UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee, 

v. 

JAMES LEE WATSON, 

 Defendant - Appellant. 

No. 20-5046 

(D.C. No. 4:04-CR-00182-TCK-2) 

(N.D. Okla.) 

_________________________________ 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

_________________________________ 

Before TYMKOVICH, Chief Judge, BRISCOE and BACHARACH, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

 Pro se prisoner James Lee Watson filed a motion for compassionate release on 

his own behalf. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). The district denied the motion 

because Mr. Watson (1) had not exhausted his administrative remedies and (2) had 

not satisfied the requirements of the policy statement set forth in Sentencing 

Guideline § 1B1.13 and its application notes. On appeal, however, the government 

has changed its position to assert that Mr. Watson exhausted his administrative 

* After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined 

unanimously to honor the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral 

argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore 

submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, 

except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It 

may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 

and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

June 24, 2021

Christopher M. Wolpert 

Clerk of Court
2 

remedies, thereby conceding this requirement is satisfied.1

 And while the appeal was 

pending, this court held § 1B1.13 does not apply to compassionate-release motions 

filed by a prisoner. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we therefore 

vacate the district court’s opinion and order denying the motion and remand for the 

district court to consider the motion anew. 

 Since the First Step Act of 2018, compassionate-release motions may be filed 

either by the Director of the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) or by prisoners on their own 

behalf. See § 3582(c)(1)(A). While this appeal was pending, we adopted a three-step 

process for considering such motions. See United States v. Maumau, 993 F.3d 821, 

831 (10th Cir. 2021); United States v. McGee, 992 F.3d 1035, 1042-43 (10th Cir. 

2021). At step one of the analysis, “a district court must find whether extraordinary 

and compelling reasons warrant a sentence reduction.” Maumau, 993 F.3d at 831 

(brackets and internal quotation marks omitted); McGee, 992 F.3d at 1042 (brackets 

1

 This court has not issued a binding decision on whether exhaustion under 

§ 3582(c)(1)A) is a jurisdictional requirement, but unpublished decisions indicate 

that exhaustion is a mandatory claim-processing rule. See United States v. Avalos, 

No. 20-3194, 2021 WL 1921847, at *2 n.2 (10th Cir. May 13, 2021); United States v. 

Johnson, No. 20-6103, 2021 WL 1053706, at *2 (10th Cir. Mar. 19, 2021); but see 

United States v. Salcido, No. 20-2108, 2021 WL 2285220, at *1 (10th Cir. June 4, 

2021). Other circuits similarly have held that § 3582(c)(1)(A)’s exhaustion 

requirement is a “nonjurisdictional claim-processing rule.” United States v. Franco, 

973 F.3d 465, 468 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 920 (2020); see also United 

States v. Harris, 989 F.3d 908, 911 (11th Cir. 2021); United States v. Gunn, 980 F.3d 

1178, 1179 (7th Cir. 2020); United States v. Alam, 960 F.3d 831, 833 (6th Cir. 2020). 

We therefore treat exhaustion as a mandatory claim-processing rule and accept the 

government’s concession. See Hamer v. Neighborhood Hous. Servs. of Chicago, 

138 S. Ct. 13, 17 (2017) (“If properly invoked, mandatory claim-processing rules 

must be enforced, but they may be waived or forfeited.” (emphasis added)). 
3 

and internal quotation marks omitted). At step two, the district court must find 

whether a sentence “reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued 

by the Sentencing Commission.” Maumau, 993 F.3d at 831 (emphasis and internal 

quotation marks omitted); McGee, 992 F.3d at 1042 (emphasis and internal quotation 

marks omitted). And at step three, the district court must “consider any applicable 

§ 3553(a) factors and determine whether, in its discretion, the reduction authorized 

by steps one and two is warranted in whole or in part under the particular 

circumstances of the case.” Maumau, 993 F.3d at 831 (brackets and internal 

quotation marks omitted); McGee, 992 F.3d at 1042 (brackets and internal quotation 

marks omitted). 

 With regard to the second step—the requirement to consider applicable 

Sentencing Commission policy statements—we held that the current version of 

§ 1B1.13 “is applicable only to motions filed by the Director of the BOP, and not to 

motions filed directly by defendants.” Maumau, 993 F.3d at 837; McGee, 992 F.3d 

at 1050. “In other words, if a compassionate release motion is not brought by the 

BOP Director, Guideline § 1B1.13 would not, by its own terms be considered to 

apply to it.” Maumau, 993 F.3d at 837 (brackets and internal quotation marks 

omitted); see also id. at 838 (Tymkovich, C.J., concurring) (“Until the Sentencing 

Commission updates its guidance, there is no ‘applicable policy statement,’ 

18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), that constrains the district court’s discretion to consider 

whether a defendant-filed motion satisfies the ‘extraordinary and compelling’ 

standard.”). 
4 

 Not having the benefit of Maumau and McGee, the district court relied heavily 

on § 1B1.13 in evaluating Mr. Watson’s motion. In McGee, where the district court 

similarly misunderstood its authority with regard to a compassionate-release motion, 

we remanded for the district court to consider the motion anew. See McGee, 

992 F.3d at 1051. We follow that course here, expressing no opinion on the merits of 

Mr. Watson’s motion. 

 We lift the abatement of this case and grant Mr. Watson’s motion to proceed 

without prepayment of costs or fees. We deny his Motion for Supplement Pursuant 

to Fed. R. App. P. 28(j) and his Motion to Supplement the Record on Appeal 

Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 10(e). We vacate the district court’s decision filed on 

April 16, 2020, and we remand this matter for the district court to consider the 

compassionate-release motion anew, consistent with Maumau and McGee. 

Entered for the Court 

Mary Beck Briscoe 

Circuit Judge