U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Publishing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800

Fax: (202) 512–2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402–0001

96–816PDF 2015

U.S. COUNTERTERRORISM EFFORTS IN SYRIA:

A WINNING STRATEGY?

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, 

NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

SEPTEMBER 29, 2015

Serial No. 114–101

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

MATT SALMON, Arizona 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

PAUL COOK, California 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

CURT CLAWSON, Florida 

SCOTT DESJARLAIS, Tennessee 

REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin 

DAVID A. TROTT, Michigan 

LEE M. ZELDIN, New York 

DANIEL DONOVAN, New York 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

AMI BERA, California 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

GRACE MENG, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois 

BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE

TED POE, Texas, Chairman 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

PAUL COOK, California 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin 

LEE M. ZELDIN, New York 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

General Jack Keane, USA, Retired, chairman of the board, Institute for 

the Study of War .................................................................................................. 5

Mr. Thomas Joscelyn, senior fellow, Foundation for Defense of Democracies ... 14

The Honorable Daniel Benjamin, Norman E. McCulloch Jr. director, John 

Sloan Dickey Center for International Understanding, Dartmouth College 

(former Coordinator for Counterterrorism, U.S. Department of State) ........... 27

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

General Jack Keane, USA, Retired: Prepared statement .................................... 8

Mr. Thomas Joscelyn: Prepared statement ........................................................... 17

The Honorable Daniel Benjamin: Prepared statement ........................................ 29

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 50

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 51

(1)

U.S. COUNTERTERRORISM EFFORTS IN SYRIA: 

A WINNING STRATEGY? 

TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 29, 2015

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2 o’clock p.m., in 

room 2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ted Poe (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. POE. The subcommittee will come to order. Without objection, all members may have 5 days to submit statements, questions, and extraneous materials for the record subject to the length 

limitation in the rules. 

I will make my opening statement, then yield to the ranking 

member, Mr. Keating, for his statement. 

On September 10th, 2014, President Obama announced that the 

United States would ‘‘degrade and ultimately destroy ISIS.’’ That 

was a year ago. Obviously, ISIS didn’t get the memo. The terrorist 

group keeps on moving across the Middle East killing those who 

stand in its way by raping, pillaging, and murdering those who disagree with ISIS. 

ISIS controls half of Syria and large parts of Iraq. Civilized society is losing to these barbarians. Despite the U.S. spending billions 

in a counterterrorism strategy, the terrorist groups numbers have 

not decreased; in fact, ISIS has grown in size with affiliates now 

all over the world, including Indonesia, Yemen, Egypt, and Libya. The U.S. $3.7 billion air strike campaign has been plagued with 

little measurable successful results. From the very beginning, military officials warned that the air strikes relied on virtually no 

human intelligence on the ground surveillance. They were right. 

Without good intelligence, the number of air strikes the U.S. has 

carried out have been few, and the results are uncertain. Also, ISIS 

fighters killed by our air strikes seem to be replaced immediately 

with other jihadists. 

Our intelligence estimates that ISIS’ numbers are the same as 

they were when the air strikes started. In addition, the administration’s $500 million Train and Equip Program has proved to be a 

failure by anyone’s measure. In July, officials reported they had 

identified 7,000 planned participants, but only trained 60 due to intense vetting procedures, and other excuses. 

Later that month, 54 fighters crossed into Syria to fight ISIS 

forces that numbered in the tens of thousands. Of those 54 merceVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:51 Nov 04, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_TNT\092915\96816 SHIRL
2

naries, virtually all were killed, captured, or scattered when attacked. We’re now down to four or five trained mercenaries according to General Lloyd Austin of CENTCOM. 

Despite this failed policy, just last week we sent a second group 

of about 70 U.S.-trained fighters into Syria. Just 1 day later, reports suggested that one of the officers defected and surrendered 

his arms to an al-Qaeda Syrian affiliate. Several truckloads of 

weapons were allegedly traded to the terrorist group al-Nusra for 

safe passage through Syria. It’s time to abandoned this failed Train 

and Equip Program. 

The reality is just as bleak on the online battlefield. ISIS has 30 

to 40,000 social media accounts. It uses the internet to spread its 

propaganda, raise money, and find recruits as far away as Washington State. In 2011, the administration promised a strategy to 

combat terrorists’ use of social media. Four years later, the administration still has not shown us that strategy; no plan, no degrading of ISIS, no defeating of ISIS. 

The intel given to the administration has also reportedly been 

doctored to cover up how bad the war against ISIS is really going. 

Meanwhile, thousands of people are fleeing the Middle East, flooding Europe, and demanding entry into other Western countries because of the ISIS carnage and chaos in Syria and Iraq. There is 

more. ISIS continues to recruit want-to-be jihadists online for free 

via U.S.-owned social media companies. 

The administration continually is saying that everything is okay, 

is an embarrassing and wrong assessment of the violence and 

threat of ISIS. Today, we are here to get frank assessment of the 

administration’s counterterrorism strategy in Syria. In the face of 

our failure to destroy ISIS, we should be focusing on what we can 

do better, how we can improve our strategy in the future. 

ISIS’ advances in Syria translate into more direct threats to our 

national security and our interests both home and abroad. ISIS 

wants to destroy the United States and everything the U.S. stands 

for. ISIS fears no one; certainly not the U.S., so it continues to 

murder in the name of its radical jihadist beliefs. It has already 

killed numerous Americans. We need a strategy that protects 

American people from this radical Islamic threat. Now we hear on 

the horizon that the Russians may intervene and help defeat ISIS. 

Who knows? 

The U.S. needs to define the enemy and defeat it. And that’s the 

way it is, and I’ll yield to the ranking member, Mr. Keating. 

Mr. KEATING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for conducting this 

hearing, and I thank also our witnesses for being here today. 

The conflict in Syria is an open wound in the volatile Middle 

East. President Assad has brutalized, bombed, used chemical weapons on his own people creating the conditions for ISIL and alQaeda to thrive in Syria, and driving millions of Syrians to flee 

their country. The resulting refugee crisis has severely strained the 

resources of Syria’s neighbors and exposing divides in Europe, 

which in some parts is already suffering from an intolerant brand 

of nationalism. 

The conflict in Syria is also drawing in foreign fighters who contribute to the instability and represent possible terrorist threats 

3

when they return to their countries of origin, including the United 

States. To put it mildly, the order of battle in Syria is complex. 

The United States has called for Assad to leave power and opposes ISIL and al-Qaeda affiliate, al-Nusra. The United States supports so-called moderate Syrian opposition forces and the Syrian 

Kurdish group known as YPG. Meanwhile, our NATO ally, Turkey, 

late to the fight against ISIL opposes Assad and Kurdish militants, 

and the PKK, as well, which also has close ties to our Syrian Kurdish allies, the YPG. Our sometimes allies against ISIL, Iraq, Iran, 

and Russian support the Assad regime, and our partners in Saudi 

Arabia and the Gulf States oppose Assad and ISIL, while some individuals within these states provide funding to Sunni extremist 

groups in Syria. 

Given this tangled regional situation which has been further 

complicated by Russia’s recent movement of military equipment 

and personnel into Syria, the United States has, in my view, wisely 

refrained from introducing sizeable ground force into Syria to combat ISIL. Yet, in concert with our partners we must do more to 

counter and defeat ISIL which controls significant territory in 

Syria and Iraq, extending its influence beyond the Middle East into 

Africa and Asia. 

ISIL’s atrocities are horrific, and we must work to put a stop to 

its campaign of murder, slavery, and the destruction of cultural 

heritage. By virtue of its ideology, ISIL needs to control territory 

in order to survive, and to ultimately defeat ISIL we need to assist 

our allies in the region in retaking that territory. 

The key questions in my mind are, how will the United States 

and its partners sufficiently array its forces against ISIL to defeat 

it? And as we work to do this, how will we deal with the Assad 

regime whose illegitimacy and brutality was the root cause of the 

Syrian civil war? 

We know that to date the plan to train and equip moderate Syrian fighters has not met its objectives. I hope that today’s hearing 

will provide some constructive proposals on how going forward the 

United States and its allies can enhance counterterrorism efforts in 

Syria. 

I yield back, Mr. Chair. 

Mr. POE. Thank the gentleman from Massachusetts. 

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from South Carolina, Mr. 

Wilson, for 1 minute. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Sadly, the President’s strategy in Syria is failing, resulting in refugees fleeing violence and then drowning at sea. According to a recent article in the New York Times, the administration reports,

‘‘That coalition strikes killed about 10,000 Islamic State fighters. The group continues to replenish its ranks drawing an average of about 1,000 new fighters per month.’’

The President was wrong to belittle ISIS to JV, and he was wrong 

and made a mockery of the term ‘‘red line.’’ The failure of the Train 

and Equip mission of Syrian Opposition Forces has given enemy reinforcements space to insert itself and prop up the Assad dictatorship. 

4

The U.S. needs to change course and create a new strategy to defeat safe havens threatening American families at home. I believe 

it’s important that the U.S. and international community recognize 

that the situation in Iraq and Syria is, in fact, a global problem requiring broad international cooperation to promote stability in the 

region for families to prosper in their home nation. 

Mr. POE. The gentleman yields back his time. 

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr. Sherman, for 1-minute opening statement. 

Mr. SHERMAN. No one in the administration is saying that everything is okay. The Shiite Alliance is more dangerous than ISIS and 

more evil. They’ve killed far more Americans starting in the 1980s 

when Hezbollah attacked our Marines. And so if we confront ISIS, 

we have to do so in a way that does not empower Assad, Hezbollah, 

and Iran. 

You can attack U.S. policy, but we don’t as a nation want to send 

troops into the ground, and we are living with the results of an absolutely failed policy of the last administration in Iraq which installed Maliki, slightly improved now with al-Abadi. The fact is, the 

Iraqi Government betrayed us this week in entering into a special 

intelligence alliance with Iran, Assad, and Russia. 

The Train and Equip Program has been a failure. Due to political 

correctness, we have not armed those we know are not Islamic extremists; namely, the Yazidis and the Christians. And due to diplomatic correctness, we have not armed the Kurds directly, but try 

to put everything through Baghdad. That does not mean we should 

abandon the Train and Equip Program, which should have begun 

much earlier, as many on this committee argued, because what is 

the alternative? The chairman tells us we must defeat ISIS. Whose 

ground troops are going to do that, and what is a plan other than 

the administration’s plan, poorly carried out in the case of the 

Train and Equip Program, that will allow us to achieve that goal 

without massive American casualties. 

I yield back. 

Mr. POE. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. 

Perry, for 1 minute. 

Mr. PERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

In spite of its shortcomings, and there are many, the last administration’s policy was not completely failed, and I would submit 

that the failure was after that President left, and with the advent 

of the new policy. 

To that effect, in his September 2014 address from the White 

House, President Obama laid out a plan to degrade and ultimately 

destroy ISIL through a comprehensive and sustained counterterrorism strategy. In Syria, this goal was to be achieved with two 

major policies; a systematic campaign of air strikes and increased 

support to forces fighting the Islamic State on the ground. 

A year later, what does this strategy currently look like? Eleven 

sorties per day yielding an average of 43 bombs dropped daily, a 

handful of Syrian rebels who would rather be fighting Assad at a 

cost of about $100 million to the American taxpayer. 

According to a report published recently by the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, ISIS has extended its territorial reach and 

5

now controls 50 percent of Syria, including most of the country’s oil 

wells which have proven to be a significant source of revenue. 

Mr. Chairman, I think it is high time this administration go back 

to the drawing board. 

I yield back. 

Mr. POE. The gentleman yields back his time. 

The Chair recognizes the gentleman, Mr. Rohrabacher, for 1 

minute. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

This administration has managed to turn a bad situation, which 

it did inherit, which was a bad situation that we created on this 

side of the aisle by going along with the President who precipitously invaded Iraq at a time when he hadn’t finished in Afghanistan, but that bad situation this administration inherited has been 

turned into a catastrophe of this administration’s making. 

U.S. policies, even our supplies sent to defeat ISIL are now in 

the possession of radical Islamic groups that intend on killing 

Americans and other people who believe in our Western values. 

This administration has found every excuse to undermine the governments and the forces that are most friendly to our cause and 

the cause of peace. 

In Syria, we refused to cooperate with Russia 5 years ago claiming that there was an alternative, and what happened in those 5 

years? It’s turned into an ever-worse situation, and the money that 

was sent over to arm a Third Force we now find has been used to 

train and equip hostile forces to those people who are trying to 

bring peace to the Middle East. 

Thank you for holding this hearing; looking forward to getting 

the details. 

Mr. POE. The gentleman yields back. 

The Chair will now recognize and introduce all three of our witnesses. Thank you, gentlemen, for being here. 

General Jack Keane is the chairman of the board at the Institute 

of the Study of War. General Keane is a retired four-star general 

and the former vice-chief of staff for the United States Army. 

Mr. Thomas Joscelyn is a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, and senior editor of The Long War Journal, 

a publication dealing with counterterrorism and related issues. 

And Ambassador Daniel Benjamin is director of the John Sloan 

Dickey Center for International Understanding at Dartmouth. Ambassador Benjamin previously served as Ambassador-at-Large and 

coordinator for the counterterrorism at the United States State Department. 

Thank you, gentlemen, for being here. General Keane, we’ll start 

with you. 

STATEMENT OF GENERAL JACK KEANE, USA, RETIRED, 

CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD, INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF 

WAR 

General KEANE. Thank you, Chairman Poe, Ranking Member 

Keating, distinguished members of the committee for inviting me 

back today. I’m honored to be here with my distinguished panel colleagues. 

6

The Middle East has experienced one of the most tumultuous periods in its history with the old order challenged by the aspirational goals of the Arab Spring, Islamic terrorists taking advantage 

of this political and social upheaval, and Iran using proxies to 

achieve regional influence and control. 

ISIS has become the most successful terrorist organization in 

modern history by dominating a large swath of Syrian-Iraq territory while expanding its formal affiliations into seven countries, 

and developing a worldwide following. 

As you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, approximately a year ago, the 

President announced U.S. policy that in conjunction with our Coalition partners we would degrade, and ultimately defeat ISIS. While 

there has been some progress, looking at this strategy today, we 

now know the conceptual plan of Iraq first and minimal commitment in Syria is fundamentally flawed. The resources provided to 

support Iraq and Syria are far from adequate. The indigenous 

ground forces in Syria and Iraq are not capable of defeating ISIS. 

The air campaign rules of engagement are too restrictive. We have 

not impacted the ideology or ISIS recruiting as 28,000 new recruits 

have arrived this year alone. As such, we are not only failing, we 

are losing this war. I can say with certainty our strategy will not 

defeat ISIS. 

ISIS, who is headquartered in Syria, recruits, trains, and re-supplies in Syria. It is from Syria that ISIS has so successfully expanded, and it is from Syria that ISIS reaches out to 20,000 social 

media sites per day. They control large swaths of territory in Syria 

from Iraq border to Damascus. This territorial control is what differentiates it from other terrorist organizations, but it is also its 

greatest vulnerability. 

To defeat ISIS, we must take its territory away, as we did with 

Germany, Japan, and Korea; yet, we have no strategy to defeat 

ISIS in Syria. We have no effective ground force, which is a defeat 

mechanism. Air power will not defeat ISIS; it has not even been 

able to deny ISIS the ability to attack at will. ISIS grew to a terrorist army only because of the sanctuary in Syria. We cannot succeed in Iraq if ISIS is allowed to exist in Syria. 

The United States finds itself at a critical juncture with its ISIS 

strategy failing, the Syrian civil war in its fourth year, and because 

the Assad regime this last year has been losing ground to the 

rebels and some political support, Vladimir Putin is executing a 

military buildup in Syria to insure the survival of the Assad regime. Putin is also working to create an alternative anti-ISIS Coalition that includes Russia, Iran, Syria, and Iraq in a direct challenge to the U.S.-led Coalition. 

In view of these very real challenges, what can we do? As to the 

strategy, Sun Tzu said, ‘‘Tactics without a strategy is the noise before defeat,’’ and we have some noise. 

Once and for all, 22 years after the first World Trade Center 

bombing, 14 years after 9/11, we should develop in conjunction 

with our allies a comprehensive strategy to defeat radical Islam. 

Otherwise, we will continue to react to individual terrorist movements, al-Qaeda, ISIS, Ansar al-Sharia, Boko Haram, you name it, 

with no end in sight. 

7

As to Syria, recognizing an effective ground force is the key to 

defeating ISIS with much less restrictive use of air power. The 

ground force should consist of the Syria Kurds, the only force who 

has enjoyed success against ISIS in Syria. This force should be 

armed as required, and provided special forces advisors to assist 

with the use of air power. 

Despite the dismal failure of the Train and Equip mission of the 

moderate Sunni Arab Force, I agree with Mr. Sherman, it is still 

essential to put together this vital capability. The parameters for 

this force must change. We cannot restrict the Sunni Syrian Arabs 

to exclusively fighting ISIS, when their priority is the Assad regime 

who is destroying their communities and killing their families. 

They want to fight the Assad regime and ISIS; let them. 

Also, this force and their communities must be protected as 

should the Syria Kurds. Begin by establishing free zones in the 

north and south, use Coalition air power to include the Turks to 

enforce it, and permit the people to use the free zone as a sanctuary. Advise Assad if he challenges the free zone, then U.S.-led 

Coalition will shut down his air power. 

We must step up the use of our special operations forces to conduct routine ground raids, not just limited to drone raids. But the 

harsh reality is that the Syrian Kurds and the Sunni Arabs may 

not be sufficient to dislodge ISIS and defeat them in Syria. And the 

task may ultimately require an outside Arab coalition assisted by 

the United States ground and air components. 

As to Assad, while the United States and the Coalition desires 

a political solution to the Syrian civil war, recognize that Assad 

will never depart unless the military momentum shifts against 

him. Despite Russia’s military pressure, this should still be U.S. 

policy. 

As to Russia, once again, Putin is outmaneuvering the United 

States, and once again he will out-bluff us. Putin’s economy is in 

the tank. His financial reserves are running out. His military is no 

match against the United States. He has deployed a relatively 

small military and limited capability to Syria; yet, he will likely get 

what he wants, the preservation of the Assad regime. 

The United States should not coordinate any military operations 

with Russia. To do so, we are de facto in collusion with the Syrian 

regime, Iran, the Quds Force, and Hezbollah. Putin is counting on 

President Obama’s fear of escalation, and fear of confrontation to 

force U.S. capitulation to Russia’s ambition in Syria, and the Middle East at large. This, in my view, is a game changer. 

There are no easy answers in Syria, but we don’t have the luxury 

to say it’s too hard, and it’s too complicated. There have been plenty of mistakes and lost opportunities to be sure, but U.S. interests, 

U.S. security, and U.S. credibility is at stake. What is most needed 

now is U.S. determined leadership and resolve to commit to defeating ISIS along with a revised effective strategy. 

Thank you, and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of General Keane follows:]

8


96816a-1.eps
9


96816a-2.eps
10


96816a-3.eps
11


96816a-4.eps
12


96816a-5.eps
13


96816a-6.eps
14

Mr. POE. Thank you. Mr. Joscelyn. 

STATEMENT OF MR. THOMAS JOSCELYN, SENIOR FELLOW, 

FOUNDATION FOR DEFENSE OF DEMOCRACIES 

Mr. JOSCELYN. Chairman Poe, Ranking Member Keating, and 

other members of the committee, thank you for inviting me here 

today to speak about our counterterrorism efforts in Syria. 

As others have already said, the war is exceedingly complex. I’m 

not going to pretend to have all the answers for you, but I’ve heard 

a few things here already which are consistent with my testimony. 

I want to highlight them in my oral testimony. 

First is sort of the necessity of removing territory from the Islamic State or ISIS. The Kurds have done a good job this year taking the northern third of Raqqah Province away from the Islamic 

State, but as David Ignatius in the Washington Post recently reported, they’ve been basically under-resourced, and for some reason 

there’s a holdup in getting more resources to take that fight to Islamic State. I don’t know why that is; however, that seems to be 

the case. 

In that vein, I would say that the founding mythos of the Islamic 

State is that it is the resurrection of the Caliphate. They brought 

this back to being a reality on this earth. And I think that as long 

as that myth exists and lives, that basically we’re going to keep 

seeing more recruitment, we’re going to keep seeing more people 

flock to the Caliphate. Now, you’re going to have some people who 

defect, and who aren’t happy, and who go home, and we need to 

trumpet their messages. But as long as this founding myth that 

they are the Caliphate and control territory exists, they’re going to 

keep going. 

And to that point, this morning the Treasury Department released what I think is really unprecedented; 35 terrorist designations at once this morning. Most of the designations deal with the 

Islamic State and underscore the degree to which the Islamic State 

has mushroomed. They deal with the Islamic State’s provinces in 

the in the Khorasan and the Caucus Province, also the Islamic 

State’s growing presence in the Sinai. And also, most importantly, 

deals with western recruits have gone to the Islamic State and 

posed some level of threat to their home countries. 

Now, the plots that have been, I think, highlighted in these designations aren’t necessarily 9/11 style plots. These aren’t these sort 

of spectacular events that we should all be worried about, but it 

shows that there is at least the seed of an idea of attacking their 

home countries there with some of the individuals who were designated this morning. 

One quick point to something Mr. Sherman said about Iran and 

Assad. I think even taking it a step further, I think that they actually are the fundamental destabilizing force in the region, and have 

actually fueled Sunni jihadism. Just last month, as we reported in 

The Long War Journal, the Islamic State brutally executed four 

members of the popular mobilization forces in Iraq. They did so in 

a manner that was consistent with the way the Shiite extremists 

had previously executed Sunnis who they were fighting. And too oftentimes in our media coverage, we get the ISIS video which is sort 

of, you know, glossy and highly stylized, and something that’s realVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:51 Nov 04, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00018 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_TNT\092915\96816 SHIRL
15

ly there for the wow factor, but not enough attention is given to 

what’s happening on the Shiite side which is really driving this. 

And, unfortunately, as long as Shiite extremism is expanding, what 

that does is it forces Sunnis more into the radicals camps, more 

into the jihadist camps, and that’s not a good thing. Obviously, that 

underscores the idea that in the long run, Assad and Iran are not 

an answer to this at all. 

One further threat stream that I want to highlight today, and 

this goes to a lot of what we work on. I think it’s very poorly misunderstood, is the al-Nusra Front, and the Sunni jihadists in Syria 

who are not aligned with the Islamic State, and who are actually 

opposed to them. I think they’re actually—there’s a gross misunderstanding of what they’re doing, because what you don’t hear 

often is that they are actually building their own state in northern 

Syria, and particularly in the Idlib Province. 

The al-Nusra Front is openly loyal to Ayman al-Zawahiri, the 

head of al-Qaeda. It is seeded with senior al-Qaeda operatives, 

some of whom have actually trained, and lived, and worked with 

al-Qaeda going back to the 1980s. In a recent video, they highlighted the 9/11 attacks as something that’s part of their legacy 

and their heritage, and say that this is part of—they’re the heirs 

of this glory. And their videos and propaganda show very clearly 

that al-Qaeda actually seeks to build an Islamic State or Emirate 

as well in Syria. This is absolutely without a doubt. 

And, in fact, is you look at the Train and Equip Program, the recent problems with it, I think this is another fact that needs to be 

highlighted. The problems came not from ISIS, the problems came 

from al-Nusra Front or al-Qaeda, going back to July when members of Division 30 went into Syria into the Aleppo Province, it was 

al-Nusra that was waiting for them that, as you said, Chairman 

Poe, killed, and captured, and basically disbanded this group very 

quickly. We were not expecting that for some reason on the U.S. 

side. 

Now just recently we have now an admission from CENTCOM 

saying that, in fact, several vehicles and ammunition at a minimum were turned over to al-Nusra Front in northern Syria, not 

ISIS, as part of a deal that was brokered to basically guarantee 

safe passage for some of the people who were somehow affiliated 

with this program. 

I think this highlights to a certain extent that there’s such a myopic focus on the Islamic State, and such a drive to say the Islamic 

State is really the only threat we have to be worried about here, 

that basically a lot of times what’s actually happening with these 

other groups is just as important, if not more so in the long run. 

And finally I’ll say this, there’s been somewhat of a public relations campaign to get the West to support or at least tactically support some of the Sunni jihadists in Syria, including Ahrar al-Sham. 

That is a horrible idea. Members of the Obama administration 

have actually openly objected to that idea and said that’s a no-go. 

They are right in that regard. Ahrar al-Sham should in no way be 

our partner in Syria. They cannot be. This is a group that openly 

says that the Mullah Omar’s Taliban is a model for what they’re 

building in Syria. It is deeply allied with al-Qaeda in Syria. It’s had 

senior al-Qaeda veterans implanted in its ranks, and seeded in its 

16

ranks. This is a group that is absolutely not worthy of our support, 

and so I will end on a final warning; which is that the Sunni 

jihadists who are not Islamic State, and are not affiliated, and are 

actually against Assad, a lot of these groups are not our allies. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Joscelyn follows:]

17


96816b-1.eps
18


96816b-2.eps
19


96816b-3.eps
20


96816b-4.eps
21


96816b-5.eps
22


96816b-6.eps
23


96816b-7.eps
24


96816b-8.eps
25


96816b-9.eps
26


96816b-10.eps
27

Mr. POE. Thank you, Mr. Joscelyn. 

The Chair now recognizes Ambassador Benjamin. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DANIEL BENJAMIN, NORMAN E. MCCULLOCH JR. DIRECTOR, JOHN SLOAN DICKEY 

CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL UNDERSTANDING, DARTMOUTH COLLEGE (FORMER COORDINATOR FOR COUNTERTERRORISM, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE) 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. Chairman Poe, members of the subcommittee—is that better? Begin again. 

Chairman Poe, Ranking Member Keating, distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear 

today to discuss the important issue of counterterrorism in Syria. 

Many have spoken of Syria as the problem from hell. Today with 

upwards of 1⁄4 million dead, more than 4 million Syrians in exile, 

a crisis in Europe and in Syria’s neighborhood, and almost 8 million internally displaced, one can only say that Syria has descended 

to a lower and darker circle of hell. And as many have mentioned, 

from an American perspective, the enduring safe haven that has 

been created in Syria and in Iraq is an outstanding problem for 

U.S. security. 

This hearing, moreover, comes at a moment of dangerous flux 

with the deployment of substantial numbers of Russian forces to 

Syria, and that appears to be a game changer for Western strategy. 

I think it’s unlikely now that there will be any chance of removing 

Bashar al-Assad’s regime, or of the regime being pressured to come 

to the negotiating table on terms that it finds inhospitable. 

And I believe that it’s important to look at the regional context, 

as well. While a diplomatic solution will have to be found, and 

there is no military solution has been said over and over again, we 

face a potential another round of flux followed by equilibrium at a 

higher level of violence with Sunni powers in the region supporting 

their proxies to fight against Assad, now backed by the Russians. 

And that, in turn, could raise the stakes from a counterterrorism 

perspective, as well. 

It is a moment for innovative diplomacy, and I would just say 

that I share the view that we need to show more flexibility on the 

issue of the fate of the Assad government. And while, ultimately, 

a leader has committed the atrocities on the scale that Bashar alAssad has, cannot be allowed to stay in power, humanitarian and 

counterterrorism concerns demand that we be flexible about the 

modalities of that departure. 

As others have noted, the key shortcoming in Syria and Iraq remains the absence of a capable ground force which is essential for 

achieving the kind of success against ISIL that we seek to achieve. 

Here there are two critical problems; what has been mentioned, the 

weak showing on Equip and Train needs no further discussion 

here. But, equally, I think it’s important to understand again the 

regional context, which is that our Coalition partners are far from 

engaged in this struggle as seriously as we would like. While Western allies are showing growing commitment, and we should all welcome France’s decision to launch air strikes against targets in 

Syria, the Saudis and the smaller Gulf States remain principally 

interested in the sectarian conflict and Exhibit A in that regard is 

28

the conflict of Yemen, where a humanitarian catastrophe is also 

unfolding. And Saudi Arabia’s determination to extirpate the 

Houthis in Yemen is receiving far more attention and resources 

than the effort to roll back ISIL and Sunni extremism. 

Our and our allies’ agendas are at odds, and that is going to be 

a continuing problem in this extraordinarily difficult situation. But 

that said, I still think that the strategy we have, while hardly ideal 

is the best one available to us. For all its grotesque violence, ISIL 

has not yet manifested itself as a first tier terrorist threat to the 

United States. It has not yet shown significant interest in out-ofarea attacks. I believe that will change the more we bomb them, 

but for the time being, I don’t think they can be said to be an alQaeda-like threat. They have not devoted the effort to long distance 

covert operations the way al-Qaeda did. 

Much has been made about the threat of foreign fighters. I would 

point out that there’s only been one case so far of a foreign fighter 

coming back to his home country and carrying out an attack. That 

was in Brussels. We see an awful lot of radicalization young individuals who want to be part of the team, want to show that they 

are part of this historic movement, but this kind of violence which 

remains low-level, and I would say non-existential, certainly, is the 

new normal in jihadist terrorism. It’s not something to sniff at, but 

it is certainly less threatening than the catastrophic attacks we 

feared after 9/11. 

I agree with Mr. Joscelyn about the importance of the myth of 

the Caliphate and holding territory. That has galvanized lots of extremists, but I would suggest that we have a number of tools at 

our disposal. We are seeing an accelerating campaign of drone and 

other air strikes that are taking our senior officials of ISIL. And 

I believe that over time this will throw the group off balance and 

make it harder for them to achieve their military or their statebuilding objectives. And I think over time that will also make a 

ground campaign more attractive to some of our allies who we hope 

will get involved. 

I remain strongly opposed to putting U.S. boots on the ground. 

This would be repetition of the surge, and would only address 

symptoms and not the causes. I have a lot more to say, but I look 

forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Benjamin follows:]

29


96816c-1.eps
30


96816c-2.eps
31


96816c-3.eps
32


96816c-4.eps
33


96816c-5.eps
34


96816c-6.eps
35

Mr. POE. I thank the gentleman. I recognize myself for 5 minutes 

for questions. 

Is it in our national security interest that ISIS be defeated? General? 

General KEANE. Yes, absolutely, in my judgment. I mean, we are 

talking about—it is a national security interest for us for stability 

and security in the Middle East. It is in our national security interest dealing with our allies, obviously, who are being impacted by 

ISIS. And I also believe that ISIS left unattended will eventually 

become more of a direct threat to the American people at large, and 

I think the evidence is already there in terms of the fertility for 

something like to take place. Certainly, there is the intent. 

Mr. POE. Ambassador Benjamin, did I hear you correct when—

did you say that Assad, he’s going to stay in Syria? At some—he’ll 

be the leader, the President, whatever of a portion of Syria, or not? 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. Mr. Poe, first let me just say, I fully 

agree that over the long term we want ISIL to be defeated, but I 

think that the key here is strategic patience, and that we should 

do it in a way that comports with our long-term interests, and 

doesn’t result in another mistaken deployment. 

As for Assad——

Mr. POE. Strategic patience, does that mean that we’d let ISIS 

get a pass for a few years, and——

Ambassador BENJAMIN. No, I think it means that we continue 

striking them and we’ve now carried out roughly 6,000 air strikes. 

Mr. POE. Are you saying those air strikes have been successful 

in stopping ISIS? 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. I think that they have done a good job 

at containing ISIS. And I think that containment, unfortunately, is 

the solution of the moment. 

Mr. POE. Do you agree with that, General Keane? 

General KEANE. No. Absolutely, that’s not true. What has happened, CENTCOM has chosen to use activity-based analysis to provide some impact of what ISIS is doing. Therefore, we receive information that says number of air attacks, number of vehicles destroyed, and we haven’t been counting bodies since Vietnam, number of people killed. How we come to that conclusion is beyond me. 

What we’re not doing in terms of the analysis that you’re not receiving, but it is inside the CENTCOM headquarters is a matrixbased analysis that looks at the enemy and says how effective is 

their command and control? What is their tactical and operational 

initiative? What is their territorial control? Has it gone up, gone 

down, where is it now? What is their capability to regenerate 

forces? What degree of resiliency that they have? All of those 

things I just mentioned, plus four or five others, are all to the plus, 

which tells you that the air campaign is not nearly as effective as 

it could be, and it certainly is not having any significant impact on 

those categories, which is the way we judge an enemy force. 

Mr. POE. Ambassador Benjamin, without going into that issue 

more, I mean, I think the General is right, and you’re wrong. This 

is not defeating ISIS. I would think they would applaud the same 

type of lack of strategy because they’re expanding. But answer my 

question; is Assad here to stay in Syria, or a portion of Syria, now 

36

that the Russians are involved? Is that what you said? I’m just asking that question. 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. What I said, sir, was that over the long 

term Assad needs to go. That, I believe, is consistent with our values and the revulsion of the international community, but that we 

should think hard about how we sequence that, and whether or not 

we agree to let him, for example, remain throughout his elected 

term in order to deal with the fact that the Russians are simply 

not going to leave ahead of time. 

I also would point out, sir, that otherwise, we are right now in 

a conflict in which we’re fighting both sides from a middle that 

doesn’t exist. 

Mr. POE. More than one side. Reclaiming my time. 

Now that the Russians are involved, Putin, Napoleon of Siberia 

now moving into the area. You’ve got Russia, Assad, Iran now 

working together. How does that issue impact our strategy, lack of 

strategy, or a future strategy in defeating ISIS? General, you want 

to try that? 

General KEANE. Certainly. Well, first of all, it is a reality, but 

we should not let Putin and his limited military capability that he’s 

providing take us off what our strategy is, which is to defeat ISIS 

and put together an effective ground force in Syria to do that, and 

also do the same thing in Iraq, and provide the number of resources that we need to do that. 

I would tell Mr. Putin that I’m going to fly my airplanes where 

I want, when I want, I’m going to do what I want with them, and 

you’re not going to interfere with them period. I mean, the idea of 

deconflicting operations with Putin is ridiculous. There’s no reason 

to do something like that. We have to stand up for what our goals 

are in that country, in Syria, and also in Iraq. Putin is playing a 

card here, and he’s gotten away with it in 2013 on the chemical 

weapons, he got away with it in Crimea, and he got away with it 

in Ukraine. And given that encouragement that we’ve provided 

him, he’s playing another one. 

I do agree with this, Mr. Chairman, it does solidify what was 

happening to the Assad regime. They were losing Alawites, erosion 

of support not to the point where he was going to removed, but it 

was eroding, and the rebels were gaining on him, particularly in 

Idlib Province, and that was Jabhat al-Nusra. And he knew that, 

and that sanctuary that they have, that Alawite sanctuary was 

being threatened. The Iranians provided him the detailed information on that because their intelligence is better, and that’s what 

this move is about, to solidify the Assad regime. And that will happen to a certain degree, but if we continue the momentum against 

the Assad regime and support that, and support issues against 

ISIS, I believe at some point we’ll be able to work a deal to get 

Assad out of there. 

Mr. POE. Thank you, General. 

I yield to the ranking member, Mr. Keating from Massachusetts. 

Mr. KEATING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to touch on one issue, and maybe get back to some of the 

other issues we were discussing. I’ll start with Ambassador Benjamin. What’s the role of Turkey, Turkey as an effective partner? 

Within hours after the U.S. had an agreement with Turkish offiVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:51 Nov 04, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00040 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_TNT\092915\96816 SHIRL
37

cials to use the air force bases to launch air strikes against ISIL, 

Turkey launched air strikes against PKK in northern Iraq, the Syrian Kurdish group. And the YPG has close ties to PKK, and is one 

of the most effective anti-ISIL forces in Syria. Plus, although 

they’re improving, I think Turkey has also been one of the most—

probably the most main transit site for a country where fighters 

are flowing into Syria now. What could we do to better work with 

Turkey? I think it’s critical that they become an effective partner 

for us. 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. Well, it’s critical that they become an effective partner for us, but I would say the diplomacy with Turkey 

is an extraordinarily vexed problem, Mr. Keating. And Turkey has 

made clear that its number one priority is the removal of Assad. 

And complicating that is that President Erdogan has decided to essentially tack back against one of his greatest achievement, which 

was ameliorating tensions between Turks and Kurds in his own 

country by striking out against Kurds for political gain. And while 

we do benefit from being able to fly out of Incirlik now, we have 

an enormously challenging problem because the Turks are dead set 

against increased influence for the YPG, or any other Kurdish 

group outside of Turkey. So, the diplomacy there is extraordinarily 

difficult. And, again, the Turks are increasingly concerned about 

ISIL, but they are nowhere nearly as concerned about ISIL as they 

are about Assad, which has become an obsession. His removal has 

become an obsession for Mr. Erdogan. 

Mr. KEATING. I couldn’t agree—I was in Turkey just 4 months 

ago, and I agree with you that—in their hierarchy of their concerns, Assad is first, the Kurds second, and ISIL may be third 

maybe, so that creates a problem that I see. I don’t know if any 

of the other witnesses want to see how we could better deal with 

Turkey, if that’s possible at all. 

Mr. JOSCELYN. I’ll echo Mr. Benjamin’s honorable remarks here 

about dealing with Turkey because I think diplomacy is very difficult to deal with them. 

I’ll say this, Turkey—in my opening remarks I highlighted Ahrar 

al-Sham as a group that’s not our partner in Syria. They’re a member of the Jaysh al-Fatah Coalition which is led by al-Nusra Front, 

which is al-Qaeda. Ahrar al-Sham fights hand and glove with alQaeda, al-Nusra Front throughout all of Syria. Ahrar al-Sham also 

happens to be Turkey’s preferred proxy in the fight in Syria, and 

this is a group we profiled. I’ve probably written 100 articles on 

them about now in The Long War Journal, and there’s no doubt 

about what Ahrar al-Sham is. This is a Sunni jihadist group that’s 

aligned with al-Qaeda. It’s being set up to be basically the long run 

Taliban in Syria. Basically, the al-Qaeda, at least pre-9/11, you 

think about having these local Syrian forces that could basically be 

a face for Sunni jihadism in Syria. That’s Ahrar al-Sham is, and 

Turkey is the number one backer at this point of Ahrar al-Sham. 

General KEANE. The only thing I would add is, listen, all the 

problems that Turkey has given us to be sure but, nonetheless, in 

mid-July they came to an agreement with the United States to establish, for want of another term, a free zone with us, and to enforce that free zone using air power. So, that is a beginning and 

a recognition that that will provide some relief in terms of sancVerDate 0ct 09 2002 11:51 Nov 04, 2015 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00041 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_TNT\092915\96816 SHIRL
38

tuary relief for people who need that measure of protection. And, 

of course, that serves their self-interest in terms of migration 

across their border with refugees, but it’s also a way of protecting 

a ground force. And I think that’s a positive thing, it’s something 

we can work with. 

Mr. KEATING. General, I appreciate your going forward with direct comments, but the difficulty I have trying to find out how to 

follow-through deals with the use of ground troops, as well. And 

you say that we have to have U.S. and our allies engaged in those 

ground troops to be successful. Two things; number one, how do we 

get our allies? The conversations I’ve had are not encouraging with 

our Western allies participating. Number two, let’s assume we did, 

let’s assume we were successful. What do you see for the time 

frame of those ground troops having to hold that territory? 

General KEANE. The issue we have, and you mentioned in a discussion with the panel, is every one of our allies on the border 

there, their number one issue is Assad. And it’s not that ISIS isn’t 

important to them, but they want the focus to be the removal of 

that regime and what it’s been largely doing to Sunnis, whose constituency is within their own countries. And that’s why I thought 

the more aggressive strategy in dealing with Assad early on going 

back a few years, this is one of the lost opportunities we had to 

build a capable force that pretty much has gone by the wayside in 

a sense, because if you remember, a national security team from 

this administration offered that as an opportunity in the summer 

of 2012. We should never lose that focus, because I don’t think they 

will participate as a ground force, an Arab Coalition ground force 

as long as that regime is there. But when you talk to them, once 

the removal of that regime, then they’re willing to entertain the 

thought of taking some kind of ground action against ISIS, if it’s 

still warranted at that time. 

And I suspect, even though we should try some of these other options, and I think the administration is looking at some different 

options, I’m not certain those options are going to be successful. 

Mr. KEATING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Ambassador Benjamin was going to comment on this. I hope he 

has the opportunity to do that with other questions. 

I yield back. 

Mr. POE. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Pennsylvania, 

Mr. Perry. 

Mr. PERRY. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Joscelyn, what were the factors that led to the complete failure of the original batch of U.S.-trained Syrian fighters that 

crossed into the country from Syria in July, if you know, from your 

perspective? 

Mr. JOSCELYN. What happened, and we were watching this, ironically enough, on social media. Al-Qaeda, al-Nusra Front has all 

sorts of social media accounts, and they basically were taunting us 

as this was ongoing releasing a statement saying that they had basically captured or killed a number of the Division 30 forces they’re 

called as they crossed into Aleppo in northern Syria. 

The problem here was that it wasn’t thought based on press reporting that, in fact, al-Qaeda in Syria was going to interfere with 

an American-backed effort, which I think was shortsighted. I don’t 

39

know who made that call, or who made that choice, but that’s what 

it said in the press reporting. So, it wasn’t ISIS that interfered 

with us, it was al-Nusra Front or al-Qaeda that did. And then 

quickly what they did was after basically intercepting these guys 

as they were sent into Syria, they then went and raided their headquarters north of Aleppo, which we then—the U.S. then sent in air 

cover to try and kill them, and actually probably killed dozens of 

al-Qaeda fighters during the conflict. But the end result was that 

these 54 fighters that went into Syria were quickly disbanded. 

Mr. PERRY. I mean, 54 is a pretty—what was the force opposed 

to them when they came in? Do you have any idea? I mean, 54, 

I’m just——

Mr. JOSCELYN. It’s a drop in the bucket. I mean, the point is——

Mr. PERRY. You’ve got a platoon of fighters. 

Mr. JOSCELYN. I mean, Nusra Front by comparison, and this 

wasn’t even factored in the strategy, easily has thousands upon 

thousands of jihadists now if you just look at their operations on 

a day to day basis. And they’re not even ISIS. And then you go deal 

with ISIS and all the other factors there. 

Mr. PERRY. General Keane, in what ways do you believe the recent Iran nuclear deal with affect counterterrorism efforts in Syria? 

I know that’s maybe a little bit of a stretch, but can you draw a 

thread for us and put some points on it that we can maybe see 

some milestones, if you can come up—if you can think of some? 

General KEANE. Well, I think it’s pretty self-evident. I mean, the 

progress that the Iranians have made in the last 35 years using 

proxy clients to sponsor terrorism for them, and also to execute 

military operations for them have led to significant influence and 

control in Lebanon, Syria, Yemen, and Iraq. And with close to $150 

billion worth of funding that’s going to be returned to their coffers, 

which is a significant percentage of their GDP, I think if we just 

estimate that likely 20–30 percent go to domestic needs to appease 

a population and keep them out of the streets, and most of it will 

go to their number one strategic objective, is not a nuclear weapon. 

Their number one strategic objective is to dominate and control the 

region, and that is where that money will go. And that will mean 

Hezbollah funding, it’ll certainly means Quds Force funding, both 

of who are on the ground in Syria. 

And I may say, making a significant contribution also on the 

ground in Syria but no longer there, but helped prop up the Assad 

regime before ISIS invaded Iraq was thousands of Iraqi Shia militia that were all trained by the Iranians. So, that will be the mainstay of where most of the money will go. It will not just impact 

Syria, it’ll impact other countries in the region. But, certainly, it 

will have impact on Syria. 

Mr. PERRY. Keeping with that kind of a thought, the implications 

of Russian forces in Syria, and especially in light of the Assad regime’s recent use of Russian warplanes to carry out air strikes. You 

kind of talked about this briefly before. 

Do you believe the U.S. can still—do we have the resolve? What 

are the implications, what are the challenges to us instituting a nofly zone should we chose to with the advent of Russian forces proper being in country? 

40

General KEANE. Well, I think the free zone also would obviously 

be a no-fly zone. We would not tolerate the Assad regime bombing 

a free zone, so I think it’s a—the no-fly zone has a little bit of a 

third rail to this administration, so I think a free zone is a better 

word. And, also, it’s a place where refugees can go to seek sanctuary. 

But look, what——

Mr. PERRY. Are we going to be mixing it up with Russian planes? 

Are American fighter pilots going to be mixing it up with——

General KEANE. I don’t see any reason why the Russians would 

do something like that. They’ve got some intercept airplanes, 

they’re called SU–24s. They’ve got some multi-roll fighters on the 

ground, and they’ve got some close air support airplanes. They 

have about a squadron of fighters, they’ve got about a squadron of 

Hinds and Hips, and they’ve got a half a dozen drones. That’s a 

limited air capability. They’ve got some ground forces and some 

tanks, about a battalion size to sort of protect the airbase and the 

greater airbase—and a base they’re forming north of that. That’s 

not a power projective offensive ground force. You push it out so 

you don’t have Jabhat al-Nusra lobbing mortars at their airbase 

and interfering with their operations. 

It is a limited military capability designed to have significant political impact. And I believe it will have significant political impact. 

He knows what he’s doing. 

Mr. PERRY. Thank you, General. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. POE. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

At the beginning, I said that the Shiite Alliance was more dangerous, more evil, has killed more innocent Muslims, killed more 

Americans than ISIS has. What I should point out, what I failed 

to point out at the beginning of this, but ISIS is far more gruesome. 

Assad will give 1,000 people with barrel bombs and have the good 

taste to deny it. ISIS will behead a dozen people and put it up on 

YouTube. 

There have been those who have blamed the United States for 

everything and said we’ve accomplished nothing. I would point out 

for the record that ISIS was on its way to take Baghdad, at least 

the Sunni neighborhoods in Baghdad, and it was American air 

power that stopped them. Speaking of Baghdad, this is an ally that 

may not be worthy of very much American support. 

Ambassador, do you know how much money we spent propping 

up that regime this year? We’ve got thousands of troops there, we 

give them lots of free weapons. Any idea what the price is? 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. I’m afraid I couldn’t give——

Mr. SHERMAN. Okay. We’ll try to find out for the record, but this 

is a regime that has oil revenues present and future that will not 

commit to repay us with future oil revenues. It’s a regime that 

sends money to ISIS, it pays the civil servants in Mosul, which 

means they’re giving money to people under ISIS control, it I believe gives Mosul free electricity for which ISIS can collect. But, 

most importantly, ISIS seized all those bank notes. The Iraqi regime will not recall them as many countries do and issue new currency. And, of course, the reason for that is that really makes it 

41

tough to be a corrupt politician because you have your store of 

money in the old bank notes. 

We’re losing the cyber war. The number one thing ISIS has is it 

does control territory, but the second thing is that our message in 

cyber space is terrible. One of the reasons for that is that we don’t 

have anybody on our team who’s paid to understand Islam. We 

think that if we can just prove that al-Baghdadi beheaded innocent 

girls, that that will undercut his support. It may increase his support. He may put that up on YouTube. What we fail to realize is 

if we can catch him eating a ham sandwich, that’s what will undercut his support. 

Ambassador, while you were in government, if you wanted to call 

a U.S. Government employee who’s full-time job was to be a true 

expert in Sharia, in the Quran, in the Hadith, was there anybody 

who was a U.S. Government employee you could call on who had 

memorized the Quran, which is kind of a basic level of Islamic 

scholarship? 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. Yes, sir, I’m sure there are many——

Mr. SHERMAN. Did you ever call on one? Can you name one, because I’ve been told again and again that the State Department refuses to hire anyone for their knowledge of Islam. Now, for all I 

know, our Ambassador to Paraguay is a devote Muslim, but he’s 

focused on Paraguay. Who would you call? What office? 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. So, if I wanted an intelligence briefing, 

I’d call the intelligence——

Mr. SHERMAN. Is there anybody in the Intelligence Service? 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. There are many, many, many people. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Who are true graduates of the top Islamic scholarship schools? 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. No, but there are many other ways of acquiring that kind of knowledge. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Well, there’s many other ways—look, we hire 

thousands of lawyers at the State Department. We’ve got people on 

salary because they understand European diplomatic law of the 

1800s. We don’t have anybody who’s memorized the Quran. 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. That’s just not true, sir. 

Mr. SHERMAN. That’s not true? Well, I’ve—can you name anybody who has? 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. I’m sure that that’s the standard. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Okay. How about the standard of being able to 

apply both Sunni and Shiite Hadith to the behavior of individual 

actors? 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. We have many people who can——

Mr. SHERMAN. We have many people, but you can’t name one. 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. I’m not——

Mr. SHERMAN. In other testimony from the State Department, 

they’ve said they refuse to hire anybody to do that. But when you 

say intel, that means they’re not involved in public diplomacy. 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. We also have people in the intelligence 

part of——

Mr. SHERMAN. Okay. So, you’re saying the intel community advises our public diplomacy and our cyber communications efforts? 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. Absolutely. 

42

Mr. SHERMAN. That’s an interesting role for intel to be doing on 

a day to day basis. I have yet to find a single communication from 

the State Department showing the hypocrisy and the failure to follow Islamic law of our enemies in the Middle East, nor can you 

name a single person that has this. But you’re sure they’re there. 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. But I can show you 100 different pieces 

put out by the Center for Counterterrorism Strategic Communications that have done exactly that. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Yes, and none of them by somebody who could—

who would be mid-level at any of the top Islamic schools in the 

world. Yes, they’ve listened to the great course’s summary of the 

Islamic religion. 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. That’s an absolutely unacceptable slur 

on some truly remarkable scholars——

Mr. SHERMAN. I asked you what post in the State Department 

is hired for their knowledge? 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. I&R. 

Mr. SHERMAN. IR? 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. I&R, Intelligence and Research. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Intelligence and——

Ambassador BENJAMIN. Also, NEA has expert——

Mr. SHERMAN. Okay. I’ve called over there many times and 

they’ve told me nobody, and you’re telling me there’s somebody, but 

you can’t name them. And you know that they’re only going to hire 

people with fancy degrees from Princeton, not scholarship from the 

major Islamic universities. But maybe there’s some other reason 

why our cyber efforts are so pitifully poor when it comes to confronting ISIS. 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. A major reason why our cyber efforts are 

inadequate, sir, is that Congress has never funded them at an adequate level. 

Mr. SHERMAN. We funded them far more than ISIS is funded, 

and it’s not like they’ve accomplished 10 percent of what they 

should have. It’s not like you come to us with a success story and 

say we can do 10 more. We have the largest public diplomacy effort 

in the world, and the greatest failure in the world. And we are losing to people who behead children. We should be able to do a better 

job. 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. Well, so this is a much longer conversation, sir, but the fact is that they have right now a story that is 

very attractive to disaffected Muslims in many countries around 

the world, and we don’t. And that’s a real problem. What would 

you propose that that message be? Come to the United States 

where you can’t get a visa? What exactly should the message be to 

people who find that to be a really attractive possibility——

Mr. SHERMAN. Well, first and foremost would be a review of Islamic scriptures to demonstrate how what ISIS is doing is violative 

of them. 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. Sir, the government——

Mr. SHERMAN. Giving visa to the——

Ambassador BENJAMIN [continuing]. Has done this over and over 

again and found out that when the U.S. tells Muslims what is Islamic and what is not, we fail. 

43

Mr. SHERMAN. We don’t have to do the telling. We can be beseeching those who can issue the fatwas, but we don’t have the 

background. 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. Do that, too. 

Mr. POE. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

The Chair recognizes the other gentleman from California, Mr. 

Rohrabacher. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you. With all due respect to my colleague from California, who we agree with most of the time, I 

would have to say that certainly the cooperation between our intelligence services and public diplomacy are not only strong, but expected to be strong. That’s part of their job, and I know they work 

with various people. I spent 7 years in the Reagan White House, 

and I don’t think that they’re any different now than they were 

then. There was a wide range of cooperation there with the intelligence community. So, whether or not they come up with the right 

policies or decisions, is something else again. 

Anyway, I could go into great detail for you, but I was a speech 

writer for President Reagan, and I can tell you that there was a 

great deal of resources available on how people think in that part 

of the world, and what will appeal to them, et cetera, at least during the Reagan administration. I don’t know, maybe they don’t do 

that any more. 

Mr. SHERMAN. If the gentleman will yield. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Sure. 

Mr. SHERMAN. I’ve called over there seeking information from 

people who would qualify as Islamic scholars and they’ve said, ‘‘We 

don’t hire any of those.’’

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Maybe that’s what they tell a Congressman, 

you know. Maybe they’ve got their——

Mr. SHERMAN. Well, they’re really doing a bad job, or they’re 

lying to Congress, and I’ll leave it to our witness to tell us which 

it is. 

I yield back. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. Well, thank you very much. 

I’m concerned about a couple of things. One of the things I’m 

most concerned about is that we end up using our own money, and 

our own tax dollars that have been used in the name of fighting 

this horrible threat of radical Islamic terrorism. Of course, we have 

a President, I might add, who I don’t seem to remember having 

been able to usher those words, or utter those words, radical Islamic terrorist, but I’m afraid that the money that we’ve been 

spending, that much of it has gone and ended up in the hands of 

the people who are radical Islamic terrorists. 

This Third Force that the administration insisted that we support in Syria rather than going with Assad, which is what the Russians were proposing, I understand that that Third Force now is 

proven that it’s actually now working with ISIL, and that some of 

their commanders who have been on the payroll up until 2013 are 

now engaged in activity with these terrorists. Is that correct? General, do you know, do you guys know anything about that? 

General KEANE. I have no knowledge of that. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, the Third Force just—yes, sir, go 

ahead. 

44

Mr. JOSCELYN. The most recent reports are actually that someone in the New Syrian Force, a commander who may or may not 

have been vetted to be trained, it’s not clear to me based on what 

CENTCOM is saying. CENTCOM’s storyline over the last week has 

evolved, but that a commander from this force may or may not 

have defected to al-Nusra Front, which is al-Qaeda in Syria. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Right. 

Mr. JOSCELYN. Certainly, whether or not he was vetted or not to 

provide—be directly involved in the program, he certainly provided, 

according to CENTCOM, equipment and ammunition to al-Nusra 

Front, which is al-Qaeda, which is U.S.-supplied equipment and 

supplies directly to al-Qaeda. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Right. Well, so there’s ample evidence that 

this has been going on. Maybe we haven’t proven the case yet, but 

I will just say that it—I think the idea that we should just create 

a Third Force on our own and go out there and support it with people that we don’t know, basically, because we’re creating a new 

force, I think has been a catastrophe for the stability of the Middle 

East. 

And let me ask about that. Again, why is it that you have 

Assad—I mean, during World War II, we sided with Hitler as I 

might say Putin acknowledged the other day at a speech. He said, 

‘‘Hey, you worked with us to defeat Hitler. We walked away from 

being the Soviet Union, and yet you still won’t work with us even 

in the Middle East against these radicals.’’ Why is that Assad being 

a bad guy, but knowing that he doesn’t intend to kill Americans, 

why aren’t we helping, going along with the idea of going over 

there and helping the bad guy who wants to kill people who want 

to murder Americans? That makes all the sense in the world to me. 

Maybe we should have worked with Putin and it would have been 

better off. If you want to refute that, go right ahead. 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. Mr. Rohrabacher, I would make a few arguments. First, we faced an existential struggle in World War II 

that I think made collaborating with Stalin’s Russia, an entirely 

different proposition from collaborating with a mass killer like 

Hafez al-Assad. I don’t think that our vital interests are in any 

way engaged in the region in the way that we experienced——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. You’re saying Assad is worse than Stalin. 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. World War II. No, I’m not saying—I’m 

saying it’s a different situation and, therefore, we should employ 

different standards. But I think the other thing that’s been lost 

sight of here is that were we to side with Assad, or were we to put 

a ground force into Syria to combat ISIL, we would quickly find 

ourselves without an awful lot of our allies in the Sunni Arab 

world, allies who we have long and historic relationships with, and 

who we have many differences with right now, but who we still do 

not want to fully alienate. And I would count among them Saudi 

Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, Qatar, and Kuwait. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Sure, so all of these countries like the Saudis 

who actually paid for the pilots to fly planes into our buildings on 

9/11, we’re worried about what the Saudis have to tell us. And I 

will tell you one thing. At least you know these ISIL people are 

right up front that they want to murder us. We put up with Pakistan, we put up with Saudi Arabia, and I think we are providing 

45

or giving ourselves some sort of delusion about what the real world 

is all about. And I don’t know what we’ve done to punish Saudis 

about what they did to help on 9/11, but radical Islam is our 

enemy, and the Saudis have financed it, and some of the very same 

people you’re talking about have been financing ISIL. Have they 

not? Some of the same governments you just mentioned have financed ISIL. Isn’t that correct? 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. No, I don’t believe there’s any evidence 

that any of those governments have financed ISIL. I think that 

there have been cases in which some of them have financed other 

groups that we would consider too extremist for our support——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Who then became ISIL. 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. What? 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Who then became ISIL. Anyway, it’s a very 

complicated—this is a complicated world. It’s not something that 

can be just done with slogans. I understand that, and we need all 

the guidance we can get, and all the information. The General and 

I had a good talk out in the ante room beforehand about his various ways of analyzing a situation, which I found to be very helpful, and thank you. I had to go into the backroom with—we had 

a meeting with the Japanese, a Japanese delegation I had to meet 

with. I will read your testimony and look at it. Thank you for your 

advice today. And thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. POE. I thank the gentleman. 

The Chair will recognize a member not of this committee, but 

certainly welcome to ask questions, Ms. Sheila Jackson Lee from 

Texas, for 5 minutes. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much, and to 

the ranking member. And let me thank you very much for convening a very important hearing. As a member of the Homeland 

Security Committee and Judiciary, and a former member of this 

committee, I’ve dealt with these issues quite frequently. So, I’m 

just going to raise questions based upon my following of this, and 

I raise these questions with Mr. Benjamin. And I know it’s difficult 

to maybe give a precise answer, but let me try to probe that. 

Let me just take something from speculation and news articles 

that the driving of the Syrian refugees, tragic. No one will forget 

the 3-year-old, the picture of that will remain stained in our hearts 

and our minds. Do you think there was a strategy to drive those 

refugees at the time that they were into Europe, which was not 

prepared even though the generosity of Germany was noted, to destabilize their resettlement program? I’m just going to start there, 

work my way back to Syria. Do you have any sense of how those 

refugees, the large numbers that they were, were coming into Europe at that time? 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. No, I’m afraid I don’t. I can’t say exactly 

what the trigger was. There were a number of things that happened on the ground in Syria that I think convinced Syrians that 

the situation was only going to get more dire. I don’t think that 

there was anything that was done intentionally to disrupt European affairs; although, I do think that some of the central and eastern European countries that were waystations for the refugees saw 

it in their interest to hustle them out of the country toward Austria 

and Germany as fast as they could. 

46

Ms. JACKSON LEE. My concern, and I’ll go now back to Syria. 

One, 2 years ago, many of us were supporting the Syrian American 

community, and still do in terms of if we were back one or 2 years 

ago about supporting that military that was the Syrian, I believe, 

military component that was against Assad, to provide them with 

the support systems that they needed. And, obviously, it didn’t 

come full circle for that to occur. We now find ourselves with the 

vacant space or the vacuum in which ISIS/ISIL has been able to 

take up residence, take up violence, establish a Caliphate, and to 

destroy any source of life that we possibly could have. 

Do you have a position on what I think the President has offered, 

is that Assad must go, but there is room for his leaving to be tempered, or to be, if you will, established through a process. Do you 

see any good intentions in Russia’s effort to maintain that Assad 

must stay? And, of course, now not only is there a Caliphate, but 

Russia now has seemingly an open door in Syria. It certainly has 

assets that it wants to protect, resources it wants to protect. And 

how do you see that playing out? Is Russia going to be an effective 

partner? Is Russia’s dominance of Syria going to be a detriment to 

trying to get it stabilized for the good people of Syria that I met 

when I was in Damascus and spent time there who want to come 

back and reclaim their country? 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. Well, you’ve asked a number of very good 

questions, and some of them are hard to answer. I think the short 

story here is that we do not know the full scope of President 

Putin’s designs in Syria. He has talked about putting together a coalition to fight ISIL. And I think that there are intense conversations going on as there were yesterday at the U.N. between the 

President and Putin on exactly this issue. 

I think that it is important to underscore that Russia has long 

looked at Syria as one of its very small numbers of true, reliable 

allies. And that has been true for many decades at this point, so 

it’s not entirely surprising that Russia decided to take this step to 

support this one very reliable ally. 

And I think that the President or the administration, I should 

say, is making a number of noises suggesting that there may be 

more room for discussing the long game in terms of Assad, but I 

think it’s quite clear that Russia is not going to throw him overboard any time soon. And we don’t have a lot of leverage there to 

effect that. So, that is why I said in my statement earlier, that I 

think that, ultimately, because of the crimes he’s committed, Assad 

will need to go. But I think that there’s a lot more flexibility in 

thinking about how that might happen now in Washington and 

around the world. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. The General looks like he wants to answer. 

General KEANE. May I respond to that? 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. General. 

General KEANE. That’s a very interesting question. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General KEANE. First of all, the reason why the Russians came 

is because Assad for this last year has been losing territory, particularly northern territory, and particularly in Idlib Province, 

mainly due to Jabhat al-Nusra. And, also, he’s begun to erode his 

political base in terms of the Alawites possibly thinking about 

47

somebody else. So, a 60-year relationship with Russia, former Soviet Union, over 100,000 Russians before the civil war began actually lived in that belt, that Alawite belt; a base on the Mediterranean, the only base that he has outside of Russia itself, he cannot 

in his own self-interest lose the strategic interest he has in Syria. 

It is his foothold in the Middle East, so here he comes, and he’s 

going to prop up this regime. That is the main reason he’s there, 

he’s creating a bit of another narrative. It’s about ISIS, it’s about 

propping up the regime. 

And here’s where I agree totally with President Obama in his 

U.N. speech, because what that does then, what Putin is saying is 

I am reinforcing the status quo inside Syria, and that means the 

humanitarian catastrophe that we have been watching for 4 years 

will continue because Putin is going to subsidize that regime and 

make certain it doesn’t fall. And, remember, Assad has been making war on his people for these 4 years. It’s not just barrel bombing, it’s systematic genocide, starvation in towns and neighborhoods, destroying every food factory that they can destroy, bread 

factories, canned food factories, et cetera, 62 percent of all hospitals 

he’s destroyed because that’s another way of killing people, if they 

can’t be treated, 70 percent of all ambulances, and now the use of 

chlorine gas. It’s a very methodical systematic way he’s using to 

kill his population. 

This is what Putin is underwriting, and this is the status quo 

that that President spoke about when he said, ‘‘The carnage will 

continue.’’ That, I believe, will happen, sad as that is. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you both. 

Mr. POE. The Chair thanks the witnesses and the gentlewoman; 

the Chair thanks the members, as well. 

At this point, this subcommittee hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 3:27 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

(49)

A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

50

f


96816n.eps
51

Æ


96816m.eps