FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

_____________________________

No. 1D18-1324

_____________________________

FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF 

CORRECTIONS and MARK S.

INCH, as Secretary of Florida 

Department of Corrections,

Appellants,

v.

MIAMI HERALD MEDIA COMPANY,

publisher of The Miami Herald,

JULIE BROWN, and CASEY 

FRANK,

Appellees.

_____________________________

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Leon County.

Charles W. Dodson, Judge.

August 9, 2019

WINOKUR, J.

The Florida Department of Corrections (DOC) appeals the 

trial court’s final order finding that the Miami Herald1

 1 The Appellees are the Miami Herald Media Company and 

two of the newspaper’s journalists, Julie Brown and Casey Frank. 

This opinion will refer to the Appellees collectively as the Miami 

Herald.
2

established good cause to grant the newspaper access to 

requested prison video recordings. We reverse and find that the 

trial court abused its discretion in light of the Miami Herald’s 

admission that it no longer needed the footage.

I.

In August 2015, the Miami Herald made separate public 

records requests asking DOC for specific video footage depicting 

the area around an inmate’s cell at the Suwannee Correctional 

Institution (the Suwannee footage) and the outside shower area 

of an inmate dorm at Sumter Correctional Institution (the 

Sumter footage).

DOC denied both requests, stating that the requested video 

recordings were confidential and exempt from Florida’s public 

records laws. Specifically, DOC claimed that the footage fell 

under the “security plan” exemption to Florida’s public disclosure 

laws. §§ 119.071(3)(a) & 281.301(1), Fla. Stat. As a result, the 

Miami Herald filed a complaint seeking injunctive and 

mandamus relief requesting that the trial court compel DOC to 

produce the footage. After reviewing the video footage in camera

and conducting hearings on the matter, the trial court issued an 

order finding that the videos fell within the security plan

exemption and were exempt from public disclosure.

In April 2016, the Miami Herald filed a motion for 

reconsideration asking that the trial court reassess its order due 

to the legislature’s then-recent amendments to sections 

119.071(3)(a)3.d. and 281.301(2)(d) providing for a “good cause” 

exception to an exemption from public disclosure. Specifically, the 

Miami Herald argued that its goal of gathering information 

regarding inmate treatment at state prisons and reporting it to 

the public constituted good cause. DOC denied that the 

newspaper provided sufficient good cause to warrant disclosure of 

the footage and reiterated its security concerns over its release.

In May 2017, the trial court granted the Miami Herald’s 

motion for reconsideration noting the “awards [Miami Herald 

journalist Julie Brown] has received for her reporting on Florida’s 

prisons” and concluding that “[d]isclosure of the video recordings 
3

in this case, combined with the extremely important right of 

freedom of the press, in my opinion constitutes good cause.” At a 

subsequent hearing, the Miami Herald advised the trial court 

that it would no longer wanted the videos as they were no longer 

newsworthy. 

In February 2018, the trial court issued its Final Order 

noting that the Miami Herald no longer wanted copies of the 

security footage, but still found that the newspaper had shown 

good cause to satisfy the exception to the public disclosure 

exemption laws. As a result, the trial court ruled that DOC was 

legally obligated to provide the Miami Herald access to the 

videos.

II.

Records related to the physical security of a State 

correctional facility are exempt from disclosure under Florida’s 

public records and safety and security services laws.2 The 

applicable statutes provide exceptions to exemption, and in 2016, 

the Legislature added a provision to the exceptions permitting 

disclosure “[u]pon a showing of good cause before a court of 

competent jurisdiction.” Ch. 2016-178, §§ 1 and 2, Laws of Fla. 

(codified at § 119.071(3)(a)3.d.; § 281.301(2)(d), Fla. Stat.).

 2 Section 119.071(3)(a), Florida Statutes exempts from public

disclosure “[r]ecords, information, photographs, audio and visual 

presentations . . . relating directly to the physical security or 

firesafety of [a] facility” owned or leased by the State of Florida or 

any of its political subdivisions, as well as private property owned 

or leased by an agency. Similarly, section 281.301(1), Florida 

Statutes exempts “[i]nformation relating to the security or 

firesafety systems for any property owned by or leased to the 

state or any of its political subdivisions, and information relating 

to the security or firesafety systems for any privately owned or 

leased property which is in the possession of any agency” from 

disclosure under section 119.07(1), Florida Statutes.
4

The Fourth District recently addressed the application of 

this “good cause” exception. State Attorney’s Office of Seventeenth 

Judicial Circuit v. Cable News Network, Inc., 251 So. 3d 205, 207 

(Fla. 4th DCA 2018). The case involved several media outlets that 

requested surveillance footage from Marjory Stoneman Douglas 

High School depicting the mass shooting that occurred there on 

February 14, 2018 (the Parkland shooting). Id. at 207-09. On 

appeal, the Fourth District affirmed the trial court’s ruling that 

the media had shown “good cause” and that disclosure was 

necessary “because the narrative provided by ‘the authorities’ 

[was] confusing and has shifted and changed over time” noting

that “the footage reveals the conduct of public servants 

‘discharging their assigned duties and responsibilities’” and how 

the school’s security system “failed to protect the students and 

staff” during the shooting. Id. at 215 (quoting Tribune Co. v. 

Cannella, 438 So. 2d 516, 521 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983)).

In particular, the court concluded that “the legislature 

intended courts to apply a common law approach to ‘good cause,’ 

where meaning emerges over time, on a case-by-case basis, and 

courts arrive at a desirable equilibrium between the competing 

needs of disclosure and secrecy of government records.” Cable 

News Network, Inc., 251 So. 3d at 214. Accordingly, whether 

“good cause” exists depends “on the peculiar facts and 

circumstances of each case” and that “the trial court is in the best 

position to weigh the equities involved, and [its] exercise of 

discretion will be overruled only upon showing of abuse.” Id.

(quoting Donhal v. Syndicated Offices Sys., 529 So. 2d 267, 269 

(Fla. 1988) (emphasis added)).

We are persuaded by the Fourth District’s analysis and 

review the trial court’s Final Order for abuse of discretion.3 A 

 3 DOC argues that we should review the question de novo. 

The case relied upon by DOC, however, does not pertain to the

public records and security laws at issue in this case nor does it 

deal with the meaning of good cause, but rather the meaning of 

the word “immediate” for purposes of the Administrative 

Procedure Act. Sch. Bd. of Palm Beach Cty. v. Survivors Charter 

Schs., Inc., 3 So. 3d 1220 (Fla. 2009). Cable News Network, Inc., 
5

trial court abuses its discretion if its decision is “arbitrary, 

fanciful, or unreasonable.” Payton v. State, 239 So. 3d 129, 131 

(Fla. 1st DCA 2018) (citing Huff v. State, 569 So. 2d 1247, 1249 

(Fla. 1990)).

III.

DOC argues that the trial court’s articulation of “good cause” 

is overly broad and eviscerates the “security plan” exemption to 

Florida’s public records law. Specifically, DOC claims that the 

Miami Herald simply cited the fact that an award-wining 

journalist was seeking the videos as per se “good cause.” As a 

result, the trial court’s ratification of Miami Herald’s position 

effectively substitutes the legislature’s good cause exception for a 

“press” exception. The Miami Herald argues that the trial court 

weighed the factors and equities involved and after reviewing the 

videos determined that good cause existed to support disclosure.

DOC’s position is not entirely unfounded. While the Miami 

Herald did argue that it “s[ought] access to the videos as part of 

its process of gathering information about how inmates are 

treated in our prisons and reporting it to the public,” it also 

stated that its good cause was “self-evident,” referencing several 

articles written by Julie Brown regarding state prisons and the 

many awards she won.4

 

in contrast, directly concerns appellate review of an order ruling 

on this particular subsection.

4 In court, the Miami Herald essentially based its good cause 

on Brown’s journalistic accolades:

[MIAMI HERALD]: Our basis for the good cause is 

pretty simple, Judge. It’s Julie Brown. She has won 

multiple awards reporting on the prison system; the 

Department of Corrections and how things are 

operating. And we gave the Court a list of her awards 

and as well as copies of her articles.
6

Moreover, the Miami Herald filed ten articles with the trial 

court all written by Brown, as well as an affidavit from Brown. 

The affidavit did not indicate any specific information or reason 

why the videos were needed. Brown simply reiterated her past 

journalistic awards and the fact that the videos at issue are “for 

the purpose of continuing our investigative reporting on Florida’s 

prisons, and continuing to provide the public and the Legislature 

information which can be used for further reforms of our prison 

system.”

The trial court did reason that access to the videos served a 

vital public interest that the Miami Herald facilitated by its 

reporting. We simply note that the Legislature’s addition of the 

“good cause” exception could not have reasonably been meant to 

create an exception satisfied by personal or institutional 

notoriety.

In any event, this Court need not decide whether the Miami 

Herald satisfied the good cause exception, because it disavowed 

any need for the footage. The newspaper explicitly informed the 

trial court that it no longer sought the videos because the events 

were no longer newsworthy and Brown was able to write an 

article about the Sumter footage. Regardless of whether the 

Miami Herald’s previously-offered reasons for disclosure met the 

statutory standard, their contention that it no longer wanted the 

videos because they were no longer newsworthy means that they 

failed to show good cause sufficient to invoke the exception to 

exemption. Thus, the Final Order’s finding of good cause was 

unreasonable.

IV.

Florida law allows for the public disclosure of materials that 

otherwise would be exempted for security purposes if good cause 

is shown. The Miami Herald extinguished any claim to good 

cause when it unambiguously renounced its need for the video 

footage. Therefore, the trial court abused its discretion by 

compelling DOC to disclose the video recordings.

REVERSED.
7

LEWIS and OSTERHAUS, JJ., concur.

_____________________________

Not final until disposition of any timely and 

authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 

9.331.

_____________________________

Candy L. Messersmith of Rumberger, Kirk & Caldwell, P.A., 

Orlando, for Appellants.

Sanford L. Bohrer and Scott D. Ponce, of Holland & Knight, LLP, 

Miami, for Appellees.