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96–168 PDF 2015

ADMITTING SYRIAN REFUGEES: THE INTELLIGENCE 

VOID AND THE EMERGING HOMELAND SECURITY THREAT 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

COUNTERTERRORISM 

AND INTELLIGENCE 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

JUNE 24, 2015 

Serial No. 114–22 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/ 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas, Chairman 

LAMAR SMITH, Texas 

PETER T. KING, New York 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan, Vice Chair 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

LOU BARLETTA, Pennsylvania 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

CURT CLAWSON, Florida 

JOHN KATKO, New York 

WILL HURD, Texas 

EARL L. ‘‘BUDDY’’ CARTER, Georgia 

MARK WALKER, North Carolina 

BARRY LOUDERMILK, Georgia 

MARTHA MCSALLY, Arizona 

JOHN RATCLIFFE, Texas 

DANIEL M. DONOVAN, JR., New York 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

CEDRIC L. RICHMOND, Louisiana 

WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts 

DONALD M. PAYNE, JR., New Jersey 

FILEMON VELA, Texas 

BONNIE WATSON COLEMAN, New Jersey 

KATHLEEN M. RICE, New York 

NORMA J. TORRES, California 

BRENDAN P. SHIELDS, Staff Director 

JOAN V. O’HARA, General Counsel 

MICHAEL S. TWINCHEK, Chief Clerk 

I. LANIER AVANT, Minority Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON COUNTERTERRORISM AND INTELLIGENCE 

PETER T. KING, New York, Chairman 

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan 

LOU BARLETTA, Pennsylvania 

JOHN KATKO, New York 

WILL HURD, Texas 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas (ex officio) 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts 

FILEMON VELA, Texas 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi (ex officio) 

MANDY BOWERS, Subcommittee Staff Director 

DENNIS TERRY, Subcommittee Clerk 

HOPE GOINS, Minority Subcommittee Staff Director 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS

The Honorable Peter T. King, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of New York, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 1 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 3 

The Honorable Brian Higgins, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of New York, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Counterterrorism 

and Intelligence: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 26 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 26 

The Honorable Michael T. McCaul, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Texas, and Chairman, Committee on Homeland Security ................. 5 

The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress From 

the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on Homeland 

Security: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 4 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 5 

WITNESSES

Dr. Seth G. Jones, Director, International Security and Defense Policy Center, 

Rand Corporation: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 7 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 8 

Mr. Thomas Fuentes, Assistant Director (Retired), Federal Bureau of Investigation .................................................................................................................. 14 

Dr. Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 15 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 17 

The Honorable Peter T. King, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of New York, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence: 

Statement of HIAS ............................................................................................... 32 

Statement of Syrian Community Network (Chicago, IL), Syrian American 

Medical Society, Karam Foundation, Syria Relief and Development, Syrian Expatriates Organization, Watan USA, Rahma Relief Foundation, 

Hope for Syria ................................................................................................... 32 

Statement of Mirna Barq, President, Syrian American Council ...................... 34 

Statement of Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Service ............................... 35 

Statement of CWS, Church World Service ......................................................... 37 

(1) 

ADMITTING SYRIAN REFUGEES: THE INTELLIGENCE VOID AND THE EMERGING HOMELAND SECURITY THREAT 

Wednesday, June 24, 2015 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON COUNTERTERRORISM AND INTELLIGENCE, 

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:07 a.m., in Room 

311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Peter T. King [Chairman 

of the subcommittee] presiding. 

Present: Representatives King, Barletta, Katko, McCaul, Higgins, Keating, Vela, and Thompson. 

Mr. KING. Good morning. The Committee on Homeland Security 

Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence will come to 

order. We are waiting for the Ranking Member, who has been detained. He has graciously said we could start the hearing without 

him. He will be coming shortly, as will, I believe, the Chairman of 

the full committee. 

So, the subcommittee is meeting today to hear testimony from 

three distinguished experts regarding the security situation in Iraq 

and Syria and to review potential vulnerabilities in the refugee 

screening process. I would like to welcome the Members of the subcommittee and express my appreciation to the witnesses who are 

here today. Now I will make an opening statement. 

For Americans opening our doors to those who flee violence or exploitation, this is part of who we are as a Nation. America has a 

long and proud history of providing safe harbor to refugees. Refugees admitted to America include our former colleague, the late 

Congressman Tom Lantos from Hungary, scientist Albert Einstein 

from Germany, among thousands more who have contributed to 

American society. But we have also had refugees and asylum seekers who take advantage of U.S. safe haven to plot and carry out 

attacks. 

Over the last 4 years, the conflict in Syria has forced more than 

3.9 million Syrians to flee their country, in large part due to the 

continued violence and savagery of ISIS, making this one of the 

world’s biggest refugee crises without an end in sight. This year, 

the United States is expected to admit several thousand Syrian refugees, a number only expected to rise over the next few years, as 

well as almost 70,000 refugees from approximately 70 countries. 

We have heard open and closed testimony from Government officials and security experts expressing concerns that terrorist groups 
2 

may seek to use Syrian refugee programs as a gateway to carry out 

attacks in Europe and America. It is essential that we have a discussion of the humanitarian crises and the security risks inherent 

in the process. I agree that the vast majority of Syrian refugees do 

not have ties to terror groups. However, we have been reviewing 

the current security vetting procedures for a number of months. I 

have a number of concerns, not the least of which is the lack of onthe-ground intelligence necessary to identify terror links. 

With the lack of stable foreign governments, foreign intelligence 

agencies, military intelligence, U.S. Embassies abroad, and access 

to human intelligence on the ground in Syria, the information and 

intelligence that we are able to acquire regarding individuals who 

seek to enter the United States is limited and oftentimes unverifiable. This significantly degrades the quality and accuracy of our 

vetting process. 

The United States has seen the danger of flawed refugee vetting, 

as well as the potential for refugees to be radicalized once they are 

in the United States. In 2011, I held a hearing on Islamic 

radicalization within the Somali-American community. This included the 20-plus cases of individuals, many refugees or children 

of refugees, who left the United States to join al-Shabaab. Since 

that time, we have seen about a dozen other Somali-American 

youths join ISIS. 

On May 25, 2011, two Iraqi refugees were arrested in Bowling 

Green, Kentucky and charged with conspiracy to kill U.S. nationals 

abroad, attempting to provide material support to terrorists and to 

al-Qaeda in Iraq, and 21 other charges. According to a July 2011 

news article, the FBI was looking into potential terror ties for approximately 300 additional Iraqi refugees. Other cases include the 

blind sheik, Omar Abdel Rahman, the 1993 World Trade Bomber 

Ramzi Yousef, Mir Qazi involved in the 1997 CIA headquarters 

shooting, and, of course, the Tsarnaev brothers in Boston. While 

these bad actors represent a small percentage of the total number 

of refugees in the United States, we have to continuously monitor 

the changing threat environments. 

In just the past 3 weeks, there have been at least 10 arrests by 

the FBI of U.S. individuals connected with ISIS and plotting attacks on the homeland. The on-line radicalization and calls by ISIS 

leadership for Islamists to carry out attacks in the United States 

are resonating with small pockets of U.S. society. There is little 

doubt that these calls for attacks are also resonating within the 

refugee community both domestically and those still abroad. This 

does not mean we should close our borders and not accept anyone. 

But we certainly need to be thoughtful and deliberative about the 

process and provide the American people with the most assurance 

that we are not importing terrorists. 

There is no doubt that a number of significant improvements 

were made to the refugee vetting process in 2011 after the alarming cases involving the Iraqi refugees. At the same time, there have 

been procedural failures that resulted in denial of refugee status 

for a number of Iraqi and Afghani nationals who put their lives on 

the line to help the United States during the military campaigns. 

We have invited a distinguished panel of experts testifying today 

to assess the current threat environment, to share their perspec-
3 

tives on refugee vetting, and to solicit their recommendations on 

what additional security measures should be considered. 

[The statement of Chairman King follows:] 

STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN PETER T. KING

For Americans, opening our doors to those who flee violence, war, and exploitation 

is part of who we are as a Nation. America has a long and proud history of providing safe harbor for refugees. Refugees admitted to America include Congressman 

Tom Lantos (Hungary) and scientist Albert Einstein (Germany), among thousands 

more who have contributed to U.S. society. But we have also had refugees and asylum seekers take advantage of U.S. safe haven to plot and carry out attacks. 

Over the last 4 years, the conflict in Syria has forced more than 3.9 million Syrians to flee their country, in large part due to the continued violence and savagery 

of ISIS, making this one of the world’s biggest refugee crises without an end in 

sight. This year, the United States is expected to admit several thousand Syrian refugees—a number only expected to rise over the next few years as well as almost 

70,000 refugees from approximately 70 countries. 

We have heard open and closed testimony from Government officials and security 

experts expressing concerns that terrorist groups may seek to use Syrian refugee 

programs as a gateway to carry out attacks in Europe and America. It is essential 

that we have a discussion of the humanitarian crisis and the security risks inherent 

in the process. 

I agree that the vast majority of Syrian refugees do not have ties to terror groups. 

However, we have been reviewing the current security vetting procedures for a 

number of months, and I have a number of concerns, not the least of which is the 

lack of on-the-ground intelligence necessary to identify terror links. 

With the lack of stable foreign governments, foreign intelligence agencies, military 

intelligence, U.S. embassy support, and access to human intelligence on the ground 

in Syria, the information and intelligence that we are able to acquire regarding individuals who seek to enter the United States is limited, and oftentimes unverifiable. 

This significantly degrades the quality and accuracy of our vetting process. 

The United States has seen the danger of flawed refugee vetting, as well as the 

potential for refugees to be radicalized once they are in the United States. 

In 2011, I held a hearing into Islamist radicalization within the Somali-American 

community. This included the 20-plus cases of individuals, many refugees or children of refugees, who left the United States to join al-Shabaab. Since that time, we 

have seen about a dozen other Somali-American youth join ISIS. 

On May 25, 2011, two Iraqi refugees were arrested in Bowling Green, Kentucky 

and charged with conspiracy to kill U.S. nationals abroad; attempting to provide 

material support to terrorists and to al-Qaeda in Iraq; and 21 other charges. According to a July 2011 news article (LA Times), the FBI was looking into potential terror 

ties for approximately 300 additional Iraqi refugees. 

Other cases include the Blind Sheikh—Omar Abdel Rahman, 1993 World Trade 

Center bomber Ramzi Yousef, Mir Aimal Kansi the 1997 CIA Headquarters shooter, 

and the Tsarnaev brothers. 

While these bad actors represent only a small percentage of the total number of 

refugees in the United States, we have to continuously monitor the changing threat 

environment. In just the past 3 weeks, there have been at least 10 arrests by the 

FBI of U.S. individuals connected with ISIS and plotting attacks in the homeland. 

The on-line radicalization and calls by ISIS leadership for Islamists to carry out 

attacks in the United States are resonating with small pockets of U.S. society. There 

is little doubt that these calls for attacks are also resonating within the refugee 

community—both domestically and those still abroad. This doesn’t mean that we 

should close our borders and not accept anyone, but we certainly need to be thoughtful and deliberative about the process and provide the American people with the 

most assurance that we are not importing terrorists. 

There is no doubt that a number of significant improvements were made to the 

refugee vetting process in 2011, after the alarming cases involving several Iraqi refugees. At the same time, there has been procedural failures that resulted in the denial of refugee status for a number of Iraqi and Afghani nationals who put their 

lives on the line to help the United States during the military campaigns. 

We have invited a distinguished panel of experts testifying today to assess the 

current threat environment, share their perspectives on refugee vetting and solicit 

their recommendations on what additional security measures should be considered. 
4 

Mr. KING. Now I recognize the Ranking Member of the full committee, the gentleman from Mississippi, Mr. Thompson, for an 

opening statement. 

Mr. THOMPSON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. It is good 

to see you. Let me welcome the witnesses to the hearing. I appreciate you holding this hearing. 

It is important for us in looking at the United States refugee program and see how it was impacted by the terrorist attacks of September 11. In the aftermath of those attacks, a review of refugeerelated security procedures were undertaken. Refugee admissions 

were briefly suspended. Enhanced security measures were implemented. However, more than a decade after the enhanced security 

measures have been undertaken, with limited instances of fraud, 

there are those who believe that certain populations are unable to 

be properly vetted for security purposes. 

Rather than focus on the fear and concern surrounding Syrian 

refugees, I think we should focus on the known facts about the Syrian refugee population. The Syrian people are the primary victims 

of the violent conflict in Syria and the brutal actions of ISIL. They 

are the most vulnerable to the violence, and have known first-hand 

the cruelty of ISIL and other groups that have brought harm upon 

their communities. These refugees, like most others that arrive in 

the United States, are fleeing difficult, even life-threatening situations. The idea that they would be met with suspicion and hate 

upon arrival in the United States is an affront to the values we uphold and promote. 

Like Americans, most Syrians consider ISIL to be their enemy as 

well. Within the United States, the Syrian American Council has 

already partnered with the Office of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties within the Department of Homeland Security to organize 

community briefings for Syrian Americans focused on countering 

violent extremism. Groups like this encourage a robust Congressional debate on how ISIL can be stopped both at home and 

abroad. In fact, the leading demographic of those seeking or joining 

ISIL is in the United States who were born U.S. citizens, including 

citizens with no ancestry from major Muslim countries. Therefore, 

preventing vulnerable Syrian refugees from entering the United 

States will not address the Unites States issue with violent extremism. 

Time and time again, I have urged this committee not to have 

a narrow view of violent extremism which ignores violent extremist 

activities of domestic groups. Regrettably, last week’s attack at the 

Emanuel AME Church in Charleston brought this issue into stark 

focus. Congress, the President, and the Department of Homeland 

Security need to come together with the State and local governments to honestly acknowledge that domestic terrorism is a threat 

to the safety and security of the American homeland, including the 

refugees who resettle within our borders. 

We must move beyond the perceived fears of the unknown and 

focus on credible threat information and allow the security vetting 

systems we have in place to work. I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

[The statement of Ranking Member Thompson follows:] 
5 

STATEMENT OF RANKING MEMBER BENNIE G. THOMPSON

JUNE 24, 2015 

Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank you for holding this hearing to examine the 

United States’ security screening process of Syrian refugees and the threats those 

refugees may pose to the United States. 

The United States refugee program was greatly impacted by the terrorist attacks 

of September 11. In the aftermath of those attacks, a review of refugee-related security procedures was undertaken, refugee admissions were briefly suspended, and enhanced security measures were implemented. 

However, more than a decade after these enhanced security measures have been 

undertaken with limited instances of fraud, there are those that believe certain populations are unable to be properly vetted for security purposes. Rather than focus 

on the fear and concern surrounding Syrian refugees, I think we should focus on 

the known facts about the Syrian refugee population. The Syrian people are the primary victims of the violent conflict in Syria and the brutal actions of ISIL. 

They are the most vulnerable to the violence and know first-hand the cruelty of 

ISIL and other groups that have brought harm upon their communities. These refugees, like most others that arrive in the United States, are fleeing difficult, even 

life-threatening, situations. The idea that they would be met with suspicion and 

hate upon arrival in the United States is an affront to the values we uphold and 

promote. 

Like Americans, most Syrians consider ISIL to be their enemy, as well. Within 

the United States, the Syrian American Council has already partnered with the Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties within the Department of Homeland Security to organize community briefings for Syrian Americans focused on countering 

violent extremism. Groups like this encourage a robust Congressional debate on how 

ISIL can be stopped both at home and abroad. 

In fact, the leading demographic of those seeking or joining ISIL in the United 

States are U.S.-born citizens, including citizens with no ancestry from majority-Muslim countries. Therefore, preventing vulnerable Syrian refugees from entering the 

United States will not address the United States’ issues with violent extremism. 

Time and time again, I have urged this committee not to have a narrow view of 

violent extremism, which ignores violent extremist activity of domestic groups. Regrettably, last week’s attacks at the Emanuel AME Church in Charleston brought 

this issue into stark focus. Congress, the President, and the Department of Homeland Security need to come together with State and local governments to honestly 

acknowledge that domestic terrorism is a threat to the safety and security of the 

American homeland, including the refugees who resettle within our borders. 

We must move beyond the perceived fears of the unknown and focus on credible 

threat information and allow the security vetting systems we have in place to work. 

I yield back. 

Mr. KING. The Ranking Member yields back. 

I recognize the Chairman of the full committee, the gentleman 

from Texas, Mr. McCaul. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank you for 

holding this important hearing. We have been sounding the alarm 

for months on this issue and for good reason. America has a proud 

tradition of welcoming refugees and immigrants. But we need to 

make sure the extremists do not exploit this pathway to our country, especially from terrorist safe havens. 

Last year, the administration announced plans to surge the admission of Syrian refugees into the United States, including plans 

to resettle roughly 2,000 of them this year and thousands more 

next year. This is concerning for two reasons. First, terrorists have 

made it known that they want to manipulate refugee programs to 

sneak operatives into the West. Second, top National security officials have admitted that intelligence gaps in Syria will make it 

hard to weed them out of refugee pools. 

Testifying before our committee in February, the director of the 

National Counterterrorism Center called these refugees a population of concern given the expansive presence of ISIS and al- 
6 

Qaeda in Syria. At the same hearing, the FBI’s assistant director, 

Michael Steinbach, for counterterrorism, argued that identifying 

potential operatives would be difficult because, ‘‘our databases 

won’t have the information we need.’’ Simply put, we cannot screen 

applicants confidentially if we don’t have good intelligence on the 

ground. We can’t vet them properly if we don’t have the proper 

databases. 

In light of these concerns, I sent a series of letters to the administration this year highlighting the risk of accelerating Syrian refugee admissions and requesting greater assurances regarding the 

screening process. The responses were inadequate. The administration was vague in explaining how the screening process would overcome the intelligence gaps. I just wrote the President 2 weeks ago, 

again, asking for answers and a Classified briefing for Members of 

this committee. We are still waiting for a serious response. I do not 

take this issue lightly. Terrorists are constantly probing our defenses and would not hesitate to exploit a program meant to save 

innocent people fleeing from violence for the purpose of attacking 

our homeland. 

I remind you that members of al-Qaeda in Iraq, the predecessor 

to ISIS, have already managed to sneak in to our country through 

refugee settlement programs. Two of these terrorists, arrested in 

2009, were responsible for killing four Pennsylvania National 

Guard soldiers in Iraq. Yet they were gained entry and resettled 

in Bowling Green, Kentucky. That was when we had far better intelligence on the ground in Iraq to vet refugees, where in Syria we 

are dark. 

The situation today in Syria is even more chaotic, making it difficult to get the biometric, biographic, and other information needed to ensure individuals being admitted into our country do not intend to do our people harm. Since its founding, America has welcomed refugees from conflict zones in the darkest corners of the 

globe. We will not abandon that tradition. It embodies the compassion of our people and represents our deepest values. But we must 

also not abandon our vigilance. We cannot be naive. 

In Syria, we are witnessing the largest convergence of Islamist 

terrorists in world history. Some of these fanatics want to turn our 

refugee programs into a Trojan horse to carry out attacks here at 

home. We cannot allow that to happen. I hope the White House 

will do more to convince Congress and the American people that it 

is moving forward cautiously, appropriately, but most importantly 

with the security of the American people as a priority. If it does 

not, we may need to consider taking additional steps here on Capitol Hill. With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. KING. I thank the Chairman of the full committee for his 

statement. 

Now we will proceed to the witnesses. Other Members of the 

committee are reminded opening statements may be submitted for 

the record. We are pleased to have a very distinguished panel of 

witnesses before us today on this important topic: Dr. Seth Jones, 

Mr. Tom Fuentes, and Dr. Daveed Gartenstein-Ross. 

Beginning with Dr. Jones, he is the associate director of the 

International Security and Defense Policy Center at the Rand Cooperation, as well as an adjunct professor at Johns Hopkins Uni-
7 

versity School for Advanced International Studies. He served as the 

representative for the commander of the U.S. Special Operations 

Commands, the assistant secretary of defense of special operations. 

Prior to that position, he served as a plans officer and an adviser 

to the commanding general U.S. Special Ops in Afghanistan. 

He specializes in counterinsurgency and counterterrorism, including a focus on Afghanistan, Pakistan, and al-Qaeda. I have 

been reading all his bio. But the fact is, Dr. Jones has testified before this committee many times. He is a good friend of the committee and he works with us. We appreciate having you back here 

again today. Dr. Jones, you are recognized for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF SETH G. JONES, DIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL 

SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY CENTER, RAND CORPORATION 

Mr. JONES. Thank you, Chairman King. Thank you, Ranking 

Member Thompson and other distinguished Members of the committee. This is a very important hearing. I will divide my comments into three sections. 

The first is an update on the wars in Syria and, to a certain extent, Iraq. The second is to try to tie that back to the homeland. 

The third is to bring in the refugee issues. Let me start with a brief 

update. As all of us here know, the wars in both Syria and Iraq, 

which are deeply intertwined, continue to impact U.S. National security and continue to contribute to large refugee flows. At least by 

my assessment, in Syria, while the United States is providing limited support to some Syrian rebels through such programs as the 

Congressionally-approved Train and Equip Program and is conducting some limited air strikes against groups like Daesh and the 

Khorasan Group, the rest of 2015 is, indeed, concerning. 

Daesh or ISIS is likely to remain highly capable in Syria because 

of its access to resources and its ability to replace killed and captured leaders, as well as to continue to get pretty significant funding streams. In addition, the al-Qaeda-affiliated group, Jabhat alNusra in Syria has also increased its control of territory. In fact, 

at least by my estimates, al-Nusra may be more capable now. By 

that, I mean more fighters, more funds, and more territory controlled than at any time since its creation in 2011, including in 

such strongholds as Idlib, Syria. 

That brings us to the connection to the homeland. The two 

groups in Syria, they also operate in Iraq, remain Daesh or ISIS 

and the Khorasan Group. They present high threats to the U.S. 

homeland. Both appear to be plotting attacks and certainly trying 

to inspire attacks in the U.S. homeland, as well as other places in 

the West. I think the issue that is worth noting is that we have 

more foreign fighters in this broader battleground that is Syria and 

Iraq than we have had in any jihadist battlefield in the modern 

era. 

This is a slightly different problem set than what I had to deal 

with in Afghanistan, what we had to deal with in Libya, and other 

places. Over 20,000 foreign fighters, about 17 percent or so appear 

to be coming from the West. Roughly 200 Americans are known to 

have attempted to travel to Syria to fight with Islamic militants. 

Obviously, of additional concern is the growing number of attacks 
8 

1The opinions and conclusions expressed in this testimony are the author’s alone and should 

not be interpreted as representing those of RAND or any of the sponsors of its research. This 

product is part of the RAND Corporation testimony series. RAND testimonies record testimony 

presented by RAND associates to Federal, State, or local legislative committees; Governmentappointed commissions and panels; and private review and oversight bodies. The RAND Corporation is a non-profit research organization providing objective analysis and effective solutions 

that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors around the world. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. 2This testimony is available for free download at http://www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/ 

CT433.html. 

we have seen across the West with links either directly or indirectly back to this region. 

Garland, Texas, Copenhagen, Denmark in February 2015, Paris, 

France in January 2015, Sydney, Australia in December 2014, Ottawa, Canada in October 2014, Brussels, Belgium in May 2014, 

just to name a few. The broader issue, as we look to the ties between Syria and the United States, is, first, more foreign fighters 

than we have seen on any modern battlefield, and, second, our intelligence picture is clearly much worse than at least my own experience in several battlefields overseas where we had a sustained 

American presence on the ground to collect information. 

So this brings me briefly back to refugees. I am happy to discuss 

this in more detail. Got roughly 4 million refugees based on the 

Syria problem set. Refugees has, as the Chairman noted, historically played and will continue to play a critical role in ensuring 

U.S. economic prosperity and cultural diversity. But the risks associated with refugees may be higher from Syria for several reasons. 

First, Syria and neighboring Iraq have the highest number of foreign fighters than any modern jihadist battlefield as I have already 

noted. There has been an exodus of some fighters to the West. 

Second, several groups in the region, like Daesh or ISIS, have 

planned to put operatives in the West, including in Europe, by having them seek political refugee status. This is not just in Syria by 

the way. We have seen this effort in Libya, among other places. 

Third, the U.S. intelligence community’s understanding of extremists in Syria is worse. I do think it is worth considering a range 

of issues, improving data management of potentially concerning 

refugees, rescreening procedures, holding data collected at refugee 

camps, some DNA checks, and a few other issues. 

But let me just say in conclusion, that the United States does 

have a long-standing tradition of offering protection and freedom to 

refugees who live in fear of persecution. The Chairman mentioned 

a number of ones, including Albert Einstein. An integral part of 

that mission, however, in my view, needs to be ensuring that those 

refugees considered for entry into the United States, including from 

such jihadist battlefields as Syria, do not present a risk to the safety and security of the United States. I think what we are looking 

for is a balance. I am happy to talk more about those specifics in 

the Q and A period. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Jones follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SETH G. JONES 1 2

JUNE 24, 2015 

Chairman King, Ranking Member Higgins, and distinguished Members of the 

Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence, thank you for inviting me to 

testify at this important hearing, ‘‘Admitting Syrian Refugees: The Intelligence Void 
9 

3Daesh is an acronym from the Arabic name of the group, al-Dawlah al-Islamiyah fil ‘Iraq 

wal-Sham. 4See, for example, Liz Sly, ‘‘Assad’s Hold on Power Looks Shakier Than Ever as Rebels Advance in Syria,’’ Washington Post, April 26, 2015. 5See, for example, Patrick B. Johnston, Countering ISIL’s Financing: Testimony Presented Before the House Financial Services Committee on November 13, 2014, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND 

Corporation, CT–419, 2014. On antiquities, see Financial Action Task Force, Financing of the 

Terrorist Organization Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), Paris: Financial Action Task 

Force, February 2015. 6See, for example, Tim Arango, ‘‘ISIS Captures Key Iraqi City Despite Strikes,’’ New York 

Times, May 18, 2015; Hugh Naylor and Mustafa Salim, ‘‘Key City in Iraq Falls to Militants,’’ 

Washington Post, May 18, 2015. 7Seth G. Jones, A Persistent Threat: The Evolution of Al Qa’ida and Other Salafi Jihadist, 

Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, RR–637–OSD, 2014. 

and the Emerging Homeland Security Threat.’’ I have divided my comments into 

four sections. The first provides an overview of the wars in Syria and neighboring 

Iraq, the second focuses on the terrorism threat to the United States, the third outlines the foreign-fighter problem from Syria and Iraq, and the fourth examines the 

implications for Syrian refugees. 

I. UPDATE ON THE WARS IN SYRIA AND IRAQ

The wars in Syria and Iraq, which are deeply intertwined, continue to impact U.S. 

National security. 

In Syria, the United States is providing limited support to some Syrian rebels 

against Daesh—also known as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), or simply Islamic State (IS)—under the Congressionally-approved train-and-equip program.3 However, U.S.-led airstrikes have 

been insufficient to seriously degrade Daesh in Syria. Over the rest of 2015, Daesh 

is likely to remain highly capable because of its access to resources and its ability 

to replace killed and captured leaders. Daesh has recently strengthened control in 

such Syrian areas as Homs, Dayr az Zawr, and Ar Raqqah. In addition, the alQaeda-affiliated Jabhat al-Nusrah has also increased its control of territory. In fact, 

Jabhat al-Nusrah may be more capable now—with more fighters, funds, and territory—than at any time since its creation in 2011, and it retains a stronghold in 

northwestern Syrian areas such as Idlib. The recent capture of the town of Jisr alShughour in northern Idlib province was just the latest in a string of battlefield victories by rebel forces, which have made advances in both the north and the south 

of the country.4

In neighboring Iraq, the United States is engaged in a counterinsurgency campaign against Daesh and its allies. After nearly 10 months of bombing and U.S. 

military, intelligence, and diplomatic support to the Iraqi government and local actors, Daesh has lost ground in some areas—including most recently in Tikrit. But 

Daesh still retains substantial territory in the predominantly Sunni provinces of 

Anbar, Salaheddine, and Nineveh. In addition, Daesh remains well-funded, allowing 

it to continue operations. Its funding comes from such activities as smuggling oil, 

selling stolen goods, kidnapping and extortion, seizing bank accounts, and smuggling antiquities.5 Daesh’s capture of Ramadi in May 2015—despite an intensified 

U.S. bombing campaign—indicates that the organization retains significant capabilities in some areas.6

II. THE TERRORIST THREAT TO THE U.S. HOMELAND

In understanding the threat from Syria and Iraq, it is important to understand 

the broader context. Not all terrorist groups present a direct threat to the U.S. 

homeland. As Table 1 highlights, terrorist groups can be divided into three categories: Those that pose a high threat because they are involved in plotting or instigating attacks against the U.S. homeland; those that pose a medium threat because 

they are involved in plotting attacks against U.S. structures, such as embassies and 

U.S. citizens overseas (though not against the U.S. homeland); and those that pose 

a low threat because they are focused on targeting local regimes or other countries.7

Two terrorist groups operating in Syria—Daesh and the Khorasan Group—present 

high threats (Table 1). 
10 

TABLE 1.—EXAMPLES OF TERRORISTS THAT THREATEN THE UNITED STATES 

High Threat Medium Threat Low Threat 

Characteristics ....................... Plotting or instigating attacks 

against the U.S. homeland and U.S. targets overseas (e.g., U.S. embassies and citizens).

Plotting attacks against U.S. targets overseas (e.g., U.S. embassies and citizens). Limited or no active plotting against U.S. homeland or U.S. targets overseas. 

Examples ................................ • Al Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula.

• Core al Qa’ida (including the 

Khorasan Group).

• Daesh ............................................• Some inspired individuals and 

networks.

• Al Shabaab ...................................• Jabhat al-Nusrah .........................• Ansar al-Sharia Libya groups .....• Al Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb • Boko Haram ..................................

• East Turkestan Islamic Movement • Suqor al-Sham 
11 

8The data are from the National Counterterrorism Center. See Nicholas J. Rasmussen, Current Terrorist Threat to the United States: Hearing before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, February 12, 2015. 9The data are from the UK’s Security Service, or MI5. See Andrew Parker, Director General 

of the Security Service (MI5), ‘‘Terrorism, Technology and Accountability,’’ Address to the Royal 

United Services Institute (RUSI) at Thames House, January 8, 2015. 

First, some groups pose a high threat. Since its expansion in Iraq and Syria, 

Daesh has become a growing threat to the United States. Rather than the complex 

attacks on 9/11, which involved years of training and meticulous planning, the most 

likely Daesh threat today comes from smaller, less-sophisticated attacks from inspired individuals who may have limited or no connections to the organization. Core 

al Qa’ida, based in Pakistan, also presents a threat to the U.S. homeland. But their 

leaders have had difficulty recruiting—or even inspiring—competent operatives in 

the West. That’s why Ayman al-Zawahiri sent a small group of operatives, referred 

to as the Khorasan Group, to Syria to plot attacks in Europe and the United States. 

Another is al Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula, which provided training to two of 

the operatives involved in the Charlie Hebdo attacks, Said and Cherif Kouachi. Several Yemen-based operatives—including leader Nasir al-Wuhayshi—continue to plot 

attacks against the United States. In addition, a small number of inspired individuals, such as the Tsarnaev brothers, who perpetrated the April 2013 Boston Marathon bombings, pose a threat. Still, terrorists have had difficulty striking the U.S. 

homeland because of robust counterterrorism steps by the Department of Homeland 

Security, Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. intelligence community, and other 

Federal and local agencies. 

Second, several extremist groups pose a medium-level threat because of their interest and capability to target U.S. citizens overseas, though they have little interest 

or ability to strike the U.S. homeland. Ansar al-Sharia Tunisia, for instance, has 

planned attacks against U.S. diplomats and infrastructure in Tunis, including the 

U.S. Embassy. Several groups with a presence in Libya—such as the various Ansar 

al-Sharia Libya branches and al Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb—also pose a threat 

to U.S. embassies and citizens in North Africa; so does al-Shabaab in Somalia. Its 

objectives are largely parochial: To establish an extreme Islamic emirate in Somalia 

and the broader region. Al-Shabaab possesses a competent external operations capability to strike targets in East Africa. The September 2013 Westgate Mall attack in 

Nairobi, Kenya, was well-planned and well-executed, and involved sophisticated intelligence collection, surveillance, and reconnaissance of the target. 

Third, some extremist groups present a low-level threat to the United States. 

These groups do not possess the capability or intent to target the United States at 

home or overseas. They include such organizations as the East Turkestan Islamic 

Movement, which is primarily interested in Chinese targets. 

III. FOREIGN FIGHTER CHALLENGE FROM SYRIA AND IRAQ

Of particular concern for the United States is the growing number of extremists— 

both Sunni and Shi’a—that have traveled to (and from) Syria and Iraq to fight. The 

Syrian-Iraqi battlefield likely has the largest concentration of foreign extremists of 

any jihadist battlefield in the modern era. There have been over 20,000 foreign 

fighters who have traveled to Syria to fight. Approximately 3,400 fighters, or 17 percent, appear to be coming from the West. Approximately 200 Americans are known 

to have attempted to travel to Syria to fight with Islamic militants.8 It is difficult 

to predict whether most of the foreign fighters will remain in Syria, Iraq, and other 

countries over the long run to fight or die on the battlefield; move to future war 

zones; or return to the United States and other Western countries. Even if some return, it is uncertain whether they will become involved in terrorist plots, focus on 

recruiting and fundraising, or become disillusioned with terrorism. Still, foreign 

fighters have historically been agents of instability. Volunteering for war is often 

the principal stepping stone for individual involvement in more extreme forms of 

militancy—including in the United States. 

Indeed, there have been a growing number of attacks and plots across the West 

tied either formally or informally to Syria and Iraq. These include attacks in Garland, Texas, in May 2015; Copenhagen, Denmark, in February 2015; Paris, France, 

in January 2015; Sydney, Australia, in December 2014; Ottawa, Canada, in October 

2014; and Brussels, Belgium, in May 2014. More broadly, there were over 20 terrorist plots in the West either directed or provoked by extremist groups in Syria between October 2013 and January 2015.9 Daesh has been linked directly or indirectly 
12 

10These attacks have generally not involved returned foreign fighters, but rather individuals 

inspired directly or indirectly by Daesh. 11Parker, 2015. 12Parker, 2015. 13Parker, 2015. 14 Brian Michael Jenkins and Jean-Francois Clair, ‘‘Predicting the ‘Dangerousness’ of Potential Terrorists,’’ The Hill, March 26, 2015; Jenkins and Clair, ‘‘Different Countries, Different 

Ways of Countering Terrorism,’’ The Hill, February 27, 2015. 15 Jen Psaki, U.S. State Department Daily Press Briefing, Washington, DC, February 13, 

2015. 

to plots in such countries as France, Australia, Belgium, Libya, Tunisia, and the 

United States.10

There is also significant concern among America’s European allies about the 

threat from Syria and Iraq. For instance, more than 600 British extremists have 

traveled to Syria and Iraq.11 Many have joined Daesh. ‘‘We know that terrorists 

based in Syria harbor the same ambitions towards the United Kingdom—trying to 

direct attacks against our country, and exhorting extremists here to act independently,’’ said MI5 director-general Andrew Parker in a January speech.12 Similar to 

the United States, the British face a complex threat, with more extremists than MI5 

and the Metropolitan Police Service’s Counter Terrorism Command, or SO15, can 

cover at any one time. Despite these challenges, MI5 and the police remain aggressive. In England and Wales, there has been a 35-percent increase in terrorist-related arrests since 2011. And more than 140 individuals have been convicted for terrorism-related offenses since 2010.13

The British are not alone. Counterterrorism agencies across Europe and North 

America are under tremendous pressure to prevent terrorist attacks. French authorities report that nearly 1,400 French citizens have gone to Syria—or tried to go. 

French authorities arrested 91 persons suspected of extremist activity in 2012—and 

another 143 persons in 2013.14

IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR REFUGEES AND THE U.S. HOMELAND

Based on these threats, it is important to examine potential risks from increased 

refugee flows from the region. In February 2015, the Department of State noted that 

it was ‘‘likely to admit 1,000 to 2,000 Syrian refugees for permanent resettlement 

in Fiscal Year 2015 and a somewhat higher number, though still in the low thousands, in Fiscal Year 2016.’’15

Refugees have historically played—and will continue to play—a critical role in ensuring U.S. economic prosperity and cultural diversity. In addition, the threat to the 

U.S. homeland from refugees has been relatively low. Almost none of the major terrorist plots since 9/11 have involved refugees. Even in those cases where refugees 

were arrested on terrorism-related charges, years and even decades often transpired 

between their entry into the United States and their involvement in terrorism. In 

most instances, a would-be terrorist’s refugee status had little or nothing to do with 

their radicalization and shift to terrorism. 

But risks associated with refugees from Syria may be higher today for several reasons. First, Syria and neighboring Iraq have the highest numbers of foreign fighters 

on any modern jihadist battlefield, and there has already been an exodus of some 

fighters to the West. Second, several groups in the region like Daesh have planned 

to put operatives in the West, particularly in Europe, by having them seek political 

refugee status. Daesh has also been active in some refugee camps in Syria. Third, 

the U.S. intelligence community’s understanding of extremists in Syria is worse 

than in many other jihadist battlefields, such as Iraq and Afghanistan, because of 

more limited intelligence collection capabilities. 

Individual terrorists and terrorist groups have multiple options to attack the U.S. 

homeland. First, they can inspire and encourage locals to conduct attacks through 

magazines like Dabiq (published by Daesh) and Inspire (published by al Qa’ida in 

the Arabian Peninsula). Second, they can infiltrate members into the United States 

from overseas to conduct attacks or recruit operatives from U.S. communities. Third, 

they can target aircraft or vessels coming into the United States. In 2010, for example, al Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula attempted to target cargo planes using plastic explosives hidden in printer cartridges. 

Refugees have occasionally been involved in the first two types of plots. Perhaps 

the best-known case involved Waad Ramadan and Alwan Mohanad Shareef 

Hammadi, who were arrested on Federal terrorism charges in 2009 in Bowling 

Green, Kentucky. They had been granted refugee status despite their insurgent activities in Iraq and their role in attacking U.S. troops. The Bowling Green arrests 

led to numerous changes in how the United States processed refugees and asylum- 
13 

seekers. The process had been haphazard, partly because there were so many refugees and asylum-seekers—including from Iraq—being processed through the system. 

But there were also challenges because the data were not well organized across the 

U.S. Government. 

Overall, there are a small number of cases in which refugees have been arrested 

on terrorism-related charges in the United States. Examples include the following: 

• a Bosnian refugee in St. Louis (arrested in 2015) 

• a Somali refugee in Minneapolis (2015) 

• an Uzbek refugee in Boise, Idaho (2013) 

• two Chechen refugees in Boston (2013) 

• an Uzbek refugee in Aurora, Colorado (2012) 

• two Iraqi refugees in Bowling Green, Kentucky (2011) 

• a Somali refugee in Columbus, Ohio (2011) 

• a Somali refugee in St. Louis, Missouri (2010) 

• a Somali refugee in Portland, Oregon (2010) 

• an Afghan refugee in Aurora, Colorado (2009) 

There have been other cases in Canada. Ahmed Ressam, the millennium bomber 

who was convicted in 2001 of planning to bomb Los Angeles International Airport 

(LAX) on New Year’s Eve 1999, had applied to Canada as a refugee. He was denied 

refugee status, but still managed to remain in Canada before attempting to attack 

the United States. Raed Jaser, who pled guilty in March 2015 to involvement in a 

terrorist plot that targeted a train route between Toronto and New York City, had 

applied for refugee status in Canada as a Palestinian. The Canadian government 

rejected his family’s refugee claims. But since the family was stateless, the government allowed family members to stay in the country under Canada’s ‘‘deferred removal’’ program. Finally, Sayfildin Tahir Sharif (also known as Faruq Khalil Muhammad ‘Isa), who was arrested in Canada in 2011 on a U.S. warrant, had moved 

to Canada as a refugee from Iraq. 

Because of these concerns, the United States should reassess its refugee program 

and make sure it safeguards National security. As already noted, a number of 

changes were implemented after the Bowling Green arrests. It is worth examining 

whether there needs to be enhanced screening and data collection for applicants, 

such as 

• additional background checks and other screening protocols in place at the Department of Homeland Security and the Federal Bureau of Investigation for 

screening refugee applicants—including Syrian applicants—through the U.S. 

Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP). 

• improved data management of potentially concerning refugees. Some of the mistakes in the past were not due to screening errors, but rather caused by poor 

data management. Information on terrorist links never made it to the right 

databases. 

• an enhanced U.S. intelligence community role in implementing heightened 

measures to vet potential refuges from countries of concern, including Syria. 

Some of this has already occurred through such programs as the National 

Counterterrorism Center’s Kingfisher Expansion program. 

• enhanced re-screening procedures for refugees who have entered the United 

States 

• better engagement with Visa Waiver Program countries out of concern that refugees from Syria, Iraq, or other high-risk countries could be resettled there and 

then enter the United States with a lower level of scrutiny 

• additional authorities to hold data collected in refugee camps. 

The United States has a long-standing tradition of offering protection and freedom 

to refugees who live in fear of persecution, some of whom are left to languish in 

deplorable conditions of temporary asylum. An integral part of that mission needs 

to be ensuring that those refugees considered for entry into the United States, including from such jihadist battlefields as Syria, do not present a risk to the safety 

and security of the United States. 

Mr. KING. Thank you, Dr. Jones. 

Our next witness, Tom Fuentes, served in the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation for 25 years, retiring in 2008 as an assistant director. 

His distinguished career focused particularly on organized crime, 

cyber crime, and international law enforcement cooperation. For 

any of us who watch television, he is currently serving as a law enforcement analyst for CNN. I am glad you took a break from the 

jailbreak itself today to join with us. Seriously, I certainly always 
14 

get a lot out of listening to your commentaries and your analysis 

on these issues. It is a privilege to have you testifying here today. 

I thank you. Mr. Fuentes, you are recognized. 

STATEMENT OF THOMAS FUENTES, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR 

(RETIRED), FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION 

Mr. FUENTES. Thank you, Chairman King. Thank you, other 

Members of the committee, for inviting me here today. I did not 

submit a prepared statement in advance. I knew that my distinguished colleagues would very well illustrate the number of Syrian 

refugees, the scope of the issue of trying to determine how many 

will come, how they will come in, what processes will occur for 

them to try to vet them. 

My point with this would be that the last 5 years of my career 

in the FBI, I served as the head of the International Program, running the legal attache ́ offices around the world. I was the Bureau’s 

first on-scene commander in Iraq in 2003. I also served as a member of Interpol’s executive committee and have worked closely with 

Interpol issues for more than 25 years. 

The issue of international police cooperation is essential in everything we do. In all aspects of American business, students overseas, 

vacationers overseas, the issue of having countries that we work 

closely with, that we can rely on is essential for all aspects. But 

this particular issue, it comes down to do we have working partners in Syria. The fact is we do not. 

When I was in charge in Iraq in the summer of 2003 into the 

fall of 2003, even simple things there became difficult because the 

looters had taken the computers of Iraq’s Department of Motor Vehicles and other Government computers, the actual computers that 

had the data on them, and the servers. So we had no way to vet 

immediately in the summer of 2003, but we built that up over time 

as we had the intelligence assets. I opened the FBI’s formal legal 

attache ́ office in October 2004. The United States has been able to 

work with Iraqis and get information. 

We have had some success, again, in Afghanistan and other 

countries that we were working with. But currently in Syria, we 

don’t have that capability. We do not have an FBI office. Our 

human sources are minimal. Our, obviously, signals intelligence 

are also going to be minimal to understand what is actually occurring there. We don’t have a Government we can partner with. That 

is the key thing. If any of these individuals would be in a database, 

you know, that is why they are refugees in many cases. If they are 

on the Government’s radar in Syria, it could be for negative reasons which would cause them to want to come out and possibly 

seek a life here. 

So, for me, I would completely agree that the ideals of this country are that we take in immigrants and refugees from all over the 

world seeking the American Dream, seeking a better life, and especially the refugees that seek it for their children obviously. That becomes a problem as well when the children come, as we saw with 

the Somali refugees. As we saw in the Tsarnaev case, the Boston 

bombers, you see children who 4 or 5 years later are old enough 

to become radicalized even with their parents being completely unaware. 
15 

So my issue with this is how the vetting process would work, 

how it could possibly succeed, and recognizing that I know the FBI 

does not have the ability to really do an adequate vetting on this 

issue. Thank you. 

Mr. KING. Thank you, Mr. Fuentes. 

Our next witness, is Dr. Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, a senior fellow 

at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, an adjunct professor 

at Georgetown University’s Security Studies Program, and a lecturer at the Catholic University of America. 

He is also the chief executive officer of Valens Global, a consulting firm focusing on the challenges posed by violent, non-state 

actors. Doctor, it is a privilege to have you here today. You are recognized. Thank you. 

STATEMENT OF DAVEED GARTENSTEIN-ROSS, SENIOR 

FELLOW, FOUNDATION FOR DEFENSE OF DEMOCRACIES 

Mr. GARTENSTEIN-ROSS. Thank you, Chairman King, Ranking 

Member Vela, distinguished Members of the committee. In this testimony, I want to talk about how we have significant interests in 

alleviating the refugee situation in the region. 

The refugee situation caused by the Syria conflict is very grave. 

Both for humanitarian reasons and also for reasons of National interest, we should care about the situation deeply. This committee 

has also quite clearly raised issues about domestic radicalization. 

I think declining domestic capacity is something that should be 

considered, as well as the overall coherence of our migration policies. 

With respect to the region, as Dr. Jones said, there are about 4 

million registered refugees outside of Syria right now. You also 

have a significant amount of, millions of Syrians who can be classified as internally displaced persons. You have significant upheaval 

and strain that this is causing in neighboring states. In Jordan, 

which is already a state which is strapped for water, which has a 

sky-high unemployment rate, in Lebanon, in Turkey, this has 

caused multiple challenges, both internal security challenges, domestic unrest, pitting native citizens against refugees. You have 

155,000 registered refugees from Syria in North Africa and a significant movement of refugees into Europe from Libya’s human 

trafficking networks. The collapse of the state in Libya has caused 

massive inflows through what is called the central Mediterranean 

route. 

Now, when this committee looks at this situation, there is both, 

as I said, humanitarian concerns and also strategic concerns related to the impact this has on the United States’ partners in the 

region. When we look at, however, the risks associated with this, 

I think there is two specific radicalization concerns. One which was 

already raised is the concern that you might try to insert, a terrorist group might try to insert operatives into the United States 

in this way. This is not, I would say, the primary concern in my 

view. The reason why is because in order to get an operative into 

the United States, a group like Jabhat al-Nusra or the Islamic 

State would have to land them in a refugee camp and then hope 

they got picked up in the lottery process, in this case, being consid-
16 

ered one of the neediest by the United Nations and then move to 

the United States. 

Now, this could happen. But there is much easier ways to move 

into Europe such as coming in through Libya, given the fact that 

a large number of Syrian refugees or those who can be classified 

as refugees are now moving into Europe through the Libyan route. 

However, despite the fact that I think the danger isn’t particularly 

high, when you look at the security procedures, they are layered 

but they really look like the TSA’s layered procedures, where the 

TSA checks a lot of boxes. But at the end of the day and the tests 

that have been done recently, it hasn’t found the bomb. Other than 

the interview procedure, if that is done effectively, I am not convinced there is anything that really stands a chance of preventing 

a terrorist operative from getting in. 

Now, the second thing is radicalization concerns. If you look at 

the narrative that could be used for a Syrian refugee, it is going 

to depend upon whether they were displaced by the Islamic State, 

by al-Nusra, or by the Assad regime which is extraordinarily brutal. I think we would be foolish to ignore the fact that not the Islamic State, but Jabhat al-Nusra, al-Qaeda’s affiliate in Syria, has 

recently managed to position itself as at the forefront of opposing 

Assad and has managed to make itself popular both with other opposition groups and also with many Syrian people. For someone in 

the United States who has a special interest in Syria, sees the 

West as not acting, and looks at Nusra as cooperating with people, 

providing governance, and being at the forefront of opposing Assad, 

I think there is an elevated risk of radicalization that needs to be 

a part of this conversation. 

The final two things I want to point to, our declining domestic 

capacity. When we talk about violent non-state actors in the United 

States of all stripes, one thing that is of concern is that our resources are going to become fewer and fewer in the future. We have 

a National debt that is skyrocketing, that should soon surpass $20 

trillion. Right now, it is at the $18 trillion mark. Looking at our 

own resources to handle problems that exist within the United 

States should be part of any conversation that involves outlays 

both on the security and humanitarian end. 

Finally, I want to say a word about the coherence of U.S. migration policies. I would say the United States has not met its basic 

obligations to people who helped us in Iraq and in Afghanistan, 

serving as translators or contractors for U.S. efforts. When we talk 

about taking in people from abroad, those who are needy, those 

who help the United States should be part of any conversation and 

should be at the forefront of those who we try to help. The United 

States deservedly has a bad reputation for not standing behind 

people who help us. When we deal with a situation where there are 

more conflicts at the sub-state level where we have to liaise with 

sub-state actors, making sure that we garner the right reputation 

for standing by our friends is an important part of what U.S. policy 

should promote. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Gartenstein-Ross follows:] 
17 

1The UN High Commissioner for Refugees, ‘‘Syria Regional Refugee Response,’’ May 31, 2015, 

available at http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php. 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DAVEED GARTENSTEIN-ROSS

JUNE 24, 2015 

Chairman King, Ranking Member Higgins, and distinguished Members of the 

committee, on behalf of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, it is an honor 

to appear before you to discuss the humanitarian and security issues posed by admitting Syrian refugees, and what the Government can do to address this challenge. 

The Syrian refugee crisis represents the tragic consequences of politics gone awry 

in the Middle East. Millions of Syrians have been displaced due to the fighting, 

which has also produced a near-complete fracturing of Syrian society. The refugee 

crisis must be considered with an emphasis on both humanitarian and security 

issues, as they are deeply linked. This testimony thus seeks to highlight the competing considerations that should inform our thinking and policies on this issue by 

focusing on both the deep humanitarian and geopolitical challenges associated with 

the Syrian refugee crisis, but also reasons why policymakers have legitimate concerns about the admission of large numbers of Syrian refugees into the United 

States. Even though rebel groups seem to have recently broken the stalemate with 

Bashar al-Assad’s regime, this doesn’t mean that the Syrian civil war will imminently end, and even an end of the civil war doesn’t mean an end to the refugee 

crisis: The proliferation of jihadist groups in the country is a demonstration of just 

how enduring the refugee crisis may be. 

The United States is now asking whether it should accept those Syrian refugees 

left most vulnerable by the conflict. While there may be both moral and pragmatic 

considerations counseling in favor of such a course of action, there are also challenges involved in doing so, and the risk exists that the United States could end 

up with an incoherent set of migrations policies, given its failure to admit the many 

Afghans and Iraqis who directly aided U.S. efforts during the major wars in both 

countries. Put simply, the United States has not met its obligation to locals in those 

two countries who assisted the U.S.’s military efforts, and whose lives are endangered 

as a result. Thus, any discussion of admitting Syrian refugees should recognize these 

obligations as a part of the discussion, one that should take priority. 

My testimony begins by outlining, country by country, the impacts of the Syrian 

refugee crisis, detailing where refugees have ended up in the Middle East, Europe, 

and North America. It examines the conditions of refugee camps, as well as humanitarian efforts of host nations and international organizations. The Jordanian response will be specifically highlighted, as Jordan has been particularly challenged 

by the sudden influx of refugees. The testimony concludes by describing potential 

problems related to resettling Syrian refugees in the United States, including security concerns. 

THE HUMANITARIAN CRISIS RELATED TO SYRIAN REFUGEES

The Syrian refugee crisis, now entering its fourth year, presents dire humanitarian concerns. The exodus of Syrians to neighboring states has created a myriad 

of challenges for host countries and aid organizations alike. Syrians displaced from 

the conflict now number almost 4 million in such neighboring countries such as Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, and Egypt, as well as European and North American 

states. 

Syrian refugees have been removed from the violence that continues to plague 

their home country, but they remain an at-risk population in the countries to which 

they have fled. Conditions in refugee camps vary, but they have created numerous 

humanitarian issues. Outside of the camps, displaced Syrians struggle to afford 

housing and find work, while host nations grapple with the implications of trying 

to integrate a refugee population that has become more likely to stay as the crisis 

continues. 

Scope of the crisis.—According to the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees 

(UNHCR), the UN’s refugee agency, nearly 4 million registered Syrian refugees live 

outside of Syria.1 There is also an unknown, though sizable, number of Syrian refugees who have not been registered, leaving them in legal limbo and without access 

to services provided by humanitarian agencies. Additionally, the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) estimates that there are approximately 7.6 million 
18 

2 Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, ‘‘Syria IDP Figures Analysis,’’ December 2014, 

available at http://www.internal-displacement.org/middle-east-and-north-africa/syria/; Global 

Overview 2014: People Internally Displaced by Conflict and Violence (Geneva: Norwegian Refugee Council and Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, May 2014), p. 11, available at 

http://www.internal-displacement.org/assets/publications/2014/201405-global-overview-2014- 

en.pdf. Note: The distinction between IDPs and refugees is that refugees have fled their country 

of citizenship, whereas IDPs have left their home but remain in their country of citizenship. 3 Nour Samaha, ‘‘ ‘I Wasn’t Afraid, but Now I Am’: Syrians Fear Lebanon’s Visa Rules,’’ Al 

Jazeera, January 5, 2015. 4 European University Institute and Migration Policy Centre, ‘‘Syrian Refugees: A Snapshot 

of the Crisis—in the Middle East and Europe,’’ August 2014, available at http:// 

syrianrefugees.eu/?pagelid=87. 5 Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, ‘‘Iraq IDP Figures Analysis,’’ January 2015, available at http://www.internal-displacement.org/middle-east-and-north-africa/iraq/. 6Tom Rollins, ‘‘Syrian Refugees in Egypt Determined to Get to Europe,’’ Al-Monitor, July 24, 

2014. 7 ‘‘What’s Behind the Surge in Refugees Crossing the Mediterranean Sea,’’ New York Times, 

May 21, 2015. 8 European University Institute and Migration Policy Centre, ‘‘Syrian Refugees: A Snapshot 

of the Crisis. 9 Harriet Grant, ‘‘UN Plan to Relocate Syrian Refugees in Northern Europe,’’ Guardian (U.K.), 

March 11, 2015. 10 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, ‘‘Resettlement and Other Forms of Admission for Syrian Refugees.’’ May 13, 2015, available at http://www.unhcr.org/52b2febafc5.pdf. 11Somini Sengupta, ‘‘U.N. Calls on Western Nations to Shelter Syrian Refugees,’’ New York 

Times, April 17, 2015. 

internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Syria, making it the country with the largest 

population of individuals displaced by conflict and violence in the world.2

Countries bordering Syria have borne most of the burden of housing Syrian refugees. Turkey, with over 1.7 million registered refugees, holds more registered Syrian 

refugees than any other country. Second to Turkey is Lebanon, which houses nearly 

1.2 million registered refugees, along with approximately 300,000 unregistered refugees.3 Jordan houses approximately 620,000 refugees, with the majority (80 percent) 

residing in urban areas such as the capital, Amman.4 Iraq houses around 250,000 

Syrian refugees, in addition to 3 million-plus IDPs who have been displaced by the 

current conflict in Iraq.5

Syrian refugees have also sought asylum or temporary residency in other countries in the region. According to UNHCR, there are 155,000 registered Syrian refugees in North Africa; of those, approximately 130,000 reside in Egypt, though conditions for Syrian refugees in that country have deteriorated since Mohamed Morsi’s 

regime was overthrown in July 2013.6 A growing number of Syrian refugees based 

in Egypt have attempted the treacherous journey to Europe by sea. A significant 

number of Syrian refugees also live in Libya, though most of them are unregistered. 

Many Syrian refugees still residing in Libya do not intend to remain, and are planning to travel to Europe via Libya’s well-established human smuggling networks.7

Europe is home to a steadily-growing population of Syrian refugees. Nearly 

150,000 Syrians have sought asylum in Europe since 2011 and European Union 

(E.U.) member states have pledged to resettle another 33,000 Syrians in the coming 

months.8 Though E.U. law states that refugees must register in their country of 

entry, many Syrian refugees evade migration officials in southern and eastern European countries, and travel to northern European countries, where they then apply 

for asylum. Among European states, Germany and Sweden have received the most 

Syrian refugees, with both countries processing over 50,000 Syrian asylum applications from 2011–2014.9 Of the 33,000 refugees whom E.U. member states have 

vowed to resettle, the vast majority (30,000) will be resettled in Germany.10

The United States has admitted a small number of Syrian refugees. According to 

the State Department, 700 Syrian refugees have been accepted since the civil war 

began, and the State Department has revealed plans to accept as many as 2,000 

additional refugees by the fall of 2015.11 Canada has pledged to accept 11,000 refugees in the near future. 

Conditions for refugees inside and outside of refugee camps.—The massive forced 

migration out of Syria has necessitated a huge humanitarian response. Camps have 

been established in several countries to address the inflow of refugees. Yet with 

dwindling funds and resources, conditions are deteriorating. 

There are over 3.5 million Syrian refugees in Jordan, Iraq, Turkey, and Lebanon. 

Camps provide food, water, electricity, cash vouchers, basic medical services, education, and shelter. The camps, and the services they provide, are jointly managed 

by the host governments, UNHCR, and several participating NGOs. Some camps, 
19 

12Mac McClelland, ‘‘How to Build a Perfect Refugee Camp,’’ New York Times, February 13, 

2014. 13 Ibid. 14Michael Kimmelman, ‘‘Refugee Camp for Syrians in Jordan Evolves as a Do-It-Yourself 

City,’’ New York Times, July 4, 2014 (discussing the Azraq camp). 15 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Living in the Shadows: Jordan Home Visits Report 2014 (January 2015), available at http://www.unhcr.org/54b685079.pdf. 16Data taken from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, ‘‘Syria Regional Refugee Response,’’ last updated May 31, 2015, at http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php. 17 ‘‘Syrian Refugees Struggle Amid Aid Cuts, Lack Labor Rights,’’ Associated Press, May 19, 

2015. 18 UNHCR, ‘‘Syria Regional Refugee Response: Jordan,’’ May 28, 2015, at http:// 

data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/country.php?id=107. 19 Elena Buryan, Analysis of Host Community-Refugee Tensions in Mafraq, Jordan, 

MercyCorps, October 2012. 

notably the Kilis camp in Turkey, have relatively high standards of living.12 But the 

quality of services is not standardized across all camps; and even in a well-run camp 

like Kilis, the refugees want nothing more than to leave.13 Many camps have seen 

overcrowding and major budget shortfalls, and some camps reportedly lack electricity.14 Malnutrition, poverty, and disease are endemic. 

But these camps represent the living situation for only 11 percent of refugees. 

Eighty-nine percent live in communities outside the camps, among the native population. Egypt and Lebanon, both of which have accepted a large number of refugees, 

do not even have official camps. The sudden influx of refugees has caused tensions 

with local populations, in part due to rising property costs, unemployment rates, 

and the overburdening of public institutions such as health care and education. Indeed, conditions outside of the camps are arguably worse for Syrian refugees than 

conditions within the camps. A recent report by UNHCR concerning the refugees in 

Jordan living outside of official camps (84% of the total for that country) found that 

nearly half were living in bad or uninhabitable conditions, two-thirds were living 

at or below the poverty line, and one-sixth lived in abject poverty.15 Refugees living 

outside of official camps lack many of the essential services that are at least partially provided inside the camps. This has caused even further substandard living 

conditions for Syrian refugees who resettle among the native population. 

Conditions for refugees, both inside and outside of official camps, are likely to 

worsen. Only 20 percent of the $4.5 billion funding request for UNHCR to sustain 

its 2015 operations assisting refugees has been fulfilled.16 Food aid has already been 

cut, as the Associated Press explains: 

‘‘The World Food Program reduced the number of Syrian refugees eligible for food 

vouchers from 1.9 million to 1.7 million in January to focus on the neediest. Since 

then, it has twice reduced benefits, most recently in May by a total of about 30 percent, and the neediest among more than 520,000 refugees living outside camps in 

Jordan now receive just $21 per person per month.’’17

The situation can be expected to further deteriorate. Lacking money and resources, UNHCR and host governments will not be able to sustain their current efforts without more assistance from the international community. 

The case of Jordan.—The impact of Jordanian refugees on Jordan demonstrates 

that the current crisis is not just humanitarian, but also has real strategic implications for the region—and for the United States as well. Jordan’s current population 

is approximately 8 million, of which about 628,160 are Syrian refugees.18 This 8.5 

percent increase in population attributable to the inflow of refugees from Syria has 

strained the country in multiple ways. 

Most Syrian refugees have settled in either Jordan’s urban centers or refugee 

camps, with about 80% going to urban areas. A statistical analysis my research 

team performed on Syrian refugees in Jordan suggests that 51.3 percent are in the 

northern region, while only 3.5 percent are in the south; and the distribution of Syrian refugees in Jordan is even more uneven on a governorate scale. The Mafraq 

governorate, which makes up most of Jordan’s border with Syria, has absorbed most 

of the refugees in the north, and 25% of all Syrian refugees in Jordan overall. Refugees now make up 35% of Mafraq’s population, with the two major destinations 

being the capital city of Mafraq and the Za’atari refugee camp. 

Syrian refugees in Jordanian cities, initially welcomed with a high degree of hospitality, are encountering rising tensions with the host community. A September 

2012 report showed that 80% of Jordanians in the city of Mafraq would prefer that 

the refugees leave the city to live in camps.19 The rising population produced by the 
20 

20 Ibid. 21Kimmelman, ‘‘Refugee Camp for Syrians in Jordan Evolves as a Do-It-Yourself City.’’ 22 Alice Speri, ‘‘ ‘We Don’t Have Any Hope to Go Back’: Syrian Refugees’ Lives Turn Permanent in Zaatari Camp,’’ Vice, May 9, 2014. 23 Ibid. 24 ‘‘Tapped Out: Water Scarcity and Refugee Pressures in Jordan,’’ Mercy Corps, March 2014. 25 Ibid. 26 Alaa Milbes, ‘‘Getting Water to Zaatari During Drought Season,’’ Oxfam Policy and Practice 

Blog, August 19, 2014, at www.policy-practice.oxfam.org.uk/blog/2014/08/getting-water-tozaatari-during-drought-season. 27Food and Agricultural Organisation, ‘‘Plan of Action: Jordan, 2014–2018,’’ January 2014, at 

www.fao.org/fileadmin/userlupload/rne/docs/Jordan-Plan.pdf. 28 Ibid. 29Karin Laub, ‘‘Syrian Refugees Struggle Amid Aid Cuts, Lack of Labor Rights,’’ Associated 

Press, May 19, 2015. 30Khalid Al Wazani, The Socio-Economic Implications of Syrian Refugees on Jordan: A CostBenefit Framework (Amman: Issnaad Consulting, 2014), available at www.kas.de/wf/doc/ 

kasl37808-1522-2-30.pdf?140522145513. 31 U.S. Commercial Service, U.S. Department of Commerce, ‘‘Jordan: Renewable Energy Market,’’ 2011, available at http://export.gov/jordan/static/Jordan%20Renewable%- 

20Energy%20MarketlLatestlegljol034925.doc. 32Wazani, The Socio-Economic Implications of Syrian Refugees on Jordan. 

inflow of refugees has caused, among other things, a drastic rise in housing prices.20

Many Jordanians also fear that Syrian refugees are competing for their jobs. 

Conditions in Jordanian refugee camps, especially the Za’atari camp—with 85,000 

residents—are comparatively well-suited for a long-term stay, and the camps have 

appeared more permanent over time. (This is not to say that the conditions can be 

considered good.) Za’atari has a significant black market economy, but also signs of 

normalcy that include barber shops, paved streets, electric poles, private toilets, private gardens, a pet store, a flower shop, and an ice cream parlor. In July 2014, 

3,500 businesses could be found in Za’atari.21 Another indicator of the camps’ potential permanence is rising levels of school attendance. One resident observed that 

most parents kept their children out of school initially, electing to wait and continue 

their education once they returned to Syria. Now, however, Za’atari residents send 

their children to school ‘‘because they don’t have any hope to go back.’’22 Jordan’s 

government has begun to acknowledge, at least implicitly, that Syrian refugees 

could be permanent in the country. UNHCR’s external relations officer noted that 

the new Azraq refugee camp is designed to function like a city instead of a temporary camp.23

This refugee population has placed significant demands on Jordan’s resources. 

The government of Jordan is currently able to satisfy the basic needs of the refugee 

community, but it may not be able to do so in the long run. Jordan is one of the 

most water-scarce countries in the world, and before refugees arrived the country’s 

groundwater resources were on track to be depleted as early as 2060.24 The government’s strategy to manage water use and increase sustainability did not account for 

the sudden addition of large numbers of Syrian refugees to the population. Water 

resources could now depleted years earlier than previously projected. 

The locations hardest hit by the refugee influx have seen average daily supply of 

water per person plummet to 30 liters, far below the 80 liters per day necessary 

to satisfy basic needs. At this level, ‘‘sanitation standards decline, diseases rise, subsistence crops wither, and children go thirsty.’’25 In Za’atari, refugees are allocated 

35 liters of water per day, compared to the 70 to 145 liters per person per day provided in pre-conflict Syria.26

The entry of hundreds of thousands of Syrian refugees has caused food prices to 

rise sharply, especially in the north. For example, in Mafraq governorate, food prices 

have increased by 27 percent.27 A study has found that more than 60 percent of Syrian refugees in the al-Ramtha, Beni Obaid, Irbid, and al-Badiya districts and the 

Jarash and Ajloun governorates do not have adequate access to food.28

Compounding this problem has been substantial cuts in food assistance to Syrian 

refugees, as the World Food Program reduced the number of Syrian refugees eligible 

for food aid in January 2015, and has further reduced benefits twice since then.29

Further, the electricity generation sector has been strained, which has been expensive for Jordan’s government due to its subsidization of energy.30 Compounding 

the problem, Jordan imports 96 percent of its oil and gas, so it is exposed to fluctuations in energy prices on the supply side, and to population changes and increased 

consumption on the demand side.31 Pressure on Jordan’s sanitation, education, and 

health systems is also increasing.32 Many schools are running two shifts at the expense of quality to accommodate Syrian refugee children, who are perceived to be 
21 

33 USAID, The Fiscal Impact of the Syrian Refugee Crisis on Jordan (January 2014), p. xi. 34 Ibid., p. 38. 35 United Nations Development Programme, Municipal Needs Assessment Report: Mitigating 

the Impact of the Syrian Refugee Crisis on Jordanian Vulnerable Host Communities (2014), p. 

11. 36 Yasser Abdih, Andrea Gamba, and Rafik Selma, Jordan: Selected Issues (Washington, DC: 

International Monetary Fund, April 2014), p. 5. 37Khaled Neimat, ‘‘Majority of Jordanians Call for End to Syrian Refugee Influx,’’ Jordan 

Times, April 15, 2013. 38 Rana Sweis, ‘‘No Syrians Are Allowed Into Jordan, Agencies Say,’’ New York Times, October 

8, 2014. 39 Human Rights Watch, ‘‘Jordan: Vulnerable Refugees Forcibly Returned to Syria,’’ November 

24, 2014, at http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/11/23/jordan-vulnerable-refugees-forcibly-returned-syria. 40Suleiman al-Khalidi, ‘‘Jordan Shuts Border Crossing with Syria after Fighting,’’ Reuters, 

April 1, 2015. 41Peter Cobus, ‘‘Where the Grave Isn’t Free: One Afghan Interpreter’s Trials of U.S. Resettlement,’’ Voice of America, April 22, 2015. 42 Emerson Brooking and Janine Davidson, ‘‘Why is a Comedian the Only One Talking About 

the Plight of Afghan Interpreters?,’’ Council on Foreign Relations, October 23, 2014, available 

at http://blogs.cfr.org/davidson/2014/10/23/why-is-a-comedian-the-only-one-talking-about-theplight-of-afghan-interpreters/. 

at a lower educational level than Jordanian children due to curriculum differences 

and their interruption in education. 

The influx of refugees also places significant strains on Jordan’s economy. A January 2014 USAID study estimated that the direct and indirect costs of managing the 

Syrian refugee population amounted to 2.4 percent of Jordan’s GDP.33 The study 

found that growing government expenditures on refugees caused a decline in Jordan’s ability to provide services and security to the general population.34 A separate 

study by the U.N. Development Programme found that the cost of hosting refugees 

in Jordan totaled $5.3 billion for 2013–2014, and most of these costs were covered 

by Jordan’s government.35 And refugee-related economic costs extend to several 

other sectors of Jordan’s economy. As previously noted, rental prices have increased 

as Syrian refugees drive up demand for rental units.36 The uptick in rental prices, 

along with other factors related to the refugee population, has contributed to a rise 

in inflation. Jordan’s informal economy has also expanded as Syrian refugees look 

for jobs in informal industries. 

All of this has fueled resentment among native Jordanians, who have consistently 

opposed opening their border to Syrian refugees. In a survey conducted in 2013, 71 

percent of Jordanians opposed allowing more Syrian refugees into the country, while 

58 percent said that the quality of service had declined in neighborhoods where Syrian refugees lived.37 Resentment and opposition to the refugee presence has only 

grown over time. 

Jordan has been forced to adapt its policies to deal with the growing number of 

Syrian refugees residing within its borders. Jordan initially welcomed Syrian refugees with what can be termed an ‘‘open-border policy’’ at the start of the conflict 

in 2011. But as the Syria crisis intensified and became more protracted, Jordan has 

adjusted its control over the Jordan-Syria border, its management of refugee camps, 

and its legal framework concerning Syrian refugees. In September and October of 

2014, for example, the border was closed to refugees, though the government’s official stance remained that it was open to women, children, and injured refugees.38

In November, Human Rights Watch found that Syrian refugees attempting to cross 

into Jordan were being forcibly returned.39 Jordan again closed its border with 

Syria at the beginning of April 2015 due to the nearby outbreak of violence.40 Jordan also began restricting the movement of Syrian refugees to urban areas by impeding their ability to exit camps and move around the country in 2014. 

For these reasons, the Syrian refugee crisis is not just a humanitarian concern, 

but a strategic concern for one of the key U.S. allies in the region. 

CONCERNS RELATED TO ACCEPTING MORE SYRIAN REFUGEES INTO THE UNITED STATES

The biggest concern related to the United States admitting greater numbers of 

Syrian refugees is that it has failed to meet its basic obligations to foreign nationals 

who assisted U.S. efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Only a fraction of the Afghans 

who served U.S. military efforts, including as interpreters or contractors, have been 

admitted into the United States.41 Emerson Brooking and Janine Davidson note 

that ‘‘when American servicemen rotate away,’’ their ‘‘translators remain—often becoming top-priority targets for reprisal attacks.’’42

The United States has a fundamental obligation to the men and women who 

worked with us in Iraq and Afghanistan, risking their lives and their families’ lives. 
22 

43 Rusty Bradley, ‘‘Heroes Left to Die,’’ War on the Rocks, April 23, 2014. 44 Justin Fishel and Mike Levine, ‘‘U.S. Officials Admit Concern over Syrian Refugee Effort,’’ 

ABC News, February 12, 2015. 45Lauren Gambino, ‘‘U.S. Steps up Syrian Refugee Admissions, But Why Are Some Still Excluded?,’’ Guardian (U.K.), March 11, 2015. 46 Anne Gearan, ‘‘U.S. to Greatly Expand Resettlement for Syrian Refugees,’’ Washington Post, 

September 30, 2014. 47Somini Sengupta, ‘‘U.N. Calls on Western Nations to Shelter Syrian Refugees,’’ New York 

Times, April 17, 2015. 48 Ibid. 49See ibid. (discussing how those on the list are among the most vulnerable); Gearan, ‘‘U.S. 

to Greatly Expand Resettlement’’ (discussing the inclusion of Syrians who have worked with 

Americans). 50The various steps of the refugee settlement process are outlined in U.S. Committee for Refugees and Immigrants, ‘‘Security Screening of Refugees Admitted to the United States: A Detailed, Rigorous Process,’’ n.d., available at www.rcusa.org/uploads/pdfs/ 

Refugee%20resettlement%20-%20step%20by%20step%20USCRI.pdf. 

The situation for refugees from Syria is tragic, and is important for many reasons. 

But as we focus on the current crisis, let us not forget those to whom we owe a 

direct debt: There are both moral and also pragmatic reasons that we should put 

them at the top of our migration priorities. Further, one concern policymakers have 

about admitting Syrian refugees is whether some militants might be in their midst, 

and the Afghans and Iraqis who helped the United States should present a lower 

vetting burden.43

Beyond the concern that the United States should ensure that Afghans and Iraqis 

who assisted U.S. efforts should not be left home to die, there are pragmatic concerns related to increasing our admission of Syrian refugees. The first one this testimony will discuss is terrorism and lawlessness concerns. 

Policies for screening refugees.—The United States has a set of layered policies in 

place for screening and admitting refugees. The system involves multiple checks 

across several agencies for medical and security concerns. Though this lessens the 

probability that malevolent actors will gain entrance into the United States, it fundamentally depends on the quality of U.S. intelligence about the Syrian refugee population. The biggest concern is a ‘‘clean skin,’’ an individual connected with a 

jihadist organization whose connections to the group are not known by American intelligence or law enforcement agencies. Indeed, U.S. officials have expressed concern 

that they might lack the assets to properly vet Syrian refugees for ties with militant 

groups prior to resettlement in the United States. As FBI assistant director Michael 

Steinbach said, ‘‘You have to have information to vet. Databases don’t [have] the 

information on those individuals, and that’s the concern.’’44

The White House has allotted up to 70,000 refugees for permanent resettlement 

in fiscal year 2015, with 33,000 places reserved for refugees from the Middle East 

and South Asia.45 Syrian refugees are now seen as of special humanitarian concern 

to the United States, as both UNHCR and the United States have determined that 

‘‘tens of thousands of refugees living outside Syria are unlikely to ever be able to 

return.’’46 The UN’s high commissioner on refugees, Antonio Guterres, has called on 

industrialized countries to admit 130,000 Syrian refugees in the next 2 years.47

Candidates for resettlement to the United States have been referred by UNHCR, 

and there are currently 11,000 refugees who will be screened by U.S. officials as the 

next step in the process.48 The UN’s refugee agency has said that those on the 

United States’ list include ‘‘the most vulnerable,’’ such as single mothers and their 

children, victims of torture, and people with medical needs; and they also include 

Syrians who have worked with Americans, thus making them vulnerable to persecution.49

To be admissible, a candidate must pass a series of security and medical checks. 

A Department of State Resettlement Service Center (RSC) compiles personal data 

and background information for the security check process 50 Some refugees go 

through an additional review, a Security Advisory Opinion, which is conducted by 

multiple law enforcement and intelligence agencies. While the methodology for additional review selection is not public, it is reasonable to assume that those who are 

flagged as potentially posing a more severe security threat are selected. Candidates 

for refugee status are also fingerprinted and interviewed in person by an officer 

from U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services. A medical screening is completed, 

mostly to check for infectious diseases such as tuberculosis. Finally, a second interagency security check is completed before the refugee’s departure to verify that all 

information remains correct, and that there are no relevant additions since the process began. Only after all these security and medical checks have been completed and 

analyzed can a refugee be admitted to the United States. 
23 

51 U.S. Department of State, ‘‘U.S. Refugee Admissions Program,’’ n.d., available at http:// 

www.state.gov/j/prm/ra/admissions/. 52 U.S. Department of State, ‘‘The Reception and Placement Program,’’ n.d., available at 

http://www.state.gov/j/prm/ra/receptionplacement/index.htm. 53 Ibid. 54 U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, Department of Homeland Security, ‘‘Refugees,’’ 

April 11, 2013, available at http://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/refugees-asylum/refugees. 55 Harald Doornbos and Jenan Moussa, ‘‘Italy Opens the Door to Disaster,’’ Foreign Policy, 

April 13, 2015. 56See discussion in Charlie Winter, Libya: The Strategic Gateway for the Islamic State (London: Quilliam Foundation, 2015). 57 Carrie Johnson, ‘‘Terrorism Case Exposes Gaps In Refugee Screening,’’ NPR, June 8, 2011. 58 James Gordon Meek, Cindy Galli, and Brian Ross, ‘‘Exclusive: U.S. May Have Let ‘Dozens’ 

of Terrorists into Country As Refugees,’’ ABC News, November 20, 2013. 59Peter Finn, Carol Leonnig, and Will Englund, ‘‘Tamerlan Tsarnaev and Dzhokhar Tsarnaev 

Were Refugees from Brutal Chechen Conflict,’’ Washington Post, April 19, 2013. 

The process of resettling to the United States as a refugee can take as few as 8 

weeks, but on average it takes 18 to 24 months.51 However, the Department of State 

can expedite the process if there is a need, including particular physical dangers to 

the refugees. 

After refugees are approved for resettlement, they receive U.S. Government support for moving and transitioning to life in the United States. Though refugees are 

not given the option to pick where they will live initially, if they have relatives in 

the United States, they will likely be resettled with or near them.52 Otherwise, domestic resettlement agencies match the resource capabilities of around 190 available 

communities to refugee needs in order to find the best match. Various State and 

Federal agencies, in conjunction with private organizations, are responsible for supporting refugees through the resettlement process. Refugees are met at the airport, 

taken to their new apartment, and given appliances, climate-appropriate clothing, 

food, and a one-time sum to help with initial expenses.53 Refugees can work immediately upon arrival in the United States. With proper documentation, trips outside 

the country permitted, but the refugees are not allowed to return to their country 

of persecution.54 One year after resettlement, refugees are required to apply for permanent residency, and after 5 years in the United States they can apply for citizenship. 

Security concerns.—There has been a great deal of concern related to the current 

influx of refugees into Europe, which is degrees of magnitude larger than the United 

States’ intake of refugees. Counterterrorism officials and even some refugees have 

warned that militant groups such as the Islamic State may seek to infiltrate Western Europe. One refugee in Germany warned about Italy’s lax security measures: 

‘‘Any ISIS terrorist could have entered Italy and traveled further into Europe without any problem. ISIS members can take their guns and hand grenades with them, 

because the Italians never even checked any of the luggage.’’55 Islamic State supporters have similarly alluded to their interest in using migrant outflows to gain 

entry into Europe.56 Though security concerns are lower for the United States, they 

should still be acknowledged. 

There are several cases of refugees who have been involved in terrorist activities 

in the United States, though the risks should not be exaggerated. In May 2011, 

Waad Alwan and Mohanad Hammadi, two Iraqi refugees who had been resettled 

in Kentucky, were arrested in a sting operation and charged with attempting to provide arms to al-Qaeda in Iraq (the group that would later become the Islamic State). 

In talks with an undercover informant, the men also discussed the possibility of carrying out attacks domestically. Both Alwan and Hammadi are believed to have been 

involved in the Sunni insurgency in Iraq before coming to the United States: 

Hammadi even boasted to an undercover operative involved in the sting operation 

that he had planted IEDs in Iraq, while Alwan told the same operative that he had 

killed U.S. soldiers with a sniper rifle.57 Both men were admitted into the United 

States despite having been detained in Iraq due to suspicions about their involvement in insurgent activities.58

Tamerlan and Dzokhar Tsarnaev, the brothers responsible for the Boston Marathon bombing, arrived in the United States after their parents received refugee status in 2002.59 Tamerlan was 15 and Dzokhar was 8 at the time. They would subsequently radicalize and carry out their notorious attack. 

Though distinct from the above instances due to the differences between the admission of refugees and asylum seekers, several jihadists involved in terrorist activities in the United States used asylum applications to remain in the country. Mir 

Aimal Kansi, who shot and killed 2 CIA employees and wounded 3 more in a January 1993 attack outside the agency’s Langley headquarters, entered the United 
24 

60Ted Conover, ‘‘The United States of Asylum,’’ New York Times, September 19, 1993. 61Daryl Fears, ‘‘Bill Shifts Burden to Asylum-Seekers,’’ Washington Post, May 1, 2005. Both 

Kansi and Yousef exploited an asylum process that, at the time, allowed any migrant who applied for asylum to receive a work permit while his claim was being investigated. Following 

Kansi’s attack, the United States eliminated asylum seekers’ ability to do so. 62Gotay Alpak et al, ‘‘Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder among Syrian Refugees in Turkey: A 

Cross-Sectional Study,’’ International Journal of Psychiatry in Clinical Practice 19(1), March 

2015, pp. 45–50. 63 Claudia Maria Vargas, ‘‘War Trauma in Refugees: Red Flags and Clinical Principles,’’ Visions: BC’s Mental Health and Addictions Journal 3(3), Winter 2007. 

States illegally but applied for asylum, and was later allowed to stay in the country 

under a general immigration amnesty. Omar Abdel Rahman applied for political 

asylum to delay his deportation.60 Similarly, Ramzi Yousef, a key leader of the 1993 

World Trade Center attack, ‘‘asked for asylum and was released pending a hearing,’’ 

and organized the attack while his asylum application was still pending.61

Post-traumatic stress and other vulnerabilities.—Syrian refugees have been particularly susceptible to post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) because of their exposure to warfare, detachment from their previous life, and the privations of refugee 

life. They have continued to face hardships even after escaping a war zone. According to recent academic study on Syrian refugees, up to a third of Syrian refugees 

suffer from PTSD.62 PTSD can serve as a major impediment to successful integration into society, including manifesting in adjustment issues, language barriers, unemployment, and feelings of isolation and exclusion. PTSD sufferers often experience severe anxiety, panic attacks, insomnia, and erratic behavior. These symptoms 

can reveal themselves through difficulty in completing daily tasks, difficulty in 

school, substance abuse, and suicidal thoughts.63 Beyond PTSD, refugees’ experiences with losing their home, family, friends, and livelihood can produce their own 

sets of problems. 

CONCLUSION

Thus, the Syrian refugee crisis presents a large number of challenges, both humanitarian and strategic. As I said at the outset, the United States should link its 

refugee policies to fulfilling our obligations to Iraqis and Afghans who assisted U.S. 

efforts in those countries. Fulfilling U.S. obligations to Iraqis and Afghans who assisted U.S. war efforts should be seen as of paramount importance for both moral 

and pragmatic reasons. 

As this testimony has demonstrated, there are a variety of considerations related 

to Syrian refugees, and while security considerations should not be overstated, they 

do exist. (Some of the specifics of the refugee population being considered for refugee 

status, such as the fact that it represents the most vulnerable members, may mitigate concerns about terrorism and radicalization.) In addition to considering options 

related to refugee resettlement, U.S. policy makers should look to crafting comprehensive policies that also address such matters as targeted investments to alleviate the economic hardship on countries with large refugee populations, measures 

such as improved education to enhance the quality of life for Syrian refugees, and 

appropriate law enforcement training for countries hosting these populations. 

Thank you again for inviting me to testify today. I look forward to answering your 

questions. 

Mr. KING. Thank you, Doctor. 

I would just add that to the extent that I am familiar with that 

issue, I fully agree with the last point you made, that we have not 

done enough for those who, especially in Afghanistan, the translators who are going to be left behind. They are at risk from the 

Taliban and others. I fully agree with that statement. 

You mentioned the importance of countries in the region, that we 

assist them with the, in fact, you mentioned, let me also ask the 

question to all three members of the panel, I have Jordan in mind 

in particular, how important it is that we do something to alleviate 

the pressure in Jordan. At the same time, we have these real risks 

to the United States. 

How much faith would any of the three of you have if we focused 

on the refugees in Jordan and relied for assistance on the Jordanian Government as far as vetting? It would seem to me we 
25 

would have a better chance of vetting those refugees who have 

been in the camps in Jordan than we would just taking other refugees. I mean it is still a risk. 

But do you believe it would serve a purpose to focus on refugees 

that are right now in Jordan and have gone through a certain vetting process from the Jordanians? 

Mr. GARTENSTEIN-ROSS. The Jordanians, obviously, have a strong 

intelligence service. But the danger that we are talking about here 

is a refugee who could be classified as a clean skin. That is, if they 

don’t have identifiable links to various terrorist organizations in 

the region. I think it is fair to assume, although I find that often 

when I assume things with the U.S. Government I really shouldn’t, 

but it is fair to assume that there is already liaisons going on with 

Jordanian intelligence. So that if someone is flagged as being connected to Nusra or connected to ISIS, that we can get that information from the Jordanians. 

So I think that to the extent that there is identifiable information, our layered screening procedure will pick that up. The problem is that we have a layered screening procedure which is not 

well-designed to pick up the clean skin. I think liaising with Jordanian intelligence doesn’t solve that problem. 

Mr. KING. Mr. Fuentes and Dr. Jones. 

Mr. FUENTES. I think I would agree with that. We have had a 

very outstanding relationship with the Jordanians. I know I 

worked closely with them back during the time of the beginning of 

the Iraq war onward. Their intelligence service is excellent. They 

were inundated during the Iraq war time by hundreds of thousands 

of Iraqi refugees that poured into Jordan. Now they have equal 

numbers of Syrians, if not more, pouring in. 

But the problem for the Jordanians is a similar problem for us, 

do they have access to intelligence on the ground to be able to vet 

people through Syria? Do they have enough of a relationship with 

Assad and is that enough for us to be able to rely on? I think one 

of the countries in the region that we have had a lot of success, 

surprisingly, has been Yemen. Even though we have removed many 

of the assets that we had in Yemen, we have been able to still rely 

on the outstanding work of the Saudi Arabians in Yemen. Because 

many of the Yemeni-Iraqi in the Arabian Peninsula members are 

Saudis. They were able to infiltrate that group from the beginning. 

They provide tremendous intelligence to the United States, to the 

British, to other services based on that. 

A good example of that would be the printer cartridge bombs 

that were mailed to the United States, destined for the United 

States and for Western Europe. They had the exact shipping document numbers of each box. That enabled the British services at the 

airport there to actually open the box and find 80 grams of PETN. 

They have had success but that is because we have a service on 

the ground there that has already penetrated many of the groups 

in that country. 

We don’t have a similar situation in Syria. That is the big problem right now. We don’t have any other reliable partner of ours 

that is already in that country in a position to supply us the information where if they were to get it, they would. But we don’t know 

if they can get it. 
26 

Mr. KING. Dr. Jones. 

Mr. JONES. Mr. Chairman, I think when you look at the refugee 

flows from Syria into the region, the highest numbers are in Turkey at about 1.7 million, in Lebanon, about 1.2 million, in Jordan, 

about 629,000, and then in Iraq, about 249,000 Syrian refugees. 

Out of those four countries, I would have notable concerns about 

the, what you are talking about in Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon 

which brings me to Jordan. 

The way I would answer your question is among those four major 

countries, Jordan has, I think, by far the best intelligence agency 

and the best handle on this problem for a range of reasons, including concerns about the destabilization of Jordan. So I would look 

at this as almost a layered defense. We took a chunk of the refugees from Jordan, I think they have got better access to intelligence 

on refugees. We would also rely on U.S. allies, the Brits, others 

that have intelligence, as well as U.S.-owned, SIGINT, human, and 

other collection. 

But I would say the one concern I would have is if people became 

aware we were primarily taking Syrian refugees from Jordan, there 

would be an incentive by groups to get their terrorists through Jordan at that point. So, you know, we might be careful in how we 

publicly discuss that. Thank you. 

Mr. KING. Actually my time has expired. But I would just say 

from listening to the testimony of each of you in answer to the 

question, there seems to be no real answer here. Because we do 

have some moral and diplomatic obligation to take some refugees 

in. But there is really not even close to a reasonable guarantee that 

we can vet any of them. 

Then you have the other issue raised by Dr. Gartenstein-Ross 

about those who come here and become radicalized. So it would 

seem no matter how we proceed on this, it just may be a question 

of trying to minimize the risk. But there is still going to be significant risk there no matter what procedures we follow there, more 

so than I would say refugees from other countries we have had to 

deal with in the past so. 

With that, I recognize the Ranking Member of the subcommittee, 

Mr. Higgins. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I apologize for being 

late. I was at a meeting on the Iran nuclear negotiations. 

Mr. KING. Were you meeting at the White House? Are you namedropping? 

Mr. HIGGINS. No, I didn’t say. I apologize. I will ask for unanimous consent to submit my opening statement for the record. 

Mr. KING. Yes. 

[The statement of Ranking Member Higgins follows:] 

STATEMENT OF RANKING MEMBER BRIAN HIGGINS

JUNE 24, 2015 

Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank you for holding this hearing to examine the 

homeland security threat posed by terrorist groups trying to exploit the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program in order to plan or execute terrorist attacks in the United 

States and abroad. Today, I know we will hear from those who believe this threat 

is significantly amplified by the influx of Syrian refugees who are expected to be 

admitted into the United States over the next few years. 
27 

While I acknowledge that there have been cases where terrorists, their associates, 

or foreign nationals have attempted to use the U.S. refugee process as a gateway 

to facilitate terrorist planning and attacks. However, I would offer that the attempted fraud associated U.S. Refugee program is no more or less than the attempted fraud that exists within other programs. To prevent exploitation, the refugee vetting process has been publicly characterized by a State Department official 

as ‘‘intensive, ‘‘ ‘‘slow,’’ and ‘‘rigorous.’’ 

Such a process exposes refugees to a great deal of scrutiny from U.S. law enforcement and intelligence agencies. Along with the systems and processes in place, the 

deliberateness of the process may inherently complicate the timing and ability of 

terrorists’ plans. Throughout our history, the United States has been a haven for 

refugees fleeing persecution and those who would play on our fears should not derail 

that proud legacy. 

The United States should commit to resettling more of the refugees identified by 

the U.N. Refugee Agency as needing resettlement. Under our current resettlement 

plans, the United States is projected to rescue less than 1% of the refugees from 

Syria. This will not relieve the burden on the other resettlement countries that are 

hosting millions of refugees and spending billions of dollars on their care. 

But it is a first step. I encourage us to find a balance. We must continue to carefully screen refugee applicants for all National security and terrorism concerns. I 

would urge both my Democratic and Republican colleagues to ensure that sufficient 

resources and staff are in place and available to ensure that the security vetting 

process is thorough without hindering resettlement for legitimate refugees. 

Prohibiting Syrian refugees from resettlement or lowering the already minimal 

number of refugees in the United States now, when there is no real evidence that 

they are a terror threat, would be to actively and explicitly discriminate against 

them. 

Again, I thank Chairman King for his leadership and focusing our oversight on 

this hearing. However, I would warn us against overstating fears and creating a 

level of suspicion on an already vulnerable population. 

With that, I yield back. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. The situation 

in Syria is, obviously, you know, placing extraordinary pressures on 

Western countries and the United States to accept more refugees 

from Syria than ever before. So today, you know, how many refugees, Syrian refugees has the United States taken in to date? I 

would ask each one of the members on the panel. 

Mr. GARTENSTEIN-ROSS. The number has been relatively low. I 

don’t have the exact figure on hand. I actually was reading about 

it this morning. But it is less than the tens of thousands range. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Okay. 

Mr. FUENTES. That is my understanding, a few thousand. But I 

don’t have the exact numbers. 

Mr. JONES. A few thousand again. But I don’t have the exact 

numbers on my fingertips. 

Mr. HIGGINS. The United Nations is saying that Syrian refugees, 

there is about 130,000, that over the next couple of years that will 

have to go to Western countries and the United States. But the 

concern, obviously, is the vetting process. That is challenged specifically by not having good intelligence on the ground. 

Dr. Jones, you had made reference to Jordan as having the best 

intelligence. Is that a viable option for the United States and other 

Western countries to have the vetting process done by Jordanians? 

Mr. JONES. I would say in order to protect and maximize U.S. 

National security, I would never rely on anyone else. I think what 

would make sense is a layered system. So the Jordanians have a 

pretty good vetting process. But I think the United States would 

have to rely on other allies and its own intelligence that it collects 

by itself. 
28 

Mr. HIGGINS. How many U.S. agencies are involved in the vetting process? 

Mr. JONES. Well, I think if you are talking about agencies that 

collect information and pass it, there are, obviously, large numbers 

in the U.S. Department of Defense, in the U.S. Department of Defense intelligence agencies, in the CIA, in the Department of Homeland Security, and FBI, so a fair number. 

Mr. HIGGINS. So one would argue that the current system in 

place is perhaps a lengthy process but a thorough process? 

Mr. JONES. Lengthy process. A thorough process, assuming 

names get into the system. 

Mr. HIGGINS. What is the obstacle to names getting into the system? 

Mr. JONES. Well, I think adequate intelligence that, that an individual who is a terrorist or has been facilitating terrorism in a 

country like Syria has been identified by whether it is the United 

States or an ally and provided that information. Not just that, but 

we have the names, the nom de guerres, the spellings of that individual. I mean those are the challenges. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Okay. I yield back. 

Mr. KING. The gentleman yields back. The gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Barletta. 

Mr. BARLETTA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. In a February hearing 

before the full House Homeland Security Committee, Assistant Director for the Counterterrorism Division at the FBI Michael 

Steinbach, commented on the intelligence community’s lack of information on the ground in Syria to adequately vet those seeking 

admission to the United States. He stated that you have to have 

information to vet. 

So the concern in Syria is that we don’t have systems in place 

on the ground to collect the information to vet. Mr. Jones and Mr. 

Fuentes, based on your experience, how would you assess the intelligence community’s ability to obtain the information, necessary to 

properly screen Syrian refugee applicants for admission? Dr. Jones, 

do you want to start? 

Mr. JONES. Sure. I am not in Government anymore, so I don’t 

have full access to what the United States has in place. But based 

on my broad understanding of what the United States had in place 

and has in place in other countries, including Iraq and Afghanistan 

where it has forces on the ground, that in Syria it has far fewer 

human collectors, far fewer signals intelligence and other capabilities. So, in that sense, it has much fewer, it has a much weaker 

ability to collect information that would be useful for the vetting 

process. 

Mr. BARLETTA. Mr. Fuentes. 

Mr. FUENTES. Mike Steinbach, the assistant director, worked for 

me 10 years ago as assistant legal attache ́ and then later legal 

attache ́ in Israel. He is a complete expert in what it takes to gather 

information from a reliable partner, share intelligence, have cooperation for the mutual security of both sides, the United States 

and for the country he is working in. 

So he knows exactly what the limitations are with Syria when 

you have no partner, there is no FBI office on the ground in Syria, 

we have no reliable partner there to gather information from them. 
29 

When I say reliable, again, these refugees are going to be basically, 

they are refugees because they are enemies of the state. So we 

can’t rely on that state to give us good information. Therefore, 

there is really no source of adequate information to put in any 

database. 

Mr. BARLETTA. Could ISIS and al-Qaeda operatives use our Nation’s refugee system to carry out another 9/11-style attack? Is the 

United States putting itself at risk by accepting refugees from a 

country where the Government admittedly has insufficient intelligence? Both again. 

Mr. JONES. It is possible. It has not generally been their practice 

to get recruits into the United States through refugee programs. 

Again, the probability is not zero. But they have generally moved 

towards trying to inspire people already in the United States 

through social media and other ways. It is certainly possible 

though. They have talked about doing this in Syria, Libya, and several other places. But it has not been their main focus. 

Mr. FUENTES. In the aftermath of 9/11, the United States, the 

measures that were taken by U.S. law enforcement, intelligence, 

DOD, other agencies of the Government, were very extensive and 

very successful. 

The strategy of al-Qaeda at that time was basically, we referred 

to it in the Bureau as the big bang theory. They wanted the giant, 

prolific attack that generated world-wide publicity, which 9/11 almost could not be equalled or topped. Other groups that we have 

seen over the years, Hezbollah, Hamas, and others, believed in a 

different philosophy, death by a thousand cuts. 

So they were willing to do a bombing at a bus station in Israel 

or at a discotheque or in a cafeteria, kill four or five people at a 

time, maybe 50 people on a bus. But they were happy with that 

because they were also killing people that were engaged in everyday life which meant the whole population thought wait a minute, 

I take a bus, I go to school, I go to a cafeteria and eat, that could 

be me. So that generated terror at a different level. Over the years, 

because we have tracked international financing, the fact that 

Osama bin Laden would not have been able to exert command and 

control like he did on the 9/11 attack, personally meeting and vetting each of the hijackers, approving the individuals submitted to 

him by Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, you can’t exercise that kind of 

control over an attack by courier or remote control where you are 

not in communication. 

Communication is essential to fight them. It is essential for them 

to carry out the attack. That is what was eliminated. So in this situation, you know, we have a situation where I don’t think any Syrian refugee through that process, not any Syrian but a Syrian refugee through this process is going to be able to come in and mastermind a 9/11. Can they come in and do the street corner attack, 

run over people, stab people, you know, the death by a thousand 

cuts, in some cases literally, yes. But any terrorist and any 

radicalized American, we are seeing that every day with arrests by 

the FBI for people willing to do so that type of attack and the difficulty in stopping that. 

Mr. BARLETTA. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
30 

Mr. KING. The gentleman yields back. The gentleman from 

Texas, Mr. Vela. 

Mr. VELA. Dr. Jones, obviously, the challenges of intelligence 

gathering in Syria are great. You started to talk about our relationship with Jordan and what they are doing on that end. I was wondering if you could elaborate on our relationship with Jordan. Also, 

after Jordan, what are the other countries that we should be looking at in terms of this kind of information sharing? 

Mr. JONES. So the U.S. relationship with Jordan has, obviously, 

been long-standing. There is, my understanding, a training going 

on with Jordan with rebels operating in Syria. So there is, there 

has been intelligence sharing between the United States and Jordan about individuals that are being trained to fight against the 

Assad regime or actually as the administration argues against the 

Islamic State in Syria. 

There have been concerns about weapons of mass destruction in 

Syria. So the Jordanians and the Americans have worked fairly 

closely on building the capability to go in and seize weapons of 

mass destruction if they were to be found, additional ones were to 

be found in Syria. So the relationship is fairly robust between the 

United States and Jordan. Where I would have concerns is some 

of the other countries in the region. 

Lebanon has got a fairly weak government, has historically had 

one. Hezbollah contains to play an important role in the political 

system in Lebanon. Probably not as good of a way to vet through 

Lebanon. Iraq, I have little faith that the Iraqi Government will be 

helpful in vetting. It has had a hard time controlling its own territory from ISIS. 

Then Turkey, Turkey is a NATO country. It certainly has an 

ability to monitor but Turkey has had a very difficult time managing the foreign fighter route through its own country. So Turkey’s ability is circumspect to some degree. It is the predominant 

pipeline, if you need to get to Syria, to get there, you go through 

Turkey. So, again, I have concerns about Turkey’s ability, though 

it is a NATO country, to keep a close eye on that. 

Mr. VELA. So from the Syrian refugee standpoint, are those four 

countries basically the first stop? 

Mr. JONES. Yes. They are the largest, as far as I am aware, they 

are the largest locations for Syrian refugees, yes. 

Mr. VELA. Now, is there anything else you think we need to do 

in terms of enhancing our relationship with Jordan? 

Mr. JONES. In addition to continuing to provide intelligence sharing between the United States and Jordan, nothing off the top of 

my head, no. 

I think the biggest challenge the United States is going to have 

is probably in Turkey, in Lebanon, and then in Iraq where its fidelity on the intelligence is just weaker. 

Mr. VELA. I guess this is a question for both you and Mr. 

Fuentes. From the standpoint of intelligence gathering overall in 

Syria, what else do you think we can do? I mean, is it a resource 

issue or—— 

Mr. FUENTES. I think with Syria, it is not a resource issue. We 

have to have a stable government there. We have to have, I think 

we are not going be able to do this until we have the aftermath 
31 

of whatever is happening now and some government is in control 

of that whole country and, hopefully, becomes a partner of the 

United States. 

Now, we could have what we have in Libya where you just have 

chaos and a failed state. That could occur. Or we could have dual 

states there of the Assad regime controlling maybe Damascus and 

part of the country, and ISIS or other groups, al-Nusra, the other 

part of the country. So it is going to be difficult for us to have a 

working partner there at any level and a partner that we can trust 

their information if they give it to us. 

When you asked about Amman, I mean, about Jordan, the 

United States has had a tremendous relationship all through, you 

know, before the Iraq war, during the Iraq war, they served as basically a base for us to go from, as did Kuwait at that time. But 

also the Jordanians for us built a giant police academy just outside 

of Amman so that Iraqi police officers could be vetted by U.S. agencies, brought to that location by the thousands, and trained and 

then returned back to Iraq. 

You have noticed, we haven’t had the issue in Iraq over the years 

of police officers and Iraqis killing Americans like we later faced in 

Afghanistan on several occasions. So that program was successful. 

Also when the process of, as I mentioned, I opened the FBI’s office, 

the formal attache ́ office in Baghdad in 2004. At that time, it was 

decided that that embassy was going to be either the largest or second-largest embassy in the U.S. system. The largest being Cairo, 

Egypt. 

So they were expecting about 1,000 people to be employed in the 

service of that embassy. Jordan volunteered that the United States 

could have a second partial embassy of Baghdad based in Amman 

where it would be safer and, therefore, not need 1,000 people in 

Baghdad to service the Iraqi-Baghdad legal—I mean Embassy at 

the time. So they have been tremendously helpful. Their partnership has been strong. The cross-training that has gone on between 

their personnel and American personnel has been outstanding. 

So I don’t know that we could increase, you know, it is hard to 

be a stronger partner with them. We have certain partners like 

that in the world that you wonder how you could be closer, whether 

it is Israel or whether it is the British or the Australians. But, you 

know, the situation is what are they able to get from Syria, can 

they do any better than we can? I think at the moment, it is questionable that they can. 

Mr. VELA. Thank you. I yield back. 

Mr. KING. The gentleman yields back. 

I would just add I don’t know of any closer ally we have in the 

world than Jordan, I mean, at every level of cooperation of Jordan 

is first class, of Jordanians is first class. 

I received five statements for the record from non-profit groups 

that work with refugees. I ask unanimous consent that they be included in the record. Without objection. 

[The information follows:] 
32 

STATEMENT OF HIAS 

JUNE 24, 2015 

Throughout our history, America has been defined by our generosity toward those 

who seek a safe haven from oppression. An asylum system that is fair, effective, and 

humane honors both our country’s history and reflects the deeply-held American 

and Jewish tradition of offering a chance at a new beginning to those who seek safety and freedom. Once given that opportunity, refugees and asylees become active 

and productive members of American communities. 

In the aftermath of World War II, when the price for keeping doors closed to refugees was made starkly clear, the international community adopted the 1951 United 

Nations Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, which to this day defines 

who is a refugee and what legal protection a refugee is entitled to receive and is 

the basis for the U.S. refugee and asylum law. 

The Immigration and Nationality Act provides a way for those fleeing persecution 

to seek refuge while preventing those who pose a threat or danger to the United 

States from entering. The law established mechanisms to screen for potential 

threats. The procedure for screening out applicants for refugee status that may pose 

a threat to the United States has only become more rigorous since September 11. 

Today the refugee program has the most thorough security screenings of any form 

of immigration relief. 

Refugee applicants undergo multiple security screenings at almost every step of 

the process of resettlement to the United States. The Department of State and the 

Department of Homeland Security share in the responsibility of screening refugee 

applicants. An applicant’s biographic information and biometric information are vetted against multiple law enforcement and intelligence databases including the State 

Department’s Consular Lookout and Support System (CLASS), which includes the 

Government’s terrorist watch list information, the Federal Bureau of Investigation 

(FBI) Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS), and DHS’s 

Automated Biometric Identification System (IDENT). This is in addition to the inperson interview conducted by DHS staff to ascertain the validity of the claim for 

refugee status. 

HIAS believes that National security and assistance to refugees from Syria are 

not incompatible. Syrian refugees are subject to the rigorous security screening processes in place. Many of those seeking asylum are victims of terrorism and are trying 

to find safety from extremism. The U.S. refugee program can offer them that safety 

and still protect the United States from possible threats. 

There are some Syrian refugees who will never be able to return home or live 

safely a country of first asylum. The United States can help the countries of first 

asylum that have shouldered the responsibility for so many Syrians fleeing the crisis by providing assistance and resettling some of the most vulnerable refugees who 

are unable to live in these countries in safety. By doing so, the United States will 

proudly honor its tradition of providing safe haven for refugees and ensure that the 

most vulnerable can rebuild their shattered lives free of fear. 

STATEMENT OF SYRIAN COMMUNITY NETWORK (CHICAGO, IL), SYRIAN AMERICAN

MEDICAL SOCIETY, KARAM FOUNDATION, SYRIA RELIEF AND DEVELOPMENT, SYRIAN

EXPATRIATES ORGANIZATION, WATAN USA, RAHMA RELIEF FOUNDATION, HOPE FOR

SYRIA

JUNE 24, 2015 

Dear Chairman Peter King, Ranking Member Brian Higgins, and Members of the 

Subcommittee: We write to you as a group of non-political Syrian American-led humanitarian organizations that provide multi-sector relief inside of Syria, to refugees 

and host countries in the region, and to Syrian refugees in the United States. Our 

efforts together help millions of Syrians, both those who remain in Syria and those 

displaced as refugees. Our programs cover the full range of humanitarian sectors, 

including community services, education, food and non-food items, health, protection, water/sanitation/hygiene, and women’s empowerment. In addition to emergency relief, our organizations have established development projects that promote 

sustainable living and lay the groundwork for voluntary refugee return, such as 

building schools, facilitating jobs and skills training, and helping to establish bakeries and flour mills. Together, we support over 100 health facilities and almost 

1,000 medical staff inside of Syria who operate under the principle of medical neutrality and risk their lives to save others. Our organizations prioritize education, 

psychosocial support, and community healing. We’ve been fortunate to have leading 
33 

Congressional officials visit our field programs to see their impact on Syrian refugees, and we’ve had the opportunity to advocate for humanitarian support for Syria 

and Syrian refugees at the highest levels of U.S. Government, from President 

Obama to Secretary Jeh Johnson to leaders of the House and Senate. 

We further represent a constituency of Syrian Americans, humanitarian allies, 

and local volunteers throughout the United States, from Texas to New York. As the 

crisis has become increasingly protracted, our organizations have begun to work 

with local resettled Syrian refugees in the United States, coordinating with volunteers, refugee agencies, and civic and religious organizations to ensure that Syrian 

refugees are welcomed and assisted in their transition. Our built-in networks of Syrian American and partner communities have been invaluable in these transitions. 

We are humbled to submit this statement to the House Homeland Security Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence on admitting Syrian refugees. As 

you know, the United Nations estimates that about 4 million people have fled Syria 

and 7.6 million others are internally displaced. Over 230,000 Syrians have been 

killed since 2011. As Mr. Anto ́nio Guterres, the United Nations High Commissioner 

for Refugees, said recently: ‘‘The Syrian war unleashed the worst humanitarian crisis of our time.’’ 

The enormous flow of refugees has created a strain on host countries in the region, which are forced to deal with extreme economic pressures, overcrowded hospitals, shortages of basic public services, and growing resentment among host communities. The regional dynamics of Lebanon, Jordan, and Turkey, which have taken 

on the majority of the refugee burden, have been altered over the last few years. 

The conflict in Syria has led to a regional crisis, and the sheer numbers of refugees 

and lack of support for host communities threaten the stability of these countries. 

However, as Anne Richard, the Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of Population, 

Refugees, and Migration at the Department of State, said: ‘‘... These very real 

burdens must pale in comparison to the daily struggles of Syrians themselves. Imagine losing practically everything—your loved ones, your home, your profession, and 

your dignity.’’ 

We commend the United States Government for taking a leadership role to stand 

for these vulnerable refugees and to offer them a glimpse of hope. Throughout history, the United States has always taken a leadership role in assisting vulnerable 

refugees. The United States has accepted the majority of all UNHCR referrals from 

around the world. In 2013, United States reached its goal of resettling nearly 70,000 

refugees from nearly 70 countries. Now, the United States has put forth invaluable 

efforts to resettle vulnerable Syrian refugees. 

We have worked closely with our partners at the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program, coordinated by the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration at the Department of State and the Department of Homeland Security, along the way. We 

commend their meticulous and exemplary work. All Syrian refugee profiles being actively considered for resettlement are reviewed thoroughly by the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program with support and leadership from the White House and security 

vetting agencies. These Syrians go through extensive security background checks. 

The majority of Syrian refugees being considered for resettlement are among the 

most vulnerable populations of women and children seeking to flee the effects of 

conflict. With assistance from the International Organization for Migration, they are 

provided with medical exams and logistics for transportation before coming to the 

United States. 

Once Syrian refugees arrive, our groups work alongside a network of resettlement 

agencies, non-profits, churches and mosques, civic organizations, and local volunteers to welcome them. These U.S. groups work in 180 communities across the country to ensure refugees have access to work, education, opportunities to improve their 

English, and what they and their families need to be comfortable and have a happy 

and healthy future. 

The Syrian Community Network is a prime example of a volunteer-led organization working closely with resettled Syrian families to ease their transition, focusing 

particularly on the Chicago area. The Syrian Community Network works with 10 

families that have been resettled through various agencies. One family in particular 

stands out as an upcoming success story. Resettled in Chicago in January 2015, 

Mayada is a single mother with 6 children ranging between the ages of 4 and 19. 

Her two oldest children, Zeyd and Zeynab, hold steady jobs and help to pay rent, 

all while they attend ESL classes at the local community college. The four younger 

children—Wedad, Zakaria, Shahed, and Shaima—have been performing remarkably 

in school, exceeding expectations. They all dream of graduating college and becoming doctors, teachers, computer engineers, and so much more. The youngest daughter, Shaima, decided that she wants to be a photojournalist after a Chicago journalist interviewed her. Just recently, Wedad, who will be in ninth grade in the fall, 
34 

was accepted into the ‘‘GirlForward’’ summer program designed for bright adolescent refugee girls in the city of Chicago. Syrians are known to have an entrepreneurial spirit and, given the opportunity, Syrian refugees will become the next 

American success story. 

We strongly urge the Homeland Security Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and 

Intelligence to support their counterparts at the Department of State and Department of Homeland Security as they work to further increase resettlement numbers 

for vulnerable Syrian refugees in 2015 and beyond. The families and individuals 

being considered for resettlement face dire protection challenges and often need specialized care. Among those being considered are victims of torture, women at risk, 

persons with disabilities, LGBTQ persons facing risk, women-headed households, 

and those facing acute security threats. To prohibit Syrian refugees from the option 

of U.S. resettlement because of the presence of ISIL and other extremist groups in 

Syria, and not based on thorough U.S.-led security checks and humanitarian needs 

assessments, discounts the commendable work of the Department of Homeland Security and Department of State and amounts to blatant discrimination based on nationality. The Homeland Security Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence should work to further ensure sufficient staffing and capacity for security 

vetting agencies to increase their ability to conduct thorough and quick security 

checks. 

Our organizations function as implementing partners for many of the major 

INGOs and U.N. agencies in Syria and coordinate with the U.S. agencies taking the 

lead refugee resettlement here at home. Our talented staff and volunteers have been 

the backbone of crisis relief for Syria and have a comprehensive understanding of 

the changing situation on the ground. From seeing the trends of displacement in 

Syria and the region first-hand, we think that it is essential for the United States 

to take a leading role in Syrian refugee resettlement for the protection of Syria’s 

vulnerable refugees, for the stability and security of the region, and for the relevance of the United States as a humanitarian and global leader. We strongly encourage the Homeland Security Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence 

to work with relevant U.S. departments and the administration to ensure that vulnerable Syrian refugees continue to have the hope of resettlement and a brighter 

future. 

STATEMENT OF MIRNA BARQ, PRESIDENT, SYRIAN AMERICAN COUNCIL

MAY 21, 2015 

Chairman King, Ranking Member Higgins, and Members of the subcommittee: 

The Syrian American Council is the largest and oldest Syrian American community 

organization in the United States. Founded in 2005 in Burr Ridge, Illinois, SAC is 

a multi-ethnic, multi-confessional, non-partisan organization that incorporates all 

segments of the Syrian American community. Our activities include community organizing, youth empowerment, media outreach, advocacy, and support for pro-democracy activists in Syria. SAC has 23 local chapters Nation-wide. 

SAC is honored to submit this statement for the record to the Subcommittee on 

Counterterrorism and Intelligence. Significant communities of Syrian Americans 

exist in many areas of the United States, including New York, Texas, Iowa, Florida, 

Ohio, Pennsylvania, Michigan, and Ohio. Their income levels are above the median 

for American citizens and many of them provide jobs and livelihoods for other Americans in their locale. Older community members have found in America a democratic 

haven from political persecution, while our youth have grown up here and consider 

American culture their own. 

As a young Christian growing up in Damascus, I personally was blessed to have 

experienced the wonders and beauty of the holiday season in my beloved Syria. The 

memories of festivities throughout the Damascus old city, the carolers, the beautifully lit Christmas trees, the nativity mangers, and the churches filled with celebrants will stay with me forever. Each year, I take the time to describe my experience to friends and family in my hometown of Orlando, Florida so they will understand the inherent tolerance and diversity of the Syrian people. That inherent tolerance and diversity is now under attack. 

The Syrian American community shares your dismay at the rise of the so-called 

Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and at the urgent home-grown terror threat 

that has resulted from this rise. We are also painfully aware that ISIS has exploited 

the crisis in Syria to turn our ancestral homeland into a locus for recruitment. ISIS 

has severely impeded our ability to get help to ordinary Syrians in need. At times, 
35 

Syrian Americans have been forced into hasty exits from their humanitarian work 

inside Syria after finding out that ISIS had marked them for death. 

We consider ISIS our enemies, and as such, we are keen to help Congress and 

the U.S. Government as they work to stop these extremists. SAC has already 

partnered with the Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties at the Department of 

Homeland Security to organize community briefings for Syrian Americans. In addition, staff members of the SAC have briefed senior White House officials on ISIS 

activities inside Syria. We encourage a robust Congressional debate on how ISIS can 

be stopped both at home and abroad. 

Along these lines, it is important to note that Syrian immigrants to the United 

States are in no way the leading demographic of foreign fighters joining ISIS. Out 

of over 150 U.S. nationals who have successfully joined or attempted to join ISIS 

in Syria and Iraq, we know of only one potential case involving a Syrian American 

(who is not charged with having joined ISIS). By contrast, many U.S.-born citizens 

have joined ISIS, including citizens with no ancestry from majority-Muslim countries. Clearly, barring vulnerable Syrian refugees from entering America will not address this vast majority of cases. 

America is a Nation of immigrants and always has been. Each year, the United 

States admits some 70,000 refugees as new citizens, and the Syrian refugee crisis 

is far and away the worst refugee crisis in the world today. United Nations High 

Commissioner for Refugees Antonio Guterres has referred to the Syrian refugee crisis as ‘‘the worst humanitarian disaster since the end of the Cold War.’’ Furthermore, the majority of Syrian refugees up for resettlement are not fighting-age males, 

but innocent women and children seeking to flee the vicious conflict. They live in 

horrible conditions, and every winter, multiple child refugees die for lack of heating 

and winter clothing. Many refugees even have family members or close friends and 

associates within the Syrian American community who are ready to care for them. 

To bar Syrian refugees from resettlement in the United States now, when their 

need is so great and when there is no real evidence that they are a terror threat, 

would be to actively and explicitly discriminate against them—against us—simply 

for being Syrian. We as Syrian Americans encourage our Congress Members to support the fight against ISIS and defend our country against home-grown terrorism 

without contributing to the demonization of the entire Syrian community. 

Founded in 2005 in Burr Ridge, Illinois, the Syrian American Council is the largest Syrian-American community organization in the United States. It serves to amplify the voice of the Syrian-American Community. SAC is a multi-ethnic, multi-confessional, non-partisan organization that includes members from all segments of Syrian society, and has over 23 chapters Nation-wide. It is an organization devoted to 

community organizing, awareness-raising, youth empowerment, media outreach, advocacy, and support for Syrians seeking to build a free and democratic Syria. 

STATEMENT OF LUTHERAN IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE SERVICE

JUNE 24, 2015 

Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Service (LIRS) appreciates the opportunity to 

submit its views on the United States Refugee Admissions Program as it pertains 

to Syrian refugees. As the national organization founded by Lutherans to serve uprooted people, LIRS is committed to helping those who have been forced to flee their 

homes find protection. Following God’s call in scripture to uphold justice for the sojourner, LIRS serves as a leader in calling for the protection of vulnerable migrants 

and refugees, including children and families from Syria. 

For over 75 years, LIRS has worked to welcome over 400,000 refugees to the 

United States on behalf of the Evangelical Lutheran Church in America, the Lutheran Church—Missouri Synod and the Latvian Evangelical Lutheran Church in 

America. In fiscal year 2014, LIRS and its Refugee Resettlement affiliates welcomed 

over 11,000 refugees to their new communities and empowered them to build new 

lives. 

Resettlement in a third country is considered a durable solution and a last resort 

for only a small fraction of the world’s most vulnerable refugees. LIRS is proud to 

be one of nine agencies that partners with the Federal Government, particularly the 

Department of State’s Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM) and 

the Department of Health and Human Services’ Office of Refugee Resettlement 

(ORR) to be a part of this solution. LIRS is dismayed that despite the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) registering over 4 million Syrian 

refugees, half of whom are children, only a precious few Syrian refugees have been 

resettled in the United States. 
36 

The United States Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP) located within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services 

(USCIS) agency continually achieves its dual mission to offer resettlement opportunities to eligible refugees while safeguarding the integrity of the program and the 

United States National security. To protect U.S. National security, DHS provides 

advanced training to its refugee adjudicators on security protocols, fraud detention, 

and fraud prevention. In addition, each refugee considered for resettlement in the 

United States goes through a multi-layered screening process before coming to the 

United States. These processes include multiple biographic and biometric checks by 

U.S. security vetting agencies which are routinely updated, in-person interviews 

with trained adjudication’s officers and ‘‘pre-departure’’ checks. No case is finally approved until results from all security checks have been received and analyzed. 

To add unnecessary security screening mechanisms to this already robust process 

would needlessly harm individuals who need protection by delaying their resettlement. ‘‘Sadly, the Syrian refugee population includes severely vulnerable individuals: Women and girls at risk, survivors of torture and violence, and persons with 

serious medical needs or disabilities,’’ said Linda Hartke, LIRS president and CEO. 

‘‘LIRS and our national network stand ready to do what it takes to welcome into 

U.S. communities the most vulnerable Syrian refugees who cannot return home or 

integrate in the countries currently hosting them.’’ 

The U.S. Refugee Admissions Program offers refugees safe haven and a chance 

at a new life, while also bringing tangible benefits to the communities that welcome 

them. Having endured incredible hardship and unimaginable horrors in their home 

countries, refugees often spend years exiled in host countries once they flee, awaiting the opportunity to rebuild their lives. In the case of Syrian refugees, host countries in the region are increasingly strained and unable to offer benefits or stability. 

Once they are resettled in a third country, refugees routinely become engaged and 

productive community members, contributing economically, socially, and spiritually 

to our communities. The support of welcoming communities, congregations, volunteers, employers, schools, foster families, and others makes resettlement a successful public-private partnership. The Federal Government, particularly PRM and 

ORR, and State governments play a vital role. 

The conflict in Syria only continues to worsen. As mentioned, UNHCR has registered over 4 million refugees, half of whom are children, who have been forced to 

flee to neighboring countries. It is LIRS’s position that the United States should 

commit to resettling a higher number of vulnerable Syrian refugees. However, to 

achieve this goal, more focus and resources must be committed to the admission 

process as well as the resettlement and integration of newly-arriving refugees. 

INCREASED FUNDING NEEDS AND NECESSARY RESETTLEMENT REFORMS

Resources available to refugee families and adults through ORR have remained 

stagnant for many years. To ensure that Syrian refugees resettled in the United 

States would receive the help they need to locate housing, receive medical attention 

and employment assistance, among other services, and to promote self-sufficiency 

and long-term integration this funding must be increased. While private support 

plays an important role in the reception and integration of refugees, Federal resources are critical to ensure refugees receive essential services. Refugee populations 

arriving to the United States have changed significantly since the formal establishment of the resettlement program in the Refugee Act of 1980. Today’s refugee population is much more diverse and vulnerable than it was more than three decades 

ago. However, services lack flexibility to be responsive to the diverse strengths and 

needs of refugees arriving today. Furthermore, ORR’s mandate has expanded over 

the years from serving resettled refugees to include asylees, Iraqi and Afghan Special Immigrant Visa recipients, Cuban and Haitian entrants, survivors of human 

trafficking and torture and unaccompanied children. Because funding has not kept 

up with these changes in ORR’s mandate and diversifying client needs, ORR has 

strained to provide sufficient support and services to all of the populations under 

its care. 

REFORMS TO TERRORISM-RELATED INADMISSIBILITY GROUNDS

Under immigration law, an individual cannot be admitted to the United States 

if they have provided material support, including insignificant material support, to 

an undesignated terrorist organization; a member of such an organization; or to an 

individual the individual knows, or reasonably should know, has committed or plans 

to commit a terrorist activity. In 2001, Congress enacted legislation that significantly broadened the definition of ‘‘terrorist activity.’’ 
37 

As a result, refugees, including many vulnerable Syrian refugees, who pose no 

threat to National security face denial of protection and resettlement in the United 

States due to unintended consequences of the overly-broad application of the ‘‘material support to terrorist organizations’’ bar (and related bars) to admission. Indeed, 

current law threatens to exclude any Syrians who fought with any armed opposition 

group in Syria (regardless of whether or not the individual applicant was involved 

in any violations of international humanitarian law or other crimes), anyone who 

provided ‘‘material support’’ to any opposition force or opposition fighter, anyone 

who solicited funds or members for such a force, and even anyone whose spouse or 

parent is found to have done these things. 

These bars are duplicative and carry severe consequences. As mentioned previously, refugees are required to pass intense security screenings and background 

checks as part of the admission process. People who commit war crimes, crimes 

against humanity, or who persecute others are inadmissible to the United States 

under other provisions of our immigration laws. However, overly broad ‘‘terrorism’’ 

bars prevent the ability of the United States to provide welcome to bona fide refugees seeking safety. 

LIRS RECOMMENDATIONS

LIRS’s expertise, experience, and compassion—drawn from decades of welcoming 

vulnerable newcomers—inspires our advocacy. To address current resettlement 

needs facing refugees, including millions of Syrian refugees, and improve welcome 

for refugees in the United States, LIRS makes the following recommendations to 

Congress: • Ensure robust funding of the Department of State’s Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration and the Department of Health and Human Services’ Office 

of Refugee Resettlement to better protect and assist refugees overseas and those 

resettled to the United States. • Enact pending legislation to strengthen refugee protections and resettlement, 

including the bi-partisan Protecting Religious Minorities Persecuted by ISIS Act 

of 2015 (H.R. 1568). • Amend problematic anti-terrorism provisions that define ‘‘material support’’ too 

broadly. • Increase the Presidential Determination from 70,000 refugees in fiscal year 

2015 to 100,000 refugees in fiscal year 2016 to allow resettlement of Syrian refugees in addition to on-going resettlement of other refugees from around the 

world. 

If you have any questions about this statement, please contact Brittney Nystrom, 

LIRS Director for Advocacy. 

STATEMENT OF CWS, CHURCH WORLD SERVICE

JUNE 24, 2015 

Church World Service, a 69-year-old humanitarian organization representing 37 

Christian denominations, works to assist refugees through protection internationally 

and by providing resettlement services to help refugees adjust to their new lives and 

integrate in the United States. 

The U.S. Refugee Admissions Program is a life-saving, public-private partnership 

that helps rescue refugees who have no other means of finding safety. To be considered a refugee, individuals must prove that they have fled persecution due to their 

nationality, ethnicity, religion, political opinion, or membership in a particular social 

group. Refugees face three options: Return to their home country, integrate in the 

country to which they first fled, or be resettled to a third country. For the millions 

who are unable to return home due to significant threats to their safety and are 

rejected by the country to which they first fled, resettlement is the last resort. While 

less than 1 percent of the world’s estimated 15 million refugees are resettled to a 

third country, resettlement saves lives and also helps encourage other countries to 

provide durable solutions for refugees within their borders, including local integration. The United States has a long history of providing protection to persons fleeing 

persecution, and U.S. communities, schools, congregations, and employers welcome 

refugees and help them integrate in their new homes. In turn, refugees contribute 

to their new communities with their innovative skills, dedicated work, and inspiring 

perseverance. 

Currently, Syria is experiencing the worst humanitarian crisis the world has seen 

in 20 years, with approximately 4 million refugees who have fled the country and 

7.6 million internally displaced. Roughly three-quarters of those displaced are 
38 

women and children. Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey, Iraq, and Egypt currently host more 

than 3.9 million registered Syrian refugees and thousands more who are not registered. Specifically, religious minorities living in ISIS-held territories, including 

Christians, Yezidids, Shabaks, Turkoman Shiites, Coptic Christians, Druze, 

Mandeans and Assyrians have fled in the thousands. While this crisis is complex 

and requires a variety of solutions, refugee resettlement plays a strategic role in alleviating pressure on host countries in the region, galvanizing international awareness of the human costs of the crisis, and providing durable solutions and opportunities for a new life for vulnerable populations fleeing persecution. Many European 

countries have welcomed Syrians through resettlement and humanitarian admissions schemes, including Germany pledging to accept 30,000; Sweden to resettle 

2,700 and with more than 9,000 asylum applications pending; and Norway, France, 

Austria, Finland, and other countries working to provide protection and resettlement to Syrian refugees. While traditionally a world leader in refugee resettlement, 

the United States has resettled only a small numbers of Syrian refugees. 

The refugee resettlement program is the most difficult way to enter the United 

States, routinely taking individuals referred to the program longer than 1,000 days 

to be processed. Security measures are intrinsic to the integrity of the refugee program, and over the years, the U.S. Government has continuously fine-tuned the system to maximize domestic security. All refugees undergo thorough and rigorous security screenings prior to arriving to the United States, including but not limited 

to multiple biographic and identity investigations; FBI biometric checks of applicants’ fingerprints and photographs; in-depth, in-person interviews by well-trained 

Department of Homeland Security officers; medical screenings; and other checks by 

U.S. domestic and international intelligence agencies, including additional biographical screening by the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) since August 

2011. www.rcusa.org/uploads/pdfs/HowlRefugeeslGetltolthelUSlChart.pdf. 

In addition, mandatory supervisory review of all decisions; random case assignment; 

inter-agency National security teams; trained document experts; forensic testing of 

documents; and interpreter monitoring are important checks in place to maintain 

the security of the refugee resettlement program. 

CWS urges the United States to welcome refugees and asylum seekers impacted 

by the Syrian conflict and ensure access to resettlement by the most vulnerable Syrian refugees, with special attention to women and girls, children in adversity, and 

other highly vulnerable populations. CWS stands committed to working with both 

chambers of Congress and the administration to resettle Syrian refugees as part of 

our foreign policy interests and humanitarian responsibilities. We urge all Members 

of Congress to support these efforts to provide safety to vulnerable refugees from 

Syria and beyond. 

Mr. KING. Now, the gentleman from New York, Mr. Katko. 

Mr. KATKO. Thank you. I want to echo the sentiments of the 

Chairman that there is a moral imperative to try and do something 

to help these refugees. There is no question about that. I had the 

good fortune with the task force that I am part of to go to the Middle East and see first-hand the gravity of the situation in Baghdad 

and flying over Jordan and seeing the camps and in Turkey, as 

well as in many other places. 

So, yeah, we do have a moral imperative; but we also have a 

duty as leaders of this great Nation to protect our citizens. That 

therein lies the rub, I guess, right? So, I want to analyze this a little bit in a bifurcated manner and first just ask you each a simple 

question. Do any of you think it is a good idea to allow refugees 

into this country when you can’t properly vet them? Forget about 

the moral side of it. Just answer me; from a security standpoint, 

is it a good idea? Does anybody think it is? No. I think we are 

unanimous in that. Am I right? 

Okay. So then the question then becomes, what do you do? Can 

we help them somehow in other ways, other than bringing them 

here? Is that something that anyone has contemplated, and if they 

have, how can we do that? I would like to hear from each of you 

on that. 
39 

Mr. GARTENSTEIN-ROSS. I agree with that, and I think that looking at this through a National interest perspective is important. At 

the end of the day as American policymakers, there is a strong 

duty, obviously, to the American public. 

Actually addressing the situation over there, is I think, very important and arguably may get more bang for the buck because if 

you look at the percentage, you know, right now we are looking at 

taking in 70,000 refugees this year of which about 33,000 would be 

from the region, so the maximum is about 33- to 35,000 Syrian refugees. That is a drop in the bucket. 

If you look at the situation on the ground in the camps, trying 

to improve the situation in the camps, providing job opportunities, 

educational opportunities, often people who are in camps are set 

back significantly in their education, particularly because as the 

populations initially went there, they thought that they would be 

there temporarily; and so children ended up missing a year or more 

equivalent of school in addition to the situation that is there. 

The one thing I would point to that I would be cautious of is 

that, particularly in Jordan, since most of the refugees there are 

not in camps, there is a great deal of tension between the native 

Jordanian population and the refugees; and so any sort of jobs program that is aimed specifically at refugees may generate more resentment. But I think thinking about that angle and what you can 

for the region, is both from a security perspective and probably 

from a domestic resource perspective, has advantages and may actually be from kind of the overall humanitarian perspective, the 

best use of our money. 

Mr. KATKO. Thank you very much. Mr. Fuentes. 

Mr. FUENTES. Yes, I would agree with that. If you provide the 

type of resources that maybe make these camps more livable, make 

them, you know, better in terms of humanitarian cause, not just 

care and feeding and shelter, but also educational programs and 

other opportunities, the length of time that you would be providing 

those services would also be a deterrent to terrorists because they 

wouldn’t want to take the time to have to have somebody go 

through a 1- or 2-year program to go through that process. 

Then they would have to worry that they would lose them, that 

they would become pro-United States or pro-West as opposed to 

whatever cause they thought they were sending them to. So I think 

that if we did more for the refugees before they got here and it took 

a longer time to do that, it might in itself be a deterrent. 

Mr. KATKO. Dr. Jones. 

Mr. JONES. I think a range of those steps would be helpful. I 

would have two additional comments. One is I think a long-term 

strategy for Syria right now is lacking, and I think in addition to 

refugee issues, finding ways to wind down the war through political, military, and other steps would be useful. I don’t believe we 

have a long-term strategy at the moment, and I would urge whatever administration comes next as well as this one to make this a 

priority based on the threats that we are talking about. 

The other issue I would just note is I think we have got these 

vetting challenges in a range of countries we are now seeing extremists; Libya, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, Iraq. The 

Islamic State has expanded into a range of these countries. So, 
40 

again, I would also note that this vetting issue is problematic in 

a number of them, and even in the Yemen case our presence there 

has declined significantly over the last several years, including our 

intelligence picture. So we have got this problem in several places. 

Mr. KATKO. Yeah. I am glad to hear you all pretty much agree 

with what I believe to be the issue is; we can’t have people coming 

into this country where we can’t properly vet them. Especially in 

this day and age where ISIS is trying different ways to probe and 

get in here as well. 

So, I think maybe taking a fresher look at what we can do while 

they are still over there is something which might fulfill the moral 

imperative we have to help them, and that is something we should 

probably think about a little bit more and talk about a little more 

fully going forward. So thank you, gentleman. 

Mr. KING. The gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. Keating. 

Mr. KEATING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Getting back to our 

own intelligence in Syria, we talked about what we can gain from 

other countries. Now since we have had limited, you know, people 

on the ground there, how much has it improved our own internal 

intelligence on Syria? Any idea? It had to have gotten better because it was at a very low ebb. 

Mr. JONES. My assessment is if you look at the U.S. intelligence 

and military’s targeting in Syria, including of Khorasan targets, it 

is obviously good enough to take out some very serious al-Qaeda, 

al-Nusrah, and some Islamic State targets, so I think the capability 

is better today than it was a year or 2 ago. So better. That doesn’t 

mean good. 

Mr. KEATING. We have had witnesses at other hearings in other 

committees testify that Assad’s position is much more precarious 

than it was. 

How would you speculate things might change in terms of the 

refugee situation if he is gone, if he is out of power personally, you 

know, whether or not he is replaced by someone more or less 

aligned to his own administration or someone else? I know it is 

speculative, but how significant would that be, given the fact that 

I do believe that he is in a much more precarious situation. 

Mr. FUENTES. I think it would depend on who he is replaced 

with. If we have ISIS take over the whole country or Khorasan 

Group or other al-Qaeda affiliates, we have gone from bad to worse, 

but actually it is bad already. So I think that the intelligence assets that we do have on the ground in Syria right now to help target who we want to get in terms of members of adversarial groups 

is one thing. 

To have them be in a position to vet refugees, they are not going 

to be able to do that. They are in a covert, very dangerous, precarious situation. So I think that is a different ability for our intelligence services. 

Mr. KEATING. The same people testified, just for the record, you 

know, that it would be highly unlikely, you know, that it would be 

one of those groups that would be able to take over in that kind 

of change. 

Dr. Jones had a comment with the Visa Waiver Program, how we 

should be more engaged in that. Clearly there is a concern that if 

people resettle and they are there and there is a lower level of se-
41 

curity, how do you propose we better engage with that program, 

the Visa Waiver Program? 

Mr. JONES. I think part of this is continuing to work with European allies. I think some of that has improved over the last year 

or two in getting names on lists. The Germans have been more cooperative in providing names of individuals they have been concerned about. So I think part of the issue on Visa Waiver is continuing to get more granular information on names of individuals 

of concern for terrorist activity. Different spellings of names, noms 

de guerre. That is the direction I would encourage on Visa Waiver. 

Mr. KEATING. The other question I have, of the small number of 

refugees we have in the United States now, how is that broken 

down with women and children? Any figures in that respect? Any 

estimates in that respect at all? None. 

Well, the other issue really is one in the larger sense of our allies. You have referenced, you know, one country, Germany, that 

is vetting this as well. I was a part of the same group that went 

through not only through the Mideast, but through Europe, looking 

at any pathways for foreign fighters. But I think the same thing 

can be said, too, in terms of the concern with the refugees in Turkey, 1.9 million, they told us, refugees are there. They have 40 million people coming in and out of the Istanbul Airport, largely with 

people leaving there, having no information provided to us. 

When you mentioned how there is a disparity among some of our 

allied countries in Europe, can you name some of the things that 

should be done, and particularly what countries could use more engagement on our part? 

Mr. FUENTES. I think in terms of international cooperation, you 

know, we do have outstanding relationships with our European allies and almost all of the Middle East countries where we have a 

partner relationship. Some places we don’t have it. 

I mentioned that I served as a member of the Executive Committee of Interpol, and many of these countries are also, including 

Iran, members of Interpol. So there is some dialogue even in those 

channels that we often can use in spite of the public stance that 

a country might be our enemy, you know, back channel, we do on 

occasion get some help from a number of these countries if they see 

the same threat to them that we see to us. That becomes the issue 

here. 

In terms of Germany, there is a large Turkish population in Germany, so they have had some degree of success in getting cooperation, having sources of information, from the Turkish population; 

and the Germans have been very welcoming of the immigrant population from Turkey that has come there and now in some cases, 

you know the other groups that come there also. 

But our European allies again, many of these countries are 

underresourced in terms of these kind of threats, and the Visa 

Waiver Program does give an opportunity. I know Director Mueller 

over the time when he was director of the FBI repeatedly testified 

that he opposed the Waiver Program because of the ease of access 

or the easier access for individuals if they were radicalized in Europe that have European passports that could come here. 

That being said, there was no intention ever of changing that 

policy based on the business between Europe and the United States 
42 

and the complete other concerns of interaction that we have that 

would become more difficult if visa program was eliminated. 

Mr. KEATING. Okay. Mr. Chairman, my time is up. I yield back. 

Mr. KING. The gentleman yields back. I have one question I 

would like to pursue. Dr. Gartenstein-Ross, in your testimony you 

mentioned the perhaps greater threat if Syrian refugees do come 

in of those who are vetted but yet have family members, children 

perhaps, who become radicalized after they are here. 

I would like to ask Mr. Fuentes first: Is it possible; what is the 

practicality of the FBI surveilling, maintaining a surveillance of 

Syrian refugees when they come in? Would that violate FBI procedures? Are there sufficient resources to do it? Could it be effective? 

Then I will ask the other two witnesses for their comments on that. 

Mr. FUENTES. I think the answer would be no to all of that. I 

think the policy of just following people for the sake of it doesn’t 

exist. There has to be some predication that there has been information received or some indication that they are either involved in 

criminal activity or some activity that threatens National security. 

The fact is that when you look at the number of instances that 

come up that you and I have both been on CNN talking about, is 

this an intelligence failure? When you have over 1 million names 

on the TIDE list for example, and a few thousand FBI agents and 

analysts, there is going to be no way to keep track of that. We hear 

this over and over. Well, at one time this person was on the FBI’s 

radar. Well, a million people are on the FBI’s radar unfortunately. 

So you really have to have that narrowed down with some degree 

of specificity and predication before you can actually initiate it. 

Now, right now the FBI, as Director Comey has mentioned, they 

have active counterterrorism investigations in every single State. 

Then when you take some locations, if that is just one per State 

minimum, let’s say New York, let’s say in Chicago, in the District 

of Columbia, those could be in the dozens; they could be in the hundreds, with that many more number of subjects. 

So you could be looking at tens of thousands of potential subjects 

that there is a reason to follow them but it can’t be done, not in 

every case. They have to prioritize. They have to triage who they 

are looking at and how many resources are devoted to it. So the 

practicality in a refugee vetting process, I think just doesn’t exist. 

Mr. KING. Dr. Gartenstein-Ross, based on what Mr. Fuentes just 

said, do you see any answer to the question that you raised about 

the threat of radicalization of those who come to the country? 

Mr. GARTENSTEIN-ROSS. I think it is a community for which you 

would have an elevated level of risk in that regard. I mean, there 

is a standard narrative in a group like Jabhat al-Nusrah could use, 

and the reason I focus on al-Nusrah is because I think the Islamic 

State would actually have more trouble recruiting in this population. It wouldn’t be impossible, but it would have a bit more trouble because they understand what the Islamic State has done. It 

is much more overtly brutal. 

Nusrah in contrast is brutal, but it doesn’t, you know, tweet out 

photos of people they have beheaded recently. They don’t release 

videos of them drowning people in a cage in a swimming pool. They 

also, unlike the Islamic State, work very well with other groups at 

a local level. So in that regard, the risk would be there as I stated 
43 

it. The area where I think in the future we can reduce risks is in 

terms of vetting people as they come in because that is one of the 

significant questions that has been raised. I should point out that 

our vetting system is very antiquated. You know, when we are 

talking about what we look for, what we look for, has Acunia come 

up? Is their name in a database? 

One thing that we should think about is the world is moving towards a big data solution for intelligence across the board. It is not 

always the solution to everything. There are downsides to big data, 

but we haven’t thought about it in this context. Now, let me say 

I do work, you know, on this from both sides. I am a security studies person. I also do work on asylum cases for asylees as an expert 

witness, often pro bono. I talk about country conditions in places 

like Somalia or Afghanistan. 

One of the things that is disturbing about our asylum process is 

it is really hard to determine if someone is lying. You have their 

story, and when I am an expert witness, I am not there to say if 

they are telling the truth. I am just there to say, does their story 

match with what we know about the country? Now, when we talk 

about the big data approach, what we don’t have, if someone says 

okay I was in Somalia, I was in Mogadishu in September 2010, and 

my family was massacred by Shabaab. Well, did that happen? 

What I think we should start to move towards is a situation 

where we take sig acts, significant acts, from these theaters and 

put them in a database that can be cross-checked in multiple ways 

so we can see, does their story actually match with what was going 

on on the ground at that particular time at a granular level? 

No. 2, when you look at where they were coming from, do they 

match with people who were known as militants? Right now we 

don’t have the sort of system in place where you can actually start 

to get a chance of getting at clean skins or getting at people who 

there might be some corroborating evidence or some evidence that 

would tend to refute their story or show that they pose a risk. 

That is something we should figure out for the future because 

this will not be the last refugee crisis that we face, and getting better at our screening will make us safer as a Nation. 

Mr. KING. Dr. Jones. 

Mr. JONES. Very briefly, on your first FBI question having served 

last year on the FBI Director’s 9/11 Commission and looking at FBI 

resources now, I mean I strongly agree with Mr. Fuentes’ comment, 

especially when you add the rise in social media use by these 

groups, the cyber attacks, et cetera. It would not be good for U.S. 

freedom to be following people without prior indications that they 

were involved in terrorism. 

But I would also note, just to complicate this a little bit, that 

based on past individuals that have been plotting or have attacked 

in the United States, it is not clear to me that refugees are more 

likely to radicalize than others. We have lots of people in the 

United States that are not refugees that have radicalized, that 

have converted. So, you know, the problem is clearly much bigger 

than this. 

The last thing I would note—and this goes to a question that Mr. 

Keating noted earlier, too—is I think the more information we have 

about these individuals, DNA, biometrics, et cetera, the better it 
44 

will be, including I do think it is worth considering rescreening procedures before they become eligible for permanent resident status, 

so potentially looking at several layers here. 

Mr. KING. I would just conclude by saying that I think we have 

raised issues today that there are no, in no way any definitive answers for. I heard what Mr. Katko said about we should never 

allow refugees in if there is a threat of terrorism. I understand 

that. 

On the other hand, from talking to Jordanian officials, and they 

are our closest ally, if nothing else just for the diplomatic help that 

it would give Jordan, we have to show we are doing something. 

Otherwise King Abdullah could be losing some of his support in 

Jordan, so it is in our National interest, apart from any moral imperative or whatever, that something be done, and we have to find 

ways to do it, though, where the vetting is increased, I think or 

vetted. 

So with that, I would—does the Ranking Member have any questions? 

Mr. HIGGINS. Yes. For context, the United Nations has indicated 

that of Western nations resettling Syrian refugees, Germany will 

resettle the largest number, some 30,000; followed by Canada, 

about 11- or 12,000. According to the State Department, the United 

States will resettle about 1,000 to 2,000 this year. More in coming 

years but, this year. That disparity is attributed to what? Less of 

a rigorous assessment screening process in Germany and Canada 

versus the United States? Dr. Jones. 

Mr. JONES. I don’t know what the process is for why Germany 

any has allowed more and what the policy discussions are; but I 

will say that when you look at the foreign fighter problem in Europe, including in Germany, that is connected to Syria, the threat 

in Germany is serious. They have got more people in Syria than 

we have. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Mr. Fuentes. 

Mr. FUENTES. I think we as Americans have pretty much been 

unaware for many years of the nature of the threat in Europe, and 

particularly al-Qaeda. Back when 9/11 happened, that obviously 

dominated U.S. news for weeks and months. What most Americans 

never heard of was that very week, a couple days after 9/11, alQaeda was going to blow up the U.S. Embassy in Paris and conduct bombing attacks in the Netherlands and in Belgium at NATO 

facilities. 

Seven European countries were working with the FBI on those 

al-Qaeda cells at the time and neutralized them, and I think 14 

people were arrested, stood trial, were convicted, served jail sentences. One of them that was the coordinator of the Embassy attack in Paris later was released from jail and helped conduct or coordinate the Charlie Hebdo attack. So these are cells that go back 

more than a decade in those countries, Germany included. You 

know, this has been on-going, and I think most Americans don’t realize the extent of the threat that has already been in Europe all 

these years and most of the time successfully neutralized but not 

always. 

Mr. GARTENSTEIN-ROSS. When you are asking about the disparities, I think one of the primary things that is at play with respect 
45 

to Germany is that you have had a large amount of Syrian refugees 

come into Europe through the central Mediterranean route. It is a 

route coming in through Libya. In the third quarter of last year, 

there were over 75,000 refugees, not refugees rather, but irregular 

migrants who went in through this route. 

One of the majority groups, one of the two largest groups for that 

quarter, was Syrians of whom they are refugees. Now when Syrians get to Europe, you have in international law, a rule against 

refoulement, that is a rule against returning them to the country 

that they were forcibly expelled from. So when they are there, 

something has to be done with them. In part, Europe trying to set 

a policy for what to do with Syrians who have gotten there through 

this route I think plays somewhat of a role in terms of why Germany has taken such high numbers. 

With respect to Canada, they have kind of a different set of policies and norms with respect to refugee populations than the United 

States does, but I wouldn’t attribute this to there necessarily being 

worse screening in any of these countries than in the United 

States. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Got it. Thank you very much. The panel has been 

very helpful, and I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. KING. I want to thank all the witnesses for their testimony. 

This has been I think a very illuminating meeting. It certainly 

brought out information that I think is vital for the record. It has 

also raised questions that we have address. I would perhaps indulge on you if we could consult with you as we go forward. Any 

thoughts or advice you have as this matter goes forward, we would 

greatly appreciate it. 

Also the Members of the subcommittee may have some additional 

questions for you, and we ask you to respond in writing if you 

would. With that, pursuant to Committee Rule 7(E), the hearing 

record will be held open for 10 days. Without objection, the subcommittee stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:25 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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