Center for the Study of 

National Reconnaissance Second Printing
A HISTORY OF 

THE MILITARY POLAR ORBITING

METEOROLOGICAL SATELLITE PROGRAM

R. Cargill Hall

September 2001

OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN

NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE
ii

CONTENTS

Section Page

Preface........................................................................................................................................iv

A Temporary Meteorological Satellite Program..........................................................................2

Toward a Permanent Program: From Strategic to Tactical Applications .................................... 12

Fine-Tuning the DMSP.............................................................................................................. 22

A Change in Time and Circumstance ........................................................................................ 29

Afterword ................................................................................................................................ 35

Acknowledgments .................................................................................................................... 36

Launch Tables .......................................................................................................................... 38

References................................................................................................................................ 46

ILLUSTRATIONS

Figure Page

1. TIROS Experimental Weather Satellite, 1960............................................................1

2. Lt. Col. Thomas O. Haig, First DMSP Program Director...........................................3

3. First DMSP Launch, 23 May 1962.............................................................................5

4. Joseph V. Charyk, Under Secretary of the Air Force..................................................6

5. Air Force Surplus Antenna Mount 

with 40 ft. Diameter Reflector Adapted for DMSP.....................................................7

6. Night Launch of the Third DMSP, 19 February 1963.................................................8

7. Night Launch of First Thor-Burner I, 18 January 1965............................................. 10

8. TIROS Operational System (TOS)........................................................................... 11

9. Program 417 (DMSP) Military Members at Dining-In, Late 1964............................ 13

10. DMSP Block 4 Satellite........................................................................................... 17

11. Col. John E. “Jack” Kulpa, DMSP Program Director 1965-1968 ............................. 18

12. Maj. James R. Blankenship and

Maj. Melvin F. “Nick” Chubb, Jr. at Block 5 Design Review................................... 19

13. DMSP Block 5A Satellite ........................................................................................ 20

14. DMSP Block 5B Satellite ........................................................................................ 21
 

iii

15. DMSP Block 5D-1 Satellite..................................................................................... 24

16. DMSP Nighttime Image of the Aurora Borealis....................................................... 26

17. DMSP Block 5D-2 Satellite..................................................................................... 28

18. DMSP Image of the Western United States and Mexico........................................... 31

19. DMSP Image of the Red Sea ................................................................................... 32

20. DMSP Block 5D-3 Satellite..................................................................................... 33
 

iv

Preface

In 1961, at the height of the Cold War, a director of the National Reconnaissance Office 

(NRO) authorized the construction and launch of a small meteorological satellite to support

CORONA and other film-limited imaging satellite systems. Though undertaken as an “interim”

measure while awaiting completion and launch of a national weather satellite, in the months that

followed the NRO spacecraft would incorporate so many desirable features and perform so

admirably that it became the template adopted for all American civil and military low altitude 

meteorological satellites. I researched and wrote the first installment of this history, which covered 

these actions and events, using available classified records while assigned temporarily to NRO

headquarters in the mid 1980s. After returning to the NRO as its historian in the late 1990s, and

upon declassification of the original work and endnotes in February 2000, I shared it with the early 

program participants and completed the story through the turn of the Millennium and the

consolidation of American military and civil meteorological satellite programs into a National

Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS).

People act. They make decisions that trigger events. To the extent practical, this brief

history turns on the people who shaped the story, particularly for the early NRO years when the

effort was highly classified, handled in compartmented channels, and little known even to those

who received and used the meteorological products. The people on which I focused in this story, the 

successive program directors and their immediate associates, brought to the meteorological satellite 

enterprise different technical skills and management approaches—all of them operating in a

bureaucratic framework that changed with organizational realignments. Over the years, as the

program moved from the NRO to the regular Air Force, and eventually to the Department of

Commerce, they found themselves dealing with more federal regulations, more officials whose

approval they required before choices and actions could be made or taken, and much more

Congressional oversight. That they acted to identify and select the best outcome for this national

effort I think goes without saying. That the choices made often produced outcomes that departed

markedly from initial expectations is likewise apparent.

The scope of this work, limited primarily to the program itself, did not permit its

treatment in the larger political and social context.∗ I touch on but do not explore and analyze the

 

∗

In terms of its social and economic ramifications, for example, nighttime images of the Earth furnished by 
 

v

program’s interactions with the major contractors, with officials in other federal agencies such as

the National Aeronautics and Space Administration and the National Oceanographic and

Atmospheric Administration, or with Congressional representatives and their staffs who, by the mid 

1970s, largely determined how many and what kinds of meteorological satellites would best serve

the country. A comprehensive history remains to be written. In that effort, I hope the historian of

record will find in this work a useful building block. Not all readers will agree with my

interpretation of events, or with my skepticism about the outcome of a cost-effective, combined

military-civil NPOESS. Noteworthy military attempts to specify and contract for “one size fits all,” 

except perhaps for certain hosiery, mostly have failed in terms of meeting diverse performance

requirements on a fixed schedule and at a reduced cost. I would be pleased, however, if the

NPOESS team overturns precedent. Any errors of fact that remain are mine.

 

R. Cargill Hall

September 2001

 

defense meteorological satellites (such as Fig. 16. in this monograph), permitted geographers and social scientists to 

make informed estimates of population densities in various regions. Cf., C. D. Elvidge, K. E. Baugh, E. A. Kihn, and 

E. R. Davis, “Mapping City Lights with Nighttime Data from the DMSP Operational Linescan System,”

Photogrammetric Engineering and Remote Sensing, Vol. 63, No. 6, 1997, pp. 727-734; Paul Sutton, Dar Roberts, 

Chris Elvidge, and Hank Meij, “A Comparison of Nighttime Satellite Imagery and Population Density for the

Continental United States, Photogrammetric Engineering and Remote Sensing, Vol. 63, No. 11, 1997, pp. 1303-

1313; and Paul Sutton, “Modeling Population Density With Nighttime Satellite Imagery and GIS,” Computer, 

Environment, and Urban Systems, Vol. 21, No. 3/4, 1997, pp. 227-244.
1

Successful operation of overhead photoreconnaissance satellites, the RAND Corporation 

had warned the Air Force in the mid 1950s,1 depended on accurate and timely meteorological

forecasts of the Sino-Soviet landmass. Such forecasts would make possible cloud-free photography 

over areas of interest. Indeed, pictures of clouds retrieved from a film-limited spacecraft cost

dearly—a fact made plain in 1960-1961 by the images returned from early CORONA missions.

When an interdepartmental study of the subject ended in April 1961, however, the National

Aeronautics and Space Administration, or NASA, received the U.S. franchise to establish

requirements and develop meteorological satellites for both the Departments of Commerce and

Defense in the National Meteorological Satellite Program. This program, its proponents contended, 

would avoid duplicated effort and produce at less cost a single National Operational Meteorological 

Satellite System (NOMSS) to meet all civil and military forecasting needs, including presumably

those of the National Reconnaissance Program (NRP).2 

But in the Pentagon in 1961, Under Secretary of the Air Force Joseph V. Charyk, who 

also headed the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), remained unconvinced. NOMSS, at best 

two or three years away, also was

supposed to support international

meteorological data exchanges, an

objective inconsistent with

contemporary NRP requirements for

secrecy. Moreover, the television

camera of NASA's first experimental, 

“wheel-mode” TIROS weather 

satellite, spin stabilized to inertial

space and launched the year before on 

1 April 1960, viewed only an oblique 

swath of the Earth’s surface

occasionally in each orbit instead of

once each time it revolved. Charyk

knew that NASA officials did not

believe a spin-stabilized weather

Fig. 1. TIROS Experimental Weather Satellite, 1960 

(Note the vidicon lens at bottom left on the satellite.)
 

2

satellite that would keep its spin axis perpendicular to its orbit plane could be developed soon—and 

certainly not inexpensively and in time to furnish strategic meteorological forecasts for

reconnaissance satellite flight operations in 1962.* He therefore acted to create an “interim”

meteorological satellite program for the NRO. In the event, that program also would fashion the

technology and flight operations for what would become the polar orbiting, low altitude national

weather satellite system administered by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration

(NOAA).

A Temporary Meteorological Satellite Program

On 21 June 1961, Charyk spoke with Major General Robert E. Greer, Director of the

Office of the Secretary of the Air Force for Special Projects (SAFSP) in El Segundo, California. He 

asked Greer to prepare a “minimum” proposal for four “Earth-referenced” wheel-mode weather

satellites to be launched on NASA Scout boosters. Greer responded with just such a plan for a 22-

month program, one that specified a small fixed budget and a first launch in ten months. The

Deputy Secretary of Defense approved it, and the Director of Defense Research and Engineering,

Harold Brown, made available to the NRO the necessary funding. On 27 July 1961 Greer’s deputy, 

Colonel Harry Evans, appointed Lt. Colonel Thomas O. Haig the first director of the Defense

Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP).† Haig, a meteorologist and electrical engineer, accepted 

the assignment on condition that he would not have to use the resident “systems engineering and

technical direction” contractor,‡ could select his own small staff, and could use fixed price, fixed

delivery contracts under his direct control throughout the program. Evans added a “kill switch” of

 

*

TIROS (Television Infrared Observation Satellite) had emerged from the Air Force WS-117L 

reconnaissance satellite competition back in 1956. After Lockheed won the primary contract, RCA officials, whose 

proposal had not been selected, sold the concept of a television infrared weather satellite to the Army Signal Corps 

at Belmar, New Jersey, which, along with the Advanced Research Projects Agency, funded further work. After

NASA began operating in October 1958, it acquired TIROS along with a number of the key Signal Corps personnel. 

As the 1960s began, plans called for equipping TIROS with infrared horizon sensors that would determine horizon 

crossings and trigger picture taking of the scenes below.

†

This program, needless to say, had a succession of numeric and alphabetic names, including Program II, P-35, 

698BH, 417, and Defense Systems Applications Program (DSAP). In order to avoid confusion, the current designation 

DMSP is used throughout this history.

‡

To Haig’s view, an SE&TD contractor could only justify its existence by introducing changes. Since

changes involved time and cost money, SE&TD support was incompatible with fixed price, fixed delivery

contracting. See Thomas O. Haig, “’Technical Direction’: Outmoded Management Concept?” in Perspectives in

Defense Management, Industrial College of the Armed Forces, May 1967.
 

3

his own: if the first launch could not be met on schedule or if costs appeared certain to exceed the 

fixed budget, he instructed Haig to terminate the program and recover government funds

immediately without further direction.3 

 In the months that followed, the DMSP

effort operated on NRP funds under the NRO security 

blanket, but located physically outside the NRO

Special Projects Office in El Segundo for purposes of

cover and ease of operations.4 Haig divided the work

among those he initially selected: three officers and

Renell LaBatt, “a very busy secretary.”* He invested

his own time in program management, with special

attention paid to a contract he negotiated with RCA

for the weather satellite. Captain Stephen Dvorchak,

joined later by Captain Richard Geer, was assigned the 

Scout launch vehicle; a small, four-stage, solid

propellant rocket built by Chance Vought and

procured under NASA direction. To meet program

performance requirements, Dvorchak substituted a high acceleration Lockheed Propulsion 

Company MG-18 solid-propellant motor in place of the standard Scout fourth stage Altair motor.

Captain Luin Ricks handled ground support, tracking, command, and readout at the Air Force

ground stations operated by the Lockheed Missiles and Space Division (LMSD). Finally, Major

Charles Croft oversaw contract management at all the various firms involved, novel contracts that 

were “fixed price” instead of the customary “cost plus fixed fee.”5 The RCA fixed-price, fixeddelivery contract proved itself in December 1961 when a major structural member of the weather

satellite, the base plate, failed during tests and company officials requested a three month delay for 

redesign. Croft, after discussion with Haig, advised RCA that it had ten days to produce a fix or the 

contract would be terminated under procurement regulations “at no cost to the government.” The

 

*

By the end of 1962 the program office staff had increased to five officers and two secretaries, including Etta 

Holt. Three or four SAC officers also were assigned at that time, involved primarily with the Scout launch vehicle and 

ground support. This small number grew to about 15 military and civilians by the mid-1960s, when the program

transferred from the NRO to Air Force Systems Command.

Fig. 2. Lt. Col. Thomas O. Haig,

First DMSP Program Director
 

4

RCA program manager appeared three days later with revised internal schedules that met the

original launch date.

Neither the Scout booster nor the RCA satellite mounted redundant equipment, and a

failure anywhere in the system meant the loss of a mission. All of those involved regarded the

enterprise as a single purpose, minimum cost, “high-risk” program. Smaller and lighter than the

original TIROS, the 100-pound TIROS-derived RCA satellite was shaped like a 10-sided 

polyhedron, 23-inches across and 21-inches high. A spinning motion, introduced on injection into 

orbit, was maintained on the early NRO weather satellites at about 12 rpm by small spin rockets. By 

adopting a concept advanced by Haig and Lt. Ralph Hoffman, however, the spin axis was

maintained perpendicular to the orbit plane by torquing the satellite against the Earth's magnetic

field, the forces supplied through a direct-current loop around the satellite's perimeter. A ground

command would cause the electric current to flow in the desired direction to generate the torque.

Those few NASA officials who knew about it viewed the NRO-Air Force program as a no-risk test 

of a modified four-stage Scout with an “Earth-referenced” wheel-mode weather satellite.6 

If it operated correctly, the RCA shuttered television camera (a photosensitive vidicon

tube) would be pointed directly at the Earth once each time the satellite rotated. At the programmed 

interval, when infrared horizon sensors indicated the lens was vertical to the Earth, the vidicon

would take a picture of an 800-mile-square area of the surface below, with the image recorded on

tape as an analog signal for later transmission to the ground. Launched into a sun-synchronous 450 

nautical mile circular polar orbit, the RCA television system would provide 100 percent daily

coverage of the Northern Hemisphere at latitudes above 60 degrees, and 55 percent coverage at the 

equator. Readout of the tape-recorded pictures was planned to occur on each pass over the western 

hemisphere; at the ground stations, the video pictures of cloud cover over the Eurasian landmass

would be relayed to the Air Weather Service's Air Force Global Weather Central collocated with

Headquarters Strategic Air Command at Offutt AFB, near Omaha, Nebraska.7
 

5

Haig's “blue suit” program

team met its ten-month schedule,

although, as the high-risk aspects of the 

effort suggested, without immediate

success. The polar-orbiting DMSP

satellites were to be launched from the

West Coast range on Point Arguello, at 

Vandenberg AFB, located near the

town of Lompoc, California. As events 

transpired, a standard four-stage Scout

booster carrying an NRO GRAB

satellite was first in line, and was

viewed as a system test by the DMSP

office. This vehicle, launched on 25

April 1962, ended in a Scout booster

failure within sight of those in the

blockhouse. The temperamental Scout

booster, this time with an MG-18 

fourth stage, failed again during launch 

of the first NRO weather satellite on 23 May when the vehicle self-destructed towards the end of

second stage ignition. The second DMSP launch on 23 August 1962 resulted in success, although 

the Lockheed ground-control team failed at first to track the weather satellite. Each day at high noon 

the vehicle took pictures as it transited the Soviet Union. Weather pictures of the Caribbean returned 

by this vehicle two months later in October also proved crucial during the “Cuban Missile Crisis,” 

permitting effective aerial reconnaissance missions and reducing the number of aerial weatherreconnaissance sorties in the region.8

Lt. Colonel Haig reported to General Greer at the NRO Special Projects Office in El

Segundo, but Joseph Charyk took a personal interest in the affairs of the weather satellite program 

initiated to satisfy NRP requirements.∗ That program now possessed the first U.S. military satellite 

 

∗

The DMSP Program Manager normally briefed Charyk monthly at NRO Headquarters in the Pentagon,

and then back-briefed General Greer on his return regarding any directions he had received from the DNRO.

Fig. 3. First DMSP Launch, 23 May 1962
 

6

to be commanded and operated on orbit on a

daily basis over an extended period of time.

(The first spacecraft ultimately ceased

transmissions on 23 March 1963.) At the

Pentagon on the morning of 24 September

1962, Charyk advised Haig that NASA's

planned Nimbus weather satellite, or

NOMSS, would be delayed, and that he

should plan one additional year for the interim

NRO meteorological satellite program. Haig,

who had guessed as much, had next year's

budget charts ready. Lockheed claimed a

major part of the total budget for groundsupport operations, but, the Lt. Colonel

insisted, he could build two ground stations

and a control center, man them with blue-suiters, and operate the weather satellites in support of the 

NRP for one-eighth the amount bid by the contractor.9

Under Secretary of the Air Force and NRO director Charyk approved the cost-saving 

proposal on the spot. Then he picked up the phone and called Air Force Chief of Staff General

Curtis E. LeMay and arranged for an appointment. That afternoon at the Pentagon, Haig explained 

to the Chief of Staff how Air Force personnel could man and operate two weather satellite ground 

stations and a control center. The general listened intently and, when Haig left an hour later, “it was 

with a promise of all the people I needed from the Strategic Air Command [SAC] and, ‘if anybody 

gets in your way, call me!’” from LeMay. At the General's direction, Haig boarded an airplane

bound for Omaha and, next day at Headquarters SAC, briefed CINCSAC General Thomas S. Power 

and his staff. SAC’s leaders promptly committed to the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program

all the personnel it required.10

During the ensuing weeks, program personnel worked at all hours, every day. They

found surplus Nike anti-aircraft rocket sites in the states of Maine (near Loring AFB), and

Washington (near Fairchild AFB), procured six large van bodies from Norton AFB in San

Bernadino, located two abandoned antenna mounts on Antigua Island in the Caribbean, and wrote a 

Fig. 4. Joseph V. Charyk,

Under Secretary of the Air Force
 

7

fixed-price contract with Radiation

Incorporated for two 40-foot radar

dishes and associated electronic gear.

In between, they helped screen SAC

military personnel “until we had two

groups of very good men” to operate

the tracking stations. In July 1963, ten 

months after go-ahead, the program

office transferred DMSP satellite

ground tracking and readout from

Lockheed to its own stations in Maine 

and Washington. About the same

time, a command and control center

for the DMSP manned by SAC

personnel began operating one floor

below Air Force Global Weather

Central in Building D, the old Martin

bomber plant, next door to SAC

Headquarters at Offutt AFB, 

Nebraska.11

The first DMSP weather satellite to be controlled at the ground stations manned by Air 

Force personnel was flight number three launched on 19 February 1963. At Vandenberg AFB,

another Air Force team, the Systems Command 6595th Aerospace Test Wing, conducted launch

operations.* In this instance, the Scout booster upper stages again malfunctioned and placed the

satellite in an orbit unsuited to strategic weather reconnaissance operations for more than a few

months at best. In late April, the satellite's primary tape-recorder control circuit failed and with it the 

storage of primary data for later commanded transmission, although direct vidicon readout

continued for a few weeks more. A new experiment, however, continued to function nicely for

 

*

A few years later, when the Thor booster replaced Scout as the DMSP launch vehicle, launch duties

transferred from the 6595th ATW to SAC’s 4300th Support Squadron, which had experience with Thor rocket

launches. “It was a source of great pride to SAC,” Richard Geer recalled, but the transfer proved “galling to some in 

the 6595th.” Moreover, office reasoning held, “SAC would not tolerate launch failures.”

Fig. 5. Air Force Surplus Antenna Mount 

with 40 ft. Diameter Reflector Adapted for DMSP
 

8

many months: an infrared radiometer that registered the Earth's background radiation and indicated 

the extent of nighttime cloud cover.* At Global Weather Central, the 3d Weather Wing used

computer programs written by Air Weather Service personnel to produce crude operational maps of 

the cloud cover at night over the regions observed until January 1964. Indeed, the infrared

experiment proved so successful that it was mounted on all DMSP satellites through Block 4,

eventually also providing measurements of cloud height and the Earth's heat balance.12

The fourth and fifth

DMSP launches on 26 April and 27 

September 1963 resulted once again 

in Scout booster failures. The gap in 

weather reconnaissance that began

in May 1963 would continue until

January 1964. And, despite appeals 

for changes in design and testing

that the program office requested to 

improve reliability, NASA officials 

who procured Scout vehicles for the 

NRP refused to make them. After

considering other booster prospects, 

on 23 October 1963 Colonel Haig, with the approval of Joseph Charyk's successor, Air Force

Undersecretary Brockway McMillan, cancelled the last two Scout vehicles on the original LTV

contract and all six of them on a follow-on order. He followed that action by terminating completely 

all NASA Scout-related activities on 25 October.13 Five launches in two years had yielded three

Scout booster failures and increasing NASA intransigence. In the National Reconnaissance

Program, the space agency and its erratic Scout booster had struck out.

Since the fourth Scout launch, Haig and Richard Geer actively had sought a replacement 

booster that would provide improved reliability and at least equivalent weight-lifting capacity. They 

knew that a number of liquid-propellant SM-75 Thor intermediate-range ballistic missiles, returned 

 

*

David S. Johnson, at that time manager of the TIROS weather satellite program in the Weather Bureau and 

one of the few persons there cleared to know about DMSP, referred various experiments to the NRO-Air Force 

program including a novel one conceived by Vernor Suomi at the University of Wisconsin that weighed about six 

ounces, including a tiny wire recorder, and produced course but useful data on the radiated heat of cloud cover, from 

Fig. 6. Night Launch of the Third DMSP, 19 February 1963
 

9

a few months before from England as part of the U.S. concession in the Cuban Missile Crisis, were 

stored in San Bernadino. They also were acquainted with an FW-4S solid-propellant rocket motor

produced by the United Technology Corporation. This rocket was cast in the same motor casing as 

the Scout fourth stage, and, mounted on the Scout spin table, would comprise the second stage of

what would become known as the “Burner I” launch vehicle. For this launch vehicle, Douglas

Aircraft replaced the IRBM inertial guidance system with a Bell Telephone Laboratory guidance

package and added a cold gas coast attitude control section on top of the Thor to keep the axis of the 

FW-4S injection stage properly aligned.14 Approved by the NRO director McMillan in December

1963, and by CINCSAC General Thomas S. Power (SAC personnel would now launch the new

vehicle and control the weather satellite on orbit) in January 1964, DMSP personnel set to work

ordering and testing the Burner I components. A few months later, in March, the Program Office

received approval to plan for a new second stage, to be called “Burner II,” for a Thor-based launch 

vehicle. Late in the year, a source selection board chose Boeing to produce the all-new self-guided 

solid-propellant upper stage. The more powerful Thor/Burner II combination, which eventually

employed an additional solid-propellant third stage to increase the weight-lifting capacity, continued 

to be used in the program until the early 1980s.15 

Before any “Thor/Burner” mission could be mounted, and to close gaps in strategic

weather coverage of the Eurasian landmass after the final Scout launch failure of 27 September

1963, Brockway McMillan also had approved acquisition of two Thor-Agena launch vehicles as

interim replacements. Haig's program office pressed them into service. The liquid-propellant ThorAgena booster combination, also used to launch the CORONA film recovery satellites, was larger 

and more expensive than needed for DMSP, but it could carry two of the RCA weather satellites

into orbit simultaneously. On 19 January and 17 June 1964 Thor-Agenas did just that, successfully 

placing a total of four DMSP satellites into orbit. In the months that followed, members of the

National Reconnaissance Program and SAC had all the meteorological data that they wanted.* A

Burner I, meanwhile, ascended properly in its first launch on 18 January 1965, but failed to place its 

satellite in orbit when the nose fairing refused to separate. Nonetheless, the DMSP Thor/Burner 

combinations in succeeding months and years achieved an enviable 86 percent launch success

 

which the heat balance of the Earth could be determined. 

*With the latitude this presented, in December 1964 Haig requested SAC operations personnel to program 

DMSP picture-taking on passes over Antarctica and have the Air Weather Service send the pictures to the Program 

Office. Cut and pieced together, the office produced a complete map of the Antarctic Continent that was
 

10

record before the Atlas booster succeeded it in the 1980s.* 

At first extended from year to year awaiting the arrival of NASA's NOMSS, by mid1965 the NRO’s “interim” weather satellite effort looked and acted like a formal military space

program. As its primary mission, DMSP furnished the NRP daily strategic (morning coverage,

primarily, during the first few years) meso-scale observations of cloud distribution and organization 

over the Eurasian landmass. Beginning in 1965 two DMSP polar orbiting, sun-synchronous weather 

satellites would normally

function in circular orbits at

450 nautical miles altitude.

One, a morning bird, passed

over the Soviet Union about 

0700 local time and relayed

weather conditions at first

light. A second, late morning

(but called a “noon”) bird

began the same track about

1100 local time, showing the

change in cloud cover with the 

increase in atmospheric

heating during the day. 

Reflecting on the accomplishment many years later, Haig counted four early DMSP

contributions to astronautics. First, the novel management scheme made possible a small program

office that exercised technical direction without the “assistance” of a systems engineering 

contractor, and its members could get a decision at the NRO and act quickly. The office used fixedprice, fixed delivery contracts, all blue-suit operations, and achieved an excellent success record at 

an annual cost less than one half that of equivalent NASA weather satellite development programs. 

Second, because the spin axis of the RCA wheel-mode satellite was maintained perpendicular to the 

orbit plane by electrically torquing it against the Earth's magnetic field, Haig reasoned that one also

could control and maintain a constant spin rate electrically, driving it like the rotor of a direct

 

subsequently presented to NRO director Brockway McMillan who, by all accounts, was most taken with it.

*

See Tables 1 through 8, DMSP Launch Record.

Fig. 7. Night Launch of First Thor-Burner I, 18 January 1965
 

11

current motor. That would eliminate the solid rockets that produced a spin rate that varied with time 

and made it difficult to determine the location of the cloud pictures. Written into RCA's second-year 

contract for an additional four Block 1 satellites, the concept worked in space. Third, when the

DMSP ground stations were assembled in 1963, the program office eliminated the costly “boresight 

tower” used routinely to determine a tracking/readout antenna's pointing vector and a transmitter

used to check the receiving system sensitivity during operation. Program personnel substituted

instead a technique of scanning the sun to establish the pointing vector with a hermetically sealed 

low-energy transmitter in the center of the antenna reflector used to check receiving sensitivity. The 

DMSP station test procedures worked just as accurately and at far less cost; they became standard 

practice for nearly all tracking/readout systems. Finally, DMSP altered established Air Force

techniques of satellite tracking. Captain Luin Ricks refused to believe that the tracking problem was 

as arcane and costly as Lockheed personnel made it appear. Working with SAC personnel, Ricks 

prepared a much simpler tracking program* thereafter used with great success by the DMSP ground 

stations and adopted by the ground stations of other satellite programs.16

When in April 1965 Colonel 

Thomas O. Haig stepped down as the

program director, DMSP had eclipsed

all other overhead meteorological

endeavors. Initial NASA skepticism

notwithstanding, DMSP had pioneered

the space technology so well, so

quickly, and so inexpensively that the

space agency, prodded firmly by the

Department of Commerce, at that time

embraced carbon copies of the DMSP

wheel-mode Block 1 satellite, called the 

TIROS Operational System (TOS), as

an interim polar-orbiting weather

 

*

A single set of punched paper tapes at each ground tracking station eliminated the requirement to transmit an 

antenna programming tape before each pass. Every pass by a DMSP satellite in any orbit between 250 and 550 nautical 

miles altitude could be supported by the tape set with a maximum antenna pointing error of 1.5 degrees.

Fig. 8. TIROS Operational System (TOS), 

Based on the DMSP Block 1 Satellite

(Note the vidicon pointing radially to take pictures on each 

revolution of the vehicle.)
 

12

satellite.* And besides the strategic weather reconnaissance furnished to the NRP, the defense

meteorological satellites also had begun to provide tactical weather reconnaissance of pre-selected 

regions to a transportable ground station overseas, with significant effects on military operations in 

Southeast Asia.17 

Toward a Permanent Program:

From Strategic to Tactical Applications

Strategic weather reconnaissance recorded for the NRP might command the primary

mission of the DMSP, but American military services wanted tactical weather data to meet a variety 

of operational needs. By 1963 it was plain that NASA's sophisticated, three-axis stabilized, low

altitude Nimbus-NOMSS satellite would be extensively delayed and, when finished, likely too

complex and expensive to satisfy Defense Department and NRP meteorological requirements—

tactical or strategic.† On 23 January 1963 Harold Brown, Director of Defense Research and

Engineering, requested a reassessment of tactical requirements by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS).

Would the National Meteorological Satellite Program and its planned NOMSS, Brown inquired,

meet them? The JCS replied in the negative; its leaders urged that the Defense Department build 

and operate a commanded direct-readout weather satellite able to relay high-quality, day-and-night 

tactical meteorological data to transportable ground and shipboard terminals “ASAP.”18 

But the political and bureaucratic climate in 1963 did not favor an all-military tactical

weather satellite system. All of the military meteorological satellite requirements would continue to 

be furnished to NASA and the Department of Commerce for the NOMSS.‡ To assess and combine 

those requirements, in early 1964 the Defense Department established in the Air Staff a Joint

Meteorological Satellite Program Office (JMSPO). After further agitation by the military services, 

however, the Defense Department and the NRO approved a test of the defense meteorological

 

*

The Weather Bureau had launched and tested TIROS 9, the first wheel-mode copy of the DMSP, in January

1965. The first of the TOS built to this standard, called ESSA-1, was launched a year later, in February 1966. Nine of 

these civil meteorological satellites were launched between 1966 and 1969 for the parent agency at that time, the

Environmental Science Services administration.

†

A Nimbus first launch scheduled in June 1962 had slipped to 1964; in fact, these vehicles would eventually be 

directed to research purposes, never to become the NOMSS.

‡

The Bureau of the Budget issued BOB circular A-62 on 13 November 1963 that reaffirmed and established 

policy for Defense Department participation in the National Meteorological Satellite Program. 
 

13

satellite applied to tactical operations in the 1964 Strike Command Goldfire exercise at Fort

Leonard Wood in southwest Missouri. Air Force Global Weather Central at Offutt AFB relayed

weather reconnaissance pictures directly to the Army and Air Force users supporting ground and

paratroop exercises at the fort, and for the deployment of fighter aircraft on a transatlantic flight.

Later in the year, between 24 and 26 November, Global Weather Central furnished tactical weather 

data over Central Africa to the Military Airlift Command, which proved crucial in the successful

airlift of Belgian paratroopers from Europe to Stanleyville in the Congo, where hostages seized in 

an uprising were freed. The weather data proved to be of considerable value in these tactical

operations, analysis revealed, but improvements were needed. Coverage had to be received daily at 

local ground stations before meteorologists could depend on a satellite as a primary source of data, 

and a resolution at the surface better than the three nautical miles provided by the DMSP Block-I 

satellites was judged “extremely desirable.”19 

Fig. 9. Program 417 (DMSP) Military Members at Dining-In, Late 1964

Back Row, Left to Right: Lt. Clifford B. Stearns, Capt. Luin B. Ricks, Lt. Col. Thomas Haig, Lt. Col. 

Melvin Weinstein, Capt. Richard L. Geer, Lt. Edward R. Foechterle, Lt. Ralph Hoffman, Capt. James F. 

Roberts, Capt. Calvin H. Markwood.

Front Row, Left to Right: Capt. Melvin F. Chubb, Jr., Capt. C. Neale Elsby, Capt. Harold E. Wakitsch, 

Robert Anderson (guest speaker), Maj. Richard Turner, Lt. Col. Jim Wayne, Maj. Tom Jones
 

14

In Southeast Asia, meanwhile, Radio Hanoi ceased broadcasting local weather

observations in September 1964, and Air Weather Service Detachment 14 in Saigon faced

forecasting with limited and unreliable data. When U.S. air strikes against North Vietnam

commenced in February 1965, Det-14 personnel found themselves unable to meet the demand for 

weather information from the 2d Air Division and the Studies and Observation Group of the

Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV), which conducted clandestine operations against 

North Vietnam. In response, the Air Force, with Defense Department and NRO approval, on 18

March 1965 launched a noontime military meteorological satellite that could be programmed to

record and readout specific weather data in Southeast Asia to support tactical operations in the

theater. In one of his last official acts in support of that effort, in January Haig planned and laid out 

the DMSP ground station at Tan Son Nhut Air Base, Saigon, in South Vietnam. The new station

was erected and began operating in time to support the satellite launched in March. It furnished to 

military users, within 30 minutes of receipt, complete cloud-cover data for North Vietnam, South

Vietnam, and parts of Laos, China, and the Gulf of Tonkin.20 

All three military services and MACV put to immediate use the DMSP tactical

meteorological data retrieved by Det-14.* In the spring of 1965 commanders could scrub, delay, or 

recall aerial sorties, or divert them to secondary targets based on hard weather information. The

Naval Advisory Group and the MACV Studies and Observation Group used DMSP-generated 

forecasts to schedule the operation of their fleets of small boats that operated along the coast of the 

Indo-China Sea and the Gulf of Tonkin. Before long, mobile, air-transportable DMSP ground

terminals were installed at Udorn AB, Thailand, and Osan AB, South Korea. Another fixed site,

like the original one at Tan Son Nhut, appeared at Hickam AFB, Hawaii. Finally, on 20 May 1965 

at Vandenberg AFB, SAC personnel launched a special defense meteorological satellite reserved

exclusively for tactical meteorological applications. Weather data from this satellite so improved the 

timeliness and accuracy of forecasts in Southeast Asia that the military services, in October 1965, 

 

*

The TOS civil meteorological satellites could not be programmed to observe and record specific areas in 

Southeast Asia for later readout. They did carry Automatic Picture Transmission (APT) equipment that allowed

anyone with receiving equipment to acquire television and infrared images of the Earth as they were being taken. 

But APT did not provide pictures farther north than its line of sight. DMSP satellites, however, operated in three

modes: direct readout, like APT; programmed picture taking of selected regions, with the sequence stored in a tape 

recorder for readout by a local ground station; and preprogrammed picture taking over the Eurasian land mass. Thus, 

Det-14 personnel did not use TOS.

 
 

15

cancelled all daily, routine aerial weather-reconnaissance sorties.21

These impressive results were enough to prompt action from Defense Department

officials who now sought to break the NASA/Department of Commerce franchise on a NOMSS and 

pursue openly a separate military weather satellite program for strategic and tactical applications. 

On 22 June 1965, Under Secretary of the Air Force and NRO director Brockway McMillan advised 

General John P. McConnell, incoming Chief of Staff, USAF, that the DMSP would transfer from

the NRP to USAF funding and direction, effective 1 July 1965 (the beginning of FY 1966). The

DMSP program office in El Segundo would move from NRO Program A, the Air Force Special

Projects Office, to the Space Systems Division next door, in Air Force Systems Command, with

Headquarters USAF and Systems Command assuming overall management responsibility for what 

McMillan termed an “ongoing development/operational program.” The Strategic Air Command

would continue to launch the satellites and operate the DMSP control center and ground terminals 

in the continental United States; Air Weather Service would man the direct readout terminals

overseas, while continuing to operate Air Force Global Weather Central and process DMSP

strategic weather data at Offutt AFB. This program, McMillan observed in closing, “has been

entirely a ‘blue suit’ effort. The cost has been remarkably low; the results have consistently

exceeded expectations.” Perhaps anticipating an excess of public affairs enthusiasm on the Air Staff, 

he regretted to say that security restrictions precluded any public recognition of DMSP

accomplishments.22 

This change introduced a more complex dual-management chain. On the Air Staff,

overall management responsibility devolved to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Research and

Development because the DMSP was programmed and budgeted as an advanced development line 

item. The director of the NRO retained a strong interest, monitoring DMSP through Air Weather

Service personnel assigned to his staff. Operational requirements flowed from the NRO through the 

Air Weather Service to the West Coast program office. Technical guidance now came from the

Deputy Chief of Staff for Research and Development through Air Force Systems Command to the 

program office. The program office, the focal point at Space Systems Division, exercised authority 

for planning, directing, contracting, and system engineering. 

Making the change to a permanent program complete, a few months later, on 28

September 1965, officials of the Defense Department and the Department of Commerce signed an 

agreement that eliminated the requirement for prior coordination of “aeronomy” and
 

16

“meteorological reconnaissance programs.” Thereafter, except for periodic reassessments demanded 

by the Bureau of the Budget (later the Office of Management and Budget) and Congress,* the

Defense Department all but withdrew from the NOMSS concept, and NASA leaders converted

Nimbus into a research and development test bed.23 A few years later, in December 1972, DMSP 

meteorological data also began to be furnished routinely to the Department of Commerce/National 

Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration and its National Weather Service at Suitland, Maryland. 

At that time, security restrictions on DMSP tactical applications were removed.† A few months later 

in March 1973, Under Secretary of the Air Force and NRO director John L. McLucas publicly

announced the existence of DMSP in a Pentagon press conference.24

Back in 1964, when tests began of the meteorological satellite applied to tactical military 

operations at home and abroad, the NRO approved modification of three additional satellites for

direct readout. These 160-pound vehicles, identical in size and shape to their 100-to-120 pound

Block 1 predecessors, also mounted improved infrared radiometers and were known collectively as 

Block 2. Launched during 1965 and 1966, two of them attained Earth orbit and provided tactical

meteorological data for operations in Southeast Asia. A fourth satellite, the one equipped and

launched expressly for tactical uses on 20 May 1965, came to be called Block 3. The reason for this 

curiosity, a “one-vehicle block,” involved efforts to distinguish it from its Block 2 cousins that also 

supported the primary strategic cloud cover mission for the NRP. Shortly before he stepped down as 

DMSP director and control of the DMSP passed to the Air Force Systems Command, in early 1965 

Colonel Haig secured permission to begin the design of a more powerful military meteorological

satellite that met more completely the demands of its customers.25 

The Block 4 satellite, slightly larger than those in Blocks 1 and 2, was 30 inches in

diameter, 29 inches high, and weighed 175 pounds. Still spin-stabilized, the satellite nonetheless

provided improved weather coverage. Previously, the single 1/2-inch focal length RCA vidicon

television camera in Block 1 and 2 satellites furnished a nadir resolution of 3-to-4 nautical miles

(nm) over an 800-nm swath, with significant gaps in coverage of the Earth at the equator. Block 4 

 

*

For example, in November 1979 President Jimmy Carter, overriding OMB protests, reaffirmed the

positions of the departments of commerce and defense that favored maintaining separate civil and military polar

orbiting weather satellite programs until future block changes were adopted. Even that restriction was removed by 

President Reagan in his 4 July 1982 National Space Policy.

†With the use of DMSP tactical weather data in Southeast Asia, knowledge of the program became widespread. 

In early 1969 word of this program linked to its tactical applications appeared in the open literature. Practical

adjustments that acknowledged at least that part of the enterprise could no longer be avoided. (See "Industry Observer," 
 

17

vehicles carried two one-inch focal length vidicons

canted at 26 degrees from the vertical that provided

global coverage of the Earth (contiguous coverage at 

the equator), along a 1,500-nm swath. The resolution 

varied from 0.8 nm at the nadir to 3 nm at the

picture's edge. Besides a multi-sensor infrared

subsystem, Block 4 also incorporated a highresolution radiometer that furnished cloud-height 

profiles. A tape recorder of increased capacity stored 

pictures of the entire northern hemisphere each day,

while the satellite furnished real-time, direct local

tactical weather coverage to small mobile ground or

shipboard terminals.26 

Under the guidance of a new program director and graduate of the U.S. Military

Academy, Major John E. “Jack” Kulpa, Jr., eight Block 4 defense meteorological satellites were

delivered and seven successfully launched between 1966 and 1969.∗ Because of the 1965 change in 

command relationships, however, Kulpa found himself reporting to four bosses instead of two. Not 

only did the new NRO director Alexander Flax want to be kept advised, his subordinate, the director 

of the NRO’s Air Force Special Projects Office also expected that courtesy, especially since Kulpa 

had just completed an assignment there directing a research subsatellite program. At Headquarters

Air Force Systems Command, General Bernard Schriever took a personal interest in DMSP, while 

his subordinate, the commander of the Space Systems Division, became the general officer

presumably responsible for DMSP. In the event, Kulpa later recalled, “each of them thought that 

one of the others was my real reporting official, and I was left pretty much alone to prosecute the

effort.”27 But the program director could no longer claim the same NRO exemptions from the Air 

Force -375 series of procurement regulations, and his office staff found itself encumbered 

increasingly with “operational requirements,” “development plans,” and other accoutrements of the 

formal Air Force acquisition process. 

 Shortly after assuming command, Kulpa began work on the next series of weather

 

Aviation Week and Space Technology, 27 January 1969, p. 13.)

∗

All seven successfully achieved orbit. The eighth vehicle, not needed for operational requirements, was 

Fig. 10. DMSP Block 4 Satellite
 

18

satellites, DMSP Block 5. He delegated instrument requirements and design of the spacecraft to two 

able subordinates, Captain Richard Geer who had previously shepherded launch vehicles, and

Major James Blankenship, who had previously supported Haig while acting chief of the Technical 

Services Branch, Headquarters Air Weather Service (AWS). Blankenship had just returned from the 

Royal University in Stockholm where he had

completed a Ph.D. thesis on Atmospheric Photo

Chemistry. Brilliant with an eminently practical

turn of mind, he played a predominant role in the 

payload design that made Block 5 especially userfriendly, such as formatting of the imagery to

standard AWS weather chart scales. Moreover,

Geer recalled, he possessed “excellent long-range 

vision, seeing data applications, technology 

solutions, and political ways and means far into

the future. His expertise in weather

phenomenology, his aggressive attitude, his

persuasiveness, and a unique [NRO access via the 

AWS] . . . combined to make him arguably the

most powerful person in the SPO [system

program office].”28

Indeed, the revolutionary Block 5 spacecraft that resulted from the efforts of Geer and

Blankenship took the form of an integrated system; it departed entirely from the TIROS-derived 

technology of its predecessors. The two men visited meteorologists at work, and then examined

what the industry could produce. Instead of starting with a sensor in space and determining what it 

might tell the user about the weather, these two based the Block 5 design on the users’ wish to

receive a product in a form that approached as closely as possible the weather charts and maps that 

they, the meteorologists, employed. Moreover, the product furnished the albedo of each scene, not 

its brightness, which varied enormously from full sunlight to partial moonlight.29 A survey of the

industry and new technologies revealed line scanning sensors and advances in highly sensitive

visible light and infrared point (as opposed to array) detectors. Instead of using complicated

 

donated to the Chicago Museum of Science and Industry.

Fig. 11. Col. John E. “Jack” Kulpa,

DMSP Program Director 1965-1968
 

19

electronics to scan the raster of a TV camera, they reasoned, one now could let the motion of the

satellite provide the scanning along the line-of flight. That would require a spacecraft that always

“looked down,” rather than one that wheeled along its orbit. But a satellite stabilized on three axes 

would make possible acquiring a strip of imagery of indefinite length, imagery that could be

rectified at will.30

Some 200 hours of flight tests of experimental sensors, conducted by Captain Melvin F. 

(“Nick”) Chubb in a T-39 aircraft, produced line scan images that a newly promoted Lt Colonel

Kulpa used to secure the approval of the Block 5 design from his superiors in Systems Command. 

After a source selection competition in May 1966, Westinghouse won the contract to furnish the

constant resolution oscillating telescope sensor and ground display equipment, and RCA won the

contract to provide the spacecraft 

bus. The Westinghouse

“Operational Line Scanner”

(OLS), as it came to be called,*

provided images of the Earth and 

its cloud cover in both the visual

and infrared (IR) spectral regions. 

With this system, nadir visualimaging resolution at the Earth's

surface improved to 0.3 nm

during daytime and 2 nm at night 

through quarter-moonlight 

illumination levels. The higher

resolution (less than 0.5 nm) now 

satisfied the requirements of

tactical users. The infrared subsystem furnished 2-nm resolution at the surface day and night, as

well as cloud-height profile and identification of all clouds above or below a selected altitude, and 

heat-balance data. Complete global coverage was transmitted over encrypted S-Band digital data

 

*

Originally called the “Oscillating Line Scanner,” the name was changed by NRO-DMSP personnel who, 

about to present the case for it at the Pentagon, were advised that the military “good word of the day” was

“operational.” The OSL thus was sold for development with the new, “operational” name. (James R. Blankenship, 

letter to the author, 23 September 2000.

Fig. 12. Left to Right: Maj. James R. Blankenship and

Captain Melvin F. “Nick” Chubb, Jr. at Block 5 Design Review
 

20

links. Block 5 simultaneously satisfied the

meteorological needs of the military commander in the 

field for tactical support, while it met completely the

“strategic” requirements of the National

Reconnaissance Office. In the months that followed,

Blankenship took “shameless advantage of that fact,

telling tactical and strategic customers, in turn, that

Block 5 had been designed entirely for them. It was

true enough.”31 

To achieve the pointing accuracy required

for the Block 5 line scan sensor, the spacecraft

employed a novel momentum-bias attitude-control 

system. It consisted of a momentum wheel and

horizon scanner, and magnetic coils. The wheel and

scanner controlled the pitch axis, while the magnetic coils controlled the roll and yaw axes,

replacing the momentum dissipated by friction in the bearing between the momentum wheel and the 

main body of the spacecraft. The slab-sided, tube-shaped Block 5 satellite remained 30 inches in

diameter, but its height increased to 48 inches and its weight rose to 230 pounds. Positioned

horizontally on orbit, it closely resembled an overturned garbage can. Three Block 5A spacecraft 

were built before military demands for greater tactical meteorological support dictated further

changes.32 

In 1969, all three military services looked forward to still more tactical weather support 

from the improved DMSP, and all three sought to obtain it on a daily basis. To that end, the three 

service assistant secretaries for research and development agreed on a “joint-service utilization

plan” for DMSP.33 On 29 March 1969, John S. Foster, Jr., Director of Defense Research and

Engineering, approved the plan* and the funds needed to improve Block 5 spacecraft to ensure

receipt of DMSP weather data on terminals on board ship.34 The result was Block 5B and -C. 

Longer, at 84 inches in height, and heavier, at 425 pounds, these spacecraft exclusively required use 

 

*

The joint-service DMSP use plan would be revised and updated in June 1973, and again in late 1976. 

Shipboard readout terminals had by the mid 1970s been installed on board the aircraft carriers USS Constellation 

and USS Kennedy assigned to CINCPAC and CINCLANT, respectively.

Fig. 13. DMSP Block 5A Satellite
 

21

of the uprated booster called Thor/Burner IIA. Block 5B spacecraft added a large sunshade on the

“morning birds,” a more powerful 20-watt traveling-wave-tube amplifier (TWTA) transmitter that 

radiated ample power for receipt of the signal on board ships (though it was never used for this

purpose operationally), a second primary data recorder, and a gamma-radiation detector. Block 5C 

added a vertical temperature/moisture profile sensor and an improved IR sensor that now achieved a 

resolution of 0.3 nm at the Earth's surface.35 

In all, three Block 5A, five Block 5B, and three Block 5C satellites were built and

launched between February 1970 and February 1976.36 Collectively they furnished the strategic

(global, stored) and tactical (direct readout) weather coverage required by the NRO and the JCS,

although their operational life expectancy on orbit averaged at best about ten months. Meanwhile, 

Kulpa had departed the program for another NRO assignment in 1968; Lt. Colonel Wilbur B.

Botzong served as his replacement for the next six years, until 1974. Subsequently, a succession of 

program directors followed him, often in

rapid order. Beginning in the mid 1970s, the 

DMSP staff at the Space Systems Division

in El Segundo matured, expanded

numerically, and adopted a more lethargic

pace of operations. Its early peripatetic

activity and corner-cutting solutions to

bureaucratic and technical problems became 

things of memory. Transferring the military

meteorological satellite program to Air

Force Systems Command in 1965 had

reduced security restrictions, to be sure, but 

it also had introduced bureaucratic layering

(absent Colonel Haig's first rule, the

Aerospace Corporation now provided

systems engineering and integration

support), it had returned the program to conventional Air Force contracting and procurement

practices, and it had markedly increased the number of program personnel involved in

decision-making. Bespeaking these less salutary changes, the program office authorized launch of

Fig. 14. DMSP Block 5B Satellite
 

22

the last Block 5C satellite on 19 February 1976 with incorrect weight-to-propellant-loading 

calculations. Launched from Vandenberg Air Force Base, the Thor/Burner II booster rose

majestically through the atmosphere, reached the edge of space, exhausted its propellant, and the

DMSP satellite whistled back to Earth—a total loss.37

Fine-Tuning the DMSP 

The 10-sided, tub-shaped Block 5 polar-orbiting weather satellite had reached the end of 

its growth potential by the early 1970s. Moreover, this design, which took advantage of

spin-stabilization for internal thermal control, was ill suited to Block 5 operation in a “de-spun” 

three-axis-stabilized attitude. An entirely new design tailored entirely to Earth-oriented orbital

flight, one that met the demands of its military and civilian clients for increased pointing accuracy 

and more growth potential, appeared necessary. Indeed, beside offices of the National Oceanic and 

Atmospheric Administration in Suitland, Maryland, that began routinely to receive DMSP weather 

data in late 1972, a digital facsimile system had been installed in September 1972 at the National

Military Command Center to receive weather data transmitted from Air Force Global Weather

Central to the JCS. Shortly thereafter, a second digital facsimile system was installed at

Headquarters Tactical Air Command at Langley AFB, Virginia, and a third at the Army's White

Sands Missile Range in New Mexico, for its use in environmental research.38 

Another reason for starting a new Block 6 military meteorological satellite derived from 

the short lifetimes on orbit of the Block 5 series. A larger, heavier machine would furnish space and 

power for redundant components. If one component failed, another could be activated in its place. 

Studies of the Block 6 satellite, which proceeded in the late 1960s on the basis of a mean-mission 

lifetime on orbit of 16 months minimum, began in earnest in the early 1970s under DMSP Program 

Director Botzong.* But DMSP Block 6 with that designation was not to be. In the partisan realm of 

Washington politics, a new block number meant “a new start.” At best it would entail special

justification before Congressional Committees and involve unusually close scrutiny in the Office of 

Management and Budget (OMB). And officials in OMB favored combining the civil and military

 

*

Colonel Botzong would see this work completed before he retired in August 1974. Subsequently, he went 

to work for RCA.
 

23

polar orbiting meteorological satellite into one program the met everyone’s needs. At worst, a Block 

6 would fail to receive approval and spark an effort to merge the two programs. Air Force officials 

therefore elected to term the new spacecraft a modification: DMSP “Block 5D.” For those

acquainted with the nomenclature, the earlier Roman numerals used to identify DMSP blocks now 

converted to an Arabic numeral, which signified a block change. In Washington, politicians

unacquainted with its significance appropriated funds for five of the “modified” Block 5D

spacecraft in fiscal year 1972. 

The program office, however, had introduced a requirement for an Earth-oriented 

pointing accuracy much greater than the one imposed on it predecessor Block 5C. In the design

competition for the new spacecraft conducted between Boeing and RCA, only the latter firm was

judged able to meet completely that requirement. A contract for five Block 5D satellites, signed

with RCA in the fall of 1972, set a required launch date for the first of them in the fall of 1974. But 

the greater pointing accuracy and a complement of additional instruments also had increased the

projected cost of these spacecraft compared with their predecessors, and it introduced the risk of

delays in development.39

Whatever its pointing accuracy, and the numerical sleight-of-hand for “Block 5D”

notwithstanding, in November 1972 the OMB requested that the Departments of Commerce and

Defense reexamine a consolidated civil and military polar orbiting meteorological satellite program, 

and the possibility of using a single spacecraft to satisfy the demands of both. Either action could be 

expected to result in substantial dollar savings, and a steering group composed of representatives

from NOAA, the Defense Department, and NASA was formed once again to consider these

questions. Since the technical capability of the existing Block 5C already exceeded the capability of 

a planned NOAA successor, TIROS-N, the group’s report, issued in mid-1973, concluded that the 

greatest savings would be realized in a single national meteorological satellite system managed by

the Air Force, using a standard DMSP Block-5D satellite. This uncivil solution was quickly rejected 

by Henry Kissinger, President Nixon’s National Security Advisor, who argued that it would violate 

the National Aeronautics and Space Act, which dictated a separation of military and civil

spacefaring, and by officials made uneasy in the Department of State, who warned of adverse

international repercussions. Subsequent interagency deliberations led by Air Force Under Secretary 

James W. Plummer, the director of the NRO, resulted in an agreement in July 1974 to achieve major 

cost savings by adopting a variant of the DMSP Block-5D military satellite for use in both the civil 
 

24

(replacing TIROS-N) and military polar-orbiting, low-altitude, meteorological space programs. The 

larger, joint-use version needed by the NOAA to support additional sensors, was identified as Block 

5D-2. The five original Air Force-RCA spacecraft thus became DMSP Block 5D-1.40 

The Block 5D-1 design that had emerged back in the early 1970s resembled in

appearance conventional Earth-oriented satellites of this period. Sized to fit the space taken by the

Burner IIA solid-propellant upper stage on the Thor, it was five feet in diameter and 20 feet long. 

The 5D satellite built by RCA consisted of three sections: a square precision-mounting platform on 

the forward end supported the sensors and other equipment required for precise alignment; in the

center, a five-sided equipment-support module contained the bulk of the electronics and featured

one or two pinwheel louvers on four sides for thermal control; and, at the aft end, a circular reaction 

and control-equipment 

support structure

housed the spent third

stage solid-propellant 

rocket motor and

contained reactioncontrol equipment. A

deployable, 6-by-16 

foot sun-tracking solar

array was also mounted 

aft, on this section.

With its complement of 

additional sensors, the

spacecraft weighed 1,150 pounds, making it more than twice as massive as its Block 5C

predecessors. To heft the additional weight into orbit, the program office contracted with Boeing for 

a new, larger, solid propellant second stage. The original Burner-IIA second stage, now adapted as a 

third stage and fixed to the satellite, was used during ascent to inject the vehicle into its circular,

sun-synchronous 450 nautical mile Earth orbit.41

Once in orbit, the 5D-1 RCA spacecraft had to point and control the optical axis of the

primary imaging sensor to within .01 degree, in effect making the satellite “a spaceborne optical

bench.” This was achieved by automatic momentum exchange between three momentum wheels—

Fig. 15. DMSP Block 5D-1 Satellite
 

25

one each positioned in the yaw, roll, and pitch axis—and magnetic coils that interacted with the

Earth's magnetic field and prevented the accumulation of wheel secular momentum. The wheels and 

coils were coupled with three orthogonal gyroscopes that measured short-term changes in attitude, 

and a star sensor that updated attitude position to bound the effects of gyro drift. A backup system, 

composed of an Earth sensor that furnished pitch and roll information, and a sun sensor that

provided yaw information, ensured attitude control about one-tenth as accurate as the primary

system. The software programs for both systems were stored in two redundant central computers

and processing units.42

Besides performing spacecraft-control functions autonomously on orbit, the integrated

5D computers and attitude-control system also controlled the Thor booster and its upper stages

during ascent and orbit injection. A pre-set (but reprogrammable in orbit) software code contained 

in both of the central computers made possible the autonomous orbital operations. All of these

control and maintenance functions were directed to a single purpose: support of the primary

imaging sensor, an improved Westinghouse electro-optical Operational Linescan System (OLS).

The OLS consisted of a scanning optical telescope oscillated in a sinusoidal (side-to-side) motion by 

counter-reacting springs and a pulsed motor. In a nominal orbit, the OLS covered a swath width of 

1,600 nm and furnished a nadir resolution at the Earth's surface of 0.3 nm in the visual and infrared 

spectra, with a resolution of 0.5 nm at the edges. The OLS also could produce “smoothed” images 

with a constant resolution of 1.5 nm across the scan. The visual and thermal data acquired on cloud 

cover and cloud-height profiles could be stored in three tape recorders for transmission on command 

to Earth in an encrypted, digital format. Direct readout, of course, also was available to tactical

users.43 The increased amount of data that could not be effectively transmitted over the leased land 

lines used previously, began to be relayed from the DMSP ground stations to Air Force Global

Weather Central at Offutt AFB via commercial communications satellites beginning with the first 

launch of a Block 5D. 

A variety of secondary sensors, some judged as “nice to have,” appeared in different

combinations on Block 5D-1 missions. Five of them frequently appeared on the spacecraft. An

atmospheric density sensor measured the major atmospheric constituents (nitrogen, oxygen, and

ozone) in the Earth's thermosphere on the daylight portion of each orbit. A precipitating electron

spectrometer counted ambient electrons at various energies. A scanning infrared radiometer

furnished vertical temperature profiles, vertical water vapor profiles, and the total ozone
 

26

concentration. A passive microwave-scanning radiometer profiled global atmospheric temperatures 

from the Earth's surface to altitudes above 30 kilometers. Finally, a gamma-radiation sensor

furnished by the Air Force Technical Applications Center detected nuclear detonations as part of the 

ongoing Integrated Operations NUDET Detection System.44 

The complexity of the new satellite and design changes introduced along the way, as

some had feared, increased costs and delayed the first Block 5D-1 flight from 1974 until 1976. Air 

Force Systems Command dispatched an Inspector General’s team to examine the program at Space

and Missile Systems Organization (SAMSO, formerly the Space Systems Division) in El Segundo 

in January 1975. At Systems Command headquarters, Major General Nick Chubb, who years before 

had first flight tested the OLS for DMSP, found one of the findings most alarming: given the life

expectancy of the Block 5C spacecraft already on orbit, the two year delay in launching Block 5D-1 

Fig. 16. DMSP Nighttime Image of the Aurora Borealis Taken by the First Block 5A Satellite in 1971 

(Note lighted cities from Canada through Central America.)
 

27

could be expected to produce a significant gap in meteorological satellite coverage at the end of the 

decade. Worse, there was all but nothing that could be done to avoid it.45 

The value of autonomous flight operation nonetheless was demonstrated during the first 

launch of the first Block 5D-1 on 11 September 1976. The spacecraft unexpectedly tumbled endover-end in space. A few months later, intermittent communication with the tumbling satellite was 

established and ground controllers reprogrammed the computers. The attitude-control system

thereafter slowed the rate of tumbling until the satellite stabilized on three axes and began operating 

properly. A flexible Block 5D design had made possible the recovery of a mission at first believed 

lost.46

Nevertheless, as the inspector general team had warned in 1975, the degraded

performance of the remaining 5C spacecraft on orbit, the delay in launching the first 5D-1 vehicle, 

and the unanticipated loss of the last Block 5C at launch in February 1976 combined to produce

poor DMSP weather coverage between 1975 and 1977. The program office was forced to change

DMSP status from fully operational to partially operational. Then matters got worse. The second

5D-1 satellite, launched on 5 June 1977, vaulted into a drifting orbit and by the spring of 1978 it had 

moved so far out of position that most of the OLS data was all but useless to the National 

Reconnaissance Office. The third and fourth vehicles, launched from Vandenberg AFB on 30 April 

1978 and 6 June 1979, respectively, fared better. With these two meteorological satellites operating 

on orbit, the last 5D-1 vehicle was held for launch as a replacement, when needed.47

While the Block 5D-1 enterprise moved ahead, work on the joint-use Block 5D-2, 

contracted with RCA in 1975, proceeded slowly. Technical changes introduced by the civilian and 

military co-users, and prolonged studies of the proper booster for the 5D-2, brought more delays and 

increased costs. In El Segundo, the DMSP program office at the Space and Missile Systems

Organization found it necessary to slip the first 5D-2 launch from 1980 to 1982.48 Meanwhile,

between 1975 and 1980, a succession of six DMSP program directors arrived, were reassigned, and 

left. The era when a Tom Haig or a Jack Kulpa guided DMSP activity for several years at a time

appeared to be a thing of the past. In Washington D.C., as the decade drew to a close, the sharp rise 

in cost of the new Block 5D-2 weather satellite moved cost-conscious members of OMB and

Congress in 1979 to reduce the number on order for the Air Force from 13 to 9. Nine long-life 

follow-on satellites, according to those addressing the question in Washington, were more than

enough for the country.49 
 

28

The electronic components of the follow-on satellites remained essentially the same as

those in 5D-1, but the 5D-2 structure increased in length from 20 to 22.5 feet. The extension

increased the downward-facing sensor-mounting area and lengthened the equipment-support 

module amidships. That module now contained a second 25.5-amp-hour battery and sported two or 

three pinwheel temperature control louvers on four of its five sides. The solar array mounted on the 

aft reaction control equipment-support structure also increased in size to 10-by-16 feet, furnishing 

increased electrical power. Two important sensors were added to those in the 5D-1 complement: a 

topside ionospheric sounder provided detailed global measurements of the electron distribution in

the Earth's ionosphere, and a microwave imager (flown on the last few 5D-2 satellites) defined the 

extent of sea ice and seastate conditions (wave height 

and patterns) on the world's

oceans. Withal, these 

changes increased the weight 

of the Block-5D-2 spacecraft 

to 1,792 pounds—a sum too

great for the Thor/Burner

booster combination. Heated

debates took place between

officials in the program

office and Aerospace

Defense Command, the

launch agency at that time,

about adapting Thrust Augmented Thors to the task, just to keep a “blue suit” launch squadron.

Ultimately, however, the launch vehicle selected for the 5D-2 meteorological satellite in 1980—

after 16 months of vacillation—was the General Dynamics Atlas E, an improved version of the

liquid-propellant intercontinental ballistic missile deployed briefly in the early 1960s. The solidpropellant Burner IIA upper stage, fixed to the aft end of the satellite, was retained, again used at 

altitude to drive the vehicle into a circular 450 nautical mile polar orbit.50 

Fig. 17. DMSP Block 5D-2 Satellite
 

29

A Change in Time and Circumstance

A conjunction of events precipitated successes and failures in late 1979. For some around 

the world, their time had arrived. In mid-October the Pittsburgh Pirates won the World Series in

seven games. On 3 November in Tehran, Iran, Shiite militants seized the American Embassy,

imprisoned the staff, and dared the United States to do anything about it. A few weeks later, on

Christmas Day, the Soviet Union began airlifting military forces into nearby Afghanistan, intent it 

seemed on securing a vassal state. But for others time had run out. In September 1979 the first of the 

Block 5D-1 polar-orbiting satellites, which had begun to fail earlier in the year, ceased all effective 

operations. The third satellite failed to operate on orbit at the beginning of December 1979. Shortly 

after the New Year began, in March 1980, the second satellite used for tactical weather support in a 

drifting orbit, also failed. The fourth vehicle, meanwhile, encountered electrical problems, began to 

falter, and experienced a total telemetry system failure. On 29 December 1979 ground controllers

placed it in a “backup mode.” The fifth and last Block 5D-1 satellite held in reserve was quickly

readied for flight and shipped to Vandenberg AFB. Now, officials in the DMSP program office

could only hope for the best. With Block 5D-2 vehicles delayed in development, a first launch could 

not occur at least until 1982—two years in the future. The sputtering fourth DMSP satellite, to be

joined now by the new fifth Block 5D-1 spacecraft, had therefore to function on orbit for an

extended period if the nation's strategic and tactical military meteorological needs were to be met 

completely.51

On 15 July 1980, at Vandenberg AFB in California, a Thor/Burner launch vehicle

carrying the last 5D-1 satellite roared to life and ascended skyward. For the first time in many years, 

a Thor/Burner combination failed. The second and third stage solid rockets apparently did not

separate, and the satellite fell into the South Pacific. Four weeks later in August, high above the

Earth, the fourth and last 5D-1 satellite completely ceased to function. Back in the mid 1970s the

program had temporarily operated with a single satellite in orbit. Not since the early 1960s,

however, had the program faced an absolute gap in military meteorological coverage. An

investigation of DMSP by Air Force Systems Command identified funding cutbacks and program

management fundamentally weakened by a rapid turnover of program directors to be the principal 

contributing causes. The requirement for an extreme pointing accuracy and the much-increased 
 

30

complexity of these machines, which contributed to spiraling costs and launch delays, appeared to 

escape notice. The deficiencies cited might be rectified by 1982; in the meantime, however, the

military services and the NRP would have to rely on NOAA satellites and other programs for

tactical and strategic meteorological coverage.52

Having to rely on NOAA for satellite meteorological data was a bitter pill for Air Force 

officials to swallow. For years they had defended DMSP before Congress and the public as

“indispensable” to military decision-makers, especially in times of conflict.53 To be sure, since the

mid 1970s, data from NOAA weather satellites had been received on the East Coast and transmitted 

to Air Force Global Weather Central over an automated weather network, where it could be

combined with information from the DMSP satellites and other ground and aerial observations

obtained throughout the world. Between mid-1980 and 1983 these data, less that of the military

weather satellites, would meet most military needs. Although the NOAA spacecraft were not

designed specifically to satisfy fully the high-resolution visual and infrared strategic meteorological 

requirements of the National Reconnaissance Program, it would no longer be possible for Air Force 

leaders to claim that these civil spacecraft would not do at all. 

At Air Force Global Weather Central, DMSP high-resolution data had permitted its

meteorologists to assess the cloud cover over the Eurasian continent and issue rapid forecasts that 

predicted the percent probability of obtaining cloud-free photography over areas about to be

transited by reconnaissance spacecraft. These time-critical forecast probabilities of cloud-free 

conditions had been the key determinants in directing camera operations and film expenditure.54 By 

mid 1980, however, many years accumulation of cloud-cover data from all sources permitted

statistical modeling and forecasting. Combined with the NOAA weather satellite data, cloud-cover 

now could be predicted beforehand and that estimate used to direct overhead imagery operations. 

Back in 1963-1964, only 50-to-60 percent of CORONA reconnaissance satellite

photographs proved to be cloud-free with the support of DMSP meteorological satellites. Part of the 

difficulty stemmed from meteorologists at the NRO’s Satellite Operations Center in the Pentagon

who at first failed to properly define cloud cover in terms of the relative viewing angle to the target. 

Part of it stemmed from the differing terminology used by the intelligence customers who submitted 

target requirements to the Committee on Imagery Requirements and Exploitation (COMIREX). In 

1966 COMIREX adopted as a single standard the World Aeronautical Chart and its subdivisions,

called World Aeronautical Grid Cells, or WAG Cells. Each WAG Cell was a uniform 12-by-18 
 

31

nautical miles on a side around the world. Intelligence customers thereafter submitted target

requests to COMIREX identified by WAG Cell location and sorted by ephemeris—whichever 

satellite orbital trace crossed a

particular WAG Cell and at what time. 

At Offutt AFB, the Air Weather

Service's Air Force Global Weather

Central began work on a threedimensional cloud analysis. The

programs merged all overhead imaging 

and civilian weather reports into a

global cloud analysis with a spatial

resolution of 25 nm on a polar

stereographic grid, by date and time of

day. By the late 1960s, employing a

software program devised by the Air

Weather Service, Air Force Global

Weather Central could estimate the

probability of cloud-free access on any

day and time throughout the year for

any required target.55

This effort assumed increased importance in 1972 when operation of a new imaging

satellite began. The early morning “scout” military weather satellite furnished weather conditions

over the Soviet Union at first light. These data, used in the cloud analysis and forecast system,

provided cloud-cover estimates that were transmitted from Air Force Global Weather Central to the 

Satellite Operations Center in the basement of the Pentagon and used as a short-term forecast to

program satellite camera operations in the reconnaissance satellites that trailed the weather scout.

The late morning “assessment” weather satellite told how accurate the cloud forecast had been,

determined whether target requirements had been satisfied, and also contributed data to the weather 

model. Finally, personnel in the Defense Mapping Agency scanned the film returned by

reconnaissance satellites and reported actual cloud cover to Air Force Global Weather Central

afterward, further contributing to the weather model data base.56 By the late 1970s a high percentage 

Fig. 18. DMSP Image of the Western United States and 

Mexico at 1/3 Nautical Mile Resolution, early 1970s
 

32

of satellite pictures taken of the Earth were

free of cloud cover. Without these weather

forecasts, only 38-to-40 percent of the

imagery returned would have been cloudfree. Probabilities of cloud cover generated

by the weather analysis model combined

with low-altitude NOAA satellite data* thus 

met minimum NRP strategic weather

forecast requirements during the 1980-1982 

DMSP interregnum.57 

In December 1982 the first of the 

Block 5D-2 military weather satellites, a

morning bird, was launched successfully

atop an Atlas booster. The second and third 

satellites followed the first one into orbit in

November 1983 and June 1987,

respectively. These military meteorological

satellites once again supplied the global

coverage needed by the country's three

military services and the NRP—and did so for many months. Indeed, the primary OLS on the first 

5D-2 satellite did not cease functioning until mid-August 1987, providing nearly five years of

effective operation, while the second ceased in November of that year; the third satellite OLS

continued to function until mid-August 1991. In the meantime, Defense Department and NOAA

officials made plans for another improved version of what would become the standard U.S. civil

and military low-altitude weather satellite, Block 5D-3.

58 

Design studies of a still larger and heavier Block 5D-3 satellite began in the late 1970s,†

but funds for the military version were not appropriated until mid-1980. The 5D-3 satellites, though 

 

*

To meet separate NOAA weather modeling needs, a primary NOAA polar-orbiting satellite crossed the Soviet 

Union at about 2430 local time, while a second one followed at 0830 in the morning. These times and unavoidable

delays in relaying weather data to Air Force Global Weather Central did not mesh well with NRP forecast requirements.

†

Air Force officials briefly considered calling this series of DMSP satellites Block 6, but abandoned the idea 

when President Jimmy Carter issued a directive in late 1979 that specified military and civil meteorological satellite

programs would continue to be conducted separately until the next satellite block change. (Presidential Directive 54,

Fig. 19. DMSP Image of the Red Sea at 1/3 Nautical 

Mile Resolution, early 1970s 

(Mediterranean Sea at the top of the image.)
 

33

initially designed to be

compatible for launch on

NASA's Space Shuttle and be 

laser-hardened, ultimately 

would be launched on an

unmanned expendable rocket.

This satellite mounted an

improved Westinghouse OLS

and a larger combination of

secondary sensors. The length 

of the satellite increased from

22 to 24 feet, while the weight 

rose to 2,278 pounds. The

RCA spacecraft consisted of the same basic components as its immediate predecessors, but included 

a larger solar array, three 50-amp-hour batteries, and a redesigned sunshade. The center section now 

sported four pinwheel temperature control louvers on four of its five sides. These and other design 

improvements combined to give the 5D-3 an anticipated mean mission lifetime on orbit of five

years (60 months). The first of six 5D-3 spacecraft was scheduled to be delivered to the Air Force in 

June 1990. Following the loss of the Space Shuttle Challenger in January 1986, however, all of

them were rescheduled for launch atop modified Titan-II intercontinental ballistic missiles. 

After the introduction of the DMSP Block 5D-1 satellites, Air Force leaders realigned the 

organization and operation of the program. Responsibility for launching DMSP spacecraft

transferred in the mid-1970s from the Strategic Air Command (SAC) to the Aerospace Defense

Command, and then to the Air Force System Command's Space Division. When the Air Force

established a Space Command in September 1982, the new organization gained from SAC

responsibility for operating the ground stations in Maine and Washington State,* and the DMSP

Command and Control Center at Offutt AFB. Following the disruption that occurred with the gap in 

 

"Civil Operational Remote Sensing," 23 November 1979.)

*

In 1979-1980 the DMSP program also had arranged for data readout and relay of weather data from a third 

site, the Air Force Satellite Control Facility tracking station in Hawaii.

Fig. 20. DMSP Block 5D-3 Satellite
 

34

satellite coverage during the early 1980s, and despite the inter-command politics that attended the 

organizational realignment, in 1987 the operational DMSP received the management attention it

deserved, met its strategic and tactical commitments, and could be judged reasonably fine-tuned. 

Fine-tuned or not, between 1962 and 1994 the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program 

had sparked a revolution in overhead meteorology. It introduced the “wheel-mode” operational

satellite, novel attitude-control systems, new satellite-tracking programs, and the operational use of 

infrared imagery to the field of meteorology. Beginning in 1966 it acquired a tactical as well as

strategic capability and furnished the needed weather support for both activities. Indeed, DMSP

significantly increased the image-search system effectiveness of NRO reconnaissance satellites and 

of SAC SR-71 and U-2 reconnaissance aircraft, while it markedly reduced the number of aerial

meteorological sorties. The integrated Block 5 introduced the first systems approach that turned on 

the user’s requirements. All the while, the mean mission lifetime on orbit of the military

meteorological satellites increased from 90 days in Block 1, to five years on the most recent Block 

5D-2 flights. These successes were tempered in the 1970s by the layering of management and the

introduction of increasingly complex spacecraft that brought with them program delays, increased 

costs, and, ultimately, the gap in weather coverage that occurred in the early 1980s.

The Defense Meteorological Satellite Program, certainly during the early years and at

least until the early 1970s, made do with less. In those years, DMSP development and production 

was accomplished with fewer personnel and at less than one-half the cost of equivalent NASA and 

Department of Commerce efforts.59 Pushed to operational status within 24 months, the DMSP

demonstrated remarkable technical performance for both strategic and tactical applications.

Considering its cost and performance in the mid-1960s, Commerce Department leaders told their

counterparts at NASA that they would adopt the DMSP wheel-mode spacecraft in place of Nimbus 

as the standard for low-altitude, polar-orbiting meteorological applications. That choice was made

formal in the mid 1970s when the DMSP Block 5D three axis-stabilized spacecraft also was

selected for use in both programs. But the choice of a common spacecraft bus highlighted the near 

identical content of the civil and military low altitude meteorological satellite programs.
 

35

Afterword

Early in 1993, once again prompted by the Office of Management and Budget and

Congressional committees to justify separate military and civil polar orbiting meteorological 

satellites, representatives of the Department of Defense, the Department of Commerce’s NOAA,

and NASA reconvened to study the issue. Members of this group most likely were unacquainted

with the interdepartmental study conducted by their predecessors thirty-two years before in 1961, a 

study that had produced plans for a National Operational Meteorological Satellite System. Because 

of security restrictions only recently lifted, they surely were unacquainted with the most significant 

aspects of the history that you have just read. But unlike events in 1961, the technology for spacebased meteorological observation now was well developed, the international sensitivity associated 

with overhead reconnaissance had all but disappeared, and weather satellites were in operation in

orbit around the clock. Hardly to anyone’s surprise, and with much greater assurance, members of

the 1993 study reached conclusions similar to those of 1961: a single program would eliminate the 

need for duplicate satellites and ground stations, it would reduce the number of people involved

along with the corresponding costs, and it could be made to satisfy both civil and military

requirements for “operational, space based, remotely-sensed, environmental data.”60 But this last

proposition remains open to question. If history is any guide, attempts to acquire advanced weapon 

systems (e.g., the TFX/F-111) that will do everything for everyone more often than not have failed 

to achieve that goal, and have cost more in the bargain. 

Nevertheless, the 1993 interdepartmental study, after appropriate departmental

coordination and approvals, led later that year to the preparation of a “tri-agency” plan to combine 

the two weather satellite programs into one. But the word “combine,” would not be used. Perhaps it 

suggested bureaucratic foot-dragging, if not myopia, and a substitute was selected in its place—one 

that implied a new initiative. On 5 May 1994 President William Clinton issued a Presidential

Decision Directive announcing the choice,61 and, coincident with it, the Departments of Defense,

Commerce, and NASA released the “Implementation Plan for a Converged Polar-orbiting 

Environmental Satellite System.” The plan created an Integrated Program Office that would

develop, acquire, and operate the converged National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental

Satellite System (NPOESS). It formed an Executive Committee composed of senior officials from

all three government agencies that would serve as a board of directors and ensure that the NPOESS
 

36

indeed met the requirements of each. And, under the terms of the plan, each agency shared

responsibility for different elements of NPOESS. The NOAA held “overall responsibility for the

converged system,” including operating the satellites on orbit and representing the program to the 

various civil and international communities involved. The Defense Department became responsible 

for contracting and acquiring the new meteorological satellites and for launching them. Finally,

reminiscent of the division of labor in 1961 that produced Nimbus, NASA assumed responsibility

for “facilitating the development and incorporation of new cost-effective technologies into the

converged system.”62

The NPOESS program office, located at a NOAA facility in Silver Spring, Maryland, 

opened its doors on 3 October 1994. Four years later, in May 1998, the NPOESS program director 

assumed responsibility for controlling DMSP satellites, along with the NOAA polar orbiting

satellites. On 11 June the Air Force Space Command 6

th Space Operations Squadron, which had

previously operated DMSP satellites from a control center near the old SAC Headquarters in

Omaha, Nebraska, inactivated. It brought to a close an effort begun in secret to meet the

meteorological needs of the National Reconnaissance Office and its National Reconnaissance

Program nearly four decades before, in 1961. After May 1998, civilians at the NOAA’s Satellite

Operations Control Center in Suitland conducted space flight operations for all polar orbiting U.S. 

weather satellites, though the Air Force established a backup satellite operations center, manned by 

USAF Reserve personnel, at Schriever Air Force Base near Colorado Springs, Colorado. Sometime 

late in the first decade of the new Millennium, NPOESS satellites will become available as

replacements for the current Block 5D-3 DMSP and NOAA satellites, as they expire on orbit.63 But 

that is another history in the making.

Acknowledgments

When in early 2000 the NRO declassified its meteorological satellite history, it became

possible for me to share an early version with some of the original participants who had left the 

program and, along with it, their security clearances many years before. On receiving word of the 

declassification, several of them also corresponded with me, sent unclassified documents that

they possessed, and two prepared written memoirs. Altogether, they corrected errors of fact and 

added details not otherwise found in NRO and Air Force documents, and in the process
 

37

contributed mightily to this work. Among those who furnished vital records or recollections, I

am most especially indebted to Thomas O. Haig, Richard L. Geer, Ronald E. Mintz, James R. 

Blankenship, John E. (Jack) Kulpa, and John D. Cunningham. At one time or another, each one 

of them were eye witnesses to and played active roles in the story; indeed, John Cunningham,

who first served DMSP as an Air Force officer in the 1970s and 1980s, is currently the System

Program Director for the Integrated Program Office/NPOESS. Finally, special thanks are owed 

to my colleague Matthew Doering who researched and prepared the DMSP Launch Record

tables, and placed carefully the illustrations that appear in this work.
 

38

Table 1

DMSP Launch Record

Scout Rocket

DATE LAUNCH 

VEHICLE

LAUNCH 

SITE

PAYLOAD PERCENT 

SUCCESS

REMARKS

5-23-62 Scout

V-112

PALC 

SLC-5

DMSP 

Block 1

0% Failed to Orbit;

2

nd Stage Exploded *

8-23-62 Scout

V-117

PALC

SLC-5

DMSP 

Block 1

50% Success;

EMD 6-11-63

2-19-63 Scout

V-126

PALC 

SLC-5

DMSP 

Block 1

66.6% Improper Orbit;

First DMSP with 

Infrared System

4-26-63 Scout

V-121

PALC 

SLC-5

DMSP 

Block 1

33.3% Failed to Orbit;

3

rd Stage Exploded *

9-27-63 Scout

V-132

PALC 

SLC-5

DMSP 

Block 1

16.6% Failed to Orbit;

3

rd Stage Failure

Abbreviations: DMSP = Defense Meteorological Satellite Program; EMD = End of Mission 

Date; PALC = Point Arguello Launch Complex; SLC = Space Launch Complex

* An investigation after the V-121 failure revealed that the Range Safety Officer (RSO) turned 

off the Command Destruct (CD) transmitter when the Range was pronounced “Clear” from any 

debris that might result from a catastrophic malfunction. What the RSO failed to consider was 

that with the CD transmitter turned off, the Scout receiver, equipped with an automatic gain 

control onboard the rocket, began searching for the next strongest signal. The next strongest 

signal turned out to be a radio station broadcasting music in the Los Angeles basin. Based on the 

investigation, when a male vocalist enunciated the consonant “p” the receiver interpreted it as the 

coded destruct signal. 
 

39

Table 2

DMSP Launch Record

Thor-Agena D Rocket *

DATE LAUNCH 

VEHICLE

LAUNCH 

SITE

PAYLOAD PERCENT 

SUCCESS

REMARKS

1-19-64 ThorAgena DVAFB 

SLC-1W

Two DMSP 

Block 1 

satellites

100% Success;

EMD 7-10-64

& 

EMD 3-17-65

6-17-64 ThorAgena DVAFB 

SLC-1W

Two DMSP 

Block 1 

satellites

100% Success;

EMD 2-16-66

&

EMD 10-15-65

Abbreviations: DMSP = Defense Meteorological Satellite Program; EMD = End of Mission 

Date; SLC = Space Launch Complex; VAFB = Vandenberg Air Force Base

* The Thor-Agena launch vehicle carried two DMSP satellites simultaneously.
 

40

Table 3

DMSP Launch Record

Burner I Rocket

DATE LAUNCH 

VEHICLE

LAUNCH 

SITE

PAYLOAD PERCENT 

SUCCESS

REMARKS

1-18-65 Burner I VAFB 

SLC-10W

DMSP 

Block 1

0% Failed to Orbit;

Payload shroud 

failed to separate

3-18-65 Burner I VAFB 

SLC-10W

DMSP 

Block 1

50% Success;

EMD 6-15-65

5-20-65 Burner I VAFB 

SLC-10W

DMSP 

Block 3

66.6% Success;

EMD 2-16-67

9-9-65 Burner I VAFB 

SLC-10W

DMSP 

Block 2

75% Success;

EMD 9-22-66

1-7-66 Burner I VAFB 

SLC-10W

DMSP 

Block 2

60% Failed to Orbit;

Upper stage failed to 

ignite

3-30-66 Burner I VAFB 

SLC-10W

DMSP 

Block 2

66.6% Success;

EMD 5-3-68

Abbreviations: DMSP = Defense Meteorological Satellite Program; EMD = End of Mission 

Date; SLC = Space Launch Complex; VAFB = Vandenberg Air Force Base
 

41

Table 4

DMSP Launch Record

Thor/Burner II Rocket, Block 4 Satellites

DATE LAUNCH 

VEHICLE

LAUNCH 

SITE

PAYLOAD PERCENT 

SUCCESS

REMARKS

9-15-66 Thor/Burner 

II

VAFB 

SLC-10W

DMSP 

Block 4A

100% Success;

EMD 11-3-68

2-8-67 Thor/Burner 

II

VAFB 

SLC-10W

DMSP 

Block 4A

100% Success;

EMD 5-18-67

8-23-67 Thor/Burner 

II

VAFB 

SLC-10W

DMSP 

Block 4A

100% Success;

EMD 3-13-68

10-11-67 Thor/Burner 

II

VAFB 

SLC-10W

DMSP 

Block 4A

100% Success;

EMD 6-23-68

5-23-68 Thor/Burner 

II

VAFB 

SLC-10W

DMSP 

Block 4B

100% Success;

EMD 5-26-69

10-22-68 Thor/Burner 

II

VAFB 

SLC-10W

DMSP 

Block 4B

100% Success;

EMD 9-19-70

7-22-69 Thor/Burner 

II

VAFB 

SLC-10W

DMSP 

Block 4B*

100% Success;

EMD 3-19-71

Abbreviations: DMSP = Defense Meteorological Satellite Program; EMD = End of Mission 

Date; SLC = Space Launch Complex; VAFB = Vandenberg Air Force Base

* One Additional DMSP Block 4B satellite was manufactured, but not launched. The satellite, 

also known as 4B-4, was donated to the Chicago Museum of Science and Industry.
 

42

Table 5

DMSP Launch Record

Thor/Burner II Rocket, Block 5A & 5B Satellites

DATE LAUNCH 

VEHICLE

LAUNCH 

SITE

PAYLOAD PERCENT 

SUCCESS

REMARKS

2-11-70 Thor/Burner 

II

VAFB 

SLC-10W

DMSP 

Block 5A

100% Success;

EMD 3-19-71

9-3-70 Thor/Burner 

II

VAFB 

SLC-10W

DMSP 

Block 5A

100% Success;

EMD 2-15-71

2-17-71 Thor/Burner 

II

VAFB 

SLC-10W

DMSP 

Block 5A

100% Success;

EMD 3-3-73

10-14-71 Thor/Burner 

II

VAFB 

SLC-10W

DMSP 

Block 5B

100% Success;

EMD 4/27/72

3-24-72 Thor/Burner 

II

VAFB 

SLC-10W

DMSP 

Block 5B

100% Success;

EMD 2-23-74

11-9-72 Thor/Burner 

II

VAFB 

SLC-10W

DMSP 

Block 5B

100% Success;

EMD 5-22-75

8-17-73 Thor/Burner 

II

VAFB 

SLC-10W

DMSP 

Block 5B

100% Success;

EMD 1-24-77

3-16-74 Thor/Burner 

II

VAFB 

SLC-10W

DMSP 

Block 5B

100% Success;

EMD 5-27-76

Abbreviations: DMSP = Defense Meteorological Satellite Program; EMD = End of Mission 

Date; SLC = Space Launch Complex; VAFB = Vandenberg Air Force Base
 

43

Table 6

DMSP Launch Record

Thor/Burner II Rocket, Block 5C & 5D1 Satellites

DATE LAUNCH 

VEHICLE

LAUNCH 

SITE

PAYLOAD PERCENT 

SUCCESS

REMARKS

8-9-74 Thor/Burner 

II

VAFB 

SLC-10W

DMSP 

Block 5C

100% Success;

EMD 12-1-77

5-24-75 Thor/Burner 

II

VAFB 

SLC-10W

DMSP 

Block 5C

100% Success;

EMD 11-30-77

2-19-76 Thor/Burner 

II

VAFB 

SLC-10W

DMSP 

Block 5C

94.4% Failed to Orbit;

Improper fuel 

loading

9-11-76 Thor/Burner 

II

VAFB 

SLC-10W

DMSP 

Block 5D1

95% Success;

EMD 9-17-79

6-5-77 Thor/Burner 

II

VAFB 

SLC-10W

DMSP 

Block 5D1

95.2% Success;

EMD 3-19-80

5-1-78 Thor/Burner 

II

VAFB 

SLC-10W

DMSP 

Block 5D1

95.5% Success;

EMD 2-28-84

6-6-79 Thor/Burner 

II

VAFB 

SLC-10W

DMSP 

Block 5D1

95.7% Success;

EMD 8-29-80

7-15-80 Thor/Burner 

II

VAFB 

SLC-10W

DMSP 

Block 5D1

91.7% Failed to Orbit;

4

th Stage Failure

Abbreviations: DMSP = Defense Meteorological Satellite Program; EMD = End of Mission 

Date; SLC = Space Launch Complex; VAFB = Vandenberg Air Force Base
 

44

Table 7

DMSP Launch Record

Atlas E Rocket 

DATE LAUNCH 

VEHICLE

LAUNCH 

SITE

PAYLOAD PERCENT 

SUCCESS

REMARKS

12-21-82 Atlas E VAFB 

SLC-3W

DMSP 

Block 5D2

100% Success;

EMD 8-24-87

11-18-83 Atlas E VAFB 

SLC-3W

DMSP 

Block 5D2

100% Success;

EMD 10-17-87

6-20-87 Atlas E VAFB 

SLC-3W

DMSP 

Block 5D2

100% Success;

EMD 8-13-91

2-3-88 Atlas E VAFB 

SLC-3W

DMSP 

Block 5D2

100% Success;

EMD 2-24-92

12-1-90 Atlas E VAFB 

SLC-3W

DMSP 

Block 5D2

100% Success;

EMD 2-8-95

11-28-91 Atlas E VAFB 

SLC-3W

DMSP 

Block 5D2

100% Success;

EMD 8-30-00

8-29-94 Atlas E VAFB 

SLC-3W

DMSP 

Block 5D2

100% Success;

EMD 4-28-97

3-24-95 Atlas E VAFB 

SLC-3W

DMSP 

Block 5D2

100% Success;

EMD N/A

Abbreviations: DMSP = Defense Meteorological Satellite Program; EMD = End of Mission 

Date; SLC = Space Launch Complex; VAFB = Vandenberg Air Force Base
 

45

Table 8

DMSP Launch Record

Titan II Rocket

DATE LAUNCH 

VEHICLE

LAUNCH 

SITE

PAYLOAD PERCENT 

SUCCESS

REMARKS

4-4-97 Titan II VAFB 

SLC-4W

DMSP 

Block 5D2

100% Success;

EMD N/A

12-12-99 Titan II VAFB 

SLC-4W

DMSP 

Block 5D3

100% Success;

EMD N/A

11-14-01 Titan II VAFB 

SLC-4W

DMSP 

Block 5D3

Projected Launch 

Date

Abbreviations: DMSP = Defense Meteorological Satellite Program; EMD = End of Mission 

Date; SLC = Space Launch Complex; VAFB = Vandenberg Air Force Base
 

46

REFERENCES

1. Any photography of the Earth’s surface from space, RAND reminded the Air Force, had to 

occur when “weather permits ground observation.” Robert M. Salter, Jr., James E. Lipp, and 

Richard S. Wehner, Utility of a Satellite Vehicle for Reconnaissance (Santa Monica: The

RAND Corporation, R-217, April 1951), p. 80. See also, W. R. Cartheuser, Weather 

Degradation of Reconnaissance (Santa Monica: The RAND Corporation, D-4003, 10

December 1956). The first serious evaluation of a meteorological satellite and what it could 

be expected to do for synoptic weather analysis, needless to say, also took place at RAND at 

the same time. See Stanley M. Greenfield and William W. Kellogg, Inquiry into the

Feasibility of Weather Reconnaissance from a Satellite Vehicle (Santa Monica: The RAND 

Corporation, R-218, April 1951). See also, Karl R. Johannessen, The Meteorological

Factors Affecting Photographic Reconnaissance from Very High Altitudes, Air Weather

Service Technical Report 154, May 1961. An informed review of early meteorological

satellite developments can be found in David S. Johnson, “Evolution of the U.S.

Meteorological Satellite Program, Some Reminiscences,” Bulletin of the American

Meteorological Society, Vol 75., No. 9, September 1994, pp. 1705-1708.

2. Lt Col James B. Jones, “The National Weather Satellite Program: Its Utility as a

Contribution to Military Weather Support and as a Peaceful Instrument of U.S. Foreign

Policy,” Research Report prepared for the Air War College, Air University, 1965, pp. 1-2. 

The National Reconnaissance Program, created in 1961 by the Central Intelligence Agency 

and the Department of Defense, included all United States “satellite and overflight

reconnaissance projects whether overt or covert.” The National Reconnaissance Office

(NRO), headquartered in the Defense Department, managed the NRP.

3. Ltr, Thomas O. Haig to Lt. Col. Richard Dickover, HQ AWS/DOD, no subject, 13 Nov

1984, p. 1. See also, Robert Perry, A History of Satellite Reconnaissance, Volume IIA –

SAMOS, 1972, pp. 211-215; 

4. Richard L. Geer, “Comments on the Early Years of U.S. Space Programs: Recollections of a 

Participant,” 1999, p. 3.

5. Ltr, Haig to Dickover, p. 2.

6. Ralph B. Hoffman and Thomas O. Haig, “Space Uses of the Earth’s Magnetic Field,” Space 

Systems Division, Air Force Systems Command, October 1964; also, Robert L. Perry, A 

History of Satellite Reconnaissance, Vol IIA, SAMOS, pp. 223-224. The term “wheelmode” meant a spin-stabilized satellite that took a picture of the Earth each time it revolved.

7. Perry, Vol IIA, pp. 221-222.

8. Rpt, Program 417 - Military Meteorological Satellite System, HQ AWS/OP, 1 June 1966, p. 

7.
 

47

9. Ltr, Haig to Dickover, p. 2; Perry, Vol IIA, p. 254.

10. Ltr, Haig to Dickover, p. 3. SAC leaders had wanted for some time to get into the space

business and the meteorological satellite operation, which was of particular interest, meshed 

nicely with that desire and with the command’s requirements for world-wide weather data. 

See Ltr, General Thomas S. Power, CINCSAC, to General Thomas D. White, Chief of

Staff, USAF, regarding TIROS weather satellite, 1 December 1960 (Thomas D. White

Papers, Library of Congress, Box 34, 2-15SAC.).

11. Interview, Thomas O. Haig with the author, the Pentagon, 6 October 1995.

12. Perry, Vol IIA, pp. 268-70. The Block 5 satellites would mount vastly improved sensors,

with the IR and visual line scanner viewing the Earth through a beam splitter, operating

simultaneously. The resulting images thus could be overlaid.

13. Ibid., pp. 290-291.

14. Captains Richard L. Geer, James F. Roberts, and Calvin H. Markwood, “Development of

the Burner Space Launch Vehicles,” Space Systems Division Air Force Systems Command, 

1966. Also, Geer, “Comments on the Early Years,” pp. 8-9. Officials of the Douglas

Aircraft Company that manufactured the Thor rockets put the new launch vehicle

combination “on the front burner.” Thus the name “burner (number) I.” 

15. Ibid. pp. 11-12; 

16. Ltr, Haig to Dickover, pp. 2-3.

17. “Weather Bureau Rejects Nimbus for Operational Satellite Program,” Aviation Week &

Space Technology, 7 Oct 1963; DOC/USWB-NASA News Release 63-220, “NASAWeather Bureau Announce Nimbus Agreement,” 4 Oct 1963. For a description of NASA’s 

NRO-derived TOS, see NASA News Release 64-125, “Operational Weather Satellite Study 

Completed, Contract to be Negotiated for TIROS Operational System,” 28 May 1964; for its 

appearance as an operating weather satellite, see James F. W. Purdom and W. Paul Menzel, 

“Evolution of Satellite Observations in the United States and Their Use in Meteorology,” in 

James R. Fleming, ed., Historical Essays on Meteorology, 1919-1995 (Boston: The

Diamond Anniversary History Volume of the American Meteorological Society, 1996), pp. 

107-109; see also, Ltr, David S. Johnson, U.S. Weather Bureau, Department of

Commerce (DOC), to Col. Thomas O. Haig, 29 June 1965, regarding Program 417

(DMSP) contributions to the NOMSS.

18. Rpt, Meteorological Satellite Background, HQ AWS/OP, June 1963, p. 2.

19. Rpt, AFSC/AWS Ad Hoc Report on Meteorological Satellite Programs, Appendix A, U.S.

Meteorological Satellite Programs, 1 May 1966, p. A-13.
 

48

20. Rpt, AFSC/AWS Ad Hoc Report on Meteorological Satellite Requirements and Systems, 

Appendix F, Use of Program 417 Data in Military Operations, 1 May 1966, pp. F-1 – F-2.

21. Ibid., pp. F-2 – F-3; Rpt, Program 417, no author indicated, 8 April 1969, p. 1; and Rpt,

Program 417-Military Meteorological Satellite System, HQ AFSC/MSFU, June 1966, pp.

11-12.

22. Memorandum, from Brockway McMillan, Under Secretary of the Air Force, to General

John P. McConnell, CSAF, “Program 417 Management,” 22 June 1965; preliminary

planning in Memo, Brockway McMillan, Undersecretary of the Air Force, to Chief of Staff, 

USAF, "Program 417 Program Management," 22 June 1965.

23. Rpt, Review of the Defense Systems Application Program (DSAP), Program 417, NRO

document 77896-72, p. 35.

24. John L. McLucas, “A New Look From USAF's Weather Satellites,” Air Force Magazine, 

June 1973, pp. 64-67.

25. Rpt, A Review of the Defense Systems Application Program (DSAP), Program 417,

NRO document 77896-72, p. 10.

26. Ibid., pp. 9-10; also, Rpt, Program 417 Military Meteorological Satellite System, HQ

AFSC/MSFU, June 1966, p. 6.

27. John E. Kulpa, telephone interview with the author, 27 July 2000.

28. Geer, “Comments on the Early Years,” p.17

29. Brightness varies by many orders of magnitude and posed a data link capacity problem. The 

user, however, wasn’t as much interested in the brightness of a scene as he was in its

albedo—its reflectance. As Geer described the solution: “We devised a simple scheme. We 

placed a suitably shaped light sensor on the spacecraft to ‘look over its shoulder’ to

determine sun (or moon) illumination. What the satellite sees roughly corresponds to the

illumination on the scene below. By dividing the brightness signal from the primary earthfacing sensor by the brightness signal from the illumination sensor, the albedo of the scene 

is left. Since albedo only varies over one order of magnitude (1.0 to 0, perfectly reflective to 

perfectly black), the [data] link problem was solved.” Ibid., p. 20.

30. Ltr, James R. Blankenship to the author, 23 September 2000; also, Geer, “Comments on 

the Early Years,” p. 18

31. Kulpa, telephone interview; Geer, “Comments on the Early Years,” p. 19.

32. Paper, “Program 417 (U),” no author indicated, 8 Apr 1969, p. 3; Rpt, A Review of the

Defense Systems Application Program (DSAP), Program 417, NRO document 77896-72, p. 

10.
 

49

33. Memorandum, from Alexander H. Flax (Assistant Secretary of the Air Force), Robert A.

Frosch (Navy), and Charles L. Poor (Army), to John S. Foster, Jr., DDR&E, Subj: “Program 

417,” 5 March 1969.

34. Memorandum, John S. Foster, Jr., DDR&E, to the Assistant Secretaries of the Army,

Navy, and Air Force (R&D), “Program 417,” 29 March 1969.

35. Rpt, A Review of the Defense Systems Application Program (DSAP), p. 10.

36. See DMSP Launch Record, Tables 5 and 6.

37. Interview, Lt. Col. Richard F. Picanso, DMSP Program Element Monitor, with the author, 

the Pentagon, 12 August 1987.

38. Rpt, Defense Meteorological Satellite Program, 29 January 1976, p. 2 

39. Hist, Directorate of Space, DCS/Research and Development, 1 July 1972-31 December

1972, p. 63; Geer, “Comments on the Early Years,” p. 22.

40. Hist, Air Weather Service, 1976, Vol I, pp. 189-190.

41. Rpt, “Block 5D, A Compendium,” USAF Space and Missile Systems Organization, July 

1975, p. 28.

42. Ibid., p. 30; Paper, J. R. Blankenship and J. J. McGlinchey, “Evolution of the Block 5

Spacecraft to Meet Changing Military Needs,” September 1979.

43. "Block 5D, A Compendium," pp. 36-41.

44. Ibid., pp. 42-43. 

45. Geer, “Comments on the Early Years,” p. 23.

46. Blankenship and McGlinchey, p. 30.

47. Hist, Air Weather Service, 1976, Vol I, pp. 207-209; Hist, Space and Missile Systems

Organization, 1 January 1977-31 December 1977, Vol I, p. 185.

48. Ltr, John D. Cunningham to the author, 18 September 2000, with comments on draft

manuscript.

49. Hist, Space and Missile Systems Organization, 1 July 1973-30 June 1975, Vol I, p. 399;

Interview, Picanso with the author, 12 August 1987.
 

50

50. Hist, Space and Missile Systems Organization, 1 October 1979-30 September 1980, Vol I 

pp. 2l2-213; Blankenship and McGlinchey, p. 306; RCA Chart, Defense Meteorological

Satellite Program, n.d.; and Letter, Cunningham to the author, 18 September 2000.

51. Hist, Air Weather Service, 1979, Vol I, pp. 192-196. 

52. Hist, Space and Missile Systems Organization, 1 October 1979-30 September 1980, Vol I, 

p. 205; Hist, Space and Missile Systems Organization, 1 October 1980-30 September 1981, 

Vol I, p. 270.

53. See, for example, Maj. Ernie R. Dash and Maj. Walter D. Myers, “The Meteorological

Satellite: An Invaluable Tool for the Military Decision-Maker,” Air University Review, Vol 

24, No. 3, March-April 1978, pp. 15-24.

54. Rpt, A Review of the Defense Systems Application Program (DSAP), Program 417, NRO

77896-72, 1972, p. 20.

55. Interview, Donald E. Welzenbach, CIA Historian, with the author, 7 January 1987;

Interview, Lt. Col. Robert E. Peterson, Air Weather Service Representative to NRO Staff, 

with the author, 15 October 1987; Geer, “Comments on the Early Years,” p. 21.

56. Ibid.; "A Review of the Defense Systems Application Program (DSAP), Program 417," pp. 

20-23.

57. Interview, Welzenbach with the author.

58. Hist, Space and Missile Systems Organization, 1 October 1979-30 September 1980, Vol I, 

p. 214; Minutes, DMSP User's Working Group (USWG) Meeting Minutes, 28 February

1986 and 11 January 1987; Directive, "Program Management Directive for DMSP," 20

October 1986.

59. Rpt, A Review of the Defense System Applications Program (DSAP), Program 417, Table 8, 

DSAP/ITOS Cost Comparisons, p. 33; See also, Memo, HQ USAF/RDS to SAFRD (Dr.

Flax), "System Comparison," 28 February 1969, Atch 3, Cost Analysis.

60. National Environmental Satellite Data and Information Service News Release, “The

National Polar-orbiting Operational Satellite System (NPOESS),” Public Affairs, 6 January 

1999, p. 1.

61. Presidential Decision Directive/NSTC-2, 5 May 1994.

62. NESDIS News Release, 6 January 1999, p. 2.

63. Ibid., p. 3; Air Force News Release, “First Satellite-Flying Unit Inactivated,” 12 June 1998.