COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

Present: Judges Elder, Petty and McCullough

Argued at Richmond, Virginia

RICHARD ALVIN OTEY

OPINION BY

v. Record No. 2439-11-2 JUDGE STEPHEN R. McCULLOUGH

DECEMBER 26, 2012

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF SPOTSYLVANIA COUNTY

David H. Beck, Judge

Joseph E. Hicks (Jarrell, Hicks & Waldman, P.C., on brief), for 

appellant.

Aaron J. Campbell, Assistant Attorney General (Kenneth T. 

Cuccinelli, II, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.

Richard Alvin Otey was stopped for driving with a defective brake light. The stop led to 

the discovery of illegal drugs. He challenges the validity of the stop, contending that the stop 

was not justified because, as a matter of law, his brake light was not defective. We disagree and 

affirm.1

BACKGROUND

On April 15, 2011, Deputy D.J. Hart of the Spotsylvania County Sheriff’s Office was 

conducting surveillance of a suspect vehicle driven by appellant. As he drove closer to 

appellant’s car, Deputy Hart noticed that “a portion of the third brake light, the high mount brake 

light, was out.” This particular brake light had “two lights in it,” and Deputy Hart testified, 

 1 This is not the first time we have been presented with this issue. On two prior 

occasions, albeit in unpublished opinions, we reached the same conclusion that we do here. See

Commonwealth v. Gaskins, No. 0101-11-4, 2011 Va. App. LEXIS 180 (Va. Ct. App. May 24, 

2011); Ragland v. Commonwealth, No. 1036-96-2, 1997 Va. App. LEXIS 109 (Va. Ct. App. 

Feb. 18, 1997). 

PUBLISHED
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“one-half of that light was out.” Based on this fact, Deputy Hart made a traffic stop. On 

cross-examination, Deputy Hart acknowledged that he was able to see the brake lights 

illuminate. He could not determine with certainty the distance between his vehicle and 

appellant’s, but he stated that the two vehicles could have been separated by 500 feet. 

As he approached the vehicle, Deputy Hart noticed “a strong and distinct odor of fresh 

marijuana coming from inside the vehicle.” When asked about the odor, Otey admitted that 

there was a bag of marijuana in the center console. Deputy Hart seized the bag, as well as a

digital scale located under the driver’s seat. Otey admitted to possessing two additional bags in 

his pockets. Otey later stated that he was “fronted” the marijuana, meaning that he would sell it 

and then reimburse his supplier with the proceeds from the sales.

Otey moved to suppress the evidence seized following the traffic stop, arguing that the 

stop was improper. The trial court denied the motion, reasoning that the stop was justified based

on the defective brake light. Otey was convicted of possession of marijuana with intent to 

distribute and sentenced to serve three years in prison, with all but 60 days suspended. 

ANALYSIS

When this Court reviews a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, “‘the burden is 

upon [the losing party] to show that the ruling, when the evidence is considered most favorably 

to the [prevailing party], constituted reversible error.’” McGee v. Commonwealth, 25 Va. App. 

193, 197, 487 S.E.2d 259, 261 (1997) (en banc) (quoting Fore v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 1007, 

1010, 265 S.E.2d 729, 731 (1980)). Although the facts here are not in dispute, we view the 

evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party. Branham v. Commonwealth, 283 

Va. 273, 279, 720 S.E.2d 74, 77 (2012).

The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects against unreasonable 

searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV. An officer’s stop of a vehicle is reasonable under 
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the Fourth Amendment if the officer possesses at least articulable and reasonable suspicion that 

the vehicle is in violation of a statute or regulation governing the vehicle’s equipment. Delaware 

v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979). See also McCain v. Commonwealth, 275 Va. 546, 553, 659 

S.E.2d 512, 516 (2008) (“An officer may effect a traffic stop when he has reasonable suspicion 

to believe a traffic or equipment violation has occurred.”). If the search violates the suspect’s 

Fourth Amendment rights, exclusion of the illegally seized evidence generally constitutes the 

remedy. See Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2423 (2011). 

The issue before us pivots on a question of statutory construction, namely, the meaning of 

the term “defective” in Code § 46.2-1003. “Statutory interpretation presents a pure question of 

law and is accordingly subject to de novo review by this Court.” Washington v. Commonwealth, 

272 Va. 449, 455, 634 S.E.2d 310, 313 (2006). 

Code § 46.2-1003 makes it “unlawful for any person to use or have as equipment on a 

motor vehicle operated on a highway any device or equipment mentioned in § 46.2-1002 which 

is defective or in unsafe condition.” In turn, Code § 46.2-1002 mentions “lighting device[s], 

warning device[s], signal device[s], safety glass, [and] other equipment for which approval is 

required by any provision of this chapter . . . .”2 Finally, Code § 46.2-1014.1 requires 

automobiles to “be equipped with a supplemental center high mount stop light of a type 

approved by the Superintendent or which meets the standards adopted by the United States 

Department of Transportation.” 

Appellant argues that Deputy Hart’s stop was based on a mistaken reading of the law. He 

contends that Code § 46.2-1014 supplies the standard for what constitutes a “defective” brake 

light. Code § 46.2-1014 provides in relevant part that 

 2 The Superintendent of the State Police is the person who is tasked with providing this 

approval. See Code §§ 46.2-1005 and 46.2-1002.
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Every motor vehicle . . . except an antique vehicle not 

originally equipped with a brake light, registered in the 

Commonwealth and operated on the highways in the 

Commonwealth shall be equipped with at least two brake lights of 

a type approved by the Superintendent. Such brake lights shall 

automatically exhibit a red or amber light plainly visible in clear 

weather from a distance of 500 feet to the rear of such vehicle 

when the brake is applied. 

Appellant reasons that his brake light was not defective because it was visible from 500 feet. 

“Ordinarily, when a particular word in a statute is not defined therein, a court must give it 

its ordinary meaning.” Moyer v. Commonwealth, 33 Va. App. 8, 35, 531 S.E.2d 580, 593 (2000)

(en banc) (citing McKeon v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 24, 27, 175 S.E.2d 282, 284 (1970)). The 

plain, ordinary meaning of the term “defective” is straightforward. A brake light is “defective” if 

it is “faulty, deficient.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 591 (1981). A brake light 

that lights up by only half is faulty and deficient, just as an engine that sputters and lurches is 

defective, even if it works well enough to enable the driver to reach his destination. We adopt 

the plain language reading of the term “defective.”

In addition, Code § 46.2-1003 is codified among the provisions regulating “vehicle and 

equipment safety.” As we noted in Ragland v. Commonwealth, No. 1036-96-2, 1997 Va. App. 

LEXIS 109 (Va. Ct. App. Feb. 18, 1997),3 this provision 

does more than set a minimum standard; it regulates the 

maintenance of devices or equipment used on a vehicle. In 

particular, Code § 46.2-1003 prohibits the use on a vehicle of any

equipment mentioned in Code § 46.2-1002 that is either unsafe or 

defective, whether or not this equipment exceeds the minimum 

requirements set forth elsewhere in the Code. Thus, the apparent 

intent of Code § 46.2-1003 is to compel automobile owners to 

repair or replace any of their vehicle’s equipment that falls into a 

defective or unsafe condition.

 3 Although not binding precedent, unpublished opinions can be cited and considered for 

their persuasive value. Rule 5A:1(f). 
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Id. at *6-*7. Appellant’s attempt to harmonize Code § 46.2-1003 and Code § 46.2-1014 would 

have “the effect of eviscerating the impact of Code § 46.2-1003 because it would create an entire 

class of equipment that may be legally used on a vehicle in an unsafe or defective condition 

simply because the equipment is in excess of the Code’s minimum requirements.” Id. at *7. We 

decline to “construe these two provisions to achieve such an unwarranted result.” Id.

Moreover, reading Code § 46.2-1003 in the manner argued by appellant – that a brake 

light is defective only if it is not visible from 500 feet – would render superfluous and redundant 

the language in Code § 46.2-1003 prohibiting defective equipment. Under appellant’s suggested 

reading, Code § 46.2-1003 would simply repeat the requirements already set forth in Code 

§ 46.2-1014. Basic canons of statutory construction proscribe interpreting statutes in a way that 

renders statutory language superfluous. See, e.g., Zhou v. Zhou, 38 Va. App. 126, 136-37, 562 

S.E.2d 336, 340-41 (2002). 

We also note that under the Virginia Administrative Code, a vehicle will not pass 

inspection if a vehicle’s rear light assembly “does not work as designed by the manufacturer,” if 

all rear lamps “are not in operating condition” and where a lamp’s “filaments do not burn.” 

19 VAC § 30-70-150(1), (2), (10).

4

 It certainly would be odd for a vehicle’s malfunctioning rear 

light to cause the vehicle to fail the state inspection but at the same time not be “defective.”5

Finally, appellant makes a policy argument in support of reversal, contending that a stop 

such as this one is “unduly burdensome to the driver.” Appellant’s Br. at 12. Our role as a 

 4 This same regulation provides that “[f]or those vehicles that are equipped with a 

multiple LED light (not filament-burning bulbs), they will pass inspection if more than 50% of 

the diode lights are burning.” 19 VAC § 30-70-150(5).

5 Only “device[s] [and] equipment mentioned in § 46.2-1002” are required to be kept in a 

non-defective condition under Code § 46.2-1003. As a result, assuming that some nonfunctioning optional equipment would cause a vehicle to fail state inspection, such defective 

optional equipment would not justify a stop under Code § 46.2-1003.
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reviewing court is to determine whether the stop conformed to the law. The legislature certainly 

may choose to constrain the discretion exercised by law enforcement officers in particular 

contexts beyond the requirements of the Fourth Amendment. That policy decision, however, is 

for the legislature to make.6 

Deputy Hart’s stop of appellant’s vehicle was based on a reasonable, articulable 

suspicion that appellant’s vehicle had defective equipment. Therefore, the trial court correctly 

denied appellant’s motion to suppress. 

CONCLUSION

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Affirmed.

 6 We note that officers are directed, subject to limited exceptions, to issue a summons 

rather than effectuate an arrest for traffic infractions, and traffic infractions are defined to include 

equipment violations. See Code §§ 19.2-74, 46.2-937, 46.2-100, and 46.2-113.