The United States Army War College

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

CENTER for

STRATEGIC

LEADERSHIP and

DEVELOPMENT

The United States Army War College educates and develops leaders for service 

at the strategic level while advancing knowledge in the global application 

of Landpower.

The purpose of the United States Army War College is to produce graduates 

who are skilled critical thinkers and complex problem solvers. Concurrently, 

it is our duty to the U.S. Army to also act as a “think factory” for commanders 

and civilian leaders at the strategic level worldwide and routinely engage 

in discourse and debate concerning the role of ground forces in achieving 

national security objectives.

The Strategic Studies Institute publishes national 

security and strategic research and analysis to influence 

policy debate and bridge the gap between military 

and academia.

The Center for Strategic Leadership and Development 

contributes to the education of world class senior 

leaders, develops expert knowledge, and provides 

solutions to strategic Army issues affecting the national 

security community.

The Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute 

provides subject matter expertise, technical review, 

and writing expertise to agencies that develop stability 

operations concepts and doctrines.

The Senior Leader Development and Resiliency program 

supports the United States Army War College’s lines of 

effort to educate strategic leaders and provide well-being 

education and support by developing self-awareness 

through leader feedback and leader resiliency.

The School of Strategic Landpower develops strategic 

leaders by providing a strong foundation of wisdom 

grounded in mastery of the profession of arms, and 

by serving as a crucible for educating future leaders in 

the analysis, evaluation, and refinement of professional 

expertise in war, strategy, operations, national security, 

resource management, and responsible command.

The U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center acquires, 

conserves, and exhibits historical materials for use 

to support the U.S. Army, educate an international 

audience, and honor Soldiers—past and present.

U.S. Army War College

Senior Leader Development and Resiliency

SLDR
i

STRATEGIC

STUDIES

INSTITUTE

The Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) is part of the U.S. Army War 

College and is the strategic-level study agent for issues related 

to national security and military strategy with emphasis on 

geostrategic analysis.

The mission of SSI is to use independent analysis to conduct strategic 

studies that develop policy recommendations on:

• Strategy, planning, and policy for joint and combined 

 employment of military forces;

• Regional strategic appraisals;

• The nature of land warfare;

• Matters affecting the Army’s future;

• The concepts, philosophy, and theory of strategy; and,

• Other issues of importance to the leadership of the Army.

Studies produced by civilian and military analysts concern 

topics having strategic implications for the Army, the Department of 

Defense, and the larger national security community.

In addition to its studies, SSI publishes special reports on topics 

of special or immediate interest. These include edited proceedings 

of conferences and topically oriented roundtables, expanded trip 

reports, and quick-reaction responses to senior Army leaders.

The Institute provides a valuable analytical capability within the 

Army to address strategic and other issues in support of Army 

participation in national security policy formulation.

iii

Strategic Studies Institute

and

U.S. Army War College Press

A RUSSIAN VIEW ON LANDPOWER

Aleksandr V. Rogovoy

Keir Giles

April 2015

The views expressed in this report are those of the authors and 

do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the 

Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. 

Government. Authors of Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) and 

U.S. Army War College (USAWC) Press publications enjoy full 

academic freedom, provided they do not disclose classified 

information, jeopardize operations security, or misrepresent 

official U.S. policy. Such academic freedom empowers them to 

offer new and sometimes controversial perspectives in the interest of furthering debate on key issues. This report is cleared for 

public release; distribution is unlimited.

*****

This publication is subject to Title 17, United States Code, 

Sections 101 and 105. It is in the public domain and may not be 

copyrighted.
iv

*****

Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should

be forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. 

Army War College Press, U.S. Army War College, 47 Ashburn 

Drive, Carlisle, PA 17013-5010. 

*****

This manuscript was funded by the U.S. Army War

College External Research Associates Program. Information on 

this program is available on our website, www.StrategicStudies

Institute.army.mil, at the Opportunities tab.

*****

All Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) and U.S. Army War

College (USAWC) Press publications may be downloaded free 

of charge from the SSI website. Hard copies of this report may 

also be obtained free of charge while supplies last by placing 

an order on the SSI website. SSI publications may be quoted 

or reprinted in part or in full with permission and appropriate 

credit given to the U.S. Army Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. 

Army War College Press, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA. 

Contact SSI by visiting our website at the following address: 

www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil.

*****

The Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War

College Press publishes a monthly email newsletter to update 

the national security community on the research of our analysts,

recent and forthcoming publications, and upcoming conferences sponsored by the Institute. Each newsletter also provides 

a strategic commentary by one of our research analysts. If you 

are interested in receiving this newsletter, please subscribe on the 

SSI website at www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil/newsletter.

ISBN 1-58487-672-7
v

FOREWORD

In a time of rapid change for the U.S. Army, it is essential to retain awareness of how potential adversaries are also developing their concepts of Landpower. 

This Letort Paper, written by an influential Russian 

general, lays out an authoritative view on the importance of substantial conventional land forces, as seen 

from Moscow. 

The year 2014 was an eventful one for the Russian 

military, opening with the seizure of Crimea, continuing through ongoing operations in and near Ukraine, 

and culminating with the issue of a new Military Doctrine reflecting what Russia describes as new security 

realities in Europe. All of these circumstances have 

drawn attention back to the challenge to U.S. interests 

posed by the Russian military. The issue of this Paper 

is therefore especially timely. 

The author, Major General Aleksandr Rogovoy, 

is a professor at the Russian General Staff Academy 

with a substantial record of academic and operational 

experience, and a direct contributor to the drafting 

of Russia’s 2014 Military Doctrine. An introduction to 

General Rogovoy’s paper has been provided by noted 

British scholar of the Russian military, Mr. Keir Giles. 

This introduction provides essential context for the 

piece, as well as highlighting key areas that will be 

of particular interest to U.S. policymakers. Mr. Giles 

explains some of the fundamental assumptions guiding Russian thought in this area. Some of these will 

be familiar to U.S. military readers; others will be 

unrecognizable. 

The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to present this unique insight into the thinking and assump-
tions of the Russian military. It is recommended not 

only to decisionmakers considering responses to a 

newly assertive Russia, but also to planners developing the shape of the U.S. future land forces, and the 

challenges they may face.

 

 

 DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

 Director

 Strategic Studies Institute and

 U.S. Army War College Press

vi
vii

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

KEIR GILES is the director of the Conflict Studies Research Centre (CSRC), a group of deep subject matter 

experts on Eurasian security formerly attached to the 

United Kingdom (UK) Ministry of Defence. Now operating in the private sector, CSRC provides in-depth 

analysis on a wide range of security issues affecting 

Russia and its relations with overseas partners. After 

beginning his career working with paramilitary aviation in Russia and Ukraine immediately following 

the fall of the Soviet Union, Mr. Giles joined the BBC 

Monitoring Service (BBCM) to report on political and 

military affairs in the former Soviet space. While attached from BBCM to CSRC at the UK Defence Academy, he wrote and briefed for UK and North Atlantic 

Treaty Organization (NATO) government agencies on 

a wide range of Russian defense and security issues. 

Uniquely, he is a double Associate Fellow of the Royal 

Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House) in 

London, UK, as well as a regular contributor to research projects on Russian security issues in both the 

UK and Europe. Mr. Giles’s work has appeared in 

a wide range of academic and military publications 

across Europe and in the United States.

ALEKSANDR V. ROGOVOY is a professor at the Russian Armed Forces’ General Staff Military Academy 

(VAGSh), where he teaches on the Military Art faculty. 

He spent his conscript service in the Soviet Army in 

Germany, where, in addition to his normal duties, he 

was detailed to guard Rudolf Hess in Spandau Prison, 

Berlin. Selected for officer training, he graduated from 

the Higher Combined-Arms Command Academy in 

1976 and returned to command positions in Germany. 
From 1981-84, Major General Rogovoy attended the 

Frunze Military Academy, before continuing to more 

senior command positions in combined-arms units in 

the Kola Peninsula, Mongolia, Germany, and Moscow 

Military District. After completing VAGSh in 1995-97, 

Rogovoy commanded the “Special Division” of the 

Far Eastern Military District. In 2003, Major General 

Rogovoy joined the staff of VAGSh as a senior lecturer and was appointed Professor in 2010. He now 

combines teaching with academic research and practical involvement in the development of the Russian 

armed forces, including contributing to the drafting 

of the 2014 Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation. Work already published or in preparation for 

the Russian armed forces includes the monographs 

“Preparation and Conduct of Peace Enforcement Operations,” “Preparation and Conduct of Peace Support 

Operations,” and “The Russian Approach to CounterTerrorism.” Each of these projects draws on his extensive operational experience, both within Russia and 

in a number of countries in Russia’s near abroad, the 

Middle East and North Africa. Major General Rogovoy has taken part in a number of international cooperation projects on behalf of VAGSh, including 

repeated visits to the NATO School Oberammergau, 

NATO Defense College Rome, and the U.S. National 

Defense University.

viii
ix

SUMMARY

Russia’s seizure of Crimea, and ongoing operations in eastern Ukraine, have refocused attention on 

the Russian military as a potential cause for concern 

in Europe. This Letort Paper, by an influential Russian general and military academic, lays out specifically Russian views on the essential nature of strong 

conventional land forces, and how they may be used. 

With an expert commentary providing essential context and interpretation, the paper presents a valuable 

insight into Russian military thinking, at a potentially 

critical juncture for European security. 

The author, Major General Aleksandr Rogovoy, 

is a professor at the Russian General Staff Academy 

with a substantial record of academic and operational 

experience, including developing Russian doctrine on 

the use of the Armed Forces beyond Russia’s borders. 

The commentary has been provided by British expert 

Keir Giles, who gives the context and background for 

General Rogovoy’s paper, and highlights key areas of 

importance to a Western readership.

Moscow continues to place primary importance 

on conventional military force, with the direct intention of growing capability in order to challenge U.S. 

power. While the United States and other Western 

militaries are considering their future form after two 

decades of focus on counterinsurgency, for Russia the 

picture is different; strong emphasis on the enduring and central role of numerous conventional land 

forces remains unchallenged. This paper should assist U.S. and Western planners and decisionmakers 

by providing direct insight into resurgent Russia’s 

military thinking.

1

A RUSSIAN VIEW ON LANDPOWER

Keir Giles

For any state, the purpose of investing in military 

power is to accomplish political goals. One of the basic 

tenets of realism is that the larger and more skilled 

the military, the more effectively the state can then deter the military power of another state and influence 

political decisionmaking. But for over a decade, this 

fundamental principle has been partially eclipsed for 

the United States and its allies as a result of principal 

threats arising from actors other than states. The result 

of this shift in priority for the U.S. military, to address 

the nonstate actor or terrorist threat, has been a calling 

into question of the need for a large Landpower force 

in times of stringent cuts to the military budget. 

According to Janine Davidson, senior fellow for 

defense policy at the Council on Foreign Relations 

and former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, 

“the U.S. military is at a crossroads” as the rebalancing in the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review envisages 

a severe constriction in conventional ground forces, 

including a planned 20 percent reduction in the active 

component of the U.S. Army.1

 Meanwhile, however, 

competitors have continued to focus on direct military 

competition with adversary states. It follows that the 

strategic relevance of Landpower overall is not an assessment that the United States can make for itself, in 

isolation from the strategic environment as perceived 

by competitor nations with a distinctive land force 

posture of their own. 

Russia is the prime example. Operations in Crimea 

and eastern Ukraine in early-2014 demonstrated the 

results of processes that had been ongoing in the Russian military and in Russian security thinking for 
2

almost a decade,2 as Moscow continues to place primary importance on conventional military force, with 

the direct intention of growing capability in order to 

challenge U.S. power.3 Russia’s new assertiveness, 

backed up by at least the semblance of a capable landbased military, caused widespread surprise outside 

a narrow expert community; but this should not lead 

anyone to believe that this was a new departure. 

President Vladimir Putin had made no secret of 

driving change within Russia toward his ambition to 

reassert Russian power through the tried and tested 

means of military strength, as well as lip service to new 

notions of soft power more suited to a post-nationalist 

21st century Europe. This led to consistent startling 

increases in military spending. These began not with 

the current high-profile rearmament program that attracted widespread attention abroad, but immediately 

when the Russian Federation first enjoyed a flow of 

disposable income as a result of rising oil prices in 

2004-05. Efforts began at that point to improve conventional military capability, to supplement the nuclear 

deterrent that had been retained as an essential minimum guarantee of Russian sovereignty during the 

preceding decade of chronic military underspending 

and force reductions. Though the army is still much 

in need of improvement, and the current transformation project still faces significant challenges, Russia 

has proved both in Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 

2014 that land force is a valid political tool to achieve 

foreign policy goals. 

Ukraine in particular is a shining example of how 

the existence of a large land force can be effectively 

combined with aspects of irregular warfare to achieve 

these goals. Therefore, bold statements such as “there 

is no doubt that irregular warfare campaigns will be 

the norm rather than the exception in the future”4
3

should not be allowed to distract from the vital importance of maintaining sufficient land-based conventional force to act as a deterrent to behavior considered 

unacceptable in the current world order. 

This is not the first time that military thinkers have 

predicted a growing marginalization and eventual irrelevance for Landpower. According to one review of 

U.S. planning options: 

When military aircraft gained widespread adoption 

in the 1920s, a new breed of thinkers (or false prophets, depending on what military service you are from) 

like General Billy Mitchell and General Giulio Douhet 

claimed that there would be no more need for old 

ground armies. Yet the need for “boots on the ground” 

lived on throughout the 20th century—just as it will 

live on into the 21st.5

It follows that conceptual approaches to deciding 

on future military capability must not take place in 

a planning vacuum, but needs to take account of the 

very different views of other significant military actors, who may be less than willing to fall in with the 

U.S. view of how military power ought to develop. 

Views differ on the precise extent of improvements 

in Russian military capability that result from the unprecedented program of transformation since 2008. In 

this context, the distraction of operations in Crimea 

and eastern Ukraine in early-2014 is unhelpful; there, 

the main force Russian troops opposite the Ukrainian 

border were for much of the conflict irrelevant, and 

the special operations forces actually engaged should 

not be taken as representative of the condition of the 

Russian military overall.6

 Direct, although unavowed, 

involvement of Russian forces in combat in Ukraine 

later in 2014 gives a more helpful but still imperfect 

view of current capabilities. 
4

Furthermore, transformation of the Russian armed 

forces, and declarations on the new Russian way of 

war—call it “hybrid,” “nonlinear,” “ambiguous,” or 

any other of the recently coined epithets7—have done 

little to shift assumptions in Moscow on the primacy 

of nuclear or conventional brute force in safeguarding 

Russia’s interests. Contrary to widespread assumptions, new approaches to achieving political aims 

through the use of the military do not, in fact, mean a 

new way for the Russian military as a whole to fight.8

Transformation of the Russian armed forces is intended to ensure that those forces can hold their own in 

full-scale, high-intensity conflict, where a decisive role 

will be played by land forces. 

There is no shortage of Russian policy statements 

and documents implying that a U.S. military presence in states neighboring Russia is a direct threat. 

The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation 2010 

was careful to describe the North Atlantic Treaty 

Organization (NATO) (and by extension, the United 

States) as a “military danger” rather than a threat, 

stipulating that it could become a direct threat if certain conditions were met.9

 The response by NATO to 

events in Ukraine arguably meets those conditions. 

It is reasonable to expect that the new version of the 

Military Doctrine, currently scheduled for release in 

December 2014,10 will be markedly more hostile to the 

United States, whether through the proxy of NATO 

or directly. It should be ensured that plans to reduce 

the role and relevance of land forces within the U.S. 

military take this potential increase in hostility from a 

major land power into account. Given all of the aforementioned, the importance of closely examining the 

Russian view of the role of land forces in the modern 

military should be clear. 
5

This Paper lays out one such Russian view. It is 

written by Major General Aleksandr Rogovoy, a professor at the Faculty of Military Art of the Russian 

General Staff Academy with an extensive history of 

both academic and operational service. His description of Russia’s transformation efforts, with their emphasis on creating high-tech, modern, agile forces, 

will be familiar from other literature on the subject. 

But it is the emphasis on the enduring and central role 

of land forces that is of direct relevance here. 

“Wars are fought for territory and resources. There 

is only one way of defending these two things, and 

that is the physical presence of ground forces,” Rogovoy believes. Therefore, “All Russian forces operate 

solely in support of ground forces. They are not independent arms, merely facilitators.”11 This is sufficiently different from many Western assumptions that 

specific passages from Rogovoy’s text should be given 

closer attention. The following quotations are taken 

from General Rogovoy's paper, the full text of which 

can be found on page 17 onward. 

The Russian Federation has found itself at the centre 

of radical geopolitical change, and has become the 

subject of increased interest and even territorial claims 

from other countries.

The notion that other states have designs on Russian territory is taken as a given among a broad range 

of senior Russian military and civilian officials. This 

includes a long list of supposed territorial disputes 

with Russia, some of which have long faded into history on the other side of the border. For example, a 

briefing on “Threats to the Military Security of the 

Russian Federation” given by former Chief of General 

Staff Sergey Makarov to the Academy of Military Sci-
6

ences in early-2011 began with a map slide showing 

these disputes along almost the entire European periphery of Russia—including such implausible ones as 

Germany wishing to reclaim Kaliningrad, or Finland, 

Karelia. The idea also includes the idée fixe that Russia 

is a rich and desirable country, whose natural resources present a tempting target for potential invaders. In 

effect, Russia projects its own history and principles 

onto foreign partners who have not the slightest desire to march on Moscow. 

This “increased interest” introduces a long list of 

threats that the Russian military must counter. Many 

of these seem innocuous or improbable—but it must 

be remembered that they will be interpreted in Moscow in accordance with a Russian view of the world, 

which contains a hostile, irresponsible and aggressive 

NATO and United States. In this context, references to 

“deployment of groups of forces and systems with a 

view to launching a military attack on Russia or its allies,” “military exercises with provocative aims,” and 

changes to “the current balance of forces near the borders of the Russian Federation” all refer, in Russian 

eyes, to any enhancement of U.S. cooperation with 

European partners. 

A further threat that, in the Russian view, merits a 

military response is “discrimination and the suppression of rights, freedoms and legitimate interests of 

Russian Federation citizens in foreign countries.” This 

is by now a well-worn narrative in Russian motivations for aggressive action against neighbors, as demonstrated in both Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014, 

as well as consistent pressure against the Baltic States 

over the largely imaginary disadvantage notionally 

suffered by Russian speakers there. The fact that even 

if a problem did exist, use of military force to resolve it 

would be entirely at odds with international relations 
7

between developed countries, is encapsulated in the 

“Bolzano/Bozen Recommendations on National Minorities in Inter-State Relations” adopted by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, 

and therefore endorsed by Russia, to govern precisely 

this kind of situation—in effect explaining that it is not 

Russia’s place to interfere.12

These are not the only descriptions of threats that 

Rogovoy classes as meriting a military response contrary to all Western notions of what a country’s armed 

forces are for. Among cross-border threats, he lists 

“information activities hostile towards Russia and its 

allies.” This is especially topical in the current state 

of intense information warfare waged by Russia over 

events in Ukraine, but the language is borrowed from 

Russia’s Information Security Doctrine, and therefore 

can be taken to extend to Russia’s long-held and deepseated suspicion of information transfer systems, including the Internet, and in particular social media. 

The consequences of conceptual mismatches between 

Russia and its neighbors such as these are that very 

close attention needs to be paid to precisely what 

Russia considers to be hostile action, which demands 

counteraction using military force. 

Peacekeeping has become a priority in the activities of 

the Russian Federation Armed Forces. It is a powerful tool in Russian foreign policy. The use of Russian 

troops in peacekeeping operations is one of the ways 

to protect the national interests of the Russian Federation and ensure its security.13

It is essential to note that translating the Russian 

word used here—mirotvorcheskiy—as “peacekeeping,” while accepted as a standard translation, risks 

giving entirely the wrong impression of what Russia 
8

intends for these troops. The Russian word is closer to 

“peace creation,” and envisages a far more assertive 

and violent role than the Western concept of maintaining a peace that has already been achieved. After all, 

the Russian attack on Georgia in 2008 was referred 

to as an “operation to enforce peace on Georgia.” In 

early-2014, foreign defense attachés in Moscow were 

treated to a demonstration of Russian “peacekeeping” 

training, and reported that instead of training in winning hearts and minds, what they saw was in effect 

an all-out high-intensity assault, with air support, on 

the location where peace was supposedly to be created.14 Russian peacekeeping troops have also been 

created for overt political roles. In Rogovoy’s words, 

Russia needs peacekeeping forces “because that’s the 

only way you can move troops across another country’s borders with a band playing and with everybody 

pleased to see them.”15

Russia also has an entirely different attitude both 

to nuclear weapons, and to the prospect of their use, 

as alluded to in Rogovoy’s note that “preserving the 

potential of the strategic deterrent forces” is the prime 

task of the Russian military. This theme has been explored in detail in a recent Strategic Studies Institute 

paper.16 Another very distinctly Russian theme within 

the text is the reference to World War II (or the Great 

Patriotic War) as a relevant benchmark for modern 

force development. 

But the main thrust of the Paper is to emphasize 

the centrality of Landpower to ensuring Russian 

national security: 

Given the vastness of Russia and the length of its land 

borders, it is obvious that it is simply impossible to 

safeguard the defence capability of the Russian state 

without extensive use of the Land Forces.
9

Yes, they do it in cooperation with other armed services and service arms of the armed forces, but other 

armed services and branches of the armed forces tend 

to act in the interests of the Land Forces.

Some military theorists (mostly supporters of the idea 

of so-called “contactless wars”), who do not properly 

evaluate the trends outlined above, have begun increasingly to claim a reduction in the role of the Land 

Forces, which, in their opinion, will in the wars of the 

future decide only auxiliary tasks. In my view, these 

assertions are absolutely groundless.17

In this context, Rogovoy refers to experience in 

Chechnya (referred to in the official Russian formulation of “the antiterrorist operation in the North Caucasus”) and Georgia (“the operation to enforce peace”) 

to show that missile and air strikes can achieve a political aim by compelling an adversary to make concessions, but only the land forces can actually control territory, and therefore it is these which are essential in 

subduing opponents. 

Rogovoy also highlights Russia’s program to 

improve its capability of using long-range weapons: 

against the enemy in a way that does not require it 

to be engaged in close-in combat. They are missile 

systems, air defence missile systems, multiple-launch 

rocket systems, long-range artillery guns that can fire 

precision-guided munitions . . .18

This section is of particular topicality when considering cross-border influence and stand-off strikes and 

bombardments against Ukraine during mid-2014, in 

the absence of any overt incursion.
10

In an appendix entitled “Views of Foreign Military 

Analysts,” Rogovoy holds a mirror to U.S. re-evaluations of the role of land forces, and of the threats that 

the U.S. Army must counter. The result is a fascinating “view from the side” on the current debate over 

force restructuring. It can be assumed that Rogovoy’s 

views and assumptions are not that far removed from 

those of his colleagues developing specific plans relating to U.S. military power. As such, the appendix 

should also be examined closely, since it is indicative 

of how the U.S. debate, and its likely results, may be 

perceived by these planners. 

CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY 

RECOMMENDATIONS 

If the trajectory of increasing Russian budget and 

capability, and decreases in the budget and capability of European militaries, continue indefinitely, then 

obviously the two trends will eventually intersect and 

Russia will have achieved its goal of overmatching 

modern Western militaries. But Russia does not have 

to wait that long. A combination of the political will 

to use force, and a variety of other tools at Russia’s 

disposal to influence target states, serve as force multipliers in Russian security calculus. It follows that in 

order to feel confident enough to mount a challenge to 

the United States, Russia does not need a large, powerful, modern force equivalent to that of the United 

States in every aspect of capability.

Russia under President Putin has shown, both 

in Syria and Ukraine, that only small and tangential 

amounts of actual applied military force are needed 

to accomplish their political goals. In Syria, the primary goal of preventing a U.S. military intervention 
11

and regime change was achieved by a mix of hard, 

persistent diplomatic efforts and support for the Asad 

regime with money, weapons, and political protection in the United Nations (UN). In Ukraine, Moscow startled the world by moving mass amounts of 

its land forces quickly and effectively to the border 

with Ukraine. But in the early stages of the conflict, 

the main role of those forces was then to sit on the 

border, augmenting and depleting as required in 

order to focus the attention of the West like a hypnotist’s watch, while only small groups of Russian 

special operations forces actually conducted warfare 

inside Ukraine. And yet, Putin is still accomplishing 

his goals: undermining the Petro Poroshenko government, keeping Ukraine within the Russian sphere of 

influence, portraying Russia to the domestic audience 

as a strong power successfully deterring U.S. ambition, and last but not least, sending a strong message to other states in Russia’s vicinity not to step out 

of line. 

At the same time, Ukraine also demonstrates another key facet of current Russian military policy; that 

of faking it till you make it. Some Western analysts are 

prone to the error of confusing Russian ability to conduct large-scale military exercises with an ability to 

actually wage large-scale war, with little assessment 

of how and whether those exercises actually result in 

improved combat capability. Russian military transformation remains a work in progress, and further capability improvements are to be expected. But in the 

meantime, the progress of the campaigns in Ukraine 

and Crimea show that Russia is already willing to 

make use of those parts of its land forces that have 

already reached an acceptable level of capability, even 

as the broad mass of those forces is still under par. 
12

According to one view, the primary benefit accruing to Russia from the recent large scale exercises, 

over and above practicing the actual movement of 

troops, is propaganda and intimidation. This tallies with the role of the Russian troops opposite the 

border with eastern Ukraine, who initially facilitated 

Russian objectives simply by being there as a potential problem, rather than by actually doing anything. 

But the development path of Russian military capability overall has been clear for some time, and greater 

parts of that military will be considered ready for use 

as time passes. Two responses to this situation are essential; first, proper investment in the analytical capability to watch, understand, and predict Russia (and 

proper attention paid to the results of that analysis); 

and second, ensuring that land forces do not become 

sufficiently hollowed out to tip the balance of Russian 

security calculations in favor of challenging them. 

The United States does not, as yet, suffer from 

the deficiencies in analytical capacity on Russia that 

plague partner nations such as the United Kingdom 

(UK).19 Nonetheless, the degree of surprise which appears to have overtaken the United States not only at 

operations in Crimea, but at the Russian military’s 

new capabilities as demonstrated in exercises throughout 2013, argues that the conclusions reached by that 

capacity are either flawed, or correct but not being 

passed high enough up the intelligence food chain to 

reach decisionmakers. The paths that led to the current 

condition and use of Russian Landpower were both 

long and well-signposted. This allowed scholars, even 

at the dawn of the Putin era, to place essential caveats on the development of relations with Russia,20 and 

more recently, for warnings to be issued in 2013 on 
13

the implications for Russia’s neighbors of Moscow’s 

development of its new military tool.21 The manner 

in which Russia defends its perceived interests is sufficiently well-known, and Moscow’s declaratory policy sufficiently pellucid, that after Georgia and now 

Ukraine, some form of Russian military intervention 

against NATO member states in the future should no 

longer be automatically discounted by forecasters. 

There is no doubt irregular warfare has become a 

principal method of conflict in the 21st century. However, this should not lead to a reduced emphasis on the 

primary importance of maintaining sufficient conventional Landpower. As put in one Australian review: 

It may be that, in some cases, the pendulum has 

swung too far in favour of irregular warfare in terms 

of training and the development of concepts of operations. . . . A large military has the inherent capacity to 

train a certain part of the force to cater for the irregular 

aspects in the conduct of conflict while continuing to 

maintain a majority of the force oriented towards its 

raison d’être—the defence of the sovereignty of the nation against any and all attacks.22

A reduced size and capability of U.S. Landpower 

to respond to large conventional military threats inevitably reduces the risk element in another nation’s 

calculus when considering using military force to 

achieve its political goals, thereby making this option 

more attractive. While a conventional land force attack on U.S. territory seems entirely unlikely, NATO 

nations are acutely aware that infringements of their 

sovereignty become increasingly probable as Russia 

continues its campaign of assertiveness in Eastern 

Europe. The result is that: 
14

There is an acknowledged need for armed forces within NATO and partner nations to change focus from 

insurgency-related operations back to more classic 

forms of state on state warfare. Land warfare tactics 

and operational art against modern but more traditional large scale troop formations need to be developed and trained.23

Regardless of the reluctance of some NATO allies 

to take an interest in funding their own defense, if the 

United States is to continue to safeguard its vital interests in Europe, it is essential to pay continued close attention to conventional Landpower. This is necessary 

to ensure the flexibility not only to respond to further 

highly likely adverse developments in European security, but also globally wherever the United States 

has interests and friends with land borders. In short, 

being prepared for irregular warfare is important, 

but maintaining sufficient Landpower to deter adversaries effectively is essential. 

ENDNOTES - RUSSIAN VIEW ON LANDPOWER

1. Janine Davidson, “Retrench or Rebalance? America’s 

Evolving Defence Strategy,” London, UK: Royal Institute of International Affairs, September 2014. 

2. Keir Giles, “Military Service in Russia: No New Model 

Army,” Shrivenham, UK: Conflict Studies Research Centre, 

May 2007.

3. Keir Giles, Russian Military Transformation—Goal in Sight, 

Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 

May 2014. 

4. “The Relevance of Air Power in Irregular Wars,” Pathfinder, 

Issue 213, Canberra, Australia: RAAF Air Power Development 

Centre, December 2013. 
15

5. P. W. Singer, “What Churchill Can Teach Us About the 

Coming Era of Lasers, Cyborgs, and Killer Drones,” Foreign 

Policy, October 22, 2013.

6. Discussions at International Institute for Strategic Studies 

Global Strategic Review, Oslo, Norway, September 20, 2014. 

7. As expounded in House of Commons Defence Committee, “Towards the next Defence and Security Review: Part Two—

NATO,” Third Report of Session 2014–15, London, UK: House of 

Commons, July 31, 2014. 

8. Kristin Ven Bruusgaard, “What is New about Russian 

Strategy?” Parameters, Vol. 44, No. 3, Autumn 2014, pp. 81-90. 

9. Keir Giles, “The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation 2010,” Rome, Italy: NATO Defense College, February 2010. 

10. Author’s private conversations with senior Russian 

officers, September 2014. 

11. Author interview, February 4, 2014. 

12. “The Bolzano/Bozen Recommendations on National Minorities in Inter-State Relations,” Vienna, Austria: Organization 

for Security and Co-operation in Europe, October 2, 2008, available from www.osce.org/hcnm/33633.

13. Information Security Doctrine of the Russian Federation, Moscow, Russia: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, December 

29, 2008.

14. Private conversation with Moscow-based defense attaché, 

August 2014. 

15. “Ukraine: Vladimir Putin’s Military Action Reveals a Wider Plan,” BBC News, August 28, 2014, available from www.bbc.

co.uk/news/world-africa-28971901.

16. Keir Giles, “European Missile Defense and Russia,” Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 

July 2014. 
16

17. Ibid.

18. Ibid.

19. Highlighted in House of Commons Defence Committee 

report.

20. Michael McFaul, “Getting Russia Right,” Foreign Policy, 

Winter 1999-2000, pp. 58-73. 

21. Foreword to Giles, Russian Military Transformation—Goal 

in Sight. 

22. “Future Wars and Air Power,” Pathfinder, Issue 211, 

Canberra, Australia: RAAF Air Power Development Centre, 

November 2013. 

23. S. Forss and P. Holopainen, “Nordic Defense Cooperation 

and European Security,” forthcoming publication. 
17

DEVELOPMENT PROSPECTS FOR 

LAND FORCES

Major General Aleksandr V. Rogovoy

The current stage of international development is 

characterized by acute socioeconomic conflicts and 

political differences. At the beginning of the 21st century, emerging processes suggest that the role that 

military force plays as the nations of the world seek 

to safeguard their political and economic interests is 

becoming greater. This means that a whole range of issues to do with both the main aspects of international 

security and the principles of the Russian Federation’s 

national security have to be rethought.

In the third millennium, the Russian Federation 

has found itself at the center of radical geopolitical 

change and has become the subject of increased interest and even territorial claims from other countries. 

Russia’s transformation into a strong economic and 

military power able to defend its own national interests independently is not to the taste of some countries, which remain committed to resolving various 

conflicts through the use of military force in breach of 

the rules of international law. Consequently, Russia’s 

military security will be of crucial importance in the 

21st century, too. 

What is understood by military security is where 

society, the state, and its citizens are secure against external and internal threats associated with the use of 

military force or the threat of its use. Military security 

is the most important ingredient of Russia’s national 

security. It is determined by the political situation of 

the country and the level of its defense capability. Military security presupposes that military threats and the 
18

dynamics of their development must be ascertained. 

The Russian Federation Law “On Security” gives the 

following definition of “threats”: “a set of conditions 

and factors that endanger the vital interests of the 

individual, society and state.”1

Military force still plays a major role in the achievement of political goals by states and blocs of states:

• the range of conditions under which military

force is used is expanding. The threat of nuclear 

and conventional large-scale war has receded 

somewhat, while at the same time the number 

of risks associated with the emergence of lowintensity armed conflicts has increased;

• new centers of economic and political power

are emerging, and geopolitical competition 

for the redivision of spheres of influence is 

intensifying;

• the geographical expanse, which is potentially

fraught with crisis, remains in place and is expanding (the Balkans, the Caucasus, Middle, 

Central and South Asia, and the Near and 

Middle East), the level of regional conflict potential in it on the basis of ethnicity, religion or 

crime is increasing, the trend is that the arms 

race is being renewed, and the danger of proliferation in precision-guided, conventional, 

nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction 

and their means of delivery exists in different 

regions; and,

• previous international and regional security

mechanisms are losing their earlier effectiveness and cannot adequately respond to the rapidly changing strategic situation.
19

Analysis of the current global military-political 

situation in the world suggests that the starting point 

in assessing the level of military threat to Russia is 

that the role of military force in international relations in recent years has not diminished. Moreover, 

the military-political situation does not exclude the 

possibility that major armed conflicts affecting the security interests of the Russian Federation might arise 

near Russia’s borders, or that a direct military threat 

to Russia’s security might occur. National, including 

fundamental national interests, may be affected by a 

diverse range of threats that emerge as a result of particular developments in the military-political situation 

and that may take different forms, such as political, 

military-political, or the use of force. It can be said that 

in the current international situation, there are three 

types of threats to neutralize, which are to some extent 

a function of the Russian Federation Armed Forces: 

external, internal and cross-border. The main external 

military threats must include:

• deployment of groups of forces and systems

with a view to launching a military attack on 

Russia or its allies;

• territorial claims against Russia, and the

threat of political or military annexation of her 

territories;

• the pursuit by states, organizations and movements of programs to develop weapons of mass 

destruction;

• interference in the internal affairs of the Russian Federation by foreign states or by organizations supported by foreign states;

• demonstrations of military force near Russia’s

borders, and military exercises with provocative aims;
20

• the existence near the borders of the Russian

Federation or the borders of its allies of epicenters of armed conflict that threaten its security;

• instability and weak state institutions in border 

countries;

• build-ups of troops in a way that upsets the 

current balance of forces near the borders of the 

Russian Federation or the borders of its allies 

and their adjacent territorial waters;

• expansion of military blocs and alliances to the

detriment of the military security of the Russian Federation or its allies;

• the activities of international radical groups

and the strengthening of Islamic extremism 

near the Russian border;

• deployment of foreign troops (without the consent of the Russian Federation and approval 

of the UN Security Council) in the territory of 

countries adjacent and friendly to the Russian 

Federation;

• armed provocations, including attacks on the

Russian Federation’s military facilities located 

on the territory of foreign states, as well as facilities and installations on the state border of 

the Russian Federation or the borders of its 

allies;

• action to prevent the work of Russian state and

military control systems, the functioning of the 

strategic nuclear forces, missile attack warning, 

missile defense, space surveillance, and the 

combat sustainability of forces;

• actions that impede Russia’s access to strategically important transport communications;

• discrimination and the suppression of rights,

freedoms, and legitimate interests of Russian 

Federation citizens in foreign countries; and,
21

• proliferation of equipment, technologies, and 

components used in the manufacture of nuclear 

weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, as well as dual-use technologies that can 

be used to create weapons of mass destruction 

and their means of delivery.

The main internal military threats must include:

• attempts to change the constitutional order and

the territorial integrity of Russia by force;

• planning, preparation, and implementation of

actions to disrupt and disorganize the functioning of the institutions of state power and 

government, and attacks on vital government, 

economic, and military sites and information 

infrastructure;

• forming, equipping, training, and running of illegal armed groups;

• illegal distribution and circulation of weapons,

ammunition, and explosives in the territory of 

the Russian Federation;

• large-scale organized criminal activities threatening political stability on the scale of a constituent part of the Russian Federation; and,

• the activities of separatist and radical religious

and nationalist movements in the Russian 

Federation.

In recent times, cross-border threats have become 

more and more important for the military security 

of states. They include political, military-political, or 

use-of-force threats to the interests and security of the 

Russian Federation, which combine the features of 

both internal and external threats, and which, being 

of an internal nature in the forms they take, are in es-
22

sence external (in the sources of origin and initiation, 

possible participants, and so on). The significance of 

cross-border threats to the military security of the 

Russian Federation will have a tendency to increase. 

Such threats can include:

• creating, equipping, supporting, and training

in other countries of armed groups with a view 

to transferring their activities to the territory of 

the Russian Federation or the territories of its 

allies;

• the subversive activities of separatist, ethnic,

or religious extremist groups, directly or indirectly aimed at undermining the constitutional 

order in Russia, creating a threat to its territorial integrity and to the security of its citizens;

• cross-border crime, including smuggling and 

other illegal activities, on a scale threatening 

the military-political security of the Russian 

Federation or stability on the territory of its 

allies;

• information activities hostile towards Russia

and its allies;

• the activities of international terrorist organizations; and,

• drug trafficking posing a threat that drugs 

might be trafficked to the territory of Russia 

or that its territory might be used as that of 

a transit country for drug trafficking to other 

countries.

Today, the level of military threat to Russia’s security can be regarded as relatively low. None of the 

existing conflicts involving the use of force creates a 

direct military threat to its security. At the same time, 

in view of changes in the global geopolitical situation 
23

in the world, we have to admit that to ensure Russia’s 

security only through political opportunities (membership in international organizations, partnerships, 

opportunities to influence) is becoming impossible. 

Thus, to ensure military security, it is important to determine the nature of dangers and threats to national 

interests. This is the defining factor for the planning 

of organizational development of the military with 

military security in mind, since the exaggeration of 

threats leads to resources being unjustifiably diverted 

from other national priorities, while their understatement leads to distortions in military development and 

major errors that cannot be quickly remedied in a crisis situation. To ensure national security, a variety of 

methods, techniques, and tools can be used. Military 

force, however, still has a special place among them. 

It is the task of the armed forces to neutralize external 

threats, with internal and cross-border threats as part 

of it, that is put into practice in cooperation with other 

security structures and the appropriate authorities of 

the Russian Federation’s allies. The Russian armed 

forces perform their tasks in accordance with the Constitution of the Russian Federation, federal laws of the 

Russian Federation in relation to defense and security, 

other state regulatory acts, and Russia’s international 

commitments in strict compliance with international 

law. The main tasks of the armed forces in relation to 

the military security of the country include:

• strategic, mainly nuclear, deterrence of potential aggressors to deter them from waging war 

against Russia and its allies;

• if necessary, to back up the political actions of

the state with the demonstration of force or a 

naval presence;
24

• reliable protection and defense of the state border of the Russian Federation, and to prevent 

the infiltration of its territory by armed groups;

• to maintain the composition and condition of

the nuclear forces at a level that ensures the inevitability of nuclear retaliation against the aggressor in any situation; and,

• localization and neutralization of armed border conflicts by permanent-readiness troops 

(forces), and, in the event of an escalation, with 

the implementation of full or partial strategic 

deployment by the armed forces to repel the 

act of aggression and achieve the nominated 

military-political and military-strategic goals.

In today’s environment, the objectives of the armed 

forces in the system of security in the Russian Federation are not limited just to matters of national defense. 

The need to use military force requires a broader 

framework. Peacekeeping has become a priority in the 

activities of the Russian Federation Armed Forces. It is 

a powerful tool in Russian foreign policy. The use of 

Russian troops in peacekeeping operations is one of 

the ways to protect the national interests of the Russian Federation and ensure its security. Modern Russian military planning, based on a realistic assessment 

of the Russian Federation’s current resources and 

capabilities, assumes that the Russian armed forces 

must be able to:

• in peacetime and in emergencies, while maintaining strategic deterrence potential and fulfilling the tasks of maintaining combat readiness 

without additional mobilization activities, successfully accomplish missions simultaneously 

in two armed conflicts of any type, as well as 
25

mount peacekeeping operations, both independently and as part of multinational forces;

• in the event of an escalation in the military-political and military-strategic situation, ensure 

strategic deployment of the Russian Federation 

Armed Forces and deter the escalation of the 

situation, through the strategic deterrence forces and the deployment of permanent-readiness 

forces; and,

• in wartime, with the available forces, defend

against enemy aerospace attack and, following full-scale strategic deployment, be able to 

accomplish missions simultaneously in two 

local wars.

Proceeding from the tasks related to the ensuring 

of the Russian Federation’s military security, the military-political leadership of the country has identified 

priorities for reform and strengthening of its armed 

forces now and in the foreseeable future. The main 

ones are:

• preserving the potential of the strategic deterrent forces;

• increasing the number of permanent-readiness

formations and units, and forming force groupings on their basis;

• improving operational (combat) training of

troops (forces);

• improving the system of manning the armed

forces;

• implementing a program for the modernization of arms, military, and special equipment, 

and maintaining them in a combat-ready state;

• improving military science and education; and,

• improving the systems of indoctrination and 

moral and psychological training.
26

Currently, Russia is taking specific measures to 

modernize the armed forces. Its major focus is to maintain the strategic nuclear forces at a level that ensures 

guaranteed deterrence of aggression against the Russian Federation and its allies. Over the next 5 years, 

the plan is to increase significantly the degree to which 

the strategic nuclear forces are equipped with modern 

long-range aircraft, submarines and strategic missile 

troop launchers. Today, successful work is already 

underway to develop unique high-precision weapons 

systems and maneuverable warheads that have a trajectory that is unpredictable (so far as the potential adversary is concerned). Along with effective means to 

breach missile defenses, the new types of weapons allow what is one of the most important guarantees for 

lasting peace to be preserved—a strategic balance of 

forces. As part of the general-purpose forces, around 

600 permanent-readiness units and formations have 

been mustered by 2013. In case of need, mobile and 

self-sufficient groups that will be underpinned by 

professionally trained permanent-readiness units and 

formations from the land forces can be quickly set up 

in any potentially dangerous sector.

In recent years, there has been a significant increase in the proportion of funds allocated for the 

development of the army and navy, over expenditure 

intended for their upkeep. All the measures towards 

the modernization of the armed forces being taken 

now and to be taken in the future should ultimately 

provide the Russian Federation with a capability adequately to respond to modern-day military threats to 

its security, guarantee protection against these threats 

and ensure territorial integrity.

Based on the foregoing, the following conclusions 

can be drawn:
27

1. Military security is one of the special types of 

security; and, 

2. To ensure military security, it is necessary to 

have modern armed forces, and to form an effective 

system of collective security or global security.

The land forces play an important and often decisive role in the protection of the state. Has their 

present-day importance changed, given that the trend 

is towards an increase in the proportion of aerospace 

forces and systems? Indeed, the military role of aerospace has increased significantly over the past decade 

through the use of high-tech systems, especially for 

reconnaissance, communications, navigation, and 

long-range firepower. In the future, this trend will 

only grow.

It has to be said that the land forces have always 

played a vital role in the maintenance of Russia’s 

military security and in the defense of its national interests. Russian military strategy, based on the fundamental assumption that victory can be achieved only 

through the joint efforts of all the services in the armed 

forces, ensured during the Great Patriotic War (World 

War II) that the strengths of each of them were put 

to the best possible use. However, since the hostilities 

with Nazi Germany took place primarily on land and 

the outcome of the war was decided in land battles, 

the main role in the warfare against an experienced, 

well-trained enemy army belonged to the land forces, 

which were the basis of the armed forces of the United 

Soviet Socialist Republics. During the war, their share 

in the battle strength of the armed forces ranged from 

80 to 86 percent, while their total numerical strength 

at the beginning of 1945 increased by a factor of 2.2 

compared to June 1941. Accordingly, the land forces 
28

constituted the basis of strategic groupings and tackled all the major objectives assigned to the Red Army. 

Meanwhile, the groups of forces in the other armed 

services of the armed forces were used and operated 

mainly in support.

In the prewar years, Russian military science 

achieved considerable success in the development of 

military theory. This contributed to the fact that, during the war, the land forces, in conjunction with the 

other armed services of the armed forces and on the 

basis of the best theory of the deep offensive, prepared 

and brilliantly executed more than 50 operations by 

groups of fronts, around 250 front operations and 

multiple army ones.

The Great Patriotic War is rightly considered a 

“war of engines,” so the success of the land forces in 

the decisive battles was largely due to the quantity 

and quality of the weapons and military equipment 

supplied to them. The experience of the Great Patriotic War shows that, even under extremely difficult 

wartime conditions, all the problems and challenges 

in the building and development of the land forces can 

be successfully solved. This requires a clear program 

of action, deliberate concentration of financial and 

logistical resources in key sectors, firm control over 

the process of reform, and efficient operation of the 

military-industrial complex. When these conditions 

are met, one can also expect success at this stage of the 

transformations aimed at the construction of modern 

land forces able to respond adequately to the threats 

and challenges of the 21st century.

In the years after World War II, the land forces 

were formally established as an armed service in the 

armed forces, when the Main Command of the land 

forces was created in 1946. Their subsequent develop-
29

ment was influenced by scientific and technological 

progress, which ensured that effective weapons and 

military equipment were developed to meet the ever 

greater demands of war. This enabled the land forces 

successfully to accomplish any missions to ensure the 

military security of our country.

However, the indisputable fact is that the earth’s 

surface remains the main sphere of human activity today and will remain so in the foreseeable future, and 

military conflicts arise as a rule because of “earthly” 

problems: territorial disputes, striving to gain control over natural resources, redistribution of spheres 

of influence, or political, ideological, religious, and 

other differences. Given the vastness of Russia and 

the length of its land borders, it is obvious that it is 

simply impossible to safeguard the defense capability 

of the Russian state without extensive use of the land 

forces. They are a versatile and multifunctional armed 

service of the armed forces; their military formations 

are able to take control of areas and lines of defense 

and hold them for a long time in order to consolidate 

definitively their success.

The total length of the Russian Federation’s borders is 60,932 km. Of these, 22,125 km are on land (including 7,616 km of lakes and rivers) and 38,807 km 

(about two-thirds) are at sea.

After the collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist 

Republics (USSR), Russia has the following types of 

borders:

1. Old frontiers coincide with the frontiers of the 

former USSR (inherited from the USSR), most of which 

are fixed by international treaty:

• borders with states of the far abroad (Norway, Finland, Poland, China, Mongolia, and 

North Korea).
30

Map 1. Russian Territorial Borders.

2. New borders with the near abroad:

• former administrative boundaries formalized

as state borders with the Commonwealth 

of Independent States countries (the border 

with Belarus, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Georgia, 

and Azerbaijan); and,

• the borders with the Baltic countries (Estonia,

Latvia, and Lithuania).

3. The northern and eastern borders of Russia are 

maritime (12 nautical miles).

4. The western and southern borders are mainly 

over land. The great length of Russia’s state borders 

is the result of the size of its territory and the winding outline of the coastlines of the Arctic, Pacific, and 

Atlantic Oceans that surround its shores.

5. Maritime borders of Russia border 12 

countries. 

6. The longest sea border (19,724.1 kilometers 

[km]) runs along the coast of the Arctic Ocean; the 

longest land border is with Kazakhstan, 7,591-km.
31

This country, with 60,000-km of land borders and 

surrounded on three sides by seas and oceans, must in 

addition to the four operational-strategic commands 

have the fifth, mobile operational-strategic command, 

which will enable it to give an all-sided response to 

threats and challenges both within the country and 

abroad. That is to say, as “territorial presence” forces, 

the land forces, in the present conditions too, continue 

to play a decisive role in the defeat of the enemy and 

the achievement of the objectives of military action. 

Yes, they do it in cooperation with other armed services and service arms of the armed forces, but other 

armed services and branches of the armed forces tend 

to act in the interests of the land forces.

Unfortunately, during the crisis of the 1990s, the 

capabilities of the land forces decreased somewhat, 

which was caused not only by a considerable reduction in their numerical strength, but also a substantial 

reduction in the rate at which modern weapons and 

military equipment were developed and supplied to 

the troops. It was at the same time that new trends 

in the changing nature and substance of warfare began to emerge, which were dictated by the increasing 

effectiveness of conventional weapons as well as the 

command and control and operational and combat 

support systems that were coming into service in the 

armies of the world’s most developed nations.

First, precision-guided weapons and munitions 

based on artificial intelligence, as well as robotic systems and weapons whose operation is based on new 

physical principles, have been used more and more 

widely in the course of military operations. For example, during the war in Iraq (2003), the total number 

of guided munitions that were used to attack ground 

and air targets exceeded 15,000 rounds, which ac-
32

counted for 70 percent of the total. Compare that to 

the war against Iraq in 1991, when this figure was 9 

percent; against Yugoslavia (1999), when it was 35 

percent; and in Afghanistan (2001), where the figure 

was 69 percent.

Second, the proportion of aerospace forces and 

systems has increased, and conventional strategic 

weapons have come into play as the main weapon of 

war, providing direct strategic results. Thus, during 

the war against Iraq (2003), the United States used a 

constellation of 50-59 military satellites, 28 global positioning system satellites and a large number of commercial satellite communications and remote earthsensing satellites in orbit. More than 1,000 combat 

aircraft were used to deliver massive air strikes. From 

March 20 to April 10, 2003, alone, they flew some 

33,000 combat sorties, including 15,000 in support of 

the coalition forces’ ground operation that followed.

Third, the spatial characteristics of warfare have 

expanded, since the increasing reach of current and future weapons allows powerful strikes to be delivered 

over the entire depth of the warring states’ territory, 

with targets being hit not only consecutively but also 

simultaneously, which means that any region of the 

world may become a theatre of operations. All clashes 

and battles thus become dispersed, voluminous in nature, and cover warfare over all its dimensions; front, 

depth, and height.

Fourth, even greater importance in the wars of 

the 21st century has been accorded to the information component of warfare. This is because the troops 

are equipped with highly effective weapons systems 

based on the extensive use of information technology, 

as well as high-performance reconnaissance, communications, navigation, automated command and 
33

control, electronic warfare, and other systems. In this 

context, achieving information superiority over the 

enemy becomes one of the basic conditions for the 

success of military operations. The role of information 

warfare in future wars increases accordingly.

Fifth, the temporal parameters of warfare have 

become “compressed” because of an increase in the 

rapidity of hostilities due to the fact that the collection, 

processing, and use of information about the enemy 

and the friendly troops is carried out in real or nearreal time. The initial period of the wars of the future 

could become the main and decisive one, as the initiator of the war (the aggressor), especially one having 

technological superiority, will seek, with lightning 

speed and as soon as possible, to achieve its militarypolitical objectives.

Sixth, highly maneuverable, mobile action by the 

troops with the use of all spheres of warfare and the 

need to preempt the enemy in combat (operations) 

dictate the transition from strictly vertical command 

and control linkages to global network-based automated command and control and weapons systems. 

This kind of transition involves setting up a unified 

information-exchange network linking decisionmakers and forces that ensures the necessary information 

about the situation is quickly brought to the attention 

of combatants, both superior and subordinate command and control agencies and neighbors on a “manyto-many” basis. In practice, the process of command 

and control over forces and systems is accelerated. 

The tempo of operations, the effectiveness with which 

the enemy is engaged, the survivability of the friendly 

forces, and the level of self-synchronization during 

warfare are also increased.
34

It should be noted that some military theorists 

(mostly supporters of the idea of so-called “contactless wars”) who do not properly evaluate the trends 

outlined earlier increasingly have begun to claim a 

reduction in the role of the land forces, which, in their 

opinion, will in the wars of the future decide only 

auxiliary tasks. In my view, these assertions are absolutely groundless. Of course, if the purpose of military 

action is to force the government of the opponent to 

accept an externally imposed political solution, as was 

the case, for example, in Iraq (1991) and Yugoslavia 

(1999), its achievement will sometimes be possible if 

it is limited to massive missile and air strikes, even 

then provided that government has no answer to it: 

no modern aviation, air defenses, means for delivering powerful retaliatory strikes and so on.

But when the task is to seize or retake territory 

captured by the enemy or to repel a ground invasion 

by superior enemy forces, the land forces will have a 

decisive role. After all, the land forces have been and 

still are the only means to hold and control territory. 

No wonder they say that no territory can be considered conquered or liberated when no soldier has set 

foot on it. This was eloquently demonstrated by the 

experience of the antiterrorist operation in the North 

Caucasus and the operation to compel Georgia to 

make peace, during which it was simply impossible 

to achieve goals only through missile and air strikes, 

without immediate, active, and decisive action by the 

land forces. Certainly, in the course of modern wars 

and armed conflicts, there will occur independent, 

quite long stages in the warfare between the sides, the 

main focus of which will be to deliver preemptive, retaliatory, or launch-on-warning massive missile and 

air strikes and to wage electronic and other types of 

warfare over the entire depth of the enemy’s territory. 
35

The land forces, however, will take a very active 

part in this, as they also are armed with long-range 

high-precision weapons effective against the enemy in 

a way that does not require it to be engaged in close-in 

combat. They are missile systems, air defense missile 

systems, multiple-launch rocket systems, long-range 

artillery guns that can fire precision-guided munitions, 

anti-tank guided missiles, and electronic warfare systems, the quantity of which in the nomenclature of armament in the land forces has been growing steadily. 

Therefore, this is not about the reduction of the role of 

the land forces in modern warfare, but about the need 

to increase the share of advanced high-performance 

long-range high-precision weapons and “smart weapons” in the nomenclature of their armament, and that 

is one of the priorities in their development at this 

stage. The fact that the role of the land forces has not 

been reduced is in particular borne out by the new 

Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, which defines the main tasks of the armed forces in relation to 

the military security of the state. Analysis shows that 

success in the accomplishment of the vast majority of 

them can be achieved with the dominant role of the 

land forces. First and foremost, this is:

• protection of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and inviolability of the territory of the Russian Federation;

• containment and prevention of military

conflicts;

• preparation and conduct of operations to repel

an enemy ground invasion, defeat the troops 

or forces of the aggressor, and force it to cease 

hostilities on favorable terms;

• prevention, containment, and resolution of

cross-border and internal armed conflicts;

• the fight against terrorism;
36

• maintenance of martial law or state of emergency; preparation and conduct of territorial 

defense;

• forming up, preparing and dispatching strategic reserves to their destination;

• support for strategic regroupings of troops;

• replacement of losses;

• security and peacekeeping operations (or operations to restore peace/security); and,

• measures to prevent or eliminate a threat to

peace, suppression of acts of aggression, or 

breach of peace on the basis of United Nations 

Security Council resolutions, and many others.

Besides this, the military formations of the Russian 

land forces now constitute the basis of the Collective 

Rapid Reaction Forces, established under the Collective Security Treaty Organization, and are always on 

standby to honor Russia’s allied commitments in accordance with international treaties. Therefore, we are 

convinced that in the foreseeable future the land forces will retain a key role in ensuring Russia’s military 

security, as their military formations will continue to 

form the basis of groups of troops and forces in strategic sectors. In these cases, the structure, equipment 

and level of training of the land forces must ensure 

their capability to conduct successfully active warfare under any scenario for the outbreak of wars and 

armed conflicts with any possible adversary, be it the 

regular army of one of the world’s most developed 

nations or irregular forces from international terrorist 

organizations.

In order for the land forces fully to suit their purpose, as well as for them to be able to deal with the 

trends that emerge in the changing nature and content 
37

of warfare in the long term, a wide range of activities 

are currently under way aimed at their construction 

and development. The aim of these transformations 

is to create fundamentally new highly mobile formations, military units, and command and control agencies in an efficient structure of organization and establishment, equipped with modern weapons, military 

and special equipment, highly field-trained and able, 

in collaboration with the forces and formations of 

other armed services and service arms in the Russian 

Federation armed forces, to guarantee the accomplishment of the mission to ensure the military security of 

the state.

To date, much has already been done, particularly 

concerning improving the structure of the land forces:

• permanent-readiness brigades have replaced

divisions;

• a more streamlined three-tier command and

control system (military district, operational 

command, brigade) has been adopted;

• the network of military educational institutions 

has been optimized;

• a mixed system of manning (contract personnel

and conscripts) has been adopted; and,

• the training of professional noncommissioned

officers has been organized.

Much is still being done, especially regarding the 

re-equipment of the land forces’ formations and units 

with modern models of weapons, military, and special equipment as part of the State Armaments Program for 2011-20, the training of personnel to operate them, improving the processes of command and 

control as a unified automated command and control 

system for the troops and weapons at the tactical level 
38

enters service, raising the effectiveness and quality of 

combat training, and the search for advanced forms 

and methods of warfare.

The most important focus is now on the development of an operational and tactical-level reconnaissance system, providing a comprehensive view of 

the entire zone of imminent hostilities over the entire 

combat-mission depth (within weapons range) in any 

situation using intelligence from space and air reconnaissance systems. The main way to increase the effectiveness of reconnaissance is, in our opinion, for 

the combined-arms formations to be equipped with 

unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) systems. They must 

be highly survivable, mobile, multifunctional, capable 

of helicopter-like flight patterns (vertical takeoff and 

landing, hover), and of day-and-night and all-weather 

use from unprepared sites or directly from the transporter vehicle. Meanwhile, the equipment mounted 

on a UAV must enable the necessary information 

about the enemy to be obtained quickly, in real-time 

or near-real-time, with the indication of the exact coordinates of targets in the dynamic, rapidly changing 

environment of modern combined-arms combat. The 

effectiveness of UAV use can be maximized if they 

are on the combat strength of combined-arms formations in the land forces (formations in the service 

arms and special troops of the land forces). As they 

independently control the UAV, combined-arms commanders can bypass intermediate instances to obtain 

the intelligence they need directly from it and quickly 

put it to use in order to achieve their combat objectives. Another important aspect is to build an effective 

command and control system on the basis primarily 

of a unified automated command and control system 

for the tactical level to integrate the functions of com-
39

mand, control, reconnaissance, communications and 

navigation. Its implementation should improve the 

combat effectiveness of the formations and units by 

not less than 50 percent, as the complete information 

picture of the battlefield is formed for the appropriate 

commanders in real time, as the command and control cycle is shortened by a factor of two to three, and 

the level of automation is brought to that of a single 

soldier or weapon.

It is impossible to improve the effectiveness of 

the command and control system without improving communications, to make them high-speed, highbandwidth, stable, reliable and secure. These kinds of 

systems should be designed based on digital signal 

processing techniques using modern technology. In 

the process, it is important to achieve a significant increase in uptime and reduce the weight and size of radio systems, as well as to develop them with possible 

interservice application in mind. Navigation support 

of warfare is equally important in the present-day environment. It should be developed both based on the 

earliest introduction of the GLONASS (global navigation satellite) system and the provision of the land 

forces with associated onboard and wearable receivers, and through the development of other reliable 

autonomous sources that can highly accurately determine the current location of objects.

It is impossible to counter the enemy as it organizes command and control and the interaction of its firepower and reconnaissance assets in a single information and telecommunications environment, without 

widespread use of electronic warfare. The main focus 

in this aspect should be on the development of operational and tactical-level systems that provide for the 

guaranteed accomplishment of objectives such as the 

jamming of enemy reconnaissance and target indica-
40

tion radar systems, both ground-based and air-based, 

and its latest digital communications and information 

exchange systems, as well as robust electronic defense 

for our own troops. 

Moreover, even now it is advisable to make an effort to develop advanced electronic weapons—electronic warfare systems based on new physical principles. Integrated development of reconnaissance, 

communications, navigation, identification and electronic warfare systems and their deep integration on 

the basis of automated command and control systems 

will allow, in the opinion of experts, a unified system 

of intelligence and information support for the land 

forces to be created, which will significantly improve 

the effectiveness of combat operations in an information warfare environment. As for firepower, the fact is 

that, as mentioned earlier, the aim of their development 

should be to equip the land forces with highly efficient, long-range high-precision weapons and ammunition that make for dependable firepower to engage 

the enemy deep in the zones for which the groups of 

forces or troops are responsible in a strategic direction 

up to 500-km; at the level of operational commands 

between 150-170-km; and at brigade level 50-70-km. 

Along with this, due attention should be given to improving the rate of fire of rocket and artillery systems, 

the yield and armor piercing capability of ammunition, the working conditions of crews, survivability, 

automation of processes to prepare for fire and to fire, 

and the capability quickly to replenish ammunition. 

The saturation of the land forces with high-precision 

weapons that are used in a single reconnaissance and 

information environment will allow combined-arms 

formations in the future to act as reconnaissance and 

strike systems that provide the capability to gain and 
41

maintain information and fire superiority over the enemy in a timely fashion, and, under favorable conditions, its defeat in the initial or subsequent phases of 

military conflict on any scale. 

It follows from this that the main requirement for 

the development and production of weapons and 

military equipment for the land forces is to provide not 

just separate, albeit very effective, models but complete 

functional systems which, along with weapons systems, include appropriate support systems: reconnaissance, communications, navigation, automated 

command and control, camouflage and concealment, 

electronic and information warfare, integrated protection, identification and others, up to and including training simulators. In our view, only this approach will be able to bring the level of equipment 

in the land forces to a whole new level, to match 

the nature and content of modern warfare. Thus, 

the land forces continue to play a significant role in 

Russia’s military security. The ongoing set of activities aimed at their development should lead to a substantial increase in the combat capabilities of military 

formations and the development of advanced forms 

and methods of warfare.

The earth’s surface is still the main sphere of human activity today and will be for the foreseeable 

future. Military conflicts arise as a rule because of 

“earthly” problems: territorial disputes; striving to 

gain control over natural resources; redistribution 

of spheres of influence; or political, ideological, religious, and other differences. Given the vastness of 

Russia and the length of its land borders, it is obvious 

that it is simply impossible to safeguard the defense 

capability of the Russian state without extensive use 

of the land forces. They are a versatile and multifunc-
42

tional armed service of the armed forces; their military 

formations are able to take control of areas and lines 

of defense and hold them for a long time in order to 

consolidate their success definitively. That is to say, as 

“territorial presence” forces, the land forces continue 

to play a decisive role in the defeat of the enemy and 

the achievement of the objectives of military action 

even under today’s new conditions. Yes, they do it 

in cooperation with other armed services and service 

arms of the armed forces, but other armed services 

and service arms of the armed forces tend to act in the 

interests of the land forces.

ENDNOTE - DEVELOPMENT PROSPECTS 

FOR LAND FORCES

1. “Федеральный закон Российской Федерации от 28 

декабря 2010 г. N 390-ФЗ “О безопасности’” (Federal Law of the 

Russian Federation No. 390-FZ of December 28, 2010), available at 

www.rg.ru/2010/12/29/bezopasnost-dok.html.
43

DEVELOPMENT PROSPECTS FOR 

LAND FORCES

APPENDIX

VIEWS OF FOREIGN MILITARY ANALYSTS

The American commanders have in recent years 

significantly re-evaluated the role of the land forces 

in any future war and consider them one of the most 

important armed services of the armed forces, as only 

they can close in with the enemy and engage it in combat or an operation, and capture and hold important 

strategic areas. Therefore, all-sided action is being 

taken to enhance their combat capabilities, firepower 

and strike capability, and mobility and maneuverability on the battlefield, for which they are being supplied with the most advanced weapons and military 

equipment, the structure of their formations is being 

improved, and new principles of their operational use 

are being developed. 

The U.S. command attaches special importance to 

helicopter gunships, intended to engage mobile armored targets, especially tanks. Serious attention is 

being accorded to the modernization of anti-tank helicopter subunits as part of the U.S. Army in Europe. 

In the experience of military exercises, helicopters can 

destroy tanks from low altitude at ranges of up to 5 

kilometers (km), with a ratio of up to 15:1 between 

tanks and helicopters destroyed. According to foreign 

experts, at this ratio of losses the available quantity of 

American helicopter gunships in Europe is, it is said, 

equivalent to having 3,500 tanks. 

In the view of the leading American experts from 

the Strategic Studies Institute at the U.S. Army War 

College, in the 21st century the land forces have an 
44

important place in the structure of the armed forces. Studies by the combat training command of this 

armed service under the special project “Land Forces 

of the Future” have four main elements: the likely 

geopolitical changes and realities, the behavior of people and organizations, the development of the art of 

war, and the impact of technological progress. Experts 

believe that the main goal of the United States, which 

is the only nation involved in nearly all of the affairs of 

other nations throughout the globe, is to get the most 

out of peaceful coexistence and to minimize periods 

of armed conflict. In the opinion of the American 

leadership, a key role in bringing this about belongs 

to the Army, whose further development is grounded on a number of external and internal factors. The 

former include:

• weapons of mass destruction and high-tech

proliferation, which increase the potential of 

ambitious leaders and groups;

• the use of terrorism by states to achieve national objectives;

• an increase in the number of transnational challenges and the growing integration of the international community;

• the cyclical nature of development, with alternating periods of violence and relative 

stability;

• the general instability of the situation in the

medium-development and underdeveloped 

countries, aggravated by possible tensions between highly developed nations; and,

• the formation, under the influence of growing 

international integration, of different communities and national enclaves within states, that 

will require extra efforts in order to secure their 

support for U.S. military action.
45

The internal factors that will affect the development of the land forces, according to U.S. experts, 

include the following:

• changing attitudes among the American public

to threats to U.S. national interests as much reduced and insignificant; and,

• the negative attitude of the political leaders and

public opinion to lengthy or costly military operations except when U.S. national interests are 

under threat.

According to American experts, several problems 

will have to be solved in order to select the optimal 

strategy for the development of the land forces in 

view of the factors noted earlier. First, the modernization strategy to be chosen will have to be of the kind 

that will minimize the risks associated with a variety 

of threats. This implies that if the international situation is relatively favorable, the land forces will be able 

to expend a minimum amount of resources on longterm modernization and development. If, on the other 

hand, the world will be dominated by conflicts, the 

United States should focus on rapid development and 

modernization of its land forces. The country’s current 

strategy should, according to analysts, be adjusted 

somewhat to reflect the threats likely to occur soon.

Second, the combat effectiveness of the land forces needs to be maximized, as they remain relatively 

small in number and have to perform major largescale tasks. One way to increase their effectiveness is 

to form international coalitions. Another is through 

the introduction of new technologies. The latter assumes greater return, but also requires significant 

financial investment. In addition, as noted by military experts, staking on the widespread use of tech-
46

nological innovations is fraught with negative consequences. In particular, it can lead to existing high-cost 

technology being prematurely retired. It is also possible that the probable adversary could find cheaper 

countermeasures.

Third, the land forces will have to decide whether 

the conduct of war is their sole function or just one of 

many (albeit the most important). The boundaries that 

have been drawn historically for the use of the army 

could be expanded as the concept of national security 

changes. Today, it includes the protection of national 

assets and information systems, the environment and 

public health. The view of American researchers, 

however, is that it is necessary for the leadership of 

the land forces to decide whether to take on new tasks 

or to focus on one or two of them and to delegate the 

rest to other agencies.

Fourth, the further development of the land forces 

requires public support, which will allow funding to 

continue at the appropriate level, as well as the required number of personnel to be maintained. In this 

context, the command will have to constantly and 

persistently explain the importance of the land forces 

and their role in curbing violence, protection from 

aggression, support for allies and friendly countries, 

and help in the elimination of armed conflicts. The 

strategic assessment of the role of the land forces until 2020 is that, most probably, the land forces will be 

involved in action in the event of regional conflicts, 

provide humanitarian assistance, and participate in 

the fight against terrorism and guerrilla groups in urban and rural areas. They can also be used in combat 

operations in the coastal zone and in the defense of the 

continental United States.
47

The view of U.S. military theorists is that the land 

forces of the 21st century should differ significantly 

from the army of the 1980s and early-1990s, primarily 

as a number of technical innovations, mainly in the 

sphere of information technology, will enter service. 

These forces will be a more flexible strategic force capable of winning a decisive victory on the battlefield 

as they maneuver and deliver effective and accurate 

fire. In the first half of the 21st century, U.S. Army 

formations and units will continue to be stationed 

in Korea, Japan, and Western Europe, although their 

numerical strength may be reduced. Improvements to 

the structure of organization and establishment also 

assume changes to the ratio of the active and reserve 

components of the land forces.

Two options are being proposed:

1. the first is to retain only the powerful combat 

units as active and to move secondary units to the 

reserve; and,

2. the second is to move the major combat units 

to the reserve and to include forces more suited to 

modern conditions for the use of military force (operations during local military conflicts) in the active 

component.

Currently, the U.S. land forces are in the process of 

evolutionary development, as they are saturated with 

computer and information technologies. The army of 

the “day after tomorrow,” which should emerge in the 

21st century as a result of a “revolution in military affairs,” will be a qualitatively new formation. The land 

forces of the “day after tomorrow” are most likely to 

be composed of this kind of numerically small units 

and formations capable of quick redeployment from 

one point of the globe to another in order to deliver 
48

short-duration and pinpoint strikes without bulky 

combat support. A small number of larger subunits 

will remain for peacekeeping operations.
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General William E. Rapp

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

and

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE PRESS

Director

Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Director of Research

Dr. Steven K. Metz

Authors

Major General Alexsandr V. Rogovoy

Mr. Keir Giles

Editor for Production

Dr. James G. Pierce

Publications Assistant

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

*****

Composition

Mrs. Jennifer E. Nevil