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i 

94–228 2015

[H.A.S.C. No. 114–26] 

HEARING 

ON

NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT 

FOR FISCAL YEAR 2016 

AND

OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED 

PROGRAMS 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR 

AND LAND FORCES HEARING 

ON

FISCAL YEAR 2016 GROUND FORCE 

MODERNIZATION AND ROTORCRAFT 

MODERNIZATION PROGRAMS 

HEARING HELD 

MARCH 19, 2015 
(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR AND LAND FORCES 

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio, Chairman 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

JOHN FLEMING, Louisiana 

CHRISTOPHER P. GIBSON, New York 

PAUL COOK, California, Vice Chair 

BRAD R. WENSTRUP, Ohio 

JACKIE WALORSKI, Indiana 

SAM GRAVES, Missouri 

MARTHA MCSALLY, Arizona 

STEPHEN KNIGHT, California 

THOMAS MACARTHUR, New Jersey 

WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts 

HENRY C. ‘‘HANK’’ JOHNSON, JR., Georgia 

TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois 

MARC A. VEASEY, Texas 

TIMOTHY J. WALZ, Minnesota 

DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey 

RUBEN GALLEGO, Arizona 

MARK TAKAI, Hawaii 

GWEN GRAHAM, Florida 

SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts 

JESSE TOLLESON, Professional Staff Member 

DOUG BUSH, Professional Staff Member 

JULIE HERBERT, Clerk 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Turner, Hon. Michael R., a Representative from Ohio, Chairman, Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces ...................................................... 1 

WITNESSES 

Grosklags, VADM Paul A., USN, Principal Military Deputy to the Assistant 

Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development, and Acquisition), U.S. Navy; 

accompanied by BGEN Joseph Shrader, USMC, Commanding General, Marine Corps Systems Command, and William E. Taylor, Program Executive 

Officer Land Systems, U.S. Marine Corps ......................................................... 4 

Williamson, LTG Michael E., USA, Military Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics and Technology); accompanied 

by LTG Anthony R. Ierardi, USA, Deputy Chief of Staff, G–8, and MG 

Michael D. Lundy, USA, Commander, Army Aviation Center of Excellence .. 3 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Grosklags, VADM Paul A., joint with BGEN Joseph Shrader and William 

E. Taylor ........................................................................................................ 39 

Williamson, LTG Michael E., joint with LTG Anthony R. Ierardi ............... 23 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

Ms. Sanchez ...................................................................................................... 59 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Turner ........................................................................................................ 63 

Mr. Wilson ......................................................................................................... 67 

(1) 

FISCAL YEAR 2016 GROUND FORCE MODERNIZATION 

AND ROTORCRAFT MODERNIZATION PROGRAMS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR AND LAND FORCES, Washington, DC, Thursday, March 19, 2015. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:46 a.m., in room 

2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Michael R. Turner 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL R. TURNER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM OHIO, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

TACTICAL AIR AND LAND FORCES 

Mr. TURNER. Hearing will now come to order. Today, the subcommittee convenes to receive testimony on the fiscal year 2016 

budget request for Army and Marine Corps ground force and rotorcraft modernization programs. 

I am pleased to welcome our distinguished panel of witnesses. 

We have Lieutenant General Michael E. Williamson, Military Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics 

and Technology); Lieutenant General Anthony R. Ierardi, Deputy 

Chief of Staff, G–8; Major General Michael D. Lundy, Commander, 

Army Aviation Center of Excellence; Vice Admiral Paul A. 

Grosklags, Principal Military Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of 

the Navy (Research, Development and Acquisition); Brigadier General Joseph Shrader, Commanding General, Marine Corps Systems 

Command; Mr. William E. Taylor, Program Executive Officer Land 

Systems. 

Gentlemen, thank you all for being with us today. And thank you 

for your service. Modernization continues to be a top priority for 

this committee. The committee, through the annual defense authorization process, has prevented production breaks for critical armor 

platforms, such as the Abrams tank. Given the current situation in 

Ukraine and the return of armor to Europe, this was the right decision. 

The committee has also helped to ensure the Department was developing and buying the best possible personal protective and individual equipment for the warfighter. We will continue to work to 

find ways to help incentivize the industrial base to continue investment and innovation in this area. 

For the Army, this will be an important year for the ground program such as Abrams, Bradley, Paladin MV, and Stryker modernization. The Marine Corps has finalized requirements for a family of amphibious combat vehicles and is pursuing a streamlined 

acquisition strategy that, of course, we are watching closely. 
2 

As we go forward, the committee will continue to ensure modernization strategies address current and future threats. However, 

all that progress could come unraveled, given the budgetary environment. As you know, I voted against sequestration. And recently, 

I wrote a letter to the Speaker about the need to increase the 

topline to the defense budget. The letter had over 70 signatures 

committing to fully funding our national security. 

The budget process is still playing out. But I fear that the nightmare of marking the budget request to sequestration levels may become a reality. And of course, as you know, the Budget Committee 

is diligently working today. 

So what does that mean for modernization? Tradeoffs and significant funding reductions to critical programs will have to be made. 

The industrial base will be impacted at every level. General 

Odierno, the Chief of Staff of the Army, has stated the Army would 

experience an overall modernization investment decrease of 40 percent, effectively impacting every program. 

The Department survived the first round of sequester, but not by 

much. Programs were still delayed, cutbacks were made for training, and we essentially robbed Peter to pay Paul. We have exhausted those options. The reality is the military is caught between 

rising obligations and shrinking budgets. 

So in addition to receiving updates on Army and Marine Corps 

programs, I have asked our witnesses to prepare to discuss potential impacts of sequestrations on these programs. I am concerned 

that we are dropping our guard right as the world is falling apart. 

We either make smart, targeted investments now, or we pay for 

that as failure on down the road. 

The protection of our national defense and of the security of the 

American people must come first. I would like to thank Loretta 

Sanchez, my ranking member, who has not yet been able to make 

it to the hearing. When she does, I know she has an opening statement. I am going to be turning this hearing over to the able hands 

of my vice chair, Paul Cook, after I open it with this question. And 

I would like—— 

STAFFER. [Off mike.] 

Mr. TURNER. Sorry. Yes. Great, excellent. 

I am going to pose this question for you, that after your opening 

statements I would like you to begin with and perhaps work into 

your statements. And that question is that in the budget discussion, they currently are looking at funding overseas contingency operations [OCO], and with a base budget that is at the budget control levels. How does the mix between OCO and base budget affect 

your overall operations and issues with respect to acquisition? 

Now turning to then the opening statements. We will go to General Williamson. And I will be handing the gavel over to Mr. Cook. 

Thank you, gentlemen. 
3 

STATEMENT OF LTG MICHAEL E. WILLIAMSON, USA, MILITARY 

DEPUTY TO THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE ARMY (ACQUISITION, LOGISTICS AND TECHNOLOGY); ACCOMPANIED 

BY LTG ANTHONY R. IERARDI, USA, DEPUTY CHIEF OF 

STAFF, G–8, AND MG MICHAEL D. LUNDY, USA, COMMANDER, 

ARMY AVIATION CENTER OF EXCELLENCE 

General WILLIAMSON. Thank you, Chairman Turner and other 

distinguished members of the Subcommittee on Tactical Air and 

Land Forces. Thank you for the invitation to discuss the Army’s fiscal year 2016 ground force modernization and rotorcraft modernization programs and for this opportunity to appear with our Navy 

and Marine Corps counterparts. 

With me today are Lieutenant General Tony Ierardi and Marine 

Corps—the Army’s Deputy Chief of Staff G–8 and Major General 

Michael Lundy, the Commanding General of the U.S. Army Aviation Center of Excellence in Fort Rucker. 

Mr. Chairman, I respectfully request that our written statement 

be made a part of the record for today’s hearing. 

Equipping soldiers to meet Army warfighting challenges and to 

become a leaner, more lethal, and expeditionary asset to the joint 

force requires investments in both non-developmental and developmental capabilities. Non-developmental capabilities, such as information technology, will leverage commercial technologies that don’t 

require a significant Army science and technology or research and 

development investment, saving both time and taxpayer dollars. 

Developmental capabilities will most often be used in areas 

where the Army drives advancement and investment, such as combat vehicle technology; rotary aviation; lethality; and intelligence, 

surveillance, and reconnaissance. We will continue to take advantage of existing technologies, while investing in the research to 

produce significant technological change with military application. 

We are also working to ensure a balanced approach to modernization. First, the Army will preserve science and technology investment in key enabling technologies to support next-generation 

modernization efforts when resources become available. Examples 

of this investment include the development of the future lift—future vertical lift capability to guide future aviation modernization, 

advanced body armor and individual protective equipment to provide force protection against a range of evolving threats, and addressing emergency gaps such as cyber and electronic warfare as 

we operate in a contested information environment. 

Second, the Army will continue selected investment in new capabilities that improve lethality, such as Patriot Missile Segment Enhancement and the Joint Air-to-Ground Missile, as well as network 

mission command capabilities such as the family of tactical radios, 

including the Manpack and Rifleman Radio. 

Third, the Army will invest in incremental modernization of existing platforms to improve performance and address existing limitations in the area of network communications and energy consumption. Combat vehicle modernization includes the Abrams 

tank, the Bradley infantry fighting vehicle, and Stryker engineering change proposal programs. Aviation modernization includes existing upgrades to our Black Hawk, Apache, and Chinook aviation 
4 

platforms to improve engine performance, digitize cockpits, and 

support joint operations. 

Fourth, the Army will continue to reset our existing inventory of 

equipment returning from theater to enable near-term readiness 

for contingency operations. 

Fifth, the Army will continue the divestiture of selected legacy 

systems to reduce our sustainment costs. Examples include divesting tactical wheeled vehicles in favor of the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle and divesting the aging M–1113 armored personnel carriers 

in favor of the Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle. 

Mr. Chairman, while General Ierardi will discuss with the committee this morning his concerns on sequestration from a resource 

perspective and share the impacts that the Budget Control Act will 

have on instability to our programs across all of our portfolios, I 

will discuss with you how our modernization accounts ensure our 

soldiers have the best equipment available and to maintain critical 

parts of the defense industrial base. 

Another round of defense sequestration in fiscal year 2016 will 

have major impacts on Army modernization. These impacts include 

delays in equipment support to expeditionary forces, delays in combat vehicle and aviation modernization, increases in sustainment 

costs to fix older equipment, increases in capability gaps, higher 

unit cost, and stretched procurement schedules. 

The Army’s modernization budget remains near historic lows. 

Still, our modernization mission to develop and procure systems 

that allow our soldiers to dominate across the full spectrum of operations remains essential. We must always ensure our soldiers 

have the right equipment at the right time and at the right place 

to accomplish their assigned mission. 

Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the subcommittee, 

we greatly appreciate and thank you for your steadfast and strong 

support of the outstanding men and women of the United States 

Army, our Army civilians, and their families. 

This concludes my opening remarks. And we look forward to your 

questions. 

[The joint prepared statement of General Williamson and General Ierardi can be found in the Appendix on page 23.] 

Mr. COOK [presiding]. Thank you, General. Because of the time 

constraints, what we are going to do is just have two opening statements. And then, of course, we will get right to questions and answers. And I apologize for, you know, what is going on here today. 

This is a very, very important hearing. 

But right now, if I could turn to Admiral Grosklags, if you could 

give your opening statement, I would appreciate it. 

STATEMENT OF VADM PAUL A. GROSKLAGS, USN, PRINCIPAL 

MILITARY DEPUTY TO THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE 

NAVY (RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND ACQUISITION); ACCOMPANIED BY BGEN JOSEPH SHRADER, USMC, COMMANDING GENERAL, MARINE CORPS SYSTEMS COMMAND, 

AND WILLIAM E. TAYLOR, PROGRAM EXECUTIVE OFFICER 

LAND SYSTEMS, U.S. MARINE CORPS 

Admiral GROSKLAGS. Sure. Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear 
5 

before you today to address our Marine Corps ground systems and 

rotorcraft modernization programs. 

Joining me today is Brigadier General Joe Shrader, Commander 

of the Marine Corps Systems Command, and Mr. Bill Taylor, our 

Program Executive Officer [PEO] from Marine Corps Land Systems. We also have submitted a formal statement for the record. 

And I will be brief in my opening remarks. 

The challenges of the current and future environment demand 

that our Nation maintains a force and readiness that is capable of 

global response, literally today or tomorrow. Your force for that 

readiness is the United States Marine Corps. And to ensure the 

readiness and capability of our Marine Corps required to execute 

that global response, we continue to pursue a balanced approach, 

a balanced perspective to our force that is flexible, survivable, lethal, and highly expeditionary. 

From a modernization-specifics perspective, this requires careful 

allocation of our limited resources to those areas which promise the 

most operationally effective payoff. Our ground combat tactical vehicle modernization strategy is a prime example of that approach. 

The Amphibious Combat Vehicle, or ACV, is the Marine Corps 

number one modernization priority. The Joint Light Tactical Vehicle program, or JLTV program, is our second-highest priority. 

Together, those two programs form the core of a strategy that 

will sustain and enhance the mobility of our ground combat element well into the future. Our PB16 [President’s budget for fiscal 

year 2016] requests support of the ACV development program and, 

in coordination with the Army, supports low-rate initial production 

of the JLTV. 

In parallel, we continue modernization of the vertical lift component of our air combat element. With the continued support of Congress, we will complete our procurement of the UH–1 Yankee [Y] 

in fiscal year 2016 and the AH–1 Zulu [Z] in fiscal year 2019. The 

current V–22 multiyear program continues through fiscal year 

2017 and will nearly complete the procurement objective of 360 aircraft. 

And finally, the CH–53K development program is anticipating a 

first flight this calendar year in 2015, and low-rate initial production starting next year. 

The Marine Corps will remain America’s expeditionary force in 

readiness. And as already stated, this means that the Marines 

must be ready to fight tomorrow. This in turn requires readiness 

of the current force to be prioritized over all other investments. 

However, the Marines tasked with meeting the future threat will 

be dependent upon the equipment provided by the modernization 

programs of today. These programs, such as those I have just mentioned, are dependent upon stable, predictable funding at a level 

commensurate with our PB16 request. Over time, under-investing 

in modernization will result in maintaining older or obsolete equipment at a higher cost and with degraded capabilities. It will erode 

our Marines’ warfighting advantage. 

If I could, I will just continue into answering the chairman’s 

question about OCO. Our preference is certainly to fund our programs in accordance with how we have proposed the PB16 submit. 

That provides us with a stability and the predictability that our 
6 

programs require to execute their tasks efficiently. It enables industry to plan effectively and efficiently because they understand 

what is in the budget. 

While we certainly wouldn’t turn down OCO—I mean, funding 

the program regardless of the source of the funds is better than not 

funding the program, to ensure that we have the readiness and the 

capabilities that we need. But it presents a significant number of 

challenges for us to effectively and efficiently utilize those dollars. 

Some things to consider. If we take more of our base and put it 

into OCO, is a discussion of which parts of that base do go into 

OCO. Because it will have potential long-term ramifications for the 

health of those areas of our programs who are no longer considered 

part of the base. So in concert with Congress, if we go down this 

path, we would ask that we have some significant discussions, if 

you will, about how we mechanize that. 

Enabling additional flexibility in how we spend dollars that are 

funded via OCO would also be important, as there are restrictions 

on us today that would make—again, dependent upon which part 

of the base is put into OCO, very difficult to execute. 

So there are some near-term implications. But quite honestly, I 

am more concerned about the long-term implications for our planning, our budgeting. Not only internal to the services, but also with 

our industry partners and where are they going to invest, where 

do they see the budget going in the future. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The joint prepared statement of Admiral Grosklags, General 

Shrader, and Mr. Taylor can be found in the Appendix on page 39.] 

Mr. COOK. Thank you, Admiral. 

And I just want to make a couple of comments. And maybe we 

should have had this hearing in a couple of weeks. Because obviously, everybody has been following the drama. And of course, that 

is going to be the big question in terms of operational contingencies 

and what part of the budget—and I don’t want to get ahead of the 

Budget Committee. I don’t want to throw anybody. But that right 

now is being discussed. And the reason I said maybe we should 

have this hearing in 2 weeks is exactly we would address those 

methods or ways how we can do that. 

You have got a lot of support on this committee and on the 

House Armed Services Committee in general. But you have to remember—and I am not preaching to you. You know, your establishment knows more about the military than anybody else. But I 

think I get educated pretty well. But if you are not on the House 

Armed Services Committee, a lot of the people don’t understand the 

importance of some of these programs that we are talking about. 

So maybe what I am suggesting is if you could expand who you 

talk to in the district or what have you. And it is going to become 

even more complicated when we start discussing the role of the 

OCO and the operational contingencies and what fits in there. It 

is lot of money. We are going to have a lot of battles going on one 

way or the other. And a lot of us are going to come back to you— 

and I am probably going to be one of them—saying that how do we 

do this in terms—and it is not going to be about how much armor 

is on this or the plating for the M–1 battle tank or—it is going to 

be probably in the next few weeks a budgetary question. And I 
7 

hate to sound so pedantic. But that is—that is what we have to 

look forward to. 

What I am going to do right now is—the ranking member is not 

here. But I was going to ask Ms. Duckworth to be the ranking 

member right now in the absence of Ms. Sanchez. Thank you. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. Happy to serve, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. COOK. Thank you. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. General Shrader, I wanted to sort of chat with 

you a little bit about the JLTV specifically. And I know the Marine 

Corps and the Army have been working well together to develop 

the JLTV to replace the Humvee. My understanding is that the 

sustainment modification initiative [SMI] was going to be put into 

place to help us bridge that gap to modernize your existing 

Humvees before the JLTV procurement process is completed. However, last week on the Senate side, General Krulak testified that 

SMI for Humvees has since been canceled due to sequestration and 

there is no money for this program in the budget. 

So my question is, given that the Marine Corps is expecting only 

5,500 JLTVs in service by 2022 and the original modification plan 

has been canceled, what is the plan to bridge the gap of 

sustainment and modernization of the legacy vehicles until the 

JLTV program is fully realized? 

General SHRADER. Ma’am, thank you for the question. So within 

the ground combat tactical vehicle strategy that we have put out 

there, we did have a balance and a plan to cover both the JLTV 

and the Humvee as they come on board. If I could, ma’am, the program rests within PEO Land Systems, Mr. Bill Taylor, who is here, 

and if I could invite him to address the more—the details of your 

question. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. Great. Thank you. 

General SHRADER. Yes, ma’am. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. Mr. Taylor. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Congresswoman Duckworth, you are correct that 

the program was, in fact, terminated. But we were allowed to continue the non-recurring effort associated with that program such 

that we have actually completed the development work and put 

three capability packages on the shelf. So if in times of prosperity, 

the Marine Corps can return to those engineering proposals and reconsider instituting them in terms of procurement. But the R&D 

[research and development] is completed and those capability packages are on the shelf and ready for procurement if the Marine 

Corps decides to do that. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. So what you are saying is—are you saying that 

you are willing to assume the risk of not modernizing the Humvees 

or the SMI packages, but you have the information—you have the 

packages there ready—— 

Mr. TAYLOR. That is a service-level decision. They have decided 

to assume the risk and sustain the remaining fleet of Humvees. 

But they have these capability packages at the ready, should they 

determine that they need to pursue those. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. What is the timeline from when you decided 

you wanted to go ahead and implement if the services decided yes, 

we actually do want to implement this? 
8 

Mr. TAYLOR. I would say approximately 1 year to the point that 

we could start procuring those capability packages. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. Okay. And then will the Army National Guard 

and Marine Corps Reserves unit receive their JLTVs concurrently 

with the Active Duty counterparts, along with the SMIs, as well? 

Mr. TAYLOR. The fielding strategy is in draft form right now. 

They have identified quantities and major commands. Beyond that, 

the Reserves are scheduled to get those after the Active forces. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. And what is the projected status of the 

Humvees in the Marine Corps right now in terms of protection and 

interoperability in light of the canceled SMI? 

Mr. TAYLOR. The current plan is to sustain the fleet as is. They 

will continue to go through a depot reset. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. You know, I really do—and again, I am preaching to the choir here. You guys are being forced to make some really tough decisions that put our troops at great risk, potentially 

great risk, as a result of sequestration; something that we certainly 

on this side of the hearing room need to do our job to end. And I 

have some real concerns that with the short timeline we expect you 

to react to fielding of troops and equipment, that we are putting 

you in a very difficult situation. Thank you for that. 

My next question is really going to be, obviously, on the Army, 

the aviation modernization program and also the restructuring initiative. I understand the important cost-saving reforms from last 

year—and some of this continues a hot topic in ARI [Aviation Restructuring Initiative] as it stands. My understanding is all 

Apaches are on hold in terms of the transfer, except for 48 that can 

be transferred starting next fiscal year. Is that correct? I don’t 

know who—— 

General LUNDY. Yes, ma’am, that is correct. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. That is correct? So if ARI was to be fully implemented, what is the timeline for the modernization of those 111 

Black Hawks going to the Guard as part of the ARI? 

General LUNDY. Ma’am, I can answer that one. The modernization strategy for the National Guard, as well as for all compos, it 

is multiple components. It is not just whether we are going to go 

from an A to—from an Alpha [A] model to a Lima [L] model or a 

Lima to a Mike [M]. But it also has ITEP [improved turbine engine 

program] and other things. So there are multiple modernization efforts that are going on. 

As we look at moving forward, 2023 is when we are going to divest—2023 right now. We have been able to accelerate that because 

of ARI—we will be able to divest all of the A models. And we have 

600 right now that are across the inventory. So they will be out of 

the National Guard by 2023 and out of the Active Component. 

We are currently converting Limas to Victor [V] models, which 

is the full-integrated glass cockpit. Those we are going to start 

fielding in 2018. The majority of those are going into the National 

Guard and the Army Reserve. And we are continuing to field Mike 

models. 

So by 20—depending on which piece of the modernization you are 

looking at, the oldest ones, the ones we really have to get out, will 

be out of the inventory by 2023. We will have Victors starting to 

go in. And that will go between 2018 and 2032. And then our Mike 
9 

models will finish about 2028. So there are a number of modernization efforts. And then we will go back in and put the new turbine 

engine into each one of them. So that is going to be another modernization effort. And that is going to be balanced between all three 

compos. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. Okay. Well, I am from a State that doesn’t 

have Apaches. So I have got no dog in that—— 

General LUNDY. Yes, ma’am. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH [continuing]. In that hunt. But I have got to say 

that I am concerned about those States that do have Apaches. And 

I want to make sure that if you are moving the Apaches out of the 

Guard, before those Hawks show up, that those crews are actually 

getting the slots to go to schools so that they can get qualified and 

the qual [qualification] courses, the Q courses, so that they are 

ready to go when those aircraft show up. I wouldn’t want to see 

crews sitting around for 18, 24 months and then suddenly the 

Apaches show up and they are not qualified. Now you are just 

sending guys—it is going to take forever for them to get up to RL1 

[Readiness Level 1]. 

General LUNDY. Yes, ma’am. No, you are exactly right. That is 

clearly a part of our strategy. That is why the timing is so important. Because we only have so much capacity in the schools. So as 

we—you know, this is a pretty good integrated effort across modernization and all of the different things, training and sustainment. 

And so we have to have the timing to where I have got space in 

the school to do that. We have that space set aside. It is clear within the plan right now that we will be able to train not only all of 

the National Guard aviators, Army Reserve aviators, and our 

Kiowa aviators that are going to be converting to 64 [Apache AH– 

64]. 

So ARI is very important from a timing perspective. And it also 

gives us the space to do all this modernization. Because if we don’t 

do that, all of those UH–60s are going to slide out to the right. 

That is going to be the bill payer for that—if we don’t do ARI. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. Right. And the schools are not just for the pilots; correct? You are talking about all the aviators, the entire air 

crew? 

General LUNDY. Yes, ma’am. The crew chiefs, we are training 

them at Fort Eustis, as well as at both the National Guard training 

centers. So we—this is a fully integrated effort across all three 

compos, components, and we have it locked pretty tight right now. 

So that has been the most difficult thing. And we just completed 

fully synchronizing that. So I think we are in great shape. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. Okay. Great. Well, if you ever want to see the 

oldest flying Black Hawk in the Army inventory, I invite you to 

come to Illinois and—— 

General LUNDY. Yes, ma’am. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH [continuing]. And visit it. Fourth off the production line, 1978 model. 

General LUNDY. And that is a—that is a huge concern for me as 

I look at all three components. I still have a number of EH–60s 

that are converted to Alpha models down in Fort Rucker. So we do 

need to get, you know, the National Guard modernized, as well as 

the Army Reserve. 
10 

Ms. DUCKWORTH. Yes. Because I like to get those—we call them 

‘‘Frankenhawks’’ in Illinois because of the—— 

General LUNDY. Yes, ma’am. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH [continuing]. They are not actually true Alpha 

models—— 

General LUNDY. Yes, ma’am. 

Ms. DUCKWORTH [continuing]. But they are Frankenhawks. 

Thank you. 

Again, I think that the fact that you are here and that what we 

are all talking about here—the common theme is we need to work 

on sequestration so that our military and our men and women who 

put on a uniform and who are willing to take the fight to the 

enemy have everything that they need. 

And I am concerned that what we are doing is we are structuring 

the force to the dollars and the political will, as opposed to figuring 

out what we need you to do and then sustaining and giving you the 

resources to do what you need. And the games that we are playing, 

we are putting money into OCO funding as opposed to the base 

budget, puts you in a really tough position as the professionals that 

we ask you to be to maintain our Nation’s military. 

So I thank you for what you do. And we are going to work as 

hard as we can on this side. And I know I certainly will. So thank 

you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. COOK. Thank you. The latest is vote is going to be 11:30. 

And right now we will go with Congressman Gibson. 

Mr. GIBSON. Well, thanks, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the panelists being here. Thank you for your service to our country, sacrifices of your family. 

And I want you to know I am listening very carefully and you 

are communicating effectively. We understand impacts of sequester, which was never meant to be the plan. It was a backup to 

force—really, for us to get our work done. And, you know, in 2012, 

we had a budget—bipartisan budget that was fashioned roughly off 

Simpson-Bowles. And I was one of 38 that voted for that. And then 

in December of 2013, I supported the bipartisan agreement that delayed the sequester for a couple of years. 

So, you know, ideally we will get an agreement that completely 

eliminates sequester. But at a minimum, I want to get one that we 

can have several years of stability of the consistent important funding levels that you need. I wanted to say that up front. 

The question has to do with the transition from Kiowa to the 

Echo [E] model of Apaches. I am hearing good things on that. This 

is an Army program, obviously. So—and in addition to the Echo 

model, also the Drone [D] interim solution. So one, the reports I am 

getting, which are sort of anecdotal, I would like to confirm that 

that transition seems to be going well. And in particular, I am interested in knowing how from a human dimension, a training perspective, how the Kiowa pilots are doing in making that transition 

to the platform, the Echo model. 

General LUNDY. Sir, I can answer that pretty quickly. I know we 

are short on time. One, the E model just—our first battalion deployed to Afghanistan, and the performance was absolutely phenomenal. It is a leap between the AH–64D and the AH–64E. And 
11 

we did man-on-man teaming over there. We are doing man-on-man 

teaming right now as we do operations in the other part of the theater. 

We have just recently done some training at the National Training Center. We just really had our first integrated rotation out 

there. So that is going very well. We are finishing training some 

of our first OH–58 [Kiowa] crew members, both in the Apache and 

we actually had a number that volunteered to go into the unmanned systems, as well. 

So we are putting some trained Scout aviators flying our unmanned systems, which is really going to pay big dividends. We 

just graduated three. We are actually—two of them have done so 

well, we are keeping them at the schoolhouse to be instructor pilots 

on the flight line. So I think we are in very good shape. I don’t see 

any issues with the training. And I am pretty happy with where 

we are at. 

Mr. GIBSON. That is encouraging. And particularly appreciate 

hearing it from General Lundy, somebody who I know firsthand is 

a remarkable warfighter and a great leader. I want to—the next 

question has to do—it is a little deeper. 

And I am thinking here the new Armed Aerial Scout platform, 

I am very interested to know how the planning is going for that. 

Talk to me in terms of who we are engaging in the planning process and timelines and how that is going. 

General LUNDY. Well, we are still developing—we still have a 

valid requirement for an Armed Aerial Scout. That has not 

changed. I mean, we made a fiscal decision based on the original 

40 percent cuts that came into the aviation modernization portfolio, 

one of the reasons it drove ARI. So it remains a valid requirement. 

The chief has said it remains a valid requirement. 

We are continuing—really, where we are taking that now is taking a look at as we go into future vertical lift, what is going to be 

the armed reconnaissance capability that we have in future vertical 

lifts. 

We are doing a number of analysis of alternatives [AOAs] that 

are associated with the armed reconnaissance variant. We have got 

the—we have got the requirement already clearly identified for a 

conventional aircraft right now. So we are looking again at future 

vertical lift as being that next iteration of the armed Scout. Now, 

if something materializes between now and then, we are certainly 

going to remain agile enough that we can look at it. Because it is 

a valid requirement. But we are certainly going to be dependent 

upon the fiscal restraints that we have. 

Mr. GIBSON. And just to follow up. In terms of engagements with 

think thanks and industry, is there a—has there been a plan to engage in that way, or has it been—talk me through that. 

General LUNDY. Well, in future vertical lifts, which is where—we 

have a working industry group that is within that. So we meet at 

the joint level. This is a fully-integrated joint program from inception, which is great. The Marine Corps participates, as well as the 

Navy and the Air Force. And we have an industry consortium that 

participates in that. And we are really looking at all of the 

variants. And one subcomponent of that variant is the armed re-
12 

connaissance component. So as we are going through, that is where 

that is interacting. 

But I meet pretty routinely. We have done some industry days. 

And recruitment process outsourcing [RPO] is pretty active with 

that as well on engaging industry on future concepts and requirements. 

Mr. GIBSON. I thank you for the update. 

And I yield back, Chairman. Thanks so much. 

Mr. COOK. Thank you. 

Congressman Veasey. 

Mr. VEASEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I had just one question, 

as I know the time is short. 

I wanted to ask particularly about if there is a slowdown in production on JLTV, what sort of impact would that have on the price, 

you know, per vehicle? Obviously, if you are going to be buying less 

due to sequestration, that you—there could be obviously be more 

cost per vehicle, as opposed if that was not present. So if you could 

just kind of help me understand that, that would be great. 

General WILLIAMSON. Sir, so your instincts are absolutely on target. The challenge for us is that—so we have developed a pretty detailed program plan for JLTV. I would tell you that it is probably 

one of the better programs that I have witnessed as an acquisition 

officer. And so the challenge for me is that—so when we perturb 

that plan because of fluctuations in the programming, that means 

we are going to have to negotiate in production—we will have to 

negotiate in production, if it is fewer quantities, which will drive 

the cost up considerably. 

And so we have worked really hard on affordability. And I will 

ask General Ierardi to comment on that. But it has been a focus 

of ours with this platform to maintain that affordability cap. 

General IERARDI. And sir, we have obviously worked, as General 

Williamson indicated, to keep the program affordable as we look to 

the future. 

In the context of BCA [Budget Control Act] levels of funding, 

JLTV and all of these programs, obviously, would be, you know, 

put in a position where we would have to evaluate carefully how 

we are buying, how we are programming for future buys. There 

will be impacts, regrettably, across the board in a number of programs if we are marked at BCA and have a BCA level of funding 

throughout our program period. 

Mr. VEASEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back my time. 

Mr. COOK. Thank you. 

Congressman Knight. 

Mr. KNIGHT. Thank you, Mr. Chair. And again, because we are 

so short on time, can you explain to me on the armored personnel 

carriers, the 113s, where we are on the fleet; how many we still 

have in service, how many are in theater, and where we are going 

with that and how quickly will they be gone? 

General IERARDI. Sir, I don’t have the exact number of 113s in 

the inventory. There are quite a few. We have since stopped using 

these vehicles operationally. It is the Army’s intent, and it is under 

execution now, to move away from the employment of M113s, 

which brings into the discussion the AMPV [Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle], which is the follow-on vehicle to the M113 variant. 
13 

It is an important capability for the Army the replace mobility 

that the M113s bring in the varied terrain that our armored and 

tracked vehicles operate. And so it is—AMPV is an important program for us to replace the M113s. They are not being used and 

haven’t been used in some time in deployed environments. 

They are—having come from the 1st Cavalry Division as the 

commanding general, we still had them in our motor pools and 

used them in training. But by and large, we need to have that vehicle replaced. And it is our intent to replace it with the AMPV to 

get increased mobility and increased survivability for our soldiers. 

Mr. KNIGHT. Very good. Thank you, sir. 

And Admiral, on the Joint Strike Fighter, I get the Joint Strike 

Fighter at Edwards Air Force Base, so we get the Air Force variant, but we don’t get carrier variant as much. We do a little bit of 

testing out there. But since most of that is done at Pax River, I 

would like to see if there is an update on what you think about the 

Joint Strike Fighter, when it is going to be coming IOC [initial operating capability] and all that. 

Admiral GROSKLAGS. Yes, sir. So the Marine Corps is up first 

with the IOC. We are still planning on that in summer, June or 

July. They are on track with both the software and the reconfiguration of the air vehicles for the IOC configuration. The squadron has 

stood up over the last year, the folks who are being trained and put 

in place. We think the Marine Corps IOC is definitely on track for 

this summer. 

The Air Force follows behind that. I won’t speak to their 

timeline. Although, from everything I am aware of, they are on 

schedule as well for their IOC. The Navy is the third one out of 

the barrel. We have a threshold date of February of 2019, an objective date 6 months prior to that. We require release of 3F software, 

which a short explanation is that is the release that we believe is 

required for our carrier-based aircraft to be fully integrated with 

the rest of the air wing. So that is why the Navy is kind of at the 

end, because we are waiting for that 3F software. 

That software is making progress. It has been delayed somewhere between 4 and 6 months based on a joint program office’s 

estimate. That estimate has not changed over the last 18 months. 

So it is not sliding to the right; they are holding the schedule. And 

we anticipate that that 3F will be available to the fleet approximately 6 months before we actually require it for IOC. 

So overall, the program is making steady progress forward. And 

we think they have been on track for the last year or two. The cost 

of the air vehicles is coming down and things are progressing. 

Mr. KNIGHT. I fully agree. Thank you, Admiral. 

Thank you, Mr. Chair. I yield back. 

Mr. COOK. Thank you. 

I would like to welcome the ranking member that has arrived, 

Congresswoman Sanchez. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I do apologize to 

everybody for arriving late. And I thank Ms. Duckworth and others 

for holding down the fort, shall we say, when I was unfortunately 

detained. 

Okay. So I heard that you were talking about the helicopters. So 

I am not going to go into all the—I am talking about the Black 
14 

Hawks. But I still have some very, very specific questions to that. 

And the first would be is it possible to accelerate the UH–60L helicopter upgrades in fiscal year 2016? There are already 40 in the 

budget. What is the limit at the Army depot in Corpus Christi, 

Texas? 

Secondly, the Army’s budget already has 94 UH–60 helicopters. 

The Navy budget has another 29. Could the production line and 

the multiyear contract with Sikorsky accommodate more helicopters in fiscal year 2016? 

And finally, am I right to be worried about the promised helicopters in the 2000—in the 2020s in terms of the pressure on the 

Army’s budget? And can we be confident that funding will actually 

happen? Why don’t we start there, gentlemen, because I don’t see 

a lady—— 

General IERARDI. Ranking Member, I will start with your final 

question. I think all programs at lower levels of funding would require our continued evaluation. So obviously, UH–60 modernization 

for us is a very important effort. We would not want to change the 

priority that we have to modernize the UH–60 Alphas. And we will 

strive to do that. Under—— 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Can we accelerate them in the 2016 budget? 

General WILLIAMSON. So ma’am, we—— 

Ms. SANCHEZ. The upgrades? 

General WILLIAMSON. Ma’am, we can go back and look at that. 

As you know, we workload our depots and maintenance facilities. 

And so they have sized their workforce, and they are associated 

with that funding. So I will take the action to go back and see what 

the growth capacity is within the current—— 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Yes, if there is any capacity within the resources 

we currently have there would be interesting, since everybody 

wants Black Hawks. 

General WILLIAMSON. Yes, ma’am. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. What about multi—more helicopters? 

General WILLIAMSON. So ma’am, it is the same thing. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Okay. 

General WILLIAMSON. So as you know, as we negotiate a 

multiyear contract, it is based on the number of aircraft and the 

timing. And so it would require us to go back and engage to see 

what it would take, if there is some ceiling. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. At what point could you give us a report on that? 

I mean, how long will it take you to sort of figure out is there capacity for us to get the modernization through? And is there also 

capacity to maybe buy a few more? Or if we wanted to buy a set 

of 10 more, for example, what would be the add-on cost would—— 

General WILLIAMSON. Ma’am so—— 

Ms. SANCHEZ. On the back of an envelope, I am asking. I am not 

talking about some historic big study. 

General WILLIAMSON. So on the back of the envelope, it would 

probably take me a couple of weeks. And the reason why is because 

there is some negotiation involved with the folks who have to do 

the work. And so I would actually not be inclined to say it is something that I would turn in days. I want to make sure that we come 

back with some accuracy. So I will get back with your office very 
15 

quickly on the timeline and make sure that we provide those answers. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 59.] 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Perfect. And then with respect to the budget out 

into the 2020s, how do y’all feel? 

General LUNDY. Well, ma’am, from a proponent perspective, the 

UH–60 modernization in the Guard is one of our number one 

issues. And it is obviously an issue for the National Guard, and it 

is also an issue for the Army Reserve and the Active Component. 

You know, we have got a mix of those aircraft. 

So from a proponent perspective, that will remain a priority. Certainly, you know, as the G–8 talked about, depending upon what 

funding levels come down, the Army may be forced to reprioritize. 

But certainly from the aviation level, that is a priority for us. 

General IERARDI. Ma’am, I have concerns given the lack of predictability in funding what past 2020 is going to look like. And 

frankly, I would not necessarily say that we would have the ability 

to accelerate based on where we are financially right now into the 

2020s. I would hope that we would have the resources to be able 

to do what it is we are planning to do to modernize those aircraft. 

But can’t speak to that right now. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you. 

Mr. Chairman, I have another question. But I am going to—since 

I came late, I would like to get some of these newer members to 

get to ask their questions first. If you would indulge me on the return—on the round robin. Thank you. 

Mr. COOK. Thank you for being so magnanimous. It is tough for 

a marine to say that word. I certainly can’t spell it. 

Congressman Moulton, you have a question? Oh, I am sorry. I 

thought we were going to go—I apologize. Gosh, such magnanimity. 

She didn’t have any questions. 

[Off mike.] 

We are going to have a verse of kumbaya. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. You can tell we are all Democrats here. 

Mr. COOK. Hey, hey, hey. 

Mr. MOULTON. Thanks very much, Mr. Chairman and my colleagues. I actually have just a question from the Marine Corps representative general. Could you speak a little bit about your small 

arms modernization plans and how much you intend to follow the 

Army’s lead? Are you going to stick—are you going to move from 

the M16 to the M4, are you going to look for a replacement for the 

M9? 

General SHRADER. So thank you for the question, sir. First I will 

address the rifle. So right now, the Marine Corps does plan to stick 

with the M4. We have also moved to the fourth generation of the 

M16, which is the M16A4. So those are the two workhorses, if you 

will, of the M16 family. 

Mr. MOULTON. Are you continuing to buy M16A4s, or has the lessons from Iraq and Afghanistan pushed you more toward the M4? 

I mean, as someone who was issued an M16 and then worked hard 

to acquire an M4, I know there is a lot of feedback from the troops 

in the field that an M4 would be a more appropriate weapon. But 

you may have good reason to disagree. 
16 

General SHRADER. Sir, I would have to just go back to what I 

said earlier. Right now, we are not seeing a requirement to go 

away from the M16A4 that we are issuing, and then the M4 also. 

We do have a small number of M4A1s that we are issuing as well. 

But right now we are staying with the M4 and the M16A4. 

On the handgun systems, sir, we do not have a requirement to 

move away right now from the M9 service pistol. And the other pistol that we have is the M45A1 close-quarters combat pistol. Those 

are our two service pistols that we have. We are working with the 

Army on their effort to—their modular handgun system program 

that they are working on and collaborating with them on that and 

working to see what will come out of that and make a decision 

downstream from that if we need to. 

Mr. MOULTON. So you don’t know at this point whether you will 

join in that program or not? You are just observing, collaborating? 

General SHRADER. Yes, sir. Observing, collaborating. But right 

now we do not have a requirement that I am aware of to move 

away from the M9 and the M45A1, sir. 

Mr. MOULTON. Do you not share some of the Army’s concerns 

with lethality of the M9? 

General SHRADER. Sir, I am not aware of the concerns that we 

would have that would cause us to move away from the M9, sir. 

Mr. MOULTON. Okay. All right. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield my time. 

Mr. COOK. Thank you. Before I give this back to Congresswoman 

Sanchez, just a comment about the questions there which I thought 

were great. Just a historical note that many years ago I was there 

when we made the transition from the M14 to the M16. I must 

have cursed that weapon so many times. Because when it was first 

issued in Vietnam, it didn’t work very, very well. And I said this 

thing would not last 5 years. And miracles happen. I have actually—that weapon has almost outlived me. And we are going to see 

who lasts longer. Miracles do happen. 

Congresswoman Sanchez, top that one. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. What were you talking about? 

Mr. COOK. The M14 to the M16. You weren’t even born yet, I 

know you are going to tell me. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Of course not, Mr. Chairman. I was not. You are 

totally correct on that. 

Okay. So I continue to hear inside and outside the military that 

the individual soldier or marine want a replacement for the M4 

and the M4A1. Supposedly, the Army is conducting the caliber 

study that is going to take quite a long time. As far as I know, the 

Marine Corps is not doing a study. 

I know the services don’t currently have a requirement for replacing the M4 and the M4A1, but do you think there should be 

such a requirement, given that when I look at the blogs, when I 

get calls, it is always about these things are jamming. The Army 

did a study a while back, 2 or 3 years ago. There are other weapons 

out there that jam less often. Requirement? 

General IERARDI. Ma’am, as the Army’s G–8, I would say that 

right now our strategy to enhance—to continue to enhance, there 

has been over 90 improvements to the M16—the M4 Carbine, 

which moves forward that weapon, continues to move it forward. 
17 

And it is a capable weapon. In my service in 1st Cavalry Division, 

I did not hear one complaint from my soldiers about the M4 Carbine. As a matter of fact, soldiers wanted the M4 for what it brings, 

which is a compact, easy to maintain, and capable weapon. And 

so—— 

Ms. SANCHEZ. So you never heard a reliability issue with respect 

to that with the men that served with you, the men and women— 

men. 

General IERARDI. As I said, there have been a number of improvements in this weapon system. And our strategy right now is 

to continue to improve what we have while we look to procure new 

M4A1s. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Okay. Well, I would beg to differ, with what I 

hear. So I will continue down this warpath of trying to get the individual soldier and marine a better weapon, especially with some of 

the studies that I have seen. 

My next and last question is about the ammunition that the 

Army and the Marines use. I am talking about the 5.56 millimeter 

round. Obviously, you guys are using two different things, two different rounds. And you have procured several million rounds to 

date and you have used them in combat. 

While I understand how the demands of combat might have gotten us into the situation where two services are not using the same 

bullets, but I would like to better understand how we get out of 

that situation in the future. Because maintaining two different inventories of the same size combat ammunition is probably not the 

most efficient way to go. And I just think it looks bad. It makes 

us all look bad. At a time when Chairman Turner and many others 

are arguing about more funding for the DOD [Department of Defense], it appears very wasteful from the outside to have the Marines and the Army not buying the same bullets. 

So my questions are, do the Army and Marine Corps agree that 

the M855A1, the Army round, meets the requirements for an improved 5.56 millimeter round? If not, where do you diverge or disagree? What specific test events, if any, are planned to provide 

more information on the performance of the Army’s round? And finally, it has been suggested that the Army’s round somehow does 

damage to the weapons that it is used in. Do you believe that is 

true? 

General WILLIAMSON. So ma’am I will give a short answer. So we 

have standardized on this ammunition. And as you know, we buy 

considerable quantities. I have no test data to support the fact that 

it caused more jamming or damage to the weapon. As you know, 

when we looked at the upgrade for the M4, one of the things we 

looked at was the feed mechanism to understand if it was caused 

by the round or the mechanics of the weapon. 

We think that we have addressed that. To be honest with you, 

we have addressed that in the magazine, where we were having 

some problems with the feed mechanism. But we are confident that 

we have picked the correct round. And we continue to support that. 

General SHRADER. Ma’am? Ma’am, if I could address on—from 

the Marine Corps side of the house. Right now our current round 

is the M855, the 5.56. But we are conducting testing with the Army 

on the M855A1 round. That testing is—I believe is going to begin 
18 

in April and should go through July/August timeframe. I can get 

the exact dates for that if you would like. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. That would be great. 

General SHRADER. Yes, ma’am. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. And what are you testing for? What do you anticipate out of this test? What do you anticipate to reach? 

General SHRADER. So the—what we are pursuing in a new 

round, ma’am, or an upgraded round, would be the three things are 

precision, lethality, and reduced signature, or muzzle suppression, 

if you will. Those are kind of the big three that we are pursuing 

in enhancing small arms ammunition. But those are the three 

things I would offer. The testing is going to begin. And once we are 

complete with the testing, we will have to analyze the data and 

make logical decisions out of that. Yes, ma’am. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Great. We will be watching that also. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. COOK. Thank you very much. Congresswoman, I—by the 

way, I thought that was a great question. I am very, very sensitive 

to it for obvious historic reasons. And years ago, all the jamming, 

failure to extract. And it was like back to the Revolutionary War 

with a cleaning rod to get that out. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Mr. Chairman, it is still going on. And the answer 

is we just have to teach our soldiers how to clean their weapons 

better. 

Mr. COOK. Well, I think it was more than that. You might not 

have been around at that time. But what they did was they 

changed the buffer plate, they looked at the examination, they examined the ammunition, the clearance. And it was a serious problem. And as I said, I never envisioned that it would stay around 

that long. But we are going to have further hearings on that very 

subject. 

But right now we are—they have called votes. But more importantly, I want to thank the panel. You know, we are changing the 

schedule and blah, blah, blah, and we are speeding up and everything like that. And I actually thought it was a great hearing. And 

I appreciate everybody’s patience. And to come here right in the 

middle of this. And thank you so much for your testimony. And 

look forward to hearing more. Thank you. This meeting is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:41 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 
A P P E N D I X 

MARCH 19, 2015 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

MARCH 19, 2015 

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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING 

THE HEARING 

MARCH 19, 2015 

(59) 

RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. SANCHEZ 

Generals WILLIAMSON, IERARDI, and LUNDY. The Aviation Restructure Initiative 

(ARI) will allow the Army to retain and modernize its most capable aircraft in all 

three components to meet future demands of the Combatant Commanders. Under 

current fiscal realities, the cost savings from ARI implementation enables accelerated modernization of the Army National Guard. Modernization of the H–60 Black 

Hawk fleet is a herculean effort to modernize 2,135 aircraft and consist of three programs: 1) UH–60A to UH–60L Recapitalization (RECAP), 2) New HH/UH–60M procurement, and 3) UH–60L to UH–60V RECAP. These efforts began in Fiscal Year 

2007 (FY07) with the UH–60A to UH–60L RECAP at Corpus Christi Army Depot 

(CCAD), which is scheduled to transition to the UH–60L to UH–60V RECAP program in FY18. Also in FY07, the Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation began full rate production of the HH/UH–60M aircraft that is projected to produce 1,375 HH/UH–60M 

aircraft through approximately FY28. In FY18, CCAD will begin the UH–60L to 

UH–60V RECAP program to recapitalize and digitize 760 UH–60L aircraft through 

approximately FY34. 

Accelerating additional UH–60A to UH–60L RECAP aircraft in FY16 is possible, 

but such efforts will increase the risk in successfully transitioning CCAD to the 

UH–60L to UH–60V RECAP program in FY18. Steady-state CCAD capacity is 36 

aircraft a year; this rate level-loads all phases of production, maintains skilled labor, 

and retains lower-tier vendors. Maximum capacity is 48 aircraft a year. The current 

programmed production rate is approximately 40 aircraft a year. This rate levelloads all phases of production, maintains skilled labor force, retains subcomponent 

vendors, and supports a smooth production ramp for the UH–60L to UH–60V program. Production rates at the maximum capacity (48 aircraft) will create skilled 

labor and subcomponent vendor spikes preceding the transition to the UH–60L to 

UH–60V program. These spikes could result in loss of skilled labor and qualified 

subcomponent vendors due to excess capacity when CCAD transitions into initial 

low-rate UH–60L to UH–60V production. The labor and vendor losses could negatively impact the depot’s ability to reach the planned full rate production of 48 aircraft a year beginning in FY20. 

An additional eight UH–60M aircraft can be placed on the current Multi-Year 

Contract (#8 FY12–16). This will increase procurement of Army configured aircraft 

from 94 to 102 aircraft. The Army is currently in negotiations on the next MultiYear Contract (#9 FY17–21) and the Army will submit the Multi-Year Contract proposal in the fall of 2015 for Congressional approval. 

Upon completion of Army Aviation restructure and modernization, the Army National Guard will have an end state fleet of 960 UH–60 aircraft: 460 H–60M (includes both UH–60M assault and HH–60M Medical Evacuation (MEDEVAC) units) 

and 500 UH–60V (includes both UH–60V assault and UH–60V MEDEVAC units).

[See page 15.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

MARCH 19, 2015 

(63) 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TURNER 

Mr. TURNER. The Budget Committee’s resolution has provided additional funding 

to the OCO request as a way to offset sequestration impacts. What are your 

thoughts on using the OCO request to offset sequestration? How would this help to 

mitigate the impacts on modernization programs? 

Generals WILLIAMSON, IERARDI, and LUNDY. The Army supports the President’s 

Budget request for Fiscal Year 2016 (FY16). The President’s Budget provides the 

Army with the stability and the predictability to execute our programs efficiently 

and meet the requirements of the National Defense Strategy. Resourcing modernization through Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funding presents a significant 

number of challenges for us to utilize those dollars effectively and efficiently for investment in new technologies, incremental upgrades, and continued sustainment of 

proven capabilities. OCO does not enable our industry partners to plan efficiently 

or effectively because they cannot determine the Army’s level of commitment in the 

budget. Long-term funding uncertainties are challenging the Army’s ability to plan 

and execute programs and provide the right capabilities to our Soldiers. 

The current Office of Management and Budget guidelines also limit modernization 

efforts to fund replacement of losses, replacement, or repair of equipment returning 

from theater, and purchase of specialized in-theater equipment. Programs that are 

currently operating within these narrowly defined windows have already requested 

the required OCO in FY16; these activities have not been submitted as part of the 

base budget request. For the Army to shift acquisition programs into OCO Research, 

Development and Acquisition (RDA), the authorities would need to expand to include additional activities. 

Finally, funding Base RDA programs in FY16 with all or partial amounts of OCO 

RDA dollars will create limitations on funding authorities in the event of an FY17 

Continuing Resolution. In addition, RDA programs marked in the Base budget and 

replaced with OCO incur additional inflexibility, as the Department will be unable 

to reprogram funds internally with Below Threshold Reprogramming actions. 

Mr. TURNER. The FY16 budget request assumes the Army is allowed to transfer 

96 National Guard Apache helicopters to the active component. Last year’s NDAA 

allows the Army to transfer 48 helicopters with a waiver. What is the status of that 

waiver? Please speak to some of the operational and programmatic impacts you 

could face if the Army is only allowed to transfer 48 Apache helicopters in FY16? 

Generals WILLIAMSON and LUNDY. In accordance with the FY15 NDAA, the Army 

is authorized to transfer up to 48 AH–64s Apaches from the Army National Guard 

(ARNG) to the Active Army between 1 October 2015 and 31 March 2016. This transfer was contingent on the Secretary of Defense certifying to Congress that the transfer of 48 AH–64s Apaches from the ARNG to the Army would not create unacceptable risk in that the ARNG is less able to serve as the combat reserve of the Army. 

The Secretary of Defense submitted the certification letter to Congress on 27 March 

2015 for the transfer of 48 AH–64s. 

The FY16 Aviation Restructure Initiative (ARI) transfer plan complies with FY15 

NDAA. If the Army is limited to only 48 AH–64 Apaches transfers in FY16, the 

operational impact will include 10th Mountain Division at Fort Drum, New York, 

not receiving Apaches essential to build and train its Armed Reconnaissance Squadron (ARS) for operations in FY17. This would also result in an indefinite delay of 

the planned transfer of up to 1,500 Soldiers and family members to Fort Drum in 

support of the Army ARI. The Army would be forced to disrupt inductions into the 

AH–64E Apache remanufacturing line in Mesa, AZ or reduce readiness by removing 

additional Apaches from Active Army units. We would need to delay transfers of 

modernized UH–60L Blackhawks to the ARNG as backfills for transferred Apaches 

are curtailed, slowing National Guard Blackhawk modernization. 

Prohibiting future transfers beyond the initial 48 AH–64s would: require the 

Army to spend $5.52B in additional procurement and $350M annually in operations 

and sustainment funding; disrupt or delay nearly all aviation modernization programs to include UH–60A Blackhawk upgrades in the National Guard; create up 

to a five-year readiness hole and insufficient ready forces to meet demands; and/or 

cause additional Active Army aviation reductions. 
64 

Mr. TURNER. I understand the Army is continuing to review the performance requirements for the Modular Handgun System and that has caused a delay in the 

schedule. What is the current status of the Modular Handgun System, and if the 

program continues to be delayed have you considered a product improvement program for the current M9 handgun? 

General WILLIAMSON. The Army is planning on releasing the Modular Handgun 

System (MHS) full and open competition Request for Proposals later in Fiscal Year 

2015. The Army has considered a dual path strategy similar to what was done during the Individual Carbine competition. A dual path strategy, which invests in upgrading the current system while searching for a replacement, requires significant 

investment in schedule and funding. The M9 Pistol is a 30 year old system. Handgun technology has advanced significantly and the cost of a new, more capable system is less than refurbishing the M9. Additionally, although the M9 Pistol meets 

the requirements for which it was developed, both the Army and the manufacturer 

agree that a modified M9 would still not meet the Army’s Modular Handgun System 

requirements. In today’s current fiscally constrained environment and considering 

that a modified M9 does not meet requirement, nor provide an opportunity for full 

and open competition, a dual path strategy for MHS is not supportable. 

Mr. TURNER. Please provide some concrete examples of how major defense acquisition programs would be impacted in FY16? For example, what impact would this 

have on the schedules for the Army’s Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle program and 

the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle program? How would this impact Army Aviation 

modernization in FY16? 

General WILLIAMSON. Assuming a 40 percent reduction applied across the board in modernization investments, AMPV RDTE funding would be reduced by $92.1M 

from $230.2M. For the most part, this reduction would impact the procurement of 

prototype hardware. Currently, approximately $105.5M is planned for prototype 

hardware procurement in FY16. In order to maintain design and development activities, the reduction would mean that procurement of most prototype hardware 

would be deferred to FY17. The Critical Design Review would likely remain in 

FY16, but the first prototype delivery would slip from 1QFY17 to 4QFY17. All subsequent milestones would slip by approximately nine months. This slip presupposes 

that funding in future years would not be similarly reduced. 

Assuming a 40 percent reduction applied across the board in modernization in- vestments, JLTV Other Procurement, Army funding would be reduced by $123.3M 

from $308.3M and R&D funding would be reduced by $13.0M from $32.5M. This reduction would delay low-rate initial production Live Fire and Operational testing by 

eight months and reduce the number of vehicles bought by 207-vehicles. The overall 

impact to the JLTV schedule would be delaying the program’s Initial Operating Capability by a minimum of one year, which would result in an Acquisition Program 

Baseline breach. 

The impacts listed above only reflect Army specific impacts. Simultaneous 

changes to the U.S. Marine Corps budget will have additional impacts to the program. 

Assuming a 40 percent reduction applied across the board in modernization investments, the Aviation Restructuring Initiative would be severely disrupted. The 

Multiyear Contracts (MYCs) for CH–47 Chinook and UH–60 Black Hawk would be 

terminated and the planned MYC’s for Black Hawk and AH–64 Apache in FY17 

would be unexecutable. The AH–64 Apache program would breach Nunn-McCurdy 

thresholds. Major program milestones for the Common Infrared Countermeasure 

(CIRCM) system, UH–60V Black Hawk, and CH–47 Chinook Block II would slip at 

least a year or more. MQ–1C Gray Eagle, AH–64 Apache, UH–72 Lakota, and UH– 

60 Black Hawk fielding would be significantly delayed, adversely impacting support 

to current operations. The severe disruption of the aircraft industrial base would result in layoffs and the loss of many second and third tier suppliers. 

Mr. TURNER. Regarding the Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle program, I understand the report required by section 216 of the National Defense Authorization Act 

for Fiscal Year 2016 on the AMPV is now complete. General Williamson, please 

elaborate on the report’s findings and conclusions. What was the report’s conclusions 

regarding the feasibility of incorporating medical wheeled AMPV variants as part 

of the Armored Brigade Combat Team? 

General WILLIAMSON. The Army conducted a comprehensive analysis of the M113 

Family of Vehicles (FoV) outside of the Armored Brigade Combat Teams (ABCT). 

The FoV’s within the ABCTs are assigned to operational units, known as Echelons 

Above Brigade (EAB), as well as medical vehicles. 

The analysis determined that a portion of the EAB M113s have comparable requirements to M113 mission roles in the ABCT and other EAB M113s have vehicle 

requirements more comparable to ABCT combat vehicles (the M2 Bradley Fighting 
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Vehicle). Furthermore, wheeled medical vehicles are unsuitable for ABCTs due to 

the inability to maneuver with highly mobile combat vehicles. 

Additionally, we conducted a thorough examination of the Army’s M113 fleet in 

EABs and the ABCT medical variant M113 FoV. This analysis revealed size, weight, 

power, and cooling (SWaP–C) deficiencies were the primary capability gaps for mission command vehicles, while insufficient mobility and force protection/survivability 

are capability gaps in tactical level units (e.g., Sapper Company, Mobile Assault 

Company Assault Platoon). 

Because the EAB M113 mission roles have a strong commonality with ABCT mission roles, they share common vehicle requirements with regard to mobility, force 

protection/survivability, SWaP–C, and reliability, availability, and maintainability. 

There are no existing medical vehicles that are suitable candidates as a medical 

evacuation or medical treatment vehicle within the ABCT formation based on performance results compared against the threshold AMPV capability development document requirements. 

Mr. TURNER. I understand FY16 is the final year for procurement of the Excalibur 

precision guided artillery round, and that technically the Army will be short of its 

war stock requirement for Excalibur rounds. What is your plan to buy the additional 

Excalibur projectiles the Army requires? 

General WILLIAMSON. At the end of FY16 the Army will have procured the 6,264 

rounds that were required to be placed in inventory. However, the Army will end 

up being 566 rounds short of the 6,264 war reserve requirement due to rounds being 

fired in combat and some rounds proving unserviceable. 

The Army Acquisition Executive signed an acquisition decision memorandum on 

23 December 2014 authorizing the program to procure the war reserve shortfall if 

funding becomes available. 

Mr. TURNER. Please discuss your current modernization programs for Army National Guard aviation, specifically, can you provide additional details for converting 

UH–60A Black Hawks to the UH–60L configuration? 

General WILLIAMSON. A key component of the Army’s UH–60 modernization is the 

UH–60A to UH–60L recapitalization program, which provides another 4,000 hours 

or approximately 10 years of economic useful life to the aircraft. Initiated in Fiscal 

Year 2007 (FY07), the program recapitalizes an existing UH–60A, while concurrently upgrading the aircraft to the UH–60L configuration. In FY13, the Army extended the UH–60A to UH–60L recapitalization program from its original end date 

in FY15 to late-FY18 at approximately 40 aircraft a year. Primarily, this extension 

is focused on modernizing and increasing readiness in the Army National Guard. 

By FY16, the UH–60A to UH–60L recapitalization is projected to modernize 273 

total aircraft, with 223 or 82 percent of those in the Army National Guard. 

Upon completion of Army Aviation restructure and modernization, the Army National Guard will have an end state fleet of 960 UH–60 aircraft: 460 H–60M (includes both UH–60M assault and HH–60M MEDEVAC units) and 500 UH–60V (includes both UH–60V assault and UH–60V Medical Evacuation units). 

The Aviation Restructure Initiative (ARI) has allowed the Army to retain and 

modernize its most capable aircraft in all three components to meet future demands 

of the Combatant Commanders. Under current fiscal realities, the cost savings from 

ARI implementation enables accelerated modernization of the Army National Guard 

UH–60 fleet. 

Mr. TURNER. The Budget Committee’s resolution has provided additional funding 

to the OCO request as a way to offset sequestration impacts. What are your 

thoughts on using the OCO request to offset sequestration? How would this help to 

mitigate the impacts on modernization programs? 

Admiral GROSKLAGS. Sequestration level funding would further exacerbate capability gaps; delay or forego the development and delivery of critical warfighting capabilities; further reduce strike weapons capability and capacity; and further reduce 

overall force readiness. Shifting base budget resources into Overseas Contingency 

Operations (OCO) risks undermining a mechanism meant to fund incremental costs 

of overseas conflicts and fails to provide a stable base budget upon which future 

years defense planning is based. It would be preferred to fund our programs in accordance with the PB16 submission. That would provide the stability and predictability that our programs require to execute efficiently and effectively. It also would 

provide our industry partners, who are key to our modernization efforts, with more 

certainty and less risk as they plan their execution and investment strategies. 

Mr. TURNER. What is the current status of the CH–53K heavy lift helicopter development program? Is the program still on cost and schedule? 

Admiral GROSKLAGS. The CH–53K is in the Engineering, Manufacturing and Development (EMD) phase. More specifically, the program is executing ground test of 

the complete aircraft configuration, and is planning first flight in late CY15. The 
66 

Ground Test Vehicle (GTV) has accumulated 186.5 hours. First flight aircraft (Engineering Development Model (EDM) 1) has successfully executed ground turns and 

continues preparations for first flight. 

Root cause of the failed main gearbox quill rods discovered in December 2014 has 

been determined, and redesigned quill rods are currently being tested in the main 

gearbox. While this failure and subsequent investigation resulted in a temporary 

cessation of ground testing, the program has resumed ground testing and is on track 

for first flight this year and entry into Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP) in FY17, 

as is currently scheduled. The CH–53K program remains executable to the PB–16 

budget request. 

Mr. TURNER. Please provide an update on your current plans for the HMMWV 

Sustainment Modification Initiative. 

General SHRADER. The High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) 

Sustainment Modification Initiative (SMI) has been cancelled. Procuring the Joint 

Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) and using the first buy of about 5500 vehicles to replace the most at risk portion of our light vehicle fleet will allow us to provide our 

Marines that are most likely to come into contact with the enemy with the most 

up to date equipment. In these times of budge constraint, we must focus on modernization of our tactical vehicle fleet. The savings associated with cancelling the 

HMMWV SMI program will allow us to focus on the Amphibious Combat Vehicle 

(ACV) and JLTV. We hope to eventually replace the entire HMMWV inventory with 

JLTV. 

Mr. TURNER. The Budget Committee’s resolution has provided additional funding 

to the OCO request as a way to offset sequestration impacts. What are your 

thoughts on using the OCO request to offset sequestration? How would this help to 

mitigate the impacts on modernization programs? 

General SHRADER and Mr. TAYLOR. Continual base-to-OCO transfers mask our 

true baseline costs, hindering long-term planning and risking capability and capacity to respond to crises around the world. OCO is temporary by definition, and the 

Marine Corps is charged by the 82nd Congress to be the Nation’s permanent Force 

in Readiness. 

Effective budgeting for baseline programs requires a stable stream of funding over 

the long term, but OCO, by its nature, can only be budgeted and requested in single-year increments. The current forced reliance on OCO removes the predictability 

necessary for effective budgeting and delays difficult but critical decisions regarding 

what requirements are both enduring and affordable. Ten years of OCO, plus the 

steady erosion of the baseline through years of efficiency cuts and multiple baseto-OCO transfers, have forced the Marine Corps to rely increasingly on OCO to fund 

our enduring needs. 

Mr. TURNER. I understand the ACV 1.1 program plans to award two development 

contracts in fiscal year 2016 to two contractors to build 16 test vehicles each (32 

total). Please discuss the rationale for procuring 32 test vehicles. 

Mr. TAYLOR. The ACV 1.1 acquisition strategy is designed to maintain competition 

up to the Milestone C, Low Rate Initial Production decision currently planned for 

2Q FY18. In close coordination with the test community, the program manager determined 16 vehicles per contractor is the appropriate number based on several factors including scope, locations and required duration to complete testing. This test 

strategy includes developmental, live fire, and reliability testing. Many of these 

tests will be conducted in parallel at various test locations ranging from Aberdeen 

to Yuma Test Center, as well as Camp Pendleton and Fort Greely, Alaska. Consideration was given to procuring more than 16 vehicles; however, the additional cost 

outweighed the projected benefits. The strategy includes conducting an operational 

assessment to ensure that the Marine Corps remains on schedule to deliver a much 

need capability to the operational forces by 2020. The breakdown of events for the 

16 test vehicles per manufacturer is as follows: 

• Verification of System Requirements. The verification of compliance with ACV 

system specifications will require the use of 11 vehicles in concurrent developmental testing at 6 different locations (e.g., land mobility testing at Aberdeen 

and Yuma Test Centers, water mobility testing at Camp Pendleton, and Survivability testing at White Sands Missile Range) in the Engineering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) period. Additionally, these vehicles will also be used 

in Reliability Growth Testing and to verify compliance with EMD exit criteria 

for reliability in preparation for LRIP. 

• Live Fire Testing. Planned live-fire tests at the component and system level 

during EMD will require 2 test vehicles to ensure readiness for subsequent Full 

Up System Level testing on LRIP vehicles. 

• Training. Marine training will require the use of 3 of the test vehicles in EMD. 

This training will be used to develop New Equipment Training (NET) proce-
67 

dures, train Operating Force Marines prior to operational testing, and develop 

Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures prior to the required EMD Operational Assessment (OA). Developed NET procedures will also support subsequent vehicle 

fielding of ACV 1.1. 

Mr. TURNER. If we return to funding levels required by the Budget Control Act, 

could the Marine Corps realistically afford to procure the JLTV and the ACV, Increment 1.1? What trade-offs would you have to make in modernization if we return 

to BCA funding levels? 

Mr. TAYLOR. No we will not be able to procure both the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) and Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV) 1.1 if we are forced to Budget 

Control Act numbers. In fact, the ACV program will have to be delayed indefinitely, 

recapitalization of legacy programs will fall further behind, and sustainment costs 

of legacy equipment will rise. Even incremental year-to-year tradeoffs will not permit the required modernization. 

Additionally, JTLV procurement will be delayed and Marines will continue to rely 

upon the HMMWV for light tactical mobility. This will mean using a vehicle with 

170 Mean Miles Between Operation Mission Failure (MMBOMF) that is also less 

protected and less capable than the JLTV, which has an MMBOMF requirement of 

2,400 miles. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WILSON 

Mr. WILSON. How important is the AMPV program to the Army and the Department of Defense? 

What has been put under contract thus far, and what is the current AMPV acquisition timeline? 

Army leadership has described the AMPV as the Army’s highest combat vehicle 

priority. What is the capability gap that drives this decision? 

Several of the defense-related Committees have directed the Army and OSD to 

provide further information on AMPV program; have any of these Reports been delivered to the Congress? 

One of the tenants of the AMPV program has been that no currently fielded vehicle has the survivability, mobility and other capabilities which the Army requires 

in the AMPV. Is this still the case? 

General WILLIAMSON. The AMPV program is a high priority developmental effort 

with in the Army combat vehicle portfolio. The AMPV Engineering and Manufacturing Development contract with Low Rate Initial Production options was awarded 

on 23 December 2014. The LRIP options of up to 289 vehicles will begin delivering 

production vehicles following a Milestone C decision currently planned for Fiscal 

Year 2019 (FY19). A separate Full Rate Production contract will be awarded in 

FY21 with the first unit equipped in FY21 and full operational capability in FY23. 

In addition, the M113’s mission is to provide mission command, fire support, medical, and general support throughout the Armor Brigade Combat Team’s (ABCT’s) 

battlespace. The M113 became operationally irrelevant as they lack the protection, 

survivability, and power growth necessary to fight within the ABCTs. The AMPV 

will fill the capability gap left by the now irrelevant M113. 

The HASC directed the Army to report on its plan to eventually replace all M113s 

within Echelons Above Brigade (EAB) formations and assess the feasibility of incorporating wheeled medical variants within the ABCT. The Army submitted the report to Congress on 27 February 2015. The HAC–D directed the Office of the Secretary of Defense Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) to report on existing wheeled and tracked combat vehicles used for medical purposes and compare 

the results to the Army’s current plan to develop the AMPV to include an independent Army Surgeon General assessment on the CAPE criteria. The report was 

submitted on 6 April 2015. The SAC–D directed the Army to conduct an Analysis 

of Alternatives (AoA) for the AMPV EAB requirement in FY15. The AoA will be 

complete on the third quarter FY16. Based on the AMPV AoA and congressionally 

directed studies, the Army has confirmed that there are no currently fielded vehicles 

that meet the survivability, mobility, and other capabilities required for the AMPV. 

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