COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Humphreys, Agee and Kelsey 

Argued at Salem, Virginia 

ROBERT BRUCE BROWN, II 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 0542-02-3 JUDGE D. ARTHUR KELSEY 

 JANUARY 21, 2003 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ROANOKE COUNTY 

Richard C. Pattisall, Judge 

 Gillian Deegan for appellant. 

 Donald E. Jeffrey, III, Assistant Attorney 

General (Jerry W. Kilgore, Attorney General; 

Leah A. Darron, Assistant Attorney General, 

 on brief), for appellee. 

 Robert Bruce Brown challenges his conviction for grand 

larceny (stealing a power trim saw) in violation of Code 

§ 18.2-95. Brown claims that the Commonwealth failed to present 

sufficient evidence of his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 

Finding the evidence sufficient, we affirm the trial court. 

I. 

On appeal, we review the evidence "'in the light most 

favorable to the Commonwealth'" and grant it the benefit of any 

reasonable inferences. Ward v. Commonwealth, 264 Va. 648, 654, 

 

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
570 S.E.2d 827, 831 (2002) (quoting Higginbotham v. 

Commonwealth, 216 Va. 349, 352, 218 S.E.2d 534, 537 (1975)). 

That principle requires us to "'discard the evidence of the 

accused'" which conflicts, either directly or inferentially, 

with the Commonwealth's evidence. Wactor v. Commonwealth, 38 

Va. App. 375, 380, 564 S.E.2d 160, 162 (2002) (quoting Watkins 

v. Commonwealth, 26 Va. App. 335, 348, 494 S.E.2d 859, 866 

(1998)). 

In early March 2000, building contractor Danny Tester was 

building and "trimming" a house in Roanoke County. At the end 

of each workday, Tester stored his tools, including a large 

Delta trim saw, "in the laundry room in the house." He had 

purchased the saw about a year earlier for $700. On March 6, as 

he usually did, Tester left all his tools at the house when he 

finished working for the day. When he returned to the house the 

following morning, his Delta saw and several other tools were 

gone. 

Seven days later, Brown visited the Vinton Pawn Shop. 

Claiming that "he was running low on material for another job," 

Brown asked the shop's manager, Tommy Mullins, whether Brown 

could "pawn" a saw and "borrow $200." Mullins looked at Brown's 

identification, took a picture of Brown, and purchased the saw 

for $200. The saw was a Delta "big trim saw." 

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Tester's trim saw was very uncommon in the Roanoke area. 

Although he had owned two such trim saws in his career, Tester 

purchased each by special order through Marco, a local store. 

When he went to order a replacement saw from Marco after it was 

stolen, however, he learned that the manufacturer did not "make 

that saw anymore." Needing a replacement saw quickly, Tester 

decided to "look around" and see if he could "find one in a pawn 

shop." 

One week after Brown sold the saw, Tester entered the 

Vinton Pawn Shop. After describing his missing saw to Mullins, 

Tester asked whether the shop ever sold similar saws. Recalling 

that he had received a trim saw a week earlier, Mullins asked 

Tester what the saw "looked like" and whether it had "any 

distinct markings." Tester described the saw as one equipped 

with "a Craftsman blade" and "fairly new" without "a lot of 

scratches." Tester also stated that the top of the saw had "a 

little bit of construction glue on it." The two men then walked 

to the back of the store and examined the saw that Mullins had 

recently purchased from Brown. The saw precisely matched 

Tester's description. Upon viewing the saw, both Mullins and 

Tester "agreed that it was [Tester's] saw." 

At trial, Brown, also a contractor, claimed that he 

purchased the saw from "a gentleman" at Happy's Flea Market. 

The gentleman, Brown claimed, was selling "tools and all sorts 

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of different stuff," including the large Delta trim saw. Brown 

claimed that he and his brother purchased the saw for $150. 

Brown testified that he obtained no receipt or other proof of 

the sale, and he mentioned that, due to the passage of time and 

his interactions with numerous people at Happy's, he would be 

unable to identify the man who sold him the saw. During 

cross-examination, Brown conceded he could not recall what 

specific construction jobs he was "working at the time [he] 

pawned the saw." Brown also admitted, for impeachment purposes, 

that he had an extensive criminal background: four misdemeanor 

larceny convictions and ten felony convictions. 

After the close of the evidence, Brown renewed his motion 

to strike, arguing that the prosecution failed to prove that the 

saw Brown sold to Vinton Pawn Shop was Tester's saw. The trial 

court denied the motion and sentenced Brown to five years in 

prison for grand larceny. The court then suspended two years 

and eight months of the sentence. 

 II. 

Due process requires the prosecution to prove the 

defendant's guilt "beyond a reasonable doubt." Fiore v. White, 

531 U.S. 225, 228-29 (2001). This essential safeguard of 

liberty, as stringent as it is, does not ignore the axiom that 

"'[e]vidence is seldom sufficient to establish any fact as 

demonstrated and beyond all doubt.'" Harris v. Commonwealth, 

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206 Va. 882, 887, 147 S.E.2d 88, 92 (1966) (quoting Toler v. 

Commonwealth, 188 Va. 774, 780, 51 S.E.2d 210, 213 (1949)). 

Even so, mere suspicion of wrongdoing coupled with a bare 

probability of guilt can never suffice. 

When faced with a challenge to the sufficiency of the 

evidence, we "presume the judgment of the trial court to be 

correct" and reverse only if the trial court's decision is 

"plainly wrong or without evidence to support it." Davis v. 

Commonwealth, 39 Va. App. 96, 99, 570 S.E.2d 875, 876-77 (2002) 

(citations omitted); see also McGee v. Commonwealth, 25 Va. App. 

193, 197-98, 487 S.E.2d 259, 261 (1997) (en banc). Under that 

standard, we cannot "substitute our judgment for that of the 

trier of fact, even were our opinion to differ." Wactor v. 

Commonwealth, 38 Va. App. 375, 380, 564 S.E.2d 160, 162 (2002) 

(citation omitted); see also Harris v. Commonwealth, 38 Va. App. 

680, 691, 568 S.E.2d 385, 390 (2002). In other words, a 

reviewing court does not 

ask itself whether it believes that the 

evidence at the trial established guilt 

beyond a reasonable doubt. Instead, the 

relevant question is whether, after viewing 

the evidence in the light most favorable to 

the prosecution, any rational trier of fact 

could have found the essential elements of 

the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. 

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Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979) (emphasis in 

original and citation omitted).1 "This familiar standard gives 

full play to the responsibility of the trier of fact fairly to 

resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to 

draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts." 

Id.

In circumstantial evidence cases, the reasonable doubt 

standard requires proof "sufficiently convincing to exclude 

every reasonable hypothesis except that of guilt." Coleman v. 

Commonwealth, 226 Va. 31, 53, 307 S.E.2d 864, 876 (1983). This 

construct has two important subsidiary rules. First, only a 

hypothesis of innocence flowing "from the evidence, not those 

that spring from the imagination of the defendant" must be 

considered. Stevens v. Commonwealth, 38 Va. App. 528, 535, 567 

S.E.2d 537, 540 (2002) (citation omitted). Second, whether an 

"alternative hypothesis of innocence is reasonable is a question 

of fact and, therefore, is binding on appeal unless plainly 

 

1

 When a jury decides the case, "we review the jury's 

decision to see if reasonable jurors could have made the choices 

that the jury did make. We let the decision stand unless we 

conclude no rational juror could have reached that decision." 

Pease v. Commonwealth, 39 Va. App. 342, 355, 573 S.E.2d 272, ___ 

(2002) (en banc). The same standard applies when a trial judge 

sits as the fact finder. "If reasonable jurists could disagree 

about the probative force of the facts, we have no authority to 

substitute our views for those of the trial judge." Campbell v. 

Commonwealth, 39 Va. App. 180, 186, 571 S.E.2d 906, 909 (2002). 

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wrong." Id.; Harris, 38 Va. App. at 691, 568 S.E.2d at 391; 

Archer v. Commonwealth, 26 Va. App. 1, 12-13, 492 S.E.2d 826, 

832 (1997). In other words, only when a fact finder 

"arbitrarily" ignores the reasonableness of the innocence 

hypothesis should the decision be overturned on appeal. 

Stevens, 38 Va. App. at 535, 567 S.E.2d at 540 (citation 

omitted). 

 III. 

An individual commits larceny by wrongfully taking the 

property of another "without his permission and with the intent 

to permanently deprive the owner of that property." Stanley v. 

Webber, 260 Va. 90, 96, 531 S.E.2d 311, 315 (2000); Welch v. 

Commonwealth, 15 Va. App. 518, 521-22, 425 S.E.2d 101, 104 

(1992) (citations omitted). Grand larceny involves the theft of 

property with a value exceeding $200. Code § 18.2-95; Tarpley 

v. Commonwealth, 261 Va. 251, 256, 542 S.E.2d 761, 763-64 

(2001). To convict an individual of larceny, the Commonwealth 

must prove that the suspect intended to steal the property when 

he took possession of it. Tarpley, 261 Va. at 256, 542 S.E.2d 

at 763-64. The intent to steal can be inferred by "the actions 

of the defendant and any statements made by him." Id. at 256, 

542 S.E.2d at 764. 

Upon establishing that a larceny has occurred, "the 

unexplained possession of recently stolen goods permits an 

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inference of larceny by the possessor." Winston v. 

Commonwealth, 26 Va. App. 746, 757, 497 S.E.2d 141, 147 (1998) 

(citation omitted). This inference "throws upon the accused the 

burden of accounting for that possession," Hope v. Commonwealth, 

10 Va. App. 381, 385, 392 S.E.2d 830, 833 (1990) (en banc) 

(citations and internal quotations omitted), and provides prima

facie evidence that the possessor committed the larceny. Id. 

To raise this inference, the Commonwealth must show that 

the goods in question match the "general description" of the 

recently stolen items. See Wright v. Commonwealth, 2 Va. App. 

743, 747, 348 S.E.2d 9, 12 (1986). "When an accused is found in 

possession of goods of a type recently stolen, strict proof of 

identity of the goods is not required." Henderson v. 

Commonwealth, 215 Va. 811, 812-13, 213 S.E.2d 782, 783 (1975); 

see also Bunch v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 423, 437, 304 S.E.2d 

271, 279 (1983) ("strict proof of identity" not required). In 

other words, it is 

"not necessary that the identity of stolen 

property should be invariably established by 

positive evidence. In many such cases 

identification is impracticable, and yet the 

circumstances may render it impossible to 

doubt the identity of the property, or to 

account for the possession of it by the 

accused upon any reasonable hypothesis 

consistent with his innocence." 

Reese v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 671, 673, 250 S.E.2d 345, 346 

(1979) (quoting Gravely v. Commonwealth, 86 Va. 396, 402, 10 

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S.E. 431, 433 (1889)). Consequently, if the property can be 

recognized reasonably by other means, we do not believe it 

"necessary for the goods to have been identified by serial 

number" or some other precise identifying code. Wright, 2 

Va. App. at 747, 348 S.E.2d at 12. 

Brown contends that the Commonwealth's failure to link the 

serial number on Tester's saw to the serial number of his saw 

negates the larceny inference. We disagree. The evidence 

proved that Tester examined the saw personally and confirmed it 

as his own. The Delta trim saw was an uncommon tool, difficult 

to find because "nobody stocks them." It could be bought only 

through special order from stores in the area. Despite the 

difficulty in procuring such a tool, Brown claims that he 

purchased the same type of saw for a fraction of its cost just 

one week after Tester's saw was stolen. The unique 

characteristics of Tester's saw —— the Craftsman blade and 

construction glue dripped across the top —— precisely matched 

the saw Brown sold to Vinton Pawn Shop. These facts, when taken 

together, adequately raised the larceny inference. 

Brown failed to rebut the inference by providing a credible 

account for his possession of the saw. He had no receipt of the 

sale. The passage of time, Brown unconvincingly claimed, 

rendered him unable to "identify [the seller] now." Equally 

telling was Brown's inability to identify what construction 

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jobs, if any, he worked at the time he pawned the saw. Given 

Brown's history of ten felony convictions and four larceny 

misdemeanors, the trial judge was at liberty to discount Brown's 

self-serving explanation as a mere effort at "lying to conceal 

his guilt." Shackleford v. Commonwealth, 262 Va. 196, 209, 547 

S.E.2d 899, 907 (2001); Mughrabi v. Commonwealth, 38 Va. App. 

538, 548, 567 S.E.2d 542, 546 (2002); Morrison v. Commonwealth, 

37 Va. App. 273, 284, 557 S.E.2d 724, 730 (2002). "A 

defendant's false statements are probative to show he is trying 

to conceal his guilt, and thus is evidence of his guilt." 

Emmett v. Commonwealth, 264 Va. 364, 372, 569 S.E.2d 39, 45 

(2002) (quoting in parenthetical from Rollston v. Commonwealth, 

11 Va. App. 535, 548, 399 S.E.2d 823, 831 (1991)); see also

Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 296 (1992) (if the defendant's 

sworn testimony is disbelieved as a deliberate falsehood, the 

fact finder may consider the "perjured testimony as affirmative 

evidence of guilt"). 

 Sufficient evidence supports Brown's conviction for grand 

larceny. The trial court, therefore, did not err in finding 

Brown guilty of this offense. 

 Affirmed. 

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