior. (Id. at 

p. 981; but see J.L., supra, 529 U.S. at pp. 271‒272 [anonymous tip was 

insufficiently reliable where the informant “neither explained how he knew 

about the gun nor supplied any basis for believing he had information about 

[the defendant]”].) 

Even so, a reliability problem arises from the information the tipster 

conveyed. Although she contacted police in person and left identifying 

information, her tip provided only a vague and highly subjective 

characterization of the behavior she saw. What is “shady” to one person may 

6 The BWC footage shows the tipster’s conversation with officers and the 

events that follow, albeit without audio. A woman emerges from her vehicle 

and approaches the officers. Schnautz talks to her for about 40 seconds. He 

then walks to his car, gestures as if to direct Officer Williams in the other 

police vehicle to lead the way, and drives several blocks to where Williams is 

parked directly behind the black Mercedes, lights flashing. Schnautz pulls in 

behind Williams’s patrol car, parks, and immediately steps out. At this point 

the audio begins. 
17

be unremarkable to another. Standing alone, nothing the tipster said was 

“reliable in its assertion of illegality.” (J.L., supra, 529 U.S. at p. 272.) 

Although officers confirmed the presence of Black males in a black Mercedes 

parked on the specified street, this could not cure the tip’s central defect—the 

car was legally parked, and officers did not observe any indicia of criminal 

activity when they arrived. On this record, the citizen’s tip was insufficiently

reliable as to any illegal behavior to provide a basis for a detention. (Id. at 

pp. 271−272; see, e.g., Coulombe, supra, 86 Cal.App.4th at p. 57 [finding 

reasonable suspicion from contemporaneous in-person citizen reports that 

someone fitting defendant’s description was carrying a firearm amongst a 

crowd of New Year’s Eve revelers].)

In isolation, an allegation of “shady” behavior is far too vague to 

suggest criminal activity. “Even a reliable tip will justify an investigative 

stop only if it creates reasonable suspicion that ‘criminal activity may be 

afoot.’ ” (Navarette, supra, 572 U.S. at p. 401 [finding reasonable suspicion 

where conduct alleged by 911 caller suggested drunk driving].) Just as a 

Terry stop may not rest on “bare-boned tips” about guns or narcotics (J.L., 

supra, 529 U.S. at p. 273), a detention cannot be based solely on a citizen tip 

that someone is acting “shady.” Even Schnautz struggled to define what 

“acting shady” meant, testifying it could convey anything from a person 

casing cars or looking to commit burglary to being “in the area for any 

unknown reasons.” As Edgerrin’s counsel remarked at the suppression 

hearing, “shady” can mean any number of things, and does not necessarily 

suggest a crime is occurring. It follows that a bare-bones tip of shady 

behavior conveys no more than a mere hunch of criminal activity, which does 

not suffice to justify a stop. (Brown, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 981; Navarette, 

supra, 572 U.S. at p. 397.)
18

We pause here to clarify that, confronted with a tip that was 

insufficient to create reasonable suspicion, officers were nonetheless entitled 

to investigate further. As the juvenile court stated, they had a right to drive 

to the location after receiving the tip. Once there, they could have made 

additional observations before approaching or attempted a consensual 

encounter by asking if the minors were willing to answer a few questions. 

What they could not do, without more, was immediately detain the minors. 

Here, it was uncontroverted that officers conducted no additional 

investigation after receiving the tip. Accordingly, unless they possessed 

additional prior knowledge to justify the detention—an issue the parties 

strenuously dispute—their actions were unlawful.

c. Basing reasonable suspicion on other contextual evidence would

require a credibility assessment the juvenile court did not make.

Contending there were additional factors at play, the People assert that 

Schnautz made the stop based on his knowledge that Edgerrin was a gang 

member in rival territory combined with the citizen tip. True enough, 

Schnautz testified on direct that he was helping Detective Sidhu with her 

surveillance on Edgerrin earlier that day and that she had informed him that 

Edgerrin was “a Lincoln Park gang member” present “in a rival set 

neighborhood.” Schnautz further claimed to know beforehand that Edgerrin 

drove a black Mercedes and was on probation with an active Fourth waiver. 

Upon receiving the citizen tip, Schanutz claimed he suspected that Edgerrin 

was inside and “could be looking to commit some kind of act of violence 

against any rival set gang member.” 

Sidhu’s testimony supported this version of events. She claimed on 

direct to know prior to the day of the stop that Edgerrin was on probation 

with a Fourth waiver. In surveilling Edgerrin that afternoon, she said she 

saw him in a black Mercedes bearing the same license plate as the car later 
19

stopped. Sidhu testified that she relayed to Schnautz and other officers that 

Edgerrin was in a black Mercedes with an active Fourth waiver. She was 

unequivocal that officers knew Edgerrin’s probation status before making the 

stop. 

While these contextual facts would surely affect our “totality of 

circumstances” analysis for reasonable suspicion (or justify the search 

outright as a straightforward probation search), we cannot rely on them to 

affirm for the simple reason that they were heavily disputed, with no 

credibility finding made by the juvenile court. Defense counsel vigorously 

challenged what officers knew in making the stop. As we describe below, the 

court at times cut off this inquiry, and it did not ultimately make a credibility 

finding as to facts that were unnecessary to its (ultimately incorrect) decision

that no detention occurred. “Thus, we do not have before us any express or 

implied findings of fact and determinations of credibility that might permit 

us to uphold the search on this theory.” (People v. Hoeninghaus (2004) 120 

Cal.App.4th 1180, 1198.)7

For example, defense counsel noted while cross-examining Detective 

Sidhu that her police reports on March 14 and 26 did not mention surveilling 

Edgerrin that afternoon or informing other officers about his Fourth waiver 

or the Mercedes. When Sidhu replied that she conveyed this information 

verbally to Schnautz and other officers over the radio, counsel for Edgerrin 

questioned why there was no such reference in the computer-aided dispatch 

(CAD) generated in this case. The court stopped this inquiry, finding it “far 

7 Edgerrin suggests the court made an implied finding that officers knew 

about his Fourth waiver only after making the stop. But we do not read the 

court’s comment that the Fourth waiver “came up” in the midst of a 

consensual encounter to suggest any implied finding that the officers were 

unaware of Edgerrin’s Fourth waiver (or other attendant circumstances) 

before they approached the Mercedes.
20

enough afield.” Edgerrin’s counsel eventually established that police reports 

are written in chronological order, and Sidhu’s reports did not mention seeing 

Edgerrin in a black Mercedes earlier that day nor reference any records check 

performed on Edgerrin prior to the stop. The first mention of a records check 

in Sidhu’s reports instead followed her description of the stop. Once more, 

the court sustained the prosecutor’s relevancy objection, halting further 

inquiry. 

Defense counsel likewise identified several discrepancies in Schnautz’s 

account. Schnautz testified he had reviewed Officer Williams’s arrest report 

and found it “accurate,” but conceded it contained nothing “related to 

Edgerrin [J.] driving around a black Mercedes” prior to his detention. 

Schnautz likewise did not recall being informed at any point about a license 

plate number for a particular black Mercedes. Edgerrin’s counsel then 

probed Schnautz’s “initial . . . reasons for approaching the vehicle.” As 

Schnautz conceded, the tipster had simply conveyed that “there [were] some 

guys in a black Mercedes that seemed shady.” This prompted him and the 

three officers to drive directly to the location of the Mercedes, park, and step 

out of their vehicles to contact its occupants. Schnautz did not run the 

license plate before stepping out. He agreed he had no prior contact with 

Edgerrin before making the stop. 

Next up, Jamar’s attorney tried to pinpoint when Schnautz and Sidhu 

had been in contact with each other. She asked Schnautz, “[Sidhu] didn’t 

relay any information to you on March 13 about Edgerrin [J.]; correct?” 

Schnautz did not respond, invoking privilege under Evidence Code section 

1040.8 After some discussion, the court permitted a “limited inquiry.” The 

8 Evidence Code section 1040 protects “official information” acquired in 

confidence by a public employee during the course of his or her job, which 
21

question was read back, and Schnautz answered “Yes.”9 Trying to clarify, 

counsel asked, “[a]t what point in time did you receive this information [from 

Sidhu]?”—but the court ended the inquiry, finding it irrelevant to whether 

the encounter was consensual. When counsel asked whether either of the 

police reports Schnautz reviewed (authored by Williams and Short) contained 

any information related to prior surveillance on Edgerrin, the court sustained 

the prosecutor’s objection, stating the topic had been covered by Edgerrin’s 

counsel. Schnautz did not recall anything in the police reports relating to 

officers’ prior knowledge of Edgerrin’s probation status, Fourth waiver, or 

gang affiliation. 

During closing arguments, Edgerrin’s counsel stated that there 

remained a “credibility issue” as to what transpired earlier that day, as 

officers’ alleged surveillance on Edgerrin was not reflected in any of the police 

reports. He understandably relied on several apparent inconsistencies 

between the police testimony and the BWC footage to suggest that officers 

“had no idea who was in that vehicle” when they surrounded it. For instance, 

includes all evidence gathered in ongoing criminal investigations. (County of 

Orange v. Superior Court (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 759, 764.) Where the 

privilege is asserted in criminal proceedings, the court must consider the 

defendant’s due process interests—the prosecution cannot commence 

criminal proceedings “and then invoke its governmental privileges to deprive 

the accused of anything which might be material to his defense.” (United 

States v. Reynolds (1953) 345 U.S. 1, 12.) If the privilege is invoked, the 

defendant must make a prima facie showing for disclosure, upon which the 

court examines the party claiming privilege in camera to determine whether 

it should be upheld. (People v. Montgomery (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 1011, 

1021; accord, In re Marcos B. (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 299, 308 [defense 

counsel has the right to propose questions for the in camera hearing].)

9 Between the original question being framed in the negative, an 

evidentiary objection causing a lengthy gap, and a readback, there may be 

some ambiguity in what Schnautz meant in answering “Yes.”
22

Schnautz stumbled over how to spell or pronounce Edgerrin’s name and did 

not appear to know who he was. Not until he later ran a records check did 

Schnautz seem to realize that Edgerrin was on probation. Jamar’s counsel 

joined these arguments, further questioning the prosecutor’s claim that this 

was a straightforward probation search: “If it was so clear and simpl[e], then 

there would have been evidence of knowledge of this Fourth waiver prior to 

this hearing, prior to Detective Sidhu sitting there on the stand.” Instead, 

prior communication about the Fourth waiver was not mentioned in reports 

prepared by Williams, Short, or Sidhu. Counsel maintained that there wasn’t 

“any credible information that there was knowledge that Edgerrin [J.] was on 

probation with a Fourth waiver prior to the stop.” 

In summary, counsel for both Edgerrin and Jamar argued that 

Schnautz and Sidhu had made up a justification after the fact—nothing in 

the police reports or BWC footage suggested that officers were surveilling 

Edgerrin that day, knew he was in a black Mercedes, knew he was a gang 

member in rival gang territory, or knew his probation and Fourth waiver 

status before making the stop. The juvenile court did not entertain these 

credibility questions, cutting the defense inquiry short because it rejected at 

the threshold that a detention occurred. 

“A detention may not be justified after the fact on a basis not relied on 

by the officer.” (People v. Bower (1979) 24 Cal.3d 638, 647; see Jaime P., 

supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 133 [otherwise unlawful search of minor subject to 

probation search condition could not be justified by post-search discovery of 

that condition].) Absent a factual finding as to what officers knew about 

Edgerrin at the time they first approached the Mercedes, we cannot 

determine whether additional contextual evidence either provides reasonable 
23

suspicion for a detention, or justifies the search completely based on 

Edgerrin’s Fourth waiver.10 

d. Remand is necessary.

Because justification for the stop turns on credibility assessments that 

have yet to be made, remand is necessary. Following a hearing, the juvenile 

court must make necessary factual findings as to what the officers knew 

when they stopped the minors. (See People v. Bowers (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 

1261, 1273 (Bowers) [remanding for the trial court to consider additional 

theories justifying the search]; People v. LeBlanc (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 157, 

168 [same].)11 

If the court determines that the officers knew Edgerrin had an active

Fourth waiver prior to the detention, that ends the inquiry. (Jaime P., supra, 

40 Cal.4th at p. 134.) Likewise, if officers knew other contextual facts—such 

10 The only other evidence at the hearing concerned the neighborhood 

where the detention occurred. Schnautz described Encanto as a “high-crime 

area,” with reports of drugs, prostitution, vehicular and residential 

burglaries, and stolen vehicles. While this may provide relevant context for 

the stop, “reasonable suspicion cannot be based solely on factors unrelated to 

the defendant, such as criminal activity in the area.” (People v. Casares

(2016) 62 Cal.4th 808, 838; see People v. Walker (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 1372, 

1391 [“the fact that the detainee happens to find himself or herself in a highcrime neighborhood is, of itself, insufficient to support a reasonable suspicion 

for a peace officer to stop that person”]; Souza, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 230

[“ ‘the detaining officers must have a particularized and objective basis for 

suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity’ ” (italics 

added)].)

11 At oral argument before this court Edgerrin and the People expressed 

different thoughts regarding the proper scope of proceedings on remand. We 

leave this issue to the experienced trial judge, who can consider the parties’ 

positions and evaluate whether to hold an entirely new suppression hearing 

or instead conduct a more limited proceeding to make the necessary factual 

findings.
24

as Edgerrin’s gang membership, his presence in rival gang territory, or his 

sighting in a black Mercedes hours before the stop—those facts might 

enhance the reliability of the citizen tip or, in their totality, create reasonable 

suspicion to justify the detention. If the court upholds the detention on one 

or both of these grounds, crediting the officers’ accounts, it should deny the

motions to suppress and reinstate the judgments. (Bowers, supra, 117 

Cal.App.4th at p. 1273.) But if the court instead resolves the credibility 

questions in defendants’ favor and finds the search unlawful, it should grant 

the motions to suppress and afford Edgerrin and Jamar an opportunity to 

withdraw their guilty pleas. (People v. Ruggles (1985) 39 Cal.3d 1, 13; People 

v. Hill (1974) 12 Cal.3d 731, 769.)12

12 Our disposition eliminates the need to address Edgerrin’s final 

argument, conceded by the People, that the juvenile court failed to calculate 

his predisposition custody credits pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code 

section 726. If the court on remand again denies Edgerrin’s suppression 

motion and reinstates the judgment, he will have the opportunity to seek 

correction of the judgment to properly reflect the predisposition custody 

credits accrued.
25

DISPOSITION

The judgments in People v. Edgerrin J. (case No. J239465) and People 

v. Jamar D. (case No. J242137) are reversed, and the matters are remanded 

to the juvenile court with directions to vacate its order denying the motions to 

suppress and conduct a renewed suppression hearing, consistent with this 

opinion, to resolve credibility conflicts as to what the officers knew at the 

time they detained defendants. If the court again denies the motions to 

suppress, it shall reinstate the judgments; but if it grants the motions, it 

shall afford defendants an opportunity to withdraw their guilty pleas. (See 

Bowers, supra, 117 Cal.App.4th at p. 1274.)

DATO, J.

WE CONCUR:

HALLER, Acting P. J.

GUERRERO, J.
Dato, J., Concurring.

I take the somewhat unusual step of concurring in my own majority

opinion to add a few personal observations.

Nearly a century ago Justice Benjamin Cardozo wrote: “The great tides 

and currents which engulf the rest of men do not turn aside in their course 

and pass the judges by.” (Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process (1921) 

p. 168.) Nor should they. As our broader cultural views on racial injustice 

evolve, courts and judges are compelled to acknowledge and confront the 

problem. (See, e.g., B.B. v. County of Los Angeles (2020) 10 Cal.5th 1, 31 

(conc. opn. of Liu, J.) [citing “the troubling racial dynamics that have resulted 

in state-sanctioned violence, including lethal violence, against Black people 

throughout our history to this very day”]; Utah v. Strieff (2016) 136 S.Ct. 

2056, 2070−2071 (dis. opn. of Sotomayor, J.) [“it is no secret that people of 

color are disproportionate victims of this type of scrutiny” in suspicionless 

stops]; State v. Saintcalle (Wash. 2013) 309 P.3d 326, 341 (Saintcalle)

[“Racial inequalities permeate our criminal justice system and present 

important moral issues we all must grapple with.”]; Glossip v. Gross (2015) 

576 U.S. 863, 921 (dis. opn. of Breyer, J.) [contemplating how conscious and 

unconscious bias affect jury determinations of relative culpability in capital 

cases “despite their legal irrelevance”].) 

Although he ultimately denied the suppression motion, Judge Willis 

presciently anticipated issues that would soon stir our national consciousness

when he remarked, “Now, we could go into the social justice analysis of young

[B]lack men in [B]lack communities being over-policed, directly or indirectly, 

and discuss all manner of circumstances.” He declined to do so, however, 
2

believing “the law hasn't reached that point as of yet.” Speaking in May 

2019, he could not have known what a difference a year would make.1

We have resolved this appeal without delving into complex issues of 

race and policing, but I submit that as judges we must remain mindful of the 

broader context in which this case arose. Three Black male teenagers sitting 

in a legally parked vehicle were detained by four police officers. The 

detention may have been based on nothing more than a tip from a woman—

who appears to be White—that the teens were “acting shady.” In situations 

like this, law enforcement officers must be sensitive to how implicit biases 

might influence what passersby perceive as a threat, just as judges must 

appreciate how officers on the receiving end of a vague, subjective tip might 

interpret the information they obtain.2 (See, e.g., Saintcelle, supra, 309 P.3d 

at p. 335 [“we all live our lives with stereotypes that are ingrained and often 

unconscious, implicit biases that endure despite our best efforts to eliminate 

them”].) Similarly, racial dynamics can affect how officers’ actions are 

perceived by someone in defendants’ shoes. (See, e.g., Commonwealth v. 

Warren (Mass. 2016) 58 N.E.3d 333, 342 [Black males in Boston who flee 

police “might just as easily be motivated by the desire to avoid the recurring 

indignity of being racially profiled as by the desire to hide criminal activity”]; 

1 Referencing recent events, Jamar argues that even “in this day and 

age, [B]lack males continue to be reported to police for innocuous conduct.” 

He lays some of the blame on courts for justifying detentions “without more 

specific articulable facts.”

2 It is significant that recent legislation “to ameliorate bias-based 

injustice in the courtroom” will soon require all public-facing court staff in 

this state to complete implicit bias training. (Stats. 2020, ch. 418, §§ 1(b), 3

(Assem. Bill No. 242).) Effective January 1, 2021, an amended Rule of Court 

will likewise mandate anti-bias training for all judicial officers. (Cal. Rules of 

Court, rule 10.469(e), as amended by the Judicial Council on Sept. 25, 2020.)
3

Jamison v. McClendon (S.D. Miss., Aug. 4, 2020, No. 3:16-CV-595-CWR-LRA) 

__ F.Supp.3d __ [2020 WL 4497723, at *22] [decades after the 1960’s, “Black 

male teens still report a ‘fear of police and a serious concern for their personal 

safety and mortality in the presence of police officers’ ”].) 

Ultimately, there are myriad ways in which racial perceptions and 

biases might surface in a given criminal case, as in everyday life. And while 

the police officers here never inquired further to find out what exactly the 

tipster saw that concerned her, our opinion appropriately emphasizes the 

perils of relying solely on this type of report as a basis to detain. To that end, 

the objective standard of reasonable suspicion, which has always required 

more than a mere hunch to justify a detention, remains a vital safeguard for 

protecting our important Fourth Amendment rights.

DATO, J.