J-A23016-16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

LEON RAYMOND WALLS

Appellant No. 1488 WDA 2015

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered August 13, 2015

In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County

Criminal Division at No: CP-02-CR-0007810-2014

BEFORE: LAZARUS, STABILE, and STRASSBURGER,*JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED AUGUST 4, 2017

Appellant, Leon Raymond Walls, appeals from the August 13, 2015 

judgment of sentence imposing ten to twenty years of incarceration after a 

jury found Appellant guilty but mentally ill of attempted homicide, two 

counts of aggravated assault, unlawful restraint, terroristic threats, 

possession of an instrument of crime, and recklessly endangering another 

person.1 We affirm. 

This case involves stabbings that occurred on March 25, 2013 on 

Highland Avenue and in a Target department store in the East Liberty 

neighborhood of Pittsburgh. The record reflects that Jobe Wright, Mike 

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1

 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 901, 2501, 2702, 2902, 2706, 907, 2705, respectively. 
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Turner, Roland Smith and Tyrique Walker were standing on Highland Avenue 

when Appellant passed by and stabbed Wright. N.T. Trial, 6/2-4/15, at 68-

69, 88-89, 104-05. Appellant yelled, “he robbed me,” as he fled down the 

sidewalk toward the nearby Target. Id. Turner and Wright pursued 

Appellant by car after the stabbing, and Smith and Walker pursued him on 

foot. Id. at 70, 90, 106. There was no prior relationship between Appellant 

and Wright, Smith, Turner, or Walker. Id. at 71, 83-84. 

Smith found Appellant in the bathroom of Target changing his clothes. 

Id. at 107. Smith confronted Appellant about the stabbing, and Appellant 

said to Smith, “You trying to rob me.” Id. at 108. Smith then left the 

bathroom and went outside the store to await the arrival of the police. Id.

at 109-110. Meanwhile, Appellant encountered Turner and Wright in the 

store. Id. at 70. Appellant, still brandishing a knife, threatened to kill 

Turner. Id. at 72-73. Appellant hit Turner with a shopping cart and began 

running through the store. Id. at 75-76. Turner handed the bat to Wright, 

who pursued Appellant through the store. Id. at 93. Wright and Appellant 

exchanged words, with Wright confronting Appellant about the stabbing and 

Appellant yelling, “I’m not going to jail.” Id. at 94. 

Sharon Meadows, mother of victim Allison Meadows, heard Appellant 

yelling, “You stole my wallet.” Id. at 122, 139. Appellant made his way to 

the cash registers, where he took a hold of 16-year-old Allison, who was 
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waiting in line with her mother and Chelsea Stokes.2 Id. at 124-26, 132. 

Appellant yelled, “Y’all think I’m playing,” and “They’re robbing me.” Id. at 

76, 95-96. Stokes testified that Appellant was also shouting, “Call the cops” 

or “Call the police.” Id. at 140, 144. Appellant held Allison by the neck and 

put the knife to her back and yelled, “I’m gonna stab her. I’m gonna stab 

her.” Id. at 126. 

Turner testified that Appellant stabbed Meadows twice and attempted 

to stab her a third time but another bystander prevented him. Id. at 76, 79. 

Wright testified that “some young kid” jumped over the counter when 

Appellant stabbed Meadows. Id. at 97. Sharon Meadows and Chelsey 

Stokes testified that the stabbing occurred just after the bystander 

intervened. Id. at 128, 143. Turner claimed he was ten feet away from 

Appellant and Meadows when the stabbings occurred. Id. at 77. After the 

bystander intervened, Turner attempted to wrestle Appellant to the ground. 

Id. at 80. Smith, who had returned to the store, and Wright also “rushed” 

Appellant. Id. at 112. Unable to wrestle Appellant to the ground, Turner 

used a humidifier to hit Appellant in the head. Id. at 80. Wright testified 

that he hit Appellant with the bat several times. Id. at 98. Smith suffered 

three cut fingers and lost the use of two of them. Id. at 115, 118. 

____________________________________________

2

 Stokes is the mother of Sharon’s grandson and Allison’s nephew. Sharon 

and Allison were in town to visit Stokes’ five-year-old son, who underwent 

transplant surgery in 2012. Id. at 132, 137-38. 
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City of Pittsburgh Police Officer Leroy Schrock responded to the scene, 

observed the altercation among Appellant and the others, and ordered 

everybody to stop. Id. at 147-48. Target security identified Appellant as 

the person with the knife, and Officer Schrock ordered Appellant to roll onto 

his belly. Id. at 147-48, 159. Appellant had a bewildered look in his eyes 

and did not comply. Id. at 148, 158. Appellant did not make any 

aggressive moves toward Officer Schrock. Id. at 158-59. When Appellant 

did not comply with Office Schrock’s order to roll over, Officer Schrock used 

pepper spray on Appellant and then tried to force Appellant onto his belly. 

Id. at 148-49. Back up arrived and used a Taser on Appellant, after which 

Officer Schrock was able to handcuff him. Id. at 149. 

There is no evidence that Wright robbed Appellant before Appellant 

stabbed him, nor is there any evidence that Wright and his companions were 

attempting to rob Appellant when they pursued Appellant into Target. The 

primary issue before us is whether Appellant, when he committed these 

crimes, was legally insane and therefore incapable of forming criminal intent. 

The Commonwealth arrested Appellant and charged him with three 

counts of attempted homicide, five counts of aggravated assault, one count 

each of unlawful restraint and false imprisonment, two counts of terroristic 

threats, one count of possession of an instrument of crime, four counts of 
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recklessly endangering another person, and one count each of simple assault 

and resisting arrest.3 

On June 4, 2014, a jury found Appellant guilty but mentally ill of the 

following offenses: attempted homicide of Meadows, aggravated assault of 

Wright and Meadows, unlawful restraint and false imprisonment of Meadows, 

terroristic threats toward Meadows and Turner, possession of an instrument 

of crime, and recklessly endangering another person (Meadows). The jury 

found Appellant not guilty by reason of insanity of the attempted homicide of 

Wright and recklessly endangering another person (Wright).4 

The jury found Appellant not guilty of attempted homicide of Walker, 

aggravated assault of Walker, Turner, and Smith, recklessly endangering 

another person (Walker and Smith), and resisting arrest. 

On August 13, 2015, the trial court imposed an aggregate 10 to 20 

years of incarceration, the mandatory minimum. Appellant filed timely postsentence motions one day later. The trial court denied the post-sentence 

motions on August 28, 2015. This timely appeal followed. 

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3

 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 901, 2501, 2702, 902, 903, 2706, 907, 2705, 2701, and 

5104, respectively. 

4

 We observe that “[i]nconsistent verdicts are proper so long as the 

evidence is sufficient to support the convictions that the jury has returned.” 

Commonwealth v. Trill, 543 A.2d 1106, 1111 (Pa. Super. 1988) (holding 

that it was permissible for a jury to find the defendant guilty of one offense 

and guilty but mentally ill of another, where the offenses were committed on 

the same day), appeal denied, 562 A.2d 826 (Pa. 1989). Appellant does not 

challenge the consistency of the verdicts. 
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Appellant presents three questions for our review: 

I. Did the Commonwealth present insufficient evidence to 

convict [Appellant] on any count, as it failed to prove he 

possessed the required intent to commit any offense? 

II. Are the verdicts of guilty but mentally ill against the weight 

of the evidence, as the conclusion of the Commonwealth’s 

expert was based on evidence not in the record, namely 

the disproven accusation that [Appellant] resisted arrest? 

III. Is the statute governing the sentencing of those found 

guilty but mentally ill, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9727, 

unconstitutional, statutorily sanctioned cruel and unusual 

punishment and a violation of due process? 

Appellant’s Brief at 7. 

We consider these arguments in turn. The following standard governs 

our review of Appellant’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence: 

When evaluating a sufficiency claim, our standard is 

whether, viewing all the evidence and reasonable inferences in 

the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the factfinder 

reasonably could have determined that each element of the 

crime was established beyond a reasonable doubt. This Court 

considers all the evidence admitted, without regard to any claim 

that some of the evidence was wrongly allowed. We do not 

weigh the evidence or make credibility determinations. 

Moreover, any doubts concerning a defendant’s guilt were to be 

resolved by the factfinder unless the evidence was so weak and 

inconclusive that no probability of fact could be drawn from that 

evidence. 

Commonwealth v. Kane, 10 A.3d 327, 332 (Pa. Super. 2010), appeal 

denied, 29 A.3d 796 (Pa. 2011). 

Appellant argues the evidence of his guilt is insufficient because he 

was legally insane. As noted above, the jury found Appellant guilty but 

mentally ill on numerous counts. Section 314 of the Crimes Code governs 
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the insanity defense, and distinguishes legal insanity from guilty but 

mentally ill: 

(a) General rule.--A person who timely offers a defense of 

insanity in accordance with the Rules of Criminal Procedure may 

be found “guilty but mentally ill” at trial if the trier of facts finds, 

beyond a reasonable doubt, that the person is guilty of an 

offense, was mentally ill at the time of the commission of the 

offense and was not legally insane at the time of the commission 

of the offense.

(b) Plea of guilty but mentally ill.--A person who waives his 

right to trial may plead guilty but mentally ill. No plea of guilty 

but mentally ill may be accepted by the trial judge until he has 

examined all reports prepared pursuant to the Rules of Criminal 

Procedure, has held a hearing on the sole issue of the 

defendant’s mental illness at which either party may present 

evidence and is satisfied that the defendant was mentally ill at 

the time of the offense to which the plea is entered. If the trial 

judge refuses to accept a plea of guilty but mentally ill, the 

defendant shall be permitted to withdraw his plea. A defendant 

whose plea is not accepted by the court shall be entitled to a 

jury trial, except that if a defendant subsequently waives his 

right to a jury trial, the judge who presided at the hearing on 

mental illness shall not preside at the trial.

(c) Definitions.--For the purposes of this section and 42 

Pa.C.S. § 9727 (relating to disposition of persons found guilty 

but mentally ill):

(1) “Mentally ill.” One who as a result of mental disease or 

defect, lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the 

wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to 

the requirements of the law.

(2) “Legal insanity.” At the time of the commission of the 

act, the defendant was laboring under such a defect of 

reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the 

nature and quality of the act he was doing or, if he did 

know it, that he did not know he was doing what was 

wrong.

(d) Common law M’Naghten’s Rule preserved.--Nothing in 

this section shall be deemed to repeal or otherwise abrogate the 
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common law defense of insanity (M’Naghten’s Rule) in effect in 

this Commonwealth on the effective date of this section.

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 314. 

A defendant pleading an insanity defense bears the burden of proving 

by a preponderance of the evidence that he did not know either the nature 

and quality of the act he committed, or that what he was doing was wrong. 

Commonwealth v. Sohmer, 546 A.2d 601, 604 (Pa. 1988); 18 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 315(a). 

Mental illness under our Crimes Code will not be permitted 

to eliminate the mens rea requirement for culpability for 

otherwise criminal conduct unless the M'Naghten test is met. 

Subsection 314(a) by its very terms accepts the fact that the 

offender is guilty of the offense charged, which necessarily 

implies that the mental illness did not preclude the mens rea

required by the offense. It is equally apparent from section 

9727 that a finding of mentally ill was also not intended to 

mitigate the punishment to be meted out for the commission of 

the criminal act. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9727.[5] Equally as obvious is 

____________________________________________

5

 Section 9727 provides: 

(a) Imposition of sentence.--A defendant found guilty but 

mentally ill or whose plea of guilty but mentally ill is accepted 

under the provisions of 18 Pa.C.S. § 314 (relating to guilty but 

mentally ill) may have any sentence imposed on him which may 

lawfully be imposed on any defendant convicted of the same 

offense. Before imposing sentence, the court shall hear 

testimony and make a finding on the issue of whether the 

defendant at the time of sentencing is severely mentally disabled 

and in need of treatment pursuant to the provisions of the act of 

July 9, 1976 (P.L. 817, No. 143), known as the “Mental Health 

Procedures Act.”

(b) Treatment.--

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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that it does not create a distinct offense nor does it provide an 

enhancement of an existing offense.

Id. at 606. 

Appellant’s expert, Dr. Abhishek Jain, a forensic psychiatrist, 

interviewed Appellant twice and reviewed relevant records. N.T. Trial, 6/2-

4/15, at 178. Dr. Jain concluded Appellant was schizophrenic with 

borderline intellectual functioning. Id. at 179, 181. Appellant suffered from 

delusions of paranoia, which are a “fixed false belief in things that are not 

actually happening in reality.” Id. Appellant believed the sun and moon 

were not real, and he would “try to make sense of various numbers and 

predict if the world was real or not.” Id. at 179, 201. Appellant also 

suffered from hallucinations, including hearing a voice say, “Hate! Hate! 

Hate!” Id. at 180, 201. On the day in question, Appellant heard a voice 

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

(1) An offender who is severely mentally disabled and in need of

treatment at the time of sentencing shall, consistent with 

available resources, be provided such treatment as is 

psychiatrically or psychologically indicated for his mental illness. 

Treatment may be provided by the Bureau of Correction, by the 

county or by the Department of Public Welfare in accordance 

with the “Mental Health Procedures Act.”

(2) The cost for treatment of offenders found guilty but mentally 

ill, committed to the custody of the Bureau of Correction and 

transferred to a mental health facility, shall be borne by the 

Commonwealth.

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9727(a), (b). 
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say, “Hate! Hate! Hate! They are going to kill you.” Id. at 199. Dr. Jain did 

not believe Appellant was feigning his symptoms. Id. at 184-88. 

Appellant told Dr. Jain he did not remember the assault of Wright and 

Allison Meadows. Id. at 195, 198. He remembered being in a dollar store 

buying bug repellant before the assaults, and then he remembered waking 

up in a pool of blood at Target. Id. at 195. On cross-examination, defense 

counsel established that a behavior clinic report prepared shortly after 

Appellant’s arrest indicated that Appellant affirmed that the stabbings 

occurred. Id. at 211. Dr. Jain testified that it was difficult to determine 

whether Appellant actually remembered the events in question or if he was 

responding to what he had been told. Id. 

Dr. Jain noted that, during the incident, Appellant asked people to call 

police and claimed he was being robbed. Id. at 202-03, 206-07. Appellant 

had no obvious motive to stab Wright, as the two did not know each other. 

Id. at 203. Dr. Jain described the stabbing of Allison Meadows as follows: 

But overall he was acting in a self-protective manner, and 

this, again in my opinion, in the belief that he was being 

harmed. Then when he grabbed Ms. Allison Meadows, again he 

initially grabbed her as a shield. Again to me this was a 

demonstration of him acting in a self-protective manner while he 

is very paranoid, very delusional, very fearful. So he grabs her 

as a shield in a self-protective manner and then only stabs her, 

from my understanding, after he was grabbed from behind. So 

he is in a highly agitated state. Then he gets grabbed from 

behind and then impulsively, almost as a reaction, sudden 

reaction, to being grabbed, then he stabs Ms. Meadows twice. 
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Id. at 205. Dr. Jain opined that Appellant “was most likely acting in a 

manner that he did not think was wrong.” Id. at 208. Rather, Appellant 

believed he was defending himself. Id. Dr. Jain opined that Appellant, in 

light of his severe illness, did not know what he was doing was wrong. Id.

at 209, 218-19. 

Dr. Bruce Wright, a psychiatrist, testified for the Commonwealth. Dr. 

Wright interviewed Appellant once and reviewed relevant records. Id. at 

257-58. Appellant’s statements to Dr. Wright were consistent with the 

statements he gave to Dr. Jain. Id. at 258. Specifically, Appellant claimed 

he went to a dollar store to buy bug spray and did not recall anything until 

after stabbing Allison Meadows at Target. Id. Appellant told Dr. Wright he 

obtained the knife because people in his hallucinations kept telling him he 

would be attacked. Id. at 259, 265. Dr. Wright diagnosed Appellant with 

schizophrenia. Id. at 260. On whether Appellant knew his actions were 

wrong, Dr. Wright testified: 

I was not—I am not able to say with a reasonable degree 

of certainty that [Appellant] knew his actions were wrong. It is 

my opinion that he lacked substantial capacity to understand the 

wrongfulness of his actions and to conform his behavior to the 

requirements of the law. So lacking substantial capacity is very 

different than knowing what you are doing is wrong. Knowing is 

absolute. You either know or you don’t know what you are 

doing. It is my opinion because of the psychiatric illness he 

lacked substantial capacity to know what he was doing was 

wrong. 

Id. at 261. Dr. Wright opined that Appellant’s request for someone to call 

the police was not consistent with knowledge of wrongdoing. Id. at 262. 
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Appellant’s statement, “I’m not going to jail,” on the other hand, indicated 

some knowledge of wrongdoing. Id. That statement, combined with 

Appellant’s resistance of arrest were, according to Dr. Wright, “two very key 

points that illustrate a part of him knew what he was doing was wrong.” Id.

at 263. Dr. Wright declined to speculate whether his testimony would have 

been the same if Appellant had not resisted arrest. Id. at 267-68. 

In summary, Dr. Jain testified that Appellant did not know what he 

was doing was wrong, thus rendering him legally insane under § 314(c)(2). 

Dr. Wright testified that Appellant lacked the substantial capacity to 

understand the wrongfulness of his conduct, thus rendering him mentally ill 

under § 314(c)(1), but capable of forming criminal intent. Appellant 

acknowledges Dr. Wright’s testimony, but argues that “[i]n the interests of 

criminal justice, this Honorable Court must consider ‘lacking substantial 

capacity’ to do something and ‘not having the capacity’ to do that same 

thing, as one in the same. This is a linguistic distinction without a practical 

difference.” Appellant’s Brief at 31. 

Appellant’s argument fails because it contradicts established 

precedent. Put simply, a guilty but mentally ill conviction “does not negate 

[an appellant’s] intent to commit a criminal act.” Commonwealth v. 

Rabold, 920 A.2d 857, 859 (Pa. Super. 2007) (quoting Commonwealth v. 

Santiago, 855 A.2d 682, 701 (Pa. 1988)), affirmed, 951 A.2d 329 (Pa. 

2008). In Commonwealth v. Trill, 543 A.2d 1106 (Pa. Super. 1988), 
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appeal denied, 562 A.2d 826 (Pa. 1989), this Court analyzed the distinction 

between legally insane and mentally ill: 

Mental illness and insanity are qualitatively separate 

concepts. The two definitions do, however overlap. All 

individuals who are legally insane are also mentally ill. But the 

converse of the statement, that all persons who are mentally ill 

are also insane, is false. The difference is not quantitative. In 

other words, an extremely mentally ill individual may not be 

legally insane. A high degree of mental illness does not destroy 

mens rea. The difference is qualitative. Insanity definitions are 

attempts to isolate the element of mens rea that may be present 

in some illnesses but not in others. Because the two concepts 

involve qualitatively separate elements, they are not likely to 

cause undue confusion to juries.

Id. at 1128 (quoting Comment, Guilty But Mentally Ill: An Historical and 

Constitutional Analysis, 53 Urban L.J. 471, 478 (1978)). More succinctly, 

“[t]he mentally ill defendant in a murder case may exhibit only a limited 

understanding that killing is generally agreed to be wrong; the legally insane 

person has no idea whatsoever that killing is considered to be wrong.” Id. 

at 1131 (Beck, J. concurring). 

Furthermore, the Trill Court noted that it is within the jury’s province 

to determine the credibility and weight of conflicting psychiatric testimony. 

Id. at 1112; see also, Rabold, 920 A.2d at 860. Given the plain language 

of § 314(c)(1), the case law interpreting that section, and Dr. Wright’s 

testimony, we conclude that the record contains sufficient evidence from 

which the jury could reject Appellant’s insanity defense and find him guilty 

but mentally ill. 
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Next, Appellant argues that the guilty but mentally ill verdicts are 

against the weight of the evidence because Dr. Wright based his opinions on 

his erroneous belief that Appellant resisted arrest. 

Appellate review of a weight claim is a review of the 

exercise of discretion, not of the underlying question of whether 

the verdict is against the weight of the evidence. Because the 

trial judge has had the opportunity to hear and see the evidence 

presented, an appellate court will give the gravest consideration 

to the findings and reasons advanced by the trial judge when 

reviewing a trial court’s determination that the verdict is against 

the weight of the evidence. One of the least assailable reasons 

for granting or denying a new trial is the lower court’s conviction 

that the verdict was or was not against the weight of the 

evidence and that a new trial should be granted in the interest of 

justice.

This does not mean that the exercise of discretion by the 

trial court in granting or denying a motion for a new trial based 

on a challenge to the weight of the evidence is unfettered. In 

describing the limits of a trial court’s discretion, we have 

explained:

The term “discretion” imports the exercise of judgment, 

wisdom and skill so as to reach a dispassionate conclusion within 

the framework of the law, and is not exercised for the purpose of 

giving effect to the will of the judge. Discretion must be 

exercised on the foundation of reason, as opposed to prejudice, 

personal motivations, caprice or arbitrary actions. Discretion is 

abused where the course pursued represents not merely an error 

of judgment, but where the judgment is manifestly unreasonable 

or where the law is not applied or where the record shows that 

the action is a result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill-will.

Commonwealth v. Clay, 64 A.3d 1049, 1055 (Pa. 2013) (citations 

omitted; emphasis in original). 

As explained above, Appellant did not comply when Officer Schrock 

ordered him to roll onto his belly. Officer Schrock used pepper spray on 
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Appellant and another officer used a Taser before Officer Schrock was able 

to handcuff Appellant. Nonetheless, Officer Schrock testified that Appellant 

did not physically resist police. The Commonwealth charged Appellant with 

resisting arrest, but the jury found him not guilty. 

Dr. Wright opined that Appellant had at least some capacity to 

appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct because he stated “I’m not going 

to jail” and because he resisted arrest. N.T. Trial, 6/2-4/15, at 262. 

Appellant argues that his convictions of guilty but mentally ill, based largely 

on Dr. Wright’s expert testimony, are against the weight of the evidence 

because Dr. Wright incorrectly believed Appellant resisted arrest. 

We reject Appellant’s argument for two reasons. First, Dr. Wright did 

not testify that Appellant’s resistance of arrest was a necessary condition for 

his opinion. When defense counsel pressed this point on cross examination, 

Dr. Wright declined to testify that his conclusion would change if Appellant 

had not resisted arrest. Dr. Wright’s other key point—that Appellant said, 

“I’m not going to jail,” did not depend on whether Appellant resisted arrest. 

Second, the record contains evidence that Appellant failed to comply with 

Officer Schrock’s orders, and that pepper spray and a Taser were necessary 

before Officer Schrock could handcuff Appellant. Even though the jury found 

Appellant not guilty of resisting arrest, Dr. Wright could reasonably rely on 

Appellant’s noncompliance with a police order in support of his opinion that 

Appellant had at least some capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his 
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actions. We cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in 

denying a new trial on this basis. 

Appellant’s final argument is that § 9727 is unconstitutional because it 

permits cruel and unusual punishment. Appellant acknowledges that this 

Court in Commonwealth v. Yasipour, 957 A.2d 734 (Pa. Super. 2008) 

held that § 9727 does not violate the state and federal constitutional 

prohibitions of cruel and unusual punishment. Appellant invites us to 

reconsider Yasipour because § 9727(b)(1) provides that a severely 

mentally disabled defendant shall be provided treatment “consistent with 

available resources,” and because no sufficient resources are available in this 

case. Appellant’s Brief at 44 (citing 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9727(b)(1)). At the 

sentencing hearing, the trial court stated: 

I also want to state on the record that [defense counsel, 

the prosecutor] and myself have all spent a lot of time in the last 

week looking for and hoping to find an appropriate mental health 

facility where [Appellant] can be treated. 

It is my strong belief that [Appellant] is suffering from a 

serious mental illness, was at the day of the crime and still is. 

We have run up against a wall. If sent to Torrance, it would be, 

it is a very short-term stay. Although I am going to recommend 

that he be placed in a mental health facility, or in a facility that 

is a correctional facility with mental health sections, or pods, or 

whatever they call them. 

N.T. Sentencing, 8/13/15, at 3. After Appellant spoke on his own behalf, the 

trial court responded: 

I understand and I believe you. I believe you were 

mentally ill on that date that this occurred. And I think you are 

still mentally ill. 
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Unfortunately, it’s very difficult for me to find someplace 

appropriate for you to go. The budgeting, and I know this isn’t 

your fault, but they have just taken away so many resources, 

and what happens is that people that are mentally ill, since they 

have nowhere else to go, end up in jail. I’m sorry for your 

situation. 

And I don’t think you meant to do it. I believe that. 

Id. at 4-5. 

We are sympathetic to Appellant’s plight, but we are bound by the 

precedential opinions of our Supreme Court and prior panels of this Court.6 

As Appellant acknowledges, the Yasipour Court concluded that § 9727 does 

not violate the prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment found in the 

Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 1, § 13 of 

the Pennsylvania Constitution. Furthermore, applicable statutory and case 

law makes clear that a finding of guilty but mentally ill does not negate a 

defendant’s intent, nor does it entitle the defendant to receive a different 

sentence than any other person convicted of the same offense. 42 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 9727(a); Sohmer, 546 A.2d at 604; Santiago, 855 A.2d at 701; Rabold, 

920 A.2d at 859. Any change to the existing law must come from our 

Supreme Court and/or the General Assembly. 

Finally, Appellant argues that § 9727 violates due process because it 

provides no means by which an offender can challenge the sufficiency of 

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6

 Furthermore, the power to create treatment resources and appropriate the 

necessary funding rests with our General Assembly. 
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available treatment resources prior to being stripped of his liberty. 

Appellant’s Brief at 51. Appellant raised this argument for the first time in 

his Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement. Thus, he has waived it. Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) 

(“Issues not raised in the lower court are waived and cannot be raised for 

the first time on appeal.”). In any event, this court has noted that after the 

trial court finds an offender in need of treatment and commits him to the 

Bureau of Corrections, as the trial court did here, it becomes the Bureau of 

Corrections’ responsibility to formulate an adequate treatment plan. 

Commonwealth v. Sematis, 555 A.2d 1347,1349-50 (Pa. Super. 1989). 

The adequacy of the Bureau of Corrections’ treatment plan is not properly 

before us on review of the judgment of sentence. 

Judgment of sentence affirmed. 

Judge Strassburger joins this memorandum.

Judge Lazarus files a concurring statement in which Judge 

Strassburger joins. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 8/4/2017