COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

Present: Judges Malveaux, Raphael and Frucci

Argued by videoconference 

RONNIE MARSHALL

MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY

v. Record No. 0890-23-4 JUDGE STUART A. RAPHAEL

AUGUST 20, 2024

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY

Stephen C. Shannon, Judge

Michael C. Sprano (The Sprano Law Firm, LLP, on brief), for 

appellant.

Lindsay M. Brooker, Assistant Attorney General (Jason S. Miyares, 

Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.

Ronnie Marshall appeals his convictions for aggravated murder and two counts of using a 

firearm in the commission of murder. He argues that the trial court erred in denying his 

attorney’s motion to withdraw, admitting video recordings of the victims’ interviews with police, 

and excluding certain rap videos produced by the victims’ son. Finding no abuse of discretion in 

the trial court’s rulings, we affirm the convictions.

BACKGROUND

On appeal, we recite the facts “in the ‘light most favorable’ to the Commonwealth, the 

prevailing party in the trial court.” Hammer v. Commonwealth, 74 Va. App. 225, 231 (2022) 

(quoting Commonwealth v. Cady, 300 Va. 325, 329 (2021)). Doing so requires that we “discard” 

the defendant’s evidence when it conflicts with the Commonwealth’s evidence, “regard as true 

all the credible evidence favorable to the Commonwealth,” and read “all fair inferences” in the 

* This opinion is not designated for publication. See Code § 17.1-413(A).

UNPUBLISHED
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Commonwealth’s favor. Cady, 300 Va. at 329 (quoting Commonwealth v. Perkins, 295 Va. 323, 

324 (2018)).

Marshall breaks into the McDaniels’ home

The victims here were Brenda and Edward McDaniel, described to the jury as a “military 

couple.”1 In the early evening of May 24, 2021, Brenda and Edward were in their upstairs 

bedroom when their adult son Michael ran into the house and told them to call the police. 

Michael had been walking home from a grocery store when he saw one of his coworkers, Ronnie 

Marshall, in a car outside the residence. Michael took “cover” upstairs because Marshall had a 

gun. 

Brenda and Edward heard loud banging on the front door, like someone was trying to 

get in. Edward got his shotgun and loaded it with two shells. As Brenda called the police, 

Marshall entered the home through the sliding back door. He was holding a gun and started to 

walk upstairs. Edward stood at the top of the stairs, unsure what was happening. 

When he spotted Edward, Marshall asked, “Where’s Michael?” Marshall claimed that 

Michael had taken something from him. Marshall held his gun to his side. As Marshall 

repeatedly asked about Michael, Brenda announced that she had called the police. With the 

sound of police sirens approaching, Marshall fled the house. 

Fairfax County Police Officer Michael Schmeltz interviewed Brenda, Edward, and 

Michael. Schmeltz’s body camera recorded the conversations, and those recordings were later 

admitted into evidence over Marshall’s objection. Detective Jamaah Cheatham also interviewed 

the family. An audio recording of that interview was admitted into evidence, also over 

Marshall’s objection. 

1 Brenda was a recently retired Army colonel who had served as a nurse; Edward was an 

active-duty Army colonel serving as a doctor. The trial court excluded evidence of their rank. 
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Later that evening, Michael’s cellphone received a call from an unfamiliar number. 

Michael told the police about the call. The police determined that the number belonged to 

Marshall and that he had tried to call Michael three times on May 24th. Michael denied taking 

anything from Marshall and said that Marshall had been “picking on [him] at work.” 

Marshall murders Brenda and Edward McDaniel

On the morning of May 26, Brenda and Edward had a “talk about safety” with Michael, 

who was fearful after the break-in. Brenda and Edward then went outside to take the family dog 

on a morning walk. Michael and his girlfriend stayed in the house. Michael told his parents “to 

be careful.” 

That same morning, Marshall had finished his shift at FedEx, where he worked alongside 

D’Angelo Strand. Marshall was upset. He told Strand that “he had just been robbed” by a 

coworker. Marshall claimed to have been “jumped” and that the “father” had “pulled out” a 

“pump shotgun,” stealing Marshall’s firearm. Marshall asked Strand to drive him to the house so 

he could retrieve his property. Marshall offered to pay for “gas money.” 

Strand drove Marshall to the McDaniels’ home, arriving around 9:00 a.m. Marshall told 

Strand to park “[a] little bit down the street around the corner.” Marshall and Strand walked up 

to the house. Marshall told Strand that he had a gun with him. 

Inside, Michael sensed something amiss and looked out from the dining-room window. 

He saw two men in hoodies approaching the house, and he recognized Marshall. Marshall was 

dressed all in black, wore gloves, and had a ski mask over his face. He also had a gun. Michael 

didn’t recognize the other man, who was wearing all white. Michael called the police, locked all 

the doors, and ran upstairs with his girlfriend.

Looking out his bedroom window, Michael saw Marshall walking up from an exterior,

basement-level staircase, then run down the driveway with the other man. Just then, the family 
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dog was returning home, off-leash, followed by Brenda and Edward. Marshall had “his hands 

out [of] his pocket[s]” and was holding the gun. 

Marshall and Strand reached the bottom of the driveway as Brenda and Edward 

approached. Michael’s parents were just outside of his view from the bedroom window. 

According to Strand, Marshall asked the parents, “Where’s your son?” The parents said they 

didn’t know. Marshall asked: “Am I going to get my money or my property back?” When one 

of the parents responded—“Does it look like I have a wallet?” Marshall leveled his gun at 

Edward and shot him. Edward fell back into the culvert at the edge of the yard. 

Not expecting a shooting, Strand fled back to his car. As Strand ran, he heard “[a] few 

more shots.” Michael too heard “multiple shots” as he and his girlfriend sheltered inside. 

Strand got back into his car, Marshall jumped in on the passenger’s side, and Strand 

drove away. Marshall asked Strand to drop him off in Alexandria. Marshall told Strand, “I had 

to do it because they knew my name.” 

Fairfax County Police Officers Dwayne Daniels and Brian Snow responded to Michael’s 

call, finding two dead bodies on the ground, close to the street. Brenda was “just at the bottom 

of the driveway . . . partially under a tree”; Edward was in the ditch “between the mailbox and 

the driveway.” Brenda had suffered a gunshot wound to the head and two to the torso. Edward 

had also been shot in the head and torso. The police found six .45 caliber cartridge cases nearby. 

Testing confirmed that the cartridges were discharged from the same gun. 

Two witnesses in a pickup truck near the house saw a vehicle flee the scene; they 

reported the license plate number to the police. The next day, Strand turned himself in after 

learning that his “tags had been on the news” and that police were looking for him. Marshall 

was arrested soon after. 
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The grand jury indicted Marshall on two counts of aggravated murder (Code § 18.2-31), 

two counts of second-degree murder (Code § 18.2-32), and two counts of using a firearm in the 

commission of a murder (Code § 18.2-53.1). A jury trial was scheduled for October 24, 2022. 

Defense counsel moves to withdraw

At his client’s request, Marshall’s court-appointed lawyer moved to withdraw. At a 

hearing on the motion, six days before trial, Marshall told the court that he didn’t “feel like [his 

attorney] ha[d] [Marshall’s] best interest [in] this case right now.” Marshall said he wanted his 

attorney “to file a couple of motions,” but the attorney said “he couldn’t.” Marshall interpreted 

that as “just a lack of effort.” The court asked defense counsel if he “just ignore[d] [Marshall’s] 

opinion” or if he “work[ed] through the legal issues when deciding which motions to file and 

which might be frivolous.” Marshall’s lawyer said that he didn’t “believe there’s any legal basis 

for” the motions Marshall wanted him to file. 

The Assistant Commonwealth’s Attorney informed the court that she had just learned of 

a jail call in which Marshall said that “he was planning to try and get his attorney removed from 

the case, and [that] if the Court denied that motion, his intention was to attack his attorney in a 

professional visiting booth.” As the case was ready for trial, the Commonwealth opposed the 

motion to withdraw. 

Marshall’s counsel told the court that he was willing to remain on the case, but that “I 

think that does create a conflict if . . . I am given information that my client intended to . . . or 

intends to physically assault me. . . . I think that definitely creates a conflict of interest.” The 

court took a recess for Marshall’s lawyer to seek ethics guidance from the Virginia State Bar. 

Upon reconvening, the court asked defense counsel whether Marshall’s threat would “prevent 

[him] from being a zealous advocate for [his client].” Marshall’s lawyer said “no,” he didn’t 

take the threat “personally.” He said that bar counsel had advised him simply to move to 
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withdraw and leave the decision to the court’s discretion. Marshall’s lawyer reaffirmed that the 

threat “would not affect [his] professional responsibilities and carrying out those responsibilities 

to zealously advocate on behalf of [his] client,” but that it might be “sort of a distraction” at trial 

worrying “if [he] need[s] to duck.” 

For his part, Marshall denied having threatened his lawyer. He said that if the court 

listened to the recorded conversation, the judge would hear Marshall say, “Nah, I’m just playing. 

I would never do that.” 

The trial court listened to the recording, as Marshall had asked.2 Afterward, the court 

found no cause to allow counsel to withdraw and denied the motion. 

The Commonwealth moves to admit Brenda’s and Edward’s recorded interviews

The Commonwealth moved in limine to permit evidence of prior bad acts and “forfeiture 

by wrongdoing.” It planned to introduce evidence that Marshall had been in the McDaniels’ 

home two days before their murders, armed with a handgun, and had left only after Edward 

McDaniel confronted him with a shotgun. The Commonwealth moved to admit the parents’ 

statements to police. Marshall did not contest the admissibility of the content of the parents’

statements but opposed admitting them through video and audio recordings. Marshall argued 

that the statements should be elicited instead through the testimony of the police officers. He 

argued that the recordings would be unfairly prejudicial under Virginia Rule of Evidence

2:403(a) because of their “emotional impact,” showing “two people two days before they were 

murdered.” The trial court overruled Marshall’s objections and the recordings were played for 

the jury. 

2 Because the recording was not admitted into evidence or transcribed at the hearing, it is 

not part of the record before us. At oral argument here, Marshall’s counsel acknowledged the 

reasonable inference that the recording corroborated what Marshall claimed to have said on the 

recorded call. 
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Marshall seeks to admit Michael’s rap videos

Michael, the victims’ son, testified at trial. On cross-examination, Marshall sought to 

introduce portions of rap videos that Michael had made and posted online in the weeks before the 

murders. Marshall proffered that the videos were relevant to rebut the Commonwealth’s theory 

of motive and to show that “there are potentially other people out there that also would not like 

[Michael] and would have motive to do him harm.” Marshall added that the videos were 

admissible for impeachment because Michael had “denied engaging in any kind of taunting or 

insulting or challenging behavior to other people.” Michael, however, had testified that his rap 

videos were not “smack talk” because they were not targeted “towards people . . . that’s just 

rap.” 

The Commonwealth objected to admitting the videos, calling it “vague, irrelevant and 

confusing to the jury to say that a rap video would lead someone that is unnamed to commit a 

murder against two people when the witness has identified the perpetrator that he saw that day.” 

The trial court watched the videos outside the presence of the jury. The court noted that one 

video mentioned “somebody named Jamal.” The other videos did not “seem to be . . . tie[d] to 

any individual or incident that . . . might be offensive.” The court said it would allow Marshall 

“to ask [Michael] questions about having a beef with someone named Jamal. But [the court] 

d[idn’t] see a basis for the admissibility of the tapes at th[at] time.” 

When his cross-examination resumed, Michael denied knowing anyone named Jamal.

Marshall is convicted

The jury found Marshall guilty of one count of aggravated murder and two counts of 

using a firearm in the commission of murder.3 The trial court sentenced Marshall to life 

3 The verdict form reflects that the jury found Marshall guilty of aggravated murder of 

more than one person as part of the same act or transaction. The jury did not return a verdict on 

the second aggravated-murder indictment that was premised on killing more than one person in 
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imprisonment for aggravated murder and eight years’ incarceration on the firearms charges. 

Marshall noted a timely appeal. 

ANALYSIS

Marshall seeks a new trial based on three rulings by the trial court that he says were 

erroneous. We consider each in turn.

A. Motion to Withdraw (Assignment of Error 1)

Marshall claims that the trial court should have permitted his lawyer to withdraw from 

representing him at trial. The decision whether to permit a court-appointed lawyer to withdraw 

is committed to the “sound discretion of the trial court.” Payne v. Commonwealth, 233 Va. 460, 

473 (1987). We review an order denying a motion to withdraw for an abuse of discretion. Paris 

v. Commonwealth, 9 Va. App. 454, 459 (1990). 

Marshall argues that the trial court erred in denying the motion to withdraw because 

Marshall’s threat to attack his lawyer created an “actual conflict of interest.” The Sixth 

Amendment protects the right to assistance of counsel in criminal prosecutions, which includes 

the right to effective assistance of counsel. Strickland v. Washington, 446 U.S. 668, 686 (1984). 

“A defendant’s right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment is violated by ‘an actual conflict of 

interest [that] adversely affect[s] [a] lawyer’s performance.’” Kenner v. Commonwealth, 71 

Va. App. 279, 297 (2019) (first alteration in original) (quoting Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 

350 (1980)), aff’d on other grounds, 299 Va. 414 (2021). “The burden of establishing an alleged 

conflict of interest between an attorney and his client is upon the person who asserts such a 

conflict.” Turner v. Commonwealth, 259 Va. 816, 819 (2000). So Marshall bears that burden 

here.

three years. As Marshall was charged with aggravated murder and second-degree murder, the 

jury was instructed on more than one grade of homicide. Finding Marshall guilty of aggravated 

murder, the jury did not return a verdict on the second-degree-murder charges. 
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The burden to establish an actual conflict of interest is heavy. “‘[A]n actual conflict of 

interest’ mean[s] precisely a conflict that affected counsel’s performance—as opposed to a mere 

theoretical division of loyalties.” Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 171 (2002). “An actual 

conflict of interest exists where counsel has responsibilities to other clients or personal concerns 

that are actively in opposition to the best interests of the defendant.” Moore v. Hinkle, 259 Va. 

479, 489 (2000). “[T]he possibility of [a] conflict is insufficient to impugn a criminal 

conviction.” Kenner, 71 Va. App. at 297 (first alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting 

Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 350). To meet his burden, Marshall must show “something beyond a mere 

theoretical concern that [his] attorney’s performance might be affected by his knowledge of 

[Marshall’s] threat.” Spence v. Commonwealth, 60 Va. App. 355, 370 (2012). 

Marshall failed to carry that burden here. Marshall asserts that “[t]he interest of [his] 

lawyer in his personal safety was clearly in conflict with [Marshall’s] interest” because his 

counsel had “doubts regarding his ability to remain focused during the trial” since “at any given 

moment he might need to be ready to duck.” Marshall Br. 11. But Marshall’s lawyer twice told 

the trial court that Marshall’s threat “would not affect [his] professional responsibilities . . . to 

zealously advocate” on Marshall’s behalf. Indeed, Marshall has not alleged that his counsel was 

distracted at trial nor that his performance suffered in any way. 

What is more, Marshall’s claim of an actual conflict is undercut by Marshall’s insistence 

at the hearing below that he would not physically harm his lawyer. Marshall told the trial court: 

“If you listen to the full phone call you would hear me say, ‘Nah, I would never do that. I’m just 

playing.’” The trial court listened to the entire recording and still found no cause to allow 

counsel to withdraw. Having heard Marshall and listened to the recorded call, the trial court was 

entitled to credit Marshall’s claim that he did not mean the threat.
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Given counsel’s unwavering position that he could still “zealously advocate” for 

Marshall and Marshall’s insistence that he did not intend to threaten his lawyer, the trial court 

did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to withdraw.

B. The Recordings of Brenda’s and Edward’s Interviews (Assignment of Error 2)

Marshall claims that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing the Commonwealth 

to play video and audio recordings of Brenda’s and Edward’s May 24, 2021 interviews with 

police. Marshall asserts that the probative value of the recordings was substantially outweighed 

by the danger of unfair prejudice because “[a]llowing the jury to see and hear the McDaniels tell 

that story themselves . . . served only to appeal to the emotions of the jury.” We review a trial 

court’s decision whether to admit evidence for an abuse of discretion. Kenner, 299 Va. at 424.

The Commonwealth has the “prerogative to choose what evidence to offer to the factfinder to meet its burden of proof,” subject only to the rules of evidence. Boone v. 

Commonwealth, 285 Va. 597, 600 (2013). Otherwise relevant evidence may be excluded if the 

probative value of the evidence is “substantially outweighed” by the danger of “unfair 

prejudice.” Va. R. Evid. 2:403. “All evidence tending to prove guilt is prejudicial to an accused, 

but the mere fact that such evidence is powerful because it accurately depicts the gravity and 

atrociousness of the crime or the callous nature of the defendant does not thereby render it 

inadmissible.” Powell v. Commonwealth, 267 Va. 107, 141 (2004). “‘[U]nfair prejudice’ refers 

to the tendency of some proof to inflame the passions of the [jury], or to invite decision based 

upon a factor unrelated to the elements of the claims and defenses in the pending case.” Lee v. 

Spoden, 290 Va. 235, 251 (2015). 

We have said that unfairly prejudicial evidence should be excluded when it “generates 

such a strong emotional response that it is unlikely that the jury could make a rational evaluation 

of its proper evidentiary weight.” Fields v. Commonwealth, 73 Va. App. 652, 673 (2021). 
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Marshall asserts that seeing and hearing recordings of Brenda and Edward only two days before 

they were murdered would have a “powerful emotional effect on the jury.” 

But the trial court did not abuse its discretion in applying the balancing test required by 

Rule 2:403. Marshall concedes that the “content” of the parents’ recorded interviews carried 

probative value. Assuming for argument’s sake that some jurors would react emotionally to the 

parents’ recorded interviews, the parents’ calm demeanors in describing the encounter bely 

Marshall’s claim that the recordings would “inflame the passions” of the jury. See Lee, 290 Va. 

at 251. The recorded interviews are nothing like the “particularly graphic crime scene or autopsy 

photos” that we said in Fields would be “inherently unfairly prejudicial.” 73 Va. App. at 673. 

So we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in finding that the risk of unfair 

prejudice did not “substantially outweigh[],” Va. R. Evid. 2:403, the probative value of the 

evidence.

C. The Rap Videos (Assignment of Error 3)

Finally, Marshall argues that the trial court should have admitted portions of rap videos 

that Michael made and posted on the internet before his parents were murdered. We review a 

trial court’s decision to exclude such evidence for an abuse of discretion. Kenner, 299 Va. at 

424.

Marshall says that the rap videos were relevant to show “that there might have been other 

people who also harbored ill will towards Michael McDaniel, and thus might have come to the 

house looking for him on May 26, putting them on a collision course with Brenda and Edward.” 

Marshall adds that the videos were impeaching because Michael had testified that he did not 

engage in “taunting” or “smack talk” on social media. 

Evidence that has “any tendency to make the existence of any fact in issue more probable 

or less probable than it would be without the evidence” is relevant evidence that is admissible, 
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subject to constitutional and statutory limitations and the Rules of the Supreme Court of 

Virginia. Va. R. Evid. 2:401. We have said that “evidence that merely suggests or insinuates 

that [a] third party may have committed the crime . . . ‘is irrelevant; it tends to confuse and 

mislead a jury unless “evidence [has been] introduced . . . [that] points directly to guilt of a third 

party.”’” Ramsey v. Commonwealth, 63 Va. App. 341, 354 (2014) (third, fourth, and fifth 

alterations in original) (quoting Oliva v. Commonwealth, 19 Va. App. 523, 527 (1995)). Such 

evidence is relevant “only ‘where there is a trend of facts and circumstances tending clearly to 

point out some other person as the guilty party.’” Oliva, 19 Va. App. at 527 (quoting Karnes v. 

Commonwealth, 125 Va. 758, 766 (1919)).

The rap videos here contain offensive language and feature young men brandishing 

weapons. The videos do not call out specific individuals or make specific threats that suggest a 

motive to kill Michael or his parents. The trial court noted that only one video mentioned 

someone’s name—“Jamal.” The trial court allowed defense counsel to question Michael about a 

conflict with “Jamal.” But Michael denied knowing anyone named Jamal or “calling out” Jamal 

in any rap video. 

We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s conclusion that the rap videos were not 

relevant to anything in controversy. Nonspecific and nontargeted “threats” in a rap video do not 

make it more probable than not that someone other than Marshall harbored sufficient ill will 

toward Michael to have come to his house on the morning of May 26, 2021, armed with a gun. 

Nor can we find that the rap videos were admissible to impeach Michael’s credibility. 

Marshall says that the videos “are full of vulgar, taunting, highly disrespectful, and threatening 

language” in “direct contradiction” to Michael’s testimony that he did not engage in “taunting” 
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or “talking smack.”4 Marshall also claims that the videos impeached Michael’s image as “an 

innocent young man who gets bullied by others but never responds in kind.” To be sure, “[an]

opposing party may impeach [a] witness by ‘draw[ing] into question the accuracy of the 

witness’s perception, recordation, recollection, narration, or sincerity.’” McCarter v. 

Commonwealth, 38 Va. App. 502, 506 (2002) (third alteration in original) (quoting Strong, 

1 McCormick on Evidence, § 33 n.5, at 123 (5th ed. 1999)). But a party may not introduce 

extrinsic evidence on a collateral matter to show that the witness testified untruthfully. See

Va. R. Evid. 2:613(a)(ii) (“Extrinsic evidence of collateral statements is not admissible.”). 

Whether Michael engaged in “taunting” or “smack talk” in his rap videos was collateral to 

whether Marshall was the assailant who murdered Michael’s parents. The videos were thus 

properly excluded.

CONCLUSION

Finding no reversible error by the trial court, we see no basis to disturb Marshall’s 

convictions.

Affirmed.

4 For his part, Michael testified that his videos were not “smack talk” because they were 

not addressed “towards people . . . that’s just rap.” He said that his rap videos were “just for 

entertainment.”