UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 12-4704

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

LUIS FERNANDEZ JAUREGUI MADRIZ, a/k/a Jose Luis Gonzalez 

Gonzalez,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

Maryland, at Baltimore. James K. Bredar, District Judge. 

(1:11-cr-00096-JKB-3)

Submitted: June 17, 2013 Decided: July 9, 2013

Before TRAXLER, Chief Judge, and WILKINSON and MOTZ, Circuit 

Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Barbara E. Kittay, Rockville, Maryland, for Appellant. Rod J. 

Rosenstein, United States Attorney, Joshua L. Kaul, Assistant 

United States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

A jury convicted Luis Fernandez Jauregui Madriz of 

possession with intent to distribute cocaine and cocaine base, 

in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Madriz appeals, 

asserting that the district court erred in denying his motion to 

suppress the cocaine found on his person during a directed 

traffic stop. We affirm.

I.

Based on calls intercepted during an investigation into a 

drug organization, federal law enforcement officers had 

information that on February 6, 2010, Madriz would pick up a 

quantity of narcotics to deliver to a supplier. On that day, 

the officers watched Madriz’s home and followed him when he and 

his father left in a car.

At the direction of the federal officers, the Maryland 

State Police stopped the vehicle on the Baltimore-Washington 

Parkway. One of the state police officers asked Madriz’s 

father, who was driving, if there was anything illegal in the 

car, and Madriz’s father nodded. Soon thereafter, the state 

police officers removed Madriz and his father from the vehicle, 

and a drug-detection canine alerted the police to the presence 

of narcotics in the vehicle. The officers searched the vehicle
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but did not discover any weapons or contraband. A pat down of 

Madriz and his father had also yielded negative results.

Officer Daniel Peterson subsequently conducted an 

additional search of Madriz. Officer Peterson testified that he 

detected a hard bulge near Madriz’s groin area, and that Madriz 

initially denied that he was concealing anything. Officer 

Peterson testified that he then moved to undo Madriz’s belt, at 

which point Madriz admitted that he had drugs. According to 

Officer Peterson, he then undid Madriz’s pants and removed from 

Madriz’s underwear what turned out to be a 131.1 gram package of 

cocaine.

Madriz moved to suppress the cocaine, contending that the 

state police officers performed an unlawful search and seizure. 

The district court denied the motion. A jury subsequently 

convicted Madriz of the charged crime. Madriz’s sole appellate 

challenge is to the denial of his motion to suppress.

II.

“We review a district court’s factual findings underlying a 

motion to suppress for clear error, and the court’s legal 

determinations de novo.” United States v. Edwards, 666 F.3d 

877, 882 (4th Cir. 2011). “When a motion to suppress has been 

denied, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to 

the government.” Id.
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A.

On appeal, Madriz first contends that the district court

should have suppressed the cocaine because the Maryland State 

Police lacked authority to conduct the stop at that location on 

the Baltimore-Washington Parkway, which is within exclusive

federal jurisdiction. In rejecting this argument, the district 

court reasoned that the state police officers acted at the

“behest and direction and under the direct and immediate 

supervision” of federal agents who did have authority, and who 

had probable cause to believe that Madriz was involved in a drug 

conspiracy. Tr. of Motions Hr’g 221-22.

Madriz does not contest the district court’s finding that 

the stop was supported by probable cause. And, under the 

circumstances of this case, the fact that the state police acted 

in an area of exclusive federal jurisdiction does not render the 

stop unreasonable. See United States v. Mason, 52 F.3d 1286, 

1289 n.5 (4th Cir. 1995) (rejecting argument that drug 

paraphernalia seized by customs officers technically 

unauthorized to conduct search had to be suppressed, because the 

lack of authorization “d[id] not rise to the level of a 

constitutional violation” under the circumstances); United 

States v. DiCesare, 765 F.2d 890, 897 (9th Cir. 1985) (refusing 

to suppress evidence on the basis that customs officer who 

obtained search warrant may have lacked authority to do so, 
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where authorized officials participated in the investigation and 

executed the warrant). Thus, the district court did not err in 

finding that the stop was reasonable.

B.

Madriz next argues that the district court should have 

suppressed the cocaine because the search of his underwear, 

which led to the seizure of the cocaine, was unreasonable. 

Again, we disagree.

To determine whether a search is reasonable, “we examine 

the search in its complete context and consider the following 

factors: 1) the place in which the search was conducted; 2) the 

scope of the particular intrusion; 3) the manner in which the 

search was conducted; and 4) the justification for initiating 

the search.” Edwards, 666 F.3d at 883.

The place of the search -- along the busy BaltimoreWashington Parkway in the afternoon -- cuts in favor of 

suppression. “We have repeatedly emphasized the necessity of 

conducting a strip search in private.” Edwards, 666 F.3d at 883 

(internal quotation marks omitted).

However, the remaining factors dictate our conclusion that 

the district court did not err in finding the search reasonable. 

First, the search was justified. We agree with the district 

court that the police had probable cause to arrest Madriz for 

conspiracy to distribute narcotics prior to the second pat down
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by Officer Peterson. Tr. of Motions Hr’g 215. Therefore, even 

though that search preceded Madriz’s formal arrest, the search 

was nonetheless justified as a search incident to his arrest. 

See Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 111 (1980); United States 

v. Han, 74 F.3d 537, 541 (4th Cir. 1996) (“A search may be 

incident to a subsequent arrest if the officers have probable 

cause to arrest before the search.”); United States v. Miller, 

925 F.2d 695, 698 (4th Cir. 1991).

Further, both the scope and the manner of the search were 

reasonable. During the pat down, Officer Peterson identified a 

hard object in Madriz’s groin area; Officer Peterson limited the 

scope of his subsequent search to that area. Officer Peterson 

first asked Madriz what the object was; not believing Madriz’s 

answer, Officer Peterson moved to unbuckle Madriz’s belt, at 

which point Madriz informed the officer that the object was 

drugs. Officer Peterson checked the space between Madriz’s 

pants and underwear before briefly pulling out Madriz’s 

underwear and discovering and removing the cocaine. Officer 

Peterson proceeded cautiously at every step of the search, and 

at no point did the search threaten Madriz’s safety. Compare

Edwards, 666 F.3d at 885 (finding a strip search unreasonable 

because the search “posed a significant and an unnecessary risk 

of injury” to the defendant). Accordingly, the district court 

did not err in finding the search reasonable.
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III.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm. We dispense with 

oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are 

adequately presented in the materials before this court and 

argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED