UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

________________ _________________ DONNY W. MYERS; BRENDA J. MYERS, Plaintiffs - Appellants,

v. WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., Trustee forCertificate Holders of Bear Stearns AssetBacked Securities Trust 2005-1, AssetBacked Certificates, Series 2005-1, Defendant - Appellee. No. 16-6316 (D.C. No. 5:16- CV-00663-D) (W.D. Okla.)

________________ _________________ ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

________________ _________________ Before PHILLIPS , McKAY , and McHUGH , Circuit Judges.

________________ _________________ Plaintiffs Donny and Brenda Myers, proceed ing pro se, appeal the district court’s dismissal of their complaint, which sought to void a state-foreclosure judgment and alleged several claims under Oklahoma tort la w. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.

* After examining the briefs and appella te record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This or der and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, re s judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value c onsistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### April 20, 2017
Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court- 2 - In 2006, Defendant Wells Fargo filed a pe tition for foreclosure in Oklahoma state court after Plaintiffs failed to make mort gage payments. The state court entered judgment in favor of Wells Fargo in 2007. Subsequently , Plaintiffs filed numerous motions in state court to vacate the judgment, all of which were denied, arguing that Wells Fargo lacked standing to pursue th e foreclosure and that Wells Fargo had committed fraud on the court. ( See Appellee’s Suppl. App. at 1–73.) In 2016, after losing in state court, Plain tiffs filed a complaint against Wells Fargo in federal district court. The complaint, wh ich invokes Rule 60 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure—the rule on requests for re lief from a judgment or order—asserts nine “causes of action” including “Lack of Standi ng/Wrongful Foreclosure,” “Fraud upon the Court/Fraud in the Concealment,” and “Void Assignment of Note Mortgage & Deed of Trust.” (R. at 5.) Plaintiffs also allege their due process rights were violated during the course of the foreclosure proceedings and that Wells Fargo is liable under state tort law for intentional infliction of emotio nal distress and slander of title. Wells Fargo moved to dismiss th e complaint based on (1) the Rooker–Feldman doctrine; (2) claim and issue preclusion; and (3) failure to state a claim. The district court granted the motion and dismissed the case, holdi ng that Plaintiffs’ claims were barred by the Rooker–Feldman doctrine. It also st ated that, even if Rooker–Feldman did not apply, the claims “would still be barred under the doctrines of res judicata and/or collateral estoppel.” (R. at 1000.) Plaintiffs filed this timely appeal. “Although we construe pro se f ilings liberally, [Plaintiffs’] pro se status does not excuse [them] from complying wi th the fundamental requirements of the Federal Rules of- 3 - Civil and Appellate Procedure.” Russell v. Sherman & Howard, LLC , 222 F. App’x 698, 699 (10th Cir. 2007) (internal qu otation marks and brackets om itted). “A party, including a pro se litigant, waives an inadequately brie fed issue, and ‘mere conclusory allegations with no citations to the reco rd or any legal authority fo r support’ are inadequate to preserve an issue for review.” Krumm v. Holder , 594 F. App’x 497, 501 (10th Cir. 2014) (quoting Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux & Janer , 425 F.3d 836, 841 (10th Cir. 2005)). Plaintiffs’ “pro se appellate brief is inadequa te as [they do] not support [their] arguments with citations to the record or any legal authorities and ther efore fail[] to comply with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 28(a)(8)(A).” Moffett v. Colvin , 580 F. App’x 688, 689 (10th Cir. 2014). Nor can Plaintiffs avoid the consequen ces of their inadequate briefing by incorporating their district court filings by reference. ( See Appellants’ Opening Br. at 4 (“I could go into all of the claims listed in the Complaint but it would be easier to just read the Complaint rather than me double write it.”).) Our rules do not allow parties to incorporate by reference the arguments they made in the district court. See 10th Cir. R. 28.4 (“Incorporating by reference portions of lower court . . . briefs or pleadings is disapproved and does not satisfy the requireme nts of Fed. R. App. P. 28(a) and (b).”) Plaintiffs’ “ pro se status does not except [them] from such established rules.” Wardell v.
Duncan , 470 F.3d 954, 964 (10th Ci r. 2006) (holding that a pro se appellant could not incorporate pleadings into his appellate brief). What’s more, Plaintiffs’ argumen ts fail on the merits. “The Rooker–Feldman doctrine establishes, as a matter of subject-ma tter jurisdiction, that on ly the United States- 4 - Supreme Court has appellate authority to review a state-court decision.” Merrill Lynch Bus. Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Nudell , 363 F.3d 1072, 1074–75 (10th Cir. 2004) (footnote omitted). It “precludes federal district c ourts from effectively exercising appellate jurisdiction over claims actually decided by a state court and claims inextricably intertwined with a prior state-court judgment

. ” Mo’s Express, LLC v. Sopkin , 441 F.3d 1229, 1233 (10th Cir. 2006) (inter nal quotation marks omitted). Without citing any legal authority, Plainti ffs assert that the district court was wrong to dismiss the complaint under Rooker–Feldman for two reasons: (1) “ Rooker– Feldman does not apply where there [are] allega tions [that] Extrinsic Fraud ha[s] been committed upon the state court”; and (2) “the [ Rooker–Feldman ] doctrine does not apply if the Plaintiff had no reasonable opportun ity to raise his federal claim in state proceedings.” (Appellants’ Reply Br. at 4; see also Appellants’ Opening Br. at 4.) But both arguments are foreclosed by circuit preced ent: Even if Plaintiffs could prove fraud, we do not recognize an “ex trinsic fraud” exception to Rooker–Feldman

. See Tal v. Hogan , 453 F.3d 1244, 1 256 (10th Cir. 2006) (noting th at “new allegations of fraud might create grounds for appeal, but that appe al should be brought in the state courts”); see also, e.g. , Bradshaw v. Gatterman , 658 F. App’x 359, 362 (10th Cir. 2016) (rejecting the “argument that extrinsic fraud can override Rooker–Feldman ”). Second, even if Plaintiffs could prove “no reasonable opportunity ” to raise their federal claims in the state court proceedings, it is not the case that the st ate court “had to actua lly hear every issue” as Plaintiffs argue (Appellants’ Reply Br. at 5). The doctrine applies “regardless of whether the state-court procee ding afforded the federal-c ourt plaintiff a full and fair- 5 - opportunity to litigat e her claims.” Kenmen Eng’g v. City of Union , 314 F.3d 468, 478 (10th Cir. 2002), abrogated in part on other grounds by Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp. , 544 U.S. 280, 291–92 (2005); see also Smith v. Colo. Supreme Court ( In re Smith) , 287 F. App’x 683, 685 (10th Cir. 2008). For the foregoing reasons, the district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED . We GRANT appellants’ motion to proceed in forma pauperis

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ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Monroe G. McKay Circuit Judge