[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 14-11197

Non-Argument Calendar

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D.C. Docket No. 3:10-cv-00884-MMH-JRK

KATHY FOWLER, 

LACRETIA GONZALES, 

 Plaintiffs - Appellants,

versus

RITZ-CARLTON HOTEL COMPANY, LLC, 

 Defendant - Appellee,

GEORGE CAVANAUGH, et al.,

 Defendants.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

________________________

(August 19, 2014)

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Before PRYOR, MARTIN and COX, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

This case comes to us with an extended history. The Plaintiffs in this case 

signed identical arbitration agreements. But, in violation of the plain terms of their 

agreements, they filed this suit instead of initiating arbitration. The parties 

eventually proceed to arbitration and an award was entered in favor of the 

defendant, Ritz-Carlton Hotel Company, LLC. Instead of accepting this result, the 

Plaintiffs have since perpetuated long and frivolous litigation. 

I. Facts and Procedural History

The Plaintiffs commenced this suit by filing a complaint against RitzCarlton that alleged seven different causes of action related to the Plaintiffs’ 

employment with Ritz-Carlton.1

 (R. 1.) The Plaintiffs and Ritz-Carlton stipulated 

to stay the lawsuit and proceed to arbitration on all claims. (R. 4 at 38.) The 

district court granted the parties’ request and issued a stay pending completion of 

the arbitration. (R. 6.)

Over seven months later, the Plaintiffs filed a Demand for Arbitration with 

the American Arbitration Association (“AAA”). (R. 32-1.) The parties mutually 

selected the arbitrator, (R. 32-2 at 3.) and the arbitrator issued a scheduling order 

 1 The complaint also names five individual defendants (George Cavanaugh, et al.). (R. 

1.) However, these individual defendants were apparently never served, and, in any case, the 

claims against them were abandoned in the district court. (R. 4.)

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requiring the Plaintiffs to submit an amended demand for arbitration by October 

28, 2011. (R. 11-1 at 3.) The Plaintiffs failed to meet this deadline. Almost three 

months later, on January 20, 2012, Ritz-Carlton’s counsel sent the Plaintiffs’ 

counsel an e-mail reminder that the deadline for the amended demand was 

overdue. (R. 32-4 at 2.) One month later, Ritz-Carlton filed a motion to dismiss 

the arbitration for failure to prosecute. (Id.) Only then, four months after the 

deadline, did the Plaintiffs file a motion for extension of time. (Id.) The arbitrator 

decided to grant the Plaintiff’s motion for an extension and denied Ritz-Carlton’s 

motion to dismiss because she was “reluctant to penalize [the Plaintiffs] for their 

attorney’s lack of diligence.” (Id. at 3.) However, the arbitrator emphasized that 

“[a]ny further delay created by [the Plaintiffs] or their counsel will not be tolerated 

in the absence of written proof of ‘good cause’ and will result in dismissal of [the 

Plaintiff’s] claims with prejudice.” (Id. at 4.)

The arbitrator issued a revised scheduling order requiring that discovery be 

completed by November 2, 2012. (R. 32-5.) The order provided that each party 

could take up to ten depositions. (Id.) The Plaintiffs moved to depose forty 

witnesses. (R. 32-6.) On, August 23, 2012, the arbitrator denied this motion, 

instructed the Plaintiffs to “identify those individuals who they wish to depose as 

soon as possible,” and set September 20, 2012 as the date of the first depositions. 

(Id.) On September 18, 2012, the Plaintiffs served Ritz-Carlton with a notice of 

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intent to depose four witnesses on September 20, 2012. Ritz-Carlton moved for a 

protective order from these depositions based on the short notice. (R. 32-11 at 1.) 

The arbitrator granted the motion, but provided that the Plaintiffs could still take 

depositions at a later date so long as they provided Ritz-Carlton with reasonable 

notice. (Id. at 3.) In doing so, the arbitrator noted that “this lack of diligence is 

consistent with [the Plaintiffs’] counsel’s prior actions (or lack thereof) in this 

case.” (Id.)

Four days after the arbitrator released this order, the Plaintiffs moved to 

disqualify the arbitrator, alleging that the arbitrator “shows bias toward [RitzCarlton] that has utterly thwarted [the Plaintiffs’] ability to build their case via 

discovery.” (R. 32-12 at 4.) The Plaintiffs also alleged that the arbitrator was 

biased in favor of Ritz-Carlton because she had an advertising relationship with 

Ritz-Carlton’s parent company, Marriot. The AAA summarily denied the 

Plaintiffs’ motion and reaffirmed the arbitrator’s appointment. (R. 32-13.)

On November 2, 2012 (the day scheduled for completion of discovery) the 

Plaintiffs moved to compel a wide variety of discovery requests including seventytwo interrogatories (which were already answered) and depositions of six 

employees. (R. 32-14.) The arbitrator found the motion to be without merit and 

denied it. (Id. at 13.)

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On December 7, 2012, Ritz-Carlton filed motions for summary judgment on 

all claims. The Plaintiffs were required to respond on December 28, 2012, but

missed this deadline. (R. 32-16 at 2, 10.) Instead, almost a month later on January 

24, 2013, the Plaintiffs filed a motion with the district court to remand the case to 

federal court because of the arbitrator’s alleged bias. The district court held that 

the motion lacked any legal authority and denied it. (R. 18 at 2.)

On February 25, 2013—almost two months late—the Plaintiffs filed a 

motion requesting an additional five days to respond to Ritz-Carlton’s summary 

judgment motion. (R. 36-2 at 2.) The arbitrator denied the motion, finding that the 

Plaintiffs had waived the right to respond. (R. 36-2 at 2.)

On April 30, 2013, the arbitrator issued awards in favor of Ritz-Carlton. 

Despite the Plaintiffs’ failure to respond, the arbitrator “reviewed in full” the 

evidence in the record and found that most of the Plaintiffs’ claims were frivolous. 

(32-16 at 7–9, 14–16.) The arbitrator also awarded Ritz-Carlton costs and 

attorney’s fees, with the amount to be determined by the district court. (R. 32-16 

at 9, 16.)

A week later, the Plaintiffs filed a “Demand for De Novo Trial by Jury.” (R. 

20.) The district court held that the demand was frivolous, struck it from the 

record, and cautioned the Plaintiffs “against filing further frivolous documents that 

simply waste judicial resources.” (Id.) Ritz-Carlton moved for the district court to 

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confirm the arbitration awards. (R. 23.) The district court referred the motion to a 

magistrate judge, and the magistrate judge entered an order requiring the Plaintiffs 

to show cause why the motion should not be granted based on the Plaintiffs’ failure 

to respond. (R. 25.) The Plaintiffs responded and sought vacatur of the arbitral 

awards. The Plaintiffs contended that the arbitrator showed evident partiality.2

 (R. 

34.)

The magistrate judge issued a report and recommendation that the motion to 

confirm the arbitration award be granted and that the motion to vacate be denied.

3

 

(R. 34.) The court found that it was “perhaps not coincidentally, the claim of 

evident partiality came on the business day following the arbitrator’s granting of a 

protective order to Defendant regarding depositions of four witnesses.” (R. 34 at 8 

n.8.) The magistrate judge found that the Plaintiffs’ factual descriptions and 

arguments were “inaccurate,” “largely distorted and/or mischaracterized,” and “farfetched and unpersuasive.” (Id. at 9–11, 13.) The court reiterated that “Plaintiffs’ 

counsel has been cautioned by this Court against filing documents that waste 

judicial resources.” (Id. at 11.) And, the court stated that “[t]o point out each and 

every inaccuracy or mischaracterization would be very time consuming.” (Id.) 

Over the Plaintiffs’ objections, the district court adopted the magistrate judge’s 

 2 The Plaintiffs also contended for the first time that the arbitration agreements “are 

insufficient, vague, stale, and superseded.”

3 Although the court chose to address the motion on the merits, the court also noted that 

the motion to vacate did not comply with the court’s local rules. (R. 34 at 6 n.6.)

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report and recommendation with only a small change to the legal standard for 

attorney’s fees. (R. 37.) The Plaintiffs appeal.

II. Issue on Appeal

Did the district court err by confirming the arbitration award? Specifically, 

was the arbitrator evidently partial, or did she exceed her powers?

III. Standard of Review

“We review confirmations of arbitration awards and denials of motions to 

vacate arbitration awards under the same standard, reviewing the district court's 

findings of fact for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo.” Frazier v. 

CitiFinancial Corp., LLC, 604 F.3d 1313, 1321 (11th Cir. 2010).

IV. Discussion

Judicial review of an arbitration award “is usually routine or summary” 

because “the FAA imposes a heavy presumption in favor of confirming arbitration 

awards.” Cat Charter, LLC v. Schurtenberger, 646 F.3d 836, 842 (11th Cir. 2011) 

(quotation omitted). Arbitrators “do not act as junior varsity trial courts where 

subsequent appellate review is readily available to the losing party.” Id. at 843 

(quotation omitted). Instead, review of an arbitral award is limited to the four 

grounds for vacatur expressed in 9 U.S.C. § 10(a). Accordingly, “judicial review 

of arbitration decisions is among the narrowest known to the law.” AIG Baker 

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Sterling Heights, LLC v. Am. Multi-Cinema, Inc., 508 F.3d 995, 1001 (11th Cir. 

2007) (quotation omitted).4

A. The arbitrator was not evidently partial.

The Plaintiffs contend that the arbitrator was evidently partial because: 

Marriot (Ritz-Carlton’s parent company) advertises on the arbitrator’s firm’s 

website, the arbitrator failed to accept their summary judgment response filed late, 

denied a discovery request, and applied an incorrect summary judgment standard. 

An arbitration award may be vacated “[w]here there was evident partiality or 

corruption in the arbitrators, or either of them.” 9 U.S.C. § 10(a). “[A]n 

arbitration award may be vacated due to the “evident partiality” of an arbitrator 

only when either (1) an actual conflict exists, or (2) the arbitrator knows of, but 

fails to disclose, information which would lead a reasonable person to believe that 

a potential conflict exists. Gianelli Money Purchase Plan & Trust v. ADM 

Investor Servs., Inc., 146 F.3d 1309, 1312 (11th Cir. 1998). If the allegations are 

based on failure to disclose a potential conflict, the arbitrator must be aware of the 

potential conflict. Id. Any “alleged partiality must be direct, definite and capable 

 4 In the reply brief, the Plaintiffs contend that Ritz-Carlton attempts to improperly narrow 

the court’s de novo review by contending that arbitration awards are subject to limited review 

and should be summarily confirmed. (Appellants’ Reply Br. at 2.) This statement either belies a 

fundamental misunderstanding of appellate standards of review or a baseless attempt to discredit 

Ritz-Carlton’s brief. (Appellee’s Br. at 21–22.) As Ritz-Carlton’s brief points out, our review of 

the district court’s decision is de novo. But, the district court exercises only limited review of 

the arbitral award and will ordinarily summarily confirm the arbitral award unless it should be 

vacated for one of the grounds in 9 U.S.C. § 10(a).

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of demonstration rather than remote, uncertain and speculative.” Id. (internal 

quotation omitted). “[T]he ‘evident partiality’ exception is to be strictly construed, 

as it must be if the federal policy favoring arbitration is to be given full effect.” Id. 

(citation omitted).

The district court correctly held that the Plaintiff’s allegations fail because 

they are at most “remote, uncertain and speculative.” Id. The Plaintiffs neither 

alleged nor presented evidence that the arbitrator even knew of this mention of a 

Marriot hotel on one page of her firm’s website. But, even assuming she did know 

of this webpage, the district court correctly found that this is not an advertisement. 

Rather, the Marriot hotels are listed among other nearby hotels on a page labeled 

“concierge.” Presumably, this list is simply provided for the convenience of 

visitors to the firm. Such a list is not direct and definite evidence of evident 

partiality.

The Plaintiffs’ other arguments essentially ask us to infer partiality because 

the Plaintiffs disagree with the arbitrator’s judgment. But, we have previously held 

that “the mere appearance of bias or partiality is not enough to set aside an 

arbitration award.” Lifecare Intern., Inc. v. CD Medical, Inc., 68 F.3d 429, 433 

(11th Cir. 1995). And, the district court correctly noted that we do not review the 

substance of an arbitrator’s judgment. See Frazier v. CitiFinancial Corp., LLC, 

604 F.3d 1313, 1323–24 (11th Cir. 2010). Thus, as the Second Circuit has said, 

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“adverse rulings alone rarely evidence partiality.” Scandinavian Reinsurance Co. 

v. Saint Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 688 F.3d 60, 75 (2d. Cir. 2012); see also

White Springs Agricultureal Chemicals, Inc. v. Glawson Investments Corp., 660 

F.3d 1277, 1283 (11th Cir. 2011) (explaining that we don’t review the legal merits 

of the arbitrators award even though an argument is presented in terms of the 

FAA). Accordingly, the Plaintiffs arguments are foreclosed by clear precedent in

this circuit and are frivolous.5

In addition to these frivolous arguments, the Plaintiffs continue to claim that 

the Marriot has a “prior relationship” with the arbitrator’s firm, advertises on the 

firm’s website, and has an “advertising relationship” with Marriot. (Appellant’s 

Br. 15, 16, 20.) The district court found that these allegations are “inaccurate.” (R. 

34 at 9.) Yet, the Plaintiffs go so far as to falsely claim that “the record in [sic] 

plain that the arbitrator’s law firm . . . allows Marriot to advertise on the law firm’s 

website.” (Id. at 18–19.) And, the Plaintiffs represent to the court that “[i]n it’s 

order adopting the R&R, the district court backed away from the R&R’s contention 

that Marriot does not advertise on the arbitrator’s website.” (Appellants’ Br. at 19 

 5 On appeal, the Plaintiffs also contend that the arbitrator was evidently partial because 

she failed to investigate potential conflicts. (Appellant’s Br. at 19–22.) At the outset, it is 

unclear whether this argument has been preserved. But, even assuming it is, we have firmly 

rejected this standard. In fact, the very case the Plaintiffs cite notes that the Eleventh Circuit 

follows a different standard. See Applied Indus. Materials Corp. v. Ovalar Makine Ticaret Ve 

Sanayi, A.S., 492 F.3d 132, 138 (2d Cir. 2007). Furthermore, the Plaintiffs omit mentioning 

Lifecare International Inc. v. CD Medical, Inc., 68 F.3d 429, 434 (11th Cir. 1995), where we 

specifically held that a failure to investigate a potential conflict is not sufficient to establish 

evident partiality.

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n.6; Appellants’ Reply Br. at 4 n.2.) But, the district court specifically overruled 

the Plaintiffs’ objections on this point and adopted the magistrate judge’s finding. 

(R. 37 at 8–11.) 

On appeal, the Plaintiffs add new claims that “Marriot posts” information 

about its hotels “on the cover page” of the arbitrator’s law firm’s website. 

(Appellant’s Br. at 19; Appellants’ Reply Br. at 5.) It is explicitly clear that the 

listing of the hotels is not on the “cover page” of the website, but rather is a page 

that can only be accessed by clicking other links. Furthermore, no evidence in the 

record supports the allegation that Marriot posts information on the website. In 

addition to these misrepresentations, the district court correctly found that the

Plaintiffs “have largely distorted and/or mischaracterized the record” in regards to 

the remaining allegations of evident partiality. (R. 34 at 9.) These allegations are 

repeated on appeal, but we decline to continue describing “the long and tortured 

history of the arbitration proceedings” because “to point out each and every 

inaccuracy or mischaracterization would be very time consuming.” (R. 34 at 11.)

B. The arbitrator did not refuse to hear material or pertinent evidence.

The Plaintiffs also contend that the arbitral award should be vacated because 

the arbitrator refused to hear material evidence. An arbitration award may be 

vacated “where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct . . . in refusing to hear 

evidence pertinent and material to the controversy.” 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(3).

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The Plaintiffs’ contention is frivolous. The arbitrator allowed both parties a 

full and fair opportunity to present evidence. The Plaintiffs did not take advantage 

of this opportunity, but instead filed a response to Ritz-Carlton’s summary 

judgment motion almost two months late. Nevertheless, the arbitrator still 

reviewed the entire record in deciding the summary judgment motion. According 

to the Supreme Court, an award is only vacated for refusing to consider evidence 

when an arbitrator’s error is “in bad faith or so gross as to amount to affirmative 

misconduct.” United Paperworkers Inten. Union, AFL0CIO v. Misco, Inc., 484 

U.S. 29, 40, 108 S. Ct. 364, 372 (1987). The allegations here fail to meet this 

standard. Accordingly, the Plaintiffs arguments are foreclosed by the clear 

precedent of the Supreme Court.6

C. The arbitrator did not exceed her authority.

The Plaintiffs also contend that the arbitrator exceeded her authority by 

awarding costs and attorney’s fees. An arbitration award may be vacated “where 

the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a 

mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.” 

9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4).

 6 The Plaintiffs also contend that the district court erred by failing to hold an evidentiary 

hearing on these issues. Because the Plaintiffs’ contentions are meritless, the district court did 

not err in deciding not to hold an evidentiary hearing.

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At the outset, it is unclear whether this argument has been preserved. But, 

regardless, it is meritless. The arbitration agreements the Plaintiffs signed provide

the arbitrator authority to award “whatever remedies are allowed by law.” (R. 23-1 

at 7.) And, the AAA rules (which were incorporated by the agreement) explicitly 

allow the arbitrator to award attorney’s fees and costs.7

 (R. 23-3 at 37.) The 

Plaintiffs alleged that the arbitrator exceeded her authority. Yet, the Plaintiffs 

argument is not that attorney’s fees are not a type of “remedy available at law.” 

Rather, the Plaintiffs essentially argue that if the arbitrator had applied the law 

correctly, she would not have awarded attorney’s fees. In fact, the Plaintiffs spend 

eleven irrelevant pages simply discussing the merit of their underlying claim. We 

have previously considered and rejected this precise line of argumentation in White 

Springs Agricultural Chemicals, Inc. v. Glawson Investments Corp., 660 F.3d 1277 

(11th Cir. 2011). There, we explained we will not entertain arguments that the 

arbitrator “exceeded her powers by acting contrary to the law” because we do not

review the arbitrator’s award for underlying legal error. Id. at 1283. Even though 

the Plaintiffs present their arguments in terms of the Federal Arbitration Act, they 

ask us to do what we may not—look to the legal merits of the underlying award. 

Id. Accordingly, the Plaintiffs argument is foreclosed by our precedent.

8

 7 Notably, the Plaintiffs omit these inconvenient facts.

8 In making this argument, the Plaintiffs contend that the Middle District of Florida has 

previously held that this agreement limits the employee’s financial exposure to $50.00. 

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V. Conclusion

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.

9

AFFIRMED.

 

(Appellant’s Br. at 37.) The Plaintiffs cite an unpublished case, but the case says no such thing. 

See Tranchant v. Ritz Carlton Hotel Co., Case No. 10-233 (M.D. Fla. 2010).

9 In B.L. Harbert Int'l, LLC v. Hercules Steel Co., 441 F.3d 905 at 907 (11th Cir. 2006), 

we warned litigants that “in order to further the purposes of the FAA and to protect arbitration as 

a remedy we are ready, willing, and able to consider imposing sanctions in appropriate cases.” 

Id. at 914. Accordingly, a separate order will be issued requiring the Plaintiffs to show cause 

why their conduct in this appeal does not warrant sanctions against the Plaintiffs, their counsel, 

or both. We reserve jurisdiction to consider whether sanctions are appropriate.

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