*Effective March 31, 1995, the functions of the Secretary

of Health and Human Services in social security cases

were transferred to the Commissioner of Social Security.

Pub. L. No. 103-296. Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 43(c),

Shirley S. Chater, Commissioner of Social Security, is

substituted as the appellee in this action. Although we

have substituted the Commissioner in the caption, in the

text we continue to refer to the Secretary of Health and

Human Services because she was the appropriate party at

the time of the underlying decision.

 1The Honorable Harold D. Vietor, United States District Judge

for the Southern District of Iowa.

___________

No. 95-1111

___________

Colleen R. Hayes, *

*

 Plaintiff - Appellant, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Southern District of Iowa.

Shirley S. Chater, Commissioner *

of Social Security,* ** Defendant - Appellee. *

___________

 Submitted: September 15, 1995

 Filed: January 8, 1996 ___________

Before BOWMAN, JOHN R. GIBSON and BEAM, Circuit Judges.

___________

JOHN R. GIBSON, Circuit Judge.

Colleen R. Hayes appeals from the district court's1 judgment
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affirming the Secretary of Health and Human Services's denial of

her application for supplemental security income benefits. She

argues that the administrative law judge erred by discounting the

opinion of her treating physician. She also argues that the

district court erred in affirming the administrative law judge's

decision to deny benefits because the hypothetical question put

forth to the vocational expert did not include all of her

restrictions and impairments. We affirm.

Hayes is a fifty-three-year-old woman with a ninth grade

education who is also trained as a nurse's aide. She claims a

disability onset date of November 12, 1991, after she injured her

back lifting a patient. She also claims disability due to pain and

breathing problems.

Following the five-step analysis mandated by 20 C.F.R.

§ 404.1520 (1995), the administrative law judge found that Hayes

has "severe" impairments in that she is significantly affected in

her ability to perform basic work activities. The judge found that

Hayes had a degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine, chronic

pain syndrome, and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease. The

judge concluded, however, that Hayes did not have an impairment or

combination of impairments qualifying under the "listed

impairments." Although finding that Hayes could not perform her

past relevant work as a nurse's aide, maid, or cleaner, the judge

found the Secretary met her burden of proving that Hayes retained

the residual functional capacity to perform light exertional level

work. A vocational expert testified that Hayes could work as a

light, unskilled assembly worker, including pencil, ballpoint pen,

and toy assembler, as well as an inside security guard, and that

such positions were available in the state and national economies.

The administrative law judge found that Hayes' testimony was not

"fully credible" as to pain, and denied Hayes' disability claim.

The Secretary adopted the administrative law judge's ruling as her

final decision, and the district court affirmed. 
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We affirm the district court if the administrative law judge's

decision is supported by substantial evidence on the record as a

whole. Shannon v. Chater, 54 F.3d 484, 486 (8th Cir. 1995). "We

may not reverse merely because substantial evidence would have

supported an opposite decision." Id. (internal quotations

omitted). 

Hayes first argues that the administrative law judge's finding

of her residual functional capacity is not supported by substantial

evidence. Hayes contends that the judge failed to consider the

opinions of her treating physicians that she could not repeatedly

lift, bend, twist, or turn, and that she must take frequent breaks.

Hayes contends that her treating physician's opinion is entitled to

great deference. Thompson v. Sullivan, 957 F.2d 611, 614 (8th Cir.

1992). She contends that the hypothetical question asked to the

vocational expert did not include limitations on twisting, turning,

bending, and the need to alternate positions frequently or take

breaks, and thus, the vocational expert's testimony cannot

constitute substantial evidence that she is not disabled. Hayes

further argues that the administrative law judge's finding that

Hayes must avoid temperature extremes due to her respiratory

difficulties is inconsistent with the judge's conclusion that she

is not disabled. She argues that she would be exposed to extreme

temperatures getting to and from work, and thus, this fact

demonstrates that she is disabled.

It is true that the vocational expert testified that the

assembly and security guard jobs would require twisting "to some

extent," and repetitive lifting of no "more than a couple of

pounds." The administrative law judge found that the positions

would require occasional twisting. The medical evidence which

Hayes directs us to, however, does not establish that she is

precluded from these activities. The medical report Hayes cites

states: "[Hayes] cannot tolerate repetitive lifting, bending,

twisting or turning anymore than an occasional activity throughout
 2

The vocational expert also testified that these jobs would

allow Hayes to change positions frequently on an as-needed basis.

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the course of her work duties. . . . I would anticipate that a

weight restriction of approximately 25# is appropriate. . . ."

Thus, the report itself does not indicate that Hayes can never

twist, turn, or bend. Moreover, the doctor issued the report in

February 1989, and Hayes returned to work as a motel maid for six

months in 1991. Other evidence in the record supports the finding

that Hayes can perform light exertional level work.2 Hayes

testified that she can lift twenty to twenty-five pounds. Results

of diagnostic tests further support the finding that Hayes' back

problems are not disabling. A lumbar myelogram was normal, showing

no evidence of a herniated disc or other abnormality. 

Because we conclude there is substantial evidence that Hayes

can perform light exertional work, there is no error in the

hypothetical question posed to the vocational expert. The

hypothetical question included all of Hayes' impairments and

limitations which the administrative law judge concluded were

credible. See Montgomery v. Chater, 69 F.3d 273, 275 (8th Cir.

1995). 

Finally, we reject Hayes' argument that her pulmonary disease

entitles her to benefits. The administrative law judge found that

Hayes must avoid extremes of temperature in the workplace, but he

did not find that she could not travel to and from work. She

testified that she has trouble breathing with heat and humidity,

but that she has to be exposed to heat and humidity for half an

hour before she has trouble breathing. She also testified that she

is able to drive, and that she is able to go to the doctor and

grocery store. Thus, we must reject her argument that she is

unable to get to and from work. 

The administrative law judge's finding that Hayes is not
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disabled is supported by substantial evidence on the record as a

whole. Accordingly, we affirm.

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U. S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.