the battlefield from atop a high hill. The G-6 set up a sound system in the desert, and the

G-2 and G-3 Marines prepared an even grander version of the 'mother of all terrain

models' for the upcoming drill.

Participating and supporting units attended the second Jersey Drill, allowing everyone an

opportunity to gain a clear understanding of the Division 's intended scheme of maneuver.

Persoimel from across the Division, higher, adjacent, and supporting units attended

this capstone event. Lieutenant General Conway, Major General (UK) Brimms, Major

General Amos, Major General Stalder, Rear Admiral Kubic, Brigadier General Natonski,

and Brigadier General Usher were in attendance. The large audience included uniforms

from almost every branch and service, including the UK coalition partners. The purpose

of the drill was to ensure that commanders, supporting organizations, and Division battle

staff had a clear understanding of the Division's intent. The task organization, battlefield

geometry, and visualization of the sequence of events for the Opening Gambit were

reviewed. The review allowed all units to visualize their role in the coming fight. Even

with a planned sequence of events, the Division's plan remained agile enough to

incorporate the expected last minute changes and timings that are always part of such a

high stakes endeavor.

Lieutenant Colonel Bob Sinclair, the Division Current Operations Officer,

coordinated the drill from start to finish in his usual enthusiastic and forceful manner. He

and Lieutenant Colonel Groen from the G-2 conducted a tag-team briefing, covering the

geographic laydown, expected enemy actions, and friendly scheme of maneuver timings

for the entire Opening Gambit. Although the specific opening day timing was still

unresolved, the Division used a nominal four-day separation between A-day and G-day

for the drill scenario. Actions on the terrain model began in the Division's Dispersal

Areas in northern Kuwait, and continued through the establishment of a bridgehead

across the Euphrates River. Even though originally planned as a Division rehearsal, the

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drill was invaluable as it coordinated key players from throughout the MEF to the actions

of the Opening Gambit.

The exercise complete, Lieutenant General Conway took the opportunity to address

the assembled staffs. He remarked that the rehearsal was well done, and that he was glad

all elements of the MEF had participated. Then, with an unexpected gravity in his voice,

he announced that five days ago, the President had notified USCENTCOM that they were

to be ready to attack into Iraq on order. The assembled crowd of professionals let the

words sink in. This would be the last rehearsal. This marked the end of preparation and

the beginning of execution. The MEF was going to war, and the Marines gathered here

would be the ones to lead it.

Reducing the Border Obstacles

On 5 March, Kuwaiti engineers began the reduction of the border obstacles on the

Kuwaiti side. Breaching commenced with the cutting of the first electrified fence, which

was cut in three places by the end of the day. The work, conducted by KLF engineers

and a civilian contractor, was conducted to look like routine fence maintenance scheduled

for that time of year. As a precaution, however, MEF tasked the Division to provide a

counterfire capability so that the engineers could withdraw if they were fired upon by

Iraqi artillery. 1 1th Marines ordered 5/11 to displace to within five kilometers of the berm

marking the UN Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), and to move the Regimental CP with two

Q-46 and two Q-37 radars forward to provide a counterfire headquarters and target

acquisition capability. The Division FSCC stood by to request aviation fires from 3d

MAW. There was no Iraqi response the first day. The pace of work picked up, however,

and soon the engineers were breaching the berm and filling in the tank ditches. The

Division noted an increase in frequency of Iraqi patrols along the border, but still there

was no belligerent response. The engineers worked in daylight only. Each day,

Lieutenant Colonel Paul Cyr, dressed in a nondescript set of blue coveralls, went forward

into the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) to monitor the work and ensure that the engineers

created the breaches where and how the Division desired. At the end of six days of work,

twenty-eight breach lanes had been cut and the fence had been removed in twenty places.

The engineers withdrew from the berm, but 1 1th Marines, now with 1/1 1 in position to

provide counterbattery fires, remained forward.

The Enemy's Last Moves

Signs of Regime instability appeared daily as the fissures in the Regime's façade

began to widen. Reports of Saddam's alleged efforts to seek asylum outside of Iraq had a

demoralizing effect on the Iraqi army. The reports also raised interesting questions on

the US side, as media pundits debated whether an attack would be necessary if Saddam

were to step down voluntarily. The Division remained undistracted by the running

political dialogue, and kept its attention on securing its military objectives quickly if the

order came. The standard Regime tactics of shuffling officers between commands,

threatening deserters with execution, and reinforcing conventional units with special

Regime troops continued. Reportedly, any Iraqi caught with a Global Positioning System

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(GPS) receiver or satellite telephone was subject to execution. In a nation-wide exercise

in whistling in the dark, the Regime continued to tell its armed forces and its people that

the US would not attack. Even with these false messages of assurance (written for

domestic consumption) the Regime began to quietly pull forces off the 'Green Line' in

the north. (The Green Line was the line of control between Kurdish and Iraqi forces in

northern Iraq.) Later, after the Turkish Government had denied the US permission to

stage an attack from Turkey as part of a 'Northern Option', this trend accelerated. Most

notably, the Adnan Republican Guard Mechanized Infantry Division was pulled south to

Tikrit and the northern outskirts of Baghdad by rail (thus gaining for itself an opportunity

to meet the 1St Marine Division on a future battlefield.)

The Division's commanders and staff officers watched with disdain as the open

international press began to publish

some highly accurate reports of the

US planned attack. Reports

telegraphing the criticality of the

South Rumaylah oilfields to the US

plan were broadcast in the

international press, and grimly

debated by a series of pundits on

national television. Having already

observed the Iraqis reposition

forces in response to media

discussions of an amphibious

assault, the Division waited,

hopeful that the enemy would not

react to these new reports by

initiating the destruction of the 'Fire Trenches' were dug by the Iraqis. When filled

with oil and set ablaze, they pro vided obscuration of oilfield infrastructure. From some deftnsive positions and artillery systems. of the forward staging areas in

Kuwait, the routine glow of the

Iraqi oil infrastructure from natural gas burn-off could be seen in the night sky. Division

eyes watched vigilantly for any unexplained bright spots on the night horizon.

As if they were reading the Division's thoughts (or perhaps just reading the

newspaper) signs of suspicious activity in the South Rumaylah oilfields increased. There

were a number of isolated indicators of infantry units deploying to the area. Daily, the

Division sent the Pioneer in a detailed search pattern of the area of the oil infrastructure.

The vigilance was finally rewarded on a daylight mission in March, when artillery pieces

were observed setting up near the GOSPs. Perhaps this was the long-awaited move into

the oilfields. These reports were quickly followed by confirmation of conventional

Battalion-sized units moving in and preparing defensive positions in the oilfield area.

Large suspicious trenches were dug in scattered positions throughout, and the Iraqis were

observed filling these trenches with oil, then lighting them on fire. Were these 'fire

trenches' for obscuration alone? Was there some more insidious purpose for these fire

trenches such as the release of chemical agents in an oil slurry? In the intelligence

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reports from higher, the reported size of the Iraqi unit in the oilfields quickly swelled

from battalion to division size. Division intelligence personnel noted the presence of one,

two, three, and eventually four artillery batteries in South Rumaylah, as well as the

nearby presence of reinforcing artillery from III Corps. These reinforcing GHN-45's

were particularly problematic, as they were known to be chemical-capable, and had

repositioned to a point that allowed them to range all the way into Kuwait. With repeated

sightings of BM-2 1 Multiple Rocket Launchers near Zubayr, the Iraqis finally seemed to

be waking from their long slumber

Closer to Az Zubayr, a battalion-sized tank unit was observed establishing defensive

positions near the Crown Jewel. Elements of the III Corps anti-tank missile battalion

were observed near the Shuaybah barracks north of Az Zubayr. Reports of armored units

moving south to defend closer to the border began to come in, and the Regime forces in

Safwan were reportedly reinforced with heavy machine guns, and tanks. Almost daily,

there was some report of major changes in the enemy disposition in southern Iraq,

making it very difficult to differentiate fact from fiction. Reporting of massed armor

defending near Safwan, and the reports of Republican Guard reinforcement of the

southern Iraqi defenses could not be confirmed, even with repeated Pioneer and P-3

missions. These reports would continue to flow into the Division, even while crossing

the Line of Departure, and were to cause several tense moments later in execution. The

fog and friction of war continued to impact the Division, even at the doorstep of the

much-vaunted information age. The theorized 'holy grail' of perfect clarity on the

the battlefield had certainly not yet been achieved. Tn fact, the Division's information

needs appeared to expand exponentially with each new piece of information received, in

an endless and ever expanding cycle. The commanders throughout the Division took it

all in stride and, armed with the CG's intent, adapted their plans as the clock wound down

on the Iraqi Regime.

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The Division was faced with a significant impact to the timing of the Opening

Gambit. RCT-5 had planned to quickly seize the oil infrastructure against only limited

resistance. Now that the enemy was present in large and growing numbers, this task

might take longer than originally planned. The targeting implications of these forces

occupying positions near critical oil infrastructure were also significant. The Gas Oil

Separation Plants, in particular, had tremendous explosive potential that could easily be

ignited by a careless artillery round. The Division sought and received the attachment of

UK oilfield experts who could assist in the rapid but safe shutdown of the GOSPs. This

would reduce the risk of catastrophic explosion to the Marines of RCT-5 who would

seize them. Extricating the enemy from the South Rumaylah without blowing up the

whole complex (and themselves) fell to RCT-5 as a primary challenge.

Additional indicators of SSMs now appeared in the South, and the Division's reaction

was swift. The Division quickly nominated detected SSMs for immediate strike under

the auspices of OSW. The enemys missiles were in violation of UN restrictions that

forbade certain Iraqi weapons systems south of the 32d parallel. Specific indicators of

Abibil- 100 Missiles and launchers were detected in the Al Qurnah, Al Basrah, and Az

Zubayr areas. The presence of these highly mobile launchers in range of the Division's

The Iraqi disposition in southern Iraq, as ass essed just prior to the Division crossing the line of

departure.

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assembly areas marked a new threat. In a clear demonstration of the enemy's ability to

outpace a ponderous deliberate targeting cycle, the detected systems usually hid or

moved before Coalition aircraft were able to deliver bombs on target, and often

reappeared nearby within days. This shift in targeting by OSW aircraft from anti-air

defense capability to anti-offensive missile capability was a significant turning point.

Balancing the elimination of threats to ground units in Kuwait with the risk of beginning

a general air shaping campaign was to prove difficult. The Division waited grimly and

patiently for attack orders, from within the range fan of the Iraqi missile systems.

Something would have to change soon, as the Iraqis were gaining a capability that

presented a threat to both Coalition forces and Kuwaiti civilians.

The Eve of Combat — The Stage is Set

As the diplomatic clock wound down, the entire world watched the Coalition forces

poised to remove a ruthless dictator. Thanks to the Global Broadcast System, the

Division CP was able to follow the political events, even from their advanced bases in

Kuwait. UN weapons inspections had restarted in December of 2002, as Division forces

were preparing to deploy. The inspectors noted the same lack of cooperation on the part

of the Iraqis as previous inspectors, but had not yet been able to find any major 'smoking

gun' that confirmed the presence of WMD. The Division watched as the UN inspectors

visited suspect sites within its proposed zone and came up empty-handed. In February,

the Iraqi's Al Samoud II missiles were declared in violation of UN restrictions, removing

one of the SSM systems that the Division had been prepared to defend against. In early

March, the US found itself opposed diplomatically by France, Germany, and Russia, and

stymied in the UN Security Council. On the 7t1 of March, Chief UN weapons inspector

Hans Blix reported continued intransigence on the part of the Regime. The politicians

wrestled with the appropriate response to a dictator in open defiance of the UN for the

past twelve years, who was known to be pursuing WMD, and who controlled the Iraqi

people through a careful program of sadistic repression. On 16 March, the leaders of the

US, UK, and Spain met in the Azores and committed themselves to taking action to

remove the threat posed by Saddam. Diplomatic options were coming to a close, as the

US sought, then abandoned, an attempt at additional UN Security Council action.

On 17 March, President Bush issued an ultimatum, giving Saddani 48 hours to leave

iraq or face his forced removal. In the wake of the President's ultimatum to Saddam

Hussein, USCENTCOM declared Iraqi forces hostil&. The Division Main CP listened to

the President's words. There was no longer any doubt. All of the months of planning,

preparation, and rehearsal would now be put to the test. The Marines would be called

once again to face the nation's foes and remove an armed threat, to stand and deliver a

victory.

On the evening of 17 March, Blue Diamond issued the FRAGO for all units of the 1 St

Marine Division to move from the LSAs to their Dispersal Areas. Units confirmed

receipt of the order, and prepared to move out.

The CG delivered this message to all the Marines and Sailors of the Division:

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133
I've come to understand that in reality, war is nothing but nasty business. You can write

poetry and plant flowers around it, but it's nothing but hard work and nasty business.

Chapter 4

The Opening Gambit

On the evening of 17 March, Saint Patrick's Day, the Division published a FRAGO directing

the Division's units to move from their LSAs to Dispersal Areas (DAs). Early the next morning,

President Bush delivered a speech that many in the Kuwaiti desert awoke early to hear. The time

for diplomacy had run out, and the President gave the regime of Saddam Hussein 48 hours to

depart Iraq or face military action. The LSAs came alive with activity. Final preparations were

made to vehicles, equipment was remounted, additional chow was distributed, and water jugs

were topped off. Because units had spent the past ten days living out of their packs, the Marines

were prepared to move to the Dispersal Areas at a moment's notice.

With the 17 March order to move to DAs, the Division began a series of moves that would

end in Baghdad and Tikrit. President Bush's ultimatum to the Iraqi Regime was followed by a

flurry of activity on the political front, none more important than confirmation that the UK

government had given its approval for its forces to participate. The execute order was gladly

received by the 1st UK Armoured Division. The extraordinary partnership that the UK and

Marine Divisions had established during planning was given the green light to continue into

execution. US Central Command (USCENTCOM) issued the order declaring all Iraqi military

and paramilitary forces to be hostile, and the wartime Rules of Engagement were put in place.

The Division watched as the last of the UN Observer forces were withdrawn from the

demilitarized zone along the border. As quickly as the UN Observers left, the Iraqis filled the

vacated posts. There was now nothing between the two armies but a berm of sand and a ditch.

The two sides eyed each other warily, each waiting for the other to make a move. Division

actions near the border drew sporadic mortar fire from the Iraqis, and even the smallest action on

the Iraqi side of the line drew a Coalition reaction. There was an inevitability to the coming

combat now, and Blue Diamond was eager to get moving.

From the moment the Division issued the FRAGO, wheels were set in motion. A rapid

tempo was important even in this first movement. The Division made a tempting target for an

enemy artillery or missile attack while it moved out of its established LSAs. The Division

moved quickly to establish the Main CP, get artillery fire-capable, and establish security zones

ahead of the DAs. The first unit out of the LSA was the Division Forward CP, which

immediately moved to its position in northern Kuwait. The 11th1 Marines CP, 1/11, and

counterbattery radar teams were already in position. By the morning of 18 March, the Division

Forward was up and running in northern Kuwait, and ready to assume 'Blue Diamond' control.

(On the radio nets, the term 'Blue Diamond' served as the call-sign for the Division headquarters

(Main or Forward) that currently had control of the fight. Passage of the call-sign accompanied

passage of control of the Division. This way, it was transparent to subordinate elements as to

whether the Division Forward or Division Main CP was running the fight.)

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The Forward CP assumed control on 18 March, allowing the Main CP to tear down and

displace to its battle position in northern Kuwait, just short of the range of enemy artillery units

that could reach inside Kuwait. By the afternoon of 19 March, the Main CP was in its battle

position far forward of the rest of the Division. From this carefully selected and practiced site,

the Main CP would command and control the invasion of Iraq, sited for the best possible

communications with widely dispersed maneuver elements. This positioning was fundamental to

the uninterrupted tempo of the attack. 'Blue Diamond' was passed back to the Main CP, and the

Marines began to track both enemy and friendly movements with a keen focus. The Forward

CP, under Lieutenant Colonel Bob Sinclair, tore down and moved into its Attack Position (AP),

ready to displace into Iraq behind the assault elements. For the Marines in the Division CP, the

fight had begun.

The DAs had been carefully chosen as an

intermediate step that would not only keep

units out of the line-of-sight of Jabal Sanam,

but also would get them out of the fixed LSA

locations, which likely had been targeted for

enemy surface-to-surface missile fire. If the

Iraqis were going to launch preemptive

missile strikes or chemical attacks, the LSAs

could easily be targeted. The DAs, located 10

kilometers or more outside the LSAs, were

closer to the border but still beyond the range

of Iraqi artillery systems. The Division was

Once the Division received the order, more than 20,000 eager to fight, but did not want to precipitate a

Marines moved from LSA 's to their DA 's near the political event by making a provocative

Iraqi border. movement on the ground.

To ensure smooth movement of all Division units, 3d AA Battalion (Reinforced by 2d and 4thi

AA Battalions, and a reserve company of MPs) established Traffic Management Control Points

to guide units to the DAs. Strict unit movement control would enable the rapid tempo of the

Division through critical chokepoints in the fight. The Division units in the LSAs began their

movement to the north, continued in good order, and were in position on the afternoon of 18

March. Because of the pre-movement reconnaissance, these movements were accomplished

with minimal 'friction'. The more than 20,000 Marines of the Division and their over 5,000

vehicles moved out of the LSAs and were consolidated within the DAs. Third MAW and

supporting US Army Aviation helicopters were positioned with the Division and RCT CPs to

provide CASE VAC and Command and Control (C2) birds.

The Division also began to move artillery into some of its intermediate Position Areas (PAs).

Each direct support artillery battalion would push up to PAs that would support their respective

RCTs. The positioning of artillery and counterbattery radars was key, as these weapons needed

to be well forward to provide fires in support of breaching activities. Because these critical

systems were so far forward, Alpha Company from 3(1 LAR was assigned a guard mission to

prevent enemy interference with the Division's artillery fire-support assets. The LAR Company

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also provided a measure of security for the Division Main CP, which was at risk in the unlikely

event of an Iraqi attempt at a spoiling attack.

The carefully rehearsed Division scheme of maneuver continued from the Dispersal Areas

with a movement to Attack Positions (APs) just short of the border obstacles. The APs were the

final staging areas the assaulting elements would occupy prior to commencing the attack. The

Division's scheme of maneuver had clearly identified the sequence of moving from LSAs to DAs

to APs, but had left the time spent in each flexible. Each unit monitored the execution matrix

containing the sequence of events, but was prepared to spend minutes, hours, or even days in the

APs or DAs as battlefield conditions dictated. After leaving the APs, the attacking forces would

exploit the breaches that the Kuwaitis had prepared through the border obstacles. There were a

number of breach lanes across the Division's front. To the west, breach lanes 'Red' 1-6

supported RCT-5's attack. In the center, lanes 'Green' 1-5 supported 11th Marines and 3d LAR.

On the eastern edge of the zone, breach lanes 'Orange' 1-5 supported RCT-7's attack near

Safwan. By the plan, the Division Main CP would issue the command, and the Division would

attack across the border in a simultaneous, unstoppable wave.

Endeavoring to keep the situational awareness of his commanders high, the CG conducted a

final coordination/update conference to

provide current operational timelines. The

coordination meeting, held at a desolate,

windy location, revealed no issues. The

commanders were confident, and their

units ready. Each passing moment now

posed a risk to the oilfield infrastructure,

and gave the Iraqis time to react to the

attack they surely knew was coming.

Although weather adversely impacted

collections within the last 24 hours, the G2 located one new Iraqi Type 59-1 artillery

battery approximately 18 km north of

Safwan, and an ASTROS multiple rocket The CG and subordinate commanders tneet one more launcher in the vicinity of Shuaybah lime before crossing the Line of Departure. barracks. Both positions were nominated

and were targeted by OSW aircraft.

The Iraqis Disposed to Defend

On the eve of battle, the Iraqis hunkered down in a largely set piece defense across the

Division's zone. At the border, the Division faced screening and reconnaissance elements from

the Iraqi border guards, Regime security services, and Baath militia. Human Intelligence had

reported reinforcements of the defenses in the Safwan area, and a number of tanks from the 51St

Mechanized Division had been pushed south down Highway 31. The border guard and Regime

troops patrolled the border in isolated groups, supported by mortar fires. There were reports of

hasty minefields emplaced in the wake of the withdrawing UN forces, especially to the north of

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Jabal Sanam, and Iraqis were observed laying surface mines astride the few roads that led across

the border from Kuwait.

To the west, the previous weeks had seen a full brigade of the Iraqi RA 18th infantry Division

move in to the previously undefended South Rumaylah oilfields, concentrated in the vicinity of

GOSP 3 and the South Rumaylah intermediate pump station. A battalion of D-30 howitzers

directly supported this brigade, with general support provided by at least two batteries of Type

59-i's and one battery of GHN-45's. This position appeared largely unsupported by other

maneuver elements, however, and stood isolated in the oilfield infrastructure.

To the east, armored elements from the 5 1st Mechanized Division's 41st Brigade had been

pushed south, forward of their garrison positions to defend along the Highways 8 and 31 avenues

of approach in the vicinity of the Zubayr pumping station complex, or 'Crown Jewel'. Major

elements of the 3 1st Brigade had withdrawn into the Al Basrah urban area, but at least one

battalion remained in the vicinity of the Shuaybah barracks just north of Az Zubayr. Judging by

its stationary equipment, major elements of the 32d Brigade likewise remained in the vicinity of

garrison, with some screening elements pushed south down Highway 80. There had been a

surprising lack of conventional preparation of obstacles, minefields, and integrated defensive

positions on the part of this Division.

On the north side of the Shaat Al Basrah waterway, The 6t1 Armored Division (6th AD)

remained dispersed on the approaches to Al Basrah from the east and north. The 30thi Armored

Brigade remained oriented toward the Iranian border and Al Faw, while the Armored

Brigade was poised north of the Saddam Canal in a position to counterattack to the west or south.

The remaining brigade of the 6th AD, the 25th Mechanized, remained in defensive positions near

Al Qurnah, guarding the Euphrates River crossing there. If the Iraqis were going to vigorously

defend, the 6th AD would be a center of gravity for them. The 6 AD had older equipment, but

had over 100 T-54/55 main battle tanks. The iraqis could do little with conventional military

forces to stop the 1st Marine Division's assault, but the 6th AD was their best bet to attempt to

delay it.

The 1 1th Infantry Division (1 1th ID) remained spread across the marshes to the east of An

Nasiriyah, and had reportedly sent one of its brigades to reinforce Al Basrah and the port of

Umm Qasr. The Division G-2 had expected to see the 1 1th ID consolidate in the An Nasiriyah

defenses, but they had not done so by the time the Division commenced its attack. By all

appearances, the Iraqis had chosen to use the 1 11ii ID to maintain control over the local Shiites,

while other Regime forces defended the An Nasiriyah chokepoint. The city of An Nasiriyah was

reportedly defended by at least a brigade of reinforcements from the north, composed of

elements of the Republican Guard, Baath militia, and an unknown number of paramilitary

fighters. Located at the waist of the ?hourglass! chokepoint, An Nasiriyah presented challenges to

long term stabilization similar to the ones the Al Basrah area did. The Division hoped to avoid

the enduring tasks that would accompany securing and stabilizing the An Nasiriyah urban area,

leaving this mission to Task Force Tarawa.

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The Iraqi III Corps of the Regular Army Forces defended in the Division zone. Just before Blue

Diamond commenced the attack, an Iraqi informant reported that a Republican Guard armored brigade

had allegedly crept into position near the Safwan border crossing (green icon above.)

The Iraqi missile and rocket forces were still reported operating throughout the Division's

zone, with at. least a brigade's worth of launchers and missiles in position to range the border

area and Kuwait. There had been no reduction in the number of reported sightings or imagery

detections of these systems, and the words of the Regime's previous threats still rang in the

Division's ears. The Regime had told the Iraqi people to be strong for 72 hours, and withstand

the Coalition assault. The Regime promised this would give them time to launch a massive

retaliation using its missile forces. The Iraqis had experienced some success to date in hiding

these forces from coalition targeting, and all of these systems were possibly chemical-capable.

The strong words were likely just more bluster on the part of the Regime hierarchy in order to

buy time for their own escape, but the possibility of the employment of chemical weapons in the

opening days of the war could not be dismissed out of hand or wished away.

19 March

Poised for Battle

On 19 March, as units topped off fuel and ammo in the DAs, selected elements of the

Division were operating forward in security zones established to prevent enemy incursions

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across the border. To the west of Highway 80, 3d LAR Battalion prepared to tie in with the Brits

on the right and with RCT-7 on the left. Alpha Company, 3d LAR, moved north to protect

artillery and engineer elements operating along the border. Elements of 3d Battalion, 7th Marines

(3/7), and 1st Tank Battalion took up positions near the southern Kuwaiti berm, approximately 5

km south of the border. To the west, 1st LAR Battalion established a security zone to the far

western limits of the Division's battlespace. These units were to observe a number of interesting

activities in the tiny space between two armies poised for battle.

That day, Major Andy Milburn, a plans officer with the RCT-7 staff, was accomanying an

attached Psychological Operations (PsyOps) detachment from the US Army's 305t PSYOPS

Company as they moved close to the border to broadcast a surrender message to the Iraqi armed

forces. Major Milburn was interested to note the Iraqis actually grouping together to listen to the

recorded message. At least some of the Iraqis were interested enough to listen, but certainly their

commanders and Regime minders would not allow this sort of assembly. "I wonder why we

haven't seen any indirect fires from these guys yet," he wondered aloud. There were apparently

a few Iraqis who agreed and were not convinced by the PsyOps message, because he had no

sooner said the words out loud than the Iraqis obliged the PsyOps team by lobbing mortar rounds

at them. US Army Sergeant Thomas Stiffey, the team chief, was not amused. From that point

on, Sergeant Stiffey was leery of traveling anywhere with Major Milburn.

That evening, President Bush's diplomatic ultimatum to Saddam Hussein expired. The

Iraqi's had chosen to reject the ultimatum, and now faced the reality that the Regime would be

removed by force. On the night of 19 March, US Navy ships in the Arabian Gulf launched over

35 cruise missiles at targets in Baghdad and other strategic sites. The successive activation of

wartime Air Tasking Orders (ATOs) followed this strike. The initiation of the air campaign (Aday) had arrived, and the Division

watched the firepower of 3' MAW

begin to shape the positions of the

51St Mechanized Division and the

units in the Rumaylah oilfields. In

addition to the planned wartime

ATOs, the Wing had also arranged

eight hours of shaping which was

planned to be 'cut and pasted' into

The SCUD missile system is capable of delivering long range the last OSW ATO. Aviation fires

conventional and NBC munitions. Primary intelligence and against ground targets commenced

fires tasks were to locate and destroy Iraqi missile systems. immediately, and took a significant

toll against the enemy artillery. The

G-2 and G-3 Fires sections were able to confirm the destruction of the troublesome battery of

long-range GHN-45 artillery pieces by having the VMIJ fly the Pioneer over the position. As the

Marines of the Division would later attest, these aviation fires had devastating effect on the Iraqi

defenders, and began to impact the decision process of many Iraqis who were undecided about

whether they should stay and fight the Americans or run away. The Division CG entered the

Main CP and set MOPP 1. He approved 11th Marine's move north to the border area and their

PAs. The artillery units quietly moved up under the cover of darkness.

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Patriot missile batteries poised throughout northern and central Ku wa it provided a multi-layer

missile defense for cities, airfields, fixed facilities and maneuver forces staged in Kuwait.

As the Division sat poised waiting for the word to go, the Iraqis reiterated their intent to defy

President Bush's ultimatum by launching volleys of long-range missiles at major US bases in

Kuwait. The Iraqis chose to target major facilities at Camp Doha, Ali al Salem Air Base, and Al

Jaber airbase, as well as Camp Commando, which housed the Division Support Area (and the

MEF CP.)

The theater had established a 'SCUD-beeper' warning system to give early indication of a

missile launch out of Iraq, and the beepers began to repeatedly sound off in the Division and

RCT CPs. In each CP, the buzz of normal activity would cease whenever the beeper went off.

Everyone would stop and look at the Senior Watch Officer (SWO) as he fumbled with the device

then squinted to read the message on the tiny screen. This day, the beepers were going off at a

cyclic rate, and every time a

missile launch was reported, the

Division upgraded to MOPP-2.

The Iraqis were not going to get a

'free shot' at an unprepared

Division. Almost every time, the

alert was quickly followed by a

report that Patriot batteries located

strategically around northern

Kuwait had destroyed the missiles.

The initial tension soon subsided,

and the Marines grew accustomed

to the thought of an unseen,

unheard missile battle taking place

in the skies over their heads. Over

the course of the day, only a few

missiles made their way through

the defensive umbrella, and all A Patriot missile races to intercept an incoming Iraqi Surface to

impacted in the open desert or Surface Missile in Northern Kuwait.

splashed into the Gulf of Kuwait. With typical machismo, the Marines jeered the poor accuracy

of the Iraqi missileers. One missile, a Chinese built Seersucker, brought the war close to home to

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