The United States Army War College

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

CENTER for

STRATEGIC

LEADERSHIP and

DEVELOPMENT

The United States Army War College educates and develops leaders for service 

at the strategic level while advancing knowledge in the global application 

of Landpower.

The purpose of the United States Army War College is to produce graduates 

who are skilled critical thinkers and complex problem solvers. Concurrently, 

it is our duty to the U.S. Army to also act as a “think factory” for commanders 

and civilian leaders at the strategic level worldwide and routinely engage 

in discourse and debate concerning the role of ground forces in achieving 

national security objectives.

The Strategic Studies Institute publishes national 

security and strategic research and analysis to influence 

policy debate and bridge the gap between military 

and academia.

The Center for Strategic Leadership and Development 

contributes to the education of world class senior 

leaders, develops expert knowledge, and provides 

solutions to strategic Army issues affecting the national 

security community.

The Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute 

provides subject matter expertise, technical review, 

and writing expertise to agencies that develop stability 

operations concepts and doctrines.

The Senior Leader Development and Resiliency program 

supports the United States Army War College’s lines of 

effort to educate strategic leaders and provide well-being 

education and support by developing self-awareness 

through leader feedback and leader resiliency.

The School of Strategic Landpower develops strategic 

leaders by providing a strong foundation of wisdom 

grounded in mastery of the profession of arms, and 

by serving as a crucible for educating future leaders in 

the analysis, evaluation, and refinement of professional 

expertise in war, strategy, operations, national security, 

resource management, and responsible command.

The U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center acquires, 

conserves, and exhibits historical materials for use 

to support the U.S. Army, educate an international 

audience, and honor Soldiers—past and present.

U.S. Army War College

Senior Leader Development and Resiliency

SLDR
STRATEGIC

STUDIES

INSTITUTE

The Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) is part of the U.S. Army War 

College and is the strategic-level study agent for issues related 

to national security and military strategy with emphasis on 

geostrategic analysis.

The mission of SSI is to use independent analysis to conduct 

strategic studies that develop policy recommendations on:

• Strategy, planning, and policy for joint and combined 

 employment of military forces;

• Regional strategic appraisals;

• The nature of land warfare;

• Matters affecting the Army’s future;

• The concepts, philosophy, and theory of strategy; and,

• Other issues of importance to the leadership of the Army.

Studies produced by civilian and military analysts concern 

topics having strategic implications for the Army, the Department of 

Defense, and the larger national security community.

In addition to its studies, SSI publishes special reports on topics 

of special or immediate interest. These include edited proceedings 

of conferences and topically oriented roundtables, expanded trip 

reports, and quick-reaction responses to senior Army leaders.

The Institute provides a valuable analytical capability within the 

Army to address strategic and other issues in support of Army 

participation in national security policy formulation.

i

iii

Strategic Studies Institute

and

U.S. Army War College Press

REASSESSING THE BARRIERS TO 

ISLAMIC RADICALIZATION IN KAZAKHSTAN

Zhulduz Baizakova 

Roger N. McDermott

July 2015

The views expressed in this report are those of the authors and 

do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the 

Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. 

Government. Authors of Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) and 

U.S. Army War College (USAWC) Press publications enjoy full 

academic freedom, provided they do not disclose classified 

information, jeopardize operations security, or misrepresent 

official U.S. policy. Such academic freedom empowers them to 

offer new and sometimes controversial perspectives in the interest of furthering debate on key issues. This report is cleared for 

public release; distribution is unlimited.

*****

This publication is subject to Title 17, United States Code, 

Sections 101 and 105. It is in the public domain and may not be 

copyrighted.
iv

*****

Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should 

be forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. 

Army War College Press, U.S. Army War College, 47 Ashburn 

Drive, Carlisle, PA 17013-5010. 

*****

All Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) and U.S. Army War 

College (USAWC) Press publications may be downloaded free 

of charge from the SSI website. Hard copies of this report may 

also be obtained free of charge while supplies last by placing 

an order on the SSI website. SSI publications may be quoted 

or reprinted in part or in full with permission and appropriate 

credit given to the U.S. Army Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. 

Army War College Press, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA. 

Contact SSI by visiting our website at the following address: 

www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil.

*****

The Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War 

College Press publishes a monthly email newsletter to update 

the national security community on the research of our analysts,

recent and forthcoming publications, and upcoming conferences sponsored by the Institute. Each newsletter also provides 

a strategic commentary by one of our research analysts. If you 

are interested in receiving this newsletter, please subscribe on the 

SSI website at www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil/newsletter.

ISBN 1-58487-694-8
v

FOREWORD

The authors reassess the barriers to Islamic radicalization in the Republic of Kazakhstan. They provide 

crucial analysis and findings for policymakers seeking 

to engage with the country, while also presenting important insights into the historical and cultural impediments in the path of radicalizing its youth. Despite 

the proximity of the Central Asian Republics to Afghanistan and the Global War on Terrorism, unlike its 

neighbors, Kazakhstan has remained relatively stable 

and low risk in the face of international terrorism and 

extremism. This monograph examines some of the 

reasons as to why this is the case, proving that early 

judgements offered by commentators concerning Kazakhstan’s experience of domestic politically inspired 

violence in 2011-12, exaggerated the potential threat 

of growing Islamic radicalization. 

For 70 years, Kazakhstan underwent a forceful and 

externally imposed secularization and was maintained 

rigidly under Soviet rule, with no official state support 

for organized religion. Yet, there were mosques functioning in the Soviet era, and the people in its territory maintained their own religious beliefs. However, 

secularization left its own effects on the religious identity of the Kazakhs, and today the country is opening 

up to Islam by treading its own path as part of the 

Muslim community. 

This monograph presents one of the most underresearched subjects of modern Kazakhstan: examining attitudes and approaches to Islam. It investigates 

the historical roots and perspectives of a nomadic lifestyle and how they are being changed and developed 

on the way toward what many today understand 

as traditional Islam. One of the main questions the 
authors of this monograph pose is what traditional 

Islam means for modern day Kazakhstan.

Islam in Kazakhstan merges and intertwines preIslamic traditions with the rituals of Shamanism and 

Tengrianism that once existed in the wider steppes 

where a nomadic lifestyle took hold precluding the 

people from building stationary worship places. Very 

few scholars in Kazakhstan are currently undertaking serious research on this subject. Meanwhile, many 

foreign observers suggest that Central Asian countries are undergoing a thorough and rapid Islamization process. This analysis provides some answers 

to that assumption. How does Islam in Kazakhstan 

differ from Islam in Turkey, Qatar, and Malaysia, for 

example? What makes it so distinctive? Is that particular type or variety of Islam today encouraging young 

men to travel to Syria and Afghanistan?

This monograph is a soul-searching account of 

what Islam means to the general population and how 

it is perceived; it reveals deep internal development 

of the post-Soviet society to embrace new ideas and 

open up to the wider world of global integration and 

cosmopolitanism. It discusses the specifics of how Islam has transformed, been adopted, modernized, and 

accepted in the poly-ethnic, poly-cultural and polylinguistic environment of Kazakhstan. Then, it moves 

from theory to practice in its empirical implementation, describing how Kazakhstan struggles against its 

own specific types of terrorism and extremism, and 

how it continues to pursue this.

Terrorism and extremism are commonly discussed 

national security issues in Central Asia, frequently 

tied to developments in Afghanistan or the emerging 

threat from the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). 

The authors, however, trace the roots of Kazakhstan’s 

vi
vii

counterterrorist strategy and assess the actual experience of acts of political violence in the country in 

2011-12, and how this impacted new means and approaches to mitigating the risks of domestic terrorism. 

They conclude that those acts of violence, while its 

perpetrators often claimed inspiration from international Islamic terrorism, were carried out by criminal 

elements rather than homegrown terrorists. Nevertheless, the experience of these acts of violence, including 

suicide bombings targeting security forces, was used 

by the state to recraft measures and policies aimed at 

reducing the danger of terrorist groups making inroads into the country.

In fact, the fundamental value of this analysis lies 

in the effort the authors make to avoid looking at these 

complex issues from a foreign or Euro-Atlantic perspective; they seek to assess these themes from within, 

offering a more realistic insight into the evolution of 

religion in Kazakhstan, as well as its related security 

policies. Therefore, this monograph will be of interest 

to decisionmakers trying to find ways to deepen and 

strengthen ties with Kazakhstan and support the country’s security, and to scholars investigating post-Soviet 

transition. Too often, these issues are stove-piped with 

analysts assessing the various issues in a compartmentalized manner. But here, in this work, drawing upon 

indigenous sources the authors integrate their analysis 

of history, religion, political violence, and criminality, 

and their interconnections to security policy in a userfriendly way. The result speaks for itself and presents 

readers with a sober and genuine view of the security 

challenges stemming from radical Islam, in the context of identifying the numerous barriers standing in 
the way of tipping growing numbers of the country’s 

youth into transnational radical Islamist movements.

 

 DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

 Director

 Strategic Studies Institute and

 U.S. Army War College Press

viii
ix

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

ZHULDUZ BAIZAKOVA is Research affiliate to the 

Institute for Security and Cooperation Studies of the 

Al-Farabi Kazakh National University in Almaty, 

Kazakhstan. She served for 7 years in the Ministry 

for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 

including a foreign posting to the United Kingdom. 

She is currently specializing in security and environmental issues of the Central Asian region. Ms. Baizakova holds an M.Sc. degree in international security 

and global governance from the Birkbeck College, 

University of London.

ROGER N. MCDERMOTT has specialized in Russian 

and Central Asian defense and security studies. He is 

an Adjunct Fellow of the Hudson Institute in Washington, DC; Affiliated Senior Analyst, Danish Institute 

for International Studies, Copenhagen; and Senior 

International Fellow, Foreign Military Studies Office, 

Fort Leavenworth.

xi

SUMMARY

Central Asia is one of the most complex and underassessed regions in the world and has been experiencing an exacerbation or activation of radical Islamic 

movements over the last decade or so. To some extent, 

extremism has shown its various facets in all Central 

Asian states. 

The general overviews listing the roots of the Islamic radicalization usually explain it by several 

combined factors. These complex processes include 

increasing urbanization, institutional and individual 

corruption, the growing gap between rich and poor, 

the inability of the state to provide security, corruption in the law enforcement agencies, poor functioning of the state religious bodies, inefficient power 

structures, and a limited scope for citizens to influence 

decisionmaking resulting in lower trust in the authorities, as well as other factors. The authoritarian regimes 

of Central Asia gave rise to boiling anger and discontent among their populations. For people unable 

to defend their rights and interests, religion may be 

viewed as an escape from their minimized existence. 

However, all those factors described were more or less 

present much earlier. Even more paradoxically, the 

extent of the Islamic radicalization taking place at that 

point did not occur while the Taliban was in power in 

Afghanistan. 

Kazakhstan, being the most stable and safe country 

in the region, witnessed a series of alleged extremistterrorist acts since 2011. The number of Islamic activists has grown, particularly in rural areas. As an official response to that, Kazakhstan continues to improve 

its legislation on combating terrorism and extremism. 

However, since this experience of domestic “politi-
xii

cal violence” in 2011-12, the country has suffered no 

major incidents.

This analysis begins by providing an overview of 

historic roots and identity of “Kazakh Islam,” while 

attempting to explain how it emerged. Then it describes the nature of connection and influence reaching Kazakhstan from neighboring North Caucasus 

and Afghanistan and how it affects radicalization of 

the youth. Then main reasons for misleading assumptions are closely examined to identify how Kazakhstan 

is viewed from the outside world. Separate sections 

explore the state structures and the role of the state 

overseeing the issues regarding Islam and its practices. Special attention is drawn upon banned extremist 

groups, their specifics, and the country’s experience 

of political violence in 2011-12, as well as the state’s 

response to the acts of violence.
1

REASSESSING THE BARRIERS TO 

ISLAMIC RADICALIZATION IN KAZAKHSTAN

HISTORICAL ROOTS AND IDENTITY 

OF “KAZAKH ISLAM”

The Islamic religion came to the steppes of Kazakhstan around the 13th to 14th centuries. However, 

Islam did not embed itself deeply enough to become 

the overwhelming religion of the Kazakh tribes. The 

first time the Sharia law was introduced was during 

the rule of Khan (provincial governor) in 1815. The 

main missionaries in the Kazakh steppes were Tatar 

mullahs that tried to convert nomadic people to Islam. 

The initial functions of mullahs and imams were to 

teach and enlighten those who wanted to learn voluntarily. It is important to note that Islam was not 

imposed forcefully. Islam had become an official religion of the medieval Khanates of the Turkic world, 

but it was never fully accepted with all its dogmas. 

Attendance at the mosque and five daily prayers remained conditional. Islam took deep roots in big cities and towns among traders and crafters; however, 

the rest of the population followed both Islam and 

Tengrianism, sometimes interchangeably.1

As Shokan Valikhanov writes, Islam had decoded 

the Shamanism of the Kazakhs. At the same time, modern Kazakhs worship their ancestors and their spirits 

in addition to visiting sacred places, which completely contradicts traditional Islamic rules.2

 Islam was 

popular as an underground movement during Soviet 

times, and many Kazakhs remained, observing their 

religious duties behind closed doors. In the Soviet period of the 1920-30s in the Central Asian region, there 

were 20 times more unregistered mosques and three 
2

to four times more illegal clergy than official statistics 

showed.3 Since Kazakhstan gained its independence, 

Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Turkey expressed the biggest interest in providing religious education and 

funding for the construction of new mosques.4

The branch of Islam used in Kazakhstan is the 

Hanafi Madhhab, which is Sunni. The Hanafi is the 

largest of four existing schools in Islam (30 percent of 

Muslims worldwide) and is the most liberal one. Today, 72 percent of Kazakhstan’s population are followers of Islam.5

 Other sources claim there are currently 

11 million Muslims (out of 16 million), belonging to 24 

nationalities.6

Kazakh Islam currently presents a mixture of the 

ancient traditions (Tengrianism, Shamanism) and traditional type of Islam (Sunni). Sometimes Kazakhs 

combine those two types when performing certain 

rituals. Nowadays, there is a clear intertwining of the 

Old (Tengrianism and Shamanistic) beliefs with the 

traditional ways of Islam. Most Kazakhs would be 

unable to tell where one ends and the other begins. 

For example, the belief in Aruak (the spirit of ancestors) coexists with the rules of Islamic burial where 

women are banned from attending. One of the main 

features of the so-called Kazakh Islam is that the majority of the Kazakh population have a very fragmentary knowledge of real Islam. Very few people in the 

country speak Arabic in order to read the Koran in the 

original language. 

Nevertheless, going on the Hadj (a pilgrimage 

to Mecca) became somewhat fashionable for certain 

groups of people. For example, as of February 2013, 

the price of a Hadj for Kazakhs varied from $3,500 to 

$3,900.7 The average monthly wage is roughly $700.8

In other words, middle-class Kazakhs, not to mention 
3

working class, cannot easily afford such a trip, and either have to work hard to save the required amount or 

borrow it in the form of credit.

Professor Saniya Edelbay from the Department of 

Philosophy at Al-Farabi Kazakh National University 

in Almaty, Kazakhstan, argues that “traditional” Islam 

was never inherent in Kazakh culture. Kazakh women’s traditional dress has nothing in common with 

how true Islamic women should dress, like covering 

the arms and face.9 Furthermore, Rasul Zhumaly, a 

specialist in oriental studies and lecturer at the Suleyman Demirel University, believes that for the past few 

years Kazakhstan has been experiencing Islamophobia due to the number of cases involving terrorism.10

It is widely assumed that all Kazakhs are automatically Muslims; however, there are Kazakhs belonging 

to other religions even though the number is low. 

In the immediate wake of the collapse of the Soviet 

Union, some Kazakhs joined Christian, Buddhist, and 

other religions.11 However, there were many who 

found themselves in an ideological vacuum without 

being able to identify their religious identity. Nurlan 

Ayupov writes that Kazakhs being lost and confused 

as to their identity may revert to their initial roots: 

Tengrianism. Most Kazakh traditions and rites stem 

from this tradition. Tengrianism shows the way out of 

the dead-end where Turks found themselves driven 

by other world religions, and the rebirth of Tengrianism would lead to a complete change of mentality.12

The Kazakh model of Islam had adjusted itself to 

Tengrianism, merging Islamic and Tengrianism traditions and ideas, which later became known as Turkic 

Islam or Central Asian Islam or folk Islam.13 Moreover, Tengrianism can position itself as a cultural and 

civilizational self-identity factor of Kazakh people and 

other Turkic nations. 
4

INFLUENCE FROM THE NORTH CAUCASUS 

AND AFGHANISTAN 

On April 15, 2013, Boston had witnessed its first 

terrorist attack after September 11, 2001 (9/11), perpetrated by two amateurish Chechen brothers, Tamerlan and Dzhokhar Tsarnaev. Immediate investigation 

discovered that prior to arriving in the United States, 

the family lived in Kyrgyzstan for some period, which 

led to certain speculations about close connections between North Caucasus (NC) and Central Asia (CA). 

The matter was worsened by the fact that, in the aftermath of the bombings, two Kazakhstani exchange 

students, Dias Kadyrbayev and Azamat Tazhayakov, 

were charged with tampering with evidence and obstruction of justice, as well as conspiracy. They threw 

away the backpack that contained fireworks, the powder that was used to make a bomb, and the laptop belonging to one of the brothers. It was proved that the 

Kazakhstanis did that on the request of Dzhokhar. In 

late-July 2014, Azamat Tazhayakov had been found 

guilty; Dias Kadyrbayev will face his trial in September 2015. Both of them may face up to 25 years, plus a 

significant amount of fines and deportation.14

In spite of this particular set of events, to say that 

there are strong links between Kazakhstan and North 

Caucasus is far-fetched. At no point was it suggested 

that the Kazakh students helped the Chechens out of 

sympathy for their cause or took any direct part in 

preparations for the bombings. 

One of the initial links between CA and NC started when former Soviet leader Josef Stalin deported 

Chechen people to the territories of modern day 

Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan in 1944. There is still 
5

some Chechen diaspora living in Western Kazakhstan, and it was from there (Atyrau) that radical Islamists recruited Kazakhs to fight in the NC. 

However, today there is no direct connection reported about the insurgency in NC (Dagestan, Ingushetia, etc.) and terrorist acts taking place in Kazakhstan. The ideology, methods, and purposes are 

entirely different. 

Jacob Zenn, an analyst of African and Eurasian affairs for The Jamestown Foundation, Washington DC, 

suggests that many so-called Kazakhstanis that were 

captured or killed in the NC were actually from the 

ethnic Chechen generation that was once deported 

from Chechnya and who may still hold Kazakh passports and citizenship.15 There are accounts that Kazakh 

nationals captured in the NC are ethnic Caucasians 

(predominantly Chechens) holding Kazakhstani citizenship. Those are actually third or fourth generation 

Chechens that were deported from the NC by Stalin 

and became Kazakhstanis.16

The current epicenter of the insurgency in the NC 

is Dagestan, where the presence of a small number 

of Kazakh fighters was reported between 2009 and 

2011. However, that does not prove the case for extensive help or even influence from Kazakhstan. The 

coordinator of the Center for Security Programs in Astana, Talgat Mamyraymov, notes that the idea of the 

NC radical influence on CA is widely overestimated. 

The roots of terrorism for Kazakhstan are located not 

abroad, but within the country itself; it lies within the 

domestic social political situation rather than imported 

extremist Islamist views. 

If anything, the ties between CA and NC radicals 

are mainly formed in Afghanistan. After the drawdown of International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) 
6

forces in 2014, both CA and NC terrorists might divert 

their attention to the Central Asian region. But their 

motives would be far from clear, lacking the drivers 

present in their Afghanistan campaign against “foreign invaders,” and intrinsically linked to long established nexus of crime, drug trafficking, and terrorism.

The former head of the Centre for Counter-terrorism Programs, and political expert Erlan Karin 

believes that militants who earlier functioned around 

the Afghan-Pakistan border are now becoming more 

active near the Afghan-Tajik border. The Afghan drug 

trade grew to become an everlasting link between the 

Talibs, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), and 

other Islamists, including al-Qaeda. Kazakhstan closely borders with Russia’s Bashkortostan Province (300 

kilometers [km] away), where in Aktobe in October 

2011, four Salafists were convicted for police shootings. Bashkortostan Islamists use the Kazakh route for 

transportation to Afghanistan and Pakistan.17

REASONS FOR MISLEADING ASSUMPTIONS

Today international Islamic movements are attracting the youth, predominantly young men. With 

increasing urbanization, there are mass movements 

happening from villages to the cities. That, in turn, 

increases the urban population of the cities and adds 

a critical mass of young men and women, who, upon 

arrival, sometimes cannot find a job or are unable to 

enter any educational establishment. Such groups become automatically exposed to certain religious vulnerabilities, also taking into account that they had no 

chance to receive any previous religious education. 

There are, of course, local mosques in the villages; 

however, the quality of the mullahs preaching there is 
7

in question. Also, some of the prisons in Kazakhstan 

serve as a perfect recruitment ground for radicalization attempts. One of the radicalization sources stems 

from imprisoning alleged Salafists that spread their 

extremist perceptions attracting the disenfranchised 

youth.18 Radicals serve terms together with common 

criminals, and that is something that needs to be 

amended by the authorities. 

The United States believes that Kazakhstan uses 

the threat of radicalization to deal with the political 

opposition.19 It is also assumed that Kazakh law enforcers have low capabilities to distinguish between 

extremists and criminals.20 One of the reasons the 

extremists turn out to be popular in CA is explained 

by the lack and/or absence of the knowledge about 

real Islam. It is blamed on the officials and governments for not providing adequate information to the 

population. According to this view, it is very easy 

to drive the moderate but inexperienced Muslims 

toward radicalization.

Officials in all CA states became accustomed to 

inadvertently blaming foreign governments for their 

disruptive influence. That in itself reflects the Soviet 

mentality of the elite when the main responsibility 

for unpleasant events is directed toward an external 

force. However, there are facts and figures showing 

that external forces are at play as well. For example, 

Kyrgyzstan is too economically weak to fund and 

sustain the increasing number of new mosques being 

built all across the country. Some experts believe it is 

being directly funded by Saudi Arabia and sometimes 

Turkey.21

Another bias concerning the reasons for radicalization in CA from the Russian point of view is the 

assumption that Central Asian governments are too 
8

weak and decentralized to keep a tight grip on power, which leads their populations to frustration and 

search for enemies. The extent of such arguments is 

highly questionable, since each Central Asian country 

needs to be looked upon and analyzed separately.

Some Russian experts tend to see the roots for Islamism in CA in the poor social economic conditions 

of the region, driving young people to an alternative 

lifestyle. In other words, Russians blame Central Asian 

governments for creating the volatile atmosphere of 

distrust of the youth in their own authorities. For example, Aleksandr Vavilov from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in Russia goes as far as suggesting that 

one of the main reasons for Islamic radicalization in 

CA is the weakening and possible loss by the people 

of the “worldwide culture and civilization” as it is 

reflected in the Russian language.22

Russian sources frequently blame the alleged 

growing radicalization of the Central Asian region on 

the collapse of the Soviet Union and the deterioration 

of their educational and social systems. But the issue 

looks more complicated than this overly simplified 

politicized narrative implies. With the elimination of 

the Iron Curtain, Kazakh people became more open 

to different kinds of influences and knowledge. The 

entire Islamic world had been closed to CA countries 

for more than 70 years, and now the region is fully 

exposed to whatever ways of Islam the others want to 

bring and/or impose. Nevertheless, one expert from 

the Diplomatic Academy claimed that Russia’s position in its foreign policy strategy is based on the fact 

that all former Soviet Republics are under the natural 

exclusive zone of Russian influence, due to its cultural 

and historical ties, and especially due to existing in the 

Russian information space.23
9

Perhaps it is worthwhile to consider that Kazakhstan had turned into such a vulnerable state for Islamic 

influences precisely because it was previously closed.

Now the population is in a state of permanent confusion and disorientation as to what real Islam is and 

how to pursue it. But before that, Kazakhstan’s government and leadership should think about whether 

the country needs to be guided toward awareness of 

what constitutes real Islam. That remains a huge open 

question for government and society. 

Kazakhstan’s leading expert on Afghanistan, Sultan Akimbekov, suggests the theory that the radicalization movement starts when some forces are directly 

targeting the existing synergy of the traditional power 

distribution that is between secular and spiritual authorities. In other words, if some forces plan to modernize the nation and governance structures in a way 

that damages or inflicts serious changes upon the traditional status quo, there will always be forces opposing it and trying to turn back the process. He argues 

that it is precisely the case with Afghanistan, when 

the 1978 April revolution brought forth the National 

Democratic Party extreme in its aspirations to modernize the backward Afghan society, which, in turn, led 

to many complications, including the Soviet invasion 

and prolonged civil war.24 However, the case cannot 

be compared with Kazakhstan due to several reasons. 

Kazakhstan has never been ruled and governed under 

Sharia law. The distribution of power had a predominantly secular character with mullahs or imams never 

interfering into the state of political affairs. Moreover, 

when the Soviet expansion began from 1917 onwards, 

the changes they introduced to the patriarchal society 

never took the shape of an armed or extreme opposition from the local masses. The character of the resistance held a different nature and approach. 
10

Modern Kazakhstan’s multivector foreign policy 

requires the country to maintain good balanced relations with everyone including the Muslim countries. 

Kazakhstan is pursuing those goals. Constitutionally, 

however, Kazakhstan is a secular state. The present 

leadership encourages the country to stay secular 

by introducing restrictive religious legislation and 

other measures.

On June 29, 2014, the newly emerged Islamic State 

(IS), formerly known as the Islamic State of Iraq and 

the Levant (ISIL), and by some as the Islamic State of 

Iraq and Syria (ISIS), included Kazakhstan along with 

other CA states as part of the territory called Khorasan. Unsurprisingly, that caused a negative reaction 

from both the expert community and from the ordinary population. It is assumed that a number of Kazakhstani militants who first fought in Syria can now 

also be found among the founders of IS. The exact 

number of Kazakhstani nationals is unknown. To the 

question of whether ISIL might present any serious 

threat to Kazakhstan, most of the interviewed analysts 

answered negatively but cautiously.25

As things stand today, Kazakhstan presents only a 

small and distant fraction of the grand-scale ISIL plan 

to unite all sovereign countries considered to be somewhat Muslim. The implementation of such a plan remains to be seen. 

STATE STRUCTURES OVERSEEING 

ISLAM IN KAZAKHSTAN

There are two main governmental bodies in charge 

of the Islamic religion on a state scale: the Agency on 

Religious Affairs and the Spiritual Directorate of Kazakhstan Muslims. Today, one can say that the state 
11

strictly controls the religious sphere, some may argue 

that it is overwhelmingly strict. That also includes the 

requirement for official registration of any religious 

entities (organizations, gatherings, unions, etc.), appointing and monitoring imams, registering mosques, 

and checking religious practices.26

In addition, the state attempts to control any kind 

of religious literature being imported into the country. All these types of measures originate from the 

Soviet era, and all Central Asian governments follow 

these measures to one extent or another. For example, 

Kazakhstan’s Agency on Religious Affairs had studied around 2,000 websites, and consequently 950 of 

them were blocked due to their promotion of violent 

extremism in 2010.27

The Spiritual Directorate of Muslims of Kazakhstan 

is an authoritative institution, not a spiritual one, according to one of the country’s experts on Islam, Alma 

Sultangalieva. She also argues that the religious field 

should not be monopolized as the government tries to 

suppress other religious dissidents.28 This argument 

can be supported by the multiple cases of the official 

Muslim clergy incompetence. For example, one of the 

reasons the youth start following “pure Islam” is the 

inaccessibility of the official imams to whom they cannot speak. Usually imams are too busy to talk face-toface, handling other religion-related things like weddings, burials, or other rituals. Sometimes youths also 

feel too shy to ask questions. Disaffected youth then 

go to those with whom they can talk and have time to 

reply to their questions. Unfortunately, those volunteers may not always have good intentions. 

There are examples of Russian-speaking Kazakhs 

visiting mosques and trying to take part in prayers 

and listening to preaching. Part of the problem, how-
12

ever, lies in the fact that the preaching is in Kazakh, 

and there is no available translation. Thus, many of 

those that speak Russian start addressing “other” 

sources. According to one visitor, 70 percent of people 

who regularly attend the mosque are happy to “translate” the preaching, but in a way that suits them.29

One of the examples of confusion is suggested by the 

fact that there are contradictions between fatwas issued by the Spiritual Directorate and some of the national traditions that are fixed in the Cultural Heritage 

state program.

The 9th grade of high school has a subject called 

“The Basis of Religions,” where students are supposedly taught basic information.30 Among citizens writing their comments to the agency are those who are 

concerned by the increasing number of the Islamic 

fanatics wearing long beards and hijabs, particularly 

in educational institutions such as the Nur Mubarak 

Egypt University.31 Many religious fanatics take the 

words of high level officials, such as Kazakh President 

Nursultan Nazarbayev and twist their meaning. For 

example, Nazarbayev had said that “Our roots are 

Turkic, and our religion is Islam.”32 For many ardent 

followers, such a statement might be enough to assume that the Head of State is encouraging Kazakhs 

to take up the green banners of Islam.

As of December 2012, there were 2,228 mosques 

functioning in Kazakhstan that were re-registered by 

the Spiritual Directorate.33 There are only 10 madrasas functioning under the supervision of the Spiritual 

Directorate. According to national legislation, there 

are specially designated places (churches, mosques, 

and certain shop networks) where ordinary Kazakh 

citizens are able to obtain religious literature, including translations of the Koran. So unless it is illegally 
13

distributed, one cannot easily acquire even the Koran 

and other related books. It is a curious fact that in the 

Doctrine of National Unity of Kazakhstan (approved 

in April 2010), there is not even a single word mentioning Islam as the leading religion of the population. 

However, there are provisions in the field of interconfessional relations:

The unifying principle of religion, prevention of the 

negative impact of the religious factor on the state 

of interethnic relations should become an important 

direction of strengthening national unity. In order to 

achieve the goal it is necessary to:

• develop partnership between state and religious 

associations in order to develop interreligious dialogue and mutual understanding, strengthen the 

stability in society;

• provide cooperation and joint work of state bodies and religious associations in addressing such 

social objectives as strengthening moral societal 

guidelines; increasing role of the family; combating drug addiction, alcoholism, distribution of the 

youth crime, and homelessness;

• use spiritual values of traditional religions to 

strengthen moral fabric of society, enhancing religious literacy of population;

• execution of a systematic awareness raising activities with the public, especially with the youth, in 

order to counter the spread of extremism and radicalism;

• support nongovernmental organizations, whose 

activity is aimed at informing the population about 

pseudo-religious associations and providing psychological, legal, and judicial assistance to victims 

of these associations.

Due to the stated measures, religion should facilitate 

enhancement of a correct system of moral values, 

ideas of tolerance, unity, and harmony in society.34
14

State control has also tightened its grip by arranging the cuts in Kazakh students going abroad to study 

at theological institutions. In 2011, there were 500 such 

students. Afterwards, 130 students returned home 

after local authorities sent the relevant messages to 

the families. Today no Kazakh student can enroll in 

any Saudi Arabian institution without the formal approval of the Ministry of Education of Kazakhstan. 

The same scheme would also extend to other potential 

“suspicious” enrollments in countries such as Turkey, 

Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, and others.35

BANNED EXTREMIST GROUPS

State-level efforts to counter religious extremism 

as a possible breeding ground for terrorism are by no 

means new in Kazakhstan. The Law of the Republic 

of Kazakhstan “On Countering Extremism” (February 

18, 2005, No. 31) empowers the Supreme Court with 

the authority to designate organizations banned as 

either terrorist or extremist groups. This is set out in 

Article 8, sections 1-4, and depends on state security 

bodies furnishing the court with sufficient evidence 

against any organization for inclusion on such a list. It 

also recognizes the right to include groups banned by 

foreign states. Since then, the list of banned organizations has become a matter of public record.36 However, 

this simply formalized an already established practice 

to use the Supreme Court to ban such organizations.

On October 12, 2006, Kazakhstan’s Supreme Court 

approved a revised list of banned terrorist organizations in the country and Prosecutor-General Rashid 

Tusupbekov released the list. Astana banned the 

IMU, Hizb-ut-Tahrir al-Islami (HT), Jamaat of Central 

Asian Mujahedins, Islamic Party of Eastern Turkestan, 
15

Kurdistan Workers Party, Boz Kurt, Lashkar-e-Toiba, 

Social Reforms Society (Kuwait), Asbat-an-Asar (Israel), al-Qaeda, Taliban, and the Muslim Brotherhood 

(Egypt).37 Some of these groups were already banned 

in the country since 2004, and, indeed, were recognized internationally as terrorist organizations. Critics of the list said that the Muslim Brotherhood and 

Lashkar-e-Toiba did not operate in Kazakhstan on a 

level sufficient to justify their inclusion in the list of 

banned organizations. Saulebek Zhamkenuly, press 

secretary for the Prosecutor-General’s Office, said: 

It does not mean all these organizations are active 

in Kazakhstan. The decision to ban them is a preventive measure. These organizations are considered as 

terrorist in Russia, the US, Turkey, Uzbekistan and 

Pakistan.38

On November 17, 2006, the Supreme Court added 

an additional organization to this list; the East Turkestan Liberation Organization.39 By February 16, 2009, 

President Nazarbayev had signed into law a ban on 

206 items of religious literature.

It is worthwhile to trace briefly Kazakhstan’s Supreme Court decisions since it first announced a ban of 

four organizations on October 15, 2004. By March 2005, 

that list had grown to 11 organizations before reaching 13 in late-2006. Since then, this list has reached 16, 

with one group (HT) designated as extremist and the 

other 15 considered to be terrorist groups. The court of 

Atyrau on November 25, 2011, added the Soldiers of 

the Caliphate, and again it is important to understand 

this as a preventative measure.40
16

RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS IN THE 

REPUBLIC OF KAZAKHSTAN

Overall, 3,088 religious organizations representing 17 confessions were re-registered as of October 

25, 2012. Although the Law on Religion in October 

2011 provoked controversy, it also generated reliable 

statistics on the breakdown of religious organizations 

in the country, as shown in Figure 1. However, Western human rights-based critiques of this law actually 

overlook the fact that it serves as a major legal barrier 

to further radicalization of the country’s youth. This 

is based on the fact that the law bans religious tracts 

or religious activity without permission, and restricts 

it to designated places. In practical terms, someone 

trying to promote radical Islam cannot distribute their 

literature openly in the country’s shops or in areas 

where people gather in large numbers. This arguably drives the activity underground where, paradoxically, it is far easier to monitor, though there may 

be mistakes and underestimation concerning some 

individuals or groups.41

Nonetheless, the phenomenon of political Islam or 

radical Islamist groups operating within CA is neither 

new nor particularly dependent upon external influences. Such militant networks were present during the 

Soviet era such as Adolat (Justice), Tawba (Repentance), 

and Islam Lashkalari (Warriors of Islam), and scholars 

have linked their re-emergence in CA with the political reforms initiated in the 1980s.42 However, the acts 

of political violence in Kazakhstan in 2011-12 was a 

new experience for the country. Yet, these events 

need to be outlined and understood in their context 

before tracing how the authorities respond and draw 

conclusions as to the nature of this threat.
17

Source: www.din.gov.kz/eng/religioznyeobedineniya/?cid=0&rid=691.

Figure 1. Religious Organizations Re-registered 

as of October 25, 2012.

KAZAKHSTAN’S LIMITED EXPERIENCE OF 

POLITICAL VIOLENCE: 2011-12

Despite its closer defense and security cooperation with the United States and the North Atlantic 

Treaty Organization (NATO) following 9/11 and official claims to have prevented acts of terrorism on 

its territory, Kazakhstan had not been targeted successfully by international terrorist groups. Reports 

No. Confession/Denomination As of January 1, 2011 As of October 25, 2012.

1 Islam 2,811 2,229

2 Orthodoxy 304 280

3 Pentecostal Churches 400 189

4 Evangelical Christian-Baptist 364 100

5 Catholicism 118 79

6 Jehovah's Witnesses 70 59

7 Presbyterian Churches 229 55

8 Seventh-Day Adventists 67 42

9 Evangelical Lutheran Church 32 13

10 Methodists 18 11

11 New Apostolic Church 47 8

12 Krishnaism 14 8

13 Bahai 20 6

14 Judaism 26 4

15 Buddism 4 2

16 Church of Jesus Christ of 

Latter-day Saints (Mormons) 1 2

17 Mennonites 6 1

Total 4,531 3,088
18

on the activities of the Kazakhstani security services 

in the 1990s and 2000s frequently targeted members 

of Hizb-ut-Tahrir, while other groups known to be 

involved in terrorism were less prominent in the 

reported disruption activities of the state security 

agencies. This could sometimes prove to be contradictory. In 2004, for instance, the National Security 

Committee (Komitet Natsionalnoy Bezopasnosti or KNB) 

claimed that they had shut down the Jamaat of Central Asian Mujahedins (JCAM). However, in 2006, 

the KNB claimed to have disrupted a terrorist plot 

orchestrated by JCAM members.43

Detailed case studies of these incidents are necessary in order to further frame an understanding of the 

scale of this apparent outburst of violent activity in the 

country. This must also be analyzed in context: in 22 

years of independence, the country has experienced a 

series of violent incidents over only an 18-month period. As these events unfolded, the authorities were 

clearly taken by surprise, suggesting that the intelligence services and other security forces had little prior 

warning or detailed understanding as to the type of 

activists or perpetrators involved. This can be seen 

in the first responders at the scene (only later were 

KNB special forces deployed), as well as in some of 

the weaknesses in the “groups” involved in their use 

of violence. In other words, the authorities may have 

rushed to label many of these incidents as “terrorist,” 

when in fact they could be symptoms of other more 

credible explanations.

Its first experience of anything remotely resembling a terrorist incident occurred on May 17, 2011, in 

Aktobe. Rakhimzhan Makhatov, a 25-year-old, detonated a device, killing himself and wounding three 

others at the entrance of the local headquarters of the 
19

KNB. The suicide bomber had alleged links with an 

Islamic terrorist group. The incident was described as 

“an act of revenge (or protest) against the treatment 

of Islamic extremists in prison.” It has been reported 

that adherents of Wahhabism in Kazakhstan’s prisons 

had been tortured.44 On May 24, 2011, a car bombing 

occurred in the capital Astana, targeting a KNB detention facility; the only causalities were the two men 

inside the vehicle. 

Dmitry Kelpler, the owner of the vehicle, and “Ivan 

Cheremukhin” were both from the Pavlodar Province. 

According to the local Internal Troops of the Ministry 

for Internal Affairs (MVD), the latter’s passport was 

stolen, and his real identity was confirmed as Sergei 

Podkosov, a 34-year-old from the city of Pavlodar.45

Podkosov had a criminal record, and the authorities 

disclosed that he had converted to Islam a few years 

before the attack.46 No information was released on 

Kelpler, but the reference to the past criminal record 

and religion of the second individual held out a potential link to radical Islam. The authorities offered 

no official link to any known terrorist group. The two 

unrelated incidents in Aktobe and Astana were linked 

only by the KNB targets. 

As the authorities struggled to come to terms with 

the country’s first experience of suicide bombings, a 

fresh incident took place in the Aktobe Province between police and six suspects. On June 30, 2011, assailants shot two unarmed police officers in the village of Shubarshy in Aktobe Province. Police named 

six suspects between the ages of 22-43 (Kuanysh Alimbetov, Akylbek Mambetov, Toktarbek Mambetov, 

Bektemir Urazov, Miras Karazhanov, and Aybek 

Dzhumagazin), and offered a reward of $100,000 for 

information resulting in their capture. On July 2-3, 
20

the MVD launched a special operation to apprehend 

the suspects deploying Sunkar and Berkut special forces. The operation failed to detain any suspects and left 

one officer dead and three soldiers wounded. Shortly 

afterwards, a KNB Arlan special forces unit arrived to 

join the search. A joint operation was conducted near 

the village of Kenkiyak close to Shubarshy on July 8, 

killing nine and capturing two suspects and seizing 

a number of weapons. One soldier from one of the 

special forces units died in the operation.47 The only 

linkage between these incidents and radical Islam apparently relates to the discovery of radical literature in 

the trunk of a vehicle belonging to 22-year-old Talgat 

Shakanov arrested on June 28 for possession of unregistered weapons. This arrest resulted in associates of 

Shakanov retaliating by shooting the two policemen 

on June 30. The incidents appear less to do with radical Islam than with criminality, and the motive for the 

murder of the policemen was clearly revenge. First 

Deputy Interior Minister Marat Demeuov dismissed 

the assertion that Islamic radicalism was the cause: 

“For several years, the criminal group had been stealing oil from a pipeline using religious ideas as a cover.” Shakanov’s banned literature is the only possible 

link to radical Islamist ideology.48

Atryau, October 31, 2011: A Turning Point?

On October 31, 2011, two bombs exploded in 

Atyrau, resulting in the death of the bomber and 

damaging a regional government office as well as an 

apartment building. The first of these devices was 

placed in a garbage can near the local government office and resulted in blowing out some of its windows. 

The second, an apparently bungled effort, was first 
21

reported as a “suicide bombing,” damaging the apartment building adjacent to the prosecutor’s office.49 A 

previously unknown terrorist group Jund al-Khilafah

(Soldiers of the Caliphate, JK) claimed responsibility 

for the attacks. The same “group” had earlier released 

a video to protest a recently passed law on religion. 

Astana’s law on religion on October 13 had banned 

prayer in state buildings and unregistered religious 

activity in the country, and required previously registered religious groups to re-register. JK “members,” as 

such, claimed this was only a warning to the government and denied an intended suicide bombing. Yet, 

the existence of the group has remained a mystery—it 

may simply disguise a group of disaffected youths, 

though some sources suggest the group is tied to the 

Afghanistan-Pakistan border areas.50 To date, this is 

the only incident in Kazakhstan for which this alleged 

group claimed responsibility, and its dead “members” 

may in fact be its only real participants. The linkage between the incident and the claims about the existence 

of the group have never been established, though by 

late-November 2011, this “group” had been added to 

an officially banned list.

In fact, some Western analysts appear to take seriously the existence of JK, compared with more sober 

assessments by Kazakhstani analysts.51 This is based 

on claims as to the existence of the group largely rooted in videos posted online from August 2011 to December 2011. This narrative purports that the group 

“emerged with ties to Afghanistan and Pakistan.” It 

represents an attempt by Kazakh diaspora militants 

involved in fighting alongside the Taliban to unite under a Central Asian umbrella, but at best with unclear 

aspirations.52
22

Video evidence used to support such claims is less 

than convincing. At best, it may represent a number of 

ethnic Kazakhs who joined the Taliban insurgency in 

Afghanistan, but it by no means offers a clear ideology 

or explains what the “group” may have against the 

authorities in Astana. The JK video claimed it opposed 

the Law on Religion that was passed on October 11, 

2011, because the law was an attempt to prevent Muslim worship in places of work and other public buildings; professed that it banned the wearing of headscarves; accused the government of allegedly closing 

mosques; torturing Muslim prisoners in state prisons; 

and called for the overthrow of President Nazarbayev, 

following the violence at Zhanaozen where several civilians were killed. The latter actually had nothing to 

do with extremism or terrorism but resulted from a 

trade dispute and the over-reaction of security forces 

to public disorder.53

While the court of Atyrau rushed to add this group 

to the national list of banned extremist organizations 

by late-November 2011, Kazakhstani analyses of this 

alleged group has offered a more sober and questioning overview. Former Secretary of Nur Otan, Erlan 

Karin, also questioned the reality of JK: 

I am skeptical about the existence of so-called organization ‘Soldiers of the Caliphate.’ This organization 

has claimed responsibility for a series of terrorist attacks as in our country and in Afghanistan.54

French intelligence agencies had dismissed the 

possibility of the group as a real terrorist organization 

in one of its own investigations, as Karin adds, “this 

again suggests that the organization even if it exists, is 

more involved in PR for their brand, trying to create 
23

a specific request for information on their activities.”55

In Karin’s view, it remains too early to describe the 

events in Kazakhstan in 2011-12 as “terrorism.”56

SPECIFIC FEATURES OF ISLAMIC TERRORISM 

IN KAZAKHSTAN

One of the specifics of terrorism in Kazakhstan is 

that it is mostly the law enforcement agencies (KNB 

and MVD) that have been targeted.57 Another interesting feature is that there are no official statements or 

claims from the alleged terrorists committing crimes 

in Kazakhstan concerning their goals, interests, and 

other required information. There is virtually no opportunity for communication or interaction between 

the authorities and these alleged groups. 

Other Kazakh experts note that, mainly in 2011, 

terrorist acts committed in the country by “unprofessionals” stem from the socio-economic injustice and 

poverty of the general population. The violence is a 

demonstration of the protest against the state and official corrupt structures. Mainly Western Kazakhstan is 

blamed for harboring certain violent extremist ideas, 

even though the region is considered to be affluent because of its concentration of oil resources. The specific 

features of Western Kazakhstan are the high unemployment level, huge gap between salaries (between 

those who are employed at oil sites and other jobs), as 

well as its geographical closeness to Russia’s NC and 

the Karakalpakstan region of Uzbekistan, that tend 

to spread fundamentalist ideas.58 To counteract this, 

Karin argues that over the past 5-6 years, western and 

southern, as well as central and northern Kazakhstan 

have witnessed cases where extremists were detained 

for spreading extremist/terrorist literature and gathering groups for unlawful activities.59
24

Political Islam in CA is downplayed due to the absence of one centralized leader as well as any single 

leadership in each country.60 For example, Kazakh experts claim that small jamaats are scattered across the 

country, and their number and size of their membership are unknown. They have no center, nor a single 

Amir, no clear hierarchy or structure, as well as no 

logistical supply chain, as is the case in Afghanistan 

and the NC.61 Karin says that “Kazakh terrorist acts” 

do not originate from a single organization and seem 

to be badly planned. No one knows their objectives 

or what targets they would pursue in the future. He 

propagates strong analytical work in the area.62

Patterns of Violence.

Despite the widespread publicity generated by the 

attacks and the release of propaganda videos by JK, 

it is worth noting that this is the only incident clearly 

attributed to or claimed by this “group.” Moreover, 

the exact nature of the incident points more toward 

amateurism or inexperienced individuals rather than 

those functioning within a sub-state group, properly 

funded and trained for this type of activity; the damage to the target was low grade, suggesting a lack of 

expertise in the handling of explosives. 

Another instance of an individual accidently selfdetonating during a bomb making effort occurred in 

Atyrau on September 5, 2012. Seven days later, police 

and KNB members tried to arrest a number of suspects 

believed to be linked to the explosion. Four other suspects were arrested on September 7. In the clash with 

security forces that followed, five suspects were killed 

and one wounded, and one member of the security 

forces was wounded. Additional arrests followed this 
25

operation.63 On September 14-15, two men attacked 

and wounded a police post in the Isataya-Mamambeta 

square in Atyrau. Shortly after this incident, a group of 

men attacked the local MVD headquarters in Atyrau, 

throwing Molotov cocktails at the guards. Police and 

MVD Berkut special forces conducted an operation 

to detain the suspects involved in these incidents 

on September 21; all four suspects were killed in the 

operation.64

Indeed, this amateur theme carries through other 

incidents in the 2011-12 narrative of political violence 

in Kazakhstan. For example, on November 8, 2011, an 

unidentified assailant shot and killed two policemen 

as they stopped vehicles during a patrol of the Auezov 

district of Almaty. Police witnessed the suspect and 

an accomplice loading suspiciously large items into 

the trunk of a car. By November 12, police arrested the 

driver and three others, discovering small arms, automatic weapons, and ammunition at the residence involved; however, there was no reported discovery of 

Islamic extremist literature.65 In early-December 2011, 

in the village of Boralday on the northwest outskirts 

of Almaty, KNB Arystan special forces conducted an 

operation to apprehend several suspects allegedly 

involved in the shooting in Almaty on November 8. 

A weapons cache was discovered, but no religious 

literature was found.66

Incidents in Almaty in July 2012 appeared to follow 

this pattern. On July 11, an explosion occurred at a 

house in the village of Tausamaly (in the Almaty outskirts); the bodies of several people (including children) were found inside. A police search of the property reported finding weapons (AKS-74U and a few 

pistols), bomb making materials, police equipment 

(radios and traffic batons), as well as police and secu-
26

rity services uniforms, and, on this occasion, some religious literature. The explosion was thought to have 

been a bungled attempt at bomb making.67 On July 30, 

2012, MVD Sunkar special forces and police conducted 

an operation in the western part of Almaty to detain 

several suspects involved in killing two police officers 

on July 28. The operation led to an apartment building 

being evacuated and the area sealed off; after several 

hours the Sunkar unit stormed the building, killing six 

suspects and no other casualties were reported. Small 

arms, automatics weapons, and a “large amount” of 

ammunition were discovered, but no extremist publications. The dead suspects were not believed by the 

authorities to belong to any extremist group, but had 

all served time in prison for various offences.68

On August 17, 2012, a police rapid response unit 

carried out an operation in the Karasai District (Almaty Province, southwest of Almaty) to arrest a group of 

criminals reportedly linked to an explosion in Tausamaly on July 11. The building was stormed and nine 

people inside the house were killed, one of whom was 

reportedly a child.69

However, the KNB came under high-level criticism following such incidents. In July 2012, President 

Nursultan Nazarbayev called for “concrete measures” 

to counter extremists and terrorists operating in the 

country. Nazarbayev castigated the security forces 

for their “unprofessionalism,” and failing to prevent 

the explosion in the first place: “work is not done 

properly.” Nazarbayev stated that: 

As the president and guarantor of our constitution, 

I am not satisfied with the work of law enforcement 

agencies, particularly that of the KNB. The efforts we 

are making are not efficient enough.70
27

This critique of intelligence and security failure to 

detect and disrupt the initial incident in the Karasai 

district in the Almaty region on the previous day led 

Nazarbayev to castigate the KNB and draw a more 

general conclusion: “we are acting post factum all the 

time.”71

While many of these incidents may in fact be linked 

to criminal activity and bear no correlation to religious 

extremism or terrorism, there was also another category—the lone crazed gunman. On November 12, 2011, 

Maksat Kariev killed seven people in a series of attacks across the Taraz in Zhambyl Province (southern 

Kazakhstan). No connection was discovered between 

Kariev and extremist literature, though he reportedly 

had military experience.72

Some Kazakhstani security specialists believe that 

at its height, the radical underground in Western Kazakhstan numbered no more than 200, and JK, if it can 

be established to have existed rather than serving as 

an amorphous umbrella for the disaffected, may have 

constituted as little as five members. One analysis puts 

these extremists in a much wider context: 

Jihadist hiding in Kazakhstan represents the armed 

fundamentalist network organization, consisting of 

the Jamaats, poorly interacting with each other, but 

look to create a single network structure with a clear 

hierarchy. The purpose of the organization is the overthrow of existing regimes in Central Asia and the establishment of Sharia in the region of the state—the 

Central Asian Emirate. For example, Islam Tekushev, 

the Chief Editor of the Caucasus Times argues that 

armed jihadists of Kazakhstan are part of a wider extremist community whose aim is to establish a Central 

Asian Imarat, which will include parts of Uzbekistan, 

Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan.73
28

This structure interacts with terrorist organizations 

in the Middle East and NC. In the process of its formation, Kazakhstan’s underground at the same time 

draws on the principles of organizations of all these 

terrorist centers. This is due, first of all, to the geography of Kazakhstan, which was at the crossroads of 

ancient civilizations of the world; at the intersection of 

major transport arteries; and the economic, cultural, 

and ideological relations between East and West.74

According to the KNB, law enforcement agencies 

“failed to prevent 18 out of 53 extremist actions in 

2011–2012.” The KNB claims that in this period “35 

violent actions were averted,” and the activities of “42 

extremist groups were neutralized.” Among the “18 

violent extremist actions,” seven involved the use of 

explosives.75 Reflecting on and assessing the patterns 

and differences in these incidents of possible “terrorist” acts in Kazakhstan during 2011-12, it is possible to 

draw the following observations:

• These acts of violence were unconnected to 

each other and demonstrate no evidence of 

what might be construed as a coordinated 

campaign;

• It is unclear whether all of these events constitute terrorism, or stem from criminal activity;

• The targets of these attacks were KNB or government buildings and policemen;

• Only one incident resulted in a “group” claiming responsibility;

• The premature detonation of explosives does 

not imply a high-level of training on the part of 

the handlers;

• Many of the suspects in these incidents were 

later killed by security forces, though police 
29

had tried to talk to suspects before the storming 

of premises was authorized;76

• Although security operations frequently uncovered arms caches, not all cases resulted in 

finding banned religious publications;

• Motives for these crimes appear to be varied, but are inconsistent with known terrorist 

models of targeting the wider public;

• Though the security forces frequently suffered 

casualties during operations, the follow-up 

presence of special forces units minimized loss 

of life on the part of security personnel;

• There is no direct link between Islamic militants 

operating in the North Caucasus, Afghanistan, 

or elsewhere and these violent incidents in 

Kazakhstan.

Thus, although Kazakhstan experienced an upsurge in political violence in 2011-12, there appears to 

be no evidence to either support the idea that a professional and coordinated terrorist problem had emerged 

within the country or that this was directly linked to 

the insurgency in the NC. However, in terms of the 

security response to this new threat, it is clear that after the authorities were taken by surprise, and early 

operations were reactive and resulted in high rates of 

fatalities among both suspects and the security forces, 

a gradual transition occurred toward a softer interdiction-based approach.

In this context, it is also clear that the NC link to 

these fledgling groups or individuals was taken less 

seriously than were issues pertaining to Syria or Iraq. 

For example, on July 21, 2014, the district court in Shymkent, southern Kazakhstan, sentenced four members of an alleged terrorist group with Syrian links. 

Three of them, (A. Abdubaytov, S. Abdubaytov, and 
30

B. Bayzharkynov), were convicted of participating in 

the terrorist group’s activities or in preparing acts of 

terrorism, as well as in financing terrorist activities. 

These were sentenced to 8 to 9 years in prison. The 

group’s fourth member (M. Bekmurzayev) received a 

5-year prison sentence for “illegally acquiring, carrying, and storing firearms as a member of the group.” 

The four men were prosecuted for their activities from 

October 2011 to November 2013, and had also allegedly taken part in the group’s activities in Syria.77

Indeed, despite the high profile emergence of ISIL 

in Syria and Iraq, experts in Kazakhstan see no direct 

threat posed by the very small numbers of the country’s citizens allegedly involved. Almaty-based political scientist Rustam Burnashev believes the group 

poses only a threat within the Middle East, and sees 

this as mainly related to Syria and Iraq for the foreseeable future.78 Calls to participate in Jihad, therefore, 

will draw young disaffected youth to centers of conflict internationally, but while their numbers remain 

very small in Kazakhstan, the authorities believe the 

security threat to be low and certainly manageable.

STATE RESPONSES TO TERRORISM AND 

EXTREMISM, 2011-13

One clear pattern that emerged in the wake of 

these violent incidents in Kazakhstan in 2011-12 was 

the avoidance of an over-reaction on the part of the 

authorities; in other words, this did not result in passing draconian legislation or become an excuse for an 

indiscriminate crackdown. In this sense, legislation 

passed in the country dealing with religion, religious extremism, and terrorism must be viewed in a 

much wider evolutionary context since independence 

in 1991. 
31

Equally, the adjustments to national legislation in 

response to these events seem rooted in longer-term 

strategy and aim to deprive radicals of further easy 

inroads into radicalizing Kazakhstani youth. The legislative and security response to the violent acts in this 

period are therefore low key, and by no means represent a knee-jerk response or an attempt by the authorities to apportion blame wrongly.79

First, by drafting a revised law on terrorism, signed 

into law in January 2013, whereby international experience for combating terrorism was taken into consideration, the law emphasizes respect and protection of 

human rights in the state’s efforts to counter terrorism. The bill passed “On amendments and additions 

to legislative acts on combating terrorism” is a departure from traditional regional approaches to counter 

terrorism. Instead of placing the burden on the intelligence services and security forces alone, it expands 

its basis to connect with civil society. It enshrines in 

law a large-scale outreach, or information campaign, 

to explain to the Kazakhstani public the following key 

points: the dangers of terrorism, exposing its various 

forms and mechanisms, the methods used by terrorists to recruit and disseminate their ideology of political violence, and consequently offers the development 

of a “civic consciousness,” facilitating cooperation 

between the security forces and citizens to reduce the 

social basis of support for terrorism. It is this appeal to 

civil society to help combat terrorism that makes this 

law unique within CA.80

This envisages an information campaign to inform 

the public about the dangers of terrorism, and includes 

relevant contact with schools, colleges, and universities, and resulted in launching a website in December 

2012 dedicated to promoting awareness of the terror-
32

ist threat: www.counter-terror.kz. The 2013 Law on Terrorism, therefore, marks an important milestone in the 

country’s development by linking counterterrorism to 

respect for human rights. Moreover, the law allows 

the government to reach out to and co-opt civil society 

in an effort to reduce the scope of terrorist organizations, which seek to radicalize Kazakhstani society.81

By the fall of 2013, this was emerging more clearly 

as part of a far-reaching effort to stem the potential 

rise of domestic radicalism. On October 2, 2013, President Nazarbayev approved a state program on fighting religious extremism and terrorism for the period 

of 2013–17. Central and local government bodies will 

implement the program, while the then head of the 

presidential administration, Karim Masimov, would 

supervise its progress.

It involves the public in such preventative measures and in modernizing the informational work 

among “target groups.” Its key is raising awareness of 

the dangers of radical ideology while promoting education and informed discussion. One comment on the 

decree states: 

The program pays special attention to the attraction 

of the community to participate in the preventive 

work and modernization of communications and an 

awareness-raising campaigning focused on target 

groups. Most of the preventive measures set forth in 

the program will be implemented for the first time in 

Kazakhstan.82

These developments were also linked to the 

growing role of the Spiritual Directorate of Kazakhstan Muslims (SDKM), the main religious body in 

the country. Reportedly, the SDKM has launched a 

national program to promote traditional Islam. 
33

According to the country’s chief mufti, Yerzhan 

kazhy Malgazhyuly, the SDKM has formed six special groups to monitor the “religious situation” in the 

regions. Each group consists of five people: “skilled 

theologians and imams, who are well aware of the situation in the localities,” the mufti said. Malgazhyuly 

explained that these groups have worked over the past 

6 months among “people who need religious enlightenment,” including convicts, adding, “Work is also 

under way among the youth to prevent the spread of 

destructive movements and to explain the traditional 

religious values.” Indeed, the cleric claims that the 

campaign to date has persuaded “92 people” to quit the 

Salafi movement and return to traditional Islam. The 

groups visited 62 towns, 122 districts, 33 settlements, 

200 higher and secondary educational establishments, 

and 1,500 schools; most are located in the Western region of Kazakhstan—the area most prone to religious 

extremism.83

POLICY IMPLICATIONS

Astana’s reported initiatives and its references 

to the counterterrorism and anti-extremism strategy 

for 2013–17, allow a number of observations about 

the state’s wider security policy. In particular, efforts 

aimed at avoiding future radicalization of the country’s youth focuses on using the law, co-opting the 

public into the process, improving religious education, 

and offering warnings about the dangers of radical 

ideologies. In other words, the security response has 

matured to include a range of preventative measures 

aimed at curbing problems in their early stages. Such 

measures, moreover, also include a public information campaign. One striking feature in these efforts is 
34

the campaign to promote traditional Islam, something 

the government has largely shied away from backing 

in the past. Kazakhstan views these campaigns as necessary to avoid the radicalization of its young people 

over the long term and within the domestic framework; and its policymakers appear to understand that 

education will play a major prophylactic role in this 

endeavor.

Clearly, given its unexpected experience of the series of violent acts in 2011-12 including suicide bombings, the state structures in Kazakhstan have gone 

through a learning period. It is striking that, since 

these events, the country has experienced no similar 

incidents. This could imply that the movement or its 

triggers have simply burned out, but it is more likely 

that the absence of such outbreaks of violence is rooted 

in a number of factors ranging from legal approaches 

to improved standards of surveillance, detection, and 

disruption. This is borne out by reference to a case 

prosecuted in the criminal court in Atyrau Region in 

September 2013. The court successfully prosecuted 

nine Salifists on grounds of promoting terrorism, 

inciting acts of political violence, conspiring to commit terrorist acts, and involvement in arms supplies 

and production; these individuals received prison 

sentences ranging from 6 to 14 years.84 But while a 

learning curve was involved in improving state responses to the existence of such individuals or groups, 

there were also, as this article argues, a number of 

much deeper impediments to the radicalization of 

Kazakhstani youth.

Nonetheless, risks remain as Kazakhstan’s younger 

generation who were born in the immediate aftermath 

of the Soviet Union’s collapse are now over 20 years 

old. Furthermore, they experienced an ideological 
35

vacuum, together with increasingly poor quality education and all pervasive corruption which might entail 

some unexpected results for the authorities in the future. For example, there are 12 percent to 15 percent 

unemployed and 2.5 million to 2.7 million self-employed in Kazakhstan, which could become a potential 

nourishing ground for extremists.85

• Islam, as it is perceived in the Middle East/

Arab countries, has not embedded itself in Kazakhstan, either in the pre-Soviet Union era or 

the present day.

• Countries such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Qatar, 

and Turkey each have clear interests in establishing their own Islamic traditions and integrating the Kazakhstani population deeper 

into Ummah. They fund the construction of 

mosques; finance students to study Islam in 

their countries; and in some cases, dispatch their 

preachers to preach in Kazakh mosques. Due to 

their constant presence and regular funding, it 

is possible that certain portions of the Kazakhstani population may become influenced by 

these countries on how they perceive a traditional Muslim, which would contradict the normal lifestyle of an average Kazakhstani citizen. 

The United States should closely observe and 

monitor the activities of these countries, both 

in Kazakhstan and within other Central Asian 

countries, with regards to further religious 

infiltration.

• It is important to understand that the Kazakhstani population in general cannot read the 

Koran in Arabic, and the preaching in Mosques 

occur either in the Russian or Kazakh languages, which leaves scope for a degree of manipulation and misreading by interested parties.
36

• The Hadj, as well as fasting, has become fashionable among the population, many of whom 

may not fully understand its religious and spiritual meaning. Thus, one should be careful to 

avoid comparing Kazakhstani pilgrims in Mecca to those from Kuwait or Oman, for example.

• There is a certain degree of Islamic revival taking place within a specific strata of the population, mainly the youth. Thus, Kazakhstan’s 

population is becoming more Islamicized but 

not radicalized, and the distinction should always be kept in mind.

• Kazakhstan’s experience of domestic public 

violence in 2011-12 is unlikely to represent a 

manifestation of domestic or internationally 

orchestrated acts of terrorism, but the security 

forces’ response reveals institutional weaknesses which can be corrected on the basis of tailoring specific U.S. security assistance programs 

to address these issues.

• Kazakhstan has no durable and long standing links with NC Islamists; most of these assumptions are merely based upon geographical 

proximity of the latter to Western Kazakhstan. 

Another important point: when Russia claims 

that Kazakhstanis are among NC terrorists, 

they are usually ethnic Chechens, Dagestanis, 

or Ingush who managed to obtain Kazakhstani 

passports.

• An important weakness in the security response to many of these acts of public violence 

relates to first responders. That is to say, when 

the initial incidents occurred and the police 

and other units arrived on the scene, these sustained the bulk of the authorities’ casualties. 
37

Once specialist and other elite units were deployed the suspects/perpetrators were quickly 

eliminated. However, these units are not typically subordinated to the defense ministry, but 

function under the KNB or the interior ministry. As a result, U.S. security assistance needs 

to be matched to the needs of the end user and 

avoid assuming that a military response in Kazakhstan to a domestic incident is restricted to 

defense ministry forces or its elite units.

• First responders in Kazakhstan in a suspected 

act of terrorism or public violence caused by 

criminal groups need better training and access 

to fire support and coordination with other 

ministries; such gaps in the U.S. training and 

assistance offered to Kazakhstan must be addressed if this is to be easily remedied in the future. In practical terms, this involves the United 

States sharing its experience on how its own 

counterterrorist responses operate, with the 

central point being that specialists need to be 

involved at the outset, with local police playing 

only a supporting role.

• Prisons can serve as recruitment grounds for Islamic militants in Kazakhstan; thus the United 

States should consider offering assistance and 

training to address this, if such experience is 

requested by the Kazakh government.

• Since 9/11, Kazakhstan, among other states in 

CS, has proved to be a reliable partner in the 

War on Terror and a keen supporter of operations in Afghanistan. In light of the advances 

and security threats posed in the Middle East 

and elsewhere by ISIS and the reported involvement of Central Asian fighters including 
38

those from Kazakhstan, it will be even more 

important to continue such security cooperation. Yet, this has to extend into deepening bilateral intelligence cooperation and offering 

access to training and development programs 

geared toward enhancing and fostering the 

domestic intelligence and threat assessment 

capabilities of Kazakhstan.

• At the heart of further developing U.S. security 

cooperation with Kazakhstan, based not only 

on the findings of this monograph, there needs 

to be a greater effort to build a common security language to reach an agreement of how 

“terrorism” should be defined in order to better 

support local capacities.

• The radicalization of Kazakhstani youth, with 

growing numbers joining ISIS, the Taliban, and 

other Islamic terrorist organizations, is currently extremely sensitive for the government and 

the leadership of the country, and will probably 

remain so in the future. The authorities provide 

little, if no, information to the population concerning the ongoing involvement of Kazakhstani fighters in Iraq and Syria. Consequently, 

publicly available information is scarce. When 

holding discussions with their Kazakhstani 

counterparts, U.S. officials should handle such 

conversations with great caution and vigilance. 

At this stage, it is highly unlikely that Astana will be willing to share serious information concerning Kazakhstani fighters with its 

foreign partners.
39

This analysis has sought to assess soberly Kazakhstan’s evolving security environment in the context 

of concerns over Islamic radicalization, and has highlighted a number of the barriers in the path of those 

seeking recruits and to make headway in destabilizing 

the country.

As this analysis demonstrates, the level of security 

risk in Kazakhstan stemming from Islamic radicalization is mitigated by a large number of historical, 

cultural, and recent legislative factors. These include 

the fact that Kazakh identity has not been principally 

shaped by Islam, which is reflected in the constitutional status as a secular country; the level of understanding traditional Islam in the country is open to question; Kazakh Muslims are mainly unable to read in 

Arabic; anyone pursuing a level of genuine interest in 

Islam will stand out in Kazakh society as its customs, 

traditions, and family values do not assimilate these 

theological precepts into daily life; imams teach in the 

Kazakh language which compels Russian language 

speakers to depend on assistance; legislation on religion and extremism more clearly sets the barriers, rendering the work of radicals easier to target, assess, or 

limit; the population distrusts the official clergy; and, 

finally, the instances of public violence in Kazakhstan 

in 2011-12 were more likely to be linked to local criminality than to international or domestically inspired 

terrorism. Indeed, the claims made by the criminal 

culprits perpetrating such violent crimes, namely that 

they found inspiration in international terrorist movements, only served as a veneer for their own grievances; these sporadic acts of violence therefore had little 

to do with Kazakhstan experiencing a wave of genuine 

terrorist acts.
40

ENDNOTES

1. Nurlan Ayupov, as an open worldview, Almaty, 

Kazakhistan, 2012.

2. Kanat Nurov, “Kazakhstan: National Ideas and 

Traditions,” Vox populi, Almaty, Kazakhistan, 2011.

3. Nazira Nurtazina, “Fight with the Islam,” Almaty, 

Kazakhistan, 2008, p. 29.

4. Evgenii Pastukhov, “What Radical Islamists Want?” 

TsentrAsii, July-August 2012, pp. 16-35.

5. “Top Kazakh Muslim Cleric Raps Tough Religion Law,” 

London, UK: Thomson Reuters Foundation, September 30, 2011, 

available from www.trust.org/item/?map=top-kazakh-muslim-clericraps-tough-religion-law.

6. See www.kazakhstan.orexca.com/rus/religions_kazakhstan.

shtml.

7. Agency of Religious Affairs, Almaty, Kazakhstan,

 available from blogs.egov.kz/ru/blogs/lama_sharif_k/questions/.

8. See mojazarplata.kz/main/kz-news/v-kazahstane-srednjajazarplata-v-marte-2013-uvelichilasq-na-10-122-tenge.

9. Dr. Saniya Edelbay, “Traditional Kazakh Culture and Islam,” International Journal of Business and Social Science, Vol. 3, No. 

11, June 2012.

10. See tengrinews.kz/kazakhstan_news/ekspert-islamofobiya-vkazahstane-eto-ne-boyazn-islama-202165.

11. Pastukhov, pp. 16-35.

12. Ayupov.

13. Ibid.
41

14. See www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2014/07/21/jury-resumes-deliberations-trial-azamat-tazhayakov-friend-boston-marathon-bombingsuspect-dzhokhar-tsarnaev/6H1OxaskP38B3v15ryzvPJ/story.html.

15.Jacob Zenn, “Kazakhstan Struggles to Contain Salafist-Inspired Terrorism,” European Dialogue, available from eurodialogue.

org/Kazakhstan-Struggles-to-Contain-Salafist-Inspired-Terrorism. 

16. Interviews with Kazakh small and medium sized 

enterprises (SMEs), Almaty, Kazakhistan, September 2013.

17. Zenn, “Kazakhstan Struggles to Contain Salafist-Inspired 

Terrorism.”

18. Dr. Saniya Edelbay, “The Islamic Situation in Kazakhstan,” International Journal of Humanities and Social Science, Vol. 2, 

No. 21, November 2012.

19. Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Country 

Reports: South and Central Asia Overview, May 30, 2013, available 

from www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2012/209983.htm.

20. Ibid.

21. Interviews with SMEs, Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, May 2013.

22. Anastasia Mitrofanova, “Radical Islam in Central Asia 

and Russia’s interests,” Observer, No. 12, 2008, pp. 83-90, available 

from www.observer.materik.ru/observer/N12_2008/083_090.pdf. 

23. Ibid.

24. Akimbekov Sultan, Afghan Knot and Central Asia’s Security 

Issues, Almaty, Kazakhstan, 2003.

25. See sayasat.org/articles/953-kazahstan-na-puti-v-horasan.

26. Maria Elisabeth Louw, Everyday Islam in Post-Soviet Central 

Asia, Abington, Oxon, UK: Routledge, 2007.

27. Country Reports: South and Central Asia Overview, available 

from www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2012/209983.htm.
42

28. See zonakz.net/articles/40574.

29. See blogs.egov.kz/ru/blogs/lama_sharif_k/questions/214256.

30. See blogs.egov.kz/ru/blogs/lama_sharif_k/questions/178822.

31. See blogs.egov.kz/ru/blogs/lama_sharif_k/questions/201390.

32. See blogs.egov.kz/ru/blogs/lama_sharif_k/questions/178822.

33. Agency of Religious Affairs, available from blogs.egov.kz/

ru/blogs/lama_sharif_k/questions/175812.

34. The Doctrine of National Unity of Kazakhstan, Almaty, 

Kazakhstan, April 2010.

35. Nearly 400 Kazakh students study at Arab religious universities, Interfax-Kazakhstan, June 17, Astana, available from 

www.interfax.kz/?lang=eng&int_id=expert_opinions&news_id=1575.

36. “Bulletin of the Parliament of the Republic of Kazakhstan,” 2005, No. 5, p. 3; Kazakhstan Today, February 26, 2005.

37. “Kazakhstan Updates List Of Banned Terrorist Groups,” 

RFE/RL, October 12, 2006.

38. Authors’ emphasis; the decision to include a certain group 

or groups on the list can be merely preventative. See stop-sekta.kz/

index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=72:2010-05-31-09-

23-03&catid=52:2010-05-31-09-11-57&Itemid=76.

39. Ibid.; “Kazakhstan: Government Moves to Add Hizb UtTahrir to List of Terror Groups,” RFE/RL, March 18, 2005; “Uyghur Group Added to Kazakh Terror List,” RFE/RL, November 

17, 2006.

40. See www.saryarka.astana.kz/ru/node/42548; www.din.gov.

kz/rus/religioznye_obedineniya/?cid=0&rid=596.

41. See www.din.gov.kz/eng/religioznyeobedineniya/?cid=0&r

id=691.
43

42. Vitaly N. Naumkin, Radical Islam in Central Asia: Between 

Pen and Rifle, New York: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 

2005, p. 61.

43. “Kazakhs Reportedly Break Up Terrorist Group,” RFE/RL, 

December 27, 2006; Daniel Kimmage, “Analysis: Kazakh Breakthrough on Uzbek Terror Case,” RFE/RL, November 15, 2004. 

44. See www.inform.kz/rus/article/2380570; www.whitekat.ru/

countryday/2408-trevojnoe-utro.html; megapolis.kz/art/Eto_ne_terakti

_a_publichniy_suitsid_popitka_virazit_protest.

45. See tengrinews.kz/kazakhstan_news/188653; tengrinews.kz/

kazakhstan_news/189432/.

46. See www.np.kz/index.php?newsid=9132.

47. See tengrinews.kz/crime/191836; tengrinews.kz/crime/191942.

48. See www.time.kz/index.php?module=news&newsid=22632.

49. See www.azh.kz/news/view/7677; www.azh.kz/news/view/7678.

50. “Islamist Group Threatens Kazakhstan over Religion 

Law,” Reuters, October 26, 2011, available from af.reuters.com/

article/egyptNews/idAFL5E7LQ06P20111026?pageNumber=1&

virtualBrandChannel=0;www.time.kz/index.php?module=news&

newsid=24290.

51. Jacob Zenn, “On the Eve of 2014: Islam in Central Asia,”

Current Trends, June 2013, available from www.currenttrends.org/

research/detail/on-the-eve-of-2014-islamism-in-central-asia.

52. Ibid.

53. Minbar Media, “Commenting on the Recent Speech 

From President Nazarbayev,” November 16, 2011; Statement of 

Jund al-Khilafa regarding the events of Zhanaozen, “Overthrow 

the Tyrant,” December 18, 2011, available from www.youtube.

com/watch?v=tBy0CBFKyxA; “Message from the Mujahideen 

of Kazakhstan Nazarbayev Regime to Murtadskomu,” October 26, 2011, available from www.dailymotion.com/video/xly24k_
44

yyyyyyyyy-yyyyyyyyyy-yyyyyyyyyy_news#from=embediframe; Jund 

al-Khilafah, “Yusef al-Faransi as I Knew Him, Penned by ‘Abu 

Qaqa al-Andalusi’,” Flashpoint Partners, available from azelin.files.

wordpress.com/2012/04/abc5ab-al-qaqc481-al-andalusc4ab-22yc5absuf-al-fransc4ab-mue1b8a5ammad-mirc481e1b8a5-merah-as-i-knewhim22-en.pdf.

54. See www.regnum.ru/news/1524082.html # ixzz2hEPeKP00.

55. Ibid.

56. See www.zakon.kz/4457462-erlan-karin-v-borbe-s-jekstremizmom.html.

57. Marat Shibutov and Vyacheslav Abramov, “Terrorism 

in Kazakhstan: 2011-2012,” Security 2013: Trends, Risks and Scenarios Round Table, Almaty, Kazakhstan: Institute of Political 

Solutions, November 27, 2012.

58. See www.caucasustimes.com/article.asp?id=21146.

59. See abai.kz/content/erlan-karin-politolog-nam-neobkhodimoeshche-bolshe-podderzhat-pravookhranitelnye-organy-i-e.

60. Alexey Malashenko, “Islam i politika v gosudarstvah Tsentralnoi Asiii” (“Islam and Politics in Central Asian Countries”), 

Central Asia and Caucasus, No. 5, 1999.

61. See www.caucasustimes.com/article.asp?id=21146.

62. See www.regnum.ru/news/1575804.html.

63. See www.respublika-kz.info/news/doslovno/25260/; megapolis.

kz/art/Strelba_v_Kulsari; www.azh.kz/ru/news/view/11620.

64. See www.azh.kz/ru/news/view/11756; www.azh.kz/ru/news/

view/11760.

65. See www.caravan.kz/article/37979.

66. The unit used grenades and sniper fire to eliminate 

all five men inside the house. Two members of the Arystan 
45

unit were killed during the operation. See www.time.kz/index.

php?module=news&newsid=24849; tengrinews.kz/kazakhstan_news/

203042/.

67. See www.respublika-kz.info/news/doslovno/23910/; megapolis.

kz/art/Formennoe_bezobrazie-2012_07_22.

68. See www.respublika-kz.info/news/doslovno/24264/; www.

respublika-kz.info/news/doslovno/24319; megapolis.kz/art/Formennoe_

bezobrazie-2012_07_22.

69. See megapolis.kz/art/Genprokuratura_narushila_molchanie; 

Kazinform, available from August 17, 2012, www.inform.kz/rus/

article/2487720.

70. See Interfax, February 6, 2013.

71. Ibid.

72. This began at a hunting store, with an employee and a 

bystander shot and killed. Later Kariev shot two members of the 

Zhambyl KNB who were pursuing him. Shortly afterwards, he 

shot and killed two policemen. Kariev then fired a shot from a 

rocket-propelled grenade launcher through the window of a KNB 

building, and shot and wounded two more policemen, before 

being wrestled to the ground by another as he tried to throw a 

grenade. The ensuing explosion killed both men. “Tengri News, 

November 13, 2011, available from tengrinews.kz/kazakhstan_

news/201415/.

73. Ibid.

74. See www.caucasustimes.com/article.asp?id=21146.

75. See Interfax, February 6, 2013.

76. See www.ia-centr.ru/expert/14050/.

77. “Kazakhstan Jails Syria-Linked ‘Terrorist Group’,” Interfax-Kazakhstan, July 21, 2014.
46

78. See sayasat.org/articles/953-kazahstan-na-puti-v-horasan, July 

4, 2014; www.altyn-orda.kz/chem-obernetsya-dlya-kazaxstana-konfliktv-sirii/, September 4, 2013; www.altyn-orda.kz/boevik-prizval-kdzhixadu-v-sirii-na-kazaxskom-yazyke/, July 18, 2013.

79. In November 2012, Amanbek Mukashev, Senior Fellow of 

the National Center for Culture and Religions with the Religious 

Affairs Agency, publicly opposed banning the radical Islamist 

Salafiyya movement in Kazakhstan, saying there was no need for 

an official ban since its members would most likely avoid seeking registration. “There are only about 20 Salafi mosques left in 

Kazakhstan, but the followers of the teaching also attend other 

mosques.” In his view, the best way to combat this and other 

manifestations of radical Islam is to raise awareness of traditional 

Islam. “Ban on Salafiyya Movement in Kazakhstan Unreasonable: 

Expert,” Interfax-Kazakhstan, November 8, 2012.

80. See www.zakon.kz/4532801-kazakhstan-vedet-aktivnuju-borbu-protiv.html.

81. See www.counter-terror.kz.

82. See Tengri News, October 2, 2013.

83. See Interfax, October 2, 2013.

84. “Members of Banned Islamic Group Get Long Prison 

Terms in Kazakh West,” Interfax-Kazakhstan, September 10, 2013.

85. See zonakz.net/articles/40574.
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General William E. Rapp

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

and

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE PRESS

Director

Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Director of Research

Dr. Steven K. Metz

Authors

Ms. Zhulduz Baizakova

Mr. Roger N. McDermott

Editor for Production

Dr. James G. Pierce

Publications Assistant

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

*****

Composition

Mrs. Jennifer E. Nevil