NOTICE
 

The text of this opinion can be corrected before the opinion is published in the 

Pacific Reporter. Readers are encouraged to bring typographical or other formal 

errors to the attention of the Clerk of the Appellate Courts: 

303 K Street, Anchorage, Alaska 99501
 

Fax: (907) 264-0878
 

E-mail: corrections @ akcourts.us
 

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF ALASKA 

BOBBY JACK BASS, 

Appellant, 

v. 

STATE OF ALASKA, 

Appellee. 

Court of Appeals No. A-11536 

Trial Court No. 3PA-11-2791 CR 

O P I N I O N 

No. 2527 — November 18, 2016 

Appeal from the Superior Court, Third Judicial District, Palmer, 

Gregory Heath, Judge. 

Appearances: Andrew Steiner, Attorney at Law, Bend, Oregon, 

for the Appellant. Nancy R. Simel, Assistant Attorney General, 

Office of Criminal Appeals, Anchorage, and Craig W. Richards, 

Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee. 

Before: Mannheimer, Chief Judge, Allard, Judge, and Suddock, 

Superior Court Judge. * 

Judge ALLARD. 

* Sitting by assignment made pursuant to Article IV, Section 16 of the Alaska 

Constitution and Administrative Rule 24(d). 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Bobby Jack Bass was convicted of failure to render assistance to an injured 

person after a vehicle accident, a felony under AS 28.35.060(c). On appeal, Bass argues 

that the superior court improperly instructed the jury on the elements of this crime. 

We agree with Bass, and we reverse his conviction. 

Relevant legal background 

A pair of statutes, AS 28.35.050 and AS 28.35.060, define the duties of a 

driver who is involved in an accident where one or more people are injured or killed.1 

AlaskaStatute28.35.050(a) declares thatthedriver “shall immediatelystop 

the vehicle at the scene of the accident or as close to it as possible,” and that the driver 

shall then “return to, and remain at, the scene until the [driver] has fulfilled the 

requirements of AS 28.35.060.” 

Subsection (a) of AS 28.35.060 defines two distinct groups of duties that 

the driver must fulfill. First, the driver must give his or her “name, address, and vehicle 

license number” to the injured person or to some other attending person. Second, the 

driver must “render ... reasonable assistance” to the injured person, “including making 

of arrangements for attendance upon the person by a physician and [for transporting the 

person], in a manner that will not cause further injury, to a hospital for medical treatment 

if it is apparent that treatment is desirable.” 

Although the driver must comply with both sets of duties, AS 28.35.060(b) 

and (c) create different penalties for a defendant’s failure to perform each duty. Under 

AS 28.35.060(b), a driver who fails to provide identifying information is guilty of a 

misdemeanor and faces up to 1 year’s imprisonment. Under AS 28.35.060(c), a driver 

See also Drahosh v. State, 442 P.2d 44, 47-48 (Alaska 1968) (referring to 

AS 28.35.050 and AS 28.35.060 as constituting an “interlocking statutory scheme 

proscribing conduct commonly known as ‘hit and run’ driving”). 

– 2 – 2527
 

1 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

who fails to render reasonable assistance to an injured person is guilty of a felony and 

faces up to 10 years’ imprisonment. 

Why we reverse Bass’s conviction 

In the current case, Bass was indicted under the felony provision of 

AS 28.35.060. That is, he was charged with failing to remain at the scene until he had 

rendered reasonable assistance to the person who was injured in the collision.2 

But at trial, the jury was instructed that Bass would be guilty of the charged 

felony if he failed to comply with either of the two groups of duties imposed by 

AS 28.35.060(a). That is, the jury was told that Bass should be found guilty of the 

felony if the State proved either that Bass failed to provide identifying information or 

that Bass failed to render reasonable assistance. 

Bass objected to this jury instruction, pointing out (correctly) that the 

instruction permitted the jury to convict Bass of a felony for conduct that was only a 

misdemeanor under Alaska law. The court overruled Bass’s objection and gave the 

erroneous jury instruction. The prosecutor subsequently exacerbated this error by 

expressly arguing to the jurors during his summation that Bass should be convicted of 

the charged felony because he failed to provide identifying information. The jury 

convicted Bass, and Bass now appeals. 

On appeal, the State argues that the erroneous instruction was harmless 

because Bass never argued that he rendered reasonable assistance to the driver in the 

other vehicle; instead, he argued only that he was not the driver of his vehicle. (Bass 

claimed that his wife was driving.) 

AS 28.35.060(a) and (c). 

– 3 – 2527
 

2 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

But as Bass points out, there was evidence presented at trial that Bass got 

out of his vehicle and approached the other driver to check on his welfare, and that Bass 

did not leave the scene until the situation appeared to be under control and other people 

had directly assumed responsibility for taking care of the other driver. 

Bass’sattorney did notarguethis evidenceduringhis closingargument, but 

the attorney’s omission is easily explained by the fact that the trial judge had already 

rejected thedefenseattorney’s objection to theerroneous jury instruction ontheelements 

of the crime. That is, when the defense attorney delivered his summation, he already 

knew that the jury was going to be instructed that Bass could be convicted either if he 

failed to provide his identifying information or if he failed to render assistance to the 

other driver. There was no evidence that Bass provided his identifying information to 

anyone — so, under the erroneous jury instruction, it made no difference whether Bass 

checked on the other driver’s well-being before he left the scene. 

Given these circumstances, we cannot say that the erroneous jury 

instruction was harmless. We accordingly reverse Bass’s conviction for violating 

AS 28.35.060(c), and we remand this case to the superior court for further proceedings 

consistent with this decision. 

Conclusion 

We REVERSE the judgment of the superior court. 

– 4 – 2527