The U.S. Army Campaigns of the Civil War

Civil War 

Atl ntic Coast

1861–1865

The 

on the
CMH Pub 75–4

Cover: Storming Fort Wagner, Kurz & Allison, 1890 (Library of Congress)
by

R. Scott Moore

Center of Military History

United States Army

Washington, D.C., 2015

Civil War 

Atl ntic Coast

1861–1865

The 

on the

5

Introduction

Although over one hundred fifty years have passed since the 

start of the American Civil War, that titanic conflict continues to 

matter. The forces unleashed by that war were immensely destructive because of the significant issues involved: the existence of the 

Union, the end of slavery, and the very future of the nation. The 

war remains our most contentious, and our bloodiest, with over 

six hundred thousand killed in the course of the four-year struggle. 

Most civil wars do not spring up overnight, and the American 

Civil War was no exception. The seeds of the conflict were sown 

in the earliest days of the republic’s founding, primarily over the 

existence of slavery and the slave trade. Although no conflict can 

begin without the conscious decisions of those engaged in the 

debates at that moment, in the end, there was simply no way to 

paper over the division of the country into two camps: one that 

was dominated by slavery and the other that sought first to limit 

its spread and then to abolish it. Our nation was indeed “half slave 

and half free,” and that could not stand. 

Regardless of the factors tearing the nation asunder, the 

soldiers on each side of the struggle went to war for personal 

reasons: looking for adventure, being caught up in the passions 

and emotions of their peers, believing in the Union, favoring 

states’ rights, or even justifying the simple schoolyard dynamic 

of being convinced that they were “worth” three of the soldiers 

on the other side. Nor can we overlook the factor that some went 

to war to prove their manhood. This has been, and continues 

to be, a key dynamic in understanding combat and the profession of arms. Soldiers join for many reasons but often stay in the 

fight because of their comrades and because they do not want to 

seem like cowards. Sometimes issues of national impact shrink 

to nothing in the intensely personal world of cannon shell and 

minié ball.

Whatever the reasons, the struggle was long and costly and 

only culminated with the conquest of the rebellious Confederacy, 
6

the preservation of the Union, and the end of slavery. These 

campaign pamphlets on the American Civil War, prepared in 

commemoration of our national sacrifices, seek to remember 

that war and honor those in the United States Army who died 

to preserve the Union and free the slaves as well as to tell the 

story of those American soldiers who fought for the Confederacy 

despite the inherently flawed nature of their cause. The Civil War 

was our greatest struggle and continues to deserve our deep 

study and contemplation.

 RICHARD W. STEWART, PH.D.

 Chief of Military History
The Civil War on the 

Atlantic Coast

1861–1865

The Civil War on the Atlantic coast began in comic-opera 

fashion. While much of the South rejoiced over South Carolina’s 

secession and cursed yet-to-be inaugurated President Abraham 

Lincoln, fervent North Carolinians seized two Federal forts on 

the Cape Fear River. Reacting to rumors of Federal ships headed 

for the North Carolina coast, a newly formed Wilmington 

militia company, dubbed the Cape Fear Minute Men, set out 

to capture the dilapidated forts, each garrisoned by a caretaker 

sergeant. Early in the morning of 9 January 1861, the enthusiastic 

if ill-equipped militiamen pounded on the outer doors of Fort 

Johnston, a collection of decayed U.S. Army buildings situated 

near Smithville, on the entrance channel of the Cape Fear River. 

The startled Army sergeant quickly surrendered the fort to the 

invaders, but not before demanding and receiving a receipt to 

ensure proper accountability of government property. The next 

day, the Minute Men, flushed with victory, continued downriver 

to secure the much more imposing, if crumbling, Fort Caswell at 

the mouth of the Cape Fear, another post held by a lone ordnance 

sergeant who duly signed it over. The victory proved short-lived. 

Although likely to secede soon, North Carolina still remained 

in the Union, and thus the militiamen had unlawfully seized the 

forts. North Carolina Governor John W. Ellis, maintaining strict 

7
8 

legalities, ordered the intruders to find the ordnance sergeants, 

give them back the forts, and go home. The Cape Fear Minute 

Men relinquished their conquests and returned to Wilmington, 

devoid of the glory they imagined should be theirs. The restored 

caretakers reported the forts none the worse for their ordeal, a 

dubious qualification given their state of disrepair.

The exploits of the Wilmington militiamen soon faded as the 

nation rushed toward civil war and newly seceding states seized 

Federal property and installations. Local forces occupied Fort 

Pulaski, Georgia, covering the seaward approaches to Savannah, 

Georgia, and Fort Clinch near Fernandina in northeast Florida. 

Fort Sumter, blocking the harbor in Charleston, South Carolina, 

surrendered in mid-April after two days of bombardment. 

Returning to Forts Caswell and Johnston, North Carolina troops, 

this time with the governor’s approval, took permanent control, 

as did others at Fort Macon, near Beaufort, a hundred miles up 

the coast. Although showing the effects of years of parsimonious 

budgets, the forts soon anchored Confederate defenses on the 

Atlantic. Around them for the next four years would swirl a 

succession of naval and land actions, most now forgotten and 

many unnoticed even at the time. The coastal region from the 

Outer Banks of North Carolina to the St. Johns River in Florida 

saw pitched battles, innumerable skirmishes, sieges, raids and 

retribution, amphibious landings, riverine operations, military 

occupation, and partisan warfare involving thousands of troops 

from both sides as well as a major portion of the U.S. Navy. 

Not insignificantly, the operations also served as the battlefield 

proving ground for African Americans. If lacking the historical 

drama of the campaigns in Virginia or the West, those on the 

Atlantic coast were key elements in a war that slowly strangled 

the Confederacy. 

Strategic Setting

In the years before the Civil War, the ports and waterways 

of North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, and eastern Florida 

fed the economies of the Atlantic region and, to a large extent, 

much of the southeastern United States. The primarily agrarian 

coastal states relied on exports, notably cotton, rice, and naval 

stores, for their well-being. Cotton flowed through the ports of 

Savannah, Charleston, and Wilmington to mills in New England 
9

and, equally important, Great Britain. In return, buyers sent the 

money, manufactured goods, and finished products that sustained 

the Southern agrarian way of life. Thousands of merchant vessels 

cleared the harbors, the busiest being Charleston, a center 

of prosperity and, by mid-century, political agitation. Lesser 

harbors, such as Jacksonville, Florida, and New Berne, North 

Carolina, provided local hubs for collection and movement 

of goods. Linking the ports to each other and to much of the 

interior stretched a system of tidal rivers, inland sounds, and 

navigable waterways. In North Carolina, shallow-draft vessels 

maintained a lively trade on the Albemarle and Pamlico Sounds 

and the Neuse and Roanoke Rivers. Canals running north from 

the Albemarle created secure avenues to Norfolk, Virginia; the 

James River; and the lower Chesapeake Bay. A maze of coastal 

channels, barrier islands, and sluggish rivers offered protected 

waterways and outlets to the sea for cotton and rice plantations 

from northeast Florida into South Carolina. 

The introduction of railroads added to the transportation 

network. A rail line just inland from the coastal islands linked 

Savannah to Charleston. Branch lines connected the two ports to 

Columbia, Augusta, and Atlanta, Georgia. The Wilmington and 

Weldon Railroad coupled Wilmington to Petersburg, Virginia, 

intersecting at Goldsboro, North Carolina, with a line from New 

Berne to Raleigh, North Carolina. These waterways and railroads 

formed an interconnected economic network that sustained the 

Atlantic states of the South. 

Savannah, Charleston, Wilmington, and the numerous rail 

lines and waterways assumed critical strategic importance with 

the onset of war. Largely lacking a manufacturing capability, the 

newly formed Confederacy could not produce military equipage 

in adequate quantities. For this, it required shipping to move 

cotton to overseas European markets and to bring back essential 

cargoes, which in turn depended on the Atlantic ports. The fundamental strategic problem for the new nation centered on thwarting 

any Federal effort to close the ports, an immediate concern given 

President Lincoln’s declaration of a naval blockade of the South 

in April 1861. While coastal vessels could use the myriad inlets 

and waterways to hide and smuggle some goods, they could 

not compensate for large cargo-carrying blockade runners. 

Additionally, the ports became key to the South’s courtship of 

foreign support. If kept open, they remained symbols of sover-
10 

eignty and national viability, essential for diplomatic recognition. 

Closed to trade by Lincoln, they signified Confederate illegitimacy. 

Yet, the traits that made the Atlantic coast so valuable also 

made it nearly indefensible. With the exception of the captured 

Federal forts, in 1861 few defenses existed, leaving much of the 

coastline open to invasion. Moreover, with limited resources 

and threatened by Federal armies in Virginia and the West, the 

Confederate government could spare little for coastal protection. 

Regiments mustering into service departed to other theaters of 

war, leaving state governors to scrape together what few remaining 

units, local militia, and armament they could find. The situation 

quickly exacerbated political cracks in the makeup of the newly 

declared nation. Built on a foundation of states’ rights and highly 

independent state and local governments, the demands of the 

central government for troops and resources intensified distrust. 

To state governors like Joseph E. Brown of Georgia, Francis 

Pickens of South Carolina, and, later, Zebulon Vance of North 

Carolina, who could look offshore and see enemy warships, the 

immediate threat of naval assault trumped anything in far-off 

Virginia or Tennessee. That Confederate President Jefferson 

Davis did not share that view only antagonized them. As the 

war dragged on and the dangers to the coast magnified, friction 

between the Atlantic coast states and the Davis government grew 

almost to the breaking point. 

Nonetheless, in the summer and fall of 1861, despite shortages in men, weapons, and supplies, the Confederacy took 

steps to defend its coast. In North Carolina, sand earthworks 

and pile obstacles blocked Hatteras and other inlets along the 

Outer Banks while local forces prepared to guard Albemarle 

and Pamlico Sounds. On the Cape Fear River, a series of fortifications covered the two entrance channels; they would include 

the most formidable coastal stronghold of the war by late 1864. 

Charleston harbor and its adjacent inlets and islands boasted 

numerous batteries. Newly constructed forts on Hilton Head 

and Phillips Island barred entrance to Port Royal Sound, South 

Carolina, while other earthworks shielded the coastal railroad 

from Northern incursions up the inlets and rivers. A maze of 

obstacles and upstream batteries augmented Fort Pulaski, 

blocking the seaward entrances to Savannah, while to the south 

earthworks dotted the St. Johns River. Indeed, nearly every 

town along the coast seemed to be building defenses to prevent 
11

Federal access and protect blockade runners and smugglers. 

Lacking a navy, the Confederate government also issued letters 

of marque. A practice out of fashion with most nations, yet not 

quite illegal, these letters authorized civilian ships to arm themselves and prey on Northern commerce. Local seafarers took 

advantage. All along the coast, but especially at Hatteras, North 

Carolina, and the Outer Banks, privateers began capturing and 

sinking unarmed merchantmen. If the effects proved to be transitory, the panic caused to shippers was not. Northern merchants 

demanded naval protection and greatly curtailed their trade with 

the Caribbean and South America until the Navy could suppress 

the menace. Despite limited resources, competing priorities, and 

political friction, the South had managed to create an imposing 

defensive barrier on the Atlantic coast (Map 1).

The Federal government also understood the strategic 

importance of the seaboard region. A naval blockade, if somewhat 

precipitously declared by Lincoln shortly after the surrender 

of Fort Sumter, formed a vital part of Northern war strategy. 

Desperate to limit the scope of the war to that of a domestic 

conflict, at least in the eyes of Europe, the blockade served notice 

to the European powers, especially Britain, that strict neutrality 

would be enforced. Under international law, it allowed Lincoln 

to close the rebellious ports, halt outbound trade, and use naval 

force to prevent any ships, foreign or otherwise, from entering 

them. Initially, the blockade was more a political gambit than 

a military reality. Once declared, however, foreign powers were 

expected to regulate their countries’ merchant fleets in accordance with accepted international protocols. Great Britain, a key 

buyer of Southern cotton and potential supplier of war goods, 

proved reluctant to challenge those precepts, having exercised 

them in the past. 

The blockade, even if initially enforced only intermittently, 

struck directly at the Confederate war effort. No amount of smuggling or blockade running could supplant the scale of antebellum 

trade, especially if foreign nations self-regulated their shipping. 

It thus formed a crucial part of a grand strategy proposed by 

Army General in Chief Maj. Gen. Winfield Scott and endorsed 

by the Navy. Although derided and sarcastically nicknamed the 

“Anaconda Plan” by the Northern press, General Scott’s proposal 

to cordon off the Confederacy from the sea, while securing the 

Mississippi River from Illinois to the Gulf of Mexico and then 
WYSE FORK

8–10 Mar 1865

KINSTON

14 Dec 1862

GOLDSBORO

17 Dec 1862

PLYMOUTH

17–19 Apr 1864

NEW BERNE

14 Mar 1862

1–3 Feb 1864

WILMINGTON

20–22 Feb 1865

FORT FISHER

24–25 Dec 1864

FORT ANDERSON

18 Feb 1865

HATTERAS INLET

28–29 Aug 1861

13–16 Jan 1865

ELIZABETH CITY

10 Feb 1862

EDENTON

12 Feb 1862

WASHINGTON

Mar 1863

WINTON

20 Feb 1862

FORT THOMPSON

12 Mar 1862

FORT MACON

25–26 Apr 1862

ROANOKE ISLAND

7–8 Feb 1862

Cape Fear R

Peedee R

Albemarle Sound

Hampton Roads

P A M L I C O S O U N D

James R

James R

Tar R

Pamlico R

Staunton R

Dismal Swamp

Canal

Neuse R

Roanoke R

N we R

Yadkin R

N

Cape Fea r

Cape Loo ko ut

O U T E R B A N K S

Cap e

Hattera s

Cape Charles

Fort Monroe

Fort Johnston

Fort Caswell

Nor th Carolina RR

Wilmington and Manchester RR

Wilmington and Weldon RR

Atlantic and Nor th Carolina RR

South Side RR

Wes tern North Carolina RR

Salisbury

Charlotte

Cheraw

Florence

Manchester

Greensboro

Weldon

Morehead City

Beaufort

Tarboro

Appomattox Court House

Portsmouth

Hampton

Yorktown

Lynchburg

Wytheville

Spartanburg

Fayetteville

Petersburg

Norfolk

Danville

RALEIGH

COLUMBIA

NORTH

CAROLIN A

SOUT H

CAROLIN

VIRGINI

A

A

W EST

VIRGINIA

KENTUCKY

TENNESSEE

WYSE FORK

8–10 Mar 1865

KINSTON

14 Dec 1862

GOLDSBORO

17 Dec 1862

PLYMOUTH

17–19 Apr 1864

NEW BERNE

14 Mar 1862

1–3 Feb 1864

WILMINGTON

20–22 Feb 1865

FORT FISHER

24–25 Dec 1864

FORT ANDERSON

18 Feb 1865

HATTERAS INLET

28–29 Aug 1861

13–16 Jan 1865

ELIZABETH CITY

10 Feb 1862

EDENTON

12 Feb 1862

WASHINGTON

Mar 1863

WINTON

20 Feb 1862

FORT THOMPSON

12 Mar 1862

FORT MACON

25–26 Apr 1862

ROANOKE ISLAND

7–8 Feb 1862

Cape Fear R

Peedee R

Albemarle Sound

Hampton Roads

P A M L I C O S O U N D

James R

James R

Tar R

Pamlico R

Staunton R

Dismal Swamp

Canal

Neuse R

Roanoke R

N we R

Yadkin R

N

Cape Fea r

Cape Loo ko ut

O U T E R B A N K S

Cap e

Hattera s

Cape Charles

Fort Monroe

Fort Johnston

Fort Caswell

Nor th Carolina RR

Wilmington and Manchester RR

Wilmington and Weldon RR

Atlantic and Nor th Carolina RR

South Side RR

Wes tern North Carolina RR

Salisbury

Charlotte

Cheraw

Florence

Manchester

Greensboro

Weldon

Morehead City

Beaufort

Tarboro

Appomattox Court House

Portsmouth

Hampton

Yorktown

Lynchburg

Wytheville

Spartanburg

Fayetteville

Petersburg

Norfolk

Danville

RALEIGH

COLUMBIA

NORTH

CAROLIN A

SOUT H

CAROLIN

VIRGINI

A

A

W EST

VIRGINIA

KENTUCKY

TENNESSEE
FORT SUMTER

12 Apr 1861

8 Sep 1863–18 Feb 1865

CHARLESTON

Jul 1863–18 Feb 1865

BATTERY WAGNER

11 Jul 1863

18 Jul–7 Sep 1863 SECESSIONVILLE 16 Jun 1862

FORT WALKER

7 Nov 1861

FORT PULASKI

10–11 Apr 1862

OLUSTEE

20 Feb 1864

Savannah

R

Ogechee R

R

s’

y

r

a

M

.

t

S

St

.

Johns

R

Edisto R

Santee R

Bulls Bay

Por t Royal Sound

A

T

L

A

N

T

I

C

O

C

E

A

Edi sto Island

Hilton Head Island

Tybee Island

Phillips Island

St. Simon’s Island

Fort Beauregard

Fort Clinch

Brunswick

Beaufort

Port Royal

Fernandina

Georgetown

Statesboro

Augusta

Savannah

Jacksonville

St. Augustine

GEORGIA

F L ORID A

Battle

1861–1865

CIVIL W AR ALONG THE ATLANTIC C O AST 

0 100 25

Miles

Map 1
14 

defeating the South in pieces, became the strategic basis of the 

war. The plan required Army-Navy cooperation, not just along 

the Mississippi, but also along the Atlantic coast. The Navy fully 

understood the requirements of a blockade at sea, having done 

so fifteen years before in Mexico, but needed the Army to secure 

its bases and seize key locations. The Army, although focused on 

Virginia and the Mississippi, realized it must also play a role in 

strangling the Confederacy through operations along the coast. 

Strategically, if not always operationally, the Army and Navy 

agreed on this basic war aim.

During the summer of 1861, Secretary of the Navy 

Gideon Welles convened the Commission of Conference, more 

commonly called the Blockade Board or Strategy Board. Its 

members consisted of the chairman, Navy Capt. Samuel F. Du 

Pont, Alexander Bache of the U.S. Coastal Survey, Army Maj. 

John Barnard, a Corps of Engineers officer with extensive experience along the southern coast, and the board secretary (and 

active participant) Navy Cdr. Charles Davis. Neither a strategic 

planning group nor a permanent staff, the commission provided 

information and recommendations but had no authority for 

their implementation. Welles directed it to examine the Atlantic 

coastline and suggest sites for advanced naval bases to support 

the blockade. The advent of steam-powered ships meant the days 

of extended duty along remote coasts, with the need for occasional resupply, had ended. Modern ships demanded constant 

repairs and refitting, as well as regular replenishment of coal, 

provisions, and ammunition in order to be effective. In 1861, 

only Hampton Roads, Virginia, and Key West, Florida, remained 

under Federal control, more than a thousand miles apart and 

hundreds of miles from blockading stations on the Atlantic 

coast. Ships sent to watch Savannah, Charleston, or Wilmington 

could remain on station for just a short period before departing 

on the long journey back to their bases. Distance dictated that 

most would spend as much or more time coming and going as on 

blockade duty. The Navy needed anchorages that could be seized 

and easily defended. Welles wanted to know the best locations. In 

addition, he tasked the commission to look closely at the inlets, 

waterways, and coastal chokepoints that might, if closed, restrict 

Confederate trade and privateering. 

Beginning its deliberations in May 1861, by late summer 

the commission produced several reports on proposed anchor-
15

ages, complete with detailed analyses of the geography, hydrography, and defensibility of each site. Turning to operational 

issues, the commission recommended dividing the single 

Atlantic Blockading Squadron into two blockading squadrons 

(the North Atlantic and South Atlantic) separated at the North 

and South Carolina border. This command structure eased 

control problems for the Navy but meant Army forces, with no 

similar division, might find themselves operating across Navy 

commands. In making these recommendations, the commission 

assumed Army-Navy joint operations would be for the purpose 

of establishing bases or cutting off Confederate access to the sea, 

not harbingers of more extensive inland operations. While that 

supposition would be stretched somewhat in the coming years, 

especially in North Carolina, it remained a fundamental tenet 

for both the Army and the Navy, restricting most coastal operations to seizing and defending advanced bases, sealing off ports, 

and raiding. The Commission of Conference, in keeping with its 

charter, did not establish policy or strategy, nor were its recommendations directive in nature. Its reports provided the essential 

information needed for others to determine where and when 

coastal operations would be conducted. As the summer of 1861 

dragged on and the war saw its first major battles, those decisions 

were not long in coming. 

Operations

The Capture of Hatteras, 1861

While the Commission of Conference continued its work 

in Washington, the first Atlantic coast operation got under 

way. Stung by criticism in the press and Congress over the 

lackluster nature of the emerging blockade (largely unjustified 

given available resources) and recent depredations by privateers 

operating off North Carolina, the Navy looked for a chance to 

make amends. Lincoln pressed for some sort of offensive action. 

Commodore Silas H. Stringham, commanding the Atlantic 

Blockading Squadron (not yet divided), received reports that the 

inlets of the Outer Banks lacked strong defenses and could be 

easily seized to block exiting privateers. The Army, in the wake of 

its disastrous defeat at the Battle of First Bull Run, Virginia, also 

sought a low-risk victory to buttress morale and perhaps dampen 

Confederate spirits. Maj. Gen. Benjamin F. Butler, commanding 
16 

Federal forces at Fort Monroe, Virginia, and recently embarrassed by a defeat at the Battle of Big Bethel, Virginia, developed 

a plan to do just that and perhaps redeem his reputation. Eyeing 

Hatteras Inlet, North Carolina, from which privateers emerged 

almost daily, he sent proposals to Washington outlining a joint 

expedition to close it. They fell into receptive hands at the War 

Department and then found their way to Welles, who saw merit 

in them. The Commission of Conference, although lukewarm 

to the idea of operations in the sounds of North Carolina, also 

endorsed the need to close the Outer Banks. General Scott was 

reluctant to divert the Army’s barely trained forces from the 

defenses of Washington but acceded to mounting pressure and 

approved Butler’s plan. The first Atlantic coastal operation of the 

war thus began. 

A hastily organized Army-Navy force sailed from Hampton 

Roads on 26 August 1861, fully observed and reported by 

Confederate lookouts in Norfolk. The fleet consisted of six 

warships, under the command of Commodore Stringham, in 

his flagship, the screw frigate USS Minnesota, followed by a tug 

and two troop transports loaded with soldiers. Butler’s force 

consisted of the 20th New York Infantry and three companies of 

the 9th New York Infantry, better known as “Hawkins’ Zouaves” 

after their flashy French-inspired uniforms and self-promoting 

commander, Col. Rush C. Hawkins. None of the troops had seen 

combat, having been mustered into service barely three months 

earlier. The flotilla arrived off Hatteras Inlet the next day and 

prepared for battle. Stringham and Butler determined to conduct 

a two-pronged assault, bombarding the forts from the sea while 

troops landed unopposed north of enemy earthworks guarding 

the inlet. If all went well, the operation would be over quickly. 

Watching the arrival of the Federal ships, 350 ill-equipped 

and poorly trained North Carolina troops and their commander, 

Col. W. F. Martin, had little doubt as to the outcome of the 

coming engagement. The men manned two hastily constructed 

earthworks armed with an assortment of cannons and little 

ammunition. Fort Clark, mounting five guns, faced seaward 

at the entrance to the inlet. A low-lying earthwork of logs and 

sand, it stood little chance of seriously challenging the Federal 

warships. Fort Hatteras, less than a mile away across a marsh 

bridged by a rudimentary catwalk, covered the sound side of the 

inlet with an assortment of twenty-five guns. Somewhat better 
17

sited, it still lacked both the men and the ordnance to match 

the force arrayed against it. Most of the Confederate guns had a 

shorter range than those aboard the Federal ships, which merely 

had to remain at a safe distance offshore and pound the forts 

into submission. The Confederate defenders at Hatteras hoped 

to make a good showing, perhaps inflict some damage on their 

enemies, and delay the Federal expedition long enough for reinforcements to arrive.

Stringham and his warships began the attack on the 

morning of the twenty-eighth. Steaming in an oval pattern, the 

ships opened fire on Fort Clark with broadsides, kicking up 

huge geysers of sand and quickly silencing its guns. Late in the 

morning, Butler began landing the 20th New York Infantry two 

miles to the north, getting the first wave ashore unmolested. 

The amphibious operation, however, soon went awry. Winds 

increased, causing boats in follow-on waves to swamp in high 

surf. Men tumbled into the water, and, after getting only 320 

troops to the beach, Butler halted further attempts, leaving the 

20th New York alone with few supplies and its waterlogged 

ammunition largely useless. The beleaguered troops soon 

received a scare when a Navy gunboat covering the landings 

opened fire on what appeared to be cavalry bearing down on the 

exposed beachhead. Panic and confusion among the reported 

cavalry ensued as horses scattered in all directions, revealing it 

Sketch by Alfred R. Waud of Federal troops landing at Hatteras Island, 

August 1861 (Library of Congress)
18 

to be a terrified herd of local wild ponies. Fortunately for the 

New Yorkers, the Confederate defenders abandoned Fort Clark 

after having endured several hours of bombardment. The Federal 

troops occupied the earthwork, spending a restless night alone 

and unsupplied, isolated from reinforcements by the winds and 

surf. Stringham posted two warships offshore to provide gunfire 

if needed and withdrew the others and the transports to sea to 

ride out the increasing winds. 

The next morning, the winds having subsided, Stringham’s 

warships returned and took station off Fort Hatteras. Out of range 

of the fort’s guns, they bombarded the defenders with impunity 

and accuracy. The Confederates could do little to prevent the 

inevitable, even after being reinforced the previous night with 

troops ferried by steamers from Roanoke. After three hours’ 

punishment, Fort Hatteras surrendered. Butler, despite orders to 

return his force to Fort Monroe once his troops had neutralized 

the enemy’s earthworks, posted a garrison manned by Colonel 

Hawkins and his Zouaves. Alarmed by the easy Federal victory 

and apparent power of naval warships, the Confederates abandoned earthworks guarding Ocracoke and Oregon inlets along 

the Outer Banks to the north as well. Initially hailed as a great 

victory by the Northern press, Stringham received criticism 

from within the Navy for not exploiting it and moving into the 

sounds. Given the intended purpose of the mission as well as the 

small size of Butler’s force, such criticism was unfair. The success, 

however, wetted an appetite for coastal operations in both the 

Navy and War Departments.

The South Atlantic Coast, 1861–1862

The next operation was not long in coming. At a meeting 

in September, President Lincoln; Secretary of the Navy Welles; 

the new Army General in Chief, Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan; 

and the newly appointed commander of the South Atlantic 

Blockading Squadron, Admiral Samuel F. Du Pont, met to discuss 

the need for anchorages to resupply and repair ships engaged 

in the blockade. Armed with the recommendations of the 

Commission of Conference, the Navy initially proposed seizing 

Bulls Bay, South Carolina, and Fernandina, Florida. Although 

unready for any large-scale land operations, the Army agreed 

to provide 12,000 troops as a landing force, to be commanded 

by Brig. Gen. Thomas W. Sherman. Du Pont soon changed the 
19

primary objective to Port Royal Sound, South Carolina, which 

he deemed better suited to the blockading squadron’s needs. Port 

Royal offered perhaps the largest deep-water anchorage on the 

coast, protected by coastal islands that Union forces could easily 

defend, and from which they could conduct coastal raids. It was 

also situated between Savannah and Charleston and was close 

to the coast of Florida, making the anchorage convenient for his 

ships. Port Royal had one drawback: the entrance was defended 

by two Confederate forts, each more formidable than those 

faced at Hatteras. Nonetheless, Du Pont felt his warships and the 

troops provided by the Army could dispose of these defenses. By 

late October, the expedition was ready. 

On 29 October, more than fifty warships and transports 

departed Hampton Roads and headed south. They immediately 

encountered severe weather that scattered the fleet and threatened to end the operation before it began. When Du Pont’s 

flagship, the USS Wabash, reached Port Royal Sound late on 1 

November, barely half the ships could be found. Miraculously, 

in the next few days most straggled in with only minor damage. 

Unfortunately, at least three transports carrying supplies for 

the Army, as well as several of the steamers necessary for beach 

landings, floundered at sea. Worse, the vessel carrying most of 

the troops’ small-arms ammunition did not arrive for several 

days. Du Pont and Sherman realized a joint naval and land 

attack would be problematic. Reluctantly, they agreed that the 

Navy would have to deal with the rebel defenses, with Army 

troops occupying the islands surrounding Port Royal once the 

enemy had been neutralized and the passage into the anchorage 

secured. On 4 November, having sounded the offshore bar and 

found it passable at high tide, Du Pont moved the ships inshore 

and anchored within sight of the enemy. 

A 21⁄2-mile channel separated two earthworks barring 

entrance to Port Royal Sound: Fort Walker on Hilton Head Island 

and Fort Beauregard on Phillips Island. Although each mounted 

an assortment of guns with only limited supplies of ammunition, 

their range and size could inflict damage on any ships operating 

in the restricted waters at the entrance to the sound. A squadron 

of Confederate gunboats patrolled the inland waters, ready to 

attack any Federal ships entering the sound. Given the tidal 

conditions and enemy dispositions, Du Pont decided to engage 

the forts one at a time at close range from within the sound, using 
20 

the firepower of his ships to quickly silence the enemy while 

a small covering force kept the enemy gunboats at bay. On 7 

November, he entered the sound and attacked Fort Walker. After 

three hours, their guns mostly dismounted, the defenders abandoned their earthworks. Shortly thereafter, fearing they might 

be trapped on the island, the rebels at Fort Beauregard hastily 

withdrew. Naval landing parties quickly secured the empty forts. 

Watching from their transports offshore, the troops cheered. 

Over the next few days, they landed and secured Hilton Head 

and Phillips Islands. Beaufort, a few miles up the Broad River, fell 

to Navy gunboats two days later but was not fully occupied until 

early December. To prevent enemy incursions and to fully secure 

the anchorage, detachments of soldiers supported by gunboats 

probed the tidal rivers and islands, as Sherman established his 

main base on Hilton Head Island. 

The loss of Port Royal Sound sent panic through much of 

coastal South Carolina and Georgia. Plantation owners fled to 

Savannah and Charleston, many setting fire to their valuable 

cotton rather than letting it fall into Federal hands. The state 

governors demanded reinforcements from President Davis. 

Davis sent them General Robert E. Lee, formerly his military 

 Officers of the 3d New Hampshire Infantry in camp on 

Hilton Head Island (Library of Congress)
21

adviser but now appointed to command Confederate forces on 

the coast. He immediately set about improving the defenses of 

Savannah and Charleston but worried about how to protect 

the connecting coastline, realizing he lacked the forces for a 

strong defense everywhere. Observing a Federal raid up the 

Coosaw River near Port Royal in December, Lee witnessed the 

effectiveness of naval guns at keeping at bay any Confederate 

forces imprudent enough to move within range. Indeed, once 

landed, the Federal troops, lacking artillery, rarely strayed far 

from their supporting gunboats. Lee decided that rather than 

confront the gunboats, he would place his defenses upstream, 

past the shallow waters preventing gunboats from further 

ingress. Doing so would leave the island plantations vulnerable but would protect the vital railroad connecting Savannah 

and Charleston. Stationing forces at key junctions and bridges, 

Lee established a mobile reserve able to move rapidly along 

the railroad to challenge any Federal movements inland. By 

securing the rail line between the two major ports, Lee planned 

to keep the Federal force at Port Royal at arm’s length without 

tying down large numbers of Confederate troops. 

As 1862 began, Du Pont and Sherman looked beyond 

Port Royal. Du Pont wanted the Army to support the closing of 

Savannah and to seize such ports as Fernandina and Jacksonville, 

Florida. After the naval victories at Hatteras and Port Royal, 

many naval officers convinced themselves that warships could 

reduce enemy shore defenses without the need of the Army. They 

saw the Army’s role solely as occupying newly won positions. Du 

Pont became increasingly frustrated at Sherman’s unwillingness 

to provide forces to follow in the wake of the Navy. Yet Sherman 

had no orders from the War Department to venture elsewhere 

and was reluctant to scatter his troops along the coast in small 

garrisons. Additionally, without his shallow-draft launches lost 

during the transit to Port Royal, Sherman lacked the waterborne 

transport vessels necessary to support wide-ranging Navy operations. With differing perspectives, missions, and no common 

commander, Du Pont and Sherman grew increasingly antagonistic toward each other. The situation conspired to limit the 

effectiveness of the nearly 12,000 bluecoats now posted on the 

South Carolina coast. 

The two commanders finally agreed on two operations: 

seizing Fernandina and blocking the entrance to Savannah. 
22 

Although Du Pont had disregarded the commission’s recommendation to secure Bulls Bay by taking Port Royal as his 

main naval base, Fernandina remained in his plans. Sherman 

offered a brigade to support its capture. On 2 March, seventeen 

armed ships and six transports left Port Royal expecting a fight. 

Unknown to them, Lee had ordered Fernandina abandoned, 

with the last rebel train leaving the community as the Union 

ships sailed into view. On 4 March, Federal soldiers landed and 

occupied Fernandina. The expedition then moved on to seize 

St. Augustine and Jacksonville, destroying any fortifications it 

encountered. Gunboats scoured the St. Johns River and its tributaries looking for blockade runners. 

In late March, Maj. Gen. David Hunter arrived at Port 

Royal to assume command of the newly created Department 

of the South, which encompassed the coasts of South Carolina, 

Georgia, and Florida. Although Du Pont still wanted to seize as 

many coastal towns and ports as possible, Hunter concluded he 

could not garrison them all and thus pulled many of his troops 

back to Port Royal from Florida. Although he left the garrison 

at Fernandina, his troops withdrew from Jacksonville without 

consulting Du Pont, a move that infuriated the admiral and set 

the tone for later squabbles. 

Even as operations continued in northeast Florida, Federal 

attention turned to Savannah. The Navy, after reconnoitering 

the water approaches, determined its ships could not bypass 

Fort Pulaski nor get into position to bombard it without excessive risk. As long as the fort remained in Confederate hands, 

it threatened Port Royal and sheltered Savannah’s blockade 

runners. Sherman and Du Pont thought a combined naval and 

land assault on Savannah might be possible, but planning stalled 

when the two disagreed on details, and reinforcements needed 

for the operation were unavailable. Instead, the War Department 

sent orders to reduce Fort Pulaski by siege and dispatched heavy 

artillery for the purpose. Capt. Quincy A. Gillmore, a Regular 

Army engineer tasked to plan the siege, chose Tybee Island, 

about a mile off Fort Pulaski, as the best location for the arriving 

batteries. As the artillery arrived in February and March, soldiers 

toiled in the muddy soil to erect new battery sites. 

By 10 April, Gillmore had succeeded in positioning eleven 

batteries of artillery, including mortars, nine large 30-pound 

Parrott guns and converted James guns, and four naval guns 
23

transplanted from Du Pont’s ships. When the Fort Pulaski 

garrison refused to surrender, the massed batteries opened fire. 

Built in the 1840s to withstand smoothbore cannons, the fort’s 

brick outer works could not long withstand the modern rifled 

guns on Tybee Island. After just a day, Union fire had reduced the 

wall facing Tybee Island from a height of more than seven feet 

to half that, with large cracks in the masonry as well as an everwidening hole. The next day, the fort surrendered when shells 

began passing through the wall and exploding dangerously close 

to the magazine. In just thirty hours, Gillmore had demonstrated 

the power of modern rifled artillery against fixed fortifications. 

At little cost, the Federals had closed the port of Savannah. 

By the spring of 1862, the Confederacy no longer controlled 

its coast south of Charleston. A pattern now emerged that persisted 

for much of the war. The islands and inlets of South Carolina and 

Georgia became contested zones in which skirmishes abounded, 

but pitched battles rarely occurred. Federal troops supported 

by gunboats raided along the tidal waterways, foraging for 

food, confiscating cotton and lumber, destroying buildings and 

goods deemed useful to the enemy, and freeing large numbers 

of slaves whose owners fled inland. Local Confederate troops 

patrolled the islands and harassed Federal outposts, but mounted 

concerted challenges only when Federal expeditions moved up 

the tidal rivers toward the railroad. Economically damaging and 

the source of much angst, the almost continuous operations kept 

the South Atlantic coast in constant turmoil. 

The damage to Fort Pulaski from the Federal bombardment

(Library of Congress)
24 

The Burnside Expedition, North Carolina, 1862

As Federal forces seized Fernandina and prepared to 

lay siege to Fort Pulaski, another expedition readied itself to 

invade the sounds of North Carolina. Disappointed with the 

failure to exploit the capture of Hatteras, both services looked 

to control the inland waterways and perhaps threaten Norfolk 

and Richmond, Virginia, from the south. In the fall of 1861, 

Brig. Gen. Ambrose E. Burnside organized and equipped a 

division capable of conducting operations in coastal waters. 

He intended to move into the sounds of North Carolina and 

penetrate the state via its waterways. With War Department 

approval, he recruited regiments from New England and New 

York composed of men whose 

civilian occupations as fisherman and coastal mariners 

made them familiar with waterborne operations. In addition, 

he acquired gunboats, transports, and surfboats to support, 

move, and land his soldiers. 

Although finding it difficult 

to procure transports, largely 

because the Navy bought most 

of the available ships for the 

expanding blockade, Burnside 

nonetheless mustered nearly 

15,000 troops and a leaky 

assortment of barges, transports, gunboats, tugs, steamers, 

and surfboats in Annapolis, 

Maryland, by January 1862. 

The Navy agreed to support 

the expedition, providing warships and shallow-draft gunboats 

under the command of Flag Officer Louis M. Goldsborough, 

newly appointed commander of the North Atlantic Blockading 

Squadron. On 9 January, Burnside’s force departed Annapolis 

for Hampton Roads to join Goldsborough’s fleet. Two days 

later, the joint expedition sailed south for Roanoke Island, its 

first objective. 

Blocking the only passage between Albemarle and Pamlico 

Sounds, Roanoke Island held the key to the inland waterways. 

General Burnside

(Library of Congress)
25

Possession of the island would enable the Federals to control 

much of eastern North Carolina. General McClellan, contemplating his campaign up the Virginia Peninsula to capture 

Richmond, saw Burnside’s effort as a useful supporting operation, perhaps able to draw off Confederate forces or even forming 

a pincer from the south as his main army moved directly on 

Richmond from the east. Despite the strategic value of Roanoke, 

the Confederate government could spare few resources to defend 

it. In all, barely 2,000 newly raised troops from North Carolina 

and Virginia occupied the island and surrounding waters. 

Three forts defended the island and the passage, all indifferently 

equipped with obsolescent or poorly maintained pieces and 

manned by inadequately trained soldiers. The forts on Roanoke 

Island faced toward the water in expectation of a naval attempt to 

force the passage. A Federal attack up the island from the south 

seemed improbable due to its swampy terrain. Beyond some 

pickets, the southern half of the island lacked defenses, with only 

a battery of artillery and some supporting infantry blocking the 

single road and causeway in the center of it. The Confederate 

Navy deployed a varied collection of gunboats, nicknamed the 

“mosquito fleet,” in the passage itself, mostly coastal steamers 

with a cannon mounted forward. On the mainland side, a canal 

barge—anchored in the mud and mounting a battery of field 

pieces—completed the defenses.

Arriving off Hatteras, shaken by severe weather and forced 

to wait several more days until heavy seas subsided, the Federal 

armada soon discovered that the inlet’s depth of six feet prevented 

many of the larger warships and Army transports from crossing 

into the sound. By grounding a ship and then using the fastmoving tides to dig out the sand around it, thus creating a deeper 

channel, the fleet finally crossed on 4 February. Further delays 

occurred as the ships repaired damage caused by the weather. 

Goldsborough and Burnside, on good terms, used the time for 

detailed planning and coordination. Finally under way, the expedition arrived off the southern end of Roanoke on the morning 

of 7 February. Goldsborough moved quickly to engage the 

mosquito fleet and neutralize the enemy forts. He soon silenced 

their guns and chased away the gunboats, suffering little damage 

to his own ships. In midafternoon, Burnside began landing at 

Ashby Harbor to the south, while Goldsborough’s ships and 

Army gunboats lobbed shells into the surrounding forest. Some 
26 

gunboats were partially manned by detachments of the 99th New 

York Infantry, self-styled the “Coast Guard” and trained as shipboard gunners and landing parties. In a notable innovation, the 

troops landed from flat-bottom boats boarded by climbing down 

ladders placed on the sides of the transports and then towed to 

the beach by steamers. Just offshore, the steamers turned sharply, 

releasing the tow ropes and slinging the landing boats toward 

Sketch map of Roanoke Island made shortly after the battle

(Library of Congress)
27

the shoreline. Oarsmen then took over and brought them to the 

beach. By midnight, three brigades landed virtually unopposed 

and prepared to move north in the morning.

Despite the state of Confederate defenses and the successes 

of the previous day, Burnside’s troops faced a daunting task. Just 

one road ran north through the island, with deep swamps on 

either side. A mile from the landing area, the island narrowed, 

and the terrain greatly favored the defender. Mud and quicksandfilled swamps virtually cut the island in two, crossed only by a 

causeway. Here the Confederates placed a battery of three guns, 

supported by infantry. They worried little about their swampinfested flanks, which they deemed impassable. Burnside felt 

otherwise. Ordering one of his three brigades to attack straight 

up the road, he directed the others to move through the bogs and 

brush to his right and left. Early on 8 February, the attack began. 

Led by the 25th Massachusetts Infantry, the center brigade 

charged. Enemy artillery and rifle fire stopped the regiment, 

inflicting severe casualties. The 10th Connecticut Infantry 

passed through the Bay Staters from behind, advanced a little 

farther but suffered a similar fate. On the flanks, largely unnoticed by the defenders, the other brigades moved forward. The 

swamps proved to be passable, and, although slowed by muck 

and brambles, the Federals soon enveloped the Confederate line. 

Seeing mud-encrusted blue-clad soldiers emerge on their right 

and left, the defenders broke and fled. On the main road, the 9th 

New York Infantry, having spent the previous months tediously 

guarding the forts at Hatteras, charged through the stalled 

Connecticut troops and overran the remaining defenders. With 

the Confederates in retreat, Burnside moved his force forward, 

mopping up stragglers and forcing the surrender of the forts, all 

three of which could offer little resistance to the Federal troops 

in their rear. Although suffering less than a hundred killed or 

wounded in battle, virtually the entire Confederate force on 

Roanoke Island surrendered. 

The Federals quickly exploited their victory. Goldsborough 

dispatched a squadron of gunboats to Elizabeth City, North 

Carolina, to deal with the remnants of the mosquito fleet, 

destroying it and capturing the town on 10 February. Two 

days later, Edenton fell to a naval landing party that burned a 

schooner and spiked some antiquated cannons before departing. 

On 20 February, Hawkins and his regiment burned Winton on 
28 

the Chowan River after receiving sporadic gunfire from local 

militia. Although later claiming departing Confederates set 

fire to the town, his actions brought him the lasting enmity 

of North Carolina and suspicion from his own commanders. 

Nonetheless, Burnside placed Hawkins in command of a 

brigade at Roanoke and ordered him to keep Albemarle Sound 

subdued. Gunboats with detachments of soldiers aboard soon 

roamed the sound, seeking out Confederate forces, confiscating 

supplies, seizing vessels, and closing down coastal trade. With 

his rear secure, Burnside turned southward toward New Berne 

and the Neuse River.

The defeat at Roanoke shocked the Confederate government and created panic in much of eastern North Carolina. 

The Federals seemed capable of depositing troops anywhere 

their gunboats could take them. The governor insisted that 

his state troops stay in North Carolina rather than go north 

to Virginia, a demand largely unheeded by the Confederate 

government. Yet Confederate leaders, both in North Carolina 

and in Richmond, realized New Berne likely would be the 

next target. With a railroad line leading to the state capital and 

connecting the port to the Wilmington and Weldon Railroad 

at Goldsboro, New Berne provided an important terminus for 

food and supplies gathered from the surrounding countryside. 

In Confederate hands, the city offered a base to attack Federal 

gains at Roanoke and Hatteras and to counter any moves against 

the port of Beaufort. Under Federal control, New Berne would 

threaten all of eastern North Carolina and could serve as a base 

for a larger invasion of the state or a move on Wilmington to 

the south. 

With McClellan’s massive army readying itself for a spring 

offensive in Virginia, the Confederate government could spare 

few troops to defend North Carolina. Nonetheless, the state 

managed to retain a few regiments, if only partially trained and 

inadequately equipped. To prevent Federal ships from sailing up 

the Neuse River, several forts guarded the water approaches to 

New Berne, but the rebels did little to defend against a landward 

attack along the road and rail line leading west from Morehead 

City. Confederate Brig. Gen. Lawrence O. Branch established a 

defensive line about six miles from the city, with the Neuse River 

on his left and swampy pine forest on the right. With only about 

4,500 raw troops, the short line anchored on Fort Thompson on 
29

the Neuse River offered the best terrain to stop an advancing 

Federal army. Branch positioned most of his forces between the 

river fort and the railroad that split the center of his line. He 

placed the remaining men to the right with their flank resting on 

the forested swamp. A brickworks next to the railroad divided 

the two sets of breastworks, causing the right to draw back about 

150 yards and create a small gap between the two wings of his 

force. Branch compensated by posting a militia battalion near 

the works and a reserve regiment nearby. As word reached him 

of a Federal expedition marshaling at Hatteras, Branch hastened 

to finish the defenses and prepare his troops. 

On 11 March, Burnside embarked nearly 11,000 troops 

aboard transports at Roanoke, sailing to rendezvous with warships 

anchored at Hatteras. Although Goldsborough departed to deal 

with the emergency brought on by the Confederate ironclad CSS

Virginia at Hampton Roads, his subordinate, Cdr. S. C. Rowan, 

assumed command in his place. Rowan and Burnside worked 

well together. Sailing up the Neuse River, Burnside landed unopposed near Slocum’s Creek on 13 March. His three brigades then 

marched on New Berne, seventeen miles distant, while gunboats 

moved parallel along the river, occasionally firing just ahead of 

the advancing troops to ward off any unseen enemy. By nightfall, despite drenching rains that turned the approach into a 

nightmare of mud, the three brigades closed on the Confederate 

defenses. Burnside planned to attack the next morning, with 

two brigades abreast and one in reserve. Much like the enemy 

he faced, the railroad split his forces and divided the attack into 

two semi-independent efforts. To compensate, he centered his 

reserve brigade to the rear, prepared to reinforce either wing. 

Naval gunboats stood in the river, ready to provide fire support 

and to suppress Fort Thompson. 

The assault immediately broke down, as the right brigade 

attacked before the left could get into position, and stalled in 

the face of four North Carolina regiments crouched behind 

parapets. Multiple charges on the Confederate earthworks failed 

to gain ground. The 10th Connecticut Infantry then moved to 

within 200 yards of the enemy and delivered covering fires for 

their charging comrades while Rowan’s gunboats bombarded 

the defenders. Some naval shells landed among the Federals, 

creating confusion and a few friendly casualties. Rowan, noting 

the damage done to the rebel works by his heavy 9-inch guns, 
30 

later stated unapologetically, “I thought it better to kill a Union 

man or two than to lose the effect of my moral suasion.” The 10th 

Connecticut’s rifle fire and Rowan’s naval guns notwithstanding, 

the attack on the right failed. 

Meanwhile, Burnside’s left brigade began its attack. The 

leading regiment, the 21st Massachusetts Infantry, spotted 

the gap in the center of the Confederate lines and moved to 

Sketch map of the Battle of New Berne compiled from Federal and 

Confederate sources after the battle (Library of Congress)
31

exploit it. Scattering the North Carolina militia battalion, 

the Massachusetts soldiers broke through then faced right, 

flanking the enemy breastworks from behind. A melee erupted 

as the surprised Confederates tried to plug the hole in their 

lines and the Federals sought to widen it. Elements of the 21st 

Massachusetts soon found themselves nearly surrounded, but 

they refused to budge. The tide eventually turned when the 

Union reserve advanced into the gap and routed the remaining 

defenders. A staunch Confederate stand quickly transformed 

into a disorderly rout. Many of Branch’s troops did not stop until 

they reached New Berne nearly six miles away, burning the Trent 

River bridge behind them to delay Burnside’s pursuit. Rowan’s 

gunboats, however, moved up the Neuse River and arrived at the 

city wharf late on 13 March, just as the last Confederates set fire 

to stores and buildings and retreated up the rail line westward 

toward Kinston. The next day, U.S. troops ferried across the river 

and entered the city, adding to the damage by going on a looting 

spree that Burnside ended with difficulty. 

After establishing defenses to forestall any Confederate 

counterattack, Burnside directed Brig. Gen. John G. Parke to 

seize Morehead City and Beaufort, thirty miles to the east on the 

coast, and then force the surrender of the Confederate garrison at 

Fort Macon. This would eliminate Confederate forces in his rear 

and open a supply line from the port at Beaufort to New Berne, 

using the railroad that connected the two, while capturing the 

harbor at Beaufort for the North Atlantic Blockading Squadron. 

Parke moved rapidly, entering Morehead City on 22 March and 

Beaufort the next night. Startled citizens awoke to find their 

town occupied by blue-uniformed soldiers. Other than burning 

bridges in the Federal path, the few Confederates in the area 

offered little resistance. Nor could they. Southern authorities had 

shifted most of the troops originally posted near Morehead City 

to defend New Berne, leaving behind scarcely 400 men at Fort 

Macon and a few local militia and cavalry in the countryside. 

Reconnoitering a landing site on Bogue Banks out of range of 

the guns of the fort, Parke shuttled across troops and artillery, 

intending to lay siege to the post. Inching his lines forward to 

within a mile, he hid his cannon and mortar batteries behind 

sand dunes until ready to open fire, posting pickets to deflect any 

enemy attempt to disrupt his preparations. On 23 April, Parke 

sent a surrender ultimatum to the fort commander, who promptly 
32 

rejected it despite his nearly hopeless situation. Two days later, 

the Federal bombardment began, augmented by offshore Navy 

warships. Parke’s guns and mortars soon found the range, in no 

small part due to an Army signal officer in Beaufort with a clear 

view of the fort. He spotted the fall of the shells and sent corrections using flags. Unable to mount an effective response and with 

the fort’s masonry walls cracking, the defenders of Fort Macon 

formally surrendered on 26 April. 

Operations in Eastern North Carolina, 1862–1864

With the capture of New Berne and Fort Macon, Burnside 

next moved to consolidate his hold on the rest of eastern North 

Carolina. His forces occupied Washington and Plymouth and 

carried out a series of raids and marches intended to keep the 

enemy off-balance. Meanwhile, gunboats patrolled the sounds 

and rivers, sometimes landing troops to destroy Southern works 

or commandeer supplies. Even before Fort Macon fell, a Union 

force under the command of Brig. Gen. Jesse Reno had landed 

at Elizabeth City, ordered by Burnside to destroy the locks on 

the Dismal Swamp Canal connecting Norfolk with Albemarle 

Sound. Burnside feared that the CSS Virginia might venture 

south through the canal. The Confederate ironclad had recently 

attacked the Federal fleet at Hampton Roads and dueled with 

the USS Monitor. It now threatened the canals to the south from 

its base at Norfolk. Reno’s force ran into Georgia troops sent to 

protect the locks, and, after a day’s battle, the Federal expedition 

withdrew before it could accomplish its mission. Fortunately, the 

rebels scuttled and burned the Virginia on 11 May when Norfolk 

became untenable, due to the advance of General McClellan’s 

army up the Virginia Peninsula toward Richmond. In addition, 

they disabled the locks, fearing Federal gunboats might use the 

canal to attack Norfolk. 

Around New Berne and southward, Union patrols clashed 

with Confederate troops, burned saltworks, and foraged for food. 

Then, in late June, the War Department directed Burnside to reinforce McClellan’s army on the Virginia Peninsula. The general 

obliged, departing New Berne for Virginia with 7,000 men while 

leaving Brig. Gen. John G. Foster to command the remaining 

forces in North Carolina. For the next several months, Foster’s 

troops, too weak for offensive action, strengthened defenses 

around their enclaves and patrolled the countryside, occasion-
33

ally carrying out small foraging expeditions. In September and 

October, Confederate troops deployed from Virginia tested the 

Federal garrisons at Plymouth and Washington, penetrating 

the towns before withdrawing under fire from gunboats. Foster 

reacted by dispatching relief columns, but the raids caused little 

beyond local alarms. 

Not until late fall had Foster enough forces to move west 

toward the Wilmington and Weldon Railroad. The reinforcements came in the form of New England militia pledged to nine 

months of Federal service. Foster had the new men defend New 

Berne, freeing his long-term veteran regiments for expeditions 

inland. In November, Foster launched a raid toward Tarboro. 

After a few skirmishes along the way, he learned of a large enemy 

concentration converging on Tarboro and turned back. The next 

month, he marched to interdict the Wilmington and Weldon 

Railroad where it crossed the Neuse River at Goldsboro. On 11 

December, a column composed of infantry, artillery, and cavalry 

left New Berne, its movement timed as a diversion for the Army 

of the Potomac’s operations at Fredericksburg, Virginia. Three 

days later, at the Neuse River near Kinston, Foster clashed with 

troops from North and South Carolina, inexplicably positioned 

with the river to their backs. When the Federals flanked the 

Confederate line, an orderly retreat by the South Carolinians 

became a rout after rebels set the bridge across the Neuse on 

fire before the retreating troops could cross it. Only with great 

difficulty did the Confederates re-form, but not before Foster 

captured nearly 400 rebels trapped on the wrong side of the river. 

The Federal column continued toward Goldsboro, skirmishing 

with enemy forces that paralleled its advance from the other 

side of the Neuse. On 17 December, it arrived at the railroad 

bridge just a few miles from Goldsboro, guarded by three North 

Carolina regiments, which soon withdrew under Union cannon 

fire. Foster’s troops burned the bridge, cutting the Wilmington 

and Weldon Railroad, although not for long. Confederate engineers soon repaired the damage. Far from his base and facing 

enemy troops hastily dispatched from Lee’s army in Virginia after 

the Battle of Fredericksburg, Foster withdrew to New Berne. 

For the next two years, a war of patrols, raids, small 

battles, and foraging expeditions devastated eastern North 

Carolina. Federal troops continually emerged from New Berne, 

Washington, and Plymouth, or appeared from gunboats patrol-
34 

ling the sounds to challenge local Confederate forces, replenish 

food, and assert their control. Locally recruited Unionist irregulars roamed west and north from bastions resupplied by their 

Northern sponsors. Their depredations spread fear and destruction, although perhaps no more than that inflicted by Confederate 

partisans also operating in the area. A buffer zone emerged that 

defied control by either side. Federal commanders, repeatedly 

called on to dispatch regiments to Virginia or South Carolina, 

rarely mustered sufficient strength to do more than defend their 

enclaves and harass the enemy. In the winter months, Confederate 

soldiers sent from Virginia to find supplies added to the misery 

of a region already suffering from Federal foraging. 

Occasionally, Lee sent a division from the Army of Northern 

Virginia to strike at the Federal defenses, more to placate the 

North Carolina governor and populace than to achieve any real 

military gains. In March 1863, he sent Maj. Gen. Daniel H. Hill 

to attack New Berne. Failing to make headway, Hill shifted his 

forces to Washington to besiege the town but was unable to 

capture it before Federal gunboats broke through with timely 

reinforcements and supplies. In January 1864, Lee sent Maj. 

Gen. George E. Pickett to assault New Berne from three sides, 

supported by Confederate gunboats based on the Neuse River. 

The Confederates launched a series of attacks during the first 

three days of February against the Federal brigade holding the 

town. The defensive works around the city proved formidable, 

and coordination of the attacks was poor. Pickett suffered 

much the same fate as Hill the year before and soon returned 

to Virginia.

Lee replaced Pickett with Brig. Gen. Robert F. Hoke, a 

native North Carolinian. Hoke concentrated on the isolated 

Federal garrison at Plymouth, on the Roanoke River, just west of 

Albemarle Sound. He struck on 17 April 1864 with two brigades 

and artillery, supported by the CSS Albemarle, an ironclad built 

on the Roanoke River and nearly impervious to the smaller 

Federal gunboats near Plymouth. Abandoning their outer 

breastworks, the Federals withdrew to the town’s inner defenses. 

Early on 19 April, the Albemarle appeared, sailing past the river 

defenses and sinking or dispersing the gunboats in its path. 

Hoke then launched his final attack, overrunning the Federal 

lines. Disorganized, with the enemy in the streets, and cut off 

from evacuation or support from the river, the garrison surren-
35

dered. A few days later, the Federals evacuated Washington. 

Unable to challenge the enemy ironclad, the U.S. Navy momentarily ceded control of Albemarle Sound, but the Confederates 

failed to exploit their advantage. Lee demanded troops from the 

Carolinas to forestall the campaign of Union Army General in 

Chief Lt. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant in Virginia, stripping away much 

of Hoke’s force. 

During a spirited engagement with U.S. Navy gunboats in 

May, the Albemarle, its machinery poorly maintained, received 

enough damage to force it to anchor up the Roanoke River 

for repairs. The ironclad still posed a threat even if unable to 

venture forth for the moment. In October 1864, U.S. Navy Lt. 

William Cushing crashed a tug over the ironclad’s protective 

boom and drove a spar torpedo under the ironclad, sinking 

it at its moorings. The rebels soon evacuated Plymouth and 

Washington, followed closely by Federal troops who reoccupied the towns. 

Charleston and the Battle of Secessionville, 1862

While the war ebbed and flowed in North Carolina, the 

focus of Federal operations on the coast shifted to Charleston, 

South Carolina. The emotional lure of the city seemed to hypnotize the Lincoln administration. Assistant Secretary of the Navy 

Gustavus V. Fox railed at Charleston, calling it “Satan’s Kingdom,” 

and repeatedly demanded that the South Atlantic Blockading 

Squadron attack the city. To Fox, Charleston and Fort Sumter 

personified treason. As early as November 1861, following the 

seizure of Port Royal, the Navy had pressed the War Department 

to send troops to help take Charleston. The Army estimated 

that any effort to capture Charleston would require thousands 

of men who it would have to divert from other more important 

theaters of operations, and it denied the Navy’s request. To the 

War Department, so long as the port could be blockaded, such a 

distraction seemed unnecessary. Nearly 12,000 soldiers already 

served along the South Carolina and Florida coasts; no more 

could be spared.

By the summer of 1862, however, the Army could no 

longer avoid pressure to attack Charleston. General Hunter had 

assumed command of the newly created Department of the 

South in March 1862, and he immediately took a more aggressive 

stance than had his predecessor. In April, he sent forces to occupy 
36 

Edisto Island, South Carolina, 

eastward toward Charleston, 

moving closer to Charleston’s 

outer defenses. On 12 May, 

Robert Smalls, a slave pilot 

aboard the Charleston steamer 

Planter, commandeered the 

vessel while the captain and 

officers were ashore. Sailing it 

past the harbor defenses, he 

surrendered to an offshore Navy 

blockader. Smalls brought news 

that Confederate forces had 

evacuated Coles and Battery 

Islands, opening the entrance 

to the Stono River and a potential back door to Charleston 

via James Island, which lay 

immediately southwest of and 

abutting Charleston. General 

Hunter and Admiral Du Point 

acted quickly, agreeing on 

a plan to attack Charleston’s defenses from the rear by way of 

James Island. With the southern approaches to the island and 

the Stono River clear of enemy forces, the way looked open to 

the city while bypassing the many batteries that protected the 

entrance to the harbor. 

Hunter loaded one division aboard transports, sailed them 

up the Stono River, and landed them on James Island on 2 June. 

He marched another division across Johns Island to be ferried 

over to James Island. Navy gunboats covered the attack with the 

fall of their shot spotted and adjusted by Army officers signaling 

from shore to ship, an innovation previously tested during raids 

on the tidal rivers near Port Royal. Naval shells dropped in 

front of the troops, clearing woods of Confederate skirmishers, 

at times firing beyond the direct observation of the gunboats. 

The Federals greatly outnumbered their enemy, but Hunter was 

convinced otherwise. Fearing a Confederate counterattack, he 

had his men dig in. For more than a week, they skirmished with 

local Confederate forces but did not move. Hunter then departed 

for Port Royal, presumably to gather reinforcements, leaving 

General Hunter

(Library of Congress)
37

Brig. Gen. Henry W. Benham with strict instructions not to 

attack until ordered. 

While the Federals dallied, the Confederate commander 

in Charleston, Maj. Gen. John C. Pemberton, rushed troops to 

James Island. At a chokepoint between two tidal creeks about a 

half mile from the village of Secessionville, they built Fort Lamar, 

a W-shaped earthwork manned by more than 700 infantry and 

artillerymen. The fort barred any move to cross James Island. 

Using other regiments of infantry positioned at various points 

on the island, Pemberton created a reserve ready to respond to 

any Federal move (Map 2).

Aware of the enemy measures, Benham grew impatient. 

Having received no instructions from Hunter, he decided to 

strike on 16 June. An assault force totaling nearly 3,500 men 

attacked in the early morning, hoping to surprise and overwhelm 

Fort Lamar. A second force covered the Federal left, advancing 

in parallel on the other side of a small tidal creek. As the main 

force moved on Fort Lamar, the 8th Michigan Infantry came 

within 200 yards of the enemy before grapeshot and rifle fire tore 

into it. On its right, the 79th New York Infantry scaled the fort’s 

parapet and fought hand to hand with the rebel defenders before 

the Southerners forced it back. Repulsed, the Federals regrouped 

and launched two more attacks, with little success. A quarter mile 

to the left, across the tidal creek, the 3d New Hampshire Infantry 

attempted to flank the fort but could not wade through the tidal 

mud separating it from the enemy. Firing from across the creek, 

the regiment nonetheless swept the facing parapets of defenders. 

Success proved short-lived. Confederate reinforcements rushed 

to the battlefield and cannon fire from the fort soon struck the 

New Hampshire regiment. The best chance had been lost. About 

midmorning, the attack ended when Benham ordered his troops 

to withdraw, having suffered nearly 700 casualties. Outraged 

on hearing of the failed assault and seeking to deflect criticism, 

Hunter relieved Benham for disobeying his orders, then evacuated James Island. 

If Hunter possessed a lackluster combat record, he achieved 

lasting notoriety for his actions with regard to freed slaves. A 

staunch abolitionist, upon assuming command at Port Royal in 

1862, he had issued an order emancipating slaves in the department. Lincoln was not yet ready to take such a measure, in part 

because he feared alienating the slave-holding border states that 
SECESSIONVILLE 16 Jun 1862

BATTERY WAGNER 11 Jul 1863

18 Jul–7 Sep 1863

CHARLESTON Jul 1863–18 Feb 1865

FORT SUMTER 12 Apr 1861

8 Sep 1863–18 Feb 1865

Fort Moultrie

Battery Gregg

C o o p e r R i v e r

F o l l y R i v e r

S t o n o I n l e t

S t o n o R i v e r

W a n d o R i v e r

A s h l e y R i v e r

Charleston

Harbor

A T L ANTIC OCEA N

4 Mile House

C h a r l e s t o n a n d S avan n a h R R

Hog Island

S hu tes F olly Island

Morris Island

F olly Island

C oles Island

Batte ry

Island

Sulliva n’s Island

Kiawah Island

Cummings P oint

Johns Island

James Island

Moultrieville

Mount Pleasant

Secessionville

CHARLESTON

Confederate Fortications

Battle

1861–1865

CHARLEST ON AND VICINIT Y

0 1 4

Miles

Map 2
39

remained loyal to the Union, and he quickly revoked the order, 

but Hunter was undeterred. Already managing a large population 

of former slaves, which he paid to grow crops on the sea-island 

plantations in the Port Royal area as well as to perform labor 

for the Army, the general launched raids explicitly to free slaves. 

He forcibly removed slaves from the islands or armed them to 

prevent the return of white slave owners or local militia. Going 

a step further, Hunter raised a regiment of former slaves, the 1st 

South Carolina Infantry (African Descent) in the summer of 1862. 

Although initially employed as labor troops and soon disbanded 

by the War Department, the seeds had been planted. Indeed, one 

company, posted to distant St. Simon’s Island in Georgia to ward 

off Confederate marauders, could not be reached and remained 

on duty. In November, the company, under instructions from 

Brig. Gen. Rufus B. Saxton, military superintendent of plantations in the area, raided nearby islands, burning saltworks, 

confiscating foodstuffs, and removing slaves. Despite Lincoln’s 

previous directive, by the end of the month and with Saxton’s 

active complicity, the 1st South Carolina comprised more than 

500 men, soon to be commanded by Col. Thomas W. Higginson, 

a New England abolitionist and former supporter of abolitionist 

John Brown. Higginson continued to build his regiment, even 

sending recruiting parties as far south as Fernandina. 

In late 1862, the president caught up with his field commander 

and issued an Emancipation Proclamation that expressed the 

government’s intent to free all slaves living in rebel territory. On 1 

January 1863, the 1st South Carolina Infantry formally received a 

set of regimental colors and a month later mustered into Federal 

 The 1st South Carolina Infantry (African Descent) on parade, Beaufort, 

South Carolina, 1863 (Library of Congress)
40 

service. It was one of the first African American regiments 

(predating the more famous 54th Massachusetts Infantry by 

several months) and its soldiers were almost exclusively former 

slaves from the coastal region. The 2d South Carolina Infantry 

formed in May 1863, with two more units to follow later in the 

summer. In early 1864, all were reflagged as United States Colored 

Troops infantry regiments. These regiments paved the way for 

the thousands of African Americans who fought in the Civil War, 

a large number of whom would serve along the Atlantic coast.

Morris Island and Battery Wagner, 1863

Army interest in Charleston waned for more than a year 

but not so for the Navy. Secretary of the Navy Welles continually sought ways to build the image of the Navy, much of which 

remained unseen to the public in a thankless blockade. He 

distrusted joint Army-Navy operations, grousing that the Army 

claimed the glory for successes and blamed the Navy for failures, 

a charge that had some grounds after Hunter claimed the Navy 

had failed to support his troops at Secessionville. In April 1863, 

Secretary Welles ordered Du Pont, against the admiral’s advice, 

to mass his ironclad monitors and run past Fort Sumter and the 

batteries of Charleston. Welles believed, based on past experiences early in the war, that ships’ guns could overcome any fortification and this seemed like an opportunity to prove that theory 

and achieve a decisive naval victory. The effort failed against 

the defenses of Charleston Harbor. In an aftermath filled with 

recriminations, Welles replaced Du Pont with Rear Adm. John A. 

Dahlgren. The War Department also relieved Hunter, replacing 

him in June 1863 with Maj. Gen. Quincy A. Gillmore, the man 

who, as a captain, had engineered the surrender of Fort Pulaski 

fourteen months earlier. 

Gillmore believed a coordinated Army-Navy campaign 

could take Charleston. Recently arrived reinforcements enabled 

him to sustain operations from Port Royal to the south and to 

undertake operations at Charleston. Meeting with Dahlgren on 

4 July, Gillmore laid out a plan to march his troops across undefended Folly Island, cross over to Morris Island, and then overrun 

the two fortifications protecting the mouth of the harbor, Battery 

Wagner and Battery Gregg. The advance across Morris Island 

would be supported by ships firing into the flanks of the enemy. 

With Morris Island taken, heavy guns emplaced on Cummings 
41

Point could neutralize Fort Sumter and cover the Navy as its 

ships fought past the channel defenses into Charleston, opening 

the city to capture. Dahlgren readily agreed to the plan. 

On 10 July, the operation began. Covered by artillery on 

Folly Island and Navy monitors firing on Confederate defenders, 

Gillmore’s troops crossed to the southern tip of Morris Island. 

Overcoming resistance with the aid of naval gunfire, they advanced 

to within several hundred yards of Battery Wagner by nightfall. 

Blocking the way forward, Battery Wagner abutted a marsh and 

brush on one side and the ocean on the other. The only approach 

consisted of a narrow strip of open sand just wide enough for 

one regiment at a time. Soldiers from North and South Carolina 

manned the fortification, which was built of sand, earth, and 

logs in angled walls protected by an outer ditch. They sheltered 

in bombproofs against artillery and naval gunfire, able to quickly 

sortie to parapets if assaulted. Victory for an attacker was only 

possible by brute force.

Buoyed by the rapid progress up Morris Island and hoping to 

quickly overwhelm Battery Wagner, Gillmore ordered an attack for 

the next morning. But he failed to notify the Navy, whose guns had 

been a key part of the day’s success. Unaware of Gillmore’s plan, 

Dahlgren’s ships did not support the assault on the Confederate 

strongpoint. Early in the morning of 11 July, the 7th Connecticut 

Infantry, followed by the 76th Pennsylvania Infantry and 9th 

Maine Infantry regiments, advanced to within a few hundred 

yards of the walls before coming under fire and charging. Some 

of the Connecticut troops reached the crest of the wall, engaging 

the defenders at close quarters. They went no farther. Regiments 

behind the Connecticut soldiers, jammed together by the narrow 

terrain and subjected to intense fire, broke and fled, leaving the 

forward troops isolated. The Federals suffered more than 300 casualties in just a few minutes. The attack was a disaster. 

Chastised by this setback but undaunted, Gillmore planned 

a second assault. He positioned artillery and reinforced his forces 

while offshore ships systematically shelled Battery Wagner with 

their 11- and 15-inch guns. On 18 July, confident artillery and 

naval gunfire had much reduced the fort’s defenses, Gillmore 

formed ten regiments of infantry in a column of three brigades. 

Terrain dictated the formation, a drawback that Gillmore hoped 

the bombardment and sheer numbers would overcome. Leading 

the attack was the 54th Massachusetts Infantry, an African 
42 

American unit made up largely of freedmen from the Northeast, 

which had only recently arrived in South Carolina and was eager 

to prove itself. 

After a final preparatory bombardment from artillery 

and naval guns lasting nearly the entire day, Gillmore ordered 

his troops forward shortly before sunset. Unfortunately, in 

the growing dark the Navy could no longer observe its shot 

well enough to avoid endangering the attack, and it ceased its 

bombardment as the assault began. This left the enemy time to 

emerge largely unscathed from his hardened shelters to man the 

ramparts before the Federals could close on the fort. Channeled 

into a killing zone, the assault dissolved in confusion. The 54th 

Massachusetts broke through the palisade and started up the 

fort’s sloping wall, only to be greeted by canister and rifle fire that 

left it shattered. More regiments pushed in behind to meet the 

same fate. Officers fell, regiments intermingled, some soldiers 

fled, and order disintegrated. While a few troops managed to 

breach the ramparts, those not killed or wounded huddled in the 

ditch before the wall or in shell craters farther out. Elements of 

the 6th Connecticut Infantry and 48th New York Infantry scaled 

the seaward wall and entered the fort but went no farther. The 

second brigade, observing the fate of those to the front, balked 

when ordered to attack. Nonetheless, when the brigade eventually 

View of Battery Wagner after its capture

(Library of Congress)
43

moved forward and joined those pinned down at the base of the 

wall, all charged. For a few moments, success seemed possible. 

But the third brigade, waiting in reserve, inexplicably never 

advanced. The Confederate defenders sealed off any penetrations 

and continued to fire into the killing zone. Gillmore sounded 

retreat. Of more than 5,000 Federal troops engaged, nearly a third 

had been killed or wounded. The 54th Massachusetts mustered 

barely 50 percent present for duty the next day. 

Repulsed twice, Gillmore decided to besiege the rebels on 

Morris Island while simultaneously neutralizing Fort Sumter. 

In a textbook operation, trenches and traverses worked their 

way toward Battery Wagner. Artillery and naval gunfire kept 

the Confederates pinned down on Morris Island while slowly 

reducing Fort Sumter to rubble. Heavy artillery began lobbing 

shells into Charleston itself, using church spires as aiming points. 

Although of limited military impact, the bombardment of the city 

added a dimension to the campaign unseen in earlier operations. 

Civilians now became targets. By early September, the siege lines 

reached to within a few hundred yards of the walls of Battery 

Wagner. The defenders, enduring increasing casualties and faced 

with an overwhelming enemy both on land and offshore, notified 

General P. G. T. Beauregard, commanding Confederate forces 

in Charleston, that they could no longer hold out. As Gillmore 

prepared for a final assault, they slipped away. On 7 September, 

Federal troops bloodlessly occupied a nearly destroyed Battery 

Wagner and moved on to Cummings Point. Morris Island had 

finally fallen.

Charleston Under Siege

With the Federals occupying Morris Island, Fort Sumter 

faced an onslaught. Battered by Federal bombardment by land 

and sea, the artillery departed on Beauregard’s orders. Infantry 

occupied the fort, more a symbol of defiance than any real 

threat to the Federal forces. Yet it continued to attract Army 

and Navy attention. Dahlgren organized a landing force of 500 

sailors and marines and prepared to seize Fort Sumter on the 

night of 8 September. He failed to notify Gillmore, whose artillery overlooked the fort. Compounding the lack of coordination, 

Gillmore planned a similar operation the same night, unknown 

to Dahlgren. Only at the last minute did Gillmore learn of the 

Navy’s plans, and in a pique, he directed his commanders not to 
44 

support the Navy. If the Navy assault boats reached Fort Sumter 

first, then the Army troops were to draw off and offer no help. 

They did as ordered. The Navy attack proved to be a disaster. 

Caught in the act of landing but unable to cross the rubble and 

remaining fort walls, the sailors and marines succumbed to 

enemy rifle fire from within the fort and artillery fire from across 

the entrance channel at Fort Moultrie. Those not killed were 

captured. 

Fort Sumter’s defiance notwithstanding, with the capture 

of Morris Island the Union had effectively closed the port of 

Charleston. U.S. commanders could not justify the potential cost 

of a full-scale assault on the city, so they chose to remain outside 

instead, the infantry defending Morris Island and the approaches 

to the Stono River. Skirmishing became an almost daily affair. 

Occasional landings on James Island kept up the pressure and tied 

down Confederate troops. At the harbor entrance from October 

to December 1863, a sustained Army and Navy bombardment 

pounded Fort Sumter into a largely useless pile of rubble, but the 

many other Confederate harbor defenses kept the Navy from sailing 

up the channel. In early 1864, Federal gunners began a steady 

bombardment of the city that would continue for much of the next 

year. Charleston did not fall until 18 February 1865 when isolated 

and evacuated in the face of Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman’s march 

through South Carolina. Until then, it remained hemmed in and 

under constant attack, unable to contribute to the war effort and 

subjected to the punishment many in the North felt it deserved.

Federal troops on Morris Island watch the USS New Ironsides firing a 

broadside at the Confederate defenses of Charleston.

(Library of Congress)
45

The Battle of Olustee, 1864

As the siege of Charleston dragged on, active operations 

continued elsewhere in the Union Army’s Department of the 

South. A constant stream of expeditions by detachments of 

soldiers loaded aboard gunboats moved up and down the inlets 

and rivers from Edisto Island, South Carolina, to the St. Johns 

River in Florida. Raiding, skirmishing, foraging, defending 

forward outposts, garrisoning towns and coastal fortifications, 

and conducting an occasional foray inland occupied the daily 

lives of soldiers sent to the department. The largest expedition 

occurred in early 1864 in northeast Florida. Envisioned as a largescale raid to seize naval stores and prevent supplies and cattle 

from being shipped from Florida through Georgia, as well as to 

induce the Unionist factions in the region to swear allegiance, 

the operation involved nearly 6,000 troops under the command 

of Brig. Gen. Truman A. Seymour at Port Royal. Embarked on 

transports escorted by gunboats, the force sailed for Florida in 

early February 1864. Landing at Jacksonville on 7 February, the 

troops fanned out to seize key crossroads, railroad bridges, and 

enemy supplies. The 40th Massachusetts Infantry, mounted on 

horses and equipped with repeating rifles, penetrated nearly fifty 

miles inland. Confederate forces, mostly widely scattered local 

militia, offered little opposition. 

Unfortunately, early success succumbed to indecision. 

Seymour had hesitated for several days after landing, unsure of 

his next move. The delay allowed the Confederates to dispatch 

reinforcements, to include veteran Georgia troops rushed from 

Charleston. Gillmore finally ordered Seymour to consolidate his 

forces and establish a defensive line anchored on Jacksonville, and 

he appointed Seymour commander of a newly created District 

of Florida. Now holding what he considered to be an independent command, Seymour decided after concentrating his forces 

to advance west to cut the railroad line over the Suwanee River 

on which cattle and foodstuffs moved north. On 20 February, 

Seymour’s advance guard bumped into cavalry screening 

Confederate forces assembling near Olustee. What began as a 

skirmish quickly escalated into battle as both sides fed units 

forward. A crisis arose when the 7th New Hampshire Infantry, 

moving up to relieve forward elements, received contradictory 

commands, lost order, and buckled in the face of advancing 

enemy troops. On its left the 8th U.S. Colored Troops stood fast 
46 

but retreated after suffering nearly 300 casualties. Only the timely 

arrival of a New York brigade prevented a Federal rout. Restricted 

by pine forests and boggy ground, the antagonists were locked in a 

bloody struggle, with the Confederates slowly gaining the advantage. A final charge by the Georgians forced back the Federals. 

Sensing defeat, Seymour ordered a withdrawal, with the 54th 

Massachusetts and the 35th U.S. Colored Troops acting as rear 

guard. Thus protected against Confederate pursuit, the Federals 

retreated to Jacksonville. Despite the defeat at Olustee, Union 

forces occupied Jacksonville for the remainder of the war, blocking 

inland access to the sea and conducting raids into the countryside.

Olustee marked the last major battle in the Department of 

the South. Raids and skirmishing persisted among the sounds, 

islands, and waterways, while artillery continued to shell the 

city of Charleston and its outlying forts. Port Royal remained 

the largest and most important base for the South Atlantic 

Blockading Squadron, requiring an Army garrison to ensure its 

security. In the spring of 1864, General in Chief Grant ordered 

many of the veteran units serving in Florida and South Carolina 

north to join his campaign against Lee. Regiments that had 

served in the department during many of its major operations 

would now fight alongside the Army of the Potomac in the siege 

of Petersburg. When Sherman’s army approached Savannah at 

the end of its “March to the Sea” in late 1864, the troops garrisoning the coastal islands conducted expeditions up the rivers 

from Port Royal to divert Confederate troops and threaten the 

railroad between Charleston and Savannah. In January 1865, 

part of Sherman’s army shifted from Savannah to Beaufort, South 

Carolina, to begin its march though the Carolinas. Those troops 

left behind provided security and maintained control of what 

had become a backwater while the war moved north.

The Wilmington Campaign, 1864–1865

By the fall of 1864, only one major seaport remained open 

to the Confederacy. On 5 August 1864, Rear Adm. David G. 

Farragut’s ships had fought their way past the defenses of Mobile 

Bay, Alabama, effectively closing the last major Gulf port. With 

Charleston under siege, New Berne occupied, and much of the 

Atlantic coast subject to raids and occupation, Wilmington, 

North Carolina, now provided the sole access for rebel blockade 

runners. Upwards of seventy ships operated from the port, 
47

smuggling essential goods, war supplies, and not a few luxuries. 

Lee’s army in Virginia depended on them for many of the 

weapons, supplies, and ammunition otherwise unavailable to an 

increasingly exhausted South. Yet Wilmington seemed almost 

impervious to interdiction. The city lay more than twenty-five 

miles from the mouth of the Cape Fear River and well out of 

range of naval guns. The entrance to the Cape Fear River and the 

approaches to the city bristled with forts, earthworks, artillery 

batteries, and defensive lines. Two inlets, separated by miles of 

shallow water, islands, and shoals, made blockading problematic. For more than three years, the U.S. Navy had unsuccessfully tried to stop the blockade runners. To do so demanded 

more than just warships. 

The key to closing Wilmington rested with Fort Fisher, a 

mammoth earthwork located between the sea and the river on a 

peninsula formally named Federal Point but unofficially renamed 

Confederate Point by local authorities. Shaped like an inverted 

L, the mammoth fort consisted of a series of elevated battery 

positions designed to withstand the strongest naval bombardment. Its sea face, nearly a mile long from south to north just 

above the high-water line, held nearly twenty long-range guns, 

mostly 8- and 10-inch Columbiads, in protected batteries. The 

Mound Battery anchored the southern end, rising over forty 

feet and mounting two heavy cannons. It not only fixed the 

end of the fort and overlooked the inlet, it provided a beacon 

for blockade runners. The land face cut for 500 yards across 

the peninsula from the sea to the Cape Fear River. It mounted 

twenty-two smaller cannons, in one- and two-gun batteries separated by traverses shielding them from enfilading naval gunfire. 

A palisade and electronically detonated torpedoes (land mines) 

were meant to break up any assault before it reached the walls. At 

the river end, a pair of fieldpieces guarded the only entrance to 

the fort via a road that crossed a stream immediately to the front 

of the gate. At the apex of the land and sea faces rose the 32-foothigh Northeast Bastion, a combination firing battery and battle 

command post that allowed observation over the entire fort and 

its approaches. Inside the fort, a flat plain contained barracks 

and three mortars, while sturdy bombproofs dug into the fort’s 

walls protected the garrison and ammunition magazines. The 

entire fort was constructed of sand and earth covered in sea oats 

and grass designed to absorb the impact of naval shells. About 
48 

a mile west and south of the fort, at the tip of Federal Point, 

stood Battery Buchanan, mounting two 10-inch Columbiads 

and two 11-inch smoothbores overlooking the inlet and river. In 

Confederate hands, Fort Fisher kept Wilmington open. 

On 2 September 1864, Assistant Secretary of the Navy 

Fox and General Gillmore, recently reassigned to Washington, 

D.C., but seeking more active duty, met with Grant at his headquarters at City Point, Virginia, to discuss their plan to seize 

Fort Fisher. President Lincoln had expressed interest in the 

plan but was unwilling to order Grant to back the operation if, 

in the commanding general’s opinion, it was unwise to do so. 

Stalemated by Lee at Petersburg and with Sherman stalled before 

Atlanta, Grant saw little reason to siphon off troops for a risky 

campaign he considered of secondary importance and a Navy 

responsibility. He did, however, understand the political importance of the city. Wilmington remained a symbol of Confederate 

sovereignty so long as ships could enter and leave. Additionally, 

the summer battles in Virginia and Georgia had cost too many 

lives for what much of the population in the North saw as little 

gain. War weariness threatened to end the conflict short of a 

Union victory. Lincoln needed some good news from the front 

with the presidential election just a few months off, and the plan 

appeared to offer a chance for some. Grant reluctantly agreed to 

support the expedition, with the caveat that he would do so only 

when troops became available. 

No sooner had Grant tepidly endorsed the plan than the 

strategic situation changed. On the day Grant met with Fox and 

Gillmore, Sherman captured Atlanta. He then advised Grant to 

support the operation against Wilmington as a useful adjunct to 

his maturing plans to march to Savannah. The appointment of 

Admiral David Dixon Porter, known and admired by Grant since 

the Vicksburg Campaign in 1863, to command the North Atlantic 

Blockading Squadron finally convinced him to support the expedition. Although still not fully committed, in late September he 

directed 6,500 troops from General Butler’s Army of the James 

to be prepared to sail to Wilmington and appointed Maj. Gen. 

Godfrey Weitzel to command the force. Grant, however, hedged 

his bets; while earmarking the troops and directing Weitzel to 

plan for the expedition, he withheld orders to dispatch it. Delays 

in gathering the troops and procuring transports further slowed 

preparations. Grant nearly withdrew Army support when he 
49

received reports that the Confederates knew an operation to be 

forthcoming, but he gave in to continued pressure from Porter 

and the Navy Department. 

In early December, Grant learned that the Confederates 

were withdrawing troops from Wilmington and Fort Fisher 

to reinforce those confronting Sherman in Georgia. Sensing 

an opportunity, he released Weitzel. Much to Admiral Porter’s 

chagrin, however, Grant made no attempt to stop General Butler, 

nominally Weitzel’s commander, from assuming active command 

of the expedition. Whether deferring to Butler’s prerogatives as 

commander of the Department of Virginia and North Carolina or 

seizing the chance to remove, even if for a short while, the often 

inept but politically connected Butler from operations around 

Petersburg, Grant’s inaction produced an immediate effect. Any 

prior goodwill between the Army and Navy evaporated. Porter 

thought Butler a fool and still rankled over a feud dating to their 

service at New Orleans two years before. Butler equally detested 

Porter. The two rarely met, using messages and subordinates to 

communicate. Fully aware of Fort Fisher’s formidable defenses, 

Butler distrusted the Navy’s ability to neutralize them. Instead, 

he proposed to load a ship full of explosives, beach it opposite 

the fort’s sea face, and detonate it, blasting a gap in the wall and 

stunning the garrison into defenselessness. Porter thought the 

idea impractical but agreed to supply the flat-bottomed USS 

Louisiana for the purpose. Nearly two more weeks elapsed before 

the Federals could ready the ship, strip it down to look like a 

blockade runner, and pack it with more than 200 tons of explosives. Finally, on 12 December Porter’s armada, the Louisiana 

included, sailed from Hampton Roads, followed two days later 

by Butler’s troop transports.

A comedy of errors and poor coordination ensued. Porter’s 

ships put in to Beaufort, North Carolina, to coal and to complete 

packing the Louisiana. Unaware, the Army transports arrived 

at the designated rendezvous point off Wilmington on 15 

December to find no Navy ships. Three days later, Porter arrived, 

advising Butler by dispatch boat that the Navy would detonate 

the explosives-packed ship that night. Surprised and enraged, 

Butler sent Weitzel to Porter’s flagship demanding the detonation be delayed until it could be coordinated with the landing 

of his troops. Neither Butler nor Porter talked directly, instead 

using dispatches and subordinates. A storm struck the fleet on 
50 

19 December, halting all operations for the next two days. Butler 

steamed his transports to Beaufort for refueling and provisioning 

while the storm blew over. He then notified Porter, whose ships 

remained off Cape Fear, that the Army transports would return 

on 24 December. Porter chose not to wait. On the night of 23 

December, the Louisiana proceeded toward the fort, crewed by 

a few sailors. When about 600 yards offshore, the crew set the 

charges and abandoned ship. Shortly before 0200 on 24 December, 

the Louisiana exploded, sending flames and water skyward 

but doing little else. Inside Fort Fisher, the garrison assumed 

a blockade runner, chased aground by a Federal gunboat, had 

been set afire and its magazines exploded. When the sun rose 

in the morning, Porter sent a ship to assess the damage done. It 

reported Fort Fisher unscathed. 

With daylight, Porter’s ships commenced firing on Fort 

Fisher in anticipation of Butler’s arrival and a Christmas Day 

landing. The shelling lasted all day and, from the sea, looked to 

be effective as geysers of sand flew and smoke covered the fort. 

Unobserved, however, the garrison sat safely, if uncomfortably, 

in bombproof shelters while the ramparts above them absorbed 

the bombardment. In fact, many of the shells overshot the walls 

and impacted on the plain behind, destroying barracks but 

doing little else. Butler’s transports arrived that night. Fuming 

over the Navy’s actions, he sent Weitzel to meet with Porter 

and work out a landing plan. On Christmas Day, the attack 

resumed. Late in the morning, troops went ashore from surfboats and barges north of Fort Fisher, covered by gunboats. The 

fort remained silent, a sign taken by some, to include Porter, 

that the bombardment had done its work. By late afternoon, 

more than 2,500 troops landed, with another 4,000 men waiting 

offshore in reserve. As the lead brigade turned toward the land 

face of Fort Fisher, winds began to rise, threatening to halt 

further landings. The Confederates emerged from their bombproofs to man the fort’s guns, most still intact. Faced with the 

dilemma of only part of his force ashore, rising winds, and a 

still strongly defended fort, Butler ordered a withdrawal. He 

then promptly departed for Hampton Roads, even while many 

of his troops remained stranded on the beach by high winds. 

Porter was outraged at what he thought was cowardice, incorrectly believing his ships had silenced Fort Fisher. But he could 

do little more than support the troops still ashore. Two more 
51

days elapsed before all could be ferried back to their transports. 

Porter then took his ships to Beaufort.

The failure at Fort Fisher produced immediate effects. 

Lincoln recalled Butler, who never held another command. Porter 

blamed the Army, convinced the fort could have been taken by 

storm after the Navy had all but neutralized its defenses. The 

allegations stung the War Department and Grant, who pledged 

support for another attempt to seize Fort Fisher. The promise also 

reflected a renewed strategic interest in Wilmington. On the day 

Butler landed his troops near Fort Fisher, Sherman telegraphed 

Lincoln offering Savannah as a 

Christmas present. He proposed 

to march north through the 

Carolinas, and, while Grant 

originally intended to shift 

Sherman’s army to Petersburg, 

he approved the new plan. Once 

ambivalent toward Wilmington, 

Grant now viewed the port 

as an essential forward base 

for Sherman’s campaign. In 

early January 1865, he placed 

Maj. Gen. Alfred H. Terry in 

command of nearly 9,000 troops 

for a second assault on Fort 

Fisher. In written orders, Grant 

directed Terry to cooperate 

closely with Porter, warning 

him that no misunderstandings 

should come between the two. 

Terry, a modest and capable 

veteran who had commanded a brigade during the assaults on 

Battery Wagner and a corps at Petersburg, impressed Porter 

when they met at Beaufort on 8 January. They quickly bonded, 

personally meeting each day for detailed planning. 

On 12 January, the expedition got under way, led by nearly 

sixty warships ranging from small gunboats to the USS New 

Ironsides with its fourteen 11-inch Dahlgren guns. Twenty-two 

transports carried Terry’s landing force of three small divisions, 

to include one from the recently formed XXV Corps composed 

entirely of African American regiments, along with field artillery, 

General Terry

(Library of Congress)
52

heavy siege guns, and engineers. Facing the Federal force, the 

Fort Fisher garrison mustered barely 700 men, although Lt. Gen. 

Braxton Bragg, recently appointed to command the defenses of 

Wilmington, promised reinforcements to the fort’s commander, 

Col. William Lamb, should an attack occur. In December, in 

response to Butler’s landings, Lee had dispatched 6,000 men 

under the command of Maj. Gen. Robert F. Hoke to Wilmington 

from the defenses of Petersburg. Although they had arrived too 

late to be a factor, they had remained in Wilmington. In the event 

of another assault on Fort Fisher, Bragg planned to move Hoke’s 

division down Federal Point to block any movement toward 

Wilmington and threaten the Federal rear. Bragg meant to protect 

the city, believing Fort Fisher largely capable of defending itself.

Shortly after dawn on 13 January, Porter’s fleet positioned 

itself off Fort Fisher and the beaches to its north while the troops 

prepared to board boats, many rowed by sailors. Directly covering 

the landing site, Navy guns opened fire into the woods and brush 

behind the beaches, intent on keeping any Confederates at bay. 

Despite high surf that drenched many of the soldiers, the operation went smoothly. Indeed, some troops stopped on the beach 

to build fires and dry out while bands greeted follow-on waves. 

After two hours and with several brigades ashore, skirmishers 

advanced inland (Map 3).

Bragg ordered Hoke to take up positions on Federal 

Point. A brigade deployed by river steamers went ahead, while 

the remainder marched the fifteen miles from the city. Hoke, 

convinced he faced a much larger force and leery of the naval 

guns, chose to dig in and defend against attack rather than to 

strike at the landing. About 350 South Carolinians, loaded on 

boats, managed to reach Battery Buchanan and make their way 

to Fort Fisher, where Lamb could muster barely a thousand 

defenders to meet Terry. Meanwhile, Porter’s main battle line 

opened fire on the fort, focusing on the gun positions and 

the land face and its protective palisade. Tacitly admitting the 

previous bombardment may not have been wholly effective, he 

gave strict orders to his captains to carefully observe the fall of 

shot. The naval bombardment systematically whittled away at the 

defenses. Terry, meanwhile, consolidated his beachhead and late 

that night the division from the XXV Corps extended a defensive 

line across the peninsula two miles north of Fort Fisher. They 

worked all night building breastworks and prepared to stop a 
H O K E

T ER RY T ERRY

NAVAL BDE Fort Fisher

Mound Battery

Northeast Bastion

Battery Buchanan

Fort Anderson

Fort Johnston

Fort Caswell

C a p e F e a r R i v e r

Town Creek

A

T L A

N T I C

O C E A N

Federal P oint

Brunswick Ferry

Wilmington and Weldon RR

Wilmington and Manchester RR

WILMINGTO N

Smithville

13–16 January 1865

B AT TLE OF FORT FISHER

A SKETCH OF THE

Confederate Entrenchments

Union Position

Union Landing

Union Movement

Union Entrenchments

Map 3
54 

still-anticipated counterattack by Hoke’s Confederates less than 

a mile away. Behind the defensive line, the rest of Terry’s force 

readied to move south. 

The next day, the remainder of Terry’s force landed, 

along with much of the artillery and some of the siege guns. 

The African American soldiers continued to strengthen the 

defensive line while Hoke made little effort to probe it. In 

midmorning, Porter’s ships again closed in and opened fire. 

They disabled nearly all of the guns along the land face, tore gaps 

in the protecting palisade, and killed or wounded Confederates 

attempting to effect repairs or return fire. The two assault divisions moved slowly toward Fort Fisher, erecting a continuous 

set of rifle pits and remaining concealed in the woods beyond 

the beaches as they did so. Terry personally crept to within 400 

yards of the wall to see the defenses for himself and finalize his 

attack plan. Observing the damage from the naval bombardment and unsure of the size or intentions of the Confederate 

force to his north, he determined to attack Fort Fisher the next 

day rather than to settle into a lengthy siege. Terry then rowed 

out to Porter’s flagship to coordinate the assault. 

Terry’s plan exploited a weakness he had observed. His 

main effort would be directed near the river, where the land 

face ended at the road entrance to the fort. Two enemy fieldpieces protected the gate and a battery on the wall overlooked 

the open ground to the front. Nonetheless, Terry felt his troops 

could cross the ground and overwhelm the defenders while 

avoiding fire from many of the guns farther down the land 

face. The Federal forces would attack in a column of brigades, 

each to be committed on Terry’s order. Once inside, they would 

move along the land face, rolling up the batteries one at a time 

from west to east. The two commanders agreed on a system 

of flag signals to keep supporting naval gunfire just ahead of 

the advancing troops, preventing Confederates from reestablishing their defensive positions. Porter then added a twist. He 

intended to land a naval brigade of more than 2,000 marines 

and sailors armed with cutlasses and pistols to overwhelm the 

Northeast Bastion at the other end of the land face. Although 

surprised by Porter’s plan, Terry said little. Grant had strictly 

enjoined him to cooperate fully with the Navy. So far, cooperation had been excellent. The naval attack would not affect 

Terry’s plan, so he did not object. 
55

During the night, Terry advanced his brigades through the 

wooded areas near the river. They settled into shallow rifle pits 

within a few hundred yards of the land face. The 15th New York 

Engineers built battery positions along the river for heavy artillery 

to ward off any Confederate attempt to bring reinforcements down 

the river or to shell the Federals from gunboats. In midmorning on 

15 January, the naval brigade landed. Despite their officers’ efforts, 

the sailors, undrilled in land tactics, formed into a loose column. 

Marines deployed forward as sharpshooters, under orders to pick 

off any enemy who might poke up his head. By 1500, they stood 

within 600 yards of the fort, in full view of the Confederates. On 

the far right, Federal soldiers deployed to their final positions, 

led by sharpshooters who advanced to within 200 yards of the 

fort. Arrayed in a column of four brigades, each deployed in line 

to lessen casualties. At 1530, Terry signaled Porter to shift his 

bombardment, and, five minutes later, Porter’s ships sounded their 

whistles to start the attack. 

Already under sporadic cannon and rifle fire, the naval 

brigade charged in an elongated mass of shouting sailors and 

marines, with the officers quickly losing control. When the naval 

bombardment shifted to the sea face, the unsupported sailors 

advanced down the open beach into a deadly hail of rifle fire and 

canister from Confederates rushing to the parapet. Although 

many of Lamb’s guns had been destroyed or dismounted, he 

retained enough to punish the brigade. In a series of sprints and 

halts to seek shelter, the sailors and marines moved in bounds, 

fewer getting up to go forward each time. Confusion reigned 

as officers fell and order disintegrated. With no covering naval 

gunfire, Confederate defenders stood in the open and fired into 

the mass below. It became a slaughter. A few sailors reached the 

foot of the Northeast Bastion, only to be cut down from above. 

Under withering fire and without direction, the sailors and 

marines broke. The naval brigade quickly degenerated into a 

disorganized mob fleeing back up the beach. The Confederates 

cheered and catcalled the fleeing naval force, unaware the fort 

had been breached elsewhere. 

As the sailors and marines began their charge, Terry’s lead 

brigade advanced from its wooded cover. Once in the open, the 

soldiers came under fire from the battery on the land face and 

the two field howitzers that covered the access gate. In addition, 

a Confederate gun moved forward through a sally port a few 
56 

hundred yards up the land face and opened an enfilading fire. 

Despite heavy casualties, the brigade pressed on. Reaching 

the base of the palisade, the attacking soldiers discovered the 

Confederate defenders could not fire down on them without 

being exposed. The Federal troops regrouped and charged the 

enemy parapet, cresting the top more than twenty feet above, and 

became enmeshed in hand-to-hand combat. On the right, the 

117th New York Infantry charged down the road and across the 

half-destroyed bridge, straight into the two guns at the entrance 

gate. The guns fired nearly point-blank into the New Yorkers’ 

faces. Those not killed or wounded closed on the battery, where a 

melee occurred. The initial onslaught, meeting heavy resistance 

at the gate and on the parapets, stalled. Observing from a vantage 

point several hundred yards away, Terry ordered the next brigade 

to press forward. Sheer numbers began to tell. The Confederates 

at the gate and the overlooking battery finally gave way. At just 

about the moment the naval brigade broke, Terry’s troops secured 

a foothold at the other end of the land face. Inadvertently, the 

sailors and marines had distracted the enemy just long enough 

to ensure Army success. 

Wheeling to their left, the Federal troops assaulted the 

next battery on the land face, while others advanced in parallel 

on the flat ground inside the fort. Lamb, previously focused 

on the naval brigade’s charge, suddenly observed the breach 

Land face of Fort Fisher looking toward the sea (Library of Congress)
57

from his vantage point on the Northeast Bastion and shifted 

what troops he had to reinforce those already in the fight. The 

parapet restricted the battle to a continuous series of hand-tohand fights along a narrow frontage, enabling outnumbered 

Confederates to match the Federals at the point of contact. 

Confusion reigned in the bloody close-quarters fighting. 

Attacking regiments, many of their officers killed or wounded, 

lost cohesion even as the soldiers pressed on. Repositioned 

to sweep the plain inside the fort, canister fire from cannons 

on the sea face prevented any Federal advance on the open 

ground. Momentarily stalemated, the assault soon regained 

its momentum. Porter’s ships resumed firing on the land face, 

aided by signals and careful observation of regimental colors. 

The Confederates, outnumbered and assailed by Federal troops 

and blasted by accurate naval fire, began to lose heart. Yet as 

darkness fell and exhaustion on both sides set in, the battle 

abated with the defenders still in control of half the land face. 

Terry refused to let up. He ordered his final brigade 

to move into the fort and to attack as soon as it could be in 

position. At 2100, the brigade resumed the assault led by the 3d 

New Hampshire Infantry, accompanied by many of the troops 

who had fought all day. The Confederates gave way, too weak 

and demoralized to resist any longer. Clearing the land face and 

turning south along the interior base of the sea face, the attack 

killed, captured, or pushed back the remaining defenders. 

Some fled to Battery Buchanan to the south, seeking evacuation by boat. The 27th U.S. Colored Troops, redeployed from 

the northern defensive line, now joined the advance. As they 

closed on Battery Buchanan, the last defenders surrendered. In 

a tragic postscript, early on 16 January, the fort’s main magazine 

exploded in a roar, probably after entry by torch-wielding 

soldiers, killing or burying as many as 200 men, both Federal 

troops and Confederate prisoners. Fort Fisher had fallen. 

With the seizure of Fort Fisher, the port of Wilmington was 

closed. Yet Grant wanted more than to stop blockade runners; 

he needed the port and city as a base for Sherman’s army as it 

advanced though the Carolinas. Between Hoke’s division and 

the various garrisons of the Cape Fear defenses, more than 

7,000 Confederate troops still stood in the way. Terry lacked 

the strength for the task, his original force of less than 10,000 

depleted by the casualties suffered at Fort Fisher. In a testi-
58 

mony to how far the United States Army had come since 1861, 

Grant ordered the XXIII Corps, veterans of Sherman’s Atlanta 

Campaign and most recently the Battle of Franklin, Tennessee, 

to travel east from Nashville by train and board transports for 

movement to North Carolina. He appointed its commander, 

Maj. Gen. John M. Schofield, to take personal command of 

operations. Within three weeks, the lead division from the 

corps arrived at Fort Fisher. On 11 February, Terry, now under 

Schofield’s direction, advanced up the east side of the Cape Fear 

only to be stopped by Hoke’s division, still dug in to the north. 

Schofield ferried the division of the XXIII Corps to the west 

side of the river. On 18 February, supported by Navy gunboats 

moving in parallel, the division enveloped the Confederate 

stronghold at Fort Anderson, fifteen miles downriver from 

Wilmington, forcing the defenders to retreat. With the Federals 

approaching Wilmington from the west and on the river, Bragg 

ordered Hoke to withdraw to the city’s inner defenses. He made 

one last stand on 20 February to allow Confederate stores to be 

evacuated or destroyed. The Confederate forces departed two 

days later, retreating northward toward Goldsboro. The 3d New 

Hampshire Infantry led the procession into the city, closely 

followed by a contingent of U.S. Colored Troops. 

The capture of Wilmington all but ended Union operations along the Atlantic coast. Charleston surrendered on 

18 February as General Sherman’s army stormed through 

South Carolina. Schofield moved inland in pursuit of Bragg’s 

rebels, directing newly arriving units of the XXIII Corps to 

sail to New Berne, link with Federal forces there, and drive 

toward Kinston and Goldsboro from the east. At the Battle 

of Wyse Fork near Kinston on 7–10 March, they clashed with 

a Confederate force under Bragg composed of local troops 

and Hoke’s division. Although initially successful, Bragg was 

outnumbered and facing entrapment by Schofield closing from 

the south. He retreated to join General Joseph E. Johnston’s 

army withdrawing slowly before Sherman. Bloody rearguard 

battles at Averasboro and Bentonville in March did little to slow 

Sherman, who continued to pursue the Confederates toward 

Raleigh and Durham. On 26 April 1865, Johnston formally 

surrendered to Sherman. With General Lee’s Army of Northern 

Virginia having already surrendered on 9 April, the American 

Civil War was finally drawing to a close.
59

Analysis

Nearly every expedition or battle along the Atlantic coast 

required Army-Navy cooperation to be successful. Port Royal, 

Hatteras, Roanoke, New Berne, Morris Island, and Wilmington 

and countless small forays would have been impossible without 

it. Along the coast and in the North Carolina inland waters, 

mobility and firepower depended on naval ships, ranging from 

large warships to small gunboats. General Lee noted in early 

1862 that Federal troops moving up the rivers and inlets of 

South Carolina and Georgia rarely strayed out of range of naval 

guns. Garrisons posted on the sea islands of South Carolina or 

in towns bordering the inland sounds relied on naval forces for 

their supply and often defense. Thus when naval superiority was 

lost, as when the ironclad Albemarle sallied forth, Union troops 

fell back and abandoned Plymouth. Once the ironclad was sunk 

several weeks later, it was the Confederates who quickly withdrew 

in the face of advancing Federal gunboats. Neither the Navy nor 

the Army could have succeeded without the other.

Yet, despite their interdependence, cooperation between the 

two services varied widely, often depending on the personalities 

involved. Friction between Gillmore and Dahlgren at Charleston 

and Butler and Porter at Fort Fisher poisoned chances for 

success. In contrast, the close relationship between Burnside and 

Goldsborough at Roanoke Island and New Berne proved key to 

the quick victories. 

If personalities played a role, so too did competing strategic goals. The Navy’s primary focus lay with the blockade; 

it did not understand the Army’s reticence to support it. The 

Army viewed the coastal war largely as a sideshow that threatened to drain badly needed soldiers from the main theaters of 

conflict. The U.S. government never overcame this divergence 

of priorities. 

Bickering aside, over the course of four years of war, 

Federal military operations along the Atlantic coast played a 

key role in slowly strangling the Confederacy. Between 1862 

and 1865, Southern cotton exports fell to just 5 percent of 

prewar levels. The number of vessels entering Confederate 

ports steadily decreased as the war went on. The broad strategy 

first envisioned by Maj. Gen. Winfield Scott and detailed by the 

Commission of Conference ultimately proved highly effective. 
60 

Bit by bit the North closed off rebel commerce while keeping 

Southern coastal communities in a state of alarm that tied 

down the Confederacy’s own hard-pressed military manpower. 

Thus, despite their relatively few numbers and often forgotten 

efforts, the soldiers who served along the Atlantic coast played 

a crucial part in the outcome of the Civil War. 
61

The Author

R. Scott Moore is the director of the Field Programs and 

Historical Services Division at the U.S. Army Center of Military 

History. He previously served in the Office of the Deputy 

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Partnership Strategy and as a 

senior defense analyst at Hicks and Associates. A Marine Corps 

infantry officer from 1976 to 2001, he participated in combat, 

expeditionary, and humanitarian operations in Panama, the 

Balkans, Kuwait, the Far East, and Africa and commanded a 

battalion landing team during noncombatant evacuation operations in Albania in 1997. Moore graduated from the U.S. Naval 

Academy in 1976, earned a master’s degree in history from Duke 

University, a master’s degree in international relations from Salve 

Regina University, and a Ph.D. in conflict analysis and resolution 

from George Mason University. He is a graduate of the Marine 

Corps Command and Staff College.
62

Further Readings

Browning, Robert M., Jr. From Cape Charles to Cape Fear: The 

North Atlantic Blockading Squadron during the Civil War. 

Tuscaloosa, Ala.: University of Alabama Press, 1993.

———. Success Is All That Was Expected: The South Atlantic 

Blockading Squadron during the Civil War. Washington, D.C.: 

Brassey’s, 2002.

Dobak, William A. Freedom by the Sword: The U.S. Colored 

Troops, 1862–1867. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of 

Military History, 2011.

Fonvielle, Chris E., Jr. The Wilmington Campaign: Last Rays of 

Departing Hope. Campbell, Calif.: Savas Publishing, 1997.

Nulty, William H. Confederate Florida: The Road to Olustee. 

Tuscaloosa, Ala.: University of Alabama Press, 1990.

Trotter, William R. Ironclads and Columbiads: The Civil War in 

North Carolina, The Coast. Winston-Salem, N.C.: John F. Blair, 

Publisher, 1989.

For more information on the U.S. Army in the Civil War, please 

read other titles in the U.S. Army Campaigns of the Civil War 

series published by the U.S. Army Center of Military History 

(www.history.army.mil).

PIN : 105530–000

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