United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit ____________

No. 22-60477

Summary Calendar

____________

Evelyn Yessenia Ordonez Rojas; Evelyn Sarahi Anariba 

Ordonez, 

Petitioners, 

versus

Merrick Garland, U.S. Attorney General, 

Respondent. 

______________________________

Petition for Review of an Order of the 

Board of Immigration Appeals

Agency Nos. A208 764 506, A208 764 507

______________________________

Before Willett, Duncan, and Wilson, Circuit Judges: 

Per Curiam:*

Evelyn Yessenia Ordonez Rojas and her minor daughter, natives and 

citizens of Honduras, petition for review of the decision by the Board of 

Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirming the denial of their application for 

asylum and withholding of removal. We DENY the petition.

_____________________

* This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

August 22, 2023

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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We review the BIA’s decision, and we and consider the immigration 

judge’s decision only to the extent it influenced the BIA. Singh v. Sessions, 

880 F.3d 220, 224 (5th Cir. 2018). We review factual findings for substantial 

evidence, and we review legal determinations de novo. Lopez-Gomez v. 

Ashcroft, 263 F.3d 442, 444 (5th Cir. 2001).

Ordonez Rojas first argues that the immigration court lacked 

jurisdiction to order her removed because her notice to appear failed to 

specify the date, time, and location of her removal hearing. Circuit precedent

forecloses this argument. Castillo-Gutierrez v. Garland, 43 F.4th 477, 480 

(5th Cir. 2022); Maniar v. Garland, 998 F.3d 235, 242 (5th Cir. 2021) 

(holding that a notice to appear “is sufficient to commence proceedings even 

if it does not include the time, date, or place of the initial hearing”) (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted)). Accordingly, the BIA did not err in 

determining that jurisdiction properly vested in the immigration court.

Next, Ordonez Rojas argues that the notice to appear is defective 

because the charge is inconsistent with the allegations. Specifically, she 

argues that she cannot be removed for attempting to enter the United States 

without valid entry documents when she never presented herself for 

admission to begin with. But she did not raise this argument to the BIA. “A 

court may review a final order of removal only if . . . (1) the alien has 

exhausted all administrative remedies available to the alien as of right . . . .”

8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1). Because Ordonez Rojas did not raise this issue to the 

BIA, it is unexhausted, and we decline to address it. See id.; Fort Bend Cnty. 

v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 1843, 1844 (2019) (“A claim-processing rule requiring 

parties to take certain procedural steps in, or prior to, litigation, may be 

mandatory in the sense that a court must enforce the rule if timely raised.”

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).

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Ordonez Rojas next argues that she demonstrated a nexus between her 

asserted harm and a protected basis under the immigration laws. To establish 

eligibility for asylum or withholding of removal, an applicant must prove that 

she is unwilling or unable to return to her home country because of persecution 

on account of her race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social 

group, or political opinion. See Cantarero-Lagos v. Barr, 924 F.3d 145, 150 

(5th Cir. 2019); Sharma v. Holder, 729 F.3d 407, 411 (5th Cir. 2013).

“[A]lthough a statutorily protected ground need not be the only reason for 

harm, it cannot be incidental, tangential, superficial, or subordinate to 

another reason for harm.” Cabrera v. Sessions, 890 F.3d 153, 159 (5th Cir. 

2018) (internal quotations marks and citation omitted).

Ordonez Rojas claims that she “was persecuted because she, an 

unprotected single mother, stood up to a gang and refused to pay the amount 

demanded.” But economic extortion is not a cognizable form of persecution 

under immigration law. See Singh v. Barr, 920 F.3d 255, 259 (5th Cir. 2019).

Substantial evidence therefore supports the BIA’s determination that 

Ordonez Rojas failed to demonstrate a nexus between any suffered harm and 

a protected ground. Because Ordonez Rojas has not established the requisite

nexus, we need not address her arguments related to past persecution. See 

INS v. Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24, 25 (1976) (per curiam) (“As a general rule 

courts and agencies are not required to make findings on issues the decision 

of which is unnecessary to the results they reach.”).

Finally, although Ordonez Rojas mentions the BIA’s denial of her 

claim under the Convention Against Torture, this argument is not adequately 

briefed, and we deem it abandoned. See Soadjede v. Ashcroft, 324 F.3d 830, 

833 (5th Cir. 2003). The petition for review is DENIED.

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