Technical Paper 3731E

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LEADER

KNOWLEDGE, DIRECTIVE BEHAVIOR, AND

PERFORMANCE IN ADMINISTRATIVE,

TECHNICAL, AND COMBAT SITUATIONS

William H. Helme and J. E. Uhlaner

PERSONNEL & MANPOWER TECHNICAL AREA

--- U. S. Army

Research lns,*i,,ute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences

September 1979

Alproved for public release; distribution unlmited.

80 009 _ - i
U. S. ARMY RESEARCH INSTITUTE

FOR THE BEHAVIORAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

A Field Operating Agency under the Jurisdiction of the

.Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel

JOSEPH ZEIDNER 

WILLIAM L. HAUSER 

*

Colonel, U S Army

Technical Director Commanderf

NO~iCI

DIST ofthi IBU IDN reorthea N-efydisribtio eenMOMby R IPlasefidriliscrreponenc coner~ngditri .S Amy utcinofrep m sch rt nsitue-: or heBeh viralan Soia Scene,

NOSTE~U Tning : i tiino this aremo report t becc n i ad AAfi.i Pecitmto eorme poiteon,

unless to designated by other authorized documents
11nol a 4i fied

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION Of THIS PAGE (UW,., 0,1. Enteod.E) AX

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Technical 73 1h_10

I. TLS. TYPE OF REPORT & PEnioD COVERED

FELATiONS4IP ETWEN LEADEIR KN~OWLEDGE, D.IRECTIVE'

EHAVIOR, AN ~ERFORNCE IIFDMINISTRATIV4 -1_ 6. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT N4UMBER

9CHNICAL, AND COMBAT SITUATIONS,-

8. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER(&)

William H.Helme M J. E. Uhaner

9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS 10. PROGRAM ELEFdENT,PROJECT, TASK AREA 6 WORK.UNIT NUMBE RS

U.S. Army Research Institute for the BQehavioral6

5001 Eisenhower Avenue, Alexandria, VA 22333 2Q162722A766

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Dep'ity Chief ' Staff for Personnel 1. SeptebOF9PAGES

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Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.

17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of the obeirace eI,,tgf In Block 20, Idifff.ei f ,oReport)

IS. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

19. K(EY WORDS (Cofninu on I~~# .1do If noeea' -nd Identfyy block nubr

Officer evaluation Behavioral style

Leadership behavior Officer prediction

officer performance

20. A86"ACT (eefne m -we ou 4 It n...awoy f d.Vifty by block number)

'This paper presents an analysis of data acquired in previous ART officer

prediction research to learn to what extent two broad characteristics of

officer behavior-military knowledge and directiveness/decisiveness--are

associated with superior performance in the three major areas of officer

assignments--combat, technical, and administrative.

(Continued) .

DD 1473 EiTION or I NOVGS IS OM'-. I L Unclassified

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a- Item 20 (Continued)

+our groups of officers were identified: high knowledge and high

decisiveness, high knowledge and low decisiveness, low knowledge and high

decisiveness, and low knowledge and low decisiveness. Performance scores

and observations of decisiveness obtained for each officer were analyzed

with respect to officers' technical and tactical knowledge.

Superior performance was found to be positively related to both Imilitary knowledge and decisiveness. Knowledge, whether technical or

tactical in content, was more important in administrative and technical I situations. Decisiveness was markedly more important in combat situations.

The analysis confirmed the importance of matching an officer's leadership

style and qualifications to the requirements of an assignment to insure

effective performance.

Fr

ii Unclassified

SECURITY CLASSIFICA T

ION OF THIS -AGEMIen nlat EnIjf d)
Technical Paper 373

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LEADER

KNOWLEDGE, DIRECTIVE BEHAVIOR, AND

PERFORMANCE IN ADMINISTRATIVE,

TECHNICAL, AND COMBAT SITUATIONS

WiIli,-m H. Helme and J. E. Uhlaner

M. A. FischI, Acting Chief

PERSONNEL & MANPOWER TECHNICAL AREA

Approved by:

E. Ralph Dusek. Director

PERSONNEL & TRAINING

RESEARCH LABORATORY

U.S. ARMY RESEARCH INSTITUTE FOR THE BEHAVIORAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

5001 Eisenhower Avenue, Alexandria, Virginia 22333

Office, Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel

Department o' the Army

September.1979

Army P~roject Numbers Officer Selection

20162722A766

2016271 7A76

Ariproved for PublgC release, distribution unlimited.
ARI Research Reports and Technical Papers are intended for sponsors of

R&D tasks and other research and military agencies. Any findings ready for

implementation at the time of publication are presented in the latter part ot 1

the Brief. Upon completion of a major phase of the task formal recommendations for official action normally are conveyed to appropriate military

agencies by briefing or Disposition Form.

iv
A

FOREWORD

The Personnel and Management Technical Area of the Army Research

Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences (ARI) conducts a continuing research program to provide the Army personnel management system with ways to identify and select good leaders and evaluate their

performance. ARI Research Reports 1172, 1173, and 1182 describe previous research on officer performance using an Officer Evaluation Center

(OEC) simulation. This report analyzes the OEC data in order to discover the relationship between officer performance in different situations and leader characteristics of military knowledge and decisiveness.

The OEC research was originally done under Army Research and Development Project 2Q062106A722, Officer Prediction, in support of the

Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (DCSPER). The continuing technology

base research on officer careers, responsive to the DCSPER, was conducted under Army Project 2Q162717A766 in FY 1978 and 2Q162722A766 in

FY 1979.

J EPH ZEIDNER

'chnical Director

A; -si,]o - u'ro

NI

,! ""nt Q W; lC n

t

. .I i' .Z . . . .

A ,.. .. • , .
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LEADER KNOWLEDGE, DIRECTIVE BEHAVIOR, AND

PERFORMANCE IN ADMINISTRATIVE, TECHNICAL, AND COMBAT SITUATIONS

BRIEF

Requirement:

To find to what extent two broad characteristics of officer leader

behavior--military knowledge and directiveness/decisiveness--are associated with level of performance in the three majoi areas of officer

assignments--combat, technical, and administrative.

Procedure:

Using data acquired in ARI's officer prediction research, four

groups of officers were identified: high knowledge, high decisiveness;

high knowledge, low decisiveness; low knowledge, high decisiveness;

and low knowledge, low decisiveness. Performance scores and observations of decisiveness were obtained for officers in these groups.

Analysis was performed separately for technical knowledge and tactical

knowledge.

Findings;

Both military knowledge and decisiveness were, as hypothesized,

found to be positively related to superior performance.

Military knowledge, whether technical or tactical in content, was

found to be more important in administrative and technical problem situations. Directiveness//decisiveness was markedly more important to

successful performance in combat situations.

Utilization:

The Officer Evaluation Center in a general sense constituted a

systems measurement bed which brought together a large number of varying factors, personal and situational, so that selected factors could

be studied in interaction. The relationships established can be useful to both research and management in developing, consistent with

events, improved procedures for officer career management.

The present analysis has confirmed the importance of officer

leadership style to effective performance in assignments having different requirements.

vii

. ~ ~- -
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LEADER KNOWLEDGE, DIRECTIVE BEHAVIOR, AND

PERFORMANCE IN ADMINISTRATIVE, TECHNICAL, AND COMBAT SITUATIONS

CONTENTS

Page

BACKGROUND ............ ............................ 11

OBJECTIVE OF THE PRESENT ANALYSIS ........ ................ 4

DESIGN OF THE ANALYSIS ........... ...................... 5

RESULTS ............... ............................. 5

CONCLUSIONS ........... ........................... 16

REFERENCES ............ ............................ 17

DISTRIBUTION ........... ........................... 19

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1. Observations of decisiveness and the 15 task-situations

used to evaluate performance .... .............. 6

2. Number of significant F-ratios for effects of technical

knowledge, decisiveness, and interaction on

performance ......... ...................... 8

3. Number of significant F-ratios for effects of tactical

knowledge, decisiveness, and interaction on

performance ........ ........................ 9

4. Percentage of variance in performance of 15

situational tasks attributable to technical

knowledge, decisiveness, and interaction .... ........ 10

5. Percentage of variance in performance of 15

situational tasks attributable to tactical

knowledge, decisiveness, and interaction .......... ... 13

6. Differential effects of knowledge and decisiveness

on task performance as a function of situations in

which decisiveness and performance were observed .... 14

ix
I

CONTENTS (Continued)

Page

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1. Schedule of activities in 3-day Officer

Evaluation Center ...... ...................... 3

2. Variance effects of technical knowledge and I

decisiveness on performance in 15 situational '

tasks of OEC .i. ................... 11

3. Variance effects of tactical knowledge and

decisiveness on performance in 15 situational

tasks of OEC ....... ..................... ... 12

4. Differential effects of knowledge and decisiveness on task performance as a function of situa- I

tions in which decisiveness and performance were

observed ........... ....................... 15

I

I

I

!

I

I

i

I

L

I

--~- .~ -- .- -- 7~T . - - - - ______
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LEADER KNOWLEDGE, DIRECTIVE BEHAVIOR,

AND PERFORMANCE IN ADMINISTRATIVE, TECHNICAL,

AND COMBAT SITUATIONS

BACKGROUND

Early identification of officer leaders and development of officer

leadership from cadet training through company and field grade assignments are of major concern in the management of the Army's manpower resources. The Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social

Sciences (ARI) conducts research to provide scientific means of identifying individuals with good leadership potential for officer training,

selecting officers for commissioning, and evaluating their performance.

Differential prediction and evaluation have become dominant objectives

in the effort to channel officers into appropriate assignments and develop their potential so as to make best use of their abilities.

Research on the relationship of leadership styles to effective

performaice has concentrated to a considerable extent on two approaches: I

(1) the effects of different behavioral styles on group performance and career satisfaction, and (2) tne differential effectiveness of leadership styles in situations differing in leader-follower task relationships. Concep- such as initiation of structure and personal consideration (e.g., Stogdill, 1974; Fleishman, 1973) have been developed and

investigated in the first approach; concepts such as task orientation

versus person-relationship orientation and definition of dimensions of

favorableness (e.g., Fiedler, 1974) have been developed and investigated in the second approach. Concurrently, the Army's research on

officer leadership has developed and validated realistic assessment

processes for measuring leader behavior. This has led to the use of

"test beds," in which the situational demands are defined, and it has

yielded constructs interrelating leader characteristics, leader behaviors, and situational requirements (e.g., Uhlaner, 1970, 1975, 1978;

Helme, Willemin, & Grafton, 1971, 1974; Helme, Willemin & Day, 1971).

Officer prediction research was undertaken by ARI to meet the need

to improve the selection and assignment of personnel for different

of. Lcer leadership positions. Analysis of duties performed by officers

pointed initially to three groups of officer a.'signments--combat, technical, and administrative--which appeared to call for different patterns of leader behavior. The basic research design was longitudinal.

Experimental measures were obtained on officers innediate)'i after their

entry on active duty, and performance evaluations were obtained at subsequent points in the officers' careers. From the original sample of

4,000, 900 officers were selected in the later phase of the program, as representative of various branches of service. These officers took

part in an experimentally controlled 3-day exercise at the Officer

Evaluation Center (OEC) established for the purpose at Fort McClellan, 4

Ala. The scenario for the exercise presented the officer with 15 problem A

1 1
situations, 5 each in combat, technical, and administrative settings

(Figure 1). The problem situations were designed to yield objective Q

recorded data on specific details of each officer's performance, as

well as jud .'.ntal. evaluations of style of behavior and effectiveness

in aspects of each task ani in each situation.

In addition to the evaluations of officer performance obtained

at the OEC, ratings were obtained of all officers who had taken the

Differential Officer Battery, which measures a variety of knowledges,

skills, and aptitudes, at entry on active duty.

Criterion data were analyzed to yield information about the

officers--the requirements of their jobs, the various ways in which

they carried out their responsibilities as leaders, and what general

modes of behavior characterized good and poor accomplishment of various

missions. Analysis of test and criterion data revealed characteristics

of officers who would be likely to succeed or to perform less well as

officers.

V4

The ARI Eelection research program enhanced the value of the procedures and provided useful measures of general verbal and quantitative

ability at higher levels. Measurement of personal attributes had

yiclded only modest predictive validity. The major contribution from

the research findings was the realization that leadership behavior was

highly complex and that the situation in which it was evaluated would

have to be considered fully. A major contribution of the evaluation _

segment of the research was to define more clearly this requirement for

new evaluation approaches, particularly those emphasizing the situation

in which leadership behavior was to be evaluated.

ARI's program in this area continues to be a many-faceted attack

on major officer personnel problems--improved methods for selection,

assignment, and promotion actions; continuing reevaluation of each officer's potential in terms of available career assignments; and development of a new research-based system of performance evaluation respon-

* sive to particular Army needs for given personnel decisions. This

research utilizes ARI's experience with simulating leadership problem

situations, with its implications for adapting officer training exercises to individual meisurement, for applying modcls in design and

testing of officer evaluation systems and subsystems, and for computerassisted simulation and feedback.

Research on officer prediction has dcne mote than provide precommissioning measures. The behavioral dimeiision! have helped shape the

constructs that are being used in research to develop a system for

selecting and evaluating officers that meets the changing patterns of

officer career development.

2
DAY ONE: MAAG Office--Peacetime XX

Test

situation Time

Technical/ 0730 Inspect 3 MAAG vehicles for combat readiness;

managerial recommended or tak %ctions to correct

deficiencies I

Administrative 1030 Correct poor supply records of Host Nation 1

Army unit; explain error- to unit's antagonistic CO

Technical/ 1330 Check for bugs in communication network display L

managerial for visit of Host Nation VIP; recommend or

make corrections

1630 Supper

Administrative 1745 Evaluate report on personnel office of Host

Nation Army unit; recommend changes in organization and work flow

Administrative 1945 Study production records of Host Nation ordnance platoon; reschedule work assignments of

repairmen

2230 To BOQ

DAY TWO: MAAG Office--Wartime

HOST NATION INVADED WITH NUCLEAR STRIFS

Technical/ 0300 By radio, direct 4 jeep-mounted survey teams

managerial on Host Nation terrain reporting road damage,

radiation levels, and other conditions

Technical/ 1200 Evaluate captured foreign weapon brought back

managerial by one of survey teams

Administrative 1330 Study Host Nation map to select new depot sites;

defend selections of depot sites made by MAAG CO

Administrative 1630 On map, select new highway net to carry materiel

from chosen depot sites to forward supply points

Technical/ 1900 Evaluate potential hasty airstrip sites and

managerial compute runway length

2000 To BOQ

Figure 1. Schedule of activities in 3-day Officer Evaluation Center.

3
DAY THREE: Guerrilla Operations

SITUATION DETERIORATES

Test

situation Time

0030 Evacuate MAAG Hq Office; trucked to woods;

5-mile night-march through woods to MAAG Field

CPI

Combat 0330 In bunker, prepare Company March Order to move

friendly guerrilla unit

Combat 0700 Prepare roadblock, first instructiug NCOs in placing demolitions on trees to form abatis F Combat 0900 With NCOs (one is unmanageable), recon Helicopter LZ and plan deployment of platoon in

its defense

Combat 1000 From prepared Observation Post, report enemy

activities and potential targets

1100 Lunch

Combat 1130 Lead rzute recon patrol in jeep; captured,

inteirogated, released, and returned to US

control

1430 CEAEFIRE: FOREIGN NATIONALS TEAVE HOST , NAT ION

Figure I (Continued)

- Research methodology has been developed to support the measurement

of performance by means which also consider the elusive noncognitive

and situational elements influencing performance.

OBJECTIVE OF THE PRESENT ANALYSIS

The research program outlined ab,.e addressed the interrelationship of leader characteristics, leadership behaviors, and mission accomplishment in different military situations. From the comprehensive

data of the entry test battery and the nearly 2,000 observations and

evaluations of performance obtained in the 15 situations at OEC, measures

of knowledges, skills, behaviors, and effectiveness were derived by

factor analysis and logical interpretation. The data analysis in the

present phase of the research, reported here, was concerned specifically

4
with the interrelationship of leader knowledge, style of behavior, and

mission accomplishment in the three situational categories--combat,

technical, and administrative. As indicated by the design of the research program, these situations were embedded in an overall combat

environment under the time constraints, input overload, and simulated

combat stregs of that environment.

The principal hypotheses investigated were (a) that both a high

level of military knowledge and leadership behavior characterized by

a high level of directiveness-decisiveness would be positively related

to superior performance in an officer, and (b) that high directiveness

would be more important to performance in combat situations, and high

knowledge more important to performance in technical and administrative

situations.

DESIGN OF THE ANALYSIS

To test these hypotheses, a sample of over 600 lieutenants, chosen

from participants in the officer prediction research program, was divided

into high and low military knowledge groups on the basis of the tests

taken on entry to active duty, previously validated in the original sample. The 600-man sample was partitioned twice: first, on the basis of

knowledge of military tactics, and second on the basis of knowledge of

military technology operations. Each officer was then evaluated on directiveness of leadership behavior in one situational context. Finally,

each officer was evaluated bn mission accomplishment in each of the 15

simulated combat situations. The mission-accomplishment evaluation for

the situation in which directiveness had been judged was omitted from

the analysis, in order to avoid rater halo or rater assumption that directiveness was nececsarily positive. Criterion data of mission accomplishment %ere also dichotomized.

Scores and evaluations were tabulated separately for each situation

in which directiveness/decisiveness was observed and also for each situation in which performance of the task or mission was evaluated. In

situations where the officer worked alone on data and instructions that

were provided--for example, producing a staff document--no observation

of decisiveness could be made. In combat comnand situations, two separate estimates of decisiveness were made. One performance evaluation

was made in each of the 15 situations. Thesa were "total scores"--the

weighted sums of separate observations and ev luations. Table 1 lists

the specific observations used to estimate de~isiveness and the 15 situations on which total performance scores were obtained.

RESULTS

The data consisted of mean performance scores for each of four

groups: high kno, edge, high decisiveness; high knowledge, low decisiveness; low knowledge, high decisiveness; and low knowledge, low

decisiveness. Since the analysis was performed separately for tactical

5
Table I 1

Observations of Decisiveness and the 15 Task-6ituations

Used to Evaluate Performance

Decisiveness observations Situations

Administrative tasks

None Office management

None Production analysis

Bearing and assurance Supply records

(Interaction with allied officer)

Bearing and assurance Site selection

(Response to turbulence and time pressure

stress)

Bearing and assurance Highway traffic

(Response to time pressure under stress)

Technical tasks

Bearing and assurance Communications exhibit

(Technical presentation to superiors)

Bearing and assurance Automotive inspection

(Direction of men)

None Weapons assessment

None Airfield layout

Bearing and assurance March order

(Response to actual combat environment)

Combat tasks

Coummand of Men Road damage and

Decisiveness radiation survey

Command of Men Security mission

Decisiveness

Command of Men Roadblock

Decisiveness

Command of Men Reconnaissance patrol

Decisiveness

Bearing and assurance Observation post

(Response in actual combat environment)

6
and for technical knowledge and for observations of decisiveness in

each of 15 situations (Table 1), there were 2 x 15 x 15 = 450 replications. Each set of mean performance scores was analyzed on a two- i

way fixed analysis of variance.

These analyses yielded F-ratios that proved highly significant

for the main effects of knowledge and decisiveness, but in only a few

instances (although well above chance incidence) in interaction variance. A summary of findings on the F-ratios is given in Tables 2 and 3.

Technical knowledge accounted for significant variance in performance

in 62% of the effects analyzed, decisiveness in 80%, and interaction

in 22%. Tactical knowledge accounted for significant variance in 85%, decisiveness in 81%, and interaction in 20% of the effects analyzed. ]

Given these findings of substantial significance, the next step ]

was to estimate the percentage of variance accounted for by each effect,

using Winer's method (1971, pp. 428-430). Table 4 shows the percentage

of variance in performance in 15 situational tasks attributable to f

technical knowledge, decisiveness, and interaction. The mean variance

explained by technical knowledge was 4.00%; by decisiveness, 6.39%;

and by interaction, 0.85%. Table 5 shows the same statistics for

tactical knowledge, decisiveness, and interaction. The mean variance

explained by tactical knowledge was 3.67%; by decisiveness, 6.53%; and

by interaction, 0.74%. These results clearly showed that across all

situations, decisiveness accounted for a substantial majority of the

performance variance explained.

On closer examination, however, Tables 4 and 5 reveal that in

administrative and technical tasks involving no interaction with subordinates or colleagues, performance variance attributable to knowledge

exceeded that attributable to decisiveness except in one highly complex

task, the communications exhibit. Strikingly, the reverse result was

found for the combat command tasks, especially for the road damage and

radiation survey task, a command-and-control task lasting 8 hours (the

longest of the problem situations) that imposed extreme pressures of

emergency decision and input overload.

Considering category of situation, the mean percentage of variance attributable to each source was as follows:

Technical

Situation knowledge Decisiveness Interaction

Administrative 4.24% 3.15% 0.74%

Technical 3.56 5.48 0.90

Combat 4.21 10.53 0.91

7
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Tactical

Situation knowledge Decisiveness Interaction

Administrative 4.17% 3.73% 0.69%

Technical 3.57 5.57 0.78

Combat 3.28 10.30 0.75

Here aga.i, knowledge--whether technical or tactical--was found to be

more important in administrative task situations; decisiveness wes more

important in technical task situations. Decisiveness was markedly more I

important in ccbat task situations. The foregoing data are presented A

graphically in Figures 2 and 3.

Table 4

4

Percentage of Variance in Performance of 15 Situational

Tasks Attributable to Technical Knowledge,

Decisiveness, and Interaction

Situational task Knowledge (K) Decisiveness (D) K

Office management 4.83 2.50 0.63

Production analysis 4.37 3.03 0.57

Supply records 3.50 6.36 1.93

Site selection 4.36 2.36 0.57

Highway traffic 4.14 1.50 1.0!

Conmmunications exhibit 2.43 7.64 0.93

Automotive inspection 3.50 6.57 1.21

Weapons assessment 3.04 7.43 1.23

Airfield layout 4.77 1.83 0.63

March order 4.07 3.93 0.50

Road damage & radiation survey 2.42 16.04 0.73

Security mission 4.42 10.42 0.73

Roadblock 4.88 9.12 1.65

Reconnaissance patrol 4.27 .65 0.73

Observation post 5.07 7.43 0.71

Mean 4.00 6.39 0.85

The last aspect investigated in the present analysis was the relationship of the situation in which decisiveness was observed to the

percentage of variance attributable to each source. For this analysis,

the six observations of decisiveness in administrative and technical

task situations (three measures of bearing and assurance in each of the

10
OFFICE MANAGEMENT

Uj PRODUCTION ANALYSIS

Ill~llll~llSUPPLY RECORDS

SITE SELECTION

HIGHWAY TRAFFIC

iii 11111 Illl~l~llCOMMUNICATIONS EXHIBIT

AUTOMOTIVE INSPECTION

WEAPONS ASSE."MENT

~IIIIIIIIIIIIIAIRFIELD LAYOUT

1IIIIIIIIIIIIIMARCH ORDER

ROAn DAMAGE AND

RADIATION SURVEY

IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIISECURITY MISSION

mmIIImIIII~tIIROADBLOCK

I HillRECONNAISSANCE PATROL

1111111OBSERVATION POST

0 2 4 6 a 10 12 14 16

PERCENT OF VARIANCE Variance due to technical knowler

1111Variance due to decisiveness

Figuie 2. Variance effects of technical knowledge and decisiveness on

performance in 15 situational tasks of DEC.
OFFICE MANAGEMENT

PRODUCTION ANALYSIS

_SUPPLY RECORDS ae

SITE SELECTION

HIGHWAY TRAFFIC

IIIIIIIIIII!COMMUNICATIONS EXHIBIT

, , , AUTOMOTIVE INSPECTION

W EAPONS ASSESSMENT

IAIRFIELD LAYOUT

ii MARCH ORDER

ROAD DAMAGE AND 111111111 IliIIIIIIIIIiIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIIiIIII RADIATION SURVEY

1111111111 1111111 11111111 SECURITY MISSION

e I IIIIIIIIIIIII I~I ROADBLOCK

IflH l RECONNAISSANCE PATROL

IIIIIHIIII 111111 OBSERVATION POST

0 2 4 8 10 12 14 16

PERCENT OF VARIANCE Variance due to tactical knowledge

Ill111 IVariance due to decisiveness

Figure 3. Variance effects of tactical knowledge and decisiveness on

performance in 15 situational tasks of OEC.

12
two task categories) were averaged and compared with the average of the

nine decisiveness measures in the combat situations. The results

(Table 6) demonstrated that in the technical task situations, technical knowledge contributed more to performance variance than decisiveness did (6.44 vs. 4.84), but that the reverse was found for decisiveness observed in combat command tasks (2.41 vs. 7.75). Tactical

knowledge, however, contributed less to performance in all tasks than

did decisiveness in technical staff situations (3.25 vs. 5.38). The

difference was even greater when decisiveness was observed in combat

situations (3.97 vs. 7.49). Apparently, decisiveness itself may also

be responsive to situational demands and to an officer's particular

expertise. To put it another way, an officer can be more decisive

if he or she knows what to be decisive about. Fig-are 4 shows these

data graphically.

Table 5

Percentage of Variance in Performance of 15 Situational

Tasks Attributable to Tactical Knowledge,

Decisiveness, and Interaction

Situational task Knowledge (K) Decisiveness (D) K x D

office management 4.37 2.57 0.63

Production analysis 3.70 3.10 0.77

Supply records 3.93 7.36 0.71

Site selection 4.57 3.50 0.71

Highway traffic 4.29 2.14 0.64

Communications exhibit 2.93 7.07 0.79

Automotive inspection 3.86 6.50 0.79

Weapons assessment 3.17 8.17 0.97

Airfield layout 4.17 1.90 0.70

March order 3.71 4.21 0.64

Road damage & radiation survey 2.58 15.42 0.73

Security mission 2.73 9.81 0.79

Roadblock 4.73 9.27 0.79

Reconnaissance patrol 2.65 9.27 0.88

Observation post 3.71 7.71 0.57

Mean 3.67 6.53 0.74

13
Table 6

Differential Effects cf Knowledge and Decisiveness on Task

Performance as a Function of Situations in Which

Decisiveness and Performance Were Observed

Percentage of variance attributable to technical knowledge

Situation-category Situation-catego:y of performance L

of decisiveness Administrative Technical Combat All

Technical staff 6.88 6.04 6.40 6.44

Combat command 2.72 2.08 2.42 2.41

All 4.39 3.66 4.01 4.02

Percentage of variance attributable to decisiveness

Administrative Technical Combat All

Technical staff 3.57 3.86 7.08 4.84

Combat command 2.94 6.37 13.94 7.75

All 3.19 5.40 11.20 6.59

Percentage of variance attributable to tactical knowledge

Administrative Technical Combat All

Technical staff 3.52 2.97 3.27 3.25

Combat command 4.53 3.97 3.31 3.97

All 4.19 3.57 3.29 3.68 j

Percentage of variance attributable to decisiveness

Administrative Technical Combat All

Technical '-taff 4.42 4.91 6.77 5.38

Combat conu and 3.44 5.90 13.11 7.49

All 3.83 5.50 10.57 6.64

II 1 I

14

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33NVUVA 0 IN383
CONCLUSIONS

The results suggested support for the first hypothesis: that the

leader's military knowledge and decisiveness of behavior are highly

related to effectiveness of performance in a wide range of task situations. In the test bed of a simulated combat emergency, evidence in--

dicates that knowledge and decisiveness are important to performance.

Tables 4 and 5 show that measures of knowledge account for from 2.4%

to 5% of the variance in performance of given tasks, with no consistent

differences among the categories of administrative, Lechnical, and combat tasks. The mean variance accounted for by decisiveness, while I

showing wider differences, was 6.39% and 6.53% when analyzed in connection with technical knowledge and tactical knowledge, respectively.

The evidence for the second hypothesis--that decisiveness is more important in combat situations and that knowledge is more important in

administrative and technical situations--is also strong. The variance

accounted for by decisiveness is far greater in the combat tasks, ranging from 7.4% to 16%, as compared to a range of 1.9% to 7.6% in the

administrative and technical tasks.

The Officer Evaluation Center provided a setting in which varying

factors of environment, type of mission, interpersonal relationships,

situational problems, and stresses were brought together. The officers

brought their different capabilities and individual ways of dealing

with problems and interacting with environmental and situational factors.

The results are generalizable beyond the specific situations, and, with

come caution, to major dimensions of leadership and officer performance.

16 S-i = m m m m m m
REFERENCES

Fiedler, F. E., & Chemers, M. M. Leadership and effective management.

New York: Scott Foresman, 1974.

Fleishman, E. A. Twenty years of consideration and structure, in E. A.

Fleishman and J. G. Hunt (Eds.), Current devp'prnents in the studyX

of leadership. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press,

1973.

Helme, W. H., Willemin, L. P., & Grafton, F. C. Dimensions of leadership in a simulated combat situation. ARI Research Report 1172.

July 1971. (NTIS No. AD 730 315) (a)

Helme, W. H., Willemin, L. P., & Day, R. W. Psychological factors

measured in the Differential Officer Battery. ARI Research Report 1173. July 1971. (NTIS No. AD 737 685) (b)

Helme, W. H., Willemin, L. P., & Grafton, F. C. Prediction if office,-:

behavior in a simulated combat situation. ARI Research Report

1182. March 1974. (NTIS No. AD 779 445) (c)

Stogdill, R. M. Handbook of leadership. New York: The Free Press,

1974.

Uhlaner, J. E. Human performance, jobs, and systems psychology--the

systems measurement bed. ARI Technical Report S-2. October 19 0.

Uhlaner, J. E. Management leadership in system measuz'ement beds. ARI

Technical Report S-3. August 1975. (NTIS No. AD A021 888)

Uhlaner, J. E. Management leadership in system measurement beds revisited. AIPI Technical Report S-5. February 1978. (NTIS No.

AD A057 479)

Winer, B. J. Statistical principles in experimental design. New York:

McGraw-Hill, 1971.

17
DISTRIbUTION

ARt ,stributlion List

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IHODA (DAPE POR) 2 USAEIEC. Ft Benjaijen Harrison. ATTN- Lirmy

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19

_x-- - h
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4 9- rsh Del Stafl, Brit ilh Embassy. Willhinglor' 

I

20