COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Bray, Annunziata and Overton 

GLADYS PHYLLIS ROSE SHELTON 

v. Record No. 1498-95-2 MEMORANDUM OPINION*

 PER CURIAM 

UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA NOVEMBER 7, 1995 

AND 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION 

 (Norman Lamson, on briefs), for appellant. 

 (James S. Gilmore, III, Attorney General; Rita 

M. Sampson, Assistant Attorney General; Donald 

G. Powers, Assistant Attorney General, on 

brief), for appellees. 

 Gladys Phyllis Rose Shelton ("claimant") appeals a decision 

of the Workers' Compensation Commission denying her application 

filed on February 27, 1995 alleging a change in condition 

beginning October 1, 1994. Specifically, claimant contends that 

the commission erred in ruling that she did not file her 

application before the expiration of the twenty-four month 

limitations period contained in Code § 65.2-708(A). Finding no 

error, we affirm.1

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 

 1Claimant's Motion to Strike Appellees' Brief on the ground 

that appellees cited unpublished opinions of this Court is 

without merit and is denied. 

 Claimant sustained a compensable injury by accident on 

March 5, 1991. University of Virginia and Commonwealth of 
 2 

Virginia (collectively referred to as "employer") paid claimant 

temporary total disability benefits from March 23, 1991 to March 

24, 1991 and from March 26, 1991 to March 28, 1991. On April 20, 

1992, claimant filed her first change in condition application. 

On March 23, 1993, the commission awarded claimant temporary 

total disability benefits for the period from March 26, 1992 

through May 5, 1992, and ten weeks of permanent partial 

disability benefits for the period from May 6, 1992 through July 

15, 1992. The commission ordered employer to pay all benefits 

owed to claimant pursuant to the March 23, 1993 award in a lump 

sum. Employer paid the lump sum award to claimant in two checks 

dated March 23, 1993, which claimant received on March 31, 1993. 

 On February 27, 1995, claimant filed her second change in 

condition application alleging she once again became disabled 

from working on October 1, 1994. 

 On March 2, 1995, an assistant claims examiner denied 

claimant's application on the ground that it was filed more than 

twenty-four months after July 15, 1992, the last day for which 

compensation was paid pursuant to the March 23, 1993 award. The 

full commission affirmed the claims examiner's rejection of 

claimant's application. 

 Claimant argues that the correct limitations period 

applicable to her claim is twenty-four months from either March 

23, 1993, the date of employer's checks representing the lump sum 

payments, or March 31, 1993, the date she actually received the 
 3 

lump sum payments from employer. 

 "[T]he Commission's construction of the [Worker's 

Compensation] Act is entitled to great weight on appeal . . . ." 

City of Waynesboro v. Harter, 1 Va. App. 265, 269, 337 S.E.2d 

901, 903 (1985). Moreover, 

 "[t]he right to compensation under the 

workmen's compensation law is granted by 

statute, and in giving the right the 

legislature had full power to prescribe the 

time and manner of its exercise. When the 

legislature has spoken plainly it is not the 

function of courts to change or amend its 

enactments under the guise of construing 

them. The province of construction lies 

wholly within the domain of ambiguity, and 

that which is plain needs no interpretation." 

Dan River, Inc. v. Adkins, 3 Va. App. 320, 328, 349 S.E.2d 667, 

671 (1986) (quoting Winston v. City of Richmond, 196 Va. 403, 

407-08, 83 S.E.2d 728, 731 (1954)). 

 Code § 65.2-708(A) plainly and unambiguously provides that 

an award shall not be reviewed "after twenty-four months from the 

last day for which compensation was paid," not twenty-four months 

from the last day on which compensation was received. Based upon 

this plain language, we cannot say that the commission erred in 

construing Code § 65.2-708(A) to find that the twenty-four months 

limitations period expired on July 15, 1994. Because claimant 

filed her application after July 15, 1994, the commission did not 

err in dismissing her application. 

 For the reasons stated, we affirm the commission's decision. 

 Affirmed.