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i

iii

Strategic Studies Institute

and

U.S. Army War College Press

EVOLVING ARMY NEEDS 

FOR SPACE-BASED SUPPORT

Jeffrey L. Caton

April 2015

The views expressed in this report are those of the author and 

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public release; distribution is unlimited.

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copyrighted.
iv

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ISBN 1-58487-676-X
v

FOREWORD

To support warfighters in the 21st century, Army 

and joint space operations must adapt to a congested, 

contested, and competitive international space environment. This monograph examines how the Army is 

postured to meet current and future space-based support needs to conduct unified land operations. It also 

provides recommendations regarding how to facilitate the best evolutionary path for future Army space 

activities to meet the changing environment for unified land operations as well as the diverse challenges 

of ongoing global operations, technological advances 

by potential adversaries, increased international 

competition, and domestic resource constraints. 

The monograph posits that the Army should retain its current focus on space operations as crossdomain support for terrestrial warfighter operations. 

It also suggests that the development of such support 

should include stakeholder and proponency issues 

with regard to cyberspace operations. Continuing to 

advance policies and strategies that embrace the joint, 

interagency, and international aspects of space operations will help ensure reliable and resilient support to 

operational and tactical commanders in any theater 

of operation.

 

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

Director

 Strategic Studies Institute and

 U.S. Army War College Press

vii

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

JEFFREY L. CATON is President of Kepler Strategies 

LLC, Carlisle, PA, a veteran-owned small business 

specializing in national security, cyberspace theory, 

and aerospace technology. He is also an Intermittent 

Professor of Program Management with Defense Acquisition University. From 2007 to 2012, Mr. Caton 

served on the U.S. Army War College (USAWC) faculty, including as Associate Professor of Cyberspace 

Operations and Defense Transformation Chair. Over 

the past 5 years, he has presented lectures on cyberspace and space issues related to international security in the United States, Sweden, the United Kingdom, 

Estonia, Kazakhstan, and the Czech Republic supporting programs such as the Partnership for Peace Consortium and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

Cooperative Cyber Defence Center of Excellence. His 

current work includes research on cyberspace and 

space issues as part of the External Research Associates Program of the Strategic Studies Institute, USAWC, as well as serving as a facilitator for Combined/

Joint Land Force Component Commander courses 

at the Center for Strategic Leadership and Development, USAWC. Mr. Caton served 28 years in the U.S. 

Air Force, working in engineering, space operations, 

joint operations, and foreign military sales, including 

command at the squadron and group level. Mr. Caton holds a bachelor’s degree in chemical engineering 

from the University of Virginia, a master’s degree in 

aeronautical engineering from the Air Force Institute 

of Technology, and a master’s degree in strategic studies from the Air War College.
viii

SUMMARY

Is the Army properly postured to meet current 

and future space-based support needs to conduct unified land operations? This monograph addresses this 

fundamental question in two main sections:

• Current Army Space Operations. Considering 

the mandate by the National Command Authority in January 2012 to operate effectively in 

space, this section examines space capabilities 

as they are currently organized for the soldier 

and other joint warfighters. First, it identifies 

the five joint space mission areas as they compare to the Army’s six warfighting functions. 

Next, the section presents an overview of current Army space forces, then builds the context 

of joint space forces and offers examples of 

international partnerships.

• Envisioned Future Army Space Operations. 

This section assesses current Army activities 

oriented to meet the evolving needs of the future space environment. This includes not only 

the continued integration and exploitation of 

existing space capabilities, but also the development and deployment of Army space support operations that provide responsive support to operational and tactical commanders in 

theater. Rather than delve into all joint space 

mission areas, it focuses on the three areas of 

current Army emphasis: future space force enhancement, future space force application, and 

the connection between space and cyberspace 

operations. The section then compares the direction of Army space endeavors against national policy and guidance to identify any critical deficiencies or incongruities.
ix

This monograph is limited to unrestricted and unclassified open source information, thus any classified 

discussion must occur at other appropriate venues. 

The evolution of Army space operations is well documented in many sources. Therefore, this monograph 

serves not as a comprehensive history or detailed critique of the Army’s myriad accomplishments. Rather, 

it serves as a primer for current and future spacebased operations to provide senior policymakers, 

decisionmakers, military leaders, and their respective 

staffs with an overall appreciation for existing Army 

space capabilities and the challenges, opportunities, 

and risks associated with their use in joint operations.

1

EVOLVING ARMY NEEDS 

FOR SPACE-BASED SUPPORT

The U.S. Army has been involved with spacebased military operations for well over a half-century. 

During this time, space operations have changed from 

a realm exclusive to scientists and engineers; to highly 

classified activities largely unknown to the general 

population; to the unveiling of space-based communication, imagery, surveillance, and environment capabilities that have become a foundation for all modern 

warfare. Today, such support is so ingrained in daily 

operations that most soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines assume it has been, and always will be, available 

for their use. But with such reliance comes a vulnerability that potential adversaries may try to exploit. 

Is the Army properly postured to meet current and 

future space-based support needs to conduct unified 

land operations? This monograph addresses this fundamental question first by examining current Army 

space operations within the broader context of joint 

operations. Next, it surveys key aspects of Army space 

activities envisioned for future operations. Finally, 

it compares the direction of Army space endeavors 

against national policy and guidance to identify any 

critical deficiencies or incongruities. 

This monograph is limited to unrestricted and unclassified open source information, thus any classified 

discussion must occur in other appropriate venues. 

The evolution of Army space operations is well-documented in many sources. Therefore, this monograph 

serves not as a comprehensive history or detailed 

critique of the Army’s myriad accomplishments in 

space operations, but rather as a primer for current 

and future space-based operations to provide senior 

policymakers, decisionmakers, military leaders, and 
2

their respective staffs with an overall appreciation for 

existing Army space capabilities and the challenges, 

opportunities, and risks associated with their use in 

joint operations.

CURRENT ARMY SPACE OPERATIONS

The necessity of the U.S. military to operate effectively in space was emphasized by the National 

Command Authority in January 2012 when President 

Barack Obama and Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta provided strategic guidance for sustaining U.S. 

global leadership in the 21st century. Specifically, they 

directed that: 

DoD will continue to work with domestic and international allies and partners and invest in advanced capabilities to defend its networks, operational capability, 

and resiliency in cyberspace and space.1

Space capabilities comprise many diverse systemsof-systems, which include ground-based infrastructure, satellites and space launch vehicles, and the 

electromagnetic links that connect them.2 But rather 

than discuss individual space systems, we will instead 

examine space capabilities as they are currently organized for the soldier and other joint warfighters. This includes an overview of current Army space forces within the context of joint space forces and of international 

partnerships.

Space Capability Requirements.

While a comprehensive knowledge of the space 

domain is not necessary for all warfighters, planners 

and senior officers should have a basic understanding 

of how space operations integrate and enhance their 
3

domain military operations. To facilitate this understanding, we will briefly examine the major mission 

areas of space operations and compare them to Army 

warfighting functions. Joint Publication (JP) 3-14, Space 

Operations, has evolved and expanded significantly 

over the past decade to reflect the increasing integration of activities in the space domain with those 

in the traditional domains of land, sea, and air. The 

latest version (May 2013) addresses the fundamentals of military space operations, the command and 

control of space forces, the roles and responsibilities 

of Service components, and the methods of planning 

for space operations.3 First, let us review the five major mission areas: space situational awareness; space 

force enhancement; space support; space control; and 

space force application. 

Space situational awareness (SSA) provides the 

foundation for all space operations by characterizing 

the ongoing activities in the space domain. It has only 

recently been identified as a separate mission area; 

previous joint space doctrine listed SSA as a functional capability under the Space Control mission.4

 SSA 

constantly assesses the status of U.S. and cooperative 

space systems as well as those of multinational activity, to include that of potential adversaries. This assessment requires four functional capabilities. First is the 

ability to detect, track, and identify objects in space in 

order to establish and maintain an accurate catalog to 

utilize as part of a common operating picture. Second 

is the ability to conduct the threat warning and assessment necessary to attribute and differentiate causes of 

space effects among environment conditions, system 

anomalies, and potential hostile actions. Third is the 

ability to characterize not only observed space activity 

but also the possible strategy and intent of such activity, as well as the nature of any possible threat to the 
4

ground, electromagnetic link, or space element of the 

system. The fourth functional capability is that of data 

integration and exploitation to help tie together the 

multisource data from the other three SSA functional 

capabilities in iterative processes that also enhance 

the functions.5

Space force enhancement capabilities increase 

the combat potential of the joint force by providing 

space-based support that improves effectiveness and 

reduces confusion. This is especially valuable for the 

joint force commanders who require access to denied 

areas that cannot be provided by traditional domainbased capabilities. The space force enhancement mission area comprises seven functional capabilities. The 

first is the ability to provide the necessary intelligence, 

surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) through space 

operations in a similar manner that ISR is provided 

through the traditional domain operations, except 

from a much higher vantage point. The next two capabilities, launch detection and missile tracking, use 

some common infrastructure and assessment methods; they each provide timely notification for the 

protection of joint forces as well as space assets. Environmental monitoring provides joint forces with data 

regarding meteorological and oceanographic conditions as well as factors in the space environment that 

may affect joint operations, such as solar flares, which 

may temporarily affect certain radio frequency transmission. The fifth functional capability, satellite communications (SATCOM), has become so ingrained in 

military operations that some may consider it a necessary vice, a force enhancement. Likewise, space-based 

capabilities for positioning, navigation, and timing 

(PNT), such as those provided by the Global Positioning System (GPS) satellite constellation, are not only 

critical to the vast majority of military operations, also 
5

extremely important to commercial users and ordinary 

citizens worldwide. Navigation warfare (NAVWAR) 

is the seventh functional capability intended to assure 

friendly use of PNT information and to prevent adversary use of the same by leveraging space, cyberspace, 

and electronic warfare assets.6

Space support, like SSA, provides three functional 

capabilities that serve as the foundation to operate 

and sustain space forces. First is spacelift, which is 

the ability to deliver satellites and material into the required orbit around Earth. This requires space launch 

vehicles and launch infrastructure, as well as range 

operations, to ensure the safe and reliable launch and 

initial orbit attainment. Second, once a satellite is in 

orbit, space support is the basis of the functional capability for satellite operations that establishes the 

proper telemetry, tracking, and commanding (TT&C) 

links necessary to not only maneuver and operate the 

satellite and its payloads, but also to monitor and sustain its health status. Third, the ability for reconstitution of space forces is required to maintain operational 

satellite constellations by reconfiguring or replacing 

damaged satellites, repositioning satellites to cover 

for temporary gaps in coverage, or replenishing obsolete or expired satellites.7

Space control involves the ability to ensure the 

freedom of action for U.S. and friendly forces in space 

and, when necessary, to negate adversary space capabilities. It is divided into two functional capabilities: 

offensive space control (OSC) and defensive space 

control (DSC). OSC uses prevention measures to preclude “an adversary’s hostile use of U.S. or third-party 

space systems/services to support their operations.”8

Prevention activities may utilize all forms of national power—diplomatic, informational, military, and 

economic—to protect the joint forces’ advantages in 

space. OSC also may involve space negation, which 
6

consists of “active defensive and offensive measures to 

deceive, disrupt, degrade, deny, or destroy an adversary’s space capabilities.”9

 DSC operations deal with 

preserving “the ability to exploit space capabilities via 

active and passive actions, while protecting friendly 

space capabilities from attack, interference, or unintentional hazards.”10 While they focus on responses to 

deliberate threats, such as GPS or SATCOM jammers, 

DSC operations also focus on incidental hazards, such 

as space debris, radio frequency interference, and 

solar effects.11

Space force application focuses on “combat operations in, through, and from space to influence the 

course and outcome of conflict by holding terrestrial 

targets at risk.”12 It includes activities such as ballistic missile defense and land- or sea-based intercontinental ballistic missiles.13

Clearly, military space operations are a joint venture. But how do Army forces leverage such capabilities to support its mission? In his March 2014 testimony to Senate Armed Service Committee, Lieutenant 

General David L. Mann, Commanding General of 

the U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command 

and Army Forces Strategic Command (USASMDC/

ARSTRAT) noted that: 

space-based capabilities leveraged and employed 

across the National space enterprise enable each of 

these [six Army] warfighting functions. Virtually every Army operation relies on space capabilities to enhance the effectiveness of the force.14

This dependence is evident in Table 1, which depicts how specific joint space operations mission areas 

support the six Army warfighting functions of mission 

command, movement and maneuver, intelligence, 

fires, sustainment, and protection. 
7

Table 1. Joint Space Operations Support 

of Army Operations.

Mann summarized the importance and scope of 

space operations to the Army with the statement that: 

integrating space capabilities enables commanders, 

down to the lowest echelon, to conduct Unified Land 

Operations through decisive action and operational 

adaptability.15

Army Warfighting Functions

Joint Space Operations

Mission Areas

Mission 

Command

Movement 

and 

Maneuver

Intelligence Fires Sustainment Protection

Space Situational Awareness

Detect/Track/Identify x x

Threat Warning & Assessment x

Characterization x x x x

Data Integration & Exploitation x x x x x x

Space Force Enhancement

Intelligence, Surveillance, & Reece x x x x x

Launch Detection x x x x x

Missile Tracking x x x x x

Environmental Monitoring x x x x x x

Satellite Communications x x x x x x

Positioning, Navigation, & Timing x x x x x x

Navigation Warfare (NAVWAR) x x x x x x

Space Supports

Spacelift x

Satelite Operations x x x x x x

Reconstitution of Space Forces x

Space Control

Offensive Space Control x x x x x

Defensive Space Control x x x x x x

Space Force Application

Ballistic Missile Defence x x x x x x

Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles x
8

Let us now examine the specific elements of the 

Army total force that are dedicated to providing such 

critical space-based resources to all warfighters.

Army Space Forces.

The current structure of USASMDC/ARSTRAT 

had both evolutionary and revolutionary growth from 

its rather humble origins back in October 1957 as the 

Redstone Anti-Missile Missile Systems Office located 

at Redstone Arsenal, AL. During the 1960s through 

the 1980s, Army space-related efforts emphasized this 

anti-ballistic missile mission with programs such as 

Sentinel (the Lyndon Johnson administration), Safeguard (the Richard Nixon administration), and “Star 

Wars”—the Strategic Defense Initiative (the Ronald 

Reagan administration). These efforts reflected the 

ebb and flow of strategic arms buildups and limitation 

treaties that typified the Cold War between the United 

States and the Soviet Union.16 President Reagan had 

a broader view of space operations and took actions 

toward the creation of a unified command dedicated 

to the space domain, and on September 23, 1985, U.S. 

Space Command (USSPACECOM) was established in 

Colorado Springs, CO.17 The Army formed a planning 

group to design the Army component to this new joint 

command that became the Army Space Agency and 

eventually grew to become the U.S. Army Space Command, a field operating agency, on April 7, 1988.18

In 1991, Operation DESERT STORM ushered in a 

new era of modern warfare that successfully exploited 

space-based force enhancement in combat operations 

across all traditional domains. The lessons learned 

from this campaign expanded the Army’s view of 

space support to expeditionary operations and led to 

the creation of deployed teams to provide space sup-
9

port and tactical missile warning as part of a greater 

emphasis on theater missile defense. The national missile defense was reduced in scope by President George 

H. W. Bush to the Global Protection against Limited 

Strikes (GPALS), with the Army taking lead on much 

of the system-of-systems development. The rest of 

the decade saw many organizational changes as the 

Army consolidated its space and missile development 

efforts and operations.19

On October 1, 1997, the field operating agency of 

the U.S. Space and Strategic Defense Command was 

redesignated a major Army command—the U.S. Army 

Space and Missile Defense Command (USASMDC). The 

new command’s mission included a role as the Army 

proponent for space and ballistic missile defense and 

command of the 1st Satellite Control Battalion as well 

as joint responsibilities as the Army component to the 

U.S. Space Command (ARSPACE).20 The operational 

structure of USASMDC continued to evolve, and the 

final major development came with the 2002 change 

to the Unified Command Plan that disestablished 

USSPACECOM and transferred its mission functions 

to a “new” U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM).21

Consequently, USASMDC/ARSTRAT became the 

Army service component command to the new 

USSTRATCOM.22

In its current mission, USASMDC/ARSTRAT: 

conducts space and missile defense operations and 

provides planning, integration, control and coordination of Army forces and capabilities in support of U.S. 

Strategic Command missions (strategic deterrence, integrated missile defense, and space operations)

as well as continues to serve as the Army proponent for 

space and missile defense technology development.23
10

The Commanding General, USASMCD/ARSTRAT 

also serves as the commander of the USSTRATCOM 

Joint Functional Component Commander for Integrated Missile Defense (JFCC IMD), the “third hat” 

of command for that position.24 The vision for the 

command views all of these responsibilities not only 

in terms of immediate warfighting needs, but also in 

medium- and long-range planning for future force 

requirements: 

As the Army’s force modernization proponent for 

space, global missile defense, and high altitude; and 

as the Army’s operational integrator for global missile 

defense, USASMDC/ARSTRAT will focus on three 

core tasks:

1. Provide trained and ready space and missile defense forces and capabilities to the warfighter and 

the nation (today).

2. Build future space and missile defense forces (tomorrow).

3. Research, test, and integrate space, missile defense, cyber, directed energy, and related technologies (day-after-tomorrow).25

To implement this vision within the current organization, the “today” part of the mission is led by 

the Deputy Commanding General-Operations; the 

“tomorrow” portion is headed by the Director, Future Warfare Center; and the “day-after-tomorrow” 

is managed by the Director, Technical Center.26 The 

detailed doctrinal aspects of these operations are presented in Field Manual (FM) 3-14, Army Space Operations.

27 The remainder of this section focuses on current Army space operations in general terms, and the 

next section discusses various future aspects. Table 2 

provides a summary of the current major Army space 

units that will be discussed.
11

Table 2. Major Army Space Operations Units.28

Unit Mission Joint Space Operations

Mission Areas

1st Space Brigade

Conducts continuous space force 

enhancement, space support, and space 

control operations in support of combatant commanders, enabling shaping and 

decisive operations.

Space Force Enhancement

Space Support

53rd Signal Battalion

Manages satellite payload control of the 

DoD Wideband Constellation by operating 

and maintaining global Wideband Satellite 

Communications Operations Centers and a 

Defense Satellite Communications System 

Certification Facility.

Space Force Enhancement

Space Support

1st Space Battalion

Provides theater support to warfighters:

- Ballistic Missile Early Warning (JTAGS)

- Army Space Support Teams

- Commercial Imagery Team

Space Force Enhancement

117th Space Battalion

Colorado Army National Guard unit providing space support:

- Army Space Support Teams

- Commercial Imagery Team

Space Force Enhancement

100th Missile Defense Brigade 

(GMD)

Operates the GMD fire control network, 

provides positive operational control of 

ground-based interceptors at Fort Greely, 

AK, and Vandenberg AFB, CA, and ensures 

the protective security of the systems 

deployed there.

Space Force Enhancement

Space Force Application

49th Missile Defense Battalion Headquarters and Fire Direction Center at 

Fort Greely, Alaska.

Space Force Enhancement

Space Force Application

Missile Defense Detachments

Detachment 1 at Vandenberg AFB for GBI 

operations support.

AN/TPY-2 radar detachments that provide 

missile defense support to geographic 

commands:

- Detachment 10 (U.S. Pacific Command)

- Detachment 11 (U.S. European 

Command) 

- Detachment 12 (U.S Central Command)

- Detachment 13 (U.S. European 

Command)

Space Force Enhancement

Space Force Application
12

1st Space Brigade. 

The 1st Space Brigade is a multicomponent brigade established as a provisional unit in April 2003 

and formally activated on May 25, 2005. The history of 

its three battalions goes back even further, the initial 

unit being the 1st Satellite Control (SATCON) Battalion created in May 1995 due to the expanded Army 

responsibilities for military satellite communications 

following Operation DESERT STORM. The battalion grew to five companies located worldwide, and 

on October 15, 2005, the unit became the 53rd Signal 

Battalion (SATCON).29 Regarding its value to the 

warfighter, communications ranks among the most 

important of space-based enablers.30

Although space operations were making great 

strides in operationalization with the formation of 

USSPACECOM and its service components, the tactical Army was still largely unaware of the potential 

benefits. To help bridge this gap, the 1st Space Battalion was established on December 15, 1999, to provide theater support for missile warning and space 

force enhancement. The initial structure comprised 

four Army Space Support Teams (ARSSTs) to provide 

space products and five Joint Tactical Ground Stations 

(JTAGS) to provide ballistic missile early warning. As 

the need for deployed space support grew, additional 

ARSSTs and JTAGS were added as well as Commercial Imagery Teams to leverage space products for a 

broader range of sources.31

Serving as the Army National Guard counterpart 

of the 1st Space Battalion is the 117th Space Battalion, 

tasked to: 
13

enable operations by maximizing military utilization 

of space-based assets to include satellite imagery, 

missile warning systems, satellite communications, 

space-based weather and global positioning system 

capabilities.32

Originally formed as the 193rd Space Support Battalion in September 2001, it was redesignated to its current number in October 2007. The 117th Space Battalion includes 11 ARSSTs and one Center for Innovative 

Technology (CIT), which may also perform defense 

support to civil authorities (DSCA) missions. With 

the exception of support for Hurricane Katrina recovery, most of the DSCA operations have been limited 

to Colorado, such as imagery and mapping support 

for incident commanders during wildfires near Fort 

Collins, CO, in 2012.33

100th Missile Defense Brigade 

(Ground-based Missile Defense).

The 100th Missile Defense Brigade (Ground-based 

Missile Defense [GMD]) was activated on October 

16, 2003, in Colorado Springs, CO, as a multicomponent unit of Army active and National Guard soldiers 

tasked to defend the homeland from ballistic missile 

attacks. In January 2004, the 49th Missile Defense Battalion was activated at Fort Greely, AK, as an Alaska 

National Guard unit tasked to operate the groundbased interceptors (GBI) stationed there.34 These units 

brought to fruition the vision of the President George 

W. Bush administration to field a national missile defense rapidly following the U.S. withdrawal from the 

1972 Antiballistic Missile Treaty in June 2002. The deployment of GBI systems and support equipment was 
14

designed to be an evolutionary process that would allow for technology insertion as well as adaptability to 

the changing threat environment.35

Part of the brigade’s evolution was the establishment of detachments for GBI and warning radar operations. In May 2011, Detachment 1 was established at 

Vandenberg Air Force Base, CA, as a unit of the California National Guard, formally culminating a 7-year 

effort to establish a force to secure and monitor the 

GBI systems located there.36 Detachments were also 

established to operate the Army Navy/Transportable 

Radar Surveillance and Control Model 2 (AN/TPY-2), 

a high-resolution, phased-array radar designed specifically for ballistic missile defense.37 These detachments are located within geographic combatant command areas of responsibility: Detachment 10 in the 

U.S. Pacific Command; Detachments 11 and 13 in the 

U.S. European Command; and Detachment 12 in the 

U.S. Central Command. 

Ongoing Army Space Operations Support.

The global nature of Army space operations is 

reflected in the slogan, “The sun never sets on USASMDC/ARSTRAT.”38 This is not an idle claim. Indeed, ARSSTs and CITs have been deployed to the U.S. 

Central Command on 86 occasions since 2001.39 Space 

Support Elements (SSEs) provide support to deployed 

headquarters and brigade combat teams as the staff’s 

focal point for maximizing space-related capabilities 

for intelligence (G-2), operations (G-3), and information (G-6).40 Also, expertise for SSEs and ARSSTs can 

support the joint planning process through the development of Annex N, Space Operations, to operational 

orders for supported joint commanders.41 JTAGS 
15

operate from strategic positions in the U.S. Pacific 

Command and U.S. Central Command to provide accurate and timely missile warning data—launch location, flight tracking, and predicted impact area—to 

operational communities writ large.42

For space force enhancement, the Army has critical 

roles in the tracking and communications for friendly 

forces. USASMDC/ARSTRAT has operated the Mission Management Center for friendly force tracking 

(FFT; formerly blue force tracking) since its beginning 

in October 2001 with support to combat operations in 

Afghanistan. These support operations have become 

thoroughly integrated into joint forces to provide the 

PNT data necessary to enable confident and decisive 

maneuver using over 50 types of tracking devices. 

The system currently processes over one million location tracks each day to provide a common operating 

picture to forces worldwide.43 USASMDC/ARSTRAT 

also operates Wideband SATCOM Operations Centers (WSOCs) and Regional SATCOM Support Centers (RSSC) in six locations worldwide—three in the 

continental United States and one each in Hawaii, 

Germany, and Japan.44 With SATCOM as the Army’s 

top space priority, these centers are undergoing the 

modernization and equipment replacement necessary 

to assure continued compatibility with new communication satellite systems.45

Joint Space Forces.

In addition to the efforts of ARSTRAT, other 

military service components also participate in both 

providing and utilizing space-based support to the 

warfighter. The U.S. Air Force component oversees 

space launch and satellite on-orbit checkout; operates 
16

a ground-based satellite control network; operates 

several satellite constellations to accomplish all forms 

of space force enhancement; and operates groundbased radars that support space situational awareness and ballistic missile warning. The U.S. Navy 

component is implemented through the commander, 

U.S. Fleet Cyber Command, and focuses on network 

operations, associated space-control activities, satellite communication, and space situational awareness. 

The U.S. Marine Corps component does not operate 

any satellite systems but does focus on supporting 

space operations planning as well as integrating space 

force enhancement decentralized, combined arms 

operations.46

To accomplish the command and control of joint 

space forces, USSTRATCOM uses the Joint Force Component Command for Space (JFCC Space) designated 

as the commander, 14th Air Force, and headquartered 

at Vandenberg Air Force Base, CA. JFCC Space is comprised of three operations centers—the Joint Space 

Operations Center (JSpOC), the Joint Navigation Warfare Center, and the Missile Warning Center—that 

together serve to provide operational employment 

of worldwide joint space forces.47 JFCC Space also 

serves as the Global Space Coordinating Authority, 

which works with any Space Coordinating Authorities (SCAs) designated by joint force commanders in 

geographic combatant commands.48

In addition to the military service components’ 

space missions, there are many Department of Defense 

(DoD) agencies and other government groups that also 

contribute significantly to the success of joint space operations. These organizations and their relevant areas 

of support are summarized in Table 3. As indicated, 

some of the services that they provide may include 

products and services from commercial space users. 
17

Table 3. Agencies and Organizations 

Supporting Joint Space Operations.49

International Partnerships.

Joint space doctrine promulgates that: 

international cooperation in military space-based ISR 

systems with allies and other partners may contribute to US national security objectives by enhancing 

Support Agency Areas of Support

Defense Information Systems Agency 

(DISA)

Military and commercial satellite and 

network

National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency

Military and commercial geospatialintelligence products (e.g., maps, charts, 

navigation data, etc.)

National Security Agency/Central Security 

Service (NSA/CSS)

Signals intelligence, information assurance, and cryptological support

Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)

Military intelligence and analysis from: 

- Missile & Space Intelligence Center 

- Defense Special Missile & Aerospace 

Center

Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) Support for counter-weapons of mass 

destruction (WMD) efforts

National Reconnaissance Office (NRO)

Research, development, acquisition, and 

operation of national overhead reconnaissance systems

National Air & Space Intelligence Center 

(NASIC) Assessment of foreign air & space threats

National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC)

Assessment of potential adversary satellite jammers or other electronic warfare 

against space systems

National Oceanic & Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)Military and commercial atmospheric data 

collection and dissemination

Missile Defense Agency (MDA) Develop, test, and field an integrated and 

layered ballistic missile defense system
18

interoperability, supporting coalition operations, and 

building partnership capacity.50

But these advantages are not limited to the ISR applications of space operations; DoD policy dictates that: 

DoD will cooperate with interagency, international, 

and commercial partners to define and promote safe 

and responsible space operations. This includes sharing space situational awareness and flight-safety information, as well as supporting the development 

of transparency and confidence-building measures 

and behavioral norms promoting responsible space 

operations.51

Army space forces have embraced these mandates 

and are working with military forces of many nations 

in diverse mission areas of space operations. For example, members of the Australian Defense Force work 

in concert with 53rd Signal Battalion soldiers at the 

WSOC in Hawaii, even earning the right to wear the 

U.S. space badge.52 Also, partnerships are being fostered by JFCC-IMD via a long-term campaign called 

“Nimble Titan” to bring representatives from foreign militaries together to collaborate on global missile defense.53 Participation in annual exercises has 

grown from eight countries in 2008 to 22 countries 

contributing in 2014.54

ENVISIONED FUTURE ARMY 

SPACE OPERATIONS

This section assesses current Army activities oriented to meet the evolving needs of the future space 

environment. This includes not only the continued 

integration and exploitation of existing space capa-
19

bilities, but also the development and deployment 

of “Army space support operations over time to provide dedicated, responsive theater focused support to 

operational and tactical commanders.”55 Rather than 

delve into all joint space mission areas, this focuses on 

the three areas of current Army emphasis: future space 

force enhancement, future space force application, 

and the connection between space and cyberspace operations. It then compares the direction of such Army 

space endeavors against national policy and guidance 

to identify any critical deficiencies or incongruities.

Ready Space Capabilities for the Future 

Enhancement.

Despite the extreme velocities at which space objects travel, the laws of physics dictate that satellites 

are fixed in their relative orbital framework. Recognizing this, USASMDC/ARSTRAT is conducting three 

Joint Capability Technology Demonstrations (JCTDs) 

to provide timely and tailored space-based communications and imagery support as well as prompt and 

responsive space launch capabilities.

Traditionally, military satellites have been large 

space vehicles with energy storage devices and redundant payload systems designed for years of service. 

While very capable, their operations could hardly be 

defined as agile or tactical. The USASMDC Technical 

Center has been exploring the use of microsatellites 

(10-100 kilograms) and nanosatellites (1-10 kilograms) 

with the aim of exploiting their benefits for the tactical 

warfighter:

Appropriate constellations of nanosatellites and microsatellites in low earth orbit can provide a high de-
20

gree of persistence for the warfighter which he or she 

can depend upon, much like the GPS is today. The 

presence of a proliferated constellation of relatively 

short life nano- or microsatellites allow for technology 

refresh opportunities and are problematic to adversaries who might want to eliminate space-based support 

to the warfighter. Technology demonstrations such as 

SMDCONE, Kestrel Eye, NanoEye, and SATS, together with the dedicated launch capability provided by 

the Multipurpose NanoMissile System, can help establish the case for inexpensive space force enhancement 

for the tactical warfighter through low cost, rapidly 

developed nanosatellite constellations.56

Such satellites could be used in anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) situations for such uses as exfiltrating 

data from unattended ground sensors, providing 

force enhancement coverage to remote operating locations, or augmenting existing space assets to support 

temporary upsurges in activities. 

The first Army nanosatellite was successfully 

launched on December 8, 2010, marking the end of 

a drought of Army launches that had lasted over 50 

years. The satellite, SMDC-ONE, rode to space as a 

secondary payload on a commercial Falcon 9 rocket; 

its primary mission of about 30 days was to demonstrate data receipt and transmission with ground stations.57 Additional nanosatellites have been launched, 

most notably one in December 2013 in support of a 

U.S. Southern Command initiative to expand communication coverage for missions to include humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations evaluated 

in partnership with Brazil and Peru. Two additional 

nanosatellite launches are scheduled for launch in 

December 2014.58
21

Kestrel Eye is an Army lead JCTD to develop a 

nanosatellite that can deliver 1.5-meter-resolution visible imagery directly to warfighters in theater without 

any interim data relay or filtering. It is designed to be 

tactically responsive, low-cost, and relatively durable 

with an operational life greater than 1 year. In essence, 

Kestrel Eye attempts to extend the operational concept of the unmanned aerial vehicle into space. With 

the appropriate constellation size, Kestrel Eye could 

provide persistent coverage accessible by handheld 

devices by warfighters in any theater of operation. 59

Having a fleet of highly capable nanosatellites is 

of little use if they cannot be placed into the space domain in a prompt and effective manner. Current space 

launch schedule lead times are typically measured in 

years. To break this paradigm, the Army is leading 

another JCTD, the Soldier-Warfighter Operationally 

Responsive Deployer for Space (SWORDS). The goal 

is to leverage off-the-shelf technology and equipment 

to develop a low-cost vehicle ($1 million procurement 

cost per vehicle) that can achieve a launch cycle of 24 

hours from storage call up to launch ready. The program includes ground engine testing and suborbital 

flights before a full orbital test flight.60

The three key JCTDs being pursued by 

USASMDC/ARSTRAT to prepare more agile and effective tactical space force enhancement programs 

are summarized in Table 4. Again, these are not the 

complete portfolio of the Army space technical center; 

other efforts include some diverse missions as highaltitude and persistent airship systems, such as the 

Long Duration Multi-Intelligence Vehicle (LEMV). 

For now, let us change focus to future space force application in contested A2/AD environments.
22

Table 4. Army Space Joint Capability Technology 

Demonstrations (JCTDs).61

Future Force Application.

While the GMD units in Alaska and California provide significant ballistic missile defense capabilities, 

USASMDC/ARSTRAT continues not only to refine 

and enhance these existing systems, but also to look 

System Description & Mission 

Highlights Cost Goals 

SMDC Nanosatellite 

Program (SNaP)

• Functionally effective data/

communication capability

• Low-burden Beyond Line of 

Sight (BLOS) capability

• Multi-functional relay 

capability

• Tailored constellation mission matching

Less than $1 million

per satellite production

Kestrel Eye • Graphical User Interface 

(GUI) on Personal Digital 

Assistant (PDA)

• Same-pass tactical user 

tasking and image delivery

• Store / forward imagery 

passing

• Tasking, Processing, Exploitation and 

Dissemination (TPED) 

integration

$1 million per satellite 

production

Soldier-Warfighter 

Operationally 

Responsive Deployer for 

Space (SWORDS)

• Launch on demand

• Optimized orbit 

placement

• Combatant Command 

launch operation 

flexibility

• Rapid augmentation in event 

of hostilities via low-cost 

deployable launcher

$1 million per launch vehicle
23

at new technologies for anti-ballistic missile uses. One 

example is the use of directed energy to counter rocket, artillery, or mortar attacks. The High Energy Laser 

Mobile Demonstrator (HEL MD) is such a system; it 

has completed low power testing for target tracking 

and commenced high power (10 kilowatt) field tests.62

The HEL MD is on track to demonstrate “a ruggedized 

and supportable high energy laser [50 kilowatt] with 

subsystems installed on a tactical military vehicle to 

enhance the safety of deployed forces” by 2017.63

Army space experts are also examining potential 

offensive force applications that traverse space, such 

as the Advanced Hypersonic Weapon (AHW) designed to “cooperatively develop an alternative vehicle to broaden research and development and reduce 

risk to the Prompt Global Strike program.”64 The payload delivery vehicle of the AHW was the Hypersonic 

Glide Body (HGB), which itself tested advanced concepts in thermal protection, navigation, guidance, and 

control. The AHW completed a successful test flight 

on November 17, 2011, from the Pacific Missile Range 

Facility in Hawaii to the Reagan Test Site (RTS) at 

Kwajalein Atoll. The RTS witnessed another noteworthy accomplishment in 2011 when its millimeter wave 

radar was upgraded to make it the highest resolution 

imaging radar in the world, a significant capability for 

its role as a contributing sensor in the Space Surveillance Network.65

Cyberspace Connections. 

Arguably the most rapidly evolving arena of military activity is that of cyberspace operations. In addition to the connections between space and cyberspace 

in the nascent cyberspace doctrine, Army space has 
24

enduring formal ties to the emerging commons. During the initial formation of U.S. Cyber Command as a 

subunified command to USSTRATCOM, USASMDC/

ARSTRAT was designated as the interim Army Forces 

Cyber Command in 2009, pending the eventual establishment of 2nd Army in that role. With the emphasis of Army space forces on the prompt and secure 

exchange of operational information crucial to the 

deployed soldier, it is prudent for USACSMDC/ARSTRAT to continue to collaboration with U.S. Army 

Cyber Command to ensure unity of effort in all areas 

of the doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) development and refinement.66

This overlap between the space and cyberspace 

domains is also evident in the other space service 

components. On December 7, 2010, the 24th Air Force 

achieved its full operational capability and was formally designated Air Forces Cyber. Less than 3 years later 

it took on the role of Joint Force Headquarters-Cyber 

to serve as a command and control authority for joint 

cyberspace forces.67 But the 24th Air Force remains an 

organization within Air Force Space Command, thus 

sharing a formal connection with JFCC-Space (the 14th 

Air Force). The opposite is true for the Navy, in which 

its cyberspace organization also has responsibilities 

for space operations. In the Navy’s structure, the commander, 10th Fleet, is the commander, U.S. Fleet Cyber Command; in this role, the commander also serves 

as “the Navy’s central operational authority for space 

in support of maritime forces afloat and ashore.68
25

Space Policies and Strategies.

The foundation for U.S. military space systems 

operations was updated and clarified as part of the 

legislatively mandated 2010 Space Posture Review. The 

interim report from the study was submitted to Congress in March 2010, and its results helped to form 

the contents of the new National Space Policy released 

by the White House on June 28, 2010.69 Upon the release of this new national policy, Secretary of Defense 

Robert Gates emphasized the continued vital nature 

of space systems to military operations as well as the 

changes in the international space environment that 

prompted the review: 

Our continued presence in space is vital to our national security. Space-based capabilities are critical to 

our military’s ability to navigate accurately, strike precisely, and gather battle space awareness efficiently. 

However, changes in the space environment over the 

last decade challenge our operations. Today, space 

is increasingly contested as our systems face threats 

of disruption and attack, increasingly competitive as 

more states, private firms, and others develop spacebased capabilities, and increasingly congested with 

orbital debris.70

Specifically, the Space Posture Review formed the 

National Security Space Guidelines section of the 

National Space Policy; these guidelines distinguished 

joint and individual responsibilities for the Secretary 

of Defense and the Director of National Intelligence 

(DNI).71 The objectives of their collective work is to: 

invest in space situational awareness capabilities and 

launch vehicle technologies; develop the means to as-
26

sure mission essential functions enabled by space; enhance our ability to identify and characterize threats; 

and deter, defend, and if necessary, defeat efforts to 

interfere with or attack U.S. or allied space systems.72

Guidelines were also provided for commercial and 

civil sectors of space activities.73

The DoD and DNI activities in space were further 

refined and codified in the National Security Space Strategy, a classified document which was released with 

an unclassified summary in January 2011. It echoed 

Gates’ earlier comments, stating concisely that “the 

current and future strategic environment is driven 

by three trends – space is becoming increasingly congested, contested, and competitive.”74 To operate in 

this environment, three overarching national security 

space objectives were established: 

Strengthen safety, stability, and security in space; 

maintain and enhance the strategic national security 

advantages afforded to the United States by space; 

and energize the space industrial base that supports 

U.S. national security.75

In turn, to accomplish these objectives, five interrelated strategic approaches were provided that addressed the spectrum from peaceful and responsible 

use of space through the need of operations in a space 

environment degraded by effects from adversary attacks.76 These themes have remained consistent and as 

previously noted, the goal to “operate effectively in 

cyberspace and space” was elevated to be among the 

President’s top 10 priorities for DoD efforts promulgated in January 2012.77

How is the Army implementing these priorities 

for space operations? Army Space Policy is outlined 
27

in Army Regulation (AR) 900-1, which declares that 

dependency on space-based capabilities: 

requires the Army to actively participate in defining space related capability needs that ensure necessary force structure and systems are developed and 

acquired to enable the land force to conduct the full 

range of military operations now and in the future.78

This policy identifies the five dominant stakeholder communities for space activities within the Army 

and briefly outlines their responsibilities regarding 

combat development (CBTDEV) and materiel development (MATDEV).79 Together, these five groups 

contribute to the Army Space Council, which provides 

recommendations through the Vice Chief of Staff of 

the Army regarding activities to support four broad 

objectives: 

1. To maximize the effectiveness of current space 

capabilities in support of operational and tactical land 

warfighting needs;

2. To influence the design, development, acquisition, and concepts of operation of future space systems that enable and enhance current and future 

land forces;

3. To advance the development and effective use 

of responsive, timely, and assured Joint interoperable 

space capabilities; and,

4. To seamlessly integrate relevant space capabilities into the operating force.

Details and priorities of efforts toward objectives 

were outlined in an earlier document, the United States 

Army Space Master Plan, issued in 2006 in two versions 

(one classified and one unclassified summary).80 It also 

identified seven “Army Issues for Resolution” in areas 
28

such as military SATCOM, use of commercial imagery, and utility of directed energy, which are being addressed in current Army space efforts.81 Also initiated 

in 2006 was a Space Operations Concept Capability 

Plan to guide a comprehensive capabilities-based assessment (CBA) across not only Army stakeholders, 

but joint and interagency players as well.82

While in general terms the Army Space Policy is 

consistent with current national guidance, it was last 

released in 2009 and thus has not been updated to cite 

explicitly the evolving nature of the space environment articulated in the 2011 National Security Space 

Strategy. However, the guidance was carried forth in 

the Army Space Operations White Paper written in part to 

serve as a foundation to conduct an updated space operation CBA; it includes the key concepts that “space 

is a contested domain; [and operations therein] need 

cross-domain solutions.”83 These efforts are part of the 

2011 Army Space Strategic Plan, which was informed 

by the national-level space guidance and focused on 

efforts “to assure access to resilient and relevant space 

capabilities that aid Army forces in unified land operations.”84 Most recently, these tenets were emphasized in the 2014 Army Strategic Planning Guidance under the Strategic Priority of maintaining a ready and 

modern Army: 

• Integrate Resilient Space Capabilities.

Enable all personnel, not just space specialties, to leverage space capabilities for improved combat effectiveness in contested operational environments, even 

in the face of adversary attempts to degrade, disrupt, 

or deny access to space capabilities.85
29

Essentially, the evolution of space-related themes in 

current Army policy and strategy documents appear 

to follow consistent trends that are in concert with 

national security space guidelines. Implementation 

of such guidance will help to ensure the continued 

integration of space-based capabilities into unified 

land operations. 

Budget Trends.

Of course, one of the sure ways to judge the priority 

of efforts in the Pentagon is to examine the amount of 

resources that are dedicated to them. Figure 1 depicts 

the budgets for the space-based systems and missile 

defense programs within the context of the overall 

DoD equipment modernization portfolio for Fiscal 

Year 2015. Together, they comprise $15.4 billion—almost exactly 10 percent of the overall $153.9 billion 

modernization base. 

Figure 1. Space and Missile Defense 

Budget Context (Fiscal Year 2015).86

($ in Billions)

Numbers may not add due to rounding

Space-based
30

Missile defense funding dollars include ballistic 

missile defense systems ($6.8 billion), tactical ballistic missile defense ($1.0 billion), and tactical missile 

defense ($0.4 billion). Priorities are focused on five 

systems, two of which are in the Army’s purview; the 

others are joint. First, the GMD element of the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) has continued 

funding to purchase GBIs toward the goal of having 

40 GBIs at Fort Greely and four GBIs at Vandenberg 

AFB by Fiscal Year 2017, as well as technology investments to refine and improve fire control and target 

discrimination capabilities. Terminal High Altitude 

Area Defense (THAAD) systems are also funded to 

continue building an eventual force of 31 interceptor 

and associated components as well as support of four 

existing THAAD batteries and plans for a fifth battery in Fiscal Year 2015. The sea-based Aegis Ballistic 

Missile Defense continues to build with funding for 

30 SM-3 Block 1B missiles as well as ship equipment 

upgrades. The Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC-3) 

system upgrades continue with funding for improved 

communications, interoperability, and electronic warfare capabilities. Related to the PAC-3 is its Missile 

Segment Enhancement (MSE) program funding, 

which procures 70 MSE interceptor missiles with increased lethality and improved survivability.87

Space-based system funding dollars are broken 

down into satellites ($4.2 billion), support ($1.6 billion), and launch ($1.4 billion). The modernization priorities center on six programs (one Navy and five Air 

Force), three of which are SATCOM constellations; the 

other three are for PNT satellites, infrared surveillance 

systems, and space launch vehicles. The Mobile User 

Objective System (MUOS) is DoD’s next generation 

ultra-high frequency (UHF) SATCOM constellation, 
31

and its funding covers various aspects of procurement, testing, and launch support for three satellites. 

The Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) 

system is a four satellite constellation to replenish the 

aging Cold War Military Strategic Tactical Relay (MILSTAR) system. AEHF funding continues procurement 

funding for two satellites as well as insertion of new 

technologies. The Wideband Global SATCOM (WGS) 

system is designed to augment and eventually replace 

the Defense SATCOM System (DSCS). The WGS funding addresses the checkout, launch, and support costs 

for two satellites. The remaining top priorities funds 

include GPS system support for the procurement of 

two Block III satellites and the continued development 

of the next generation operational control system as 

well as technology development for user equipment. 

The Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) has continued funding for procurement of two satellites and 

technology insertion efforts. Finally, the purchase of 

the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) block 

buys of three launch vehicles continues, as does funding for launch preparation and site operation.88

Since space-based capabilities are becoming increasingly integrated into Army operations, it is difficult to extract the exact amount of money spent for 

all space activities in a given budget. Table 5 provides 

some highlights of the Army space-related funding in 

the Fiscal Year 2015 DoD budget request. It includes 

almost 975 million dollars of funding for development, procurement, and support efforts.
32

Table 5. Key Army Space-Related Funding in 

Fiscal Year 2015 DoD Budget.89

The Way Ahead For Army Space Operations.

This monograph examines the past and present of 

Army and joint operations as well as how these operations may fit into the congested, contested, and 

competitive international space environment. To facilitate the best evolutionary path for future activities, 

the monograph recommends the following actions be 

considered.

• The Army should retain its current focus on 

space operations as cross-domain support for 

terrestrial warfighter operations as it seems appropriate and prudent; it is unlikely that widespread physical warfare will occur in space in 

the near future.

Budget Activity Space-Related Activity Budget Amount

(Millions of Dollars)

Aircraft procurement GPS, SATCOM equipment 148.3

Other procurement GPS, SATCOM, JTAGS 467.7

Applied research Sensors, antenna, command & 

control 34.4

Advanced technology 

development

Command & control, electronic 

warfare 36.7

Advanced components & 

prototypes Missile defense, space integration 26.8

System development & 

demonstration SATCOM, tactical networks 62.04

Kwajalein Atoll support Space & missile testing 176.0

Operational systems development SATCOM, JTAGS 21.2

Miscellaneous space activities 

support Security, communications 1.4

TOTAL 974.5
33

• The Army should update its Army Space Policy (AR 900-1) to reflect the tenets of the 2011 

National Security Space Strategy and to include 

cross-domain stakeholder and proponency issues with regard to cyberspace operations.

• The Army needs to ensure its approach to any 

nanosatellite program or similar system-ofsystems comes from an architectural perspective that considers the impacts of these miniconstellations on ongoing military, national, 

commercial, and international activities in 

same orbit. Also, the Army must consider 

how the operational space environment may 

change if other countries try to establish similar 

constellations.

• The Army should keep its space organizations 

involved with the development of joint cyberspace doctrine and should push for deliberate and dedicated development of cyberspace 

theory writ large to better coordinate actions 

related to space, cyberspace, and the electromagnetic spectrum.

• The Army should retain its emphasis on force 

enhancement appropriate for the force with 

“the most boots on the ground.” This includes 

support from, and exploitation of, space-based 

capabilities to “shoot, move, and communicate” better through:

— timely and accurate position, navigation, 

and timing data;

— continued refinement and expansion of 

friendly force tracking; and,

— continued refinement and expansion of satellite communications.
34

• The Army should continue to integrate international cooperation into its operations to enhance interoperability as well as build crucial 

relationships that may provide access to locations critical to the ground-based segments of 

space systems.

• The Army should continue to provide support 

to combatant commanders and theater commanders via embedded and deployed teams—

Space Support Elements, Army Space Support 

Teams, and Commercial Imagery Teams. The 

Army should continue to actively seek feedback 

and implement aggressive after-action reports 

and lessons learned processes to help ensure 

not only the proper number of teams sent, but 

also the bringing together of the proper subject 

matter mix. 

The Army’s development of its space capabilities 

and forces continues to evolve to meet the changing 

environment for unified land operations as well as the 

diverse challenges of ongoing global operations, technological advances by potential adversaries, increased 

international competition, and domestic resource constraints. Continuing to advance policies and strategies 

that embrace the joint, interagency, and international 

aspects of space operations will help to ensure reliable and resilient support to operational and tactical 

commanders in any theater of operation. 

ENDNOTES

1. Barack Obama and Leon Panetta, Sustaining U.S. Global 

Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense, Washington, DC: Department of Defense (DoD), January 2012, p. 4. The context of the 

quote is:
35

Operate Effectively in Cyberspace and Space. Modern 

armed forces cannot conduct high-tempo, effective operations without reliable information and communication networks and assured access to cyberspace and space. Today 

space systems and their supporting infrastructure face a 

range of threats that may degrade, disrupt, or destroy assets. Accordingly, DoD will continue to work with domestic and 

international allies and partners and invest in advanced capabilities to defend its networks, operational capability, and resiliency 

in cyberspace and space.

2. Brian Garino and Jane Gibson, “Space System Threats,” 

Chap. 21, AU-18 Space Prime, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air 

University Press, September 2009, pp. 273-282, available from aupress.maxwell.af.mil/digital/pdf/book/AU-18.pdf, accessed on October 

4, 2014. This publication has evolved over many years to become 

one of the best one-stop references on most aspects of military 

space operations.

3. Joint Publication (JP) 3-14, Space Operations, Washington, 

DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, May 29, 2013. 

4 . JP 3-14, January 6, 2009, p. II-7. In this obsolete version of 

doctrine, space situational awareness (SSA) is a functional capability under space control: 

SSA is fundamental to conducting space operations. It is a 

key component for space control because it is the enabler, or 

foundation, for accomplishing all other space control tasks.

5. JP 3-14, May 29, 2013, pp. II-2 – II-4. 

6. Ibid., pp. II-4 – II-6. For those with the proper document access clearance and need to know, additional details can be found 

in the classified document DoD Instruction (DoDI) S-3100.14, Space 

Force Enhancement (U), January 12, 2001. 

7. Ibid., pp. II-6 – II-8. For further details on the policy, responsibilities, and procedures for space support, see DoDI 3100.12, 

Space Support, September 14, 2000, available from www.dtic.mil/

whs/directives/corres/pdf/310012p.pdf. 
36

8. Ibid., p. II-8. 

9. Ibid., pp. II-8 – II-9. The definitions of the five elements of 

space negation are listed as:

(a) Deception. Those measures designed to mislead an 

adversary by manipulation, distortion, or falsification of 

evidence to induce the adversary to react in a manner prejudicial to their interests.

(b) Disruption. Those measures designed to temporarily 

impair specific targeted nodes of an adversary system, usually without physical damage to the space system.

(c) Degradation. Those measures designed to permanently impair (either partially or totally) the utility of targeted adversary systems, usually with physical damage.

(d) Denial. Those measures designed to temporarily 

eliminate the utility of targeted adversary systems, usually 

without physical damage.

(e) Destruction. Those measures designed to permanently eliminate the utility of targeted adversary systems.

10. Ibid., p. II-9. 

11. Ibid. For those with the proper document access clearance and need to know, additional details can be found in 

the classified document DoDI S-3100.15, Space Control (U), 

January 19, 2001.

12. Ibid., p. II-9.

13. Ibid., (3-14), pp. II-9 – II-10. For those with the proper document access clearance and need to know, additional details can 

be found in the classified document DoDI S-3100.13, Space Force 

Application (U), September 14, 2000.

14. David L. Mann, Commanding General, U.S. Army Space 

and Missile Defense Command and Army Force Strategic Command, Statement for the Record before the Committee on Armed 

Services, Strategic Forces Subcommittee, Senate, 113th Cong., 2d 

Sess., March 12, 2014, p. 3, available from www.armed-services.

senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Mann_03-12-14.pdf, accessed on September 19, 2014. For additional details on space capabilities in Army 

functional concepts, see Institute of Land Warfare, U.S. Army 
37

Space Capabilities: Enabling the Force of Decisive Action, An AUSA 

Torchbearer National Security Report, Arlington, VA: Association of the United States Army, May 2012.

15. Ibid.

16. Sharon Watkins Lang, “Who Do You Think You Are? The 

Genealogy of an Organization: USASMDC/ARSTRAT,” Army 

Space Journal, Vol. 11, Special Ed., Senior Enlisted Leaders Training Conference (SELTC), 2012, pp. 40-43. This article provides an 

excellent and concise history from 1957 to 2012 of the evolution of 

Army space operations.

17. Edward J. Drea et al., History of the Unified Command 

Plan, 1946-2012, Washington, DC: Joint History Office, 2013. 

The Army also had a role in the concept of forming U.S. Space 

Command (p. 49):

Command arrangements for strategic nuclear forces, joint 

special operations, and space also interested the Army Operations Deputy. Uncertain whether the present unified and 

specified command system provided the best vehicle for 

planning and execution of the Single Integrated Operational 

Plan (SIOP) by US strategic nuclear forces, he recommended scrutiny of the present system. The growing worldwide 

threat of insurgency and instability convinced him that the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff also needed to assess the Joint Special 

Operations Command’s ability to coordinate the conduct 

of conventional and unconventional warfare and special 

operations. In light of the new space programs, the USAF 

Space Command, and the possibility of a new unified command for space, the Army Operations Deputy proposed discussion of the impact of such developments upon national 

strategy, global planning, joint command arrangements, 

and global conflict.

18. Headquarters, Department of the Army, UNITED STATES 

ARMY SPACE COMMAND (UIC: W4XQAA), General Order No. 

20, Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 

April 4, 1988. USARSPACE was activated as a Field Operating 

Agency of the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations 

and Plans with the following mission:
38

2. Mission. The United States Army Space Command (USARSPACE) will serve as the Army component to United 

States Space Command (USSPACECOM). USARSPACE will 

provide USSPACECOM an Army perspective in planning 

for DoD space system support to land forces and strategic 

defense operations. USARSPACE will ensure integration of 

Army requirements into USSPACECOM planning for space 

support, respond to USCINCSPACE directed taskings, command assigned Army forces and conduct planning for DoD 

space operations in support of Army strategic, operational 

and tactical missions.

19. Lang, “Who Do You Think You Are?” p. 42. 

20. Headquarters, Department of the Army, U.S. ARMY 

SPACE AND STRATEGIC DEFENSE COMMAND—REDESIGNATION, General Order No. 5, Washington, DC: Headquarters, 

Department of the Army, March 1, 1998. The new command’s 

mission was diverse and challenging (p. 2):

3. The missions of the U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense 

Command are—

a. The CG, USASMDC, serves as the Army specified 

proponent for space and NMD [National Missile Defense] 

and as the Army operational integrator for TMD [Theater 

Missile Defense]. In accordance with Department of Defense and Army guidance, he coordinates, integrates, and/

or executes combat development, materiel development, 

technology base, and advanced research and development 

activities for assigned space, NMD and other programs; 

is the Army integrating command for TMD; is directly responsible to the Army Acquisition Executive for acquisition 

matters; executes the Army Tactical Exploitation of National 

Capabilities Program (TENCAP) in accordance with the approved TENCAP Charter; manages and operates National 

Test and Range Facilities at U.S. Army Kwajalein Missile 

Range (USAKA/KMR), the High Energy Laser Systems Test 

Facility (HELSTF) and Wake Island; serves as Executive Director of the United States Army Space and Missile Defense 

Battle Lab and serves as the Army’s Implementing Agent 

for the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START).
39

b. The CG, U.S. Army Space Command (USARSPACE), 

commands all assigned forces, operates assigned facilities; 

is the Army Component to United States Space Command 

(USSPACECOM); responds to USCINCSPACE operational 

taskings; coordinates and integrates Army resources and 

requirements into USSPACECOM plans and operations for 

operational exploitation of space and missile defense capabilities; provides USCINCSPACE an Army perspective in 

planning for Department of Defense space systems; commands the 1st Satellite Control Battalion (1st SATCON); and 

manages the joint tactical use of assigned satellite communications systems; commands the Joint Tactical Ground Stations (JTAGS) and the Army Space Support teams (ARSST); 

provides operational support to the Space and Missile Defense Battle Lab; as directed, acts as the Army spokesman 

for space in joint forums.

c. The CG, USASMDC, articulates Army requirements 

for Joint programs for space and missile defense, technology 

base development, testing, and operational warfighting.

21. Drea et al., History of the Unified Command Plan, 1946-

2012, p. 86. The difference between the “new” and “old” 

USSTRATCOM was:

On 22 July [2002] the Secretary forwarded Change-1 to 

the 2002 UCP to the President, who on 30 July signed the 

document that created a “new” USSTRATCOM that had 

the responsibilities for the nuclear missions of the “old” 

STRATCOM and space operations, including warning 

and assessment of space attack, previously assigned to 

USSPACECOM, the latter being disestablished. The accelerated pace enabled the President to nominate Admiral Ellis 

as STRATCOM commander on 2 August before Congress 

adjourned for its August recess.

22. Lang, “Who Do You Think You Are?,” p. 43. For a detailed history of USASMDC/ARSTRAT from its origins through 

2003, see James Walker, Lewis Bernstein, and Sharon Lang, Seize 

the High Ground: The Army in Space and Missile Defense, Redstone 

Arsenal, AL: History Office, USAMDC, 2003.
40

23. “U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command/Army 

Forces Strategic Command,” factsheet, March 2014, available 

from www.smdc.army.mil/FactSheets/SMDC_trifold_0314.pdf, accessed on October 5, 2014.

24. Richard P. Formica, “2011 Achievements/2012 Priorities,” 

Army Space Journal, Vol. 10, No. 3, Winter 2012, pp. 4-5, 16. 

25. “USASMDC/ARSTRAT Organizational Vision Statement,” USASMDC/ARSTRAT public website, available from 

www.smdc.army.mil/2008/Vision.asp#CORE, accessed on October 

6, 2014. 

26. Timothy R. Coffin, USASMDC/ARSTRAT Command 

Overview, Von Braun Memorial Symposium, Springfield, VA: 

American Astronautic Society, October 17, 2012, available from 

www.astronautical.org/sites/default/files/attachment/Coffin%20

2012%20VB.pdf, accessed on October 2, 2014. 

27. Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 

3-14, Army Space Operations, Washington, DC: Department of the 

Army, August 2014. Although this document is unclassified, its 

distribution is limited to DoD and DoD contractors in order to 

protect certain technical data. Thus, details of its contents are not 

included in this monograph.

28. U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command/Army 

Force Strategic Command, “Supporting the Warfighter through 

Space and Missile Defense,” Redstone Arsenal, AL: USASMDC/

ARSTRAT Public Affairs Office, June 2014.

29. Sharon Watkins Lang, “First in Space: The 1st Space Brigade,” Army Space Journal, Vol. 11, Special Edition: Senior Enlisted Leaders Training Conference (SELTC), 2012, pp. 34-36. The 

1st Satellite Control (SATCON) Battalion/53rd Signal Battalion 

(SATCON) key roles are (p. 34):

With a mission of providing payload and transmission control of the DSCS constellation, the battalion’s companies 

were organized according to location and situated around 

the globe at Forts Detrick and Meade in Maryland; Landstuhl, Germany; Camp Roberts, Calif.; and Fort Buckner, 

Okinawa, Japan. As technology has evolved, so too has the 
41

mission. With the addition of the Wideband Global System 

configuration and its support requirements, D Company 

left Camp Roberts in 2011 and now is located at Wahiawa, 

Oahu, Hawaii.

30. David L. Mann, “Army Space and Missile Defense Plays 

a Critical Role in Protecting the Nation,” Army Magazine, Vol. 64, 

No. 4, April 2014, pp. 41-44.

31. Lang, “First in Space,” p. 35. For a detailed history of the 

early years of ARSST operation through 2002, see James Walker and James T. Hooper, Space Warriors: The Army Space Support 

Team, CMH Pub 70-91-1, Fort McNair, DC: U.S. Army Center of 

Military History, March 1999, July 2003 (Rev.).

32. “117th Space Battalion,” available from co.ng.mil/arng/

units/space/default.aspx, accessed October 5, 2014.

33. Robert W. Enzenauer, Donald P. Laucirica, and Jesse M. 

Morehouse, “A Space Blueprint for the National Guard,” Army 

Space Journal, Vol. 11, Space Cadre Ed., 2012, pp. 34-36.

34. Institute of Land Warfare, The Ballistic Missile Defense System: The Army Role in Limited Defensive Operations, AUSA Background Brief No. 102, Arlington, VA: Association of the United 

States Army, October 2004.

35. Sharon Watkins Lang, “Guard . . . Engage . . . Destroy, For 

None Shall Pass: The 100th Space Brigade,” Army Space Journal, 

Vol. 11, Special Ed.: Senior Enlisted Leaders Training Conference 

(SELTC), 2012, pp. 31-33. This article provides a concise history 

of the unit starting with the National Missile Defense Act of 1999 

signed by President William J. Clinton.

36. Ibid., p. 33. Also see “100th Missile Defense Brigade 

(MDB),” available from co.ng.mil/arng/units/gmd/default.aspx, accessed on October 5, 2014. 

37. Missile Defense Agency, Army Navy / Transportable Radar 

Surveillance (AN/TPY-2), Fact Sheet, Fort Belvoir, VA: Missile Defense Agency, July 23, 2014, available from www.mda.mil/global/

documents/pdf/an_tpy2.pdf, accessed on October 7, 2014.
42

38. Most official USASMDC/ARSTRAT PowerPoint briefings 

with Distribution A have the slogans “Secure the High Ground” 

and “The Sun Never Sets on USASMDC/ARSTRAT” along the 

bottom banner of each slide.

39. Mann, U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command and Army Force Strategic Command, Statement for the 

Record, p. 6.

40. Institute of Land Warfare, Space Support Elements: Embedded Space Expertise in Army Modular Forces, AUSA Background 

Brief No. 105, Arlington, VA: Association of the United States 

Army, November 2005. 

41. JP 3-14, Space Operations, May 29, 2013, pp. III-4 and V-2. 

The format for Annex N is found in Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff Manual 3130.03, Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX) 

Planning Formats and Guidance, October 18, 2012. The document is 

unclassified, but limited to official distribution.

42. Mann, U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command 

and Army Force Strategic Command, Statement for the Record, p. 

8. For insight into JTAGS operations, see Ed White, “The History 

of JTAGS,” Army Space Journal, Vol. 5, No. 1, Winter, 2006, pp. 

1F-3F; and Dave Price, “Organize As We Fight Army Theater Missile Warning—JTAGS,” Army Space Journal, Vol. 5, No. 1, Winter, 

2006, pp. 4F-5F.

43. Ibid., p. 8. Also see “Friendly Force Tracking,” Army Space 

Journal, Vol. 11, Special Ed.: Senior Enlisted Leaders Training 

Conference (SELTC), 2012, p. 39. 

44. “Wideband Global SATCOM,” Army Space Journal, Vol. 

11, Special Ed.: Senior Enlisted Leaders Training Conference 

(SELTC), 2012, p. 37. A brief description of the WGS system:

The Wideband Global SATCOM constellation is a high-capacity satellite communications system designed to support 

the Warfighter with newer and far greater capabilities than 

those provided by current systems, yet it is compatible with 

existing networks and terminals. WGS provides two-way 

X-band and Ka-band communications as well as Ka-band 
43

broadcast services to U.S. Armed Forces and other agencies worldwide. The procuring agency is the U.S. Air Force 

Space Command’s Space and Missile Systems Center at Los 

Angeles Air Force Base, California.

WGS will augment and eventually replace DOD communications services currently provided by the Defense Satellite Communications System, which provides Super High 

Frequency wideband communications, and by the Ka-band 

Global Broadcast Service, which uses direct broadcast satellite technology to provide critical information to U.S. and 

allied forces.

45. Mann, U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command and Army Force Strategic Command, Statement for the 

Record, p. 7.

46. JP 3-14, Space Operations, May 29, 2013, pp. III-4, 

IV-7 - IV-9.

47. “Joint Force Component Command for Space (JFCC 

Space),” factsheet, Offutt Air Force Base, NE: U.S. Strategic Command, December 2011, available from www.stratcom.mil/factsheets/7/JFCC_Space/, accessed October 8, 2014.

CDR JFCC Space serves as the single point of contact for 

military space operational matters to plan, task, direct, 

assess, and execute space operations. JFCC Space conducts space operational level planning, integration, and 

coordination with other USSTRATCOM joint functional 

components, other combatant commanders through their 

space coordinating authority (SCA), and other Department 

of Defense (DoD) partners, and when directed, non-DoD 

partners to ensure unity of effort in support of military operations, national security operations, and support to civil 

authorities. 

48. JP 3-14, Space Operations, May 29, 2013, p. III-2. Details of 

the Space Coordinating Authority (SCA) include:

In selecting the appropriate option, the JFC considers the 

mission, nature, and duration of the operation; preponderance of space force capabilities made available; and resident 
44

C2 capabilities (including reachback). The SCA has primary 

responsibility for joint space operations planning, to include 

ascertaining space requirements within the joint force.

Summarizing, the SCA’s roles and responsibilities include:

(1) Integrating space capabilities.

(2) Planning, coordinating, and synchronizing space operations in the operational area and ensuring inputs from 

the joint force staff and components are incorporated.

(3) Maintaining situational awareness of theater space 

operations, and coordinating with the CCMD SCA or 

Commander, JFCC SPACE, to integrate theater space operations into DOD space operations.

(4) Providing consolidated space requirements through 

the JFC for coordination as required.

49. Ibid., pp. IV-9 – IV-13.

50. Ibid., p. A-2.

51. Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, DoD Directive 

3100.10, Space Policy, Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 

October 18, 2012, p. 2. Regarding international cooperation in 

space, the policy goes on to state:

DoD will seek to expand space-related cooperation with 

international partners, building and sharing space capabilities with these partners to the extent practicable and leading 

combined space operations, including space-support operations. DoD space-related international cooperation activities 

will be based on mutual interest and will be conducted to 

enhance collective security capabilities, forge closer security 

ties with allies and friends, and advance U.S. policy objectives. In its efforts to expand space-related cooperation, 

DoD will:

(1) Proactively seek opportunities to cooperate with 

allies and selected international partners in developing 

space architectures and in designing, acquiring, and operating military space systems. DoD will pursue interoperable systems in which trusted participants share costs, 

benefits, and risks. 

(2) Extend the battlefield advantages that space systems 

can provide to allies and coalition partners, to the maximum practicable extent.
45

(3) Work with international partners to protect mutual 

security interests related to dual-use technologies and 

services.

52. Mike Howard, “Moving Forward: U.S./Australian 

Partnership,” Army Space Journal, Vol. 11, Space Cadre Ed., 

2012, pp. 12-14.

53. Jason Gabrick, “Foreign Liaison Officer Program to Bed 

Down,” Army Space Journal, Vol. 11, Space Cadre Ed., 2012, p. 15.

54. Dottie White, “Nimble Titan Examines Future Multinational Cooperation Opportunities for Missile Defense,” Redstone Arsenal, AL: USASMDC/ARSTRAT Public Affairs, available from www.army.mil/article/125169/Nimble_Titan_examines_

future_multinational_cooperation_opportunities_for_missile_defense/, 

accessed on October 6, 2014.

55. Department of the Army, Training and Doctrine Command 

(TRADOC) Pamphlet 525-7-4, The United States Army’s Concept Capability Plan (CCP): Space Operations 2015-2024, Version 1.0, Fort 

Monroe, VA: Headquarters, U.S. Army TRADOC, November 15, 

2006. The scope of this effort was defined as: 

The CCP is designed to achieve four imperatives:

• Facilitate the integration of space capabilities across the 

full spectrum of Army and joint operations.

• Improve the Army’s ability to exploit existing space capabilities.

• Deliver space capabilities that address Army needs (capability requirements) and priorities by influencing the 

design of space-based systems and payloads.

• Systematically and deliberately evolve Army space support operations over time to provide dedicated, responsive theater focused support to operational and tactical 

commanders.

Central to achieving these imperatives, the concept describes 

the need for a layered infrastructure involving specific space 

enablers at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. This 

infrastructure consists of facilities, personnel, organizations and equipment that extend space-based enablers to 

the “last tactical mile.” Using an operational level vignette, 
46

and the Army capstone concept’s seven key operational 

ideas (shape and entry operations, operational maneuver 

from strategic distances, intratheater operational maneuver, 

decisive maneuver, concurrently and subsequent stability 

operations, distributed support, and network-enabled battle 

command) the CCP illustrates the integration and contribution of space-enabled capabilities in a future Modular Force 

operational setting.

56. John R. London III, A. Brent Marley, and David J. Weeks, 

Army Nanosatellite Technology Demonstrations for the Tactical Land 

Warfighter, paper presented at the 27th Army Science Conference, Orlando, FL, Redstone Arsenal, AL: USASMDC/ARSTRAT 

Technical Center, September 2010, p. 8.

57. John Cummings, “Army Nanosatellite on First Flight,” 

Army News Release, Redstone Arsenal, AL: USASMDC/ARSTRAT Public Affairs, available from www.army.mil/article/49115/

army-nanosatellite-on-first-flight/, accessed on October 10, 2014.

58. Jose Ruiz, “Nanosatellite Launch Marks SOUTHCOM’s 

Entry to Space,” U.S. Southern Command New Release, Miami, 

FL: USSOUTHCOM Public Affairs, available from www.southcom.mil/newsroom/Pages/MEDIA-RELEASE-Nanosatellite-launchmarks-SOUTHCOM%E2%80%99s-entry-to-space.aspx, accessed on 

October 10, 2014. 

59. “Kestrel Eye Visible Imagery Nanosatellite Technology Demonstration,” factsheet, Redstone Arsenal, AL: 

USASMDC/ARSTRAT Technical Center, no date, available 

from www.smdc.army.mil/FactSheets/KestrelEyeTC0112.pdf, accessed October 5, 2014. 

60. “SWORDS: Soldier-Warfighter Operationally Responsive Deployer for Space,” factsheet, Redstone Arsenal, AL: USASMDC/ARSTRAT Technical Center, no date, available from 

www.smdc.army.mil/FactSheets/SWORDS.pdf, accessed October 

5, 2014.

61. Tom Webber, “USASMDC/ARSTRAT Update: Maximizing Capabilities and Targets of Opportunities in Austere Times,” 

presentation at the 2012 AUSA Missile Systems Conference, Red-
47

stone Arsenal, AL: Association of the United States Army, April 

12, 2012, available from www.smdc.army.mil/2008/TechnicalCenter.

asp, accessed October 2, 2014, slide 11.

62. Ibid., slide 10. 

63. David L. Mann, Commanding General, U.S. Army Space 

and Missile Defense Command and Army Force Strategic Command and Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated 

Missile Defense, Statement for the Record before the Committee 

on Armed Services, Strategic Forces Subcommittee, Senate, 113th 

Cong., 2d Sess., March 25, 2014, pp. 6-7. 

64. Webber, “USASMDC/ARSTRAT Update: Maximizing 

Capabilities and Targets of Opportunities in Austere Times,” 

slide 8.

65. Debra G. Wymer, “Technical Expertise and Dedication,” 

Army Space Journal, Vol. 10, No. 3, Winter 2012, pp. 14-15. The 

upgrade on the RTS millimeter wave radar changed its operating frequency from 2 gigahertz to 4 gigahertz, thus improving its 

imaging resolution from 12 centimeters down to 6 centimeters.

66. Jac W. Shipp, “Space & Cyberspace: The Overlap and Intersection of Two Frontiers,” Army Space Journal, Vol. 10, No. 1, 

Spring/Summer 2011, pp. 40-43.

67. “24th Air Force Fact Sheet,” JBSA-Lackland, TX: 24th Air 

Force Public Affairs, June 2014, available from www.24af.af.mil/

library/factsheets/factsheet_print.asp?fsID=15663&page=1, accessed 

on October 10, 2014.

68. JP 3-14, Space Operations, May 29, 2013, p. IV-7.

69. “Strategic Defense Reviews: Space Posture Review,” U.S. 

Department of Defense website, available from www.defense.gov/

spr/, accessed on October 25, 2014.

70. Robert Gates, “Defense Secretary Robert Gates Statement on the National Space Policy,” News Release No. 703-697-

5131/5132, Washington, DC: Department of Defense, June 28, 

2010, available from www.defense.gov/spr/docs/National_Space_
48

Policy_SecDef_June_28_2010.pdf, accessed on October 25, 2014. 

Secretary Gates went on to note the interagency and international 

nature of space operations:

Together with other departments and agencies, the Department of Defense will take a number of steps to support the 

new National Space Policy, and will work with the Office of 

the Director of National Intelligence to develop a strategy 

document to address specific national security requirements 

for outer space. We will look to leverage growing international and commercial expertise to enhance U.S. capabilities 

and reduce vulnerabilities. 

Finally, we will pursue activities consistent with the inherent right of self-defense, deepen cooperation with allies and 

friends, and work with all nations toward the responsible 

and peaceful shared presence in space.

71. Barack Obama, National Space Policy of the United 

States of America, Washington, DC: The White House, June 28, 

2010, pp. 13-14. 

72. “Fact Sheet: The National Space Policy,” White House 

website, available from www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/factsheet-national-space-policy, accessed October 25, 2014, p. 2.

73. Obama, National Space Policy of the United States of

America, pp. 10-13.

74. Robert M. Gates and James R. Clapper, National Security Space Strategy: Unclassified Summary, Washington, DC: Secretary of Defense and Director of National Intelligence, January 

2011, p. 1.

75. Ibid., p. 4.

76. Ibid., p. 5. The five strategic approaches are: (1) Promote 

responsible, peaceful, and safe use of space; (2) Provide improved 

U.S. space capabilities; (3) Partner with responsible nations, international organizations, and commercial firms; (4) Prevent and 

deter aggression against space infrastructure that supports U.S. 

national security; and, (5) Prepare to defeat attacks and to operate 

in a degraded environment.
49

77. Obama and Panetta, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense, p. 3. Consistent with the National 

Security Space Strategy, the space environment for DoD operations 

was described as:

Growth in the number of space-faring nations is also leading to an increasingly congested and contested space environment, threatening safety and security. The United States 

will continue to lead global efforts with capable allies and 

partners to assure access to and use of the global commons, 

both by strengthening international norms of responsible 

behavior and by maintaining relevant and interoperable 

military capabilities.

78. Headquarters, Department of the Army, Army Regulation 

900-1, Army Space Activities: Department of the Army Space Policy, 

Washington, DC: Department of the Army, January 23, 2009, p. 6.

79. Ibid., p. 1. The five dominant Army stakeholder communities in space are: (1) The Chief Information Officer/G–6 

(CIO/G–6) represents the Network and Communications community; (2) The Deputy Chief of Staff, G–2 (DCS, G–2) represents 

the Army’s Intelligence community; (3) The Deputy Chief of Staff, 

G–3/5/7 (DCS, G–3/5/7) represents the electronic warfare community; (4) The Commanding General (CG), U.S. Army Space 

and Missile Defense Command/U.S. Army Forces Strategic Command (USASMDC/ARSTRAT) represents the Army Space community; and, (5) the CG, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) represents the land force CBTDEV community. 

The Army will overcome the space-related development process 

challenges through collaborative cross-proponent efforts centered 

on the operational and tactical needs of land forces.

80. Ron Dickerman, “Army Space Master Plan,” Army Space 

Journal, Vol. 6, No. 1, Winter 2007, pp. 18-19, 46-47.

81. “2006 United States Army Space Master Plan,” Public Affairs factsheet, Redstone Arsenal, AL: US Army Space and Missile 

Defense Command, available from www.smdc.army.mil/FactSheets/

ASMP.pdf, accessed on October 5, 2014. The seven Army Issues 

for Resolution regarding space operations were:
50

1. ISSUE - MILSATCOM: The Army must seek innovative solutions, to include partnering with commercial providers, to overcome MILSATCOM shortfalls in capacity, 

user access and delays in capability improvements.

2. ISSUE – Where should the Army invest in near-space 

and high-altitude, long-endurance platforms as a lower 

cost, more responsive alternative to space platforms if 

they prove technologically feasible?

3. ISSUE: Establish DOTMLPF development proponents 

(where they do not currently exist), and assign responsibilities for potential Army involvement in tactical satellite 

and near-space and high-altitude, long-endurance capabilities and operations.

4. ISSUE: Assess the utility in pursuing a more efficient 

commercial imagery policy and process in order to better 

support time-sensitive tactical use.

5. ISSUE: Plan for the prioritized migration from using 

commercial SATCOM to using MILSATCOM as the primary means of transmitting mission-critical data.

6. ISSUE: Army-operated elements of the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) must be supported in accordance with the BMDS Transition and Transfer Plan to defeat space-transiting ballistic missiles launched against the 

US homeland, allies, deployed forces and other national 

interests, and the BMDS plan to provide enhanced missile 

detection and assured warning for the US homeland and 

regional combatant commanders.

7. ISSUE: Assess the utility of using directed energy as 

a weapons system within the Future Force. Consider mission areas, applications and constraints as part of the assessment.

82. TRADOC Pamphlet 525-7-4, The United States Army’s Concept Capability Plan (CCP): Space Operations 2015-2024, pp. i-ii.

83. Richard P. Formica, “U.S. Army Space Capabilities: Enabling the Force of Decisive Action,” PowerPoint briefing, Redstone Arsenal, AL: U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command, June 1, 2012, slide 6, available from www.smdc.army.mil/

CG/2012/LTGFormicaPresentation.pdf, accessed on September 

1, 2014.
51

84. Institute of Land Warfare, U.S. Army Space Capabilities: Enabling the Force of Decisive Action, An AUSA Torchbearer National 

Security Report, Arlington, VA: Association of the United States 

Army, May 2012, p. 6. For additional background on recent Army 

space strategy documents, see also Richard P. Formica, “Synchronizing Efforts: Providing Capabilities 24/7/365,” Army Space Journal, Vol. 11, Space Cadre Ed., 2012, pp. 4-5; and Timothy R. Coffin, 

“Joint the Conversation: Partnering through Interdependency,” 

Army Space Journal, Vol. 11, Space Cadre Ed., 2012, pp. 8-9.

85. Raymond T. Ordierno and John M. McHugh, Army Strategic Planning Guidance 2014, Washington, DC: Department of 

the U.S. Army, available from defenseinnovationmarketplace.mil/

resources/ASPG2014.pdf, accessed October 25, 2014, p. 23. Additional key mentions of space-based activities related to Army priorities include:

• Adapt the Army Force Generation Model.

Sustain the Total Army’s ability to provide a manned, 

trained and equipped force to meet the full range of current and emerging CCDR requirements, to include areas 

such as space, cyberspace, missile defense, and countering 

weapons of mass destruction. (p. 22)

• Build Resilient Mission Command at the Tactical and 

Operational Level.

Enable Army forces to operate through enemy attacks on 

its mission command systems, to include denial of capabilities in specific domains, to include space and cyberspace. (p. 23)

86. Office of the Undersecretary of Defense (Comptroller)/

Chief Financial Officer, United States Department of Defense Fiscal 

Year 2015 Budget Request: Program Acquisition Cost by Weapon System, Washington, DC: Department of Defense, March 2014, available from comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/documents/defbudget/

fy2015/fy2015_Weapons.pdf, accessed on July 11, 2014, p. i.

87. Office of the Undersecretary of Defense (Comptroller)/

Chief Financial Officer, United States Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2015 Budget Request: Program Acquisition Cost by Weapon 

System, pp. 4-1 – 4-6.
52

88. Ibid., pp. 7-1 – 7-7.

89. Values in Table 5 were derived from the Appendix of 

the report “U.S. Defense Space-Based and Related Systems Fiscal Year 2015 Budget Comparison, Update 6,” Colorado Springs, 

CO: Space Foundation, July 20, 2014, pp. 34-40, available from 

www.spacefoundation.org/sites/default/files/downloads/Update%20

6%20FY%202015%20DoD%20Space%20Budget%20Comparison.

pdf, accessed on October 2, 2014. These values were also checked 

against FY2015 budget documents from the Under Secretary of 

Defense (Comptroller), specifically the Procurement Programs 

(P-1) Amendment and Research Development, Test & Evaluation 

Programs (R-1) Amendment, available from comptroller.defense.

gov/budgetmaterials.aspx, accessed October 11, 2014. 
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General William E. Rapp

Commandant

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U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE PRESS

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Director of Research

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