[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advanc e sheets, it may be cited as Ohioans for Concealed Carry, Inc. v. Columbus , Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-6724.]

NOTICE This slip opinion is subject to f ormal revision before it is pu blished in an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are reques ted to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohi o, 65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published.

S LIP O PINION N O
. 2020-O HIO -6724
O HIOANS FOR C ONCEALED C ARRY , I NC ., ET AL ., A PPELLANTS , v. T HE C ITY OF C OLUMBUS ET AL ., A PPELLEES
. [Until this opinion appears in t he Ohio Official Reports advanc e sheets, it may be cited as Ohioans for Concealed Carry, Inc. v. Columbus , Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-6724.] Civil law—Before an Ohio court may consider the merits of a legal claim, the person seeking relief must establis h standing—Court of appeals’ judgment affirmed. (No. 2019-1274—Submitted July 8, 2020—Decided December 18, 2020 .)

A PPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 18AP-605, 2019-Ohio-3105.

________________ O’C ONNOR , C.J. {¶ 1} In this appeal, we determine whether appellants, Ohioans for Concealed Carry, Inc. (“OCC”) and Buckeye Firearms Foundation, Inc. (“BFF”) (collectively, “appellants”), have standing to bring an action seeking declaratoryS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

2 and injunctive relief against appellees, the city of Columbus a nd Columbus City Attorney Zach M. Klein (collectively, “the city”) regarding two firearm-related ordinances that appe llants allege are unlawful under R.C. 9.68. Because we conclude that appellant s have not established standing in this case, we affirm the judgment of the Tenth Dis trict Court of Appeals. I. Relevant Background {¶ 2} In May 2018, the Columbus City Council passed Columbus Ordinance 1116-2018. This ordinance, among other things, enact ed two provisions of the Columbus City Code (“C.C.C .”) relevant to this case, C.C .C. 2323.13 and 2323.171. C.C.C. 2323.13 is the city’s weapons-under-disabilit y ordinance and prohibits individuals who have been previously convicted of a m isdemeanor domestic-violence offense from possessing a firearm, C.C.C. 232 3.13(A)(3).
C.C.C. 2323.171 makes it a misdem eanor, C.C.C. 2323.171(B), for a person to “knowingly acquire, have, carry, or use an illegal rate-of-fire -acceleration firearm accessory,” C.C.C. 2323.171(A). According to the city, this or dinance is directed
at firearm accessories kn own as “bump stocks.” See C.C.C. 2323.171(C)(1). {¶ 3} A little over a month after the city enacted these ordinances, appellants and Gary Witt, a member of OCC and a resident of Col umbus, filed a complaint against the city seeking an injunction against enforc ement of the ordinances as unconstitutional, based on the argument that they are preempted by R.C. 9.68—a statute pertaining to ensuring that the laws throug hout Ohio regarding the right to bear arms are uniform—and seeking a declaratory ju dgment that C.C.C. 2323.13 and 2323.171 violate R.C. 9.68. The complaint asserted that appellants were not-for-profit Ohio corporations and were composed of fire arm owners across Ohio, “including members who [were ] taxpayers of the [c]ity of Columbus.” {¶ 4} The complaint asserted two causes of action. In the first, app ellants and Witt sought injunctive relief against enforcement of the or dinances through a statutory-taxpayer action, as permitted by R.C. 733.59. In sup port, appellants andJanuary Term, 2020

3 Witt alleged that the implementation of the ordinances “resulte d in, or is imminently likely to result in, the misapplication (and an inap propriate and unlawful expenditure) of funds of the City, by virtue of effort s by the City to advertise and promote the Ordina nces, enforce the Ordinances, i mplement the Ordinances and defend the Ordinances.” They also asserted that the ordinances were “an abuse of the City’s home rule power” and “involved, or [were] reasonably likely to involve, execution of contracts with third parties co ncerning the advertisement, enforcement, and implementation of the unlawful provisions therein, including but not limited to contracts for public defe nders for indigent defendants charged with violatin g the Ordinances.” Appellants and Witt alleged that they were seeking “to enforce the public right of the peop le to keep and bear arms and all peripheral rights guaranteed to them by the Consti tution of Ohio, the
Constitution of the United State s of America and R.C. 9.68.” {¶ 5} In the second cause of action, a ppellants and Witt asserted the y were entitled, pursuant to R.C. 9.68, to a declaration that the ordi nances are unlawful, “as well as every other ordinance enacted, promulgated and/or m aintained by Defendant City that purports to regulate the right of a person to possess, purchase, sell, transfer, transport, store, or keep any firearm, part of a firearm, its components and ammunition.” Appella nts and Witt also requested an award o f attorney fees
under R.C. 9.68. {¶ 6} In tandem with filing the complaint, appellants and Witt also m oved for a temporary restraining order against the city and a prelim inary injunction, both of which sought to preclude the city from enforcing C.C.C. 2323 .13 and 2323.171. The trial court granted the temporary restraining order, enjoin ing the city from all enforcement activity associated with C.C.C. 2323.13 and 2323.17 1. In opposition to the preliminary-injunction motion, the city argued, in part, that appellants and
Witt had little chance of success on the merits because they la cked standing to bring
their claims.S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

4 {¶ 7} After a hearing on the prelimin ary injunction, the trial court held that Witt had taxpayer standing under R.C. 733.59. Because the city ’s ordinances “directly impact the rights” of appellants’ members, the trial court also found that appellants had organizational standing. The trial court ultima tely found C.C.C. 2323.171 to be unconstitutional and granted a permanent injunct ion enjoining its enforcement. However, the trial court denied injunctive relief regarding C.C.C.
2323.13. {¶ 8} On appeal, the city challenged t he trial court’s finding that a ppellants and Witt had standing. The Tenth District Court of Appeals agr eed with the trial court that Witt had taxpayer standing for injunctive relief und er R.C. 733.59, but concluded that appellants had fa iled to establish that they had standing under R.C. 733.59, R.C. 9.68, or R.C. Chapter 2721, Ohio’s Declaratory Ju dgment Act. 1 2019-Ohio-3105, 140 N.E.3d 1215, ¶ 46 (10th Dist.). {¶ 9} Appellants sought discretionary review, and we accepted the following proposition of law: “A nonprofit firearms-rights asso ciation has standing to challenge as unconsti tutional municipal ordinances that viol ate R.C. 9.68 by maintaining an action for declaratory and injunctive relief und er R.C. 9.68, R.C. 733.59, and/or Ohio Revise d Code Chapter 2721.” See 157 Ohio St.3d 1495, 2019- Ohio-4840, 134 N.E.3d 1210. {¶ 10} On December 18, 2019, while this appeal was pending, the city repealed C.C.C. 2323.171. See Columbus Ordinance 3189-2019. The city explained in its merit brief that it repealed the ordinance bec ause the United States Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Fire arms, and Explosives had issued a rule stating

1. The court of appeals also found that OCC and BFF failed to establish standing under the publicright doctrine. However, we declined review of appellants’ pro position of law challenging this holding. In addition, appellants concede in their reply brief that “no ‘public rights’ standing argument is present in this appeal.” Thus, we do not address t he public-right-standing doctrine in this decision.January Term, 2020

5 that a firearm with a bump-stock accessory was a “machinegun,” the possession of which is already a felony unde r federal and state law. II. Analysis {¶ 11} As a threshold matter, we address the city’s assertion that app ellants’ claims regarding C.C.C. 2323.171, th e bump-stock ordinance, are moot because that ordinance was repealed while this appeal was pending. App ellants argue that because the city has not repealed the weapons-under-disability ordinance, C.C.C. 2323.13, and there is also a reasonable probability that the ci ty will attempt to enact a similar ordinance to the bump-stock ordinance in the future, this appeal is not moot. Moreover, appellants argue that they may still be entitl ed to an award of attorney fees under R.C. 9.68(B). We find that the issue wheth er appellants have standing remains relevant to the resolution of attorney fees re lated to appellants’ challenge to C.C.C. 2323.171. Thus, we proceed to determine th e question of standing. A. Standing {¶ 12} It is well established that prior to an Ohio court’s considerin g the merits of a legal claim, “the person or entity seeking relief m ust establish standing
to sue.” Ohio Pyro, Inc v. Ohio Dept. of Co mmerce, Div. of State Fire Marshal , 115 Ohio St.3d 375, 2007-Ohio-5024, 875 N.E.2d 550, ¶ 27. At a minimum, common-law standing requires the litigant to demonstrate that h e or she has suffered (1) an injury (2) that is fairly traceable to the defe ndant’s allegedly unlawful conduct and (3) is likel y to be redressed by the reque sted relief. Moore v.
Middletown , 133 Ohio St.3d 55, 2012-Ohio-3897, 975 N.E.2d 977, ¶ 22. Sta nding
does not turn on the merits of th e plaintiffs’ claims but rathe r on “whether the plaintiffs have alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy that they are entitled to have a court hear their case.” ProgressOhio.org, Inc. v.
JobsOhio , 139 Ohio St.3d 520, 2014-Ohio-2382, 13 N.E.3d 1101, ¶ 7. Sta nding may also be conferred by statute. Middletown v. Ferguson , 25 Ohio St.3d 71, 75,S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

6 495 N.E.2d 380 (1986). Whether appe llants have established sta nding is a question of law, which we review de novo. See Moore at ¶ 20, citing Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of

Commrs. v. State , 112 Ohio St.3d 59, 2006-Ohio-6499, 858 N.E.2d 330, ¶ 23. {¶ 13} Standing “ ‘ “is not dispensed in gross,” ’ ” it must be demons trated
for each claim and each form of relief. Preterm-Cleveland, Inc. v. Kasich , 153 Ohio St.3d 157, 2018-Ohio-441,102 N.E.3d 461, ¶ 30, quoting Davis v. Fed.
Election Comm. , 554 U.S. 724, 734, 128 S.Ct. 2759, 171 L.E.2d 737 (2008), quoting Lewis v. Casey , 518 U.S. 343, 358, 116 S.Ct. 2174, 135 L.Ed.2d 606 (1996), fn. 6. Here, appellants asserted two claims for relief in their complaint: (1) a statutory-taxpayer action for injunctive relief under R.C . 733.59 and (2) a declaratory-judgment action based on the argument that R.C. 9.6 8 provides them the right to challenge the ordina nces. Appellants assert that as nonprofit firearmsrights associations, they have standing to challenge municipal ordinances that violate R.C. 9.68. They do not, however, seek to establish sta nding through traditional common-law principles. Instead, appellants claim t hat they have standing through three alternative, statutory means: (1) statut ory standing under R.C. 9.68, (2) taxpayer standing under R.C. 733.59, and (3) sta tutory standing under the Declaratory Judgment Act. B. Standing Under R.C. 9.68 {¶ 14} Appellants assert several theor ies of standing under R.C. 9.68. We first address appellant s’ argument in their complaint that R.C. 9.68 provides them with standing because it “provides Plaintiffs a private right o f action to challenge any ordinance, rule or reg ulation in conflict with it.” {¶ 15} R.C. 9.68(A) states that the right to keep and bear arms is a “fundamental individual right” t hat is a “constitutionally prot ected right in every part of Ohio.” R.C. 9.68(A) also identifies the “need to provi de uniform laws throughout the state” regulating the ownership and possession o f firearms. The former version of R.C. 9.68(B), wh ich was in effect at the time this case was filed,January Term, 2020

7 also stated: “In addition to any other relief provided, the cou rt shall award costs and reasonable attorney fees to any person, group, or entity that p revails in a challenge to an ordinance, rule, or regulation as being in conflict with this section.” 2 Sub.H.B. No. 347, 151 Ohio Laws, Part IV, 8138, 8140. {¶ 16} Appellants assert that R.C. 9.68(B)’s reference to “any person, group, or entity that prevails in a challenge to an ordinance,” means that anyone may challenge an ordinance as being in conflict R.C. 9.68, and that the statute thereby confers standing. The Tenth District rejected this arg ument, however, noting that R.C. 9.68 is silent r egarding standing or creating a cause of action. We agree with the court of appeals. {¶ 17} As this court noted in ProgressOhio.org, Inc. , a statute’s silence “as to who has standing to maintain a constitutional challenge to t he legislation does not render the statute ambiguous ,” nor “will we read the statut ory silence as clearly expressing an intention to abroga te the common-law requirements for standing.” 139 Ohio St.3d 520, 2014-Ohio-2382, 13 N.E.3d 1101, at ¶ 22. T hus, even if we read the language in former R.C. 9.68(B) to imply the availabil ity of a cause of action to challenge an ordinance, that would not abrogate the n eed for a “person, group, or entity” to establish s tanding for purposes of pursuin g a civil action under
that statute. {¶ 18} Appellants also argue that they have standing under R.C. 9.68 t o challenge the ordinances in this case because they have establi shed standing in

2. The General Assembly amended R.C. 9.68 in 2019, and the ame ndment became effective while this appeal was pending. 2018 Am.Sub.H.B. No. 228. As amended , R.C. 9.68(B) expressly states that “[a] person, group, or entity adversely affected by any ma nner of ordinance, rule, regulation, resolution, practice, or other action enacted or enforced by a political subdivision in conflict with division (A) of this section may bring a civil action against t he political subdivision seeking damages from the political subdivision, declaratory relief, injunctive relief, or a combination of those remedies.” However, we limit our analysis to former R.C. 9.68( B) because that was the version in effect when appellants filed their complaint. See R.C. 1.58(A)(1) (“The reenactment, amendment, or repeal of a statute does not * * * [a]ffect the prior operat ion of the statute or any prior action taken thereunder”).S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

8 other cases challenging different ordinances. Indeed, appellan ts assert that this
court’s review of the merits in cases like Ohioans for Concealed Carry, Inc. v. Clyde , 120 Ohio St.3d 96, 2008-Ohio-4605, 896 N.E.2d 967, in which O CC was a party, have already implicitly recognized OCC’s standing under R.C. 9.68. We reject this argument. {¶ 19} This court’s decision in Clyde has no bearing on the standing analysis in this case. In Clyde , OCC filed an action seeking an injunction and an order striking down a municipal ordinance that prohibited the c arrying of concealed handguns in Clyde city parks. Id . at ¶ 1, 19. This court ultimately concluded that
the ordinance was unconstitutiona l under the Home Rule Amendmen t, Article XVIII, Section 3, of the Ohio Constitution, because the ordinan ce was an exercise of the municipality’s police power that conflicte d with a gener al law. Id . at ¶ 1. {¶ 20} The fact that a party has established standing in a prior case does not establish the party’s standing in every case filed thereafter. The question of standing depends on whether the plaintiffs have alleged some ba sis—grounded in common or statutory law—that entitles them to have a court hear their case. See State ex rel. Dallman v. Franklin Cty. Court of Common Pleas , 35 Ohio St.2d 176, 178-179, 298 N.E.2d 515 (1973), quoting Sierra Club v. Morton , 405 U.S. 727, 92 S.Ct. 1361, 31 L.Ed.2d 636, 641 (1972) (“ ‘Where the party does not rely on any specific statute authorizing invocation of the judicial process , the question of standing depends upon whether the party has alleged such a “per sonal stake in the outcome of the controversy,” Baker v. Carr , 369 U.S. 186, 204, 82 S.Ct. 691, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 [1962], * * * as to ensure that “the dispute sought to be adjudicated will be presented in an adversary context and in a form histori cally viewed as a capable of judicial resolution,” Flast v. Cohen , 392 U.S. 83, 101, 88 S.Ct. 1942, 20 L.Ed.2d 947 [1968] * * *’ ” [ellipses added in Dallman ]). Thus, standing must be
determined on t he allegations presented in each case

.January Term, 2020

9 {¶ 21} Finally, appellants also seem to contend that they have standin g simply because they are entitled to relief under R.C. 9.68 on t he merits of their challenge. Specifically, appellants argue in their merit brief that “[w]hether any Plaintiff owned or planned to own any of the several firearm co mponents banned by the City * * * is entirely beside the point. Columbus undid what the General Assembly did in enacting statewide preemption.” As we stated a bove, however, standing does not turn on the merits of the plaintiffs’ claims but rather on “whether the plaintiffs have alleged such a personal stake in the outcom e of the controversy that they are entitled to have a court hear their case.” ProgressOhio.org, Inc. , 139 Ohio St.3d 520, 2014-Ohio-2382, 13 N.E.3d 1101, at ¶ 7. {¶ 22} In sum, we find no basis under former R.C. 9.68, which was in e ffect at the time this case was filed, to conclude that appellants ha ve established standing
in this case. C. Taxpayer Standing Under R.C. 733.59 {¶ 23} Appellants next argue that they have standing under R.C. 733.59 to bring a taxpayer action for injunctive relief. When a statute provides for judicial review, “ ‘the inquiry as to standing must begin with a determi nation of whether the statute in question authorizes review at the behest of the plaintiff.’ ”
Middletown , 25 Ohio St.3d at 75-76, 495 N.E.2d 380, quoting Sierra Club , 405 U.S. at 732, 92 S.Ct. 1361, 31 L.Ed.2d 636. Accordingly, we be gin with R.C. 733.59, which sets forth the prerequi sites for a taxpayer’s act ion:

If the village solicitor or city director of law fails, upon th e written request of any taxpayer o f the municipal corporation, t o make any application provided for in sections 733.56 to 733.58 of the Revised Code, the taxpayer may institute suit in his own na me, on behalf of the munici pal corporation.S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

10 “Taxpayer,” as used in R.C. 733.59, contemplates and includes “ ‘any person who, in a private capacity as a citizen, elector, freeholder or taxp ayer, volunteers to enforce a right of action on beha lf of and for the benefit of t he public.’ ” State ex
rel. White v. Cleveland , 34 Ohio St.2d 37, 40, 295 N.E.2d 665 (1973), quoting State ex rel. Nimon v. Springdale , 6 Ohio St.2d 1, 215 N.E.2d 592 (1966), paragraph two of the syllabus. {¶ 24} Nowhere within the complaint do appellants allege that they are citizens, electors, freeholders, or taxpayers themselves. Inst ead, they allege that they are “not-for-profit Ohio corporation[s]” composed of “firearm owners across the state of Ohio, including mem bers who are taxpayers of the C ity of Columbus.” Nevertheless, appellants argue th at they have associational sta nding under R.C. 733.59 by virtue of Witt’s individua l-taxpayer standing. Assoc iational standing is for organizations who sue on behalf of their members. See Peoples Rights Org.,
Inc. v. Columbus , 152 F.3d 522, 527 (6th Cir.1998) (“An association * * * can h ave standing as a representative of its members”). Notably, howeve r, appellants’ complaint does not allege that they are bringing a taxpayer act ion on behalf of Witt

. The complaint alleges that the l etter sent to initiate the taxp ayer action, as required under the statute, was sent by “Pl aintiff OCC and Plaintiff BFF , on behalf of
themselves , and Plaintiff Witt on behalf of himself.” (Emphasis added.) Here, it is clear that appellants are suing on behalf of themselves. As a result, Witt’s individual-taxpayer standing does not confer standing upon appe llants. {¶ 25} Appellants also argue that the Te nth District’s judgment must b e reversed because although the cour t stated that “Ohio courts ha ve implicitly recognized the standing of associations in statutory taxpayer a ctions,” 2019-Ohio3105, 140 N.E.3d 1215, at ¶ 37, it ignore d appellants’ associat ional standing. And allowing this judgment to stand would “undo legions of cases,” including State ex
rel. Fisher v. Cleveland , 109 Ohio St.3d 33, 2006-Ohio-1827, 845 N.E.2d 500. We disagree.January Term, 2020

11 {¶ 26} Our decision in Fisher addressed only the specific standing argument that had been presented in that case; namely, whether relators had
asserted a matter that concerne d a public right or benefit. “A taxpayer action is properly brought only when the right under review in the action is one benefitting the public.” Id. at ¶ 10. In Fisher , the civil suit had been initiated by an individual, Robert Fisher, and the Associati on of Cleveland Fire Fighters, Local 93 of the
International Association of Fir e Fighters. Our analysis did n ot reach the issue
whether the Association of Cleve land Fire Fighters had properly asserted standing as a taxpayer, either alone or on behalf of its individual memb er, because we
concluded that the action di d not affect a public right. Id. ¶ 14. {¶ 27} Here, appellants fail to identify the other cases that are purp ortedly among the “legions” we would have to undo if we affirmed the co urt of appeals’ judgment. Nonetheless, we note th at the court of appeals recog nized that the cases it cited in support of its statement that Ohio courts have impl icitly recognized the standing of organizations in taxpayer actions did not “directly address standing nor
inform what the associations alle ged in their complaints, i.e., did they allege they met the definition of taxpayer,” 2019-Ohio-3105, 140 N.E.3d 121 5, at ¶ 37. Nor did the cases address associational standing. See id ., citing State ex rel. Jones v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Commrs. , 124 Ohio App.3d 184, 187, 705 N.E.2d 1247 (1st Dist.1997); Natl. Elec. Contrs. Assn. v. Mentor , 108 Ohio App.3d 373, 380, 670 N.E.2d 1042 (11th Dist.1995). {¶ 28} The court of appeals also cited Ohioans for Concealed Carry, Inc. v.
Cleveland , 2017-Ohio-1560, 90 N.E.3d 80 (8th Dist.). We find this case
instructive. In Ohioans for Concealed Carry, Inc. , the Eighth District noted that the requirement in R.C. 733.59 that a written request be served on the city law director asking that he or she initiate suit on behalf of the c ity is a mandatory prerequisite to a taxpayer action. Id . at ¶ 42. But OCC had sent the letter on the individual plaintiff’s behalf, and R.C. 733.59 “does not author ize taxpayer actionsS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

12 by proxy,” id . at ¶ 43, and OCC “is not an indi vidual taxpayer or citizen,” id . at ¶ 44. For these reasons, the c ourt of appeals upheld the trial court’s determination that the individual plaintiff l acked standing to pursue a taxpa yer action because he did not properly initiate the taxpayer action. Id

. {¶ 29} Here, the complaint alleged that Witt sent the letter to initia te the taxpayer action on behalf of himself, and Witt’s taxpayer actio n in this case is proceeding. And the complaint a lleged that appellants sent the letter to initiate the taxpayer action “on behalf of themselves.” Thus, appellants ha ve not alleged a taxpayer action on W itt’s behalf. Because they are not taxpaye rs in their own right, they have not established standing to bring a taxpayer action f or injunctive relief under R.C. 733.59 to challenge the ordinances. D. Standing Under the Declaratory Judgment Act {¶ 30} Appellants also assert that they have standing under R.C. 2721. 03 to
seek a declaration that the ord inances are unlawful. R.C. 2721 .03 pertains only to “person[s] whose rights, status, or other legal relations are a ffected by a constitutional provision, statute, * * * [or] municipal ordinan ce.” The three prerequisites to declaratory re lief include “(1) a real controv ersy between the parties, (2) justiciability, and (3) the necessity of speedy re lief to preserve the parties’ rights.” ProgressOhio.org, Inc. , 139 Ohio St.3d 520, 2014-Ohio-2382, 13 N.E.3d 1101, at ¶ 19; see also Moore , 133 Ohio St.3d 55, 2012-Ohio-3897, 975 N.E.2d 977, at ¶ 49. {¶ 31} Appellants argue that these requi rements apply to them and that the traditional standing requirements must “yield” here because the y are seeking a declaration that the city’s ordinances are unconstitutional. C onsequently, appellants argue that they do not need to show that they have a ctually been injured or that they have suffered any particularized harm. Additional ly, appellants assert that they do not need to wait for the ordinances to be enforced before challenging the constitutionality of the ordinances.January Term, 2020

13 {¶ 32} Although a declaratory-judgment a ction generally contemplates t hat the action is brought before an injury-in-fact has occurred, a plaintiff must nonetheless demonstrate “actual pr esent harm or a significant p ossibility of future harm to justify pre-enforcement relief.” Peoples Rights Org., Inc. v. Columbus , 152 F.3d 522, 527 (6th Cir.1998). Certain impending injury is sufficient to obtain preventative relief; a plaintiff need not wait for an injury to actually occur. Id

. {¶ 33} In Peoples Rights Org., Inc. , the plaintiffs challenged in federal court a Columbus City Code provision th at prohibited the sale, transf er, acquisition, or possession of any assault weapon. Id . at 527-528. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that the indi vidual plaintiffs established st anding to pursue their declaratory-judgment action based on a significant possibility of future harm. Id

. at 530-531. The court also determined that the organization pl aintiff established associational standing. Id . at 531. A review of the allegations in the complaint is
instructive. {¶ 34} In that case, the organization pl aintiff, Peoples Rights Organi zation, Inc. (“PRO”), and two of its mem bers brought a pre-enforcement action seeking a declaration that a Columbus City Code provision prohibiting ass ault weapons was
unconstitutional. Id . at 526. PRO alleged that its members owned firearms that may have been defined as “assault weapons” under the ordinance. Id . at 528-529. They also alleged that members had not registered their firearm s, because they were unsure whether they qualified as “assault weapons” under the or dinance. Id . at 528. The complaint alleged that the individual plaintiffs and member s of PRO owned semiautomatic handguns and that they could not determine whethe r those weapons constituted “assault weapons” under the ordinance. Id . One of the individual plaintiffs alleged that he owned a rifle with a detachable maga zine, which he believed was the only ma gazine that would fit the rifle, but th at he could not determine whether that weapon c onstituted an “assault weapon” u nder the
ordinance. Id

.S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

14 {¶ 35} Here, in stark contrast, the onl y allegation in appellants’ com plaint relating to firearms is that appellants’ members own firearms. The complaint contains no allegation that the members own firearms with bump stocks or some other accessory that could be c onsidered within the purview of the ordinance. It also lacks any allegation that the members wish to own bump sto cks. And there is no allegation that members offer bump stocks for sale. The com plaint similarly contains no allegations speci fic to the weapons-under-disabilit y ordinance. For example, there is no allegation t hat any of appellants’ members have been charged
with or convicted of a misdemea nor offense of domestic violence . The complaint is simply devoid of any allegati on on which we could conclude t he significant possibility of future injury. 3 {¶ 36} In Peoples Rights Org., Inc. , the Sixth Circuit noted, “It is clear from the complaint the predicament that [the plaintiffs] face.” Id ., 152 F.3d at 528. Here, however, appellants have alleged no predicam ent. Nonetheless, in support of their cause of action for declaratory relief, they allege that they a re entitled to a

3. The first dissenting opinion suggests that because this cas e has proceeded past the close of the pleadings, the standing inquiry resembles the standard for a mo tion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Civ.R. 12(C). Applying that standard, that dissent concludes that the city has failed to demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that appellants cannot pr ove that any of their members have been injured by the ordinance because “it is possible” appellan ts could prove that a member has been harmed by the ordinances. Dissenting opinion of Kennedy, J., at ¶ 54. But the standard for motions for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Civ.R. 12(C) is still grounded in the pleadings. Indeed, “[t]he trial court must limit its inquiry to the materi al allegations in the pleadings—accepting those allegations and all reasonable inferences as true—and, if it is clear from the pleadings that plaintiff could prove no set of facts which would entitle him t o relief, judgment on the pleadings is appropriate as a matter of law.” Fisher v. Ahmed , 2020-Ohio-1196, 153 N.E.3d 612, ¶ 11 (9th Dist.). Here, there are no allegations in the complaint on which to bas e the first dissenting opinion’s assumptions about appellants’ potential proof of harm. Moreove r, “[w]hile the proof required to establish standing increases as the suit proceeds, * * *, the s tanding inquiry remains focused on whether the party invoking jurisdiction had the requisite stake in the outcome when the suit was filed.” Davis v. Fed. Election Comm. , 554 U.S. 724, 734, 128 S.Ct. 2759, 171 L.Ed.2d 737 (2008). We also note, as does the first dissenting opinion, that appell ants presented no evidence of standing at the trial court’s hearing on the motion for a preliminary in junction. In fact, appellants asserted that no evidence was required to rebut the city’s standing chal lenge and that the issues to be argued at the hearing were appellants’ and Witt’s “legal standing and the efficacy of the claims raised in the [c]omplaint.”January Term, 2020

15 declaration that the ordinances, “as well as every other ordina nce enacted, promulgated and/or maintained by Defendant City that purports t o regulate the right of a person to possess, purchase, sell, transfer, transport, st ore, or keep any firearm, part of a firearm, its component s and ammunition” are unlawful. As we stated in ProgressOhio.org, Inc. , an “idealistic opposition” to a challenged law is insufficient to establish standing under the Declaratory Judgme nt Act. 139 Ohio St.3d 520, 2014-Ohio-2382, 13 N.E.3d 1101, at ¶ 19. {¶ 37} Appellants also argue in their merit brief that Ohio’s Declarat ory Judgment Act broadly authorizes actions for declaratory relief predicated on
constitutional or nonconstitutiona l grounds, and that such reli ef “should be employed to ensure the City’s unconstitutional Ordinances will not subject firearms owners to new municipal criminal penalties.” The general avail ability of an action for declaratory relief to challenge an ordinance is not the sub ject of this appeal. This appeal relates to appellants’ standing to pursue such reli ef. The strength of the merits of a claim for declaratory relief is not relevant to a plaintiff’s burden to establish standing. Standing de pends on “whether the plaintiff s have alleged such a personal stake in the outcome o f the controversy that they ar e entitled to have a
court hear their case.” ProgressOhio.org, Inc. at ¶ 7. Thus, we decline the invitation to establish a blanket rule that a certain plaintiff will always have standing under the Declaratory Judgment Act to challenge municipal ordin ances under R.C. 9.68. We conclude that in this case, on the allegations in the complaint and on the arguments presented, appellant s have not established standing. E. Appellants’ Future Ability to Est ablish Standing Is Not Before this Court {¶ 38} Both dissenting opinions suggest that appellants could demonstrate standing based on harm to one of their members by the city ordi nances. Dissenting opinion of Kennedy, J., at ¶ 54; dissenting opinion of DeWine, J., at ¶ 64. In doing so though, each dissenting opinion implicitly acknowledges that appellants have not alleged or proved a b asis for standing i n this case at this time.S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

16 {¶ 39} In an attempt to circumvent this fact, the second dissenting op inion fashions a newly minted argument that offers appellants an oppo rtunity to reargue their standing case with the benefit of the court’s collective agreement that they have not alleged a proper basis for standing. This approach no t only would relieve appellants of their well-estab lished burden to establish standi ng and present the court with a justiciable claim, but also would provide appellan ts with an unprecedented belief that even if they cannot establish standin g on their asserted theory, they can try again on remand. {¶ 40} At every level, appellants have a rgued that they have standing under R.C. 9.68 to pursue injunctive and declaratory relief without having to demonstrate harm. Indeed, in appellants’ rep ly brief to this court, they m ade the following statements: (1) “The City’s arguments about the standing of [ap pellants] under R.C. 9.68 fail because the requirements for standing do not require actual injury or particularized harm for relief from the City’s firearm Ordinanc es” and (2) “Neither [appellant] need demonstrate that its members own guns. * * * The interest in uniformity is, in and of itself, sufficient to create standing * * *.” And even though the claim for injunctive relief may proceed on Witt’s taxpayer standing under R.C. 733.59, appellants’ proposition of l aw is seeking a broad, brig ht-line rule that “[a] non-profit firearms-rights associ ation has standing to challeng e as unconstitutional municipal ordinances that violat e R.C. 9.68 by maintaining an a ction for declaratory and injunctive relief under R.C. 9.68, R.C. 733.59, and/or Ohio Rev ised Code Chapter 2721.” (Emphasis a dded.) Appellant s have request ed that this court
reverse the Tenth District’s s tanding decision on its merits, n ot because it was “premature,” dissenting opinion of DeWine, J., at ¶ 58. We sho uld not allow a party another opportunity to establish standing on remand after the issue was argued by the parties and determined by the court. {¶ 41} Moreover, the second dissenting opinion states that appellants “were never individually put to the burden of proving standing in the proceeding below.”January Term, 2020

17 Dissenting opinion of DeWine, J ., at ¶ 63. Yet appellants had ample opportunity to prove standing below; first in their complaint and again whe n the city challenged their standing in its memorandum in opposition to a preliminary injunction. Nevertheless, the dissenting opi nions assert that the city miss ed the boat for not challenging standing via the proper procedural vehicle or faili ng to “show beyond doubt,” dissenting opinion of Ke nnedy, J., at ¶ 54, appellants lacked standing when
it is the plaintiff’s burden to allege a basis for standing. See also dissenting opinion of DeWine, J., at ¶ 63; Albanese v. Batman , 148 Ohio St.3d 85, 2016-Ohio-5814, 68 N.E.3d 800, ¶ 24 (“To have standing, the party bringing the action must assert a personal stake in the outcome of the action” [emphasis sic]); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife , 504 U.S. 555, 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992) (emphasizing that a plaintiff’s burden to establish standing is “an indispensable part of the plaintiff’s case”). {¶ 42} But contrary to the second dissenting opinion’s suggestion, the re is no magical moment during litigation that a plaintiff is relieve d of its burden to establish standing. It is a “jurisdictional requirement” that must be met for a party
to maintain a lawsuit. Dallman , 35 Ohio St.2d at 179, 298 N.E.2d 515. Thus, standing “may be raised at any time during the pendency of the proceedings,” New Boston Coke Corp. v. Tyler , 32 Ohio St.3d 216, 513 N.E.2d 302 (1987), paragraph two of the syllabus, including by a reviewing court sua sponte, Dallman at 178 (this court sua sponte raising the issue of standing and dismissing t he appeal based on a party’s failure to allege a pers onal stake in the outcome of th e proceedings). {¶ 43} Further, the case at h and is different than Planned Parenthood of Idaho, Inc. v. Wasden , 376 F.3d 908 (9th Cir.2004), on which the second dissenting opinion relies to promote such a view. In that case, the distr ict court explicitly
declined to decide whether Pla nned Parenthood had standing, bec ause another plaintiff had standing to sue, and Planned Parenthood requested that the Ninth Circuit do the same, decline review of its standing, in an atte mpt to have the meritsS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

18 of the appeal decided. Id. at 917-918. The trial court he re made no such caveat as to appellants’ standing, and appe llants have argued the exact o pposite on appeal, asserting that they have standing under the theories asserted a nd that the Tenth
District should affirm their own standing to bring their claims for declaratory and injunctive relief. {¶ 44} In sum, there is no basis for a remand on standing here. We ha ve not identified an error in the T enth District’s decision nor ha ve we announced a
new test or standard for the low er courts to apply. The thresh old requirement that a plaintiff must establish standi ng is far from a new concept i n the law. See
Dallman at 179 (“It is an elementary concept of law that a party lacks standing to invoke the jurisdiction of the c ourt unless he has * * * some r eal interest in the subject matter of the action”). To hold as we do today, that a ppellants have not met that threshold requirement does not deprive them of another opp ortunity to seek relief from the city ordinances under R.C. 9.68. Our holding s imply means that they, like every plaintiff who files a lawsuit, must establish standing to maintain
their suit. See Clifton v. Blanchester , 131 Ohio St.3d 287, 2012-Ohio-780, 964 N.E.2d 414, ¶ 15, quoting State ex rel. Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward , 86 Ohio St.3d 451, 469, 715 N.E.2d 1062 (1999) (“ ‘It is well e stablished that before an Ohio court can consider the merits of a legal claim, the person seeking relief must establish standing t o sue’ ”). Here, appellants ad opted a flawed theory of standing and continued to r ely on it throughout the adversar ial process. Because their theory is incorrect in this case, we cannot remedy it her e. For whatever case appellants may file in the future, they will have the benefit o f this court’s decision today as well as the dissenting opinions’ observations on how t o properly establish standing.January Term, 2020

19 III. Conclusion {¶ 45} For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that appellants have not established standing under R.C. 9.68, R.C. 733.58, or R.C. Chap ter 2721 to challenge the ordinances. There fore, we affirm the court of ap peals’ judgment. Judgment affirmed.

F RENCH , D ONNELLY , and S TEWART , JJ., concur.

K ENNEDY , J., dissents, with an opinion.

D E W INE , J., dissents, with an opinion joined by F ISCHER , J.

_________________ K

ENNEDY , J., dissenting. {¶ 46} Because appellees, the city of Columbus and Columbus City Attorney Zach M. Klein (collectively, “the city”), cannot demon strate beyond doubt that appellants, Ohioans for Concealed Carry, Inc., and B uckeye Firearms Foundation, Inc., can prove no set of facts establishing that t hey have standing to sue on behalf of their members, I dissent and would reverse the judgment of the Tenth District Court of Appeals dismissing the associations fro m this litigation and would remand this matter for a trial on the merits of the reque st for a permanent injunction. {¶ 47} In May 2018, Columbus City C ouncil passed Ordinance 1116-2018, which enacted Columbus City Code (“C.C.C.”) 2323.13 (penalizing the possession of weapons by (1) those who have been convicted of various felo ny offenses that are not barred by state law, (2 ) those who have been convicted of misdemeanor domestic violence, and (3) those who are subject to certain dom estic-violence protection orders) and 2323.171 (c riminalizing the possession o f firearm components such as bump stocks, w hich accelerate the rate of fi re). {¶ 48} Ohioans for Concealed Carry, Buckeye Firearms, and Gary Witt—a member of Ohioans for Concealed Carry and a resident of Columbu s—filed a complaint seeking a permanent injunction and a motion seeking a preliminaryS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

20 injunction against the city’s enforcement of the new ordinances , asserting that the
ordinances conflicted with R .C. 9.68, a general law permitting Ohioans to possess firearms, firearm parts, firearm components, and ammunition “[e ]xcept as specifically provided by the United States Constitution, Ohio C onstitution, state law, or federal law.” {¶ 49} Relevant here, the city responde d by asserting that Ohioans for Concealed Carry and Buckeye Firearms had failed to sufficiently allege that any of their members would have standing to sue to enjoin the ordinanc es, and at the preliminary-injunction hearing, the parties did not present any evidence on the issue
of associational sta nding . The trial court found that Ohioans for Concealed Carry, Buckeye Firearms, and Witt had standing to sue, and it permanen tly enjoined the city from enforcing the bump-stock ban, C.C.C. 2323.171, but de nied the request to enjoin enforcement of the wea pons-under-disability law, C.C. C. 2323.13. {¶ 50} The Tenth District Court of Appe als reversed the trial court’s judgment and remanded the case to the trial court, concluding t hat the trial court erred in granting a permanent injunction when the matter had be en set for a hearing on the request for a preliminar y injunction. 2019-Ohio-3105, 1 40 N.E.3d 1215, ¶ 57, 59 (10th Dist.). It also h eld that Ohioans for Concealed Carry and Buckeye Firearms lacked standing to sue on behalf of their members. In so holding, the court of appeals looked only to the complaint and held that the assoc iations had not adequately alleged th at their members would have had standing t o sue in their own right. Id . at ¶ 45. {¶ 51} Standing is established “in the same way as any other matter on which the plaintiff bears the bur den of proof, i.e., with the m anner and degree of evidence required at the successi ve stages of t he litigation.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife , 504 U.S. 555, 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992). T herefore, the stage of the proceeding (s uch as on a motion to dismiss, a motion for judgmentJanuary Term, 2020

21 on the pleadings, or a motion for summary judgment) dictates th e standard of
review. {¶ 52} The court of appeals reviewed the sufficiency of the complaint’ s allegations when analyzing whether Ohioans for Concealed Carry and Buckeye Firearms have standing to sue on behalf of their members. Howe ver, it failed to apply the applicable standard of review. When a defendant chal lenges the adequacy of a complaint after the close o f pleadings, a court construes as true the material allegations in the complaint and draws all reasonable inference s from them in favor of the nonmoving party and decides whether it is beyond doubt t hat the plaintiff can prove no set of facts entitling it to relief. State ex rel. Midwest Pride IV, Inc. v.

Pontious , 75 Ohio St.3d 565, 569-570, 664 N.E.2d 931 (1996). {¶ 53} An association has standing to bring a lawsuit on behalf of its members when (1) its members w ould otherwise have standing to s ue in their own right, (2) the interests the association seeks to protect are g ermane to its purpose, and (3) neither the cla im asserted nor the r elief requested req uires the participation
of individual members in the lawsuit. State ex rel. Food & Water Watch v. State , 153 Ohio St.3d 1, 2018-Ohio-555, 100 N.E.3d 391, ¶ 18. An asso ciation suing as a representative of its members m ust have “at least one member with standing to present, in his or her own right, the claim (or the type of cla im) pleaded by the
association.” United Food & Commercial Workers Union Local 751 v. Brown Group, Inc ., 517 U.S. 544, 555, 116 S.Ct. 1529, 134 L.Ed.2d 758 (1996). However, a member is not required to be a named plaintiff. See id . at 547, fn. 2 (standing was
not defeated when a union was the named party and the trial cou rt had denied a motion to amend the compl aint to add members); see also Food & Water Watch at ¶ 18 (associational standing may apply when neither the claim a sserted nor the relief requested requi res the participati on of individual membe rs). {¶ 54} The city has failed to show beyond doubt that Ohioans for Conce aled Carry and Buckeye Firearms cannot prove that any of their respe ctive membersS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

22 have been injured by the ordinances. The complaint describes b oth entities as
associations of firearm owners a nd Columbus taxpayers, and it a lleges that they “seek to enforce the public right of the people to keep and bea r arms and all peripheral rights guaranteed to them by the Constitution of Ohi o, the Constitution of the United States of America and R.C. 9.68.” It is possible that they could prove
that at least one member from each association has been harmed by the ordinances, either because he or she has been prohibited from owning or pos sessing a rate-offire acceleration device or because he or she has been disarmed in Columbus by virtue of a disqualifying conviction or a domestic-violence pro tection order. Similarly, it is possible that they could prove that they each have a member who has been prosecuted or threat ened with prosecution under those ordinances or who objects to spending tax dollars to enforce them. {¶ 55} “[A] plaintiff or relator is not r equired to prove his or her c ase at the pleading stage and need only give reasonable notice of the clai m.” State ex rel.
Harris v. Toledo , 74 Ohio St.3d 36, 37, 656 N.E.2d 334 (1995). The association s have met that burden here. {¶ 56} Lastly, the fact that the Columbus City Council repealed C.C.C. 2323.171 (the bump-stock ban) after we accepted jurisdiction in this case does not render any part of this case moot. As the United States Suprem e Court has explained, “[t]he voluntary ce ssation of challenged conduct doe s not ordinarily render a case moot because a dismissal for mootness would permi t a resumption of the challenged conduct as soon as the case is dismissed.” Knox v. Serv. Emps. Internatl. Union, Local 1000 , 567 U.S. 298, 307, 132 S.Ct. 2277, 183 L.Ed.2d 281 (2012). Such “maneuvers designed t o insulate a decision from r eview by [a court] must be viewed with a critical eye.” Id . And here, the associations have a continuing interest in vindicati ng their standing to challenge criminal ordinances that limit their members’ right to keep and bear arms and a con tinuing interest in seeking an award of attorney fees, costs, and nominal damages i f they succeed inJanuary Term, 2020

23 the trial court. See R.C. 9.68; Memphis Community School Dist. v. Stachura , 477 U.S. 299, 308, 106 S.Ct. 2537, 91 L.Ed.2d 249 (1986), fn. 11. {¶ 57} I therefore would reverse the judgment of the court of appeals dismissing Ohioans for Concealed Carry and Buckeye Firearms fro m the lawsuit. Because this court did not accept any other issue for review, t his matter should be
remanded to the trial court to c onduct an evidentiary hearing o n the request for a permanent injunction.

_________________ D E W INE , J., dissenting. {¶ 58} In my view, it was premature for the Tenth District Court of Ap peals to determine that Ohioans for Concealed Carry, Inc., and Buckey e Firearms Foundation, Inc. (collectively, “the gun-rights groups”), lack standing. I would leave that matter for further proceedings in the trial court. I dissent from the majority’s decision to do otherwise. {¶ 59} The procedural posture of this case is unique. Gary Witt and t he gun-rights groups filed a complaint seeking to enjoin the city’ s enforcement of two Columbus code provisions. At the same time, the gun-rights gro ups and Witt filed a motion for a preliminary injunction. After a hearing on the motion, the trial court permanently enjoined the city from enforcing Columbus City Code 2323.171. Importantly, at no point in the trial court did the city move t o dismiss the gun-rights groups or Witt from the lawsuit for lack of standing. It did a rgue generally, however, that injunctive relief should be denied because all th e parties lacked standing. {¶ 60} On appeal in the Tenth District, the city argued that the trial court should not have granted the injunction, because none of the par ties had standing. The Tenth District concluded that Witt had standing to maintain a claim under R.C. 733.59. 2019-Ohio-3105, 140 N.E.3d 1215, ¶ 32 (10th Dist.). The court of appeals also determined that the trial court should not have issued a p ermanent injunctionS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

24 when the matter had been set f or a hearing on only a preliminar y injunction. Id . at ¶ 56-57. As a consequence, it re manded the matter to the trial court for further proceedings. {¶ 61} The city did not challenge the holding that Witt possessed stan ding.
So we must assume for present purposes that the court of appeal s’ decision on that issue was correct. Curiously, though, after concluding that Wi tt had standing, the
Tenth District then concluded th at the gun-rights groups did no t have standing. Id

. at ¶ 46. This was unnecessary. On a claim for injunctive reli ef, only one plaintiff needs to establish standing to assert a claim in order for a co urt to have subjectmatter jurisdiction over the claim. See Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc. , 547 U.S. 47, 52, 126 S.Ct. 1297, 164 L.Ed.2d 156 (2006), fn. 2 (noting that the court of appeals did not determine wheth er other plaintiffs had standing, because the presence of one plaintiff with standing i s sufficient to make a case justiciable); Beaver Excavating Co. v. Testa , 134 Ohio St.3d 565, 2012-Ohio5776, 983 N.E.2d 1317, ¶ 16 (“[I]t is sufficient for purposes o f jurisdiction that at least one plaintiff has standing for the claims of the remainin g plaintiffs to be heard and the court to proceed to decide the case on the merits”). B ased on the determination by the court of appeals that Witt had standing, t he trial court had the authority to issue injunctive relief. So there was no need for the court of appeals to decide whether the gun-rights groups possessed standing. {¶ 62} The majority argues that a rema nd would relieve “ appellants of their
well-established burden to estab lish standing and present the c ourt with a justiciable claim.” Majority opinion at ¶ 39. Indeed, the authority cited by the majority deals largely with whether a claim is justiciable. See id. at ¶ 41, citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife , 504 U.S. 555, 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992). B ut of course, “justiciablity” is not the issue here. Because we must assume that Witt had standing, the claim is justiciable. See Dept. of Commerce v. United States House of Representatives , 525 U.S. 316, 330-334, 119 S.Ct. 765, 142 L.Ed.2d 797 (1999)January Term, 2020

25 (holding that the presence of one plaintiff with standing is al l that is needed to make claim justiciable, and finding it unnecessary to consider the s tanding of the other plaintiffs). {¶ 63} It is of course true that even though only one plaintiff need h ave standing for a court to issue injunctive relief, a court may st ill dismiss parties without a personal stake in the outcome. See Planned Parenthood of Idaho, Inc. v.
Wasden , 376 F.3d 908, 918 (9th Cir.2004), fn. 6 (noting that because one plaintiff had standing, there was no reas on to consider the standing of t he other plaintiffs for purposes of appeal, but on remand, the district court may need to determine whether the party was a proper plainti ff because only proper parties ma y enforce an injunction). But the problem that I have with the majority’s d ecision to affirm the court of appeals’ dismissal of t he gun-rights groups as parties for lack of standing is that the groups were never individually put to the burden of proving standing in the proceeding below. The city did not move to dismiss any of the plaintiffs from the lawsuit for lack of standing nor did it move for summary ju dgment as to any of the plaintiffs. The city did ar gue that the court lacked juris diction to grant injunctive relief because all three of the plaintiffs lacked st anding, but all that was necessary to defeat this argument was a showing that any one pl aintiff had standing. {¶ 64} As the other dissent points out, it may be possible for the gun -rights groups to establish associational standing by showing that they have a member who has been injured or threatened with injury by the Columbus prov isions. Dissenting opinion of Kennedy, J., at ¶ 54. The matter is being remanded to the trial court. If the city believes there are grounds to dismiss the gun-rights g roups from the case for lack of standing, it can file an appropriate motion, the gu n-rights groups can respond, and the trial court can rule accordingly. {¶ 65} A remand that allows for the possibility of further proceedings on the standing issue seems particul arly appropriate here. The co urt of appeals reversed the judgment granting a permanent injunction because t he trial court’sS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

26 consolidation of the matter with the preliminary injunction dep rived the city of “a full and fair opportunity to pres ent evidence.” 2019-Ohio-3105 , 140 N.E.3d 1215, at ¶ 57. The gun-rights groups dese rve the same consideration. {¶ 66} I would reverse the decision of the court of appeals dismissing the gun-rights groups from the action for lack of standing and rema nd the matter to the trial court. Because the majorit y does otherwise, I respectful ly dissent.

F ISCHER , J., concurs in the foregoing opinion.

_________________ Haynes, Kessler, Myers & Postalakis, Inc., David S. Kessler, St ephen P. Postalakis, and Eric B. Hershberg er; and Barney DeBrosse, L.L.C . and Derek A. DeBrosse, for appella nt Ohioans for Concealed Carry, Inc. James P. Sean Maloney; and Ronald Lemieux, for appellant Buckey e Firearms Foundation, Inc. Zach Klein, Columbus City Attorney, Richard N. Coglianese, City Solicitor General, and Lara N. Bake r-Morrish, for appellees.

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