J-S46035-17

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

LANCE LESTER HAWKES 

Appellant

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 98 MDA 2017

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence January 9, 2017

In the Court of Common Pleas of Adams County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-01-CR-0001330-2015

BEFORE: BOWES, OLSON, JJ., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED AUGUST 29, 2017

Appellant Lance Lester Hawkes appeals the judgment of sentence 

entered by the Court of Common Pleas of Adams County after the trial court 

convicted Appellant of Aggravated Assault. Appellant raises challenges to 

the sufficiency and weight of the evidence. We affirm.

On March 3, 2010, at midnight, Officer Richard Henry Phillips 

attempted to initiate a traffic stop of Appellant’s vehicle, which was traveling 

eastbound on York Road. Officer Phillips activated the overhead lights of his 

patrol car and began to follow Appellant’s vehicle. Appellant refused to pull 

over, fled an excessive rate of speed (approximately 80 to 100 miles per 

hour), and ran a red light at the Cross Keys intersection. Just three to four 

____________________________________________

*

Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S46035-17

- 2 -

seconds later, while pursuing Appellant through the intersection, Officer 

Phillips’s patrol car collided with a tractor-trailer. As a result of the accident, 

Officer Phillips sustained traumatic brain injury, broken facial bones, and a 

broken leg. 

Appellant fled the scene of the accident and was able to avoid 

apprehension for five years. On November 12, 2015, Appellant was charged 

with aggravated assault of a police officer under 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2702(a)(2). 

Following a stipulated bench trial, Appellant was convicted of Aggravated 

Assault on November 3, 2016. Appellant filed a post-trial motion, which was 

subsequently denied. The lower court sentenced Appellant to 51⁄2 to 11 

years’ incarceration on January 9, 2017. Appellant filed a timely notice of 

appeal and complied with the lower court’s direction to file a concise 

statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).

Appellant raises two issues for our review on appeal:

1. Whether there was sufficient evidence, as a matter of law, to 

support a verdict of guilty of the crime of aggravated assault?

2. Whether the lower court abused its discretion when it denied 

Appellant’s motion for a new trial because the verdict was 

against the weight of the evidence?

Appellant’s Brief, at 4.

In reviewing Appellant’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence 

supporting his aggravated assault conviction, we are guided by the following 

standard:
J-S46035-17

- 3 -

The standard of review for a challenge to the sufficiency of 

the evidence is to determine whether, when viewed in a light 

most favorable to the verdict winner, the evidence at trial and 

all reasonable inferences therefrom is sufficient for the trier of 

fact to find that each element of the crimes charged is 

established beyond a reasonable doubt. The Commonwealth

may sustain its burden of proving every element beyond a 

reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial evidence.

The facts and circumstances established by the 

Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of 

innocence. Any doubt raised as to the accused's guilt is to be 

resolved by the fact-finder. As an appellate court, we do not 

assess credibility nor do we assign weight to any of the 

testimony of record. Therefore, we will not disturb the verdict 

unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a 

matter of law no probability of fact may be drawn from the 

combined circumstances.

Commonwealth v. Wanner, 158 A.3d 714, 717–18 (Pa.Super. 2017) 

(quoting Commonwealth v. Vogelsong, 90 A.3d 717, 719 (Pa. Super. 

2014)).

Appellant was convicted of Aggravated Assault pursuant to Section 

2702(a)(2) of the Crimes Code which provides that “[a] person is guilty of 

aggravated assault if he ... attempt[ed] to cause or intentionally, knowingly 

or recklessly cause[d] serious bodily injury to any of the officers, agents, 

employees or other persons enumerated in subsection (c) ... while in the 

performance of duty.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2702(a)(2). Police officers are 

included in the category of individuals enumerated in Section 2702(c).

Appellant specifically argues that there is insufficient evidence to show 

that he acted with the requisite recklessness. To sustain a conviction for 

aggravated assault based on the theory of recklessness, the Commonwealth 
J-S46035-17

- 4 -

must prove a heightened mens rea and show the defendant’s recklessness 

rose to the level of malice. Commonwealth v. Kling, 731 A.2d 145, 147 

(Pa.Super. 1999).

Malice exists where there is a wickedness of disposition, 

hardness of heart, cruelty, recklessness of consequences, and a 

mind regardless of social duty, although a particular person may 

not be intended to be injured. Where malice is based on a 

reckless disregard of consequences, it is not sufficient to show 

mere recklessness; rather, it must be shown the defendant 

consciously disregarded an unjustified and extremely high risk 

that his actions might cause death or serious bodily injury. A 

defendant must display a conscious disregard for almost certain 

death or injury such that it is tantamount to an actual desire to 

injure or kill; at the very least, the conduct must be such that 

one could reasonably anticipate death or serious bodily injury 

would likely and logically result. 

Id. at 147–48 (citations omitted).

Although this Court has recognized that motor vehicle crashes seldom 

warrant a conviction for aggravated assault due to the heightened mens rea 

requirement, “a conviction based on malice is appropriate where evidence 

demonstrates the element of sustained recklessness by a driver in the face 

of an obvious risk of harm to his victims.” Commonwealth v. Kling, 731 

A.2d 145, 149 (Pa.Super. 1999) (citing Commonwealth v. Comer, 552 Pa. 

527, 716 A.2d 593 (1998)). See Commonwealth v. Riggs, 63 A.3d 780, 

784–85 (Pa.Super. 2012) (finding this Court has not hesitated in upholding 

an aggravated assault conviction for a motor vehicle crash when the 

particular facts support a finding of malice). 
J-S46035-17

- 5 -

In Riggs, this Court affirmed the appellant’s aggravated assault 

conviction, when the defendant ran a red light, traveled at a high rate of 

speed through an intersection without applying his brakes, collided with 

another vehicle, and fled from the scene of the accident. This Court found 

these circumstances, along with the fact that Appellant had been previously 

involved in three high-speed chases with police, supported the finding of 

sustained recklessness. Id. at 785. In Kling, this Court upheld the 

appellant’s conviction for aggravated assault as the appellant caused a fatal 

accident when racing on a curvy mountain road at speeds in excess of eighty 

m.p.h. The record showed that just moments before the crash, the 

appellant nearly hit a minivan traveling in the opposite direction, but 

continued his reckless conduct and disregarded the risk that his conduct 

could result in serious disaster. Thereafter, the appellant sped into a double 

blind curve, where he crossed the center line, killing an oncoming driver and 

seriously injuring her ten-year-old son. As result, this Court found the 

appellant exhibited sustained recklessness as he “had adequate time to 

calculate and reflect upon the consequences of his reckless conduct, thus 

rendering the choice to continue it malicious.” Kling, 731 A.2d at 150.

In the case sub judice, we find sufficient evidence to demonstrate that 

Appellant acted with sustained recklessness in the face of an obvious risk of 

harm to Officer Phillips and the public at large. Although Officer Phillips 

attempted to pull over Appellant’s vehicle for a traffic stop and activated the 

overhead lights of his patrol car, Appellant disregarded the officer’s request 
J-S46035-17

- 6 -

and initiated a high-speed chase in which Appellant reached speeds between 

80 and 100 m.p.h. Appellant continued at this high rate of speed through 

the red light at an intersection in an attempt to avoid apprehension. Officer 

Phillips, in pursuit of Appellant, passed through the intersection just seconds 

later, and was hit by a tractor-trailer. As this evidence shows Appellant 

blatantly disregarded the risk that his conduct could cause death or serious 

bodily injury to another person, we conclude there is sufficient evidence to 

support Appellant’s aggravated assault conviction.1

Appellant also raises a challenge to the weight of the evidence 

supporting his aggravated assault conviction. In reviewing a challenge to 

the weight of the evidence, our standard of review is as follows:

The weight of the evidence is exclusively for the finder of fact 

who is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence and to 

determine the credibility of the witnesses. An appellate court 

cannot substitute its judgment for that of the finder of fact. 

Thus, we may only reverse the lower court's verdict if it is so 

contrary to the evidence as to shock one's sense of justice. 

Moreover, where the trial court has ruled on the weight claim 

below, an appellate court's role is not to consider the underlying 

question of whether the verdict is against the weight of the 

evidence. Rather, appellate review is limited to whether the trial 

court palpably abused its discretion in ruling on the weight claim.

____________________________________________

1 Although Appellant asserts in his appellate brief that the Commonwealth 

failed to prove that his conduct caused the serious bodily injury to Officer 

Phillips, Appellant does not cite any authority or develop any analysis to 

support a challenge to the causation element. Thus, this issue is waived. 

See Commonwealth v. Woodard, 129 A.3d 480, 509 (Pa. 2015) (holding 

that “[w]here an appellate brief fails to ... develop an issue in any other 

meaningful fashion capable of review, that claim is waived. It is not the 

obligation of an appellate court to formulate appellant's arguments for him”). 
J-S46035-17

- 7 -

Commonwealth v. Champney, 574 Pa. 435, 444, 832 A.2d 403, 408 

(2003). “A trial court's denial of a weight claim is the least assailable of its 

rulings. Conflicts in the evidence and contradictions in the testimony of any 

witnesses are for the fact finder to resolve.” Commonwealth v. Lofton, 57 

A.3d 1270, 1273 (Pa.Super. 2012), appeal denied, 620 Pa. 721, 69 A.3d 601 

(2013) (internal citations omitted).

Appellant argues that the trial court erred in making certain factual 

determinations. First, although the driver of the tractor-trailer told police 

that Appellant ran a red light, Appellant argues that another eyewitness told 

officers Appellant had a green light when he passed through the intersection. 

Second, Appellant objects to the trial court’s characterization of the 

intersection as “busy” when the crash occurred at midnight. Third, Appellant 

argues that the trial court erred in finding that he was traveling 80 and 100 

m.p.h. when one of the witnesses “correctly predicted” Appellant was driving 

between 80 and 90 m.p.h.

Appellant’s challenge to the weight of the evidence is meritless as “a 

new trial should not be granted because of a mere conflict in the testimony 

or because the judge on the same facts would have arrived at a different 

conclusion.” Commonwealth v. Widmer, 560 Pa. 308, 319–20, 744 A.2d 

745, 752 (2000) (citation omitted). We will not disturb the trial court’s 

credibility determinations as factfinder and discern no abuse of discretion by 

the trial court in concluding that the verdict was not against the weight of 

the evidence.
J-S46035-17

- 8 -

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of sentence.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Bowes, J. join the memorandum.

Olson, J. Concurs in the Result. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 8/29/2017