alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
§ 1.26 Representation before the Department of Agriculture. ( a ) *Applicability.* This section applies to all hearings and other proceedings before the Department of Agriculture, except to the extent that any other regulation of the Department may specifically make this section, or any part of this section, inapplicable as to particular hearings or other proceedings.
( b ) *Administrative provisions.* ( 1 ) In any hearing or other proceeding before the Department of Agriculture, the parties may appear in person or by counsel or other representative. Persons who appear as counsel or in a representative capacity in any hearing or proceeding must conform to the standards of ethical conduct required of practitioners before the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, and to any applicable standards of ethical conduct established by statutes, executive orders and regulations.
( 2 ) Whenever the Secretary finds, after notice and opportunity for hearing, that a person who is acting or has acted as counsel or representative in any hearing or other proceeding before the Department has not conformed to any such standards of ethical conduct, the Secretary may order that such person be precluded from acting as counsel or representative in any hearing or other proceeding before the Department for such period of time as the Secretary deems warranted. Whenever the Secretary has probable cause to believe that any person who is acting or has acted as counsel or representative in any such hearing or other proceeding has not conformed to any such standards of ethical conduct, the Secretary may, by written notice to such person, suspend the person from acting as such a counsel or representative pending completion of the procedures specified in the preceding sentence.
( 3 ) No employee or former employee of the Department shall be permitted to represent any person before the Department in connection with any particular matter as to which by reason of employment with the Department the employee or former employee acquired personal knowledge of such a nature that it would be improper, unethical, or contrary to the public interest for the employee or former employee so to act.
( 4 ) This section shall not be construed to prevent an employee or former employee of the Department from appearing as a witness in any hearing or other proceeding before the Department.
(18 U.S.C. 203, 205, 207)
[32 FR 5458, Apr. 1, 1967, as amended at 60 FR 66480, Dec. 22, 1995]
================================================================================

                              Exhibit 32.2

               CERTIFICATION OF PRINCIPAL ACCOUNTING OFFICER
                    PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                    AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906
                     OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

I, Zaf Sungur,  principal  accounting  officer of Brookmount  Explorations Inc.,
certify,  pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906
of the  Sarbanes-Oxley  Act of 2002,  that the Annual  Report on Form  10-KSB of
Brookmount  Explorations Inc., for the fiscal year ended November 30, 2004 fully
complies  with the  requirements  of  Section  13(a) or 15(d) of the  Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and that the information  contained in the Annual Report on
Form 10-KSB fairly presents in all material respects the financial condition and
results of operations of Brookmount Explorations Inc.


/s/ Zaf Sungur
---------------------------
Zaf Sungur
Principal Accounting Officer
February 25, 2005
#### In the Matter of Dorothea Cornwell, Petitioner, v IBM Corporation et al., Respondents.

— Proceeding instituted in this court pursuant to section 298 of the Executive Law to review a determination of the State Human Rights Appeal Board, dated May 24, 1978, which affirmed an order of the State Division of Human Rights finding no probable cause to believe that respondent IBM Corporation (IBM) was guilty of an unlawful discriminatory practice based upon petitioner’s race, color, sex or disability. Petitioner’s complaint alleging that IBM discriminated against her on the basis of race, color, sex and disability by denying her equal terms, conditions and privileges of employment and forcing her to resign was dismissed by the State Division of Human Rights after an investigation disclosed that there was no probable cause to support such a claim. This determination, which *1035was affirmed by the State Human Rights Appeal Board, must be confirmed. There is substantial evidence in the record to support the finding that the petitioner was denied a transfer from IBM’s Endicott facility to another location because of her poor attendance record and resulting lack of dependability. Accordingly, that finding is conclusive and must be upheld (Executive Law, § 298; *Matter of Mize*v *State Div. of Human Rights,*33 NY2d 53, 57). Petitioner herself admitted that if denied a transfer, she could not return to work at the Endicott location. Petitioner argues that the State Division of Human Rights failed to adequately investigate the allegations in her complaint against IBM. The regional director of the division office in which the complaint is filed is required to make a “prompt and fair investigation” of the allegations in the complaint (9 NYCRR 465.6 [a]). The method of investigation is left to the discretion of the regional director and may include written or oral inquiry (9 NYCRR 465.6 [b]). The complainant must be afforded an opportunity to rebut evidence submitted by or obtained from the respondent before the complaint may be dismissed for no probable cause (9 NYCRR 465.6 [c]). These procedures were followed to the letter by the regional director. The allegations in petitioner’s complaint were reviewed and an investigative inquiry form containing detailed questions pertaining to these allegations was sent to IBM. Its response contained specific facts and documentation sufficient to rebut petitioner’s allegations. Petitioner was then interviewed by the regional director and given an opportunity to read and rebut the evidence submitted by IBM. Accordingly, since the division acted reasonably and arrived at its decision after investigating the petitioner’s allegations and allowing her an opportunity to be heard, the determination should be upheld *(State Div. of Human Rights v Wayne Drug Co.,*60 AD2d 990). Determination confirmed, and petition dismissed, without costs. Mahoney, P. J., Greenblott, Sweeney, Kane and Main, JJ., concur.
Exhibit 32.2



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



CERTIFICATION



I, William E. Hantke, Chief Financial Officer of Premcor Inc. (the Company), pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, do hereby certify as follows with respect to the Company:



| | 1. | The quarterly report on Form 10-Q of the Company for the period ended September 30, 2004, fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934; and
| | -- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | 2. | The information contained in such Form 10-Q fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| | -- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|IN | WITNESS WHEREOF, I have executed this Certification on this 26th day of October 2004.
|-- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



By:

/s/ William E. HantkeChief Financial Officer




A signed original of this
written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to Premcor Inc. and will be retained by Premcor Inc. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
625.103 Exceptions. ( a ) The authority to make the determination prescribed in FAR 25.103(a) is delegated, without power of redelegation, to the head of the contracting activity.
[69 FR 19336, Apr. 13, 2004]
#### P. J. O’Connell, appellant, v. Myrtle Doble, also known as Myrtle Giblaro, appellee.

Gen. No. 31,010.

Action for rent. Judgment for defendant. Appeal from the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. Asa G. Adams, Judge, presiding. Heard in the second division of this court for the first district at the March term, 1926.

Reversed and remanded.

Opinion filed October 5, 1926.

Robert H. Holmes, for appellant.

Arnd, Gavin, Griffin & Maraz, for appellee; Frederick Arnd, of counsel.

Mr. Justice Barnes

delivered the opinion of the court.
#### Long Beach Public School Employees Group C Association, Appellant, v American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, Afl-cio, et al., Respondents, et al., Defendants.

[775 NYS2d 580]

In an action to recover union dues and agency fees held by the defendants City School District of the City of Long Beach and Fleet Boston Financial Corporation, doing business as Fleet Bank, the plaintiff appeals from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Cozzens, Jr., J.), dated December 19, 2002, as granted the motion of the defendants American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO and American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, Council 66, Local 1671 for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

The Supreme Court properly granted the motion of the defendants American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO and American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, Council 66, Local 1671, for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. These defendants were entitled to union dues until certification of the plaintiff as the exclusive bargaining agent for the employee unit *(see*Civil Service Law § 208 [1] [b]; *Matter of Civil Serv. Empls. Assn. v Newman,*72 AD2d 120, 123 [1980]). Smith, J.P., Krausman, Crane and Mastro, JJ., concur.
903.104-1 Definitions. As used in this section and for the purposes of the post-employment restrictions at 48 CFR 3.104-2(b)(3)— *Deputy program manager* means the individual within DOE who normally acts as the program manager in the absence of the program manager, and does not mean an individual who occasionally acts for the program manager or the deputy program manager.
*Program manager* means the individual within DOE who: ( 1 ) Exercises authority on a day-to-day basis to manage an acquisition program— ( i ) For a system attained through the acquisition process; and
( ii ) With one or more contracts, at least one of which has a value exceeding $10,000,000; and
( 2 ) Is generally the person at the lowest organizational level who has authority to make technical and budgetary decisions on behalf of DOE.
*System* means a combination of elements that function together to produce the capabilities required to fulfill a mission need, including, but not limited to hardware, equipment, software, or any combination thereof.
[63 FR 56851, Oct. 23, 1998. Redesignated and amended at 74 FR 36361, July 22, 2009]
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## Breadcrumb

            -           State-based Occupational Health Surveillance Clearinghouse      

# State-based Occupational Health Surveillance Clearinghouse

This is a clearinghouse of state-developed products supported through NIOSH Surveillance cooperative agreements. Data and products focused on young workers can be identified by using the search link and terms such as "youth" and "young worker.

https://wwwn.cdc.gov/niosh-statedocs/
Order entered June 28, 2013

In The

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-12-00456-CR

JOHN ARLON MILLER, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 4

Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. F10-25128-K

ORDER

The Court GRANTS the June 25, 2013 request of the Dallas County District Clerk for an 

extension of time to file the supplemental clerk’s record in this appeal. 

We ORDER the Dallas County District Clerk to file, within FIFTEEN DAYS of the 

date of this order, a supplemental clerk’s record containing a detailed itemization of the costs 

assessed in the case, including but not limited to, specific court costs, fees, and court appointed 

attorney fees. In accordance with Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 103.001, the cost 

bill shall be signed by the officer who charged the cost or the officer who is entitled to receive 

payment for the cost. We further ORDER that the supplemental clerk’s record include a 

document explaining any and all abbreviations used to designate a particular fee, cost, or court 

appointed attorney fee.
We DIRECT the Clerk to send copies of this order, by electronic transmission, to the 

Gary Fitzsimmons, Dallas County District Clerk; the Dallas County District Clerk’s Office, 

Criminal Records Division; and to counsel for all parties.

/s/ LANA MYERS 

JUSTICE
§ 1.169 Post-hearing procedure and decision. ( a ) *Corrections to transcript or recording.* ( 1 ) At any time, but not later than the time fixed for filing proposed findings of fact, conclusions and order, or briefs, as the case may be, any party may file a motion proposing corrections to the transcript or recording.
( 2 ) Unless a party files such a motion in the manner prescribed, the transcript or recording shall be presumed, except for obvious typographical errors, to be a true, correct, and complete transcript or recording of the testimony given at the hearing and to contain an accurate description or reference to all exhibits received in evidence and made part of the hearing record.
( 3 ) At any time prior to the filing of the Judge's decision and after consideration of any objections filed as to the transcript or recording, the Judge may issue an order making any corrections in the transcript or recording which the Judge finds are warranted, which corrections shall be entered onto the original transcript or recording by the Hearing Clerk (without obscurring the original text).
( b ) *Proposed findings of fact, conclusions, order and briefs.* The parties may file with the Hearing Clerk proposed findings of fact, conclusions and orders based solely upon the record and on matters subject to official notice, and briefs in support thereof. The Judge shall announce at the hearing a definite period of time within which these documents may be filed.
( c ) *Judge's decision.* The Judge, within a reasonable time after the termination of the period allowed for the filing of proposed findings of fact, conclusions and order, and briefs in support thereof, shall prepare, upon the basis of the record and matters officially noticed, and shall file with the Hearing Clerk, the Judge's decision, a copy of which shall be served by the Hearing Clerk upon each of the parties. Such decision shall become final and effective without further proceedings 35 days after the date of service thereof upon the respondent, unless there is an appeal to the Judicial Officer by a party to the proceeding pursuant to § 1.170: *Provided,* That no decision shall be final for purposes of a request for Judicial Review, as provided in § 1.175(a), except a final decision of the Judicial Officer on appeal.
[45 FR 6587, Jan. 29, 1980, as amended at 60 FR 8458, Feb. 14, 1995]
EXHIBIT32.1





SECTION 1350 CERTIFICATIONOF


CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER AND CHIEF
FINANCIAL OFFICER





In connection with theannualreport ofGlobal Food Technologies,
Inc.("Company") on Form
10-Kfor theyearendedDecember 31, 2008,as filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission ("Report"), theundersigned, in the capacities and on
the dates indicated below, hereby certifypursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (18 U.S.C.Section1350) that to their
knowledge:all





1.           The Report fully complies with the
requirements of Section 13(a) or15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934; and





2.           The information contained in the Report
fairly presents, in allmaterial respects, the financial
condition and results of operations of theCompany.





Dated February 25,
2009








/s/ Keith
Meeks





Keith Meeks, President and Chief
Executive Officer








/s/
Marshall F
Sparks





Marshall F. Sparks, Chief Financial
Officer
#### Harry Poticka et al., appellants, v. Mabel C. Wolffs, appellee.

Gen. No. 34,544.

Opinion filed May 13, 1931.

Millard B. Powers and William Jay Bobinson,. for appellants.

Michael F. Byan and Charles E. Lewis, for appellee.

Mr. Justice Hebei

delivered the opinion of the court.
9905.502-30 Definitions. ( a ) The following are definitions of terms which are prominent in this Standard. Other terms defined elsewhere in this chapter 99 shall have the meanings ascribed to them in those definitions unless paragraph (b) of this subsection requires otherwise. ( 1 ) *Allocate* means to assign an item of cost, or a group of items of cost, to one or more cost objectives. This term includes both direct assignment of cost and the reassignment of a share from an indirect cost pool.
( 2 ) *Cost objective* means a function, organizational subdivision, contract, or other work unit for which cost data are desired and for which provision is made to accumulate and measure the cost of processes, products, jobs, capitalized projects, etc.
( 3 ) *Direct cost* means any cost which is identified specifically with a particular final cost objective. Direct costs are not limited to items which are incorporated in the end product as material or labor. Costs identified specifically with a contract are direct costs of that contract. All costs identified specifically with other final cost objectives of the educational institution are direct costs of those cost objectives.
( 4 ) *Final cost objective* means a cost objective which has allocated to it both direct and indirect costs, and in the educational institution's accumulation system, is one of the final accumulation points.
( 5 ) *Indirect cost* means any cost not directly identified with a single final cost objective, but identified with two or more final cost objectives or with at least one intermediate cost objective.
( 6 ) *Indirect cost pool* means a grouping of incurred costs identified with two or more cost objectives but not identified with any final cost objective.
( 7 ) *Intermediate cost objective* means a cost objective that is used to accumulate indirect costs or service center costs that are subsequently allocated to one or more indirect cost pools and/or final cost objectives.
( b ) The following modifications of terms defined elsewhere in this Chapter 99 are applicable to this Standard: None.
970.0371-8 Employee disclosure concerning other employment services. ( a ) Management and operating contractors are responsible for requiring its employees to file with the contractor, a written disclosure statement concerning outside employment services which involve the use of information in the area of the employee's employment with the contractor. The disclosure shall contain such information concerning the outside employment as the contractor may prescribe. As a minimum, the employee's disclosure shall: ( 1 ) Acknowledge that the employee has read and is familiar with: ( i ) The requirements and restrictions prescribed in this section,
( ii ) DOE publication entitled, “Reporting Results of Scientific and Technical Work Funded by DOE”, and
( iii ) The requirements of the contractor's contract with DOE relating to patents.
( 2 ) Include information concerning any rate of remuneration significantly in excess of the employee's regular rate of remuneration;
( 3 ) Identify any actual or potential conflicts with DOE's policies regarding conduct of employees of DOE's contractors set forth in this section;
( 4 ) Address any potential impacts that such employment may have on the contractor's responsibility to report fully and promptly to DOE all significant research and development information; and
( 5 ) Identify any potential conflicts such employment may have with the patent provisions of the contractor's contract with DOE.
( b ) The contractor shall provide a copy of all disclosures to the contracting officer.
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

FIRST DISTRICT OF TEXAS AT HOUSTON

ORDER

Appellate case name: In the Interest of S.L.F., A.D.T., and A.A.T., children

Appellate case number: 01-17-00329-CV

Trial court case number: 2015-43569

Trial court: 310th District Court of Harris County

Appellant is appealing the trial court’s order terminating her parental rights, signed on 

April 4, 2017. An appeal from a final order of termination is an accelerated appeal and the 

notice of appeal must be filed within 20 days from the date the trial court’s order is signed. See 

In re K.A.F., 160 S.W.3d 923, 924 (Tex. 2005); see also TEX. R. APP. P. 26.1(b). 

The notice of appeal was filed on April 26, 2017, which is not within the 20-day time 

period for filing the notice of appeal in an accelerated appeal. See TEX. R. APP. P. 26.1(b). 

However, when the notice of appeal is filed after the deadline but within 15 days after the 

deadline for filing the notice of appeal, a motion for extension is implied. See Verburgt v. 

Dorner, 959 S.W.2d 615, 617 (Tex. 1997). Appellant’s notice of appeal was filed within this 15-

day period, but she must offer a reasonable explanation for failing to file the notice of appeal in a 

timely manner. See TEX. R. APP. P. 10.5(b)(1)(C), 26.3; Jones v. City of Houston, 976 S.W.2d 

676, 677 (Tex. 1998).

An order requesting counsel to provide a reasonable explanation for the untimely filing of 

the notice of appeal issued on June 22, 2017, and counsel has not responded to that order. 

Accordingly, unless, within 36 hours of the date of this notice, you respond in writing, 

providing a reasonable explanation for untimely filing the notice of appeal, your appeal 

will be dismissed. See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.3(a), (c). You must respond in writing even if you 

have previously claimed your notice of appeal was timely filed. If counsel no longer represents 

appellant, counsel must immediately notify this Court. 

It is so ORDERED.

Judge’s signature: /s/ Harvey Brown

 Acting individually  Acting for the Court

Date: August 7, 2017