IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

Assigned on Briefs August 12, 2015

CURTIS DWAYNE STAGGS v. STATE OF TENNESSEE

Direct Appeal from the Circuit Court for Lawrence County

No. 31393 Stella L. Hargrove, Judge

No. M2014-01416-CCA-R3-PC – Filed June 29, 2016

The Petitioner, Curtis Dwayne Staggs, appeals the Lawrence County Circuit Court‟s 

denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions of first degree 

premeditated murder, first degree felony murder, and aggravated robbery and resulting 

effective sentence of life plus twelve years. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that he 

received the ineffective assistance of counsel because trial counsel failed to raise the 

statute of limitations as a defense against his aggravated robbery charge and because 

counsel failed to request a jury instruction cautioning the jury to evaluate the weight and

credibility of a witness‟s testimony in light of the witness‟s agreement with the State. 

Based upon the record and the parties‟ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the postconviction court.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court is Affirmed.

NORMA MCGEE OGLE, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which ROBERT W.

WEDEMEYER, J., joined. CAMILLE R. MCMULLEN, J., filed a dissenting opinion.

Ronald G. Freemon, Columbia, Tennessee, for the appellant, Curtis Dwayne Staggs.

Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; Clark B. Thornton, Senior 

Counsel; and Brent A. Cooper, District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of 

Tennessee.

OPINION

I. Factual Background
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We glean the following relevant facts from this court‟s opinion of the Petitioner‟s 

direct appeal of his convictions:

This case arises from the Defendant‟s participation in a 

robbery and shooting of the victim, Joann Rigling, who died 

from the injuries she sustained. The victim was found on 

June 19, 1992, with one gunshot above her eye behind the 

counter of Phillip‟s One-Stop market in Saint Joseph, 

Tennessee, and the market cash register was missing. Jimmy 

Dale Hogan and Tammy Smith were arrested for the murder 

and robbery. Hogan was convicted [of first degree felony 

murder and especially aggravated robbery] after a jury trial 

but obtained post-conviction relief on appeal, and this Court 

ordered a new trial [on felony murder]. During the 

reinvestigation of these crimes in preparation for Hogan‟s 

retrial, authorities learned additional information that led a 

Lawrence County grand jury to indict the Defendant for first 

degree premeditated murder, first degree felony murder, and 

aggravated robbery for his role in the 1992 murder and 

robbery.

State v. Curtis Dewayne Staggs, No. M2011-02361-CCA-R3-CD, 2012 WL 5542690, at 

*1 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Nashville, Nov. 13, 2012). 

At the Petitioner‟s trial, the most damaging evidence against him came from 

Hogan, who testified for the State that about one week before the crimes, he was present 

at a meeting in which the Petitioner and the victim‟s husband, Phillip Rigling, discussed 

the robbery. Id. at *5. Hogan testified that on the day of the crimes, he and the Petitioner

drove to Phillip‟s One-Stop market and entered the store. Id. at * 6. Hogan said that the 

Petitioner ordered the victim to open the cash register, that the victim refused, and that 

the Petitioner shot her. Id. On cross-examination, Hogan acknowledged that he had 

almost completed his twenty-year sentence for especially aggravated robbery and that he 

was testifying against the Petitioner in exchange for a concurrent, twenty-year sentence 

for felony murder. Id. at *7. He also acknowledged that he was arrested for the crimes in 

1996 but did not implicate the Petitioner until 2010. Id.

The jury convicted the Petitioner as charged of first degree premeditated murder, 

first degree felony murder, and aggravated robbery. Id. at *10. The trial court merged 

the felony murder conviction into the premeditated murder conviction and sentenced him 

to life. Id. The trial court sentenced the Petitioner to twelve years for the aggravated 

robbery conviction and ordered that the sentences be served consecutively for a total 
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effective sentence of life plus twelve years. Id. The Petitioner appealed to this court, and 

this court affirmed his convictions. Id. at *18. Subsequently, the Petitioner filed a pro se 

petition to rehear, arguing for the first time that the State indicted him for aggravated 

robbery outside the statute of limitations. This court determined that he was not entitled 

to relief because he was still represented by counsel and because counsel did not raise the 

issue in the original appellate brief. State v. Curtis Dewayne Staggs, No. M2011-02361-

CCA-R3-CD (Tenn. Crim. App. at Nashville, Jan. 18, 2012) (order).

After our supreme court denied the Petitioner‟s application for permission to 

appeal, he filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief, alleging, in pertinent part, that 

he received the ineffective assistance of counsel because trial counsel failed to argue that 

the statute of limitations had expired for the aggravated robbery charge and failed to 

request a jury instruction cautioning the jury to evaluate Hogan‟s testimony carefully in 

light of his “deal” with the State. The post-conviction court appointed counsel, and 

counsel filed an amended petition. In the amended petition, counsel alleged that trial 

counsel was ineffective by failing to enforce the statute of limitations for the aggravated 

robbery charge because the crime occurred eighteen years before the State indicted the 

Petitioner and because the indictment failed to “[put] the Petitioner on notice of those 

circumstances which would allow the State to proceed with prosecution of the aggravated 

robbery charge[.]” Counsel also alleged in the amended petition that trial counsel was 

ineffective for failing to request a jury instruction regarding Hogan‟s testimony pursuant 

to State v. Bolden, 979 S.W.2d 587 (Tenn. 1998).

Relevant to this appeal, trial counsel testified at the evidentiary hearing that he was 

appointed to represent the Petitioner on December 12, 2010, and that he first met with the 

Petitioner on December 29, 2010. They reviewed discovery materials and discussed the 

case. The Petitioner‟s trial occurred about eight months later. The Petitioner was 

incarcerated in Lawrenceburg, the city in which counsel‟s office was located, so counsel

was able to meet with the Petitioner “numerous times” before trial.

Counsel testified that he and the Petitioner discussed the State‟s “star” witness, 

Hogan. They also discussed whether the Petitioner wanted to testify and any witnesses 

he wanted to testify on his behalf. The Petitioner maintained that he was not involved in 

the crimes and did not want counsel to explore a guilty plea. The State had charged the 

Petitioner in count three with aggravated robbery, and the Petitioner asked counsel 

“whether some or all of [the] charges were barred by the statute of limitations.” Counsel 

researched the law, which provided that if the Petitioner had lived out of state or 

concealed the crime, the statute of limitations was tolled. Counsel said he did not pursue 

the statute of limitations issue because the Petitioner had been living in Missouri “for a 

number of years.” 
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Trial counsel testified that the State gave him a letter in which it “outlined” 

Hogan‟s expected testimony and “what his plea deal would be if he testified in 

accordance with that.” Counsel questioned Hogan about the agreement in front of the 

jury, and Hogan testified that he was to plead guilty in exchange for a twenty-year 

sentence. Counsel said he did not remember if he requested that the trial court instruct 

the jury to evaluate Hogan‟s testimony carefully in light of the plea agreement. Counsel 

also did not raise the instruction issue on direct appeal. 

On cross-examination, trial counsel testified that he became licensed to practice 

law in 1997 and that he had been practicing about fourteen years at the time of the 

Petitioner‟s trial in 2011. He said that he practiced civil and criminal litigation and 

estimated that he had participated in fifteen to eighteen jury trials during his career. On 

redirect examination, counsel acknowledged that the indictment alleged that the 

Petitioner committed aggravated robbery on June 19, 1992.

The Petitioner testified that he was not guilty of the crimes and that he was hoping 

his post-conviction petition would result in a new trial or dismissal of the charges. The 

Petitioner first met trial counsel at the Lawrence County Jail, and they met four or five 

times, not including the Petitioner‟s appearances in court. The Petitioner said he was 

scared and that he relied on counsel. However, counsel had no trial strategy, saying only 

that “we‟re going to argue that you‟re innocent.” The Petitioner and counsel discussed 

the statute of limitations for aggravated robbery, and the Petitioner asked counsel about 

the statute of limitations several times. Counsel told the Petitioner that the statute of 

limitations did not apply because the Petitioner had lived in Missouri. The Petitioner said 

he did not move to Missouri until 2002, ten years after the robbery. The Petitioner stated

that after the jury convicted him, he asked counsel to appeal the statute of limitations 

issue. He identified two letters he wrote to trial counsel, dated December 2012 and 

January 2013, in which he continued to question counsel about the statute of limitations

issue. The Petitioner said he thought the statute of limitations was “out” on the 

aggravated robbery charge.

On cross-examination, the Petitioner testified that during one of his meetings with 

trial counsel, counsel brought “a box full of stuff down there to look at.” He denied that 

the meeting lasted six hours and said that their meetings “never lasted two hours. One of 

them might have lasted a couple of hours, but the rest of them never did.” The Petitioner 

acknowledged that according to counsel‟s records, they met at the jail at least ten times. 

The Petitioner denied telling Tennessee Bureau of Investigation Agent Josh Melton, who 

worked with the district attorney‟s office on Hogan‟s retrial, that he had been living in 

Missouri ten or twelve years. He said that he moved to Missouri in 2002 and that he 

never concealed the crime.
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In a written order, the post-conviction court found the Petitioner not credible “on 

any issue raised in the Petitions” and denied his petition for post-conviction relief. As to

the statute of limitations for aggravated robbery, the post-conviction court noted that trial 

counsel told the Petitioner that the statute of limitations was tolled because the Petitioner 

lived in Missouri after the crimes. The court concluded that counsel “raised every 

possible defense available to Petitioner.” As to the jury instruction issue, the court found 

that “the charge to the jury satisfied State v. Bolden relative to the plea agreement of codefendant, Jimmy Dale Hogan.”

II. Analysis

To be successful in a claim for post-conviction relief, a petitioner must prove the 

factual allegations contained in the post-conviction petition by clear and convincing 

evidence. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-110(f). “„Clear and convincing evidence means 

evidence in which there is no serious or substantial doubt about the correctness of the 

conclusions drawn from the evidence.‟” State v. Holder, 15 S.W.3d 905, 911 (Tenn. 

Crim. App. 1999) (quoting Hodges v. S.C. Toof & Co., 833 S.W.2d 896, 901 n.3 (Tenn. 

1992)). Issues regarding the credibility of witnesses, the weight and value to be accorded 

their testimony, and the factual questions raised by the evidence adduced at trial are to be 

resolved by the post-conviction court as the trier of fact. See Henley v. State, 960

S.W.2d 572, 579 (Tenn. 1997). Therefore, the post-conviction court‟s findings of fact are 

entitled to substantial deference on appeal unless the evidence preponderates against 

those findings. See Fields v. State, 40 S.W.3d 450, 458 (Tenn. 2001).

A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is a mixed question of law and fact. 

See State v. Burns, 6 S.W.3d 453, 461 (Tenn. 1999). We will review the post-conviction 

court‟s findings of fact de novo with a presumption that those findings are correct. See

Fields, 40 S.W.3d at 458. However, we will review the post-conviction court‟s 

conclusions of law purely de novo. Id.

When a petitioner seeks post-conviction relief on the basis of ineffective 

assistance of counsel, “the petitioner bears the burden of proving both that counsel‟s 

performance was deficient and that the deficiency prejudiced the defense.” Goad v. 

State, 938 S.W.2d 363, 369 (Tenn. 1996) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 

687 (1984)). To establish deficient performance, the petitioner must show that counsel‟s 

performance was below “the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal 

cases.” Baxter v. Rose, 523 S.W.2d 930, 936 (Tenn. 1975). To establish prejudice, the 

petitioner must show that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel‟s 

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A 

reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 

outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. Generally, [b]ecause a petitioner must establish 
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both prongs of the test, a failure to prove either deficiency or prejudice provides a 

sufficient basis to deny relief on the ineffective assistance claim. Indeed, a court need not 

address the components in any particular order or even address both if the [petitioner] 

makes an insufficient showing of one component. Goad, 938 S.W.2d at 370 (citing

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697).

A. Statute of Limitations

First, the Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel 

because trial counsel failed to raise the statute of limitations as a defense to the

aggravated robbery charge. The State argues that the post-conviction court properly 

denied relief because the court found the Petitioner not credible when he claimed that he 

did not move to Missouri until 2002. We conclude that the Petitioner has failed to 

demonstrate that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel.

Aggravated robbery is a Class B felony. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-402(b). The 

statute of limitations for a Class B felony is eight years. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-12-

101(b)(2). However, “[n]o period during which the party charged conceals the fact of the 

crime, or during which the party charged was not usually and publicly resident within the 

state, is included in the period of limitation.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-12-103. “If the 

tolling . . . is triggered by the absence of the accused from the state, obviously upon his or 

her return to the state the statute would begin to run. If the tolling is triggered by 

concealment, the statute would begin to run when the concealment ceased.” State v. 

Davidson, 816 S.W.2d 316, 321 (Tenn. 1991). 

As our supreme court has stated, “[W]here an indictment or presentment shows 

upon its face, or by stipulation, that the applicable statute of limitations has expired, the 

instrument must allege facts which demonstrate that the statute was tolled for a sufficient 

period of time to avoid the bar of the statute of limitations.” Id. at 321. The State may 

amend the indictment by alleging the facts which served to toll the statute. Morgan v. 

State, 847 S.W.2d 538, 542 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992). The State is required “to plead and 

prove the tolling. Where the allegations are insufficient, the indictment or presentment 

will be dismissed upon motion, and there can be no trial in which to prove what was not 

alleged.” Id. 

Here, post-conviction counsel alleged in the amended petition that trial counsel 

was ineffective by failing to enforce the statute of limitations as to the aggravated robbery 

charge because the crime occurred eighteen years before the indictment and because the 

indictment failed to “[put] the Petitioner on notice of those circumstances which would 

allow the State to proceed with prosecution of the aggravated robbery charge[.]” At the 

evidentiary hearing, post-conviction counsel introduced a copy of the indictment into 
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evidence. In count three of the July 29, 2010 indictment, the State alleged that the 

Petitioner committed aggravated robbery on June 19, 1992. However, the State did not 

allege any facts regarding the Petitioner‟s moving out of State that would have tolled the 

statute of limitations. Thus, the indictment was untimely on its face because the statute 

of limitations expired on June 19, 2000. Moreover, our review of the direct appeal record 

shows that the State did not file an amended indictment or that trial counsel filed a pretrial motion asserting a defect in the indictment. 

Nevertheless, because this is a case for post-conviction relief, the burden was on 

the Petitioner to demonstrate that he was actually prejudiced by trial counsel‟s failure to

seek relief from a prosecution barred by the statute of limitations. Overton v. State, 874 

S.W.2d 6, 11 (Tenn. 1994); see Morgan, 847 S.W.2d at 540. The Petitioner argued at the 

evidentiary hearing and contends on appeal that the statute of limitations was not tolled 

because he did not move to Missouri until 2002, ten years after the crimes and two years 

after the statute of limitations expired. He notes that at his 2011 trial, Agent Melton 

testified that he thought the Petitioner had been living in Missouri only eight or nine 

years. However, our review of the trial transcript reveals that Agent Melton actually 

stated, “I want to say eight to nine [years], but I would be testifying without a 100 percent 

accuracy to that.” Furthermore, although the Petitioner testified at the evidentiary 

hearing that he moved to Missouri in 2002, the post-conviction court found him not 

credible. We note that in the Petitioner‟s pro se petition to rehear, which he filed in this 

court in November 2012, the Petitioner stated, “Petitioner did not leave Tennessee until 

the Spring of 1998. Petitioner did not buy a home in Missouri until the Spring of 2000.” 

Thus, by the Petitioner‟s own admission, he left the State of Tennessee approximately six 

years after the crimes, two years before the statute of limitations for the aggravated 

robbery charge expired. Thus, we agree with the post-conviction court that the Petitioner 

has failed to show that he was actually prejudiced by counsel‟s deficient performance. 

B. Jury Instruction

Next, the Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel 

because trial counsel failed to request a jury instruction in which the court cautioned the

jurors to evaluate the weight and credibility of Hogan‟s testimony in light of his

agreement with the State. The State argues that the Petitioner is not entitled to relief 

because the jurors were aware of Hogan‟s plea agreement and because the trial court 

instructed them to consider whether any promises or other influences existed that could 

have affected the witness‟s testimony. We agree with the State.

In Bolden, the defendant and his co-defendant were charged with first 

premeditated degree murder. 979 S.W.2d at 589. The codefendant entered into an 

agreement with the State in which he agreed to testify truthfully against the defendant in 
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exchange for a plea to second degree murder and a twenty-five-year sentence. Id. At 

trial, though, the codefendant claimed that he did not remember what happened on the 

night of the murder. Id. During a recess, the State entered into a second agreement with 

the codefendant in which he agreed to testify against the defendant in exchange for a plea 

to second degree murder and a fifteen- to twenty-five-year sentence. Id. The defendant, 

whom the jury convicted of second degree murder, argued on direct appeal of his 

conviction that he was denied his right to due process and a fair trial because the 

agreement required that the codefendant testify to specific acts. Id. at 590. Our supreme 

court disagreed, holding that nothing indicated the codefendant was required to give false 

testimony or testify according to a particular script. Id. at 592. The supreme court also 

noted that “essential safeguards” were followed in that the jury and the defendant were 

informed of the agreement, the defendant conducted a full and vigorous crossexamination of the codefendant, and “the jury was instructed that its function was to 

weigh the testimony and determine the credibility of the witness.” Id. at 592-93.

Similarly, nothing in this case indicates that Hogan‟s plea agreement required that 

he give false testimony or testify according to a script. The jury and the Petitioner were 

informed of the agreement, and trial counsel cross-examined Hogan about it. Hogan 

testified that he was still serving his twenty-year sentence for robbing Phillip‟s One-Stop 

and that he was testifying truthfully against the Petitioner in exchange for a concurrent, 

twenty-year sentence. He acknowledged that he had served most of his sentence and that 

he was going to be released from confinement soon. Counsel continued to cross-examine 

Hogan vigorously about his participation in the crimes and his waiting fourteen years to 

implicate the Petitioner. 

Moreover, our review of the preliminary jury instructions shows that the trial court 

instructed the jurors that they were to assess the credibility of the witnesses and the 

importance of their testimony. The court then listed eight factors the jury should consider 

in making its assessment, including the following:

5. Does the witness have bias, prejudice or personal interest 

in how this case is decided?

6. Are there any promises, threats, suggestions, or other 

influences that affected how the witness testifies?

7. In general, does the witness have any special reason to tell 

the truth or any special reason to lie? 

Although the trial court did not specifically instruct the jury to evaluate the weight and 

credibility of Hogan‟s testimony carefully in light of the plea agreement, Bolden does not 
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require such an instruction. In any event, the three factors stated above inherently 

instructed the jury to do so. Thus, we conclude that trial counsel did not render deficient 

performance or that the Petitioner was prejudiced by any deficiency.

III. Conclusion

Based upon the record and the parties‟ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the postconviction court.

_________________________________ 

NORMA MCGEE OGLE, JUDGE