COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Chief Judge Fitzpatrick, Judges Frank and Clements 

DEANNA PORTER 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION*

v. Record No. 3093-03-1 PER CURIAM 

 MAY 18, 2004 

DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCE 

 MANAGEMENT, DEPARTMENT OF 

 EMPLOYMENT DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND 

 NORFOLK STATE UNIVERSITY 

 FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NORFOLK 

Jerome James, Judge 

 (Curtis T. Brown, on brief), for appellant. 

 (Jerry W. Kilgore, Attorney General; Joseph R. Carico, Chief Deputy 

Attorney General; Judith Williams Jagdmann, Deputy Attorney 

General; Guy W. Horsley, Jr., Special Assistant Attorney General, on 

brief), for appellee. 

 Deanna Porter was employed by Norfolk State University (NSU) and was terminated 

effective January 10, 2003 pursuant to the issuance of a Group III Written Notice. Porter initiated a 

grievance challenging her termination. Following an April 23, 2003 grievance hearing, the hearing 

officer upheld the termination. Porter then appealed to the Department of Human Resource 

Management (DHRM), which affirmed the hearing officer’s decision on July 9, 2003. Thereafter, 

the circuit court affirmed DHRM’s decision in a November 10, 2003 final order. Porter appeals to 

this Court from that order. On appeal, she argues she “was never afforded due process in this 

matter.” 

 *

 Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication. 
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 Upon reviewing the record and briefs of the parties, we conclude that this appeal is without 

merit. Accordingly, we summarily affirm the decision of the trial court. See Rule 5A:27. 

Background

 On December 13, 2002, NSU issued to Porter a Group II Written Notice with termination 

effective January 10, 2003 for “failure to follow a supervisor’s instructions, perform assigned work, 

or otherwise comply with established policy.” The termination was based in part on NSU’s 

determination that Porter used her position within the school’s registrar’s office to register herself 

for classes. This registration violated NSU’s policy because Porter had unpaid balances due NSU at 

the time. Upon receipt of the notice, Porter indicated she disagreed with the charge. NSU 

conducted an investigation, reported its findings in writing, and determined the facts supported the 

charges against Porter. NSU also determined Porter had an active Group III Notice on file for past 

misconduct. 

 During the grievance review process, NSU invalidated the earlier Group III Notice. NSU 

also rescinded the December 13, 2002 Group II Notice, finding the offense was serious enough to 

warrant a Group III Notice. NSU issued the new Group III Notice, alleging an “abuse of her 

position and role within the University, and conspiring to violate University policy for personal 

gain,” based upon the same acts as supported the earlier Group II Notice. Porter timely challenged 

the new Group III notice. 

 After the April 23, 2003 grievance hearing, the hearing officer determined NSU had proven 

Porter abused her position and that the Group III Notice with the sanction of termination was 

appropriate. In addition to her appeal to DHRM noted above, Porter also appealed the hearing 

officer’s ruling to the Department of Employment Dispute Resolution (EDR), alleging the hearing 

officer violated the grievance procedure, state policy, and her due process rights. EDR concluded, 

in a July 25, 2003 order, that there was no violation of the grievance procedure by the hearing 
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officer either “prior to or during the hearing.” EDR also noted that “[t]o the extent [Porter’s due 

process violation] assertion is based on purported non-compliance with the grievance procedure, the 

claim fails.” EDR’s ruling did not address the allegation of violations of state personnel policy, 

deferring, as required, to DHRM. See Code § 2.2-3006(A). In its ruling, DHRM found no violation 

of state personnel policy. 

 The circuit court found Porter had failed to demonstrate the hearing officer’s decision was 

“contradictory to law.” 

Analysis

 Porter asserts in her question presented that the “decision of the hearing officer is contrary to 

the law and statutes in the issuance of a Group II Written Notice being rescinded for a Group III 

Written Notice.” However, the only complaint she makes in the argument section of her brief is that 

she “was never given the opportunity to be heard, to confront witnesses, or the opportunity to have 

counsel represent her prior to January 10, 2003, the date of her termination.” 

 We note that “[t]he General Assembly has clearly vested review of policy issues involved 

in employee grievances in the Department of Human Resource Management, and not in the 

courts.” Va. Dept. of State Police v. Barton, 39 Va. App. 439, 446, 573 S.E.2d 319, 323 (2002). 

Thus, we are bound by the determination that there was no violation of the grievance procedure 

either prior to or during the hearing. See Tatum v. Dept. of Agr. and Consumer Serv., 41 

Va. App. 110, 122, 582 S.E.2d 452, 458 (2003). Therefore, we address only Porter’s contention 

that she was not afforded her due process rights prior to her termination. 

 Having created a property right in continued employment, a state may not 

constitutionally authorize the deprivation of such an interest without “appropriate procedural 

safeguards.” Cleveland Bd. Of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985). Prior to 

termination, a non-probationary, non-exempt employee of the Commonwealth is entitled to oral 
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or written notice of the charges, an explanation of the employer’s evidence, and an opportunity 

to respond, appropriate to the nature of the case. Id. at 546. A more comprehensive 

post-termination hearing follows termination. See Grievance Procedure Manual § 5. The 

pre-termination notice and opportunity to be heard “need not be elaborate,” “need not 

definitively resolve the propriety of the discharge,” nor provide the employee with an 

opportunity to correct her behavior. Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 545. It need only serve as an 

“initial check against mistaken decisions - - essentially, a determination of whether there are 

reasonable grounds to believe that the charges against the employee are true and support the 

proposed action.” Id. at 545-46. 

 Porter was afforded sufficient pre-termination due process. She received notice of the 

reasons for the termination in the December 13, 2002 and January 13, 2003 letters and the February 

27, 2003 Group III Written Notice. She was provided an opportunity to respond to the charges and 

did so in conjunction with the investigation conducted by NSU’s human resources department. She 

was afforded further opportunity to respond to the allegations through the grievance process of 

which she availed herself. 

 Accordingly, we summarily affirm the decision of the circuit court. See Rule 5A:27. 

Affirmed.