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i

iii

Strategic Studies Institute

and

U.S. Army War College Press

FROM FROZEN TIES TO STRATEGIC 

ENGAGEMENT:

U.S.-IRANIAN RELATIONSHIP IN 2030

Roman Muzalevsky

May 2015

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iv

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ISBN 1-58487-679-4
v

CONTENTS

Foreword ...................................................vii

About the Author ...................................................... xi

Summary................................................... xiii

1. Introduction: The Time Has Come ....................1

2. Forces Driving U.S.-Iranian Détente ................9

 New Administrations and the Potential 

 for Change ..................................................9

 The Bite of Sanctions as the Stimulus 

 for Negotiations .........................................14 

 Geo-economic Trends and the Merits of 

 Economic Engagement ...............................18

 Geopolitical Dynamics and Security 

 Cooperation Imperatives ............................ 23

3. U.S.-Iranian Strategic Relationship in 2030........37

 Strategic Engagement Ensues after Iran 

 Obtains Nuclear Weapons Capability ......38

 Comprehensive Cooperation Follows 

 after Parties “U”-Turn and Reach a 

 “G” Bargain .................................................41

 Incremental Strategic Engagement 

 Emerges as Sides Continue Advancing 

 Ties ...................................................... 43

 The Three Alternative Futures—Likelihood 

 and Plausibility Assessment .......................46

4. Cultivating and Preparing for 

 Strategic Change.................................................. 67

 Steering Relationships with Key Players.....67

 Enhancing Regional Economic 

 Development.................................................76 

 Adapting Regional Military Posture............82

 Advancing Regional Institutional 

 Capacity......................................................... 93 

5. Conclusion: What is Next? Prospects, 

 Vision, Steps ..................................................... 107

FOREWORD

Locked in a confrontational stance lasting more 

than 3 decades, the United States and Iran have failed 

repeatedly to transform their hostile relationship. The 

ongoing nuclear talks, however, offer better prospects of not only addressing Iran’s nuclear program 

challenges, but also developing a mutually beneficial 

strategic relationship between the United States and 

Iran in the long term. Why are these prospects better today? According to Mr. Roman Muzalevsky, the 

coming to power of new presidential administrations 

in both countries, the additional sanctions under the 

Barack Obama administration, game-changing regional trends, as well as U.S.-Iranian economic and 

security cooperation imperatives, have all facilitated 

an interim nuclear deal, prompting talks of a promising start in U.S.-Iranian ties that, if cultivated, could 

turn into a strategic détente by 2030.

In this analytically rigorous monograph, Mr. Muzalevsky, an author of numerous works on security 

and geopolitics, explains these and other geo-economic and geopolitical forces that have been driving a U.S.-

Iranian détente and presents a vision of three possible 

U.S.-Iranian strategic relationships that could emerge 

in the next decade and a half. He then provides an 

assessment of each possible outcome in terms of its 

likelihood and plausibility against domestic and international factors that either facilitate or inhibit related 

developments and outcomes, offering short- and longterm recommendations for the United States, Iran, and 

their partners to prepare for a strategic change that a 

U.S.-Iranian rapprochement would entail. The author 

envisions a strategic engagement involving a nuclear 

weapons-capable Iran; a comprehensive cooperavii
viii

tion following a “Grand Bargain”; and an incremental strategic engagement after a nuclear deal as three 

possibilities, with the latter type combining elements 

of the other two without producing “extreme” outcomes. A departure from numerous other works, Mr. 

Muzalevsky offers compelling reasons and arguments 

to engage a nuclear Iran rather than work to isolate 

it—a task necessary to prevent inadvertent conflict 

and ensure regional strategic stability in the already 

volatile region. 

The author’s emphasis on constructive U.S.-Iranian strategic engagement is a fresh and welcome effort to ponder a reformatted relationship between the 

long-standing foes in the Greater Middle East and assess likely implications of this dramatic shift on allies, 

partners, and general regional dynamics—a task that 

Mr. Muzalevsky executes masterfully by providing a 

comprehensive and visionary account of alternative 

futures and required steps to get to a positive relationship. He argues that, if achieved, a U.S.-Iranian détente would promote internal and external integration 

of the Greater Middle East, facilitating the U.S. strategy of fostering global connectivity. A détente, he says, 

would also ease regional tensions, create dynamics for 

resolution of long-standing conflicts, and stimulate 

“development and reconstruction of countries ravaged by wars and sectarian violence”—an imperative 

that could not be more urgent given the author’s characterization of the Greater Middle East as the “region 

of wars.” According to him, it would also enable the 

United States to adjust its global military posture by 

deploying some of its regional military assets to other 

parts of the world to address other challenges, while 

repurposing remaining forces to tackle newly emerging and future threats in the Greater Middle East itself. 
The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer 

Mr. Muzalevsky’s work for analysts and policymakers interested in U.S.-Iranian relations, challenges 

posed by nuclear weapons and their proliferation, as 

well as the future of the Greater Middle East and U.S. 

global power.

 

 

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

Director

 Strategic Studies Institute and

 U.S. Army War College Press

ix

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

ROMAN MUZALEVSKY works for iJet International 

Inc., performing research, reporting, and analysis of 

global, regional, and national security affairs, risks, 

and trends, as well as providing incident response and 

crisis management services. He is also a Contributing 

Analyst on Eurasian Affairs and Security at Jamestown Foundation. Previously, he worked for CSM 

Solutions Inc., National Democratic Institute, DFID 

Public Finance Reform Project, Central Asia-Caucasus 

Institute, security consultancy Wikistrat, and global 

strategy advisory consultancy Krull Corp. in the United States and Central Asia. He conducted research on 

security issues in the post-Soviet space at the Center 

for Political and Military Analysis at Hudson Institute 

as part of the George F. Jewett Foundation Fellowship 

Award for Projects on the Study and Practice of Grand 

Strategies. Mr. Muzalevsky has authored dozens of 

articles on Eurasian and global affairs, geopolitics, 

security, and strategic trends. In 2013, he authored 

a monograph, titled, Central Asia’s Shrinking Connectivity Gap: Implications for U.S. Strategy, published by 

the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War 

College. He received his M.A. in international affairs 

with concentration in security and strategy studies 

from Yale University and has a diploma in international affairs from the International Ataturk Ala-Too 

University in Kyrgyzstan, Central Asia.

xi

xiii

SUMMARY

The ongoing nuclear talks between Iran and P5+1 

following the most stringent sanctions against Iran to 

date have opened new prospects for relaxation of tensions between Tehran and the West, and for a U.S.-Iranian détente in the long run. The coming to power of 

new presidential administrations in both the United 

States and Iran, the additional sanctions, sweeping 

geo-economic and geopolitical trends, and U.S.-Iranian cooperation imperatives all contributed to these 

dynamics. Some now view the negotiations as a new 

beginning in U.S.-Iranian ties, which could herald the 

emergence of a U.S.-Iranian strategic relationship in 

the next 15 years. 

This monograph, written in late-2014, develops 

and examines three possible strategic relationships 

between Iran and the United States that could emerge 

by 2030: 1) strategic engagement involving a nuclear 

weapons-capable Iran; 2) comprehensive cooperation following a “Grand Bargain”; and, 3) incremental 

strategic engagement after a nuclear deal. These relationships deliberately focus on constructive engagement, skipping the status quo and a strike on Iran as 

other possible outcomes. While it does not identify the 

winner, this monograph assesses the plausibility and 

likelihood of each relationship emerging and recommends policies to cultivate and prepare the United 

States, Iran, and their partners for a strategic change.

A resulting U.S.-Iranian relationship would probably rest on common policies on select issues rather 

than look like a full-blown strategic partnership, which 

is unlikely in the next 15 years as the parties need to 

rebuild trust and realign policies with their allies and 

partners. Such a relationship would thus likely rest 
xiv

on the principle and practice of selective engagement, 

but with an understanding and direction to a more 

full-fledged strategic relationship in the longer term. 

If accomplished by 2030, a U.S.-Iranian détente

would advance external integration of the Greater 

Middle East, aiding the U.S. strategy of fostering 

global connectivity. It would promote relaxation of 

tensions, resolution of conflicts, and development 

and reconstruction of countries ravaged by wars and 

sectarian violence. It would also enable the United 

States to deploy select regional military assets to other 

locales, such as Asia and Europe, to deal with other 

challenges while repurposing its remaining assets to 

address new threats in the Greater Middle East.

1

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION:

THE TIME HAS COME

Roman Muzalevsky

We remain a young nation, but in the words of Scripture, the time has come to set aside childish things.

 Barack Obama, January 20, 2009.1

The nuclear talks between Iran and P5+1 (the five 

United Nations [UN] Security Council nuclear powers: the United States, Britain, France, Russia, and 

China, plus Germany) over Tehran’s controversial nuclear program following the most stringent sanctions 

against Iran to date have opened new prospects for 

relaxation of tensions between Tehran and the West 

and for a U.S.-Iranian détente in the long run. The 

coming to power of new presidential administrations 

in both the United States and Iran, the additional sanctions, sweeping geo-economic and geopolitical trends, 

as well as U.S.-Iranian economic and security cooperation imperatives, all contributed to these positive 

dynamics.

The change of two consecutive presidential administrations in the United States and Iran in 2008 

and 2013, respectively, facilitated the conclusion of an 

“interim nuclear deal” in 2013, which the parties extended twice in 2014, agreeing to reach a final accord 

by June 1, 2015. This became possible after the election 

and reelection of Barack Obama as U.S. President in 

2008 and 2012, which ushered in an era of a less assertive U.S. foreign policy, with the new administration 

emphasizing diplomacy and engagement with the 
2

world. This posture has coincided with Washington’s 

diminishing global influence amid the rise of new 

power centers and enormous fiscal challenges that 

have undermined the U.S. global role. This posture 

has forced U.S. leadership to focus more on domestic 

concerns following years of failing U.S. war efforts in 

Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as diplomacy and engagement on global issues in an effort to reverse its 

declining global influence. 

Meanwhile, severe economic challenges and proreform “Green Movement” protests have forced the 

Iranian leadership to loosen its grip, facilitating the 

emergence of more moderate forces calling for engagement—not estrangement—with the world. The 

additional sanctions imposed on Iran by Washington and its partners in 2012 aggravated the already 

weakened Iranian economy, encouraging Tehran to 

switch tactics, if not yet strategy, and engage with 

the P5+1 as part of the nuclear negotiations in 2013 

rather than continue on an isolationist course. The additional sanctions caused a significant decline in oil 

exports, reduced government revenues, contributed 

to depreciation of local currency, and exacerbated 

socio-economic challenges. The defeat of conservative 

President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who had served 

two consecutive terms, and the election as president in 

June 2013 of Hassan Rouhani, a moderate cleric who 

had once served as Iran’s chief nuclear negotiator, has 

created more room for domestic and foreign policy 

changes in these conditions, including as they concern 

the nuclear talks. Already in November, Iran and the 

P5+1 powers struck the “interim nuclear deal,” agreeing to remove sanctions and bring billions of dollars 

in sanctions relief to Iran in return for Tehran freezing 

or rolling back elements of its nuclear program and 
3

committing to reach a “comprehensive solution” by 

mutually agreed deadlines. This has allowed Tehran 

to alleviate its economic problems while leaving a 

door open for resolution of its grievances as part of 

the ongoing and future talks with the major powers. 

Meanwhile, a series of geo-economic and geopolitical trends and cooperation imperatives have been 

driving a U.S.-Iranian détente in the long run. Iran has 

one of the world’s largest concentrations of oil and 

gas resources and serves as a bridge for the emerging 

transcontinental network of energy, trade, and transit links serving markets throughout Eurasia. It has a 

very young and dynamic labor pool, as well as large 

economic sectors suffering from the lack of foreign 

direct investment (FDI) and modernization. It further 

displays an untapped trade capacity with the West 

and could serve as a source of reconstruction and 

development assistance to war-torn countries in the 

Greater Middle East. This is a prospect that the United 

States should exploit as it seeks to enhance global connectivity and contribute to the development and stability of Eurasia, which is reconnecting at a rapid pace 

due to the rise of India, China, Russia, and Turkey, 

among other actors. Washington should ensure it is in 

a position to shape this historic process by leveraging 

the geo-economic and geostrategic position of Iran, 

which borders conflict-stricken parts of the greater 

region requiring development and integration into 

the global economic order. In this context, the rise of 

the United States as a global energy player, Iran’s role 

as an energy producer and transit state, and potential 

U.S.-Iranian economic cooperation have far-reaching 

implications for global development, geopolitics, and 

a U.S.-Iranian strategic relationship. 
4

The geo-economic trends and merits of U.S.-Iranian economic engagement complement the importance 

and sweep of geopolitical dynamics and U.S.-Iranian 

security cooperation imperatives. The raging civil 

and proxy wars throughout the Greater Middle East 

and developments stemming from the Arab Spring 

have altered the geopolitical landscape of the region, 

prompting Washington and Iran to consider engagement as part of the talks and even ponder possible 

cooperation on select regional challenges as they seek 

to bring stability to the region. While Iran’s regional 

position has strengthened vis-à-vis the United States 

following the toppling of the Taliban in Afghanistan 

and Saddam Hussein in Iraq, Iran has proven unable 

to force game-changing outcomes. By the same token, 

the United States, while still the most formidable military power, is no longer in a position to force regional 

dynamics without substantially damaging its already 

weakened regional standing. Neither Iran, nor Washington today is able to address effectively—certainly 

not alone—the numerous security challenges emanating from Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Syria, Lebanon, 

and Yemen, among other states. These countries are 

experiencing civil wars and sectarian violence threatening their disintegration, with the struggle between 

Shia and Sunni factions backed by rivals Iran and 

Saudi Arabia respectively assuming alarming dimensions. The persistent conflict between secularist and 

Islamist forces and the emergence of the Islamic State 

(IS), which has conquered parts of Iraq and Syria after 

waging both unconventional and traditional warfare, 

has undermined further the already fragile regional 

security order and raised concerns about the future of 

the entire region. 
5

In these conditions, Iran and the United States 

need each other to address common economic and 

security challenges, and many view the nuclear talks 

as the start of a new chapter in the more than 3 decades of estranged relations between the two countries. A thawing in U.S.-Iranian ties could herald the 

emergence of a U.S.-Iranian strategic engagement in 

the next 15 years, which would change fundamentally 

global and regional dynamics, with major implications for the U.S. global military posture and regional 

stability. As the United States and Iran continue on the 

presumed trajectory of gradually improving relations, 

Washington and its allies should be prepared for this 

dramatic shift, regardless of whether or not Iran “goes 

nuclear.” No one knows when or if this shift would 

occur, or what a U.S.-Iranian strategic détente might 

look like. From a U.S. perspective, it would ideally 

rest—among other attributes—on U.S. cooperation 

with an Iran that: 

• does not possess or seek nuclear weapons; 

• does not engage in terrorism targeting the 

United States and its allies; 

• does not pursue policies hostile to Washington 

and its allies; 

• does not menace Israel; and, 

• supports U.S. policies pursuing the development and integration of the Greater Middle 

East into the global economy and rules-based 

regimes. 

From Iran’s standpoint, such a relationship would 

ideally rest—among other considerations—on cooperation with Washington that: 

• acknowledges Iran’s right to pursue nuclear 

power for civilian purposes; 

• renounces regime change as a policy; 
6

• stops supporting proxies of Iran’s perceived 

regional enemies; 

• removes sanctions and releases frozen assets; 

• assists Iran with modernization and integration 

into the global economy; 

• recognizes Iran’s interests and status as a rising 

regional power; and, 

• makes pertinent changes to its military posture 

in terms of capabilities and intent. 

This work has developed three types of a U.S.-

Iranian strategic relationship and dynamics that could 

emerge by 2030: 

1. strategic engagement involving a nuclear weapons-capable Iran; 

2. comprehensive cooperation following a “Grand 

Bargain”; and, 

3. incremental strategic engagement after a 

nuclear deal. 

The parties get to the first dynamic after Iran stalls 

for time, improves ties with the United States on a 

limited level, and then admits to having a nuclear 

weapons capability, which probably would prompt 

a more substantive engagement between Tehran and 

Washington that seeks to maintain strategic stability 

while cooperating on other issues of mutual concern. 

The sides achieve the second dynamic after they make 

a “U” turn and reach a “Grand Bargain,” leading to 

comprehensive cooperation. They arrive at the third 

dynamic after addressing Iran’s nuclear program 

issues, reaping the benefits of an incremental, yet 

increasingly strategic, engagement as they tackle security challenges together and in concert with other 

actors. These types of a strategic relationship and 

related dynamics—while overlapping—deliberately 
7

focus on a constructive U.S.-Iranian engagement regardless of whether Iran gets the “nukes,” skipping 

a prevalent discussion on two other possibilities: the 

status quo, which would continue to entrench the 

hostile relationship; and a U.S., Israeli, or U.S.-Israeli 

strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities, which would lead to 

systemic perturbation in the region.

While it does not identify the winner, this monograph assesses the plausibility and likelihood of each 

relationship emerging and provides policy recommendations to cultivate and prepare the United States, 

Iran, and their partners for a strategic change due to 

a comprehensive nuclear deal and the likely emergence of a strategic relationship between Iran and the 

United States by 2030. A resulting strategic relationship would probably rest on common policies on select issues rather than look like a full-blown strategic 

partnership, which is unlikely in the next 15 years as 

the parties need to rebuild trust and adjust or realign 

policies with their allies and partners. Such a relationship would likely rest on the principle and practice of 

selective engagement, but with an understanding and 

direction to a more full-fledged strategic relationship 

in the longer term. Even if the parties achieve a “Grand 

Bargain,” they would need time to translate the vision 

into action, making the incremental and selective strategic engagement a more likely scenario. The challenge 

of improving Iranian-Israeli and the Iranian-Saudi Arabic relations would demand utmost creativity on the 

parts of Washington, Tel-Aviv, Riyadh, and Tehran. 

While Israel and Saudi Arabia would be pressured to 

seek accommodation with Iran following a nuclear 

deal or amid a strategic détente between the United 

States and Iran, they would proceed gradually given 

their fundamental disagreements over status, power, 

and security issues in the broader region. 
8

If accomplished by 2030, a U.S.-Iranian strategic 

détente would generate positive developments in 

the greater region, even if Iran eventually acquires 

nuclear weapons capability—not an ideal but potentially manageable outcome. In the economic realm, 

it would advance modernization and integration of 

Iran’s outdated economy into regional and global networks, with pertinent implications for liberalization 

of Iran’s domestic and foreign policy in the long run. 

It would enable Central and South Asian states to expand their own external integration, aiding the U.S. 

strategy of fostering global connectivity in the process. It would also promote development and reconstruction of countries ravaged by wars and sectarian 

violence. In the security realm, it would advance security cooperation mechanisms, relaxation of tensions, 

and resolution of long-standing conflicts, contributing 

to regional stability. It would also facilitate the U.S. 

military policy of protecting allies and sea lanes along 

the greater region’s perimeter, enabling it to devote 

some of its regional military assets to other locales to 

deal with other challenges, as in Asia and Central and 

Eastern Europe, as well as to repurpose its remaining 

forces to address new threats in the same region. It 

would allow Washington, Iran, and their partners to 

more effectively tackle existing and emerging challenges in the Greater Middle East.

The time to engage Iran has come, and it should 

not raise the fear of desertion or “Armageddon.”

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 1

1. Quoted in Dana H. Allin and Steven Simon, The Sixth Crisis: 

Iran, Israel, America, and the Rumors of War, Oxford, UK: Oxford 

University Press, 2010, p. 133.
9

CHAPTER 2

FORCES DRIVING U.S.-IRANIAN DÉTENTE

A problem is solved when it gets tougher.

 An Arab proverb.1

NEW ADMINISTRATIONS AND THE 

POTENTIAL FOR CHANGE 

When Barack Obama assumed the U.S. presidency 

in 2009, he emphasized engagement with the world, 

especially Muslim countries, that continue pointing 

to the devastating consequences of U.S. policies that 

have allegedly brought wars and misery rather than 

democracy and prosperity. The change in U.S. foreign 

policy rhetoric from one of assertion to one of humility was a major boost to deadlocked talks between 

Iran and the P5+1 (the United States, Britain, France, 

Russia, and China, plus Germany), with the Obama 

administration undertaking engagement with Iran in 

order to seal a nuclear deal and to lay the foundation 

for improvement of their estranged ties in the long 

run. Importantly, the change in U.S. foreign policy approach signaled the need for the United States to “restore balance in domestic and international politics” 

and “shift focus to the home front” after costly wars 

of the previous administration, the effect of the global 

financial crisis, and a looming age of austerity due to 

U.S. mushrooming federal debt.2 Like Obama, Iran’s 

new president, moderate cleric Hassan Rouhani, has 

sought to tilt the balance between domestic and foreign policy by pursuing policy changes in Iran’s relations with the world amid debilitating economic sanctions, severe socio-economic challenges, and popular 

frustrations with the regime. 
10

While it signaled Washington’s willingness to 

change course, the U.S. outreach to Iran during 

Obama’s first term yielded no substantial progress, 

constrained as it was by policy inertia from the George 

W. Bush administration’s stance centered on isolation 

of Iran, regime change, and willingness to engage 

Tehran in negotiations only if it agreed to halt uranium enrichment. The new administration was further 

constrained by:

• resistance from the U.S. Congress, which has 

emphasized punitive measures against Iran3

and displayed a pro-Israel position that Iran 

should either halt uranium enrichment or face 

comprehensive sanctions and a potential military attack; 

• the pro-Israel and the pro-Arab lobby groups,4

which have resisted U.S. initiatives advancing 

negotiations with Iran without substantial and 

verifiable concessions from Tehran; and 

• a stance by Principalists in Iran led by the conservative former President Ahmadinejad (with 

the conservative cleric and Supreme Leader 

Ayatollah Khamenei playing a mediating role 

between the Principalists and Reformers), 

who occasionally rebuffed U.S. engagement attempts, citing Washington’s lack of respect. 

The lack of understanding in Washington of diverging views of different power centers in Iran, and 

Iran’s lack of understanding of divergent stances by 

the legislative and executive branches of the U.S. Government, have impeded engagement further, raising 

suspicions of “good cop, bad cop” games.5

This is not to obscure the active role of the pro-Iran 

lobby in prompting Washington to pursue the talks.6
11

Iran itself reached out to the U.S. administration seeking negotiations multiple times, but the forces of resistance were too strong and circumstances of outreach were perceived as too unfavorable.7

 However, 

the 2005 election and re-election of Ahmadinejad for 

the second term as president in 2009, the associated 

consolidation of power by Principalists, and the subsequent crackdown by the regime in Tehran against 

“Green Movement” supporters protesting electoral 

fraud—all worked against progress in the talks and 

engagement.8 By 2009, the lack of progress prompted 

Washington to emphasize its “two track strategy” by 

applying additional economic pressure and offering 

sanctions relief to Iran in an effort to encourage the 

nuclear talks.9

The exit of Ahmadinejad and the coming in June 

2013 of a moderate cleric, Hassan Rouhani, Iran’s 

chief nuclear negotiator during 2003-05, opened new 

prospects for engagement in nuclear talks. Iran and 

the P5+1 concluded an “interim nuclear deal” in November 2013, extended it first in July 2014 and then in 

November 2014, agreeing to continue the talks until 

March 2015. The parties plan to reach a political framework by then and possibly continue the negotiations 

until June 2015 in order to reach a final accord. The 

“interim nuclear deal” provided anywhere between 

$U.S.7-20 billion in sanctions relief to Iran in exchange 

for Iran freezing or rolling back all elements of its 

nuclear program. Sanctions were lifted in the automobile, precious metals, and petrochemical industries. 

Iran agreed to a 5 percent enrichment cap, to eliminate 

its stockpile of 20 percent low enriched uranium, to 

limit the number of spinning centrifuges, and to allow intrusive inspections by the International Atomic 

Energy Agency (IAEA), among other conditions of 
12

the agreement. The deal mirrors Iran’s 2005 proposal 

which the Bush administration, emboldened after the 

toppling of the Taliban in Afghanistan and Saddam 

Hussein in Iraq, rejected because it enshrined Iran’s 

right to continue enriching uranium permanently. The 

interim deal, however, states that “a comprehensive 

solution would involve a mutually defined [uranium]

enrichment program with practical limits and transparency measures to ensure the peaceful nature of 

the program.”10 Washington’s willingness to adjust 

its position from “no enrichment of uranium” to “no 

nuclear bomb” has been a strong factor in prompting the moderate administration to agree to the 

“interim” deal.11

The end of two consecutive Republican presidential administrations in the United States in 2008 

and two consecutive conservative presidential administrations in Iran in 2013 created an opening for 

the pursuit of the talks. A successful progress in the 

negotiations or their conclusion through a mutually 

agreed nuclear deal presents historic opportunities 

for Obama and Rouhani to entrench their legacies and 

generate political capital for their ideological camps. 

This effort would surely confront enormous resistance 

from all quarters, at home and abroad. U.S. partners, 

especially Saudi Arabia and Israel, are extremely cautious and oppose any type of rapprochement with 

Iran that would not serve their national interests as 

they relate to Tehran’s nuclear program and Iran’s 

regional agenda. As Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin 

Netanyahu remarked, Rouhani plans to “smile all the 

way to the bomb,” highlighting a possible attempt by 

Tehran to stall for time as part of a “charm offensive” 

by the Rouhani administration.12 A full Republican 

control of the U.S. Congress following the congressio-
13

nal elections in November 2014 and the complicated 

political system in Iran, as well the gravitas of Khamenei and his allies, will continue to challenge respective 

presidential administrations and the prospects of improved U.S.-Iranian ties in the long run. A comeback 

of a new presidential administration in either country 

could set the clock back further, despite pressures on a 

new administration to continue the course of a previous one, at least in the United States.13 But the overall 

trajectory has offered prospects brighter than is generally assumed when it comes to a possible U.S.-Iranian 

strategic détente in the long run. 

Iran’s foreign policy over the past 2 decades has 

seen significant moderation, with Tehran focusing 

more on national interests than revolutionary ideology as the guiding principle and reaching détente 

with states in the European Union (EU), the Persian 

Gulf, the Caucasus, and Central and South-East Asia, 

in part as a way to compensate for its estranged relationship with the United States.14 It has restarted diplomatic relations with the United Kingdom (UK) and 

built especially strong economic and political ties with 

Turkey, Russia, and China, leading to a notable thaw 

in relations with major players since the P5+1 concluded the “interim” deal in 2013.15 Both the United 

States and Iran also have a history of cooperative policies pursued by different administrations.16 Reformist 

and moderate administrations were in place under 

former presidents Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and 

Mohammad Khatemi in Iran in the 1900s and 2000s, 

while Rouhani’s flexible approach to foreign policy 

could yet result in major changes to the dialogue that 

some pragmatists in Iran describe as “neither wine, 

nor prayer” (i.e., neither prohibited, nor obligatory).17

The current administrations in the United States and 
14

Iran thus need to sustain the momentum of cooperative dynamics and expand it institutionally into the 

next administrations. They also need to exercise patience and put a premium on long-term progress in 

the face of institutional resistance.18 As they do so, 

the issue of remaining and possible future sanctions 

will be a major challenge given their impact on Iran’s 

willingness to engage in the talks under the “interim” 

deal, and the general dynamics that might bring the 

two countries to accommodation and détente in the 

long run. 

THE BITE OF SANCTIONS AS THE STIMULUS 

FOR NEGOTIATIONS 

Under the Obama administration, the United States 

has undertaken an enhanced “dual track” approach 

toward Iran, pursuing ever-crippling sanctions and 

engagement while dropping its long-standing condition that Iran first suspend its uranium enrichment. In 

2011, it imposed sanctions on Iran’s Central Bank and 

its lifeline oil exports, arranging for additional sanctions. Whether it was the major factor prompting Iran’s 

engagement in the talks is debatable, but it certainly 

encouraged Iran to cooperate.19 As Ahmadinejad noted, the latest sanctions were “the most extensive . . .

sanctions ever” and that “this is the heaviest economic onslaught on a nation in history . . . every day, all 

our banking and trade activities and our agreements 

are being monitored and blocked.”20 Meanwhile, the 

large-scale anti-government protests in 2009, amid 

electoral fraud allegations against Ahmadinejad, provided another stimulus for engagement in the talks in 

hopes of relieving not only the economic but also the 

political pressures built up over the years. 
15

A brief review of the Iranian economy is needed 

to understand the impact of sanctions and sanctions 

relief. The Iranian economy ranks 19th in the world 

based on purchasing power parity, with its gross domestic product in 2013 estimated at $U.S.987 billion. 

The country ranks 2nd and 5th in world proven gas and 

oil reserves, making it a critical link in global energy 

balances amid the rise of new power centers and the 

search by countries for uninterrupted and diversified 

energy supplies. Iran displays a tremendous potential 

as a global, let alone regional, player. But its economic 

performance is severely constrained. Its private sector 

is highly underdeveloped, while the state-dominated 

economic sectors are inefficient and underperforming. Unemployment is at about 16 percent, with unemployment for youth between ages 15-24 at about 23 

percent. Inflation in 2013 hit a striking 42.3 percent, 

but declined to about 21 percent in 2014 following the 

election of Rouhani.21 Skilled labor and technology 

investments are severely lacking. Iran’s major export 

partners include China (22.1 percent), India (11.9 percent), Turkey (10.6 percent), South Korea (7.6 percent), 

and Japan (7.1 percent). Its major import partners are 

the United Arab Emirates (UAE) (33.2 percent), China 

(13.8 percent), Turkey (11.8 percent), and South Korea 

(7.4 percent). The sanctions reduced Iran’s oil exports 

by 50 percent (Iran’ petroleum exports constituted 80 

percent of all exports in 2013), cut government spending, and led to the depreciation of the currency by 60 

percent, causing negative economic growth in both 

2012 and 2013 for the first time in 20 years.22

The “Green Movement” anti-government protests 

in 2009 against electoral fraud underscored the precarious position of the ruling elites in Iran, even if they 

catered to the needs of a largely urbanite and middle 
16

class citizenry and failed to galvanize rural segments 

of the society—the backbone of popular support for 

the regime. Ultimately stifled, protesters voiced both 

political and economic demands, reflecting the need 

for the statist political and economic regime to engage 

in reform or face resistance, even if insubstantial.23 The 

electoral victory by Rouhani in June 2013 is therefore a 

vote of confidence by the Supreme Leader and Iranian 

people, a concession by the regime keen on avoiding 

social rifts, and a “green light” for promoting change, 

given the imperatives for reforms in domestic and 

foreign policy realms.24 Iran’s desire to conclude the 

“interim” deal is therefore not surprising, but does 

not necessarily indicate Iran’s readiness to pursue 

a greater engagement with the United States after a 

nuclear deal is achieved. Khamenei views the United 

States as the main rival, and his policy of “heroic flexibility” enabling Tehran to find a balance and compromise in domestic and foreign policies, may be a way to 

use “flexible tactics” to score political, economic, and 

military dividends in the overall contest with Washington. Khamenei stated that “nobody should believe 

that the enemies of the Islamic revolution have given 

up their enmity,” while offering hope of engagement 

stating that “the Islamic Republic will negotiate with 

the Satan on specific issues that are of interest.”25

The lifting of $U.S.7-20 billion in sanctions, including related long-term positive ripple effects on the 

economy, has demonstrated for Iran the untapped 

potential of its engagement with the world, while 

strengthening the hands of Reformers and moderates 

in Iran who have been marginalized over the last decade but have now emerged as a stronger force keen 

on winning overwhelming popular support for its incipient yet potentially “revolutionary” domestic and 
17

foreign policies. The resultant economic gains for Iran 

now and in the future could help ensure that it turns 

into an engaged, not estranged, power that is willing to assuage the security concerns of its neighbors 

while reaping the economic benefits of its increasingly 

global engagement. This is especially important because sanctions imposed on Iran in recent years have 

shifted its trade with largely market economies to its 

trade with largely authoritarian states.26 On the other 

hand, the sanctions relief could help bring Iran closer 

to nuclear weapons if, following the “interim” and a 

final nuclear deal, it continues to or starts pursuing a 

nuclear weapons capability in secrecy and under the 

cover of ever-expanding economic relations with P5+1 

and other actors.27

Just as Obama did, Rouhani has positioned himself as a president keen on bringing change. But, like 

Obama, Rouhani is yet to confront a full spectrum of 

resistance from foreign and domestic circles to his initiatives, making it imperative for the Obama administration to solidify its position in the ongoing negotiations and achieve the sought-after outcomes sooner 

rather than later. Arguably, similar logic should dictate the approach of Rouhani’s administration, which 

has a chance to strengthen its position in Iran’s domestic politics and amplify the voice of Reformers. A 

failure to conclude a deal could result in harsher sanctions yet, or worse—an attack on Iran. This would be a 

disaster and a lost opportunity, considering the merits 

of economic and security cooperation between Washington and Tehran on a broad range of global and 

regional issues, which have been driving a long-term 

U.S-Iranian détente for years, despite strong obstacles.
18

GEO-ECONOMIC TRENDS AND THE MERITS 

OF ECONOMIC ENGAGEMENT 

Geo-economic trends unfolding in the Greater 

Middle East, and concerning the United States, make 

the merits of U.S.-Iranian economic engagement all 

too clear. An economic engagement between the two 

countries would advance the regional and global economic integration and help Iran modernize and integrate its economy with global networks. Importantly, 

it would help address global and regional energy security needs, promoting a diversified uninterrupted, 

and secure supply of energy sources to global markets, while contributing to global economic growth. 

A fuller integration of Iran into the global economic architecture would have a transformative impact 

on Iran and the U.S.-Iranian strategic relationship. It 

would also spur a faster, already ongoing integration 

of the landlocked but energy-rich Central Asia and energy-poor South Asia into the global economic system. 

Currently, energy, trade, and transit companies and 

developers shun Iran, forestalling the inter-regional 

integration of these areas on terms that Washington 

could shape were it to engage Iran. The economic and 

geopolitical benefits for the United States of integrating Iran into the continental economy are enormous. 

Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Lebanon, and other countries in 

the Middle East would have more opportunities for 

development. The Central Asian states of Kazakhstan, 

Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan 

would be relieved from geopolitical and geo-economic pressure exerted by Russia and China. Afghanistan, 

Pakistan, and India would have expanded access to 

Iran’s vast energy resources and use its geo-economic 

location to address their reconstruction, energy defi-
19

cits, and modernization needs. An economically prosperous and politically stable Greater Middle East is a 

U.S. strategic interest. 

The lifting of sanctions on Iran’s oil sector and normalization of U.S.-Iranian relations would enable Iran 

to diversify its export base from an overwhelming reliance on Asian markets, while expanding Iran’s revenue 

base to advance modernization of its underperforming economy. A 2008 study by the National Foreign 

Trade Council indicates that increased oil production 

by Iran following the removal of sanctions might have 

decreased the market price of crude oil by 10 percent 

and saved the United States billions of dollars.28 Both 

Iran and American corporations would be interested 

in bringing U.S. foreign direct investment (FDI) and 

the latest technologies to develop energy and other 

sectors of the Iranian economy. Iran’s oil sector alone 

requires at least $U.S.200 billion for upgrades and 

expansions, as well as 2.5 times more in investments 

than the country’s total annual development budget 

in order to “save” Iran’s oil infrastructure.29 A U.S.-

Iranian economic engagement would also stimulate 

more cooperative policies between Arab states and 

Iran, enabling them to coordinate more effectively oil 

production and export policies which could advance 

collaboration in other areas in the future (Saudi Arabia and Iran cooperated heavily on matters regarding 

oil production and exports in the 2000s, at least on 

the declaratory level30). This is important given recent 

energy export interruptions in Libya and the raging 

civil and proxy wars in Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, and 

Afghanistan that threaten the already complex mosaic 

of energy developments in the greater region which 

Iran’s involvement could help address. 
20

The issue of global and regional energy security 

is highly complex, defined by uninterrupted and safe 

access, exploitation, transit, and use of diverse energy 

resources by regimes ranging from authoritarian and 

democratic to theocratic and nationalistic. Iran and 

the United States—both major global energy exporters 

serving the needs of established and emerging power 

centers that are challenging patterns of resource flows 

across the planet—could work together to advance energy security cooperation in the future. A recent rise 

of the United States as a major global energy producer 

and a projected rise of Iran as a transcontinental energy bridge and exporter as part of its full-fledged global engagement are yet to impact overall on the energy 

landscapes. The development of fracking technologies 

turned the United States from an energy importer just 

years ago into one of the world’s largest energy exporters, while the lifting of sanctions on Iran and projected 

modernization of its energy sector would usher in a 

more geo-economically active role by Iran in global 

energy markets. The U.S. energy revolution, also extending into alternative energy developments, creates 

more room for maneuver, including in U.S. relations 

with Iran. The U.S. Energy Information Administration forecasts that by 2020, the United States might 

become the world’s largest oil producer, and energy 

self-sufficient by 2035.31 These prospects prompt fears 

of U.S. abandonment of its Arab Gulf Cooperation 

Council (GCC) partners.32 But Washington should not 

underestimate its energy dependence on the Persian 

Gulf, given U.S import of goods produced in Europe 

and Asia using either Iranian oil or oil passing through 

the Gulf.33 Moreover, it confronts energy security challenges facing its European and North Atlantic Treaty 

Organization (NATO) allies, which depend heavily on 
21

Russia’s energy exports. An Iran that is more friendly 

and secure can help address both challenges. 

Ranked 2nd and 4th in the world’s proven gas and 

oil reserves and an Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) member, Iran has and will 

continue to be at the forefront of great power politics, 

with traditional powers and newly emerging economic giants factoring its vast energy resources and 

transit capacity into their strategies. But this untapped 

potential could only be turned into a strategic advantage if concerned parties integrate Iran’s economy into 

global networks—a task that seems impossible without mending ties between Iran, Washington, and their 

partners. That Iran may face oil shortages already by 

2030, or run out of oil by 2020 if global oil consumption picks up (assuming Iran has less than half of the 

oil reserves it claims), adds urgency to this imperative, given the need for a more efficient energy sector 

and economic diversification in Iran to forestall the 

collapse of its economy or “adventurism” with negative consequences for regional and global stability.34

Larger exports of U.S. and Iranian oil and gas would 

help stabilize global oil prices and the more variable 

gas prices. The price of Brent crude oil, for instance, 

has fallen by almost 25 percent since mid-June 2014 

from $115 at its peak to $87 a barrel at its bottom, with 

structural factors, China’s slowdown, and stagnation 

in the EU holding back any increase in the price in 

the short term, considering also projected increases in 

oil production in North America and the hesitancy of 

OPEC to cut production.35 Iran’s oil exports in particular would stabilize price dynamics while diversifying the pool of available energy resources for EU and 

Central Asian countries, which overly depend on suppliers occasionally resorting to bullying tactics to ad-
22

vance their agendas. The United States could be more 

at ease knowing that its European partners can lessen 

their dependence on imports from Russia, which has 

used energy exports as a coercion tool in the past. Iran, 

for instance, expressed an interest as recently as 2010 

in supplying gas to the long-overdue Nabucco pipeline designed to mitigate EU dependence on Russian 

gas by allowing the EU to import more gas from the 

Middle East, the Caspian, and Central Asia.36 Russia 

itself would see more incentives to diversify its energy 

exports-dependent economy, including by pursuing 

more liberal policies that, with time, could ensure a 

more friendly foreign policy course by the Kremlin 

toward neighbors and distant partners, including the 

United States and Iran. 

The geo-economic trends and merits of U.S.-Iranian economic engagement and energy security cooperation imperatives encourage Iran and Washington 

to seek a nuclear deal and strategic engagement. The 

benefits of economic engagement would extend to the 

military realm, given the relaxation of tensions in the 

region following a nuclear agreement, allowing Iran 

and the United States to dedicate fewer military resources to protecting economic interests on sea lanes 

or land routes. As a result, Washington could use 

freed-up resources elsewhere, including in the Pacific, while Iran could focus on modernization of its 

underdeveloped economy and armed forces. (Some 

estimates indicate that Iran has been allocating merely 

25 percent of funding required to modernize and recapitalize its armed forces to the level seen under the 

Shah Muhammad Reza37). But it is the volatile geopolitical dynamics and security cooperation imperatives 

that more vividly highlight the benefits of U.S.-Iranian 

cooperation in the short term and their strategic ties in 

the long run.
23

GEOPOLITICAL DYNAMICS AND SECURITY 

COOPERATION IMPERATIVES 

Raging civil and proxy wars in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Libya, Yemen, and Afghanistan are undermining U.S. capacity to lead and sustain regional security 

orders and the global security architecture, making it 

imperative to engage key regional actors in shaping 

regional stability. This is all the more important, given the diminishing profile of the United States in the 

Greater Middle East and the growing regional influence of Iran, which enhances the need—exercised effectively by Tehran and Washington prior to the 1979 

Islamic Revolution—for regional security cooperation. 

Neither Washington nor Tehran benefits from regional insecurity, but both could gain by bringing stability to Shia-populated Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Libya, Yemen, and Afghanistan and by ensuring secure transit 

of energy resources via the Persian Gulf and Iran. To 

understand the benefits of such security cooperation 

and the stimulus it provides for reaching a U.S-Iranian 

détente, one must dissect the relative positions of the 

United States and Iran in the Greater Middle East in 

light of the “Arab Spring,” ongoing civil and proxy 

wars in the region, as well as the overall political 

and military struggle between regional Islamist and 

secularist forces. 

The “Arab Spring” and recent security developments in the Greater Middle East have caught the 

United States off guard. The Obama administration 

either did not support or was slow in supporting the 

powers-that-be, the Islamist, and secularist forces 

before, during, and after the overthrow or change of 

regimes in Tunis, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen.38 This is 

despite an arguable observation that Obama’s policy, 
24

unlike his predecessor’s, has emphasized a stake not 

just in the stability of regional countries, “but in the 

self-determination of individuals.”39

Washington chose to support the Islamists but was 

unprepared for a come-back to power by the military 

in Egypt, which has no stamina for an assertive regional role that it traditionally had exercised as a regional balancer, including vis-à-vis Iran. The United 

States drew a “red line” for the use of weapons of mass 

destruction (WMD) by the embattled Syrian regime 

of President Bashar al-Assad, but did not intervene 

after the regime crossed this line by killing approximately 1,000 people in 2012 and 2013 using chemical 

weapons. Russia’s convenient offer to arrange for the 

dismantling and transfer of the weapons out of Syria 

helped Washington save face, but the violation of its 

own commitment undermined U.S. credibility and deterrence capabilities.40 Nor did Washington prevent, 

mitigate, or respond effectively to insecurity in Libya, 

where an Islamist attack in Benghazi killed its ambassador, and rival militias continue undermining the 

formation of a unity government and stability of energy exports. It failed to respond effectively in Bahrain 

when Saudi Arabia and the UAE dispatched troops 

to suppress pro-reform Shia anti-government forces. 

Unsuccessful U.S. campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan 

and security challenges posed by IS in Iraq, Syria, and 

areas close to Turkey have further undercut the U.S. 

regional role, highlighting the need for Washington to 

seek allies to stabilize the flaring region. 

These volatile dynamics prompted some to draw 

a parallel between the diminished influence of Great 

Britain in the Middle East after World War II and the 

end of the short-lived unipolar moment of the United 

States after the Cold War, along with U.S. receding 
25

influence in the Middle East, where local actors feel 

increasingly comfortable challenging U.S. interests, 

positions, and counsel.41 Iran is one of them, poised 

to use the political awakening of regional societies to 

enhance its position, as the region’s “balance of power 

is becoming . . . a balance of influence.”42

The U.S. declining regional status is in contrast to 

the growing position of Iran, which has grown stronger following the “Arab Spring,” the U.S. toppling of 

its Taliban foe in Afghanistan in 2011, and the removal 

of a rival regime and dismantling of Saddam Hussein’s army in Iraq in 2003. As former Iranian President 

Khatami quipped: “Regardless of where the United 

States changes regimes, it is our friends who will 

come to power.”43 Iran now exploits the growing role 

of civil societies in pressuring Arab regimes, though 

the combination of its own and regional popular frustrations have also challenged the Iranian regime, just 

as domestic forces have emerged in Iran that shape 

domestic and regional narratives.44 Iran’s Islamic 

Revolutionary Guard Corps relies on the Qods Force, 

numbering 10,000-15,000, to support pro-Iranian forces in Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Lebanon, Arab GCC states, 

Gaza/West Bank, Afghanistan, South Caucasus, and 

Central Asia.45

In Iraq, Iran’s support for Shia militias has marginalized Sunni forces and led to the emergence of a 

relatively stronger pro-Iranian religious and political 

leadership in Baghdad amid frequent anti-Shia militant attacks. Iran provides Shia rebels in Iraq with 

military and technological support in the form of improvised explosive devices and explosively-formed 

penetrators.46 It also backs political forces, including 

the Dawa party and the Islamic Supreme Council of 

Iraq. In Syria, it supports Assad’s Alawite faction fi-
26

nancially and militarily, using Hezbollah and its Qods 

forces on the ground to counter rebels supported by 

Arab states and the United States. In Yemen, it supports Shia Houthi rebels whose recent takeover of the 

capital, Sana’a, has brought to the group major geopolitical gains in the battle between Sunni and Shia factions throughout the region. In Lebanon, it provides 

significant financial and military support to Hamas in 

Gaza and Hezbollah, making it an important player in 

the Arab-Israeli conflict and a key to its resolution. In 

Afghanistan, it helped Washington and the Northern 

Alliance overthrow the Taliban and is now projecting 

meaningful economic and political influence in the 

country due to proximity, common cultural heritage, 

ties to the Afghan Shia Hazara population, growing 

economic penetration (trade, transit, and construction 

industries), and political influence extending to antiand pro-Taliban Sunni factions.47 In South Caucasus, 

it actively supports Shia groups in Azerbaijan while 

expanding ties to Christian Armenia and Georgia.48 In 

a move meant to showcase its rising profile, Iran even 

sailed two war ships via the Suez Canal soon after the 

popular uprising in Egypt in 2011.49 Iran’s growing 

profile helps it cope with a perceived loss of grandeur 

since the 16th century, when Iranian empires lost 

Bahrain (1521), Baghdad (1638), the Caucasus (1828), 

western Afghanistan (1857), Baluchistan (1872), and 

areas of present-day Turkmenistan (1894).50

Iran is a geopolitically dynamic state due to its 

immense resource wealth, fervent ideology, military 

capabilities, extensive network of allies, large population, and strategic location. Rich in energy resources 

and straddling three volatile regions, it underwent 

an Islamic Revolution that replaced the monarchy 

and has struggled to reconcile democratic and Is-
27

lamic principles. It has been effectively building alliances with state and nonstate groups despite Western 

sanctions and resistance, while displaying untapped 

potential to serve as a bridge and integrator of several regions. Iran is also the largest of all countries in 

the Middle East by territory, one of the region’s most 

populous states (77.5 million; Egypt, 82 million; Turkey, 75 million; and Saudi Arabia, 29 million), and has 

one of the region’s largest armed forces and arsenals, 

although most of its weaponry is outdated.51 These aspects make it crucial for Washington and its allies to 

engage, rather than estrange, Iran. 

Despite its enhanced position, Iran is unable to 

resolve regional conflicts or advance its geopolitical goals effectively while faced with the formidable 

power of the United States and U.S. allies. Wherever it 

looks, Tehran confronts Washington in its own neighborhood and is unable to force radical outcomes in 

many of the regional conflicts and dynamics. Moreover, some of Iran’s wins are really U.S. geopolitical 

mistakes. Both the United States and Iran need each 

other to advance their positions, constrained by conflicts and increasingly autonomous policies of their 

partners and allies. Washington and Iran could gain 

a lot by cooperating to resolve regional wars and conflicts. They would also find it beneficial to cooperate 

on counterterrorism activities, which can serve as an 

initial trust-building initiative before or after the conclusion of a nuclear deal. Both fight Sunni-inspired and 

financed radicalism and terrorism, and neither wants 

to have forces deployed along Iran’s eastern and western borders, provided major security concerns are addressed and oil continues to flow unimpeded via the 

Strait of Hormuz.52
28

The emergence of IS has increased the need for 

U.S.-Iranian cooperation in fighting the militant group 

in Iraq and Syria. In June 2014 during an IS offensive, 

Iran provided Qods Force advisers, drone surveillance, and weapons transfers, as well as helped with 

reanimating Shia militias, such as the Promised Day 

Brigade, As’aib Ahl Al Haq, Kata’ib Hezbollah, and 

the Mahdi Army of Moqtada Al Sadr, to help Iraqi 

authorities.53 Iran has also been transferring arms and 

ammunition to Iraq and the Peshmerga forces fighting the IS, returned Iraqi combat aircraft to Baghdad 

flown to Iran at the start of the 1991 war in Iraq, and 

helped the United States with political transition in 

Baghdad that involved the appointment of Haider alAbadi as prime minister following a spike in sectarian 

violence partially attributed to the preceding administration led by al-Maliki.54

Washington, for its part, authorized airstrikes in 

Iraq and Syria and in November 2014 the deployment of additional 1,500 U.S. forces to Iraq, doubling 

the number of its troops training Iraqi and Kurdish 

forces. It further tasked its Air Combat Command of 

the U.S. Air Force to start an 8-year contract in October 2016 to “operate, maintain, and support Air 

Force Central Command’s major war reserve materiel facilities in Oman, Qatar, Kuwait, and the UAE.” 

The rapid advance by IS on Baghdad prompted U.S. 

Secretary of State John Kerry to note that Washington 

was “open to discussions [with Iran on Iraq] if there’s 

something constructive that can be contributed by 

Iran.”55 The United States has already lost more than 

4,000 U.S. troops in Iraq since 2003 and, along with 

costs of the war in Afghanistan, has spent $U.S.1.8 trillion.56 It cannot afford to lose the fight against old and 

new al-Qaedas. Nor can it afford the fight without the 
29

support of its allies and partners in the conditions of 

fiscal austerity, prompting the need to cooperate with 

regional payers, including Iran, in fighting the group’s 

growing capabilities.

Washington and Tehran further face the rising influence of China and India in the Greater Middle East, 

driven by their growing appetites for energy resources and geopolitical clout. While the United States is 

interested in advancing a global and regional balance 

of power, Iran is keen on diversifying its relations to 

balance its burgeoning ties with the two juggernauts, 

which are expected to project military assets into the 

region to protect their growing economic interests. A 

rapprochement would allow Washington and Tehran 

to strengthen their positions in respect to the increasingly assertive presence and policies of China and India. Along with the volatile security developments in 

the Greater Middle East, the regional trends defined 

by the growing presence of China and India—both 

dynamic powers capable of challenging regional and 

global security orders—make the strategic benefits 

of security cooperation between Iran and the United 

States particularly obvious. This is especially so given 

constraints on the U.S. military in waging a conventional war against Iran or China while engaging in 

a global struggle against terrorism and counterinsurgency wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The current 

U.S. global engagements and military constraints, 

especially as they relate to its ground forces, make it 

unrealistic for the United States to contemplate another conflict—hypothetically with Iran—if such a 

need arises.57

Washington and Tehran could collaborate in the 

framework of Arab-Israeli, Arab-Iranian, and IsraeliIranian conflicts, as well as reconstruction of war-torn 
30

countries, counterterrorism efforts, and geopolitical 

balancing. Such cooperation would have both military 

and economic dimensions—a major imperative considering persistent instability in the Greater Middle 

East and the lack of development and integration of 

the region into the global economic and security networks and institutions. The ideological hostility between Iran and the United States should not conceal 

the benefits of geopolitical cooperation or the possibility of normalized relations in the long run. History 

provides a reference point: Franklin Roosevelt allied 

the United States with Stalinist Russia and Richard 

Nixon developed a working partnership with Maoist China. In both cases, an intense ideological rivalry 

characterized the relations, but Washington chose accommodation to enhance its interests and avoid the 

deadlock.58 Khamenei’s declaration—and later a principle guiding Iran’s foreign policy—that the “revolution was exported once, and that is the end of the 

story” gives more room for such a possibility.59

ENDNOTES—CHAPTER 2

1. Ryan Crocker, William Luers, and Thomas Pickering, “How 

a U.S.-Iran Nuclear Deal Could Help Save Iraq,” The Washington 

Post, July 11, 2014.

2. Fawaz A. Gerges, “The Obama Approach to the Middle 

East: The End of America’s Moment?” International Affairs, Vol. 

89, No. 2, 2013, p. 302. Also see James Mann, The Obamians: The 

Struggle Inside the White House to Redefine American Power, New 

York: The Penguin Group, 2012, pp. 340-341.

3. Samuel J. Brannen, “Squaring the Problem: U.S. Policy 

Considerations,” Samuel J. Brannen, ed., The Turkey, Russia, Iran 

Nexus: Evolving Power Dynamics in the Middle East, the Caucasus, 

and Central Asia, Washington, DC: The Center for Strategic and 

International Studies (CSIS), November 2013, p. 38.
31

4. For discussion on lobby groups and interests, see Trita Parsi, A Single Role of the Dice: Obama’s Diplomacy with Iran, New Haven, CT, and London, UK: Yale University Press, 2012, p. 22. For 

discussion on the Israel lobby, see John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy, New York: 

Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 2008.

5. For discussion on Iran’s perspective on the issue, see Seyed 

Hossein Mousavian with Shahir Shahidsaless, Iran and the United 

States: An Insider’s View on the Failed Past and the Road to Peace, 

New York: Bloomsbury, 2014, pp. 1-5, 12.

6. Walid Phares, The Lost Spring: U.S. Policy in the Middle 

East and Catastrophes to Avoid, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 

2014, p. 178.

7. See Christopher Ferrero, “The Iran Narrative: The Ideational Context of US Foreign Policy Decision-Making toward 

the Islamic Republic of Iran,” Iran and the Caucasus, Vol. 17, 

2013, pp. 41-76.

8. For discussion on the impact of Ahamdinejad’s election 

and consolidation of power by hardliners, see Suzanne Maloney, 

Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 123, No. 3, Fall 2008, p. 542, review 

of the book by Nathan Gonzalez, Engaging Iran: The Rise of a Middle East Powerhouse and America’s Strategic Choice, Westport, CT: 

Praeger Publishers, 2007.

9. Kenneth Katzman, Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses, Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, October 1, 

2014, p. 51.

10. Matthew Kroenig, A Time to Attack: The Looming Iranian 

Nuclear Threat, New York: Palgrave McMillan, 2014, pp. 80-85.

11. Mousavian, p. 9.

12. Kroenig, p. 79.

13. Mann, pp. 336-337.
32

14. Independent Task Force Report, Iran: Time for a New Approach, New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2004, p. 18. Also 

see Thomas P. M. Barnett, The Pentagon’s New Map: Blueprint for 

Action, New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 2005, p. 99. For discussion 

on comparisons between Revolutionary France and Revolutionary Iran, see Zbigniew Brzezinski and Brent Scowcroft, America and the World: Conversations on the Future of American Foreign 

Policy, New York: Basic Books, 2008, p. 62.

15. Alireza Nader, The Days After a Deal with Iran: Continuity and Change in Iranian Foreign Policy, Santa Monica, CA: RAND 

Corporation, 2014, pp. 3-4.

16. Katzman, pp. 49-50.

17. Independent Task Force Report, p. 19.

18. Parsi, p. 240.

19. Kroenig, p. 94.

20. Gerges, p. 319.

21. Ian Bremmer, “Oil Price Plummet Won’t Help U.S. with 

Iran or Russia,” Reuters, November 11, 2014.

22. Central Intelligence Agency World FactBook, Country 

Profile: Iran, June 22, 2014. Also, see Nader, p. 5. 

23. Mousavian, pp. 232-234.

24. Katzman, pp. 12-13.

25. See Open Source Center, “Iran: Leader Outlines Guard 

Corps Role, Talks of ‘Heroic Flexibility’,” September 18, 2013. 

Also see Nader, pp. 10-11.

26. John Tirman, A New Approach to Iran: The Need for Transformative Diplomacy, Cambridge, MA: MIT Center for International 

Studies, July 2009, p. 10.

27. Kroenig, p. 89.
33

28. Dean A. DeRosa and Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Normalization of Economic Relations: Consequences for Iran’s Economy and the 

United States, Washington, DC: National Foreign Trade Council, 

2008, pp. 3-4.

29. Mousavian, p. 271.

30. Gregory Gause III, The International Relations of the Persian 

Gulf, Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 2010, p. 182.

31. See Bremmer.

32. Jon B. Alterman, “Acting and Reacting in the Middle 

East,” Craig Cohen and Josiane Gabel, eds., Global Forecast 2015: 

Crisis and Opportunity, Washington, DC: CSIS, 2014, p. 52.

33. Nori Kasting and Brandon Fite, U.S. and Iranian Strategic 

Competition: The Impact of China and Russia, Washington, DC: CSIS, 

November 28, 2012, pp. 16-17.

34. For more discussion, see Robert Bayer, The Devil We Know: 

Dealing with the New Iranian Superpower, New York: Three Rivers 

Press, 2008, pp. 143-144.

35. Stratfor, “Lower Oil Prices Carry Geopolitical Consequences,” November 3, 2014.

36. Kasting and Fite, p. 36.

37. Steven R. Ward, Immortal: A Military History of Iran and 

Its Armed Forces, Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 

2009, p. 309.

38. Walid Phares, The Lost Spring: U.S. Policy in the Middle East 

and Catastrophes to Avoid, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014, 

pp. 167-175, 185, 222.

39. Gerges, pp. 311-312.

40. Sharon Squassoni, “Why Deterrence Failed to Prevent Syrian Use of WMD,” in Cohen and Gabel, eds., pp. 14-15.
34

41. Gerges, p. 300.

42. Flynt Leverett, “The Iranian Nuclear Issue, the End of 

the American Century, and the Future of International Order,” 

Penn State Journal of Law and International Affairs, Vol. 2, No. 2, 

2013, p. 255.

43. Quoted in Vali Nasr, “The Implications of Military Confrontation with Iran,” James N. Miller, Christine Parthemore, 

and Kurt M. Campbell, eds., Iran: Assessing U.S. Strategic Options, Washington, DC: The Center for New American Security, 

September 2008, p. 93.

44. See Dalia Dassa Kaye, “Iran May Not Be the Big Winner of 

Mideast Uprisings,” The Washington Post, March 4, 2011.

45. Katzman, p. 19.

46. James N. Miller, Christine Parthemore, and Kurt M. 

Campbell, “Game-Changing Diplomacy: A New American Approach to Iran,” James N. Miller et al., p. 10.

47. For more discussion, see Alireza Nader, Ali G. Scotten, 

Ahmad Idrees Rahmani, Robert Stewart, and Leila Mahnad, Iran’s 

Influence in Afghanistan: Implications for the U.S. Drawdown, Santa 

Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2014.

48. Andrew C. Kuchins and Jeffrey Mankoff, “Turkey, Russia, 

and Iran in the Caucasus,” Brannen, ed., pp. 12-22.

49. Dalia Dassa Kaye, Alireza Nader, and Parisa Roshan,

Israel and Iran: A Dangerous Rivalry, Santa Monica, CA: RAND 

Corporation, 2011, p. 69.

50. Katzman, p. 1.

51. Robin Wright, ed., The Iran Primer: Power, Politics, and U.S. 

Policy, Washington DC: The United States Institute of Peace, in 

collaboration with the Woodrow Wilson International Center for 

Scholars, 2010, pp. 1-6.
35

52. George Friedman, The Next Decade, New York: 

Doubleday, 2011.

53. Katzman, p. 37.

54. Ibid., p. 37. 

55. Michael Gordon and David Sanger, “U.S. Is Exploring Talks with Iran on Crisis in Iraq,” The New York Times, June 

17, 2014. 

56. Walter Pincus, “Accepting U.S. Limitations in the Fight 

against the Islamic State,” The Washington Post, November 3, 2014.

57. Thomas Donnelly and Frederick W. Kagan, Ground Truth: 

The Future of U.S. Land Power, Washington, DC: The American 

Enterprise Institute, 2008, pp. 35-39.

58. Friedman, pp. 106-119.

59. Quoted in Flynt Leverett and Hillary Mann Leverett, Going to Tehran: Why the United States Must Come to Terms with the Islamic Republic of Iran, New York: Metropolitan Books, 2013, p. 19.

37

CHAPTER 3

U.S.-IRANIAN STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP 

IN 2030

This will shake the world. 

Zhou Enlai to Henry Kissinger in 1972,

 upon completing negotiations over the 

Shanghai Communique.1

The possibility of P5+1 (the United States, Britain, 

France, Russia, and China, plus Germany) and Iran 

reaching a nuclear deal and the benefits of a U.S.-

Iranian strategic détente prompt an assessment of a 

U.S.-Iranian strategic relationship in the next 15 years, 

regardless of whether Iran “goes nuclear.” This work 

has developed three types of a U.S.-Iranian strategic 

relationship and dynamics that could emerge by 2030: 

1. strategic engagement involving a nuclear weapons-capable Iran; 

2. comprehensive cooperation following a “Grand 

Bargain”; and, 

3. incremental strategic engagement after a 

nuclear deal. 

The parties get to 1) after Iran stalls for time, improves ties with the United States on a limited level, 

and then admits to having a nuclear weapons capability, prompting a more substantive engagement as 

the parties seek to maintain strategic stability while 

cooperating on other issues of mutual concern. The 

sides achieve 2) after they make a “U” turn and reach 

a “G” bargain, leading to a comprehensive cooperation between them. They arrive at 3) after concluding 

a nuclear deal, reaping the benefits of an incremental 
38

yet increasingly strategic engagement as they tackle 

challenges together and in concert with other actors. 

These types of a strategic relationship and related dynamics—while overlapping—deliberately focus on a 

constructive U.S.-Iranian engagement regardless of 

whether Iran get the “nukes,” skipping a prevalent 

discussion on two other possibilities: the status quo, 

which would continue to entrench the hostile relationship; and a U.S., Israeli, or U.S.-Israeli strike on 

Iran’s nuclear facilities, which would lead to systemic 

perturbation in the region.

STRATEGIC ENGAGEMENT ENSUES 

AFTER IRAN OBTAINS NUCLEAR 

WEAPONS CAPABILITY 

In this scenario, despite likely intermittent breaks, 

the parties continue their nuclear negotiations, building mutual trust in the geopolitical conditions that 

work against the possibility of a costly strike on Iran’s 

nuclear facilities. The seemingly successful course of 

talks ensures that Washington does not commit itself 

to costly and damaging options for dealing with Iran, 

saves face, and acclimates its allies to the idea of improving and emerging strategic U.S.-Iranian ties. Tehran effectively stalls for time while continuing nuclear 

talks; manages to improve ties with the United States 

on a limited level by helping with regional challenges, 

including primarily on the counterterrorism front; 

and only then admits to having a nuclear weapons 

capability. 

The revelation of Iran’s nuclear weapons capability—without an explicit U.S.-Iranian or international 

deal preventing Iran from obtaining such a capability and without clarity regarding the possession of 
39

a nuclear weapon by Iran—allows Washington and 

Tehran to partially save face and not break their growing relationship. Unlike in the case with North Korea, 

Tehran and Washington are prompted to pursue a 

substantive engagement, seeking to maintain strategic 

stability and to contain proliferation of weapons of 

mass destruction (WMD) in the Greater Middle East. 

Specifically, the United States and Iran undertake major efforts to advance regional security cooperation. 

However, the lure of WMD is too strong to resist, and 

a number of regional actors, including Turkey, Egypt, 

and Saudi Arabia, are poised to start or expand their 

civil nuclear programs. The diminished U.S. regional 

profile and the nuclear status of Iran give them no hope 

of protection by Washington or reprieve from fear due 

to Iran’s potentially adventurous regional polices. The 

United States still maintains a heavy regional military 

presence to assuage concerns of its allies, but manages 

to diminish it significantly in response to a cooperative stance by Iran, the overall trajectory of improving 

relations with Tehran, and a corresponding relaxation 

of regional tensions. 

While treading cautiously and developing contingency policies, U.S. traditional allies in the Persian 

Gulf and Israel begin to undertake a more cooperative approach to Iran. They also seek concrete security 

guarantees from the United States and assurances from 

China and India to protect them from or hedge against 

a potentially emboldened Iran that could launch fullspectrum warfare using conventional, proxy, and 

nuclear attacks. The Arab states in the Persian Gulf 

leverage their already developing and more constructive ties with Iran, building on their cautious yet increasingly engaged policies toward Tehran following 

a reelection of Hassan Rouhani or another moderate 
40

and given the prospects of a concluded, comprehensive nuclear deal. Dubbed a “one weapon state,” 

which assumes its possible annihilation with just one 

nuclear weapon due to its small territory, Israel finds 

ways to cooperate with a nuclear Iran, drawing on the 

legacy of the mutually beneficial ties that had existed 

between them before and after the Islamic Revolution. 

A new strategic reality in the Middle East emerges, 

with potentially positive implications for the resolution or substantial mitigation of the region’s longstanding conflicts, including the Arab-Israeli one. 

Both Israel and Iran now have more incentives not 

to escalate their positions or force their actions vis-àvis each other or the Arab states, which either seek 

or have already obtained security commitments from 

the United States. Iran, as part of cooperation with the 

United States and for fear of provoking Israel or escalating ongoing interstate tensions, decides to leverage its financial and military influence on Hamas and 

Hezbollah in an effort to promote an accord between 

Israelis and Palestinians, as well as Israelis and Arabs 

as a whole. The Arab states already have more incentive to address their differences, given the enhanced 

regional profile of Iran. However, the potential for a 

regional arms race, both conventional and nuclear, is 

increasing, prompting closer U.S-Iranian engagement 

to ensure region-wide strategic stability. 

In the economic realm, global oil and regional gas 

prices climb up in the short term, given geopolitical 

risks stemming from a nuclear weapons-capable Iran. 

However, the reduction of regional tensions and expanded energy exports by Iran work to mitigate the 

increase in energy prices. Still, the reduction of regional tensions fails to induce a full-fledged economic 

cooperation that would otherwise unleash the full po-
41

tential of Iran’s economy. Parties seek to build bridges 

with a nuclear weapons-capable Iran in an attempt to 

shape its moves, but they choose not to “deep dive” 

just yet because of sensitivities about Iran’s nuclear 

status and the need to retain leverage on Iran that 

increasingly relies on their support to modernize its 

economy. 

COMPREHENSIVE COOPERATION 

FOLLOWS AFTER PARTIES 

“U”-TURN AND REACH A “G” BARGAIN

In this scenario, within the next 15 years, the parties conclude a “Grand Bargain,” making a complete 

“U” turn from the decades-long hostile and estranged 

relations to a friendly and engaged strategic relationship by 2030 that addresses the strategic interests of 

the United States and Iran and advances security, stability, and development needs of the Greater Middle 

East. The parties have established official ties, and a 

normalization of relations is paying big dividends.

Iran is allowed to enrich uranium as part of a nuclear deal but commits not to pursue nuclear weapons capability, while agreeing to a verifiable regime 

for its nuclear program. It rescinds support to terrorist groups targeting the United States and U.S. allies; 

collaborates with the United States on policies toward 

war-torn Iraq; and provides support to Washington 

in dealing with the Arab-Israeli conflict as well as 

civil and proxy wars and security tensions still raging in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, Palestine, and Afghanistan. Iran also pledges to work with the United 

States in tackling Sunni and Shia-inspired extremism 

and militancy in the Greater Middle East. It further 

commits to assisting with the reconstruction of Iraq 
42

and Afghanistan; improves its humans rights record; 

opens up its economy to U.S. and Western investments; and works with the United States to advance 

the integration of the greater region into the global 

economic space. 

In return, the United States acknowledges Iran’s 

right to pursue nuclear capability for civilian purposes; renounces alleged attempts at regime change; 

unfreezes Iranian funds seized following the hostage 

crisis; removes crippling sanctions; and assists with 

modernizing and integrating the Iranian economy 

into the regional and global economy networks. It also 

collaborates with Iran on counterterrorism activities; 

and stops alleged support to proxies of Saudi Arabia and other countries of the Persian Gulf targeting 

Iran’s interests in the Greater Middle East. Finally, it 

recognizes Iran’s legitimate security interests and role 

as a rising regional power in the greater region, while 

significantly downsizing and repurposing its military 

posture in the Persian Gulf. 

A period of more full-fledged cooperation ensues, 

with Iran and the United States successfully and effectively collaborating in the economic sphere. U.S foreign direct investment (FDI) and technology transfers 

flow into the badly underperforming and increasingly 

prospective Iranian economy. Iran manages to revive 

its energy sector and boost its oil and gas exports, benefiting U.S. and Western corporations as well as European countries that can now lessen their dependence 

on energy imports from Russia—a perceived geopolitical contender for the United States in Eurasia. Washington and Tehran open up a new vista of collaboration in advancing regional and cross-regional energy, 

trade, and transit links spanning East, South, Central, 

and West Asia, thereby promoting globalization and 
43

Iran’s lagging integration into the world economy. In 

the process, Iran turns into a regional economic force, 

complementing its geopolitical weight. The United 

States, in turn, advances its strategy of expanding the 

“core” while shrinking the “gap.”

In the security realm, the parties achieve a reduction in regional tensions by addressing Iran’s nuclear 

program challenges and start advancing regional security cooperation platforms involving the United 

States, Arab countries, Iran, Israel, Turkey, Pakistan, 

Russia, China, and India, among others. Washington 

and Iran cooperate in bringing stability to Iraq, Syria, 

Yemen, Lebanon, and Afghanistan, while collaborating in their increasingly joint struggle against Sunni 

militancy in the wider region. They also start engaging Arab and non-Arab powers in confidence-building 

arrangements and promoting common economic and 

security frameworks advancing development and stability in the Persian Gulf and the Greater Middle East. 

Negotiations to address the Palestinian issues and 

the Arab-Israeli conflict receive a promising boost, as 

parties seek reconciliation following a substantial reduction in regional tensions. The regional parties and 

Washington also commence the creation of a WMDfree zone in the region.

INCREMENTAL STRATEGIC 

ENGAGEMENT EMERGES 

AS SIDES CONTINUE ADVANCING TIES 

Under this scenario, Tehran and Washington begin to chart a path to normalization of their relations 

by pursuing strategic engagement in incremental 

though not always sequential steps, allowing them to 

advance from one major track defining a problem to 
44

the next. A step-by-step quid pro quo generates trust 

that builds up and leads to normalization of relations 

after 2030. The countries are far from becoming allies, 

but common challenges and incremental successes 

build enough momentum for a strategic engagement 

to emerge on key bilateral and regional issues. 

The sides first conclude a nuclear deal, enabling 

Tehran to enrich uranium permanently under a verifiable regime in return for lifting of sanctions. A relaxation of regional tensions ensues, despite Iran’s ability 

to obtain a “breakout” capacity, prompting the parties 

to seize the momentum and pursue a strategic engagement on select issues. As part of the post-nuclear deal 

memorandum, the parties publicly issue apologies for 

grievances stemming from the Central Intelligence 

Agency-backed overthrow of Iranian Prime Minister 

Mohammad Mossadeq in 1953 and the 1979 hostage 

crisis. The United States discontinues the policy of 

regime change and recognizes the Islamic Republic, 

prompting Tehran to set up a diplomatic conduit short 

of establishing diplomatic ties for fear of creating too 

much pressure too soon on the theocratic regime to 

adapt or face removal from power.

Washington trades its economic toolkit for Iran’s 

geo-economic and geopolitical capabilities. The parties develop a plan to enhance trade relations with the 

United States and its allies, committing to technology 

transfers, and billions in FDI flows into the Iranian 

economy. This helps Iran modernize and diversify 

away from its overwhelming dependence on the oil 

sector and Asian energy importers. Better performance and more open and diversified economic ties 

mitigate prevalent youth unemployment and reduce 

poverty, stimulating political liberalization. In return, 

Iran agrees to serve as a major interregional link for 
45

a growing number of trade, energy, and transit corridors being built throughout the Greater Middle 

East, contributing to the U.S. policies of integrating 

Central-South Asia and the Middle East with the 

global economy. 

The United States recognizes Iran as a regional 

power with legitimate interests and abandons its policy of containment in return for Tehran’s constructive 

engagement in addressing regional security challenges. Iran, in time, assists with resolution of conflicts and 

reconstruction of Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan. Tehran 

ceases military support to Hamas and Hezbollah, pursuing their transformation into demilitarized entities 

operating within mainstream politics of Palestine and 

Lebanon. It also helps integrate Shia militias into the 

fragile political and security order in Iraq, while working to bring a resolution to the still raging conflict in 

Syria. This process is not a clear-cut trade, but a phased 

approach enabling the parties to verify each other’s 

intensions and build trust as they gradually elevate 

their strategic relationship from one track to another. 

The United States, Iran, Turkey, Iraq, and the Arab 

states pursue regional security cooperation, advancing secure passage of energy resources through the 

Persian Gulf, a WMD-free zone, and normalization of 

ties involving Israel, Iran, and the Arab states. Increasingly, the parties appreciate Iran’s contribution to regional security and development, while Iran moderates its tense stance toward neighbors and engages 

in cooperative practices that advance confidence in 

its constructive role as a major regional power. The 

constructive engagement by Iran mitigates security 

concerns emanating from Tel-Aviv and Arab capitals 

about Iran’s growing regional profile and improving 

ties between Tehran and Washington, creating conditions for the re-establishment of diplomatic ties be-
46

tween the United States and Iran, as well as Tel-Aviv 

and Tehran, in the next few years. Iran’s theocratic 

regime remains in place, but moderate forces gain increasing influence across administrations and prepare 

the groundwork for Iran’s political transformation 

from a Sharia-based system to a secular political order 

beyond 2030. 

THE THREE ALTERNATIVE FUTURES—

LIKELIHOOD AND PLAUSIBILITY 

ASSESSMENT 

Strategic Engagement Ensues after Iran Obtains 

Nuclear Weapons Capability. 

This scenario and related outcomes are premised 

on Iran’s interest in acquiring nuclear weapons capability at all costs. This is not a far-fetched proposition, 

considering the history of concealed nuclear facilities 

in Iran, Tehran’s defiance of United Nations (UN) Security Council resolutions, and its lack of cooperation 

with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). 

The survival of the theocratic regime, perceived threats 

from Israel, and invasions of and proxy wars for new 

regimes in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya, among others, enhance for Iran the appeal of nuclear weapons 

and related deterrence capabilities. Getting its hands 

on the “nukes” would make Iran part of the club of 

nuclear powers and help it advance its regional political and military influence while raising its prestige 

as the first Shia Muslim country to possess nuclear 

weapons in the region alongside Israel and Pakistan.2

Iran also perceives the development of nuclear weapons as a “shortcut” to get to a “desired modernity” by 

demonstrating its scientific capacity and advancement 

to the world and major powers.3
47

In this light, Israel worries that “the charm offensive” by the Rouhani administration could drive 

a wedge among the P5+1 members, undermine the 

impact and intent of international sanctions, and lead 

to a deal that brings Iran closer to nuclear breakout 

capacity. Hence, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s portrayal of the “interim” deal as a “historical mistake,” not a “historic agreement,”4

 or his 

characterization of failure by the parties to reach an 

agreement by November 25, 2014, as “no deal is better than a bad deal.” This scenario assumes that Israel 

and the United States would allow Tehran to drag 

nuclear talks on for the next 15 years. Iran may well 

manage to play a “one step forward, two steps back” 

game in the talks. Iran can also build confidence and 

rapport with Washington in the meantime by helping 

it address regional security issues before an ultimate 

nuclear deal is reached, stalling for time as it works to 

get its grip on the “nukes.” Meanwhile, a normalization of trade relations and integration of Iran into the 

global economy could remove the current focus on its 

nuclear program, enabling Tehran to obtain nuclear 

weapons capability with less resistance from major actors and the international community. This could be 

part of the current strategy by Tehran, which seeks to 

exhaust external parties and discourage them from applying similar pressures a repeated number of times.5

Some argue that the United States, Israel, and their 

partners simply have no viable options preventing 

Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons capability, placing a higher premium on accommodation and relaxation of tensions with Iran. The U.S. regional power 

is more likely to decline further down rather than 

climb back up—exactly the reason for strategic engagement with a nuclear Iran. In March 2013, Ameri-
48

can President Barack Obama indicated, referring to 

the U.S. intelligence community, “it would take Iran 

over a year or so to develop a nuclear weapon.”6

Skeptics dismiss the view about the lack of options 

for dealing with Iran, alleging that the “lack of options” argument provides justification for acceptance 

of a nuclear Iran. This, they argue, could breed what 

is dreaded—a nuclear Iran run by Mullahs keen on 

spreading their fervent Islamic revolution across 

borders.

The scenario also assumes that Israel and the United States would accept a nuclear weapons-capable 

Iran and its potential adventurism in foreign policy 

throughout the region after the revelation of Iran’s 

nuclear capability and would not resort to the use of 

force to stop Tehran from fielding a nuclear weapon 

or producing more of them in the future. Put differently, they would not “strike while the iron is hot” 

or “take the bull by the horns” while they still could. 

Both sides drew their “red lines,” with Israel pledging 

not to allow even a nuclear weapons-capable Iran and 

the United States promising to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon.7

 In a way, this line of thinking is similar to the “red line” drawn by Washington 

for Assad’s use of chemical weapons, only much more 

difficult to defend when it is Iran crossing it, even 

if it may not have the weapon yet. The revelation of 

Assad’s WMD use and Washington’s hesitation to enforce the “red line” in response speaks of diminished 

U.S. capacity to intervene forcefully. At the same time, 

one should not discount a possibility that Israel and/

or the United States may be tempted to strike a nuclear Iran, assuming that Iran’s nuclear capabilities are 

still limited.8
49

As far as Iran’s possible adventurism, the record of 

nuclear proliferation does not lend credibility to the 

argument that nuclear weapons “facilitate regional 

bullying or adventurism.”9 Though not a guarantee, 

the possession of nuclear weapons could make its 

owner more cautionary and less escalatory, though 

it would certainly limit policy options of other actors in the region. For instance, a hypothetical Iranian 

declaration equating an attack on Hezbollah as an attack on Iran would certainly constrain Israeli’s range 

of responses.10 Kenneth Waltz’ argument that Iran’s 

nuclear weapons could be a factor of strategic stability 

in the Middle East11 deserves a careful review, not as a 

prescription for helping Iran get the nuclear bomb but 

as a means to deal with a geopolitically complex aftermath. Of course, one should admit that neither Iran, 

nor Israel would operate in a “stable [Mutually Assured Destruction] environment” because neither of 

them could have a “secure, second-strike capability,” 

prompting a dangerous possibility of what Thomas 

Schelling describes as “reciprocal fear of surprise attack.”12 Nevertheless, the existence of “two nuclear 

states plus regional stability” may be a better outcome 

than “two nuclear states with regional upheaval,” not 

to mention nuclear proliferation risks inherent in either outcome.13 Finally, regional and other countries 

would more likely welcome a nuclear Iran that is open, 

secular, more democratic, and engaged with the West 

and others, rather than a nuclear Iran with opposite 

attributes.14

Another assumption of the scenario is that Iran 

and the United States get to start improving their relationship without addressing Iran’s nuclear program 

issues adequately. This is not impossible but difficult 

to imagine, given potential accusations of defeat that 
50

opponents in both countries could level on respective 

administrations. Valid as it may be, one should also 

consider the history of U.S.-Iranian cooperation during the Contra Affair in the 1980s and in Afghanistan 

shortly after September 11, 2001—in addition to conceivable wild card scenarios—that provides a precedent and reveals a potential for improvement in ties 

without the parties concluding a nuclear deal first. A 

relaxation of tensions following a conclusion of the 

deal could, however, lead to an even more substantive 

and productive strategic engagement, and in relatively shorter timeframes. This would not only extend to 

the bilateral relations as they concern the Greater Middle East but also Latin America, where Iran has been 

enhancing its presence (As Mahmoud Ahmadinejad 

once quipped, “When the Western countries were trying to isolate Iran, we went to the U.S. backyard.”15) 

The scenario’s major vulnerability stems from the 

idea that the new reality of a nuclear-weapons capable 

Iran invites more cooperation, even strategic engagement, from Washington. This is not an invalid observation, considering the case of severed U.S.-North 

Korean ties, especially after Pyongyang went nuclear 

in the 2000s. However, major differences work in favor of an increasingly strategic engagement with a 

nuclear-weapons capable Iran. The United States and 

Iran have not fought a prolonged conventional war on 

Iranian or other territory and are not deadlocked in an 

armistice. Nuclear China and Russia—both bordering 

North Korea and having massive conventional forces 

and arsenals—provide some measure of containment and counterbalance to North Korea. A nuclear 

weapons-capable Iran would find itself in the region 

with a nuclear Pakistan and Israel that possess about 

100 and 200 nuclear bombs each. Not least important 
51

is the overall complexity and the conflict potential in 

the Greater Middle East—the area I dub the “region 

of wars.” There is just too much at stake in this region 

for the United States to distance itself from a nuclear 

weapons-capable Iran that can create solutions as well 

as problems (depending on the approach the United 

States chooses to pursue under the circumstances). 

Moreover, the United States has found a way to cooperate with a nuclear Pakistan and India.

Finally, the scenario assumes that the Arab states, 

Turkey, and Israel would accept the status quo, begin 

to gradually improve ties with Iran, and would refrain 

from pursuing their own nuclear capability. On the 

one hand, this is a valid possibility, assuming that the 

United States brings in all the parties into common security frameworks and extends its more explicit protection to the Arab states and Israel (Turkey is already 

a North Atlantic Treaty Organization ally). The Arab 

states and Israel could also draw on their legacies of 

cooperation with Iran before the Islamic Revolution, 

after the revolution, and even more recently in the case 

of the Arab states and Iran.16 On the other hand, tensions between the Sunnis and Shia are running high, 

Saudi Arabia is poised to contest Iran’s growing capabilities, and Israel’s fear of a nuclear Iran is too strong 

for cooperative steps to emerge. But there is a third 

possibility: A nuclear Iran could actually stimulate cooperation between all concerned parties for purposes 

of maintaining strategic stability in the greater region. 
52

Comprehensive Cooperation Follows after Parties’ 

“U”-Turn and Reach a “G” Bargain.

This scenario assumes that the parties manage to 

reconcile many of their grievances after more than 3 

decades of their estranged and hostile relationship. It 

ignores the record of repeatedly failed negotiations; 

bureaucratic inertia; and opposition within Iran, the 

United States, Israel, and the Arab states to a deal allowing Iran to permanently enrich uranium (thereby 

allowing it to get to the breakout capacity) leading to 

full-fledged U.S.-Iranian cooperation. While weighty, 

this line of thinking disregards the systemic forces 

reviewed in Chapter 1, strategic interests shared by 

Tehran and Washington pushing them to achieve the 

“Grand Bargain,” and opportunity costs of failing to 

conclude such a high-payoff deal. The “Grand Bargain” is grand not only due to its historic and geopolitical significance. It is also grand because of its quid 

pro quo elements that ultimately constitute and are 

shaped by those very systemic forces that are capable 

of simultaneously supporting and challenging the regional order. In other words, the system itself needs 

the “Grand Bargain” to save itself from implosion. 

Holding keys of a systemic change in the region, Iran 

and the United States can make it happen. Both share 

a number of common interests, threats, and opportunities that are calling for the grand deal. 

Skeptics further point to numerous difficulties of 

pursuing such a complex undertaking resting on a 

multitude of diverse and controversial issues, which 

are of fundamental importance to the parties involved. 

They have a point. Just resolving the nuclear side 

of the deal is a mind-boggling exercise that may yet 

undercut the desirability and anticipated practicality 
53

of an incremental approach to the nuclear talks and 

construction of a U.S.-Iranian strategic relationship. 

But years of negotiation failures have convinced opponents that pursuing and getting to the “G” bargain 

is not a senseless idea. The policy of coercion and isolation of Iran largely has failed over the last 3 decades, 

while no “U” turn in the relations should be expected 

without a deal involving a big leap rather than small 

steps. First, a decision to pursue the “G” bargain would 

not damage the U.S. position. Second, the parties can 

avoid minor setbacks that are a feature of incremental approaches and could derail the entire trajectory 

of talks and force parties to start over. Third, they 

can ensure higher pay-offs in shorter timeframes.17

A “G” bargain caters to Iran’s view of itself as a major 

player with legitimate security interests, which is capable of making “grand” deals with a “great” power 

based on mutual respect and common interests. After all, Iran was a, if not the, major protector of the 

Persian Gulf states prior to the Islamic Revolution—a 

role it ceded to Iraq and the United States and now 

wants to reclaim by leveraging its rising profile.18 It 

also views its security through the prism of foreign invasions—7 in the last 200 years, to be precise—which 

brought humiliation and left a lasting mark on the 

Iranian psyche.19

Proponents of the “Grand Bargain” scenario also 

highlight historical precedents, including the ones involving Iran itself, which demonstrate the futility of 

the incremental approach and the need for “Grand” 

thinking. They cite Richard Nixon’s decision to “put 

aside all the issues which constituted the existing SinoAmerican dialogue” and focus on “the broader issue 

of China’s attitude toward dialogue with the United 

States”—a move that allegedly led to the Shanghai 
54

Communiqué in 1972 and improvement of the relationship between the two states.20 They further cite 

Iran’s cooperation with the George H. W. Bush administration on the hostage crisis in Lebanon, with the Bill 

Clinton administration on arms shipments to Bosnia, 

and with the George W. Bush administration on the 

invasion of Afghanistan—all of which could have, but 

failed to induce a détente between the United States 

and Iran.21 Tehran further pursued comprehensive negotiations with Washington starting with the second 

term of the Khatami administration.22 But the lack of 

meaningful engagement by the United States led to a 

weakened position of moderates within the Iranian 

administrations, which culminated in the comeback 

to power of the Principalists in the face of Ahmadinejad as president, who leveraged the country’s growing 

revenues from record-high oil prices to challenge the 

U.S. position throughout the greater region.23

Tehran went even further, reaching out to Washington in search of a “Grand Bargain” in 2003, offering to end support to Palestinian terrorist groups; 

encourage disarmament of Hezbollah; assist with 

counterterrorism; accept a Saudi plan on Arab-Israeli 

peace; work with Washington to advance political 

and economic stability in Iraq; and open its nuclear 

program to intrusive inspections. In return, it asked 

the United States to recognize the legitimacy of the 

Islamic Republic and its security concerns; stop the 

regime-change rhetoric; lift all sanctions; support Tehran’s efforts to obtain war reparations related to the 

Iran-Iraq War; assist with apprehension of members 

of an Iranian expatriate terrorist group; and respect 

its right to access chemical, biological, and nuclear 

technology. Israel would need to withdraw from all 

occupied territories, accept an independent state of 
55

Palestine, and agree to equal sharing of Jerusalem and 

a fair resolution of the Palestinian refugee issue. The 

expectation was that it would lead to normalization 

of ties between Iran and Israel and the successful implementation of the two-state solution.24 But the Bush 

administration rejected the deal because it legitimized 

the Iranian regime25 and because the United States was 

in the position of relative strength after it toppled the 

Taliban in Afghanistan and Saddam Hussein in Iraq 

on Iran’s eastern and western flanks. 

Now that Iran has traded places with the United 

States, would it pursue a “G” deal with Washington, 

whose regional geopolitical clout has been dissipating? On the one hand—“no,” because a relatively 

stronger Iran may not favor the deal altogether, let 

alone a sub-optimal one. Iran is already experienced 

in facing regional security threats in the conditions 

of isolation and sanctions, which suggests that a rapprochement may not be viewed in Tehran as an absolute necessity.26 On the other hand—“yes,” because 

Iran’s stronger bargaining power can allow it to get a 

better optimal deal. What is clear is that motivations 

to engage in talks are not always easily defined, leaving plenty of room for “yes,” “no,” and “it depends” 

options. Furthermore, Iran is known to have reached 

a détente with both Britain and Saudi Arabia, despite 

deep antipathy by Khamenei’s regime to Riyadh and a 

“conspiratorial” sentiment toward London.27

The likelihood of the U.S.-Iranian strategic relationship emerging rests on the “G” deal’s perceived 

power to transform interstate ties. But would it generate sufficient and necessary momentum for relaxation 

of tensions across a wide spectrum of complicated 

regional conflicts and agents? After all, the pursuit 

of regional security cooperation mechanisms is un-
56

likely to eliminate lingering and legitimate geopolitical concerns of the United States, its allies, and Iran 

itself. Nor is it likely to ensure the end of proxy wars 

or militant attacks coordinated by regional state entities dissatisfied with the “G” bargain. Finally, the 

scenario assumes that all, and I mean all, are onboard 

with the deal, even if Washington and Tehran go it 

alone in spearheading fundamental changes that the 

bargain entails. Of course, some could counter that 

there is “no historically determined enmity between 

Arabs and Iranians” and thus find accommodation 

following the conclusion of the “G” Bargain an easy 

undertaking, citing Iran’s expanding ties with Iraq following the removal of Saddam, for instance.28 But this 

ignores conquests of Persian domains by Arabs and 

religious and civilizational differences, not to mention 

geopolitical circumstances and dynamics that have 

long generated hostility between Iranians and Arabs.

A good question, then, is whether a strategic relationship based on comprehensive U.S.-Iranian cooperation is an illusion. As some argue, Iran does not 

want a unified Iraq and seeks regional domination. It 

cannot provide guarantees of abandoning its alleged 

nuclear weapons program. Iran also needs the conflict 

with the United States to ensure its regime survival.29

A far-reaching bargain seems impossible on ideological, political, and economic grounds, as the Iranian 

regime was founded on revolutionary zeal and antiAmericanism.30 Accepting engagement with the United States for some Iranian Principalists is equivalent 

to aligning Iran’s policies, if not subordinating them, 

with those of Washington, Tel Aviv, and Riyadh to the 

detriment of Iran’s autonomous regional position and 

its role as a defender of Muslim causes.31
57

Of course, miracles are unlikely to occur overnight: 

This was true of the U.S. détente with China and the 

Soviet Union and would be true in the case of a U.S. 

détente with Iran. The transformation of interstate ties 

is not the “G” Bargain’s stipulation but an implication 

requiring time and direction to unfold. Moreover, the 

parties could increase the chances of such a bargain if 

they viewed normalization of their ties as a statecraft 

tool rather than a post-deal award.32

Incremental Strategic Engagement Emerges 

as Sides Continue Advancing Ties. 

Unlike the first scenario, Iran gets to enrich uranium permanently under a verifiable regime but does 

not obtain or admit to having a nuclear-weapons capability. Unlike the second scenario, Tehran gets the 

nuclear deal done in order to advance normalization 

of ties in the long run, but does not seek a “G” Bargain 

due to its relatively stronger geopolitical position and 

desire to first enhance confidence in mutual relations 

by pursuing incremental steps in cooperation with the 

United States on select issues. This scenario is in between the two “extremes” and may have better prospects at materializing, though it is not without a set of 

its own weak and strong points. 

The strategic relationship presumed under this scenario shares similarities with a “select engagement” 

partnership concept articulated in “Iran: The Time 

for a New Approach” report by an Independent Task 

Force, chaired by Zbigniew Brzezinski and Robert 

Gates. The report authors called for the United States 

to reassess its policy of nonengagement, highlighting areas in which the United States and Iran could 

undertake their selective engagement on converging 
58

interests and build on incremental progress to address the broader range of issues. However, the report also provides dissenting views that cast doubt on 

the likely relative success of the incremental engagement in improving the general relationship between 

Washington and Tehran, citing failure of such approach over the last 3 decades and the need for a more 

comprehensive deal.33

Others have voiced similar ideas or assessed U.S.-

Iranian engagement from the perspective of different 

negotiating strategies meant to satisfy the parties’ 

interests. Former U.S. ambassador to Iraq and Afghanistan Ryan Crocker; Director of the Iran Project at 

Columbia University William Luers; and former U.S. 

Undersecretary of State Thomas Pickering have called 

for a strategic U.S.-Iranian partnership, emphasizing 

that “mutually informed parallel action is essential.”34

Seyyed Hossein Mousavian, a former Iranian diplomat and author, in turn, has recommended a phased 

approach by first addressing the nuclear issue, followed by issues related to terrorism, human rights, 

Iraq, Syria, and energy, among others. Lynn Davis, in 

her RAND study, highlights the need for “caution” 

and “hedging” to foster and harness a change in Iranian policies.35 Meanwhile, Christine Parthemore and 

James Miller point to the need for a game-changing 

diplomacy with Iran that would require “de-emphasizing near-term threats of military action, giving first 

priority to getting comprehensive verification in place 

for Iran’s nuclear program, and negotiating directly 

with Iran on a broad range of issues”36 thereafter. 

Such approaches and envisioned relationships 

presume that the parties proceed cautiously in view of 

domestic politics and that they build trust gradually, 

in part to mitigate concerns of anxious allies about 
59

prospects of improved ties between the United States 

and Iran. To flip a term often attributed to President 

Ronald Reagan, the parties first need to “verify, then 

build trust.”37 The incremental approach focuses more 

on timing, issues, and building trust rather than just issues. It appears more possible in the circumstances of 

severed diplomatic ties because the parties need time 

to cultivate trust first through phased cooperation. In 

contrast, parties that recognize one another and maintain diplomatic ties have more room to encourage 

faster, more comprehensive, and simultaneous work 

on all concerned tracks. The incremental approach to 

strategic engagement in this scenario makes the process lengthier, slowing down the momentum toward a 

full-fledged strategic relationship because of potential 

setbacks that can occur with each new administration. 

However, it does not presuppose the impossibility of 

pursuing a resolution and/or collaboration on several 

separate tracks simultaneously; it merely makes it less 

likely while emphasizing gradualism and trust-building as parties move along the spectrum of normalization from one issue to the next in a more or less phased 

manner. After all, building trust and endowing interests-based agreements with trust makes them much 

more likely to be accepted as binding, effective, and 

productive in spurring a substantial cooperation.38

The scenario further assumes that Israel chooses 

or is forced not to launch an attack on Iran, despite 

its declared policy of preventing a nuclear-weaponscapable Iran at all cost. As part of the concluded 

nuclear deal, Iran can enrich uranium permanently 

under specific caps preventing Tehran from getting a 

break-out capacity. But Israel is unlikely to trust Iran, 

even with the IAEA’s safeguards in place, given the 

revelation of secret nuclear facilities in Iran in the past. 
60

However, the conclusion of a nuclear deal would lead 

to reduction in regional tensions. Israel’s diplomatic 

maneuvers to convince the international community 

about the practicality, necessity, or desirability of an 

attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities would be more constrained, especially given serious limits on Israeli and 

U.S. capabilities to strike and destroy or set back Iran’s 

nuclear program.39 The position of the United States, 

too, would work against such a possibility. 

The scenario also assumes that Iran is desperate 

for economic support and would reciprocate using 

its economic capacity as an energy power and transit 

link and its geopolitical capacity as a regional power. 

Iran’s economy is outdated and underutilizing its potential, but whatever gains it has made seem to have 

been sufficient over the last 3 decades to continue on 

an isolationist course. What made a partial difference in inducing the ongoing talks, however, were 

the crippling sanctions on Iran’s oil sector and the 

fact that Russia and China, among others, joined in. 

The badly performing economy and anti-government 

protests against electoral fraud in 2009 encouraged 

the Iranian regime to relax its grip, made possible by 

the new administration headed by Rouhani, who declared a new course toward a resolution of the nuclear 

program issues. 

But this line of thinking rests on the argument that 

the Islamic regime does not fear the prospect of political liberalization and popular pressures for political 

and economic reform following the conclusion of a 

nuclear deal, economic opening, and U.S. recognition 

of Iran—the issues making the idea of Iran’s integration into the global economy a double-edged sword. 

After all, it is anti-Americanism that keeps the regime 

in power in Tehran. Yet, the Iranian theocratic system 
61

is very unpopular among Iranian citizens; the Iranian 

public has a more favorable opinion of the United 

States than societies in many countries in the Middle 

East; and popular pressure for reform in Iran is growing, considering prevalent unemployment and high 

inflation40—a dynamic not lost on domestic politics in 

Iran with the coming of a moderate administration. 

That said, Iran has “multiple centers of authority and 

constant power struggles,” and its system has proven 

“remarkably resilient to wars, economic crises, and 

intense domestic rivalries.”41

The incremental engagement envisioned in this 

scenario also makes the desired transition to a more 

liberal political and economic order in Iran a more 

smooth and, thus, more accepted and likely outcome.42 The history of ongoing struggles for democracy in Iran—thwarted by domestic and external forces 

over the last 100 years—highlights that possibility 

(the Constitutional revolution in 1906; the Mossaddeq 

rebellion; the Islamic Revolution which the populace 

initially perceived as a quest for more democratic rule; 

and a series of reformist administrations).43

However, it is unclear if Iran wants to be part of 

America’s project of advancing globalization. Iran 

may also lose support with Muslims worldwide by collaborating with Washington on controversial issues. 

Meanwhile, opponents of the incremental strategic 

engagement could play the role of spoilers, preventing 

Iran and the United States from pursuing the disarmament of Hamas and Hezbollah, or reconstruction in 

Iraq and Afghanistan, among other goals. To mitigate 

this prospect, Iran and the United States could position themselves as bridges between the West and the 

East, the Christian and the Muslim civilizations, the 

developed and developing worlds working together 
62

on what are increasingly common challenges in the 

age of globalization. 

Regardless of the ultimate shape of a U.S.-Iranian 

strategic relationship, it would mark a dramatic reversal of the currently hostile relationship—a shift for 

which Washington, Tehran, and their allies should 

prepare now. The proposed policies do exactly that, 

assuming the United States desires a strategic relationship with Iran to reverse its decline and attain a 

“strategic recovery.”44

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 3

1. Quoted in Flynt Leverett and Hillary Mann Leverett, 

Going to Tehran: Why the United States Must Come to Terms with 

the Islamic Republic of Iran, New York: Metropolitan Books, 

2013, p. 369.

2. James K. Sebenius and Michael K. Singh, “Is a Nuclear Deal 

with Iran Possible? An Analytical Framework for the Iran Nuclear 

Negotiations,” International Security, Vol. 37, No. 3, 2012-13, p. 60.

3. David Patrikarakos, Nuclear Iran: The Birth of an Atomic 

State, New York: L. B. Tauris & Co., LTD, p. 288.

4. Dalia Dassa Kaye and Jeffrey Martini, The Days After a Deal 

with Iran: Regional Responses to a Final Nuclear Agreement, Santa 

Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2014, p. 3.

5. Matthew Kroenig, A Time to Attack: The Looming Iranian 

Nuclear Threat, New York: Palgrave McMillan, 2014, pp. 89-96.

6. Michael D. Shear and David E. Sanger, “Iran Nuclear 

Weapon to Take Year or More, Obama Says,” The New York Times, 

March 14, 2013.

7. Sebenius and Singh, p. 63. Also, see Kaye and Martini, p. 5.

8. Dalia Dassa Kaye, Alireza Nader, Parisa Roshan, Israel and 

Iran: A Dangerous Rivalry, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 

2011, p. 21.
63

9. Paul R. Pillar, “The Role of Villain: Iran and U.S. Foreign Policy,” Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 128, No. 2, Summer 

2013, p. 214.

10. Leverett and Mann Leverett, p. 309.

11. See Kenneth Waltz, “The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: 

More May Be Better,” Adelphi Papers No. 17, London, UK: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1981, pp. 28, 30.

12. Also see James N. Miller, Christine Parthemore, and Kurt 

M. Campbell, eds., Iran: Assessing U.S. Strategic Options, Washington, DC: The Center for New American Security, September 

2008, p. 30; and Richard N. Haass, “Living with a Nuclear Iran,” 

in Miller, Parthemore, and Campbell, p. 115.

13. William E. Odom, “The Nuclear Option,” in “21 Solutions 

to Save the World,” Foreign Policy, No. 160, May-June 2007, p. 52.

14. Barnett, p. 102.

15. Tirman, pp. 6, 13, 34.

16. For the remark and discussion on Iran’s activities in Latin America, see Cynthia Arnson, Haleh Esfandiari, and Adam 

Stubits, eds., Iran in Latin America: Threat or ‘Axis of Annoyance’? 

Reports on the Americas #23, Washington, DC: The Woodrow 

Wilson Center, 2007.

17. Katzman, pp. 33-37.

18. Robin Wright and Shaul Bakhash, “The U.S. and Iran: An 

Offer They Can’t Refuse?” Foreign Policy, No. 108, Autumn, 1997, 

p. 125. Also, see Tamim K. Kashgari, “Understanding Iran: Between Central Asia and the Gulf Cooperation Council,” Student 

Pulse, Vol. 3, No. 4, p. 4.

19. Remarks by Ervand Abrahamian during conference 

on “Iran-U.S. Relations: Imagining a New Paradigm,” Conference Report, New York: The New York University Center for 

Dialogues, March 2009, p. 5.
64

20. See Hillary Mann Leverett, “How Precipitous a Decline? 

U.S.-Iranian Relations and the Transition from American Primacy,” Penn State Journal of Law and International Affairs, Vol. 2, 

No. 2, 2013, p. 348.

21. Remarks by Hillary Mann Leverett during conference 

on “Iran-U.S. Relations: Imagining a New Paradigm,” Conference Report, New York: The New York University Center for 

Dialogues, March 2009, p. 10.

22. Leverett and Mann Leverett, p. 122.

23. Mousavian, pp. 211-214.

24. Ferrero, pp. 48-49. Also, see Parsi, pp. 2-3.

25. Gregory Gause III, The International Relations of the Persian 

Gulf, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2010, p. 170.

26. Tirman, p. 37.

27. Suzanne Maloney, “Diplomatic Strategies for Dealing 

with Iran: How Tehran Might Respond,” in Miller, Parthemore, 

and Campbell, p. 10.

28. Arshin Adib-Moghaddam, Iran in World Politics: The 

Question of the Islamic Republic, New York: Columbia University 

Press, 2008, p. 26.

29. Kim R. Holmes, “A Really Bad Bargain: A U.S.-Iranian 

“Strategic Relationship,” The National Interest, September 3, 2014.

30. For discussion on this issue, see Nader, The Days After a 

Deal with Iran: Continuity and Change in Iranian Foreign Policy.

31. Parsi, pp. 216-217.

32. Tirman, p. 18.

33. Ryan Crocker, William Luers, and Thomas Pickering, 

“How a U.S.-Iran Nuclear Deal Could Help Save Iraq,” The Washington Post, July 11, 2014.
65

34. See Lynn E. Davis, The Days After a Deal with Iran: U.S. 

Policies of Hedging and Engaging, Santa Monica, CA: RAND 

Corporation, 2014.

35. See Christine Parthemore and James Miller, “The Case for 

Game-Changing Diplomacy with Iran,” Policy Brief, Washington, 

DC: The Center for a New American Security, 2008.

36. See Lynn E. Davis, The Days After a Deal with Iran: U.S. 

Policies of Hedging and Engaging, Santa Monica, CA: RAND 

Corporation, 2014.

37. Miller, Parthemore, and Campbell, p. 16.

38. Tirman, p.16. Tirman views trust as an important component of any big deal with Iran, but the concept is also applicable in 

the case of incremental evolution of a relationship or agreements 

between Iran and the United States.

39. Miller, Parthemore, and Campbell, pp. 16-20.

40. Ibid., pp. 13-14. Also, see Independent Task Force 

Report, p. 13.

41. Gary Sick, “A Selective Partnership: Getting U.S.-Iranian 

Relations Right,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 85, No. 6, November/December 2006, essay review on Ray Takeyh, Hidden Iran: Paradox 

and Power in the Islamic Republic, New York: Henry Holt and Company, LLC, 2006.

42. Wyn Q. Bowen and Joanna Kidd, “The Iranian Nuclear 

Challenge,” International Affairs, Vol. 80, No. 2, p. 275.

43. Darisuh Borbor, review of Kenneth Pollack’s The Persian Puzzle: The Conflict Between Iran and America, in Iran and the 

Caucasus, Vol. 9, No. 2, 2005, p. 406.

44. Mann Leverett, “How Precipitous a Decline?” pp. 328-345.

67

CHAPTER 4

CULTIVATING AND PREPARING FOR 

STRATEGIC CHANGE

Strategy without tactics is the slowest route to victory. 

Tactics without strategy is the noise before defeat.

Chinese proverb 

(apocryphally attributed to Sun Tzu).1

STEERING RELATIONSHIPS WITH 

KEY PLAYERS

Besides seeking to mend ties with Iran, the United 

States would need to steer its relationships with major 

actors to prepare for a strategic shift that its détente 

with Iran would entail, regardless of whether Iran 

“goes nuclear.” Doing so would more effectively ensure U.S. national interests and prepare its allies and 

partners for this shift and the ensuing strategic change. 

Washington would need to highlight related strategic 

benefits for its allies and for the regional stability. In 

the process, the focus should be on steering, not pushing, as well as on guiding, not dragging, its partners. 

This is critical because: 

a. The United States cannot impose outcomes as effectively as it could have a decade or more ago, given 

its diminished global and regional influence; 

b. Iran itself should be encouraged to open up and 

do more to gain trust of U.S. partners and allies; 

c. The United States should not create an impression or a reality of abandoning its partners; and, 

d. Washington needs to ensure that there are as 

few spoilers of the anticipated shift as possible. 
68

Pursuing the nuclear talks in the framework of 

P5+1 (the United States, Britain, France, Russia, and 

China, plus Germany) is important because it allows 

fostering common decisions and outcomes that reflect the positions of several U.S. partners, gradually 

softening them to the idea of a U.S.-Iranian engagement that may turn into a strategic relationship in the 

long term. Washington would find it easier to work 

with European allies that are members of the North 

Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). These countries share extensive interests with the United States, 

have concerns about their energy security, and possess economic tools to help Iran revive its economy. 

After the conclusion of a nuclear deal and removal of 

sanctions, Washington should work with them closely 

to ensure substantial foreign direct investment (FDI) 

and technology transfers to Iran in return for constructive steps by Tehran toward normalizing its ties 

with Washington and European capitals in various 

spheres. The deal should be very sweet and difficult to 

resist for Iran, which needs massive investments and 

technological infusions to revive its underperforming 

oil sector and the overall economy.2

Steering U.S. ties with Russia, China, and India 

would be more difficult but no less important, given 

the need to mitigate potential obstacles to U.S.-Iranian engagement by Moscow, Beijing, and New Delhi. 

Russia is not interested in having a nuclear Iran at its 

doorstep and would prefer being able to shape regional outcomes if Iran were to “go nuclear.” It has positioned itself as an intermediary in the nuclear dispute, 

seeking to reap “the benefits of selective cooperation” 

with both the United States and Iran.3 Moscow’s ties 

with Tehran worsened after the discovery of an enrichment facility near Qom and Russia’s support to 
69

the United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution 

1929, which banned the sale of its advanced S-300 surface-to-air missile system to Iran.4

 However, Russia 

helped Iran complete a nuclear power plant in Bushehr in 2012 that requires Iran to return all spent fuel 

rods to Russia; agreed in 2014 to build two new nuclear power reactors in Iran and potentially six more 

thereafter, with the oversight of construction and fuel 

handling provided by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)5

; remains Tehran’s major weapons 

supplier, accounting for 16 percent of Iranian arms imports in 2011.6

 Russia and Iran further support Assad 

in Syria, where Russia maintains its only refueling station in the Mediterranean region and where Iran finds 

its only state ally.7

But Russia is also a major oil and gas exporter and 

a competitor to the energy-rich Iran. A U.S.-Iranian 

strategic rapprochement would enable the European 

Union (EU) and Iran to explore options of delivering 

substantially more energy exports to the EU, Central 

Asia, and Southeast Asia, primarily to China and India, undermining Moscow’s leverage on these regions 

and countries. More expanded exports by Iran could 

well cause a drop in global oil and regional gas prices, 

undercutting energy revenues on which Kremlin strategists rely to maintain their power, while encouraging 

Russia to diversify and modernize its own economy. 

Washington would need to work with both “siloviki” 

and “civiloki” to advance a vision of a modern Russia, which is not hostage to its resource exports-based 

economy but is a globally competitive player. In this 

context, and to prevent a Russia being caught off 

guard, Washington should help Moscow develop other sectors of the Russian economy with FDI and technology inflows from the West. This would help Russia 
70

liberalize economically and politically, while preparing it to face an increasingly active Iran that is keen on 

expanding its energy exports. Washington should also 

encourage Russia to enhance its economic presence 

in Iran to mitigate Tehran’s dependence on China, 

sending a signal that Russia would remain a part of 

the strategic change in the region. Finally, it should 

continue to leverage its missile defense plans in Europe to elicit Russia’s cooperation in facilitating both 

the nuclear talks and a future U.S.-Iranian strategic 

engagement.

China is a major player on Iran-related issues ranging from proliferation and sanctions, arms sales, energy resource development, to trade and investments. 

Beijing has not lent strong support either to the United 

States or Iran in the nuclear dispute, “supporting nuclear/arms sanctions on Iran diplomatically and flouting them in practice.” China is Iran’s largest trading 

partner (planning to boost trade to at least $100 billion 

by 2016 from the current $30-40 billion) and a major 

arms supplier (it had provided Tehran with large 

arms shipments—including HY-2 Silkworm anti-ship 

missiles—by the 6th year of the Iran-Iraq War in 1980-

88). China had supplied missile-related technologies 

to Iran, forcing Washington to impose sanctions on 

Beijing from 2001-10. It is also Iran’s largest oil importer, importing 85 percent (worth $U.S.39 billion) of 

all Iranian oil exports in the first 10 months of 2011 

(though its imported oil from Iran in 2011 represented 

11 percent of all oil imports). Beijing is one of a few 

major players assisting Iran with modernizing its energy sector and exploiting Iran’s underdeveloped and 

new oil and gas fields.8

China views Iran as a platform against alleged U.S. 

domination attempts, seeking to enhance its regional 
71

influence while “pinning down” the U.S. military in 

the Gulf to make it more challenging for the United 

States to implement its declared pivot to the Pacific to 

face a rising China. As a prominent Chinese foreign 

policy analyst Wang Jisi, Dean of the Peking University School of International Studies, commented on 

the U.S. war effort in Iraq: “It is beneficial for our external environment to have the United States militarily and diplomatically deeply sunk in the Mideast to 

the extent that it can hardly extricate itself.”9 Mending ties with Iran is a key to the U.S. extrication, while 

working with China could help Washington to foster 

improvement in the U.S.-Iranian relationship. U.S. efforts to induce cooperation from China would involve 

accepting a greater yet constructive role of China in 

global affairs; U.S. cooperation on cross-Strait issues; 

U.S. support for China in accessing high technology 

from the United States;10 and proposals for sharing the 

burden of protecting energy flows increasingly bound 

for East Asia. 

While India is not a member of P5+1, its status as 

a nuclear power, economic dynamism, and growing 

geo-economic partnership with Iran makes New Delhi 

a critical actor in influencing the evolution of Iran over 

the next decade. India has the largest population of 

Shias after Iran; faces similar geopolitical concerns regarding the role of Pakistan in Afghanistan and the 

wider region; and has concerns about stability in Central Asia. It is a major energy importer and a growing 

trade partner for Iran, which offers the main trade corridor for India to Central Asia given Pakistan’s reluctance to allow expanded trade across its territory into 

Central Asia. New Delhi is keen on cooperating with 

Iran in developing Iran’s port at Chabahar that would 

facilitate a trade and transit connection between In-
72

dia, one the one hand, and Afghanistan and Central 

Asia, on the other, bypassing the need for India to rely 

on Pakistan to access those markets. India is also concerned that Iran is turning into a strategic partner for 

China—Iran’s main arms exporter and energy importer.11 India has agreed—under strong pressure—to cut 

oil imports from Iran after the imposition of sanctions 

in 2012, but has drastically boosted energy and other 

cooperation with Iran following the conclusion of the 

“interim nuclear deal” in November 2013. The United 

States should work with New Delhi to advance interregional infrastructure initiatives involving Iran, not 

least due to India’s growing profile in Central Asia 

and Afghanistan, as well. 

China and India are major importers of Iranian energy resources, and their share is only bound to grow 

with the removal of all sanctions on Iran, translating 

into more geopolitical leverage for Beijing and New 

Delhi in the Greater Middle East. China’s and India’s 

growing regional economic presence is critical for the 

development of the region and the U.S. strategy of 

shrinking the “gap,” but Washington should keep in 

mind the geopolitical mass that their economic presence is generating and how China and India could 

leverage it to the detriment or benefit of U.S. policies 

in the region, especially in light of anticipated military expansion of these actors in the Persian Gulf and 

the Greater Middle East.12 In this context, the United 

States would do well to enlist the support of its Western partners in helping Iran diversify its economy 

away from its overwhelming reliance on China, India, 

and other actors in South-East Asia, while enhancing 

their own geopolitical presence. By 2013, Iran’s trade 

with Asia counted for 83 percent of its overall trade, 

while its trade turnover with China represented 50 
73

percent of its overall trade.13 Washington should also 

start working with China and India on developing 

regional security mechanisms and, with time, joint 

or rotational patrolling of the Persian Gulf and other 

sea arteries through which energy exports, including those of Iran, flow to global markets. It is critical 

that Washington navigates its relationship with China 

and India by institutionalizing it, given implications 

of more dynamic and strategic ties involving Tehran, 

Beijing, and New Delhi following a nuclear deal. 

But steering ties with Israel and Saudi Arabia, 

among other Arab Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) 

states, would require a lot of finesses on the part of 

Washington. Skeptics fear that neither Saudi Arabia, 

nor Israel is likely to significantly alter their policies 

vis-à-vis Iran after the conclusion of a nuclear deal, 

let alone a possible détente between Tehran and 

Washington. Washington should pursue regular and 

high-level strategic dialogues with and among all the 

concerned parties on broader regional security and 

strategic issues in order to mitigate any adverse implications from the deal.14 It should also continue policies 

emphasizing “prevention and preparation” vis-à-vis 

both Iran and Israel: discouraging Iran from obtaining 

nuclear weapons and being ready to deter should it 

“go nuclear,” while discouraging Israel from launching an attack on Iran and strengthening its capabilities 

in an effort to prepare it for a new strategic reality in 

the region. In the process, the United States should encourage intelligence sharing with Israel and communication between Israeli and Iranian security experts 

and officials on deterrence and cooperation issues.15

Washington has levers to encourage Israel to 

support U.S. positions and policies regarding a U.S.-

Iranian détente provided this rapprochement assures 
74

Israel’s core security interests and involves Iran as a 

friendlier power. Washington is Israel’s major arms 

supplier, providing it with $U.S.3 billion in military 

aid annually. Both share extensive technological, economic, and strategic ties. The United States should 

consider extending its security commitments to Israel 

but in a way that allows Israel sufficient autonomy in 

addition to enhanced protection so as not to undermine Israel’s own deterrence while enabling its freedom of action as needed.16 In parallel, Washington 

should encourage Tel-Aviv to play a constructive role 

in resolving regional conflicts, which would ease regional tensions and allow Israel to gradually improve 

ties with Iran, especially given Tel Aviv’s history of 

cooperation with Iran and their only recent strategic 

competition (both started to view one another as very 

strong rivals only in the last decade.17) 

In the case of Arab countries, especially Saudi Arabia, the United States would do well to reinforce its 

security commitments but without expanding its military posture after a nuclear deal, as it seeks to reduce 

its military presence due to gradually improving ties 

with Iran and the need to pivot to the Pacific to face assertive China. It should also encourage economic and 

security ties between Iran and the Arab states because 

resolving the region’s conflicts depends on cooperative policies between major Sunni and Shia supporters. Iran and Saudi Arabia, among other Arab states, 

have already started to work more closely, given Tehran’s growing regional profile and diminishing U.S. 

influence in the region. Washington should encourage 

their cooperation, ideally as part of institutionalized 

processes, regimes, and mechanisms, in order to build 

upon this institutional framework of cooperation 

when the time comes for a U.S.-Iranian détente. 
75

As it steers its partners, Washington should not 

lose sight of the need to restore a balance of power in 

the region. The weakened Iraq is no longer offering 

that opportunity, but there is a country that does—

Turkey. A NATO ally with the largest army in the 

Middle East and population approximating Iran’s, 

Turkey has emerged over the last decade as one of the 

world’s most dynamic economies, recently becoming 

the world’s 15th largest. Its economic prowess has enabled it to play an increasingly assertive role in the 

extended neighborhood, boosting its economic presence and political sway, including in Iran with which 

it shares strong energy and trade ties. It was Turkey 

that, along with Brazil, had brokered a nuclear swap 

deal with Iran in June 2010 as part of the Tehran Declaration, noting Tehran’s right to enrich uranium for 

peaceful purposes and stipulating that Tehran would 

ship 1,200 kilograms of low-enriched uranium to Turkey within 1 month. Washington rejected the deal 

because it failed to prevent Iran’s breakout capacity, arranging for multilateral sanctions against Iran 

rather than embracing the role of Brazil and Turkey in 

institutionalizing positive dynamics involving Iran’s 

nuclear program. The U.S. action damaged its ties 

with Turkey and Brazil, both of which voted against 

the sanctions on Iran.18

Unlike Saudi Arabia, Turkey is politically vibrant, 

economically dynamic, and militarily more competent. Unlike Iran, Turkey brings a “liberal” Islam that 

is not revolutionary or conservative and embraces 

modernism.19 Like Iran, Turkey has strengthened its 

role as a Muslim voice and has seen the center of gravity shift from the Arab core to the non-Arab periphery. 

It did so by opposing the war in Iraq and championing 

the rights of Palestinians and Muslims throughout the 
76

region during the Arab Spring.20 Washington should 

encourage Ankara to assume the mantle of a major regional power capable of balancing Iran and cooperating with it at the same time thus ensuring a more secure 

and stable regional environment, which welcomes a 

new role for a stronger Iran and a new role for Turkey 

as a counterbalancer.21 In 2013, President Obama spent 

more time in meetings and phone conversations with 

then Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan than any other 

leader attests to the strategic importance of Turkey for 

the United States in the region. Turkey has assumed 

a leading support role in Afghanistan and Iraq, mediated between Iran and the West and between Syria 

and Israel, while serving as a pivotal geo-economic 

force in the neighborhood. Washington and Ankara 

have notably kept in check their differences over Iran, 

Israel, and the Kurdish issues so as to preserve their 

strategic ties and allow more flexibility in their policies.22 Preparing Turkey for the counterbalancer role 

should also help Washington ensure that Ankara remains anchored to Western security and economic 

institutions despite its eastward push.23

ENHANCING REGIONAL ECONOMIC 

DEVELOPMENT 

Iran’s size, geopolitical position, and its geoeconomic potential make it a crucial link in the U.S. 

strategy of shrinking the “gap” and promoting the 

inclusion of fringe economies into the global economic space. But political impediments and security 

concerns surrounding Iran’s nuclear program, among 

other issues, have prevented Washington, Tehran, 

and numerous regional players from engaging in this 

historic venture. The question is not limited to Iran’s 

need for economic modernization and integration 
77

into the global economy after years of relative isolation—itself a major imperative considering the need 

for stability in the Middle East. The challenge—and 

Iran is a key to solving it—is the economic development and integration of entire regions between themselves and with the world economy. This task is acute 

given a series of wars, past and ongoing, which have 

put the issue of reconstruction of numerous countries 

and societies to the forefront of the economic development agenda of host governments, major players, 

and the international community in general. It is also 

imperative given the growing importance of global 

trade that has emerged as an “ideational fault-line” 

among policy elites in the United States in the age of 

globalization, with “trade dispositions” increasingly 

shaping U.S. “strategic choices (decisions to engage, 

contain, and use force) toward geostrategically critical 

countries.”24

Iran straddles the Greater Middle East, bordering 

parts of the Middle East, the Caspian, and Central and 

South Asia, making it a pivotal link in inter-regional 

development and integration. On its eastern flank sit 

war-torn Afghanistan and terrorism-stricken Pakistan. On its western flank lie disintegrating Iraq and 

Syria, as well as divided Lebanon, ravaged as they are 

by sectarianism, terrorism, and civil wars. To its south 

is Yemen, a tribal state with poor economic performance and prospects of disintegration, struggling (as 

Lebanon) to preserve tribal, sectarian, and ethnic balances. Iran’s cultural, economic, and political reach in 

all these countries makes it an important development 

partner for the United States. Washington should develop measures to plug Iran into emerging transcontinental energy, trade, and transit links in order to generate economic, political, and security dividends for 

itself and the greater region. 
78

A lot of this work is already being done, with or 

without the United States. Iran and its partners in the 

Middle East have expanded their ties significantly 

over the last decade. But it is Iran’s growing relations with Central and South Asian partners that are 

overlooked. Iran’s relations with India are facilitating energy, trade, and transit links between Iran and 

Central and South Asia, as well as contributing to the 

emergence of a strategic Iranian-Indian partnership 

and geopolitical rivalry between China and India in 

the greater region.25 The sanctions relief provided as 

part of the “interim nuclear deal” has led to intensified contacts between China and Iran, as well as India 

and Iran, showing the prospects of Iran’s expanding 

relations with Central and Southeast Asia. India and 

Iran seek to complete the Chabahar port, enabling 

them to link with Central Asia and Afghanistan. Currently, Pakistan impedes India’s effort to trade with 

Afghanistan, despite allowing some Afghan exports 

to reach India. Having the port, to which India has 

committed $U.S.100 million after investing $U.S.100 

million to construct a 220 kilometer-long road linking 

Afghanistan and Chabahar, would be a game changer 

for India, Iran, Central Asia, and the United States. 

(The port at Chabahar competes with the Pakistani 

port at Gwadar, which China helped finance to facilitate energy and trade flows to and from its western 

regions.) New Delhi has also recently expressed interest in building a gas pipeline from southern Kazakhstan to India. However, instability in Pakistan and Afghanistan and the standoff between Iran and the West 

have impeded India’s imports of energy resources 

from Iran and Central Asia. The United States should 

facilitate such initiatives as they serve the reconstruction and modernization needs of participating parties, 
79

contributing to the U.S. vision of an interconnected 

and more prosperous world. 

The focus on economic infrastructure is important, 

not least because of the U.S. military’s need to rely on 

it to pursue its own missions, including in Afghanistan and the wider region. The U.S. New Silk Road 

Strategy (NSRS), launched in 2011, is a welcome development as it seeks to link Central and South Asia 

with each other and the global economy by turning 

Afghanistan into a key integration hub.26 However, 

the NSRS is a concept more than it is strategy, lacking in resources and commitment by Washington and 

its partners.27 The exclusion of Iran from the regional 

integration further undermines U.S. economic policy 

in the Greater Middle East. A U.S. economic and military policy needs to consider the growing connectivity 

within Eurasia, the continent’s own integration with 

the global economy, and the role of Iran that connects 

volatile sub-regions of the Greater Middle East. In 

this light, Washington should encourage Pakistan to 

pursue the long overdue $U.S.1.5 billion-worth IranPakistan pipeline to supply gas from Iran’s South Pars 

gas field to Pakistan’s energy- and conflict-stricken 

Baluchistan and Sindh provinces, as well as support 

an extension of this pipeline to India. It should also 

encourage Pakistan and Iran—via back channels for 

now—to link their respective ports at Gwadar and 

Chabahar. Washington should further support the efforts of Iran, India, and Afghanistan to implement a 

plan to develop a “southern silk road” linking South 

Asia to Central Asia and the Gulf of Oman.The United 

States should also facilitate an agreement over water 

sharing between Kabul and Tehran in both bi- and 

multilateral frameworks and help with regional refugee and border security issues. These small steps could 

help build larger trust and enhance U.S.-Iranian ties.28
80

Washington should welcome Iran’s efforts to develop infrastructure in Afghanistan, Tajikistan, and 

Turkmenistan. Like the United States, India, Central 

Asian states, and Afghanistan, Shiite Iran is not interested in the comeback to power of the Wahhabi 

ideology-inspired Taliban in Afghanistan, where Tajiks make up one-third of the country’s predominantly 

Sunni Muslim population. Iran works closely with 

Tajikistan and Afghanistan to prevent this scenario 

and to break the relative isolation of all three Persianspeaking countries from regional and global economic 

networks. This trilateral partnership is unlikely to 

turn into a political or military alliance soon, but it 

does enable Iran to increase its influence in Central 

and South Asia, especially as it develops railway and 

energy links with Turkmenistan, as well.29 A removal 

of sanctions on Iran following a nuclear deal and a 

U.S. Iranian engagement would open more access for 

Afghanistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan to global 

markets, contributing to regional and global stability 

and allowing Washington to utilize its military assets 

for new missions. 

Washington should also support the development 

of confidence-building mechanisms regarding the use 

of Caspian energy resources, the challenge which interlinks the divergent and overlapping positions of 

Russia, Iran, the Central Asian and South Caucasus 

states, and the issue of European energy security.30 A 

U.S.-Iranian strategic engagement would prompt Iran 

to soften its opposition to Kazakhstan’s and Azerbaijan’s efforts to build underwater pipelines across the 

Caspian Sea, facilitating East-West energy and trade 

linkages. The unresolved status of the Caspian prevents littoral states from exploiting the region’s vast 

energy resources and delivering them to global mar-
81

kets. The engagement would allow Tehran and Washington to shape geopolitical dynamics in the Caucasus, where Russia is the strongest actor. It would 

also induce Russia and Caspian and Middle Eastern 

energy-producing countries to diversify their energy 

export-dependent economies once Iran’s and Caspian 

exports start inundating regional and global markets. 

The United States should also encourage expansion of 

trade ties between Iran, Turkey, and Arab countries to 

build mutual trust and cooperation while binding the 

parties economically.

With time, the United States should leverage 

Iran’s own geo-economic capabilities to advance the 

region’s internal and external integration. To do so effectively, it could even now open an interest section in 

Iran, which the George W. Bush administration considered,31 dealing with economic and other issues. But 

it would also need to encourage Iran to solicit assistance from China and India, among others, which are 

already spearheading major trade, energy, and transit 

initiatives throughout Eurasia that involve Iran and 

parts of the Greater Middle East. To start doing it now 

means being able to shape the contents and direction 

of cross-regional and global economic development 

and integration processes for the long haul—an imperative made clear by the rise of emerging powers 

capable of challenging the U.S.’s preeminent position 

in select regions.32

Iran’s geo-economic position allows it to play a 

prominent role in the neighborhood, but its outdated 

economy prevents it from utilizing its full potential. 

Subject to the progress of nuclear talks and removal of 

sanctions, the modernization of the Iranian economy 

therefore presents a critical challenge and opportunity for collaboration between Iran and the West. The 
82

United States and its European and South-East Asian 

partners could well remove unilateral sanctions on 

Iran now, while keeping UN sanctions in place subject 

to Iran’s continued cooperation in the nuclear talks.33

Iran represents a massive market for U.S. goods and 

services, especially in the oil, aviation, and computer 

industries.34 The United States and its partners would 

also do well to promote cultural and economic exchanges, people-to-people contacts, and institutional 

arrangements binding Iran to certain commitments,35

while providing it with much-needed FDI and technology transfers to boost its faltering economy. This 

would help Iran improve the efficiency of its energy 

sector, diversify its energy-export dependent economy, fight its double-digit youth unemployment, and 

replenish government coffers. Importantly, it would 

enable Iran to better connect with the immediate region and the world, allowing it to participate and 

reap benefits of its own growing external economic 

engagement and the expanding presence of other actors in the Greater Middle East. However, Iran needs 

to accelerate rather than delay measures enabling it 

to join the World Trade Organization, especially since 

the United States and European capitals dropped their 

objection in 2005.36

ADAPTING REGIONAL MILITARY POSTURE 

The U.S. regional military posture should enable 

Washington to address conventional and unconventional security threats in the Persian Gulf, but 

Washington should be careful not to overstretch its 

already strained military capabilities, certainly not 

at a time when Iran presents an opportunity to ease 

U.S. regional military burdens as the United States 
83

pivots to the Pacific. As some have argued, a major 

containment of Iran—centered on policies countering 

Iran in Iraq, disarmament of Lebanon, and protection 

of the Arab GCC states and their oil production and 

exports—would severely drain U.S. financial power, 

forcing Washington to spend the equivalent resources 

that Rome, Britain, or Spain once spent to run their 

now vanished empires.37

Washington should not change its military posture 

fundamentally until after a nuclear deal with Iran is 

made and both the United States and Iran demonstrate 

verifiable commitment to cooperation and normalization of ties. However, it can start adapting its military 

policy now by pursuing smaller changes. As it seeks 

to do so, Washington should understand a simple reality—it cannot afford another war or significant and 

long-term deployments in the Gulf in the conditions 

of austerity and its declining influence amid the rise 

of new powers. It should therefore adjust its interests 

and also focus on diplomacy to retain and enhance its 

position globally.38 Its military policy toward Iran and 

the region should hinge on explicit steps by Iran toward changes in its regional policies given the level 

of uncertainty regarding a nuclear deal, its implementation, and responses to these developments by 

U.S. partners.39 It should refrain from military threats 

and discussion of regime change against Iran.40 The 

United States should therefore back its rhetoric (in his 

2013 speech, Obama stated that the United States does 

not seek regime change) with specific actions, in return for certain steps by Iran. This is critical given the 

impact of the overall narrative of the hostile relationship between Iran and the United States and the need 

to deconstruct it to advance positive outcomes.41 As 

President John Kennedy instructed in 1962: 
84

. . . the great enemy of truth is very often not the lie—

deliberate, contrived, and dishonest—but the myth—

persistent, pervasive, and unrealistic. Too often we 

hold fast to the clichés of our forebears. We subject all 

facts to a prefabricated set of interpretations. We enjoy the comfort of opinion without the discomfort of 

thought.42

Regarding U.S. military bases, U.S. Arab partners 

could decide to either upgrade or downgrade their 

military ties, following a nuclear deal or a U.S.-Iranian 

détente.43 In this context, Washington would have to 

balance its security commitments to Arab partners 

without provoking Iran, while ensuring that it retains 

the capability of advancing its regional interests. It 

should consider the possibility of downgrading select regional bases to a semi-permanent status, while 

transforming the semi-permanent facilities to “lilypads” as part of its Global Defense Posture Review.

44 It 

could use the freed-up military resources for new missions in the Greater Middle East, the Pacific, and even 

Europe to face the increasingly assertive Islamic State 

(IS), China, and Russia. Doing so would cut costs and 

signal to Iran that the United States is confident with 

its resultant posture to meet its security needs and ensure protection of its allies. It would also encourage 

Tehran to offer its own quid pro quos. In its message, 

this move would be similar to the removal of two U.S. 

warships patrolling the Taiwan Straits and easing of 

barriers for promoting U.S.-Chinese contact (changes 

in shipping, visa, and export regimes) that the Nixon 

administration undertook to achieve a détente with 

China more than 4 decades ago.45 This, and other measures, then helped Washington to avoid a situation 

where, as Henry Kissinger later wrote, the exclusion 

of China from “America’s diplomatic option meant 
85

that America was operating internationally with one 

hand tied behind its back”—a situation similar to U.S. 

current Iran policy.46

Several factors mitigate concerns about redesigning U.S. regional military posture in case the parties 

fail to reach a nuclear deal or détente and, instead, 

have to confront each other. Iran does not have a 

strong conventional capability. Its military strategy 

relies heavily on asymmetric tactics and means—a 

deliberate response based on “asymmetrical” and 

“extraregional” warfare to the superiority of U.S. 

conventional forces.47 Iran would rely heavily on its 

ships, submarines, and short range missiles to retaliate against possible attacks, using its significant 

number of small boats to “swarm” vessels and laying 

mines in the Strait of Hormuz.48 Moreover, Israel and 

the Arab GCC states have amassed some of the latest 

weapons systems and are arguably better positioned 

in some respects to address Iran’s threats to their security. Compared to Iran, as of 2013, the United States 

spent almost 70 times more, Saudi Arabia spent more 

than quadruple, and Israel spent nearly double on 

defense.49 Washington would find it easier to reduce 

its permanent presence while keeping a large rotating 

temporary presence.50 Washington would also retain 

a capability to strike Iran. Specifically, it could use its 

carrier battle group: It operates at least one in the Gulf 

with dozens of strike aircraft as well as cruise missiles 

on surface ships and submarines. It could also use 

short-range strike aircraft and strategic bombers from 

home, Britain, or Diego Garcia.51

As part of downsizing its military presence and refocusing it after a nuclear deal and verifiable steps toward normalization of U.S.-Iranian ties, Washington 

should encourage the Arab GCC states to run select 
86

military facilities jointly or independently to spread 

the costs without significantly undermining the military balance. Washington should also improve the theater missile defenses of its allies and offer them more 

specific security guarantees, not just as an end in itself 

but as a way to generate leverage vis-à-vis Iran as it 

continues its talks with Tehran on nuclear and nonnuclear related security and economic issues.52 If Iran 

obtains overt or ambiguous nuclear weapons capability, Washington should signal its readiness to launch 

a preemptive strike against Iranian nuclear facilities if 

Tehran increased the alert status of its nuclear forces. 

Israel should consider “going open” about its nuclear 

weapons capabilities in order to boost its deterrence, 

including its second strike capability that would be 

credible in light of its small territory and population.53

Israel’s current policy is that “Israel will not be the 

first to introduce nuclear weapons into the Middle 

East. . . . Nor will it be the second.”54 Finally, Washington should consider extending a “security umbrella” 

to GCC states and Israel.55 But Israel may not welcome 

the idea if a deal with Iran leads to substantially decreased regional tensions. As a former Israeli official 

quipped, “You don’t need an umbrella if there is no 

rain.”56

Patrolling the Persian Gulf would remain a priority, even with a reassignment to the Pacific—in the 

case of a U.S.-Iranian détente—of one of the allegedly 

two U.S. carrier fleets operating in the Persian Gulf 

area. Approximately 20 percent of the world’s oil 

flowed through the Strait of Hormuz each day as of 

2012, with the United States and China being interested in ensuring a secure passage and transit of energy 

resources via the Gulf from North Africa, the Middle 

East, and Central Asia. While most of this oil comes 
87

from the Arab countries,57 the expansion of Iranian 

oil production and exports in the long run, following 

the removal of all sanctions and a nuclear deal, would 

change the energy balance (but not the goal of securing energy flows in coordination with various powers, 

big and small). As progress is made in the improvement of U.S.-Iranian ties, agreeing to deploy only one 

aircraft carrier at any time in the Gulf or the Arabian 

Sea in exchange for a gesture from Iran would signal 

U.S. intent to reduce tensions with Iran,58 while making it possible to reassign this carrier to the Pacific to 

face China’s growing naval capabilities. 

The reduction of U.S. military presence—but not 

security commitments to its allies—could help mitigate threats and prevent oil supply disruptions given 

the overall reduction in regional tensions.59 Iran’s geography—almost all of its coast is cut off by mountains—has ensured a limited role of sea power in 

Iran’s military history and thus limited development 

of its naval capabilities,60 making it possible to reduce 

costs associated with U.S. naval capabilities specifically designed to contain Iran. Of course, the imperative to ensure an adequate number of naval, air, and 

ground capabilities to protect oil supplies transiting 

via the Gulf should persist. Washington would do 

well to start pondering a formula allowing Iran to play 

a constructive role in patrolling the Gulf.61 In the short 

term, and given the possibility of a conflict rather than 

a détente with Iran emerging at any time, Washington 

should encourage its partners to use more southern 

routes within the Gulf (as water depth allows), which 

would not only make the vessels transiting there 

harder to hit in case of a possible conflict, but also enable the United States to respond more effectively.62

It should also continue experimenting with surface 
88

task forces development meant to counter Iran’s unconventional capabilities centered on its speed boats.63

These measures would signal to Iran a less menacing 

yet still capable U.S. military posture in the greater 

region. Moreover, establishing a hotline on issues of 

Gulf maritime security involving the United States, 

Iran, and the GCC states would be a welcome effort.64

As U.S. Admiral Mike Mullen stated:

We haven’t had a connection with Iran since 1979. 

Even in the darkest days of the Cold War, we had links 

to the Soviet Union. We are not talking to Iran, so we 

don’t understand each other. If something happens, 

it is virtually assured that we won’t get it right—that 

there will be miscalculation which would be extremely 

dangerous in that part of the world.65

In this context, the United States should negotiate and implement an “Incidents at Sea” agreement 

with Iran—as called for by Congressional Resolution 

94—following a related study by the Department of 

Defense (DoD) on the merits of such an agreement. 

Open source reporting indicates that the concept has 

not been implemented. But it should be, given a series 

of incidents involving Iranian vessels and British warships that may have prompted a military confrontation with Iran.66

The United States should pursue similar initiatives 

with countries whose naval capabilities are growing in the Indian and Pacific Oceans. The anticipated 

military presence of India and China—as some of the 

world’s largest energy importers—in these areas and 

the Greater Middle East and the Persian Gulf calls for 

the pursuit of common understandings and institutionalized platforms enabling a trusted participation 

of these actors in patrolling both the highs seas and 

the Gulf. This is especially important given China’s 
89

support to Iran in building anti-access/area denial 

(A2/AD) capabilities and projected expansion of U.S. 

military presence in the Pacific, where China’s development of advanced A2/AD capabilities strengthens 

its territorial claims in the South and East China Seas, 

and where chances of miscalculation and miscommunication pose a growing danger to regional stability.67

Washington should ensure it keeps its AirSea Battle 

Concept updated to counter A2/AD capabilities of its 

potential challengers while seeking to open direct lines 

of communication, and have plans in place if China 

decides to lease Iranian naval facilities in the Gulf.68

Mending ties with Iran should, in part, mitigate the 

growing regional role of China.

In the area of arms sales, the United States should 

ensure that the Arab GCC states continue to have access to U.S. weaponry before and after a rapprochement between Tehran and Washington, including 

combat aircraft, precision-guided munitions, littoral 

combat ships, radar systems, and communications 

gear. But it should not upset the conventional military 

balance and prompt Iran to pursue nuclear weapons. 

In 2012, Washington launched a “U.S.-GCC Strategic 

Dialogue” to coordinate missile defense capabilities 

of the Arab Gulf states, expressing an interest in providing weapons to the GCC states as a group. Recent 

sales include Patriot advanced capability-3 sales to 

the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Kuwait and advanced terminal high altitude area defense systems 

to the UAE and Qatar. Reports in 2012 indicated that 

the United States was installing an early-warning 

missile defense radar in the region.69 A year earlier, 

Washington agreed to supply arms worth more than 

$U.S.100 billion to Saudi Arabia, Israel, the UAE, and 

other countries in what is now one of the world’s most 

militarized regions.70
90

In case of a U.S.-Iranian strategic relationship that 

could conceivably embolden Iran (with or without a 

nuclear weapon), Washington could expand the sales 

of defensive capabilities, naval and air drills, and integration of partner systems with U.S. missile defense 

systems, while being careful not to provoke Iran which 

is successfully developing its missile capabilities.71

Tehran’s ballistic missiles program is already fairly 

advanced, wielding short-range and medium-range 

missiles capable of reaching the entire Middle East 

and parts of southern Europe. DoD projects that by 

2015, Iran, which has the region’s largest number of 

ballistic missiles, could have an intercontinental ballistic missile capable of reaching the U.S. east coast.72 A 

2014 DoD report shows that Iran continues to develop 

A2/AD capabilities to control the Strait of Hormuz, 

advanced naval mines, submarines, coastal defense, 

and anti-ship cruise missile capabilities.73

In 2008, Washington agreed with Poland and the 

Czech Republic to set up a missile defense system to 

counter Iranian ballistic missiles, but later decided to 

temporarily switch to ship-based systems, likely as 

a quid pro quo for Russia’s support on Iran.74 Washington should continue using this card to encourage 

Moscow’s cooperation on Iran, while signaling U.S. 

willingness not to design systems specifically targeted 

against Iran in return for Tehran’s steps to normalize ties. It should further assist Israel with its shift to 

a three-tier missile defense system based on the Arrow II, Arrow III, Patriot, and David’s Sling systems 

to offset possible failure with any one or more of the 

systems.75 The United States should also continue 

cooperation with the Arab GCC states involving the 

U.S.-sponsored Integrated Air Defense Center for Excellence built near the air force headquarters in Abu 
91

Dhabi, UAE. The center is designed to simulate defense against incoming missiles and develop common 

responses among the Arab GCC states.76

But Washington should also leverage its arms sales 

to Israel and the Arab GCC states to encourage them 

to follow a U.S. lead on Iran, while being careful not 

to push them too much or irreversibly into an orbit 

of rival weapons suppliers, such as Russia and China, 

among others. After all, Iran is unlikely to dramatically reverse course in its ties with Israel and Saudi 

Arabia shortly following a nuclear deal, given the continued grip on power by Khamenei and the Guards.77

The United States should also be careful to leave more 

legal room in its arms sales contracts to maintain 

a balance of power in the region that would see an 

even more powerful Iran, which itself with time may 

be interested in acquiring U.S. weapons. This would 

ensure that: a) The Arab states have a stronger sense 

of security; b) Iran is aware of the U.S. security commitment to the Arab states; and, c) Washington may 

consider selling its weapons to Iran if Tehran normalizes its relations with Washington and cooperates in 

addressing regional challenges as a responsible actor. 

The United States and its partners should stand 

ready for a shift in the capabilities, theaters of operations, and the regional presence of terrorists groups 

and demonstrate readiness to cooperate with Iran in 

fighting transnational terrorism. The number of attacks by al-Qaeda-affiliated groups skyrocketed between 2007 and 2013, with the IS leading the charge in 

2013 (43 percent), followed by al-Shabaab (25 percent), 

Jabhat al-Nusrah (21 percent), and al-Qaeda in the 

Arabian Peninsula (10 percent). Meanwhile, the number of jihadists doubled between 2010 and 2013, with 

the war in Syria representing the leading source of recruits.78 Few could predict the emergence of the IS as 
92

a potent force in Iraq and Syria, let alone its growing 

appeal worldwide following expressions of allegiance 

to it by militant groups based outside the Middle East. 

Washington, Iran, and their partners should all join 

forces to prevent radicalization and intercept activities by the IS, al-Qaeda, and a host of other terrorist 

groups in the Greater Middle East and South-East 

Asia. Just recently, the IS announced efforts to expand 

its operational reach into Central-South Asia, while alQaeda created its own South Asia wing and planned 

to hijack a Pakistani warship and attack a U.S. Navy 

vessel at a base near the port city of Karachi in September 2014. In another case, in November 2014, a threat 

of attack on India’s eastern port and city of Kolkata, 

prompted India’s navy to withdraw two warships 

from the port.79

Washington and Tehran could now focus on counterterrorism efforts in the framework of their relations 

and cooperation with key players in Iraq, Afghanistan, and especially Pakistan given its own domestic threat of terrorism and likely increased profile in 

Afghanistan’s political and security scene after the 

drawdown of U.S. forces from Afghanistan by 2016.80

They should also focus their counterterrorism efforts 

on Africa, which is rapidly emerging as a major theater of terrorist planning and operations. With time, 

the collaboration with Iran and the resolution or mitigation of conflicts in the Middle East, could free up 

military, economic, and diplomatic resources to deal 

with reconstruction of Iraq and Syria and emerging 

terrorist threats in Africa. Finally, they should stand 

ready for the emergence of terrorist groups with hybrid capabilities. The case of the IS shows the emergence of groups capable of using conventional military resources and tactics to pursue political ends of 

conquering and holding a populace and territory. 
93

Furthermore, the United States and Iran already 

have an opportunity to collaborate on counternarcotics activities. This concerns the construction, equipping, and manning of border posts along the IranAfghan border as well as sharing of intelligence in 

bi- and multilateral settings. Iran sits on some of the 

world’s most active narco-trafficking routes emanating from Afghanistan, responsible for production of 

some 90 percent of the world’s illicit opiates distributed via Iran, Central and South Asia.81 The involvement of terrorist groups in drug-trafficking calls for 

flexible counternarcotics and counterterrorist policies 

that benefit from interdepartmental and cross-functional exchanges of expertise and joint activities across 

international borders and with participation of several 

countries, including Iran. Stemming the production 

and flow of drugs is also a major inter-regional economic development concern given the impact of drug 

distribution and use on Iran’s and the region’s young 

population, corruption, and lost economic opportunities due to the undermined social and health fabric of 

local societies. Washington should thus provide logistical and financial support to the UN-backed Triangular Initiative advancing counternarcotics collaboration 

among Iran, Pakistan, and Afghanistan.82

ADVANCING REGIONAL 

INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY 

Construction of institutional frameworks of cooperation in military, security, and economic development areas is a critical task for countries that are embroiled in regional conflicts and are still modernizing 

but severely lack cooperation mechanisms trusted by 

neighbors or their own citizens. This imperative is 
94

closely linked with the idea of interconnectedness and 

interdependence that proponents of the Peace Theory 

argue mitigates the risk of war by advancing the costs 

of disruption of created networks. But it offers something more: Institutional frameworks of cooperation 

also advance the importance of legal cultures and 

rules spanning domestic and international realms for 

enhancing national, regional, and global stability. The 

Greater Middle East, or “the region of wars” as I call it, 

faces numerous conflicts but lacks trusted cooperation 

mechanisms despite connections that countries have 

built up with each other in select areas. Moreover, 

existing and potential conflicts may prompt intervention that would require an expanded role of ground 

forces. The U.S. military’s transformation necessitates 

the development and introduction of new concepts 

of engagement and reconstruction on the ground to 

promote peace after waging war—a type of “system 

administrators” force concept in order to ensure a 

smooth transition from war to peace, associated with 

reconstruction efforts and needs.83

In this regard, the U.S.-Iranian competition, as 

well as cooperation, has major implications for legal 

frameworks, regimes, and governance mechanisms 

that together shape the emerging global security and 

economic order, making it imperative for the United 

States to develop governance frameworks and avoid 

situations where its threats to use force are no longer 

credible and are strategically damaging.84 The growing profile of Iran and tectonic shifts anticipated following a nuclear deal or a U.S.-Iranian détente further 

call for the development of such frameworks to mitigate misperception and miscalculation, to improve 

trust and collaboration, as well as to advance security 

and stability. The possibility of Iran “going nuclear” 
95

only adds urgency to pursue this undertaking early 

on. As Israel’s former Foreign Minister Shlomo BenAmi asserts: 

The question today is not when Iran will have nuclear 

power, but how to integrate it into a policy of regional 

stability before it obtains such power. Iran is not driven by an obsession to destroy Israel, but by its determination to preserve its regime and establish itself as a 

strategic regional power, vis-à-vis both Israel and the 

Sunni Arab States. . . . The answer to the Iranian threat 

is a policy of détente, which would change the Iranian 

elite’s pattern of conduct.85

In the realm of security cooperation and institutionalization, Washington should advance the resolution of regional conflicts by leveraging effectively its 

ties with select actors and relying on their assistance 

to create a stake for them in the process and demonstrate the benefits of their constructive involvement. 

Built-up antagonisms and tensions, including those 

that are centered and could be addressed with Iran’s 

involvement, make it almost necessary for the United 

States to start advancing a multilateral framework of 

regional security cooperation involving Turkey, Iran, 

Israel, and the Arab states.86 Washington should also 

encourage the creation of a Gulf Security Forum that 

would assure its members of noninterference, build 

mutual confidence, expand crises management and 

conflict prevention capacity, and ensure collaboration 

against common security threats and economic challenges, among other goals.87 Doing so while increasing 

and highlighting the importance of regional cooperation platforms such as the Manama Dialogue is particularly important due to current apprehensions about 

the “interim nuclear deal,” the perceived sell-out of 
96

Arab countries in favor of Iran, and the noninclusion 

of the GCC members in the negotiations led by P5+1. 

The apprehensions have prompted a Kuwaiti commentator to observe that Arab countries “are not at the 

table but on it”88 and have served to undercut a Saudi 

position on a U.S.-Iranian détente—“engagement yes, 

marriage no.”89

The United States and the Persian Gulf countries 

should further develop memorandums of understanding with China and India on ways these actors can assist with regional security needs upon request from 

the regional countries in consultation with the United 

States. Washington would do well to also promote the 

concept and practice of a weapons of mass destruction (WMD)-free zone in the Middle East, especially 

given a strong possibility that Iran could obtain nuclear weapons capability and prompt other regional 

actors to consider acquiring it. A related task is to start 

strengthening the Non-Proliferation Treaty regime by 

promoting additional protocols and separate treaties, 

while developing nuclear forensics capabilities and 

a global repository of nuclear material samples that 

would help track the proliferation of WMD materials 

and discourage their use and proliferation.90

These measures would serve regional stability and 

help assuage concerns of U.S. allies, especially Israel, 

associated with perceived negative implications stemming from a nuclear deal or a U.S.-Iranian détente.91

After all, Israel and the Arab states may choose to reject 

rather than adapt to a nuclear deal, let alone a détente, 

and attempt to sabotage both without having to strike 

Iran. Israel may forcefully respond to Hezbollah and 

Iranian arms shipments to the group via Syria, while 

Saudi Arabia may pursue a nuclear weapons capability and more actively support Sunni militant groups 
97

and political factions targeting Iran’s interests.92 A resultant escalation of tensions or war could engulf other parties, especially given U.S. commitments to allies 

and warnings by Iranian leaders that Iran could retaliate against Qatar and Bahrain—the countries hosting 

the U.S. Fifth Fleet and Central Command—in a case 

of war against the Islamic Republic. 

A détente of the Arab states with Iran would lessen the role of Tehran as a “rallying cry” for Muslims 

worldwide.93 If Israel and the Arab states chose to 

adapt, they would be tempted to increase their collaboration while pursuing missile defense development 

and, in Israel’s case, measures to enhance the benefits 

of its nuclear posture for deterrence purposes. The 

United States should seek to assist and regulate related 

measures but explicitly warn its partners that it would 

not support a strike on Iran after a nuclear deal (barring extraordinary circumstances or new revelations 

about Iran’s noncompliance). In parallel, Washington 

should consider extending its nuclear umbrella to the 

Arab states in the Gulf, in addition to maintaining 

35,000 American forces operating throughout GCC 

states as part of Defense Cooperation Agreements.94 It 

should further seek to engage both Israel and the Arab 

states in regional platforms involving Iran so as to 

avoid a possible political split between Israel and the 

Arab GCC states on the issue of Iran, as Iran’s growing regional profile may drive a wedge between Israel 

and the Arab states.95 Washington and NATO could 

also offer NATO membership to Israel, but Europeans 

and Israelis may consider twice on this, given the freedom of action that Israel cherishes.96

In the economic sphere, the United States should 

encourage actors to develop multilateral trade, energy, and transit initiatives involving Israel, the Arab 
98

states, Turkey, and Iran. Doing so would advance regional interdependence and ensure that the regional 

countries and external actors can more effectively 

shape Iran’s gradual or accelerated integration into 

the regional economic fabric. It should advance similar initiatives involving Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, 

Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, 

Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan, based on regional 

and cross-regional formats in Central-South Asia, a 

region that lacks integration with the global economy. 

Iran’s central geo-economic position in the Greater 

Middle East suggests the need for the United States to 

engage it in economic initiatives of transregional and 

transcontinental importance. This need would become 

more pronounced, and initiatives of the sort would be 

self-propelling, if sanctions on Iran were removed following conclusion of a nuclear deal. Until then, and 

as part of a sanctions relief package already provided, 

the United States and its P5+1 partners should clearly 

demonstrate to Tehran the benefits of economic engagement by enabling Iran to make substantial trade, 

investment, and technology transfer deals with P5+1 

members (with appropriate clauses allowing the parties to disengage in case of failed negotiations with as 

few losses as possible). 

In the area of political transitions, the United 

States should be careful not to disrupt regional power 

balance(s) in the Greater Middle East by spearheading democratization using military or political instruments. But it should be ready to anticipate and channel democratization as a systemic force that can either 

upset or advance regional power balance(s). The Arab 

Spring, controversial as it is in its manifestations and 

implications, has demonstrated the extent of popular 

frustration with dictatorial rule in several countries of 
99

the region and the degree of force that can be brought 

to bear by the population—Islamists or secularists—

on the powers-that-be. The ongoing modernization 

and integration of the Greater Middle East into the 

global economic and security architecture is bound 

to proceed with tensions between the modernists and 

traditionalists, the Islamists and the secularists, the 

democrats and the dictators. The United States should 

continue with a democratization agenda as part of its 

political rather than military policy, but be more adept at using this tool to promote its multifaceted interests. Where the tensions have built up substantially, 

it should engage opposing forces early on to mitigate 

any fallout from rapid or sudden political transitions, 

especially in relatively dynamic countries that are also 

pivotal to the U.S. global strategy: Turkey, Iran, Saudi 

Arabia, Egypt, and Pakistan. 

ENDNOTES—CHAPTER 4

1. Taken from Flynt Leverett and Hillary Mann Leverett, Going to Tehran: Why the United States Must Come to terms with the Islamic Republic of Iran, New York: Metropolitan Books, 2013, p. 60.

2. Dennis Ross, “Diplomatic Strategies for Dealing with Iran,” 

James N. Miller, Christine Parthemore, and Kurt M. Campbell 

eds., Iran: Assessing U.S. Strategic Options, Washington, DC: The 

Center for New American Security, September 2008, p. 10.

3. Nori Kasting and Brandon Fite, U.S. and Iranian Strategic 

Competition: The Impact of China and Russia, Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), November 28, 

2012, p. 5.

4. Jon B. Alterman with Carolyn Barnett, “Turkey, Russia, and 

Iran in the Middle East,” Samuel Brannen, ed., The Turkey, Russia, 

Iran Nexus: Evolving Power Dynamics in the Middle East, the Caucasus, and Central Asia, Washington, DC: CSIS, 2013, p. 9. 
100

5. Andrew E. Kramernov, “Russia Reaches Deal With Iran 

to Construct Nuclear Plants,” The New York Times, November 

11, 2014. 

6. Kasting and Fite, p. 41.

7. Ibid., p. 47.

8. Ibid., pp. 4-14, 23.

9. Scott Harold and Alireza Nader, China and Iran: Economic, Political, and Military Relations, Santa Monica, CA: RAND 

Corporation, 2012, pp. 1-2, 13, 20.

10. Ibid.

11. Harsh V. Pan, “India and Iran: An Axis in the Making?” 

Asian Survey, Vol. 44, No. 3, May/June 2004, pp. 369-383.

12. Thomas P. M. Barnett, The Pentagon’s New Map: Blueprint 

for Action, New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 2005, pp. 83-84.

13. Seyed Hossein Mousavian with Shahir Shahidsaless, Iran 

and the United States: An Insider’s View on the Failed Past and the 

Road to Peace, New York: Bloomsbury, 2014, p. 290.

14. For discussion on this, see Dalia Dassa Kaye and Jeffrey 

Martini, The Days After a Deal with Iran: Regional Responses to a Final 

Nuclear Agreement, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2014. 

15. See Dalia Dassa Kaye, Alireza Nader, and Parisa Roshan, 

Israel and Iran: A Dangerous Rivalry, Santa Monica, CA: RAND 

Corporation, 2011, pp. xii-xiv.

16. Ibid., p. xii.

17. See Ibid., pp. ix-xi.

18. Alterman with Barnett, p. 10. 

19. Also see Alireza Nader, The Days After a Deal with Iran: 

Continuity and Change in Iranian Foreign Policy, Santa Monica, CA: 

RAND Corporation, 2014, p. 9.
101

20. Fawaz A. Gerges, “The Obama Approach to the Middle 

East: The End of America’s Moment?” International Affairs, Vol. 

89, No. 2, 2013, pp. 155-157.

21. George Friedman, The Next Decade, New York: Doubleday, 

2011, pp. 106-119.

22. Gerges, pp. 316-318.

23. Roman Muzalevsky, “Turkey Looks Forward, Talks SCO,” 

Eurasia Daily Monitor, Vol. 10, Issue 27, February 13, 2013.

24. Richard K. Herrmann and Jonathan W. Keller, “Beliefs, 

Values, and Strategic Choice: U.S. Leaders’ Decision to Engage, 

Contain, and Use Force in an Era of Globalization,” The Journal of 

Politics, Vol. 66, No. 2, May, 2004, p. 576.

25. See Sergej Mahnovski, Kamil Akramov, and Theodore 

Karasik, Economic Dimensions of Security in Central Asia, Santa 

Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2006. Also see Rollie Lal, Central Asia and Its Asian Neighbors: Security and Commerce at the Crossroads, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2006.

26. For an outline of the concept, see S. Frederick Starr, In Defense of Greater Central Asia, Washington, DC: The Central AsiaCaucasus Institute, 2008. Also see S. Frederick Starr, Afghanistan 

Beyond the Fog of Nation-Building: Giving Economic Strategy a Chance, 

Washington, DC: The Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, 2011. Also 

see S. Frederick Starr and Andrew Kuchins, with Stephen Benson 

et al., The Key to Success in Afghanistan: A Modern Silk Road Strategy, 

Washington, DC: The Central Asia-Caucasus Institute in cooperation with the Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2010. 

27. Jeffrey Mankoff, The United States and Central Asia After 

2014, Washington, DC: CSIS, 2013, p. 21.

28. Alireza Nader, Ali G. Scotten, Ahmad Idrees Rahmani, 

Robert Stewart, and Leila Mahnad, Iran’s Influence in Afghanistan: 

Implications for the U.S. Drawdown, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2014, pp. vii-viii.
102

29. Roman Muzalevsky, “The ‘Persian Alliance’ and Geopolitical Reconfiguration in Central Asia,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, 

Vol. 7, Issue 161, September 9, 2010.

30. For a discussion of these initiatives, see Nader et al., Iran’s 

Influence in Afghanistan, pp. 24-40.

31. Gawdat Bahgat, “United States-Iranian Relations: The 

Terrorism Challenge,” Parameters, Vol. 38, No. 4, 2009, p. 107.

32. For a discussion on needed U.S. policy measures to shape related regional and global dynamics, see Roman Muzalevsky, Central Asia’s Shrinking Connectivity Gap: Implications for U.S. Strategy, Carlisle, PA: 

Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, November 

2014, pp. 131-155.

33. John Tirman, A New Approach to Iran: The Need for Transformative Diplomacy, Cambridge, MA: MIT Center for International 

Studies, July 2009, p. 29.

34. Robin Wright and Shaul Bakhash, “The U.S. and Iran: An 

Offer They Can’t Refuse?” Foreign Policy, No. 108, Autumn 1997, 

p. 125. Also see Tamim K. Kashgari, “Understanding Iran: Between Central Asia and the Gulf Cooperation Council,” Student 

Pulse, Vol. 3, No. 4, p. 125.

35. Independent Task Force Report, Iran: Time for a New 

Approach, New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2004, p. 7.

36. James K. Sebenius and Michael K. Singh, “Is a Nuclear 

Deal with Iran Possible? An Analytical Framework for the Iran 

Nuclear Negotiations,” International Security, Vol. 37, No. 3, 2012-

13, p. 82. 

37. Robert Bayer, The Devil We Know: Dealing with the New Iranian Superpower, New York: Three Rivers Press, 2008, p. 138.

38. Tirman, pp. 4-5. 

39. Lynn E. Davis, The Days After a Deal with Iran: U.S. Policies 

of Hedging and Engaging, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 

2014, p. 6. 
103

40. Ibid., p. 33. Also see Independent Task Force Report, p. 42.

41. Christopher Ferrero, “The Iran Narrative: The Ideational 

Context of US Foreign Policy Decision-Making toward the Islamic 

Republic of Iran,” Iran and the Caucasus, Vol. 17, 2013, p. 71. On 

causes of the narrative, see Paul R. Pillar, “The Role of Villain: 

Iran and U.S. Foreign Policy,” Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 128, 

No. 2, Summer 2013, pp. 217-226.

42. Quoted in Leverett and Mann Leverett, p. 8.

43. Davis, p. 5.

44. For a discussion on the goals of this review, see Alexander 

Cooley, Base Politics: Democratic Change and the U.S. Military Overseas, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008, pp. 217-238.

45. Tirman, p. 20.

46. Hillary Mann Leverett, “How Precipitous a Decline? U.S.-

Iranian Relations and the Transition from American Primacy,” 

Penn State Journal of Law and International Affairs, Vol. 2, No. 2, 

2013, p. 347. 

47. Vali Nasr, “The Implications of Military Confrontation 

with Iran,” James N. Miller, Christine Parthemore, and Kurt M. 

Campbell, eds., Iran: Assessing U.S. Strategic Options, Washington, 

DC: The Center for New American Security, September 2008, pp. 

101-102.

48. Kenneth Katzman, Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses, Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, October 1, 

2014, p. 56.

49. Leverett and Mann Leverett, p. 25.

50. Davis, p. 8.

51. Ashton B. Carter, “Military Elements in a Strategy to Deal 

with Iran’s Nuclear Program,” in Miller, Parthemore, and Campbell, eds., p. 82.
104

52. Miller, Parthemore, and Campbell, eds., p. 22.

53. Richard N. Haass, “Living with a Nuclear Iran,” Miller, 

Parthemore, and Campbell, eds., pp. 116-117.

54. Kaye, Nader, and Roshan, p. 49.

55. Katzman, p. 56.

56. Kaye, Nader, and Roshan, p. 53.

57. Kasting and Fite, p. 15.

58. Kenneth M. Pollack, Daniel L. Byman, Martin Indyk et al., 

Which Path to Persia: Options for a New American Strategy toward 

Iran, Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 2009, p. 40.

59. Mann Leverett, “How Precipitous a Decline? . . .,” 

pp. 331-332.

60. Steven R. Ward, Immortal: A Military History of Iran and 

Its Armed Forces, Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 

2009, pp. 5-7.

61. Bayer, p. 257.

62. Caitlin Talmadge, “Closing Time: Assessing the Iranian 

Threat to the Strait of Hormuz,” International Security, Vol. 33, No. 

1, Summer, 2008, pp. 116-117.

63. David Christ, The Twilight War: The Secret History of America’s Thirty-Year Conflict with Iran, New York: The Penguin Press, 

2012, pp. 558-561.

64. Kaye and Martini, p. 16. 

65. Quoted in Parsi, A Single Role of the Dice, p. 240. 

66. Taken from Katzman, p. 54.

67. Kasting and Fite, p .7.
105

68. Harold and Nader, pp. 18-19.

69. Taken from Katzman, pp. 55-56.

70. Gerges, p. 179.

71. Davis, p. 5.

72. Kroenig, pp. 117-118.

73. See Annual Report on Military Power of Iran, Unclassified Executive Summary, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of 

Defense, January 2014.

74. Katzman, p. 56.

75. Kaye, Nader, and Roshan, p. 47.

76. Christ, pp. 558-561.

77. Nader, p. 8.

78. Anthony H. Cordesman, “The Need for Better CivilMilitary Planning,” Craig Cohen and Josiane Gabel, eds., Global Forecast 2015: Crisis and Opportunity, Washington, DC: CSIS, 

2014, p. 53.

79. Jibran Ahmad, “Taliban Group Threatens to Attack India 

Following Border Blast,” Reuters, November 5, 2014.

80. Alireza Nader, Ali G. Scotten, Ahmad Idrees Rahmani, 

Robert Stewart, and Leila Mahnad, Iran’s Influence in Afghanistan: 

Implications for the U.S. Drawdown, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2014, p. 30.

81. For more information on the drugs production and distribution, see the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and the 

Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Ministry of Counter Narcotics, 

Afghanistan Opium Survey, Kabul, Afghanistan, November 2014.

82. Nader, Scotten et al., pp. vii-viii.
106

83. Barnett, pp. 2, 104.

84. Flynt Leverett, “The Iranian Nuclear Issue, the End of the 

American Century, and the Future of International Order,” Journal of Law and International Affairs, Vol. 2, Issue 2, 2013, pp. 240-245.

85. Trita Parsi, Treacherous Alliance: The Secret Dealings of Israel, Iran, and the U.S., New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 

2007, p. 281.

86. Wyn Q. Bowen and Joanna Kidd, “The Iranian Nuclear 

Challenge,” International Affairs, Vol. 80, No. 2, p. 274. 

87. Independent Task Force Report, p. 47.

88. Kaye and Martini, pp. 12-16.

89. Trita Parsi, A Single Role of the Dice: Obama’s Diplomacy with 

Iran, New Haven, CT, and London, UK: Yale University Press, 

2012, p. 15.

90. Miller, Parthemore, and Campbell, eds., p. 24.

91. Tirman, p. 42.

92. Kaye and Martini, pp. 6-7; 10-14.

93. Nasr, p. 105.

94. Kaye and Martini, pp. 8-10, 15.

95. Kaye, Nader, and Roshan, p. 28.

96. Pollack, Byman, Indyk et al., pp. 137-138.
107

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

WHAT IS NEXT?—PROSPECTS, VISION, STEPS

You cannot prevent and prepare for war at the same 

time.

 Albert Einstein1

Prospects for the U.S.-Iranian ties to improve are 

clearly there, and both administrations should stick to 

the plan of agreeing on a final nuclear deal that could 

facilitate the emergence of a strategic relationship 

between Iran and the United States, which both parties need more than ever in the current conditions of 

economic and security challenges and opportunities. 

This suggests choosing a route and riding it through 

rather than pursing two and not arriving at either destination. Because the U.S. administration for now has 

chosen not to engage in war (as it would also inflict 

significant damage to itself, its allies, and the region 

at large) and because the Iranian administration has 

chosen to engage rather than confront Washington, 

both parties are in a good position to advance from 

the state of estrangement to a détente in the long term. 

President Hassan Rouhani already seeks to make 

multiliteralism and expansion of ties with global economic institutions a foreign policy priority and a way 

to contribute to “global norm-setting.” This fits with 

the U.S. vision of its foreign policy under the Obama 

administration that has sought more multilateralism 

and engagement, including with Iran if it is ready to 

negotiate in good faith and for a good purpose. What 

both sides now need is extreme will and patience—
108

both demonstrated relatively well recently—as they 

continue negotiating on nuclear related challenges 

and, increasingly likely, other issues of mutual concern. The United States and Iran should agree that 

Tehran’s right to uranium enrichment for civilian 

purposes should continue as long as it is a transparent and verifiable process. They should also start exploring, sooner rather than later, possible avenues of 

cooperation on counterterrorism and resolution of 

regional conflicts. 

In the process, neither the United States, nor Iran 

should shy away from unilateral gestures, which 

should show good will and genuine efforts to find 

common ground but which should not compromise 

the parties’ fundamental positions or interests without a comprehensive nuclear or non-nuclear accord. 

As part of the current sanctions relief package, Washington could already open doors for economic cooperation between the West and Iran, enabling Iran to 

modernize its relatively outdated economy. Tehran, 

in return, could offer a helping hand to Washington in stabilizing and/or reversing gains of militant 

groups in Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon, Yemen, 

and Palestinian territories, saving Washington enormous resources. In this context, Iran’s recent cooperation efforts in response to developments in Iraq (the 

advance of the IS and replacement of Prime Minister 

Nouri al-Maliki) and Afghanistan (hints of stabilization support) are actions that under a more substantive framework of strategic relations could translate 

into constructive regional dynamics aimed at containing/reversing hostile gains. 

If Tehran and Washington were to pull it off by 

2030, their strategic engagement would allow them to 

address a wide range of shared security and economic 
109

challenges in the wider region, including but not limited to: a relatively insecure transit of energy resources 

in, through, and out of Iran as well as via the Strait of 

Hormuz, which prevents the United States from redeploying some of its regional military assets to other 

regions, especially in the context of the U.S. “pivot” 

to the Pacific; prevalent drug-trafficking in the region, 

including through Iran; the reconstruction needs following conflicts in Syria, Iraq, Libya, Yemen, and Afghanistan, which have in part prompted the deployment of U.S. military assets on Iran’s flanks; radicalism 

and terrorism targeting Western and Iranian interests; 

the relative isolation of Iran and other regional states 

from global and regional markets; and Washington’s 

continued diminishing global influence. 

A constructive and strategic U.S.-Iranian relationship would enable the United States and countries of 

the Greater Middle East to facilitate a faster, more secure, and smoother regional connectivity to the world 

economy, contributing to the global and regional 

economic and security order. Washington could free 

up some military resources it currently deploys to 

keep Iran in check. This includes the military forces 

positioned and rotated into the Greater Middle East, 

especially in the Persian Gulf area, the deployment 

and use of which could be reformatted and repurposed to deal with pressing challenges elsewhere, as 

in Asia and Europe, and/or to address new threats 

in the same region. Some of these new threats could 

stem from the geopolitical and geo-economic realignment in the Greater Middle East spurred by a possible 

U.S.-Iranian strategic relationship. Ultimately, such a 

relationship would adjust and overhaul U.S. military 

doctrines, policies, and strategies, not only vis-à-vis 

Iran but a whole spectrum of countries in this volatile 
110

region, making it imperative to align military resources with the new vision and goals in a coherent fashion. 

This process would be incremental, given the odds of 

selective strategic engagement emerging as a more 

realistic form of a U.S.-Iranian relationship by 2030. 

Whatever the type of strategic relationship emerges, the United States cannot afford to lose its stake in 

shaping transformational developments unfolding 

in the Greater Middle East and involving Iran. Iran’s 

global integration and regional engagement could 

advance U.S. global strategy by repositioning and repurposing U.S. regional assets, especially given the 

possibility of Iran “going nuclear” and the growing 

profile of China and India, which are expected to enhance their regional economic presence by accompanying it with a possible projection of military capabilities in the coming years. Tehran’s agreement to limit 

its nuclear program in return for sanctions relief has 

already led to intensified relations between China and 

Iran, as well as India and Iran, showing the prospects 

of Iran’s expanding relations with Central and SouthEast Asia. Shaping these transformational processes is 

a key to U.S. global standing for decades to come. 

A U.S.-Iranian constructive strategic engagement would enhance the interconnectedness of Eurasia and advance the U.S. post-World War II global 

strategy of fostering global connectivity, unimpeded 

global trade, and global security. Tehran has already 

been seeking to expand its economic ties with Central 

Asian countries, which link South-East Asia with Iran 

and the rest of the Middle East, by participating in 

trade, transport, and hydro-energy projects. These are 

the areas of collaboration that Washington, Beijing, 

New Delhi, and capitals throughout the continent can 

hardly ignore, given the isolation of Central and South 
111

Asian countries from Eurasian and global markets 

and security concerns post-2016 when coalition troops 

plan to withdraw fully from Afghanistan. Specifically, 

Washington could with time extend its New Silk Road 

Strategy, which seeks to develop and position Afghanistan as a trade and transit hub of Central and South 

Asia, to the Greater Middle East by incorporating the 

active and growing participation of a conveniently 

located Iran.

Iran’s participation in the development of transcontinental trade, energy, and transit infrastructure 

has direct implications for U.S. military logistics, basing arrangements, deployment of military assets, and 

strengthening of institutional and partner military ties 

with select regional countries. This is especially so, 

given projected geopolitical changes that would spur 

a need for new missions in Eurasia and given the resurgence of Russia, China, and India as rising powers 

with global aspirations. Washington should therefore 

be prepared to face adverse risks stemming from the 

realignment of geopolitical relations in the Greater 

Middle East following a nuclear accord and, importantly, after a possible strategic détente with Iran by 

2030. This primarily concerns the ties between predominantly Sunni and Shiite states, on the one hand, 

and the ties between the United States and Saudi 

Arabia, among others, on the other. 

As they cultivate their strategic relationship, Tehran and Washington should promote confidence ties 

in the region. Doing so via institutional frameworks 

across defense and other areas—a treaty or an organization including regional parties—would minimize 

the fallout of the geopolitical realignment prompted 

by a U.S.-Iranian détente and would also prevent major external powers from capitalizing on this realign-
112

ment to advance an agenda contrary, detrimental, or 

hostile to U.S. global and regional interests. Washington should further design policies to restore a regional 

balance of power by engaging the rising Turkey. In 

the process, Washington should clearly demonstrate 

its commitment to ensuring stability by advancing 

cooperation platforms to minimize the prospects of 

yet another conflict—especially one involving Iran—

in the Greater Middle East. As Albert Einstein once 

said, “You cannot prevent and prepare for war at the 

same time.”

ENDNOTES—CHAPTER 5

1. Taken from Trita Parsi, A Single Role of the Dice: Obama’s 

Diplomacy with Iran, New Haven, CT, and London, UK: Yale 

University Press, 2012, p. 1.
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General William E. Rapp

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

and

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE PRESS

Director

Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Director of Research

Dr. Steven K. Metz

Author

Mr. Roman Muzalevsky

Editor for Production

Dr. James G. Pierce

Publications Assistant

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

*****

Composition

Mrs. Jennifer E. Nevil