## F IRST 

## D ISTRICT 

## C OURT OF 

## A PPEAL 

## S TATE OF 

## F LORIDA

_____________________________

No. 1D 18

- 1324

_____________________________

F LORIDA D EPARTMENT OF C ORRECTIONS and M ARK S.

I NCH

, as Secretary of Florida Department of Corrections

,

Appellant s ,

v.

M IAMI H ER ALD M EDIA C OMPANY

, publisher of T he Miami Herald

, J ULIE B ROWN

, and C ASEY
F RANK

,

Appellee s

.

_____________________________

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Leon County

. Charles W. Dodson , Judge

.

August 9, 2019

W INOKUR

, J.

The Florida Department of Correct ions ( DOC ) appeals the trial court’s final order finding that the Miami Herald 1

1 The Appellees are the Miami Herald Media Company and two of the newspaper’s journalists, Julie Brown and Casey Frank.

T his opinion will refer to the Appellees collectively as the Miami

Her a ld.2 established good cause to grant the newspaper access to requested prison video recordings. We reverse and find that the trial court abused its discretion in light of th e Miami Herald’s admission that it no longer needed the footage.

I.

In August 2015, the Miami Herald made separate public records requests asking DOC for specific video footage depicting
the area around an inmate’s cell at the Suwannee Correctional

Insti tution ( the Suwannee footage) and the outside shower area
of an inmate dorm at Sumter Correctional Institution (the Sumter footage).

DOC denied both requests

, stating that the requested video recordings were confidential and exempt from Florida’s public

r ecords l aws . Specifically, DOC claimed that the footage fell

under the “security plan” exemption to Florida’s public disclosure laws. § § 119.071(3)(a ) & 281.301( 1 ), Fla. Stat. As a result, the
Miami Herald filed a complaint seeking injunctive and
mandamus relief r equesting that the trial court compel DOC to produce the footage. After reviewing the video footage in camera and conducting hearings on the matter, the trial court issued an order finding that the videos fell within the security plan exemption and were ex empt from public disclosure

.

In April 2016, the Miami Herald filed a motion for reconsideration asking that the trial court reassess its order due to the legislature’s then

- recent amendments to sections 119.071(3)( a ) 3.d. and 281.301( 2)(d) providin g for a “good cause” exception to an exemption from public disclosure. Specifically, the Miami Herald argued that its goal of gathering information regarding inmate treatment at state prisons and reporting it to the public constituted good ca use. DOC denie d that t he newspaper provided sufficient good cause to warrant disclosure of the footage and reiterated its security concerns over i t s release.

In May 2017, the trial court granted the Miami Herald’s motion for reconsideration noting the “awa rds [ Miami He rald jou r nalist Julie Brown] has received for her reporting on Florida’s prisons” and concluding that “[d]isclosure of the video recordings3 in this case, combined with the extremely important right of freedom of the press, in my opinion consti tutes good ca use.” At a subsequent hearing, the Miami Herald advised the trial court that it would no longer wanted the videos as they were no longer newsworthy.

In February 2018, the trial court issued its Fina l Order noting that the Miami Herald no longer wanted co pies of t he security footage , but still found that the newspaper had shown good cause to satisfy the exception to the public disclosure exemption laws. As a result, the trial court ruled that DOC was legally obligated to provide the Miam i Herald access to the
vide o s.

II.

Records related to the physical security of a State
correctional facilit y are exempt from disclosure under Florida’s public records and safety and security services laws

. 2 The applicable statutes provide exceptions to exemption, and in 20 16,
the Le gislature added a provision to the ex c e ptions permitting
disclosure “[u]pon a showing o f good cause before a court of competent jurisdiction. ” Ch. 2016

- 178, §§ 1 and 2, Laws of Fla. (codified at § 1 19.071(3)(a)3.d.; § 281.301(2)(d), Fla. Stat.).

2 Section 119.071(3)(a), Fl orida Statutes e xempts f rom publ ic
disclosure “ [ r ] ecords, information, photog raphs, audio and visua l presentations . . . relating directly to the physical security or firesafety of [a] facility” owned or leased by the State of Florida or any of its political subdivisions, as well as priv at e property owned or leased by an agency. Si milarly, section 281.3 01(1), Florida Statutes exempts “[i]nformation relating to the security or firesafety systems for any property owned by or leased to the state or any of its political subdivisions, and info rm ation relating to the security or firesafet y systems for any priv ately owned or leased property which is in the possession of any agency ” from disclosure under section 119.07(1), Florida Statutes.4 T he Fou rt h District recently addressed the application of

this “ good cause ” exception. State Attorney ’ s Office of Seventeenth Judicial Circuit v. Cable News Network, Inc. , 251 So. 3d 205, 207 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018)

. The case involved several media outlets th at

reque st ed surveillance footage from Marjory S toneman Douglas High School depicting the mass shooting that occurred there on February 14, 2018 (the Parkland shooting). Id . at 207

- 09. On appeal, the Fourth District affirmed the trial cour t’s ruling that

t he media h ad shown “good cause” and that disclos ure was necessary “because the narrative provided by ‘the authorities’ [was] confusing and has shifted and changed over time” not ing that “the footage reveals the conduct of public servants ‘discharging their assigne d duties and responsibilities’” and how the school’s security system “failed to protect the students and staff” during the shooting. Id

. at 215 (quoting Tribune Co. v.
Cannella , 438 So. 2d 516, 521 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983)).

In particular

, the court con cluded t ha t “the legislature

intended courts to apply a common law approach to ‘good cause,’ where meaning emerges over time, on a case

- by

- case basis, and courts arrive at a desirable equilibrium between the competing needs of disclosure and secrecy of gov ernment re cords.” Cable News Network, Inc. , 251 So. 3d at 214 . Accordingly, whether “good cause” exists depends “on the peculiar facts and
circumstances of each case” and that “the trial court is in the best position to weigh the equities involved, and [it s] exerc is e of discretion will be overruled only upon showing of abuse .” Id

. (quoting Donhal v. Syndicated Offices Sys

. , 529 So. 2d 267, 269 (Fla. 1988) (emphasis added)).

We are persuaded by the Fourth District’s analysis and
review the trial court’s Fin al Order f or abuse of discretion. 3 A

3 DOC argues that we should review the question de no vo

. T he case relied upon by DOC , however, d oes not pertain to the publ i c records and security laws at issue in this case nor does it deal with the meaning of good cause

, but rather the meaning of the word “immediate” for purposes of the Administrativ e Proc ed ure Act. Sc h. Bd. of Palm Beach Cty. v. S urvivors Charter
Schs

. , Inc. , 3 So. 3d 1220 (Fla. 2009). Cable News Network, Inc.

,5 trial court abuses its discretion if its decision is “ arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable.” Payton v. State , 239 So. 3d 129, 131 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018) (citing Huff v. State , 569 So. 2d 1247, 1249 (Fla. 1990))

.

III.

DOC argues th at the trial court’s articulation of “ good cause” is overly broad and eviscerates the “security plan” exemption to Florida’s public records law. Specifically, DOC claims that the Miami Herald simply cited the fact that an award

- wining journalist was seek in g the videos as per se “good cause.” A s a result, the trial court’s ratification of Miami Herald’s position effectively substitutes the legislature’s good cause exception for a “press” exception. T he Miami Herald argues that the trial court weigh ed the f ac tors and equities involved and after r eviewing the videos determined that good cause existed to support disclosure.

DOC ’s position is not entirely unfounded. While the Miami
Herald did argue that it “s[ought] access to the videos as p art of

its process of gathering information about how inmates are treated in our prisons and reporting it to the public,” it also stated that its good cause was “self

- evident

, ” referencing several articles written by Julie Brown regarding state p risons and the

many a wards sh e won. 4

in contrast, directly concerns appellate re view of an order ruling

on th is particular subsection.

4 In court, the Miami Hera ld ess en tially based its good cause on Brown’s jo urnalistic accolades:

[MIAMI HERALD]: Our basis for the good cause is pretty simple, Judge. It’s Julie Brown. She has won multiple awards reportin g on the prison system; the Department of Corrections and how thing s are operating. And we gave the Court a li st of her awards and as well as copies of her articles.6 Moreover, the Miami Herald filed ten articles with the trial court all written by Brown, as well as an affidavit from Brown.

The affidavit did not indicate any specific information or reason why the videos were needed

. Brown simply reiter ated her p ast journalistic awards and the fact that the videos at issue are “for the purpose of continuing our investigative reporting on Florida’s prisons, and continuing to provide the public and the Legislature
information which can be used for further reforms of our prison system.”

T h e trial court did reason that access to the videos served a vital public interest that the Miami Herald facilitated by its reporting. We simply note that the L egislature’s additio n of the “good cause” exception could not h ave reas on ably been meant to create an exception satisfied by personal or institutional notoriety

.

In any event, this Court need not decide whether the Miami Herald satisfied the good cause exception

, because it disavowed any need for the footage. The new spaper e xp licitly informed the trial court that it no long er sought the videos because the events were no longer newsworthy and Brown was able to write an article about the Sumter footag e. Regardless of whether the
Miami Herald ’ s previously

- offered reasons for dis cl osure met the statutory standard , their contention that it no longer wanted the
videos because they were no longer newsw o rthy means that they
failed to show good cause sufficie nt to invoke the exception to exemption

. Th us, the Final Order ’s findi ng of go od cause was unreasonable

.

IV.

Florida law allows for the public disclosure of materials that otherwise would be exempted for security purposes if good cause

is shown. The Miami Herald extinguished any claim to good cause when it unambiguously re nounced it s need for the video footage. Therefore, th e trial court abused its discretion by compelling DOC to disclose the video recordings.

R EVERSED

.7 L EWIS and O STERHA US

, JJ., concur

.

_____________________________

Not final until disposition of any tim ely and

au thorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 9.331

.

_____________________________

Candy L. Messersmith of Rumberger, Kirk & Caldwell, P.A.,
Orlando

, for Appellant s

.

Sanford L. Bohrer and Scott D. Ponce

, of Holland & Knight, LLP,

Miami

, for A ppellee s

.