[Cite as In re A.L., 2016-Ohio-8504.]

STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 

 )ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF SUMMIT ) 

IN RE: A.L. 

 

 

 

C.A. Nos. 28345 

28347 

APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT 

ENTERED IN THE 

COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 

COUNTY OF SUMMIT, OHIO 

CASE No. DN15-10-760 

DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY 

Dated: December 30, 2016 

 

HENSAL, Judge. 

{¶1} Appellants, Carrie L. (“Mother”) and Michael L. (“Father”), appeal from a 

judgment of the Summit County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, that terminated 

their parental rights to their minor child, A.L., and placed her in the permanent custody of 

Summit County Children Services (“CSB”). This Court affirms. 

I. 

{¶2} Appellants are the unmarried parents of A.L., the child who is the subject of this 

appeal and who was born September 9, 2015. Mother has two older children and her parental 

rights were previously terminated with respect to them. Father is the biological parent of one of 

those children and his parental rights were terminated to that child as well. See In re R.L., 

Summit C.P., Juv.Div. Nos. DN12-09-0623, DN12-09-0624 (Dec. 31, 2013), affirmed In re R.L., 

9th Dist. Summit Nos. 27214, 27233, 2014-Ohio-3117. 
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{¶3} The present case began on October 28, 2015, with the filing of a dependency 

complaint. The complaint alleged that the parents have a history of homelessness and serious 

mental health issues, that Father exhibited threatening behavior to CSB caseworkers during the 

family’s prior dependency case, and that Mother has developmental delays that inhibit her ability 

to independently parent a child. The complaint further alleged that the family was about to lose 

its housing due to a lack of funds and would soon become homeless. According to the 

complaint, the police conducted a child welfare check and talked to the parents. CSB attempted 

to follow up, but the parents refused to speak with agency representatives. The agency initiated 

the present suit out of concern for the safety of the infant. At CSB’s request, the agency was 

granted emergency temporary custody of the seven-week-old child. 

{¶4} At adjudication, the parents stipulated to the factual allegations of the complaint 

and to the dependency of the child. Upon disposition, the court granted temporary custody of 

A.L. to CSB and adopted the case plan proposed by the agency. The case plan required both 

parents to obtain stable housing, address their mental health issues, attend parenting classes, and 

complete a chemical dependency evaluation. The parents were offered weekly visitation. As of 

January 2016, they were required to attend separate visits because of their propensity to argue 

during visits. In addition, Father was advised to not become involved in any further law 

enforcement issues. 

{¶5} The trial court granted CSB’s request for an order granting a reasonable efforts 

bypass pursuant to R.C. 2151.419(A)(2) based on the prior involuntary termination of the 

parents’ parental rights to siblings of A.L. See R.C. 2151.419(A)(2)(e). A certified copy of the 

journal entry was submitted as evidence of the termination of Mother’s parental rights to R.L. 

and S.L., and Father’s parental rights to S.L. See In re R.L., Summit C.P., Juv.Div. Nos. DN12-
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09-0623, DN12-09-0624, affirmed In re R.L., 2014-Ohio-3117. Based on the reasonable efforts 

bypass, CSB was no longer required to make reasonable efforts to return the child to her parents. 

See R.C. 2151.419(A)(2) and In re L.M., 9th Dist. Summit No. 26772, 2013-Ohio-2669, ¶ 6. 

{¶6} In due course, CSB moved for permanent custody of A.L. Following a hearing, 

the trial court granted permanent custody of the child to CSB and terminated the parents’ 

parental rights to her. Each parent has appealed, and each has assigned one error for review. 

II. 

FATHER’S ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR 

THE TRIAL COURT’S GRANTING OF SUMMIT COUNTY [CHILDREN] 

SERVICES MOTION FOR PERMANENT CUSTODY IS AGAINST THE 

MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE[.] 

{¶7} Father claims that the judgment of the trial court, granting permanent custody of 

A.L. to the agency, is against the manifest weight of the evidence. In general, before a juvenile 

court may terminate parental rights and award permanent custody of a child to a proper moving 

agency it must find clear and convincing evidence of both prongs of the permanent custody test: 

(1) that the child is abandoned, orphaned, has been in the temporary custody of the agency for at 

least 12 months of a consecutive 22-month period, the child or another child of the same parent 

has been adjudicated abused, neglected, or dependent three times, or that the child cannot be 

placed with either parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with either parent, 

based on an analysis under R.C. 2151.414(E); and (2) that the grant of permanent custody to the 

agency is in the best interest of the child, based on an analysis under R.C. 2151.414(D)(1). R.C. 

2151.414(B)(1) and 2151.414(B)(2); see also In re William S., 75 Ohio St.3d 95, 99 (1996). 

{¶8} However, the Revised Code also provides that when “[t]he parent from whom the 

child was removed has had parental rights involuntarily terminated with respect to a sibling of 
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the child pursuant to section 2151.353, 2151.414, or 2151.415 of the Revised Code[,]” the 

juvenile court “shall make a determination that the agency is not required to make reasonable 

efforts to * * * eliminate the continued removal of the child from the child’s home, and return 

the child to the child’s home[.]” R.C. 2151.419(A)(2)(e) and R.C. 2151.419(A)(2). 

{¶9} Furthermore, “[w]hen the trial court grants a motion for a reasonable efforts 

bypass pursuant to R.C. 2151.419(A)(2), * * * R.C. 2151.413(D)(2) and R.C. 2151.414(B)(2) 

apply.” In re S.R.T., 9th Dist. Summit No. 27978, 2016-Ohio-788, ¶ 8, citing In re A.U., 2d Dist. 

Montgomery No. 22264, 2008-Ohio-186, ¶ 17. As relevant here, R.C. 2151.413(D)(2) provides 

that when a motion for reasonable efforts bypass is granted, the agency is required to file a 

motion for permanent custody. See S.R.T at ¶ 8, citing In re W.W., 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C110363, 2011-Ohio-4912, ¶ 49. And finally, R.C. 2151.414(B)(2) provides that the trial court 

“shall grant permanent custody of the child to the [agency]” if the court determines that: (1) the 

child cannot be placed with one of the child’s parents within a reasonable time or should not be 

placed with either parent, in accordance with R.C. 2151.414(E) and (2) permanent custody is in 

the child’s best interest, in accordance with R.C. 2151.414(D). See In re J.D., 2d Dist. 

Montgomery No. 26588, 2015-Ohio-4114, ¶ 48-49. 

{¶10} In the present case, CSB moved for permanent custody of the child, while 

indicating that the parents had their parental rights terminated with respect to siblings of the child 

and that the trial court had relieved the agency of making reasonable efforts towards 

reunification. In granting the motion for permanent custody, the trial court found that A.L. could 

not be returned to either parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with either of 

them. See R.C. 2151.414(B)(2). In support of that finding, the trial court determined, inter alia, 
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that siblings of A.L. were permanently removed from the parents’ custody for similar concerns in 

2013. See R.C. 2151.414(E)(11). 

{¶11} On appeal, Father does not dispute that each parent’s parental rights were 

terminated as to siblings of A.L. Father is nevertheless statutorily entitled to counter this fact by 

providing “clear and convincing evidence to prove that, notwithstanding the prior termination, 

the parent can provide a legally secure permanent placement and adequate care for the health, 

welfare, and safety of the child.” R.C. 2151.414(E)(11). In other words, Father may challenge 

the determination that the child cannot or should not be placed in his custody within a reasonable 

time, by clearly and convincingly establishing that he can now “provide a legally secure 

permanent placement and adequate care for the health, welfare, and safety of the child.” See R.C. 

2151.414(B)(2) and R.C. 2151.414(E)(11). Upon careful review of the record, we cannot 

conclude that Father has met this burden. 

{¶12} In the prior case, the children came into care due to the parents’ homelessness and 

their serious and untreated mental health concerns. The caseworker from that case testified in 

the current case and explained that the parents never obtained housing, only sporadically 

attended mental health treatment sessions, and were never able to remedy the concerns that 

brought the children into custody. Ultimately, the trial court found that the parents’ chronic and 

uncontrolled mental illnesses prevented them from providing the children with a permanent and 

safe home environment. In re R.L., Summit C.P., Juv.Div. Nos. DN12-09-0623, DN12-09-0624, 

affirmed In re R.L., 2014-Ohio-3117. 

{¶13} The present case began with similar concerns: homelessness and mental health 

issues. The family had been living on the streets, in shelters, and briefly in a hotel. There is no 

evidence that the parents ever obtained stable housing together. During the present case, the 
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parents ended their relationship. Father’s counselor believed Father had been staying at his place 

of employment, with friends, with his stepmother, and, most recently, in a trailer in Portsmouth, 

Ohio. Mother claimed that she obtained an apartment two weeks before the hearing, but the 

apartment had no stove, refrigerator or sink, and she had not yet obtained furnishings. Upon this 

record, neither parent has established stable housing. 

{¶14} In addition, neither parent has established that they have addressed their mental 

health issues such that they can provide a legally secure permanent placement and provide 

adequate care for the health, welfare, and safety of A.L. For his part, Father was diagnosed with 

a schizoaffective disorder bipolar type, a personality disorder with antisocial traits, and a history 

of cannabis abuse. The evaluating psychologist explained that Father’s thought processes were 

disorganized and tangential, and that he had delusions of grandeur, believing himself to be the 

smartest person on earth. She recommended that Father obtain a psychiatric evaluation. She 

also recommended that he complete parenting education and mental health counseling. 

{¶15} The record reveals that Father did not successfully address his case plan 

objectives regarding mental health. The caseworker said that Father did not complete a chemical 

dependency evaluation, refused medication, refused to provide his address to his case manager, 

and declined case management services. He attended counseling once or twice a month for four 

months, but often left before the sessions were finished, claiming he had an emergency telephone 

call and was otherwise not very forthcoming in his communications. His counselor reported no 

progress except in developing a rapport between them. She indicated that Father was not fully 

invested in counseling and was resistant to accepting help from service providers. The 

caseworker observed no progress on Father’s mental health issues since the first case. 
7 

 

{¶16} Mother also failed to demonstrate that she had successfully addressed her mental 

health issues. Mother has been diagnosed with post-traumatic stress, a personality disorder with 

dependent and borderline traits, mild mental retardation, and cocaine dependence in reported 

remission. Her evaluating psychologist testified that Mother had a lengthy history of instability 

in employment, housing, relationships, and mental health, and recommended that Mother engage 

in counseling, monthly medication management, and parenting classes. Mother currently has a 

case manager who assists her with symptom monitoring and links her to community resources. 

Although she believes Mother is presently “able to function on a day-to-day basis without 

assistance[,]” she nevertheless contacts Mother two or three times a month and assists her with 

items she needs on a daily basis, such as housing, food, household goods, furniture, and clothing, 

and helps her address the “stressors” in her life. The psychologist recognized that Mother has 

“needed extra assistance * * * throughout her life” in order to “carry out her daily life 

responsibilities” and believed that Mother would require on-going assistance with “the day-today stuff” if she is awarded custody of her children. Mother attended counseling inconsistently, 

and she continues to struggle with the same issues. 

{¶17} Father told the caseworker that he was concerned about Mother, and the people 

she “was hanging out with.” He told the caseworker that Mother even had a plan to “steal” all 

three of her children back if she lost A.L., and Father claimed he refused to be part of it. 

{¶18} Based upon this record, Father has not provided clear and convincing evidence 

that he or Mother could currently provide a legally secure permanent placement and adequate 

care for the health, welfare, and safety of the child. See R.C. 2151.414(E)(11). Thus, the record 

supports a finding that the child cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable time or 

should not be placed with either parent. See R.C. 2151.414(B)(2). 
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{¶19} The trial court also found that permanent custody was in the best interest of the 

child. See R.C. 2151.414(B)(2) and R.C. 2151.414(D)(1). When making such a determination, 

the juvenile court must consider all the relevant factors, including those enumerated in R.C. 

2151.414(D)(1): the interaction and interrelationships of the child, the wishes of the child, the 

custodial history of the child, the child’s need for permanence and whether that can be achieved 

without a grant of permanent custody, and whether any of the factors outlined in R.C. 

2151.414(E)(7) to (11) apply. R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(a)-(e). “Although the trial court is not 

precluded from considering other relevant factors, the statute explicitly requires the court to 

consider all of the enumerated factors.” In re Smith, 9th Dist. Summit No. 20711, 2002 WL 

5178, *3, (Jan. 2, 2002); see also In re Palladino, 11th Dist. Geauga No. 2002-G-2445, 2002-

Ohio-5606, ¶ 24. See R.C. 2151.414(B)(2) and R.C. 2151.414(D). 

{¶20} The first of the best interest factors requires consideration of the relevant personal 

interactions and interrelationships of the child. R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(a). There is evidence in the 

record regarding the child’s relationship with Mother and Father. 

{¶21} Father did not spend much time developing a relationship with A.L. The 

caseworker reported that Father’s attendance at early visits was inconsistent, but she was able to 

observe him with A.L. during some of the visits. She explained that Father could be loving and 

affectionate at times, but he also came to some visits in an agitated state. He was said to escalate 

quickly, and the caseworker was not always able to calm him. The caseworker stated that Father 

had unrealistic expectations regarding child development. Father took a parenting class during 

the first case, but refused to take additional parenting training during the present case. In early 

January 2016, Father asked to be taken off the visitation schedule entirely and he attended no 

visits with A.L. after that time. 
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{¶22} The caseworker also addressed Mother’s relationship with the child. The 

caseworker said Mother appears to love A.L. and is “trying to learn[,]” but Mother frequently 

needed prompts to lift the baby’s head, to feed or change the baby, and to interact or focus on 

her. During visits, Mother would often talk to the caseworker or other adults in the room about 

her own life instead of focusing on the child. According to the caseworker, Mother completed a 

parenting class, but has not demonstrated that she is able to apply what she has been taught. The 

caseworker said that Mother has not even achieved a degree of progress that would warrant a 

decrease in the level of supervision at her visits. 

{¶23} The caseworker also expressed concerns about Mother’s insight and judgment. 

For example, according to the caseworker, Mother recently told Father to put a bullet in his 

mouth and die. When questioned, Mother explained that Father has hepatitis and asthma, and he 

did not want to live anyway. The caseworker also reported that after Mother broke up with 

Father, she went from not wanting to be in another relationship - out of concern for the child’s 

well-being and stability - to being “totally head over heels in love” with a new boyfriend within 

the space of one week. The caseworker did not believe Mother understood how her decisions 

would affect the safety and well-being of her child long-term. 

{¶24} The guardian ad litem reported that A.L. is healthy and developing appropriately 

in the care of the foster parents. Those foster parents have adopted A.L.’s two siblings and are 

interested in adopting A.L. if that becomes a possibility. 

{¶25} The record does not reflect any evidence of a continuing positive relationship 

between A.L. and any extended family members. 

{¶26} The wishes of A.L. were conveyed by the guardian ad litem who has worked with 

the family for nearly three years, including two years of the prior case. See RC. 
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2151.414(D)(1)(b). With respect to Father, the guardian ad litem indicated that Father has 

significant untreated mental health diagnoses and made the choice to not engage in case 

management services. He has, in fact, had little involvement with the case, and he has had no 

contact at all with A.L. for six months. Father reportedly told the guardian ad litem that he did 

not want to become emotionally involved with the child only to have her taken away. 

{¶27} As to Mother, the guardian ad litem stated that he has observed no improvement 

in Mother’s parenting ability despite her attendance in parenting classes, and he does not believe 

that Mother has the ability to parent A.L. He cited her limited understanding of parenting and 

developmental needs of children. He expressed concern with Mother’s decision-making and 

judgment, and he indicated that Mother has continued to struggle with the ability to maintain a 

household. The guardian ad litem believes that the same problems that existed for Mother in last 

case have continued. Accordingly, the guardian ad litem concluded that it is in the best interest 

of the child to be placed in the permanent custody of the agency. He believes that the child is in 

need of permanency and recommends that she be placed in the permanent custody of CSB. 

{¶28} The custodial history of the child is that she was removed from her parents’ care 

at seven weeks. Since then, she has resided with the same foster family that adopted the child’s 

siblings. See R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(c). Mother and Father were aware that A.L.’s foster parents 

were the adoptive parents of their other children and occasionally saw the parents at the 

visitation site. Mother and Father repeatedly requested updates, pictures, and to talk to the 

children from whom their parental rights were terminated. They became angry when they were 

unable to obtain such information. Father, in particular, exhibited anger and aggression towards 

the foster parents. 
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{¶29} As to the fourth of the best interest factors, there was evidence before the trial 

court that the child was in need of a legally secure permanent placement and that no relatives had 

come forward with an interest in custody or placement. See R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(d). The trial 

court found that permanent custody is the only means to provide this child with a legally secure 

permanent placement. 

{¶30} As to the fifth of the best interest factors, each parent had had their parental rights 

terminated with respect to a sibling of A.L. See R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(e). 

{¶31} The record does not demonstrate that the trial court clearly lost its way and 

created a manifest miscarriage of justice in reaching its judgment. See Eastley v. Volkman, 132 

Ohio St.3d 328, 2012-Ohio-2179, ¶ 20. Consequently, we conclude that the trial court did not 

err in terminating the parents’ parental rights and in placing A.L. in the permanent custody of 

CSB. Father’s assignment of error is overruled. 

MOTHER’S ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR 

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT PLACED A.L. IN 

THE PERMANENT CUSTODY OF SCCS RATHER THAN GRANTING 

MOTHER A SIX-MONTH EXTENSION. 

{¶32} Mother contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it granted 

permanent custody of the child to CSB rather than granting Mother a six-month extension of 

temporary custody. In support of her position, Mother claims that an extension would be in the 

best interest of the child, that she made significant progress on her case plan, and that there is 

reasonable cause to believe that the child will be reunified with one of the parents or otherwise 

permanently placed within the period of extension. See R.C. 2151.415(D). Upon review of the 

record, this Court finds no basis upon which to conclude that the trial court abused its discretion 

in failing to grant a six-month extension of temporary custody. 
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{¶33} First, the guardian ad litem testified that an extension would not be in the best 

interest of the child because of the need for permanence and he believed an extension would 

have a negative effect on her. Second, Mother has not challenged the finding that her parental 

rights were involuntarily terminated as to siblings of A.L. and, as demonstrated above, she has 

not established that she can provide a legally secure permanent placement and adequate care for 

the health, welfare and safety of the child. See R.C. 2151.414(E)(11). The same concerns that 

existed in the prior case continued to exist in the current case. There is no evidence that she has 

overcome her mental health concerns. Mother does not have stable housing and has not 

demonstrated any improvement in parenting skills. She constantly requires prompts to address 

the basic needs of the child and does not focus on her child when she has had that opportunity. 

{¶34} Both the caseworker and guardian ad litem specifically opposed an extension of 

temporary custody, did not believe sufficient progress had been made to justify an extension, and 

did not believe reunification would occur within six months, particularly given the significant 

issues that Mother presents. The trial court found that it is unlikely that reunification would 

occur within the term of an extension of temporary custody. 

{¶35} The record fails to demonstrate that the trial court abused its discretion in not 

granting an extension of temporary custody. Mother’s assignment of error is overruled. 

III. 

{¶36} Father’s assignment of error is overruled. Mother’s assignment of error is 

overruled. The judgment of the Summit County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, is 

affirmed. 

 Judgment affirmed. 

 
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 There were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

 We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common 

Pleas, County of Summit, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy 

of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27. 

 Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of 

judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the 

period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is 

instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the 

mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30. 

 Costs taxed to Appellant. 

 

 JENNIFER HENSAL 

 FOR THE COURT 

CARR, P. J. 

SCHAFER, J. 

CONCUR. 

APPEARANCES: 

ANGELA M. KILLE, Attorney at Law, for Appellant. 

AVIVA WILCHER, Attorney at Law, for Appellant. 

SHERRI BEVAN WALSH, Prosecuting Attorney, and RICHARD S. KASAY, Assistant 

Prosecuting Attorney, for Appellee.