This document was developed by the Office of the Secretary of Defense 

(Acquisition, Technology, & Logistics), Air Warfare. 

Suggested changes, corrections, or updates should be forwarded to: 

Dyke.Weatherington@osd.mil 
i

UAV Roadmap 2002

Executive Summary 

This document presents the Department of Defense’s (DoD) Roadmap for 

developing and employing Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and Unmanned Combat 

Air Vehicles (UCAVs) over the next 25 years (2002 to 2027). DoD’s operational UAV 

systems include Predator, Hunter, Shadow, and Pioneer which have demonstrated 

tremendous capability in recent military operations. Developmental systems such as 

Global Hawk and many small UAV systems have also been put to the test in recent 

combat and combat support operations. Taken as a whole, this technology area offers 

profound opportunities to transform the manner in which this country conducts a wide 

array of military and military support operations. As with any new technology, there is 

naturally some reluctance to transition to a radically new capability. The need to fully 

demonstrate UAVs in combat and realistic training environments is critical to the 

migration of this technology. 

The overarching goal of this roadmap, in concert with the Defense Planning 

Guidance (DPG), is to define clear direction to the Services and Departments for a 

logical, systematic migration of mission capabilities to a new class of military tools. The 

goal is to address the most urgent mission needs that are supported both technologically 

and operationally by various UAV systems. Some missions can be supported by the 

current state of the art in unmanned technology where the capabilities of current or nearterm DoD assets are sufficient and the risk to DoD members is relative low. Other 

mission areas, however, are in desperate need of additional capability and present high 

risk to aircraft crews. These mission areas, highlighted in this roadmap, will receive 

significant near-term effort by the Department. 

This Roadmap describes the Services’ ongoing UAV efforts (Section 2) and 

identifies the capabilities needed by theater commanders to which UAVs could be 

applied (Section 3), then couples them to emerging technologies (Section 4) and 

operational concepts (Section 5) that could enable these capabilities within the Services’ 

programs. The resulting Roadmap (Section 6) links capability-enhancing technologies to 

the life cycles of current and projected UAV programs. It is a map of opportunities, not 

point designs - a description of the future potential of UAVs. 

This Roadmap also provides a current snapshot of the status of the Department’s 

numerous unmanned aviation efforts. Having accurate “ground truth” on DoD’s various 

UAV programs and research efforts does not solve problems, but it does allow the 

Department to place emphasis in appropriate areas. One such area is standards, the 

framework of common requirements necessary to ensure forward/backward compatibility 

within systems and interoperability among them. The Office of the Secretary of Defense 

(OSD), as part of its oversight responsibilities for Defense-wide acquisition and 

technology, intends this Roadmap to be directive in such cross-program areas as 

standards development and other interoperability solutions. 

The U.S. military has a long and continuous history of involvement with UAVs, 

stretching back to 1917. UAVs had active roles in the Vietnam, Persian Gulf, and 

Balkans conflicts, as well as Afghan operations, providing critical reconnaissance in 

each. With recent technology improvements allowing more capability per pound, today’s 

UAVs are more sophisticated and capable than ever. As the military’s operational tempo 

has increased, so too has the employment of UAVs, to include performing a wider variety 

iii
UAV Roadmap 2002

of missions than just reconnaissance. During the 1990s, DoD invested over $3 billion in 

UAV development, procurement, and operations; since 2000, it has invested another $1 

billion and will likely invest over $10 billion by 2010. Today, the DoD has in excess of 

90 UAVs in the field; by 2010, this inventory is programmed to quadruple. 

Ten years hence (2012), DoD will probably be operating F-16-size UAVs capable 

of supporting a variety of combat and combat support missions, including Suppression of 

Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD), Electronic Attack (EA), and possibly deep strike 

interdiction. It is also likely that vertical takeoff UAVs (rotary wing) capable of 

extremely long endurance (18-24 hours) will be in demonstration and limited production. 

Twenty-five years from now (2027), UAVs may exist with morphing airframes, able to 

optimize their shape for various missions and flight conditions with stretching skins and 

shape memory alloys permitting aerodynamic maneuvers impossible for manned aircraft. 

Control stations could evolve from a crew inside a multi-ton van to an individual wearing 

a suit tied into his own neuro-muscular system, seeing what the UAV’s sensors see 

through a head-mounted visor. 

The advantages offered by UAVs to the military commander are numerous, most 

notably in mission areas commonly categorized as “the dull, the dirty, and the 

dangerous.” In an era of decreasing force structure, UAVs are force multipliers that can 

increase unit effectiveness. For example, due to its vantage point, one unmanned sentry 

equipped with automated cuing algorithms and multiple sensors could survey the same

area as ten (or more) human sentries (“the dull”). UAVs could reconnoiter areas 

contaminated with radiological, chemical or biological agents without risk to human life 

(“the dirty”). Unmanned Combat Air Vehicles (UCAVs) could perform the high-risk 

suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) missions currently flown by manned EA-6s or 

F-16s (“the dangerous”) with less need for supporting aircraft. In such a role, UAVs 

would be potent force multipliers, releasing manned aircraft for other roles. 

The Office of the Secretary of Defense has identified 49 goals for unmanned 

aviation in this Roadmap that support the Department’s larger goals of fielding 

transformational capabilities, establishing joint standards, and controlling costs. Ten of

these 49 goals (shown below) have priority and have been assigned an Office of Primary 

Responsibility (OPR) to oversee their accomplishment and a due date. These goals are 

consistent with the current DPG and will be further refined in the upcoming cycle. In 

some cases, goals addressed in this document have been directly cited in the DPG, such 

as the direction for development and demonstration of Unmanned Combat Air Vehicles. 

In many other cases, the goals to follow are at a detail level below that appropriate to the 

DPG. The DPG will always take precedence, however this document will be used to 

provide additional definition and direction for UAV and UCAV technology areas. These 

goals should be considered directive, and OSD, in conjunction with the Services and 

Defense Agencies will strive to develop, demonstrate, and operationally assess these 

capabilities in the timeframes indicated. Progress reports on each goal will be submitted 

by the respective OPRs during the first quarter of each fiscal year. 

 

1. Develop and operationally assess for potential fielding a UCAV capable of 

performing several missions including SEAD/Strike/Electronic Attack; emphasize 

early fielding of an EA capability with growth to other missions. OPR: UCAV Joint 

Program Office (DARPA, USN, USAF). Due: FY10. 

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UAV Roadmap 2002

2. Develop and demonstrate a tactical UAV-class aviation heavy fuel engine suitable 

for use in UAVs such as Shadow, Pioneer and A-160. Growth potential to larger 

UAVs in the Predator class including Extended Range Multi-Purpose and LEWK, 

and options for the small UAV class are also required. OPR: DARPA, USA, 

USN/USMC. Due: FY05/07. 

3. OSD, Joint Staff, and the Services develop capability and/or capabilityperformance metrics (such as those in Section 4.1) to evaluate UAV program costs. 

Program managers should provide Joint Staff and OSD written justification at 

Milestone B and C reviews when these metrics are exceeded, and provide 

appropriate management organizations with options for reducing costs to align 

them with these metrics when this occurs. OPR: OSD. Due: FY03. 

4. Demonstrate High Definition Television (HDTV) capability with real-time 

precision targeting capability on a UAV. OPR: NIMA, USN, USAF. Due: FY05.

5. Migrate all tactical (Shadow 200) and above UAVs to Common Data Link (CDL)- 

compatible formats for line-of-sight (LOS) and beyond-line-of-sight (BLOS) 

communication. OPR: USAF, USN, USA. Due: FY06.

6. Investigate low Reynolds Number aerodynamics with a focus on improving 

digital flight control systems optimized for small UAVs (i.e., those having Reynolds 

numbers less than 1 million). OPR: OSD; USA, USN, USAF. Due: FY06.

 

7. Define a standard UAV interface providing critical situational awareness data 

and precise location data supporting airspace integration. OPR: OSD, USJFCOM. 

Due: FY04.

8. Coordinate revising FAA Order 7610.4 to replace the requirement for using the 

Certificate Of Authorization (COA) process for all UAVs with one for using the 

DD175 form for qualifying UAVs. OPR: USAF. Due: FY04.

 

9. Define security measures required for positive control of weapons employment on 

weaponized UAVs. OPR: USAF. Due: FY08. 

 

10. Decrease the annual mishap rate of larger model UAVs to less than 20 per 

100,000 flight hours by FY09 and less than 15 per 100,000 flight hours by FY15. 

OPR: USAF, USN, USA. Due: FY09/15.

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UAV Roadmap 2002

Table of Contents 

List of Figures................................................................................................................... ix

List of Tables.................................................................................................................... xi

1.0 Introduction................................................................................................................. 1

1.1 PURPOSE .................................................................................................................... 1 

1.2 APPROACH ................................................................................................................. 1 

1.3 SCOPE ........................................................................................................................ 2 

1.4 DEFINITIONS .............................................................................................................. 2 

1.5 PROGRESS SINCE PREVIOUS ROADMAP...................................................................... 2 

2.0 Current UAV Programs............................................................................................. 5

2.1 OPERATIONAL UAV SYSTEMS................................................................................... 6 

2.1.1 MQ-1 Predator................................................................................................... 6

2.1.2 RQ-2 Pioneer..................................................................................................... 6

2.1.3 RQ-5 Hunter....................................................................................................... 7

2.1.4 RQ-7 Shadow 200 .............................................................................................. 7

2.2 DEVELOPMENTAL UAV SYSTEMS ............................................................................. 8 

2.2.1 RQ-4 Global Hawk ............................................................................................ 8

2.2.2 Broad Area Maritime Surveillance.................................................................... 8

2.2.3 RQ-8 Fire Scout................................................................................................. 9

2.2.4 MQ-9 Predator B............................................................................................... 9

2.2.5 Dragon Eye ...................................................................................................... 10

2.2.6 Force Protection Aerial Surveillance System (FPASS)................................... 10

2.2.7 Neptune ............................................................................................................ 11

2.2.8 Air Force UCAV (X-45)................................................................................... 11

2.2.9 UCAV-Navy (X-46/X-47) ................................................................................. 12

2.2.10 UCAR............................................................................................................. 13

2.2.11 Dragon Warrior............................................................................................. 13

2.2.12 Program Summaries...................................................................................... 14

2.3 OTHER UAV SYSTEMS ............................................................................................ 14 

2.3.1 Residual UAV Systems..................................................................................... 14

2.3.2 Concept Exploration UAV Systems.................................................................. 15

2.3.3 DARPA UAV Programs................................................................................... 18

2.4 UAV FINANCIAL DATA ........................................................................................... 19 

2.5 UAV PROLIFERATION.............................................................................................. 21 

2.5.1 Foreign UAV Development.............................................................................. 21

2.5.2 Export Policy ................................................................................................... 22

3.0 Requirements............................................................................................................. 25

3.1 HISTORICALLY VALIDATED UAV ROLES ................................................................ 25 

3.2 COMBATANT COMMANDER REQUIREMENTS FOR UAVS.......................................... 25 

3.3 JROC-VALIDATED REQUIREMENTS FOR UAVS....................................................... 27 

4.0 Technologies.............................................................................................................. 29

4.1 PLATFORMS ............................................................................................................. 29 

4.1.1 Propulsion........................................................................................................ 29

4.1.2 Survivability ..................................................................................................... 31

4.1.3 Cost Control..................................................................................................... 32

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UAV Roadmap 2002

4.2 PAYLOADS ............................................................................................................... 34 

4.2.1 Sensors............................................................................................................. 34

4.2.2 Communication Relay...................................................................................... 38

4.2.3 Weapons........................................................................................................... 38

4.2.4 Cost Control..................................................................................................... 39

4.3 COMMUNICATION .................................................................................................... 39 

4.4 PROCESSORS ............................................................................................................ 41 

5.0 Operations ................................................................................................................. 45

5.1 OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS DEVELOPMENT ............................................................... 45 

5.1.1 Army................................................................................................................. 45

5.1.2 Navy and Marine Corps................................................................................... 46

5.1.3 Air Force.......................................................................................................... 47

5.1.4 Joint/Other....................................................................................................... 47

5.2 RELIABILITY ............................................................................................................ 48 

5.3 OPERATIONS AND SUPPORT ..................................................................................... 52 

5.4 COOPERATIVE UAV FLIGHT.................................................................................... 53 

5.5 TACTICAL CONTROL SYSTEM (TCS)........................................................................ 54 

6.0 Roadmap.................................................................................................................... 55

6.1 UAV CAPABILITIES ROADMAP................................................................................ 55 

6.2 UAV MISSIONS ROADMAP ...................................................................................... 56 

6.3 COMPARATIVE COSTS OF MANNED VS. UNMANNED AIRCRAFT............................... 58 

6.3.1 Development Costs........................................................................................... 58

6.3.2 Procurement Costs........................................................................................... 59

6.3.3 Operations & Support Costs............................................................................ 59

6.4 GOALS FOR UNMANNED AVIATION.......................................................................... 61 

6.4.1 Platform Goals................................................................................................. 61

6.4.2 Sensor Goals.................................................................................................... 61

6.4.3 Communication Goals ..................................................................................... 62

6.4.4 Technology Goals............................................................................................ 62

6.4.5 Small UAV Goals............................................................................................. 62

6.4.6 Standards Goals............................................................................................... 62

6.4.7 Airspace Goals................................................................................................. 63

6.4.8 Task/Process/Post/Use Goals.......................................................................... 63

6.4.9 Weaponization Goals....................................................................................... 63

6.4.10 Reliability Goals............................................................................................ 64

6.5 FUTURE DIRECTIONS................................................................................................ 64 

Appendix A: Platforms................................................................................................... 67

Appendix B: Sensors....................................................................................................... 87

Appendix C: Communication........................................................................................ 99

Appendix D: Technology Migration............................................................................ 111

Appendix E: Small UAVs............................................................................................. 127

Appendix F: Standards ............................................................................................... 135

Appendix G: Airspace .................................................................................................. 153

Appendix H: Task, Post, Process, and Use Considerations...................................... 165

Appendix I: Weapons................................................................................................... 175

Appendix J: Reliability................................................................................................. 185

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UAV Roadmap 2002

List of Figures 

FIGURE 2.0-1: TIMELINE OF CURRENT AND PLANNED DOD UAV SYSTEMS. ...................... 5 

FIGURE 2.2-1: LOCATIONS OF U.S. MILITARY UAVS........................................................ 14 

FIGURE 2.4-1: DOD ANNUAL FUNDING PROFILE FOR UAVS............................................. 20 

FIGURE 2.6-1: UAV MANUFACTURING COUNTRIES. ......................................................... 21 

FIGURE 3.2-1: IPL PRIORITIES LINKED TO UAV MISSIONS. .............................................. 26 

FIGURE 4.1-1: SPECIFIC FUEL CONSUMPTION TRENDS. ..................................................... 29 

FIGURE 4.1-2: MASS SPECIFIC POWER TRENDS. ................................................................ 30 

FIGURE 4.1-3: PROPULSION/POWER TECHNOLOGY FORECAST. ......................................... 30 

FIGURE 4.1-4: UAV CAPABILITY METRIC: WEIGHT V. COST........................................... 33 

FIGURE 4.1-5: UAV PERFORMANCE METRIC: ENDURANCE V. COST. ............................. 33 

FIGURE 4.2-1: UAV PAYLOAD WEIGHT VS. ENDURANCE. ................................................ 34 

FIGURE 4.2-2: STILL IMAGERY SENSOR TECHNOLOGY FORECAST. ..................................... 35 

FIGURE 4.2-3: MOTION/VIDEO IMAGERY SENSOR TECHNOLOGY FORECAST..................... 35 

FIGURE 4.2-4: RADAR IMAGER SENSOR TECHNOLOGY FORECAST. ................................... 36 

FIGURE 4.2-5: SIGINT SENSOR TECHNOLOGY FORECAST. ............................................... 36 

FIGURE 4.2-6: MASINT SENSOR TECHNOLOGY FORECAST. ............................................. 37 

FIGURE 4.2-7: FORECAST SENSOR CAPABILITIES............................................................... 37 

FIGURE 4.3-1: AIRBORNE COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY FORECAST. ............................ 40 

FIGURE 4.4-1: AUTONOMOUS CONTROL LEVEL TREND..................................................... 41 

FIGURE 4.4-2: PROCESSOR SPEED TREND. ......................................................................... 42 

FIGURE 4.4-3: PROCESSOR TECHNOLOGY FORECAST. ....................................................... 43 

TABLE 5.2-1 SHOWS THE CALCULATED VALUES OF THESE FOUR METRICS FOR THE EARLY 

AND CURRENT VERSIONS OF THE PIONEER, HUNTER, AND PREDATOR. ...................... 50 

FIGURE 5.2-1: UAV MISHAP RATE TRENDS...................................................................... 50 

FIGURE 5.2-2: DOD UAV MISHAP CAUSES........................................................................ 51 

FIGURE 5.3-1: RELATIVE DEMAND IN ACTUAL VS. SIMULATED FLIGHT TRAINING........... 52 

FIGURE 6.1-1: UAV CAPABILITIES ROADMAP................................................................... 56 

FIGURE 6.2-1: UAV MISSIONS ROADMAP. ........................................................................ 58 

FIGURE A-1: PERFORMANCE PAYOFF OF A NOTIONAL COMBAT UAV UTILIZING 

TECHNOLOGIES FROM THE JETEC PHASE III GOALS.................................................. 75 

FIGURE A-2: JETEC COST GOAL IN COMPARISON TO EXISTING SYSTEMS. ......................... 76 

FIGURE A-3: ENGINE EFFECTS ON TAKEOFF GROSS WEIGHT FOR A DESIRED MISSION 

ENDURANCE .............................................................................................................. 79 

FIGURE A-4: SPECIFIC ENERGY CALCULATION. ................................................................ 80 

FIGURE A-5: AUTONOMOUS CAPABILITY LEVELS (ACLS)................................................. 84 

FIGURE C-1: SUPPLY & DEMAND. ................................................................................... 104 

FIGURE C-2: MILITARY SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS FUTURE DIRECTION................... 106 

FIGURE D-1: MULTI-AREA INITIATIVES. ......................................................................... 112 

FIGURE D-2: PLATFORM RELATED: AERODYNAMICS & AIRFRAMES............................... 113 

FIGURE D-3: PLATFORM RELATED: MATERIALS. ............................................................ 114 

FIGURE D-4: PLATFORM RELATED: PROPULSION & POWER............................................ 115 

FIGURE D-5: PLATFORM RELATED:SURVIVABILITY......................................................... 116 

FIGURE D-6: IHPTET AND VAATE PROGRAM GOALS AND TRENDS. ............................ 117 

FIGURE D-7: WEAPONS & TARGETING............................................................................ 119 

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UAV Roadmap 2002

FIGURE D-8: PAYLOADS & SENSORS: GENERAL. ............................................................ 120 

FIGURE D-9: PAYLOADS & SENSORS: IMINT. ................................................................ 121 

FIGURE D-10: PAYLOADS & SENSORS: MASINT. .......................................................... 122 

FIGURE D-11: PAYLOADS & SENSORS: SIGINT.............................................................. 122 

FIGURE D-12: PAYLOADS & SENSORS: COMMUNICATION............................................... 123 

FIGURE D-13: PAYLOADS & SENSORS: MULIT-FUNCTION. ............................................. 123 

FIGURE D-14: PAYLOADS & SENSORS: RADAR. .............................................................. 123 

FIGURE D-15: CONTROL: GENERAL. ............................................................................... 125 

FIGURE D-16: CONTROL: HEALTH MANAGEMENT/MIXED INITIATIVE/PLANNING & 

SUPPORT. ................................................................................................................. 125 

FIGURE D-17: CONTROL: AUTONOMY............................................................................. 126 

FIGURE E-1: UAV WINGSPAN VS. WEIGHT..................................................................... 129 

FIGURE G-1: JOINT FAA/OSD APPROACH TO REGULATING UAVS................................ 154 

FIGURE G-2: US MILITARY UAV MISHAP RATES, 1986-2001 ....................................... 155 

FIGURE G-3: UAVS AND AIRSPACE CLASSES OF THE NATIONAL AIRSPACE SYSTEM...... 158 

FIGURE H-1: TPPU-TRANSFORMING DCGS TO NET-CENTRICITY.................................. 165 

FIGURE H-2: AIR FORCE’S DCGS (DCGS-AF)............................................................... 167 

FIGURE H-3: ARMY’S DCGS (DCGS-A) ........................................................................ 168 

FIGURE H-4: NAVY’S DCGS (ISR NET)......................................................................... 168 

FIGURE H-5: USMC’S DCGS (MAGIS)......................................................................... 169 

FIGURE H-6: DOD DCGS ENVISIONED STRUCTURE IN 2015 .......................................... 171 

FIGURE I-1: “ISSUES & DRIVERS”.................................................................................... 176 

FIGURE I-2: WEAPONIZED MQ-1B PREDATOR A. ........................................................... 177 

FIGURE I-3: PREDATOR/PREDATOR B, HUNTER-KILLER CONOPS................................. 177 

FIGURE I-4: SEAD/EA CONOPS, COOPERATIVE OPERATION. ...................................... 178 

FIGURE I-5: UCAV ENGAGEMENT CONOPS.................................................................. 179 

FIGURE I-6: EO/IR TARGETING SYSTEMS. ...................................................................... 180 

FIGURE I-7: RADAR. ........................................................................................................ 180 

FIGURE I-8: PROCESSORS................................................................................................. 181 

FIGURE I-9: UCAV APERTURES...................................................................................... 182 

FIGURE J-1: U.S. MILITARY UAV MISHAP RATES (LIFETIME), 1986 – 2002.................. 187 

FIGURE J-2: AVERAGE SOURCES OF SYSTEM FAILURES FOR U.S. MILITARY UAV FLEET 

(BASED ON 97,000 HOURS)....................................................................................... 189 

FIGURE J-3: AVERAGE SOURCES OF SYSTEM FAILURES FOR IAI UAV FLEET (BASED ON 

100,000 HOURS) ...................................................................................................... 189 

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UAV Roadmap 2002

List of Tables 

TABLE 2.2-1: SUMMARY HISTORY OF RECENT UAV PROGRAMS...................................... 14 

TABLE 2.4-1: FY04 PRESIDENTIAL BUDGET FOR UAV PROGRAMS. ................................. 20 

TABLE 2.5-1: CLASSES OF WORLDWIDE MILITARY RECONNAISSANCE UAVS. ................. 22 

TABLE 2.5-2: MTCR MEMBER INTEREST IN UAVS. ......................................................... 23 

TABLE 3.1-1. HISTORICALLY VALIDATED UAV ROLES. ................................................... 25 

TABLE 3.2-1: UAV MISSION AREAS. ................................................................................ 27 

TABLE 3.3-1: COMBATANT COMMANDER/SERVICE UAV MISSION PRIORITIZATION 

MATRIX—2003. ........................................................................................................ 28 

TABLE 4.1-1. UAV SYSTEM AND AIRCRAFT COSTS AND WEIGHTS................................... 32 

TABLE 5.2-1: RELIABILITY METRICS FOR UAVS............................................................... 51 

TABLE 6.1-1: OPERATIONAL METRICS............................................................................... 55 

TABLE 6.3-1: MANNED VS. UNMANNED AIRCRAFT DEVELOPMENT COSTS....................... 59 

TABLE C-1: CURRENT DOCUMENTED SPACE AND AIRBORNE SYSTEMS AND THEIR DATA 

RATE REQUIREMENTS............................................................................................... 100 

TABLE C-2: THE TOTAL MILSATCOM (2010) DATA RATE CAPABILITY FOR BEYOND LINE 

OF SIGHT COMMUNICATIONS FROM WHICH UAVS WOULD COMPETE........................ 100 

TABLE F-1: APPLICABLE NATO STANAGS.................................................................. 137 

TABLE G-1. ALIGNMENT OF UAV CATEGORIES WITH FAA REGULATIONS. ................... 157 

TABLE J-1: SUMMARY OF UAV RELIABILITY FINDINGS.................................................. 188 

TABLE J-2: SUMMARY OF UAV FAILURE MODE FINDINGS. ............................................ 188 

TABLE J-3: TECHNOLOGY TO ENHANCE UAV RELIABILITY............................................ 194 

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UAV Roadmap 2002

xii
UAV Roadmap 2002 – Section 1 

Introduction 

1.0 Introduction 

1.1 Purpose 

The purpose of this roadmap is to stimulate the planning process for US military 

unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) development over the period from 2002 to 2027. It is 

intended to assist Department of Defense (DoD) decision makers in developing a longrange strategy for UAV development and acquisition in future Quadrennial Defense 

Reviews (QDRs) and other planning efforts, as well as to guide industry in developing 

UAV-related technology. Additionally this document may help other US Government 

organizations leverage DoD investments in UAV technology to fulfill their needs and 

capabilities. It addresses the following key questions: 

• What requirements for military capabilities could potentially be filled by UAVs?

• What platform, sensor, communication, and information processing technologies 

are necessary to provide these capabilities? 

• When will these technologies become available to enable the above capabilities? 

This roadmap is meant to complement ongoing Service efforts to redefine their 

roles and missions for handling 21st century contingencies. The Services see UAVs as 

becoming integral components of their future tactical formations. As an example, the 

Army’s current Transformation initiative envisions each Brigade Combat Team having a 

reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition (RSTA) squadron equipped with a 

UAV system, reflecting the initiative’s emphasis on reducing weight, increasing agility, 

and integrating robotics. 

1.2 Approach 

The approach used in this document is to: 

1. Identify requirements relevant to defining UAV system capabilities from

authoritative sources of warfighter needs and link them to capabilities needed in 

future UAV platforms, sensors, communications, and information processing. 

2. Develop a series of forecasting trends (“Moore’s Laws”1

) for the next 25 years for 

those technologies driving UAV platform, sensor, communication, and 

information processing performance. Define the timeframe during which the 

technology to address these requirements should become available for fielding. 

3. Synthesize an integrated plan (“Roadmap”) for UAV development opportunities 

by combining the above requirements and technology trends. 

Such a roadmap could potentially be used in a number of ways, to include: 

 

1

 Moore’s Law (Gordon Moore of Intel Corp.) originated in 1965 as a forecast that the capability of 

microchip processors would double every 12 to 18 months. The semiconductor industry has used it to

define its technology roadmap for sustained growth over the past 35 years. 

1
UAV Roadmap 2002 – Section 1 

Introduction 

• Evaluating the technologies planned for incorporation in current UAV programs 

for underachieving or overreaching in capabilities. 

• Defining windows of feasibility for introducing new capabilities in the near term

on existing systems or for starting new programs. 

• Identifying key enabling technology development efforts to support today for use 

in the far term for inclusion in the Defense Technology Objectives, Joint

Warfighting Science and Technology Plan, and Defense Technology Area Plan. 

1.3 Scope 

This roadmap describes the options of routes (current and future technologies) 

available to reach a number of destinations (warfighter needs). It neither authorizes 

specific UAV programs nor prioritizes the requirements, as this is the responsibility of 

the Services and the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC). It does, however, 

identify future windows when technology should become available to enable new 

capabilities, linked to warfighters’ needs, to be incorporated into current or planned UAV 

programs. Many of the technologies discussed in this study are currently maturing in 

Defense research laboratories and contractor facilities. The roadmap’s span of 25 years 

was chosen to accommodate what typically constitutes the coming generation of aircraft 

and payload technology. 

The information presented in this study is current as of 31 December 2002. 

1.4 Definitions 

Because they are both unmanned aircraft, the distinction between cruise missile 

weapons and UAV weapon systems is occasionally confused. The key discriminants are 

(1) UAVs are equipped and employed for recovery at the end of their flight, and cruise 

missiles are not, and (2) munitions carried by UAVs are not tailored and integrated into 

their airframe whereas the cruise missile’s warhead is. This distinction is clearly made in 

the Joint Publication 1-02 DoD Dictionary’s definition of a UAV: 

A powered, aerial vehicle that does not carry a human operator, uses 

aerodynamic forces to provide vehicle lift, can fly autonomously or be piloted remotely, 

can be expendable or recoverable, and can carry a lethal or non-lethal payload. 

Ballistic or semi ballistic vehicles, cruise missiles, and artillery projectiles are not 

considered unmanned aerial vehicles.

1.5 Progress Since Previous Roadmap 

Since the 2000 edition of this Roadmap, the Army, the Marine Corps, and the 

Navy have each developed their versions of a UAV roadmap to direct their long-term

UAV efforts. Fuel cell propulsion (Conclusion 6.5.1-1) has reached the flight test stage 

in both manned aircraft and non-DoD UAVs (NASA Helios), and the Army has 

expressed plans to explore their use in a future Shadow spiral. The FY03 Foliage 

Penetration (FOPEN) Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) Integration for Terrain 

Characterization Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD) is pursuing 

near-real-time digital terrain mapping for eventual use on Global Hawk (Conclusion 

6.5.1-6). The BENVINT ACTD is exploring the utility of standardized weather sensors 

2
UAV Roadmap 2002 – Section 1 

Introduction 

on UAVs (Conclusion 6.5.2-2). In the area of regulatory reform, revised Federal 

Aviation Authority (FAA) regulations governing UAV flight in civil airspace are being 

coordinated (Conclusion 6.5.2-6), and the Missile Technology Control Regime has been 

amended to ease the export of UAV technology in certain cases. Finally, OSD and the 

Services have significantly increased their investment in UCAV technology development 

and have begun planning for a Joint UCAV Program Office to develop, demonstrate and 

field UCAV systems for a variety of combat and combat support missions.

3

UAV Roadmap 2002 – Section 2 

Current UAV Programs 

2.0 Current UAV Programs 

This Section provides condensed descriptions of current Defense Department 

UAV efforts as background for the users of this roadmap. It categorizes the 

Department’s UAVs as Operational (those currently in the hands of field units), 

Developmental (those undergoing evaluation for eventual fielding with such units), and 

Other, which includes residual assets withdrawn from service with fielded units, concept 

exploration platforms, and conceptual UAVs undergoing definition. Detailed 

descriptions are available in the Defense Airborne Intelligence, Surveillance, and 

Reconnaissance Plan (DAISRP) and at the websites listed with specific systems below. 

Since the previous edition of this Roadmap, the number of UAV programs under 

development by the DoD has increased substantially. In addition, the Army, Navy, and 

Marines have each developed Service-specific roadmaps for their UAV efforts. Finally, 

the Air Force began its “Pathfinder” initiative, which uses a spiral development process 

to reduce the time to field systems. Of the ten programs selected for this initiative, two 

are major UAV programs (Global Hawk and Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle (UCAV)). 

Figure 2.0-1 presents a consolidated timeline of the Services’ ongoing and planned 

programs, reflecting these Service UAV roadmaps. Those UAVs that started as ACTDs 

or ATDs are so indicated on the left end of their identification bar, with the leftmost 

vertical bar representing the conclusion of that program’s ACTD or ATD. The rightmost 

vertical line on each program’s bar represents actual or projected initial operational 

capability (IOC). This figure is a key component of the overall UAV Roadmap for the 

next 25 years, shown in Figure 6.2-1. 

1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030

RQ-2/PIONEER

PIONEER FOLLOW-ON

DRAGON EYE

BROAD AREA MARITIME SURVEILLANCE (BAMS)

UCAV-N

NEPTUNE

DRAGON WARRIOR

RQ-7/SHADOW

(FCS)

(FCS)

MQ-1/PREDATOR

MQ-9/PREDATOR B

FPASS

RQ-4/GLOBAL HAWK

UCAV-AF

RQ-5/HUNTER

IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM

EXTENDEDRANGE / MULTI-PURPOSE (ER/MP)

UNMANNED COMBAT ARMED ROTORCRAFT (UCAR)

ORGANIC AIR VEHICLE (OAV)

SMALL UAV (SUAV)

VTUAV

1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030

RQ-2/PIONEER

PIONEER FOLLOW-ON

DRAGON EYE

BROAD AREA MARITIME SURVEILLANCE (BAMS)

UCAV-N

NEPTUNE

DRAGON WARRIOR

RQ-7/SHADOW

(FCS)

(FCS)

MQ-1/PREDATOR

MQ-9/PREDATOR B

FPASS

RQ-4/GLOBAL HAWK

UCAV-AF

RQ-5/HUNTER

IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM

EXTENDEDRANGE / MULTI-PURPOSE (ER/MP)

UNMANNED COMBAT ARMED ROTORCRAFT (UCAR)

ORGANIC AIR VEHICLE (OAV)

SMALL UAV (SUAV)

VTUAV

FIGURE 2.0-1: TIMELINE OF CURRENT AND PLANNED DOD UAV SYSTEMS. 

5
UAV Roadmap 2002 – Section 2 

Current UAV Programs 

2.1 Operational UAV Systems 

2.1.1 MQ-1 Predator 

The Air Force MQ-1 Predator was one of the initial ACTDs in 1994 and 

transitioned to an Air Force program in 1997. It takes off and lands conventionally on a 

runway and can carry a maximum 450 lb payload for 24+ hours. Operationally, it is 

flown with a gimbaled electro-optical/infrared (EO/IR) sensor and a SAR, giving it a 

day/night, all-weather (within aircraft limits) reconnaissance capability. It uses either a 

line-of-sight (C-band) or a beyond-line-of-sight (Ku-band Satellite Communications 

(SATCOM)) data link to relay color video in real time to commanders. Since 1995, 

Predator has flown surveillance missions over Iraq, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan. In 

2001, the Air Force demonstrated the ability to employ Hellfire missiles from the 

Predator, leading to its designation being changed from RQ-1 to MQ-1 to reflect its 

multi-mission capability. The Air Force operates 12 systems in three Predator squadrons 

and is building toward a force of 25 systems consisting of a mix of 100 MQ-1 and MQ-9 

aircraft. IOC is anticipated in 2003. www2.acc.af.mil/library/factsheets/predator 

MQ-1 Predator/General Atomics/Air Force 

Weight: 2250 lb 

Length: 28.7 ft 

Wingspan: 48.7 ft 

Payload: 450 lb 

Ceiling: 25,000 ft 

Radius: 400 nm

Endurance: 24+ hr 

2.1.2 RQ-2 Pioneer 

The Navy/Marine RQ-2 Pioneer has served with Navy, Marine, and Army units, 

deploying aboard ship and ashore since 1986. Initially deployed aboard battleships to 

provide gunnery spotting, its mission evolved into reconnaissance and surveillance, 

primarily for amphibious forces. Launched by rocket assist (shipboard), by catapult, or 

from a runway, it recovers into a net (shipboard) or with arresting gear after flying up to 5 

hours with a 75 lb payload. It currently flies with a gimbaled EO/IR sensor, relaying 

analog video in real time via a C-band line-of-sight (LOS) data link. Since 1991, Pioneer 

has flown reconnaissance missions during the Persian Gulf, Bosnia, and Kosovo 

conflicts. The Navy ceased Pioneer operations at the end of FY02 and transferred their 

assets to the Marine Corps. The Marine Corps is embarking on improvements to the 

Pioneer to extend their operations with it until FY09 or a replacement is fielded. Such an 

improved Pioneer would fulfill the third tier of the Marines’ UAV roadmap, which calls 

for a system to support the Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF)/division out to a radius of 

200 km (108 nm). http://uav.navair.navy.mil/pioneer

6
UAV Roadmap 2002 – Section 2 

Current UAV Programs 

RQ-2 Pioneer/Pioneer UAVs, Inc./USMC 

Weight: 452 lb 

Length: 14 ft 

Wingspan: 17 ft 

Payload: 75 lb 

Ceiling: 15,000 ft 

Radius: 100 nm

Endurance: 5 hr 

2.1.3 RQ-5 Hunter 

The RQ-5 Hunter was originally a joint Army/Navy/Marine Corps Short Range 

UAV program that the Army intended to meet division and corps level requirements. It 

takes off and lands (using arresting gear) on runways and can carry up to 200 lb for over 

11 hours. It uses a gimbaled EO/IR sensor, relaying its video in real time via a second 

airborne Hunter over a C-band line-of-sight data link. Hunter deployed to Macedonia to 

support NATO Balkan operations in 1999, 2000, 2001, and 2002. Although full rate 

production (FRP) was canceled in 1996, seven low rate initial production (LRIP) systems 

of eight aircraft each were acquired, four of which remain in service: two for training, 

doctrine development, and exercise support, and two for contingency support. A 

competitively selected Extended Range/Multi-Purpose (ER/MP) UAV system will begin 

to replace it as early as FY05-06. www.redstone.army.mil/jtuav

RQ-5 Hunter/TRW;IAI/Army 

Weight: 1600 lb 

Length: 23 ft 

Wingspan: 29.2 ft 

Payload: 200 lb 

Ceiling: 15,000 ft 

Radius: 144 nm

Endurance: 11.6 hr 

2.1.4 RQ-7 Shadow 200 

The Army selected the RQ-7 Shadow 200 (formerly Tactical UAV (TUAV)) in 

December 1999 to meet its Brigade level UAV requirement for support to ground 

maneuver commanders. Catapulted from a rail, it is recovered with the aid of arresting 

gear. It will be capable of remaining on station for 4 hours at 50 km (27 nm) with a 

payload of 60 lbs. Its gimbaled EO/IR sensor will relay video in real time via a C-band 

LOS data link. Current funding allows the Army to procure 39 systems of four aircraft 

each for the active duty forces and 2 systems of four aircraft each for the reserve forces. 

Approval for full rate production (acquisition Milestone C) and IOC occurred in 

September 2002. The Army’s acquisition objective, with the inclusion of the Army

Reserve component, is 83 total systems. www.tuav.redstone.army.mil

7
UAV Roadmap 2002 – Section 2 

Current UAV Programs 

RQ-7 Shadow 200/AAI/Army 

Weight: 327 lb 

Length: 11.2 ft 

Wingspan: 12.8 ft 

Payload: 60 lb 

Ceiling: 15,000 ft 

Radius: 68 nm

Endurance: 4 hr 

2.2 Developmental UAV Systems 

2.2.1 RQ-4 Global Hawk

The Air Force RQ-4 Global Hawk is a high altitude, long endurance UAV 

designed to provide wide area coverage of up to 40,000 nm2

 per day. It successfully 

completed its Military Utility Assessment, the final phase of its ACTD, in June 2000, and 

transitioned into Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) in March 2001. It 

takes off and lands conventionally on a runway and currently carries a 1950 lb payload 

for up to 32 hours. Global Hawk carries both an EO/IR sensor and a SAR with moving 

target indicator (MTI) capability, allowing day/night, all-weather reconnaissance. Sensor 

data is relayed over Common Data Link (CDL) line-of-sight (LOS) (X-band) and/or 

beyond-line-of-sight (BLOS) (Ku-band SATCOM) data links to its Mission Control 

Element (MCE), which distributes imagery to up to seven theater exploitation systems. 

Residuals from the ACTD consisted of four aircraft and two ground control stations. 

Two more ACTD advanced aircraft will be delivered in early FY03 to support EMD and 

contingency operations. The Air Force has budgeted for 27 production aircraft in FY02-

07, and plans a total fleet of 51. The Air Force plans to add other sensor capabilities in a 

spiral development process as this fleet is procured. Ground stations in theaters equipped 

with the Common Imagery Processor (CIP) will eventually be able to receive Global 

Hawk imagery directly. IOC for Imagery Intelligence (IMINT)-equipped aircraft is 

expected to occur in FY06. www2.acc.af.mil/library/factsheets/globalhawk

RQ-4 Global Hawk/Northrop Grumman/Air Force 

Weight: 26,750 lb 

Length: 44.4 ft 

Wingspan: 116.2 ft 

Payload: 1950 lb 

Ceiling: 65,000 ft 

Radius: 5400 nm

Endurance: 32 hr 

2.2.2 Broad Area Maritime Surveillance 

In December 2001, Secretary of the Navy directed, on an accelerated basis, the 

acquisition of an unmanned persistent intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 

8
UAV Roadmap 2002 – Section 2 

Current UAV Programs 

(ISR) capability in support of the warfighter. In response, the Navy developed a twophased approach to rapidly acquire a Broad Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS) UAV 

system using current available platforms to speed acquisition, sensor development, 

concept of operations (CONOPS) development and achieve low risk. The first phase, the 

Global Hawk Maritime Demonstration (GHMD), will procure two off-the-shelf Air Force 

Global Hawk UAV platforms with sensors modified for maritime ISR missions and 

associated ground equipment for Navy use in CONOPS development, technology 

validation and to conduct experimentation in a maritime environment. The second phase, 

the BAMS UAV Program, is a formal DoD acquisition initiated to develop, test, field and 

support a maritime patrol, reconnaissance, and strike support UAV system. An Analysis 

of Alternatives is currently underway that will be used to help determine the platform and 

force structure required to support the BAMS UAV mission. An estimated 50 air vehicles 

are planned but the final number will be adjusted when the objective platform is selected. 

The BAMS UAV Initial Operating Capability (IOC) is currently planned for FY09. 

2.2.3 RQ-8 Fire Scout 

The Fire Scout vertical take-off and landing (VTOL) tactical UAV (VTUAV) 

program is currently in EMD and LRIP. Five Air Vehicles and four Ground Control 

Stations are now in Developmental Testing. A significant number of successful test 

flights have been accomplished demonstrating autonomous flight, Tactical Control Data 

Link (TCDL) operations, Multi-Mission Payload performance and Ground Control 

Station operations. Fire Scout Tactical Control System developmental testing is 

scheduled for mid-FY03. With continuing FY03 EMD testing successes, the Navy has 

recognized the VTUAV program value for the emerging Landing Craft Support series of 

surface vessels. The Navy is currently reviewing the VTUAV Operational Requirements 

Document (ORD) and funding has been added to the FY04 budget to continue 

development and to conduct shipboard demonstrations. Additional out year funding for 

VTUAV is being considered for future development and production. 

http://uav.navair.navy.mil/vtuav

RQ-8 Fire Scout/Northrop Grumman/Navy 

Weight: 2650 lb 

Length: 22.9 ft 

Rotorspan: 27.5 ft 

Payload: 300 lb 

Ceiling: 19,000 ft 

Radius: 150 nm

Endurance: 5+ hr 

2.2.4 MQ-9 Predator B 

Predator B is a larger, more capable, turboprop-engined version of the Air Force 

MQ-1B/Predator developed jointly by NASA and General Atomics as a high altitude 

endurance UAV for science payloads. Its initial flight occurred in February 2001. The 

Office of the Secretary of Defense acquired both existing Predator B prototypes in 

October 2001 for evaluation by the Air Force. With the capability to carry up to ten 

9
UAV Roadmap 2002 – Section 2 

Current UAV Programs 

Hellfire missiles, the MQ-9 could serve as the killer portion of a MQ-1/MQ-9 

hunter/killer UAV team. Current funding plans are to acquire nine MQ-9s, although 

Congress has expressed interest in increasing the procurement. 

MQ-9 Predator B/General Atomics/Air Force 

Weight: 10,000 lb 

Length: 36.2 ft 

Wingspan: 64 ft 

Payload: 750 lb internal/3000 lb external 

Ceiling: 45,000 ft 

Radius: 400 nm

Endurance: 24+ hr 

2.2.5 Dragon Eye 

Dragon Eye is a mini-UAV (4-foot wingspan and 4 lb weight) developed as the 

Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory’s (MCWL) answer to the Navy’s Over-The-Hill 

Reconnaissance Initiative and the Marines’ Interim Small Unit Remote Scouting System

(I-SURSS) requirement. The potential Navy version is referred to as Sea ALL. Dragon 

Eye fulfills the first tier of the Marine Corps UAV roadmap by providing the company/ 

platoon/squad level with an organic RSTA capability out to 10 km (5 nm). It can carry 

either an EO, IR, or low light TV as its sensor. The first prototype flew in May 2000, 

with low rate production contracts (40 aircraft) awarded to AeroVironment and BAI 

Aerosystems in July 2001. By March 2003 the Marine Corps will award a production 

contract to one of these two vendors following user operational assessment. IOC is 

planned for the Fall of 2003. A total of 311 systems, each with 3 aircraft and one ground 

station, are planned. www.mcwl.quantico.usmc.mil/images/downloads/dragoneye

Dragon Eye/BAI Aerosystems; 

AeroVironment/Marine Corps

Weight: 4.5 lb 

Length: 2.4 ft 

Wingspan: 3.8 ft 

Payload: 1 lb 

Ceiling: 1000 ft 

Radius: 2.5 nm

Endurance: 45-60 min 

2.2.6 Force Protection Aerial Surveillance System (FPASS) 

FPASS is designed for ease of use by Air Force security personnel to improve 

situational awareness of the force protection battlespace by conducting area surveillance, 

patrolling base perimeters and runway approach/departure paths, and performing convoy 

over watch. The Air Force Electronic Systems Center developed FPASS to address a 

1999 U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) request for enhancing security at overseas 

10
UAV Roadmap 2002 – Section 2 

Current UAV Programs 

bases. CENTAF refers to the FPASS vehicle as Desert Hawk. Battery-powered, it is 

launched with the aid of a bungee cord and equipped with either a visible or an uncooled 

IR video sensor. Each system consists of six aircraft and a laptop control station. 

Delivery of initial systems began in July 2002. 

FPASS/Lockheed Martin/Air Force 

Weight: 5 lb 

Length: 3 ft 

Wingspan: 4 ft 

Payload: 1 lb 

Ceiling: 1,000 ft 

Radius: 5 nm

Endurance: 60-90 min 

2.2.7 Neptune 

Neptune is a new tactical UAV design optimized for at-sea launch and recovery. 

Carried in a 72x30x20 inch case that transforms into a pneumatic launcher, it can be 

launched from small vessels and recovered in open water. It can carry IR or color video 

sensors, or can be used to drop small payloads. Its digital data link is designed to 

minimize multipath effects over water. First flight occurred in January 2002, and an 

initial production contract was awarded to DRS Unmanned Technologies in March 2002. 

Neptune/DRS Unmanned Technologies/Navy 

Weight: 80 lb 

Length: 6 ft 

Wingspan: 7 ft 

Payload: 20 lb 

Ceiling: 8,000 ft 

Radius: 40 nm

Endurance: 4 hr 

2.2.8 Air Force UCAV (X-45) 

The joint Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA)/Air Force 

UCAV System Demonstration Program (SDP) is designed to demonstrate the 

technological feasibility, military utility, and operational value of a UCAV system to 

effectively and affordably prosecute Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD) and 

strike missions in the 2010+ high threat environment. Two X-45A (Spiral 0) 

demonstrator air vehicles have been delivered to NASA's Dryden facility at Edwards 

AFB; first flight occurred in May 2002. Design has started on the next generation X-45C 

(Spiral 1) air vehicle, which will add stealth characteristics; first flight is expected in late 

2005. The Air Force has budgeted for up to 36 UCAV systems for delivery by 2010 for 

early operational capability and warfighter assessment. An effects-based spiral 

development approach is envisioned to rapidly field initial UCAV capability and expand 

that capability as technology and funding permit. www.darpa.mil/ucav

11
UAV Roadmap 2002 – Section 2 

Current UAV Programs 

UCAV/Boeing/DARPA Air Force X-45A

X-45A X-45C

Weight: 12,000 lb 35,000 lb 

Length: 26.3 ft 36 ft 

Wingspan: 33.8 ft 48 ft 

Payload: 1,500 lb 4,500 lb 

Ceiling: 35,000 ft 40,000 ft 

Speed: 0.75 M 0.85 M 

Endurance/ 

Combat Radius: 

1.5 hr 1,000 nm 

+ 2 hr loiter 

2.2.9 UCAV-Navy (X-46/X-47) 

The DARPA/Office of Naval Research's Naval Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle 

(UCAV-N) Advanced Technology Demonstration (ATD) Program is examining the 

critical technologies and systems needed to operate a large autonomous UAV from a 

Navy aircraft carrier. The system is envisioned to be multi-mission capable with an 

initial focus on tactical surveillance, evolving into a SEAD/strike system as the concept 

matures. The UCAV-N acquisition cost goal is 50 percent of the Navy’s F-35 variant, 

and its operating cost goal is 50 percent of the F/A-18C/D's. The Naval Unmanned 

Combat Air Vehicle (UCAV-N) ATD program will be merged with the current Air Force 

UCAV program under a Joint Program office. Both Northrop-Grumman (X-47A 

Pegasus) and Boeing (X-46) will partake in a Joint Strike Fighter (JSF)-like competition 

to meet Air Force and Navy requirements. First flight of a shore-based catapult and 

arrested-landing-capable UCAV-N demonstrator is expected in late FY06. Fourteen Air 

Force UCAV's are scheduled for delivery by FY08 while the Naval UCAV is planned to 

achieve IOC before 2015. www.darpa.mil/tto/programs/ucav-n 

 

UCAV-N/DARPA Navy 

Weight: 29,000 lb 

Length: 34 ft 

Wingspan: 50 ft 

Payload: 5,500 lb 

Ceiling: 40,000 ft 

Radius: 1,500 nm

Endurance: 12 hours 

12
UAV Roadmap 2002 – Section 2 

Current UAV Programs 

2.2.10 UCAR 

UCAR/DARPA Army 

(Artist Depiction)

The Unmanned Combat Armed 

Rotorcraft (UCAR) is a DARPA/Army program

begun in FY02 to develop an unmanned attack 

helicopter for the armed reconnaissance and 

attack missions at 20 to 40 percent the acquisition 

cost of a RAH-66 Comanche and 20-50 percent of 

the operating cost of an AH-64 Apache. This 

system will be a critical component of the Army

Objective Force system-of-systems architecture. 

Phase I study contracts to conduct system trades and concept exploration were awarded 

to Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, and Sikorsky in May 2002. First flight 

is anticipated in 2006, leading to an acquisition decision in 2009. With UCAR, the Army, 

Navy, and Air Force each now have unmanned combat aircraft initiatives. 

2.2.11 Dragon Warrior 

Dragon Warrior is an unmanned rotorcraft designed to provide the Marine 

Expeditionary Unit (MEU) or regiment with an organic reconnaissance, surveillance, 

precision targeting, battle damage assessment, and communication relay capability. It 

will be capable of launching and recovering from ships during amphibious operations and 

transitioning to land-based operations from a single High-Mobility Multi-Purpose 

Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) and trailer. Each system would consist of two rotorcraft. 

It would be equipped with an EO/IR sensor and laser range finder plus an interchangeable 

communication relay payload. First tethered flight was conducted in 2002, and first free 

flight should occur in 2003. A procurement decision is expected in FY06. 

www.mcwl.quantico.usmc.mil/images/downloads/dragonwarrior

Dragon Warrior/NRL/Marine Corps 

Weight: 340 lb 

Length: 7 ft 

Rotorspan: 9 ft 

Payload: 35 lb 

Ceiling: 18,000 ft 

Radius: 50 nm

Endurance: 3-5 hrs 

13
UAV Roadmap 2002 – Section 2 

Current UAV Programs 

2.2.12 Program Summaries 

TABLE 2.2-1: SUMMARY HISTORY OF RECENT UAV PROGRAMS. 

System Manufacturer

Lead

Service

First 

Flight IOC

Aircraft 

Built

Aircraft 

Fielded Status

MQ-1/Predator General Atomics Air Force 1994 2003 80 22 93 ordered 

RQ-2/Pioneer Pioneer UAVs, Inc Navy 1985 1986 175 10 Extended life 

BQM-145 Teledyne Ryan Navy 1992 n/a 8 0 Cancelled ‘93 

RQ-3/DarkStar Lockheed Martin Air Force 1996 n/a 3 0 Cancelled ‘99 

RQ-4/G’Hawk Northrop Grumman Air Force 1998 2006 6 0 51 planned 

RQ-5/Hunter IAI/TRW Army 1991 n/a 72 41 Sunset system

RQ-6/Outrider Alliant Techsystems Army 1997 n/a 19 0 Cancelled ‘99 

RQ-7/Shadow200 AAI Army 1991 2003 32 24 164 planned 

RQ-8/Fire Scout Northrop Grumman Navy 1999 n/a 3 0 Cont. Develm’t

MQ-9/Predator B General Atomics Air Force 2001 TBD 2 0 6 planned 

Dragon Eye BAI Aerosystems/ 

AeroVironment 

USMC 2000 2003 40 0 933 planned

USMC Pioneer

USMC Pioneer

USA Pointer

USA Exdrone

USAF Exdrone

USA Hunter USA Hunter

USA Shadow

USA Hunter

USA Shadow

USAF Global Hawk

USAF Predator

USN Pelican

USA Shadow

USN (various)

USN Pioneer

FIGURE 2.2-1: LOCATIONS OF U.S. MILITARY UAVS. 

2.3 Other UAV Systems 

2.3.1 Residual UAV Systems 

The US military maintains the residual hardware of several UAV programs that 

are not current programs of record, but that have deployed with operational units using 

trained, uniformed operators in recent years. Eighty-two BQM-147 Exdrones, an 80-lb 

delta-wing design, remain from over 500 built. Originally built as expendable 

communication jammers, Exdrones were converted to the reconnaissance role with the 

addition of a video camera, and 45 of them were deployed during the Gulf War. In 1997-

98, 38 were rebuilt to the Dragon Drone standard (which includes the addition of a 

gimbaled EO sensor) and have since deployed twice with Marine Expeditionary Units. 

14
UAV Roadmap 2002 – Section 2 

Current UAV Programs 

Air Force Special Operations Command (Hurlburt Field, FL) is using 15 Exdrones as 

testbeds to explore potential UAV concepts and payloads for special operations forces. 

The Army Air Maneuver Battle Lab (Ft Rucker, AL) is also experimenting with 

Exdrones, having acquired 30 in 2001. 

BQM-147 Dragon Drone/BAI Aerosystems/Marines 

Weight: 90 lb 

Length: 5.25 ft 

Wingspan: 8.2 ft 

Payload: 15 lb 

Ceiling: 10,000 ft 

Radius: 26 nm

Endurance: 2.5 hr 

Approximately 100 hand-launched, battery powered FQM-151/Pointers have 

been acquired by the Marines and the Army since 1989 and were employed in the Gulf 

War. Most recently, the Navy used Pointer to help clear the Vieques, Puerto Rico, range 

of demonstrators, and the Army acquired six systems for use at its Military Operations in 

Urban Terrain (MOUT) facility at Ft Benning, GA. Pointers have served as testbeds for 

numerous miniaturized sensors (e.g., uncooled IR cameras and chemical agent detectors) 

and have performed demonstrations with the Drug Enforcement Agency, National Guard, 

and special operations forces. http://uav.navair.navy.mil/smuav 

FQM-151 Pointer/AeroVironment/Navy 

Weight: 10 lb 

Length: 6 ft 

Wingspan: 9 ft 

Payload: 2 lb 

Ceiling: 1000 ft 

Radius: 3 nm

Endurance: 1 hr 

2.3.2 Concept Exploration UAV Systems 

ACTDs have been responsible for successfully spawning a number of recent 

UAV programs, such as Predator and Global Hawk, on an accelerated development basis. 

Because ACTDs are focused on quickly putting a capability into a theater commander’s 

hands for his evaluation before committing resources for the attendant training, spares, 

technical documentation, etc., required for a fully operational system, those efforts 

receiving a favorable endorsement arrive at the Defense Acquisition Board with a 

significant bill for “operationalization.” Three ACTDs are currently exploring new 

concepts involving unmanned aviation. 

The Counter Proliferation II ACTD, sponsored by the Defense Threat 

Reduction Agency (DTRA), envisions deploying two mini-UAVs (Finders) from a larger 

Predator UAV to conduct point detection of chemical agents. The employment concept 

15
UAV Roadmap 2002 – Section 2 

Current UAV Programs 

for Finder (Flight Inserted Detection Expendable for Reconnaissance) is to fly up to 50 

nm from Predator and loiter in the vicinity of a suspected chemical agent cloud for up to 

2 hours, passing its sensor data back to the Predator for relay to warfighters and/or 

collecting air samples for recovery by ground forces for analysis. Eight Finder systems 

(16 vehicles) are to remain as residuals when the ACTD ends in 2004. 

www.jhuapl.edu/colloq/foch

Finder/NRL/ACTD 

Weight: 59 lb 

Length: 5.25 ft 

Wingspan: 8.6 ft 

Payload: 13.5 lb 

Ceiling: 15,000 ft 

Radius: 50 nm

Endurance: 10 hr 

The Loitering Electronic Warfare Killer (LEWK) ACTD, initiated in FY01, is 

to demonstrate and assess an affordable, recoverable UAV capable of providing limited 

radar jamming and/or lethal/non-lethal munitions delivery for the SEAD mission. 

Communication relay and imagery receipt from the vehicle will also be demonstrated. 

LEWK, similar in size to a 1000-lb general-purpose bomb, can be released in flight as 

either an external or internal store of an aircraft or helicopter. Upon release, it deploys 

extendable wings and can loiter in the target area for up to 8 hours before recovery by 

parachute. First half-scale flight occurred in September 2001, with the first full-scale 

flight scheduled in March 2003 and operational demonstrations in 2004. Five LEWKs 

are envisioned as residuals at the conclusion of the ACTD. LEWK is the top contender 

to be the USMC replacement for its Pioneer UAVs. 

LEWK/SAIC/ACTD 

Weight: 800 lb 

Length: 10 ft 

Wingspan: 15 ft 

Payload: 200 lb 

Ceiling: 15,000 ft 

Radius: 400-500 nm

Endurance: 8 hr 

The Hunter Standoff Killer Team (HSKT) ACTD draws on experience gained 

in the Army’s Airborne Manned/Unmanned System Technology (AMUST) program

conducted in 2000-2001. AMUST teamed an AH-64 Apache in the killer role with a RQ5 Hunter UAV in the hunter role, linking the UAV’s video directly into the helicopter’s 

cockpit. The Apache crew controlled the Hunter’s sensor while the Hunter ground 

control station controlled its route of flight. HSKT intends to expand on this concept, 

adding technology from the earlier Rotorcraft Pilot’s Associate program. 

16
UAV Roadmap 2002 – Section 2 

Current UAV Programs 

Although not truly UAVs, two projects, one Air Force and one Army, are 

exploring expendable, munition-size devices for quick reaction, real time point 

reconnaissance. The Air Force effort originated as an Information Warfare Battlelab 

initiative (Microglider) and has evolved into Silent Eyes. Dropped from a Predator 

wing pylon, it deploys stowed wings, glides unpowered over a preprogrammed route, and 

circles its target, returning color still images for battle damage assessment prior to 

impact. The Army QuickLook effort is a GPS-guided, powered (10 hp engine) device 

that is fired from a 155-mm howitzer. Once launched, a drag chute deploys to slow the 

device so inflatable wings can deploy which then enables it to reconnoiter a 7.3 nm2 (25 

km2

) area during its 45-minute flight. First all-up flight is scheduled for late 2002, 

followed by a Future Combat System demonstration at Communications Electronic 

Command (CECOM) in January 2003. 

SilentEyes/Raytheon/Air Force 

Weight: 10 lb 

Length: 1.6 ft 

Wingspan: 2.3 ft 

Payload: 5 lb 

Ceiling: 25,000 ft (release in glide) 

Radius: 33 nm (glide) 

Endurance: 20 min

Sensorcraft is an Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) concept for a sensordriven UAV design; multiple definition contracts were awarded at the start of FY01. Its 

intent is to optimize a configuration for future airborne radar imaging and signals 

collection, then design the airframe, flight controls, and propulsion to conform to this 

configuration. The initiative integrates UAV-related efforts across a number of AFRL 

directorates and technology areas. 

Under the Small Business Initiative Research (SBIR) program, AFRL is 

developing Skytote, a vertical takeoff and landing (VTOL) UAV that transitions to 

horizontal flight. Skytote may be used for a variety of missions, including precision 

delivery and resupply of special operations teams, port and base security surveillance, 

and delivery of non-lethal weapons. The project is based on Air Force Special 

Operations Command (AFSOC) and U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) 

mission need requirements. 

 Sensorcraft/Air Force (artist concept) Skytote/Air Force (artist concept) 

17
UAV Roadmap 2002 – Section 2 

Current UAV Programs 

2.3.3 DARPA UAV Programs 

In addition to its involvement in three UCAV/UCAR demonstration programs 

(see Sections 2.2.9, 2.2.10, and 2.2.11), the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 

(DARPA) is currently sponsoring five other innovative UAV designs. The Advanced Air 

Vehicle (AAV) program is developing two unmanned rotorcraft projects, the Boeing X50 Dragonfly Canard Rotor Wing (CRW) and the Frontier A160 Hummingbird. The 

attributes being explored under the AAV program are speed, altitude, and endurance. 

The goal is to substantially improve the performance of rotorcraft to levels nearing that of 

fixed wing aircraft. The Dragonfly will demonstrate the ability to takeoff and land from a 

hover, then transition to fixed wing flight for cruise, using its stopped rotor as its wing. 

The result will be a high speed (400+ kts) rotorcraft. CRW is expected to fly in 2003. 

The other AAV project is the Hummingbird, which uses a hingeless, rigid rotor to 

achieve a high endurance (24+ hrs), high altitude (30,000 ft) rotorcraft. Its first flight 

occurred in January 2002. www.darpa.mil/tto/programs/aav

X-50 Dragonfly/Boeing/DARPA 

Weight: 1785 lb 

Length: 17.7 ft 

Wingspan: 12.0 ft 

Payload: 200 lb 

Ceiling: 10,000 ft 

Radius: 108 nm 

Endurance: 4 hr

A160 Hummingbird/Frontier/DARPA 

Weight: 4000 lb 

Length: 35 ft 

Rotorspan: 36 ft 

Payload: 300+ lb 

Ceiling: 30,000 ft 

Radius: 1500 nm

Endurance: 24+ hr 

DARPA and the Army are exploring designs for both Micro Air Vehicles

(MAVs)—aircraft no more than 6 to 12 inches in any dimension—and a slightly larger 

Organic Air Vehicle (OAV) to accompany the Army’s Future Combat System’s (FCS) 

robotic ground vehicles. The primary difference between the two systems is the MAV is 

focused on a small system suitable for backpack deployment and single-man operation, 

whereas the OAV is aimed at a larger system transported aboard one of the FCS ground 

vehicles. Honeywell was awarded an agreement to develop and demonstrate the OAV 

concept, and Robotic Technology, Inc., was subcontracted to develop the OAV under the 

FCS contract. The OAV is envisioned as a scalable-in-size UAV that can be launched 

and controlled from a HMMWV or robotic vehicle to provide over-the-hill RSTA. It is 

to be demonstrated with other FCS components at CECOM in 2003. Allied Aerospace 

18
UAV Roadmap 2002 – Section 2 

Current UAV Programs 

has been awarded an agreement as part of the MAV ACTD, which pushes the envelope in 

small, lightweight propulsion, sensing, and communication technologies. Following its 

Military Utility Assessment (MUA) in FY04, 25 MAV systems are to transfer to the 

Army in FY05. A third effort, by DARPA’s Synthetic Multifunctional Materials 

program, has developed a 6-ounce MAV, the AeroVironment Wasp, having an integrated 

wing-and-battery which has flown for 1.8 hours. www.darpa.mil/tto/programs/mav 

Wasp iStar Kestrel

AeroVironment Allied Aerospace Honeywell

Weight: .04 lb 5 lb 25 lb 

Length: 8 in 12 in 42 in 

Diameter: 13 in wingspan 9 in 17 in 

Payload: .01 lb 1 lb 10 lb 

Ceiling: 1200 ft 16,000 ft TBD 

Radius: 0.5 nm 5.5 nm 11 nm

Endurance: 100 min 40 min 120 min 

2.4 UAV Financial Data 

Between 1990 and 1999, the Department of Defense invested over $3 billion in 

UAV development, procurement, and operations. The current FY03-09 Presidential 

Budget for UAV programs of $16.2 billion will help multiply that amount by nearly six 

times in the current decade (see Figure 2.5-1). Plus-ups in the wake of September 11 

increased the FY02 UAV budget figure by $250M, and make FY03 the first billion-dollar 

year in UAV history (see Table 2.5-1). In numbers of UAVs, by 2010, the U.S. UAV 

inventory is expected to quadruple from 80 today to over 300 (not counting micro and 

mini UAVs) and to support a wider range of missions—Signal Intelligence (SIGINT) 

reconnaissance, communication relay, and SEAD—compared to today’s imagery 

reconnaissance and strike capability. 

19
UAV Roadmap 2002 – Section 2 

Current UAV Programs 2158

0

$M (

T

Y

$)

200

400

600

800

1000

1200

1400

1600

1800

2000

1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 106144 165252 430 225267 272 553 359420 388 284363 763 1456 1761 2139 2200

2200

2400

2600

2800

3000

3200

3400

3460

3017

2158

0

$M (

T

Y

$)

200

400

600

800

1000

1200

1400

1600

1800

2000

1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 106144 165252 430 225267 272 553 359420 388 284363 763 1456 1761 2139 2200

2200

2400

2600

2800

3000

3200

3400

3460

3017

FIGURE 2.4-1: DOD ANNUAL FUNDING PROFILE FOR UAVS. 

TABLE 2.4-1: FY04 PRESIDENTIAL BUDGET FOR UAV PROGRAMS. 

Program FY03* FY04* FY05* FY06* FY07* FY08* FY09* Total*

Predator 227.9 358.0 329.4 355.0 241.4 266.5 374.2 2152.4 

Pioneer 29.1 36.3 17.7 9.9 10.7 11.2 11.4 126.3

Hunter 33.9 29.2 28.2 28.1 26.0 24.6 25.2 195.2

Global Hawk 510.5 624.2 625.7 688.8 869.6 800.5 730.6 4849.9 

Shadow 200 179.0 132.0 124.8 89.0 90.5 93.6 90.2 799.1

ER/MP 0.0 23.1 33.6 71.0 85.7 140.0 168.7 522.1

Fire Scout/VTUAV 38.6 4.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 180.0 270.0 492.6

UCAV (AF & Navy) 171.3 347.8 573.3 530.3 361.7 914.7 1226.1 4125.2

BAMS 0.0 25.1 224.4 187.1 322.1 415.2 440.3 1614.2

GH Maritime Demo 189.4 76.4 57.3 59.2 61.9 56.5 56.9 557.6 

UCAR 33.0 49.4 75.9 107.7 84.2 86.2 47.0 483.4

Various Small UAV 51.6 52.4 55.0 55.0 55.0 55.0 55.0 379.0 estimated

Grand Total 1455.7 1761.6 2139.1 2158.0 2199.6 3016.9 3459.5 16190.4 

* All budget figures are given in millions of dollars and roll up RDT&E, procurement, and O&S together. 

20
UAV Roadmap 2002 – Section 2 

Current UAV Programs 

2.5 UAV Proliferation 

2.5.1 Foreign UAV Development 

Currently, some 32 nations are developing or manufacturing more than 250 

models of UAVs (see Figure 2.6-1); 41 countries operate some 80 types of UAVs, 

primarily for reconnaissance. Table 2.4-2 categorizes selected foreign UAVs and can be 

used to identify mission niches either complementing or not being performed by current 

U.S. UAVs. Systems not yet fielded are italicized in the table. Knowledge of such niches 

allows U.S. planners to rely on and better integrate the unique capabilities of coalition 

UAV assets in certain contingencies. The one niche common to a number of other 

countries but missing in the U.S. UAV force structure is a survivable penetrator for use in 

high threat environments. France and Germany have employed CL-289s with success in 

Bosnia and Kosovo, Russia’s VR-3 Reys may be succeeded soon by the Tu-300, and 

Italy’s new Mirach 150 supports its corps-level intelligence system. All are essentially 

jet engines with cameras attached which fly at low altitude at high subsonic speed to 

increase their survivability. Previous U.S. counterparts, the D-21, 1963-1971, (a Mach 3 

reconnaissance drone dropped from a B-52) and the RQ-3 DarkStar, relied on supersonic 

speed or stealth as well as high altitude for their survivability. 

MTCR Member

Non-MTCR Member

MTCR Member

Non-MTCR Member

FIGURE 2.6-1: UAV MANUFACTURING COUNTRIES. 

21
UAV Roadmap 2002 – Section 2 

Current UAV Programs 

TABLE 2.5-1: CLASSES OF WORLDWIDE MILITARY RECONNAISSANCE UAVS. 

Tactical Specialized Endurance

Country Over-the-Hill Close Range Maritime Penetrating Medium Rng Long Rng 

United States Dragon Eye 

FPASS

Hunter 

Shadow 

Pioneer

France Crecerelle

MCMM 

CL-289

MCMM

Eagle 1 

MALE

Germany Luna Brevel Seamos CL-289 Eurohawk

United 

Kingdom 

Phoenix

Watchkeeper

Watchkeeper

Italy Mirach 26

Falco

Mirach 150 Predator

Israel Scout/Searcher Heron

Russia Shmel/Yak-61 VR-3 Reys

VR-2 Strizh 

2.5.2 Export Policy

The sale of U.S.-manufactured UAVs to foreign militaries offers the triple 

advantages of 1) supporting the U.S. industrial base for UAVs, 2) potentially lowering 

the unit costs of UAVs to the Services, and 3) ensuring interoperability by equipping 

allied forces with mutually compatible systems. Balanced against these advantages, 

however, is the concern that the UAV capable of carrying a given weight of 

reconnaissance sensors and data links on a round trip could be modified to carry an equal 

weight of explosives twice that distance on a one-way mission. As the range, accuracy, 

and payload capacity of UAVs have overtaken those of cruise missiles and some ballistic 

missiles, controlling their proliferation has become a concern. UAVs fall under the terms 

of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), an informal and voluntary political 

agreement among 33 countries to control the proliferation of unmanned rocket and 

aerodynamic systems capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction (see Table 2.6-

2). Predator and Global Hawk both fall under Category I definitions (vehicles capable of 

carrying 500 kg of payload to a range of 300 km) of the MTCR and were therefore 

subject to a strong presumption of denial for export under the existing agreement. The 

U.S. Defense and State Departments drafted an updated interim policy to the MTCR in 

late 2001 to allow UAV (including UCAV) exports to selected countries on a case-bycase basis. 

U.S.-manufactured UAVs have been exported to numerous foreign countries over 

the past 40 years, from Falconers to the United Kingdom in the 1960s and Firebees to 

Israel in the 1970s to Gnat 750s to Turkey in the 1990s. The recently revised MTCR 

agreement allowed approval of the sale of six Predators to Italy in 2002. Overseas 

interest in Global Hawk has led to one demonstration in Australia, followed by a request 

to acquire the first two of as many as ten by that government. A demonstration of a 

SIGINT-variant (Eurohawk) is planned to be held in Germany in the future. 

22
UAV Roadmap 2002 – Section 2 

Current UAV Programs 

TABLE 2.5-2: MTCR MEMBER INTEREST IN UAVS. 

MTCR Member* UAV 

Exporter 

UAV 

Operator 

UAV 

Manufacturer 

UAV 

Developer 

Argentina no yes yes yes

Australia yes yes yes yes

Austria yes no yes yes

Belgium no yes yes yes

Brazil no no no no

Canada yes no yes yes

Czech Republic no yes yes yes 

Denmark no yes no no

Finland no yes no no

France yes yes yes yes

Germany yes yes yes yes

Greece no no no yes

Hungary no no no yes

Iceland no no no no

Ireland no no no no

Italy yes yes yes yes

Japan yes yes yes yes

Luxembourg no no no no

The Netherlands no yes no no

New Zealand no no no no

Norway no no no yes

Poland no no no no

Portugal no no no yes

Russia yes yes yes yes

South Africa yes yes yes yes

South Korea no yes yes yes 

Spain no no yes yes

Sweden no yes yes yes

Switzerland yes yes yes yes

Turkey yes yes yes yes

Ukraine yes yes yes yes

United Kingdom yes yes yes yes

United States yes yes yes yes

*Although not a member of the MTCR, Israel has pledged to abide by its guidelines.

23

UAV Roadmap 2002 – Section 3 

Requirements 

3.0 Requirements 

Requirements, along with the available systems (Section 2) and the emerging 

technologies to enable them (Section 4), are the three foundation stones of this Roadmap. 

The purpose of this section is to identify current and emerging requirements for military 

capabilities that could possibly be addressed by UAVs, regardless of whether a formal 

Mission Needs Statement is written against them. Three sources of these requirements 

are examined here: 40 years of historical UAV use by the Services, the annual Combatant 

Commanders’ Integrated Priority Lists, and the most recent (January 2003) poll by the 

Joint Chief of Staff (JCS) of the theaters and the Services of their UAV needs. 

3.1 Historically Validated UAV Roles 

Although how the Services have employed UAVs over the past 40 years is no 

sure indicator of how they will use them in the next 25, most of the current UAV 

programs show a strong correlation with a line of past UAV programs built to fulfill 

similar requirements. The Services have repeatedly sought to fill five legacy roles with 

UAVs, implying the underlying requirements are of a long-term, enduring validity and 

therefore can be expected to continue through the period of this roadmap. These five 

roles, and the succession of UAVs, procured or attempted, to fill them, are shown in 

Table 3.1-1. 

TABLE 3.1-1. HISTORICALLY VALIDATED UAV ROLES. 

UAV Role: Brigade/Division asset for reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition (RSTA) 

Proponent: Army

Heritage: Falconer (1950-60s) – Aquila (1970-80s) – Pioneer (1980-90s) – Outrider (1990s) – Shadow 200 

(2000s) 

UAV Role: Shipborne asset for reconnaissance and naval gunfire support 

Proponent: Navy

Heritage: Project Blackfly (1970s) – Pioneer (1980-2000s) – Fire Scout (2000s) 

UAV Role: Small unit asset for over-the-hill reconnaissance 

Proponent: Marine Corps 

Heritage: Bikini (1960-70s) – Pointer (1980-90s) – Dragon Eye (2000s) 

UAV Role: Survivable asset for strategic penetrating reconnaissance 

Proponent: Army/Air Force 

Heritage: Osprey (1960s) – D-21 (1960-70s) – Classified Program (1980s) – DarkStar (1990s) 

UAV Role: High Altitude endurance asset for standoff reconnaissance 

Proponent: Air Force 

Heritage: Compass Arrow (1960s) – Compass Dwell (1970s) – Compass Cope (1970s) – Condor (1980s) – 

Global Hawk (1990-2000s)

3.2 Combatant Commander Requirements for UAVs 

A Combatant Commander’s Integrated Priority List (IPL) is submitted annually 

by each of the nine Unified Commands to identify and prioritize the shortfalls in each 

theater’s warfighting capabilities. They are the seminal source of joint requirements from

our nation’s warfighters. IPLs offer the advantages of being “direct from the field” in 

25
UAV Roadmap 2002 – Section 3 

Requirements 

pedigree, joint in perspective, and reexamined annually, so their requirements remain 

both current and auditable over the years. Taken as a whole, they are the only source to 

enumerate worldwide (vice Service- or theater-centric) requirements. 

Of the 117 requirements submitted in the latest (2002) combined IPLs for funding 

in the FY03-08 FYDP, 42 (36 percent) identified needed capabilities that could 

potentially be filled by using UAVs. Four of the 42 specifically identified “UAVs” as a 

desired solution to the stated requirement. All but one of these capabilities have 

previously been associated in some form (a flight demonstration, a technical study, etc.) 

with UAVs, as shown in Table 3.2-1. These 42 requirements can be organized into 17 

mission areas, as shown in Figure 3.2-1. 

36%

17 UAV-Related Mission Areas 

FIGURE 3.2-1: IPL PRIORITIES LINKED TO UAV MISSIONS. 

Although EO/IR/SAR sensors have been the predominant payload fielded on DoD 

UAVs to date, Table 3.2-1 shows a number of other payloads have been previously flown 

on UAVs in proof-of-concept demonstrations. These demonstrations have shown UAVs 

can perform the tasks inherent in most of these 17 mission areas. They show that UAVs 

can be a candidate solution for certain requirements. UAVs should be the preferred 

solution over their manned counterparts when those requirements involve the familiar 

three jobs best left to UAVs: the dull (long dwell), the dirty (sampling for hazardous 

materials), and the dangerous (extreme exposure to hostile action). 

26
UAV Roadmap 2002 – Section 3 

Requirements 

TABLE 3.2-1: UAV MISSION AREAS. 

Requirements Justification for UAV Use Prior UAV Experience

(Mission Areas) “Dull” “Dirty” “Dangerous” (UAV/Payload, Place Demonstrated, Year) 

Intelligence, Surveillance, x x Pioneer, Exdrone, Pointer/Gulf War, 1990-91 

& Reconnaissance (ISR) Predator, Pioneer/Bosnia, 1995-2000 

 Hunter, Predator, Pioneer/Kosovo, 1999 

C2/Communications x Hunter/CRP, 1996; Exdrone/TRSS, 1998 

 Global Hawk/ACN, Predator/ACN, ongoing 

Force Protection x x x Camcopter, Dragon Drone/Ft Sumner, 1999 

Signals Intelligence x x Pioneer/SMART, 1995 

(SIGINT) Hunter/LR-100/COMINT, 1996 

Hunter/ORION, 1997 

Weapons of Mass x x Pioneer/RADIAC/LSCAD/SAWCAD, 1995 

Destruction (WMD) Telemaster/Analyte 2000, 1996 

 Pointer/CADDIE 1998 

Hunter/SAFEGUARD, 1999 

Theater Air Missile x x Israeli HA-10 development, (canceled) 

Defense (TAMD) Global Hawk study, 1997 

Suppression of Enemy x Hunter/SMART-V, 1996 

Air Defenses (SEAD) Hunter/LR-100/IDM, 1998 

Combat Search and x Exdrone/Woodland Cougar Exercise, 1997 

Rescue (CSAR) Exdrone/SPUDS, 2000 

Mine Counter x Pioneer/COBRA, 1996 

Measures (MCM) Camcopter/AAMIS, 1999 (Germany) 

Meteorology and x x Aerosonde/Visala, 1995 

Oceanography Predator/T-Drop, 1997 

(METOC) Predator/BENVINT ACTD, 2002 

Counter Narcotics (CN) x x Predator/Ft Huachuca, 1995 

 Pioneer/So. California, 1999 

Psychological Ops x Non-DoD UAV/leaflet dispensing, 1990’s 

All Weather/Night Strike x DASH/Vietnam, 1960s 

 Predator/Afghanistan, 2001 

Exercise Support x Predator/JOTBS, 2002 

Counter Fire x none 

Anti Submarine Warfare x DASH, 1960s 

Navigation x Hunter/GPS Pseudolite, 2000 

3.3 JROC-Validated Requirements for UAVs 

In response to an August 2000 Joint Staff-led, Joint Requirements Oversight 

Council-validated survey, Unified Command and Service staffs were given eighteen 

mission areas to prioritize in terms of their desirability for being performed by four 

UAVs (Predator, Global Hawk, Shadow 200, and/or VTUAV); the results are shown in 

Table 3.3-1. Where different, rankings from the previous survey are shown in 

parentheses. Although one-to-one alignments of these 17 missions with the previously 

27
UAV Roadmap 2002 – Section 3 

Requirements 

described 17 priorities from the IPLs for UAVs is inexact, the priorities of the two for 

congruent mission areas are in general agreement, as is shown in the last column. 

TABLE 3.3-1: COMBATANT COMMANDER/SERVICE UAV MISSION 

PRIORITIZATION MATRIX—2003. 

Mission Predator Global Hawk TUAV VTUAV IPLs 

Reconnaissance 1 1 1 1 3

Signals Intel 3 2 5 (7) 4 8 

Mine Detection/CM 11 (7) 13 (12) 6 (4) 5 11 

Precision Target Location and 

Designation 2 12 (11) 2 (3) 2 - 

Battle Management 10 (8) 6 (7) 7 (5) 9 (7) - 

Chem/Bio Reconnaissance 7 (10) 9 (10) 4 (6) 7 (9) 4 

Counter Cam/Con/Deception 5 (4) 5 8 11 - 

Electronic Warfare 8 (6) 4 9 10 10 

Combat SAR 6 (5) 7 (8) 10 6 (8) 12 

Communications/Data Relay 9 3 3 (2) 3 2 

Information Warfare 14 (11) 8 (6) 11 8 (6) - 

Digital Mapping 13 (12) 10 (9) 12 13 (12) - 

Littoral Undersea Warfare - - - 12 (13) - 

SOF Team Resupply 12 - 15 15 - 

Weaponization/Strike 4 11 13 6

GPS Psuedolite - 14 - 9 

Covert Sensor Insertion - - 14 14 - 

Decoy/Pathfinder - - 16 16 -

28
UAV Roadmap 2002 – Section 4 

Technologies 

4.0 Technologies 

The third foundation stone of this Roadmap, emerging technologies, provides the 

means by which today’s UAV systems (Section 2) will evolve the capabilities necessary 

to provide the warfighters’ requirements (Section 3). These three elements are brought 

together to form the Roadmap proper in Section 6. In this section, technologists have 

provided their best estimates of what UAV-related developments will occur and when we 

should see them in the field over the next 25 years. Four technology areas are addressed: 

Platforms (propulsion and survivability), Payloads (sensors, relays, and weapons), 

Communication, and Processors. 

4.1 Platforms 

The requirements for UAVs identified in Section 3 reveal the overwhelming 

majority of UAV uses involve dull (long duration) or dangerous (high potential for loss) 

aspects. These mission requirements translate to technology requirements for increased 

platform endurance, increased platform survivability, and/or lower platform cost. The 

dirty mission set implies low cost, disposable (generally small) UAV systems, focusing 

on simple, COTS based solutions. 

4.1.1 Propulsion 

Endurance is driven by propulsion. Two key propulsion metrics are specific fuel 

consumption (SFC) for efficiency and mass specific power (MSP) for performance. 

Figures 4.1-1 and 4.1-2 show trends in SFC and MSP, respectively, expected over the 

next 25 years. Projected propulsion advances over the next 25 years are depicted in 4.1-3 

and discussed in Appendices A and D. 

1955 1965 1975 1985 1995 2005 2015 2025

SFC, lb/hr-(lb-st)

0

0.5

1

1.5

2

2.5

Microturbo TRS 18

Gas Turbine Engines ( )

Internal Combustion Engines ( )

Projected Floor in SFC

Williams F112

Rolls Royce Viper II

Williams FJ44 RC Model Aircraft

VM Motori

Rectimo AR 1200

General Atomics KH-800

Allison 3007H Norton NR612

All points represent 

cruise conditions

1955 1965 1975 1985 1995 2005 2015 2025

SFC, lb/hr-(lb-st)

0

0.5

1

1.5

2

2.5

Microturbo TRS 18

Gas Turbine Engines ( )

Internal Combustion Engines ( )

Projected Floor in SFC

Williams F112

Rolls Royce Viper II

Williams FJ44 RC Model Aircraft

VM Motori

Rectimo AR 1200

General Atomics KH-800

Allison 3007H Norton NR612

All points represent 

cruise conditions

FIGURE 4.1-1: SPECIFIC FUEL CONSUMPTION TRENDS. 

29
UAV Roadmap 2002 – Section 4 

Technologies 

FIGURE 4.1-2: MASS SPECIFIC POWER TRENDS. 

Now 2010 2015

Turbine 

Engine 

Turbofan, turboprop, Integrated 

High Performance Turbine 

Engine Technology (IHPTET)

Versatile Affordable 

Advanced Turbine Engines 

(VAATE-1)

VAATE-II 

Note: VAATE ends in 2017

Hypersonics 

Scramjets 

AF Single Engine Scramjet 

Demo, Mach 4-7 

X-43C Multi-engine, Mach 5-7

Robust Scramjet: broader 

operating envelope and 

reusable applications (e.g. 

turbine-based combined 

cycles)

Hypersonic cruise missiles 

could be in use w/in 

operational commands. 

Prototype high Mach (8-10) 

air vehicles possible

Turboelectric 

Machinery 

Integrated Drive Generator on 

Accessory Drive, 

Integrated Power Unit – F-22

No AMAD, Electric 

Propulsive Engine Controls, 

Vehicle Drag 

Reduction/Range Extension

Enabling electrical power for 

airborne directed energy

weaponry

Rechargeable

Batteries 

Lead Acid, NiCd, in wide use 

Lithium Ion under development –

(B-2 battery – 1st example)

Lithium Ion batteries in wide 

use (100-150 WH/kg)

Lithium polymer batteries in 

wide use (300-400 WH/kg)

Photovoltaics Silicon based single crystal cells 

in rigid arrays

Flexible thin films 

 Multi-junction devices – 

Germanium, Gallium based

Concentrator cells and 

modules 

 technologies (lens, 

reflectors)

Fuel Cells Prototypes in large UAVs – 

NASA ERAST (Helios)

Production PEM fuel cells 

(automobile industry driven) 

available for UAVs

Fuel cells size, weight 

reductions 

Improvements in reformers 

resulting in multi fuels use

FIGURE 4.1-3: PROPULSION/POWER TECHNOLOGY FORECAST. 

30
UAV Roadmap 2002 – Section 4 

Technologies 

4.1.2 Survivability

Aircraft survivability is a balance of tactics, technology (for both active and 

passive measures), and cost for a given threat environment. For manned aircraft, aircraft 

survivability equates to crew survivability, on which a high premium is placed. For 

UAVs, this equation shifts, and the merits of making them highly survivable, vice 

somewhat survivable, for the same mission come into question. Insight into this tradeoff 

is provided by examining the Global Hawk and DarkStar programs. Both were built to 

the same mission (high altitude endurance reconnaissance) and cost objective ($10 

million flyaway price); one (DarkStar) was to be more highly survivable by stealth, the 

other only moderately survivable. Performance could be traded to meet the cost 

objective. The resulting designs therefore traded only performance for survivability. The 

low observable DarkStar emerged as one-third the size (8,600 versus 25,600 lbs) and had 

one-third the performance (9 hrs at 500 nm versus 24 hrs at 1200 nm) of its conventional 

stablemate, Global Hawk. It was canceled for reasons that included its performance 

shortfall outweighing the perceived value of its enhanced survivability. Further, the 

active countermeasures planned for Global Hawk’s survivability suite were severely 

pared back as an early cost savings measure during its design phase. 

The value of survivability in the UAV design equation will vary with the mission, 

but the DarkStar lesson will need to be reexamined for relevance to future UCAV 

designs. To the extent UAVs inherently possess low or reduced observable attributes, 

such as having seamless composite skins, fewer windows and hatches, and/or smaller 

sizes, they will be optimized for some level of survivability. Trading performance and/or 

cost for survivability beyond that level, however, runs counter to the prevailing 

perception that UAVs must be cheaper, more attritable versions of manned aircraft to 

justify their acquisition. As an illustration, both the Air Force and the Navy UCAVs 

were originally targeted at one third the acquisition cost of their closest manned 

counterpart, the JSF, and are still priced at a fraction of what it costs to buy their manned 

counterparts. 

One low/reduced observable characteristic implicit in the Combatant 

Commander’s IPLs, specifically for the force protection and SEAD missions, is aircraft 

acoustic signature. These two missions can be better supported by using quieter vehicles 

that are less susceptible to detection, whether by base intruders (acoustic) in the force 

protection role or by a hostile integrated air defense system employing active and passive 

(radar and acoustic) detection systems for the SEAD mission. Electric power systems, 

such as fuel cells, offer lower noise and infrared signatures for smaller UAVs while 

providing comparable mass specific power to that of Internal Combustion Engines (ICE). 

If active and passive measures fail to protect the aircraft, the focus of survivability 

shifts from completing the mission to saving the aircraft. Two emerging technologies 

hold significant promise in this area for UAVs, self-repairing structures and fault tolerant 

flight control systems (FCSs). AFRL-sponsored research into self-repairing materials 

shows composites may be capable of sealing small holes or gaps in-flight, such as those 

inflicted by small arms fire. Several on-going efforts are intent on developing FCS 

software that can “reconfigure” itself to use alternative combinations of remaining 

control surfaces when a primary control surface is damaged or lost. Fault tolerant FCSs 

will be key to improving UAV reliability and enabling successful demonstration of the 

Services’ autonomous operation initiatives. 

31
UAV Roadmap 2002 – Section 4 

Technologies 

4.1.3 Cost Control 

Empty weight cost is a commonly used metric in the aviation industry because it 

tends to remain constant across a variety of aircraft types. That number today is roughly 

$1500 per pound. Table 4.1-1 provides the empty weight and cost data for DoD UAVs 

depicted in Figure 4.1-4. It shows current DoD UAV platforms cost approximately 

$1500 per pound of empty weight and $8000 per pound of payload capacity as one “cost 

per capability” metric. Figure 4.1-5 takes this metric further by factoring in UAV 

endurance (from Section 2) to also provide a link between performance and cost in terms 

of dollars per pound-hour. OSD, Joint Staff, and the Services should develop 

capability and/or capability-performance metrics (such as those in Section 4.1) 

against which to evaluate UAV program costs. Program managers should provide 

Joint Staff and OSD written justification at Milestone B and C reviews when these 

metrics are exceeded, and provide appropriate management organizations with 

options for reducing costs to align costs with these metrics when this occurs.2

 OPR:

OSD. Due: FY03. 

TABLE 4.1-1. UAV SYSTEM AND AIRCRAFT COSTS AND WEIGHTS. 

System Aircraft Cost 

FY02 $*

Aircraft 

Weight, lb*

Payload 

Weight, lb

System Cost 

FY02 $

Number of 

Acft/System

Predator $ 1,700,000 1135 450 $ 30,000,000 4 

Pioneer $ 650,000 307 75 $ 7,000,000 4 

Hunter $ 1,200,000 1170 200 $ 20,000,000 8 

Global Hawk $ 20,000,000 9200 1950 $ 57,000,000 1 

Shadow 200 $ 325,000 216 60 $ 6,200,000 4 

Fire Scout $ 1,800,000 1502 200 $ 14,200,000 3 

Dragon Eye $ 35,000 3.5 1 $ 120,000 3 

* Aircraft costs are minus sensor costs, and aircraft weights are minus fuel and payload capacities. 

Hardware costs, including GFE, are used.

 

2

 Bolded text refers to OSD’s priority goals for unmanned aviation discussed in section 6.4. 

32
UAV Roadmap 2002 – Section 4 

Technologies 

1

10

100

1000

10000

100000

1,000 10,000 100,000 1,000,000 10,000,000 100,000,000 1,000,000,000 $1K $10K $100K $1M $10M $100M

1

10

100

1000

10,000

Weight, Lb

Cost, $FY02

Empty Weight ( )

Payload Weight ( )

$8,000/lb of

Payload Weight

$1,500/lb of

Empty Weight

Global Hawk

Fire Scout

Hu Predator nter

Pioneer

Shadow 200

Dragon Eye

100,000

$1B

1

10

100

1000

10000

100000

1,000 10,000 100,000 1,000,000 10,000,000 100,000,000 1,000,000,000 $1K $10K $100K $1M $10M $100M

1

10

100

1000

10,000

Weight, Lb

Cost, $FY02

Empty Weight ( )

Payload Weight ( )

$8,000/lb of

Payload Weight

$1,500/lb of

Empty Weight

Global Hawk

Fire Scout

Hu Predator nter

Pioneer

Shadow 200

Dragon Eye

100,000

$1B

FIGURE 4.1-4: UAV CAPABILITY METRIC: WEIGHT V. COST. 

1

10

100

1000

10000

100000

$1K $10K $100K $1M $10M $100M

1

10

100

1000

10,000

Payload Weight x Endurance, Lb-Hr

Cost, $FY02

Global Hawk

Fire Scout

Predator

Hunter

Pioneer

Shadow 200

Dragon Eye

100,000

$1B

1

10

100

1000

10000

100000

$1K $10K $100K $1M $10M $100M

1

10

100

1000

10,000

Payload Weight x Endurance, Lb-Hr

Cost, $FY02

Global Hawk

Fire Scout

Predator

Hunter

Pioneer

Shadow 200

Dragon Eye

100,000

$1B

FIGURE 4.1-5: UAV PERFORMANCE METRIC: ENDURANCE V. COST. 

33
UAV Roadmap 2002 – Section 4 

Technologies 

4.2 Payloads 

Of the 17 mission areas identified by the Combatant Commanders that could 

potentially be addressed with UAVs (see Section 3.2), ten involve sensing, three relaying 

(Command and Control (C2)/Communications, Psychological Operations, and 

Navigation), and four weapons delivery (Theater Air and Missile Defense (TAMD), 

SEAD, Strike, and Anti Submarine Warfare (ASW)) functions for the mission payload. 

The payload capacities available in current and planned U.S. military UAVs are shown in 

relation to platform endurance in Figure 4.2-1. 

Global Haw k

1,000

100

10

0 10 20 30

Pa

yloa

d, Lb

Endurance, Hrs

10,000

Dragon Eye

FPASS

Dragon Drone

Neptune

Shadow 200

Pioneer

Fire Scout

Hunter

Predator B

Predator

Global Haw k

1,000

100

10

0 10 20 30

Pa

yloa

d, Lb

Endurance, Hrs

10,000

Dragon Eye

FPASS

Dragon Drone

Neptune

Shadow 200

Pioneer

Fire Scout

Hunter

Predator B

Predator

X-50

ER/MP

Global Hawk Spiral 2

UCAV

A160

FINDER

LEWK

Systems in red italics use notional

values for payload and endurance

UCAR (2010)

X-50

ER/MP

Global Hawk Spiral 2

UCAV

A160

FINDER

LEWK

Systems in red italics use notional

values for payload and endurance

UCAR (2010)

40

FIGURE 4.2-1: UAV PAYLOAD WEIGHT VS. ENDURANCE. 

4.2.1 Sensors 

Requirements for sensing payloads on UAVs extend not just to the ten mission 

areas mentioned above, but also to the four weapons delivery missions, due to their 

reliance on detecting and identifying the target to meet rules of engagement (ROE) 

34
UAV Roadmap 2002 – Section 4 

Technologies 

constraints and to improve aim point accuracy. The dominant requirement for sensing is 

for imaging (visible, infrared, and radar), followed by signals (for the SIGINT and SEAD 

missions), chemical (weapons of mass destruction (WMD)), biological (WMD), 

radiological (WMD), meteorological (METOC), and magnetic (ASW and Mines Counter 

Measure (MCM)). Figures 4.2-1 through 4.2-5 depict expected developments in 

imaging, signals, and measurements and signatures intelligence (MASINT) sensors over 

the next 25 years by technology and by system, as well as describing the regimes in 

which such sensors must perform, the enablers necessary to improve present capabilities, 

and the missions for which each is applicable. Figure 4.2-6 then combines and maps 

these forecast developments by sensor type between now and 2010, then out to 2015. 

05 10 15 20 25

Calendar Years

Medium to high altitude, relatively sophisticated sensors beyond video capabilities

Wideband data links/architecture, focal plane arrays, lightweight optics, lightweight rigid structures,

lightweight mass storage arrays (digital storage equivalent to wet film pixels/pound), onboard

processing, ATC/ATR algorithm development,

Broad area reconnaissance, high resolution spot imagery, standoff recce, intel preparation of the 

battlefield, positive target identification, battle damage assessment

Panchromatic

00

Multispectral

SYERS,

Global Hawk

Integrated

Sensor

Suite

SYERS-2

Hyperspectral

Wet Film?

05 10 15 20 25

Calendar Years

Medium to high altitude, relatively sophisticated sensors beyond video capabilities

Wideband data links/architecture, focal plane arrays, lightweight optics, lightweight rigid structures,

lightweight mass storage arrays (digital storage equivalent to wet film pixels/pound), onboard

processing, ATC/ATR algorithm development,

Broad area reconnaissance, high resolution spot imagery, standoff recce, intel preparation of the 

battlefield, positive target identification, battle damage assessment

Panchromatic

00

Multispectral

SYERS,

Global Hawk

Integrated

Sensor

Suite

SYERS-2

Hyperspectral

Wet Film?

REGIME:

ENABLERS:

MISSIONS:

REGIME:

ENABLERS:

MISSIONS:

REGIME:

ENABLERS:

MISSIONS:

REGIME:

ENABLERS:

MISSIONS:

FIGURE 4.2-2: STILL IMAGERY SENSOR TECHNOLOGY FORECAST. 

05 10 15 20 25

Calendar Years

00

All altitudes, all vehicle classes except micro-UAVs

Miniaturized focal plane arrays, tactical line-of-sight datalinks, NRT sensor-to-shooter architecture,

autonomous vehicle/sensor ops, interneton the battlefield

Low threat surveillance, over-the-hill/behind-the-building imagery, treatyverification, “stakeouts”,

force protection/picket duty, precision strike/BDA, target designation

Predator,

TUAV

ERMP, Micro-UAV UCAV Recce,

Target Designation

Follow-on UCAV

Recce Variant

MTS Ball MTS/

Laser Designator

HDTV

Proprietary

Formats

JTA Compliant Formats

05 10 15 20 25

Calendar Years

00 05 10 15 20 25

Calendar Years

00 05 10 15 20 25

Calendar Years

00

All altitudes, all vehicle classes except micro-UAVs

Miniaturized focal plane arrays, tactical line-of-sight datalinks, NRT sensor-to-shooter architecture,

autonomous vehicle/sensor ops, interneton the battlefield

Low threat surveillance, over-the-hill/behind-the-building imagery, treatyverification, “stakeouts”,

force protection/picket duty, precision strike/BDA, target designation

Predator,

TUAV

ERMP, Micro-UAV UCAV Recce,

Target Designation

Follow-on UCAV

Recce Variant

MTS Ball MTS/

Laser Designator

HDTV

Proprietary

Formats

JTA Compliant Formats

FIGURE 4.2-3: MOTION/VIDEO IMAGERY SENSOR TECHNOLOGY FORECAST. 

35
UAV Roadmap 2002 – Section 4 

Technologies 

05 10 15 20 25

Calendar Years

00

Mechanically

Scanned Array

Mechanical/

2D ESA Active ESA

All altitudes, all vehicle classes except micro-UAVs

Scalable AESA systems, operationalized FOPEN sensors/algorithms,onboard/offboard image 

enhancement (improved resolution, coherentchange detection), aircraft electrical generator

improvements (watts/pound,power extraction efficiency)

Broad area reconaissance, ground/air moving target imagery, intel prep of the battlefield, precision 

guided munition targeting data, NRT sensor-to-shooter/sensor-to-bullet data transfer, mapping,

cueing

TESAR

ASARS-2

HYSAR

Lynx

ASARS-2A

MP-RTIP UHF/VHF FOPEN

GMTI AMTI GMTI - track AMTI - track GMTI - identify AMTI - identify

Single Pass DTED

05 10 15 20 25

Calendar Years

00 05 10 15 20 25

Calendar Years

00 05 10 15 20 25

Calendar Years

00

Mechanically

Scanned Array

Mechanical/

2D ESA Active ESA

All altitudes, all vehicle classes except micro-UAVs

Scalable AESA systems, operationalized FOPEN sensors/algorithms,onboard/offboard image 

enhancement (improved resolution, coherentchange detection), aircraft electrical generator

improvements (watts/pound,power extraction efficiency)

Broad area reconaissance, ground/air moving target imagery, intel prep of the battlefield, precision 

guided munition targeting data, NRT sensor-to-shooter/sensor-to-bullet data transfer, mapping,

cueing

TESAR

ASARS-2

HYSAR

Lynx

ASARS-2A

MP-RTIP UHF/VHF FOPEN

GMTI AMTI GMTI - track AMTI - track GMTI - identify AMTI - identify

Single Pass DTED

REGIME:

ENABLERS:

MISSIONS:

REGIME:

ENABLERS:

MISSIONS:

REGIME:

ENABLERS:

MISSIONS:

REGIME:

ENABLERS:

MISSIONS:

FIGURE 4.2-4: RADAR IMAGER SENSOR TECHNOLOGY FORECAST. 

Manned: ARL, Guardrail, ACS, Navy SIGNT, U-2, Rivet Joint, classified systems

Unmanned: Global Hawk, Predator, Tactical vehicles

05 10 15 20 25

Calendar Years

00

All altitudes, all vehicle classes

Scalable SIGINT systems, decryption software development, dense environment algorithms,

conformal/multipurpose antennas

Threat warning, cueing for imagery/electronic warfare, situational awareness, threat database, strat

ELINT/COMINT

Platform-specific

sensors, QRCs

Stratified by altitude,

vehicle characteristics

(stealth, SWAP)

Requirements-based

allocation across

manned/unmanned aircraft,

space

Mission-specific

sensors

Integrated SIGINT

architecture

Manned: ARL, Guardrail, ACS, Navy SIGNT, U-2, Rivet Joint, classified systems

Unmanned: Global Hawk, Predator, Tactical vehicles

05 10 15 20 25

Calendar Years

00 05 10 15 20 25

Calendar Years

00 05 10 15 20 25

Calendar Years

00

All altitudes, all vehicle classes

Scalable SIGINT systems, decryption software development, dense environment algorithms,

conformal/multipurpose antennas

Threat warning, cueing for imagery/electronic warfare, situational awareness, threat database, strat

ELINT/COMINT

Platform-specific

sensors, QRCs

Stratified by altitude,

vehicle characteristics

(stealth, SWAP)

Requirements-based

allocation across

manned/unmanned aircraft,

space

Mission-specific

sensors

Integrated SIGINT

architecture

FIGURE 4.2-5: SIGINT SENSOR TECHNOLOGY FORECAST. 

36
UAV Roadmap 2002 – Section 4 

Technologies 

05 10 15 20 25

Calendar Years

00

All altitudes, small/lightweight systems to complex, heavy sensors

HSI/imaging system integration, focal plane technology, chem/bio aerosol phenomenology,

materials science phenomenology, ATC/ATR algorithm development incorporating HSI, offboard

system integration, very wideband comms, improved efficiency lidars, range-gating algorithms

Hyperspectral cueing (low-res), effluent/aerosol detection and ID, materials databases, RF

characterization, battle management (MTI), anti-CCD imagery, “seeing through [walls/forests]”,

subsurface imaging, obscured IMINT, 3D imaging/battlefield simulation, specific vehicle/target

identification, SAR decoy detection

Multispectral

GMTI AMTI GMTI - track AMTI - track GMTI - identify AMTI - identify

SYERS-2

(MSI)

Hyperspectral

Initial LIDAR Systems

Hyperspectral cueing

High resolution

hyperspectral imaging

LIDAR FOPEN/imaging through clouds

05 10 15 20 25

Calendar Years

00

All altitudes, small/lightweight systems to complex, heavy sensors

HSI/imaging system integration, focal plane technology, chem/bio aerosol phenomenology,

materials science phenomenology, ATC/ATR algorithm development incorporating HSI, offboard

system integration, very wideband comms, improved efficiency lidars, range-gating algorithms

Hyperspectral cueing (low-res), effluent/aerosol detection and ID, materials databases, RF

characterization, battle management (MTI), anti-CCD imagery, “seeing through [walls/forests]”,

subsurface imaging, obscured IMINT, 3D imaging/battlefield simulation, specific vehicle/target

identification, SAR decoy detection

Multispectral

GMTI AMTI GMTI - track AMTI - track GMTI - identify AMTI - identify

SYERS-2

(MSI)

Hyperspectral

Initial LIDAR Systems

Hyperspectral cueing

High resolution

hyperspectral imaging

LIDAR FOPEN/imaging through clouds

REGIME:

ENABLERS:

MISSIONS:

REGIME:

ENABLERS:

MISSIONS:

FIGURE 4.2-6: MASINT SENSOR TECHNOLOGY FORECAST. 

Now 2010 2015

Mechanical/2D 

ESA

GMTI

Active ESA

AMTI

GMTI – Track

UHF/VHF FOPEN

Radar

SIGINT

Ladar

HSI

Video

EO/IR/MSI

AMTI - Track

GMTI - Identify

Day/Night EO/IR

Limited MSI

Proliferated MSI

Miniaturized systems

High resolution wet-film

equivalent mass storage,

coverage rates

Platform-specific sensors

QRCs for specific signals

of interest

Family of systems, Modular architecture

allowing incorporation of

QRC functionality

Air/Space integrated architecture

Miniaturized SIGINT sensors for

micro-UAVs, tailored for personal

comms devices

3D Ladar demos

3D Ladar systems

Imagery through clouds/trees

Multidiscriminant Ladar

Active spectral determination

Polarization

Low/medium resolution

Target cueing

Lightweight integrated cueing systems

Onboard processing

Day/night capability

Active illumination

Medium/high resolution

Panchromatic

Proprietary formats

Data format standards

HDTV sensors

Integrated target designation

Lightweight multispectral systems

Autonomous operation

UCAV target search/ID functions

Now 2010 2015

Mechanical/2D 

ESA

GMTI

Active ESA

AMTI

GMTI – Track

UHF/VHF FOPEN

Radar

SIGINT

Ladar

HSI

Video

EO/IR/MSI

AMTI - Track

GMTI - Identify

Day/Night EO/IR

Limited MSI

Proliferated MSI

Miniaturized systems

High resolution wet-film

equivalent mass storage,

coverage rates

Platform-specific sensors

QRCs for specific signals

of interest

Family of systems, Modular architecture

allowing incorporation of

QRC functionality

Air/Space integrated architecture

Miniaturized SIGINT sensors for

micro-UAVs, tailored for personal

comms devices

3D Ladar demos

3D Ladar systems

Imagery through clouds/trees

Multidiscriminant Ladar

Active spectral determination

Polarization

Low/medium resolution

Target cueing

Lightweight integrated cueing systems

Onboard processing

Day/night capability

Active illumination

Medium/high resolution

Panchromatic

Proprietary formats

Data format standards

HDTV sensors

Integrated target designation

Lightweight multispectral systems

Autonomous operation

UCAV target search/ID functions

FIGURE 4.2-7: FORECAST SENSOR CAPABILITIES. 

37
UAV Roadmap 2002 – Section 4 

Technologies 

4.2.2 Communication Relay

Every Combatant Commander expressed concern over communication shortfalls 

in his theater (see Figure 4.3-1). By 2010, existing and planned capacities are forecast to 

meet only 44 percent of the need projected by Joint Vision 2010 to ensure information 

superiority. A separate, detailed study, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) as 

Communications Platforms, dated 4 November 1997, was conducted by OSD/C3I. Its 

major conclusions regarding the use of a UAV as an Airborne Communication Node 

(ACN) were: 

• Tactical communication needs can be met much more responsively and 

effectively with ACNs than with satellites. 

• ACNs can effectively augment theater satellite capabilities by addressing 

deficiencies in capacity and connectivity. 

• Satellites are better suited than UAVs for meeting high capacity, worldwide 

communications needs. 

ACNs can enhance intra-theater and tactical communications capacity and 

connectivity by providing 1) more efficient use of bandwidth, 2) extending the range of 

existing terrestrial LOS communications systems, 3) extending communication to areas 

denied or masked to satellite service, and 4) providing significant improvement in 

received power density compared to that of satellites, improving reception and decreasing 

vulnerability to jamming. The potential savings in logistics is also significant. In Desert 

Storm, the deployment of Army signal units required 40 C-5 sorties and 24 ships. By 

being largely self-deployable, an endurance UAV-based ACN could reduce the number 

of airlift sorties required for communication support by half to two thirds. 

DARPA’s Adaptive Joint C4ISR Node (AJCN) is developing a modular, scalable 

communication relay payload that can be tailored to fly on a RQ-4/Global Hawk and 

provide theater-wide support (300 nm diameter area of coverage) or on a RQ-7/Shadow 

for tactical use (60 nm diameter area). The current program schedule calls for flight 

demonstrations beginning in 2004 and the addition of a simultaneous SIGINT capability 

by 2010. 

4.2.3 Weapons 

If combat UAVs are to achieve most of their initial cost and stealth advantages by 

being smaller than their manned counterparts, they will logically have smaller weapons 

bays and therefore need smaller weapons. Smaller and/or fewer weapons carried per 

mission means lethality must be increased to achieve equal or greater mission 

effectiveness. Achieving lethality with small weapons requires precision guidance (in 

most cases) and/or more lethal warheads. Ongoing technology programs are providing a 

variety of precision guidance options; some are in the inventory now. With the advent of 

some innovative wide kill-area warheads, hardening guidance systems, i.e., resistance to 

GPS jamming, appears to be the greatest technology requirement. A potentially 

significant advantage to smaller more precise weapons and penetrating launch platforms 

such as UCAVs is the reduction in collateral damage. In some cases these platform and 

weapons combinations could reduce an adversary’s ability to seek sanctuary within noncombatant areas. 

38
UAV Roadmap 2002 – Section 4 

Technologies 

As for increased lethality, a number of innovative weapons have shown 

capabilities that suggest UAV size-compatible weapons could achieve high lethality 

against difficult targets. The Naval Surface Weapons Center (NSWC) at Indian Head 

Arsenal, MD, has demonstrated a flying plate weapon that can reduce concrete structures 

to rubble or perforate steel, giving it the potential to destroy bridge piers, drop structural 

elements, and penetrate bunkers. New, more high-energy explosives are emerging that 

can be used to provide the explosive power of much larger weapons in very small 

configurations. NSWC’s intermetallic incendiary technology generates a 6700o

F 

firestorm that cannot be quenched by water, offering the promise of neutralizing 

biological and chemical agents. The flechette weapon can disable vehicles, air defense 

sites, and similar soft targets with numerous, small, high velocity flechettes. High power 

microwave (HPM) technology uses single or repetitive pulses to disrupt or destroy 

transistors in command, control, and communication centers and electronics facilities. 

The Air Force Air Armament Center’s small diameter bomb (SDB) is half the weight of 

the smallest bomb the Air Force uses today, the 500-pound Mark 82. Its 250-pound class 

warhead has demonstrated penetration of more than 6 feet of reinforced concrete. The 

Air Force hopes to deploy it by 2006 on the F-15E, followed by deployment on several 

other aircraft, including the UCAV. 

4.2.4 Cost Control 

Table 4.1-1 provides the payload capacities used in Figure 4.1-4, which shows 

current DoD UAVs cost approximately $8000 per pound of payload capacity (sensors), a 

comparable number to the payload capacity of the JSF, which is $7300 per pound 

(weapons). JSF has served as an early standard for setting both Air Force and Navy 

UCAV price goals. This same capability metric applied to the planned Air Force UCAV 

is $5500 per pound payload (weapons). As UAVs become smaller, or stealthier, the 

standoff range of sensor systems may be reduced. Reduced sensor standoff capability 

coupled with more use of COTS systems can have a significant impact on some sensor 

packages for some classes of UAVs. 

4.3 Communication 

Airborne data link rates and processor speeds are in a race with respect to 

enabling future UAV capabilities. Today, and for the near term, the paradigm is to relay 

virtually all airborne data to the ground and process it there for interpretation and 

decisions. Eventually, however, onboard processing power will outstrip data link 

capabilities and allow UAVs to relay the results of their data, vice the data itself, to the 

ground for decision making. At that point, the requirement for data link rates in certain 

applications, particularly imagery collection, should drop significantly. 

Meanwhile, data compression will remain relevant into the future as long as bandlimited communications exist, but it is unlikely compression algorithms alone will solve 

the near term throughput requirements of advanced sensors. A technology that 

intentionally discards information is not the preferred technique. For now, compression 

is a concession to inadequate bandwidth. 

In the case of radio frequency (RF) data links, limited spectrum and the 

requirement to minimize airborne system size, weight, and power (SWAP) have been 

39
UAV Roadmap 2002 – Section 4 

Technologies 

strong contributors for limiting data rates. Rates up to 10 Gbps (40 times currently 

fielded capabilities) are considered possible at current bandwidths by using more 

bandwidth-efficient modulation methods. At gigahertz frequencies however, RF use 

becomes increasingly constrained by frequency congestion, effectively limiting its upper 

frequency to 10 GHz. Currently fielded digital data links provide an efficiency varying 

between 0.92 and 1.5 bps/Hz, where the theoretical maximum is 1.92. 

Airborne optical data links, or lasercom, will potentially offer data rates two to 

five orders of magnitude greater than those of the best future RF systems. However, 

lasercom data rates have held steady for two decades because their key technical 

challenge was adequate Pointing, Acquisition, and Tracking (PAT) technology to ensure 

the laser link was both acquired and maintained. Although mature RF systems are 

viewed as lower risk, and therefore attract investment dollars more easily, Missile 

Defense Agency (formerly BMDO) funding in the 1990s allowed a series of increasingly 

complex demonstrations at Gbps rates. The small apertures (3 to 5 in) and widespread 

availability of low power semiconductor lasers explains why lasercom systems typically 

weigh 30 to 50 percent that of comparable RF systems and consume less power. 

Although lasercom could surpass RF in terms of airborne data transfer rate, RF 

will continue to dominate at the lower altitudes for some time into the future because of

its better all-weather capability. Thus, both RF and optical technology development 

should continue to progress out to 2025. Projected growth areas for airborne data links 

are shown in Figure 4.3-1. 

Common

Data Link

Narrowband

SATCOM

Wideband 

SATCOM

TCDL

CDL

MP - CDL

Now 2010 2015

Replaces C–band

on TUAVs

Integrated

on Predator

Wideband

TCDL

Networking

Capability

“Bandwidth

On Demand”

Replaces SCDL

on MC2A

Supports Network

Centric Ops

Data Only

DAMA for GH

Voice DAMA

for GH

ETP 

for GH

WGS

Avail

Ka Terminals for 

Predator and GH

Improved ETP Systems

For GH and U-2

ACN

Avail Lasercomm

for GH

AWS

Avail

Common

Data Link

Narrowband

SATCOM

Wideband 

SATCOM

TCDL

CDL

MP - CDL

Now 2010 2015

Replaces C–band

on TUAVs

Integrated

on Predator

Wideband

TCDL

Networking

Capability

“Bandwidth

On Demand”

Replaces SCDL

on MC2A

Supports Network

Centric Ops

Data Only

DAMA for GH

Voice DAMA

for GH

ETP 

for GH

WGS

Avail

Ka Terminals for 

Predator and GH

Improved ETP Systems

For GH and U-2

ACN

Avail Lasercomm

for GH

AWS

Avail

FIGURE 4.3-1: AIRBORNE COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY FORECAST. 

40
UAV Roadmap 2002 – Section 4 

Technologies 

4.4 Processors 

Increased onboard processing will be the key enabler of more responsive flight 

control systems, onboard sensor data processing, and autonomous operations (AO) for 

future UAVs. AO is a current capability-push by the Navy in the Office of Naval 

Research’s AO Future Naval Capability initiative and by the Air Force as part of the Air 

Force Research Laboratory’s (AFRL) Sensorcraft initiative. The Autononmous Control 

Levels (ACLs) used in Figure 4.4-1 were developed in response to the OSD Fixed Wing 

Vehicle (FWV) Initiative’s need for an autonomy metric in 2000. In parallel with 

developing the technology for AO, the Services must also evolve their doctrines for 

employing it. Scalable levels of AO will probably be necessary to accommodate varying 

rules of engagement (ROEs) for contingencies from peacekeeping to force-on-force. 

1955

Autonomous Control Levels

Pioneer

1965 1975 1985 1995 2005 2015 2025

Global Hawk

AF UCAV

UCAR

Fully Autonomous Swarms

Group Strategic Goals

Distributed Control

Group Tactical Goals

Group Tactical Replan

Group Coordination

Adapt to Failures & Flight Conditions

Real Time Health/Diagnosis

Remotely Guided

Onboard Route Replan

10

9

8

7

6

5

4

3

2

1

UCAV-N

Predator

1955

Autonomous Control Levels

Pioneer

1965 1975 1985 1995 2005 2015 2025

Global Hawk

AF UCAV

UCAR

Fully Autonomous Swarms

Group Strategic Goals

Distributed Control

Group Tactical Goals

Group Tactical Replan

Group Coordination

Adapt to Failures & Flight Conditions

Real Time Health/Diagnosis

Remotely Guided

Onboard Route Replan

10

9

8

7

6

5

4

3

2

1

UCAV-N

Predator

FIGURE 4.4-1: AUTONOMOUS CONTROL LEVEL TREND. 

These advances in UAV capabilities hinge on the commercial sector’s continued 

progress in manufacturing increasingly capable processors. Moore’s Law states the 

number of transistors on a microprocessor will double approximately every 12-18 

months, enabling a corresponding increase in computing power. This “law” is based on 

an observation made by Gordon Moore, Chairman Emeritus of Intel Corporation, in 1965 

and has been remarkably accurate for the past 35 years. It has been the basis for many 

performance forecasts and is used here to project the trend in microprocessor speeds for 

the next 25 years. These speeds directly determine whether warfighters can receive their 

information in real time (RT), near-real-time (NRT), or the next day (ND). Figure 4.4-2 

41
UAV Roadmap 2002 – Section 4 

Technologies 

illustrates this trend in microprocessor speed and extrapolates a trend based on speeds 

doubling every 18 months. From it, Terahertz (1000 GHz) processors should become

commercially available in the 2015-2020 timeframe. 

100 KHz

Pro

cessor S

pee

d

Intel 386 DX

1 MHz

10 MHz

100 MHz

1 GHz

10 GHz

100 GHz

1 THz

10 THz

100 THz

1 PHz

10 PHz

100 PHz

1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025

Intel 486 DX

Pentium

Pentium II

Pentium III Pentium IV

Limit of Silicon Technology

100 KHz

Pro

cessor S

pee

d

Intel 386 DX

1 MHz

10 MHz

100 MHz

1 GHz

10 GHz

100 GHz

1 THz

10 THz

100 THz

1 PHz

10 PHz

100 PHz

1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025

Intel 486 DX

Pentium

Pentium II

Pentium III Pentium IV

Limit of Silicon Technology

FIGURE 4.4-2: PROCESSOR SPEED TREND. 

However, advances in silicon-based microprocessors have a finite limit dictated 

by the laws of physics, known as the “point-one limit.” This refers to the smallest 

dimension (0.1 micron) of a transistor achievable before, according to quantum theory, 

the information-carrying electrons traveling among the transistors can tunnel through this 

distance of a few atoms, negating the on/off purpose of the transistor and corrupting data. 

Moore’s Law predicts this limit will be reached in the 2015-2020 timeframe. Even 

before this limit is reached, the cost of manufacturing silicon chips to ever increasing 

precision and tolerances should begin increasing exponentially, reversing the cost/benefit 

ratio of each new generation of microchip historically enjoyed by consumers. 

Forecast progress over the next 25 years in processor technology is depicted in 

Figure 4.4-3. Three avenues for extending silicon’s deadline are converting microchips 

to “microcubes,” replacing the silicon chip with one made of gallium arsenide, and 

developing new manufacturing processes for chip production. Silicon microcubes offer 

the simplest way to increase the number of transistors while decreasing the distance 

electrons have to travel, but will generate so much heat that elaborate (i.e., expensive) 

cooling techniques will be required. Microchip substrates made of gallium arsenide offer 

ten times the speed of silicon ones due to electrons traveling more easily through its 

crystalline architecture, but will eventually face the same point-one limit as silicon. 

Finally, the current manufacturing process (lithographic etching by ultraviolet laser) will 

need to be replaced by one capable of finer etching, such as that by shorter wavelength xrays or electron beams. However, the new manufacturing technology needed to etch the 

silicon to even reach the point-one limit is not available today. Once this limit is reached, 

improvements in microprocessor speeds must come from alternative technologies. Four 

42
UAV Roadmap 2002 – Section 4 

Technologies 

such alternative technologies currently being researched are optical, biochemical, 

molecular, and quantum processing. 

X-ray/Electron beam

Lithography

Molecular Processor

Quantum

Processor

Microcubes

Biochemical Processor

GaAs Microchip

Optical Processor

Silicon Microchip

Electronic Processor

X-ray/Electron beam

Lithography

Molecular Processor

Quantum

Processor

Microcubes

Biochemical Processor

GaAs Microchip

Optical Processor

Silicon Microchip

Electronic Processor

Present 2003-2007 2008-2017 2018-2027

FIGURE 4.4-3: PROCESSOR TECHNOLOGY FORECAST. 

43

UAV Roadmap 2002 – Section 5 

Operations 

5.0 Operations 

5.1 Operational Concepts Development 

The potential for UAVs to be used in new and innovative ways has long been 

acknowledged by many in the military establishment. It is the function of the Service 

battle labs outlined in Section 2 to convert such assumptions into demonstrations of 

practical application. Originally an Army concept (1992), battle labs have been recently 

established by the Services to address, in the Army’s words, “categories of military 

activity where there appears to be the greatest potential for change from current concepts 

and capabilities, and simultaneously, the areas where new requirements are emerging.” 

The dynamic nature of these emerging requirements underscores the importance of 

continued funding for these organizations. UAV employment has figured prominently in 

the short history of these organizations. 

5.1.1 Army

The Army’s Advanced Aviation Technology Directorate (AATD), an element 

of the U.S. Army Aviation and Missile Command’s Aviation & Missile Research, 

Development, & Engineering Center, is located at Ft Eustis, VA. AATD is focused on 

developing, integrating, and demonstrating new technologies for future UAVs, 

specifically the integration of manned and unmanned aviation. It operates four Vigilante

UAV testbeds and is in the process of converting an AH-1F Cobra into its optionally 

piloted Unmanned Combat Airborne Demonstrator (UCAD). It is also developing the 

Wing Store UAV (WSUAV) for launch from 2.75-inch rocket pods carried on 

helicopters. 

The Army’s Night Vision Electronic Sensors Directorate (NVESD) at Ft 

Belvoir, VA, employs six Pointers, six Night Hawks, two Flight Hawks, and one Setter

mini-UAVs, as well as two Camcopter rotary wing UAVs, as testbeds for evaluating 

various night vision and mine countermeasure sensors. NVESD also assumed 

responsibility for developing the initial Dragon Warrior prototype, the Sikorsky Cypher 

II, from MCWL in late 2000 for further testing and is currently helping develop the 

Buster mini-UAV. 

Although none of its six battle labs begun in 1992 is dedicated to UAVs, the 

majority of the Army’s battle labs have been involved in exploring various UAV 

operational concepts. The Air Maneuver Battle Lab at Ft. Rucker, AL, operates some

30 Exdrones for developing combined UAV/helicopter tactics. The Dismounted Battle 

Space Battle Lab at Ft. Benning, GA, working in concert with the MCWL, has evaluated 

UAVs (Camcopter and Pointer) and micro air vehicles in urban warfare scenarios at the 

Military Operations in Urban Terrain (MOUT) McKenna Facility. The Mounted 

Maneuver Battle Lab at Ft Knox, KY, which focuses on brigade-level-and-below, has 

an extensive resume of involvement with small UAVs for the scouting role and with 

UAV modeling. TRADOC’s Systems Manager (TSM) for UAVs at Ft. Huachuca, AZ, 

is the Army’s central manager for all combat development activities involving UAVs. 

45
UAV Roadmap 2002 – Section 5 

Operations 

5.1.2 Navy and Marine Corps 

The Naval Research Laboratory (NRL) in Washington, DC, has a history of 

exploring new aerodynamic and propulsion concepts for maritime UAVs. Among its 

innovative UAV concepts have been in-flight deployable wings, hovering tethered ship 

decoys, and advanced miniature electric motors. Besides the Dragon Eye and Finder 

projects described above, the NRL has built and flown over a dozen different, original 

small and micro UAV designs in recent years and is currently preparing the Dragon 

Warrior prototype for flight testing this summer. 

The Naval Air Warfare Center Aircraft Division (NAWC/AD) at NAS 

Patuxent River, MD, maintains a small UAV test, development, and demonstration team

at Webster Field, Maryland that operates a fleet of various types of small UAVs. 

NAWC/AD’s Maritime Unmanned Development and Operations (MUDO) team has 45 

Exdrones, 10 Pointers, 3 Aerolights, 2 Aeroskys, and 1 Aerostar. MUDO managed the 

evolution of the Exdrone into the Dragon Drone for use by the Marine Corps Warfighting 

Lab (MCWL). It has also supported the Maritime Battle Center during recent Fleet Battle 

Experiments by providing small UAV systems and operations expertise. 

The Marine Corps Warfighting Lab (MCWL) was created at Quantico, VA, in 

1995. It is responsible for developing new operational concepts, tactics, techniques, 

procedures, and technologies to prepare Marines for future combat. It has participated in 

UAV development for integration into battalion-level-and-below forces. In addition to 

integrating Dragon Drone UAVs into its recent series of Limited Objective Experiments 

(LOEs) supporting Capable Warrior, MCWL has funded development of Dragon Warrior 

and Dragon Eye prototypes, each tailored to specific requirements supporting the 

Operational Maneuver From The Sea (OMFTS) concept. 

The Naval Strike and Air Warfare Center (NSAWC) at NAS Fallon, NV, 

began supporting concept of operations development for integrating RQ-1/Predators into 

Fleet training exercises in 1998. To date, these efforts have focused on the time critical 

targeting and battlespace dominance missions. It participated in the naval utility 

evaluation of the RQ-4/Global Hawk during its ACTD by serving as a node to receive 

imagery during Global Hawk’s flight to Alaska in 1999. In 2001, NSAWC completed a 

Naval Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures document entitled “UAV Integration into 

Carrier Air Wing Operations” (NTTP 3-01.1-02) which can be accessed at 

www.nsawc.smil.mil. 

The Naval Warfare Development Command’s Maritime Battle Center (MBC), 

established at Newport, RI, in 1996, conducts a Fleet Battle Experiment (FBEs) each year 

to explore new technologies and operational concepts in both live and virtual scenarios. 

UAVs have participated in FBE-Echo (Predator in 1999), FBE-Hotel (Aerolight, Pioneer, 

and Dakota II in 2000), FBE-India (Aerolight), and FBE-Juliet (Sentry and Predator). 

The Naval Postgraduate School hosts the Center for Interdisciplinary Remotely 

Piloted Aircraft Studies (CIRPAS) in Monterey, CA. CIRPAS operates and maintains 

the Pelican optionally piloted aircraft and two Predators previously procured by the 

Navy. U. S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) controls their priority for use to meet 

Joint Operational Testbed System (JOTBS) requirements. JOTBS is a tool to conduct 

UAV interoperability experimentation without Service doctrine or policy constraints. 

46
UAV Roadmap 2002 – Section 5 

Operations 

5.1.3 Air Force 

The Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) is actively pursuing UAVapplicable technologies for both specific UAV programs and for unmanned flight in 

general. Its Vehicles Directorate is exploring autonomous see and avoid and flight 

control systems. Its Sensors Directorate is developing more capable, smaller radar and 

electro-optical capabilities. AFRL has contracted a concept development study for their 

Sensorcraft concept, a UAV optimized for the sensor suite it would carry. 

The Air Force established its UAV Battlelab (UAVB) in 1997 at Eglin AFB, FL, 

to explore and demonstrate the worth of innovative UAV operational concepts (as distinct 

from new systems or tactics) in key emerging areas. Its goal is to create opportunities, 

with minimal investment, for the Air Force to impact current UAV organizations, 

doctrine, training, and future requirements and acquisitions. The UAVB conducts four to 

six “experiments” annually, employing a variety of UAVs and UAV surrogates. Notable 

firsts among its efforts have been applying the Traffic Collision/Avoidance System

(TCAS) to better integrate manned and unmanned flight operations; evaluating UAVs to 

supplement base security forces (in conjunction with the Air Force Force Protection 

Battlelab); using UAVs as the “eyes” for an E-8/Joint Surveillance, Targeting, and Attack 

Radar System (JSTARS) in coordinated Scud missile hunts; and proving the military 

utility of real time UAV reconnaissance support to Special Tactics Teams. One recent 

experiment conducted with the Joint Combat Identification Evaluation Team at Ft. 

Stewart, GA, data linked the location of tanks found by a Hunter UAV through its ground 

station to F-16s to steer them in for an attack. This same capability was also used to 

abort attacks on friendly forces. 

Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) at Hurlburt Field, FL,

acquired 15 Exdrones from NAWC/AD in 2000. Operated by the 720th Special Tactics 

Group, they are used to explore UAV concepts of operation and special payloads for 

special operations forces. AFSCO also sponsored, in conjunction with the UAV 

Battlelab, a demonstration of controlling a UAV from an airborne MC-130 and is 

currently working the Sky Tote concept for resupplying special forces in the field. 

5.1.4 Joint/Other 

USJFCOM, located in Norfolk, VA, is responsible for the Joint Operational Test 

Bed System (JOTBS), composed of a Predator system with two aircraft originally used 

for TCS development, which is used to explore UAV and C4I interoperability concepts 

and procedures that benefit the joint warfighter.

The Office of the Assistant Secretarty of Defense for Command, Control, and 

Intelligence’s (OASD(C3

I)) Joint Technology Center/System Integration Laboratory 

(JTC/SIL) was established by the former Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office 

(DARO) in 1996 at the Redstone Arsenal in Huntsville, AL. Its mission is to provide 

technical support for virtual prototyping, common software and interfaces, software 

verification and validation, interactive user training, and advanced warfighting 

experiments (AWEs) for a broad variety of tactical and strategic reconnaissance assets, as 

well as C4

I systems and interfaces. It has focused on two programs supporting UAVs, the 

TCS and the Multiple Unified Simulation Environment (MUSE). MUSE is being used to 

explore operational concepts and train for the Army’s Tactical UAV. 

47
UAV Roadmap 2002 – Section 5 

Operations 

Although neither a joint nor a Defense Department organization, the U.S. Coast 

Guard has been very active in exploring potential applications of UAVs to their missions. 

Five UAV experiments have been sponsored recently by the Coast Guard Research and 

Development Center (RDC) at Groton, CT. These have included alien and drug 

interdiction along the Texas coast and in the Caribbean, as well as tests of UAV launch 

and recovery systems suspended beneath a parasail as a technique to allow UAV 

operations from otherwise non-air-capable cutters. A test of the utility of small UAVs to 

locate and identify various types of boats in open water areas has also been conducted. 

The Office of the Secretary of Defense’s (OSD) Joint UAV Joint Test and 

Evaluation (JUAV-JTE) was chartered in October 2001. This Navy-led Joint Test 

Force is based at NAS Fallon, Nevada, and is tasked with developing standardized joint 

tactics, techniques and procedures for tactical employment of UAVs in support of 

dynamic time sensitive operations. The three-year test will explore various command 

and control options for UAVs across Air Interdiction, Fire Support and Personnel 

Recovery mission areas. The JUAV Joint Test also functions as an OSD UAV tactics 

clearinghouse, working with all the services on cutting edge UAV tactical employment. 

Further information can be obtained at www.jte.osd.mil/juav. 

5.2 Reliability3

The reliability and sustainability of UAVs is vitally important because it underlies 

their affordability (an acquisition issue), their mission availability (an operations and 

logistics issue), and their acceptance into civil airspace (a regulatory issue). Improved 

reliability offers potential savings by reducing maintenance man-hours per flight hour 

(MMH/FH) and by decreasing the number of spares and attrition aircraft procured. 

Enhancing reliability, however, must be weighed as a trade-off between increased upfront costs for a given UAV and reduced maintenance costs over the system’s lifetime. 

Affordability. The reliability of the Defense Department’s UAVs is closely tied 

to their affordability primarily because the Department has come to expect UAVs to be 

less expensive than their manned counterparts. This expectation is based on the UAV’s 

generally smaller size (currently a savings of some $1500 per pound) and the omission of 

those systems needed to support a pilot or aircrew, which can save 3000 to 5000 pounds 

in cockpit weight. However, beyond these two measures, other cost saving measures to 

enhance affordability begin to impact reliability. 

Availability. With the removal of the pilot, the rationale for including the level of 

redundancy, or for using man-rated components considered crucial for his safety can go 

undefended in UAV design reviews, and may be sacrificed for affordability. Less 

redundancy and lower quality components, while making UAVs even cheaper to 

produce, mean they become more prone to inflight loss and more dependent on 

maintenance, both impacting their availability and ultimately their life cycle cost (LCC). 

Acceptance. Finally, improving reliability is key to winning the confidence of the 

general public, the acceptance of other aviation constituencies (airlines, general aviation, 

business aviation, etc.), and the willingness of the Federal Aviation Administration to 

regulate UAV flight. Regulation of UAVs is important because it will provide a legal 

basis for them to operate in the National Airspace System for the first time. This, in turn, 

 

3

 This section is extracted from OSD’s UAV Reliability study, released in 2003. 

48
UAV Roadmap 2002 – Section 5 

Operations 

should lead to their acceptance by international and foreign civil aviation authorities. 

Such acceptance will greatly facilitate obtaining overflight and landing privileges when 

our larger, endurance UAVs deploy in support of contingencies. Regulation will also save 

time and resources within both the DoD and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) 

by providing one standardized, rapid process for granting flight clearances to replace 

today’s cumbersome, lengthy (up to 60 days) authorization process. A third benefit of 

regulation is that it will encourage the use of UAVs in civil and commercial applications, 

resulting in potentially lower production costs for the military market. 

Because the various types of UAVs used by the Services are built by competing 

manufacturers, maintained by different branches of the military, and operated in a wide 

variety of mission profiles, the type of reliability and maintenance data that is collected, 

as well as the methods in which that data is tracked, are not standardized and cannot be 

easily used to compare UAV reliability across Service lines. This is underscored in that 

the equations used by each Service for determining the various measures of reliability for 

its UAVs are different. The reliability information collected and maintained for all 

Services’ UAVs should be standardized. By not doing so, cross-Service failure trends 

can be overlooked or exaggerated. 

For ease of comparison, the following four metrics are commonly used to 

represent aircraft reliability. Every effort has been made to reconcile varying Service and 

contractor methods of calculating these metrics to achieve an “apples versus apples” 

comparison in Table 5.2-1. 

1. Mishap Rate (MR) is the number of accidents occurring per 100,000 hours of fleet 

flight time, expressed as mishaps per 100,000 hours. Figure 5.2-2 depicts the 

historical MR trend for the Navy Pioneer, Army Hunter, and Air Force Predator. 

For comparison, in a recent year, Marine AV-8 Harriers had a Class A mishap rate 

of 10.5 per 100,000 hours and Air Force F-16s 3.5. Using the logic that aircraft 

mishap rates tend to be inversely proportional to their acquisition costs, current 

UAVs still have a reliability gap to close. A Department-wide effort should be 

implemented to decrease the annual mishap rate of larger model UAVs to less 

than 25 per 100,000 flight hours by FY09 and less than 15 per 100,000 flight 

hours by FY15 while minimizing system cost growth. For smaller UAVs, the 

interplay of the aerodynamics at low Reynolds Numbers (a non-scaling factor 

relating altitude, speed, and aircraft size) and flight controls is not well understood. 

In this case, flight control insufficiency, vice failure, may be a contributor to small 

UAV mishaps. Low Reynolds Number aerodynamics, with a focus on 

improving digital flight control systems optimized for small (i.e., having 

Reynolds Numbers less than 1 million) UAVs, needs additional investment.

2. Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF), in some cases called Mean Time Between 

Mission-Affecting Failure (MTBMAF), is essentially the ratio of hours flown to 

the number of maintenance-related cancellations and aborts encountered; it is 

expressed in hours. 

3. Availability (A) is the number of times a given aircraft type is able to perform its 

mission compared to the number of times it is tasked to do so, often measured as 

the ratio of hours (or sorties) flown to hours (or sorties) scheduled; it is expressed 

as a percentage. 

49
UAV Roadmap 2002 – Section 5 

Operations 

4. Reliability (R) is one hundred minus the percentage of times a launched mission is 

either canceled before take-off or aborted during flight due to maintenance issues; 

it is expressed as a percentage. 

Availability describes the performance of a system while on standby, and 

reliability describes the performance of a system while in operation. 

Table 5.2-1 shows the calculated values of these four metrics for the early and current 

versions of the Pioneer, Hunter, and Predator. 

FIGURE 5.2-1: UAV MISHAP RATE TRENDS. 

50
UAV Roadmap 2002 – Section 5 

Operations 

TABLE 5.2-1: RELIABILITY METRICS FOR UAVS. 

System 

Mishap Rate per 

100,000 hours* 

(cumulative by 

model/series) 

Mishap Rate per 

100,000 hours* 

(cumulative by 

model) 

MTBF 

 (hours) 

Availability

(percent) 

Reliability

(percent) 

RQ-1A/ Predator 43 32 40 74

RQ-1B/ Predator 31 

32 

55.1 93 89

RQ-2A/ Pioneer 363 9.1 74 80

RQ-2B/ Pioneer 139 

334 

28.6 78 91

RQ-5/Hunter

(pre-1996) 255 n/a n/a n/a

RQ-5/Hunter

(post-1996) 16 

55 

11.3 98 82

* Class A mishaps, defined as those resulting in the loss of the aircraft, or a death, or more than $1 million

in damage to the aircraft, are used here. 

By late 2002, the three current generation DoD UAV systems – the RQ-1 Predator, 

the RQ-2 Pioneer, and the RQ-5 Hunter – had accumulated nearly 100,000 flight hours 

over a combined total of 36 years of operations since 1986. The following breakout 

(Figure 5.2-2) depicts the primary causes for their combined mishap histories.

FIGURE 5.2-2: DOD UAV MISHAP CAUSES. 

As shown in Figure 5.2-2, three of the areas (flight control systems, propulsion, 

and operator training) have historically accounted for 80 percent of UAV reliability 

failures. The implication is the overall mishap rate for UAVs could be significantly 

reduced by focusing reliability improvement efforts in these areas, which could lead to 

appreciable savings by having to procure fewer attrition aircraft. Further savings could 

result from decreased line maintenance by substituting more advanced technologies for 

existing ones, such as electrical systems for hydraulic ones and digital for analog sensors. 

The challenge is to make tradeoffs so the recurring savings of a reliability enhancement 

exceeds the nonrecurring investment, as well as the impact of any potential decreases in 

performance, incurred in making the enhancement. By focusing on making reliability 

improvements in propulsion, flight control systems, and operator training/interfaces, the 

potential savings could likely outweigh the cost of incorporating such reliability 

enhancements in existing and future UAV designs. 

37%

26%

11%

17%

9%

Power/Prop

Flight Control

Comm

Human/Ground

Misc

51
UAV Roadmap 2002 – Section 5 

Operations 

5.3 Operations and Support 

The potential savings in operating and support (O&S) costs offered by UAVs 

could become significant. Today’s manned aircraft are flown over 95% (50% for ISR 

aircraft) of the time for peacetime training of airborne crews because they must practice 

in their environment to maintain their flying proficiency. Remove the airborne crew, and 

today’s costly training paradigm requires reexamination. UAV crews could receive the 

majority of their training in simulators, making their training and qualification 

significantly less expensive in terms of cost and time to qualify. By decoupling flight 

training from the number of training aircraft available, larger numbers of UAV operators 

may be trained in a given period. More UAV crews would help mitigate today’s lowdensity/high-demand operational tempo problem. 

While the potential for savings in training is generally acknowledged, the extent 

of such savings has not yet been demonstrated. Some level of actual UAV training flying 

will be required in peacetime to develop techniques and tactics for cooperative missions 

with manned aircraft—perhaps more to train the manned aircraft crews to operate with 

UAVs than for the benefit of the UAV crews. Service-unique operating environments, 

such as aboard aircraft carriers, will also impact the extent to which savings in training 

can be realized. In addition to the operators, the “boxed aircraft” concept poses 

significant challenges for training and maintaining a maintenance/logistics support 

capability ready to support surge or wartime operations tempos. 

A new paradigm for UAV crew training could evolve that more closely parallels 

that for recent Navy student pilots using Commercial Off-the-Shelf (COTS) flight 

simulator software to supplement their traditional flight training. Actual flights would of 

course still support exercises and real world operations (see Figure 5.4-1). However, 

more initial training, mission qualification, and proficiency training could be conducted 

in simulators, while most of the aircraft remain in storage for months or years at a time. 

The DARPA/Air Force UCAV program is exploring this concept by designing the 

UCAV to be storable for 10 years or more from production delivery. 

FIGURE 5.3-1: RELATIVE DEMAND IN ACTUAL VS. SIMULATED FLIGHT TRAINING. 

While such a “build, store, fly” concept holds promise for reducing UAV 

operations and support costs (see Section 6.3.3) over their life cycle, it also contains 

several cautions prior to being adopted, to include: 

• Even in such a concept, some critical level of maintenance manpower must be 

retained to support surge and/or wartime requirements. 

52
UAV Roadmap 2002 – Section 5 

Operations 

• Base infrastructure otherwise not needed to support unmanned operations (altitude 

chambers, etc.) must be retained to support global mobility requirements for manned 

assets as well. 

• Service “train as you fight” doctrines will require unmanned assets to fly training 

missions with manned assets to train their aircrews in cooperative tactics, regardless 

of the needs of the UAV crews. 

5.4 Cooperative UAV Flight 

Brig Gen Daniel P. Leaf, commander of the USAF Air Expeditionary Wing at 

Aviano, Italy, during Operation Allied Force, identified three capabilities needed by 

UAVs to fly safely and effectively with manned aircraft, based on his experience with 

both over Kosovo: 

• Massing – the ability to come together as a formation to overwhelm defenses and 

minimize losses; 

• “Rolexing” – the ability to adjust mission timing on the move to compensate for 

inevitable changes to plans and still make the time-on-target; 

• Situational Awareness (SA) – expanding the soda-straw field of view used by 

current UAVs that negatively affects their ability to provide broad SA for 

themselves, much less for others in a formation. 

Although manned versus unmanned flight was deconflicted by segregated 

airspace over Kosovo, the goal of cooperative UAV flight is to conduct operations in 

integrated airspace. UAVs will have to communicate and interact with each other and 

with manned aircraft to achieve maximum effectiveness. Consequently they will be 

required to position themselves when and where needed for optimum use. This 

positioning will range from station keeping in wide spread constellations to close 

formation with other UAVs and/or manned aircraft to aerial refueling. Such cooperation 

will enable survivable penetration of defended airspace and permit time-compressed, 

coordinated target attacks. All the Services and DARPA are currently looking at 

cooperative flight and have formed the Intelligent Autonomy Working Group to share 

results. An initial demonstration of formation flight by two unmanned aircraft is planned 

by the DARPA/Air Force X-45 program in Summer 2003, to be followed by aerial 

refueling of an unmanned aircraft. The DARPA/Army UCAR program plans to 

demonstrate collaboration between multiple aircraft to acquire, identify, and prosecute 

targets in 2007-08. The development of the necessary command and control, 

communications, sensor and weapon technologies, along with their associated software, 

will be central to fielding these breakthrough capabilities. Specifically, the development 

of a common air vehicle interface providing critical situational awareness data 

including precise location data is a key component for integration of UAVs with 

manned systems.

53
UAV Roadmap 2002 – Section 5 

Operations 

5.5 Tactical Control System (TCS) 

The TCS is an open architecture, common interoperable control system software 

for UAVs and supported Command, Control, Communications, Computer, and 

Intelligence (C4I) nodes currently in EMD. TCS will provide five scalable levels of 

UAV vehicle, sensor, and payload command and control, from receipt of secondary 

imagery (Level 1) to full control of the UAV from takeoff to landing (Level 5). It will 

also provide dissemination of imagery and data collected from multiple UAVs to a 

variety of Service and Joint C4I systems. http://uav.navair.navy.mil/tcs

54
UAV Roadmap 2002 – Section 6 

Roadmap 

6.0 Roadmap 

This section brings together the requirements and desired capabilities (Section 3) 

with emerging technological (Section 4) and operational opportunities (Section 5) in an 

effort to stimulate the planning process for Department UAV development over the next 

25 years. It attempts, through a limited number of examples, to demonstrate a process for 

selecting opportunities for solving selected shortfalls in capability and incorporating these 

solutions in Service-planned UAV systems (see Figures 6.1-1 and 6.2-1). Two roadmaps, 

one addressing technology-driven capabilities (Section 6.1) and the other operationsdriven missions (Section 6.2), provide guidance for UAV development efforts by the 

Services and industry. Subsequent sections analyze the cost of unmanned aircraft 

(Section 6.3) and list goals for unmanned aviation to achieve over the next 25 years 

(Section 6.4). The key question addressed in this section is: When will the capabilities 

required to enable the theater Commanders’ desired requirements become available? 

6.1 UAV Capabilities Roadmap 

To relate the priorities expressed by the theater Commanders in Section 3 to the 

technologies coming available within the next 25 years (Section 4), a number of 

capability metrics (see Table 6.1-1) were devised for this Roadmap. They identify 

timeframes for anticipating future capabilities to satisfy the warfighters’ requirements. 

All references to years are for dates when these capabilities are expected to become

available for fielding based on the forecast trends developed in Section 4 and the 

appendices. Some of the capabilities described have already been demonstrated in labs; 

others, primarily in the communications and processing areas, will soon be emerging in 

commercial applications. 

TABLE 6.1-1: OPERATIONAL METRICS. 

Component Requirement Capability Metrics

Availability

Timeframe 

Platforms Endurance 1. Field a diesel-powered tactical UAV (logistics savings) 2005 

2. Achieve 30% increased time-on-station with same fuel load 2010 

3. Achieve 40% increased time-on-station with same fuel load 2015 

Signature 4. Field a UAV inaudible from 500 to 1000 ft slant range 2004 

Payloads Resolution 5. Field a sensor for detecting targets under trees 2007 

6. Distinguish facial features (identify individuals) from 4 nm 2005 

7. Achieve 3 in SAR resolution over a 10 nm wide swath 2005 

8. Achieve 3 in SAR resolution over a 20 nm wide swath 2010 

Data Links Data Rate 9. Relay entire COMINT spectrum in real time 2005 

10. Relay entire ELINT spectrum in real time 2025+ 

11. Relay 100-band hyper-spectral imagery in real time 2010 

12. Relay 1000-band ultra-spectral imagery in real time 2025+ 

Information Processor 13. Map surf zone sea mines in near-real-time (<20 min) 2002 

Processing Speed 14. Map surf zone sea mines in real time 2016 

15. Reduce DTED level 5 data in near-real-time (<20 min) 2009 

16. Reduce DTED level 5 data in real time 2022 

By bringing together a plot of the predicted appearance of the listed capabilities in 

Table 6.1-1 with the timeline of current/planned DoD UAV programs (shown earlier in 

Fig. 2.0-1), a roadmap of opportunities for applying emerging capabilities to forthcoming 

UAVs is created. This “UAV Capabilities Roadmap” (Fig. 6.1-1) displays 16 such 

55
UAV Roadmap 2002 – Section 6 

Roadmap 

opportunities over the next 25 years. The upper half of Figure 6.1-1 plots the predicted 

appearance of these 16 capabilities over the next 25 years, with the date of each centered 

within a 5-year window of estimated initial availability for fielding. As an example of its 

use (see dotted lines on Figure 6.1-1), the information processing speed needed to extract 

the presence of sea mines in surf zones in real time from UAV video (some 1.8 THz from

Figure 4.4-2) should become available in 2016, which corresponds to the planned IOC 

date for the UCAV-N, making this a reasonable capability to expect in the timeframe of

the UCAV-N’s introduction. 

1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030

RQ-2/PIONEER

PIONEER FOLLOW-ON

DRAGON EYE

BROAD AREA MARITIME SURVEILLANCE (BAMS)

UCAV-N

NEPTUNE

DRAGON WARRIOR

RQ-7/SHADOW

(FCS)

(FCS)

MQ-1/PREDATOR

MQ-9/PREDATOR B

FPASS

RQ-4/GLOBAL HAWK

UCAV-AF

RQ-5/HUNTER

IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM

EXTENDEDRANGE / MULTI-PURPOSE (ER/MP)

UNMANNED COMBAT ARMED ROTORCRAFT (UCAR)

ORGANIC AIR VEHICLE (OAV)

SMALL UAV (SUAV)

VTUAV

Platforms

Payloads

Communications

Information Processing

Diesel-fueled UAV

30% SFC / Endurance increase

40% SFC / Endurance increase

Inaudible at 500-1000 ft

Detect targets under trees

Distinguish facialfeatures

3 in. resolution / 10 nm sw ath SAR

3 in. resolution / 20 nm sw ath SAR

Relay COMINT in RT

Relay ELINT in RT

Relay 100-band HSI in RT

Relay 1000-band USI in RT

Map sea mines in NRT

Map sea mines in RT

Reduce Level 5 DTED in NRT

Reduce Level 5 DTED in RT

Example

Example

1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030

RQ-2/PIONEER

PIONEER FOLLOW-ON

DRAGON EYE

BROAD AREA MARITIME SURVEILLANCE (BAMS)

UCAV-N

NEPTUNE

DRAGON WARRIOR

RQ-7/SHADOW

(FCS)

(FCS)

MQ-1/PREDATOR

MQ-9/PREDATOR B

FPASS

RQ-4/GLOBAL HAWK

UCAV-AF

RQ-5/HUNTER

IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM

EXTENDEDRANGE / MULTI-PURPOSE (ER/MP)

UNMANNED COMBAT ARMED ROTORCRAFT (UCAR)

ORGANIC AIR VEHICLE (OAV)

SMALL UAV (SUAV)

VTUAV

1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030

RQ-2/PIONEER

PIONEER FOLLOW-ON

DRAGON EYE

BROAD AREA MARITIME SURVEILLANCE (BAMS)

UCAV-N

NEPTUNE

DRAGON WARRIOR

RQ-7/SHADOW

(FCS)

(FCS)

MQ-1/PREDATOR

MQ-9/PREDATOR B

FPASS

RQ-4/GLOBAL HAWK

UCAV-AF

RQ-5/HUNTER

IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM

EXTENDEDRANGE / MULTI-PURPOSE (ER/MP)

UNMANNED COMBAT ARMED ROTORCRAFT (UCAR)

ORGANIC AIR VEHICLE (OAV)

SMALL UAV (SUAV)

VTUAV

Platforms

Payloads

Communications

Information Processing

Diesel-fueled UAV

30% SFC / Endurance increase

40% SFC / Endurance increase

Inaudible at 500-1000 ft

Detect targets under trees

Distinguish facialfeatures

3 in. resolution / 10 nm sw ath SAR

3 in. resolution / 20 nm sw ath SAR

Relay COMINT in RT

Relay ELINT in RT

Relay 100-band HSI in RT

Relay 1000-band USI in RT

Map sea mines in NRT

Map sea mines in RT

Reduce Level 5 DTED in NRT

Reduce Level 5 DTED in RT

Example

Example

Platforms

Payloads

Communications

Information Processing

Diesel-fueled UAV

30% SFC / Endurance increase

40% SFC / Endurance increase

Inaudible at 500-1000 ft

Detect targets under trees

Distinguish facialfeatures

3 in. resolution / 10 nm sw ath SAR

3 in. resolution / 20 nm sw ath SAR

Relay COMINT in RT

Relay ELINT in RT

Relay 100-band HSI in RT

Relay 1000-band USI in RT

Map sea mines in NRT

Map sea mines in RT

Reduce Level 5 DTED in NRT

Reduce Level 5 DTED in RT

Example

Example

FIGURE 6.1-1: UAV CAPABILITIES ROADMAP. 

6.2 UAV Missions Roadmap 

Unmanned aviation has historically been limited to the reconnaissance (Firebee, 

Global Hawk) and strike (DASH, Predator) missions. Reconnaissance is now a well56
UAV Roadmap 2002 – Section 6 

Roadmap 

established mission for UAVs, complementing manned aircraft in this role. Recently, the 

Air Force, the Army, and the Navy have focused separate efforts on developing more 

sophisticated UAVs, referred to as UCAVs, dedicated to the strike and SEAD missions. 

As evidenced by their DARPA origins, these UCAV programs are attempting to 

automate the most human-machine interaction (HMI)-intensive mission in aviation, and, 

in so doing, are pushing the technology of UAVs beyond that required for performing 

many other missions that they could potentially fulfill. As shown in the “UAV Missions 

Roadmap” (Figure 6.2-1), two major ‘families of missions,’ one emphasizing payload 

capacity and persistence and the other autonomy, survivability, and weapons 

employment, need to drive UAV design and development over the next 25 years. A start 

in these two directions has been made. 

The first family of missions (shown in the upper half of Figure 6.2-1) employs 

endurance UAVs as communication relays, SIGINT collectors, tankers, surveillance and 

patrol aircraft, and, eventually, airlifters. Design-wise, these roles may use one common 

platform or different ones, but they must provide significant payload capacities (power as 

well as weight) and endurances greater than 24 hours. The DARPA Adaptive Joint 

C4ISR Node (AJCN), with the potential to deploy a Global Hawk-based communication 

relay payload in the 2005-2010 timeframe, represents a first step in the “payload with 

persistence” direction for UAVs. From there, the mission similarities of the AJCN and 

the Global Hawk imagery reconnaissance UAVs could be combined in an unmanned 

SIGINT collection platform, first by transitioning the mission crews (“backend”) of the 

Rivet Joint, ARIES II, and Senior Scout aircraft to vans on the ground, followed 

eventually by the aircrews. The profile of the SIGINT collection mission, long duration 

orbits along the periphery of hostilities, resembles that for aerial refueling but adds the 

complexity of manned (receiver) and unmanned (refueler) interaction. The 

surveillance/patrol mission could be transitioned to UAVs in much the same way as for 

SIGINT collectors, by first relocating the mission crew to the ground, followed by the 

aircrew. Unmanned airlift hinges on overcoming a psychological and a policy barrier, 

the former being that of passengers willing to fly on a plane with no aircrew and the latter 

on foreign countries allowing access to their airports by robotic aircraft. In all cases, the 

technology to fly large robotic aircraft has been demonstrated; NASA flew an unmanned 

Boeing 720 in 1985, and Global Hawk routinely navigates around the ground at Edwards 

AFB. 

The second family of missions (lower half of Figure 6.2-1) for future UAVs 

employs them in weapon delivery roles, graduating from electronic warfare to air-toground to air-to-air in complexity. How close to reality are such missions for UAVs? In 

addition to the DARPA UCAV programs mentioned previously, the LEWK (see Section 

2.3.2) is an ongoing ACTD developing a UAV capability to either jam or destroy hostile 

radars then recover for reloading for subsequent sorties. By adding a recovery system to 

the latest Tomahawk variant, which features inflight retargeting, current cruise missiles 

could be “retargeted” to return home after delivering their ordnance. Progress in the 

weapon delivery direction for UAVs, because of the large number of decisions in a short 

span inherent in these missions, hinges on development of increasing levels of autonomy 

(see Section 4.4). 

57
UAV Roadmap 2002 – Section 6 

Roadmap 

P-3

MISSION

Communication Relay

SIGINT Collection

Maritime Patrol

Aerial Refueling

Surveillance / Battle Management

Airlift

2005

CURRENT AIRCRAFT INTRODUCTION INTO OPERATIONS

Payload with Persistence 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030

ABCCC, TACAMO, ARIA

Commando Solo

Weapon Delivery

SEAD

Strike

Integrated Strike/SEAD

Counter Air

Integrated Strike/SEAD/Counter Air

EA-6B

AV-8, F-117

EA-6B, F-16

F-14, F-15, F-16

F/A-18, F/A-22

C-5, C-17, C-130

AWACS, JSTARS

KC-135, KC-10, KC-130

Rivet Joint, ARIES II

Senior Scout, Guardrail

P-3

MISSION

Communication Relay

SIGINT Collection

Maritime Patrol

Aerial Refueling

Surveillance / Battle Management

Airlift

2005

CURRENT AIRCRAFT INTRODUCTION INTO OPERATIONS

Payload with Persistence 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030

ABCCC, TACAMO, ARIA

Commando Solo

Weapon Delivery

SEAD

Strike

Integrated Strike/SEAD

Counter Air

Integrated Strike/SEAD/Counter Air

EA-6B

AV-8, F-117

EA-6B, F-16

F-14, F-15, F-16

F/A-18, F/A-22

C-5, C-17, C-130

AWACS, JSTARS

KC-135, KC-10, KC-130

Rivet Joint, ARIES II

Senior Scout, Guardrail

MISSION

Communication Relay

SIGINT Collection

Maritime Patrol

Aerial Refueling

Surveillance / Battle Management

Airlift

2005

CURRENT AIRCRAFT INTRODUCTION INTO OPERATIONS

Payload with Persistence 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030

ABCCC, TACAMO, ARIA

Commando Solo

Weapon Delivery

SEAD

Strike

Integrated Strike/SEAD

Counter Air

Integrated Strike/SEAD/Counter Air

EA-6B

AV-8, F-117

EA-6B, F-16

F-14, F-15, F-16

F/A-18, F/A-22

C-5, C-17, C-130

AWACS, JSTARS

KC-135, KC-10, KC-130

Rivet Joint, ARIES II

Senior Scout, Guardrail

FIGURE 6.2-1: UAV MISSIONS ROADMAP. 

6.3 Comparative Costs of Manned vs. Unmanned Aircraft 

Any full and fair comparison of manned and unmanned aircraft costs must 

consider the three phases of any weapon system’s life cycle cost: development, 

procurement, and Operating and Support (O&S). Any such comparison should also 

ensure equivalency in scenarios and missions are used, but without making one conform

to the other’s tactics or mode of operation. It is not necessary that a single UAV replicate 

its manned counterpart’s performance; what matters is whether the UAV can functionally 

achieve the same mission objectives more cost effectively. 

6.3.1 Development Costs 

UAVs have been developed for DoD use through (1) contractor initiatives, (2) 

defense acquisition (milestone) programs, and (3) Advanced Concept Technology 

Demonstrations, or ACTDs. The shorter ACTD timelines (3-5 years vice a decade or 

more) and lessened oversight requirements have provided an alternative means for 

several recent UAV programs to rapidly reach Milestone II. The comparisons below 

(Table 6.3.1-1) show the adjusted costs to reach first flight, whether for manned or 

unmanned aircraft, by traditional or ACTD approach has historically been essentially the 

58
UAV Roadmap 2002 – Section 6 

Roadmap 

same. This is reasonable given that the engineering required to get to first flight is driven 

more by aerodynamics (i.e., flight control software development) and propulsion than by 

human factors and avionics. 

TABLE 6.3-1: MANNED VS. UNMANNED AIRCRAFT DEVELOPMENT COSTS. 

Mission/Aircraft

Program 

Start

First 

Flight Interval

Type of Program/

Program Sponsor

Cost to 

First Flight

($FY00)

Reconnaissance 

 U-2 Dec 54 Aug 55 8 mos SAP*/CIA $243M 

 RQ-4/Global Hawk Oct 94 Feb 98 41 ACTD/DARPA $205M 

Attack/Strike 

 F-16 Feb 72 Jan 74 23 DAB*/Air Force $103M 

 X-45/UCAV Apr 98 May 02 49 ATD/DARPA $173M 

Reconnaissance, Penetrating 

 SR-71 Aug 59 Apr 62 32 SAP/CIA $915M 

 D-21 Mar 63 Feb 65 23 SAP/Air Force $174M 

Stealth 

 XST/Have Blue (F-117) Nov 75 Dec 77 25 SAP/Air Force $103M 

 RQ-3/DarkStar Jun 94** Mar 96 21 ACTD/DARPA $134M 

*SAP = Special Access Program; DAB = Defense Acquisition Board (Milestone Process) 

**DarkStar built on a classified program activity prior to this contract award date.

6.3.2 Procurement Costs 

The aviation industry has long recognized an informal rule, based on historical 

experience, that the production cost of an aircraft is directly proportional to its empty 

weight (before mission equipment is added). That figure is currently some $1500 per 

pound (based on JSF in FY94 dollars). Estimates of the weight attributable to the pilot 

(ejection seat, displays, oxygen system, pressurization system, survival equipment, 

canopy, etc.) are 3000 lbs for single seat aircraft and 5000 lbs for a dual seat cockpit, or 

10 to 15 percent of the manned aircraft’s empty weight. The implied savings of $4.5 to 

7.5 million, however, must be applied to the “remote cockpit” of the UAV aircrew and 

the leasing of its requisite communication links. Conversely, this control station can be 

capable of simultaneously flying multiple UAVs, somewhat restoring the advantage in 

cost to the unmanned system. Additionally, the control station is a one-time procurement 

cost for any number of UAVs fielded during the life cycle of a particular system. 

Because UAVs replace many of the pilot functions with computers, software 

development and maintenance become additional “overhead” expenses in procuring 

UAVs. Flight critical software costs $500-600 per line of code and mission critical 

software $200. A fighter-type digital flight control system may employ over a million 

lines of code, requiring a substantial investment solely for a program’s software. 

6.3.3 Operations & Support Costs 

Merely subtracting out that weight directly attributable to the aircrew being 

onboard (i.e., de-manning an existing aircraft type) does not encompass the total savings 

offered by a “clean sheet” unmanned design optimized for the same mission. Compare 

the DARPA/Air Force/Boeing UCAV objective system to using present day SEAD/Strike 

mission platforms. The UCAV weapon system performance is to be much greater and 

have a significantly reduced total life cycle cost. The UCAV is to have a design life of 

4,000 hrs, half of which could be spent in combat operations under a form of build, store, 

59
UAV Roadmap 2002 – Section 6 

Roadmap 

fly CONOPS. Today’s SEAD/Strike platform will spend 95 percent of its 8,000 hour inflight life conducting training sorties, accumulating some 400 hours supporting combat 

operations before retirement. The depreciation rate, in terms of dollars per combat hour 

flown, of the UCAV is significantly less than that of current platforms, implying that 

UCAVs could suffer greater combat loss rates and still be cost effective by the standards 

applied to today’s manned fighters. Cost goals for the AF UCAV X-45C program are 

currently being updated, and will be available by December 2003. 

Seventy percent of non-combat aircraft losses are attributed to human error, and a 

large percentage of the remaining losses have this as a contributing factor. Although 

aircraft are modified, training emphasized, and procedures changed as a result of these 

accidents, the percentage attributed to the operator remains fairly unchanged. Five 

factors should combine in unmanned operations to significantly reduce this percentage. 

First, UAVs today have demonstrated the ability to operate completely 

autonomously from takeoff through roll out after landing; Global Hawk is one example. 

Software-based performance, unlike its human counterpart, is guaranteed to be repeatable 

when circumstances are repeated. With each UAV accident, the aircraft’s software can 

be modified to remedy the situation causing the latest mishap, “learning” the corrective 

action indelibly. Although software maturity induces its own errors over time, in the 

long-term this process could asymptotically reduce human-error induced losses to near 

zero. Losses due to mechanical failures will still occur because no design or 

manufacturing process produces perfect parts. 

Second, the need to conduct training and proficiency sorties with unmanned 

aircraft actually flying could be reduced in the near term with high fidelity simulators. 

Such simulations could become indistinguishable from actual sorties to the UAV operator 

with the use of virtual reality-based simulators, explored by AFRL, and physiologicallybased technology, like the Tactile Situation Awareness System (TSAS). The Navy 

Aerospace Medical Research Laboratory (NAMRL) developed TSAS to reduce operator 

saturation by visual information. It has been tested in various manned aircraft and has 

potential applicability for UAV operators. The system uses a vest with air-actuated 

tactors to tap the user in the direction of drift, gravity, roll, etc.; the tempo of the tapping 

indicates the rate of drift. Results have shown that use of the TSAS increases operator 

situational awareness and reduces workload. 

Third, the UAV control stations could double as simulators, eliminating the 

expense of developing and maintaining separate simulators, as is the case for manned 

aircraft. 

Fourth, with such simulators, the level of flying training required by UAVs can be 

reduced, resulting in reduced maintenance hours, fewer aircraft losses, and lowered 

attrition expenditures. Of 265 total U.S. F-16 losses to date, 4 have been in combat and 

the rest (98 percent) in training accidents. While some level of actual UAV flying will be 

required to train manned aircraft crews in executing cooperative missions with UAVs, a 

substantial reduction in peacetime UAV attrition losses can probably be achieved. 

Fifth, continuing with the F-16 as an example, 1.5 percent of the F-16 fleet’s 

maintenance man-hours in FY02 were for maintenance actions related to maintaining 

aircrew-unique items, such as canopies, ejection seats, oxygen systems, cockpit 

instruments, and survival equipment. These maintenance actions accounted for 1.6 

percent of the F-16s’ total not mission capable (TNMC) time in 2002. The cost 

60
UAV Roadmap 2002 – Section 6 

Roadmap 

associated with maintaining these items (83, 300 hours of maintenance labor in this one 

case) will be saved in UAVs. 

6.4 Goals for Unmanned Aviation 

The following capability, cost, and standardization goals for unmanned aviation 

are a consolidation of those identified within the previous text and the following 

appendices. Bolded goals have priority and have been assigned a Service or Defense 

Agency as an Office of Primary Responsibility (OPR) to oversee their accomplishment 

and a due date. These goals are consistent with the current Defense Planning Guidance 

(DPG) and will be further refined in the upcoming cycle. In some cases, goals addressed 

in this document have been directly cited in the DPG, such as the direction for 

development and demonstration of Unmanned Combat Air Vehicles. In many other 

cases the goals to follow are at a detail level below that appropriate to the DPG. The 

DPG will always take precedence, however this document will be used to provide 

additional definition and direction for UAV and UCAV technology areas. These goals 

should be considered directive, and OSD, in conjunction with the Services and Defense 

Agencies will strive to develop, demonstrate, and operationally assess these capabilities 

in the timeframes indicated. Progress reports on each goal will be submitted by the 

respective OPRs during the first quarter of each fiscal year. 

6.4.1 Platform Goals 

1. Develop and operationally assess for potential fielding a UCAV capable of 

performing several missions including SEAD/Strike/Electronic Attack; 

emphasize early fielding of an EA capability with growth to other missions. 

OPR: UCAV Joint Program Office (DARPA, USN, USAF). Due: FY10. 

2. Develop and demonstrate a tactical UAV-class aviation heavy fuel engine 

suitable for use in UAVs such as Shadow, Pioneer and A-160. Growth potential 

to larger UAVs in the Predator class including Extended Range Multi-Purpose 

and LEWK, and options for the small UAV class are also required. OPR: 

DARPA, USA, USN/USMC. Due: FY05/07. 

3. Demonstrate a fuel cell propulsion system suitable for use on tactical UAVs 

delivering 30 kW (40 hp) with a mass specific power of 0.746 kW/lb or better. 

4. OSD, Joint Staff, and the Services should develop capability and/or capabilityperformance metrics (such as those in Section 4.1) to evaluate UAV program 

costs. Program managers should provide Joint Staff and OSD written 

justification at Milestone B and C reviews when these metrics are exceeded, and 

provide appropriate management organizations with options for reducing costs 

to align costs with these metrics when this occurs. OPR: OSD. Due: FY03. 

5. Reduce wing and fuselage costs through incorporation of state of the art commercial 

composite molding technology. 

6. Develop technology solutions for a persistent, anti-access UAV system. 

6.4.2 Sensor Goals 

7. Demonstrate High Definition Television (HDTV) capability with real-time 

precision targeting capability on a UAV. OPR: NIMA, USN, USAF. Due: FY05. 

61
UAV Roadmap 2002 – Section 6 

Roadmap 

8. Develop a tactical UAV-compatible capability to detect one single tank 

(threshold)/one heavy machine gun (objective) concealed under trees. 

6.4.3 Communication Goals 

9. Migrate all tactical (Shadow 200) and above UAVs to Common Data Link 

(CDL)-compatible formats for LOS and BLOS communication by FY06. OPR: 

USAF, USN, USA. Due: FY06. 

10. Standardize on a means to ensure larger UAVs’ data link security costing no more 

than 20 percent (threshold)/10 percent (goal) of the equivalent unsecure data link’s 

price by FY08. 

11. Implement Tactical Common Data Link (TCDL) Ku-band in 2003 for Shadow 200. 

12. Integrate a TCDL capability for LOS use for Predator in lieu of the current C-Band 

LOS data link. 

13. Evaluate, and if feasible for Predator environment, integrate a Ka-band terminal on 

the Predator for use with the Wideband Gapfiller System (WGS); complete 

evaluation in FY04, fund installation in FY05, and demonstrate in FY06. 

14. Integrate a Demand Assigned Multiple Access (DAMA) voice and secure voice 

capability for Global Hawk by FY05. 

15. Integrate the capability to transmit command and control data over the Extended 

Tether Program (ETP) sensor data link for Global Hawk by FY04. 

16. Add to the ETP ground structure to support the accelerated fielding of Global Hawk. 

17. Develop the NSSA-recommended Airborne Communication Network with UAVmounted L- or S-band payloads providing wideband data and narrowband voice/data 

for broadcast, multicast, and point-to-point communication. 

6.4.4 Technology Goals 

18. Develop and demonstrate conformal wideband data link apertures with equal 

(threshold)/50 percent greater (goal) gain than current steerable dish antennas on 

Predator and Global Hawk. 

19. Develop a directed energy weapon system compatible with Predator B-size UAVs. 

6.4.5 Small UAV Goals 

20. Investigate low Reynolds Number aerodynamics with a focus on improving 

digital flight control systems optimized for small UAVs (i.e., those having 

Reynolds Numbers less than 1 million). OPR: USA, USN, USAF. Due: FY06.

6.4.6 Standards Goals 

21. Define a standard UAV interface providing critical situational awareness data 

including precise location data. OPR: OSD, USJFCOM. Due: FY04. 

22. Standardize on a common UAV mission planning architecture by FY05. 

23. Develop standards to maximize interoperability within each class of UAV and to 

maintain an appropriate degree of interoperability between classes of UAVs. 

24. Integrate joint UAV interoperability goals/assessment objectives from the USJFCOM 

JOTBS Strategic Plan into Service UAV Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures.

62
UAV Roadmap 2002 – Section 6 

Roadmap 

6.4.7 Airspace Goals 

25. Coordinate revising FAA Order 7610.4 to replace the requirement for using the 

COA process for all UAVs with one for using the DD175 form for qualifying 

UAVs. OPR: USAF. Due: FY03. 

26. Work with the FAA to define appropriate conditions and requirements under which a 

single pilot would be allowed to control multiple (up to four) airborne UAVs 

simultaneously. 

27. Document and disseminate any UAV-unique lessons learned from certifying the RQ4 Global Hawk as airworthy by means of the OSS&E process. Formal documentation 

as a DoD Instruction for guiding future ROA airworthiness certifications should be 

considered. 

28. Establish a joint program, or designate a joint office, for developing and evaluating 

automated see-and-avoid and collision avoidance systems. 

29. Equip DoD UAVs intended for Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) operations with a 

stand-alone, hot backup, ground-based navigation system and establish a standardized 

lost link procedure. 

6.4.8 Task/Process/Post/Use Goals 

30. Develop decision aids that enable automated machine-to-machine cross cueing. 

31. Allocate sufficient funds to develop the necessary hardware, software, standards, 

procedures, and practices to make multi-level security possible. 

32. Determine who has the authority and responsibility to mandate standards, procedures, 

and practices concerning multi-level security from disparate sensors/sources. 

33. Develop training programs for newly assigned and current personnel in the use of 

new UAV sensors and exploitation techniques and equipment. 

34. Fund for new exploitation software required by the introduction and upgrade of UAV 

sensors and exploitation platforms. 

35. Maintain the current funding level for mensuration/positioning software. 

36. Develop a common sensor tasking standard for all DCGSs to task all UAV sensors. 

37. Establish a joint program office to develop automated decision systems to aid in the 

exploitation, fusion, and evaluation of multiple intelligence data. 

38. Develop software that will allow sensors to automatically cross-cue one another onboard in real time. 

39. Develop a scheme, using standard formats, messages, and products, by which an 

operator can easily and quickly find and retrieve both products and raw data. 

6.4.9 Weaponization Goals 

40. Define and implement security measures required for positive control of 

weapons employment on weaponized UAVs. OPR: USAF. Due: FY08. 

41. Demonstrate equivalent Pk for a 250lb Small Diameter Bomb (SDB) comparable to 

that of a 500 lb Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM). 

63
UAV Roadmap 2002 – Section 6 

Roadmap 

6.4.10 Reliability Goals 

42. Decrease the annual mishap rate of larger model UAVs to less than 20 per 

100,000 flight hours by FY09 and less than 15 per 100,000 flight hours by FY15. 

OPR: USAF, USN, and USA. Due: FY09/15.

43. Standardize the data collected and the metrics used for reporting UAV reliability and 

availability across all Services. 

44. Perform a cost-benefit trade study for incorporating/retrofitting some or all of the 

planned Predator B’s reliability enhancements into production Predator A models. 

45. Perform cost-benefit trades for low and high level COTS approaches (see Table J3) to 

improve reliability for each fielded UAV design. 

46. Review industry Reliability Specifications Standards for applicability to UAV design. 

47. Incorporate the emerging technologies identified in Table J3 into the Defense

Technology Objectives and the Defense Technology Area Plan. 

48. Incorporate and/or develop all-weather practices into future UAV designs 

49. Investigate the potential role of advanced materials and structures for enhancing UAV 

reliability and availability. 

6.5 Future Directions 

Although this roadmap is specifically focused on the Department’s UAV 

development and fielding efforts, a much large perspective is emerging requiring a 

guiding document similar to the UAV roadmap. This larger perspective is encompassed 

by all Unmanned Systems (USs), whether UAVs, Unmanned Ground Vehicles (UGVs), 

or Unmanned Surface and Undersea Vehicles (USVs and UUVs). This family of 

emerging technology and capability shares many similar attributes and will in all 

likelihood operate in close coordination, even as a team. Many of the efforts within the 

UAV realm have equal interest and application for other USs within the Department. To 

facilitate coordinated future development of technologies and common operational issues, 

related US roadmap documents are posted at the following locations: 

UGVs are addressed in the Joint Robotics Master Plan at 

http://www.jointrobotics.com/activities_new/masterplan.shtml

UUVs are addressed in the Navy UUV Master Plan at 

http://www.onr.navy.mil/02/baa/baa01_012/pip/uuvmp.pdf

The requirement for interoperability among UAVs is equally important for 

between UAVs and manned systems as well as other US types. The need for a UAV to 

communicate and interact with a UGV is not far off. The Army’s Future Combat System

(FCS) program is exploring such concepts. In all likelihood, future UUVs may 

themselves deploy UAVs to extend their capabilities and improve overall system

performance. Small UAVs that become unattended ground sensors will blur the 

distinction between the classes of USs. These simple examples argue that, to the 

maximum extent possible, the common UAV vehicle interface now in development 

should be investigated for applicability to other USs. The ultimate goal is seamless 

integration into the battlespace of humans and unmanned, UAV or otherwise, systems. 

64
UAV Roadmap 2002 – Section 6 

Roadmap 

Broad efforts to establish and expand interoperability and standardization will 

support overall US interoperability. Global Information Grid initiatives will establish 

communications standards and provide infrastructure and components to support 

network-centric sharing of data among platforms. Joint Command and Control interfaces 

will provide standard message sets and procedures for exchange of situational awareness 

and taskings among US platforms. ISR and other application specific data and product 

standards will further support the exchange of relevant information, with horizontal 

fusion initiatives in particular providing a major multiplier effect through a coordinated 

application of resources across diverse platforms. US developers must engage and build 

upon these broader efforts to provide the greatest level of interoperability, as required to 

support unified operations. 

Several ongoing service and industry activities are specifically focused on US 

interoperability. For example, the Joint Robotics Program (JRP) is focusing on the 

technology required to enable tightly coupled UAV and UGV assets to deliver a 

significant portion of the warfighting capability envisioned for the Army’s FCS. The JRP 

has established a working group and produced a draft Joint Architecture for Unmanned 

Systems (JAUS). Initially developed to support ground systems, the JAUS architecture 

has been expanded to extend across the full spectrum of USs. Several DARPA ACTDs 

and ATDs are focusing on the integration of UGVs and UAVs. The 

ASD(C3I)/USJFCOM UAV Interoperability IPT is reviewing existing interface standards 

developed for manned and unmanned systems, to include ground, space, surface, and 

underwater systems, to identify shortfalls that must be addressed by additional standards 

to support required and projected levels of interoperability. In general, efforts to 

integrate across the US domain to date have been very limited. 

The Department is taking a much broader view of the entire unmanned systems 

landscape and the opportunities that exist for military transformation. Clearly this is a 

technology realm that is difficult to predict. However, several overarching concepts seem

to appear. 

1. Integration within unmanned systems (and with manned systems) will be high, 

necessitating a greater degree of interoperability from the outset, not added later 

as an afterthought. 

2. The trade space between capability and cost will become much greater, offering a 

wider range of options, but producing much more complex and integrated 

systems, challenging our current “platform” focus on weapons acquisition. 

3. USs may be grouped more by technology, and less by traditional classifications; 

i.e. small UAVs may have more in common with UGVs than with larger UAVs 

4. USs needs a roadmap to focus development and employment and maintain critical 

interfaces with both manned and other unmanned systems. 

It is the goal of the Department to develop a broad US roadmap that serves as an 

umbrella document covering all US roadmaps, including this document, to assure 

appropriate interfaces are maintained. This will be a challenge. However, to do 

otherwise squanders a tremendous opportunity to transform the United States’ military 

capability to allow more precise, lethal, and rapid employment of force with reduced risk 

to humans at lower acquisition and sustainment costs. 

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UAV Roadmap 2002 – Appendix A 

Platforms 

Appendix A: Platforms 

Overview 

The UAV platform is the most apparent component of a modern UAV system and 

in most cases can be considered the “truck” for the payload. Platforms can vary in size 

and shape from the micro with a wing span of 6 inches, to the behemoth with a wing span 

of 114 feet. The platform must be able to accommodate all the requirements, e.g. size, 

weight, and power, of the payload(s). The platform must also be designed with the 

capabilities required for the environment in which it will operate. Speed, endurance, 

signature, survivability and affordability are factored together to provide an integrated 

solution to meet mission requirements. While the platform is the most apparent 

component of a UAV system, in the broad perspective, air vehicles will become less of a 

long-term sustainable resource. Replacement of platforms within the larger UAV system

can be expected to increase as more emphasis is placed on spiral acquisition and 

integrated capabilities. It is unlikely that sustainment of many UAV airframes for more 

than a few decades will be cost effective. 

This appendix first considers UAV platform missions and capabilities current and 

planned. Secondly, this appendix examines critical technology areas that are considered 

enablers toward making platforms more suitable and effective. Finally, OSD goals for 

platforms will be addressed. 

Missions

Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR). A variety of platforms 

provide the U.S. with a wide and diverse ISR collection capability. Space, surface and 

airborne platforms provide a synergistic and redundant system collection capability that 

feeds both National and Service Intelligence systems. Airborne systems are one of the 

primary sources of ISR capabilities available to support a broad range of information 

requirements. These airborne systems, both manned and unmanned have varying, but 

complementary, operating characteristics and UAV systems are capturing an ever 

increasing segment of this mission area. UAVs are a key component within a larger ISR 

architecture as they are ideal platforms to carry a wide variety of sensors and other 

payload systems without risk to aircrews for extended flight durations. UAVs provide a 

wide range of platform capabilities making them ideally suited to many ISR missions. 

Depending on the specific mission requirements, capabilities such as endurance, altitude, 

size, survivability, and cost can be optimized to provide capabilities that are not possible 

with any other collection means. Additionally all UAV’s eliminate the human risk of 

exposure to air defense and counter air threats. Furthermore, UAVs are highly immune 

to contaminated conditions which would pose a risk to aircrews. 

a. Stand-off: During peacetime, the majority of airborne ISR missions are 

accomplished using standoff techniques. The standoff mode is also used during 

military operations when the risk is too great to expose platforms to a high 

probability of loss, or political sensitivities mandate constraint. In this instance, 

UAV design needs to reflect the attributes of high altitude and long endurance; 

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Platforms 

high altitude to maximize the sensor range and long endurance to maximize timeon-station. Typical collection capability for this operational concept is still 

imagery, both SAR and EO/IR/Multi-Spectral Imagery(MSI)/Hyperpectral 

Imagery (HSI), Signals Intelligence, and other less frequent collections including 

atmospheric sampling. The UAV design must also have the ability to carry the 

required payload to altitude and the propulsion system must have the capacity to 

generate both air-vehicle flight and electricity necessary to support the payloads. 

b. Overflight: There are some cases where over-flight for collection purposes is 

required. This can occur during peacetime where political conditions support 

such missions such as peacekeeping or in combat where a sufficient reduction in 

hostile air defenses has occurred. Typical UAV design for operations at in these 

scenarios vary considerably but generally require extended endurance, multiple 

operating attitudes to support broad collection capability, streaming video and 

very high resolution imagery for positive target identification. As with the high 

altitude platform, payload, and electrical output are generally attributes to be 

maximized. Additionally, because weather conditions will be encountered at 

some of these altitudes, the UAV design must support operation in all types of 

weather especially icing conditions. 

c. Denied Access: In limited cases, access to denied areas is required to support 

combat or national requirements. Generally this is achieved with national 

collectors; however it is advantageous to have an airborne penetrating capability 

to prevent an adversary from denying collection of overhead assets based on the 

predictable nature of orbiting systems. These capabilities have been embodied in 

manned platforms, most notably the U-2 and SR-71 systems although many other 

manned platforms of various types have been used on occasion. Clearly the 

disadvantage of manned platforms in a denied access collection role is the high 

potential for loss of the aircraft and crew, and failure of the mission. UAV’s are 

ideally suited to this mission area and have served as collectors in the past, e.g. 

the D-21 and AQM-34 Firebee drones. More recently, the Darkstar UAV system

was also designed to operate in this environment. Platform attributes of reduced 

signature, extended endurance, speed, sensor support including reduced signature 

apertures and operating modes are requirements for this mission area. 

 

Strike/SEAD. Recent action in Operation Enduring Freedom has shown the 

value of arming UAVs. The addition of lightweight weapons to the long endurance 

Predator vehicle made possible rapid reaction to detected targets of opportunity. The 

armed Predator’s mission could arguably be termed Armed Reconnaissance, as it played 

more upon the surveillance capability of the UAV than upon its weapons prowess. 

As opposed to the Armed Reconnaissance mission, the SEAD and strike missions 

make new demands upon UAV developers. Performance of SEAD and strike will 

demand a more robust capability in terms of weapons load and survivability. These 

missions require the development of a true Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle (UCAV). 

The UCAV brings several unmanned vehicle attributes that are attractive for the 

SEAD and strike missions when compared to manned assets: 

1. Eliminate risk of loss life of an air crew. 

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UAV Roadmap 2002 – Appendix A 

Platforms 

2. Potential for greater survivability. 

3. Greater endurance for persistence over the target area. 

4. New CONOPS enabled by the use of unmanned systems. 

5. Reduced acquisition & support cost. 

In addition, the UCAV brings several challenges: 

6. Rules of Engagement considerations that may require the intervention of a human 

operator. 

7. The prosecution of advanced Integrated Air Defense Systems (IADS) and time 

critical targets through as yet unperfected Automatic Targeting and Engagement 

Process or by a human operator outside the vehicle. 

8. The integration, interoperability, and information assurance required to support 

mixed manned/unmanned force operations. 

9. Secure, robust communications capability, advanced cognitive decision aids and 

mission planning. 

10. Adaptive autonomous operations and coordinated multi-vehicle flight. 

a. Strike: A strike mission may be against a heavily or a lightly defended target. The 

level of threat determines which UAV attribute is most influential in the argument 

for filling the mission need with an unmanned asset. In either case, if the level of

activity rises above the occasional need to hold a very few lightly defended 

targets as risk, a dedicated UCAV vice a lightly armed conventional UAV is 

required to perform the mission. The target threat level will largely determine the 

UCAV platform characteristics; although in some cases a compromise between 

multiple design drivers may be found. 

UCAVs will be used against heavily defended targets for two reasons. 

First, an unmanned air vehicle can theoretically achieve levels of survivability 

that manned aircraft cannot. Signature control without the need for human 

caretaking becomes less difficult, and maneuverability can be increased beyond 

human tolerances should that be required to enhance survivability. The design 

driver for this case is survivability, however it is achieved. Secondly, should 

survivability measures fail, the use of a UCAV removes the risk of losing a 

human life. Arguably, the strongest argument for UCAV is this ability to offer a 

risk-free use of force. 

For lightly defended targets, the argument for use of a UCAV shifts to the 

cost of conducting warfare. There are predictions of significant reductions in 

procurement, operations, and support costs for UAVs over manned aircraft. If 

these predictions are correct, the cost effectiveness in the strike mission will 

depend largely upon payload capacity as compared to manned strike assets. 

Weapons payload type and weight then becomes the driving design factor in this 

case. It should be noted, however, that a UCAV of sufficient size to be cost 

effective in the lightly armed case would probably not be a low cost UAV 

solution. In the higher range of UCAV costs, it would make sense that the vehicle 

have enhanced survivability features and be effective against heavily defended as 

well as lightly defended targets. 

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UAV Roadmap 2002 – Appendix A 

Platforms 

If a UCAV is to reduce the numbers of manned strike assets required, it 

will have to offer a robust weapons mix and a payload capacity similar to that of 

manned strike assets, however at much reduced operational and support costs. In 

addition, compatibility with the existing and planned weapons inventory for 

manned strike aircraft will be essential to keep overall armament development 

and support costs low. 

b. SEAD: SEAD may be analyzed as two different types of missions. The first is 

pre-emptive SEAD in which a pathway is cleared by pre-emptive destruction of 

enemy defenses prior to the ingress of strike aircraft. The other type is reactive 

SEAD, in which the SEAD asset must react rapidly to enemy air defenses during 

the execution of a strike. The SEAD mission implies a somewhat capable enemy. 

Since closing that enemy will be required (as described below), the survivability 

of the vehicle must be assured through speed, stealth technology, high 

maneuverability or a combination of all three. 

Execution of the both the pre-emptive and the reactive SEAD mission 

imply several critical design criteria for the UCAV platform and mission control 

system: 

Mission reliability must be extremely high, as manned assets will depend upon 

the UCAV for protection. 

Extensive Bomb Hit Assessment will be required so that operational 

commanders can properly determine whether strike “go/no-go/continue” criteria 

have been met. 

A pre-emptive SEAD mission is a strike mission with the addition of the 

following complication: the target can always shoot back. For modern threats this 

usually means that the UCAV must successfully get weapons through a 

substantial engagement envelope. This can be accomplished by designing a 

stealthy UCAV that reduces the normal “threat ring” (range at which the enemy 

defenses are effective) to a much smaller range that allows the employment of

direct attack (short range) munitions. Conversely, the UCAV may employ standoff weapons that do not require penetration of the enemy air defense system’s 

effective range. 

The use of direct attack munitions instead of more expensive stand-off 

weapons is a major driver in cost savings. 

If stand-off weapons are utilized, the problem of target identification, location 

and BDA may still require the penetration of the threat system’s engagement 

envelope. 

Execution of the reactive SEAD mission implies further design criteria: 

• Enemy defensive systems operations must be detected rapidly. 

• Reaction time from detection to neutralization of the enemy defenses must 

be very short. 

• When using Electronic Attack (EA) to neutralize defenses in support of 

manned strike forces it will be critical for the UCAV to be within 

sufficiently short range to be effective. A trade-off between EA 

effectiveness and survivability needs to be fully understood. 

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UAV Roadmap 2002 – Appendix A 

Platforms 

• When using weapons to neutralize defenses, the time of flight of the 

weapon must be reduced by the ability to stand in close to the target 

system (high survivability) or by the use of a high-speed weapon. 

• Robust, anti-jam, data-links are required. 

• Reactive SEAD will require low latency human interaction with the 

system – or high autonomy within the system for determination of ROE 

criteria. 

• Reactive SEAD implies the integration of manned and unmanned aircraft 

in a single strike event. 

Summary: The era of UCAV contribution to SEAD and strike missions is just 

dawning. Their availability will add new options in the application of force, and 

promises to reduce the cost of our armed forces. It should be noted, however, that for the 

foreseeable future UCAVs are not a complete replacement for manned aircraft. A UCAV 

can bring enhancements to mission capability (e.g. risk-free close approach to heavily 

defended targets) but will continue to only satisfy a portion of the many missions strike 

assets cover. Close Air Support is an example of one such area. The use of a UCAV to 

deliver ordnance in very close proximity to friendly forces will face technical and culture 

barriers that imply at least in the short-term, that manned aircraft programs must 

continue. There will, however, be an impact on the total numbers of manned systems that 

must be acquired.

Electronic Attack. EA is the use of electromagnetic energy to confuse or disable 

threat defensive systems. Several attributes make the use of unmanned vehicles for the 

EA mission attractive. First, an unmanned air vehicle can theoretically achieve levels of 

survivability that manned aircraft cannot. Signature control without the need for human 

caretaking becomes less difficult. In addition, maneuverability could be increased 

beyond human tolerances to enhance survivability. Secondly, should survivability 

measures fail, the use of an unmanned system removes the risk of losing human life. 

Arguably, the strongest argument for UCAV is this ability to offer a risk-free use of 

force. Many challenges remain for developers and tacticians, but the Electronic Attack 

(EA) mission is being considered for both the Air Force and Navy Unmanned Combat 

Air Vehicles. EA concepts of employment are still being developed, and may include 

jamming or employment of expendables from the UCAV. 

In developing unmanned systems for the EA mission, the following unmanned 

vehicle attributes are being considered: 

• The ability to build a very stealthy unmanned vehicle could mean closer 

approaches targeted systems, requiring less radiated power to complete the EA 

mission and the ability to detect and exploit much lower levels of targeted system

radiation. 

• Pre-planned EA in which the targeted system is known and the planned attack is 

simple lends itself well to a pre-programmed unmanned system. In some cases 

reaction time may be improved over manned systems. 

• The potential use of higher power Directed Energy (DE) weapons or 

Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) weapons in future EA missions argues for the use 

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Platforms 

of an unmanned platform, since the weapon may pose a significant risk to the 

delivery vehicle and crew as well as the target. 

• Unmanned systems offer potential savings in acquisition & support costs. 

The use of unmanned systems in the EA mission also brings several challenges: 

• The unmanned system is more dependent upon outside communications than 

manned systems. Self-jamming (interference with command and control 

communications by electronic attack emissions) could limit the ability to change 

the unmanned systems’ planned mission once the electronic attack has begun. 

• The potential for self-jamming and increased vulnerability due to a dependence 

upon communications mean a great degree of autonomy will be required in the 

unmanned EA system. 

• A manned EA aircraft provides the ability for a trained crew to evaluate large 

amounts of tactical data on the threat environment and to change the mission plan 

as required for strike support. The appearance of previously unknown threat 

defensive system modes, frequencies, or tactics may only be detected by the 

human operator’s ability to recognize patterns in the context of previous 

experience – a very difficult and as yet undeveloped ability for autonomous 

systems. 

- Without the development of autonomous EA operating capability, the 

transmission of large amounts of data describing the tactical environment 

must be provided to remote human operators in real time. These large 

transmissions would be limited by available bandwidth and self-jamming and 

could increase the unmanned system’s vulnerability. 

• A signature-controlled vehicle loses the advantage of stealth when radiating. 

“Home On Jam” threat systems could put the unmanned EA vehicle at risk. 

Execution of the Electronic Attack mission implies several critical design criteria 

and questions for the unmanned platform and mission control system: 

• Mission reliability must be extremely high, as manned assets will depend upon 

the UCAV for protection. 

• The trade-off between effective apertures for the radiation of jamming electronic 

energy will have to be balanced against the negative impact on the signature and 

survivability of the unmanned system. 

• The EA mission will require a highly autonomous system that can operate and 

handle vehicle-related and mission-related contingencies while unable to 

communicate with the mission control system (due to self-jamming and covert 

operations). 

• Reaction time from detection to neutralization of the enemy defenses must be 

very short. 

- Enemy defensive system operations must be detected and countered rapidly. 

- When using Electronic Attack (EA) to neutralize defenses in support of 

manned strike forces it will be critical for the UCAV to be within sufficiently 

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Platforms 

short range to be effective. A trade-off between EA effectiveness and 

survivability needs to fully explored. 

• The EA mission implies the integration of manned and unmanned aircraft in a 

single strike event. 

• Robust, anti-jam data links are required. 

• The amount of energy required for effective Electronic Attack is large unless the 

delivery platform is in very close proximity. The ability to generate this large 

amount of power could drive up vehicle size and cost. In addition, a vehicle small 

enough to be unobserved in close proximity to the target may not have the 

mobility (speed and range) to close the target or to persist in the target area for a 

sufficient amount of time. These considerations argue for the use of expendable 

jammers from unmanned vehicles as one means of delivering low cost EA 

performance. 

Summary: The Department of Defense is beginning the development of 

unmanned EA missions. Initial study indicates that there are both significant potential 

unmanned system strengths and significant challenges to be overcome for this mission. 

New unmanned systems will add new options in the application of force, and promises to 

both reduce the cost of our armed forces and to decrease the risk of friendly losses. It 

should be noted, however, that unmanned EA systems are not a complete replacement for 

manned EA aircraft. An unmanned EA vehicle can bring enhancements to mission 

capability (e.g. risk-free close approach to heavily defended targets) but will not have the 

autonomy required to completely replace manned systems in the foreseeable future. 

Communications Node/Data Relay. To perform the communications relay 

mission, the UAV platform must have a capability of extremely long endurance, high 

altitude, and generate adequate power. It will provide an airborne augmentation to 

current tactical and operational organic ground relevant frequencies both beyond line-ofsight and line-of-sight retransmission capability. Support of the communications relay 

mission will require continuous Line-of-Sight/Non-Line-of-Site/Beyond the Line-ofSight (LOS/NLOS/BLOS) coverage in a 24-hour period. 

The UAV should relay VHF/UHF BLOS for battlefield communications (to 

include helicopter operations) and remote sensor data. Communications relay must 

support extended range operations with a communications on the move capability for 

ground forces. These payloads for extended periods of time ideally should be small 

enough to be permanently mounted on each UAV. In the near-term, however, they will 

have to fit within the available payload capacity of the UAV. Platforms should 

incorporate a robust antenna and power suite to facilitate rapid payload reconfiguration 

and integrate advanced technology as it becomes available. Communications relay 

payloads should be constructed in modules that contain specific communications 

capabilities that can be added or removed without affecting the remainder of the payload. 

The payload must be interoperable with other UAV communications payloads at all 

echelons. 

While functioning on board the UAV, communications relay will provide BLOS 

for Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System (SINCGARS) and Enhanced 

Position Location Reporting System (EPLRS) radios, as well as remote sensors. The 

remote sensor relay can be either through the Communications/Data Relay equipment, or, 

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Platforms 

objectively, through the CDL. These payloads will be capable of autonomous preplanned 

operations or of being dynamically reprogrammed during a mission. 

The platform will provide BLOS relay for battlefield communications to include 

legacy Army Common User System (ACUS), Tactical Internet (TI) systems, and future 

Warfighter Information Network - Tactical (WIN-T). The system must be compatible 

with the Warfighter Information Network for a Joint Task Force operating in a specified 

theater of operations as provided for in the WIN-T ORD (objective). This capability will 

support interim and objective force extended battlespace operations with a command and 

control on-the-move (C2OTM) capability. These payloads will be fully interoperable 

with the emerging Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) compliant waveforms. The TI 

range extension payload will be interoperable with tactical communications relay 

payloads. Platforms must be capable of supporting ACN ground based subscribers at 

some capability in the absence of Global Hawk equipped platforms. 

The platform will be capable of relaying VHF and UHF radio voice/data 

communications (secure during wartime) from the control station via CDL through the 

platform to Air Traffic Control (ATC)/Air Traffic Service (ATS) agencies, Airborne 

Warning and Control System (AWACS), Airborne Communications Network (ABCCC) 

and other manned or unmanned aircraft (threshold). These systems must be operable 

from the controlling station to include the ability to change radio frequencies. 

The platform will be capable of relaying VHF-AM radio voice communications 

using an International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Standard And Recommended 

Procedures (SARPs) compliant radio operating with 8.33 kHz channel spacing from the 

Control Station to airspace controller communication (threshold). 

Critical Platforms Technologies

Propulsion. 

a. Integrated High Performance Turbine Engine (IHPTET) Program: Unmanned 

Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) are rapidly being developed for eventual integration into 

the Army, Navy and Air Force fleets. Today’s battlefield contains air vehicles 

that have two classes of turbine engines: 1) man-rated for manned platforms and 

2) expendables for cruise missiles. UAV service has brought about a third 

limited-life class, which must support the unique role of UAVs. The current 

development of systems such as Global Hawk and UCAV, which occupy ISR, 

SEAD and deep strike missions, have shown that existing “off-the-shelf” 

propulsion systems are placed under such heavy demands that mission capability 

and operational utility can be severely limited. Future UAVs will address combat 

scenarios and are projected to require even greater demands for better fuel 

consumption, thrust, power extraction, cost, and distortion tolerance. The 

Integrated High Performance Turbine Engine (IHPTET) program is a joint 

service, NASA, DARPA and industry initiative began in 1987, is a three-phase 

program with goals of doubling propulsion capability. IHPTET is a National 

program, and is the cornerstone of U.S. military turbine engine technology 

development. One of the three IHPTET classes of engines is the Joint 

Expendable Turbine Engine Concept (JETEC) program, a joint Air Force/Navy 

effort, will demonstrate several key UAV-applicable technologies including 

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UAV Roadmap 2002 – Appendix A 

Platforms 

advanced aerodynamics, lubeless bearings, high-temp low cost hot sections, and 

low-cost manufacturing techniques. Using data from laboratory research, trade 

studies, and existing systems, the payoffs/tradeoffs for each of the critical 

technologies will be analyzed in terms of engine performance, cost, and 

storability. 

0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000

Combat Radius

0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1

1.2

1.4

1.6

T

S

F

C (lbm/hr/lbf)

Current Technology 

(F124)

Advanced

Technology

+120%

Loiter

6 Hrs 3 Hrs 0 Hrs

+35%

Radius

Assumptions: Simplified Radius / Loiter Mission

0.8 Mn / Tropopause

L/D = 15

Fixed Aircraft Size

Loiter Time

FIGURE A-1: PERFORMANCE PAYOFF OF A NOTIONAL COMBAT UAV UTILIZING TECHNOLOGIES 

FROM THE JETEC PHASE III GOALS. 

75
UAV Roadmap 2002 – Appendix A 

Platforms 

0 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000

Thrust, lbs (SLS)

0

500

1000

1500

2000

2500

Production Cost, K (9

6

$)

PW306/5

PW308 

TFE731-60

AE3007(H)

FJ44-2

PW545G

F124 

PW545

400

300

200

100

$/Lbf

FJ44-1

CFE738-1-1

TFE731-60 PW535

JETEC Goal

115

FIGURE A-2: JETEC COST GOAL IN COMPARISON TO EXISTING SYSTEMS. 

Reducing production and development costs may be the most critical 

effort for UAV engine designers. These reductions can be achieved through 

various means such as advancements in manufacturing techniques, unique 

component designs, and multi-use applicability. Advanced manufacturing 

techniques can greatly reduce tooling cost and fabrication time. For example, 

resin-transfer molding for OMC components can reduce production cost up to 

40% over conventional lay-up techniques. JETEC is pursuing this and several 

other fabrication concepts including gang milling, high-speed milling, bonded 

castings, bonded disks, metal-injected moldings and inertial welding. 

Unique component designs must be pursued to allow UAV engines to 

provide a high level of sophistication while minimizing cost. Since part count is a 

major determinant of production cost, design features such as drum

turbomachinery, slinger combustors, threaded casings, and integral blisks can 

reduce part count by an order of magnitude. Low cost seals such as brush and 

finger designs have shown great promise for replacing large, expensive labyrinthtype seals. 

Development costs can inhibit a buyer from pursing a new engine design. 

This leaves only off-the-shelf systems that typically have less than optimal 

performance and/or cost for UAVs. These penalties can come in the form of 

increased maintenance, decreased range or speed, increased production costs, or 

decreased low observable (LO). To counter this and minimize development costs, 

industry must examine multi-use concepts where a common-core can be 

incorporated into UAV and commercial propulsion systems such as general 

aviation, business jet, and helicopter gas generators. The payoffs are enormous 

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UAV Roadmap 2002 – Appendix A 

Platforms 

for both communities - decreased cost to the military and increased technology for 

the civilian sector. 

b. Versatile Affordable Advanced Turbine Engines (VAATE): As currently planned, 

the DoD/NASA/DOE Versatile Affordable Advanced Turbine Engines (VAATE) 

initiative is ramping up over the next several years, and will follow and build 

upon the IHPTET effort. Unlike IHPTET, which focused heavily on 

performance, VAATE will build upon the technology advances of IHPTET, and 

concentrate on improving aviation, marine and even ground-power turbine engine 

affordability, which proponents define as capability divided by cost. VAATE's 

affordability orientation will look at technologies cutting engine development, 

production and maintenance costs. The balance of the VAATE affordability 

improvements will come from performance capabilities--technologies associated 

with boosting thrust and cutting weight and specific fuel consumption. 

VAATE is a two-phase program with specific goals. By the end of phase 

1 in 2010, a six fold improvement in affordability will be demonstrated, and at the 

end of phase 2 in 2017, a ten-fold improvement in affordability will be 

demonstrated. Baselines for the effort are current state-of-the-art power plants 

such as the Honeywell F124 used in the Boeing X-45A UCAV Demonstrator. 

VAATE work will be concentrated into three focus areas and two 

pervasive areas. Focus areas will include durability; work on a versatile core and 

intelligent engine technologies. Pervasive areas, which are really incubators for 

hatching ideas that should be included in the VAATE focus areas, will be 

segregated into the categories of high-impact technologies and unmanned aerial 

vehicles.

Reciprocating Internal Combustion Engines. Reciprocating internal combustion 

gasoline engines are widely used in fixed wing Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) with 

Take-Off Gross Weights less than 2000 lbs. This is true among legacy UAVs (Pioneer 

and Predator), developmental UAVs (Shadow 200) and numerous demonstration aircraft 

from both Industry and Government Laboratories where across the board both two and 

four cycle engines are used. True diesel cycle engines are precluded due to significantly 

higher engine weight as compared to the gasoline engines. While each cycle offers 

advantages and disadvantages, the demonstrated lower cost and better efficiency of these 

engines precludes developing turboshaft engines to meet these UAV needs. However, 

these engines do not meet the requirements for a common battlefield fuel as defined in 

DoD 4000. In addition, they tend to fall short in reliability/durability as compared to 

man-rated aircraft engines, making them less attractive to warfighters who rely heavily 

on the data received from their UAV payloads to make real-time decisions. Future small 

UAVs will continue to utilize these low cost, gasoline engines unless significant 

advances in weight reduction for true Diesel cycle engines, or successful modification of 

existing gasoline engines to burn Jet Propellant (JP) fuels with increased reliability, are 

achieved. 

Technology Outlook. The use of both motor gasoline and aviation gasoline in 

almost all small UAVs is undesirable as it is both logistically very difficult to support and 

unsafe (JP fuels have a higher flashpoint than gasoline). However, there are no 

significant technology or development efforts to provide an aviation suitable, small JP5/8 

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Platforms 

fuel burning engine(s) in the power classes and power to weight ratios being discussed 

here. These engines do not exist in the commercial market, and typical DoD efforts have 

utilized Small Business Innovative Research (SBIRs) topics in an attempt to develop 

these engines. While some of these attempts have shown promise, SBIRs do not provide 

a basis for a robust effort to meet many of the technical challenges that Heavy Fuel 

Engines (HFE) present 

Reliability. Reliability of current low cost two and four cycle UAV engines is on 

the order of a few hundred hours, sometimes significantly less. This shortcoming, when 

compared to turbine engines, is often overlooked due to the low cost of reciprocating 

engines. Good engine reliability has proven to be a significant factor in user acceptance 

of UAVs. However, most UAV demonstrations, and even development programs do not 

prove reliability early in their development, many times resulting in disappointing results 

in extensive flight and operational testing. Developing reliability in a small HFE will 

present a large challenge due to the differences in combustion and lubrication between JP 

fuels and gasoline, and the duty cycles imposed on them for UAV use. 

Efficiency (Brake Specific Fuel Consumption, (BSFC)). One of the most

desirable traits for any UAV is persistence, and engine fuel efficiency has a major 

influence on the number of UAVs required for a given time on target coverage. Current 

gasoline two cycle engines have relatively poor efficiency, while four stroke engines are 

better but at the cost of increased engine weight. Both engines are significantly better 

than small gas turbines in this power class. Because of this any effort to develop HFEs 

will place a large emphasis on efficiency. A HFE that operates on a true diesel cycle 

could double the endurance of a given UAV which normally uses a two stroke gasoline 

engine. Currently, two cycle engines still tend to be used extensively in small UAVs, 

particularly in demonstration efforts as they provide the UAV designer a low cost and 

lightweight, yet powerful engine. However, due to low cycle efficiency their BSFCs 

tends to be high, resulting in aircraft with limited endurance capabilities. Existing 

gasoline engines converted to operate on heavy fuels would not have significantly 

improved BSFCs, but would operate on the required JP fuels. True diesel cycle engines 

would offer greatly reduced BSFCs but technological advances are required to reduce the 

weight of these engines to get them near that of gasoline engines. 

Power to Weight. Air vehicles designed around two cycle gasoline engines 

benefit from a very high power to weight ratio. Developing a HFE for use on any AV 

utilizing an existing two cycle gasoline engine will require technology advances to 

approach similar power to weight ratios.

Technology Challenges. There are two approaches to using JP fuels in UAVs 

designed for lightweight gasoline engines; converting an existing gasoline engine to 

operate satisfactorily on JP fuels, or developing a true diesel engine light enough to be 

substituted for an existing gasoline engine. Depending on the approach chosen there are 

different Technology Challenges described below: 

This approach will yield an engine of similar efficiency to that of the current 

gasoline engines (no improvement in BSFC) but will be close in power to weight and 

minimize integration efforts. The technological challenges include designing a 

combustion system that effectively burns JP fuels without using a diesel cycle, and 

obtaining acceptable engine reliability while using JP fuels.

78
UAV Roadmap 2002 – Appendix A 

Platforms 

This approach will yield an engine of much greater efficiency than current 

gasoline engines but a significant Technology Challenge will be weight reduction in 

order to even approach that of current gasoline UAV engines while maintaining 

reliability. 

Advancements in materials are needed to allow development of diesel engines to 

approach the power to weight ratios of gasoline engines. The high cylinder pressures 

associated with the diesel cycle will require advanced materials not presently found in 

reciprocating engines. Concurrently, dynamic components such as crankshafts, 

connecting rods and bearings also need improved weight to strength/wear for suitable use 

in aviation engines. 

Weight reductions in the area of diesel fuel systems and ancillary components will 

also be required. This includes the fuel injection system, turbochargers, intercoolers, 

scavenge pumps, cooling systems, etc. Increasing efficiency requires advanced fuel 

system components such as lightweight high-pressure pumps/fuel injectors and advanced 

fuel control techniques such as rate shaping. These systems are required for diesel cycle 

engines operating on JP fuels. 

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

12345

Endurance (hrs)

Propulsion+Fuel Weight Fraction (%)

Gasoline 2 Cycle

Gasoline 4 Cycle

Diesel Cycle within 2 years

Lightweight Diesel Cycle (5+ yrs)

Rotary/Spark Assisted Engines Diesel

Burning AV Performance Improves/

Payload Weight Capacity Improves

As Weight Fraction Increases, Payload Weight Must

Decrease, AV Structure Weight Must Decrease, etc.

FIGURE A-3: ENGINE EFFECTS ON TAKEOFF GROSS WEIGHT FOR A DESIRED MISSION 

ENDURANCE

Shortcomings of Current Approaches. There have been a number of proposed 

solutions to provide a low cost HFE, but most are without merit. From innovative 

kinematic designs, to low pressure diesel engines and finally to modified gasoline two 

cycle engines, the current solution set does not provide reliable, efficient, lightweight JP 

burning engines for use in aviation. The resulting influence on UAV designs (and their 

inherent capability) of the different design approaches are depicted in Figure 1. Without 

a indepth technology program the best that can be hoped for are mediocre solutions, that 

79
UAV Roadmap 2002 – Appendix A 

Platforms 

meet some of our requirements, but fall significantly short in providing the true solution 

needed.

Alternate Propulsion Technologies. Future-looking efforts for UAV propulsion 

include the use of fuel cell- or nuclear-based power schemes. Fuel cell development has 

been pushed by NASA for use in UAVs and by the Army's Natick Laboratory for soldier 

systems (i.e., small scale uses), and their specific energy performance is approaching that 

of gasoline engines. The gaseous hydrogen fuel cells being used on NASA's Helios UAV 

in 2003 have over 80 percent of the specific energy of a two-cycle gasoline engine (500 

vice 600 Watt hours/kilogram) and 250 percent that of the best batteries (220 W hr/kg); 

further improvement is anticipated when liquid hydrogen fuel cells are introduced in 

2004. Still in development by NASA are regenerative power systems combining solar 

and fuel cells in a day/night cycle to possibly permit flight durations of weeks or longer. 

Additionally, several commercial aviation initiatives are exploring fuel cells for both 

primary propulsion and auxiliary power units (APUs). In the nuclear arena, the Air Force 

Research Laboratory has studied the feasibility of using a quantum nucleonic reactor (i.e., 

non-fission) to power long endurance UAVs, however, this remains a concept study; no 

prototypes or flight worthy hardware are currently planned. 

--------------------

Speci

HP*hr/Total Wgt

t

oning

gt

------------------------

Speci

W*hr/Total Wgt

Fuel Cell Propulsion

 Fuel Density * Fuel 

Volume 

+ Fuel Cell Wgt 

+ Reformer System Wg

+ Power Conditi

& Wiring W

+ Motor Wgt 

--------------

Total Wgt 

fic Energy=

Battery Propulsion

 Electrolyte Wgt 

+ Cathode & Anode Wgt 

+ Case Wgt 

+ Power Conditioning 

 & Wiring Wgt 

+ Motor Wgt 

------------------------------------

Total Wgt 

Specific Energy= 

W*hr/Total Wgt

Gasoline Engine

 Fuel Density * Fuel 

Volume 

+ Engine Wgt/HP * 

HPreq 

+ Accessories Wgt

--------------

Total Wgt 

fic Energy=

FIGURE A-4: SPECIFIC ENERGY CALCULATION. 

Air Vehicle Structures. Mission, environment and intended aircraft performance 

attributes are key drivers for UAV structures in the same sense as for manned aircraft. At 

one end of the “UAV spectrum” aircraft such as the Finder and Dragon Eye diminish the 

need for durable structures anticipating the possibility of decades of service use. This is 

contrasted with Global-Hawk class UAVs where individual airframes are planned to be in 

the Service force structure for periods comparable to traditional manned systems. 

Similarly, environmental requirements drive interest in air vehicle structures in 

three basic directions. UAVs primarily intended for tactical use in the close vicinity of 

ground forces dedicated to force-protection missions will have modest requirements for 

systems redundancy. For UAVs intending to be certified to fly in civil airspace, the 

recognition of redundancy requirements is a factor for the development of systems and 

integration for the entire aircraft. This tends to drive up the scale of the aircraft and the 

structures needed to host capabilities and multiple systems needed to support larger scale 

performance for endurance, altitude and extended reliability. The need for a capability to 

operate and survive in high-threat areas adds the need for signature control, which 

becomes a consideration for structures planning. 

80
UAV Roadmap 2002 – Appendix A 

Platforms 

a. Wing: Keeping targets of intelligence interest under constant and persistence 

surveillance is increasing valued by operational commanders. This, in turn, drives 

interest in wing designs that can bring the greatest possible measure of endurance 

to collection platforms. Technologies being investigated to increase wing 

performance include airfoil-shape change for multipoint optimization, and active 

aeroelastic wing deformation control for aerodynamic efficiency and to manage 

structural loads. 

b. Apertures: The demand for increasingly sophisticated sensor and communications 

systems on airborne platforms continues to grow in the face of stringent space, 

weight and power (SWAP) constraints. This tension results in the desire to 

reduce the number of sensors and required antenna systems by combining 

functions and sharing components. Reducing costs and SWAP demands on 

platforms as well is key to controlling the size and costs of the sensors 

themselves. The importance of setting rigorous requirements to specify apertures 

is a factor in sizing the collection platform itself. 

c. Consolidating capabilities on a single platform is envisioned in the Multi-Sensor 

Command and Control (MC2C) Constellation is, in effect, another means of 

aperture management. However, the constellation will include associated highand low-altitude unmanned aerial vehicles where collection systems can be 

integrated providing far more capability than any single platform. This also 

affords the opportunity to internet multiple apertures from widely separated 

platforms into a single system bringing the attributes of ground-based multi-static 

systems into the airborne environment. 

d. Lightweight Structures: Military aspirations for extended range and endurance 

face the technical challenge of reducing gross weight. Advancing technology in 

materials as well as increasing the affordability of composite structures is being 

addressed in Service laboratories. In addition to the airframe, weight issues at the 

component level such as heat exchangers, sensors and antennas are research 

priorities. Weight can also be reduced by using aircraft structure and skin 

components to perform multiple functions such fault detection and as an adjunct 

to RF capabilities. As manufacturers integrate such materials as composite 

sandwich structures in new designs and consider such technologies, as the use and 

role of thermoset and thermoplastic resin matrix materials in advanced composites 

as well as Fiber Reinforced Plastics composite structures, the penalty of weight 

will be worked to achieve the best possible performance. 

Flight Autonomy. Advances in computer and communications technologies 

have enabled the development of autonomous unmanned systems. The Vietnam conflict 

era Remotely Piloted Vehicles (RPVs) were typically controlled by the manned aircraft 

that launched them or the corresponding ground element. These systems required skilled 

operators. Some of these systems flew rudimentary mission profiles based on analog 

computers; but, they were hand flown throughout the missions. The D21, launched from

the SR-71, was the first high flyer. These systems flew pre-programmed missions and 

returned with film-based imagery. In the 1970s the Air Force embarked on the Compass 

81
UAV Roadmap 2002 – Appendix A 

Platforms 

Cope program to develop a high altitude long endurance system capable of 

reconnaissance at long range. These systems were still hand flown. 

In 1988 Boeing developed the first autonomous system; a high altitude long 

endurance UAV, CONDOR, with a design goal of 150 hours at 60,000 feet. This vehicle 

was pre-programmed from takeoff to landing and had no direct manual inputs, e.g. no 

stick and rudder capability in the ground station. The system flew successfully 11 times 

setting altitude and endurance records. The level of autonomy in this vehicle was limited 

to redundancy management of subsystems and alternate runways. It demonstrated these 

features several times during the flight test program. 

 

a. Programs: DARPA began the development of the next generation of High 

Altitude Long Endurance UAVs: Global Hawk and DarkStar. These systems 

built off of the autonomous capabilities demonstrated by the CONDOR system. 

With the increase in computational power available in airborne LRUs these 

programs were able to achieve much more sophisticated subsystem, guidance, 

navigation and control, sensor and communications autonomy than previous 

systems. Global Hawk is capable of Level 2-3 autonomy today (see Figure A-5). 

The on-board avionics architecture was dual string for flight critical components 

and federated into core avionics and mission avionics, similar to manned aircraft. 

Failure of mission avionics would not impact the ability of the vehicle to fly 

safely. The ground command, control, communications and dissemination 

architecture was also federated into workstations responsible for safety of flight 

and workstations dedicated to communications and payload operation. A major 

advance in contingency management capability was built into these systems. 

Contingencies ranged from loss of data links, and loss of navigation components 

to loss of flight computers. The airborne systems were designed to identify, 

isolate and compensate for a wide range of possible system / sub-system failures 

and autonomously take actions to insure system safety. Contingency management 

was further complicated by responses that varied with the mode of flight. The 

response to the loss of a flight computer is very different during takeoff roll, 

versus initial climb, versus once out on a mission, or preparing to land. Each 

failure has to be assessed for the impact on completing the mission. 

Preprogrammed decision trees are built to address each possible failure during 

each part of the mission. For each case identified in this matrix a corrective 

action needs to be identified and coded into the software. Contingency 

management is often one of the most difficult software modules to develop 

requirements for and subsequently is often one of the last modules completed. 

The DARPA A160 program is pushing the state of the art in rotary wing 

system performance as opposed to autonomous behaviors. A160 is an 

autonomous UAV with autonomous behaviors similar to the Global Hawk 

system. 

The DARPA/Air Force and DARPA/Navy UCAV program is extending 

the work being accomplished by these programs, advancing the state of the art in 

multi-vehicle cooperation. Cooperation in this context applies to cooperative 

actions among the UCAVs. UCAVs are envisioned to fly alone or as a forward 

element of a manned - unmanned mission. The UCAVs will have inter-vehicle 

82
UAV Roadmap 2002 – Appendix A 

Platforms 

data links to allow transfer of information between the UCAVs and between the 

UCAVs and the manned vehicles. The information may include mission plan 

updates, target designation information, image chips and possibly other sensor 

data. Key mission decisions will be made based on the information passed 

between the systems. Decisions such as: coordinated navigation plan updates, 

communication plan reassignments, weapons allocations or the accumulation of 

data from the entire squadron to arrive at an updated situational assessment. One 

of the most difficult aspects of this level of autonomy is ensuring that all elements 

remain synchronized. Verifying that all messages are received, all vehicles have 

correctly interpreted the messages and the entire squadron has a single set of 

mission plans to execute will be a key accomplishment. The UCAV system will 

still have all of the subsystem management and contingency management 

autonomous attributes as the previous generation of UAV systems. Both Air 

Force and Navy UCAV are to demonstrate at least Level 6 autonomy. 

The DARPA/Army Unmanned Combat Armed Rotorcraft program is 

advancing the state of the art in autonomous and collaborative behaviors over and 

above what the UCAV program is demonstrating. UCAR will develop the 

capability for collaboration between UCARs, collaboration with other air and 

ground-based unmanned systems, and collaboration with manned platforms. This 

collaboration will go beyond the sharing of information to enable collaborative 

search, target identification, target prosecution, and BDA. UCAR will also 

develop the capability for the interpretation of high-level mission tasking. What 

is envisioned is a system that can parse general mission objectives into specific 

mission objectives, which can then be used as inputs to a sophisticated mission 

planner. The UCAR systems will build upon the subsystem management and 

contingency management autonomous attributes developed in the previous 

generation of UAV systems. With of all of this activity, UCAR is headed for 

Level 8-9 autonomy. 

The DARPA Software Enabled Control program improves the capabilities 

of control systems for advanced unmanned aircraft, both fixed- and rotarywinged. These control systems enhance the autonomy and reliability of both 

fixed- and rotary-winged unmanned aerial vehicles, and improve the performance 

of manned vehicles. The approach taken is to mathematically model complex 

changes in flight conditions and vehicle status, to design fast digital control 

systems to automate maneuvers, and to automatically detect and recover from

faults or damage. These techniques will be implemented on a common, open 

computing platform (the OCP, Open Control Platform) using a flexible 

programmer’s interface that facilitates re-use of real-time controllers across 

multiple vehicles. Advanced control system development exploits recent 

successes in hybrid systems research, which combines continuous-time systems 

with randomly occurring discrete events. Hybrid systems can then adapt to 

sudden changes such as aerodynamic disturbances, threat conditions, damage or 

failure, or limits in the flight envelope. The software to implement these controls 

manages these events and guarantees stable operation throughout the execution of 

the mission. 

83
UAV Roadmap 2002 – Appendix A 

Platforms 

1955

Autonomous Control Levels

Pioneer

1965 1975 1985 1995 2005 2015 2025

Global Hawk

AF UCAV

UCAR

Fully Autonomous Swarms

Group Strategic Goals

Distributed Control

Group Tactical Goals

Group Tactical Replan

Group Coordination

Adapt to Failures & Flight Conditions

Real Time Health/Diagnosis

Remotely Guided

Onboard Route Replan

10

9

8

7

6

5

4

3

2

1

UCAV-N

Predator

1955

Autonomous Control Levels

Pioneer

1965 1975 1985 1995 2005 2015 2025

Global Hawk

AF UCAV

UCAR

Fully Autonomous Swarms

Group Strategic Goals

Distributed Control

Group Tactical Goals

Group Tactical Replan

Group Coordination

Adapt to Failures & Flight Conditions

Real Time Health/Diagnosis

Remotely Guided

Onboard Route Replan

10

9

8

7

6

5

4

3

2

1

UCAV-N

Predator

FIGURE A-5: AUTONOMOUS CAPABILITY LEVELS (ACLS). 

b. Ground Station C3: As the capabilities of the air vehicles continue to improve; 

the capability of the command and control infrastructure needs to keep pace. 

There are several key aspects of the off-board C2 infrastructure that are being 

addressed: a) man-machine interfaces, b) multi-vehicle C3, c) target 

identification, weapons allocation and weapons release. The location of the C3 

system can be on the ground, aboard ship or airborne. The functions to be 

accomplished are independent of the location. 

UAVs hold the promise of reduced O&S costs compared to manned 

aircraft. There are no savings by simply moving the man from the cockpit to the 

offboard C3 station. There needs to be some leverage. This is an 

oversimplification of the total C3 crew required. This crew also needs to account 

for the sensor system operator/weapons release authority, often a communications 

officer and sometimes a mission commander. The reduction to practice of 

performing multi-vehicle operations is in its infancy. The increased capabilities 

of the air vehicles may finally enable routine operations. One of the difficult 

issues being addressed is how the operator interacts with the air vehicle(s): what 

information is presented to him during normal operations and what additional 

information is presented if an emergency occurs. Advanced interfaces are being 

explored in the DARPA UCAV programs. To date, the C3 stations being 

developed are aimed more at the test environment than the operational 

environment. The advanced interfaces take advantage of force feedback and aural 

cues to provide additional situational awareness to the system operators. 

84
UAV Roadmap 2002 – Appendix A 

Platforms 

 OSD platform goals 

• Development of a robust combustion HFE program targeting performance 

for tactical/theater UAVs. 

• Reduce wing and fuselage costs through incorporation of state of the art 

commercial composite molding technology. 

• Develop technology solutions for high speed, anti-access UAV systems. 

• Develop and field a low cost tactical unmanned strike/SEAD platform by the 

end of the decade. 

• Develop and field a low cost tactical unmanned airborne electronic attack 

platform by FY08. 

85

UAV Roadmap 2002 – Appendix B 

Sensors 

Appendix B: Sensors

Overview 

Sensors are increasingly becoming the pacing item for the cost of unmanned 

vehicles dedicated to ISR. As sensors grow more complex, sophisticated, and 

specialized, it becomes critically important to take steps to control cost growth as well as 

to efficiently plan future sensor payloads that take advantage of commonality wherever 

possible. 

Commonality at the high valued subcomponent level, such as focal arrays or 

receive/transmit elements for radar systems, can help to reduce overall sensor costs by 

increasing the quantity buys of these critical, often high cost items. Where actual sensors 

cannot be made common, data format standards can minimize the redundancy of ground 

stations and data exploitations workstations. OSD is keenly interested that the services 

take steps to maximize the return on investment that new generation sensors represent. 

At the same time, new and in some cases mature technology offer the opportunity 

to simplify the task of gathering intelligence while improving throughput. The current 

ISR ground infrastructure copes well with day-to-day tasking but would be severely 

strained to support multiple simultaneous global conflicts. Innovative sensors and 

software offer ways of multiplying the capabilities of the current exploitation architecture 

and manpower while enabling collection that is not possible today – through forest 

canopies and visual obscuration, for instance. It is the intent of OSD to work with the 

Services to introduce this new technology as it matures while keeping sensor costs in 

check through coordinated development and acquisition plus adherence to common 

standards. 

This appendix considers sensor technologies that will mature over the next 25 

years and will offer promise for UAV applications. In the near term, many of these 

sensors may also find use on manned platforms – the most highly capable imaging and 

signals sensors in use on aircraft today are all on manned platforms. In most cases, 

though, there is nothing unique to the sensor that limits its use to either manned or 

unmanned aircraft. This appendix also accounts for enabling technologies that will allow 

UAVs to fully exploit current and emerging sensor capabilities. Finally, this appendix 

will set out OSD goals for the sensor area. 

Mission Areas 

Broad Area Reconnaissance. This refers both to imaging broad areas, as 

reflected in the HAE UAV goal of imaging 40,000 NM2

, as well as the ability to range 

over a large area on a single mission, while imaging only selected targets. A subset of 

this mission area is the need for synoptic coverage, instantaneous imaging of a broad area 

at the same time. 

Denied Area Reconnaissance. Information collection in areas where permission 

to overfly would be denied. 

Tactical Surveillance/Reconnaissance. Persistent coverage of a specific target 

of interest, or the need to find out what is just over the next hill. 

87
UAV Roadmap 2002 – Appendix B 

Sensors 

Moving Target Indicators for Surveillance/Battle Management. Air, ground, 

and maritime MTI are growing in importance as a battle management tool as well as a 

cueing system for high-resolution imagery. 

Intel Prep of the Battlefield. Pre-hostility information collection of an area 

where combat may occur. This is a “traditional” intelligence function involving 

collection of intelligence for a number of end purposes: targeting, force protection, troop 

training/mission planning, assessment of enemy center of gravity, and many others. 

Precision Guided Munitions Targeting. Specific sensor requirements for 

pointing and imaging accuracy to provide precise geocoordinates. 

Urban Surveillance/Reconnaissance. Observation of targets in an urban 

environment. Sensors designed for micro-UAVs are largely geared toward this mission; 

other technologies, such as multiple-look Light Detection and Ranging (LIDAR), show 

promise. 

Force Protection. Tasks include perimeter surveillance/defense, chem/bio agent 

detection, and target identification. Hyperspectral imaging and broad field of view video 

on long dwell aerial vehicles are potential sensor contributors. 

Chemical/Biological Agent Detection and Identification. One of the most 

promising potential missions for specialized HSI sensors, either in passive mode or in 

conjunction with a laser. Also a possible use for a disposable UAV with on-board 

detection sensors. This mission is tailored to the advantages of a UAV over a manned 

aircraft. 

Battle Damage Assessment. Requires high resolution imagery, preferably nearreal-time, in a hostile environment. 

Homeland Defense. An emerging mission area requiring broad area, long dwell 

surveillance, and specialized sensors aimed at detection weapons of mass destruction. 

Battlefield Simulation/Rehearsal. Specialized task requiring highly accurate 

digital terrain mapping. Challenges include not only accurate measurement but short 

time span between tasking and production. Digital maps of sufficient fidelity for mission 

rehearsals are highly perishable and must be updated immediately prior to use. 

Existing Sensors 

Most current sensor programs are either flying on manned platforms, or are on a 

mix of manned and unmanned vehicles. Since there is very little that makes a sensor 

inherently “manned” or “unmanned”, this section contains both types. Very large, 

complex sensors flying on dedicated multiengine aircraft are not considered. 

Video/Electro-Optic/Infrared (EO/IR) Sensors: 

• Video: AF Predator and Army Hunter use real-time video systems mounted in 

turrets, derivatives of commercial products. The Air Force is integrating laser 

target designators/illuminators into Predator video systems, as the Army is 

planning to do with TUAV. Current Predator video (Wescam) typically provides 

NIIRS 5-6 in visual and NIIRS 4-5 in IR at close range . 

• Global Hawk Integrated Sensor Suite (ISS) electro-optic sensor: The ISS consists 

of a SAR imaging radar and an EO/IR sensor, both produced by Raytheon 

88
UAV Roadmap 2002 – Appendix B 

Sensors 

Electro-Optic Systems. The narrow-FOV camera produces an image by stitching 

together many small frames (“chips”). The EO/IR sensor is capable of NIIRS 6.5 

at nadir. 

• Senior Year Electro-optical Reconnaissance System (SYERS 2), formerly SYERS 

P3I: The electro-optic sensor carried by the U-2. A high resolution line scanning 

camera with a 7-band multispectral capability is in production and is projected to 

become operational in late FY02. 

• Advanced EO/IR UAV Sensor: A high resolution, highly stabilized EO/IR sensor 

being developed for Army UAVs by the Army’s Night Vision Electronic Sensors 

Directorate. It consists of a multi field-of-view sensor that will provide greater 

standoff ranges and a highly stabilized gimbal that allows for an increase in the 

area of coverage. Its all digital output is JTA compliant and allows for ground 

processing tools, such as Airborne Video Surveillance. It is being evaluated for 

incorporation into the Army’s UAV program. 

Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR): 

• Advanced Synthetic Aperture Radar System (ASARS 2A): Dedicated U-2 

imaging SAR radar, capable of 1 foot resolution. 

• Global Hawk ISS radar: A partially common system with ASARS 2A, tailored for 

use on Global Hawk. Capable of spot, search, and Ground Moving Target 

Indicator (GMTI) modes; resolution to 1 foot. 

• Lynx: A tactical radar, with a limited deployment on manned aircraft, is to be 

evaluated on the Predator B. The Lynx radar has a resolution of 4 inches in the 

spotlight mode, and provides GMTI and coherent change detection capabilities. 

• TESAR: Tactical Endurance Synthetic Aperture Radar (TESAR) is a strip 

mapping SAR providing continuous 1 foot resolution imagery. TESAR is flown 

on Predator. A total of 66 radar systems have been produced and delivered. 

• Tactical UAV Radar (TUAVR): A 63 pound Tactical SAR/MTI radar for use on 

Army’s UAVs. Provides 1 foot resolution imagery in strip and spotlight modes 

and an integrated MTI capability with minimum discernable velocities of greater 

than 2 meters per second. The radar has been demonstrated on Hunter UAV. 

Signals Intelligence (SIGINT): 

The High Band Subsystem (HBSS) is designed as the high band portion of the 

Joint SIGINT Avionics Family (JSAF). HBSS was successful where the low band 

subsystem was terminated in development. HBSS is not operational but will form part of

future high altitude SIGINT systems. 

Wet Film: 

The U-2 maintains a medium resolution wet film capability with the Optical Bar 

Camera. Advantages of wet film include very high information density and releasibility 

to non-DoD users. Broad area synoptic coverage is still the exclusive purview of wet 

film systems; without efficient digital mass storage devices, electronic sensors do not 

89
UAV Roadmap 2002 – Appendix B 

Sensors 

have the ability to capture imagery of broad areas nearly instantaneously, as wet film can. 

Primary drawbacks to wet film are the lack of a near-real-time capability and the 

extensive processing facility needs. Improvements to film processing recently have 

drastically reduced the requirements for purified water, and the post-processing 

hazardous material disposal problem, but it still poses a requirement for specialized 

ground handling equipment. 

Emerging Technologies 

Multispectral/Hyperspectral Imagery (MSI/HSI). Multispectral (tens of

bands) and hyperspectral (hundreds of bands) imagery combine the attributes of 

panchromatic sensors to form a literal image of a target with the ability to extract more 

subtle information. Commercial satellite products (such as Land Remote-Sensing 

Satellite (LANDSAT) or Systeme pour l’Observation de La Terre (SPOT)) have made 

multispectral data a mainstay of civil applications, with resolution on the order of meters 

or tens of meters. Systems designed for military applications are beginning to be tested 

and in some cases fielded. Military applications of HSI technology provide the promise 

for an ability to detect and identify particulates of chemical or biological agents. Passive 

HSI imaging of aerosol clouds could provide advance warning of an unconventional 

attack. The obvious application for this technology is in the area of battlefield 

reconnaissance as well as homeland defense. Though this technology is less mature than 

HSI as an imaging system, it should none the less be pursued as a solution to an urgent 

national requirement. HSI also provides an excellent counter to common camouflage, 

concealment, and denial (CCD) tactics used by adversaries. 

Presently, the U-2’s SYERS 2 is the only operational airborne military multispectral sensor, providing 7 bands of visual and infrared imagery at high resolution. A 

prototype hyperspectral imager, the Spectral Infrared Remote Imaging Transition Testbed 

(SPIRITT), is in work at the Air Force Research Laboratory. This sensor is intended for 

testing on larger high altitude platforms such as Global Hawk, but could also be carried 

on Predator B. 

The Army’s Night Vision and Electronic Sensors Directorate (NVESD) is 

preparing to demonstrate a TUAV-class EO/IR sensor with minor modifications to give it 

multispectral capability. In addition, NVESD is developing the daytime Compact Army

Spectral Sensor (COMPASS) and the day/night Hyperspectral Longewave Imager for the 

Tactical Environment (HyLITE) specifically for UAV platforms at the brigade and 

division level. 

The Naval Research Laboratory (NRL) had developed the WAR HORSE 

visible/near-infrared hyperspectral sensor system, which has been demonstrated on the 

Predator UAV. More recently NRL had developed a complementary short-wave-infrared 

hyperspectral sensor and has demonstrated the sensor on a UAV surrogate platform

(Twin Otter). Other short- and long-wave infrared hyperspectral sensors are currently 

under development to provide a high-altitude stand-off capability for larger manned and 

unmanned platforms. The Department believes that hyperspectral imagery offer 

enormous promise and follows these programs with great interest. 

HSI Phenomenology/Ground Truth. Civil and commercial work with multiand hyperspectral imagery has built a phenomenology library that will greatly simplify 

introduction of these sensors onto manned and unmanned aircraft. Some data already 

90
UAV Roadmap 2002 – Appendix B 

Sensors 

exists in open or commercial venues to build characterization databases in anticipation of

the sensors coming online over the next decade. Using products available now and in the 

near future, the department encourages the services to characterize areas of interest with a 

view toward optimizing spectral band selection of dedicated military sensors. This 

intelligence product represents an area in which characterization of the data will be 

significantly more challenging that just building and operating the sensor. 

SAR Enhancements. SAR improvements are changing the nature of the product 

from simply an image or an MTI map to more detailed information on a target vehicle or 

battlefield. Current SAR systems can perform limited coherent change detection, 

showing precise changes in a terrain scene between images. Use of phase data can 

improve resolution without requiring upgrades to the SAR transmitter or antenna, through 

data manipulation with advanced algorithms. These and other advanced SAR techniques 

require access to the full video phase history data stream. To take full advantage of them, 

UAVs must plan on either wide-band real time data links allowing ground processing of 

the signal, or extensive on-board processing capability. Size and weight constraints 

mitigate toward increasing processing power on the ground and moving data off the 

vehicle at the high rates necessary (on the order of 274Mbps). While modern intelligence 

collection places a premium on real-time data availability, on-board mass storage of data 

could at least allow post-mission application of advanced data handling procedures 

requiring full phase history information. 

The Multi-Platform Radar Technology Insertion Program (MP-RTIP) should 

result in more capable SAR Active Electronically Steered Antenna (AESA) within this 

decade. Larger UAVs, such as Global Hawk for the Air Force and potentially for the 

Navy’s Broad Area Maritime Surveillance role, are one intended recipient of this 

technology. AESA permits mission expansion into an air surveillance role, as air-to-air 

operations is easily accomplished using AESA technology. Combined with conformal 

antennas, large AESA-based SAR systems may be able to achieve greater imaging and 

MTI capabilities as well as more specialized missions such as single pass interferometric 

SAR. 

UHF/VHF Foliage Penetration (FOPEN). There are a number of technology 

efforts to solve the Targets-Under-Trees (TUT) problem. One approach is dual-band 

radar, using VHF wavelengths to cue a UHF radar for more precise target identification. 

DARPA, since 1997, has sponsored an advanced, dual-band FOPEN SAR development. 

DARPA and MIT/Lincoln Labs have participated in joint evaluations of this radar 

system. After FY02, which is the last funded year of DARPA development, the AFRL’s 

TUT program takes over the dual-band effort and will work to further mature this 

technology. 

Light Detection And Ranging (LIDAR). Use of LIDAR is another method that 

offers the possibility of imaging through forest canopy. In current and projected tests, an 

imaging LIDAR sensor on an aircraft takes several fore-and-aft cuts at a given area of 

interest as the vehicle moves, allowing the sensor to “integrate” an image over time. 

Initial coverage rates are far less than typical SAR or EO capabilities, but planned 

systems at this point are for demonstration purposes only. 

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LIDAR Imaging. LIDAR may be used to image through an obscuration as well. 

By using a precision short laser pulse and capturing only the first photons to return, a 

LIDAR image can be formed despite the presence of light-to-moderate cloud cover, dust, 

or haze. Imaging through moderate or greater obscuration (clouds greater than 200 feet 

thick) attenuates the outgoing laser pulse by a factor of about 10-4. LIDAR can be used to 

simultaneously image through cloud and foliage, with greater attenuation (equating to 

even lower coverage rates). Currently in demonstration, this appears promising at least 

for specialized reconnaissance tasking. 

LIDAR Aerosol Illumination. The task of detecting and identifying chemical or 

biological agents can be aided with active LIDAR illumination of the target area. 

Exciting a particulate or gas cloud with a laser simplifies the “fingerprinting” necessary 

to identify the specific substance. Used in conjunction with a hyperspectral imager, 

LIDAR can provide faster and more precise identification.

SIGINT Way Ahead. With the failure of the Joint SIGINT Avionics Family 

program to produce a low band subsystem, a future SIGINT architecture is in doubt. The 

high band subsystem is producible and effective, and will form the backbone of near term

electronic intelligence systems. Efforts to consolidate low band system development are 

underway and should result in airborne platforms sharing data via standard data formats, 

using equipment tailored to the specific platform’s capabilities and mission needs. In the 

near term, federated systems, developed to add specific capabilities to manned aircraft, 

will be used to provide an initial SIGINT capability on UAVs such as Global Hawk. 

These “clip-in” systems, primarily developed by/for NSA, have been successfully 

employed on platforms such as the U-2 and RC-135 Rivet Joint. A loose federation of 

these “clip-ins” coupled with an ESM suite such as the LR-100, demonstrated on Global 

Hawk as part of the Australian TANDEM THRUST exercise, can provide the basis of an 

interim capability until a low band alternative is developed. A primary task for SIGINT 

on UAVs such as Global Hawk will be cross cueing the on-board imagery sensors. 

The Army is presently developing the Division TUAV SIGINT Payload (DTSP), 

a payload for inclusion on the Extended Range/Multi-Purpose (ER/MP) UAV. The 

ER/MP will be capable of carrying a payload of 200-300lbs and have the ability to stay 

airborne for 10 hours. The primary mission of DTSP will be to rapidly map radio 

frequency (RF) emitters on the battlefield to increase the commander’s situational 

awareness. These emitter locations will then be used to cue other ISR sensors in order to 

reduce their search times. The DTSP could provide a QRC capability on a surrogate 

Hunter UAV in FY04 to support a Brigade Combat team. 

In the longer term, the Army is developing tactical SIGINT payloads that will 

give the TUAV and smaller vehicles capability against specific targets. Rather than an 

all-encompassing system that weighs hundreds of pounds and requires electrical power 

far beyond the ability of a small vehicle to provide, the TUAV packages will be 

optimized for specific emitters or roles such as direction-finding. Cost, complexity, and 

most of all requirements growth on past SIGINT programs have posed major obstacles 

for new SIGINT sensor development as well as major upgrades to legacy systems over 

the past decade. The Army’s efforts to carefully limit the scope of systems designed for 

smaller UAVs represent the right approach to making SIGINT a key part of the UAV 

mission area. 

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Nuclear Detection Systems. Use of endurance UAVs outfitted with nuclear 

material detectors could play a key role in homeland defense over the next 25 years. 

Depending on the characteristics of the detection systems, either an aerostat or a Global 

Hawk-like long dwell aircraft could be the host platform. The department strongly 

supports work to develop and refine these detectors, with an emphasis on increased 

sensitivity and long-range effectiveness. 

Enabling Technologies 

HDTV Video Format. High definition television (HDTV) is becoming the 

industry standard format for video systems of the type flown on Department of Defense 

tactical and medium altitude endurance UAVs. The Joint Technical Architecture (JTA) 

specifies that motion video systems should be based upon digital standards, to date, no 

fielded system complies. HDTV standards represent a fundamental shift in video 

technology – from an interlaced image, where a scene is scanned in two, temporally 

separate steps and recombined to form a full image, to a progressive scanning and display 

process, where an entire scene is scanned and reproduced in one step. Progressive 

scanning eliminates temporal skewing and is the underpinning to advanced video 

processing techniques. Initial analysis indicates that moving to the HDTV specified 

formats and compression methods will result in an increase of about 2 NIIRS in image 

quality as compared to the current Predator A sensor, for example, when displayed to the 

video analyst. SHADOW is projected to field with a JTA compliant sensor. While 

digital sensors have historically been large and expensive, technology has significantly 

improved options in both of these areas. For example, the Army Night Vision lab 

recently demonstrated a 480p focal array in an 11 inch turret, suitable for employment on 

a vehicle the size of the SHADOW 200. Establishment of a common format allows 

COTS interoperability and insures that ground terminals will be able to interpret video 

data regardless of the vehicle providing that data. Equally as important, using a digital 

format reduces the deleterious effects of repeated image conversion from analog to digital 

and back along the image exploitation chain, improving over all image quality at the 

receiving station. Currently, fielded video systems and data transfer protocols are not 

standardized; many are proprietary systems that are not interoperable. In addition, the 

increased amount of data generated by a digital video system may require additional 

bandwidth to move the data from the vehicle. Data compression and innovative data 

transmission techniques will need to be explored, and impacts to existing 

communications architectures and allocated spectrum and bandwidths will also need to 

be considered and addressed.

HDTV related sensors will significantly improve not only the timeliness of PGMquality coordinate generation (GRIDLOCK (OSD)/RAINDROP (NIMA)) but the quality 

of the data as well. OSD GOAL: Services will initiate (continue) digital video sensor 

demonstration efforts in FY05 with a goal of migrating this capability to the field by 

FY08. A limited operational capability is desired by the end of FY05.

Focal Plane Array Technology. Small and micro UAVs place a premium on 

high performance components that make as little demand as possible on power, weight 

and volume. The commercial market for focal plane arrays in consumer goods has 

increased vastly over the last three years; the top-of-the-line digital cameras were only 

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recently reaching the megapixel mark, and now routinely offer 5 megapixel devices as 

well as handheld digital video recorders. 

While commercial products may emphasize only some of the spectral bands of 

interest for military applications, the trend toward more capable systems requiring less 

battery power and fitting into handheld cameras can only benefit the department. The 

services should expect vendors to capitalize on this trend and work to insure that military 

needs (such as infrared sensitivity, environmental tolerance, and ruggedness) are 

represented wherever possible. 

Digitally based (single conversion on the array) technology significantly improves 

the quality of the information in the data chain, eliminating image degradation from

repeated analog-digital-analog conversions. For this reason, multispectral versions of 

digital focal arrays are critical. Additionally, common focal arrays between 

sensors/platforms are desirable. OSD GOAL: Services (labs) will initiate digital 

multispectral still/video focal array programs in FY04 with the goal of 

demonstrating a Predator class digital IR system within 3 years. 

Flexible Conformal Antennas. There are numerous commercial and 

government programs to develop affordable conformal SAR antennas for use on a variety 

of aircraft. Their eventual availability will allow UAVs to more effectively use onboard 

payload space; currently, a SAR antenna (Mechanically-Steered Antenna (MSA) or 

Electronically-Steered Antenna (ESA)) may be the core parameter around which the rest 

of the aircraft, manned or unmanned, is designed. Conformal antennas will allow larger 

apertures using the aircraft’s skin. Agile antennas will be able to perform more than one 

function, so a single antenna (covering a large portion of the vehicle’s exterior) can serve 

the datalink needs as well as acting as imaging radar. On larger vehicles like Global 

Hawk, conformal antennas mounted near the wingtips will enable single pass 

interferometric SAR data collection, leading to swift production of precise digital terrain 

maps.

Sensor Autonomy. One of the key attributes that some UAVs offer is very long 

endurance, much longer than is practical for manned aircraft. While it may be possible to 

maintain 24 hour battlefield surveillance with a single vehicle, the system will only reach 

its full potential when it is doing part of the work of the intelligence processing facility to 

alleviate manpower needs. A number of image/signal processing and network 

collaborative technology developments will facilitate the ability to automate sensor 

operation, at first partially and over time leading to nearly total sensor autonomy. 

Current operations for large ISR platforms – Global Hawk and the U-2, for 

instance – focus on collection of a preplanned target deck, with the ability to retarget 

sensors in flight for ad hoc collection. This is suitable for today’s architecture, but 

proliferation of UAVs with a range of different capabilities will stress the exploitation 

system beyond its limits. Long dwell platforms will allow users to image/target a 

collection deck initially and then loiter over the battlefield looking and listening for 

targets that meet a predetermined signature of interest. While automatic target 

recognition algorithms have not yet demonstrated sufficient robustness to supplant 

manned exploitation, automatic target cueing (ATC) has demonstrated great utility. OSD 

strongly encourages the Services to invest in operationalizing ATC in emerging UAV 

sensor tasking and exploitation. Sensor modes that search for targets autonomously that 

meet characteristics in a target library, or that have changed since the time of last 

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observation, or that exhibit contrast with surroundings can be used to cue an operator for 

close examination. Advances in computer processing power and on-board memory have 

made and will continue to make greater autonomy possible. In a similar fashion, 

different sensor systems on board a single vehicle may also be linked, or fused, in order 

to assist in the target determination problem. Combing sensor products in novel ways 

using advanced processing systems on board the vehicle will help solve the sensor 

autonomy problem as well. 

Smaller UAVs operating with minimal datalinks, or in swarms, need this ability 

even more. The ability to flood a battlespace with unmanned collection systems demands 

autonomous sensor operation to be feasible. While the carriage of multiple sensors on a 

single, small UAV is problematic, networks of independent sensors on separate platforms 

that can determine the most efficient allocation of targets need to be able to find, 

provisionally identify, and then collect definitive images to alert exploiters when a target 

has been found with minimal if any human initiative. The desired end state will be 

achieved when manned exploitation stations – whether a single special forces operator or 

a full Deployable Ground Station (DGS) – are first informed of a target of interest when a 

sensor web provides an image along with PGM quality coordinates. This technology is 

available currently, and needs to be applied to this particular task – which will involve a 

radical change in ground exploitation infrastructure and mindset, akin to the change in 

taking a man out of the cockpit.

Air Vehicle Autonomy. Along with sensor autonomy, swarming UAVs will 

require the ability to self-navigate and self-position to collect imagery and signals 

efficiently. While air vehicle autonomy is dealt with elsewhere in the Roadmap, it is 

identified here as critical to fully exploit sensor capabilities and keep costs and personnel 

requirements to a minimum.

Lightweight, Efficient Power Supplies. In the near term, UAVs will be more 

power limited than manned aircraft, particularly in the smaller size classes. Every 

component of the aircraft, sensor and data link strives for small size, weight, and power 

consumption. For micro-UAVs, batteries with high power/weight ratios are important to 

maximize sensor capability and endurance. Larger aircraft need to extract power from

the engine to generate AC and DC power for sensor and data link operation. Industry is 

encouraged to refine methods of drawing power from the engine to reduce mechanical 

inefficiencies and losses with traditional airframe-mounted electrical and hydraulic drive 

systems. Services should consider power requirements, including prudent margin to 

allow future sensor and mission growth and total power generated as a fraction of system

weight, when developing unmanned vehicles.

Lightweight Optics and Support Structures. In keeping with the need to 

reduce vehicle weight, lightweight optics and optical support structure will enable small 

vehicles to carry the best possible EO/IR sensors. The use of composite materials for 

optical enclosures results in very stiff but light sensor housings that are capable of 

maintaining tight tolerances over a range of temperatures and operating conditions. 

Optical elements themselves must also be designed for low weight. This becomes more 

important in larger sensors with multiple glass elements; even in medium to large UAVs 

such as Predator B and Global Hawk, EO/IR sensor characteristics can limit the ability to 

carry multiple payloads simultaneously. Contractors have put a great deal of work into 

reducing optical sensor weight; the Services should capitalize on this work by adapting 

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existing sensors for new vehicle applications wherever possible, to avoid the costly 

solution of sensors designed for single vehicle applications. 

Ultra lightweight materials are also becoming available that can be used on board 

UAVs to enhance sensor operation. In particular, aerogels for vibration isolation and 

damping offer a way to improve sensor resolution and range with very low weight 

penalty. The combination of stiff, lightweight structure with effective isolation from

airframe vibration will give much greater capability to video and EO/IR sensors on small 

and medium platforms, which in turn will improve vehicle survivability by allowing 

greater standoff ranges. 

Communication. Data links that are designed for small vehicle applications are 

already proliferating in US and foreign UAV systems. Israel in particular has long 

recognized the need for effective line-of-sight and beyond-line-of-sight real time links to 

make effective use of sensor data from UAVs. Data links are dealt with extensively 

elsewhere in the roadmap, but the importance of a family of small communications 

packages using the standard CDL interface must be emphasized specifically as a sensor 

enabler. 

In addition to the need for smaller tactical data links, large vehicles carrying 

sophisticated sensors will need high capacity CDL standard links, particularly in overthe-horizon roles. Current data capacities of 274 Mbps are stressed when carrying 

multiple sensors simultaneously. Classes of sensors that particularly tax links are radar 

imagers when full phase history is sent to a ground station for post processing, and 

multispectral sensors with high resolution and wide fields of view. Hyperspectral data 

has the potential to vastly outstrip current data rates provided over existing links and most 

satellite and ground communication networks. If all (or many) bands of hyperspectral 

data must be downlinked, there will be no ability to operate any other sensors on the 

vehicle in near-real-time. Data rates in excess of 1 Gbps, using other than RF links 

(specifically laser communication), will be needed to exploit sensor capabilities, as well 

as to reduce RF spectrum saturation, in the near term. 

Swarms of UAVs carry additional communications needs. Effective distributed 

operations require a battlefield network of sensor-to-sensor, sensor-to-shooter, and UAVto-UAV communications to allocate sensor targets and priorities and to position vehicles 

where needed. While the constellation of sensors and vehicles needs to be visible to 

operators, human oversight of a large number of UAVs operating in combat must be 

reduced to the minimum necessary to prosecute the information war. Automated target 

search and recognition will transfer initiative to the air vehicles, and a robust, anti-jam

communications network that protects against hostile reception of data is a crucial 

enabler of UAV swarming.

Mass Data Storage. Onboard storage of sensor data in the terabyte class should 

be a goal to exploit manned and unmanned sensor data. Storage of complex imagery or 

phase history of radar data onboard can substitute for the extremely wideband data links 

required for near-real-time relay. Similarly, storage of the full output of a hyperspectral 

sensor will allow transmission of selected bands during a mission and full exploitation of

data post-mission. The stored data is crucial in building an HSI phenomenology database 

to select the right diagnostic bands in the first place. 

The goal for onboard mass data storage should be to replicate the capability of 

wet film for broad area synoptic coverage. Current medium resolution film cameras 

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operating at high altitude can image over 60,000 square kilometers in stereo on a single 

mission of a few hours, a capability unequalled by airborne digital sensors at this time. 

This storage capability should be possible in the mid to far term and would result in the 

elimination of wet film and its processing infrastructure. 

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Communication 

Appendix C: Communication 

Purpose 

The purpose of this annex is to provide a broad outline of the required 

communications architectures necessary to support UAV operations in the near-term

(FY10), and to lay the groundwork for the migration of these architectures to the 

Transformational Communications System after FY10. This appendix will also identify 

and describe actions needed to correct near-term (FYDP) shortfalls in satisfying the 

current communication requirements of the ISR family of UAVS -- tactical, medium, and 

high altitude -- as well as emerging UCAVs. Finally many of the aspects of UAV 

communications require protection at levels above this document. A classified 

Communications appendix is in work and is planned to be available at the beginning of 

FY04 providing additional detail. 

Near-Term Architecture 

The near-term communications architecture supporting DoD’s UAV systems 

consists of 3 independent but mutually supporting capabilities. 

1. Line-of-Sight (LOS) capabilities: All DoD UAV systems employ some form of LOS 

capabilities. Currently these exist in several different and non-interoperable 

frequencies and waveform standards. Data-rate range from a few Mb/s to greater 

than 250Mb/s. All DoD tactical and larger UAVs will migrate to the DoD Common 

Data Link (CDL) standard for LOS operations. 

2. Narrow Band Beyond Line-of-Sight (NB-BLOS): Narrow-Band BLOS is defined as 

data-rates below 1 Mb/s and generally support platform and sensor C2. Various 

MILSATCOM and Commercial SATCOM systems and formats are currently in use. 

All DoD UAVs utilizing NB-BLOS will support voice and data DAMA capability. 

3. Wide-Band Beyond Line-of-Sight (WB-BLOS): Defined as data-rates above 1 Mb/s. 

This capability is supported by both Government SATCOM and Commercial 

SATCOM. Commercial SATCOM are generally limited to data-rates less than 50 

Mb/s. 

1. Systems requiring data-rates greater than 50 Mb/s will be required to interface 

with Government SATCOM capability. 

2. Systems requiring less than 50 Mb/s can be supported by either Commercial 

SATCOM or Government/MILSATCOM. It is envisions that most DoD UAV 

system will find it beneficial to use Government/MILSATCOM as the 

primary provider of service. 

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Future Direction 

In order to achieve the Department’s goal of decision dominance throughout the 

Joint Force, it must build an integrated network, populate the network with data, develop 

command and control to exploit the network, and protect the network. The roadmap 

provided herein emphasizes building wide bandwidth connectivity of UAVs to the 

network. This will support a Joint ISR “system-of-systems” by improving capabilities to 

provide information in near-real-time through the network to operational forces. 

Transformation Communications System components including Lasercom satellites, 

when launched, must be able to support laser crosslinking within their own constellation 

and relay other sources generating high data rates. The long-term goal should be laser for 

all high data rate links (>50Mbs). A migration plan to move from RF to laser is required. 

Data that is exfiltrated from ISR sensors through a storage and Lasercom architecture will 

be routed on the backbone, brought to the ground and delivered to processing centers. 

The link to a theater for dissemination would be over terrestrial or laser backbone in an 

I/P format, based on user pull. Direct downlink (from the Lasercom relay satellites to 

Theater) of these extremely high data rates will not provide the primary data exfiltration 

path. Gateways from Laser to traditional RF transport need to be defined however, high 

altitude UAVs appear to be an ideal platform for this function. There may be a role for 

airborne nodes that concentrate communications from other sources for (laser) uplink to 

the Lasercom satellites. An ACN would generally remain far enough behind the front 

lines to avoid most direct attacks, high enough to provide information to the forward line 

of troops, and would be integrated into the Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS), followon radio concepts and the Global Information Grid (GIG) as a whole. 

Current Documented Communications Requirements 

TABLE C-1: CURRENT DOCUMENTED SPACE AND AIRBORNE SYSTEMS AND THEIR DATA RATE

REQUIREMENTS. 

Collection System Individual Data Rate (Mbps) 

Global Hawk 548 

U-2 548 

Predator 44.7

Rivet Joint 10.7 

Joint Stars 10.7 

Combat Sent 10.7 

SBR 10.7 

Cobra Ball 10.7 

TABLE C-2: THE TOTAL MILSATCOM (2010) DATA RATE CAPABILITY FOR BEYOND LINE OF 

SIGHT COMMUNICATIONS FROM WHICH UAVS WOULD COMPETE. 

Estimated Throughput for MILSATCOM Systems (2010) 

SATCOM System Number of Satellite Operational Max. System data rate (Mbps) 

DSCS/SLEP 4 800

WGS 6 15,000

AEHF 4 1,000

MUOS 6 0.039

Totals ~ 97,300

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Communication 

Tactical ISR UAVs 

TUAV ORD, HQ DA (Nov 2001): The threshold DL shall be the Tactical 

Common Data Link (TCDL). BLOS and Non-Line-Of-Site (NLOS) Data Link will be 

air-to-air relay through one TUAV (Relay) to a second TUAV (Mission) and satellite 

communications to 200 km (Threshold), 300 km (Objective). The change to a SATCOM 

datalink for TUAV control will necessitate a change in the control station and data 

terminal. 

The TUAV will be capable of relaying VHF and UHF radio voice/data 

communications from the control station via TCDL through the TUAV to ATC/ATS 

agencies, AWACS, ABCCC and other manned or unmanned aircraft. 

Pioneer. The Pioneer UAV communications are currently supported by a duplex 

C-Band data link over the frequency range of 4,430 MHz to 4,940 MHz. The Pioneer 

Improvement Program (PIP) will migrate to a TCDL LOS data link for platform and 

sensor support. 

Fire Scout. TCDL is to be used as the primary datalink between the control 

station and the air vehicle in the VTUAV communications suite. It is a Ku-band, fullduplex, digital RF datalink that’s capable of downlinking 10.71 Mbps using the CDL 

legacy waveform as well as uplinking 200 kbps in spread-spectrum format. 

UHF is to be used as the secondary datalink utilizing ARC-210 UHF/VHF radios. 

The secondary link operates between 225 to 399.975 MHz (FM).

Shadow. Shadow uses a C-band FM link for C2 and imagery downlink. This link 

will be replaced by a TCDL configuration, currently under development to support the 

challenging Shadow SWAP constraints, and support operation in the CDL Ku-band at the 

200 Kbps command and 10.71 Mbps return link rates. To be compatible with other 

Tactical UAVs, the system threshold bandwidth for the data uplink (Ground Data 

Terminal to the air vehicle) shall be 50 KHz (the objective is 200 Khz). The downlink 

shall have a minimum bandwidth of 18 MHz (threshold). 

Small Unmanned Aerial Vehicle. The threshold data link requirements are that it 

is non-secure, provides a line of site data link from the controlling location to the air 

vehicle and be capable of simultaneous transmission and reception of command uplink 

and sensor/air vehicle telemetry downlink using discrete, selectable frequencies.

Medium Altitude ISR UAV (Predator). Predator currently uses an analog CBand LOS primary link at 20 MHz bandwidth for launch and recovery operations. Once 

airborne and established in normal flight operations, Predator switches to leased 

wideband commercial Ku-Band SATCOM for primary link BLOS operations. C2 data 

rates are 200 Kbps forward, and include voice channels for ATC coordination. Sensor 

data rates are normally 3.2 Mbps return. 

The current Predator requirement listed in the Satellite Data Base (SDB) is 10.7 

Mbps thru 2020. As sensor technology matures, Predator is expected to receive a hyperspectral capability and the required data rate could grow to as much as 45 Mbps (a 

Tactical CDL – TCDL – data rate). Predator will migrate to TCDL primary LOS 

communications support by FY05. 

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High Altitude ISR UAVs. 

Global Hawk. Currently there are 3 Global Hawk requirements listed in the 

Satellite Data Base. The current IMINT entry requires 274 Mbps from 2004-2014. The 

current SIGINT entry requires 45 Mbps from 2010-2014. The current Multi-INT entry 

requires 548 Mbps in 2015 and beyond. The Global Hawk program is undergoing an 

effort to re-baseline the program. This new baseline program will have a payload 

configuration that includes an IMINT (EO/IR and SAR) and SIGINT capability 

configuration and a second configuration that is an MP-RTIP-only sensor payload. 

Global Hawk uses a UHF LOS 1-4.8 Kbps capability for launch and recovery 

operations. Normal C2 bandwidth is 200 Kbps and includes voice channels for ATC 

coordination. Once airborne and established in normal flight operations, Global Hawk 

can switch to SATCOM for BLOS C2. These C2 SATCOM options include UHF 

Military Satellite Communications (MILSATCOM), International Marine/Maritime 

Satellite (INMARSAT), or leased wideband commercial Ku-Band SATCOM. Global 

Hawk is currently not DAMA capable, and requires a complete 25 KHz UHF 

MILSATCOM channel. Global Hawk will receive a data only DAMA capability in 

2004. Global Hawk will upgrade to DAMA voice capability by FY05. 

Global Hawk currently transmits sensor data using either commercial Ku-band 

SATCOM for BLOS operations, or X-Band CDL for LOS operations. Commercial Kuband SATCOM data rates are currently fixed and selectable at 1.5, 8.58, 20, 30, 40, 47.9 

Mbps. Global Hawk will receive the ability to select any data rate (not just the above 

fixed data rate increments) later in 2003. Current X-band CDL data rates are selectable at 

10.7, 137, or 274 Mbps. 

Global Hawk will receive an Extended Tether Program (ETP) capability in 2003. 

While using ETP for sensor data, Global Hawk will still require SATCOM (UHF 

MILSATCOM or INMARSAT) for C2 of the air vehicle. Global Hawk will upgrade to 

full platform and sensor support with ETP by FY05. 

A hyper-spectral payload capability is expected to be developed for Global Hawk 

that will drive the data rate requirement to 548 Mbps and beyond. The Transformation 

Communications System is planned to migrate Global Hawk to laser communications 

capability. It is expected that data rates above 1 Gbps will be possible. 

Broad Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS). Navy requirements for BAMS being 

reviewed and are expected to range between 274 and 548 Mbps for both LOS and BLOS 

applications. 

Weaponized UAVs. 

 The estimated Air Force UCAV communications requirements are: 

 a. BLOS Communications: 

Near Term: Demand Assignment Multiple Access (DAMA) UHF Satellite 

Communication at 2-4 Kb/s. 

Mid Term: Once the airborne terminals are developed and available the UCAV 

system will use the MILSTAR Medium Data Rate (MDR) and High Data Rate 

(HDR) channels for transmitting SAR chips for targeting at 1 Mb/s. 

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Far Term: Once deployed the UCAV system will integrate with the 

Transfomational Communications System (TCS) for both Command and Control 

of the Air Vehicles and transmission of SAR data for targeting. 

 b. LOS Communications: 

The primary link for LOS control of the UCAV is Link 16. The back-up link is 

ARC-210. Intervehicle LOS communication will be accomplished with Link 16 

and in the future an Inter-Flight Data Link (IFDL) that supports stealthy 

platforms. 

The Navy’s UCAV-N potential requirements are: 

a. BLOS communications: Small AEHF transceiver capable of supporting single 

and multi-channel (wideband – approx 10-12 mbps) operations, commercial Kaband, CDL-N/TCDL (Ku band) for airborne relay, CAN – Adaptive 

Communications Node, MP-CDL (Multi-platform CDL) to support networked 

dissemination, Mil-Satellite DAMA UHF for back-up air vehicle C2, and 

VHF/UHF Voice Relay (for Air Traffic control). 

b. LOS Communications: CDL-N/TCDL direct link, MP-CDL network operations, 

LINK 16 (back-up link to ship, possible intra-flight data link), LPD/LPI/AJ 

Ka/UHF intra flight data link, and VHF/UHF C2 and voice relay. 

MQ-1B, the weaponized version of the current Predator RQ-1B, will employ 

TCDL capability as primary communication for LOS operations. 

Communications Capabilities 

For the purpose of planning, an acquisition strategy with linkage to the command 

and control required to operate a UAV in the broad categories of LOS and BLOS must be 

considered. BLOS communications for this roadmap shall be considered as being 

supplied through the use of satellite communications (SATCOM). 

Line of sight communications systems 

Narrowband Line of Sight. Current C-band LOS communications, used to launch 

and recover Predator, interferes with some foreign countries ground infrastructure 

communications networks due to differences in U.S. and foreign spectrum allocation and 

approval. 

Wideband Line of Sight. CDL is the DoD mandated family of wide-band data 

links used for full duplex, jam-resistant and point-to-point transmission of SIGINT and 

IMINT data to ground processing centers. CDL systems, built to common waveform

specifications, support high data rates and operate in the X and Ku-bands. MultiPlatform CDL (MP-CDL) is being developed for MP-RTIP applications which may 

include JSTARS, NATAR, Wide Area Surveillance (WAS), and Global Hawk, as well as 

Network-Centric Collaborative Targeting (NCCT) and other applications. 

Data link interoperability is accomplished through the use of specifications and 

standards. CDL systems fall into seven groups of CDL systems: 10.71 Mb/s through 274 

Mb/s and 2x and 4x CDL. 

103
UAV Roadmap 2002 – Appendix C 

Communication 

Support to Tactical UAVs. The Army's TUAV ORD requires TCDL, as do Fire 

Scout and the Pioneer Improvement Program. Both the Army and the CDL Program

Office are pursuing miniaturization of the TCDL for TUAV applications. 

Support to Medium Altitude UAVs. Predator has funded for integrating a TCDL 

capability for LOS use in lieu of the current C-band LOS communications. As 

previously mentioned, Current C-band LOS communications, used to launch and recover 

Predator, interferes with some foreign countries ground infrastructure communications 

networks. A TCDL capability for Predator LOS operations would resolve this conflict 

and provide Predator with additional communications options for operating in foreign 

countries. 

Support to High Altitude UAVs. The current Global Hawk LOS capability is a 

137 Mbps CDL. The program is migrating to full data rate, 274 Mbps, CDL at IOC. 

BLOS SATCOM. Satellite communications supporting UAV operations are 

provided through commercial providers and as well through government resources. 

SATCOM is used for the command and control of the aircraft when operating beyond 

line of sight as well as for providing the path for sensor data to be taken from the onboard 

sensor and delivered directly to a user or to be delivered to a network for additional 

processing and routing. SATCOM is characteristically in short supply and the demand 

grows exponentially each year. Both narrowband and wideband systems occupy different 

segments in the radio frequency spectrum, each segment having it's own capability for 

transmitting data as well as having it own sensitivity to environmental factors. These 

factors must be considered when selecting which radio spectrum segment is to be used to 

operate UAVs. 

Considerations for supply and demand are also important factors to consider in 

the UAV acquisition process. Commercial and MILSATCOM systems currently 

experience an enormous amount of pressure for more availability. 

Wideband

Gapfiller

Advanced

Wideband

System

SATCOM Capacity (GBPS)

Growing

Warfighter

Demands

199 2008

6

199

8

200

1

2004 2012

Shortfalls

2

6

15

DSCS AEHF

NOW

Growing demand will not

make the gap any better

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

Year

Throughput (

Gbps)

Wideband

Narrowband

Protected

Source: JCS/J6S Scenario V 6.0 (Dec 2000)

Combined Major 

Theater of War Satcom

Requirements

The DEMAND appears to be for wideband

 FIGURE C-1: SUPPLY & DEMAND. 

Commercial SATCOM. Commercial SATCOM is in short supply and even that 

may not be available during contingencies because of competing users. Because of 

market factors, commercial SATCOM assets are much fewer than were expected several 

104
UAV Roadmap 2002 – Appendix C 

Communication 

years ago plus bandwidth is limited on those assets that are available to DoD. 

Additionally, commercial Ku-band SATCOM coverage is not available over major 

portions of the planet (such as over the oceans, interior Africa, etc.). Since systems like 

Predator and Global Hawk can only operate BLOS where commercial Ku-band satellite 

coverage is available, this can be a limiting factor for operational employment. Although 

commercial coverage may exist over the specific area of interest, SATCOM transponders 

may already be leased and unavailable for DoD UAV use. The commercial SATCOM 

market place is competitive and currently there exists a spot and ad hoc market for the 

bandwidth commodity. The spot market for short-term bandwidth leasing is dynamic and 

therefore must be accounted for when choosing the type of SATCOM system a UAV 

must use. Furthermore, per international frequency allocation treaties, commercial Kuband SATCOM is not approved for “mobile subscriber use” (i.e., use by aircraft or 

UAV’s). 

MILSATCOM. Although reliant on commercial SATCOM resources in the near 

term, the replacement of military SATCOM systems fielded during the 1980s and 1990s 

has already begun to provide additional capacity needed to support not only combat 

forces, but also the UAV community. It should be recognized however, that a large 

percentage of these satellites will be allocated to existing tactical missions. Available 

capacity to support ISR missions remains very low at least for the near term and is the 

reason the Air Force is pursuing the Advanced Wideband System (AWS) as the future 

generation of wideband SATCOM. The system has been proposed to include high 

capacity RF frequencies like V-band or laser communication. The first AWS satellite is 

scheduled for launch in FY10 and fielding of a constellation of five satellites is predicted 

to occur around FY12. On this schedule however, AWS will be fielded too late to satisfy 

the fielding dates for the collection platforms shown previously but will be expected to 

satisfy many of the connectivity requirements UAVs will present beyond 2010. 

A bigger issue that needs to be addressed is the mismatch between the time it 

takes to deploy new MILSATCOM constellations with enhanced capabilities, and the 

time to conceive and develop new systems that generate the demand for these 

improvements. Because an increase in improved ISR systems are seen as key 

contributors to various operational needs (like rapid precision weapon delivery, for 

example), new initiatives (e.g., evolutionary improvements) in this area occur every one 

or two years. New SATCOM systems take five to seven years to reach the point of first 

launch of a new satellite. Consequently, at program initiation, the new SATCOM system

might meet requirements as initially envisioned, but would fall short by the time it is 

ready to deploy. 

There may be more utility in spacecraft that combine commercial C band and 

military X-band, or commercial and military Ka, than the current approach that combines 

X and Ka. The C/X and Ka/Ka both combine frequency bands that are adjacent and may 

offer an innovative opportunity for synergy with commercial. The assumption is Ka 

users’ primary use at higher data rates is to receive the downlink (at the same 20 GHz as 

the planned AEHF) rather than to transmit (as the GBS is used today). The connection 

between other tactical capabilities and the rest of the world will be through Teleports. 

SATCOM is becoming a limiting factor in meeting the data distribution needs of 

DoD’s projected transformation systems, including ISR systems like Global Hawk. 

Currently, Global Hawk is limited to a maximum of 50 Mbps data rates over SATCOM, 

105
UAV Roadmap 2002 – Appendix C 

Communication 

but is expected to require 274 Mbps links in the FY04 time frame and 548 Mbps in the 

FY 2010 timeframe. Today’s SATCOM systems and the next generation WGS cannot 

meet the 274 and 548 Mbps data rates. WGS can support a single channel 137 Mbps and 

with modifications 274 Mbps (currently unfunded) to the airborne terminals using two 

WGS channels. However, use of WGS for UAV support would result in current 

subscriber losing access. 

• 2 remaining DSCS

• 3 WGS satellites

• Launch AWS in 2009

• Augment w/commercial

• Complete remaining

Milstar II launches

• 4 Adv EHF satellites +

 accelerate Pathfinder

• Interim Polar 2 & 3

• Plan Advanced Polar

• Understand UFO risks

• Mitigate with hedges

• Assess commercial

• Launch MUOS for

 2007 IOC

= Planned Launch Schedule By FY 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15

Risk Risk

Milstar Advanced EHF

Replenishment

Window

Polar (Hosted) Advanced Polar

some migration to other means

UFO-11

RISK

TBD

UFO & DAMA MUOS

WGS,

DSCS and

GBS Phase II

AWS,

WGS, DSCS and

GBS Phase II/III

DSCS-SLEP

and GBS II

TBD

Wideband

Protected

Narrowband

Protected

FIGURE C-2: MILITARY SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS FUTURE DIRECTION. 

Defense Satellite Communication System (DSCS). DSCS is the current 

operational wideband satellite communication system for DoD and other government 

users. Designed in the late 1970’s, the DSCS III spacecraft was originally optimized for 

strategic and fixed, high data rate users. Fourteen spacecraft were acquired under a block 

buy contract to minimize acquisition costs; the first was launched in 1982, and two are 

still awaiting launch. 

The strategic mission is to complete transition to Milstar in 2003, and since Desert 

Storm much more emphasis has been placed on tactical wideband communications. The 

last four spacecraft were modified to better support this mission, under the Service Life 

Enhancement Program (SLEP). Two of these have been launched. 

Wideband Gapfiller System (WGS).

• WGS will consist of 3 or more satellites each offering high-capacity, DoD 

controlled, modestly-protected communications, system is planned to 

primarily replace the current (and outdated) DSCS system at X-band, but will 

also include mid-band Ka transponders that can be used for ISR applications. 

Although the WGS system will provide additional needed SATCOM capacity, 

its use contends with tactical needs and modifications are needed to enable 

274 Mbps. 

106
UAV Roadmap 2002 – Appendix C 

Communication 

• Support to Medium Altitude UAVs: Predator does not currently have a Kaband capability. Developing a Ka-band terminal for the Predator air vehicle 

would reduce its reliance on leased commercial Ku-band SATCOM, and 

provide improved coverage areas and provide a DoD owned and operated 

architecture. The Predator program office is studying the feasibility of 

developing and integrating a Ka terminal on the Predator for use with WGS. 

• Support to High Altitude UAVs: Global Hawk does not currently have a Kaband capability. Developing a Ka-band terminal for WGS on the Global 

Hawk air vehicle would provide an additional C2 capability, and also provide 

an additional capability to relay sensor data at data rates up to 137 Mbps. It 

would reduce Global Hawk’s reliance on leased commercial Ku-band 

SATCOM. Currently, this capability is unfunded. 

Advanced Wideband System (AWS). AWS will provide wideband 

MILSATCOM services to users starting in about FY09, using X-band and Ka-band 

frequencies, and possibly others. The emphasis will be on tactical users of all types, 

although the requirements are not completely defined. It is expected that UAV support 

will be provided. 

AWS was intended to be the follow-on to DSCS III, but in 1996 the JROC 

directed that an interim system be built, which became the Wideband Gapfiller System. 

The AWS program funding profile is based on the concept that only three Gapfillers will 

be acquired. AWS and its associated requirements are to be fulfilled by the 

Transformational Communication System. 

• Support to High Altitude UAVs: The WGS support to Global Hawk discussion, 

above, applies as well to the AWS. 

Description of Actions Needed to Correct Shortfalls 

The actions listed below include funded, partially funded, and unfunded activities. 

Some have been included in previous POMs, but have slipped. 

1. Improved Network Communications -- Communications Transformation. 

Communications upgrades are a major portion of transformation efforts, and will 

enable robust network centric operations. The FY03 budget includes significant 

funds to sustain and improve our communications, including expansion of terrestrial 

and space-based communications by laying additional fiber optics and employing 

novel approaches like laser communications on satellites. Within these areas, we will 

invest $5.5B in a superior command, control, and communications infrastructure that 

moves a high volume of warfighting information, plus over $800M to develop a new 

survivable, secure communications system to support the warfighter. 

Examples of programs we are emphasizing in the FY03 budget that support 

transformation include: 

• Laser communications 

107
UAV Roadmap 2002 – Appendix C 

Communication 

• Expanded terrestrial communications fiber 

• Mobile User Objective System

• Deployable Joint Command and Control system

• Joint Tactical Radio System 

• LINK-16 Tactical Data Link 

There is also substantial funding to protect and safeguard our networks to assure 

the security of information transmitted over them. 

2. Improved UAV Communications:

• Implement TCDL Ku-band in 2003 for Shadow. 

• Integrate a TCDL capability for LOS use for Predator in lieu of the current Cband LOS communications. 

• Study and, if feasible for Predator environment, integrate a Ka terminal on the 

Predator to allow WGS use in 2004. 

• Global Hawk will receive a data only DAMA capability in 2004. DAMA 

voice capability is required by FY05.. 

• Global Hawk will receive an Extended Tether Program (ETP) capability in 

2003. C2 over ETP is required, otherwise Global Hawk will still require 

SATCOM (UHF MILSATCOM or INMARSAT) for C2 of the air vehicle. 

Developing a Ka-band terminal for WGS on the Global Hawk air vehicle 

would provide an additional capability if ETP is unavailable until TCS 

implementation. It would reduce Global Hawk’s reliance on leased 

commercial Ku-band SATCOM. 

• Migrate all UAVs to CDL compatible data links for LOS and BLOS 

communication by FY06.

3. NSSA is recommending the development of an Airborne Communications Network 

(ACN) to Augment Ground Infrastructure. Current terrestrial communications 

networks are not as mobile as their supported maneuver elements. The NSSA's

vision for an ACN is a collection of UAV-mounted L- or S-band payloads that can 

provide multiple megabits per second of wideband data and narrowband voice and 

data, in the form of broadcast, multicast, and point-to-point communications. 

4. Improved Extended Tether Program Ground Systems:

• Improve existing ETP ground systems beginning in FY04. 

• Add to ETP ground structure to support the accelerated fielding of Global 

Hawk and advanced U-2 configurations. 

• Fully incorporate available satellite constellation 

108
UAV Roadmap 2002 – Appendix C 

Communication 

Conclusions 

Global conflict and the War on Terrorism will continue to stress ISR 

communications at least through 2015. The existing commercial and military LOS and 

BLOS assets cannot accommodate the increasing demand resulting from additional 

platforms and improved sensors unless UAVs, data link and SATCOM systems are 

modified. Furthermore, such improvements are essential to achieve the Department’s 

goal of decision dominance throughout the Joint Force. This UAV Communications 

roadmap supports a Joint ISR “system-of-systems” by improving capabilities to provide 

information in near-real-time through the network to operational forces. 

109

UAV Roadmap 2002 – Appendix D 

Technology Migration 

Appendix D: Technology Migration 

Overview 

In response to this roadmap’s data call, the services and other DoD agencies 

identified approximately 1014

 funded Research & Development (R&D) programs and 

initiatives developing technologies and capabilities either for specific UAVs (UAV 

“specific” programs) or broader programs pursuing technologies and capabilities 

applicable to manned as well as unmanned aviation (UAV “applicable”). The total 

research investment across the DoD was approximately $2,553M, of which 

approximately $1,216M (48%) was in UAV-specific programs , and $1,337M (52%) in 

UAV applicable programs. In the latter category, spending was primarily in the areas of 

platform, control and payload/sensors R&D, whereas the bulk of the spending in the 

former UAV specific category was in broad technology initiatives and weaponization. 

Weapons and targeting R&D constituted 61% of all UAV specific R&D program

spending. Specific investment was broken out by broad technology areas as follows: 

- 27 % ($692.46 M) was in platform-related enhancements, 

- of this, 5% was UAV specific and 95% was UAV applicable R&D 

- 14 % ($353.63 M) in control technologies (to include autonomy), 

- 32% UAV specific, 68% UAV applicable R&D 

- 19 % ($496.95 M) in sensors and other payloads, 

- 12% UAV specific, 88% UAV applicable R&D 

- 29 % ($747.3 M) in the area of weapons & targeting, 

- 100% UAV specific R&D 

- 10 % ($261.85 M) in broad R&D efforts. 

 - 100% UAV specific R&D 

Unlike last year, there were no specific R&D efforts in processing identified to 

the Task Force. Overall, the lack of specific investment in processing technologies is 

reflective of the dominance of commercial influence in new developments in the 

communications and information processing fields, clear examples of how the 

Department is benefiting from “spin-on” technology. These trends can be expected to 

continue and should continue to be leveraged as the Department considers its long-term

R&D investment strategy. 

Broad Area R&D 

The following matrix shows the near term UAV specific and UAV applicable 

R&D programs currently identified by the services and agencies in this area. Broad area 

 

4

 Note – figures and percentages used in this chapter’s discussions are approximations due to incomplete 

data receipt. 

111
UAV Roadmap 2002 – Appendix D 

Technology Migration 

programs are those that encompass a number of activities contained in at least two or 

more of the other technology categories in the roadmap. They are grouped together in 

this additional category because the level of detail of required to break out their funding 

into sub-categories was beyond the scope of the roadmap. This category includes 

programs such as the Unmanned Air Vehicle Defense Technology Objective and 

platform R&D programs that integrate multiple technologies, such as the Army/DARPA 

A-160, DARPA’s Canard Rotor Wing and the USN/USMC Dragon Warrior. Total broad 

area R&D spending is $261.85 M, or approximately 10 % of total Department and 

Agency spending on UAV programs. 100% of this spending is on UAV specific 

programs. 

Unmanned Air Vehicle Technology/AP.26

USN/USAF/Army

-Intelligent autonomy, networking/swarming, situational awareness/sensor data Processing

$ 39.2 M 9

02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 

• Multi-Area Initiatives

A-160/FCS

DARPA/Army - Rigid rotor, variable speed, autonomy

Expendable UAV ACTD/B.39

USN

-Long endurance; low cost/expendability, dispensable payloads, composites, electronic image stabilization, Low light & IR, secure satcomdata links, autopilot

$11.6 M

A-160/Hummingbird Warrior DARPA/Army - Advanced autonomy, all-weather flight, rotor technology upgrades

$261.85 M

$9.4 M*

$79 M*

Dragon Warrior USN/USMC - Small, full autonomy VTOL, tactical asset

$21.1 M

Dragon Eye USN/USMC - Backpackable, lightweight, real-time ISR system

$3.45 M

U A

9

9

9

9

9

Micro Air Vehicles ACTD/B.40

DARPA/Army - Size, lightweight, LADF airframe, autonomy, precision land/re-launch

$32.5 M 9

Organic Air Vehicle

DARPA

- Aircraft design code, autonomy, LADF airframe

Canard Rotor/Wing

DARPA - High speed VTOL UAV, Command and control, stability & control system, lockable rotary wing

$3.8 M*

$29 M*

9

9

Unmanned Air Vehicle Technology/AP.26

USN/USAF/Army

-Intelligent autonomy, networking/swarming, situational awareness/sensor data Processing

Unmanned Air Vehicle Technology/AP.26 $ 39.2 M 9

USN/USAF/Army

-Intelligent autonomy, networking/swarming, situational awareness/sensor data Processing

Unmanned Air Vehicle Technology/AP.26 $ 39.2 M

USN/USAF/Army

-Intelligent autonomy, networking/swarming, situational awareness/sensor data Processing

$ 39.2 M 9

02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 

• Multi-Area Initiatives

A-160/FCS

DARPA/Army - Rigid rotor, variable speed, autonomy

Expendable UAV ACTD/B.39

USN

-Long endurance; low cost/expendability, dispensable payloads, composites, electronic image stabilization, Low light & IR, secure satcomdata links, autopilot

$11.6 M

A-160/Hummingbird Warrior DARPA/Army - Advanced autonomy, all-weather flight, rotor technology upgrades

$261.85 M

$9.4 M*

$79 M*

Dragon Warrior USN/USMC - Small, full autonomy VTOL, tactical asset

$21.1 M

Dragon Eye USN/USMC - Backpackable, lightweight, real-time ISR system

$3.45 M

U A

9

9

9

9

9

Micro Air Vehicles ACTD/B.40

DARPA/Army - Size, lightweight, LADF airframe, autonomy, precision land/re-launch

$32.5 M 9

Organic Air Vehicle

DARPA

- Aircraft design code, autonomy, LADF airframe

Canard Rotor/Wing

DARPA - High speed VTOL UAV, Command and control, stability & control system, lockable rotary wing

$3.8 M*

$29 M*

9

9

02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 

• Multi-Area Initiatives

A-160/FCS

DARPA/Army - Rigid rotor, variable speed, autonomy

A-160/FCS

DARPA/Army - Rigid rotor, variable speed, autonomy

Expendable UAV ACTD/B.39

USN

-Long endurance; low cost/expendability, dispensable payloads, composites, electronic image stabilization, Low light & IR, secure satcomdata links, autopilot

Expendable UAV ACTD/B.39 $11.6 M USN

-Long endurance; low cost/expendability, dispensable payloads, composites, electronic image stabilization, Low light & IR, secure satcomdata links, autopilot

$11.6 M

A-160/Hummingbird Warrior DARPA/Army - Advanced autonomy, all-weather flight, rotor technology upgrades

A-160/Hummingbird Warrior DARPA/Army - Advanced autonomy, all-weather flight, rotor technology upgrades

$261.85 M

$9.4 M*

$79 M*

Dragon Warrior USN/USMC - Small, full autonomy VTOL, tactical asset

$21.1 M

Dragon Warrior USN/USMC - Small, full autonomy VTOL, tactical asset

$21.1 M

Dragon Eye USN/USMC - Backpackable, lightweight, real-time ISR system

$3.45 M Dragon Eye USN/USMC - Backpackable, lightweight, real-time ISR system$3.45 M

U A

9

9

9

9

9

Micro Air Vehicles ACTD/B.40

DARPA/Army - Size, lightweight, LADF airframe, autonomy, precision land/re-launch

Micro Air Vehicles ACTD/B.40 $32.5 M DARPA/Army - Size, lightweight, LADF airframe, autonomy, precision land/re-launchMicro Air Vehicles ACTD/B.40

DARPA/Army - Size, lightweight, LADF airframe, autonomy, precision land/re-launch

$32.5 M 9

Organic Air Vehicle

DARPA

- Aircraft design code, autonomy, LADF airframe

Organic Air Vehicle

DARPA

- Aircraft design code, autonomy, LADF airframe

Canard Rotor/Wing

DARPA - High speed VTOL UAV, Command and control, stability & control system, lockable rotary wing

Canard Rotor/Wing

DARPA - High speed VTOL UAV, Command and control, stability & control system, lockable rotary wing

$3.8 M*

$29 M*

9

9

FIGURE D-1: MULTI-AREA INITIATIVES. 

Platform Technology

Platform-related R&D has been further divided into the major R&D categories of

Airframes & Aerodynamics, Materials, Propulsion & Power and Survivability. Each is 

dealt with separately below, however overall spending on platform related R&D totals 

$693.06M, or 27% of total spending. Of this, $33.7 M, or 5%, is spent on UAV specific 

R&D programs (this represents just over 1% of the total $2,552.79M spending on UAV 

R&D), and the remaining $659.36M, or 95%, is spent on UAV applicable R&D 

programs. 

Airframes/Aerodynamics. The following matrix shows the near term UAV 

specific and UAV applicable R&D programs currently identified by the services and 

112
UAV Roadmap 2002 – Appendix D 

Technology Migration 

agencies. Total R&D spending on aerodynamics and airframes is $167 M, or 

approximately 6.5% of total UAV spending. Only $29.4 M, or 18%, of the $167 M total 

investment in Airframes and Aerodynamics is being spent on UAV specific programs 

(this represents just over 1% of the total $2552.79M spending on UAV R&D). The 

remaining $137.6M (82%) is being spent on UAV applicable technologies. 

02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09

$167 M

U A

Advanced Rotorcraft Technologies/AP.21

DARPA - Rotor structure, extension/retraction mechanisms, variable RPM rotors, micro-adaptive flow Control, Canard rotor wing aerodynamics

$16.8 M 9

Low-Cost Active Rotor/AP.23

Army - Variable geometry rotor on-blade control technology

$15 M 9

Advanced Aerodynamics USN-NAVAIR

- Abrupt Wing Stall

$9.8 M 9

9

Structural Design Methodology for Unitized Airframes

UASF - Development of probabilistic design methods

$.95 M

Survivable, Affordable, Repairable Airframe Program (SARAP)

Army

- Structural design criteria, testing, quality

$22.3 M 9

High Lift Rotors/On-Blade Controls

Army

- Active droop, active twist, on-blade controls, OSC blowing, individual blade control

$96 M 9

High L/D Active Wing

UASF

- Design wing to max efficiency

$3.25 M 9

9

Ship-Aircraft Airwake Analysis for Enhanced Dynamic Interface (SAFE-DI)

USN

- Analytical Model building for UCAV-N design

$2.9 M

• Platform Related: Aerodynamics &

Airframes

Large Low Frequency Conformal Loan Bearing Antenna Structure

USAF

- Weight Optimization, structural & RF component integrity, aperture issues

$.6 M 9

02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09

$167 M

U A

Advanced Rotorcraft Technologies/AP.21

DARPA - Rotor structure, extension/retraction mechanisms, variable RPM rotors, micro-adaptive flow Control, Canard rotor wing aerodynamics

Advanced Rotorcraft Technologies

DA

/AP

RP

.21

A

$16.8 M 9 - Rotor structure, extension/retraction mechanisms, variable RPM rotors, micro-adaptive flow Control, Canard rotor wing aerodynamics

Advanced Rotorcraft Technologies/AP.21 $16.8 M

DARPA - Rotor structure, extension/retraction mechanisms, variable RPM rotors, micro-adaptive flow Control, Canard rotor wing aerodynamics

$16.8 M 9

Low-Cost Active Rotor/AP.23

Army - Variable geometry rotor on-blade control technology

Low-Cost Active Rotor/AP.23 $15 M 9

Army - Variable geometry rotor on-blade control technology

Low-Cost Active Rotor/AP.23 $15 M

Army - Variable geometry rotor on-blade control technology

Low-Cost Active Rotor/AP.23

Army - Variable geometry rotor on-blade control technology

$15 M 9

Advanced Aerodynamics USN-NAVAIR

- Abrupt Wing Stall

$9.8 M 9 Advanced Aerodynamics USN-NAVAIR

- Abrupt Wing Stall

$9.8 M 9

9

Structural Design Methodology for Unitized Airframes

UASF - Development of probabilistic design methods

$.95 M 9

Structural Design Methodology for Unitized Airframes

UASF - Development of probabilistic design methods

$.95 M

Survivable, Affordable, Repairable Airframe Program (SARAP)

Army

- Structural design criteria, testing, quality

Survivable, Affordable, Repairable Airframe Program (SARAP) $22.3 M 9

Army

- Structural design criteria, testing, quality

$22.3 M 9

High Lift Rotors/On-Blade Controls

Army

- Active droop, active twist, on-blade controls, OSC blowing, individual blade control

High Lift Rotors/On-Blade Con

Ar

tr

m

ol

y

s $96 M 9

- Active droop, active twist, on-blade controls, OSC blowing, individual blade control

$96 M 9

High L/D Active Wing

UASF

- Design wing to max efficiency

$3.25 M 9 High L/D Active Wing

UASF

- Design wing to max efficiency

$3.25 M 9

9

Ship-Aircraft Airwake Analysis for Enhanced Dynamic Interface (SAFE-DI)

USN

- Analytical Model building for UCAV-N design

$2.9 M 9

Ship-Aircraft Airwake Analysis for Enhanced Dynamic Interface (SAFE-DI)

USN

- Analytical Model building for UCAV-N design

$2.9 M

• Platform Related: Aerodynamics &

Airframes

Large Low Frequency Conformal Loan Bearing Antenna Structure

USAF

- Weight Optimization, structural & RF component integrity, aperture issues

$.6 M 9 Large Low Frequency Conformal Loan Bearing Antenna Structure

USAF

- Weight Optimization, structural & RF component integrity, aperture issues

$.6 M 9

FIGURE D-2: PLATFORM RELATED: AERODYNAMICS & AIRFRAMES. 

Materials. The following matrix shows the near term UAV specific and UAV 

applicable R&D programs currently identified by the services and agencies in this area. 

Total R&D spending on platform materials is $134.6 M, or approximately 5 % of total 

UAV spending. Of this $134.6 M, $3 M, or 2%, of the total investment in materials 

technologies is being spent on UAV specific programs (this represents just over 1 tenth of 

1% of the total $2552.79M spending on UAV R&D). The remaining $133.6M (98%) is 

being spent on UAV applicable technologies. 

113
UAV Roadmap 2002 – Appendix D 

Technology Migration 

02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 U A

$136.4 M

Materials & Processes for Affordable Aircraft Structures/MP.42

USN/USAF - Light weight/low cost structures, adhesives, predictive models

$8.7 M 9

Composites Affordability Initiative – Aircraft/MP.34.01

USN

- Low cost composite structures technologies, production/supporting technologies

$38.9 M 9

9 Fatigue & Corrosion Insensitive Aircraft

USAF/USN

- Composite bearing/control surfaces

$8.2 M

Composites Affordability Initiative – Phase III

USAF - Design tools & criteria, accurate joint failure prediction, assurance of reliability

$62.4 M 9

9 Structurally Integrated Compact Inlet Technology

USAF

- Control of UAV inlet drag/length, flow control

$3 M

9 Structurally Imbedded HF Array

USAF - Modification of antenna design, EM issues, load/fatigue on antenna elements, algorithms For antenna shaping/beam forming

$6.1 M

Maximizing Usable Service Times (MUST)

USN

- Advanced design concepts for metallic aircraft structures

$4.5 M 9

Fatigue & Corrosion Insensitive Aircraft (FACIA) $4 M

USN - Eliminate aircraft degradation in core, skin fatigue, and control hinge fatigue

9

• Platform Related: Materials

02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 U A

$136.4 M

Materials & Processes for Affordable Aircraft Structures/MP.42

USN/USAF - Light weight/low cost structures, adhesives, predictive models

Materials & Processes for Affordable Aircraft Structu

US

res

N/

/M

U

P

S

.

A

42

F $8.7 M 9 - Light weight/low cost structures, adhesives, predictive models

Materials & Processes for Affordable Aircraft Structures/MP.42 $8.7 M USN/USAF - Light weight/low cost structures, adhesives, predictive models

$8.7 M 9

Composites Affordability Initiative – Aircraft/MP.34.01

USN

- Low cost composite structures technologies, production/supporting technologies

Composites Affordability Initiative – Aircraft/MP.34.01 $38.9 M 9

USN

- Low cost composite structures technologies, production/supporting technologies

Composites Affordability Initiative – Aircraft/MP.34.01 $38.9 M

USN

- Low cost composite structures technologies, production/supporting technologies

$38.9 M 9

9 Fatigue & Corrosion Insensitive Aircraft

USAF/USN

- Composite bearing/control surfaces

$8.2 M 9 Fatigue & Corrosion Insensitive Aircraft

USAF/USN

- Composite bearing/control surfaces

9 Fatigue & Corrosion Insensitive Aircraft

USAF/USN

- Composite bearing/control surfaces

Fatigue & Corrosion Insensitive Aircraft

USAF/USN

- Composite bearing/control surfaces

$8.2 M

Composites Affordability Initiative – Phase III

USAF - Design tools & criteria, accurate joint failure prediction, assurance of reliability

$62.4 M 9 Composites Affordability Initiative – Phase III

USAF - Design tools & criteria, accurate joint failure prediction, assurance of reliability

9 Composites Affordability Initiative – Phase III

USAF - Design tools & criteria, accurate joint failure prediction, assurance of reliability

Composites Affordability Initiative – Phase III

USAF - Design tools & criteria, accurate joint failure prediction, assurance of reliability

$62.4 M 9

9 Structurally Integrated Compact Inlet Technology

USAF

- Control of UAV inlet drag/length, flow control

$3 M 9 Structurally Integrated Compact Inlet Technology

USAF

- Control of UAV inlet drag/length, flow control

$3 M

9 Structurally Imbedded HF Array

USAF - Modification of antenna design, EM issues, load/fatigue on antenna elements, algorithms For antenna shaping/beam forming

$6.1 M 9 Structurally Imbedded HF Array

USAF - Modification of antenna design, EM issues, load/fatigue on antenna elements, algorithms For antenna shaping/beam forming

$6.1 M

Maximizing Usable Service Times (MUST)

USN

- Advanced design concepts for metallic aircraft structures

Maximizing Usable Service Times (MUST) $4.5 M 9

USN

- Advanced design concepts for metallic aircraft structures

$4.5 M 9

Fatigue & Corrosion Insensitive Aircraft (FACIA) $4 M

USN - Eliminate aircraft degradation in core, skin fatigue, and control hinge fatigue

Fatigue & Corrosion Insensitive Aircraft (FACIA) $4 M 9

USN - Eliminate aircraft degradation in core, skin fatigue, and control hinge fatigue

9

• Platform Related: Materials

FIGURE D-3: PLATFORM RELATED: MATERIALS. 

Propulsion & Power. The following matrix shows the near term UAV specific and 

UAV applicable R&D programs currently identified by the services and agencies in this 

area. Total R&D spending on propulsion and power R&D is $309.5 M, or approximately 

12% of total Department and Agency spending on UAV programs. None of this 

spending is on UAV specific programs, all funded programs are UAV applicable. 

114
UAV Roadmap 2002 – Appendix D 

Technology Migration 

02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09

• Platform Related: Propulsion & Power

$309.5 M

U A

Materials & Processes for Integrated High-Performance Turbine Engine Technology/

MP.02.01 - DARPA/USN/USAF/Army

- High-temperature, high-strength, low density engine materials, oxidation resistance

$45.3 M 9

Micro-Power Generation/SE.89

DARPA

- High temperature, high stress MEMS technologies

$24 M 9

Energy Conservation/Power Generation/SE.43

Army

-Energy density, efficiency, signature reduction, low temperature performance, autonomous

Charging size/weight reduction

$1.9 M 9

Cruise Missile/Expendable Propulsion/AP.10

USN/USAF

- Low density, high temperature engine materials

$17.9 M 9

Versatile Affordable Advanced Turbine Engines/AP.27

USN/USAF

- High temperature/low-density engine materials, active engine component control

$120.1 M 9

Joint Turbine Advanced Gas Generator (JTAGG) III

Army

- Reduction in SFC, increase in HP/WT, higher temps/rotor RPM, improved cooling & aero

$13.8 M 9

Small Heavy Fuel Engine Demo

Army

- Reduction in size, increase in HP/WT, reduction in SFC, reduction in costs

$30.9 M 9

Small Affordable Engine Technology

Army

- Affordability, reduction in size & costs, increase in HP/WT

$17.8 M 9

9 Direct Oxidation Fuel Cells

USN-ONR

-Fuel power densities, size & cost reduction, operations in anaerobic environments

$3.6 M

Rotorcraft Drive System (RDS)-21

Army

- Reduction in costs, increase in SHHP/wt and operating noise

$19.4 M 9

Future Small Drive

Army

- Reduction in costs, increase in SHHP/wt and operating noise

$14.8 M 9

02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09

• Platform Related: Propulsion & Power

$309.5 M

U A

Materials & Processes for Integrated High-Performance Turbine Engine Technology/

MP.02.01 - DARPA/USN/USAF/Army

- High-temperature, high-strength, low density engine materials, oxidation resistance

$45.3 M 9 Materials & Processes for Integrated High-Performance Turbine Engine Technology/

MP.02.01 - DARPA/USN/USAF/Army

- High-temperature, high-strength, low density engine materials, oxidation resistance

$45.3 M Materials & Processes for Integrated High-Performance Turbine Engine Technology/

MP.02.01 - DARPA/USN/USAF/Army

- High-temperature, high-strength, low density engine materials, oxidation resistance

$45.3 M 9

Micro-Power Generation/SE.89

DARPA

- High temperature, high stress MEMS technologies

Micro-Power Generation/SE.89 $24 M 9

DARPA

- High temperature, high stress MEMS technologies

Micro-Power Generation/SE.89 $24 M

DARPA

- High temperature, high stress MEMS technologies

$24 M 9

Energy Conservation/Power Generation/SE.43

Army

-Energy density, efficiency, signature reduction, low temperature performance, autonomous

Charging size/weight reduction

$1.9 M 9 Energy Conservation/Power Generation/SE.43

Army

-Energy density, efficiency, signature reduction, low temperature performance, autonomous

Charging size/weight reduction

Energy Conservation/Power Generation/SE.43 $1.9 M Army

-Energy density, efficiency, signature reduction, low temperature performance, autonomous

Charging size/weight reduction

Energy Conservation/Power Generation/SE.43 $1.9 M Army

-Energy density, efficiency, signature reduction, low temperature performance, autonomous

Charging size/weight reduction

$1.9 M 9

Cruise Missile/Expendable Propulsion/AP.10

USN/USAF

- Low density, high temperature engine materials

Cruise Missile/Expendable Propul

US

sio

N

n/A

/US

P.

A

10

F $17.9 M 9 - Low density, high temperature engine materials

Cruise Missile/Expendable Propulsion/AP.10 $17.9 M USN/USAF

- Low density, high temperature engine materials

$17.9 M 9

Versatile Affordable Advanced Turbine Engines/AP.27

USN/USAF

- High temperature/low-density engine materials, active engine component control

Versatile Affordable Advanced Turbine Eng

US

ines/A

N/U

P

S

.27

AF $120.1 M 9 - High temperature/low-density engine materials, active engine component control

Versatile Affordable Advanced Turbine Engines/AP.27 $120.1 M USN/USAF

- High temperature/low-density engine materials, active engine component control

$120.1 M 9

Joint Turbine Advanced Gas Generator (JTAGG) III

Army

- Reduction in SFC, increase in HP/WT, higher temps/rotor RPM, improved cooling & aero

$13.8 M 9 Joint Turbine Advanced Gas Generator (JTAGG) III

Army

- Reduction in SFC, increase in HP/WT, higher temps/rotor RPM, improved cooling & aero

$13.8 M 9

Small Heavy Fuel Engine Demo

Army

- Reduction in size, increase in HP/WT, reduction in SFC, reduction in costs

$30.9 M 9 Small Heavy Fuel Engine Demo

Army

- Reduction in size, increase in HP/WT, reduction in SFC, reduction in costs

$30.9 M 9

Small Affordable Engine Technology

Army

- Affordability, reduction in size & costs, increase in HP/WT

$17.8 M 9

Small Affordable Engine Technology

Army

- Affordability, reduction in size & costs, increase in HP/WT

$17.8 M 9

9 Direct Oxidation Fuel Cells

USN-ONR

-Fuel power densities, size & cost reduction, operations in anaerobic environments

$3.6 M 9 Direct Oxidation Fuel Cells

USN-ONR

-Fuel power densities, size & cost reduction, operations in anaerobic environments

$3.6 M

Rotorcraft Drive System (RDS)-21

Army

- Reduction in costs, increase in SHHP/wt and operating noise

$19.4 M 9 Rotorcraft Drive System (RDS)-21

Army

- Reduction in costs, increase in SHHP/wt and operating noise

$19.4 M 9

Future Small Drive

Army

- Reduction in costs, increase in SHHP/wt and operating noise

Future Small D

Ar

ri

m

ve

y

$14.8 M 9

- Reduction in costs, increase in SHHP/wt and operating noise

$14.8 M 9

FIGURE D-4: PLATFORM RELATED: PROPULSION & POWER. 

Survivability. The following matrix shows the near term UAV specific and 

UAV applicable R&D programs currently identified by the services and agencies in this 

area. Total R&D spending on survivability technologies is $79.56 M, or approximately 3 

% of total Department and Agency spending on UAV programs. $1.3 M, or 

approximately 2%, of this spending is on UAV specific programs. The remaining $78.26 

M (98%) is being spent on UAV applicable technologies. 

115
UAV Roadmap 2002 – Appendix D 

Technology Migration 

02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 U A

EO/IR Laser Jammer for Tacair

USN-ONR

- Small Laser jammer for SAM,AAM, imaging threats

$10.43 M 9

9 Missile Warning System

USN-ONR - Small, 2 color IR threat classification

$10.48 M

Integrated EO/IR self-protection suite 9

USN-ONR

- Low cost, small, multi-function missile warning/laser jammer

$10.7 M

9 IDECM (Integrated Defensive Electronic Countermeasures) system P3I

USN-ONR

- Towed ECM system upgrades

$22.5 M

Highly Integrated Aft-body for Survivability

USAF

- Yaw thrust vectoring integration

$1.3 M 9

Distributed Survivability Architecture

Army

- Sensor, commlink, C&C protocol architecture for manned/unmanned teams

$8.6 M 9

Distributed Team Survivability

Army

- Multi-spectral signature reduction, survivability planner

$12.8 M

$79.56 M

Distributive Aperture System

USN-ONR

- Integrated MWIR sensor tiles, low cost, low power, expendable

$1.45 M

Anguila

USN-ONR

-Networking DF Sensor

$1.3 M 9

9

9

• Platform Related: Survivability

02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 U A

EO/IR Laser Jammer for Tacair

USN-ONR

- Small Laser jammer for SAM,AAM, imaging threats

$10.43 M 9 EO/IR Laser Jammer for Tacair

USN-ONR

- Small Laser jammer for SAM,AAM, imaging threats

$10.43 M 9

9 Missile Warning System

USN-ONR - Small, 2 color IR threat classification

$10.48 M 9 Missile Warning System

USN-ONR - Small, 2 color IR threat classification

$10.48 M

Integrated EO/IR self-protection suite 9

USN-ONR

- Low cost, small, multi-function missile warning/laser jammer

Integrated EO/IR self-protection suite $10.7 M 9

USN-ONR

- Low cost, small, multi-function missile warning/laser jammer

$10.7 M

9 IDECM (Integrated Defensive Electronic Countermeasures) system P3I

USN-ONR

- Towed ECM system upgrades

$22.5 M 9 IDECM (Integrated Defensive Electronic Countermeasures) system P3I

USN-ONR

- Towed ECM system upgrades

$22.5 M

Highly Integrated Aft-body for Survivability

USAF

- Yaw thrust vectoring integration

$1.3 M 9 Highly Integrated Aft-body for Survivability

USAF

- Yaw thrust vectoring integration

$1.3 M Highly Integrated Aft-body for Survivability

USAF

- Yaw thrust vectoring integration

$1.3 M 9

Distributed Survivability Architecture

Army

- Sensor, commlink, C&C protocol architecture for manned/unmanned teams

$8.6 M 9

Distributed Team Survivability

Army

- Multi-spectral signature reduction, survivability planner

$12.8 M

$79.56 M

Distributive Aperture System

USN-ONR

- Integrated MWIR sensor tiles, low cost, low power, expendable

$1.45 M

Anguila

USN-ONR

-Networking DF Sensor

$1.3 M 9

9

9

• Platform Related: Survivability

FIGURE D-5: PLATFORM RELATED:SURVIVABILITY. 

Platform Trends & Future Initiatives. 

Propulsion & Power. Significant advances in propulsion technology have been 

achieved over the past decade by the AFRL-led, joint Integrated High Performance 

Turbine Engine Technology (IHPTET) program. Since its inception in 1988, it has 

increased the thrust-to-weight (T/W) ratio of its baseline small turbine class (Honeywell 

F124) engines by 40 percent, reduced SFC by 20%, and lowered engine production and 

maintenance costs by 40 percent. IHPTET concludes in 2003, but its successor, the 

Versatile Affordable Advanced Turbine Engines (VAATE) program, aims to improve 

each of these three criteria half again by 2015. If these trends can be continued through 

2025, T/W will improve by 250 percent, SFC by 40 percent, and costs will decline by 60 

percent (see figure below). For UAV use, these goals may partially be met by deleting 

turbine blade containment rings and redundant controls, as well as reducing hot section 

lifetime from 2000 to 1000 hours or less. In combination, the T/W and SFC 

improvements provided by IHPTET should enable the number of endurance UAVs 

needed to provide 24-hour coverage of an area to be reduced by 60 percent, or 

conversely, the endurance of individual UAVs increased by 60 percent. 

116
UAV Roadmap 2002 – Appendix D 

Technology Migration 

FIGURE D-6: IHPTET AND VAATE PROGRAM GOALS AND TRENDS. 

Electrical Systems: Three types of electrical propulsion systems are available for 

UAVs: batteries, fuel cells, and solar cells. The energy storage capacity of batteries is 

measured in terms of specific energy, and usually expressed as watt-hours per kilogram

(hp-hours per lb).5

 Higher specific energies lead to batteries with increased lifespan, 

which would lead to battery-powered aircraft with increased range and endurance, a 

major operational limitation of battery powered UAVs to date. Future growth in battery 

specific energy capability is expected with the introduction of the Lithium-polymer 

battery, which suffers from a rather short lifespan.6

 

The solid oxide fuel cell (SOFC), together with the multi-carbonate fuel cell 

(MCFC), represent the current state-of-the-art in fuel cell technology. A jump in specific 

energy capability is anticipated with the advent of the hydrogen-air, or proton exchange 

membrane (PEM), fuel cell, which is at least 5 years from production. Further advances 

in fuel cell technology could occur with hybrid cells, which use the waste heat from the 

cell to generate additional power via an attached turbine engine. By 2004, the MSP of 

fuel cell powered engines should equal or exceed that of noisy internal combustion 

engines. 

Solar energy is a viable option for other types of UAVs, such as high-altitude, 

long endurance UAVs, for use as long-dwell reconnaissance or airborne communications 

relays. The NASA/AeroEnvironment Helios solar-powered UAV set the altitude record 

(96,863 ft) in 2001 for propeller-driven aircraft by using solar cells to drive 14 electric 

motors, which together generated roughly 28 horsepower. While a storage system for 

 

5

 Specific energy is the amount of energy a battery or fuel cell stores per unit mass, 6

 The result of internal self-shorting when an electric current is passed over the metal in the polymer 

117
UAV Roadmap 2002 – Appendix D 

Technology Migration 

solar energy for use during foul weather or night conditions is being developed, the added 

weight of these storage systems probably make them prohibitive for use on micro air 

vehicles and combat UAVs. 

The above numbers can be compared to the energy content of the most popular 

energy source, gasoline. The specific energy of gasoline is about 12 hp-hr/lb. The best 

batteries listed above remain less than 2 percent of gasoline in terms of their specific 

energy. Fuel cells, while an improvement over batteries, have specific energy values 

roughly 4 percent that of gasoline. However, by 2015, this disparity between fuel cells 

and gasoline will likely be reduced by over half. 

Emerging Propulsion Technologies 

• Beaming energy to the aircraft for conversion to electricity using either 

microwaves or lasers eliminates the need to carry propellant onboard, but requires 

a tremendous transmit-to-receive power ratio (microwaves) or very precise 

pointing (lasers) and limits flight to within line-of-sight of the power source 

(both). Microwave beaming would take 100 kW (134 hp) of transmit power to 

run just a micro-UAV at a range of 0.6 miles, let alone a more substantially sized 

aircraft, whereas a laser would only require around 40 W (0.05 hp) of power. (is 

this worth even mentioning?) 

• Reciprocating Chemical Muscles (RCMs) are regenerative devices that use a 

chemically actuated mechanical muscle (ionomers) to convert chemical energy 

into motion through a direct, noncombustive chemical reaction. Power generated 

via an RCM can be used for both propulsion (via wing flapping) and powering of 

on-board flight systems. RCM technology could power future generations of 

micro-UAVs, providing vertical take-off and landing as well as hover capabilities. 

(this assumes a flapping wing design – no longer being vigorously pursued) 

• For dash or sustained high speed requirements, whether to enhance survivability 

or for access to space, propulsion options for future UAVs (and their level of 

maturity) include ramjets (mature), scramjets (developmental), integrated rocketramjet (developmental), air-turbo rocket (developmental), and pulse detonation 

engines (developmental), each with varying attributes depending on the mission. 

• Nuclear fuel engines. Technologically feasible, nuclear fuel engine remain the 

most efficient means of power for long endurance (6+ month) flights. The 

implications for long-dwell ISR are obvious. Though there are technological 

obstacles to be overcome, the principal limitation on development of this 

technology will likely be the policy implications associated with operating a 

nuclear reactor in flight over foreign countries . 

Weapons & Targeting Technology

Within the last year, the biggest change in UAV employment has been in their use 

as combat platforms, especially in a strike role. It has certainly generated significant 

press attention and also has arguably had the biggest impact on changing cultural 

perception of UAVs in the broader, non-UAV community. As a result of successes such 

as the Hellfire-equipped Predator, the thinking in the operational community about what 

118
UAV Roadmap 2002 – Appendix D 

Technology Migration 

an appropriate mission for a UAV is and what they are capable of doing has changed 

significantly. 

The following matrix shows the near term UAV specific and UAV applicable 

R&D programs currently identified by the services and agencies in this area. Total R&D 

spending on Weapons and Targeting is $747.3 M, or approximately 29% of total 

Department spending on UAV programs – making it the largest category of spending. 

100% of this spending is on UAV specific programs. 

02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 U A

• Weapons & Targeting

$405.6 M

Hunter Standoff Killer ACTD/B.35

Army

- Manned/UAV cooperation, data links, decision aids, precision targeting sensor

$38.9 M 9

Loitering Electronic Warfare Killer ACTD/B.36

USMC

- Inflatable w ing, low cost, small pow erful jammer

$12.1 M 9

Combat UAV Development and Demonstration/AP.22

DARPA/USAF

- Manned/unmanned integration, processing, autonomy, swarming

$104.3 9

Combat UAV - Navy

DARPA/USN

- Manned/unmanned integration, processing, autonomy, swarming

$92 M** 9

Unmanned Combat Aerial Rotorcraft

DARPA/Army

- Manned/unmanned integration, sensors, communication, autonomy, command & control

$158.3 M 9

Precision Targeting Identification ACTD/C.05

USN

- 3rd gen IR/spectral sensor, LADAR, sensor fusion package, electronic image stabilization

No remaining S&T $$ 9

02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 U A

• Weapons & Targeting

$405.6 M

Hunter Standoff Killer ACTD/B.35

Army

- Manned/UAV cooperation, data links, decision aids, precision targeting sensor

$38.9 M 9 Hunter Standoff Killer ACTD/B.35

Army

- Manned/UAV cooperation, data links, decision aids, precision targeting sensor

$38.9 M Hunter Standoff Killer ACTD/B.35

Army

- Manned/UAV cooperation, data links, decision aids, precision targeting sensor

$38.9 M 9

Loitering Electronic Warfare Killer ACTD/B.36

USMC

- Inflatable w ing, low cost, small pow erful jammer

Loitering Electronic Warfare Killer ACTD

US

/B

M

.36

C $12.1 M 9 - Inflatable w ing, low cost, small pow erful jammer

$12.1 M 9

Combat UAV Development and Demonstration/AP.22

DARPA/USAF

- Manned/unmanned integration, processing, autonomy, swarming

Combat UAV Development and Demonstration/AP.22 $104.3 9 DARPA/USAF

- Manned/unmanned integration, processing, autonomy, swarming

Combat UAV Development and Demonstration/AP.22 $104.3 DARPA/USAF

- Manned/unmanned integration, processing, autonomy, swarming

$104.3 9

Combat UAV - Navy

DARPA/USN

- Manned/unmanned integration, processing, autonomy, swarming

Combat UAV - Navy $92 M** 9 DARPA/USN

- Manned/unmanned integration, processing, autonomy, swarming

Combat UAV - Navy $92 M** DARPA/USN

- Manned/unmanned integration, processing, autonomy, swarming

$92 M** 9

Unmanned Combat Aerial Rotorcraft

DARPA/Army

- Manned/unmanned integration, sensors, communication, autonomy, command & control

$158.3 M 9

Precision Targeting Identification ACTD/C.05

USN

- 3rd gen IR/spectral sensor, LADAR, sensor fusion package, electronic image stabilization

No remaining S&T $$ Precision Targeting Identification ACTD/C.05

USN

- 3rd gen IR/spectral sensor, LADAR, sensor fusion package, electronic image stabilization

No remaining S&T $$ 9

FIGURE D-7: WEAPONS & TARGETING. 

General Trends & Future Initiatives. Short-term developments in this field 

will continue to focus on the fielding of strike UAVs by integrating existing technologies 

in response to short-term requirements. While almost all longer term – and big dollar - 

R&D is currently focused on the development of purpose-built Combat UAV systems 

(UCAV, UCAV-N, UCAR), the importance of the current short-term, operationally 

driven activities should not be overlooked. While it is imperative that long-term R&D 

into the purpose-built combat UAV continue in order to ensure that we are able to 

respond to the emerging realities of aerial combat in the 21st century, the additional 

operational utility driven by the “classroom of combat”, along with attendant, required 

technological advancements, can be expected to identify or reinforce new applications of 

UAVs in combat roles. Whatever the motivation, it is clear that this technology category 

represents the area of maximum growth for UAV R&D. 

Sensing Technology

Sensors & Other Payloads. The various payload capabilities being researched in 

this technology category can for the most part (currently and historically) be divided into 

two principal areas: intelligence collection sensors and communications relay payloads. 

In addition two these two areas, there are also a number or broad research programs in 

basic sensor technologies that can impact multiple programs. Finally, reflecting both the 

increased operational application of UAVs as well as advances in sensor technology, 

119
UAV Roadmap 2002 – Appendix D 

Technology Migration 

there are the two other areas of payload R&D worth noting; non-imaging radar programs, 

and multi-function RF payloads. This section will discuss each of these payload 

capabilities in turn; however it would be beneficial to recap some statistics first. Overall 

spending on sensor and payload R&D totals $496.95 M, or 19% of total UAV spending. 

Of this, 60.45 M, or 12%, is spent on UAV specific R&D programs (this represents just 

over 2% of the total $2552.79M spending on UAV R&D). The remaining $436.5M 

(88%) is being spent on UAV applicable technologies. 

General Sensor Research. The following matrix shows the near term UAV 

specific and UAV applicable R&D programs currently identified by the services and 

agencies in this area. Total R&D spending on general sensor research is $128.9 M, or 

approximately 56% of total payload and sensor spending, and 5% of total UAV spending. 

None of this money is being spent on UAV specific programs, all is in UAV applicable 

programs. Programs in this category constitute R&D that has potential broad 

applicability across more than one payload category or intelligence discipline, and 

beyond UAVs in general. 

02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 U A

• Payloads & Sensors : General

Networked Sensors for the Objective Force/B.38

Army - Robust sensor architecture; robust, jam resistant, LPI/LPD data links

$94.1 M 9

Manufacturing Technology for Cooled and Uncooled Staring Sensors/MP.38

USAF/USN

- Reduce pixel size & increase FPA sensitivity, fabrication process

$14.2 M 9

Weather/Atmospheric Impacts on Sensor Systems/BE.03

USAF - Algorithm development

$5.7 M 9

$128.9 M

UAV Compact Sensor RF Component Technologies/SE.90

USAF - Integrated radar/EW/Comm sensor, integrated RF sub-systems

$14.9 M 9

02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 U A

• Payloads & Sensors : General

Networked Sensors for the Objective Force/B.38

Army - Robust sensor architecture; robust, jam resistant, LPI/LPD data links

$94.1 M 9 Networked Sensors for the Objective Force/B.38

Army - Robust sensor architecture; robust, jam resistant, LPI/LPD data links

Networked Sensors for the Objective Force/B.38 $94.1 M Army - Robust sensor architecture; robust, jam resistant, LPI/LPD data links

$94.1 M 9

Manufacturing Technology for Cooled and Uncooled Staring Sensors/MP.38

USAF/USN

- Reduce pixel size & increase FPA sensitivity, fabrication process

$14.2 M 9 Manufacturing Technology for Cooled and Uncooled Staring Sensors/MP.38

USAF/USN

- Reduce pixel size & increase FPA sensitivity, fabrication process

$14.2 M 9

Weather/Atmospheric Impacts on Sensor Systems/BE.03

USAF - Algorithm development

Weather/Atmospheric Impacts on Sensor Systems/BE.03 $5.7 M 9

USAF - Algorithm development

Weather/Atmospheric Impacts on Sensor Systems/BE.03 $5.7 M

USAF - Algorithm development

$5.7 M 9

$128.9 M

UAV Compact Sensor RF Component Technologies/SE.90

USAF - Integrated radar/EW/Comm sensor, integrated RF sub-systems

$14.9 M 9 UAV Compact Sensor RF Component Technologies/SE.90

USAF - Integrated radar/EW/Comm sensor, integrated RF sub-systems

UAV Compact Sensor RF Component Technologies/SE.90 $14.9 M USAF - Integrated radar/EW/Comm sensor, integrated RF sub-systems

$14.9 M 9

FIGURE D-8: PAYLOADS & SENSORS: GENERAL. 

Intelligence. The ability to detect, recognize, classify, and identify targets is the 

key UAV payload requirement derived from the Combatant Commanders’ IPLs. There 

are currently R&D programs for intelligence collection sensors in the disciplines of

IMINT, MASINT, and SIGINT. Total spending on intelligence sensor R&D is $174.9 M 

– 35% of the sensors and payloads total, and 7% of overall spending on UAV R&D. Of 

this 174.9M, $28.2M, or 16%, is being spent on UAV specific programs. 

Total R&D spending on UAV-related IMINT is $40.2 M, or approximately 23 % 

of total spending on intelligence sensor R&D and 8% of overall sensor & payload R&D 

spending. None of this spending is on UAV specific programs, all is in efforts applicable 

to UAVs. 

120
UAV Roadmap 2002 – Appendix D 

Technology Migration 

02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 U A

• Payloads & Sensors: IMINT

9 IPEX - Image Processing and Exploitation Architecture USN-NAWCWD $18.9 M

9 Surveillance & Targeting Radar

USN-ONR - Simultaneous SAR/GMTI, also ISAR, MTI, sized for tactical payload

$8.1 M

9

Passive Millimeter Wave Imaging Sensor USN-ONR - Sized for tactical payload

$2.8 M

Foliage Penetration Radar DARPA 9

Counter Camouflage Concealment and Deception ACTD/A.11

DARPA/Air Force/Army - Dual band VHF/UHF SAR

$10.4 M 9

$40.2 M

02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 U A

• Payloads & Sensors: IMINT

9 IPEX - Image Processing and Exploitation Architecture USN-NAWCWD $18.9 M 9 IPEX - Image Processing and Exploitation Architecture USN-NAWCWD

IPEX - Image Processing and Exploitation Architecture USN-NAWCWD $18.9 M

9 Surveillance & Targeting Radar

USN-ONR - Simultaneous SAR/GMTI, also ISAR, MTI, sized for tactical payload

$8.1 M 9 Surveillance & Targeting Radar

USN-ONR - Simultaneous SAR/GMTI, also ISAR, MTI, sized for tactical payload

$8.1 M

9

Passive Millimeter Wave Imaging Sensor USN-ONR - Sized for tactical payload

$2.8 M 9

Passive Millimeter Wave Imaging Sensor USN-ONR - Sized for tactical payload

$2.8 M

Foliage Penetration Radar DARPA 9 Foliage Penetration Radar DARPA

Foliage Penetration Radar DARPA 9

Counter Camouflage Concealment and Deception ACTD/A.11

DARPA/Air Force/Army - Dual band VHF/UHF SAR

Counter Camouflage Concealment and 

DA

De

RP

cep

A

t

/

i

A

o

i

n A

r Fo

C

r

T

ce

D

/A

/A

r

.

m

11

y $10.4 M 9 - Dual band VHF/UHF SAR

$10.4 M Counter Camouflage Concealment and Deception ACTD/A.11

DARPA/Air Force/Army - Dual band VHF/UHF SAR

$10.4 M 9

$40.2 M

FIGURE D-9: PAYLOADS & SENSORS: IMINT. 

MASINT. Increases in resolution for imaging sensors (passive and active) are 

nearing a leveling point where new technologies will not produce leaps in resolution. 

Therefore, near and mid-term increases in the operational capability to detect, identify, 

and recognize targets will be based on increased target signature information, not just 

pixel resolution. A target may hide in a few dimensions but not in all, and once it is 

detected in one dimension, additional resources can be focused for recognition and 

identification. For example, normal two-dimensional spatial imaging of an obscure 

object of interest may be insufficient for detection unless and until it is combined with 

vibration or polarization data on the same object. The capability to increase target 

information content is enabled by this emerging multi-dimensional sensing technology. 

The following matrix shows the near term UAV specific and UAV applicable R&D 

programs currently identified by the services and agencies in this area. Total R&D 

spending on MASINT is $97.7 M, or approximately 56% of total spending on 

intelligence sensor R&D and 20% of overall payload and sensor R&D spending. Of this 

97.7 M, 28.2 M, or 29%, is on UAV specific sensors, while the remaining $69.5 M is on 

efforts applicable to UAVs. 

121
UAV Roadmap 2002 – Appendix D 

Technology Migration 

02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 U A

• Payloads & Sensors: MASINT

9 Rapid Overt Aerial Reconnaissance (ROAR)

USN-ONR - HIS mine detection

$28.2 M

Chemical Imaging Sensor/CB.19

Army - Ultra-high speed interferometers, high density FPAs, processing algorithms

$2.4 M 9

Day/Night Spectral Imaging for High Altitude and Space Reconnaissance/SE.95

USN/USAF

- MWIR/LWIR sensors, algorithms, processing

$28.4 M 9

Lightweight Airborne Multispectral Countermine Detection System/G.12

USN/ARMY -MSI/HIS, FPAs, SAR, illumination, polarization, MM wave, FOPEN sensors, on-board

processing, electronic image stabilization, payload weight reduction

$17.6 M 9

UAV Based Multi-Mode Magnetic Detection System USN-ONR

-Multi-Mode (dipole/ELF) detection, Swap, noise reduction, real-time target detection

$12.4 M 9

Standoff Biological Aerosol Detection/CB.35

Army - Real-time detection, range & sensitivity increases

$8.7 M 9

$97.7 M

02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 U A

• Payloads & Sensors: MASINT

9 Rapid Overt Aerial Reconnaissance (ROAR)

USN-ONR - HIS mine detection

$28.2 M 9 Rapid Overt Aerial Reconnaissance (ROAR)

USN-ONR - HIS mine detection

$28.2 M

Chemical Imaging Sensor/CB.19

Army - Ultra-high speed interferometers, high density FPAs, processing algorithms

Chemical Imaging Sensor/CB.19 $2.4 M 9

Army - Ultra-high speed interferometers, high density FPAs, processing algorithms

Chemical Imaging Sensor/CB.19 $2.4 M

Army - Ultra-high speed interferometers, high density FPAs, processing algorithms

$2.4 M 9

Day/Night Spectral Imaging for High Altitude and Space Reconnaissance/SE.95

USN/USAF

- MWIR/LWIR sensors, algorithms, processing

$28.4 M 9 Day/Night Spectral Imaging for High Altitude and Space Reconnaissance/SE.95

USN/USAF

- MWIR/LWIR sensors, algorithms, processing

Day/Night Spectral Imaging for High Altitude and Space Reconnaissance/SE.95 $28.4 M USN/USAF

- MWIR/LWIR sensors, algorithms, processing

$28.4 M 9

Lightweight Airborne Multispectral Countermine Detection System/G.12

USN/ARMY -MSI/HIS, FPAs, SAR, illumination, polarization, MM wave, FOPEN sensors, on-board

processing, electronic image stabilization, payload weight reduction

Lightweight Airborne Multispectral Countermine Detection S

US

yst

N

em

/A

/

R

G

M

.1

Y

2 $17.6 M 9 -MSI/HIS, FPAs, SAR, illumination, polarization, MM wave, FOPEN sensors, on-board

processing, electronic image stabilization, payload weight reduction

$17.6 M Lightweight Airborne Multispectral Countermine Detection System/G.12

USN/ARMY -MSI/HIS, FPAs, SAR, illumination, polarization, MM wave, FOPEN sensors, on-board

processing, electronic image stabilization, payload weight reduction

$17.6 M 9

UAV Based Multi-Mode Magnetic Detection System USN-ONR

-Multi-Mode (dipole/ELF) detection, Swap, noise reduction, real-time target detection

$12.4 M 9 UAV Based Multi-Mode Magnetic Detection System USN-ONR

-Multi-Mode (dipole/ELF) detection, Swap, noise reduction, real-time target detection

$12.4 M 9

Standoff Biological Aerosol Detection/CB.35

Army - Real-time detection, range & sensitivity increases

Standoff Biological Aerosol Detection/C

Ar

B

m

.35

y

$8.7 M 9 - Real-time detection, range & sensitivity increases

Standoff Biological Aerosol Detection/CB.35 $8.7 M Army - Real-time detection, range & sensitivity increases

$8.7 M 9

$97.7 M

FIGURE D-10: PAYLOADS & SENSORS: MASINT. 

SIGINT. A SIGINT system is expected to perform three functions: emitter 

mapping (geolocation of emitters), exploitation (signal content), and technical analysis of

new signals. The following matrix shows the near term UAV specific and UAV 

applicable R&D programs currently identified by the services and agencies in this area. 

Total R&D spending on SIGINT is $37 M, or approximately 21% of total spending on 

intelligence sensor R&D and 7% of overall payload and sensor R&D spending. None of 

this spending is on UAV specific programs, all is in UAV applicable programs. 

02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 U A

• Payloads & Sensors: SIGINT

Integrated Compact Electronic Sensors for Smart Sensor Webs/SE.70

Army/USAF

-Miniaturization/integration of sensors & components, networking & data fusion of m multi-domain sensor arrays

$37 M 9 $37 M

02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 U A

• Payloads & Sensors: SIGINT

Integrated Compact Electronic Sensors for Smart Sensor Webs/SE.70

Army/USAF

-Miniaturization/integration of sensors & components, networking & data fusion of m multi-domain sensor arrays

Integrated Compact Electronic Sensors for Smart Sensor W

Ar

e

m

b

y

s

/

/S

US

E

A

.70

F $37 M 9

-Miniaturization/integration of sensors & components, networking & data fusion of m multi-domain sensor arrays

Integrated Compact Electronic Sensors for Smart Sensor Webs/SE.70 $37 M Army/USAF

-Miniaturization/integration of sensors & components, networking & data fusion of m multi-domain sensor arrays

$37 M 9 $37 M

FIGURE D-11: PAYLOADS & SENSORS: SIGINT. 

Communication Payloads. The following matrix shows the near term UAV 

specific and UAV applicable R&D programs currently identified by the services and 

agencies in this area. Total spending on communications payload R&D is only $10.7 M 

– 2% of the sensors and payloads total, and only 4 tenths of 1% of overall spending on 

UAV R&D. All of this spending is on UAV specific programs. 

122
UAV Roadmap 2002 – Appendix D 

Technology Migration 

02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 U A

• Payloads & Sensors: Communication

Airborne Communications Payload

USN-ONR - Swap constraints of TUAV comms payload, OTH comms w/TCDL

$9 M 9

9 Dragon Warrior Communication Payload

USN-NRL - OTH reachback relay

$1.7 M $10.7 M

02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 U A

• Payloads & Sensors: Communication

Airborne Communications Payload

USN-ONR - Swap constraints of TUAV comms payload, OTH comms w/TCDL

$9 M 9 Airborne Communications Payload

USN-ONR - Swap constraints of TUAV comms payload, OTH comms w/TCDL

$9 M 9

9 Dragon Warrior Communication Payload

USN-NRL - OTH reachback relay

$1.7 M 9 Dragon Warrior Communication Payload

USN-NRL - OTH reachback relay

$1.7 M $10.7 M

FIGURE D-12: PAYLOADS & SENSORS: COMMUNICATION. 

Multi-Function RF Payloads. These payloads bridge the world of 

communication relay and intelligence sensor. Though optimized for neither mission, 

they have still demonstrated significant flexibility and utility. Though they are not 

intended to replace a high power, high fidelity collection or relay system, they will 

provide significant operational flexibility to a commander – especially in the early hours 

of a situation when force levels are low – through their ability to “morph” between 

missions. Additionally, they will provide ubiquitous, supporting collection capability as 

well as significant communications relay capability. The following matrix shows the 

near term UAV specific and UAV applicable R&D programs currently identified by the 

services and agencies in this area. Total spending on multi-function RF payload R&D is 

$175.8 M – 35% of the sensors and payloads total, and 7% of overall spending on UAV 

R&D. None of this spending is on UAV specific programs, all is in UAV applicable 

programs. 

• Payloads & Sensors: Multi-Function

02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 U A

Advanced Multi-Function RF Conc

US

e

NptO

 (V

N

2

R

) 9

- Technology, cost & Schedule risk reduction

$90.2 M

9 Advanced Multi-Function RF Concept (V1)

USN-ONR

- Multi-mission use of single RF antenna

$75.6 M

Airborne Communications Node/IS.59

DARPA - Co site/Co-channel interference, mobile ad-hoc networking, SWaP

$10 M 9 $175.8 M

• Payloads & Sensors: Multi-Function

02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 U A

Advanced Multi-Function RF Conc

US

e

NptO

 (V

N

2

R

) 9

- Technology, cost & Schedule risk reduction

$90.2 M

9 Advanced Multi-Function RF Concept (V1)

USN-ONR

- Multi-mission use of single RF antenna

$75.6 M

Airborne Communications Node/IS.59

DARPA - Co site/Co-channel interference, mobile ad-hoc networking, SWaP

$10 M 9 $175.8 M

02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 U A

Advanced Multi-Function RF Conc

US

e

NptO

 (V

N

2

R

) 9

- Technology, cost & Schedule risk reduction

Advanced Multi-Function RF Conc

US

e

NptO

 (V

N

2

R

) $90.2 M 9

- Technology, cost & Schedule risk reduction

$90.2 M

9 Advanced Multi-Function RF Concept (V1)

USN-ONR

- Multi-mission use of single RF antenna

$75.6 M 9 Advanced Multi-Function RF Concept (V1)

USN-ONR

- Multi-mission use of single RF antenna

$75.6 M

Airborne Communications Node/IS.59

DARPA - Co site/Co-channel interference, mobile ad-hoc networking, SWaP

$10 M 9 Airborne Communications Node/IS.59

DARPA - Co site/Co-channel interference, mobile ad-hoc networking, SWaP

Airborne Communications Node/IS.59 $10 M DARPA - Co site/Co-channel interference, mobile ad-hoc networking, SWaP

$10 M 9 $175.8 M

FIGURE D-13: PAYLOADS & SENSORS: MULIT-FUNCTION. 

Non-Imaging Radar Payloads. This single program constitutes the final distinct 

category of payload and sensor R&D. The $6.65 M in total spending on the program is 

only 1% of the sensors and payloads total and 2 tenths of 1% of overall spending on 

UAV R&D. It is a UAV specific program. 

02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 U A

9

Horizon Extension Sensor System USN-ONR - Small, high power, multiple active arrays

$6.65 M

• Payloads & Sensors: Radar

$6.65 M

02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 U A

9

Horizon Extension Sensor System USN-ONR - Small, high power, multiple active arrays

$6.65 M 9

Horizon Extension Sensor System USN-ONR - Small, high power, multiple active arrays

$6.65 M

• Payloads & Sensors: Radar

$6.65 M

FIGURE D-14: PAYLOADS & SENSORS: RADAR. 

123
UAV Roadmap 2002 – Appendix D 

Technology Migration 

Control Technology

Control-related R&D has been broken down into the major categories of General 

R&D, Health Management, Mixed-Initiative Control, Planning & Support, and 

Autonomy. Each is dealt with separately below, however overall spending on control 

related R&D totals $353.63 M, or 14% of total spending. Of this, $113.03 M, or 32%, is 

spent on UAV specific R&D programs, and the remaining 240.6 M, or 68%, is spent on 

UAV applicable R&D programs. Most R&D in air vehicle control technologies is either 

in the category of general R&D, or in the area of autonomy. General Control R&D 

spending amounts to $89.95 M, or 25% of the overall spending in this technology 

category. Of this, 34.15 M, or 38%, is on UAV specific programs, and $55.8 M, or 62% 

is on programs applicable to UAVs. Health Management spending is $4.1M, or 1% of 

the overall control technology spending. None of the money is being spent on UAV 

specific R&D. Spending on Mixed Initiative Control R&D amounts to 10.6 M, or 3% of 

overall control spending. 100% is being spent on UAV specific programs. 5.3M, or 1% 

of control spending is committed to Planning and Support R&D programs. None of it is 

for UAV specific programs. Finally, R&D into vehicle autonomy accounts for 69% of all 

spending in the category of control - $243.68 M, $68.28 M, or 28%, is for UAV specific 

R&D and the remaining $175.4 M, or 72%, is in programs with applicability to UAVs. 

124
UAV Roadmap 2002 – Appendix D 

Technology Migration 

02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09

• Control: General Deeply Networked Systems/IS.53

DARPA

- Communications, flexible networking & interfaces

$32.4 M

Immersive Interfaces & Visualization Techniques for Controlling Unmanned

Vehicles/HS.23 - USN/USAF - Interface concepts, task to display matching

$.3 M

$89.95M

U A

9

9

Joint Operational Test Bed System JFCOM

- Control Architectures

$2 M 9

Intelligent Flight Controls

USN-NAVAIR - Flight Control Predictive Diagnostics

$.7 M 9

Distributed and Infocentric Reliable Control Technologies

USAF/USN-NAVAIR -Data latency & noise failure issues, counter EW/IO, distributed system management

$.8 M 9

Intelligent Flight Controls & Automated/Assisted Maneuvering 9

USN-ONR/USAF

- Algorithm development

$1.2 M

Validation & Verification of Intelligent/Adaptive Control Systems USAF -Non-deterministic software, cost reduction-

$1 M 9

Control of Multi-Mission UAV Systems

USAF - Optimize HW&SW redundancy, self-awareness/self-adaptive logic

$10.45 M 9

Precision Autonomous Landing Adaptive Control Experiment

Army - RW control law concepts, architecture, performance criteria

$17.8 M 9

Manned/Unmanned Common Architecture Program

-System definition, state of the art COTS based component optimization, cost reduction $21.1 M 9

Adaptive Control for Shipboard AutoUSLa

A

n

F

d 9 - Control algorithm development, sensor dropout/control saturation at low speed issues

$.8 M

$1 M 9

Adaptive Control for Carrier Auto-Land 9

USN-ONR/NAVAIR/NAWC

- ALS for VSTOL UAVs, All Weather, algorithmdevelopment

$.4 M

Flight Control Predictive Diagnostics

USN-ONR/NAVAIR

-Diagnostic software to predict future control hardware failure

02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09

• Control: General Deeply Networked Systems/IS.53

DARPA

- Communications, flexible networking & interfaces

Deeply Networked Systems/IS.53 $32.4 M

DARPA

- Communications, flexible networking & interfaces

$32.4 M

Immersive Interfaces & Visualization Techniques for Controlling Unmanned

Vehicles/HS.23 - USN/USAF - Interface concepts, task to display matching

$.3 M Immersive Interfaces & Visualization Techniques for Controlling Unmanned

Vehicles/HS.23 - USN/USAF - Interface concepts, task to display matching

$.3 M

$89.95M

U A

9

9

Joint Operational Test Bed System JFCOM

- Control Architectures

$2 M 9 Joint Operational Test Bed System JFCOM

- Control Architectures

$2 M 9

Intelligent Flight Controls

USN-NAVAIR - Flight Control Predictive Diagnostics

Intelligent Fl

U

ig

S

h

N-NA

t Con

V

tr

A

o

IR

ls $.7 M 9 - Flight Control Predictive Diagnostics

$.7 M 9

Distributed and Infocentric Reliable Control Technologies

USAF/USN-NAVAIR -Data latency & noise failure issues, counter EW/IO, distributed system management

$.8 M 9 Distributed and Infocentric Reliable Control Technologies

USAF/USN-NAVAIR -Data latency & noise failure issues, counter EW/IO, distributed system management

$.8 M 9

Intelligent Flight Controls & Automated/Assisted Maneuvering 9

USN-ONR/USAF

- Algorithm development

Intelligent Flight Controls & Automated/Assisted Maneuvering $1.2 M 9

USN-ONR/USAF

- Algorithm development

$1.2 M

Validation & Verification of Intelligent/Adaptive Control Systems USAF -Non-deterministic software, cost reduction-

$1 M 9 Validation & Verification of Intelligent/Adaptive Control Systems USAF -Non-deterministic software, cost reduction-

$1 M 9

Control of Multi-Mission UAV Systems

USAF - Optimize HW&SW redundancy, self-awareness/self-adaptive logic

$10.45 M 9 Control of Multi-Mission UAV Systems

USAF - Optimize HW&SW redundancy, self-awareness/self-adaptive logic

$10.45 M 9

Precision Autonomous Landing Adaptive Control Experiment

Army - RW control law concepts, architecture, performance criteria

Precision Autonomous Landing Adaptive Control Experi

Ar

me

m

nt

y $17.8 M 9 - RW control law concepts, architecture, performance criteria

$17.8 M 9

Manned/Unmanned Common Architecture Program

-System definition, state of the art COTS based component optimization, cost reduction $21.1 M 9 Manned/Unmanned Common Architecture Program

-System definition, state of the art COTS based component optimization, cost reduction $21.1 M 9

Adaptive Control for Shipboard AutoUSLa

A

n

F

d 9 - Control algorithm development, sensor dropout/control saturation at low speed issues

Adaptive Control for Shipboard Auto-Land

USAF - Control algorithm development, sensor dropout/control saturation at low speed issues

$.8 M

$1 M 9

Adaptive Control for Carrier Auto-Land 9

USN-ONR/NAVAIR/NAWC

- ALS for VSTOL UAVs, All Weather, algorithmdevelopment

Adaptive Control for Carrier Auto-Land

USN-ONR/NAVAIR/NAWC

- ALS for VSTOL UAVs, All Weather, algorithmdevelopment

$.4 M

Flight Control Predictive Diagnostics

USN-ONR/NAVAIR

-Diagnostic software to predict future control hardware failure

FIGURE D-15: CONTROL: GENERAL. 

02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 U A

• Control: Health Management

$4.1 M JT Advanced Health & Usage Monitoring System ACTD/F.18

USN -Develop health & usage monitoring stds, eval technologies to improve safety, performance, maintenance & availability

$1.7 M 9

Advanced Vehicle Management Technology

USAF

- Photonic vehicle management, use of COTS optical sensors

$2.4 M 9

• Control: Mixed Initiative

Airborne Manned/Unmanned System Technology (AMUST)

Army - Control mechanisms, intelligent linkages, hardware integration

$10.6 M 9 $10.6 M

• Control: Planning & Support

$5.3 M

On-scene Weather Sensing and Prediction Capability/BE.04

USN

- Data assimilation, fusion, quality control, interpretation

$5.3 M 9

02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 U A

• Control: Health Management

$4.1 M JT Advanced Health & Usage Monitoring System ACTD/F.18

USN -Develop health & usage monitoring stds, eval technologies to improve safety, performance, maintenance & availability

$1.7 M 9

Advanced Vehicle Management Technology

USAF

- Photonic vehicle management, use of COTS optical sensors

Advanced Vehicle Management Technology $2.4 M 9

USAF

- Photonic vehicle management, use of COTS optical sensors

Advanced Vehicle Management Technology $2.4 M

USAF

- Photonic vehicle management, use of COTS optical sensors

$2.4 M 9

• Control: Mixed Initiative

Airborne Manned/Unmanned System Technology (AMUST)

Army - Control mechanisms, intelligent linkages, hardware integration

Airborne Manned/Unmanned System Technology (AMU

Ar

S

m

T

y

) $10.6 M 9 - Control mechanisms, intelligent linkages, hardware integration

$10.6 M 9 $10.6 M

• Control: Planning & Support

$5.3 M

On-scene Weather Sensing and Prediction Capability/BE.04

USN

- Data assimilation, fusion, quality control, interpretation

On-scene Weather Sensing and Prediction Capability/B

US

E.0

N

4 $5.3 M 9 - Data assimilation, fusion, quality control, interpretationOn-scene Weather Sensing and Prediction Capability/BE.04 $5.3 M USN

- Data assimilation, fusion, quality control, interpretation

$5.3 M 9

FIGURE D-16: CONTROL: HEALTH MANAGEMENT/MIXED INITIATIVE/PLANNING & SUPPORT. 

125
UAV Roadmap 2002 – Appendix D 

Technology Migration 

02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 U A

9 Software for Autonomous Systems/IS.52

Army/USN/USAF/DARPA

-Autonomy, adaptive real-time control, fault detection and reconfiguration, control

processing and avionics architectures, and coordinated formation flight

$117.8 M

• Control: Autonomy Pathfinder ACTD/M.17 9 SOCOM

- Cooperative robotics, LPI/LPD non-LOS comms, data integration & presentation

$243.68 M $8 M

UAV Autonomy & Intelligent Autonomy 9 USN-ONR

- Situational aw areness, multi-vehicle networks, dynamic replanning, intelligent autonomy

$56 M

9 Integrated Autonomous Systems

USN-NAVAIR

- Integrated autonomous vehicle algorithm development

$3.3 M

UAV Net-Centric Intelligent Control & Autonomy 9 USN-ONR

- Collaborative Intelligent Agents, intelligent control systems, mobile w ireless internetworking

$11.75 M

9 Automated Aerial Refueling

USAF

- Data link, multi-ship control, manned/unmanned operations, control in tanker wake

$25.6 M

Autonomous Flight Control Sensing Technology

USAF $1.4 M 9

9 Automatic Air Collision Avoidance System

USAF

- Algorithm development, data fusion, maneuvering logic

$10.23 M

Distributed Control for Autonomous Teams

USAF

- Dynamic teaming, assignment, cooperative tasks

$1.6 M 9

Internet In The Sky

USN-ONR

- Agent based network centric operations, collaborative mission planning & execution

$8 M 9

02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 U A

9 Software for Autonomous Systems/IS.52

Army/USN/USAF/DARPA

-Autonomy, adaptive real-time control, fault detection and reconfiguration, control

processing and avionics architectures, and coordinated formation flight

$117.8 M

• Control: Autonomy Pathfinder ACTD/M.17 9 SOCOM

- Cooperative robotics, LPI/LPD non-LOS comms, data integration & presentation

Pathfinder ACTD/M.17 $8 M 9 SOCOM

- Cooperative robotics, LPI/LPD non-LOS comms, data integration & presentation

Pathfinder ACTD/M.17 $8 M SOCOM

- Cooperative robotics, LPI/LPD non-LOS comms, data integration & presentation

Pathfinder ACTD/M.17

SOCOM

- Cooperative robotics, LPI/LPD non-LOS comms, data integration & presentation

$243.68 M $8 M

UAV Autonomy & Intelligent Autonomy 9 USN-ONR

- Situational aw areness, multi-vehicle networks, dynamic replanning, intelligent autonomy

UAV Autonomy & Intelligent Autonomy $56 M 9 USN-ONR

- Situational aw areness, multi-vehicle networks, dynamic replanning, intelligent autonomy

UAV Autonomy & Intelligent Autonomy $56 M USN-ONR

- Situational aw areness, multi-vehicle networks, dynamic replanning, intelligent autonomy

UAV Autonomy & Intelligent Autonomy

USN-ONR

- Situational aw areness, multi-vehicle networks, dynamic replanning, intelligent autonomy

$56 M

9 Integrated Autonomous Systems

USN-NAVAIR

- Integrated autonomous vehicle algorithm development

$3.3 M 9 Integrated Autonomous Systems

USN-NAVAIR

- Integrated autonomous vehicle algorithm development

9 Integrated Autonomous Systems

USN-NAVAIR

- Integrated autonomous vehicle algorithm development

Integrated Autonomous Systems

USN-NAVAIR

- Integrated autonomous vehicle algorithm development

$3.3 M

UAV Net-Centric Intelligent Control & Autonomy 9 USN-ONR

- Collaborative Intelligent Agents, intelligent control systems, mobile w ireless internetworking

UAV Net-Centric Intelligent Control & Autonomy $11.75 M 9 USN-ONR

- Collaborative Intelligent Agents, intelligent control systems, mobile w ireless internetworking

$11.75 M

9 Automated Aerial Refueling

USAF

- Data link, multi-ship control, manned/unmanned operations, control in tanker wake

$25.6 M 9 Automated Aerial Refueling

USAF

- Data link, multi-ship control, manned/unmanned operations, control in tanker wake

$25.6 M

Autonomous Flight Control Sensing Technology

USAF $1.4 M 9 Autonomous Flight Control Sensing TechnologyUSAF $1.4 M 9

9 Automatic Air Collision Avoidance System

USAF

- Algorithm development, data fusion, maneuvering logic

$10.23 M 9 Automatic Air Collision Avoidance System

USAF

- Algorithm development, data fusion, maneuvering logic

$10.23 M

Distributed Control for Autonomous Teams

USAF

- Dynamic teaming, assignment, cooperative tasks

$1.6 M 9 Distributed Control for Autonomous Teams

USAF

- Dynamic teaming, assignment, cooperative tasks

$1.6 M 9

Internet In The Sky

USN-ONR

- Agent based network centric operations, collaborative mission planning & execution

$8 M 9 Internet In The Sky

USN-ONR

- Agent based network centric operations, collaborative mission planning & execution

$8 M 9

FIGURE D-17: CONTROL: AUTONOMY. 

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Small UAVs 

Appendix E: Small UAVs 

Introduction 

The subject of “small” UAVs is one guaranteed to raise controversy in any 

discussion of UAVs. Though there will likely be as many opinions as participants in the 

discussion, the central points of contention will likely revolve around the issues of 

whether small UAVs should be treated as a separate class, and “how small is small”, i.e. 

what exactly constitutes a “small” UAV ad where is the dividing line between this class 

and the next one up? Both questions relate to the fundamental issue of how UAV’s are 

differentiated by class - by mission, size, support requirements, etc.? As with the world 

of manned aircraft, class differentiation in UAVs has historically been made along 

mission lines rather than platform size; fighters, bombers, reconnaissance, etc for manned 

aircraft, and long range/endurance, short range, close range, etc. for UAVs. The question 

of size as a class arose only recently with the advances in technology that allowed small 

aircraft to accomplish militarily relevant missions. For the purpose of this document, a 

small UAV is defined as follows:7

a. For UAVs designed to be employed by themselves - any UAV system where all 

system components (i.e. – air vehicles, ground control/user interface element, and 

communication equipment) are fully transportable by foot-mobile troops 

b. For UAVs designed to be employed from larger aircraft (manned or unmanned) – 

any UAV system where the air vehicle can be loaded on the larger aircraft without 

the use of mechanical loaders (i.e. – 2 man lift, etc) 

Between 1996 and 2000, DARPA focused attention on this new area of UAV 

growth with its Micro Air Vehicle program. In this program, DARPA established what 

can be considered the present lower end of the UAV size spectrum by describing a micro 

air vehicle as one six inches or smaller - the first definition of a UAV class based solely 

on size.8

 Between the micro and what was commonly called the tactical class of UAVs 

there remained a large undefined, unclassified area. As the DARPA program began to 

demonstrate that very small vehicles were indeed capable of executing militarily relevant 

missions, less ambitious developmental efforts began to field candidate UAV systems 

defined by size that fell into this “no mans land” and the debate was on, using terms like 

small, squad, man portable, backpackable, etc in an attempt to put a label on their piece 

of “small”. For good or ill, the size of the air vehicle had become an alternative standard 

to mission in defining the relevance of a UAV system. 

The fundamental relevance of small UAVs – and the reason for their being 

addressed as a separate “class” of vehicle – is, indeed, a function of their size. However, 

 

7

 This definition is not intended to preclude the individual services from developing a more nuanced 

definition that is more reflective of the limitations and demands of their operational environments. 8

 This decision on size was primarily a programmatic one based on the need to define the objective of the 

program with a goal that was suitably hard enough to justify DARPA involvement. Although it has 

become the de facto ‘industry standard’ to define micro, it is not doctrinally or technically based and is not 

immutable Rather, it has served to date as a convenient benchmark primarily because no other government 

agency has provided an alternative definition. 

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the relevance is not, as many have attempted to argue, that their small size imparts some

unique function or mission relevance to them that is missing in larger vehicles. 

Additional confusion has been imparted by economics, since small UAVs have tended to 

be technologically unsophisticated and hence cheap in comparison with their larger 

brothers (Pioneer, Hunter, Predator, etc). This relative low cost has resulted in their 

attractiveness as expendable systems, to the degree that many portray and perceive this 

feature as a unique capability of this “class” of UAVs. The relevance of small UAVs is 

routed in neither unique missions nor economy, but rather in the operational impact of 

simple logistics. By virtue of their size, “small” UAVs offer flexibility in operational 

employment that larger, more logistically complex and intense UAVs do not. 

In the case of ground force employment, this smaller size imparts a concomitant 

mobility that allows small UAVs to provide an immediate tactical responsiveness to the 

supported unit that larger UAVs can not because of their more extensive logistical 

support requirements. This is because prior to the paradigm shift that “small” UAVs 

enable, it was a given that aircraft - whether manned or unmanned – were relatively large. 

The tactical impact of this was that aviation support functions had to be based in the 

operational depth of the battle space, imparting a time distance factor to tactical requests 

for aviation support. Small UAVs eliminate that time delay in ground combat. They 

provide the commander with the ability to gather real-time information of the battlefield 

immediately to his front – over the next hill or behind the next building; they have the 

ability to provide the commander with combat information, immediately, as opposed to 

combat intelligence at some point in the future. Unlike their larger, more costly, more 

complex and logistically intense brothers, manned and unmanned, small UAVs currently 

under development will be able to be deployed literally at the front lines, at the company 

or platoon level, and will provide the commander with what amounts to a pair of flying 

binoculars. 

Other such missions not directly related to ground combatant forces would 

include local security for airfields and port complexes; perimeter security for single naval 

vessels in foreign ports, support to Special Forces operations, and local security for 

national building operations. The list is as extensive as the need for local security. This 

imparts a second defining characteristic to this “class” of UAV – the fact that it is 

providing raw data directly to the commander in the same manner that other local 

security assets (observation posts, scouts, patrols, etc) would. The systems are not 

designed to primarily be Reconnaissance & Surveillance assets feeding a higher echelon. 

In an operational sense, they are direct support assets for the unit employing them. 

In the case of air and naval force employment, their smaller size enables them to 

be employed as force multipliers with larger, more capable systems – such as the use of

Predator A-employed FINDER UAVs in the Counter Proliferation II ACTD, the addition 

of UAVs to AC-130 gunships, the employment of UAVs such as LEWK or 2.75 Inch 

rocket from aircraft, the capabilities imparted by UAVs such as WASP employed from a 

surface combatant’s naval cannon, or those deployed from submarines. In addition to 

these existing systems, this method of symbiotic employment lends itself to concepts 

such as a system of ground sensors based on small UAVs that would be delivered to the 

battlefield by a larger, loitering UAV – possibly with stealth characteristics or a high 

altitude airship. These sensors would be capable of self employment as well as 

autonomous adjustment based on operational requirements. In all these scenarios – 

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Small UAVs 

existent and conceptual – the use of small UAVs in conjunction with larger vehicles 

reinforces the strengths of both systems and yields a true force multiplier effect. 

Although the principal focus of “small” UAV systems to date has been the ground force, 

small unit support mission, it is likely that the real applicability of these systems in the 

future will be not as independent systems but as adjuncts to other, more capable UAVs. 

“Small” UAVs are attempting to answer long standing and well documented 

service requirements, at least for the ground forces. After the Gulf War, for example, the 

Marine Corps codified its requirement to see “over the hill” in the Close Range UAV 

ORD based on Gulf War lessons learned. To date, however, little effort and money has 

been expended in comparison to larger UAV programs such as Global Hawk and 

Predator, however recent service emphasis in this area is seen in such programs as the 

Marine Corps Warfighting Lab’s Dragon Eye and Dragon Warrior programs, the Navy 

XUAV ACTD, and the DARPA/Army MAV ACTD and OAV program. Although a 

significant dearth of capability remains in this area (see Figure E-1), given the growth 

potential and current commercial effort expended in the last few years in this sector of the 

UAV market (encouraged by DoD interest as evidenced by current procurement and 

developmental platforms listed), it is expected that significant numbers of “small” UAV 

systems will be developed and fielded in the period covered by this roadmap. The lack of

articulated requirements by naval and air forces should not be interpreted as a 

applicability or need, but rather the reality that requirements generation cycle has not yet 

caught up with this transformational capabilities imparted by this rapidly evolving 

technology. 

0.01

0.1

1

10

100

1000

10000

100000

0.1 1 10 100 Wing Span, m

T

otal Weight, 

k

g

Gasoline

Electric

Turbine

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Theseus

Tern

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Shadow 600

Shadow 200

STM 5B

Raptor

Prowler

Predator

Porter

Pioneer

Perseus B

Pathfinder

Outrider

Model 410

Model 324, M>1 Model 350, M>1

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Army/DARPA

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Dragon Eye

Raven

Dragon Warrior

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XUAV

Silent Eyes 115

Aerosonde Mk3

FIGURE E-1: UAV WINGSPAN VS. WEIGHT. 

In this respect, “small” UAVs represent a class of systems with much greater 

opportunity for competition due to their simplicity and use of COTS technology. This 

implies at least low cost, large numbers and probably a wide range of capabilities. These 

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Small UAVs 

attributes also imply a rapid evolution, or spiral development process as capabilities and 

missions expand – somewhat similar to the evolution of personal computing devices. 

These factors present both great opportunities and significant challenges to the 

management of the “small” UAVs within DoD. 

Missions 

Currently, there are no missions unique to small UAVs, however technology 

limitations do impact the payloads that they can realistically carry and hence impose 

defacto mission limitations on these systems. Current UAV mission capabilities are a 

function of multiple factors, including payload, range, volume of data collected, 

processing requirements, etc. As air vehicle size is decreased to allow employment by 

logistically austere organizations SWaP thresholds are crossed which eliminate the 

possibility or employing certain sensor payloads and hence potential missions. For 

example, at the current and foreseeable state of the art, data and power intensive payloads 

such as conventional SAR and HSI are not supportable in small UAVs. Conversely, 

there are a number of mission that small UAVs are particularly well suited for. Further, 

these missions require basic, existing payloads. The most prominent and pressing of 

these missions is the critical need for force protection, especially small unit situational 

awareness: local security, reconnaissance and surveillance and target acquisition – the 

need to see literally over the next hill, across the clearing and behind the building to find 

enemy soldiers – missions current tactical UAV systems can not conduct in a timely 

manner. Other potential missions could include biological and chemical agent detection 

and communications relay, critical resupply, precise bomb damage assessment, or even 

the possibility of future small UAVs having a lethal capability. 

Although technology limits current missions, it conversely appears poised to 

reverse this situation in the near future. Current technology initiatives – if they realize 

their potential - have the potential to impart a unique mission niche to this class of UAVs. 

R&D in small VTOL UAVs has been a significant outgrowth of the DARPA MAV 

program. Commercial and government efforts, most notably the current DARPA/Army 

OAV program and MAV ACTD, are working to develop a class of vehicles capable of 

autonomous flight, precision landing and independent re-launch. While current VTOL 

UAV systems have this ability, when it is incorporated into a small air vehicle the 

operational significance it imparts increases markedly. Small size reduces the likelihood 

of detection; hence a class of small VTOL UAVs would be capable of missions such as 

precision delivery of unattended ground sensors (UGS) - or other sensors – perhaps even 

function as re-locatable UGS themselves. In this latter category, a small UAV with 

precision landing capabilities enables a “perch & stare” mission that allows for long-term

surveillance of a high interest area for periods up to weeks at a time. In short, if any area 

of UAV technology can encourage “out of the box” thinking, it is the developmental 

technology associated with small UAVs. 

Critical Technology Areas for Direct Support UAV Evolution 

The DARPA MAV program did good work in establishing the technical 

foundations for work with very small air vehicles by identifying and pursuing critical 

technology areas and unique problems associated with very small vehicle flight. 

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UAV Roadmap 2002 – Appendix E 

Small UAVs 

Although all small UAVs will not operate in this extreme of the flight envelope, there are 

a number of critical technologies that are common to Small UAVs given the smaller 

physical size of the air vehicles. Among these are continuing advances in miniaturization 

– especially of processors – which will play a key role in advances in small UAV 

capability. The operational and tactical relevance imparted by the smaller air vehicle size 

of small UAVs demands that design size and weight be limited. Rapidly emerging 

electronic miniaturization technology will facilitate the development of a lightweight air 

vehicle and control system that will ultimately be transported by a single soldier.

Command & Control. To achieve their full operational potential, small UAVs 

must be built with the expectation that they will be employed by non-specialist operators 

whose primary job is something other than operating the UAV. This demands both a 

highly simple and intuitive control interface (a good GUI-Graphic User Interface) and the 

capability for autonomous vehicle operation by one or more vehicles being controlled by 

a single operator. At the same time, operational responsibility for tasks must migrate 

from the ground station to the air vehicles, the air vehicles gaining greater autonomy and 

authority, the humans moving from operators to supervisors, increasing their span of 

control while decreasing the manpower requirements to operate the UAVs. To make this 

so, critical technologies need working, both in the air vehicle and command elements of 

the UAV systems. 

Air Vehicle Element. Today small UAVs are mostly remotely piloted, but in 

recent years autonomy has been introduced to reduce required operator training, as well 

as accidents. This needs to continue to free up the human for other duties. Currently, 

small UAVs demonstrate an autonomous control level (ACL) level of 2. ACLs of 4 to 6 

would allow the human operator(s) to accomplish other duties as well as UAV operation. 

Control technology areas which need continued support and growth to enable the full 

potential of small UAVs are: 

• Onboard Intelligence – The more intelligence we can ‘pack” into the UAV, the 

more complicated task we can assign it to, and the less oversight required by human 

operators. We must continue efforts to increase intelligence of these vehicles, 

which means the services must not only look at their intelligent systems investment 

portfolios, but they must also assess the best way to package this intelligence into 

small packages. 

• Teaming/Swarming – Getting groups of small UAVs to team (or swarm) in order to 

accomplish an objective will require significant investments in distributed control 

technologies which allow swarming, but do not require huge computational 

overhead or large communications bandwidth. Technology areas, such as bioinspired control, offer paths to do such distributed control, but are now just coming 

out of the 6.1 world into 6.2. More work needs to be completed toward maturing 

these technologies via demos in the near term to show utility to the warfighter. 

Again, this takes the vehicles from an ACL of 2 to 6. 

• Health Management – small UAVs are looked at as expendable; however, they 

must still be able to fulfill a mission. Health management technologies need to be 

integrated to ensure that they are ready to go for the next mission, as well as to let 

the operator know that they will not be able to complete the current mission so that 

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Small UAVs 

other assets can be tasked. These technologies are available; they just need to be 

modified to operate in the small UAV system environment. 

• Collision avoidance – Small UAVs will either be launched from or working in close 

proximity to manned and other unmanned systems. These small UAVs, while not 

extremely massive, contain enough mass, fuel, and rotating machinery to damage 

machines and harm humans. Methods in keeping with the overall affordability of 

the vehicles must be developed. Collision avoidance technology currently in 

development for large UAVs (such as AFRL’s Auto-Aircraft Collision Avoidance 

System (ACAS) system) is not well suited for direct application to small UAVs. 

Research is required into sensors and algorithms to ensure safe small UAV 

operation in a combined arms task force. 

• Affordability – This cannot be ignored for as technology might determine whether a 

system is practical or not, the affordability determines whether it is actually 

purchased. Small UAVs are being designed to be put in harms way – we will loose 

them. We must ensure that keeping them in the supply chain will not harm

pocketbooks. We must reduce system complexity and software lines of code where 

possible. Again, bio-inspired control techniques offer reduced software costs. 

More research into their application needs to be accomplished to bring them

through 6.3 to enter product spiral development. 

• Sensing - Sensing isn’t only required for ISR and ATR applications, the 

autonomous small UAV must be able to “see” where it’s going. The small UAV 

will have to develop, and maintain, some semblance of situational awareness, and 

this will come from on-board sensing. These must be small, and they must be 

affordable. Currently situational awareness sensors are being developed for small 

UAVs; continued emphasis on their development should insure their availability for 

small UAV use. 

Command Element. The ground element is the portal that the human has to the 

UAV. As the UAV is given more autonomy, the role of the human using it will evolve 

from pilot, to operator, to supervisor, with the level of interaction with the UAV(s) 

moving to higher levels. Some of the critical technologies include: 

• Lightweight – whether installed in an aircraft, truck, ship, or slung on a soldier’s 

back, the weight and size of the command element must be minimized. Current 

efforts are looking at using PDA sized command consoles should continue for the 

man-portable systems. 

• Assured Communication – Small UAVs are only as good as the links that bind them

to the human operators. Current man-portable links have limited range. We also 

have to worry about information assuredness. Standardization Agreements, such as 

NATO Standardization Agreement (STANAG) 4586, make it easier for 

interoperability, but they also make available a portal from which enemies could 

hack into our systems. UAVs are info centric, and we must ensure we provide 

protection from cyber warfare. 

• Displays – as the human interfaces with the UAVs at higher levels, the human must 

trust the UAV to do more. To develop and keep that trust the human must be able 

to delve intent of the UAV. Displays that show intent, as well as the algorithms

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UAV Roadmap 2002 – Appendix E 

Small UAVs 

which develop the intent, must be matured. Currently ground-breaking work in this 

area is being undertaken by Air Force UCAV; work needs to be accomplished to 

migrate this technology to smaller and less expensive systems. These displays 

must also show the operator what is going on at a glance, and must fit into the 

lightweight system requirements as outlined above. 

• Voice Control – One area that might not be receiving the attention it deserves is the 

capability to voice command the UAVs. Voice recognition technology has been 

around for years, but only recently has algorithm and hardware advances made it 

practical for small and critical applications. DoD S&T organizations continue to 

research and develop this technology. Now is the time to harvest that research and 

ally it to reducing the complexity of command and control interfaces to small 

UAVs. 

Propulsion. Small UAVs, especially at the individual, squad company scale, have a 

different set of requirements than larger vehicles because propulsion systems don't scale 

uniformly (i.e. as size changes the percent of the total weight of various components 

changes.) Smaller engines have higher rpm but the weight of gears to reduce the rpm of 

the fan/propeller is more of a burden on the smaller systems (transmissions don't scale 

down well.) For example a large (20,000 pounds of thrust) gas turbine has the low turbine 

running at a max speed of less than 10,000 rpm while a small (10 pound) gas turbine runs 

at 150,000 rpm and a micro (1 pound thrust) gas turbine runs at over 500,000 rpm. While 

the small propellers can run at higher rpm, due to smaller diameter the tip speed will 

produce additional noise if it is to high. Developing small engines to run on JP-8 is 

another area of research. There are several activities that have shown promise in 

addressing this issue, including a DARPA program that is building a small engine that 

runs on pure JP-8, without additives. 

Hovering. DARPA currently has two programs (OAV & MAV ACTD) are 

pursuing ducted fan air vehicles with the ability to hover and fly in forward flight 

efficiently. A goal of these programs is to field a vehicle with the ability to "Perch & 

Stare". Conceptually, this would enable the UAV to land in a place that it can observe 

the scene where enemy activity is a concern. When the SUAV observes movement it 

notifies the human by sending a picture of the object that has moved. This reduces the 

fuel required to operate and increases the time on station significantly and eliminates the 

users need to "watch" the video screen. The SUAV does not send pictures unless 

requested or movement is detected further reducing the power required. 

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UAV Roadmap 2002 – Appendix F 

Standards 

Appendix F: Standards 

Introduction 

Interoperability among UAV systems is critical in order to reduce acquisition 

costs, share sensor data among disparate users, ease issues of operational and tactical 

control (OPCON and TACCON), allow common operational procedures and reduce 

training requirements. Interoperability, in this context, includes establishing appropriate 

technical architectures, interface standards and standard operational procedures. 

Hardware commonality, while desirable when practical so as to reduce acquisition and 

support costs, is not required to achieve interoperability under this definition. UAV 

interoperability requirements exist within the framework of existing manned aviation, 

ISR system, and Strike system interoperability architectures and are not unique 

requirements. The overarching goal intends that UAV systems contribute effective 

support to commanders through interoperability, not only with manned aviation, but with 

the entire spectrum of forces where they are operating. For near-term UAVs, the arena is 

predominately ISR with evolving capability in combat and combat support mission areas. 

The UAV roadmap will, where practical, specify those specific standards which 

OSD expects to be implemented and which OSD will monitor during program and 

funding reviews. 

The roadmap will discuss the preferred framework and methodology for 

establishment of interoperability within the UAV domain. Generically, this involves 

establishment of a UAV operational architecture, synchronization of applicable system

architectures and refinement of the appropriate technical architecture. Historically, 

attempts at UAV interoperability originated primarily in the Intelligence, Surveillance 

and Reconnaissance domain through establishment of standards. Thus the elements of 

the technical architecture were developed in the absence of an operational architecture. 

The proposed methodologies for control of these architectures, once they are developed, 

will also be discussed. 

The final objective of the roadmap will be to identify the “way ahead” for UAV 

interoperability. Development of the roadmap has led to identification of roadblocks or 

impediments to implementation of the current philosophy of UAV interoperability. 

Future actions will be recommended in order to address these impediments, allowing the 

continued evolution of interoperability among UAVs and improving the interoperability 

between UAVs and the broader Warfighter community. 

Overview and Objectives of Current Standardization Efforts 

This section of the UAV roadmap will cover current and emerging 

standardization efforts and will identify those portions of the Joint Technical Architecture 

(JTA) mandated for UAVs. Future efforts required to resolve contentious issues and to 

extend and improve interoperability through standardization will also be identified. 

The DoD Acquisition Deskbook (http://web1.deskbook.osd.mil/default.asp) states

that architecture views, as graphic representations of data, are very important to the C4I 

Support Plan review process. The Deskbook defines three types of Architecture Views – 

the Operational View (OV), the Systems View (SV), and the Technical View (TV). The 

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UAV Roadmap 2002 – Appendix F 

Standards 

systematic development of these architectures is essential to the development of 

interoperable C4ISR/DoD Architecture Framework-compliant systems. This is a process 

that shall be put into place for the UAV effort through development of UAV OV, SV, and 

TV.

DoD is developing a Joint Warfighter domain consisting of a Joint Operational 

Architecture (JOA), Joint Systems Architecture (JSA), and Joint Technical Architecture 

(JTA). The JTA is the only portion of the DoD joint architecture that is fully developed. 

The JTA is the DoD-level technical architecture and is mandated for all C4I applications 

including UAV. It provides the “building codes” (i.e., standards) for a seamless flow of 

information to support the Warfighter. The current JTA focuses on Information 

Technology (IT) (i.e., the transfer, processing, and protection of information). The JTA 

4.0 also contains a Aviation Annex, Weapon System Annex, C4ISR Domain Annex and a 

Crypto logic Sub-domain Annex, both of which are applicable to UAV. If no 

overarching TV is developed for aircraft, it is envisioned that a UAV Technical View 

will be developed to augment the JTA information technology standards to meet the 

needs of the UAV community and to expand the scope beyond the information 

technology focus. 

The top-level UAV functional architecture is divided into several key regimes. 

These include tasking, collection, processing, exploitation and dissemination. 

Standardization of the entire process is beyond the scope of the UAV roadmap. To 

achieve UAV interoperability, standardization is required in the regimes of situational 

awareness, control, tasking, collection, processing and dissemination. The portions of the 

cycle from control until the product is exploited or posted or the target is destroyed, are 

pertinent to the UAV roadmap in order to ensure platform, sensor and weapons 

interoperability while providing data to users in standard formats. 

Situational awareness deals with basic UAV data to allow for an understanding of 

the location, type, and route of the UAV. This data is necessary for airspace integration 

in military or civil application. It is the basic data set virtually all UAVs should provide 

and will become another level in the defined levels of interoperability. 

The intent of the standards section of the roadmap is to identify current and 

emerging standards that are the basis of UAV interoperability. 

Joint Technical Architecture 

Joint Technical Architecture (JTA) 3.1 and 4.0 provide flexibility for standards 

selection as they cover the full spectrum of interoperability throughout a broad range of 

applications. 

At times, this will involve down selecting from several potentially applicable 

standards within the JTA. It may also involve supplementing the current JTA with 

additional interoperability guidance. The roadmap will identify, where practical, 

emerging standards that may be mandated in the future. The roadmap will also identify 

areas where standards development is required, but where the standards and systems 

maturity is not such that usage of those standards is anticipated within the short-term. 

Note that UAV interoperability must be achieved within the context DoD ISR and of 

manned aircraft, space, command and control, combat arms and other domains that 

interact with the UAV domain. UAV interoperability must be worked within the broader 

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Standards 

DoD architecture in order to maximize the value of interoperability to DoD as a whole. 

The clear intent is to develop only those standards, which do not currently exist or to 

modify existing standards where practical. 

NATO Standardization Agreements 

Standardization Agreements (STANAGS) either contained in the JTA or to be 

placed in the JTA, are the preeminent interoperability standards. Within NATO, Air 

Group IV (AG IV) has developed the NATO ISR Interoperability Architecture (NIIA) 

(AEDP-2) that defines the technical view of architecture for national and NATO-owned 

ISR systems. (The systems view and operational view are being developed in 

coordination by operational elements of SHAPE.) This architecture is based on critical 

interfaces, thereby allowing each nation to develop systems that meet national needs, 

while still maintaining interoperability with systems of other nations. Most nations in 

NATO have adopted the NIIA for internal use to provide interoperability between the 

nation’s systems (including joint operations between services). The key standardization 

agreements (STANAGs) are defined in Table 1, below. 

TABLE F-1: APPLICABLE NATO STANAGS

STANAG 3377 Air Reconnaissance Intelligence Report Forms 

STANAG 3809 Digital Terrain Elevation Data (DTED) Geographic Information 

Exchange Standard 

STANAG 4250 NATO Reference Module for Open Systems Interconnection 

STANAG 4545 NATO Secondary Imagery Format (NSIF) 

STANAG 4559 NATO Standard Imagery Library Interface (NSILI) 

STANAG 4575 NATO Advanced Data Storage Interface (NADSI) 

STANAG 4586 Unmanned Control System (UCS) Architecture 

STANAG 4607 NATO Ground Moving Target Indication (GMTI) Data Format 

STANAG 4609 NATO Digital Motion Imagery Standard 

STANAG 5500 NATO Message Text Formatting System (FORMETS) - ADatP-3 

STANAG 7023 NATO Primary Imagery Format (NPIF) 

STANAG 7024 Air Reconnaissance Tape Recorder Interface 

STANAG 7074 Digital Geographic Information Exchange Standard (DIGEST 

Version 1.2a) 

STANAG 7085 Interoperable Data Links for Imaging Systems 

International Standardization Organization 

The International Standardization Organization (ISO) has become the focus of 

commercial international standardization. Other organizations develop standards 

for specific technologies, but ISO has the broadest base of technical C4I 

standards. NATO is working with ISO to define profiles of some of the ISO 

standards to replace current STANAG requirements. With the profiles, the 

STANAG will reference the profile as the requirement. 

Characterization of Standards 

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UAV Roadmap 2002 – Appendix F 

Standards 

UAVs today are, for the most part, extensions of existing ISR sensors and platforms. As 

such, the ISR standards that are in place and being developed for the existing manned 

ISR systems apply to UAVs. These are covered within Data, Control, Interface, and 

Flight Operations Standards. The ISR interface standards address interfaces among the 

various horizontal and vertical architectures of ISR, and include interfaces that use both 

physical (e.g. wired, tape, etc.) and electromagnetic links. Note that the Joint Technical 

Architecture currently mandates, or will mandate in the next version, all the standards 

mentioned below. 

Data Standards 

Data standards are intended to ensure that data from on-board sensors and 

payloads can be processed and interpreted by any user. Some of the categories of data 

standards include still imagery, motion imagery, signals, radar complex or video phase 

history data, hyper spectral imagery data, acoustic, chemical detection, biological 

detection, and nuclear detection weapons data. As on-board processing continues to 

make advances, distinctions between data and product standards are beginning to blur. 

For the purposes of the UAV roadmap, data standards should be interpreted to include 

both raw data and product when the product is produced on-board the platform Interface 

Standards. 

Control Standards 

Control Standards deal with the control of UAV operations, including mission 

planning and sensor control. This regime includes appropriate standardization efforts for 

mission planning and air vehicle/sensor control. Procedural, doctrinal and other guidance 

is required for true interoperability as critical processes (such as mission planning) are 

otherwise not appropriate for inclusion in a technical architecture description. One of the 

key issues facing UAV interoperability and standardization is the degree to which the 

collection regime can be made common between differing types of UAVs, particularly as 

regards mission planning and system control functions. UAVs range in continuum from

small UAVs intended for infantry squads to “see over the next hill” on to long-endurance 

theatre assets such as Global Hawk. A joint-service UAV interoperability working group 

has been established to define, to the maximum extent possible, critical interfaces for this 

broad range of UAVs with the intent of maximizing interoperability and standardization 

without unduly restricting small or, eventually, micro UAVs. This UAV Interoperability 

Integrated Product Team is co-led by U.S. Joint Forces Command and OASD(C3I). 

Interface Standards 

Interface Standards are intended to ensure that UAVs system elements can 

communicate. Physical interfaces provide the hardwired of mechanical connectivity for 

connections within the UAV or between ground elements, or alternate means to transfer 

data between the UAV and ground once the UAV is recovered. Examples of physical 

interfaces include the wideband tape and solid-state interfaces. The electromagnetic 

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(communications) interfaces provide the connectivity for the UAV to receive aircraft and 

sensor control signals from authorized control stations, or to ensure that sensor data and 

aircraft status information from UAVs can be communicated to any user who requires the 

data. Examples of communications standards include CDL, SATCOM, Link 16 

standards, and communication protocols such as TCP/IP. 

Flight Operations Standards 

Flight Operations Standards deal with ensuring that those processes related to 

operation of generic air vehicles (flight clearance, air traffic control, flight airworthiness, 

proficiency standards for operators and others) are consistent across the services. While 

not suitable for inclusion in a technical architecture, other methods and guidance must be 

put into place if interoperability is to be achieved. For integration of UAVs into the 

National Airspace structure, both civil and military, a standard set of data formats are 

required. Logistics interoperability while critical for long-term UAV cost reduction is 

currently outside the scope of this document and will be addressed in future editions. 

Data Standards 

Data standards provide the formatting for the sensor data and associated metadata 

and represent the higher levels of the interface protocol. The data formats generally are 

designed for specific types of data, such as fixed images, motion imagery, GMTI, etc. 

NATO ISR Interoperability Architecture 

The NATO ISR Interoperability Architecture includes a number of standards that 

are applicable to ISR systems. These standards cover the critical interfaces in the 

ISR data chain. It should be noted that while these standards are published by 

NATO, they were all initiated by U.S. activities, and in many cases are directly 

compatible with current U.S. standards. 

STANAG 4545 

A still imagery format has been in place since the late 1980s. The original format 

was developed for national imagery and was given the name: National Imagery 

Transmission Format (NITF). NITF 2.1 (MIL-STD 2500B Change Notice 2) is the 

current version of the standard and is equivalent to the NATO Secondary Imagery Format 

(NSIF - STANAG 4545). Over the years the format has been extended to airborne 

imagery. The standard addresses still imagery taken from EO/IR/Radar sensors. 

NITF/NSIF also prescribes the compression standards for this imagery. JPEG is 

the primary compression used for imagery but there are other compression standards that 

may be used for specific and unique applications (e.g. lossless JPEG, vector quantization, 

etc.). NIMA has proposed the implementation of JPEG 2000 in a next version of the 

NITF/NSIF standard. JPEG 2000 should support new CONOPS for how NITF/NSIF is 

to be used. 

NITF/NSIF also implements data extensions to support the transmission of GMTI 

data. This extension is unique but was developed to enhance interoperability through the 

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use of an existing standard and applications. The extension is based on the GMTI 

STANAG 4607. 

It should be noted that both NITF and NSIF are being migrated to a common 

international standard. ISO/IEC 12087-5, the Basic Image Interchange Format (BIIF) 

was created as a superset of NITF/NSIF. NATO has developed a profile of BIIF that 

matches the current requirements identified in NITF/NSIF and the profile has been 

ratified and published by ISO. The current plans are to migrate both the military standard 

and the NATO STANAG, by deactivating the military standard and having the STANAG 

point to the profile as the authoritative reference. This will eliminate the current parallel 

standards while maintaining military control over the requirements in the standard. 

All UAV systems supporting still imagery (EO/IR/MSI/HSI/radar) will comply 

with the most recent version of NITF/NSIF. 

STANAG 4559 

NATO has implemented imagery library access by taking a subset of the U.S. 

Geospatial Image Access Specification (GIAS) developed by NIMA. This standard, 

defined in STANAG 4559 – the NATO Standard Image Library Interface (NSILI), 

provides the same image library access as GIAS, but does not include some of the 

enhanced features of GIAS such as image submission and geospatial data access. NATO 

is examining the requirements for including the wider capabilities of GIAS in STANAG 

4559. 

STANAG 4607 

In 1998, ASD(C3I) directed the USAF to lead an effort to develop a common 

GMTI data format. The USAF expanded the scope of this effort to include NATO and 

Australia. As a result, NATO Air Group IV has initiated a task to develop STANAG 

4607, NATO GMTI Data Format, based on the Air Force’s original activity. This format 

is based on the NATO EX format, the Joint STARS GMTI data format, and the ASARS 

2A GMTI format. The format is also capable of being encapsulated in STANAG 4545 

(also applicable to NITF) and STANAG 7023, the NATO Primary Imagery Format. 

It is anticipated that by October 2003 STANAG 4607 will be ratified by the 

nations of NATO and subsequently promulgated by NATO. The US at that point will 

need to implement 4607 to be interoperable with other NATO GMTI implementations. 

For example, the UK ASTOR system is implementing STANAG 4607. As UAVs 

become operational, they will need to implement this STANAG to insure interoperability 

not only with NATO, but also with US forces. STANAG 4607 will be a mandated 

standard in the next version of the JTA. 

STANAG 4609 

In 1998, the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) chartered the 

Motion Imagery Standards Board (MISB) to develop a Motion Imagery Standards Profile 

(MISP). The current version is MISP 2.0a. This standard is completely based on 

commercial standards, specifically MPEG-2. Instead of having to depend on 

government-sponsored developments for motion imagery processing, this standard 

promotes the use of commercial applications and hardware. In addition, in 2001 NIMA 

also began to lead the STANAG process to develop a NATO digital motion imagery 

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STANAG. The MISP serves as the master baseline standards document. STANAG 4609 

has been specifically based on MISP2.0a to facilitate NATO acceptance of motion 

imagery standards. STANAG 4609 will replace MISP 2.0a as the operative digital 

motion imagery standard for the US. Currently MISP2.0a mandates the migration and 

development of video systems to a fully digital format typically referred to as High 

Definition TV (HDTV). Today, no UAV motion video system supports the STANAG 

4609 format. 

STANAG 7023 

STANAG 7023 is the NATO Primary Image Format. This format is intended for 

applications that require real-time recording or data link transmission of sensor data with 

little or no processing. STANAG 7023 was initiated by the US as the format for the 

ATARS program. As the ATARS program was redirected, the format was changed, and 

US interest in STANAG 7023 disappeared. However, many NATO nations (particularly 

the UK, France, Germany, and Denmark) have developed systems that implement the 

format. In order for US ground systems to be interoperable with the NATO systems, the 

US will have to implement the format for exploitation. In addition, it may be desirable to 

use this format in those applications where size, weight, and power (SWAP) constraints 

preclude on-board processing of sensor data into NITF/NSIF formatted files. 

Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) 

Many standards applicable to UAV SIGINT data are addressed in Section 4 of the 

Joint Airborne SIGINT Architecture (JASA) Version 2.0. Due to programmatic issues 

leading to cancellation of JSAF, the JASA is being reviewed for future applicability and 

necessary changes. However, NATO Air Group IV has initiated a study to examine the 

use of ELINT and ESM data within the community with an aim to standardize the data 

formats of both aspects of electromagnetic collection. 

Measuring And Signature Intelligence (MASINT) 

MASINT is predominantly a process, which uses a low-probability signal within a 

high noise environment to extract information not obtainable by other means. This 

process can be applied to data collected by sensors which are exclusively MASINT (e.g. 

nuclear materials detectors) or from sensors developed for other purposes (i.e., imagery, 

radar, weather, SIGINT sensors). In virtually every case, the requirements for data 

integrity and metadata capture are greater. MASINT does not have dedicated collection 

and transmission capabilities within the traditional warfighter ISR or C2 infrastructure, 

and must use existing assets and capabilities for mission accomplishment. To ensure that 

the MASINT data and products can be successfully incorporated within these existing 

systems, existing data formats are used where feasible. For example, the expansion of 

EO/IR systems into multi-band collectors begins to blur the line between IMINT and 

MASINT in this regime. The NITF2.1/NSIF standard has always been capable of 

handling the multispectral sources of imagery. NIMA expanded NITF to accommodate 

multispectral and hyperspectral sources with large numbers of bands and the unique 

metadata requirements, and now mandates MIL-STD-2500B (NITF 2.1)/STANAG 4545 

(NSIF 1.0) support data extensions (SDE) for multispectral and hyperspectral sensors. 

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Only where no existing format can accommodate the MASINT needs will new formats 

and standards be developed. 

Metadata 

The metadata that accompanies the imagery produced by ISR sensors is critical to 

the use of the product. Current efforts to develop standards for common metadata for 

ISR applications have been initiated within ISO. ISO DIS 19115-2 is being developed to 

provide a common metadata set for all ISR applications. Once completed, this standard 

will be mandated for use in DoD (and NATO) ISR systems. ISO is also developing the 

tools to provide XML-based metadata sets based on 19115-2 and this will be included in 

ISO/IEC DIS 19139-2. Developers are encouraged to refer to the draft standards for 

interim guidance rather than creating new metadata dictionaries. Interoperability 

between UAV systems, and between UAVs and other platform types will only be 

accomplished when all platforms share the same common format for metadata. It is 

expected that this will most likely be an XML-based metadata format. 

Still Imagery

As noted above, the image format (STANAG 4545) provides the basic metadata 

to identify the image, but relies on extensions to provide georeferencing and technical 

details of the imagery. These extensions are critical to the proper use of the data by 

common exploitation tools. The principle extensions are contained in two sets identified 

in the Compendium of Controlled Extensions (STDI-0002). The first set, the GEOSDEs, 

provides detailed georeferencing information, and the second set, the airborne SDEs, 

provides the details of the collection and sensor parameters. These extensions are 

mandated for all UAV systems using still imagery sensors (EO/IR/MSI/HIS/radar) in 

order to achieve interoperability within the user community. 

Motion Imagery

The requirement for full metadata supporting video is an emerging standard in 

development. The current metadata standard is the Key Length Value (KLV) standard 

detailed in Society of Motion Picture and Television Engineers document SMPTE 336M2001, although research is underway to harmonize this with the metadata of the other 

sources of imagery. 

MASINT 

A critical element of MASINT is metadata. This refers to both metadata related 

to the data collection (e.g. weather conditions in the sensor field of regard) and to 

metadata concerning the sensor itself (temperature of the focal plane array in an IR 

system at the time the data was collected). Both types of metadata must be preserved and 

made available down-stream for the MASINT process to be successful. The 

development of standards for data, products, and metadata has been initiated by the CMO 

in conjunction with NIMA and other agencies, to ensure that the data integrity remains 

high, and the metadata required is identified and preserved. The JTA will evolve to 

include any new standards that are developed for MASINT. 

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Other Data Types 

Adoption of the following three STANAGS, 3809, 550, and 7074, is mandatory 

for the success of UAV system interoperability and will be required in UAV systems 

where applicable. Adoption of the last two, STANAGs 3377 and 4250, is not mandatory 

but is encouraged. 

STANAG 3809 

STANAG 3809 provides the format for digital terrain elevation data (DTED) 

geographic information data exchange. This data is used for a number of different 

applications, including mission planning, mapping, ISR sensor visibility calculations, etc. 

All exchange of DTED data should be accomplished using STANAG 3809. 

STANAG 5500 

The NATO Message Text Formatting System (ADatP-3) provides the format for 

digital messages usable by ADP systems. A number of different message types are 

defined and encoded so that recipient systems can interpret each. 

STANAG 7074 

Digital Geographic Information Exchange Standard (DIGEST Version 1.2a) is the 

standard used to define all types of geographic data. This format is compatible with 

STANAG 4545, and some of the extensions defined in STANAG 7074 are used by 

STANAG 4545 to incorporate precision geographic information. 

To enhance UAV interoperability and flexibility, it is recommended that the UAV 

Control System (UCS) should also be compliant with the following STANAGs: 

STANAG 3377 

Air Reconnaissance Intelligence Report Forms are included in STANAG 3377. 

These forms are used to report the results of imagery interpretation and include forms for 

rapid exploitation, detailed exploitation, and radar analysis. This standard provides both 

the free text and automated data processing forms of each of the forms. 

STANAG 4250 

The NATO Reference Module for Open Systems Interconnection is defined in 

STANAG 4250. This model is based on the ISO Open Systems Interconnect model, 

using seven layers to define the elements of the interface protocol. The lowest level is 

the physical layer, defining the physical and electrical parameters of the actual 

connection. The highest layer defines the support for the applications that use the data 

being transported across the interface. 

Other Data Formats 

Digital Feature Analysis Data (DFAD) is data that describes the surface features 

of the terrain. This allows a more complete analysis of terrain than is available through 

the use of elevation data alone. Feature analysis includes both the natural surface and 

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man-made features. The World Geodetic System - 84 (WGS-84), contained in MILSTD-2401, provides the reference ellipsoid for use in elevation calculations. In some

cases, the ellipsoid is modified with variations of the gravitational vector through the 

designation of a reference geoid as well. In either case, developers should take care to 

ensure that metadata specifications are properly followed with respect to using the proper 

elevation reference. 

Interface Standards 

Interface standards include both those required for physical connections between 

the elements of the UAV ISR system, and the electromagnetic connectivity for data links. 

It also includes the file transfer protocols necessary for the data exchange. 

Physical Media 

The physical media includes the use of digital tape and advanced media such as 

solid-state memories and advanced disk arrays. 

STANAG 7024 

Tape media has been standardized for some time. Initially, the Common Imagery 

Ground/Surface System (CIG/SS) Acquisition Standards Handbook specified either the 

ANSI ID-1 or Ampex Digital Cassette Recording System Incremental (DCRSI) tape 

standard for ground segments. These two standards still apply for the current Distributed 

Common Ground/Surface System (DCGS) and ISR architectures. They are further 

instantiated through STANAG 7024, NATO Tape Media Standard. 

One problem with tape media is the availability of a “golden tape” to calibrate 

tape recorders and players. Without the ability to calibrate this equipment, tape media 

cannot be exchanged between airborne and ground segments much less between ground 

segments. Despite this difficulty of calibration, tape generally still offers the best 

economical means of archiving large amounts of data. 

JTA mandates the use of these specific tape media standards for use within the 

ISR community.

STANAG 4575 

Solid state recording capabilities cover everything from rotating disk (the standard 

hard drive in a computer) to Personal Computer Memory Card International Association 

(PCMCIA) cards to custom-design solid-state memory systems. Custom memory 

systems or PCMCIA cards provide excellent means to safely record and play back stored 

data. In addition the data stored in these devices can be randomly accessed greatly 

enhancing access performance. The technology behind solid-state storage has made 

significant progress over the past five years. In concert with the advance of technology, 

NATO and the US determined that a new standard interface to this solid-state media was 

required. The interface is embodied in STANAG 4575, NATO Advanced Data Storage 

Interface. This particular standard has been ratified by the US and is soon to be ratified 

by other NATO nations. Once ratification is complete, promulgation is expected by July 

2003 with several implementations both here and in Europe. The JTA had identified 

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STANAG 4575 as an emerging standard but will change it to a mandatory standard, once 

it is promulgated as well as mandating its use for solid-state storage. This standard will 

be implemented for UAVs once ratified by NATO. 

Communications 

For Data Interchange services, at a minimum, the following National 

Communications Support Plan (NCSP) mandated standards should be implemented to 

achieve interoperability. 

Common Data Link/STANAG 7085 

The Common Data Link (CDL) has been the DoD standard for high-bandwidth, 

data link for intelligence dissemination since 1991. Additionally, Assistant Secretary of 

Defense (C3I) guidance mandates the use of CDL in all Service and Agency imagery and 

signals intelligence collection systems and requires ISR wideband SATCOM systems to 

be interoperable with CDL. The CDL waveform is documented in the CDL Waveform

Standard and is managed by the Services with the USAF as the Executive Service Agent. 

The CDL Waveform Standard is reviewed and updated regularly as new, enabling 

technologies emerge to better meet warfighter needs. The current revision of the 

specification is “Revision F”. 

CDL will have an expanding role as the intelligence community and the entire 

DOD migrate toward network-centric warfighting capabilities. Although CDL has been 

used traditionally as a point-to-point ISR data link, the CDL Waveform Standard 

Revision F, along with future revisions, will include the necessary networking and 

interface standards to better assure end-to-end interoperability. Improved ISR end-to-end 

interoperability facilitates integration across all ISR assets supporting the warfighter. 

In parallel, the US has cooperated with NATO to develop STANAG 7085 which 

embodies the CDL specification. Additionally, it should be noted that STANAG 

7085/CDL is a key component of interoperability for CIGSS/DCGS. 

While the CDL specification and STANAG 7085 define the basic requirements 

for interoperability, the numerous options available within the standard allow for noninteroperable implementations that are all compliant. A set of profiles is being developed 

within the NATO community to provide more specific guidance for users of CDL 

systems. Developers will adopt one of the profiles whenever possible to minimize the 

proliferation of compliant, but non-interoperable data link systems. 

Any UAV system supporting data rates over 10Mb/s will implement and support 

CDL version F. This includes the current UAV systems: Shadow 200, Pioneer 

Improvement Program, Predator, Predator B, and Global Hawk. 

Link 16 

Link 16 is an encrypted, jam-resistant, nodeless tactical digital data link network 

established by Joint Tactical Information Distribution System (JTIDS)-compatible 

communication terminals that transmit and receive data messages in the Tactical Data 

Information Link (TADIL) J message catalog. Link 16 can provide a range of combat 

information in near-real time to U.S. and NATO allies’ combat aircraft and C2 centers. 

The TADIL J messages and protocols are defined in STANAG 5516, while the 

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communication element is defined in STANAG 4175. Operating procedures are defined 

in Allied Data Publication-16 (ADatP-16) or alternatively in the Joint Multi-TADIL 

Operating Procedures (JMTOP) (Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual CJCSM 

6120.01. 

Military Satellite Communications 

Military Satellite Communications (MILSATCOM) systems include those 

systems owned or leased and operated by DoD and those commercial satellite 

communications (SATCOM) services used by DoD. The basic elements of satellite 

communications are a space segment, a control segment, and a terminal segment (air, 

ship, ground, etc.). An implementation of a typical satellite link will require the use of 

satellite terminals, a user communications extension, and military or commercial satellite 

resources. 

For 5-kHz or 25-kHz single-channel access service supporting the transmission of 

either voice or data: MIL-STD-188-181B, Interoperability Standard for Single Access 5-

kHz and 25-kHz UHF Satellite Communications Channels, 20 March 1999. 

For 5-kHz Demand Assigned Multiple Access (DAMA) service, supporting the 

transmission of data at 75 to 2400 bps and digitized voice at 2400 bps: MIL-STD-188-

182A, Interoperability Standard for 5-kHz UHF DAMA Terminal Waveform, 31 March 

1997, with Notice of Change 1, 9 September 1998; and Notice of Change 2, 22 January 

1999. 

For 25-kHz Time Division Multiple Access (TDMA)/DAMA service, supporting 

the transmission of voice at 2,400, 4,800, or 16,000 bps and data at rates of 75 to 16,000 

bps: MIL-STD-188-183A, Interoperability Standard for 25-kHz TDMA/DAMA Terminal 

Waveform, 20 March 1998, with Notice of Change 1, 9 September 1998. 

For data controllers operating over single-access 5-kHz and 25-kHz UHF 

SATCOM channels: MIL-STD-188-184, Interoperability and Performance Standard for 

the Data Control Waveform, 20 August 1993, with Notice of Change 1, 9 September 

1998. This standard describes a robust link protocol that can transfer error-free data 

efficiently and effectively over channels that have high error rates. 

For MILSATCOM equipment that control access to DAMA UHF 5-kHz and 25-

kHz MILSATCOM channels: MIL-STD-188-185, DoD Interface Standard, 

Interoperability of UHF MILSATCOM DAMA Control System, 29 May 1996, with 

Notice of Change 1, 1 December 1997; and Notice of Change 2, 9 September 1998. 

File Transfer Protocols 

Numerous file transfer protocols have been developed in the commercial world. 

Some are applicable to ISR systems and are defined below. 

Transport Control Protocol 

The Transport Control Protocol (TCP) [RFC 761] provides a connection oriented 

reliable byte stream service. TCP is a bi-directional protocol, which has no concept of 

messages. Any framing has to be added at the application level. TCP contains an 

acknowledgement scheme which makes it reliable (bytes are delivered correctly and in 

order) and which implements flow control. 

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The use of a single end-to-end network and transport communications protocol 

allows an entire system to be managed and administered as if it were a single entity, even 

if it is sub-divided into individual communities for local management and administration. 

Internet Protocol 

The Internet Protocol (IP) generally used in the NCSP is IPv4 (RFC 791, 792, 

919,922, 1112)/ IPv6 (RFC 2460-4, 2375, 2236). The UAV architecture will adhere to 

the IP version selected by the wider defense community within which they are integrated. 

In the near-term, systems will need to support the current version of IP [IPv4, RFC 791]. 

In the longer term, as digitization progresses, it is possible that the new version of IP 

[IPv6, RFC 1883] will be adopted by the military to overcome perceived weaknesses in 

IPv4. IPv6 increases the available address space, reorganizes the protocol headers and 

improves support for security, throughput, latency, error rate and cost. 

File Transfer Protocol 

File Transfer Protocol (FTP) shall be used to transfer processed information. It 

can be used in support of HTTP to transfer files, but needs additional support for 

providing an index to the information stored on the file server. Once the file has been 

transferred to the C4I system it is then the responsibility of the C4I to provide 

applications to process the file. 

Network Time Protocol 

Network Time Protocol v3 (NTP), April 9, 1992, NTP (RFC-1305) provides the 

mechanisms to synchronize time and coordinate time distribution in large, diverse 

Internets. It uses a returnable-time design in which a distributed subnet of timeservers 

operating in a self-organizing, hierarchical-master-slave configuration synchronizes local 

clocks within the subnet and to national time standards via wire or radio. The servers can 

also redistribute reference time via local routing algorithms. 

World Wide Web Standards 

Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) shall be the main protocol used for web 

browsing. Web browsing provides a common and powerful mechanism for sharing 

information. HTTP and applications associated with the use of HTTP are used to index, 

access and transfer processed information. The ability to search the web server can be 

provided using COTS applications. A C4I user needs a Web browser (e.g., Netscape or 

Internet Explorer), the Uniform Resource Locator (URL) of the page and 

communications connectivity to access the information. 

Control Standards 

Multiple levels of interoperability are feasible among different UAV systems. 

Improved operational flexibility can be achieved if the UAV systems support appropriate 

levels of UAV system interoperability defined in the draft STANAG 4586 

Level 1: Indirect receipt of secondary imagery and/or data. (provided by other 

standards in the NIIA - STANAG 4586 not required) 

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Level 2: Direct receipt of payload data by a ground station other than the primary 

UAV Control System (UCS); where “direct” covers reception of the UAV 

payload data by the ground station when it has direct line-of-sight with the 

UAV or a relay device which has direct line-of-sight with the UAV. 

(provided by other standards in the NIIA - STANAG 4586 not required) 

Level 3: Level 2 interoperability and control of the UAV payload by a second UCS 

(handover of sensor control as defined in STANAG 4586). 

Level 4: Level 3 interoperability and UAV flight control by a second UCS 

(handover of air vehicle control as defined in STANAG 4586). 

Level 5: Level 4 interoperability and the ability of an alternate UCS to launch and 

recover the UAV (handover of tactical control of UAV as defined in 

STANAG 4586). 

 

The interoperability levels defined above can be achieved through the 

standardization of interfaces between the UAV airborne elements and the UAV Control 

System (UCS), between the air vehicle elements and external C4I elements, and between 

the UCS and external C4I Systems. In order to achieve interoperability, the UCS 

Architecture and interfaces must support the appropriate communication protocols and 

message formats for legacy as well as new UAV systems. Level 2 and above (2+) of 

interoperability requires the use of a Ground Data Terminal (GDT) that is interoperable 

with the Air Data Terminal (ADT), as defined in CDL/STANAG 7085 (e.g., connectivity 

between the GDT and ADT is prerequisite for level 2+ interoperability). At all levels, the 

data formats and data transfer protocols must also comply with the NIIA standards. For 

level 1 or level 2, the NIIA standards for data format and data transfer provide the 

required interface requirements. For levels 3 and above, STANAG 4586 provides the 

sensor and airborne platform control functionality for the higher levels. 

The UAV interoperability working group is addressing UAV control through the 

development of a standards-based approach that will likely result in changes to the draft 

STANAG 4586. The interoperability working group is focusing near term efforts on 

development of a situational awareness interface providing critical UAV platform data 

(vehicle ID, location, speed, altitude, route, etc). This development standard will be 

required on virtually all UAVs, both new acquisitions and most legacy systems, and will 

require updating as UAVs become more autonomous. 

There are already a number of existing or emerging STANAGs that are applicable 

to UAV systems. They provide standards for interoperable data link (STANAG 7085), 

digital sensor data between the payload and the AV element of the data link (STANAG 

7023, 4545), and for on board recording device(s) (STANAG 7024, 4575). Additionally, 

the draft STANAG 4586, Unmanned Control System (UCS), describes interfaces 

applicable to ground control stations and air vehicles, to include air vehicle control. 

Although somewhat limited as to broad mission area application, this draft STANAG 

contains an interface description, the Data Link Interface (DLI), which provides an 

excellent starting point for the development of a robust air vehicle interface, to include 

vehicle control functions. 

Thus, the approach to achieving the desired level of UAV interoperability is based 

on compliance with existing standards or establishing new standards for a number of 

UAV functions. 

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• A data link system(s) that provides connectivity and interoperability 

between the UCS and the AV(s). The data link system(s) must 

accommodate legacy as well as future systems. STANAG 7085, 

Interoperable Data Links for Imaging Systems, specifies a data link 

system that would provide the required connectivity and interoperability. 

• Format for payload/sensor data for transmission to the UCS via the data 

link and/or for recording on the on-board recording device. STANAG 

7023, NATO Primary Image Format Standard, with addition for nonimagery sensors, (e.g., Electronic Support Measures (ESM)), and 

STANAG 4545, NATO Secondary Imagery Format, are the required data 

formats for imagery. If GMTI data is to be used, STANAG 4607 defines 

the required format, and STANAG 4609 defines the format for digital 

motion imagery. 

• Recording device for on board recording of sensor data, if required, 

STANAG 7024, Imagery Air Reconnaissance Tape Recorder Standard, 

and STANAG 4575, NATO Advanced Data Storage Interface, specify 

standard recording devices and interface respectively. 

• An example of a standard required, but not yet fully developed, is a 

standard describing the interfaces and messages necessary to control an air 

vehicle. A starting point for this activity is the Data Link Interface (DLI) 

segment of the draft STANAG 4586, Unmanned Control System (UCS). 

Flight Operations Standards 

Flight operations standards are those standards required to operate the UAV in the 

real world airspace occupied by both manned and unmanned aircraft. These include the 

standards for flight clearance, operations with Air Traffic Control, aircraft certification 

standards, aircrew training requirements, etc. While many of these standards will parallel 

those used by manned aircraft, they must all be tailored to the specific environment of the 

unmanned platform. The details of these standards are [TBD]. 

Operational Architecture (OA) and Systems Architecture (SA). 

In an ideal world, Operational and Systems Architectures would be defined for 

UAVs. This would allow development of a consistent Technical Architecture (TA), 

which would establish the interoperability requirements for UAVs. The OA and SA 

would undergo periodic review and update as new UAVs were developed, new 

capabilities introduced and new interoperability requirements were generated. This in 

turn would lead to appropriate changes to the TA, while generating acquisition 

requirements for evolving interoperability requirements. In all likelihood, each different 

class of UAVs (large, medium, and small) could be accommodated in a common 

interoperability framework, although interoperability requirements could vary to 

accommodate the different operational thrusts of each UAV class and to recognize the 

accompanying design constraints. Thus each class of UAV would become totally 

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Standards 

interoperable, while maintaining some appropriate degree of interoperability between 

UAV classes. 

 

Process for selecting standards. 

UAV standards are usually selected for implementation by a development 

program from those in the JTA. New standards are added to the JTA periodically and 

existing ones updated based on technological advancement. However, the JTA is very 

broadly written to encompass the full range of interoperability needs. Therefore, subsets 

must be chosen for specific mission areas, such as UAVs. Additionally, some needed 

standards are not specifically included in the JTA, due to time lag as new technologies 

emerge or due to lack of specificity for lower level protocols. Currently, there is not a 

formal process in-place for choosing subsets of the JTA standards for UAV application 

except during development of the UAV roadmap. The fundamental criterion for 

standards selection should be whether or not the proposed standard will improve UAV 

systems interoperability. The process for selecting standards should closely parallel the 

JTA rule set. 

• Must be the minimal set required for interoperability or reuse 

• Standards are technically mature and stable 

• Technically implementable 

• Publicly available 

• Consistent with law, regulation, policy, or guidance documentation 

Preferred standards are those that are commercially supported in the marketplace 

with several validated implementations by multiple vendors (e.g., mainstream products). 

The order of standards precedence for the JTA is: 

• International industry standards 

• National industry standards 

• Government standards 

• Military standards 

• Proprietary standards (single vendor) are normally unacceptable but may be 

used in singular applications by exception. 

Way Ahead for Correcting Deficiencies 

One of the key issues associated with UAV standardization is lack of a defined 

Operational, Systems, and Technical Architecture for UAVs. It is proposed to work with 

the Joint Staff to develop UAV Operational and System Architectures prior to issuance of 

the next DoD UAV Roadmap version. By establishing UAV Operational and System

Architectures, it will be possible to resolve the key interoperability issues facing each 

different class of UAVs (micro, small and endurance) with their diverging requirements 

and differing design constraints. Thus each class of UAV would achieve optimal 

interoperability within the broader manned aviation, ISR, and strike communities. 

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Standards 

New technologies being incorporated into UAVs must be accompanied by 

equivalent development of the appropriate standards. It is proposed to work with the 

Joint Staff and USJFCOM to develop an overarching UAV Joint Operational Concept 

(JOC) and Joint Operational Architecture (JOA) prior to issuance of the next OSD UAV 

Roadmap. Therefore, new technologies, such as hyperspectral imagery, may be 

developed and ready for implementation prior to establishment of appropriate 

interoperability standards. Budgetary authority must be established to work standards 

concurrently with the technology, else stovepipe systems and/or delay in fielding new 

technologies results. Formal acquisition programs developing new technologies must be 

made responsible for developing and coordinating appropriate standards to ensure 

interoperability. A standard UAV interface providing critical vehicle data should be 

defined by FY04.

Standards Compliance 

A formal standards process must be put in-place for choosing subsets of the JTA 

standards for UAV application and feed development of the UAV roadmap. Wherever 

possible, this must be worked as part of broader manned aviation, ISR and strike 

community activities. This should be implemented through expansion of the UAV 

Standards Working Group charter to address these issues as a standing body. The 

primary activity would be to coordinate with existing standards development bodies to 

ensure UAV peculiar needs were addressed. This UAV Standards Working Group made 

up of AT&L, C3I and JS/J-8 representative will evaluate each DoD UAV program on an 

annual basis for standards compliance. This IPT will provide recommendations to 

AT&L, C3I and JS/J-8 for specific UAV programs. These recommendations would then 

be used in the annual Service budget evaluations to make any required adjustments. 

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Appendix G: Airspace 

Vision 

The vision for UAV flight operations in the future is for UAVs to be able to file a 

DD Form 175 flight plan and fly within hours. For military operations, UAVs must 

integrate with manned aircraft in and around airfields using concepts of operation that 

make on- or off-board distinctions transparent to airfield control authorities and airspace 

regulators. The operations tempo at mixed airfields must not be diminished by the 

integration of unmanned aviation. UAVs must also be compatible with military Air 

Tasking Orders and must require no special Joint Forces Air Component Commanderimposed provisions that impede other aircraft from sharing airspace with unmanned 

assets 

Background 

Because the current ROA systems do not have the same capabilities as manned 

aircraft to safely and efficiently integrate into the National Airspace System (NAS), 

military ROA requirements to operate outside of restricted and warning areas are 

accommodated on a case-by-case basis. The process used to gain NAS access was jointly 

developed and agreed to by the DoD and FAA in 1999. Military operators of ROA are 

required to obtain a Certificate of Authorization (COA) from the Federal Aviation 

Administration. The process can take up to 60 days, may vary among the FAA’s nine 

regional authorities, and because ROA do not have a see-and avoid capability, may 

require such additional and costly measures as providing chase planes and/or primary 

radar coverage. COAs are typically issued for one-time events, limited to specific routes 

or areas, and are valid for no more than 1 year. An exception will be the National COA 

now being negotiated on behalf of Global Hawk

With a COA, the ROA is accommodated into the system when mission needs 

dictate, but because the ROA lacks the ability to operate as a manned aircraft it is 

segregated from manned aviation rather than integrated with it. As the DoD concept of

operation of ROA systems matures and as we ensure the airworthiness of our ROA 

systems, we will look toward developing new procedures in order to gain access to the 

NAS. Toward that end, the DoD and FAA have agreed to review the current guidance 

contained in FAAH 7610.4, Military Operations, and will refine or replace the COA 

process if mutually beneficial to both DoD and FAA. 

From the DoD perspective, three critical issues must be addressed in order to 

supplant the COA process: UAV reliability, FAA regulations, and the see-and-avoid 

principle. Focusing on the regulatory aspect, air traffic management procedures must be 

addressed with the FAA. Aircraft airworthiness certification and aircrew qualification 

standards must be addressed in parallel within DoD. 

OSD and the FAA, in concert with the Air Force Flight Standards Agency 

(AFFSA), are engaged in establishing the air traffic regulatory infrastructure for 

integrating military UAVs into the National Airpsace System (NAS). By limiting this 

effort’s focus to traffic management of domestic flight operations by military UAVs, it is 

hoped to establish a solid precedent for subsequently extending such regulation to civilian 

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UAVs domestically and to civilian and military flights in international and foreign 

airspace. As depicted in Figure G-1, this initiative (shown by the brown brick) is 

intended to serve as the first brick in the larger, interwoven wall of regulations governing 

worldwide aviation. Several precepts are being followed as this DoD-FAA effort 

progresses: 

• Do no harm - avoid enacting regulations for the military user that would later 

unnecessarily restrict civilian UAV flights; where feasible, leave hooks in place to 

facilitate the adaptation of these regulations for civilian use. This also applies to 

recognizing that “one size does NOT fit all” when it comes to establishing 

regulations for the wide range in size and performance of DoD UAVs. 

• Conform rather than create - build around the existing Title 14 Code of Federal 

Regulations (formerly known as Federal Aviation Regulations, or FARs), 

adapting them to also cover unmanned aviation while avoiding the creation of 

dedicated UAV regulations. The goal is achieving transparency between 

unmanned and manned flight operations, not putting UAVs in a special treatment 

category. 

• Establish the precedent - although focused on domestic use, any regulations 

enacted will likely lead, or certainly have to conform to, similar regulations 

governing UAV flight in international (ICAO) and foreign (specific countries’) 

airspace. 

Military ROA 

Traffic Ops 

ROA Flight in

Foreign Airspace

ROA Flight in

International Airspace

Civil ROA 

Airworthiness

Civil ROA 

Traffic Ops 

Civil ROA

Crew Qualifications

Military ROA 

Crew Qualifications

Military ROA 

Airworthiness

FIGURE G-1: JOINT FAA/OSD APPROACH TO REGULATING UAVS. 

Before the vision of “file and fly” can occur, significant work must be 

accomplished in the mutually dependent areas of UAV reliability, regulation, and the seeand-avoid concept. 

 Reliability

UAV reliability is the first hurdle in airspace considerations because it underlies 

UAV acceptance into civil airspace—whether domestic, international, or foreign. 

Today's UAVs suffer mishaps at one to two orders of magnitude greater than the rate per 

100,000 hours incurred by manned military aircraft (see Figure G-2). Improving 

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reliability is necessary for winning the confidence of the general public, the acceptance of 

other aviation constituencies (airlines, general aviation, business aviation, etc.) and the 

willingness of the FAA to regulate UAV flight. FAA regulation of UAVs is important 

because it will provide a legal basis for UAV operation in the NAS for the first time; and 

a legal basis is necessary for determining liability in accidents and, therefore, insurability 

for UAV operators. Regulation of UAV operations by the FAA also should lead to 

acceptance by international (ICAO) and foreign civil aviation authorities of UAV 

operations. Such acceptance will greatly facilitate obtaining overflight and landing 

privileges when our larger, endurance UAVs deploy in support of contingencies. In 

addition, regulation will save time and resources within both the DoD and the FAA by 

providing one standardized, rapid process for granting flight clearances. Third, 

regulation will encourage the use of UAVs in civil and commercial applications, resulting 

in potentially lower production costs for the military market. 

FIGURE G-2: US MILITARY UAV MISHAP RATES, 1986-2001 

Regulation 

Regulation: Air Traffic Operations. The FAA's air traffic regulations are meant 

to ensure the multitude of aircraft flown in the NAS are operated safely and pose no 

hazard to people or property on the ground or in the air. FAA’s air traffic management 

focus is on the day-to-day operation of the system and the safe, expeditious movement of 

air traffic. Aircraft are separated by time, altitude, and lateral distance. Additionally, 

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classes of airspace are established that include specific requirements for aircraft equipage, 

pilot qualifications and flight plan filing. Regardless of the class of airspace aircraft are 

operating in, pilots are required to See-and-Avoid other air traffic. This requirement 

exists even when ground controllers provide traffic advisories or where onboard collision 

avoidance systems, such as the Traffic alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) is 

required. See-and-avoid is a key issue in allowing ROAs into civilian airspace and is 

discussed in detail in a following section. 

There are six defined classes of airspace in the U.S. Class A airspace exists from

flight level (FL)-180 (about 18,000 feet) to FL-600 (about 60,000 feet). Flights within 

Class A airspace must be IFR and under the control of ATC at all times. 

Class B airspace surrounds several major airports (generally up to 10,000 feet 

Mean Sea Level (MSL)) to reduce mid-air collision potential by requiring ATC control of

IFR and VFR flights in that airspace. 

Class C airspace surrounds busy airports (generally up to 4,000 feet AGL) that 

don’t need Class B airspace protection, and requires flights to establish and maintain twoway communications with ATC while in that airspace. ATC provides radar separation 

service to flights in Class C airspace. 

Class D airspace surrounds airports (generally up to 2,500 feet AGL) that have an 

operating control tower. Flights in Class D airspace must establish and maintain 

communications with ATC, but VFR flights do not receive separation service. 

Class E airspace is all other airspace in which IFR and VFR flights are allowed. 

Although Class E airspace often extends to the surface, it generally begins at 1200 feet 

AGL and extends upward until it meets a higher class of airspace (A-D). 

Class G airspace (there is no Class F airspace in the U.S.) also is called 

uncontrolled airspace because ATC does not control aircraft there, and IFR is not 

permitted. Class G airspace can extend to 14,499 feet MSL, but generally exists below 

1200 feet AGL, and below Class E airspace. 

Accordingly, Classes B, C, and D relate to airspace surrounding airports where 

increased mid-air collision potential exists; and Classes A, E, and G primarily relate to 

altitude, and the nature of flight operations that commonly occur at those altitudes. ATC 

provides separation services to all flights in Class A, provides it to some flights in Class 

E, and does not provide it in Class G. Regardless of the class of airspace, or whether 

ATC provides separation services, pilots are required to see and avoid other aircraft 

whenever weather permits. 

The FAA defines an aircraft as “a device that is used or intended to be used for 

flight in the air” (14 CFR 1). While model airplanes fit this definition, there is no 14 

CFR Part associated with them, i.e., they are not regulated. The FAA does, however, 

publish an Advisory Circular (AC 91-57) that encourages voluntary safety standards for 

their use. Because neither the AC nor 14 CFR provides metrics to differentiate model 

aircraft from other aircraft, the presumed difference is the onboard presence of the pilot. 

Accordingly, it is envisioned that military UAVs having similar metrics, and operated in 

a similar manner to model aircraft, would not require FAA regulatory attention. 

Examples of such UAVs are the hand- or bungee-launched types such as Pointer and 

Dragon Eye. 

The FAA also recognizes the existence of “ultralight vehicles.” Two Advisory 

Circulars (AC 103-6 and 103-7) as well as 14 CFR 103 provide advice and regulations on 

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ultralights and operating them. It is important to note that 14 CFR 103 addresses 

ultralights as vehicles and not as aircraft, but does regulate them in terms of metrics such 

as weight, speed, etc. Air-traffic regulations for ultralights are contained in 14 CFR 103, 

and prohibit ultralight flights in areas of aircraft congestion; specifically, ultralight flights 

are permitted only in Class E and G airspace. Operators of ultralights also are required to 

exercise see-and-avoid (14 CFR 103 states that ultralight vehicles are manned). As 

certain military UAVs share many operating characteristics and physical metrics with 

ultralight vehicles, it is envisioned that 14 CFR regulations related to UAVs will take into 

account the nature of ultralights and their operating environments as an analog. 

Examples of these UAVs range from the Exdrone to the Shadow 200 and the Pioneer—

weighing 80 to 450 lb. 

Finally, some U.S. military UAV types operate chiefly at medium and high 

altitudes where, in civil airspace, most of the ATC-controlled aircraft operate. 

Regulations for aircraft operations are well established in 14 CFR (particularly Part 91), 

and it is envisioned that these same regulations will govern the operation of military 

UAVs in civil airspace. Figure-3 summarizes several types of U.S. military UAVs and 

the classes of airspace in which they typically operate. 

In summary, current FAA regulations recognize “flying devices” as either 

aircraft (and regulates them), as regulated air vehicles (like ultralights), or as 

unregulated air vehicles (like RC models). Further, it applies the term Remotely 

Operated Aircraft (ROA) to UAVs in the first category. Military UAVs, then, could be 

categorized as operating in three regimes. 1) The very low-altitude regime where VFR 

line-of-sight operations of small UAVs resemble model aircraft operations and are not 

regulated; 2) the low-altitude regime where day Visual Meteorological Conditions 

(VMC) operations in the absence of ATC are similar to ultralight operations that are 

regulated by one simple 14 CFR part; and 3) the medium and high-altitude regimes in 

which Visual Flight Rules (VFR), Instrument Flight Rules (IFR), and all-weather 

operations are routine under well-established regulations and procedures. Table G-1 

summarizes the envisioned regulatory baseline for operating military UAVs in civil 

airspace. 

TABLE G-1. ALIGNMENT OF UAV CATEGORIES WITH FAA REGULATIONS. 

Remotely Operated 

Aircraft (ROAs) 

Regulated Air Vehicles 

(RAVs) 

Unregulated Air 

Vehicles (URAVs) 

Parent Regulation 14 CFR 91 14 CFR 103 for VFR 

14 CFR 91 for IFR None (AC 91-57) 

Requirements

 Licensed Pilot Yes No No 

 Aircraft Certified Yes On Request No

Implications

 Airspace Useage All Class E & G only Class G only

 MTOW Limit, lb None 254 plus pilot, etc. 55 (proposed) 

Airspeed Limit, KIAS None NTE 250 TBD (proposed) 

See & Avoid Scheme Airborne/Active Airborne/Passive Ground-based

Example Types Predator Pioneer, Shadow Dragon Eye 

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60,000 ff fft 

Global Hawk

Class A

18,000 fft 

1,200 ft AGL 

Class E

Class G

 Predator

 Pioneer

 Shadow 

Pointer

Dragon Eye

Micro AVs

Class B

Class C 

Class D

10,000 ft

4,000 ft

2,500 ft

Transponder

See & Avoid 

DME 

IFR Qualification 

Transponder * 

See & Avoid

VFR Qualification 

Hunter

* Required above 10,000 ft 

Class E

Horizon

Class E

Class A

Class E

60,000 ft MSL

18,000 ft MSL

FIGURE G-3: UAVS AND AIRSPACE CLASSES OF THE NATIONAL AIRSPACE SYSTEM. 

Although Table G-1 indicates notional categories for UAVs, it is important to 

note that the FAA uses the term, ‘category,’ in two different taxonomies (14 CFR 1). As 

used with respect to the certification, ratings, privileges, and limitations of airmen, the 

term ‘category’ means a broad classification of aircraft. Examples include: airplane; 

rotorcraft; glider; and lighter-than-air. As used with respect to the certification of

aircraft, the term ‘category’ means a grouping of aircraft based upon intended use or 

operating limitations. Examples include: transport, normal, utility, acrobatic, limited, 

restricted, and provisional. When discussing right-of-way rules in 14 CFR 91.113, 

however, the FAA uses non-mutually exclusive categories such as balloon, glider, 

airship, airplane, rotorcraft, and engine-driven aircraft for determining which flight has 

the “right-of-way. As ultralight vehicles are not aircraft, 14 CFR 103 requires them to 

yield the right-of-way to all aircraft. Similarly, model airplanes are not aircraft, but the 

FAA provides avoidance (right-of-way) advice in an Advisory Circular. 

It is clear that a taxonomy for UAVs will need to be developed that helps define 

their operating privileges, airworthiness standards, operator training and certification 

requirements, and their place in the right-of-way rules. Currently, as neither model 

airplanes nor ultralights are ‘aircraft,’ they do not have airworthiness certificates nor do 

their operators require certification. Similarly, military aircraft do not have airworthiness 

certificates and are not assigned to a 14 CFR 1 category (above). Military aircraft are 

required to comply with 14 CFR 91.113 right-of-way regulations and, therefore, would 

be presumed to fit into that taxonomy. 

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In addition to regulatory changes necessary for routine operation of military 

UAVs in civil airspace, changes to several other documents, such as Advisory Circulars 

and FAA Order 7610.4J (Special Military Operations), will be required. For the near 

term, military UAVs are not envisioned to require the use of civilian airports surrounded 

by Class B, C, or D airspace. Once their safe and reliable operation in transit between 

military airfields through class A, E, and G airspace has been established, rules for 

opening other airspace to them—beginning with Class D—can be formulated and 

eventually implemented. 

Regulation: Airworthiness Certification. The FAA's airworthiness regulations 

(14 CFR Parts 23, 25, 27, 29, 31, 33, 35, 36, 39, and 43) are meant to ensure that aircraft 

are built and maintained so as to minimize their hazard to aircrew, passengers, and people 

and property on the ground. Airworthiness is concerned with the integrity of the 

individual aircraft and the prevention of it coming apart in midair and/or its parts raining 

down on victims on the ground. Over the 19-year period from 1982 to 2000, an annual 

average of 2.2 percent of all aviation fatalities involved people being hit by falling parts 

of aircraft. A UAV that must be available for unrestricted operations worldwide (a 

Global Hawk requirement) in all classes of airspace compels consideration for the safety 

of people on the ground. The operational requirements for UAV operation in civil 

airspace means flight over populated areas must not raise concerns based on overall 

levels of airworthiness, therefore, UAV standards cannot vary widely from those for 

manned aircraft without raising public and regulatory concern. 

FAA regulations do not require "public aircraft" (ones government owned or 

operated) to be certified airworthy under FAR standards. However, because virtually all 

non-military public aircraft are versions of aircraft previously certified for commercial or 

private use, the only public aircraft not certified airworthy by FAR standards are almost 

always military aircraft. Instead, these aircraft are certified through the military's internal 

Operational Safety, Suitability, and Effectiveness (OSS&E) process, which parallels the 

FAR process. Unmanned military aircraft are also subject to the OSS&E process, so their 

airworthiness need not be addressed in new or revised FARs; this is true for any future 

unmanned public aircraft. Certification of non-public UAVs remains an open issue for 

commercial or private UAV builders and operators. 

Regulation: Aircrew Qualifications. The FAA's qualification standards (14 

CFR Parts 61, 63, 65, and 67) are meant to ensure the competency of aircrew and aircraft 

maintainers. As in the case of airworthiness certification, these Parts do not pertain to 

military personnel, who are certified in a similar, parallel process. Among the Services, 

however, this process can vary greatly, from certifying personnel as UAV operators 

whose training does not involve their learning to fly to accepting only those with formal 

flight training and a prior flying assignment. Under current rules, the FAA would not 

distinguish between these two extremes if the military certified both as competent UAV 

operators. Given the distinction drawn between ROAs and regulated/unregulated air 

vehicles in the Air Traffic section above, only ROA operators would be required to be 

IFR-qualified, certified pilots. 

A question does arise, however, when civilian pilots, such as those working for an 

aircraft manufacturer building UAVs for the military, need to fly their company's product 

during the performance of a military contract, such as for test, production delivery, and 

acceptance (DD Form 250) flights. The Defense Contract Management Agency 

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(DCMA), who is responsible for such activities leading up to the acceptance of aircraft 

by the government, has established a letter policy (DCMA-AO letter dated 31 May 2001) 

requiring all contractor UAV operators to hold a current FAA Private or Commercial 

Pilot and Instrument rating to fly outside of restricted or warning areas. Qualification 

standards for non-military UAV pilots and maintainers remains an open issue for 

commercial or private UAV builders and operators. 

See-and-Avoid Principle 

The key to providing the "equivalent level of safety" required by FAA Order 

7610.4, Special Military Operations for Remotely Operated Aircraft (ROA, the FAA term

for UAVs), is the provision of some comparable means of see and avoid (S&A) to that 

provided by pilots onboard manned aircraft. The purpose of S&A is to avoid mid air 

collisions, and this should be the focus of technological efforts to address S&A rather 

than trying to mechanize human vision. Relying simply on human vision results in mid 

airs accounting for an average of 0.8 percent of all mishaps and 2.4 percent of all aviation 

fatalities incurred annually (based on the 3-year average from 1998 to 2000). Meaningful 

see-and-avoid performance must alert the operator to local air traffic at ranges sufficient 

for reaction time and avoidance actions by safe margins. The FAA does not provide a 

quantitative definition of S&A, largely due to the number of permutations of pilot vision, 

collision vectors, sky background, and aircraft paint schemes involved in seeing 

oncoming traffic, but it does define the minimal field of regard that must be provided 

from the cockpit in its Advisory Circular 25.773-1. Having a sufficient field of regard for 

a see-and-avoid system is fundamental to actionable information and meeting the goal of 

assured air traffic separation. As for resolution comparisons, the human with 20/20 

vision has a resolution of 3.28 milliradians. 

From a technical perspective, the S&A capability can be divided into the 

detection of oncoming traffic and the execution of a maneuver to avoid a midair. The 

detection aspect can be further subdivided into passive or active techniques applicable in 

cooperative or non cooperative traffic environments. The active, cooperative scenario 

involves a radar scanning a sector ahead of the UAV to detect oncoming traffic by 

activating a transponder on the other aircraft. Its advantages are it provides both range 

and bearing to the traffic and can function in both visual and instrument meteorological 

conditions (VMC and IMC). Its disadvantages are its relative cost. Current systems 

available in this category include the various Traffic-alert and Collision Avoidance 

Systems (TCASs), which generally run $250,000 installed, and the less expensive Traffic 

Information System (TIS) for the general aviation market. 

The long-term FAA plan is “to move away from infrastructure-based systems 

towards a more autonomous, vehicle-based system” for collision avoidance (2001 

Federal Radionavigation Systems Plan). Installation of TCASs is increasing across the 

aviation community, and TCAS functionality supports increased operator autonomy. 

Research and testing into a complementary system, known as Automatic Dependent 

Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B), may afford an even greater capability and affirms the 

intent of the aviation community to support and continue down this path. With ADS-B 

capabilities, the cockpit situational awareness of cooperative traffic would extend to 60 

nm in front of the aircraft. Such equipment complements basic see-and-avoid, adds to the 

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situational awareness, and helps provide separation from close traffic in all 

meteorological conditions. 

The active, non-cooperative scenario relies on a radar- or laser-like sensor 

scanning a sector ahead of the UAV to detect all traffic, whether transponder-equipped or 

not. The returned signal provides range, bearing, and closure rate, allowing prioritization 

of oncoming traffic for avoidance, in either VMC or IMC. Its drawbacks are again its 

relative cost, which could equal 33 to 100 percent that of typical tactical UAVs (Pioneer, 

Shadow) and the high bandwidth required to route its imagery. An example of an active, 

non-cooperative system that is currently available is a combined microwave radar and 

infrared sensor originally developed to enable helicopters avoid power lines that is 

comparable in price to TCAS. 

The passive cooperative scenario, like the active cooperative one, relies on 

everyone having a transponder, but with everyone's transponder required to be 

continuously active. Its advantages are its lower relative cost (no onboard radar required 

to activate transponders) and its ability to provide S&A information in both VMC and 

IMC. Its disadvantage is its dependence on all traffic carrying and continuously 

operating transponders. Numerous examples of transponders are available, from $1000 

models for skydivers and up. UAVs would require the capability to change transponder 

settings while in flight. 

 The passive non cooperative scenario is the most demanding one and is 

most analogous to the human eye. A system in this scenario relies on a visual or infrared 

sensor to detect and provide bearing to the oncoming traffic. Its advantages are its 

moderate relative cost (more than a transponder, less than a radar) and ability to detect 

non-transponder equipped traffic. Its disadvantages are its lack of range or closure rate 

information, high bandwidth required, and its inability to penetrate heavy IMC. The 

gimbaled EO/IR sensors currently carried by reconnaissance UAVs are examples of such 

systems, but if they are looking at the ground for reconnaissance then they are not 

available to perform S&A. An emerging approach that would negate the high bandwidth 

requirement of any active system is optical flow technology, which reports only when it 

detects movement against the sky, instead of sending a continuous video stream to the 

ground controller. Imagery from one or more inexpensive optical sensors on the UAV is 

continuously compared to the last image by an onboard processor to detect minute 

changes in pixels, indicating traffic of potential interest. Only when such objects are 

detected is their bearing relayed to the ground. 

Once the "see" portion of S&A is satisfied, the UAV must use this information to 

execute an avoidance maneuver. The latency between seeing and avoiding for the pilot 

of a manned aircraft typically ranges from 5.0 to 12.5 seconds in FAA and NTSB studies 

(Krause, Avoiding Mid-Air Collisions, p. 13). If relying on a ground operator to see and 

avoid, the UAV incurs the same human latency, but adds the latency of the data link 

bringing the image to the ground for a decision and the avoidance command back to the 

UAV. This added latency can range from less than a second for line-of-sight links to 3.5 

seconds or more for satellite links. An alternative is to empower the UAV to 

autonomously decide whether and which way to react to avoid a collision once it detects 

oncoming traffic, thereby removing the latency imposed by data links. This approach has 

been considered for implementation on TCAS II-equipped manned aircraft, since TCAS 

II already recommends a direction to turn to the pilot, but simulations have found the 

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automated maneuver worsens the situation in a fraction of the scenarios. For this reason, 

the FAA has not certified automated collision avoidance algorithms; doing so would set a 

significant precedent for UAV S&A capabilities. 

Navigation Redundancy

The air navigation environment is changing, largely because of the demands of 

increased traffic flow. Allowances for deviation from intended flight paths are being 

reduced. This provides another means for increasing air traffic capacity as airways and 

standard departures and approaches can be constructed with less separation. As 

tolerances for navigational deviation decrease, the need to precisely maintain course 

grows. All aircraft must ensure they have robust navigational means. Historically, this 

robustness has been achieved by installation of redundant navigational systems. The 

need for dependable, precise navigation reinforces existing redundancy requirements.

Navigation redundancy is both an issue of military robustness to support 

operations in conflict and a regulatory issue intended to assure sufficient navigation 

confidence for traffic management and safe separation in the event of interruptions in 

navigation services (e.g. navaids and Satellite Navigation (SATNAV)) or onboard 

equipment. This section addresses the later. Military robustness is an issue for systems 

operational requirements documents. 

Navigation is addressed by regulatory authorities. The FAA in FAR Part 91 

explicitly requires appropriate navigational equipment to the ground facilities to be used. 

Air traffic regulators expect aircraft to have equipment compatible with the routes flown, 

e.g. a VOR airway requires a VOR. Further, FAA Air Circular 90-96 on Basic Area 

Navigation Standards (BRNAV) requires that “ . . . In the event of (an Area Navigation 

(RNAV)) system failure, the aircraft (must) retain the capability to navigate relative to 

ground-based navigation aids.” 

ICAO, in its Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs), states that “With 

the failure of one item of equipment, navigation equipment must be sufficient to complete 

the flight.” For both domestic and national authorities, guidance directs designers away 

from single source vulnerabilities that may result in the complete loss of navigation for a 

given platform leaving an aircraft with no alternative means to comply with a filed flight 

plan to destination. As a result, EuroControl has required a navigation architecture that 

mandates a ground-based backup system for SATNAV for the foreseeable future. The 

backup system of choice is Distance Measuring Equipment (DME). 

Redundancy requirements have been recently validated in studies that bear on 

national navigational policies. President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure 

Protection reported out that “the most significant vulnerability to the transportation 

infrastructure is the association of the modernization of the NAS with the plan to adopt 

the Global Positioning System (GPS) as the sole basis for radio-navigation in the US by 

2010. This creates the basis for a single-point failure.” 

According to the Federal Radionavigation Plan, there is growing awareness 

within the transportation community of the risks associated with the GPS system being 

the only means for position determination. Like any radio-navigation system, GPS is 

vulnerable to interference that can be reduced but not eliminated. As GPS further 

penetrates into the civil infrastructure, it becomes a tempting target that could be 

exploited by individual, groups, or countries hostile to the United States. With increasing 

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Airspace 

dependency on GPS for weapon targeting and weapon systems adversaries may be 

motivated to identify and exploit vulnerabilities. The effects of jamming and 

unintentional interference are primarily to increase the workload of both the users and the 

air traffic controllers for aircraft with backup systems. For systems solely dependent on 

GPS, loss of service leaves UAVs to rely on INS systems, none of which, in today’s 

UAVs, have drift rates allowing the successful completion of a sortie through to landing. 

The current Federal Radionavigaion Plan, signed March 2002, establishes the 

following national policies: 

• Unaugmented GPS is approved as a primary system for use in oceanic and remote 

airspace. 

• GPS is approved as a supplemental system for domestic en route and terminal 

navigation, and for nonprecision approach and landing operations. 

• The FAA’s phase-down plan for ground-based Navaids retains at least a 

minimum operational network of ground-based Navaids for the foreseeable

future.

• Sufficient ground-based Navaids will be maintained to provide the FAA and the 

airspace users with a safe recovery and sustained operations capability in the

event of a disruption in Satnav service. 

This policy applies, as a minimum, to all aircraft flying civil airspace. As GPS 

moves into a more robust architecture, the prospect for relief of some redundancy 

requirements in manned aviation may be an option in the future. However, UAVs have a 

diminished prospect for relief since, unlike manned aircraft, a UAV cannot readily 

fallback on dead reckoning, contact navigation and map reading in the same sense that a 

manned aircraft can. 

Future Environment 

The migration of the NAS from ground based traffic control to airborne traffic 

management, scheduled to occur over the next decade with the implementation of “free 

flight,” will have significant implications for UAVs. S&A will become an integrated, 

automated part of routine position reporting and navigation functions by relying on a 

combination of Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) and Global 

Positioning System (GPS) to create a virtual bubble of airspace around each aircraft, so 

that when bubbles contact, avoidance is initiated. All aircraft will be required to be 

equipped to the same level, making the unmanned or manned status of an aircraft 

transparent to both flyers and to the FAA, removing the need for separate standards. 

Finally, the pejorative perception that UAVs are by nature more dangerous than 

manned aircraft needs to be countered by recognizing that UAVs possess the following 

inherent attributes that contribute to flying safety: 

• A UAV will never be lost because a pilot experiences vertigo. 

• Many manned aircraft mishaps occur at the end of a flight, when human decisions 

and control inputs are substantial factors. Robotic aircraft are not programmed to 

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Airspace 

take chances; either preprogrammed conditions are met or the system goes 

around. 

• No UAV is likely to be lost due to aircrew urgency to return to base and family. 

• Since human support systems are not carried, mishaps from failed life support 

systems will not occur. 

• Smoke from malfunctioning, but non-vital, onboard systems does not pose the 

same threat of loss, since smoke in the cockpit can distract operators and lead to 

vision obscuration. 

• Automated take-offs and landings eliminate the need for pattern work, resulting in 

reduced exposure to mishaps, particularly in the area surrounding main operating 

bases. 

Directed Actions 

OSD directs the following actions be taken to integrate UAVs into civil airspace: 

1. Coordinate revising FAA Order 7610.4 to replace the requirement for using 

the COA process for all UAVs with one for using the DD175 form for 

qualifying UAVs. OPR: USAF. Due: FY04. 

2. Work with the FAA to define appropriate conditions and requirements under 

which a single pilot would be allowed to control multiple (up to four) airborne 

UAVs simultaneously. 

3. Document and disseminate any UAV-unique lessons learned from certifying the 

RQ-4 Global Hawk as airworthy by means of the OSS&E process. Formal 

documentation as a DoD Instruction for guiding future ROA airworthiness 

certifications should be considered. 

4. Establish a joint program, or designate a joint office, for developing and 

evaluating automated see-and-avoid and collision avoidance systems. 

5. Equip DoD UAVs intended for Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) operations with a 

stand-alone, hot backup, ground-based navigation system and establish a 

standardized lost link procedure. 

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UAV Roadmap 2002 – Appendix H 

Task/Process/Post/Use 

Appendix H: 

Task, Post, Process, and Use Considerations

Introduction 

This annex addresses Task, Post, Process, and Use (TPPU) for UAV collectors 

and develops an executable integration roadmap to guide long-range planning and 

programming in the Services and Agencies and to migrate the ISR community toward 

DoD ISR Vision 21. TPPU is a revolutionary way of thinking about how data is handled. 

Unlike Task, Process, Exploit and Disseminate (TPED), in the TPPU construct Tasking is 

net-centric, readily accessible to all authorized users, and fully integrated. 

Users/producers Post data on the network for use before it is ingested into the 

conventional processing, and exploitation processes. Processing is used in a broader 

context that can encompass exploitation, analysis, event correlation, and fusion of data 

and information. Users will have instant access, as posted data becomes available, 

replacing the dissemination notion that focused on “point-to-point” or push of 

information to specified users. 

This annex contains seven sections: Introduction, UAV TPPU Roadmap, Current 

state of TPPU, TPPU Requirements, TPPU Shortfalls, TPPU Technologies, and TPPU 

Observations and Recommendations. It is divided into two timeframes: FYDP and 2010-

2027. Requirements, shortfalls, and recommendations are considered for each timeframe. 

UAV “TPPU” Roadmap 

This section describes an integrated roadmap (Figure H-1) characterizing the 

anticipated actions necessary to guide the Services and Agencies planning and 

programming. Such guidance is needed to fully migrate the ISR UAV community 

toward the objectives of DoD's ISR Vision 21 dated 3 November 2000. 

DCGS-AF

MAGIS

TS II

MEF

TEG

CGS/TCS

TERPEB

DCGS-A

TS II

GOC

CDL

TES CGS

GRIFN

ASAS

DCGS-NJCA

JSIPS-N /BGHPES

TES-NCGS

“As Is” Architecture

DCGS-N

DCGS-A

Main

USAF

DCGS 

Core Sites

Marine Air Ground

Intelligence System

USAF

DCGS

Deployed

Sites

DCGS-A

FORWAR

D

GIG BE 

2000

2007

2015

System-Of-Systems Net-Centric

Infancy

Net-Centric

Information Infrastructure

2003/4

2010

“To Be” Architecture

CONOPS Transition

Content

Data Logic

Security Services

Application Services

IP and Web Services

Information Transport

Individual Warrior

Force

Structure

Pla

Pay

tforms

loads

Organizations

weapons sensors

combat

support

aerospace maritime

space

land personal

Content

Data Logic

Security Services

Application Services

IP and Web Services

Information Transport

Individual Warrior

Force

Structure

Pla

Pay

tforms

loads

Organizations

weapons sensors

combat

support

aerospace maritime

space

land personal

FIGURE H-1: TPPU-TRANSFORMING DCGS TO NET-CENTRICITY

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UAV Roadmap 2002 – Appendix H 

Task/Process/Post/Use 

The DoD ISR Vision 21 aims to provide integrated and responsive ISR 

capabilities operating in a collaborative enterprise assuring delivery of timely, relevant 

information for senior U.S. decision makers and for Joint / Combined forces. 

The first period begins in the current era and continues through the end of the 

FYDP (FY03-09). In this period, the Services' ground station components will move 

toward an integration of their respective Distributed Common Ground System (DCGS) 

systems. In the second time period (2010-2027), deployment of the initial Global 

Information Grid (GIG) Bandwidth Expansion capabilities begins to offer relief from

previous bandwidth constraints. As a result, advances in data processing, meta-data 

tagging, information applications (for exploitation, manipulation and visualization), and 

collaborative operations characterize the intermediate era. Many of the multi-INT, multiISR and multi-source correlation and fusion functions continue to be accomplished with a 

"man-in-the loop" technique. A separation of the sensor processes and the distributed 

manipulation of data and information characterize the end of this timeframe. 

The end-state in 2027 is characterized by extensive on-board processing with data 

coming from the platforms as well as actionable information from off-board sources in 

real time. Sensors and platforms are automatically cued and carry out prescribed 

missions. All products are immediately available for use on the information net. Indepth correlation and analysis will be performed at selected intelligence centers and their 

products will be made available on the net. 

Current TPED (DCGS As Is) 

In 2002, UAV control is via Ground Control Systems (GCS) and Mission Control 

Elements (MCE). The data are then routed to theater users (e.g., an Air Operations 

Center (AOC)) and Service Distributed Common Ground System (DCGS) nodes where 

processing and exploitation is performed. DCGS constitute a family of systems that 

provide multi-intelligence (Multi-INT) exploitation to the Joint Task Force and below 

through a combination of forward support, collaboration, and reach back. UAVs are 

connected to the DCGS via the Mission Control Element (Global Hawk) or the Tactical 

Control System (tactical UAVs). 

At the DoD level, DCGS is a Multi-INT integration strategy to achieve the 

objectives outlined below: 

1. Achieve Joint/Coalition ISR Interoperability. This includes the ability of a Joint 

Commander to flexibly employ ISR capabilities from any or all Service/Coalition 

sources to support a military operation. 

2. Produce and implement a Multi-INT and Multi-Source (U.S./Coalition surface, 

airborne, and national/commercial satellite) collaboration strategy. 

3. Guide the Services as they transition their current ISR capabilities to a Joint 

distributed collaborative network centric enterprise. 

DoD Agencies use DCGS as an architecture of specific standards to achieve Joint 

ISR interoperability at the JTF and lower echelons. For the Services, DCGS is a family 

of systems or elements designed to meet Service requirements implementing the DoD 

strategy and certified by the Joint Interoperability Test Command. 

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UAV Roadmap 2002 – Appendix H 

Task/Process/Post/Use 

The ”DoD DCGS” is a term used to refer to the entire Family of Systems (FoS) 

made up of the individual Service System of Systems (SoS) which are connected through 

designated points of interoperability. The Service DCGS architectures are composed of

SoS and/or systems (i.e., DCGS elements) as determined by the Service. The 

requirements contained herein are applicable to each Service SoS. Internal Service 

architectures are not specified, since that is a matter for Services to define and develop. 

Individual Service DCGS architectures (i.e., SoS) shall be interoperable at requisite 

classification level to provide joint and combined warfighters with the required 

capabilities. The capabilities contained in each Service implementation can be tailored to 

support the mission. Each Service DCGS SoS will either interface directly with 

Service/allied ISR platforms and/or rely on communication linkages to other Service 

DCGS FoS to satisfy requirements. 

Today, we have begun the evolution of military Service DCGSs to a network 

centric SoS that enables joint/coalition forces to securely manage ISR resources and 

access, process, post and use information and intelligence in a collaborative environment. 

The Services are making progress on their architectures and solid interoperability bases 

(e.g. Common Imagery Processor (CIP), CDL) have been established. Over forty-four 

systems have been fielded. While there are pockets of cross-Service interoperability, 

there is no connectivity between Service DCGS elements. Additionally, the Joint 

Intelligence Centers (JICs), Joint Analysis Centers (JACs), and Service intelligence 

production centers are not yet part of the DCGS architecture. The following graphics 

represent each of the Service “AS IS” operational views. 

GCS

MCE 

ETP

KU SATCOM

National National

Mission

Partners

MIST/SATCOM

National

INT

Tactical

Broadcast

Collection

Task

Receipt Process

Predator

AF DCGS - Worldwide

AF DCGS - Regional

Task

Receipt Process Exploit Disseminate Execute

AOC

AF DCGS -

Forward

AWACS

RJU. S. AI R FO RC E

Commercial

Imagery

SBIR

JSTARS

ISRM 

Host

ISRM 

Remote

Global Hawk

GCS

MCE 

ETP

KU SATCOM

National National

Mission

Partners

MIST/SATCOM

National

INT

Tactical

Broadcast

Collection

Task

Receipt Process

Predator

AF DCGS - Worldwide

AF DCGS - Regional

Task

Receipt Process Exploit Disseminate Execute

AOC

AF DCGS -

Forward

AWACS

RJU. S. AI R FO RC E

Commercial

Imagery

SBIR

JSTARS

ISRM 

Host

ISRM 

Remote

Global Hawk

FIGURE H-2: AIR FORCE’S DCGS (DCGS-AF) 

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UAV Roadmap 2002 – Appendix H 

Task/Process/Post/Use 

Theater/JTF

C4I Nodes

AF DCGS

MAGIS

UE DCGS-A DoD DCGS Family of Systems DCGS-N

Allied/Coalition

Commercial NTM Platforms/Sensors

GLOBAL DOMAIN

CONUS/OCONUS NUS/OCONUS 

Networks

GIG

GIG

DCGS-A 

Architecture

UNCLASSIFIED

US Airborne

Platforms

Reach

Dissemination

Line of Sight

DCGS-A

XXXX SOF

US/Allied Airborne

Platforms

DCGS-A

XX

FCS DCGS-A

XXX

DCGS-A

X

UA DCGS-A

GIG

Army Airborne

Platforms/Sensors

DRAFT 6 JUN 02

FIGURE H-3: ARMY’S DCGS (DCGS-A) 

USMC

DCGS

USN DCGS

USAF DCGS

USA DCGS

Theater C4I

Nodes

Global Domain

Theater

Domain

USMC

DCGS

USN DCGS

USAF DCGS

USA DCGS

Theater C4I

Nodes

Global Domain

Theater

Domain

FIGURE H-4: NAVY’S DCGS (ISR NET) 

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UAV Roadmap 2002 – Appendix H 

Task/Process/Post/Use 

XXX

 

FIGURE H-5: USMC’S DCGS (MAGIS) 

TPPU Requirements 

The requirements section is divided into two parts. The first addresses the 

Program of Record (FY04-09 Program Objective Memorandum) and the objective 

requirements taken from the draft DCGS CRD. They fall into five categories: Tasking, 

Posting, Processing, Using, and General. The second part addresses requirements beyond 

2010 and is derived from the Vision stated in the Roadmap section of this document.

Program of Record Requirements. Tasking requirements deal with common 

DoD format, multi-level security, automatic requests to change collection plans and 

directly send/receive via the Common Data Link. They must be able to receive and 

display all platform/sensor disposition and mission collection plans. 

The requirement for Posting is the capability to place data and information into a 

common portal on the Information Grid that is accessible to all users. The system must 

be able to import and export data and information electronically in varying data and 

media formats used by DoD, coalition, and allied forces. 

Processing requirements deal with the manipulation of raw, pre-processed and 

processed data into intelligence. These include machine to machine automation, 

functional manager approved/certified algorithms that automatically include accuracy 

estimate/confidence levels, decision aids that increase accuracy and speed while limiting 

human interaction, and hardware independent multi-discipline and multi-ISR common 

processing capabilities for all platforms/sensors. 

Using deals with giving the user timely access to data as it is posted and the tools 

and capabilities needed to retrieve, analyze and apply the available information to 

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UAV Roadmap 2002 – Appendix H 

Task/Process/Post/Use 

achieve desired results. The systems must be capable of receiving unexploited multi-ISR 

data produced by all means. Standards-based automated exploitation management 

processes will be required. These processes must be designed to facilitate distributed and 

collaborative exploitation using DoD approved collaborative applications and multidiscipline intelligence databases. The databases must be capable of automatically 

enabling information exchange based on user defined profiles. 

General requirements include the ability to use common user circuits with 

standard data formats and the ability to convert Service specific inputs into common 

formats passed through a multi-level or multi-layer security system capable of automated 

security parsing and dissemination of data at the appropriate security level. 

Visionary Requirements 2010 –2027. In the 2010-2027 timeframe, the 

transition to a net-centric joint ISR framework will occur. That framework will be 

characterized by the following attributes: 

• The net-centric joint ISR framework will be a global network structure, 

integrated in today’s concepts of the Global Information Grid (GIG) and the 

various communications modernization and transformation initiatives (e.g., GIG 

Bandwidth Expansion, Transformational Communications System). 

• Tasking will be accomplished by sensor / platform managers without direct 

human intervention, using a sensor / platform allocation process that is then 

managed by the sensor / platform operators seeking to “fill” requests for 

information rather than executing a static list of tasks. Sensors / platforms will 

also make coverage and collection decisions based upon the data they collect and 

either re-task themselves or task another sensor via high speed, platform-toplatform communications acting as a networked sensor “grid” or persistent 

surveillance based data and information production entity feeding the information 

portal. 

• The sources of information that will be posted, accessed and exploited will 

include traditional ISR sources of information (e.g., space-based, airborne, 

ground, surface, sub-surface, cyber, and human) as well as non-traditional 

sources of information, such as combat platforms, personnel, and commercial 

sources. All of those sources of information will be available through a “post 

before processing” functional information domain or portal, accessible in a 

secure fashion by all “users” of that information. 

• Posting in the 2010-2027 timeframe will require that any producer or user can 

plug in to the “posting domain” on the network from wherever and whenever 

necessary. A massive amount of data will be transmitted. A web-based system

will be required to give users the ability to rapidly find the data they need. The 

entire network will need to be multi-level and multi-layer secure. Supporting this 

process will be a series of applications, information management protocols, 

transport mechanisms, data wrappers, and related meta-data capabilities that will 

enable data and information provided to the “posting domain” to be de170
UAV Roadmap 2002 – Appendix H 

Task/Process/Post/Use 

conflicted, combined / correlated, and managed to maintain insight into the 

veracity, heritage, pedigree and completeness of the accessed information. 

• As the amount of data collected increases with new and more capable sensors, the 

job of exploiting the data becomes more complex. Time will continue to be of

the essence whether the data goes directly from sensor-to-shooter or through a 

more deliberate mission planning process. Disparate multi-source data must 

rapidly and in an automated fashion, be correlated and fused into information 

products. Advances in applications, changes in techniques, and adoption of 

automated processing aids and systems will be required. Further, integration and 

management of the various processing and exploitation capabilities residing on 

the network will require an adaptive set of management capabilities. These 

capabilities will be required to support the creation of tailored mission capability 

packages responsive to the defense mission being supported. This implies a 

robust collaborative environment that greatly exceeds the rudimentary tools in 

use today (e.g., NetMeeting, etc.) and relies on the resolution of the data and 

information management challenges identified earlier. 

Characterizing these attributes with a graphic presents a challenge of keeping it 

simple, while conveying the net-centricity of a secure, accessible data and information 

structure that supports both the time critical and deliberate defense mission prosecution 

processes. Figure 6 presents one view of that future and is intended to convey the 

attributes the Department seeks to field in support of UAV, and other ISR, network 

centric TPPU. 

FIGURE H-6: DOD DCGS ENVISIONED STRUCTURE IN 2015 

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UAV Roadmap 2002 – Appendix H 

Task/Process/Post/Use 

TPPU Shortfalls 

Like the Requirements section, the TPPU Shortfall section is divided into two 

parts: those that refer to the program of record and those in the 2010-2027 timeframe. 

The shortfalls were developed by comparing the “as is” DCGS capabilities from section 

III with the requirements in section IV.

Program of Record Shortfalls. Shortfalls in the Tasking area deal with the 

ability to use standard tasking procedures and messages and the lack of a feedback 

mechanism that provides an interactive environment between producer and user. 

Posting shortfalls are a lack of standard data and information reporting formats, a 

standard multi-ISR data relationship, meta-data tags for organizing and relating 

information, and an insufficient ability for deployed forces to plug into the network. 

Shortfalls in Processing are the accuracy of positional data, speed of processing, 

the insufficiency of decision aids to automate the decision making process, and the 

inability of processors in all ISR domains to respond to and meet a variety of user needs. 

Using shortfalls include the need to increase the quality and precision of

information provided, an ability to plug into the network from anywhere and an ability to 

move a massive amount of data around the Global Information Grid. 

Visionary Shortfalls 2010-2027. In the 2015-2027 timeframe, tasking or 

collection management will no longer resemble the “serial” process in use today. Rather, 

the segmentation of common functional capabilities residing on a networked structure 

should result in the creation of multiple management functions that operate almost 

independently of the physical structures we know today. For example, collection 

management as we know it today may fracture into a three part capability process defined 

by sensor asset allocation, data and information portal management, and processing 

management. In the sensor arena, collection management may no longer be required 

because the sensor / platform allocation process will provide coverage of “interest areas” 

relative to defense missions and provide persistent coverage of the interest area. Output 

from those allocated assets will be flowed into the “posting domain”, with interaction and 

self-tasking of sensors and cross cueing occurring between and / or among sensors 

allocated to the same interest area. The exploitation management process will assemble 

the necessary capabilities to exploit relevant information in the posting domain, providing 

“value added” to the overall information available. In order to realize this sort of “value 

added” or “business model” approach to ISR in the future, management tools and 

communications networks for this dynamic interaction need to be developed along with 

the doctrine, techniques and training underpinnings that supports this type of activity. 

In the 2027 timeframe, producers and users will proliferate to a network of fixed 

and deployed locations. Methods to allow users and producers to plug into the Global 

Information Grid on the move and receive/transmit large volumes of data must be 

developed. Cataloging and retrieval schemes, meta-data tags, verification and validation 

mechanisms, and data association applications must be developed to allow users to find 

and pull required data in real time. 

The need for speed and accuracy of data and information will dominate the 

shortfalls 2010- 2027. Continued emphasis will need to be placed on decision aids and 

information correlation and fusion. Training and retention of analysts will become a 

serious shortfall. 

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UAV Roadmap 2002 – Appendix H 

Task/Process/Post/Use 

TPPU Technologies 

Program summaries of the Services and Agencies 6.1-6.4 RDT&E programs 

through the FYDP were reviewed when available. These indicate that considerable effort 

is being placed on meeting the objective requirements of the DCGS CRD. Insufficient 

work is planned in the areas of advanced communications, processing, and security which 

will be discussed in the Recommendations section. 

TPPU Observations and Recommendations 

A review of the Program of Record and Visionary Shortfalls reveals that there are 

many areas where existing programs are not going to meet requirements. This section 

deals with the shortfalls by category and provides recommended courses of action in 

either the program of record (2002-2010) and/or the visionary era (2010-2027) 

• Multi-Level Security. This is a major stumbling block for the Intelligence 

Community in general and specifically for UAVs. The problem is two fold. First, 

sufficient funds are not being allocated toward the development of technology that 

will not allow security errors. The second is although this is a community wide 

problem, there is no accord within the Intelligence Community as to who has the 

authority and responsibility to mandate standards, procedures, and practices 

concerning multi-level security from disparate sensors/sources. 

Recommendation: The Intelligence Community (IC) must come together to 

agree on the scope of the problem and appoint an organization to be in charge. 

Funding should be made available within the FYDP for the IC to develop the 

necessary hardware, software, standards, procedures, and practices to make 

multi-level security possible. 

• Training. With the advent of new sensors, exploitation techniques, and equipment, 

and the constant rotation of Service members, it is necessary to develop training 

programs for newly assigned and current personnel. While the training is a constant 

recurring need, the establishment of the programs and training aid development is 

non-recurring. 

Recommendation: Services and Agencies need to POM for training program

development within the FYDP. 

• Exploitation Tools. As new collection technologies become available and existing 

ones improve, there will be a need to develop new exploitation software and to 

upgrade existing software consistent with changes in the state-of-the–art of both 

collection and processing hardware. 

Recommendation: Services and Agencies need to include costs for data 

exploitation in their sensor programs and for upgrades to existing software as 

sensors and exploitation platforms are upgraded. 

• Mensuration/Positioning Software. Services and Agencies are spending large 

amounts on this problem. 

Recommendation: Current funding levels are sufficient. 

• Tasking Standards. In order to meet the requirement for all DCGS systems to task 

all UAV sensors, common tasking standards are needed. 

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UAV Roadmap 2002 – Appendix H 

Task/Process/Post/Use 

Recommendation: The Services and Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) need a 

program to develop a set of tasking standards. DIA should POM for this effort 

in their FYDP. Furthermore, as new sensors are developed, tasking standards 

must be modified or written to include them. 

• Decision Aids and Fusion. Within the past five years it has become obvious that 

computers can aid in the exploitation Multi INT data. While the number of collectors 

and their attendant collection volumes are increasing, the number of analysts is 

shrinking. Services and Agencies must develop automated decision systems to aid in 

the exploitation and evaluation of data. This effort should include not only individual 

sensor types but also aid in the fusion and correlation of data from various sources. 

Target signature databases are needed and a standard test environment will be 

required to evaluate the decision aids over simulated conditions. 

Recommendation: Services and Agencies should form a joint program 

office to carry out this program and funds should be POM’d in the FYDP. 

This effort should carry on through the 2010-2027 timeframe to 

incorporate new sensors and advances in the state-of-the-art of computing 

and cognitive science. 

• Cross-cueing. Target identification can be greatly aided by using data from multiple 

sensors. In the case of fleeting targets, it is necessary to immediately bring additional 

sensors to bare on the target. Software is needed that will allow sensors to 

automatically cross-cue one another on-board in real time. 

Recommendation: Platform developers need to include the cost of cross-cueing 

software for the sensors on their platforms. Communication paths need to be 

developed to facilitate the cross-cueing. 

• Posting/Cataloging Schema. Inherent in the TPPU concept is a repository for both 

products and raw data. The amount of data available will increase exponentially. In 

order to be used, there must be schema by which the operator can easily and quickly 

find and retrieve it. Standard formats, messages, and products must be developed. 

Recommendation: Techniques used in industry must be adapted to meet the 

specifics of this DoD requirement. 

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UAV Roadmap 2002 – Appendix I 

Weapons 

Appendix I: Weapons 

UAV Weaponization Overview 

The UAV Weaponization Appendix is intended to provide some general insights 

into the various classes of UAV system designs and the associated weapons integration 

implications, as well as highlight both current and future UAV weaponization 

development efforts. This appendix is not intended to advocate for a specific service 

UAV system design requirement, but attempts to point out the various system design 

attributes associated with various mission requirements and the appropriate design trades 

under consideration. Finally, throughout the appendix, where and when appropriate, 

specific weaponized UAV systems and demonstrations will be referenced to illustrate 

how various service UAV programs are attempting to satisfy service derived 

requirements. For clarity, throughout the UAV Weaponization Appendix, the terms 

“weaponized UAVs” and “Unmanned Combat Air Vehicles” are used. “Weaponized 

UAV” denotes that weapons have been added or integrated into a principally developed 

ISR UAV system design. The term “UCAV” denotes a UAV system design developed 

from the start as a weapons delivery platform with the potential to accomplish other 

mission requirements like ISR, Electronic Attack, etc. 

UAV Weaponization – “Understanding the End-to-End Design 

Trades” 

Many of the system design attributes of weaponized UAVs are generally 

understood and readily comparable to both simple and complex manned aeronautical 

combat systems, with the exceptions being the final targeting and weapons control 

systems reside principally off board the air vehicle. Given this fundamental difference, 

the end-to-end design trades for weaponized UAV Systems, both for the Air Vehicle 

(AV) and the Mission Control System (MCS), become a more complex issue when 

assured weapons system safety and operational control are considered critical 

performance parameters. In addition, the supporting services’ CONOPS generally 

require a more robust UAV system design due to their repeat exposure to high threat 

defensive systems (i.e. greater Psurvivability requirements) and the needed to achieve 

improved weapons effects within reduced sensor-to-shoot time periods (i.e. greater PKill 

requirements). 

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UAV Roadmap 2002 – Appendix I 

Weapons 

UAV Weaponization – “System Integration Issues & Design 

Drivers” 

Targeting

System

Carriage &

Release Systems 

Weapons Suitability &

Specific Weapons Effects

System Support

Concepts

CONOPS

FIGURE I-1: “ISSUES & DRIVERS”. 

As alluded to previously, weaponized UAVs system designs are generally 

considered more complex systems with wider system performance margins than baseline 

ISR UAV systems. Yet, unlike these ISR UAV systems, weaponized UAV systems bring 

with them a whole host of new systems integration and weapons suitability issues into the 

overall UAV design trade space. Therefore, whether examining the mission/cost 

effectiveness of an existing ISR UAV system for weaponization or a future development 

UCAV system concept, a complete understanding of all the associated carriage/release, 

targeting sub-systems design drivers, as well as the user associated CONOPS, support 

concepts and desired weapons effects, will be needed. 

UAV Weaponization – “Association With User Provided 

CONOPS” 

An essential part of any weaponized UAV system concept is its association with 

and specific traceability to key attributes identified within a user derived Concept of 

Operations (CONOPS). Within the context of this CONOPS, the user generally identifies 

UAV Weapon System capability shortfalls and desired battlefield effects—thus loosely 

defining the initial UAV weaponization system design trade space and its suitability for 

various service missions. The following are brief descriptions of the current supporting 

CONOPS for various services related weaponized UAV missions: 

• Armed Reconnaissance – The armed reconnaissance CONOPS takes full advantage 

of the existing ISR UAV system design, leveraging principally the original air 

vehicle, sensor, and ground control system attributes. The advantages of such an 

approach are producing specific, predictable weapons effects within the fixed system

design limitations, while preserving the original ISR functionality. The strengths of 

this approach are to quickly advance new weapons delivery capabilities within 

specific system design and cost limitations. What generally inhibits this CONOPS is 

the recognition that a wider array of all weather, precise weaponry may be needed, as 

176
UAV Roadmap 2002 – Appendix I 

Weapons 

well as that time-critical operations require greater air vehicle performance than 

originally designed. 

FIGURE I-2: WEAPONIZED MQ-1B PREDATOR A.

• Hunter-Killer – The next level of weaponization CONOPS helps to mitigate the 

aforementioned ISR system design limitations, by recognizing that when UAVs work 

in concert with other UAVs (or other manned vehicles), one component may be 

optimized as the sensor/targeting device and the other component may then 

effectively act as the weapons delivery vehicle. 

PREDATOR – B The Hunter

Wide Area Search Hunter

Comm relay

Precise Coords

LGB w/kinetics?

WEAPONIZED RQ-1 The Killer

Hellfire/Precision Attack

Buddy - Lase

Low Cost/attritable

Secure track data

45 – 52K Altitude

200 KIAS

Extended Loiter

15K Altitude

70 KIAS

FIGURE I-3: PREDATOR/PREDATOR B, HUNTER-KILLER CONOPS. 

The clear advantage of this approach is to link a more costly, yet more effective, 

persistent, wide area ISR sensor/targeting system to a low cost, attritable platform that 

accomplishes the final ordinance delivery beneath the weather, closer-in to the intended 

177
UAV Roadmap 2002 – Appendix I 

Weapons 

target. While this CONOPS leverages advanced sensors to independently search for 

targets over a wide area of interest, the system CONOPS remains largely dependent on 

continuous processing of large amounts ISR target correlation data, secure continuous 

communications between air vehicles, and remote piloting/sensor control from a GCS.

• SEAD/EA -- The SEAD/EA system CONOPS for weaponized UAVs is recognized 

by the user as one of the most stressing system design drivers and, therefore, is often used 

as the primary focus for development and demonstration of emerging UCAV systems. 

FIGURE I-4: SEAD/EA CONOPS, COOPERATIVE OPERATION. 

In this operational role, UCAVs are foreseen as a “first day of the war” force 

enablers that complement a strike package by performing either preemptive lethal 

destruction of sophisticated enemy IADS in advance of the strike package or provide 

supportive Electronic Attack (EA) against specific threat emitters. The effectiveness of 

this system CONOPS relies largely on a “network centric” Mission Control System

(MCS) employing autonomous, multi-ship unmanned air vehicles, and the timely fusion 

of on-board/off-board sensor information to rapidly find, fix, track and, based on the 

strike mission priorities and rules of engagement, target specific classes of threats. 

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UAV Roadmap 2002 – Appendix I 

Weapons 

Find Fix Track/Target Engage

Sensor Range

UCAV at

- 40 Kft Altitude

- 0.8 Mach

• Detect Emitter

• Determine Emitter Type

• Determine Emitter Location

• Spot SAR

• Data Fusion

• Target Cueing

• SAR Transmission

• Target Confirmation and Prioritization

• Weapons Release Authorization

• Weapons Release

Find Fix Track/Target Engage

Sensor Range

UCAV at

- 40 Kft Altitude

- 0.8 Mach

• Detect Emitter

• Determine Emitter Type

• Determine Emitter Location

• Spot SAR

• Data Fusion

• Target Cueing

• SAR Transmission

• Target Confirmation and Prioritization

• Weapons Release Authorization

• Weapons Release

FIGURE I-5: UCAV ENGAGEMENT CONOPS. 

Another key feature of this UCAV system CONOPS is the employment of multiship cooperative targeting using on-board Electronic Support Measures (ESM) to 

determine the location of emitter targets and on-board SARs to detect non-emitting 

targets and reduce Target Location Errors (TLE). Multi-ship ESM can be used to 

triangulate an emission and cue a UCAV to take a SAR image; the UCAV can then 

transmit the image to the operator who can authorize (or deny) the UCAVs to engage the 

target. 

• Deep Strike - The Deep Strike UCAV system CONOPS is often viewed as a stressing 

requirement for the UCAV design, since extended range without in-flight air 

refueling and persistence over the target is the key attribute needed. Also implied in 

the Deep Strike system CONOPS is that some form of off-board/on-board cueing has 

occurred and then final target resolution and target recognition will be accomplished 

by the on-board, all weather sensor. The sensor normally assumed is an advanced 

SAR system with high resolution “Spot” mode capabilities permitting rapid 

transmission of one-foot resolution of SAR patch map back to the MCS. Studies 

remain to be performed to determine whether SAR-only imagery will be sufficient 

(both technically and by Rules Of Engagement) to permit weapon release. As a 

fallback, EO/IR sensors may be employed to provide visual target identification prior 

to weapon release.

• Other Niche CONOPS – Finally, there are some still evolving UCAV system

CONOPS now starting to address non-kinetic “leap ahead” technologies. Due to the 

immaturity of these other niche system CONOPS and the security safeguards 

currently associated with these technology programs, they will not be addressed in 

this UAV weaponization appendix. 

UAV/UCAV Systems – “Targeting Systems & Descriptive 

Attributes” 

An essential attribute of any weaponized UAV system is how it consistently finds, 

fixes, and fires its weaponry at the intended target. In that regard, weaponized UAVs and 

UCAVs benefit/suffer from many of the same targeting systems solutions/limitations 

associated with comparable performing manned weapon systems, with some minor 

179
UAV Roadmap 2002 – Appendix I 

Weapons 

differences being were the associated on-board equipment may now be located with the 

removal of the cockpit. However, unlike the more costly, mature, higher aero-performing 

manned systems, weaponized UAVs and small UCAV system designs are often limited 

by the weight, volume, and electrical power constraints of the platform. Thus, since often 

challenged by air vehicle design and cost limits, weaponized UAVs and UCAV must find 

or develop acceptable performing, yet smaller, less costly targeting systems. 

• EO/IR Targeting Systems – The principal advantage of electro-optic and infrared 

video camera systems for use on weaponized UAVs is that they can continue to use 

the basic designed requirements of the existing ISR UAV sensor, with minor 

adaptations for use as a targeting device for EO/IR weapons. 

WESCAM 14 MTS 

LR

EO Spotter IR Illumina

EO/I

EO Zo EO om

FIGURE I-6: EO/IR TARGETING SYSTEMS. 

However, these EO/IR targeting systems generally experience weapons delivery 

accuracy degradation due to system stabilization/sensor misalignment problems, weather 

related limitations, or the tactics requiring weapons delivery off axis from the boresighted limits of the sensor. In addition, the majority of EO/IR inventory weapons have 

tended to exceed the single carriage capacity of most current UAV systems. 

• Radars – The tactical utility of using radar data for releasing weapons through the 

weather near-precisely on the target continues to be greatly improved upon with the 

advancements in SAR, to include mobile targets with SAR GMTI. 

Lynx SAR

FIGURE I-7: RADAR. 

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UAV Roadmap 2002 – Appendix I 

Weapons 

In fact, it has been the ability to correlate both internal navigation systems and 

global positioning systems with high resolution radar images of the target that less than 3 

meter weapons accuracy has been possible in all weather conditions for a single delivery 

aircraft. Advanced targeting techniques include advanced multi-ship ESM; image 

mensuration of a SAR image with a terrain database; single vehicle, multiple look SAR 

images; and multiple vehicle, multiple look SAR images. 

However, the current array of inventory radar sensor systems, having been 

designed and developed principally around larger manned systems, pose significant 

power, weight, volume, and re-design cost challenges for weaponized UAVs and UCAV 

systems. In an attempt to reduce these constraints on future UCAVs systems, several 

conceptual targeting techniques are being demonstrated to further remove the target 

location errors, respond to time sensitive targeting requirements, and reduce system

acquisition costs. 

One conceptual approach leverages smaller, less powerful, and less costly SAR 

systems onboard individual UAVs flying diverse flight paths and fuses within the mission 

management control system their individual chipped-out views to precisely locate, 

identify, and target. The other approach is to extend the mission management capability 

of a manned system, using its larger, more powerful radar system to control smaller, 

sensor-less UCAVs. Both approaches are dependent on low probability of intercept 

tactical data links and advanced on-board or off-board processing of SAR image data. 

• Processors - An integral part of every weaponized UAV system design is the subsystem processors that specifically correlate the sensor images, electronic 

measurements and target signatures with the mission stored targeting and weapons 

parameters data. It is the processing capability or limitations of the weaponized UAV 

system that ultimately defines the systems ability to detect identify and recognize 

targets from the large array of electronic or image data obtained from on-board or offboard sources. While at the same time many of these sub-system components are 

being developed into smaller, lighter, more compact payloads, specifically for smaller 

UAV system designs, it is the processing power of these components, coupled with 

the advancement of new target recognition algorithms initially developed for small 

advanced, autonomous weaponry processors, that supports greater weapons 

integration capabilities for UAV system designs. 

FIGURE I-8: PROCESSORS. 

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UAV Roadmap 2002 – Appendix I 

Weapons 

• LO Signature Aperture Considerations – In designing future penetrating stealthy 

manned/unmanned system designs, special attention is needed to ensure on-board 

antenna apertures and sensors do not detract form obtaining the overall system

survivability (and affordability) design goals. While advanced tailless stealthy 

UCAV system designs have shown measurable benefits in their achieving of 

improved system survivability goals, they still face difficult challenges in managing 

the numerous new apertures and sensors often needed for unmanned air vehicles 

systems. 

Flush Air Data Ports

MILSTAR

UHF SATCOM

MIDS/IFF

RWR

ESM

GPS

Flush Air Data Ports

MILSTAR

UHF SATCOM

MIDS/IFF

RWR

ESM

GPS

FIGURE I-9: UCAV APERTURES. 

In addition, special consideration should be given on how best to attenuate the 

emissions and/or the radar returns that various sensors and antennas may produce when 

integrated on the air vehicle, without unfavorably impacting the systems ultimate ability 

to find, fix, track and deliver weapons in the most stressing weather and threat conditions. 

UAV/UCAV Systems – “Carriage & Release Systems” 

• Internal & External Carriage – A key system development consideration in the 

development of Weaponized UAV system is the suitability of various internal and 

external carriage and release systems. Initially the user desires to save development 

and system support costs, as well as take full advantage of existing carriage and 

release systems that have been developed and will be shared with other manned 

aircraft systems. However, specific weight, volume, and electrical power limitations 

on smaller, lighter weaponized UAV systems pose unique challenges. Generally, 

single external carriage design options for existing smaller ISR UAVs are the easiest 

to integrate at reduced costs. As the users requirements drive the need for more 

robust weapons delivery and survivability options on future UCAV systems, new 

internal storage and release equipment for advanced weapons must be developed. 

Again, because of the need to hold down weapons integration costs, the users will 

again insist, to the largest extent possible, to utilize advanced common carriage and 

release systems that are being developed and shared across the next generation 

manned/unmanned fleets. 

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UAV Roadmap 2002 – Appendix I 

Weapons 

• Impact on A/V structures & components – In an attempt to hold down overall UAV 

design weight and gain back some benefits in improved range, loiter and payload 

capacity, many UAV designers have employed light weight, high strength composite 

materials throughout much of their wing and fuselage structure. While this structural 

approach is very effective in holding down overall design-to-weight system costs, it 

requires a thorough understanding of the operational “end-state” weapons 

configuration so that the necessary internal and external electrical/fiber wiring, 

component access/placement and structural hard-points for various classes of 

weapons are accounted for in the final system design. For example, where a baseline 

ISR UAV system design used a detachable, fully composite wing structure absent of 

fuel tanks, electrical components and hard-point attachments, the associated costs to 

later add external weapons capability later is generally severe and would normally 

require a complete system redesign and development. Finally, as newer, more 

advanced compressed weapons carriage and “smart” release systems are developed 

for weaponized UAV systems and UCAV systems, greater attention will be needed 

for digital based components and the connecting fiber optic architecture stretching 

throughout the air vehicle. 

• Impact on Vehicle Survivability - Like the sensors and apertures challenges 

mentioned previously, stealthy UCAV system designs must consider the appropriate 

placement of weapons payloads, since their location to the vehicle outer mold line 

plays an important part in the overall system survivability goals. While there are 

several options to help mitigate the negative signature effects of external weapons 

payloads, the most effective payload design, if the additional weight and volume 

growth cost and performance trades are deemed acceptable, is to optimize the air 

vehicle internal payload carriage. Also an added benefit of this design approach is 

easier entry to the supporting subsystem components accessible through the internal 

payload bays and wheel wells that are open during routine ground maintenance, 

rather than using external panels which would require repeat costly, time consuming 

LO resealing and maintenance. 

UAV/UCAV – “Weapons Suitability for Various System Designs” 

The intended purpose of this section of the Weaponization UAV Appendix is to 

briefly consider the suitability of various classes of weapons for different types of UAV 

systems (i.e. a medium altitude, non-stealthy, EO/IR senor equipped; medium altitude vs. 

stealthy, SAR sensor equipped; etc.) 

 

• Air Vehicle Baseline Design & Weapons Suitability - The air vehicle baseline design 

is a key driver in determining the suitability of certain classes of weaponry for 

integration onboard a UAV system. For example, single carriage, EO/IR weapons are 

well suited for a medium altitude, non-stealthy, EO/IR sensor equipped UAV system

when the mission environment is permissive enough to permit precision employment 

(i.e. in the absence of a robust IADS, advanced fighter threat and influence of bad 

weather on both the air vehicle and weaponry). In this permissive environment the 

real effect of a long-dwell weaponized UAV system that can stare persistently at a 

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UAV Roadmap 2002 – Appendix I 

Weapons 

stationary or moving target and deliver a precise weapon at the place/time of 

choosing has been clearly shown. However, building on this long-dwell 

“persistence” on target and weapons delivery effect will require new highly 

survivable UCAV systems designs capable of carrying the broader inventory of all 

weather, precise weaponry providing the full range of targeting effects for the 

warfighter. 

• Air Vehicle Performance - The combination of both air vehicle aeronautical and 

survivability performance largely defines the limits of suitability for specific classes 

of weapons which may be integrated into the weaponized UAV or UCAV system. 

For example, these performance attributes when examined in light of the air vehicle 

range/loiter/maneuver requirements will further define the weight/size of the weapons 

and sensor load outs. 

• Data/Command Link Considerations - Often, a great deal of attention is given to the 

air vehicle system and weapons integration challenges, without equal consideration 

for the fragileness or robustness of the Data/Command Link requirements between 

the air vehicle and the mission control system. Unlike manned systems, overall 

weapon system effectiveness for weaponized UAVs or UCAV is ultimately 

dependent on the assured reliability of C4ISR system design components to pass 

targeting quality sensor data to and weapons release/withhold commands from the 

weapons officer now resident within the mission control system. Essentially, driven 

by higher weapons safety, surety and security C4ISR requirements, weaponized UAV 

and UCAV data/command links will require encryption, low probability of intercept, 

and redundant paths to ultimately assure the warfighter that the weapon system can be 

commanded in effect at all times. 

Recommendations 

Define and implement security measures required for positive control of 

weapons employment on weaponized UAVs by IOC of the first UCAV squadron 

(FY08). 

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UAV Roadmap 2002 – Appendix J 

Reliability

Appendix J: Reliability 

Background and Definitions 

The combined U.S. military UAV fleet (Pioneers, Hunters, and Predators) reached 

the 100,000 cumulative flight hour mark in 2002. This milestone is a good point at which 

to assess the reliability of these UAVs. Reliability is at the core of achieving routine 

airspace access, reducing acquisition system cost, and improving mission effectiveness 

for UAVs. Although it has taken the fleet of military UAVs 17 years to reach the 

100,000 flight hour milestone (see Figure J-1), this appendix highlights the first 

comprehensive study9

 to formally address the reliability issue for these increasingly 

utilized military assets. UAV reliability is important because it underlies their 

affordability, availability, and acceptance. 

Affordability. The reliability of the Defense Department’s UAVs is closely tied 

to their affordability primarily because the Department has come to expect UAVs to be 

less expensive than their manned counterparts. This expectation is based on the UAV’s 

generally smaller size (currently a savings of some $1,500 per pound) and the omission 

of those systems needed to support a pilot or aircrew, which can save 3,000 to 5,000 

pounds in cockpit weight. Beyond these two measures, however, other cost saving 

measures to enhance affordability tend to impact reliability. 

Availability. With the removal of the pilot, the rationale for including the level 

of redundancy, or for using man-rated components considered crucial for his safety, can 

go undefended in UAV design reviews, and may be sacrificed for affordability. Less 

redundancy and lower quality components, while making UAVs even cheaper to 

produce, mean they become more prone to in-flight loss and more dependent on 

maintenance, impacting both their mission availability and ultimately their life cycle cost 

(LCC). 

Acceptance. Finally, improving reliability is key to winning the confidence of

the general public, the acceptance of other aviation constituencies (airlines, general 

aviation, business aviation, etc.), and the willingness of the Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA) to regulate UAV flight. Regulation of UAVs is important because 

it will provide a legal basis for them to operate freely in the National Airspace System for 

the first time. This, in turn, should lead to their acceptance by international and foreign 

civil aviation authorities. Such acceptance will greatly facilitate obtaining overflight and 

landing privileges when larger, endurance UAVs deploy in support of contingencies. 

Regulation will also save time and resources within both the DoD and the FAA by 

providing one standardized, rapid process for granting flight clearances to replace today’s 

cumbersome, lengthy (up to 60 days) authorization process. A third benefit of regulation 

is that it could potentially lower production costs for the military market by encouraging 

the use of UAVs in civil and commercial applications. 

This overview presents reliability from several perspectives commonly used in 

reliability analysis. 

 

9

 UAV Reliability Study, Office of the Secretary of Defense (Acquisition Technology, and Logistics) 

185
UAV Roadmap 2002 – Appendix J 

Reliability

Reliability is the probability that an item will perform its intended function for a 

specified time under stated conditions. It is given as a percentage which 

represents the probability that a system or component will operate failure-free for 

a specified time, typically the mission duration. It relates closely to Mean Time

Between Failure. 

Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF) describes how long a repairable system or 

component will continue to perform before failure. For non-repairable systems or 

components, this value is termed Mean Time To Failure (MTTF). 

Availability is a measure of how often a system or component is in the operable 

and committable state when the mission is called for at an unknown (random) 

time. It is measured in terms of the percentage of time a system can be expected 

to be in place and working when needed, or mission available rate (MAR) in 

percent. 

Class A Mishap Rate is the number of accidents (significant vehicle damage or 

total loss) occurring per 100,000 hours of fleet flight time. As no single U.S. 

UAV fleet has accumulated this amount of flying time, each fleet’s MR represents 

its extrapolated losses to the 100,000 hour mark. It is expressed as mishaps per 

100,000 hours. It is important to note that this extrapolation does not reflect 

improvements that should result from operational learning or improvement in 

component technology. 

Maintenance cancellations/aborts were broken out into failures of the 

aircraft’s major subsystems. Use of these failure modes lead to a higher fidelity 

representation of the vehicles’ reliability. In order to make uniform comparisons 

between systems, the following definitions were used to categorize areas of 

system failure leading to mission aborts or cancellations. 

Power/Propulsion (P&P). Encompasses the engine, fuel supply, transmission, 

propeller, electrical system, generators, and other related subsystems on board the 

aircraft. 

Flight Control. Includes all systems contributing to the aircraft stability and 

control such as avionics, air data system, servo-actuators, control surfaces/servos, 

on-board software, navigation, and other related subsystems. Aerodynamic 

factors are also included in this grouping. 

Communication . The datalink between the aircraft to the ground. 

Human Factors/Ground Control. Accounts for all failures resulting from

human error and maintenance problems with any non-vehicle hardware or 

software on the ground. 

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UAV Roadmap 2002 – Appendix J 

Reliability

Miscellaneous. Any mission failures not attributable to those previously noted, 

including airspace issues, operating problems, and other non-technical factors. 

Because operating environments are not uniform as a variable affecting the data, 

weather was excluded as a causal factor in this study. 

Data and Trends 

Figure J-1 shows the numbers of Predators, Pioneers, and Hunters lost in Class A 

mishaps by year for the period 1986 through 2001. Class A mishaps are those aircraft 

accidents resulting in loss of the aircraft (in Naval parlance, “strike”), human life, or 

causing over $1,000,000 in damage. These data show a cumulative mishap rate (i.e., 

Class A accidents per 100,000 hours of flight) of 32 for Predator, 334 for Pioneer, and 55 

for Hunter (16 since the major reliability improvements in 1996). In comparison to 

manned aviation mishap rates, general aviation aircraft suffer about 1 Class A mishap per 

100,000 hours, regional/commuter airliners about a tenth of that rate, and larger airliners 

about a hundredth of that rate. 

0

10000

20000

30000

40000

50000

60000

1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004

Year

Cumulative Vehicle Flight Hours

RQ-1 / Predator

RQ-2 / Pioneer

RQ-5 / Hunter

9 5 8 5 11

3 0

0

9

1

7

3

2 0 2 1

4 0 0

0 1

1

3

0 12

3

1

0

2

1

4

1

2 0

0

General Aviation:

1 Mishap per 100K 

Hours

Pioneer Fleet:

334 Mishaps per

100K Hours

Predator Fleet:

32 Mishaps per

100K Hours

Hunter Fleet:

55 Mishaps per 100K

Hours

(16 Mishaps per 100K

Hours since 1996)

Numbers represent 

Class A Mishaps per Year

0

0

5

FIGURE J-1: U.S. MILITARY UAV MISHAP RATES (LIFETIME), 1986 – 2002 

These statistics make it apparent that the reliability of UAVs needs to improve by 

one to two orders of magnitude to reach an equivalent level of safety with manned 

aircraft. The reliability trends calculated during these flight hours are detailed in Tables 

J-1 and J-2. Following these data is a discussion about the individual UAV systems 

(early and late models) and how their fielding and operation contribute to the reliability 

data. 

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UAV Roadmap 2002 – Appendix J 

Reliability

TABLE J-1: SUMMARY OF UAV RELIABILITY FINDINGS. 

MTBF (hrs) Availability Reliability

Mishap Rate 

per 100,000 

hrs (Series) 

Mishap Rate 

per 100,000 

hrs (Model) 

RQ-1A/ Requirement n/a n/a n/a n/a 

Predator Actual 32.0 40% 74% 43 

RQ-1B/ Requirement 40 80% 70% n/a 

Predator Actual 55.1 93% 89% 31 

32 

RQ-2A/ Requirement 25 93% 84% n/a 

Pioneer Actual 9.1 74% 80% 363 

RQ-2B/ Requirement 25 93% 84% n/a 

Pioneer Actual 28.6 78% 91% 139 

334 

RQ-5/ Hunter Requirement 10 85% 74% n/a 

(pre-1996) Actual n/a n/a n/a 255 

RQ-5/ Hunter Requirement 10 85% 74% n/a 

(post-1996) Actual 11.3 98% 82% 16 

55 

Table J-1 summarizes the reliability metrics for all military UAVs examined in 

this study. With respect to the required values as outlined in the operational requirements 

and specifications, green and red signify instances in which the actual values meet or fall 

short of the requirements, respectively. In the case of the mishap rate per 100,000 hours, 

no requirements were identified. In addition, requirements are not available for the RQ1A/Predator due to their development after concluding its ACTD (discussed later in this 

Appendix). 

The mishap rate per 100,000 hours is presented in two ways. The model/series 

mishap rate illustrates “before and after” gains made in reliability and operations between 

subsequent versions of the same UAV model. The model mishap rate is a snapshot of the 

combined performance of all versions of each UAV model. It incorporates all mishaps 

over that fleet’s cumulative flight hours. 

In all cases except for the RQ-2/Pioneer, the UAV systems examined in this study 

exceed operational requirements. The shortfalls in the RQ-2A reliability performance 

(shown in red) were amended with the next generation RQ-2B with the exception of the 

availability metric. 

Table J-2 presents the failure modes analysis for each UAV model. 

TABLE J-2: SUMMARY OF UAV FAILURE MODE FINDINGS. 

Power/ 

Propulsion 

Flight 

Control Comm 

Human/ 

Ground Misc 

RQ-1A/ 

Predator 23% 39% 11% 16% 11% 

RQ-1B/ 

Predator 53% 23% 10% 2% 12% 

RQ-2A/ 

Pioneer 29% 29% 19% 18% 5% 

RQ-2B/ 

Pioneer 51% 15% 13% 19% 2% 

RQ-5/ 

Hunter 29% 21% 4% 29% 17% 

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UAV Roadmap 2002 – Appendix J 

Reliability

There are several noteworthy trends from the summary data in Table J-2. 

• The failure due to Human/Ground related issues is significantly lower for the MQ-1B 

Predator. This may be largely due to the increased use of simulators for Predator 

training, as well as enhancements made in situational awareness. 

• Despite some initial integration issues, a more complex solution for over-the-horizon 

ATC communication via the ARC-210 radio did not increase the share of mishaps 

due to communication hardware and software failures for the RQ-1. 

• The trends in the MQ-1/Predator and RQ-2/Pioneer failures due to Power/Propulsion 

are very similar. The share is in the 20-30 percent range (23% and 29%, respectively) 

for the early, A-model systems, but doubles to the 50 percent range (53% and 51%, 

respectively) in the later models. MQ-1 Block 30 upgrades address this issue. 

• The trends in the MQ-1/Predator and RQ-2/Pioneer failures due to Flight Control 

issues are also very similar. From the A-model to the B-model, the share decreases 

by approximately one-half (39% to 23% and 29% to 15%, respectively). This may be 

attributed to a better understanding of the vehicle aerodynamics and flight control as 

well as self-imposed flight restrictions for certain operating environments. 

• Despite any noticeable shifts of failure modes among the vehicles from the early to 

the late model, the reliability trends for the UAVs continued to be positive. This 

indicates an awareness of, and attention to, system deficiencies on the part of the 

designers and operators. 

The average values for the failure modes for all five systems are presented in 

Figure J-2. This aggregate view of the Predator, Pioneer, and Hunter UAV fleet provides 

a good introduction into a similar perspective on foreign UAV reliability. 

37%

26%

11%

17%

9%

Power/Prop

Flight Control

Comm

Human/Ground

Misc

FIGURE J-2: AVERAGE SOURCES OF SYSTEM FAILURES FOR U.S. MILITARY UAV FLEET

(BASED ON 97,000 HOURS) 

32%

28%

11%

22%

7%

Power/Prop

Flight Control

Comm

Human/Ground

Misc

FIGURE J-3: AVERAGE SOURCES OF SYSTEM FAILURES FOR IAI UAV FLEET

(BASED ON 100,000 HOURS) 

Israeli Defense Forces have also accumulated over 100,000 hours of operational 

flight experience with their UAVs. The manufacturer of most of these UAVs, Israeli 

Aircraft Industries (IAI), has documented the causes of failures across the past 25 years 

of this experience and made recommendations for improving reliability based on this 

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analysis. Of current U.S. UAV systems, both the Pioneer and the Hunter originated as 

IAI designs, and the Shadow evolved from the Pioneer’s design. For these three reasons, 

any examination of U.S. UAV reliability would be incomplete without examining the 

reliability of their Israeli counterparts and predecessors. 

The data trends derived from the U.S. UAV operations summarized in Figure J-2 

are remarkably similar (within 5%) to that of the Israeli UAV fleet for all failure modes. 

Given that the IAI data is also based on a substantial number of flight hours as well, one 

can argue that the U.S. is facing the same technical and operational problems of other 

operators. Furthermore, because manufacturing techniques and supply quality differ from

one country to the next, it is interesting to ask the question “Why are the failures modes 

still similar?” One answer points to external factors and the operating environment itself,

including weather and the low Reynolds number flight regime. 

MQ-1 and MQ-9/Predator 

MQ-1A. The Predator experienced low mission completion rates during its initial 

deployments in the Balkans in 1995-1997. While the primary causal factor was weather, 

system failures did account for 12% of the incomplete missions. Mission-level 

operational data from the system deployed in Hungary was used to perform a limited 

assessment of system reliability based on data covering missions from March 1996 

through April 1997. 

Out of the 315 Predator missions tasked during that timeframe, weather and 

system cancellations kept nearly two-thirds on the ground (60%). Of the remaining 

missions that were launched, slightly under one half were subsequently aborted. These 

aborts were due to system (29%), weather (65%), and operational issues (6%) that 

included airspace conflicts, operator errors, and crew duty limitations. 

Data indicates that 38 missions (12%) were scrubbed due to system failures, an 

additional 18 system aborts (6%) that did not result in mission cancellation (due to launch 

of another vehicle or weather hold), and other issues which kept the Predator on the 

ground 6 times (2%). Out of this total of 62 sorties affected by mission aborts or 

cancellations due to maintenance, operations, or human errors, the systems’ failure 

breakout data is provided in Table J-2.

MQ-1B. The Predator transition into production led to some problems which 

affected vehicle reliability. As the first ACTD program to transition to production, the 

Predator established the precedent, as well as the lessons learned, for the transition 

process. First, nearly continuous deployment commitments since March 1996 have 

delayed operational testing. Second, development of the ORD, usually produced early in 

a program to guide system design, was not begun until after the ACTD ended (indicated 

by the N/A in Table J-1) Third, additional challenges to system reliability were 

introduced, such as the addition of a wing deicing system (glycol-weeping wings) as well 

as a redesigned control station for greater portability. 

Since this rocky start, the Predator fleet has logged over 50,000 hours and has 

“come of age” during Operation Enduring Freedom. As a result of its unorthodox 

transition process, however, Predator reliability issues were discovered and addressed 

during operations around the world. Although the system still experiences reliability 

issues and vehicle losses, its performance during these operations has been remarkably 

good when compared to those outlined in the ORD.

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The data in Table J-1 and J-2 represents all mission aborts (on the ground and inflight) for all RQ-1B systems between January 1997 and June 2002. The share of 

power/propulsion failure modes has doubled in the MQ-1B compared to the MQ-1A. 

The Predator program office acknowledges that the engine is the primary reliability issue. 

The primary distinguisher between the MQ-1A and MQ-1B models is the Rotax 

914 turbocharged engine, which replaced the smaller Rotax 912 model, and was 

implemented primarily to increase the Predator’s speed. With the new engine, a variable 

pitch propeller was also added. The data over this five-year period indicates that the new 

variable pitch propeller accounted for 10 percent of all power/propulsion aborts, while 

the engine made up nearly 70 percent. This is accompanied by a corresponding reduction 

in flight control failures as well as a large decrease in malfunctions attributable to human 

errors and operations and hardware on the ground. This does not necessarily mean that 

powerplant-related failures have increased in the B model, but that reliability 

improvements made in other areas (comms, etc.) have made a comparatively greater 

impact on system reliability. 

The significant decline in human and ground related errors (from 16 percent to 2 

percent) is attributed to a concerted training effort according to one Predator operator. 

Enhancements in situational awareness also played a role in this positive trend. For 

example, periodic automated updates of the weather are supplied to the control station. A 

VHF/UHF ARC-210 radio has also been added to provide voice relay capability to the 

MQ-1B pilot, enabling direct, over the horizon communication with Air Traffic Control 

(ATC) authorities in the area of flight. An APX-100 Identification, Friend or Foe 

(IFF)/Selective Identification Feature (SIF) Mode 4 transponder was added to further 

facilitate coordination with AWACS flight controllers. Air Force PFPS (Portable Flight 

Planning Software), an offshoot of the Air Force Mission Support System (AFMSS), is 

another tool defined in the Block 1 upgrade in which threat and mission planning 

information can now be passed directly to the Predator system. 

The percentage of communications and flight control failures remained virtually 

unchanged between the two models.

MQ-9. To address certain reliability issues which arose during MQ-1B 

operations, the Predator B system, recently denoted MQ-9A, is scheduled to undergo 

specific modifications from its predecessors designed to enhance reliability. Specifically, 

the Predator B will have actuators with an MTBF of 2,000 hours, which is over an order 

of magnitude improvement over the actuator MTBF of 150 hours on the Predator A 

models. There will be a triplex (double redundant) flight control system, and the control 

surfaces survivability will increase with two rudders, four ailerons, and four elevators. 

The overall objective failure rate for the Predator B is on the order of 10-5, or 1 in 

100,000 hours of flight, a value equal to that for a number of mature manned aircraft. For 

a typical 15 hour flight, this translates to an operational reliability of over 99.99 percent. 

RQ-2/Pioneer 

RQ-2A. The reliability analysis for early-model Pioneers is based on statistical 

data gathered between September 1990 and April 1991 from three Marine, two Navy, and 

one Army Pioneer unit (total of six systems) while deployed in the Persian Gulf theater in 

support of Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Although known as the Option 

II+ version of Pioneer at that time, this model was subsequently designated as the RQ191
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2A. At the time of this data, it had been in service with the Navy for four years, the 

Marines for three, and the Army for one. By this time, it had already incorporated a 

number of reliability improvements to its original, imported version. 

With respect to its Operational Requirements Document, the early model Pioneer 

achieved less than desired reliability metrics. This could be due to one of several factors. 

First, the Pioneer was purchased from Israel as a non-developmental system in an 

accelerated procurement. Once in operation, Navy and Marine users quickly identified 

several deficiencies that contributed to unreliability. General Charles C. Krulak, then 

Commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps noted “the Pioneer does not have an automatic 

take-off, landing, or mission execution capability and that has led to a high accident rate.” 

Shipboard electromagnetic interference caused several crashes, and the engines were 

thought to be too small and easily overstressed. In addition to the need for a more 

reliable engine, the Marine Corps users also felt that the system needed a smaller 

logistical footprint and a longer endurance. 

RQ2-B. The currently fielded version of Pioneer, the RQ-2B, is essentially a 

digital version of its analog predecessors, with the major distinction being the 

replacement of the analog air data system with the digital Modular Integrated Avionics 

Group (MIAG). RQ-2Bs are modifications of the existing RQ-2A airframes, rather than 

new production. All twenty-five operational (out of 49 existing) RQ-2As have been 

converted to RQ-2Bs. There are plans to acquire spare MIAG kits through the Pioneer 

Improvement Program. 

The reliability analysis for later model Pioneers is based primarily on the Marine 

Pioneer squadron’s VMU-1 and VMU-2 operations in the late 1990’s. The reliability 

data for the RQ-2B is derived from two sources: maintenance aborts and in-flight aborts. 

Each offers a somewhat different perspective on the reliability of the overall vehicle. In a 

distribution closely resembling to the Predator MQ-1A data, the majority of the failures 

(66%) are attributable to the combination of malfunctions in flight control, power, and 

propulsion. The breakout in the flight critical systems is roughly 25 percent flight control 

failures and 75 percent power & propulsion failures. (Recall the corresponding RQ-2A 

data showed failures due to power and propulsion and flight control equally divided.) 

This suggests an improvement in the flight control system of the Pioneer over time, or 

perhaps a shift in emphasis from power and propulsion concerns. The latter explanation 

is supported given that the planned (1997) conversion from the Sachs to the more reliable 

Quattra engine was never accomplished. 

RQ-5/Hunter 

Following three crashes in close succession in August-September 1995, OSD 

terminated the RQ-5/Hunter program after LRIP completion by deciding to not award a 

full rate production contract. Seven systems of eight aircraft each were delivered 

between April 1995, and December 1996. A total of 62 aircraft were built by IAI/Malat 

and assembled by TRW. Since that redirection, however, the Hunter program has made 

numerous component quality related improvements and been used to demonstrate a wide 

variety of payloads including SIGINT, chemical agent detection, and communication 

relay for UAV use. It has supported National Training Center exercises and NATO 

operations in Kosovo, and it recently served as the surrogate TUAV for the Interim

Brigade Combat Team at Ft Lewis, Washington. 

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The acquisition of the Hunter system by the Army presents a case study in the 

peril of ignoring, and the benefits of overcoming, reliability problems. During system

acceptance testing in 1995, three Hunter aircraft were lost within a 3 week period, 

contributing to a decision to terminate full rate production. Wanting to benefit as much 

as possible from its substantial investment in the Hunter, its Program Management Office 

and the prime contractor (TRW) performed an end-to-end Failure Mode Effect and 

Criticality Analysis (FMECA) and a Fishbone Analysis on each of the critical 

subsystems. An interconnected network of failure analysis and corrective action boards 

was implemented with the authority to direct design changes to Hunter. Failures of its 

servo actuators, the leading culprit for the series of crashes, were identified, and their 

MTBF increased from 7800 hours to 57,300 hours, a sevenfold improvement. Other key 

components received focused attention including the datalink and engine. 

Hunter returned to flight status three months after its last crash. Over the next two 

years, the system’s MTBF doubled from four to eight hours and today stands at over 11 

hours. The aircraft itself achieved its required MTBF of ten hours in 1999, and today that 

figure stands close to 20 hours. Prior to the 1995 stand down and failure analysis, 

Hunters were experiencing a mishap rate of 255 per 100,000 hours; afterwards (1996-

2001) the rate was 16 per 100,000 hours. Initially canceled because of its reliability 

problems, Hunter has become the standard to which other UAVs are compared in 

reliability. 

In addition to the reliability data shown in Table J-1, an in-house reliability 

assessment performed by the prime contractor for the period of 20 December 1995 

through 15 December 2001 found a system MTBF of 16.31 hours and an availability of 

0.993. Using this MTBF value, the calculated reliability for a 2.5 hour mission is 0.86. 

All of these contractor-generated values are higher, yet not significantly different, than 

those calculated from the flight data. 

The failure modes analysis in Table J-2 is built on data from 19 June 1994 to 16 

July 2001. This data shows that Hunter’s failures, as opposed to previous system level 

breakouts for Predator and Pioneer, are generally much more evenly distributed among 

the failure modes. This is likely due to the concerted effort of the prime contractor – after 

a rigorous assessment of overall system reliability – to focus improvement on those areas 

in which the early vehicle’s reliability was lacking. The 17 percent of failures attributed 

to “Miscellaneous” is composed of malfunctions with the flight termination system and 

parachute vehicle recovery system. 

The high mishap rate of the early Hunters is comparable to that of the early 

Pioneers and, based on that similarity can be largely attributed to poor Israeli design 

practices for their UAVs in the 1980s. The significant improvement in Hunter’s mishap 

rate achieved since the mid-1990s is reflective of (1) joint government/contractor-focused 

oversight, (2) a rigorous review and analysis process being put in place, and (3) 

qualitative improvements in a number of failure-critical components (servo-actuators, 

flight control software, etc.). 

Technology Enhancing Solutions 

To address the reliability shortcomings identified above, examples of current and 

developmental technologies are presented in Table J-3. These technologies – provided in 

detail in the OSD UAV Reliability Study – are provided as examples of commercial and 

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government off-the-shelf (COTS/GOTS) solutions which have the potential to 

significantly enhance UAV reliability. Technologies/processes for each of the major 

failure modes are presented at three levels of cost/complexity. 

TABLE J-3: TECHNOLOGY TO ENHANCE UAV RELIABILITY. 

Low Level 

COTS/GOTS 

High Level 

COTS/GOTS Next Generation 

Power and 

Propulsion Lighter Engine Blocks Heavy Fuel Engine Fuel Cell Technology 

Flight Control 

Better Component 

Selection 

Methodology 

Advanced Digital 

Avionics Systems 

Self-Repairing, 

“Smart” Flight Control 

Systems 

Communications Better Environmental 

Control 

Electronically Steered 

Arrays

Film and Spray-on 

Antennas 

Human/Ground Enhanced Pilot 

Training 

Auto Take-Off and 

Recovery

Enhanced Synthetic 

Vision 

Recommendations 

Based on the preceding reliability data and trends analysis, it is possible to distill 

a focused set of recommendations which will have a measurable impact on UAV 

reliability growth. 

R-1 Introduce joint standardization of reliability data tracking for operational UAV 

systems. 

Data collection for this study provided insight into an inconsistent (and at 

times inaccurate and incomplete) reporting framework for tracking the reliability 

growth of various UAV fleets. This makes it particularly difficult to gauge not only 

the reliability of one system, but also any trends across system and Service lines. A 

single format, with jointly agreed definitions for data fields for key reliability 

metrics, needs to be developed and implemented. 

R-2 Perform a cost-benefit trade study for incorporating/retrofitting some or all of the 

Predator B’s reliability enhancements into production Predator A models. 

R-3 Perform cost-benefit trades for low and high level COTS/GOTS approaches 

identified in Table J-3 to improve reliability for each fielded UAV system. 

R-4 Develop and implement a Reliability Specifications Standard for UAV design. 

Design changes can cost 1,000 and 10,000 times more at the LRIP and final 

production phases, respectively, than the same change would during product 

design. As a result, cost increases at the early stage (for reliability downstream)

can in most cases be justified. 

R-5 Incorporate the emerging technologies identified in Table J-3 into the Defense

Technology Objectives and the Defense Technology Area Plan.

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195

R-6 Encourage more research into low Reynolds number flight regimes. 

Just as UAVs come in many categories, so too do the flight environments in 

which they operate. As a result, Reynolds number effects must be better understood 

to provide insight into such areas as (1) steady and unsteady flow effects, (2) threedimensional laminar/turbulent flow transition, and (3) ideal airfoil and wing 

geometries at Reynolds and Mach numbers which encompass the spectrum of UAV 

flight profiles. 

Investments in low Reynolds number engine components is also critical. 

Turbomachinery for UAVs at low speeds or high-altitudes face flight environments 

which are different than those to which modern propulsion has traditionally 

catered. Heat rejection, turbine and compressor tip losses, and low dynamic 

pressures are a few of the factors which can degrade the performance of a small 

propulsion system at these low Reynolds number conditions. 

R-7 Investigate the potential role of advanced materials and structures for enhancing 

UAV reliability and availability. 

High temperature materials and light-weight structures can offer significant 

weight savings for UAV airframes. On the horizon, smart materials such as shape 

memory alloys will offer alternatives to the servos, flight control surfaces, and even 

de-icing systems of existing aircraft designs, which in turn will reduce components 

count and increase reliability. 

R-8 Incorporate and/or develop all-weather practices into future UAV designs. 

Icing has been a primary factor in two Hunter mishaps and three Predator 

losses. UAV cold weather tolerance, as well as operation in precipitation and 

suboptimal wind conditions, should be a focus for UAV designers to enhance UAV 

reliability and availability in real world operations. 

Improving UAV reliability is the single most immediate and long reaching need to 

ensure their success. Their current levels of reliability impact their operational utility, 

their acquisition costs, and their acceptance into airspace regulations. The value of 

making reliability improvements must be weighed against not only acquisition cost, as is 

traditionally the case, but also against the less quantifiable returns to be gained by a 

commander. As a critical resource to the commander, UAVs must be available when 

they are called upon and have the ability to operate freely and respond quickly in any 

airspace. These recommendations are structured to ensure that this occurs.