United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 97-3572

 

Michael C. Liddell, a minor, by *

Minnie Liddell, his mother and next *

friend; Kendra Liddell, a minor, *

by Minnie Liddell, her mother and next *

friend; Minnie Liddell; Roderick D. *

LeGrand, a minor, by Lois LeGrand, *

his mother and next friend; Lois *

LeGrand; Clodis Yarber, a minor, by *

Samuel Yarber, his father and next * Appeal from the United

States

friend; Samuel Yarber; Earline Caldwell; * District Court for the

Lillie Caldwell; Gwendolyn Daniels; * Eastern District of

Missouri.

National Association for the *

Advancement of Colored People; *

United States of America; *

*

Plaintiffs-Appellees; *

*

City of St. Louis; *

*

 Plaintiff; *

*

v. *

 * 

The Board of Education of the City of *

St. Louis; Hattie R. Jackson, President, *

Board of Education of the City of St. *

Louis; Rev. Earl E. Nance, Jr., a *

member of the Board of Education of *

the City of St. Louis; Renni B. Shuter, *
2

a member of the Board of Education; *

of the City of St. Louis; Paula V. *

Smith, a member of the Board of Educa- *

tion of the City of St. Louis; Dr. Albert *

D. Bender, Sr., a member of the Board *

of Education of the City of St. Louis; *

Eddie G. Davis, a member of the Board *

of Education of the City of St. Louis; *

Dr. John P. Mahoney, a member of the *

Board of Education of the City of St. *

Louis; Marybeth McBryan, a member *

of the Board of Education of the City *

of St. Louis; Thomas M. Nolan, a *

member of the Board of Education of *

the City of St. Louis; William Purdy, a *

member of the Board of Education of *

the City of St. Louis; Robbyn G. Wahby, *

a member of the Board of Education of *

the City of St. Louis; Madye Henson *

Whithead, a member of the Board of *

Education of the City of St. Louis; *

Dr. Cleveland Hammonds, Jr., Super- *

intendent of Schools for the City of St. *

Louis; *

*

 Defendants-Appellees;*

*

Ronald Leggett, St. Louis Collector of *

Revenue; *

 Defendant; *

*

State of Missouri; Mel Carnahan, *

Governor of the State of Missouri; *

Jeremiah (Jay) W. Nixon, Attorney *

General; Bob Holden, Treasurer; *

Richard A. Hanson, Commissioner of *

Administration; Robert E. Bartman, *
3

Commissioner of Education; Missouri *

State Board of Education, and its *

members; Thomas R. Davis; *

Sharon M. Williams; Peter F. *

Herschend; Jacqueline D. Wellington; *

Betty E. Preston; Russell V. Thompson; *

Rice Pete Burns; William Kahn; *

*

 Defendants-Appellants;*

*

Special School District of St. Louis *

County; Affton Board of Education; *

Bayless Board of Education; Brentwood *

Board of Education; Clayton Board of *

Education; Ferguson-Florissant Board *

of Education; Hancock Place Board of *

Education; Hazelwood Board of *

Education; Jennings Board of Education; *

Kirkwood Board of Education; LaDue *

Board of Education; Lindbergh Board of *

Education; Maplewood-Richmond *

Heights Board of Education; Mehlville *

Board of Education; Normandy Board *

of Education; Parkway Board of *

Education; Pattonville Board of Educa- *

tion; Ritenour Board of Education; *

Riverview Gardens Board of Education; *

Rockwood Board of Education; *

University City Board of Education; *

Valley Park Board of Education; *

Webster Groves Board of Education; *

Wellston Board of Education; *

*

 Defendants-Appellees;*

*
4

St. Louis County; Buzz Westfall, County *

Executive; James Baker, Director of *

Administration, St. Louis County, *

Missouri; Robert H. Peterson, Collector *

of St. Louis County "Contract Account," *

St. Louis County, Missouri;The St. *

Louis Career Education District; *

*

 Defendants; *

*

St. Louis Teachers' Union, Local 420, *

AFT, AFL-CIO; *

*

 Intervenor Below. *

 

Submitted: February 25, 1998

 Filed: April 28, 1998 

 

Before MCMILLIAN, HEANEY, and FAGG, Circuit Judges.

 

HEANEY, Circuit Judge.

The State of Missouri (State) appeals from the district court&s July 22, 1997

order requiring the State to pay the Special School District (SSD) the costs of providing

special education services to city voluntary interdistrict transfer students between 1985

and 1996, and ordering the parties to resolve by September 19, 1997, any differences

regarding the method for calculating the amounts due. We affirm in part, and reverse

and remand in part.
5

In September 1983, the SSD, the Board of Education of the City of St. Louis

(City Board), the United States, and the Liddell and Caldwell plaintiffs, entered into an

agreement and submitted a proposed plan to settle claims relating to special education

services arising from the pending desegregation litigation. In 1985, following a fairness

hearing, the district court approved the special education plan. The plan addressed,

inter alia, education services for Phase I students--students with mild disabilities who

receive itinerant and resource classroom special education services and who spend less

than 50% of their instructional time in self-contained special education classes. Under

the plan, the SSD was to provide necessary special education services to Phase I

students who transfer to suburban school districts from the city under the voluntary

interdistrict transfer plan. The plan required the State to reimburse the SSD for the per

pupil costs of providing these services. In approving the plan, the district court ordered

the State to pay the reasonable, actual unreimbursed costs of implementing the

approved plan, including unreimbursed per pupil costs, certain administrative costs, and

transportation. Additionally, the per pupil reimbursement was to be determined by

averaging the costs directly attributable to Phase I students. In other words, the direct

costs of the teacher, classroom rental, and direct supervisory time attributed to Phase

I students would be charged to the State. 

In March 1995, the SSD requested that the State reimburse it for $7,425,000 in

costs for providing special education services to Phase I transfer students for the 1994-

95 school year. The SSD indicated that in prior years, the SSD had chosen to forego

State reimbursement for Phase I costs, but that, because of an increase in the number

of voluntary transfer students being serviced by the SSD and its severe budget

problems, the SSD was seeking reimbursement. The SSD also estimated that the

State&s obligations for the 1995-96 school year would be a similar amount. The district

court did not rule on this request. In May 1996, the SSD supplemented its request to

include costs for the school years from 1986 through 1996. Again, no action was

taken.
6

In November 1996, the SSD filed a motion with the district court seeking State

reimbursement for the school years from 1985-86 through 1996-97, or alternatively for

release from the special education plan. The SSD indicated that it and the State had

agreed on the methodology for calculating the costs for the 1994-95 school year, and the

SSD sought an opportunity to reach an agreement with the State on the calculations for

the other years. The State opposed the motion, arguing, inter alia, that the doctrines of

waiver and laches barred the SSD&s request for the years before 1994, and that the

SSD&s request for diagnostic, screening, and evaluation costs were not reimbursable. 

The district court granted the SSD&s motion for reimbursement. The court

concluded that waiver or laches did not apply. Accordingly, the district court ordered

the State to resolve its differences about the method for calculating the amounts due by

September 19, 1997. SSD submitted its position statement showing an amount due of

$27,113,177, and with interest, $39,976,542. 

On appeal, the State reiterates its arguments that it is not obligated to continue

funding because there is no interdistrict violation under Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S.

70 (1995), unitary status has been achieved, and there are no longer victims of de jure

violation. We reject the State&s renewed objections to its general funding obligations for

the reasons stated in Liddell v. Board of Education, 126 F.3d 1049, 1055-59 (8th Cir.

1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1164 (1998). We decline to reconsider that decision.

We agree with the State and the City Board that the SSD&s ten-year delay in

seeking reimbursement and its 1994 declaration that it had previously chosen to forego

reimbursement for Phase I costs before the 1994-95 school year constitutes an express

waiver of its right to receive these costs before 1994. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S.

458, 464 (1938) (waiver is intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right).

In addition, we conclude that the doctrine of laches also applies here to avoid
7

unfairness resulting from the prosecution of stale claims. See Goodman v. McDonnell

Douglas Corp., 606 F.2d 800, 805 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 913 (1980).

To prove laches, courts look to whether the delay in exercising a right is unreasonable

and unexcused and whether the delay results in prejudice for the defendant. See id. at

804. We conclude that SSD has not adequately explained the ten-year delay in seeking

reimbursement, and that the paucity of records hinders the State&s ability to retroactively

apply the complex reimbursement formula.

We also agree with the State that diagnostic, screening, and evaluation costs are

not reimbursable under the special education plan. We understand from counsel at oral

argument that these diagnostic costs for the school years beginning 1994-95 have been

quantified, and that the parties have reached an agreement as to the methodology for

computing other reimbursable costs for the years after 1994-95. We trust that the parties

will come to a resolution of the amounts in issue without further court intervention. We

note that the State is not obligated to pay interest on the reimbursable costs.

Accordingly, we reverse the district court&s order requiring the State to pay the

SSD for all reimbursable costs from 1986 through the 1993-94 school year, and remand

for a determination of reimbursable costs under the special education plan, minus

diagnostic, screening, and evaluation costs, beginning from the 1994-95 school year

through the 1996-97 school year.

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.