AUSTIN. TEXAS 78711

June23., 1977

Honorable Henry Wade DistrictAttorney Opinion No. H-1019 DallasCounty Government Center Re: Whether a county may Dallas, Texas 75202 pave a city parking lot.
DearMr. Wade:
You have requested our opinion regarding whether Dallas Countymay, pursuant to the Interlocal Cooperation Act, article 4413(32c), V.T.C.S., enter into a contract topave aparking lotowned by amunicipality or an independent school district. That statute, after defining "local government" to include, inter*, any county, municipality or school district, authorizes any local government to

contract or agree with one ormore local governments toperform governmental functions and services under terms of this Act. V.T.C.S. art. 4413(32c), S 4(a). Section 4(b) of article 4413(32c) requires that any governmental function or service performed be one

which all parties to the contract are legally authorized toperform.
. . . Inour opinion, this provision means that Dallas County is authorized topave a school district or amunicipal parking lot ifDallas County possesses any authority topave parking lots. SeeAttorney General Opinion H-28 (1973). Counties of 150,000 ormore are empowered to construct, equipand operate "aparking station adjacent toor near the courthouse of the county." V.T.C.S. art. 2372s-2, 9 2. See alsoarticles 2372s, 2372s-1, V.T.C.S. Counties of 500,000 ormoremay construct, equip and operate "parking stations inthevicinity of
. . .coliseums and auditoriums." V.T.C.S. art. 2372d-4.Honorable Henry Wade -page 2 (H-1019)

More significantly, the authority to construct, maintain and operate parking lotsmay be inferred as an incident to other, more specific county powers. In County of Cameron v. Wilson, 326 S.W.2d 162 (Tex. 1959), the Supreme Court construed article 6079c, V.T.C.S., bywhich certain counties were authorized to establish andmaintain public parks. The Court held that

[alsan incident thereto
. . . [thecounty1 may . . .provide parking space formotor vehicles.
. . . 326 S.W.Zd at 167. In our opinion, therefore, there is ample authority by which to conclude that Dallas County possesses the authority topave aparking lot, either byvirtue of a particular statute, such as article 2372s-2, or as an incident toanother county power, as inCounty of Cameron v. Wilson. See also Attorney General Opinion H-45 (1973). If

-- a county may pave aparking lot for itself, we believe it may do so for another governmental entity under the Interlocal Cooperation Act, so long as such governmental entity could itself perform that function.
InHayden v. City of Houston, 305 S.W.2d 798 (Tex.Civ. App. -- Fort Worth 1957,writ ref'd n.r.e.), the court held that, even without statutory or other authority, amunicipality may operate aparking facility whose purpose "is toprovide a convenience for that portion of thepublic desiring to visit amunicipal establishment.
. . ." 305S.W.2d at 802.. The trustees of an independent school district are authorized to "acquire and hold real and personal property" and "to manage and govern the public free schools of the district." Education Code 9 23.26. We believe that these statutory provisions, together with theprinciple established in

supra, Hayden, empower an independent school district to construct andmaintain parking lots for itself. Thus, it isour opinion that Dallas County may pave aparking lot for either amunicipality or for an independent school district. Of course, the county must receive adequate consideration in return forperforming suchwork, in order to avoid any violation of article 3, section 52of the Texas Constitution.
You also ask whether competitive bidding would be required on such a contract. InAttorney General Opinion H-93 (1973),we held that a school district need not accept competitive bids on a contract with a city for the transfer of park land to the city and the construction of recreational

p. 4209Honorable Henry Wade - Page 3 (H-1019)

improvements thereon. We characterized the contract,"as an agreement reached between twopolitical subdivisions, each having thepower of eminent domain and condemnation, respecting theparamount public use of land owned by one of them." Attorney General Opinion H-93 (197;)at 4. Likewise, in the present instance, we have held that governmental entities may contract under the Interlocal Cooperation Act todo only such acts as both are legally authorized toperform. Since competitive bidding would not be necessary in order for a municipality topave its own parking lot,we do not believe it is required when the county performs thework on behalf of the city. In our opinion, therefore, a contract between Dallas County and an independent school district or a municipality pursuant to the Interlocal Cooperation Act does not require competitive bidding.
SUMMARY Dallas County may contract topave a parking lot for either amunicipality or an independent school district, pursuant to the Interlocal Cooperation Act, article 4413(32c), V.T.C.S., so long as Dallas County receives adequate compensation for performing suchwork. Competitive bidding isnot required on such a contract.

Attorney General of Texas APPROVED: w

DAVIDM. KENDALL, Firs Assistant

C. ROBERT HEATH. Chairman Opinion Committee

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