Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 93A02-1710-EX-2468| May 21, 2018 Page 1 of 11

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANTS

Russell Ellis

Indianapolis, Indiana 

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEES

Robert L. Hartley

Maggie L. Smith 

Frost Brown Todd LLC

Indianapolis, Indiana 

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Michael A. Mullett and Patricia 

N. March,

Appellants-Intervenors,

v.

Duke Energy Indiana, LLC,

Nucor Steel-Indiana, Indiana 

Office of Utility Consumer 

Counselor,

Appellees (Applicant/Petitioner,

Intervenor, Statutory Party). 

May 21, 2018

Court of Appeals Case No. 

93A02- 1710-EX-2468 

Appeal from the Indiana Utility 

Regulatory Commission 

The Honorable James Atterholt, 

Commission Chair

Honorable Sarah Freeman

Honorable James Huston

Honorable Angela Weber

Honorable David Ziegner

Commissioners 

Honorable David Veleta 

Senior Administrative Law Judge

IURC Case No. 38707 FAC-113
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Bradford, Judge.

Case Summary 

[1] Appellee Duke Energy Indiana, LLC (“Duke”) and Benton County Wind Farm 

(the “Wind Farm”) entered into a contract under which Duke agreed to buy 

power from the Wind Farm. In 2013, a dispute arose after Duke failed to buy 

energy from the Wind Farm. The Wind Farm filed suit claiming that Duke 

owed it money for lost production under the parties’ contract. The parties 

eventually settled and Duke went to the Indiana Utility Regulatory 

Commission (the “Commission”) seeking to recover its costs from ratepayers. 

Appellants Michael A. Mullett and Patricia N. March (the “Appellants”) 

intervened in the proceeding and objected to Duke’s request. After a hearing on 

the matter, the Commission approved Duke’s request to recover the costs from 

its ratepayers over a twelve-month period. 

[2] Appellants now appeal arguing that the Commission’s order is contrary to law 

because the damages are “liquidated” and “hypothetical” and it amounts to 

impermissible retroactive ratemaking. Finding that substantial evidence 

supports the Commission’s order and no other error, we affirm. 

Facts and Procedural History 

[3] In 2006, Duke and the Wind Farm entered into a Renewable Wind Energy 

Power Purchase Agreement (“PPA”) in which Duke agreed to purchase a 

portion of the energy generated by the Wind Farm. After purchasing the 
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energy from the Wind Farm, Duke would immediately sell it into the 

Midcontinent Independent System Operator (“MISO”) wholesale energy 

market. The Indiana Utility Regulatory Commission (“the Commission”) 

approved the PPA in its entirety in 2006, concluding that “the terms of the 

Wind [PPA were] reasonable.” Duke App. Vol. II, p. 17. 

[4] The Commission also recognized that Duke would be incurring significant costs 

in connection with the PPA. Consequently, in order to further the 

Commission’s policy of encouraging the development of renewable resources, 

the Commission authorized Duke to recover all of its PPA costs from 

ratepayers for the entire twenty-year term: 

[T]he Commission finds that Duke Energy Indiana should be 

authorized to recover the Wind [PPA] costs provided for in the 

contract for the full 20 year term of that contract[.]

Duke App. Vol. II, p. 19.

[5] Following changes to certain rules and regulations in 2013, a dispute arose 

regarding the extent of Duke’s contractual obligations to the Wind Farm. Duke 

believed that based upon the parties’ contract, it was only required to accept 

and pay for energy that the Wind Farm generated and delivered to Duke. The 

Wind Farm, however, interpreted the contract to mean that Duke had to pay 

for lost production in addition to the power it delivered to Duke. 

[6] The Wind Farm sued Duke in federal court to resolve the disputed contract 

interpretation. The federal district court agreed with Duke’s interpretation and 
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granted Duke’s motion for summary judgement in 2015. The Wind Farm 

appealed to the Seventh Circuit, which agreed with the Wind Farm’s 

interpretation, reversed the district court’s ruling, and remanded with 

instructions for a determination of damages, i.e. how much Duke owed the 

Wind Farm for lost production. 

[7] The Wind Farm and Duke entered into settlement negotiations. At the 

conclusion of the settlement negotiations, the parties agreed on $29 million, 

which Duke believed was approximately equal to what it would have cost Duke 

and its ratepayers had the parties agreed with the Wind Farm’s contact 

interpretation at the outset. 

[8] Duke reported to the Commission in its Fuel Cost Adjustment (“FAC”) filing 

on July 27, 2017, that the dispute between Duke and the Wind Farm had 

settled.

1

 In its report, Duke also indicated its intention to recover the lost 

production costs from ratepayers over a six-month period.

2

 The Office of 

Utility Consumer Counselor (the “OUCC”) had no objection to Duke’s 

recovery of the $29 million as costs Duke incurred under the PPA, but 

requested that the recovery be spread over a twelve-month period rather than 

the six-month period Duke had proposed. Duke agreed to spreading the 

recovery out over a twelve-month period. On September 21, 2017, Duke filed 

 

1 Duke kept the Commission updated on the status of the dispute throughout the litigation and settlement 

process with quarterly FAC filings. 

2 Duke had repeatedly indicated that this was a possibility in its previous sixteen filings with the Commission. 
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its Proposed Form of Order in which it proposed to recover the $29 million 

through rates over a twelve-month period. 

[9] Meanwhile, Appellants intervened in this proceeding as ratepayers and filed a 

Brief in Opposition to Approval of Liquidated Damages Payment as an 

Expense Recoverable through Rates as their legal objection to Duke’s Proposed 

Order. Thereafter, Duke filed its Response to Appellant’s Brief in Opposition. 

On September 27, 2017, the Commission entered its final order approving 

proposed Duke’s rate recovery over a twelve-month period. 

Discussion and Decision

[10] The Indiana Utility Regulatory Commission was created by the General 

Assembly “primarily as a fact-finding body with the technical expertise to 

administer the regulatory scheme devised by the legislature.” Ind. Gas Co. v. 

Ind. Fin. Auth., 999 N.E.2d 63, 65 (Ind. 2013) (internal quotation removed). 

The Commission’s “goal is to ensure that public utilities provide constant, 

reliable, and efficient service to the citizens of Indiana.” Citizens Action Coalition 

of Ind., Inc. V. S. Ind. Gas and Elec. Co., 70 N.E.3d 429, 438 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017). 

An order issued by the Commission is presumed valid unless the contrary is 

clearly apparent. Id. 

[11] The standard for our review of decisions of the Commission is governed by 

Indiana Code section 8-1-3-1, which the Indiana Supreme Court has interpreted 

as providing a tiered standard of review. 
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A multiple-tier standard of review is applicable to the IURC’s 

orders. A court on review must inquire whether specific findings 

exist as to all factual determinations material to the ultimate 

conclusions; whether substantial evidence within the record as a 

whole supports the findings of fact; and whether the decision, 

ruling, or order is contrary to law.

Citizens Action Coal. of Ind., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Co. of Ind., 612 N.E.2d 199, 201 (Ind.

Ct. App. 1993) (citations omitted). In applying this standard, “[w]e review the 

conclusions of ultimate facts, or mixed questions of fact and law, for their 

reasonableness, with greater deference to matters within the [Commission’s] 

expertise and jurisdiction.” Citizens Action Coal. of Ind., Inc. v. Duke Energy Ind., 

Inc., 16 N.E.3d 449, 457 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). Additionally, “[w]e neither 

reweigh the evidence nor asses the credibility of witnesses and consider only the 

evidence most favorable to the [Commission’s] findings.” Ind. Gas Co., Inc. v. 

Ind. Fin. Auth., 999 N.E.2d 63, 66 (Ind. 2013). “On matters within its 

jurisdiction, the [Commission] enjoys wide discretion and its findings and 

decision will not be lightly overridden simply because we might reach a 

different decision on the same evidence.” Citizens Action Coal. of Ind., Inc. v. S. 

Ind. Gas & Elec. Co., 70 N.E.3d 429, 439 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017). 

I. Recovery from Ratepayers

[12] Appellants make several arguments as to why the Commission’s order is 

contrary to law which we have consolidated and restated. First, Appellants 

argue that the Commission’s order was contrary to law because the damages 

were “liquidated” and “hypothetical.” Appellants also argue that the 
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Commission acted contrary to law when it approved Duke’s recovery from 

ratepayers because it amounts to impermissible retroactive ratemaking. 

A. Liquidated “Hypothetical” Damages 

[13] The Commission approved the PPA between Duke and the Wind Farm in its 

entirety in 2006. The PPA detailed, among other things, procedures for the sale 

and purchase of energy and a calculation of damages if Duke failed to purchase 

energy from the Wind Farm. The Commission also approved full recovery 

from ratepayers of all costs that Duke incurred from the PPA over its entire 

twenty-year term. 

[14] In early 2013, after Duke failed to purchase energy from the Wind Farm, it 

became apparent that the two parties differed on their interpretations of the 

contract. This disagreement over whether Duke owed the Wind Farm for lost 

production led to the Wind Farm filing suit in federal court. During the course 

of the litigation, Duke kept the Commission updated in each of its quarterly

FAC filings. Duke also was clear that when the dispute was resolved, it would 

seek to recover from ratepayers any amount that Duke eventually paid to the 

Wind Farm.

[15] Once the dispute settled, Duke reported in a FAC filing on July 27, 2017, that 

the dispute had been resolved and it now sought to recover the costs it incurred 

under the PPA. The Commission was presented with evidence that the 

“settlement amount is no more than customers would have paid had a different 

offer been submitted to MISO from March 2013 through June 2017, and is less
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than what potentially could have been awarded has a settlement not been 

reached.” Appellants’ App. Vol. II, p. 13. The Commission subsequently 

found that “[t]he evidence of record demonstrates that the [Wind Farm] 

settlement is in the best interest of customers and the costs are reasonable for 

what is owed to [the Wind Farm] under the Commission-approved [PPA]”. 

Appellants’ App. Vol. II, p. 13. Due to the fact that the lost production costs 

arose from the PPA, the Commission found that Duke was permitted to recover 

the $29 million from its ratepayers.

[16] As for the term “liquidated damages,” Appellants have not cited to any cases to 

support the proposition that the term “liquidated damages” in a contract

precludes Duke’s recovery from ratepayers. Furthermore, there is no authority 

to support Appellants’ claim that the damages amount is purely hypothetical 

and therefore unrecoverable from ratepayers. 

[17] The Seventh Circuit found that Duke was obligated under the PPA to “pay for 

power not taken.” Benton Cty. Wind Farm LLC v. Duke Energy Ind., Inc., 843 

F.3d 298, 303 (7th Cir. 2016). The parties reached a “settlement amount [that] 

is no more than customers would have had had a different offer been submitted 

to MISO from March 2013 through June 2017, and is less than what potentially 

could have been awarded had a settlement not been reached.” Appellants’

App. Vol. II, p. 13. The Commission subsequently found that the “7th Circuit 

decision interpreting the terms of the contract does not affect our previous 

approval of this contract.” Appellants’ App. Vol. II, p. 13. 
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[18] The evidence of record demonstrates that the “[Wind Farm] settlement is in the 

best interest of customers and the costs are reasonable for what is owed to [the 

Wind Farm] under the Commission-approved [PPA].” Appellants’ App. Vol. 

II, p. 13. There is also evidence in the record that the OUCC—which 

represents ratepayers, consumers, and members of the general public—

appeared and had no objection to the proposed recovery except that it be spread 

out over a twelve-month period. Specifically, the representative for the OUCC 

testified that “the Commission has approved longer recovery times for similar 

settlements as an acceptable way to recover these costs while mitigating the 

impact on ratepayers.” Appellants’ App. Vol. II, p. 121. The Commission was

also presented with evidence from Duke’s Director of Fuels & Systems 

Optimization that the amount paid in the settlement is materially equivalent to 

what the ratepayers would have paid had Duke agreed with the Wind Farm’s 

interpretation of the PPA at the outset. The evidence in the record readily 

supports the Commission’s decision to authorize Duke’s recovery from

ratepayers. 

B. Retroactive Ratemaking 

[19] Appellants also argue that the Commission’s order is contrary to law because

allowing Duke to recover the costs amounts to impermissible retroactive 

ratemaking. The fact that the damages arose from a past dispute regarding a 

contract interpretation does not automatically make the Commission’s order 

contrary to law. This appeal arose out of an FAC proceeding, not a rate case. 

Similar to a Gas Cost Adjustment proceeding, the prohibition against 
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retroactive ratemaking does not apply because, in both, the rates that are set are 

subject to subsequent reconciliation after historical costs have become known. 

See Ind. Gas Co., Inc. v. Office of Utility Consumer Counselor, 575 N.E.2d 1044 (Ind. 

Ct. App. 1991). 

[20] Moreover, the Commission’s decision is consistent with its decisions in similar 

disputes involving Indianapolis Power and Light (“IPL”) and Northern Indiana 

Public Service Company (“NIPSCO”). In both proceedings, IPL and NIPSCO 

were involved in disputes regarding their wind farm power purchase agreements 

and were seeking to recover lost production costs from ratepayers. Based on 

how these proceedings were handled by the Commission, it appears that the 

Commission prefers that utilities defer seeking recovery from their ratepayers 

until the dispute is resolved and the full amount is known. 

[21] In accordance with the Commission’s clear preference to defer payment until a 

dispute is settled, Duke kept the Commission updated throughout the course of 

the litigation. Specifically, Duke consistently advised the Commission and the 

parties throughout the litigation and settlement process that future 

reconciliation by Duke to recover the costs may be necessary.3 When the cost 

incurred became known and the dispute was resolved, Duke provided the 

Commission with the new information in an FAC filing. 

 

3 Duke repeatedly indicated in sixteen filings (FAC-97–FAC-112) that it would seek to recover costs under 

the PPA. 
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[22] After reviewing the record, there is no indication that any of the parties or the 

Commission thought Duke would be forfeiting its right to recover the deferred 

costs in a future FAC proceeding nor is there any evidence that this deferral was 

improper. In fact, based on proceedings with other utilities, it appears that 

Duke acted in accordance with the Commission’s preferences for such matters. 

The Commission has the expertise to analyze and weigh the evidence in this 

case, and, after our review of the record, we conclude that there is substantial 

evidence support its decision to approve Duke’s recovery from ratepayers. 

[23] The judgment of the Commission is affirmed. 

Baker, J., and Kirsch, J., concur.