NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

DANIEL M. LOZANO, as Trustee of THE DANIEL M. LOZANO LIVING 

TRUST, DATED FEBRUARY 12, 2002, Plaintiff/Appellee,

v.

PACCO PROPERTIES, LP, et al., Defendants/Appellants.

No. 1 CA-CV 19-0560 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CV2016-016509

The Honorable Joseph C. Welty, Judge

The Honorable Michael W. Kemp, Judge 

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Fennemore Craig, P.C., Phoenix

By Joseph A. Schenk and Heather A. Macre

Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee

Snell & Wilmer L.L.P., Phoenix

By Kevin J. Parker and Benjamin W. Reeves

Counsel for Defendants/Appellants

FILED 10-15-2020
LOZANO, et al. v. PACCO, et al.

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Paul J. McMurdie delivered the Court’s decision, in which Presiding 

Judge James B. Morse Jr. and Judge Maria Elena Cruz joined.

M c M U R D I E, Judge:

¶1 Pacco Properties, LP and Daniel Matthew Horwits and 

Jacqueline Robin Horwits, as Trustees of The 2002 Horwits Family Trust

Dated October 7, 2002, (collectively, “Appellants”) appeal the superior 

court’s order denying their combined motion to clarify or set aside a 

judgment entered according to an offer of judgment accepted by Daniel M. 

Lozano, as Trustee of The Daniel M. Lozano Living Trust dated February 

12, 2002 (collectively, “Lozano”). For the following reasons, we conclude 

we lack jurisdiction to address the issues raised by Appellants concerning 

the motion to clarify the judgment and affirm the court’s order denying 

Appellants’ motion to set aside.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 Before the events underlying this case, Richard Thurman, the 

general partner of Pacco Properties, LP, Daniel Horwits, Lozano, and 

non-party Jeffrey Borris were equal shareholders in Beverly Hills Sports 

Council, Inc. (“Beverly Hills”). They worked together as sports agents 

representing professional baseball players. In 2002, the parties and Borris

as Trustee of the Borris Family Trust, dated June 2, 1999 (collectively, 

“Borris”) formed RJ&2D LLC (the “Company”), a member-managed 

Arizona limited liability company with its principal place of business in 

Maricopa County. Each member owned a 25% membership interest in the 

Company. Through the Company, the parties and Borris purchased 

properties in Arizona and Florida.

¶3 In February 2016, Borris sent an email to the other members 

of the Company requesting to dissolve it. In the email, Borris asserted that 

it would be “impracticable for the 4 members to co-exist” because he now 

worked for a competing sports agency and Lozano had left Beverly Hills to 

form a competing agency in 2010. After several meetings, the members of 

the Company were unable to reach an agreement concerning its dissolution.

Borris and Lozano agreed that the Company should be dissolved, while 
LOZANO, et al. v. PACCO, et al.

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3

Thurman and Horwits contended there was no basis for dissolving the 

Company.

¶4 As attempts to negotiate the Company’s dissolution broke 

down, Lozano filed this action in the superior court. In his complaint, 

Lozano alleged that the Company’s other members denied him access to 

the Arizona and Florida properties and other personal property owned by 

the Company since his departure in 2010. He further alleged that the 

members were deadlocked concerning the Company’s management.

Lozano asserted five causes of action: (1) judicial dissolution of the 

Company; (2) breach of contract; (3) breach of the covenant of good faith 

and fair dealing; (4) unjust enrichment; and (5) accounting and constructive 

trust. While this action was pending, Borris sold his interest in the 

Company to Appellants, and Lozano amended his complaint to remove 

Borris as a named party.

¶5 In January 2019, Appellants sent Lozano an offer of judgment 

according to Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 68. Appellants 

proposed that judgment be entered in favor of Lozano and against them for 

the total amount of $320,000, “inclusive of all damages, taxable court costs, 

interest, and attorneys’ fees.” Approximately two weeks later, Lozano 

accepted the offer of judgment and submitted a proposed form of judgment 

to the superior court. The proposed judgment contained the following 

language:

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED 

awarding Plaintiff Lozano Judgment against Defendants RJ & 

2D, L.L.C., Pacco Properties, LP, and Daniel Matthew Horwits 

and Jacqueline Robin Horwits, as Trustees of the 2002 

Horwits Family Trust, dated October 7, 2002, jointly and 

severally, in the amount of Three Hundred Twenty Thousand 

Dollars ($320,000).

* * *

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that no further matters remain 

pending before this court and that this Judgment is entered 

pursuant to Rule 54(c), Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure.

On March 19, 2019, without objection from Appellants, the court approved, 

signed, and entered the proposed form of judgment verbatim.

¶6 On May 24, 2019, 66 days after the court issued the judgment, 

Appellants moved to clarify the March 2019 judgment, stay its enforcement
LOZANO, et al. v. PACCO, et al.

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4

under Rule 62, and, in the alternative, set it aside under Rule 60. Appellants 

alleged that when they attempted to tender a check for the full value of the 

judgment, a dispute arose over whether the judgment extinguished 

Lozano’s 25% membership interest in the Company. Appellants requested 

the court stay the judgment’s enforcement until the dispute was resolved. 

Appellants asked the court to confirm that by resolving all claims made in 

the action—including Lozano’s claim for dissolution of the Company—the

judgment had extinguished Lozano’s membership interest.

¶7 Assuming their interpretation concerning the scope of the 

offer of judgment was incorrect, Appellants argued in the alternative that 

they were entitled to relief from the judgment under Rule 60(b)(1) or (b)(6)

based upon the “lack of a meeting of the minds and/or mutual mistake.”

Appellants also requested a hearing on the motion. In response, Lozano 

argued the judgment did not cover his membership interest in the 

Company, and that Appellants’ alleged mistake in misunderstanding the 

scope of the offer of judgment was, at best, a unilateral mistake which did 

not justify setting the judgment aside.

¶8 On June 19, 2019, the superior court issued an order denying 

Appellants’ combined motion. The court explained:

The Judgment rendered in this matter was the result of an 

accepted offer of judgment from [Appellants]. A proposed 

form of Judgment was submitted to the Court by [Lozano]. 

There was no objection filed to the submitted form of 

Judgment. The Judgment was signed by the Court.

The executed Judgment speaks for itself.

Appellants filed a notice of appeal 28 days later. In the notice, Appellants 

specified that they intended to appeal the court’s June 2019 order denying 

the combined motion and “all orders and rulings of the Court necessary to 

or supportive of the [order].”

¶9 Meanwhile, Lozano filed a new action against Appellants in 

the superior court alleging the Company had sold the Arizona and Florida 

properties, and that he was entitled to 25% of the proceeds of the sales per 
LOZANO, et al. v. PACCO, et al.

Decision of the Court

5

his membership interest and the Company’s operating agreement.

1

Appellants moved to dismiss the action, arguing the doctrine of claim 

preclusion barred Lozano’s new action due to the March 2019 judgment.

After a hearing, the court denied Appellants’ motion to dismiss. Appellants

filed a petition for special action in this court, arguing the superior court 

erred by failing to apply claim preclusion and dismiss Lozano’s new action.

This court declined to accept jurisdiction over the special action and 

dismissed the petition in a summary order.

¶10 The parties then filed cross-motions for summary judgment. 

Within both their motion for summary judgment and response, Appellants 

again argued that the March 2019 judgment barred Lozano’s action under 

the claim-preclusion doctrine. On July 23, 2020, the superior court held a 

hearing on the respective motions and took the matter under advisement. 

In an order filed on September 23, 2020, the court granted Appellants’ 

summary judgment motion, ruling that (1) the offer of judgment dissolved

Lozano’s 25% membership interest in the Company and (2) the doctrine of 

claim preclusion barred Lozano’s action. A final judgment based upon that 

ruling remains pending.

2

DISCUSSION

¶11 On appeal, Appellants argue the superior court erred by 

failing to confirm that the March 2019 judgment extinguished Lozano’s 25% 

membership interest in the Company. Appellants contend the accepted 

Rule 68 offer of judgment constitutes a judgment for all claims raised in 

Lozano’s lawsuit, including those claims predicated on his membership 

interest, and the doctrine of claim preclusion now bars any claim that has 

arisen or could arise from that interest. Appellants urge this court to 

endorse this position and, by doing so, to declare that “Lozano can make 

1 We have taken judicial notice of the related case located in the 

records of the superior court. See Vera v. Rogers, 246 Ariz. 30, 32, ¶ 6, n.1

(App. 2018) (court may take judicial notice of related superior court

records); State v. Valenzuela, 109 Ariz. 109, 110 (1973).

2 Shortly after the superior court issued its ruling in the second action, 

Appellants filed a motion requesting that this court stay any further 

consideration of this appeal pending entry of a final judgment in the second 

action. Appellants indicated they would seek dismissal of this appeal “[i]f 

and when judgment is entered in the [s]econd [l]awsuit and not appealed.” 

After consideration, we deny Appellants’ motion for a stay of this appeal.
LOZANO, et al. v. PACCO, et al.

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6

no further claim for any additional funds due and owing to him under the

[Company’s] operating agreement.” Should we conclude otherwise, 

Appellants argue in the alternative that the superior court abused its 

discretion by not finding that contract-avoidance principles justified setting 

aside the March 2019 judgment under Rule 60(b)(1). We address each 

argument in turn.

A. This Court Lacks Jurisdiction to Address the Superior Court’s 

Order Denying Appellants’ Motion to Clarify the March 2019 

Judgment.

1. The Order Denying Appellant’s Motion to Clarify the 

March 2019 Judgment Is Not Appealable.

¶12 At the outset, Appellants do not dispute that their notice of 

appeal was untimely regarding the March 2019 judgment but assert their

arguments concerning the scope and effect of that judgment stem instead

from the court’s June 2019 order denying their motion to clarify. Appellants 

cite to Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) section 12-2101(A)(2), which 

permits an appeal “[f]rom any special order made after final judgment,” 

and A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(4), which allows an appeal “[f]rom a final order 

affecting a substantial right made in a special proceeding or on a summary 

application in an action after judgment,” as grounds for our jurisdiction. 

We disagree.

¶13 “The court of appeals, as a court of limited jurisdiction, has 

only the jurisdiction conferred on it by statute.” McDougall v. Superior Court, 

170 Ariz. 474, 475 (App. 1991). Absent statutory authority, we “do not have 

jurisdiction to consider the merits of the question raised on appeal.” Musa 

v. Adrian, 130 Ariz. 311, 312 (1981). To determine if an order is appealable 

under A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(2), we must consider whether: (1) “the issues 

raised by the appeal from the order are different from those that would 

arise from an appeal” of the underlying judgment; and (2) “the order affects 

the judgment or relates to its execution.” Sotomayor v. Sotomayor-Munoz, 239 

Ariz. 288, 291, ¶ 11 (App. 2016). Regarding A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(4), we must 

determine whether the order is “a final order affecting a substantial right 

made” either: (1) in “a special proceeding”; or (2) “on a summary 
LOZANO, et al. v. PACCO, et al.

Decision of the Court

7

application in an action after judgment.” See MCA Fin. Gr., Ltd. v. Enter. 

Bank & Trust, 236 Ariz. 490, 495, ¶ 11 (App. 2014).3

¶14 Applying these considerations here, we are unconvinced that

the order denying the motion to clarify the March 2019 judgment falls 

within either A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(2) or (A)(4). Nor have we identified any 

other relevant provision from which we might acquire jurisdiction. Because 

the court denied the motion and, therefore, left the March 2019 judgment 

precisely as entered, the order neither raised questions different from those 

that would have arisen from an appeal from the judgment itself nor affected

a substantial right of the Appellants. The ruling maintained the status quo

established by the March 2019 judgment. Thus, we lack appellate 

jurisdiction to review and address the merits of the questions raised by 

Appellants’ putative appeal of the order denying the motion to clarify—

namely, any arguments concerning the nature and scope of the judgment 

outside the confines of Appellants’ request for Rule 60 relief. Musa, 130 

Ariz. at 312; see also Hirsch v. Nat. Van Lines, Inc., 136 Ariz. 304, 311 (1983) 

(“The scope of an appeal from a denial of a Rule 60 motion is restricted to 

the questions raised by the motion to set aside and does not extend to 

review of whether the trial court was substantively correct in entering the 

judgment from which relief was sought.”).

2. We Decline to Exercise Special-Action Jurisdiction to 

Review the Order.

¶15 Appellants nevertheless urge us to exercise special-action 

jurisdiction to review their arguments concerning the March 2019 

judgment. “When we lack appellate jurisdiction, ‘it is within our discretion 

to consider the matter as a special action.’” AEA Fed. Credit Union v. Yuma 

Funding, Inc., 237 Ariz. 105, 111, ¶ 21 (App. 2015) (quoting State v. Perez, 172 

Ariz. 290, 292 (App. 1992)). Generally, this court accepts special-action 

3 Appellants cite MCA Financial Group for the proposition that the 

“substantial right” portion of A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(4) only applies to the first 

proceeding described in the subsection, and not the second. While we agree 

the court’s description of A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(4) in MCA Financial Group

could be read that way, we do not believe that is what the court intended in 

that case. See MCA Fin. Grp., Ltd., 236 Ariz. at 495, ¶ 11. Indeed, the court 

cited with approval two out-of-state opinions whose interpretations of 

nearly identical provisions in their respective codes mirror our conclusion. 

Id. (citing State v. Jacques, 570 N.W.2d 331, 335 (Neb. 1997), and Ross v. Ross, 

640 N.E.2d 265, 268 (Ohio App. 1994)).
LOZANO, et al. v. PACCO, et al.

Decision of the Court

8

jurisdiction “in cases that raise issues of statewide importance, issues of first 

impression, pure legal questions, or issues that are likely to arise again,”

Frimmel v. Sanders, 236 Ariz. 232, 238, ¶ 22 (App. 2014), or “when the party 

has no plain, adequate or speedy remedy by appeal, and justice cannot be 

obtained by other means,” Luis A. v. Bayham-Lesselyong ex rel. County of 

Maricopa, 197 Ariz. 451, 453, ¶ 2 (App. 2000). See also Ariz. R. P. Spec. Act. 

1(a). (“[T]he special action shall not be available where there is an equally 

plain, speedy, and adequate remedy by appeal . . . .”).

¶16 However, we decline to treat Appellants’ arguments 

concerning the judgment and order as a special action for two reasons. First, 

special-action review of the issues raised by the Appellants’ motion to 

clarify would not be appropriate because the issues were not ripe for 

adjudication when presented to the superior court. In Arizona, prudential 

doctrines such as ripeness exist, not by constitutional mandate, but “as a 

matter of sound judicial policy.” Brush & Nib Studio, LC v. City of Phoenix, 

247 Ariz. 269, 279, ¶ 35 (2019) (quotation omitted). This judicial restraint is 

imposed “to insure . . . courts do not issue mere advisory opinions, that the 

case is not moot and that the issues will be fully developed by true 

adversaries.” Armory Park Neighborhood Ass’n v. Episcopal Cmty. Servs. in 

Ariz., 148 Ariz. 1, 6 (1985).

¶17 Here, by requesting the court to opine on the nature and scope

of the claims resolved in the March 2019 judgment, Appellants essentially 

desired a prospective ruling that any claim Lozano had or could assert

concerning his 25% membership interest in the Company was now barred 

by claim preclusion, formerly known as res judicata. In re Gen. Adjudication 

of All Rights to Use Water in Gila River Sys. & Source, 212 Ariz. 64, 69, ¶ 14 

(2006). Appellants sought the court’s endorsement of their understanding 

of the March 2019 judgment to prevent Lozano from raising a claim in 

future litigation.

¶18 But claim preclusion cannot be addressed by a court

prospectively. Claim preclusion is a defense to an action that requires a 

court to determine, among other things, whether the party asserting it can 

establish “an identity of claims in the suit in which a judgment was entered 

and the current litigation.” In re Gen. Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in 

Gila River Sys. & Source, 212 Ariz. at 69–70, ¶ 14 (emphasis added); see also

Ariz. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(1) (listing “res judicata” as an affirmative defense that

must be asserted in a responsive pleading). In other words, the preclusive 

effect of a judgment cannot be put into operation without comparing it to a 

new claim. Thus, confirming a party’s interpretation of the claims resolved 

in a judgment before a new action is filed would amount to an advisory
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opinion, or an “opinion[] anticipative of troubles which do not exist; may 

never exist and the precise form of which, should they ever arise, [the court] 

cannot predict.” Young v. Rose, 230 Ariz. 433, 439, ¶ 32 (App. 2012) (quoting 

Citibank v. Miller & Schroeder Fin., Inc., 168 Ariz. 178, 182 (App. 1990)).

Accordingly, we decline to exercise special-action jurisdiction to review an 

issue the superior court was judicially restrained from addressing.

¶19 Second, declining to exercise special-action jurisdiction to 

address the March 2019 judgment’s scope will not deprive Appellants of an 

adequate or speedy remedy by appeal. Appellants have received a

favorable ruling in Lozano’s new action and will have an adequate 

opportunity to defend that decision should Lozano appeal.

B. The Superior Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Denying

Appellants’ Rule 60(b) Motion.

¶20 We do have jurisdiction to review the aspect of the court’s 

order denying Appellant’s motion to set aside under Rule 60(b)(1). See 

M&M Auto Storage Pool, Inc. v. Chem. Waste Mgmt., Inc., 164 Ariz. 139, 141 

(App. 1990) (grant or denial of a motion to set aside judgment appealable 

as a special order made after final judgment, A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(2)).

Appellants argue that the superior court abused its discretion by failing to 

find that a lack of mutual assent or the doctrine of mutual mistake justified 

setting aside the judgment under Rule 60(b)(1).

¶21 “A trial court enjoys broad discretion in deciding whether to 

set aside judgments under Rule 60([b]).” Skydive Ariz., Inc. v. Hogue, 238 

Ariz. 357, 364, ¶ 24 (App. 2015). “Absent a clear showing of abuse of the 

court’s discretion[,] . . . or arbitrariness or unreasonableness, the decision of 

the trial court must stand.” Indus. Park Corp. v. U.S.I.F. Palo Verde Corp., 19 

Ariz. App. 342, 346 (1973). To determine whether the superior court abused 

its discretion by denying Appellants’ motion to set aside the judgment, we 

must first address a procedural question raised by the substance of 

Appellants’ Rule 60 arguments.

¶22 Although couched as a claim for relief under Rule 60(b)(1),

Appellants’ arguments are focused on avoiding the contract formed by 

Lozano’s acceptance of the offer of judgment—namely, lack of mutual 

assent and mutual mistake. See Hill-Shafer P’Ship v. Chilson Fam. Tr., 165 

Ariz. 469, 473 (1990) (describing mutual mistake and lack of mutual assent). 

In Lamb v. Arizona Country Club, 124 Ariz. 239, 240, n.2 (App. 1978), this 

court addressed the complexities and potential pitfalls surrounding a 

substantive challenge to the enforceability of a settlement agreement raised
LOZANO, et al. v. PACCO, et al.

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within a Rule 60(b) motion. In that case, the plaintiffs moved to set aside a 

stipulated judgment under Rule 60(b)(1) (then Rule 60(c)(1)), arguing they 

mistakenly did not receive the full benefit they thought they bargained for 

in the settlement agreement underlying the judgment. Id. at 239–40. In a

detailed footnote, the court outlined the “procedural dilemma” created by 

the arguments raised in the motion: “Whether the settlement agreement is 

enforceable depends upon the application of contract principles. Yet before 

contract principles can be applied, the judgment must be vacated. 

Nevertheless, the judgment cannot be vacated unless the infirmity in the 

contract is shown.” Id. at 240, n. 2.

¶23 The court then outlined two paths for resolving this dilemma. 

Lamb, 124 Ariz. at 240, n.2. First, the superior court could avoid the issue 

altogether by allowing or requiring the party raising the contract-avoidance 

argument to bring an independent action to invalidate the judgment. Id.

The Lamb court acknowledged the potential inefficiency of litigating a 

separate action instead of resolving the matter on a motion but noted that:

the difficulty with invalidating a settlement agreement on 

motion pursuant to Rule 60([b]) is that the procedural steps 

are short-circuited: there are no pleadings joining the issue 

and as a consequence there may be an incomplete exposition 

of the facts and a misguided application of the law and 

burden of proof.

Id.

¶24 Second, the superior court could use the memoranda and 

evidence submitted with the Rule 60(b) motion as a litmus test to determine 

whether the judgment should be re-opened “on condition that the issue 

relating to the avoidance of the settlement agreement be alleged by way of 

supplemental pleadings and adjudicated before it in the normal course of 

trial procedure.” Id. Turning to the situation before it, the Lamb court found 

no error in the superior court’s decision to address both the settlement and 

vacation-of-judgment while reviewing the Rule 60(b) motion because the 

court actions had accomplished the same result as the second path. Id. The 

court then examined the merits of the contract-law arguments raised by the 

plaintiffs. Id. at 241–42. Finding no reason to invalidate the settlement 

agreement, it upheld the superior court’s decision to deny the Rule 60(b) 

motion. Id.

¶25 In the years following Lamb, this court has continued to

address whether a ground for contract avoidance justifies the superior 
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court’s decision to grant or deny relief from a judgment when the court 

itself engages—either explicitly or implicitly—in that analysis. See, e.g., 

Brietbart-Napp v. Napp, 216 Ariz. 74, 81–83, ¶¶ 22–31 (App. 2007); Emmons v. 

Superior Court, 192 Ariz. 509, 511–14, ¶¶ 9–23 (App. 1998); Republic Nat. Life 

Ins. v. Rudine, 137 Ariz. 62, 64–67 (App. 1983). But assuming the same 

standards govern a challenge to the enforceability of an accepted offer of 

judgment within a Rule 60(b) motion, we are presented with a situation 

directly opposite to those faced by Lamb and its progeny. Here, the superior 

court chose to let the March 2019 judgment “speak[] for itself” and to 

summarily deny the Rule 60(b) motion without addressing the 

contract-avoidance issues raised by Appellants. We construe the court’s

action as choosing the first procedure contemplated by Lamb. As a result, 

the relevant question here is whether the superior court can, in the exercise 

of its discretion, decline to address an issue or argument raised in a Rule 

60(b) motion when the issue is better suited for adjudication by other 

means, such as by an independent action.

¶26 We conclude it can. Rule 60(d) provides explicitly that the rule 

“does not limit the court’s power to . . . entertain an independent action to 

relieve a party from a judgment, order, or proceeding . . . .” In Lamb, this 

court held the superior court was within its discretion to entertain 

settlement and vacation-of-judgment issues within Rule 60 proceedings in 

the interests of judicial efficiency despite the potential for error. But a 

necessary corollary of this conclusion is that the superior court could also 

determine that the procedural and substantive difficulties presented by a 

party’s attempt to invalidate a settlement agreement through Rule 60 

proceedings outweigh those judicial-efficiency interests.

¶27 This authority is also reflected in the Restatement (Second) of 

Judgments, which provides: “Relief from a judgment must be obtained by 

means of a motion for that purpose in the court that rendered the judgment 

unless relief may be obtained more fully, conveniently, or appropriately by 

some other procedure.” Restatement (Second) of Judgments

(“Restatement”), § 78 (Am. Law Inst. 1982). And the principles outlined in 

Rule 60(d), Lamb, and the Restatement together embody “the power 

inherent in every court to control the disposition of the causes on its docket 

with economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants.”

Powers Reinforcing Fabricators, LLC v. Superior Court, 1 CA-SA 20-0083, 2020 

WL 4979399, at *4, ¶ 17 (App. 2020) (quoting Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 

248, 254–55 (1936)). Accordingly, it is within the superior court’s sound 

discretion to determine whether a Rule 60(b) proceeding or an independent 

action is an appropriate forum to address these procedural and substantive 

issues.
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¶28 All that remains is determining whether the superior court 

abused that discretion here by declining to address the arguments raised in 

Appellants’ Rule 60 motion. We conclude it did not. Critically, Appellants’ 

request to set aside the March 2019 judgment was framed as an alternative 

remedy should the court conclude the judgment would not have the 

preclusive effect Appellants allegedly intended. Thus, Appellants placed 

the court in precisely the type of procedurally and substantively murky 

situation contemplated by Lamb. In one breath, Appellants argued the

judgment formalizing the offer of judgment was valid and enforceable. Yet, 

in the next, asserted that the agreement underlying the judgment should be 

rescinded on contract-avoidance grounds. And the situation was 

complicated further because, as we stated above, discussion of the claims 

resolved in the March 2019 judgment would have been premature. Under 

these circumstances, we cannot say the court erred by allowing the 

judgment to speak for itself and declining to set it aside. By doing so, the 

court left the parties to resolve the claim-preclusion and contract-law issues

surrounding the March 2019 judgment at a more appropriate time and

setting, where they could be fully raised, argued, and adjudicated.

ATTORNEY’S FEES AND COSTS

¶29 Appellants and Lozano both request an award of attorney’s 

fees and costs under A.R.S. § 12-341.01. We decline to award either party 

attorney’s fees. However, as the successful party on appeal, Lozano is 

entitled to recover his costs subject to compliance with Arizona Rule of Civil 

Appellate Procedure 21.

CONCLUSION

¶30 We affirm the denial of the Rule 60(b) motion.